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1. NO, the NLRC did not act in excess of jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion. Ratio Findings of fact of administrative bodies and quasi-judicial bodies are afforded great respect by the Court and are binding except when there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or the decision was arrived at arbitrarily. Reasoning - Respondents showed that their monthly take home pay amounted to no less than $240 and this was not disputed by petitioners. - There is no record or evidence which shows that the closure of the taxi business was brought about by great financial losses no thanks to the Pinatubo eruption. It was rather brought about by the closure of the military bases. - Art. 283 of the CC provides that separation pay shall be equivalent to 1 month pay or at least ½ month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. The NLRC ruling was correct in terms of US$120 as the computed separation pay. 2. Petitioners can no longer question the authority of NOWM and are held in estoppel. Reasoning - NOWM was already representing the respondents before the labor arbiter and the petitioners did not assail their juridical personality then. - Petitioners also acknowledged before the Court that the taxi drivers are themselves parties in the case. 3. Naguiat Enterprises is not liable, Antolin Naguiat is not personally liable whereas Sergio Naguiat is solidarily liable. - Re: Naguiat Enterprises’ liability Reasoning - The respondents were regular employees of CFTI who received wages on a boundary basis. They offered no evidence that Naguiat Enterprises managed, supervised and controlled their employment. They instead submitted documents which had to do with CFTI, not Naguiat Enterprises. - Labor-only contractors are those where 1) the person supplying workers to the employer does no have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools or machinery and 2) the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of the employer. - Independent contractors are those who exercise independent employment, contracting to do a piece of work according to their own methods without being subject to the control of their employer except as to the result of their work. - Sergio Naguiat was a stockholder and director of Naguiat Enterprises but, in supervising the taxi drivers

INTRODUCTION
NAGUIAT V NLRC (National Organization of Workingmen and Galang) 269 SCRA 565 PANGANIBAN; March 13, 1997
NATURE Special civil action in the Supreme Court, certiorari FACTS - Clark Field Taxi, Inc. held a concessionaire’s contract with the Army Air Force Exchange Services for the operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base. Sergio Naguiat was the president of CFTI while Antolin Naguiat was its vice president. Like Naguiat Enterprises, Inc. which was a trading firm, it was also a family-owned corporation. - Respondents were employed by the CFTI as taxicab drivers. > They were required to pay a daily boundary fee of US$26.50 (for those on duty from 1AM-12N) or US$27 (for those on duty from 12N to 12 MN) > Incidental expenses were maintained by the drivers (including gasoline expenses). > Drivers worked 3-4 times a week depending on the availability of vehicles and earned no less than US$15.00 a day. In excess of that amount, they had to make cash deposits to the company which they could withdraw every fifteen days. - AAFES was dissolved because of the phase-out of the military bases in Clark and the services of the respondents were officially terminated on November 26, 1991. - AAFES Taxi Drivers Association, the drivers union, and CFTI held negotiations as regards separation benefits. They arrived at an agreement that the separated drivers would be given P500 for ever year as severance pay. Most of the drivers accepted this but some refused to do so. - Those who did not accept the initial severance pay disaffiliated themselves with drivers union and through the National Organization of Workingmen, they filed a complaint against Sergio Naguiat under the name and style Naguiat Enterprises, AAFES and AAFES union. - The labor arbiter ordered the petitioner to pay the drivers P1,200 for every year of service for humanitarian consideration, setting aside the earlier agreement between the CFTI and the drivers union. It

also rejected the idea that the CFTI was forced to close it business due to great financial losses and lose opportunity since at the time of its closure it was profitably earning. The labor arbiter however did not award separation pay because to “impose a monetary obligation to an employer whose profitable business was abruptly shot (sic) shot down by force majeur would be unfair and unjust.” - The NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter after respondents appealed by granting separation pay to the private respondents. It said that half of the monthly salary should be US$120 which should be paid in Philippine pesos. Naguiat Enterprieses should be joined with Sergio and Antolin Naguiat as jointly and severally liable. Petitioners’ Claim: - Petitioners claim that the cessation of the business was due to the great financial losses and lost business opportunity when Clark Air Base was phased out due to the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement and the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. - They admitted that CFTI had agreed with the drivers union to grant the taxi drivers separation pay equivalent to P500 for every year of service. - They allege that Sergio and Antolin Naguiat were denied due process beause the petitioners were not furnished copies of the appeal to the NLRC. - They also allege that NOWM cannot make legal representation in behalf of the respondents because the latter should be bound by the decision of the drivers union. Respondents’ Comments: - The drivers alleged that they were employees of Naguiat Enterprises although their individual applications were approved by CFTI. They claimed to have been assigned to Naguiat Enterprises after having been hired by CFTO and that Naguia Enterprises managed, controlled and supervised their employment. - They averred that they should be entitled to separation pay based on their latest daily earnings or US$15 for working 16 days a month. ISSUES 1. WON the NLRC acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in granting separation pay 2. WON NOWM was authorized to represent the private respondents 3. WON Naguiat Enterprieses, Sergio Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat were liable 4. WON Sergio and Antolin Naguiat were denied due process HELD

torts & damages
and determining their employment terms, he was carrying out his responsibility as president of CFTI. - Naguiat Enterprises was in the trading business while CFTI was in the taxi business. - The Constitution of the CFTI-AAFES Taxi Drivers Association states that the members of the union are employees of CFTI and for collective and bargaining purposes, the employer is also CFTI. - Re: Antolin Naguiat’s liability Reasoning - Although he carried the title of general manager, it has not been shown that he had acted in such capacity. - No evidence on the extent of his participation in the management or operation of the business was proferred. - Re: Sergio Naguiat’s liability Ratio A director or officer may be held solidarly liable with a corporation by a specific provision of law because a corporation, being a juridical entity, may act only through its directors and officers. Obligations incurred by them, acting as such corporation agents, are not theirs but the direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent. In the absence of definite proof of who clearly are the officers of the corporation, the assumption falls on the President of the corporation. Reasoning - In his capacity as President, Sergio Naguiat cannot be exonerated. - An employer is defined to be any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. - Case in point is A.C. Ransom Labor Union CCLU vs. NLRC held that the identified employer A.C. Ransom Corporation, being an artificial person, must have an officer and in the absence of proof, the president is assumed to be the head of the corporation. - Both CFTI and Naguiat Enterprises were close family corporations owned by the same family. To the extent that stockholders are actively engaged in the management or business affairs of a close corporation, the stockholders shall be held to strict fiduciary duties to each other and among themselves. Said stockholders shall be liable for corporate torts unless the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance. > Nothing in the records indicate that CFTI obtained reasonable adequate liability insurance. > Jurisprudence is wanting in the definition of corporate tort. Tort essentially consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Tort is a breach of legal duty. > Art. 238 mandates the employer to grant separation pay to employees in case of cessation of operations or closure of the business not due to

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directly responsible under A1903CC as employer of Fontanilla HELD YES - There are two actions available for parents of Garcia. One is under the A100RPC wherein the employer is only subsidiarily liable for the damages arising from the crime thereby first exhausting the properties of Fontanilla. The other action is under A1903CC (quasidelict or culpa aquiliana) wherein as the negligent employer of Fontanilla, Barredo is held primarily liable subject to proving that he exercising diligence of a good father of the family. The parents simply took the action under the Civil Code as it is more practical to get damages from the employer bec he has more money to give than Fontanilla who is yet to serve his sentence. Obiter Difference bet Crime and Quasi-delict 1) crimes – public interest; quasi-delict – only private interest 2) Penal code punishes or corrects criminal acts; Civil Code by means of indemnification merely repairs the damage 3) delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts; crimes are only punished if there is a penal law; quasi-delicts include any kind of fault or negligence intervenes NOTE: not all violations of penal law produce civil responsibility e.g. contravention of ordinances, violation of game laws, infraction of rules of traffic when nobody is hurt 4) crime – guilt beyond reasonable doubt; civil – mere preponderance of evidence - Presumptions: 1) injury is caused by servant or employee, there instantly arises presumption of negligence of master or employer in selection, in supervision or both 2) presumption is juris tantum not juris et de jure TF may be rebutted by proving exercise of diligence of a good father of the family - basis of civil law liability: not respondent superior bu the relationship of pater familias - motor accidents – need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles

serious business losses or financial reverses which is the condition on this case. 4. There was no denial of due process. Reasoning - Even if the individual Naguiats were not impleaded as parties of the complaint, they could still be held liable because of jurisprudence (A.C. Ransom case). - Both also voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter when they filed a position paper. DISPOSITION The petition is partly granted. 1) CFTI and Sergio Naguiat are ordered to pay jointly and severally the individual respondents of US$120 for every year of service and 2) Naguiat Enterprises and Antolin Naguiat are absolved from liability.

BARREDO V GARCIA BOCOBO; July 8, 1942
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - from CA, holding Fausto Barredo liable for damages for death pf Faustino Garcia caused by negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by Fausto Barredo - May 3, 1936 – in road between Malabon and Navotas, head-on collision between taxi of Malate Taxicab and carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis thereby causing overturning of the carretela and the eventual death of Garcia, 16-yo boy and one of the passengers - Fontanilla convicted in CFI and affirmed by CA and separate civil action is reserved - Parents of Garcia filed action against Barredo as sole proprietor of Malate Taxicab as employer of Fontanilla - CFI and CA awarded damages bec Fontanilla’s negligence apparent as he was driving on the wrong side of the road and at a high speed > no proof he exercised diligence of a good father of the family as Barredo is careless in employing (selection and supervision) Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of Automobile Law and speeding > CA applied A1903CC that makes inapplicable civil liability arising from crime bec this is under obligations arising from wrongful act or negligent acts or omissions punishable by law - Barredo’s defense is that his liability rests on RPC TF liability only subsidiary and bec no civil action against Fontanilla TF he too cannot be held responsible ISSUE WON parents of Garcia may bring separate civil action against Barredo making him primarily liable and

ELCANO V HILL 77 SCRA 98 BARREDO; May 26, 1977
NATURE Appeal from an order of the CFI Quezon City FACTS

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- Reginald Hill, a minor yet married at the time of occurrence, was criminally prosecuted for the killing of Agapito Elcano (son of Pedro), and was acquitted for “lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.” - Pedro Elcano filed a complaint for recovery of damages from Reginald and his father Atty Marvin. CFI dismissed it. ISSUES 1. WON the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability was not reversed 2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last par) of the CC can be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the occurrence, Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married HELD 1. NO -The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him. -Barredo v Garcia (dual character—civil and criminal — of fault or negligence as a source of obligation): "The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued." "It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1402 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case aria for which, after un a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.” -Culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of a penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. -ART 1162: "Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of

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- Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. 2. YES (but…) - Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. (However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.) - While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he was of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian." - Under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." - In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual. - It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. - On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.

this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, Article 2177 of the new code provides: "ART 277. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising front negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant." - According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a 'culpa aquilian' or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and 'culpa extracontractual' or 'cuasi-delito' has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery," - Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth life" rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that me preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 12) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it’s "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress", to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. - Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.

CINCO V CANONOY 90 SCRA 369

Reasoning . she sustained injuries.Liability being predicated on quasi-delict. a criminal case was filed against the driver Romeo Hilot arising from the same accident. . contending that the trial court erred in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and in ordering him to pay moral damages.. that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals. residing in Dagupan. admitting only the personal circumstances of the parties in the complaint but denied the rest of the allegations.000 pesos atty’s. JR.torts & damages Melencio-Herrera.The City Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the civil case. He . and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. of good moral character and respected reputation in her community. It makes no distinction between “damage to persons” on the one hand and “damage to property” on the other.Respondent CA promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto the trial court’s ruling which prompted Baksh to file this petition for certiorari. may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case. 1979 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . .The RTC.000 as moral damages plus misc. . **MG’s allegations in the complaint: .Where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress. She prayed for payment for damages amounting to Php 45. old Filipina. which in turn dismissed the petition.At the pre-trial in the civil case.They observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.it was the fault r negligence of the driver in the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision.The separate and independent civil action for quasidelict is also clearly recognized in sec 2.There was a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private respondents. Petitioner appealed this decision to respondent CA. single. . proof that he had. And with respect to “harm” it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since “harm” is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. petitioner started maltreating her even threatening to kill her and as a result of such maltreatment. provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Feb. he elevated the matter on Certiorari to the CFI Cebu. The word damage is used in two concepts: the “harm” done and “reparation” for the harm done. counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit. They later agreed to get married at the end of the school semester. is so broad that in includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. and is an exchange student taking up medicine at the Lyceum in Dagupan.That Baksh later courted and proposed to marry her. . 1993 NATURE Appeal by certiorari to review and set aside the CA decision which affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision FACTS . . . 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code f the Philippines.000 as moral damages and 3. 32. – In the cases prvided for in Articles 31. .000 plus additional costs. It is essential however. A day before the filing of the complaint.. could justify the award of damages pursuant to Art. A week before the filing of the complaint. DISPOSITION Writ of Certiorari granted.Cinco filed on Feb 25.Damages were sustained by petitioner because of the collision . fees plus litigation expenses. good customs or public policy. YES Ratio In a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. 33. He also prayed for 25. Plaintiff’s claims: . May 31. casis claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married. neither sought the consent of her parents nor forced her to live in his apt.Private respondent Marilou Gonzales (MG) filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. 21 applies to this case. etc. as specifically provided for in Art 2177 of the Civil Code. particularly of Romeo Hilot. did not maltreat her but only told her to stop coming to his place after having discovered that she stole his money and passport. Respondents’ Comments: . and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. applying Art.That Baksh is an Iranian citizen. Petitioner was thus ordered to pay Php 20. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court: Sec 2. . Petitioner’s MFR having been denied. Art. ISSUE WON there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action HELD YES . Baksh repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that he is already married to someone in Bacolod. .19. as enunciated in Art 2176 of the Civil Code. MG accepted his love on the condition that they would get married.21 of the Civil Code HELD 1. raising the single issue of WON Art. the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action. 21 CC decided in favor of private respondent.Petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasidelict.Subsequently. Baksh later forced MG to live with him.In the instant case. Independent civil action. in reality. Petitioner had visited MG’s parents to secure their approval of the marriage. . respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise. 19701 a complaint for recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito. . BAKSH V CA (Gonzales) 219 SCRA 115 DAVIDE. expenses. Such civil action shall A2010 -4- prof. no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act.21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. 21 may be applied. an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. ISSUE WON damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Art. The concept of quasi-delict.Baksh answered with a counterclaim. atty’s fees.That she is a 22 yr.

Art. his halfbrother Eduardo Tolentino. Quasi-delict.The trial court found the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. They proceeded to attend a dance but did not stay long because they sensed some hostility from Cesar Galo and his companions who were giving them dagger looks. He handled the fertilizers without gloves.21 fills that vacuum. Raymundo Bangi and Marcial Barid converged at a carinderia owned by Ronnel Tolentino. which included fertilizing his pepper plants with sulfate. Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or value which could alter the result of the case. or can not be proved.000. are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Art. the source of which is urine. He returned home and cleaned his garlic bulbs before retiring at 9:00 o’clock. in the absence of Art.00. which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless. In order to avoid trouble.. the Commission has deemed it necessary. . Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. Robert Cacal. scurried to the side of the road and hid in the ricefield. as the girl is above 18 yrs of age. he busied himself with some chores. warrants for the arrest of Ballesteros. and actual damages in the amount of P35. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes. .21 Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals.755. qualified by treachery. and ordered them to pay jointly and solidarily: 1. Carmelo Agliam. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.2176 CC. “An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: 'A' seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of 'X. not because of lust but because of moral seduction. Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino sustained injuries.' A promise of marriage either has not been made.. the legislator. would have been beyond redress. His younger brother Jerry also managed to jump out.Art.Ballesteros interposed the defense of alibi. He said that he uses his left hand in lighting cigarettes and he had no motive to kill the victims. The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in the amount of P50. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code. Syquia.00. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code.000. from which We quote: “The elimination of this chapter is proposed. . there is no crime. with interest. qualified by treachery. 1991. . the cherished possession of every single Filipina. and that his hand may have been contaminated by a nitrogenous compound. casis . is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent.21. but was shot in the stomach and died. Under the present laws.The group had barely left when their owner jeep was fired upon from the rear.Moreover.The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. DISPOSITION finding no reversible error in the challenged decision. Galo claimed that he did not even talk to Bulusan or any of his companions. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Carmelo Agliam. though the grievous moral wrong has been committed. to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule: “Art. she and her parents would have such a right of action. The girl becomes pregnant. if considered. she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and battery.” . moral damages in the amount of P20. even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury. if the foregoing rule is approved.In his testimony. Vidal Agliam was able to jump out from the jeep and landed just beside it. Therefore.338 of the RPC because the private respondent was above 18 years of age at the time of the seduction. . The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Art. Article 21. Vidal Agliam. Paraffin tests conducted on Galo and Ballesteros produced positive results. Thus. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs.” . is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Thus at one stroke. and although the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage. would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. might affect the result of the case. The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men.torts & damages preparatory to their supposed marriage.00. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which. which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. the private respondent surrendered her virginity. the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying. Bulusan was not tested for nitrates.. Galo attempted to exculpate himself from the results by confessing that he had been a cigarette smoker for the past ten years and had.Bulusan echoed the defense of alibi of Galo and Ballesteros . Having been found with gunpowder residue in his hands.As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report: “But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. they decided to head for home instead of reacting to the perceived provocation of Galo and his companions. unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which. his brother Jerry Agliam. January 29.evening of May 28. Lastly. . which defines a quasi-delict. with certain exceptions. Eduardo Tolentino was not even able to move from his seat and was hit with a bullet which punctured his right kidney which caused his death.2176 CC. **Obiter: on Torts and Quasi-delicts . it is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses. Galo and Bulusan were issued. that he went to a nearby store to purchase some cigarettes. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence. it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo and Vidal Agliam. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. intentional and malicious acts.This notwithstanding.337 or Art.All pleaded not guilty. Art. just consumed eight cigarette sticks prior to the test. the said Code contains a provision. he said that he was not even present at the crime scene . known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana. Ronnel Tolentino.” A2010 -5- prof. . In short. 1998 NATURE An appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs. FACTS . in fact. in the interest of justice. the instant petition is hereby DENIED PEOPLE V BALLESTEROS 285 SCRA 438 ROMERO. especially during the festivity. But under the proposed article. The next morning. false imprisonment and deceit.

000. and actual damages in the total amount of P61. Consistent with the policy of this Court.000. The doubt to the benefit of which an accused is entitled in a criminal trial is a reasonable doubt.003.00. As regards moral damages. may be washed off with tap water. 1982. They were well-armed and approached the homebound victims.00. ISSUES 1. 3. casis court. must be amended. the victim was not in a position to defend himself. . moral damages in the amount of P20. they never attempted to present as witnesses those who could have testified to having seen them elsewhere on the night in question. However. whereas moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has experienced mental anguish. not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime. Sr. physical suffering. on the other hand. 5. Tagig. it is obvious that the accused-appellants had sufficient opportunity to reflect on their heinous plan. he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. The second passageway is about 3m in width. to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. with interest. the same having been fully substantiated by receipts accumulated by them and presented to the CUSTODIO V CA (Heirs Of Mabasa) 253 SCRA 483 REGALADO. Reasoning . Vidal Agliam Jr. method or form of attack employed by him. Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result. urine may leave traces of nitrates. Carmelo and Vidal Agliam both described the area to be well illumined by the moon. The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino. However. and not as compensatory damages. receipts. Carmelo Agliam. loss or injury sustained. Therefore.000. Such path is passing in between the row of houses of defendants.In granting actual or compensatory damages. Defendant Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because there was an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first passageway. we see no reason to disturb its findings as to this matter. This accused-appellants failed to satisfactorily prove. totally unaware of their presence. with interest. the amount of P 50. Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of. damage and injury caused to the heirs of the victims. the accused must prove. the constant interaction between them through the years (in the buying and selling of cattle and Bulusan was a classmate of Vidal) would necessarily lead to familiarity with each other such that. February 9.000... the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right.00 each.40. YES Ratio The requisites of treachery are twofold: (1) (t)hat at the time of the attack. the award of actual damages is proper. Reasonable doubt is that engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and inability..None of them attempted to corroborate their alibi through the testimony of witnesses. actual damages in the amount of P2.When said property was purchased by Mabasa. In fact. Also. DISPOSITION The decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Hence. And it was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. moral damages in the amount of P5. As access to P. 1996 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA FACTS . the claim for actual damages by the heirs of the victims is not controverted. Burgos St.In their testimonies. recompense. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20m distant from Mabasa's residence to P. vouchers. but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Reasoning . serious anxiety. or as otherwise expressed. although inestimable.00 is given to the heirs of the victims by way of indemnity. She also mentioned some other . YES Ratio Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation. Manifestations of their evil designs were already apparent as early as the time of the dance. the victims could distinctly identify their assailants. 2. WON the Court was correct in the award of damages to the heirs of the victims HELD 1. sometime in February. fertilizers and A2010 -6- prof. but these are minimal and.The plaintiff-appellee Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P. In passing thru said passageway. Considering the luminescence of the moon and the proximity between them. at the very least. viz.000. Tipas. a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6m in length. Positive identification prevails over denials and alibis. YES Ratio Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by law to convict a person of a criminal charge. from behind. there were tenants occupying the remises and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. Burgos Street from plaintiff's property. WON the trial court was correct in finding accusedappellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt 2. 4. . unlike those found in gunpowder. The prosecution need not prove motive on the part of the accused when the latter has been positively identified as the author of the crime. or in recompense for. the order granting compensatory damages to the heirs of Jerry Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr. Intent. compensatory damages in the amount of P50. one would have been able to recognize the other easily . may be determined by the trial court in its discretion. Palingon. the amount of psychological pain. Reasoning . not a whimsical or fanciful doubt based on imagined but wholly improbable possibilities and unsupported by evidence. one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises.785. There was no opportunity for the latter to defend themselves 3. is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result. The facts show that the attack was well-planned and not merely a result of the impulsiveness of the offenders. . and the like.That accused-appellants had no motive in perpetrating the offense is irrelevant.00..on the defense of alibi: for the defense of alibi to prosper.00. WON the Court correctly ruled in finding that the offense was qualified by treachery 3. as corroborated by his testimony. has to be traversed. with interest. Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino. the party making a claim for such must present the best evidence available. moral shock and so forth. there are 2 possible passageways. Metro Manila. and had furthermore shown that these were the proximate result of the offender’s wrongful act or omission. and moral damages in the amount of P10. after such investigation. The costs. Burgos St.on their excuses regarding the source of the gunpowder traces found on their hands: Experts confirm the possibility that cigarettes. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway. . and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means. Here. or satisfaction for an injury sustained.torts & damages 2.Here.

[2] Obiter: There is a material distinction between damages and injury. WON CA erred in awarding damages to plaintiffappellee Mabasa HELD 1.N. (b) the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses P8.Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip. or harm which results from the injury. 25) with plate No. upon his own property) in a lawful and proper manner. Garcia. Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital. owners and drivers. YES Ratio There is no cause of action for acts done by one person (in this case. Sindangan.. Pedro Tumala. hired and boarded a PU car with plate No.430 CC). . Inc. FACTS . 4960 of the Municipal Court of Sindangan. and driven by defendant. petitioners. together with his wife. Hence this appeal. Ratio Whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case. German C. CA affirming TC judgment with modification.. . an appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court Reasoning .TC ordered (a) defendant-appellants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access — ingress and egress. hence not contrary to morals. WON the grant of right of way to herein private respondents is proper 2.torts & damages inconveniences of having at the front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows.21 CC) [5] The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners. there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the A2010 -7- prof. that Art. respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right. hospital administrative officers. . of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the collision. 1971. Marcelino Inesin. Garcia. Luminosa L. for a roundtrip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co. damage is the loss. et. to enclose and fence their property (See Art. . and Ester Francisco. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. Garcia. and Ester Francisco. WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint for damages on the ground that since no express reservation was made by the complainants. Zamboanga del Norte. as owners. no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated. dismissing petitioners' action for damages against respondents. and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. and Pedro Tumala. although there was damage. 2. [DATE] NATURE Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental. Some of their footwear were even lost. pursuant to Sec. is not applicable because Art 33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide. and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. P30K as moral damages and P10K as exemplary damages). and driven by respondent. The injury must result from a breach of duty or a legal wrong. German C. respectively. and dismissed the complaint ISSUES 1. Mfr denied. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. to the public street. or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages. 1971. casis bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. [3] In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent.On August 4.At about 9:30 a. petitioners. Thus. As a result of the aforesaid collision. with prayer for preliminary attachment. and . There must be damnum et injuria. as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. the filing of the instant civil action is premature. THE CONCEPT OF QUASIDELICT GARCIA V FLORIDO [CITATION] ANTONIO. Zamboanga del Norte". said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No. .Petitioners are already barred from raising the same. not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver. 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. Al.The lower court sustained Mactan Inc. 77-4 W Z. good customs or public policy.Private respondents. [4] In this case. and.. without other limitations than those established by law. "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan. Zamboanga del Norte. denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 1972. ISSUES 1. for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government hospitals. Garcia. although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another. hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. in a reckless. DISPOSITION The appealed decision of CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the trial court is REINSTATED. went to CA raising the sole issue of WON lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. Contrary to the claim of private respondents. in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police and that. that act must be not only hurtful. et.The principal argument advanced by Mactan Inc. It is within the right of petitioners. grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car. while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan. bookkeeper of said hospital.000 as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. the civil aspect of the criminal case would have to be determined only after the termination of the criminal case result of a violation of a legal duty. al to in a motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11. but wrongful. petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization. because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver. Luminosa L. Inc. 33 of the New Civil Code. there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant. 2850) against the private respondents.m. the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest. petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right (Art. Mactan Transit Co. . The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing. therefore. hurt. Reasoning [1] To warrant the recovery of damages. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners. there was no legal injury. with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case. Ricardo Vayson. and from the order of said Court dated January 21. awarding damages to plaintiffs (P65K as actual damages. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way. Pedro Tumala. 7 at Zamboanga City. guilty of negligence. filed on September 1.

By instituting a civil action based on a quasi-delict. provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately. which means that of the two possible judgments. therefore. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case. "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to . whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering that by the institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case. Inc) . The former is a violation of the criminal law. 2850 is predicated on the above civil code articles and not on the civil liability imposed by the Revised Penal Code. . The proviso. there being no showing that prejudice could be caused by doing so. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31. for these articles were drafted . while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence. having always had its own foundation and individuality.Accordingly. Ratio An action shall be deemed to be based on a quasi-delict when all the essential averments under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present.Article 2176 and 2177 definitely create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code. it is my considered view that the latter provision is inoperative. WON the lower court erred in saying that the action is not based on quasi-delict since the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations and because of the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally liable for moral. an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940. 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles. but it should be noted. Reasoning . 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. casis (Criminal Case No. As to the specific mention of Article 2177 in Section 2 of the Rule 111. This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. in the cases provided for by Articles 31. which is procedural. YES Ratio An action based on quasi-delict may be maintained independently from a criminal action. there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala. 33 and 34 A2010 -8- prof. 33. . 620-621). the injured party is entitled exclusively to the bigger one. . et all (73 Phil. namely: a) act or omission of the private respondents. 2850 should be deemed as the reservation required. it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177. I cannot see why a reservation had to be made in the criminal case.As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in the criminal action. it being substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate. .The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless.As we have stated at the outset. Hence.Besides. may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law. 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code. YES. for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action. and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case. ANDAMO V IAC (Missionaries Of Our Lady Of La Salette. grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract from the nature and character of the action. as one based on culpa aquiliana. subject to the limitation mentioned in the last sentence of Article 2177 of the Civil Code. We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.It is true that under Sec. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court SEPARATE OPINION BARREDO [concur] .It is. b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 2 in relation to Sec. . under the peculiar circumstances of the case. and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. .In the case at bar. much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused. . 4960) and the civil action by petitioners. the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. . and even if it were not substantive but adjective. c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision. however. Articles 32. . Since Civil Case No. Articles 32.But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners. Reasoning . compensatory and exemplary damages . and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties. a complainant may be deemed to abandon his/her right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case. but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action. that degree of care. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car. of the Civil Code. . 2850 may proceed. d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents. or one where reservation to file the civil action need not be made. HELD 1. 2. precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. I concur in the judgment reversing the order of dismissal of the trial court in order that Civil Case No. not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute.torts & damages 2. Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages. may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case. the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extracontractual. that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made. 607. it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would substantially be the same. petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others. the actual filing of Civil Case No. which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso. petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein. Garcia. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared. It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. because the action in fact satisfies the elements of quasi-delict. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which became effective on January 1. 1964." .

(if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally).torts & damages 191 SCRA 195 FERNAN. such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. separate from criminal negligence. of ancient origin. the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners. washed away costly fences. waterpaths and contrivances.It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence. whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. 1 Article 2176. the Court applied Article 1902.On February 22.Article 2176. a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act." .The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 21772 of the Civil Code. quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case HELD Ratio YES. covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character. stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river. 1990 NATURE Petition for certiorari. Indeed. an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. to recover damages on both scores. water conductors and contrivances within its land. with no pre-existing contractual obligation 2 Article 2177. which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict. endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons. . Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person. that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. like the rest of the residents. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter. and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction. 1984. whenever it refers to "fault or negligence"." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. . now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike. 1986.On February 17. shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party. ISSUE WON a corporation." Reasoning . And later on dismissed the Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction. Moreover. respondent Appellate Court affirmed the order of the trial court. prohibition and mandamus FACTS . including an artificial lake.The waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners.A careful examination of the complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake. were constructed. . is obliged to pay for the damage done. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person. assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. All the elements of a quasidelict are present.On April 26. thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land. damaged petitioners' crops and plants. can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on A2010 -9- prof. and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Consequently. Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately. the trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in the civil case until after judgment in the related Criminal Case. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette. Potenciano. . which has built through its agents. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the land. (b) fault or negligence of the defendant. . but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. provided that the offended party is not allowed.. and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two. The former is a violation of the criminal law.The decision was based on Section 3 (a). Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.In July 1982. . having always had its own foundation and individuality. There can be no logical conclusion than this. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. and the causal connection between the act and the damage. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages. officers and directors of respondent corporation. . 1983. is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. November 6.While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the instant case is privately owned. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court .In the case of Samson vs. the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered. Dionisio. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31. As held in In Azucena vs. Such fault or negligence. in quasi-delicts.Article 2176 1of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence. waterpaths. . caused a young man to drown. . . adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. petitioners instituted a criminal action against Efren Musngi. thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land. or some other person for whose acts he must respond. for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. Inc. whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted. .Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. there being fault or negligence. petitioners filed a civil case for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent corporation. to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff. which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land. while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence. . a religious corporation. There is therefore. . the recitals of the complaint. casis between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana. According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight startling.Within the land of respondent corporation.Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang.

. in order to establish his right to a recovery. was guilty.torts & damages Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain . and the intervention of his action between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the TAYLOR V MANILA ELECTRIC 16 PHIL 8 CARSON. (2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally. they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces.It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where they were found. about 12 years of age. they opened one of the caps with a knife. . in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability. and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime — a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. an employee of the defendant. instituted by David Taylor.We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite. the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case. and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. as under the generally accepted doctrine in the United States.The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on the defendant's premises. Jessie. . 1903. is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with them. for the purpose of visiting one Murphy. The plaintiff. Therefore. in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist. . . nor how long they had been there when the boys found them. impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery. received a slight cut in the neck. The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. . spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. and 1908 of that code. by contracts. and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule. but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not. causing more or less serious injuries to all three. his nearest relative.. Finding on inquiry that Mr. must establish by competent evidence: (1) Damages to the plaintiff. and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches. of course. ISSUE WON the defendants negligence is the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries HELD NO . by his father. with a boy named Manuel Claparols. (3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage. a minor. ART. and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics. and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents. and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration. was at the time when he received the injuries complained of. An explosion followed. and for kindling of explosive substances which may not have been placed in a safe and proper place. this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own. ART. 15 years of age. 1905. March 22.Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts proven at the trial do not established the liability of the defendant company under the provisions of these articles. The father.But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience. the boys. 1910 NATURE An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries. elementary. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable. for his own pleasure and convenience.We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code. . and strolled around thereon without the express permission of the defendant. . awarding damages to the plaintiff. Murphy was not in his quarters. his entry upon defendant company's premises.No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premises unattended. crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor.These proposition are. or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place. entered upon the defendant's premises. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. .The trial court's decision. but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible. In the case of Castillo vs.After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal. more mature than the average boy of his age. or some person for whose acts it must respond. by quasi-contracts. Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties. FACTS . became frightened and started to run away. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground.10 - prof. 1089 Obligations are created by law. plaintiff. one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.On the 30th of September. when they felt disposed so to do. who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap. unless. not only for personal acts and omissions. the real difficulty arising in the application of these principles to the particular facts developed in the case under consideration. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code. and on his death or incapacity the mother. . and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises. and illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused — 1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence. casis ART. of course. Court of Appeals.. A2010 . ART. the son of a mechanical engineer. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded.The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. or create an action for quasidelicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. and do not admit of discussion. David Taylor. . upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902. who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine.

and that the defendant. casis not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises. wherein the principal question was whether a railroad company was liable for in injury received by an infant while upon its premises. plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lino. and the cases based thereon. he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. cause of the injury received by the plaintiff. although we accept the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases. In turn. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault. But the doctrine of the case is controlling in our jurisdiction. the company and driver filed a motion to suspend trial of the civil case on the ground that the criminal case was still pending." and. nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.In the criminal case. and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. that we have thought proper to discuss and to consider that doctrine at length in this decision. that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act. properly speaking. the heirs of Tayag instituted a civil action to recover damages from the company (Phil Rabbit Bus Inc) and the driver.11 - prof. and it is because we can not agree with this proposition. we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff. "attributable to the negligence of the defendant. .). 1980 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari the order of CFI Tarlac (dismissing petition for damages) FACTS . The company and driver then filed for dismissal of the civil case on the ground that the heirs do not have a cause of action because of the acquittal. Stout (17 Wall. Plaintiff contends. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in several courts. that because of plaintiff's youth the intervention of his action between the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the explosion which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident. We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap. counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last resort in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases. such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter” . but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act. on the other hand. the acquittal of the driver of the crime charged is not a bar to the prosecution for damages based on quasi-delict Reasoning . attributable to the negligence of the company). 657). he had been to sea as a cabin boy. he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap.Art. if such injury was." . it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts." and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of adult. . and necessity.The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. despite his denials on the witness stand. or for purposes of amusement. S.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred. . this provision refers to a civil action based on an obligation arising from quasi-delict. and neither is contention that a man has a right to do what will with his own property or that children should be kept under the care of their parents or guardians. was able to earn P2.In support of his contention. . which should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place where they were found by the plaintiff. and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act. and yet he willfully. and knowingly produced the explosion. Judge Alcantara granted this motion.torts & damages accident which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident. and this latter the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the injuries sustained by him. the principles on which these cases turn are that "while a railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it. viz: “6. driven by Romeo Villa. July 23. and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred. . the driver as acquitted based on reasonable doubt. or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances. we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate A2010 . so that while it may be true that these injuries would TAYAG V ALCANTARA 98 SCRA 723 CONCEPCION.But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff. Inc. under circumstances. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only.Evidently. which therefore was not.Pedro Tayag was riding a motorcycle when he was bumped by a Philippine Rabbit Bus. Judge Alcantara granted this and dismissed the civil case. such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. so as to prevent their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient weight to put in doubt. NO Ratio The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi-delict. vs. Pending the criminal case against the driver. therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. . NCC provides: “When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony.True. 31.This conclusion is founded on reason. without other fault on his part. . upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases.. justice. (84 U. which caused his instantaneous death. has failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a . if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant.As laid down in Railroad Co.In the case at bar. from idle curiosity. more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age. recklessly. The complaint itself shows that the claim was based on quasi-delit. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him. and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case. ISSUE WON Judge Alcantara correctly dismissed the civil case on the ground of no cause of action due to the acquittal of the driver HELD 1.

Gabat.M. a seventeen-year old working student who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. It was found out that there was a third person inside the Kombi. 1986.The requirement in section 2. It is not controverted. WON he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted.October 23. He was allegedly robbed of his cigarette box containing cigarettes worth P300. the acquittal of Romeo Villa was based on reasonable doubt. provided that offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores DISPOSITION petition granted. Rogelio Ligon. and the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved forward.Following close behind (about 3 meters) the Kombi at the time of the incident was a taxicab driven by Castillo. dated October 23. He immediately blocked the Kombi while the jeep pulled up right behind it.” All the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action are present: (1) act or omission constituting fault /negligence on the part of respondent (2) damage caused by the said act or omission (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or omission and (4) no preexisting contractual relation between the parties. that as the Kombi continued to speed towards Quiapo.December 6. and damage to his property would not have occurred. Rogelio Ligon. Order of CFI Tarlac set aside.Assistant Fiscal Cantos filed another information against Rogelio Ligon and Fernando Gabat for Robbery with Homicide based on a Supplemental Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo and a joint affidavit of Armando Espino and Romeo Castil. otherwise. no vendor lets go of his precious box of cigarettes in order to change a peso bill given by a customer. Yatco. . . secondary to traumatic injuries of the head. 1984. . and his companion. Castillo saw an owner-type jeep with two persons in it. Recto Avenue. He was traveling on the same lane in a slightly oblique position. Fermin Payuan.The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's version. The court said that it is of common knowledge that cigarette vendors plying their trade in the streets do not let go of their cigarette box. Otherwise. . was never apprehended and is still at large. having already been able to balance himself on the stepboard. At the intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street before turning left towards the underpass at C. . . but for damages due to a quasidelict or culpa aquiliana".the co-accused. Fernando Gabat. While this transaction was occurring. Rosales to buy some cigarettes from him. beeping his horn to make the driver stop. Castillo pursued it as it sped towards Roxas Boulevard. there could be no reason for the latter to run after the Kombi and hang on to its window.The three were all brought by the police officers to the Western Police District and turned over to Pfc. the traffic light changed to green. particularly defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan. the trial court dismissed as incredible the testimony of Gabat that the cigarette vendor placed the cigarette box on the windowsill of the Kombi. through the sole testimony of the taxicab driver that Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales and pried loose the latter's hand from the window of the Kombi. while he was trying to get from his pocket the change for the 5peso bill of Gabat.12 - prof. filed an information against Rogelio Ligon charging him with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence.I concur because petitioners' action for damages is based on article 2177 of the Civil Code. also went along with them.torts & damages family in the selection and supervision of its employees." The two men in the jeep joined the chase and at the intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard. however. Sr. as plaintiffs in the civil case. who allegedly witnessed the incident . Prudencio Castillo. While waiting. the latter could not have fallen down. is the subject of conflicting versions by the prosecution and the defense.m. 1983. was riding in a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father and driven by the other accused. stating that there can be no doubt that Gabat forcibly took or grabbed the cigarette box from Rosales because. Rule III of the Rules of Court that there should be a reservation in the criminal cases of the right to institute an independent civil action is contrary to law. "acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence. Patrolmen Leonardo Pugao and Peter Ignacio. can amend their complaint and base their action also on article 29 NCC which allows an independent civil action for damages in case of acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt. When they reached the Luneta near the Rizal monument. 1987 . cigarette vendors.February 17. The two men on board the jeep turned out to be police officers. and immediately thereafter. . resulting in the latter falling down and hitting the pavement. holding it with his left hand. Ligon which was coming from España Street going towards the direction of Quiapo.June 28. where he was treated for multiple physical injuries and was confined thereat until his death on October 30. PEOPLE V LIGON 152 SCRA 419 YAP. They drew their SEPARATE OPINION AQUINO [concur] . a certain Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at the rear seat.00 more or less.prosecution tried to establish. Gabat beckoned a cigarette vendor. shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action. bilateral. under which according to the Code Commission. The taxicab driver.Moreover. but Rogelio Ligon was detained and turned over to the City Fiscal's Office for further investigation. The petitioners. NATURE Appeal from the judgment of the RTC Manila FACTS .Investigating Fiscal Cantos. telling them "nakaaksidente ng tao.On the other hand. 1983 . not for civil liability from criminal negligence.an autopsy was conducted by the medico-legal officer of NBI which stated the cause of death of Rosales as "pneumonia hypostatic.at about 6:10 p. A2010 . casis guns and told the driver. 1983. Citing Elcano v Hill: a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act. otherwise. 1983 . Rosales was rushed by some bystanders to the Philippine General Hospital. 1095). . The Kombi did not stop after the victim fell down on the pavement near the foot of the underpass. Rosales clung to the window of the Kombi but apparently lost his grip and fell down on the pavement. . July 29. 1983 . RTC convicted Fernando Gabat. The court also believed Castillo's testimony that Gabat forcibly removed or pried off the right hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi. Rosales approached the Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of cigarettes. He sought their assistance in chasing the Kombi. As to what precisely happened between Gabat and Rosales at the crucial moment. Article 33 of the Civil Code also justifies the petitioners' independent civil action for damages since the term "physical injuries" therein embraces death (Dyogi vs. These affidavits were already prepared and merely sworn to before Fiscal Cantos on January 17. . Payuan also prepared a Traffic Accident Report. of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua where he robbed and killed Jose Rosales y Ortiz. 1984 . case REMANDED to lower court for further proceedings. 100 Phil. to alight from the Kombi." . they stopped.October 31. whether on reasonable doubt or not.6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias were released early morning the following day. Castillo was able to overtake the Kombi when the traffic light turned red. the accident in question which resulted in the death of Pedro Tayag.

the court express a finding that the defendants’ offenses are civil in nature. [date] NATURE Petition of rcertiorari to revies the decision of the Court of Appeals . Since the standard of proof to be used in civil cases is preponderance of evidence. may be a disinterested witness with no motive. but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished. held that extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil. In our view. . PADILLA V CA (Vergara) 129 SCRA 558 GUTIERREZ. "This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. has been explained by the Code Commission as follows: "The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. the CA reversed the findings of the CFI and acquitted the appellants based on reasonable doubt but nonetheless ordered them to pay P9. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility. is not entirely free from doubt because his observation of the event could have been faulty or mistaken. He is therefore entitled to acquittal on reasonable doubt. civil liability cannot be demanded. would alter the result of the case in that they would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused to acquittal. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other.600. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense. the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. went to the public market to execute an alleged order of the Mayor to clear the public market of stalls which were considered as nuisance per se. In the case at bar. when the latter is not proved. according to the court a quo. and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The stall of one Antonio Vergara was demolished pursuant to this order. it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. "other than to see that justice be done. . . unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the facts from which the civil action might arise did not exist." his testimony. In the process however the stock in trade and certain furniture of Vergara were lost and destroyed.Judicial notice may also be taken of the fact that the rear windshield of the 1978 Volkswagon Kombi is on the upper portion. The SC took the position that the said provision merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act.The SC. private rights. the crime of grave coercion was not proved in accordance with the law.While the prosecution witness. De Guzman vs Alvia." It is just and proper that. As the taxicab was right behind the Kombi. Castillo's line of vision was partially obstructed by the back part of the Kombi. and both vehicles during that time were moving fast in the traffic. if taken into account. even if not tainted with bias.a careful review of the record shows that certain material facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which.Article 29 of the Civil Code. the Court is not convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of the accused Fernando Gabat has been established beyond reasonable doubt. but sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales y Ortiz. which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission. .Petitioners. the quantum of proof necessary to sustain Gabat's conviction of so serious a crime as robbery with homicide has not been met in this case. These are circumstances which must be taken into consideration in evaluating Castillo's testimony as to what exactly happened between Gabat and the cigarette vendor during that crucial moment before the latter fell down. quoting Section 3 (C) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and various jurisprudence including PNB vs Catipon.The petitioner filed the appeal to the SC questioning the grant of actual damages despite a no guilty verdict. 1964. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party. One affects the social order and the other.Considering the above circumstances. The decision of the CA was based on the fact that the petitioners were charged with coercion when they should have been more appropriately charged with crime against person. the judgment of not guilty was based on reasonable doubt. on or about February 8. The taxicab which Castillo was driving was lower in height compared to the Kombi in which Gabat was riding-a fact admitted by Castillo at the trial. Hence. The acquittal extinguishes the criminal liability but not the civil liability particularly if the finding is not guilty based on reasonable ground. for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused. . . .13 - prof. casis FACTS . where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused.00 as actual damages. .On appeal. ISSUE WON the CA committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge HELD NO .torts & damages ISSUE WON the prosecution’s set of facts should be given credence HELD NO . .The petitioners were found guilty of grave coercion after trial at the CFI and were sentenced to five months and one day imprisonment and ordered to pay fines. following it at a distance of about three meters. thus making it visually difficult for Castillo to observe clearly what transpired inside the Kombi at the front end where Gabat was seated. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party.However.The Court also tackled the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code to clarify whether a separate civil action is required when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. occupying approximately one-third (1/3) of the rear end of the vehicle. Castillo. His testimony that he saw Gabat grab the cigarette box from Rosales and forcibly pry loose the latter's hand from the windowsill of the Kombi is thus subject to a reasonable doubt. preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? DISPOSITION Appellant acquitted for the crime of robbery and homicide. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice. only a A2010 . specially considering that this occurrence happened in just a matter of seconds. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime.

and other circumstances regarding persons. Bartolome Angeles. casis of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating. Phil. RABBIT V PEOPLE [citation] PANGANIBAN. taking into consideration his employment or occupation. gasping for breath. . 1997 NATURE Civil action for damages in a medical malpractice suit. as in the instant case. FACTS .In litigations involving medical negligence. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. 1991. The petitioner called Lydia into her office and the two had a conversation. the absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence: that the injury to the person or property was a consequence of the reckless imprudence.The following day. Because of the untidy state of the clinic. when Dr. Ercillo came out again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. Angeles arrived. Rabbit will be held liable for the civil liabilities. It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted. she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant for a rag to wipe the window and the floor with.Rowena and her other relatives waited outside the operating room while Lydia underwent operation. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she must be operated on as scheduled. According to Rowena. 9 months and 11 days to 6 years. Ercillo went out of the operating room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister immediately bought. . 1991 as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. she was wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr. Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could be postponed.Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital. who was attached to an oxygen tank. Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead as her blood pressure was already 0/0. in the generality of cases. who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee.Even without expert testimony. ISSUE WON an employer. . 1991. (3) that it be without malice. degree of intelligence. the accused jumped bail and remained at large. and to pay damages. (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary. there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a casual connection of such breach and the resulting death of his patient. While they were waiting. that petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon. Dr. Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation.Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22. Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in good standing when performing the same operation. a person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband together with the driver of the accused had to go to the San Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. unless the contrary is sufficiently established. . and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender. as soon as it arrived. The transfer to the San Pablo City District Hospital was without the prior consent of Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out about the intended transfer only when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo District Hospital.The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act. may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused HELD .torts & damages CRUZ V CA (UMALI) 282 SCRA 188 FRANCISCO.14 - prof. Rowena then noticed her mother. Ercillo re-operated on her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. no cogent proof exists that any of these circumstances caused petitioner's death. This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking in the case at bench. the petitioner informed them that the operation was finished. and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23.Thereafter. Unfortunately. The attending physicians summoned Dr. The operating staff then went inside the petitioner's clinic to take their snacks. Thus.WON has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. 2004 NATURE Petition for Review FACTS . But in the event the the accused becoems insolvent. April 14. Prior to March 22. Her death certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause. . About one hour had passed when Dr. multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years. there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients. While petitioner was closing the abdominal wall. They bought type "A" blood and the same was brought by the attendant into the operating room. . The deference of courts to the expert opinion PHIL. (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence. they were not able to comply with petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank. . head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the San Pablo District Hospital. Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a "myoma" in her uterus. the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence. physical condition. she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50. But admittedly. However.At around 10pm. .Rowena Umali De Ocampo accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital. the patient died.Napoleon Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide. Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. . a matter of expert opinion. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen A2010 . time and place.After the lapse of a few hours.For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is. . ISSUE WON the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide HELD NO . . Some thirty minutes after. Rowena and her other relatives then boarded a tricycle and followed the ambulance.

. He lived in San Mateo. . objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to discern. but it was not denied its day in court.Its liability is direct and immediate. . This row of sacks was so placed that there was a space of only about two feet between the sacks of melons and the edge of the platform. In fact. In the case before us. as they are deemed to have waived the appeal. and the train station was lit dimly by a single light located some distance away. thus. Costs against petitioner.The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them.The sack of melons on the platform is because it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station for shipment to the market. employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency.On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. Consequently. not the court.25 in the form of . . nullifying or defeating the judgment. When Jose Cangco stepped off. whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age.The accident occurred on a dark night. .15 - prof. found the facts substantially as above stated. The plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second operation was performed and the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. Reasoning . At the hearing in the CFI. DISPOSITION Petition is hereby DENIED. 1918 NATURE An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance disallowing the claim of the plaintiff for P1.torts & damages NO . got off the same car. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car. was employed by Manila Railroad Company as clerk. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee. and that they constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff.To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend. and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance.In fact. he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code. located upon the line of the defendant railroad company.After a judgment has become final. .The employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform.Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. By the same token. alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. While at large. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period. it participated in the proceedings before the RTC. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu. nevertheless. and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger. they cannot seek relief from the court. then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case. the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering. and as the train drew up to the station in San Mateo the plaintiff while making his exit through the door. Expenses reached the sum of P790. It might have lost its right to appeal. . to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent would also result in improperly amending. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company. Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa. and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked. Their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train. he instituted this proceeding in the CFI Manilato recover damages of the defendant company. As the train slowed down another passenger. substantive CANGCO V MANILA RAILROAD CO 38 Phil 768 FISHER. 1915. and should be considered.August 31. founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. A2010 . but only to extra-contractual obligations . sex. After the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop. nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. but also with regard to its amount. which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform.that is to say. he used a pass. . where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. and the plaintiff appealed. supplied by the company. Rizal.Jose Cangco. McElroy. . and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. He was immediately brought to a hospital where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. ISSUE WON there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff HELD NO Ratio In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act . took his position upon the steps of the coach.The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage. .The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition. and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform. vested rights are acquired by the winning party. petitioner admits that by helping the accusedemployee. deprived petitioner of the right to appeal. also an employee of the railroad company. the judgment against him has become final and executory. October 14.In commenting upon article 1093. especially to a person emerging from a lighted car. . . the accusedemployee. casis medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of his curation. the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities.000 against the estate of the deceased James P. the trial judge. it can be said that by jumping bail. the plaintiff was returning home by rail from his daily labors. . Emilio Zuniga.The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability. FACTS . and with serious injuries. thus.January 20. It follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of due process. and although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars.On Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment: . 1915. which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge.

or which arise from these relations. thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off.B. we are of full accord.. or in supervision over him after the selection. and consequently. whereas if the accident was caused by defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury. .Under the Spanish law.Respondent was one of the passengers on a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga. . and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure. namely. said: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee. . such third persons suffer damage. no liability is imposed upon defendant. FORES V MIRANDA [citation] REYES.torts & damages and independent. the damages should be apportioned. generally embraced in the concept of status. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case. but that presumption is refutable." . .the Manila Railroad Co.L. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person. and he incurs no liability whatever if. which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an "accident in the performance of an obligation already existing . "An attempt to alight from a moving train is negligence per se. [dissent] .but upon the principle announced in article 1902 which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or negligence. A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant. important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.. J. It is the Court’s conclusion that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence. This care has been defined to be. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties. may be rebutted. but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances. but by mere negligence or inattention. an action is brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for the damage caused by the carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of his employment The Court. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of . 1959 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . we are likewise in full accord. not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally.The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which. therefore.The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains. . such is not based upon the principle of respondent superior . the court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that article 1903 is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a contract. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced. other than contractual. the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. of certain members of society to others. and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3. as it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at this station. the obligation of making good the damage caused. The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff." With the general rule relative to a passenger's contributory negligence.The Court is of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence: "The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. Litonjua and Leynes. and directs them with equal diligence. is that of ordinary or reasonable care. duties which civilized society imposes upon its members.In the Rakes vs. casis roadbed and the surrounding ground.In Bahia vs. and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. . It is. has caused damage to another. DISPOSITION The decision of the lower court is reversed.Every legal obligation must of necessity be extracontractual or contractual. Gulf and Pacific Co. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention. namely. we have the logical result . the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting. Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual A2010 . While the vehicle was descending the Sta.With one sentence in the majority decision. There could be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. if productive of injury.In considering the probability of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff the following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the SEPARATE OPINION MALCOLM. rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris. without willful intent. would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. March 4. if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence. in cases imposed upon employers with respect to damages due to the negligence of their employees to persons to whom they are not bound by contract. sex and condition of the passenger. . even within the scope of their employment. thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties. the particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred.290. or both. which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of society. by reason of the negligence of his servants. after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code. and judgment affirmed." . .16 - prof.25. Atlantic. gives rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation. to avoid injury. and for the costs of both instances. "It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting. do injury to another. The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract. Article 1903 presumes negligence." Adding these two points together. The plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood. The cement platform also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. taking into consideration the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them. should be absolved from the complaint. of the age.

Rule: no moral damages . Atlantic may be held primarily liable as it failed in its duty to provide safe appliances for the use of its employees. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.Exception: with moral damages if: • defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith • result in the death of a passenger in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. Atlantic. relation between the parties. such damages are justly due." "ART. less a sum deemed suitable equivalent for his own imprudence. At one point. Five of the passengers were injured. 2219. NO . (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries.torts & damages speed. Such fault or negligence.However. is obliged to pay for the damage done. if there is no pro-existing contractual A2010 . ISSUE WON the defendant is entitled to moral damages HELD NO.the plaintiff’s witness alleged that a noticeable depression in the track had appeared after a typhoon. by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence. in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code. when wire loops were wound around the broken bones and screwed into place. The men were hauling the rails on 2 hand cars.. “… parties being mutually in fault.The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased" . as well as the codal concept of quasi-delict as essentially extra contractual negligence.In sum the rule is: Delict (breach of contract) Gen. .. Rakes. there being fault or negligence. but it had not been proven that Atlantic inspected the track or had any proper system of inspection. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisting contractual relation between the parties. The law has no scales to determine in such cases whose wrongdoing weighed most in the compound that occasioned the mischief” (Railroad v Norton). wanton or deliberately injurious conduct. 768 777). some behind or at it sides and some pulling . the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might." Reasoning (a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus). WON Atlantic is only subsidiarily liable 2. to some extent. is essential to justify an award of moral damages. This was reported to the foreman. YES .e. He was taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment.. the car canted and the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff who was walking by the car’s side.The difference in conditions. petitioner may recover from the defendant. January 23. 1953. may not escape liability by proving that it has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees .Reason: the advantageous position of a party suing a carrier for breach of the contract of transportation explains. and the burden is placed on the carrier to prove the it was due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure (Cangco vs. not only because Art. Whoever by act or omission caused damage to another.Petitioner had walked along the side of the car despite a prohibition to do so by the foreman. have avoided the consequences of the injured party's negligence. one of a group of 8 AfricanAmerican laborers in the employment of defendant. At the time of the trial. The accident occurred on the morning of March 22.Atlantic contends that the remedy for injury through negligence lies only in a criminal action against the official directly responsible and that the employer be held only subsidiarily liable. 2220. As Rakes was walking along the car’s side when the accident occurred. the limitation imposed by the new Code on the amount of the recovery. Moreover. the tie broke. 2206. the first on May 23. the company’s officers and 3 of the workers testified that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all against walking by the side of cars." . and prevent us from viewing the action for breach of contract as simultaneously embodying an action on tort. casis the cars in the front by a rope.000. that entitles the spouse. although not as the primary cause. compel us to differentiate between action ex contractu. Manila Railroad Co. effected to insert a metal splint. 2219. or of his employees.the plaintiff. GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY 7 Phil 359 TRACEY. defenses and proof. xxx xxx xxx ART.17 - prof. DISPOSITION The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified by eliminating the award of P5. Petitioner need not file charges with the foreman to claim damages from Atlantic. Mckenna. 2. Ratio Moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation. was at work transporting iron rails from the harbor in Manila. unlike in suits for quasi-delict. breaking his leg. In this case. which provide as follows: "ART. the carrier. WON it bars him from recovery HELD 1. .H. the track sagged. . i. ISSUES 1. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter. 1907 NATURE Action for damages FACTS . that latter is relieved from the duty to establish the fault of the carrier.00 by way of moral damages M. 2176. a criminal action is not a requisite for the enforcement of a civil action. there were no side guards on the cars to keep the rails from slipping off. but because the definition of quasi-delict in Act. and (b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the description term "analogous cases" used in Art.By virtue of culpa contractual. 1953. . WON there was contributory negligence on the part of petitioner and if so. and a third one to remove such splint. a second. 38 Phil. Petitioner’s negligence contributed only to his own injury and not to the principal occurrence—it was merely an element to the damage caused upon him. and later was subjected to a series of operations. including the respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. the driver lost control thereof. RAKES V THE ATLANTIC. Also. and actions quasi ex delicto. However. The action for breach of contract imposes on the defendant carrier a presumption of liability upon mere proof of injury to the passenger. causing it to swerve and to hit the bridge wall. Had it been otherwise. there can be no appointment of damages. it appears that respondent had not yet recovered the use of his right arm. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused by contractual breach. under the circumstance. he was found to have contributed in some degree to the injury inflicted. and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly. which was later amputated at the knee.

e." SEPARATE OPINION WILLARD AND CARSON [dissent] -the negligence of the defendant alone was insufficient to cause the accident—it also required the negligence of the plaintiff. F&B Manager of the Intercon.torts & damages . Clarita lost her credit card. and (b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the descriptive term "analogous cases" used in Art. 2220.Festejo also sent a letter to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant to assure the latter that Luis was a "very valued clients" of FEBTC.000.On 30 March 1990. .On 06 October 1988. FAREASTCARD undertakes the necessary action to avert its unauthorized use to protect its cardholders. along with the principal card. in any case. (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. but because the definition of quasidelict in Art. .On appeal to the Court of Appeals. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. . . the bank also issued a supplemental card to Clarita S. Furthermore. 21. give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith.Damages are awarded to petitioner at Php5. and (c) P20. its application can be warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. is essential to justify an award of moral damages. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Because of this. Luna applied for. includes gross.Still evidently feeling aggrieved. Naturally. 1995 NATURE Petition for review FACTS . Exceptionally. i.Fores vs. wrote back to say that the credibility of Luis had never been "in question.000. We have repeatedly ruled that moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation. and another guest at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel Intercon Manila.00 moral damages. . plaintiff should not be afforded relief FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V CA 241 SCRA 671 VITUG. the unfortunate incident occurred).00 attorney's fees. Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. the amount fairly attributable to his own negligence. dated 11 Oct.00 exemplary damages. In cases of this nature. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused contractual breach.Bad faith. such damages are justly due. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. The Civil Code provides: . Luis Luna." A copy of this reply was sent to Luis by Festejo.Art. a VP of the bank. 2219. Thus. Luis presented his FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter who promptly had it verified through a telephone call to the bank's Credit Card Department. the RTC of Pasig ordered FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300. even if we are to assume that the provision could properly relate to a breach of contract. xxx xxx xxx . not only because Art. Miranda explained with great clarity the predominance that we should give to Article 2220 in contractual relations. Luis A. . . A2010 .Art. Upon his request. the same must be discarded.13. contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. wanton or deliberately injurious conduct. the bank's internal security procedures and policy would appear to be.By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes apparent that: (a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus). Luis was forced to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588. Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the appellate court. 2220. moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract.18 - prof. we quote: Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. 2219.Art. Luna. demanded from FEBTC the payment of damages. in a contract of carriage. it failed to inform him about its security policy. in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code. Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human relations that clearly must.. Luis felt embarrassed by this incident. such damages are justly due. under the circumstances.In culpa contractual. an overzealous employee of the Bank's Credit Card Department did not consider the possibility that it may have been him who was presenting the card at that time (for which reason. Since the card was not honored.000. casis . it should be observed. expressed the bank's apologies to Luis in his letter which stated that: In cases when a card is reported to our office as lost. it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. through counsel. Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend. which provide as follows: . a FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at its Pasig Branch. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries.In August 1988. February 23. . but not simple. deducting Php 2. and was accorded. . . Festejo.500. in this context. To pay for the lunch. Adrian V. Wilful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that. . However. Luis filed a complaint for damages with the RTC of Pasig against FEBTC. William Anthony King. the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation. negligence.Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court. .Concededly.Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.Article 21 of the Code. Most importantly. (b) P50.Article 21 states: Art. ISSUE WON the petitioner is entitled to moral and exemplary damages HELD NO . can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. .In a letter. as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file. FEBTC has come to this Court with this petition for review.to meanwhile so record the lost card. under the circumstances. moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed ) of the common carrier. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that. 1988. the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.000. a Fil-Am. . however. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisitng contractual relations between the parties.In October 1986. FEBTC was forthwith informed. In order to replace the lost card.

The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger.Given the above premises and the factual circumstances here obtaining. Cuento. temperate. they came all across to Mr. 2206. 2208. in turn. 2176. . that this difference was in the mind of the lawmakers when in Art. xxx xxx xxx . 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured passenger does not die. even perhaps inadvertent.Exemplary or corrective damages. a commotion ensued. in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary. as was to be expected. therefore. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. the plaintiff. 2201. Al) 18 SCRA 155 SANCHEZ. an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself. it would also be just as arduous to sustain the exemplary damages granted by the courts below. but the fact must be shown in evidence. without such agreement. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff. the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. to honor its credit card issued to private respondent Luis should entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code providing thusly: . .Art. . when they found out that Mr. when his action is planted upon breach of contract and thus. moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. or malevolent manner (Art. there was a 'white man'. through PAL.It is to be presumed. and a carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was breached through negligence of the carrier's employees.The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort even where there is a preexisting contract between the plaintiff and the defendant This doctrine. and plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class' seat in the plane. as proved by written documents (tickets…) 3. When asked to vacate his 'first class' seat. who. and if such. September 28. without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant. In contracts and quasi-contracts. private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where. left Manila for Lourdes w/ 48 other Filipino pilgrims. fraudulent. malice or wanton attitude. 2221. oppressive. according to said Ernesto G. may be vindicated or recognized. such damages are granted if the defendant is shown to have been so guilty of gross negligence as to approximate malice. without a pre-existing contract between two parties.Art. as required by Art. 1170-1172). We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier. In contracts and quasi-contracts. WON the Court could review the questions of fact Substantive 2. Luna an amount of P5. the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton. the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort. Civil Code. But the exceptional rule of Art. liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. In quasi-delicts.19 - prof. . bad faith. the bank's failure. reckless. Carrascoso to give his seat to the 'white man. . We see no issue of sound discretion on the part of the appellate court in allowing the award thereof by the trial court. the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation. casis DISPOSITION The appealed decision is MODIFIED by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to private respondents. many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. refused. AIR FRANCE V CA (Carrascoso. Air France. 2229. WON Carrascoso was entitled to the “first class” seat he claims. 1966 NATURE PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. which has been violated or invaded by the defendant. the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. Et. 2220. had a 'better right' to the seat. FACTS . and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.000. are intended to serve as an example or as correction for the public good in addition to moral. WON Carrascoso was entitled to moral damages. exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances (Art. and.Carrascoso. Civil Code). 2232. Here." . . WON the CA failed to make a complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it.both TC and CA decided in favor of Carrascoso ISSUES Procedural 1. there being fault or negligence.Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered where the court deems such recovery to be just and equitable (Art. in its stead.Nevertheless. Such fault or negligence. in the words of the witness Ernesto G.Art. Civil Code). A2010 . the Manager alleged. .00 by way of nominal damages. In all other respects. that entitles the spouse. their consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code. .The distinction between fraud. Carrascoso traveled in “first class” but at Bangkok. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad faith. and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. the appealed decision is AFFIRMED. and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager]. In criminal offenses. To award moral damages for breach of contract. It is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to malice. is obliged to pay for the damage done. would be to violate the clear provisions of the law. bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored (Arts.torts & damages . there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith which the CA allegedly failed to find . the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying because.In case of fraud. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. unfortunately. Cuento. petitioner is ordered to pay private respondent Luis A. issued plaintiff a “first class” round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. Civil Code). 2230. From Manila to Bangkok. and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body. a civil engineer.

6.FINDINGS OF FACT: "the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered thereon". Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees.43 And is. Carrasco was issued a “first class ticket”. that any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. WON the amounts awarded to Carrascoso was excessive HELD 1. For. Testimony of the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. amongst others.xxx The law. when the dialogue happened.There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering. and Third. if not confusion. Unless. the plaintiff was issued. nor proved that the “white man” had “better right” over the seat.If. the BangkokTeheran leg.Air France did not present evidence that the “white man” made a prior reservation. and paid for. this is bad faith.QUESTION OF LAW: one which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties 2. . YES . must answer. granted that their employee was accused of the tortuous act 5. however. Deficiency in the complaint. courtesy and due consideration. was cured by the evidence. indignities and abuses from such employees. in this environment. are admissible as part of the res gestae. the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. CA held that Air France should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not. a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat. Ratio . (note: it was held that it was a case of quasi-delict even though it was a breach of contract) Ratio A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. that. petitioner. The trial court also accepted as evidence the written documents submitted by Carrasco and even the testimony of the air-carrier’s employees attested that indeed. YES Ratio. The excitement had not as yet died down. it. they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals. WON Carrascoso was entitled to exemplary damages 8. respect. may result. "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes 4. Obiter. It is (therefore) unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages."The mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution".Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness. If there had been no seat. Reasoning . WON the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso regarding the account made by the air-carrier’s purser is admissible in evidence as hearsay 7. that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. he was granted the “first class” seat. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required.16 They consist of the court's "conclusions with respect to the determinative facts in issue" . and if the “white man” had a better right to the seat. there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class. generates a relation attended with a public duty. adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. serious anxiety. when Carrascoso was asked to confirm his seat in Bangkok. YES. injurious language. by reason of which he suffered inconvenience. Reasoning . said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok.Carrascoso testified that the purser of the air-carrier made an entry in his notebooks reading "First class parties. of course. . solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn.Petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the A2010 . as petitioner underscores. wounded feelings and social humiliation. is no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense". although he had tourist class protection. . therefore. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner-air carrier-a case of quasi-delict. WON Carrascoso was entitled to attorney’s fees 9. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct. accordingly. notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed. could give ground for an action for damages. For. he imposed his arbitrary will.The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat. the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride. is one attended with public duty. thereby causing him mental anguish. YES . -Also.also…From a reading of the transcript just quoted. worse. Constitution mandates that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based" and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before". is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. The contract of air carriage. his employer. embarrassments and humiliations. However. Reasoning . be essayed. NO Ratio A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity. if the manager’s actions could be justified. bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. casis established. resulting in moral damages.20 - prof. they should have presented the manager to testify in court – but they did not do so . Certainly. naturally. YES.A written document speaks a uniform language. because of the relation which an aircarrier sustains with the public. but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats. 5.Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. Such testimony is admissible. action as we have said. also.torts & damages 4. Damages are proper. It invites people to avail of the comforts and I advantages it offers. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier. made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment-just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been . Second. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager. if forms part of the res gestae Ratio. if any. So it is. then why did they confirm Carrasco his seat? 3. he forcibly ejected him from his seat. WON moral damages could be recovered from Air France. NO. a first class ticket without any reservation whatever. contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions. Statements then.The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not. The stress of Carrascoso's. WON damages are proper in a breach contract 6. "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. . Reasoning .

(c) entire lining of coffin. . Also. YES Ratio. we. the concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased was removed from its niche underground. which is the law between them.The father himself. DISPOSITION the foregoing premises considered. no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or explore the realm of arts when bullets are flying or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. the Syquias discovered that the vault had a hole approx 3 in. Treasure. It would have been easy for Air France to contradict Carrascoso’s testimony if they had presented the purser. (2) gross negligence in failing to seal the concrete vault (Art. and the exposed parts of the deceased's remains were damaged and soiled. recklessness and lack of security precautions. the petition is DENIED. the school makes itself responsible in providing their students with an atmosphere that is conducive for learning.. Inc. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar Judgment for attorneys' fees.After about a month.A stabbing incident on August 30. preparatory to transferring the remains to a newly purchased family plot also at the . (RCBC v CA) . 2180 that the liability arises from acts done by pupils or students of the institution. or malevolent manner". It is expressly mentioned in Art. NO Ratio. like PSBA. (b) coffin was entirely damaged by water. Certainly. in diameter near the bottom and it appeared that water drained out of the hole. authorized and instructed the defendant to inter the remains of deceased. and because there was a pre-existing contractual relation between the Syquias and Mla Memorial. The petitioner contents that it should not be admitted as evidence. chose the gravesite despite knowing that said area had to be constantly sprinkled with water to keep the grass green and that water would eventually seep through the vault. father of the deceased Vicente Syquia. PSBA is not liable. the subject of inquiry is not the entry. PSBA V CA [citation] PADILLA. fraudulent. they caused the opening of the concrete vault and discovered that: (a) the interior walls showed evidence of total flooding. . Costs against petitioner. 1992 NATURE Petition to review the decision of Court of Appeals. as it was only hearsay. are beyond the ambit of that rule.The suit impleaded PSBA. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. 2176) . NO Ratio Parties are bound by the terms of their contract.Contract between the parties did not guarantee that the cement vault would be waterproof. Reasoning . 2180 of the Civil Code.Juan SYQUIA. MLA MEMORIAL is deemed to be liable for desecrating the grave of the dead. the said entry was made outside the Philippines and by an employee of petitioner.The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept 8. The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent wit this ruling of the Court. . ISSUES 1. And the MFR was similarly dealt with. its President. and that the captain refused to intervene". MFR was also denied.Respondent Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.\ 9. . VP. . The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given.The act of boring a hole in the vault was necessary so as to prevent the vault from floating away. It cannot be extended by implication. JR. Chief of Security and Assistant Chief of Security. but the ouster incident. Juan Syquia.SYQUIAS base their claim for damages against Mla Memorial on either: (1) breach of its obligation to deliver a defect-free concrete vault.21 - prof. It sought to adjudge them liable for the victim’s death due to their alleged negligence. 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista on the premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Manila RTC. say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from 'reversible error. A2010 . . The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a wanton. Trial Court’s Ruling .CA affirmed judgment of dismissal. YES Ratio The Civil Code gives the Court ample power to grant exemplary damages-in contracts and quasicontracts. Reasoning .Whatever kind of negligence it has committed. A contracting party cannot incur a liability more than what is expressly specified in his undertaking. February 4. clothing of the deceased. However.Defendants (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed alleging that since they are presumably sued under Art. . casis same cemetery. the complaint states no cause of action against them since academic institutions. it may still be liable under the law on contracts.Pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal Court of Parañaque.No quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty of any fault or negligence. beyond the terms of the contract. But when an academic institution accepts students for enrollment. But respondent court’s premise is incorrect. It was established that his assailants were not members of the school’s academic community but were outsiders. WON Mla Memorial breached its contract with petitioners. filth and silt causing the wooden parts to separate and to crack the viewing glass panel located directly above the head and torso of the deceased. WON it can be liable for culpa aquiliana HELD 1. Costs against the petitioners. 2180 on quasi-delicts. 7. Because. the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof. oppressive. DISPOSITION On balance. (Mla Memorial) FACTS . January 27. FACTS . As the concrete vault was being raised to the surface. reckless. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. Petitioners the assailed the trial court’s dispositions before the respondent appellate court which affirmed the trial court’s ruling. SYQUIA V CA (Mla Memorial Park) 217 SCRA 624 CAMPOS. In this sense. .torts & damages passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will. or alternatively 2. ISSUE WON respondent court is correct in denying dismissal of the case HELD Ratio Although a school may not be liable under Art. . We accordingly vote to affirm the same. 1993 NATURE Petition for review of CA decision dismissing Syquia family’s complaint for damages against Manila Memorial Park Cemetery.The case should be tried on its merits.

. . NO Ratio Negligence is defined by law as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons.” Pursuant to this. the vault was covered by a cement lid.The defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. Reasoning .Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana. La Union.CFI absolved defendant from liability . plaintiff was riding on his pony over the Carlatan Bridge. . he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left.The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. of the time and of the place.Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of MLA MEMORIAL provides that: “Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a concrete box. and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge.But in view of the known nature of horses. . in our opinion. . . the diligence to be observed in the performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family. . .As the defendant started across the bridge. that being the proper side of the road for the machine. Finding no evidence of negligence. The reason for the boring of the hole was explained by Henry Flores. at San Fernando. there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side. going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. . deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. He was. . instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down. in maneuvering his car in the manner above described. he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side. but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles.He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge. there is no reason to award damages. circumstances of the case do not show negligence. . and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision." In the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary. he gave two more successive blasts.When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger.” .As a result of its injuries the horse died. When the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties. . the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. the actual installment of which shall be made by the employees of the Association." Mla Memorial bound itself to provide the concrete box to be sent in the interment. .The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. 1912. the defendant guided it toward his left. the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing. negligent in the eye of the law. . he might get excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. .The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would NEGLIGENCE PICART V SMITH [citation] STREET. . and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or. A2010 . who said that: “When the vault was placed on the grave a hole was placed on the vault so that water could come into the vault because it was raining heavily then because the vault has no hole the vault will float and the grave would be filled with water. 1918 NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of La Union FACTS .On December 12. and from this moment it was no longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety.Private respondent has exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave. there was an appreciable risk that. as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant.He did this because he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. he was. casis . March 15. but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done. the court thinks. .The pony had not as yet exhibited fright." .Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet.As the defendant neared the bridge he saw the plaintiff and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. ."Sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof". ." Standard dictionaries define seal as any of various closures or fastenings that cannot be opened without rupture and that serve as a check against tampering or unauthorized opening. then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control. Interment Foreman.In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side.When he had gotten quite near. it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken.They entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care."Sealed" meant "closed. .Hence. .In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away. continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. a concrete vault was installed and after the burial. the defendant. 2. or in an outer wall of stone. .However.22 - prof. . .Syquias claim that there was a breach of contract because it was stated in the brochures that “lot may hold single or double internment underground in sealed concrete vault. given the novelty of the apparition and the rapidity of the approach. brick or concrete. was guilty of negligence that would give rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done HELD YES .As the automobile approached. .Before he had gotten half way across. the appeal ISSUE WON the defendant.In so doing. Dispositive CA decision affirmed in toto.torts & damages Reasoning .

.After watching the operation of the traveling crane used in handling the defendant's coal. 1905. David Taylor. who. and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. an employee of the defendant. became frightened and started to run away. it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. about 12 years of age. Jessie. and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. blameworthy. that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. the boys picked up all they could find. . Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. negligence is clearly established. and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches. The power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge. Murphy was not in his quarters. . the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences. Could a prudent man. was at the same time when he received the injuries complained of. 1902. These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. hung them of a stick. .torts & damages have used in the same situation? If not. and on his death or incapacity the mother. xxx xxx xxx "The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage." [citation] CARSON. and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. placed in the position of the defendant. foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so. Finding on inquiry that Mr.The Defendant Company’s defense that the caps were under the duty of independent contractors deserves scant consideration since these workers have been under the supervision of one of the company’s foremen. his nearest relative."ART. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. casis three went to the home of the boy Manuel. They then opened one of the caps with a knife.The plaintiff himself was not free from fault. but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible. by his father. crossed the footbridge of the Isla del Provisor. for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. They thrust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. FACTS .Stated in these terms. and carried them home. by quasi—contracts. and their right to take them. without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. It will be noted however. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within the city of Manila. followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision. spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. a minor.Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case. The visit made on a Sunday afternoon."ART. and 1908 of that Code. A prudent man.The plaintiff. A2010 . After crossing the footbridge. one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds. or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. as did the trial judge his decision in plaintiff's favor. March 22. impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. 1910 NATURE An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries. instituted by David Taylor.The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite. less than 9 years old. received a slight cut in the neck. 15 years of age. and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule. . with a boy named Manuel Claparols. . who had promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. more mature than the average boy of his age. then he is guilty of negligence. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded. but could not find one. is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. plaintiff. the son of a mechanical engineer. xxx xxx xxx "Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprises are equally liable for the damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties. of which each took one end. . DISPOSITION Appealed decision is reversed. .Plaintiff Taylor appears to have rested his case. 1903. and all TAYLOR V MANILA RAILROAD . not only for personal acts and omission. for the purpose of visiting one Murphy. would have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk. . Murphy. they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian. and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. known as the Isla del Provisor. Manuel looked for a hammer. After some discussion as to the ownership of caps. is liable for the damages caused by the minors who alive with them. 1903."The father. causing more or less serious injuries to all three. by contracts. upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902. Reasonable foresight of harm. and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. when the boys proposed purring a match to the contents of the cap. ."ART. The law considers what would be reckless. since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. impassable for vehicles. . . in the case under consideration. and have in themselves considerable explosive power. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. . 1089." . at the westerly end of the island.The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable. An explosion followed.On the 30th of September.23 - prof. Obligations are created by law. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm. the boys. .

the principles on which these cases turn are that "while railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only. it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts. show clearly that he the owner of land is not liable to trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by them." Chief Justice Cooley. the Court said that it is of the opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff. at a place where the railroad company knew.Just because the kids trespassed doesn’t mean that the company is not liable for anything bad that might happen to them. (84 U. To hold otherwise would be expose to all the children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or . whereon things attractive to children are exposed. and which they in their immature judgment might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with.The owners of premises." . If they leave exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to them. ISSUE 1. and in a great variety of similar cases. admit of no other explanation. and there found explosive signal torpedoes left exposed by the railroad company's employees." and. not due to his wanton or willful acts. a negligent omission." and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of an adult." In such cases the owner of the premises can not be heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation whatever." . (2) that no exception to this rule exists in favor of children who are injured by dangerous machinery naturally calculated to attract them to the premises. counsel for plaintiff relied on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last result in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases. voicing the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan. if the child is actually injured.As regards the maturity of the child. or where such infant found upon the premises a dangerous machine. attributable to the negligence of the company). this has to be examined on a case-to-case basis. formally declared that it adhered "to the principles announced in the case of Railroad Co. both English and America. at a place where the railroad company's premises. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in severally state courts. vs. is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. (4) that there is no difference between children and adults of an invitation or a license to enter upon another's premises. (wherein the principal question was whether a railroad company was liable for an injury received by an infant while upon its premises. In the case at bar. and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward them must calculate upon this. on the other hand.The owners shall be also be liable for the damages caused —"1. they should expect that liberty to be taken. from idle curiosity. children who would likely to come. (3) that an invitation of license to cross the premises of another can not be predicated on the mere fact that no steps have been taken to interfere with such practice.24 - prof.torts & damages . for which he may and should be held responsible. plaintiff at the time of the accident was well—grown youth of 15. By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence. which therefore was not. In these. casis occupants of land upon which they might naturally and reasonably be expected to enter." . who from mere idle curiosity.). or for purposes of amusement. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion. properly speaking. However. despite his denials on the witness stands. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that. if such injury was.As laid down in Railroad Co. However. and take precautions accordingly. therefore. as described by the little girl who was present. after an exhaustive and critical analysis and review of may of the adjudged cases. is clearly a breach of duty.In the typical cases. or upon which the public are expressively or impliedly permitted to enter to or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play. NO . vs. therefore. Stout ( 17 Wall. enters upon the railroad company's premises. followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer. such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. and that the defendant. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault." . making the company liable HELD 1. and this is to be determined in such case by the circumstances of the case. must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and impulses. such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. "must calculate upon this. under the circumstances. "While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault. in the case of Powers vs. we also have to look at the proximate cause and the maturity of the plaintiff if it was his negligence that contributed to the principal occurrence of the tragedy. he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. we are satisfied that plaintiff's action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting a match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff. the question involved has been whether a railroad company is liable for an injury received by an infant of tender years. Marlow. one of which when carried away by the visitor. without other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his express invitation or permission. and where the child does not enter under such conditions the owner's failure to make reasonable precaution to guard the child against the injury from unknown or unseen dangers. and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstance of the case.S. 657). and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child form entering premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are accustomed to roam about or to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to enter. or for purposed of amusement. and take precautions accordingly. or had a good reason to suppose. he had been to sea as a cabin boy. exploded and injured him. "attributable to the negligence of the defendant. .50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred.In support of his contention. In the case at bar.The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. 1908. and the cases based thereon. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only. such as a turntable left in such condition as to make it probable that children in playing with it would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where the infant did in fact suffer injury in playing with such machine. placed upon such premises by the owner. Stout. the great weight of authority holds the owner of the premises liable. wherever they go. more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age."ART. was able to earn P2. and for kindling of explosive substance which may not have been placed in a safe and proper place. WON the defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries. and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of the cap. said that: “Children. saying that (1) That A2010 .

operations manager. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter. a former employee of Syvel’s Dept Store who helped bring Zhieneth to the hospital. on that account. Criselda momentarily let go of her daughter’s hand to sign her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter. 2. Makati City. then he is guilty of negligence. conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence. Under the circumstances thus described. which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence. exempt from criminal liability. NEGLIGENCE.An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. .On the other hand. for the protection of the interest of another person. Private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar. ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. The management did nothing. heard her tell the doctor that she “nothing. 1983. either criminal or civil. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous. whereby such other person suffers injury.On May 9. The counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong base and was used without incident for the past 15 years. an event happening without any human agency.After the burial of their daughter. that degree of care. The rule. he can not recover. WON the incident is accident or attributable to negligence 2. A2010 . She looked behind her and saw her daughter on the floor. it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH.She was operated on immediately at the hospital.Gonzales’ testimony about what Zhieneth said to the doctor should be accepted because at the time she said it. petitioners did.The conclusive presumption favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. CA and CA mfr – for the Aguilars. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age.e. In our jurisdiction. on the hospital bed. to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. and is.” with a base smaller than the top. . event or happening. So the Aguilars filed a complaint for damages wherein they sought the payment of P157. and wake and funeral expenses. Petitioners Leonardo Kong. or if happening wholly or partly through human agency. should not be believed because he might have ill feelings towards petitioners. Smith. Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care. She suddenly felt a gust of wind and heard a loud thud. No contributory negligence from Zhieneth . P20. et al. This means she wasn’t making it up. . an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.The Aguilars’ side: While in the dept store. and supervisor.RTC – for Jarco Marketing Corp." DISPOSITION The petition is DISMISSED. P300. The testimony of the present employees (that Zhieneth climbed the counter so it fell) should instead be believed. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.. . ISSUE 1. and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence.torts & damages knew what he was about. the Aguilars demanded from the petitioners the reimbursement of hospital and medical bills. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability. unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment. Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's branch manager. 1999 FACTS . Yet. neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand.The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v. in view of the fact that the little girl. Store. respectively. under our law. If negligence. a child of such tender age and in extreme pain. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. is that a child under nine years of JARCO MARKETING CORP V CA (AGUILAR) DAVIDE. . 9 years of age. It was deliberately placed at a corner to avoid such accidents. pinned by the gift-wrapping counter.000 for attorney's fees and an unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary damages. Zhieneth was guilty of contributory negligence because she tried to climb the counter. who was negligent? HELD 1. December 21. . The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained. Both Gonzales and Guevarra testified to the structural instability and shakiness of the counter which is in the shape of and inverted “L. Zhieneth was crying and screaming for help. one cannot exist with the other. casis .25 - prof. .86 for actual damages. They both had informed management (while they were still working there) that the counter should be nailed to the floor. who was with him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap. et al’s side: Criselda was negligent in taking care of her daughter for allowing her to roam freely. Negligence is "the failure to observe. Gonzales and Guevarra. . through their negligence or omission to secure or make stable the counter's base. . became frightened and ran away. therefore. . would do. Petitioners refused to pay.Petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. Criselda never let go of her daughter except to sign the credit card slip. a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment. The testimony of two former employees.” when asked “what did you do?” She died 14 days later. Gonzales testified that the gift wrapping counter was right beside the verification counter where Criselda was signing. The protruding part of the counter was at the costumer side. as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family. the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury. Criselda was able to ask people to help her and bring her daughter to the hospital. Thus. RTC mfr – for the Aguilars. I did not come near the counter and the counter just fell on me. All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling event before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who testified in court. It is "a fortuitous circumstance. negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man.522. It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a physician are generally considered declarations and admissions.Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvel's Department Store. was his own act of putting a match to the contents of the cap. Gonzales." Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory. i. JARCO MKTG.We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated. Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2nd flr or Syvel’s Dept.Jarco Mktg Corp. Sadly. she was in so much pain and she answered right away. She was 6 years old. and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one. the immediate cause of the explosion .000 for moral damages. a child under nine years of age is." . by analogy. as one of its determining factors. . ET AL.

and received answer from the station to the effect that they would send an inspector. Abaya.000 for the death of Magtibay.The suspension of the sentence under Art. and its top laden with formica. ISSUE WON the suspension of the sentence under Art. Jose Salvador and Saturnino Endrina. for every tortuous act of violence or other pure tort. The CFI dismissed the criminal case. . a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. exonerated him from the crime charged HELD NO .As the three neared the place where the wire was down.telling him that the wire might be charged.The wire was cased in the usual covering.Saturnino yielded to this admonition and stopped. The Court of First Instance (CFI) Batangas found Tiangco guilty as charged. . but merely put off the imposition of the corresponding penalty. such as is commonly used by the defendant company for the purpose of conducting electricity for lighting. 80 of the RPC. The time and distance were both significant. February 28. “I have for some time been in the habit of touching wires”. . If property has been destroyed or other loss occasioned by a wrongful act. the sentence was suspended. . 57 PHIL 478 STREET. Shaped like an-inverted "L" the counter was heavy.CRISELDA too. who was somewhat ahead. Nor did such dismissal of the criminal case obliterate his civil liability for damages. 1932 FACTS ***This action was instituted by Julian del Rosario for the purpose of recovering damages from Meralco for the death of his son. but simply that he would suffer no penalty. Disposition The instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED A2010 . (Sangco) . . Subsequently. who was a few paces ahead of his classmates. Accordingly. . . Saturnino made a motion as if it touch it. no doubt feeling that he was challenged in the matter. but Alberto. of whom plaintiffs-appellees are the lawful heirs. No contributory negligence from Criselda . a minor under 18 years of age. The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal that it was not durable after all. 1944 NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance Batangas FACTS . after he had observed good conduct. but reserved such right as the heirs of the deceased might have to recover damages in a civil action against said Tiangco.000 as damages. and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA. Consequently. the civil action in the instant case was filed against defendant-appellant for damages in the sum of P2. after appellant herein had pleaded guilty.A crowd soon collected.Aug 4. all members of the second grade in the public school.80 of the Revised Penal Code. Abaya. after appellant had pleaded guilty.Defendant-appellant Tiangco. but of compensation. 9 yrs old. . said. . and that without reference to the question of moral guilt. ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us. put out his index finger and touch the wire. knew never to touch a broken electrical wire (as his dad told him so!). no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. the neighborhood school was dismissed and the children went home. resulting from a shock from a wire used by the defendant for the transmission of electricity.He immediately fell face downwards. but from the testimony of Demetrio Bingao. Luke's Hospital the child was pronounced dead. he stepped into a garage which was located nearby and asked Jose Soco to telephone the Malabon station of MERALCO that an electrical wire was burning at that place. should be absolved from any contributory negligence.Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter. and some one cut the wire and disengaged the body. At this precise moment. in order to give the delinquent minor a chance to be reformed. but this had been burned off for some distance from the point where the wire parted.At the time that message was sent the wire had not yet parted. but Alberto. Initially. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything.Soco transmitted the message at 2.As soon as Noguera took cognizance of the trouble. casis electricity used in lighting the City of Manila and its suburbs. at time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter. one of the witnesses for the defense. Alberto. . . pleaded guilty to an information for homicide through reckless negligence in that he had recklessly driven an automobile and thereby caused the death of Magtibay. Further. .At 4 p. later to the latter's hand. until Tiangco would reach his majority.The wire was an ordinary number 6 triple braid weather proof wire. 1930 – 2pm: a wire used by the defendant on Dimas.torts & damages age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. When. the criminal case was dismissed. . it is just that the loss should upon the estate of the wrongdoer rather than that of a guiltless person. and he was committed to the care and custody of Atty.m. this did not mean that he was exonerated from the crime charged. It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not secured. and that all of the company's inspectors were the Province. Upon being taken to St. who happened to be the son of an electrician.Jose. CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. . .Jose Noguera saw that the wire was burning and its connections smoking. One of the ends of the wire fell to the ground among some shrubbery close to the way. .stopped Saturnino. it was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. but as he was under 18 years of age.26 - prof. Hence this appeal. For if that was the truth.The engineer of the company says that it was customary for the company to make a special inspection of these wires at least once in six months. did not wipe out his guilt.m. . subject to the supervision of the Superintendent of Public Schools of DEL ROSARIO V MANILA ELECTRIC CO. exclaiming "Ay! madre". therefore.The end of the wire remained in contact with his body which fell near the post. not of punishment. Liability of an infant for his torts is imposed as a mode. ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist.25 p. the infant tort-feasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an adult. MAGTIBAY V TIANGCO 74 Phil 756 BOCOBO. DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed. m. she was just a foot away from her mother. in view of Tiangco’s good conduct recommended the dismissal of the case. it is clear that the end of the wire was on the ground shortly after 3 p. November 5.Alang St for the purpose of conducting . the counter just fell on her.Jose rejoined that he should into touch wires as they carry a current. huge. The CFI gave judgment for plaintiffs for P2.Alberto del Rosario.

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required in their daily rounds to keep a lookout for trouble of this kind. - There is nothing in the record indicating any particular cause for the parting of the wire.l ISSUE WON Manila Electric is liable HELD YES Reasoning - When notice was received at the Malabon station at 2.25 p. m., somebody should have been dispatched to the scene of the trouble at once, or other measures taken to guard the point of danger; but more than an 1 ½ hours passed before anyone from MERALCO appeared on the scene, and in the meantime Alberto had been claimed as a victim. - The mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of Jose (8 yrs old), doesn’t alter the case. - But even supposing that contributory negligence could in some measure be properly imputed to the deceased, such negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case, not having been the determining cause of the accident. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil., 359.) - With respect to the amount of damages recoverable, Julian is entitled to recover P250 for expenses incurred in connection with the death and burial of the boy. - Citing Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Company: Julian should recover the sum of P1,000 as general damages for loss of service. Disposition judgment reversed

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- Principal Soriano cannot be held liable, being head of academic school and not school of arts and trades, in line with Amadora case and Art 2180 of Civil Code. It is only the teacher who should answer for torts committed by their students. Besides, Soriano did not order the digging. - Based on Article 2180, Aquino can be held liable. However, petition is based on Article 2176. Did the acts/omissions of Aquino cause the death of Ylarde? Yes. He is liable for damages. The work required adult laborers. He required the children to remain in the pit after they finished digging. He ordered them to level the soil when a huge stone was at brink of falling. He went to another place and left the kids. - Left by themselves, IT WAS BUT NATURAL FOR THE CHILDREN TO PLAY AROUND. IN RULING THAT YLARDE WAS IMPRUDENT, THE LOWER COURT DID NOT CONSIDER HIS AGE AND MATURITY. A MINOR SHOULD NOT BE HELD TO THE SAME DEGREE OF CARE AS AN ADULT. - Aquino also said the digging was part of Work Education. This is unacceptable. Work is too dangerous and it was not even in the lesson plan.

- The indemnity allowed in criminal case is merely incidental to the main object sought, which is the punishment of the guilty party. - In a civil action, the principal object is the recovery of damages for wrongful death; and where, as in this case, the defendant is a corporation, not subject to criminal prosecution for the act complained of, the question assumes a vastly different aspect. - There should be a distinction between the civil liability of an ordinary person who, by wrongful act, has caused the death of another; and the civil liability of a corporation, organized primarily for profit, which has caused the death of a person by failure to exercise due care in the prosecution of its business. - The liability of such a corporation for damages must be regarded as a part of the risks which it assumes when it undertakes to promote its own business; and just as it is entitled to earn adequate profits from its business, so it should be made adequately to compensate those who have suffered damage by its negligence.

YLARDE V AQUINO [citation] GANCAYCO; July 29, 1988
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - Soriano was principal. Aquino was a teacher. The school was littered with concrete blocks. Teacher Banez started burying them. Aquino gathered 18 male pupils to help. He ordered them to dig. Work was unfinished. - Ff day, Aquino called 4 of the 18 to continue. Aquino continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil. Aquino left the children to level the loose soil and borrowed a key from Banez. Aquino told the kids not to touch the stone. - 3 of the 4 kids jumped into the pit. The remaining Abaga jumped on the concrete block causing it to slide down. 2 were able to escape but student Ylarde sustained injuries. 3 days later he died. Parents filed suit against Aquino and Soriano. Lower court dismissed and CA affirmed and said child Ylarde was negligent. ISSUE WON Aquino and Soriano can be held liable for damages HELD

CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO V PHILIPPINE MOTORS CORPORATION [citation] STREET; November 3, 1930
NATURE Appeal from decision of the CFI FACTS - Cranston was the representative of the plaintiff in Manila and plaintiff was the registered owner of the motor schooner Gwendoline. - Cranston decided to have the engine on the Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner. He had a conference with Quest, Phil. Motors manager, who agreed to do the job, with the understanding that payment should be made upon completion of the work. - The work was begun and conducted under the supervision of Quest, chiefly by a mechanic whom Quest took with him to the boat. Quest had the assistance of the members of the crew of the Gwendoline, who had been directed by Cranston to place themselves under Quest's directions. - Upon preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest concluded that a new carburetor was needed and thus installed a Zenith carburetor. The engine was tried with gasoline and the result was satisfactory. The next problem was to introduce into the carburetor the baser fuel, consisting of a low grade of oil mixed with

SEPARATE OPINION ABAD SANTOS [concur in part and dissent in part] - He concurs that MERALCO is held liable for the death
of Alberto, but dissents in so far as the decision allows the recovery of the father of the sum of P1,250 only as damages. It should be P 2250. - His reasoning: It is well settled in this jurisdiction that an action will lie to recover damages for death caused by the wrongful act. (Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821.) - In criminal cases- indemnity to the heirs of the deceased is equivalent to P1,000 - Whatever may be the reasons for the rule followed in criminal cases, I am of the opinion that those reasons do not obtain in fixing the amount of the damages recoverable in the present case.

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distillate. A temporary tank to contain the mixture was placed on deck above and at a short distance from the compartment covering the engine. This tank was connected with the carburetor by a piece of tubing, which was apparently not well fitted at the point where it was connected with the tank. The fuel mixture leaked from the tank and dripped sown into the engine compartment. The new fuel line and that already in use between the gasoline tank and carburetor were so fixed that it was possible to change from the gasoline fuel to the mixed fuel. This arrangement enables the operator to start the engine on gasoline and then, after the engine had been operating for a few moments, to switch to the new fuel supply. - It was observed that the carburetor was flooding, and that the gasoline, or other fuel, was trickling freely from the lower part to the carburetor to the floor. This fact was called to Quest's attention, but he said that, when the engine had gotten to running well, the flooding would disappear. - The boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run. The engine stopped a few times during the first part of the course, owing to the use of an improper mixture of fuel. In the course of the trial, Quest remained outside of the engine compartment and occupied himself with making distillate, with a view to ascertaining what proportion of the two elements would give best results in the engine. - As the boat was coming in from this run, the engine stopped, and connection again had to be made with the gasoline line to get a new start. After this had been done the mechanic, or engineer, switched to the tube connecting with the new mixture. A moment later a back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass of flames, which the members of the crew were unable to subdue. The salvage from, the wreck, when sold, brought only the sum of P150. The value of the boat, before the accident occured, as the court found, was P10,000. - CFI gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff to recover of the defendant the sum of P9,850, with interest at 6 per centum per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint, until satisfaction of the judgment, with costs. ISSUE WON the loss of the boat is chargeable to the negligence and lack of skill of Quest HELD YES Ratio When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he

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be incompatible with the situation now under consideration. - This action was instituted about two years after the accident had occured, and after Quest had ceased to be manager and had gone back to the US. Upon these facts, the defendant bases the contention that the action should be considered stale. It is sufficient reply to say that the action was brought within the period limited by the statute of limitations and the situation is not one where the defense of laches can be properly invoked. DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from affirmed.

will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. Reasoning - The temporary tank in which the mixture was prepared was apparently at too great an elevation from the carburetor, so that when the fuel line was opened, the hydrostatic pressure in the carburetor was greater than the delicate parts of the carburetor could sustain. This was the cause of the flooding of the carburetor; and the result was that; when the back fire occurred, the external parts of the carburetor, already saturated with gasoline, burst into flames, whence the fire was quickly communicated to the highly inflammable material near-by. The leak along the pipe line and the flooding of the carburetor had created a dangerous situation, which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken precautions to avoid. The back fire may have been due either to the fact that the spark was too advanced or the fuel improperly mixed. - Proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats. Possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire. Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was here, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occured but for Quest's carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from blame. - The trial judge seems to have proceeded on the idea that, inasmuch as Quest had control of the Gwendoline during the experimental run, the defendant corporation was in the position of a bailee and that, as a consequence, the burden of proof was on the defendant to exculpate itself from responsibility by proving that the accident was not due to the fault of Quest. As a rule workmen who make repairs on a ship in its owner's yard, or a mechanic who repairs a coach without taking it to his shop, are not bailees, and their rights and liabilities are determined by the general rules of law, under their contract. The true bailee acquires possession and what is usually spoken of as special property in the chattel bailed. As a consequence of such possession and special property, the bailee is given a lien for his compensation. These ideas seem to

UNITED STATES V PINEDA 37 Phil 456 MALCOLM; January 22, 1918
NATURE Appeal requiring a construction and an application, for the first time, of the penal provisions of the Pharmacy Law. FACTS - Santiago Pineda is a registered pharmacist of long standing and the owner of a drug store located at Calle Santo Cristo, Manila. Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription obtained from Dr. Richardson, and which on other occasions Santos had given to his horses with good results, at Pineda's drug store for filling. The prescription read: "clorato de potasa - 120 gramos - en seis papelitos de 20 gramos, para caballo." Under the supervision of Pineda, the prescription was prepared and returned to Santos in the form of six papers marked, "Botica Pineda - Clorato potasa - 120.00 - en seis papeles - Para caballo- Sto. Cristo , Binondo, Manila." Santos, under the belief that he had purchased the potassium chlorate which he had asked for, put two of the packages in water and gave the doses to two of his sick horses. Another package was mixed with water for another horse, but was not used. The two horses, to which had been given the preparation, died shortly afterwards. Santos, thereupon, took the three remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for examination. Drs. Peña and Darjuan, of the Bureau of Science, found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate. At the instance of Santos, the two chemists also went to the drug store of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate. (Barium chlorate, it should be noted, is a poison; potassium chlorate is not.) Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses, and found that death was the result of

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poisoning. ISSUES 1. WON the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the chemist Peña and Darjuan as to their purchase of potassium chlorate at the drug store of the accused, which proved to be barium chlorate 2. WON the lower court erred in finding that the substance sold by the accused to Feliciano Santos was barium chlorate and not potassium chlorate 3. WON the lower court erred in finding that the accused has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of an infraction of the Pharmacy Law, Act No. 597, section 17, as amended HELD 1. NO Ratio On the trial of a criminal case where the question relates to the tendency of certain testimony to throw light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a particular person, there is a certain discretion on the part of the trial judge which a court of errors will not interfere with, unless it manifestly appear that the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the question at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the accused. Reasoning - What appellant is relying on is the maxim res inter alios acta. As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is inadmissible. But appellant has confused this maxim and this rule with certain exceptions thereto. The effort is not to convict the accused of a second offense. Nor is there an attempt to draw the mind away from the point at issue and thus to prejudice defendant's case. The purpose is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent, and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified and fraudulent intent may even be established. It has been said that there is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents. 2. NO Reasoning The proof demonstrates the contrary. 3. NO Ratio In view of the tremendous and imminent danger to the public from the careless sale of poisons and medicines, we do not deem it too rigid a rule to hold that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it be through negligence or mistake. Reasoning - The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the

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unlawful is the giving of a false name to the drug asked for. This view is borne out by the Spanish translation, which we are permitted to consult to explain the English text. In the Spanish "supuesto" is used, and this word is certainly not synonymous with "fraudulent." The usual badges of fraud, falsity, deception, and injury must be present - but not scienter. Dispositive Judgment of the lower court, sentencing the defendant to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs, is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant, without prejudice to any civil action which may be instituted.

business which the law demands. - Turning to the law, certain points therein as bearing on our present facts must be admitted. Thus, defendant is a pharmacist. As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs and poisons which he sells. And finally it is provided that it shall be unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent name." It is the word "fraudulent" which has given the court trouble. What did the Legislature intend to convey by this restrictive adjective? - Were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud it would be difficult, if not impossible, to convict any druggist of a violation of the law. The prosecution would have to prove to a reasonable degree of certainty that the druggist made a material representation; that it was false; that when he made it he knew that it was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; that he made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by the purchaser; that the purchaser acted in reliance upon it, and that the purchaser suffered injury. Such a construction with a literal following of well-known principles on the subject of fraud would strip the law of at least much of its force. It would leave the innocent purchaser of drugs, who must blindly trust in the good faith and vigilance of the pharmacist, at the mercy of any unscrupulous vendor. We should not, therefore, without good reason so devitalize the law. - The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs. The vendor and the vendee do not stand at arms length as in ordinary transactions. An imperative duty is on the druggist to take precautions to prevent death or serious injury to anyone who relies on his absolute honesty and peculiar learning. The nature of drugs is such that examination would not avail the purchaser any thing. It would be idle mockery for the customer to make an examination of a compound of which he can know nothing. Consequently, it must be that the druggist warrants that he will deliver the drug called for. - Remembering particularly the care and skill which are expected of druggists, that in some jurisdictions they are liable even for their mistake and in others have the burden placed upon them to establish that they were not negligent, it cannot be that the Philippine Legislature intended to use the word "fraudulent" in all its strictness. A plea of accident and mistake cannot excuse for they cannot take place unless there be wanton and criminal carelessness and neglect. How the misfortune occurs is unimportant, if under all the circumstances the fact of occurrence is attributable to the druggist as a legal fault. Rather considering the responsibility for the quality of drugs which the law imposes on druggists and the position of the word "fraudulent" in juxtaposition to "name," what is made

BPI V CA 216 SCRA 51 GUTIERREZ; November 26, 1992
FACTS - In the afternoon of October 9, 1981, a person purporting to be Eligia G. Fernando, who had a money market placement as evidenced by a promissory note with a maturity date of November 11, 1981 and a maturity value of P2,462,243.19, called BPI's Money Market Department. The caller wanted to preterminate the placement, but Reginaldo Eustaquio, Dealer Trainee in BPI's Money Market Department, told her "trading time" was over for the day, which was a Friday, and suggested that she call again the following week. The promissory note the caller wanted to preterminate was a roll-over of an earlier 50-day money market placement that had matured on September 24, 1981. - Later that afternoon, Eustaquio conveyed the request for pretermination to the officer who before had handled Eligia G. Fernando's account, Penelope Bulan, but Eustaquio was left to attend to the pretermination process. - On October 12, 1981, the caller of the previous Friday followed up with Eustaquio, merely by phone again, on the pretermination of the placement. Although not familiar with the voice of the real Eligia G. Fernando, Eustaquio "made certain" that the caller was the real Eligia G. Fernando by "verifying" that the details the caller gave about the placement tallied with the details in "the ledger/folder" of the account. Eustaquio knew the real Eligia G. Fernando to be the Treasurer of Philippine American Life Insurance Company (Philamlife) since he was handling Philamlife's corporate money market account. But neither Eustaquio nor Bulan who originally handled Fernando's account, nor anybody else at BPI, bothered to call up Fernando at her Philamlife office to verify the request for pretermination.

in turn. tax account number.500. the woman holding herself out as Eligia G. to tell him of the new delivery instructions for the checks. Dy. which the woman holding herself out as Eligia G.607.BPI contends that respondent CBC's clear warranty that "all prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsements guaranteed" stamped at the back of the Fernando. Fernando. her niece would have to being a written authorization from her to pick up the checks. Cashier. to pick them up. Manager and Administrative Assistant.30 - prof. CBC's guaranty of prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement was then stamped on the two checks. . a long-standing "valued client" of CBC. who did not interview the new client but affixed her initials on the application form after reviewing it. 1981 and maturity value of P2.100. both authorized signatories for BPI. This final approval of the new current account is indicated on the application form by the initials of Regina G. In the event that the payee's signature is forged.462.On November 11. BPI returned the two checks in controversy to CBC for the reason "Payee's endorsement forged". were sent to Gerlanda E.BPI then filed a petition for review with the Regional Trial Court of Makati who dismissed said petition but modified the award by including a provision for attorney’s fees in favor of CBC. payable to "cash". the maturity date of Eligia G. There is also no showing that Eligia G. by Antonio Concepcion whom Cuaso knew to have opened. Fernando".206. and Check No. Fernando and Rosemarie Fernando. 240005 dated the same day for P1. Rosemarie Fernando.On October 14. which CBC forthwith sent to clearing and which BPI cleared on the same day. supported by Eligia G. Although the checks represented the termination proceeds of Eligia G.. Eustaquio then told her that if it were her niece who was going to get the checks. Fernando deposited the two checks in controversy with Current Account No. and initial deposit of P10. 1981 for P4. however. Fernando's signature in BPI's file. 1981. were prepared. the papers. . 240003 dated October 15. Fernando applied at China Banking Corporation's Head Office for the opening of a current account. CBC. the caller insisted on the pretermination just the same and asked that two checks be issued for the proceeds. 1981. 1981 for P48. thus. nationality. de Castro and Celestino Sampiton.00. occupation ("business woman"). Fernando went to BPI for the roll-over of her placement. ISSUES 1.800. 1981. Bernardo Laderas. not just a roll-over of the placement. payable to "cash" which the woman herself also encashed over the counter. 240006 dated the same day for P1. covering the preterminated placement. . . the same person impersonated both Eligia G.000.” . the same caller changed the delivery instructions. casis left Current Account No. instead of the checks being delivered to her office at Philamlife. These incidents led to the filing of this case with the Arbitration Committee. respectively. was that the new client was introduced by Valentin Co. 1981. as shown by the delivery receipt.000. What Cuaso indicated in the application form. "her" date of birth. respectively. among others. Fernando.The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.On November 12. Fernando's placement. and with her initials on the form signifying her approval. Fernado's money market placement with BPI. 1981 . by means of Check No. She executed an affidavit stating that while she was the payee of the two checks in controversy. .58 with interest thereon at 12% per annum from August 12. .16.000. sex. 240001 dated November 3." which was received through clearing from Far East Bank.000.58. payable to "cash" which was received through clearing from PNB Pasay Branch.000.215. 021759 and 021760 for P1.607.Two days after. he changed the delivery instruction on the purchase order slip.000. and on November 4. returned the checks for reason "Beyond Clearing Time".00 and the second for the balance. . Cash Supervisor.However. Eustaquio. 240007 dated the same day for P370. Thus. on October 22. securities clerk.800. Jr. WON the drawer/drawee bank (in this case BPI) may claim reimbursement from the collecting bank which earlier paid the proceeds of the checks after the same checks were cleared HELD 1. Her endorsement on the two checks was found to conform with the depositor's specimen signature. 1981. together with the papers consisting of the money market placement was to be preterminated and the promissory note (No.Informed that the placement would yield less than the maturity value because of its pretermination.266. 1981. NO .243. 1981. The last withdrawal on November 4. BPI issued her a new promissory note (No. Fernando's affidavit.00. nos. an account upon the introduction of Valentin Co.206.Later in the same morning. one for P1.000." which the woman identifying herself as Eligia G. Fernando encashed over the counter. 35623) to be preterminated. writing thereon "Rosemarie Fernando release only with authority to pick up. verifier clerk and documentation clerk. in fact Rosemarie Fernando who got the two checks from the dispatcher. 1981. the checks went to the dispatcher for delivery. by means of Check No. passed through the position analyst. on October 19. 26310-3 with a balance of only P571. payable to "cash. and that the checks be delivered to her office at Philamlife. Fernando's purported signature on the letter requesting the pretermination and the latter authorizing Rosemarie Fernando to pick up the two checks. following the processing route. withdrawals began on Current Account No. she never received nor endorsed them and that her purported signature on the back of the checks was not hers but forged. 35623 with maturity value of P2. by means of Check No. however. In the afternoon of October 13.00 and P613.61. by means of Check No. The two cashier's checks. Eustaquio had to hurriedly go to the dispatcher. As it turned out. earlier that year.00.torts & damages . 126310-3.19) evidencing the placement which matured that day. both of which letters were presumably handed to the dispatcher by Rosemarie A2010 . she would herself pick up the checks or send her niece. in fact. who signed the two checks that very morning. .77) to evidence a roll-over of the placement. in BPI's Treasury Operations Department.00. payable to "cash. She disclaimed having preterminated her placement on October 12. She was accompanied and introduced to Emily Sylianco Cuaso. was compared or verified with Eligia G. the Board of Directors of the PCHC reversed the Arbitration Committee's decision and dismissed the complaint of BPI while ordering it to pay CBC the sum of P1.The Arbitration Committee ruled in favor of BPI and ordered CBC to pay the former the amount of P1. Such purported signature has been established to be forged although it has a "close similarity" to the real signature of Eligia G. who would pick up the checks. before the two cashier's checks.00. With her surrender of the original of the promissory note (No. Rosemarie Fernando. As finally proceeds. civil status. 40314 with maturity date of December 23.It was. a woman who represented herself to be Eligia G. . Thereafter.500. upon CBC’s motion for reconsideration. the application form shows the signature of "Eligia G. 1983. 26310-3: On October 16.000. the real Eligia G. the dispatcher failed to get or to require the surrender of the promissory note evidencing the placement. she referred the application to the New Accounts Section for processing. both payable to Eligia G. Fernando encashed over the counter. and from his desk. proceeded to prepare the "purchase order slip" for the requested pretermination as required by office procedure. WON the collecting bank has absolute liability on a warranty of the validity of all prior endorsements stamped at the back of the checks 2. 1981. This telephone conversation ended with the caller's statement that "definitely" it would be her niece.00.

yet. the point that comes uppermost is whether the drawee bank was negligent in failing to discover the alteration or the forgery. there was yet no loss and the impostor could have decided to desist from completing the same plan and could have held to the checks without negotiating them. To the extent that the degree of negligence is equated to the . which respondent CBC did.” . Fernando with that of the impostor Eligia G. however. it can recover the amount paid from the collecting bank. The Arbitration Committee. At this stage. With these circumstances.Petitioner BPI's contention that CBC alone should bear the loss must fail. 56. however disagree in the evaluation of the degree of negligence of the banks. Fernando's purported signature on the letter requesting the pretermination and the letter authorizing her niece to pickup the checks.31 - prof. belittled petitioner BPI's negligence compared to that of respondent CBC which it declared as graver and the proximate cause of the loss of the subject checks to the impostor who impersonated Eligia G. . The gap of one (1) day between the issuance and delivery of the checks bearing the impostor's name as payee and the impostor's negotiating the said forged checks by opening an account and depositing the same with respondent CBC .BPI further argues that the acts and omissions of respondent CBC are the cause "that set into motion the actual and continuous sequence of events that produced the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. was requiring before the two checks in controversy were delivered. the banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. petitioner BPI's reliance on the doctrine of last clear chance to clear it from liability is not well-taken. The issue as to who between the parties should bear the loss in the payment of the forged checks necessities the determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties involved in the controversy in relation to the forged checks. respondent CBC had no way to discover the fraud at all. Under this premise petitioner BPI asserts that the presenting or collecting bank.The next issue hinges on whose negligence was the proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by an impostor. casis proximate cause of the loss. In fact the records fail to show that respondent CBC had knowledge. While the Arbitration Committee declared the negligence of respondent CBC graver.In presenting the checks for clearing and for payment. a vice-president of Philamlife. without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. care and trustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. the drawee bank would not have paid on the checks. CBC had no prior notice of the fraud perpetrated by BPI's employees on the pretermination of Eligia G. there is no question that the banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees. her signature was in BPI's file. Hence. Fernando's money market placement. . ." Petitioner BPI anchors its argument on its stance that there was "a gap.In the present case. the underlying circumstances of the case show that the general rule on forgery is not applicable. they cannot erase the fact that they were both guilty in not exercising extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. stated that “these withdrawals. according to petitioner BPI. 2. respondent CBC. The Arbitration Committee. a hiatus. Fernando. without any further showing that the CBC employees ‘had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect. Fernando's account did not do anything about the account's pre-termination. . Negotiable Instruments Law) that their action in accepting their checks for deposit and allowing the withdrawals against the same ‘amounted to bad faith’ cannot be considered as basis for holding CBC liable. However.Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. Fernando is not a depositor of CBC. b) The officer who used to handle Eligia G. Without such warranty." Thus. Under this doctrine. Fernando. No matter how many justifications both banks present to avoid responsibility. which nobody in BPI bothered to make to Eligia G. but which BPI neglected to take. However. In this jurisdiction we recognize negligence of the party invoking forgery as an exception to the general rule. and payment made "through or under such signature" is ineffectual or does not discharge the instrument. the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower courts declared that petitioner BPI's negligence was graver. The exception to this rule is when the party relying in the forgery is "precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority. No amount of legal jargon can reverse the clear meaning of the warranty. petitioner BPI maintains that considerations of relative negligence become totally irrelevant. A2010 . For obvious reasons. . this Court has emphasized that the collecting bank or last endorser generally suffers the loss because it has the duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior endorsements considering that the act of presenting the check for payment to the drawee is an assertion that the party making the presentment has done its duty to ascertain the genuineness of the endorsements. however. . could not have resulted in the discovery of the fraud.Applying these principles.Apropos the matter of forgery in endorsements. Following the general rule.In the present petition the payee's names in the checks were forged. NO . the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower court. the surrender of the promissory note evidencing the money market placement that was supposedly pre-terminated. Fernando. a comparison of the signature of Eligia G. the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. . By the very nature of their work the degree of responsibility. . or knowledge of such facts’ (Sec. c) Again no verification appears to have been made on Eligia G.The Arbitration Committee in its decision analyzed the negligence of the employees of petitioner BPI involved in the processing of the pre-termination of Eligia G. Moreover. actual or implied. . If the drawee-bank discovers that the signature of the payee was forged after it has paid the amount of the check to the holder thereof. . As the warranty has proven to be false and inaccurate.The general rule under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law is to the effect that a forged signature is "wholly inoperative". the checks are "wholly inoperative" and of no effect. and d) Another step that could have foiled the fraud.The PCHC Board of Directors. the collecting bank made an express guarantee on the validity of "all prior endorsements. the defendant is liable for any damage arising out of the falsity of its representation.The records show that petitioner BPI as drawee bank and respondent CBC as representing or collecting bank were both negligent resulting in the encashment of the forged checks. we rule that the issue as to whose negligence is graver is relevant. Fernando's money market placement and in the issuance and delivery of the subject checks in this wise: a) The impostor could have been readily unmasked by a mere telephone call. of the fraud perpetrated by the impostor and the employees of BPI. where both parties were negligent and such negligence were not contemporaneous.torts & damages checks was an unrestrictive clearing guaranty that all prior endorsements in the checks are genuine. stamped at the back of the checks are the clear warranty: ALL PRIOR ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OF ENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED. Petitioner BPI points out that the gap of one (1) day that elapsed from its issuance and delivery of the checks to the impostor is material on the issue of proximate cause. Hence. an interval between the issuance and delivery of said checks by petitioner BPI to the impostor and their actual payment of CBC to the impostor. had an unquestioned liability when it turned out that the payee's signature on the checks were forged. Petitioner BPI insists that the doctrine of last clear chance should have been applied considering the circumstances of this case.

No. whereby he was declared exempt from criminal liability but was obliged to indemnify the heirs if the murdered woman. throwing the plaintiff from the vehicle and causing injuries . E.413. Both banks were not able to overcome the presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. the nonChristian Baggay. in the sum of P1. ISSUE WON the negligence of plaintiff contributed to the “principal occurrence” or “only to his own injury. plaintiff must cross defendant’s tracks. No facts to merit a higher award of damages to plaintiff. because of the violent death of the woman Bil-liingan. October 1.M. It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions described. While it is true that petitioner BPI's negligence may have been the proximate cause of the loss. he cannot recover. for the purpose of holding a song service called "buni" according to the Tinguian custom. and fell. dated February 15. They let the opportunity slip by when the ordinary prudence expected of bank employees would have sufficed to seize it. greater reason to rule that the proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by an impostor was due to the negligence of petitioner BPI. with murder. for lesiones.Intoxication in itself is not negligence. Disposition The questioned Decision and Resolution are MODIFIED. 1914 NATURE An action to recover damages for injuries sustained in an accident .000. the judge on April 28 rendered the judgment cited above. and the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground.16.torts & damages is not controlling.” (If the former. the trial court was correct in apportioning damages) HELD NO Ratio Intoxication in itself is not negligence. FACTS . September 1. Under these circumstances. still the CBC employees had ample opportunity to avoid the harm which befell both CBC and BPI. 28 Phil 122 MORELAND. the total amount of the two (2) forged checks. FACTS . plaintiff drove home in a calesa and.000. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. because every person liable criminally for a crime or misdemeanor is also liable for reparation of damage and for indemnification of the harm done.At the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks.. To enter his premises from the street. . might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what his condition. 1109. without provocation suddenly attacked the woman Bil-liingan with a bolo.It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in maintaining its tracks. and on his own mother.413. is to US V BAGGAY 20 PHIL 142 TORRES.16 A2010 . Fernando with the connivance of BPI's employees. After trial and proof that the defendant was suffering from mental aberration. are stated which warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent. the impostor would complete her deception by encashing the forged checks. respondent CBC's negligence contributed equally to the success of the impostor in encashing the proceeds of the forged checks. under such circumstances. stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling. and such intoxication was the primary cause of the accident . The opening of the account itself was accompanied by inexplicable acts clearly showing negligence. such losses are subject to mitigation by the courts.Defendant Manila Electric is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street railway . Agueng. whereupon the defendant's counsel appealed to this court. . Calapini.Trial court held that both parties were negligent. It is not unnatural or unexpected that after taking the risk of impersonating Eligia G. inflicting a serious wound on her head from which she expired immediately. DISPOSITION Plaintiff not negligent. It was the gross negligence of the employees of both banks which resulted in the fraud and the subsequent loss. the rails were above-gruond. 1911 NATURE Appeal by the defendant from the judgment rendered on April 28. when he.R. leaped forward. we apply Article 2179 of the Civil Code to the effect that while respondent CBC may recover its losses. . 1910. And while we do not apply the last clear chance doctrine as controlling in this case.215. the horse stumbled.A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the ties themselves aboveground. Bil-liingan. a sober man would not have fallen while a drunken man did.32 - prof. Province of Ilocos Sur. Due care on the part of CBC could have prevented any loss. in crossing the tracks to enter his premises. charging the non-Christian Baggay. if the latter. Abra. to pay the costs in the case and to be confined in an institution for the insane until further order of the court. There is therefore. BPI shall be responsible for 60% while CBC shall share 40% of the loss of P2. and to conclude that.The Court cannot ignore the fact that the CBC employees closed their eyes to the suspicious circumstances of huge over-the-counter withdrawals made immediately after the account was opened. Quisamay. but that plaintiff’s negligence was not as great as defendant’s. exempt from criminal liability can still be civilly liable HELD YES Ratio Civil liability accompanies criminal liability. and no facts. The conclusion that if he had been sober he would not have been injured is not warranted by the facts as found. the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel.One night. other than the fact that Wright was intoxicated. but defendant claims the plaintiff was also negligent in that he was so intoxicated. named Dioalan. we are not inclined to rule that petitioner BPI must solely bear the loss of P2. notwithstanding.About the 4th of October. WRIGHT V MANILA ELECTRIC R. & LIGHT CO. but there may be civil liability because of acts ordinarily punishable. . making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the street. jr. several persons were assembled in the defendant's house in the township of Penarrubia.Both banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in the encashment of the forged checks by an impostor. and with the same bolo he like wise inflicted various wounds on the women named Calabayan. Reasoning .For this reason the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the court of Ilocos Sur. casis draw a conclusion which enters the realm of speculation and guesswork. This cause was instituted separately from the other. . 1909. This finding. awarded plaintiff P1. .Plaintiff’s residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which defendant’s tracks run. ISSUE WON an insane person. although the law has declared their perpetrators exempt from criminal liability.215.

he would surely be entitled to compensation.was the accident caused by Filomeno’s “notorious negligence”? .) .” . legal guardian. . the persons who are civilly liable for acts committed by a lunatic or imbecile. the accident which produced this tragic result did not "arise out of" his employment. while the words `in the course of' refer to the time. his act being obviously innocent. and 10 of article 8 does not include exemption from civil liability. — When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. to the danger of injury. Inc. plaintiff Elena Amedo sought to collect from defendant Rio y Olabarrieta. (2) by drunkenness on the part of the laborer who had the accident.". or over this age and under 15. It was a risk to which any person on board the M/S Pilar II. DISPOSITION Therefore. . seaman of the M/S Pilar II. or the result of the nature of such employment. and as he picked up the bill from the floor something accidentally fell upon him and injured him.case provides for other jurisprudence which describe instances of gross negligence attributable to employee (see case). A2010 . if such person be insolvent. 275. which. legal guardianship or power.since the act done by Filomeno was dangerous.Article 17 of the Penal Code states: Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable. even though they be performed unwittingly.By gross negligence is meant "such entire want of care as to raise a presumption that the person in fault is conscious of the probable consequences of carelessness.038. .she was allowed to file an amended complaint which was remanded to the trial court."notorious negligence" has been held to be tantamount to "gross negligence". such as a passenger thereof or an ordinary visitor. and circumstances under which the accident takes place . in spite of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable condition of his deranged mind. AMEDO V RIO [citation] CONCEPCION.Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who. his accident could be attributed to his gross negligence. — Compensation shall not be allowed for injuries caused (1) by the voluntary intent of the employee to inflict such injury upon himself or another person. his two-peso bill was blown by the breeze into the sea and in his effort to retrieve the same from the waters he was drowned. but this protection does not exclude liability for damage caused to those who may have the misfortune to suffer the consequences of his acts. his employment. with costs against the appellant.40 as compensation for the death of her son. 7.it may be conceded that the death of Filomeno took place "in the course of" his employment. he is still entitled to the benefit of what is necessary for his decent maintenance. are those who have them under their authority.It cannot be denied that in jumping into the sea. May 24. he jumped into the water to retrieve a 2-peso bill belonging to him. excepting that part which is exempted for their support in accordance with the civil law. The main allegation of said original complaint was: “That on May 27. 2. The hazardous nature of this act was not due specially to the nature of his employment. and it is hereby affirmed.torts & damages Reasoning .. . or worse.Article 18 of the same code says: The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos. . casis place. 2nd ed. imbeciles. his death was the consequence of his decision to jump into the water to retrieve said bill. However. Cameron [1882] 6 Colo. who worked for the defendant as a . in turn." that he displayed a "reckless disregard of the safety" of his person. 4. which was anchored then about 1 1/2 miles from the seashore of Arceli Dumarang. Sec.Plaintiff’s basis for appeal is the Workmen’s Compensation Act. is still reasonably and justly liable with his property for the consequences of his acts. also. or worse.this is distinguishable from cases wherein the act done is not dangerous per se such as when an employee drops a cigarette on the pavement and picks it up. .this however was dismissed due to lack of a cause of action which defendant filed stating that the allegation does not show that the death of plaintiff's son was due to an "accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Injuries not covered.from these provisions three conditions are essential to hold an employer liable. if. his 2-peso bill merely fell from his pocket. performing his duties as such ordinary seaman on defendant's M/S "Pilar II". at or about 11:30 o'clock in the morning while the said Filomeno Managuit was in the course of his employment. subject to the following: (1) In cases 1. 2. that he could not have been but conscious of the probable consequences" of his carelessness and that he was "indifferent. the sum of P2. who has not acted with the exercise of judgment. 1954 FACTS . and (3) it must not be caused by the "notorious negligence" of the employee. in spite of his unfortunate condition. the judgment appealed from being in accordance with law. while Filomeno Managuit was working. also. as Filomeno had. or a person under 9 years of age. affirmation thereof is proper. . the said lunatics." (Wall vs.. So. and is indifferent. or arisen from. to the danger of injury to person or property of others.This case was instituted on October 18. his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified. Filomeno Managuit. These are: (1) the accident must arise out of the employment. 1. and at the "place" where-according to the amended complaint-he was working.her amended complaint stated: “That on May 27. (2) it must happen in the course of the employment. 1949. has been defined as follows: . . Grounds for compensation. p. he was drowned. which shall be enforced. In her original complaint. 877. and as a consequence of which. Should there be no person having them under his authority. 1950.. unless they prove that there was no blame or negligence on their part."The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident and are descriptive of its character. But. 1949 at about 11:30 o'clock in the morning. while the deceased Filomeno Managuit was on board M/S "Pilar II" as such seaman. ISSUE WON Amedo could claim compensation from employer Rio HELD NO . Sections 2 and 4 of which: Sec. likewise. Palawan. 2. for the reason that his fellows ought not to suffer for the disastrous results of his harmful acts more than is necessary. see. or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment. (3) by notorious negligence of the same. Filomeno failed to exercise "even slight care and diligence. one mile and a half from the seashore of Arceli. would have been exposed had he. The Law Governing Labor Disputes in the Philippines by Francisco.33 - prof. Point in question is whether the accident was committed under these 3 conditions . and 3. in that it happened at the "time" when. jumped into the sea. 3. The blowing of his 2-peso bill may have grown out of. . It was the result of a risk peculiar to his work as a seaman or incidental to such work. Law and society are under obligation to protect him during his illness and so when he is declared to be liable with his property for reparation and indemnification. or power. Palawan. Dumarang. or minors shall answer with their own property.

under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.Petitioner also contends that the amicable settlement entered into by Mamador's widow and Macunat barred the widow's claim against the employer because she has already elected one of the remedies.At any rate. . not a truck helper being a brother-in-law law of the driver of said truck. plaintiff was injured and hospitalized. however. he checked the truck.This contention cannot be sustained because what the widow waived was the offender's criminal proscution and not all civil action for damages. . I have (sic) found out later that the fluid pipe on the rear right was cut that's why the breaks did not function. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man. while the same was at a stop position. that the proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of the parked truck in installing the early warning device. The truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving. and 6) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted on record. ISSUE 1. He has paid nothing. it is clear that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence.Petitioner alleges that the criminal case sentencing Macunat to indemnify the heirs of the deceased was a suit for damages against a third person. he and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the right side of the National Highway. Defendant's truck driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff. Serrano also testified that. ISSUES 1.Deceased’s wife now seeks compensation by Marinduque as the employer. 1956 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the WCC FACTS .Although the employer prohibited its employees to ride the haulage trucks. 3) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts. said that he knew the responsibilities of a driver. that before leaving.This is a question of fact. . NO . even if the case was against a third person. belonging to Marinduque. . 4) CA findings are contrary to those of the trial court. but it may be an evidence of negligence. Nueva Vizcaya. . thereby having the effect of releasing the employer from liability. occupying almost half of the right lane towards Solano.Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence. SC entertained review of the factual question. From the evidence presented. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case HELD 1 NO .Daniel Serrano.(Substantive) Ratio The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. . convicted and was sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. WON Mamador has a right to compensation by Marinduque 2.Plaintiff Pedro Layugan testified that while in Bagabag. 2. YES . or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do [2] Applying the definition and the test. .Notorious negligence means the same as gross negligence which implies "conscious indifferenece to consequences". that the truck allegedly being repaired was parked. Disposition Award for compensation by WCC affirmed LAYUGAN V IAC 167 SCRA 363 SARMIENTO. 1968 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of IAC decision FACTS .Defendant Godofredo Isidro admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident driven by Daniel Serrano. Daniel Serrano. "pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and probably result in injury". its violation does not constitute negligence per se. Inchausti that criminal prosection of the "other person" does not affect the liability of the employer.” .torts & damages MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS V WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION 99 PHIL 48 BENGZON. It couldn't be. to the latter. WON defendant driver Serrano was negligent 2. surmise. Whether cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder of the road is immaterial taking into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene . the petitioner herein. it would. But this case is an exception since: 1) the finding are grounded entirely on speculation.Plaintiff points to the negligence of the defendant driver while Isidro points to the driver of parked truck as negligent. . it has been established clearly that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff was caused by defendant's driver. it cannot be declared negligence because the proibition had nothing to do with the personal safety of the riders.(Procedural) Ratio Findings of fact are entitled to great respect and will not ordinarily be disturbed by this Court unless it falls down under the exceptions provided by the Court to merit review of the facts. and says that absent such proof of care. turned over and hit a coconut tree resulting in the death of Pedro Mamador and injury to the other laborers. He bumped the truck being repaired by Pedro Layugan. because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. . Due to said injuries. Reasoning . I saw the truck which was loaded with round logs. November 14. June 30. evoke the presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his helper. was not a suit for damages against third persons because the heirs did not intervene therein and they have not received the indemnity ordered by the court. 5) the said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. or conjecture. plaintiff. defendant driver.Macunat was prosecuted. . “When I was a few meters away. who was fixing the flat tire of the said truck. Hence. Nueva Vizcaya. would do. 2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken. casis not function with my many attempts. however.Under the circumstance. I stepped on my foot brakes but it did HELD 1. right after the curve. however. . . ordinarily. his left leg was amputated so he had to use crutches to walk. Reasoning [1] Negligence defined. the court already decided in Nava vs.The criminal case. WON there was notorious negligence by the deceased for having violated the employer’s prohibition to ride haulage trucks A2010 . then he is guilty of negligence.34 - prof.A truck driven by Procopio Macunat. that as a result. Defendant said that the plaintiff was merely a bystander.

As a direct consequence of such accident Layugan sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot. Ramos “that something wrong was x x x happening”. Herminda introduced herself as Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center who was to provide moral support to the patient. asked Dr. The patient’s nailbed became bluish and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position.00.M. assured Rogelio that he will get a good anesthesiologist. . The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. Dr. 2. under the circumstances involved. Immediately thereafter. however. the Isuzu truck driven by Serrano. she went out of the operating room. and saw that the patient was still in trendelenburg position. After Dr.In the case at bar. After being discharged from the hospital. The doctrine merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. Dr. she has been staying in their residence.00 to P10.542. At the operating room. particularly in the law of negligence: Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. she sought professional advice.M. still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. Disposition Petition GRANTED with costs against private respondents. the other defendant. . no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances show that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made. 1985.. p.” She then saw people inside the operating room “moving. Rogelio E. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. to them.Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka were also asked by the hospital to explain what happened to the patient.000. that the accident arose from want of care. both parties presented evidence as to the possible cause of Erlinda’s injury. Dr. [and] preparing the patient for the operation”. and its relevant to the main issue on negligence: “At this juncture. Gutierrez say.. it affords reasonable evidence. After praying. Hosaka approached her. The thing speaks for itself Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent. She then heard Dr. Erlinda Ramos stayed for about four months in the hospital. in turn. . She and her husband Rogelio met for the first time Dr. NO Note that for our purposes this was not raised as an issue in this case. Calderon. She was also diagnosed to be suffering from “diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage”. Hosaka. . an anesthesiologist and a hospital should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy. 17). heard somebody say that “Dr. Calderon arrived at the operating room.Petitioners filed a civil case for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against herein private respondents alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos. or where there’s direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. Ramos. Herminda was allowed to stay inside the operating room. Hosaka is already here. still needing constant medical attention. it is inapplicable A2010 .35 - prof. At almost 3:00 P. 1999 NATURE Petition For Certiorari FACTS . she saw this anesthesiologist trying to intubate the patient. Because of the remarks of Dra. Plaintiff presented the testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz and where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury. I formulated it in an issuetype. mali yata ang pagkakapasok. the Court is called upon to rule whether a surgeon. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that accident happened provided character of accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under management and control of alleged wrongdoer.torts & damages lamp placed 3-4m from the back of the truck. Hosaka decided that she should undergo a “cholecystectomy” operation after examining the documents presented to him. would be on June 17.Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was a robust woman except for occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of a stone in her gall bladder she was as normal as any other woman. Herminda Cruz. who was the Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center.Hours later at about 12:15 P. was also there for moral support. 1985 at 9:00 A. . who was to administer anesthesia. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when. As she held the hand of Erlinda Ramos. she incurred hospital bills amounting to P93. whatever the source of the evidence. Gutierrez was doing. She was admitted in the hospital and was with her sister-in-law. of that fateful day. casis Herminda saw about two or three nurses and Dr. with her husband Rogelio incurring a monthly expense ranging from P8.000.. Perfecta Gutierrez. In this case it is inapplicable because it was established by clear and convincing evidence the negligence of the defendant driver. O lumalaki ang tiyan” (id. and she told Rogelio E. She was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladdershe underwent a series of examinations which included blood and urine tests which indicated she was fit for surgery. which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control. Because the discomforts somehow interfered with her normal ways.During the trial. in the absence of an explanation by the defendant. . This is what the Court actually said in the case to prove its just obiter. one of the defendants in this case. Therefore this only Obiter Dicta. She thereafter heard Dr. doing this and that. The doctors explained that the patient had bronchospasm. it may be enlightening and helpful in the proper resolution of the issue of negligence to examine the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur. on June 10. And once the actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy. another anesthesiologist. Hosaka to look for a good anesthesiologist. “ Obiter [1] What is the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur? Two ways to put it: (a) This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant.25. Although not a member of the hospital staff. Herminda Cruz. She thereafter noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr. who was inside the operating room with the patient. Gutierrez. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care. . They agreed that their date at the operating table at the De Los Santos Medical Center.Herminda Cruz immediately rushed back. But as far as we’re concerned and relevant to our discussion in the outline. she saw the patient taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). “Res ipsa loquitur.” [2] In our jurisdiction. she then saw Dr. Calderon was then able to intubate the patient. she focused her attention on what Dr. So. she was given injections. and the way we apply it in cases. direct evidence is absent and not readily available. But despite this warning. Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient. RAMOS V CA [citation] KAPUNAN. “ang hirap maintubate nito. and (b) According to Black’s Law dictionary. December 29. She has been in a comatose condition. Orlino Hozaka.M.

res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge. Rogelio Ramos. the appellate court still denied the motion to admit the motion for reconsideration of petitioners in its Resolution. there can be no sufficient notice to speak of. The next day. all notices should be sent to the party’s lawyer at his given address. The motion for reconsideration was submitted on 4 July 1995.We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. whether the alleged negligence was the proximate cause of Erlinda’s comatose condition. only on 20 June 1995. WON the Court of Appeals erred in finding that private respondents were not negligent in the care of Erlinda during the anesthesia phase of the operation and. or to any and all anesthesia cases.Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is injured or destroyed while the patient is unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive control of the physicians. Eduardo Jamora. does not Reconsideration 2. Hence. Mariano Gavino to prove that the damage sustained by Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty management of her airway by private respondents during the anesthesia phase. we believe that the receipt of the former should be considered in determining the timeliness of the filing of the present petition. filed with the appellate court a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. notice to a litigant without notice to his counsel on record is no notice at all. as a matter of common knowledge and observation. . however. a copy of the decision of the appellate court was instead sent to and received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos on 9 June 1995 wherein he was mistakenly addressed as Atty. and denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner. not being a lawyer and unaware of the prescriptive period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Sillano on 11 April 1996.” The phrase “res ipsa loquitur” is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury.The decision of the Court of Appeals was received on 9 June 1995 by petitioner Rogelio Ramos who was mistakenly addressed as “Atty. much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and. or four (4) days before the expiration of the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Based on the other communications received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos. the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence.The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that. or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case. we shall also determine if the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the testimonies of the witnesses for the private respondents 4. Rogelio referred the decision of the appellate court to a new lawyer. WON it should be dismissed for being filed later than allowable 15 day period for the filing of the Motion for A2010 . Atty. In fact. Each case must be viewed in its own light and scrutinized in order to be within the res ipsa loquitur coverage. if in the affirmative. casis . the delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration cannot be taken against petitioner. . a pulmonologist. Sillano filed before this Court a motion for extension of time to file the present petition for certiorari under Rule 45. Atty. the damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for the application of res ipsa loquitur. The Court granted the motion for extension of time and gave petitioners additional thirty (30) days after the expiration of the fifteen-day (15) period counted from the receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals within which to submit the petition. private respondents primarily relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Thus. primarily on the ground that the fifteen-day (15) period for filing a motion for reconsideration had already expired. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge.torts & damages Dr. In the present case. to the effect that the cause of brain damage was Erlinda’s allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent. The petition was filed on 9 May 1996. Thus.” No copy of the decision.A copy of the above resolution was received by Atty. it affords reasonable evidence. the appellate court denied the motion for extension of time in its Resolution dated 25 July 1995.A careful review of the records reveals that the reason behind the delay in filing the motion for reconsideration is attributable to the fact that the decision of the Court of Appeals was not sent to then counsel on record of petitioners. Atty. YES . .It is elementary that when a party is represented by counsel. the petition before us was submitted on time. the liability of the physicians and the hospital in this case is not predicated upon an alleged failure to secure the desired results of an operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in the diagnosis or treatment as in fact no operation or treatment was ever performed on Erlinda. since the Court of Appeals already issued a second Resolution. Ligsay. . Moreover. Court of Appeals reversed. that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. The due date fell on 27 May 1996.Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. ISSUES 1. Based on this. Corollary thereto. and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. well within the extended period given by the Court.36 - prof. On the other hand. Moreover. . as a matter of common knowledge and experience. then counsel on record of petitioners. taken with the surrounding circumstances. . What is the cost for the damages HELD 1. was sent nor received by the Coronel Law Office. Despite this explanation. Rogelio Ramos. if negligence attended the management and care of the patient. Sillano. Ligsay. Meanwhile petitioners engaged the services of another counsel. may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence. dated 29 March 1996. . since a copy of the decision of the appellate court was not sent to the counsel on record of petitioner. As will hereinafter be explained. in the absence of explanation by the defendant. On the same day. upon all these initial determination a case is made out for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. in holding that res ipsa loquitur is available to the present case we are not saying that the doctrine is applicable in any and all cases where injury occurs to a patient while under anesthesia. Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care. negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. . Upon these facts and under these circumstances the Court would be able to say. Petitioner. the Coronel Law Office. NO . WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable 3. the appellate court apparently mistook him for the counsel on record. 2. However. Hence.Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. .Nonetheless. as such. dated 29 March 1996.However. we hold that a practical administration of justice dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur. Atty. no copy of the decision of the appellate court was furnished to the counsel on record. Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal). With a few exceptions. Ligsay. which superseded the earlier resolution issued on 25 July 1995. Sillano filed on 7 August 1995 a motion to admit the motion for reconsideration contending that the period to file the appropriate pleading on the assailed decision had not yet commenced to run as the Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals had not yet served a copy thereof to the counsel on record. or on 12 April 1996. Atty. referred the same to a legal counsel only on 20 June 1995. to replace Atty.

as such.Proximate cause has been defined as that which. Thiopental Sodium. respondent Dra. depending upon the circumstances of each case. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act. or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result. It is simply a step in the process of such proof. or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for. a Fellow of the Philippine College of Physicians and Diplomate of the Philippine Specialty Board of Internal Medicine. Before this date. In the case at bar. Towards this end. in addition to proving injury or damage. and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. Since Dr. on 17 June 1985. enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine. an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence. Such element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the defendant. it is considered as merely evidentiary or in the nature of a procedural rule. no prior consultations with. Gutierrez was unaware of the physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. who advanced private respondents' theory that the oxygen deprivation which led to anoxic encephalopathy.Private respondents repeatedly hammered the view that the cerebral anoxia which led to Erlinda’s coma was due to bronchospasm mediated by her allergic response to the drug. and relieves a plaintiff of. In other words.37 - prof. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence. all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. It is the dominant. Private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous condition. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is. the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is called upon to explain the matter.Respondent Dr. creating an inference or presumption of negligence. She was likewise not properly informed of the possible difficulties she would face during the administration of anesthesia to Erlinda. they presented Dr. Still. res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished. was due to an unpredictable drug reaction to the short-acting barbiturate. the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct. as an expert would. Jamora is likewise not an allergologist and could not therefore properly advance expert opinion on allergicmediated processes. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient. Hosaka’s negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority (as the to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. . Dr. without the aid of expert testimony. . 2.Dra. 3. casis therefore.In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable. where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. he is not a pharmacologist and. introduced into her system. which. Respondent Dra. Gutierrez admitted that she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation itself. the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. In order to have the benefit of the rule. . . unbroken by any efficient intervening cause.An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced bronchospasm properly falls within the fields of anesthesia. the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown: 1. as a matter of common knowledge and observation. the fundamental element is the “control of the instrumentality” which caused the damage. respondent Dra. could not have been capable. When the doctrine is appropriate. Until the day of the operation. permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident.In the above requisites. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say. if he could. YES . If there was such extraneous interventions. that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. . is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such operations. . . Jamora’s testimony as an expert in the administration of Thiopental Sodium. Instead. whenever it appears from the evidence in the case. The measures cautioning prudence and vigilance in dealing with human lives lie at the core of the physician’s centuries-old Hippocratic Oath. before resort to the doctrine may be allowed. and clinical pharmacology.The CA commited a reversible error. Moreover. by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him. in natural and continuous sequence. . produces injury. It is regarded as a mode of proof. an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. The real question. Jamora is a pulmonologist. therefore. Jamora cannot be considered an authority in the field of anesthesiology simply because he is not an anesthesiologist. Gutierrez’ act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. in which the pulmonologist himself admitted that he could not testify about the drug with medical authority. Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal).It does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof A2010 . On the basis of the foregoing transcript.torts & damages create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability. and without which the result would not have occurred. and 3. mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. and must establish that the essential elements of the doctrine were present in a particular incident. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way.First of all. he could not have been capable of properly enlightening the court about anesthesia practice and procedure and their complications. by evidence of exculpation. a clear indicia of her negligence. it is clear that the appellate court erred in giving weight to Dr. The resulting anoxic encephalopathy belongs to the field of neurology. which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. of explaining to the court the pharmacologic and toxic effects of the supposed culprit. a plaintiff. that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage. internal medicine-allergy. . must show a situation where it is applicable. Jamora. We find the theory of private respondents unacceptable. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied. Dr. Thus. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results. therefore. under usual and ordinary conditions. if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence. and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. . It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants. moving or producing cause. or pre-operative evaluation of Erlinda was done by her.

Except as provided by law or by . emotional and financial cost of the care of petitioner would be virtually impossible to quantify. hire.As it would not be equitable . and was in fact over three hours late for the latter’s operation. fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting “consultant” staff. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. Because of this. . it does not escape us that respondent Dr. They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the aid of professionals. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. he is normally required to attend clinico-pathological conferences.In the instant case. from the nature of the case. respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180. the difficulty is only more apparent than real. casis stipulation. . The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases. 2199. the amount of damages which should be awarded. one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. In other words. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda’s cholecystectomy. Furthermore. the physician’s performance as a specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review committee on the basis of mortality and morbidity statistics.In other words. 4. the control test is determining. While “consultants” are not. not the cost of the care the family is usually compelled to undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy. . or a consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum standards acceptable to the hospital or its peer review committee. visiting or attending. evidence of fellowship in most cases. it would be now much more in step with the interests of justice if the value awarded for temperate damages would allow petitioners to provide optimal care for their loved one in a facility which generally specializes in such care.00 in temperate damages would therefore be reasonable. for the privilege of being able to maintain a clinic in the hospital. no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. their educational qualifications. while the burden of proving negligence rests on the plaintiffs.and certainly not in the best interests of the administration of justice . These requirements are carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital administration or by a review committee set up by the hospital who either accept or reject the application.Meanwhile. In fact. Having failed to do this. petitioners were able to provide only home-based nursing care for a comatose patient who has remained in that condition for over a decade. he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This is particularly true with respondent hospital.After a physician is accepted.Art.for the victim in such cases to constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the compensatory damages previously awarded temperate damages are appropriate. guardian. . Even the temperate damages herein awarded would be inadequate if petitioner’s technically employees. the control exercised. the actual physical. nurses. where the resulting injury might be continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the injury. and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship. However. a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient’s condition. once negligence is shown. the burden shifts to the respondents (parent. private hospitals. Under the circumstances. In other words. he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda’s condition. Having premised our award for compensatory damages on the amount provided by petitioners at the onset of litigation. should be one which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved. and references. teacher or employer) who should prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. up to the time of trial. A consultant remiss in his duties. And because of the unique nature of such cases.Upon these disquisitions we hold that private respondents are solidarily liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. interns and residents. respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlinda’s condition. is normally politely terminated. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the conduct of their work within the hospital premises.torts & damages “captain” of the operative team) in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. . presents problems in apportioning responsibility for negligence in medical malpractice cases. are required to submit proof of completion of residency. The amount given as temperate damages. respondent hospital. the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has been completed and that the cost can be liquidated. with the exception of the payment of wages. or proof of a similar nature. the amount of actual damages recoverable in suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the correct minimum cost of proper care. if they are to adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused. interns and residents. an award of P1.We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital in this particular incident. conduct bedside rounds for clerks. In addition to these.Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of litigation. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists.In the first place. Given these considerations. the hiring. as in this case. Doctors who apply for “consultant” slots. generally. . apart from a general denial of its responsibility over respondent physicians. temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. This being the case.” who are allegedly not hospital employees. no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. evidence of accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate). either as a visiting or attending consultant. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage.500. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. these provisions neglect to take into account those situations. .000. . and/or for the privilege of admitting patients into the hospital. A2010 . though to a certain extent speculative. and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could not. . In neglecting to offer such proof. should take into account the cost of proper care. on the basis of the foregoing. failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. However. and feedback from patients. for anything less would be grossly inadequate. are difficult to predict.The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former’s responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. Accordingly. be made with certainty.In these cases. moderate grand rounds and patient audits and perform other tasks and responsibilities. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient. the question now arises as to whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors for petitioner’s condition. Thus. we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases. . . .In the instant case. an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. .38 - prof. The unique practice (among private hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with attending and visiting “consultants. while certain to occur. .

Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain medicines. Kho testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination. there are exceptions. Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney’s fees valued at P100. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. and solidarily against private respondents the following: 1) P1. The trial court. Kho was frank throughout her turn on the witness stand. Kho's testimony. She also gradually lost her appetite.00 each as exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.000. and Dr.The piece of rubber allegedly found was not presented in court. The trial court's following declaration shows that while it was critical of the lack of care with which Dr. A2010 . But the trial court failed to recognized that these were mere denials or negative testimonies. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. no motive to state any untruth was ever imputed against Dr. an Anesthesia Record. embedded on the ovarian cyst.Mrs. so she consulted Dr.This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant. Kho’s .000. They have fashioned their daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner. altering their long term goals to take into account their life with a comatose patient.In the instant case. DISPOSITION the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed from are hereby modified so as to award in favor of petitioners. The piece of rubber appeared to be a part of a rubber glove. Well-settled is the rule that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony. which led to the different decision of the RTC and CA. Kho threw it away as told by her to Defendant.While the rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Batiquin is liable HELD Procedural YES . leaving her trustworthiness unimpaired. Batiquin’s testimony. an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus. it affords reasonable evidence.The husband and the children. a reading of the said testimony reveals no such infirmity and establishes Dr. her positive testimony prevails over the negative testimony in favor of the petitioners. Kho saw a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen. Kho handled the piece of rubber. Kho. .500. There were inconsistencies within her own testimony. . along with other physicians and nurses. Villegas submit to another surgery. 1988. Kho’s testimony.Considering that we have assessed Dr. the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore. She then consulted Dr. which.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives.000. Dr. or when the appellate court misapprehended the facts Substantive . Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside. needless to say. They. that there was neither any tear on Dr. . Kho's testimony.It is also worth noting that the trial court paid heed to Dr. This was the cause of all of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Kho's credibility.000.00 as actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of P8. are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim.While the petitioners claim that contradictions and falsities punctured Dr. private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus.00 are hereby awarded. Kho to be a credible witness.000.352.When Dr. However. Also. a Nurse's Record. The family’s moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. Kho's knowledge of the piece of rubber could not be based on other than first hand knowledge for. Ma. however. does not occur unless through the intervention of negligence.After leaving the hospital. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's private patient sometime before September 21. Villegas . and a Physician's Discharge Summary. . The CA was correct in saying that the trial court erred when it isolated the disputed portion of Dr. dirt and pus behind the uterus. all petitioners in this case. Kho's trustworthiness. 4) P100. 5) the costs of the suit. Furthermore. Batiquin's gloves after the operation nor blood smears on her hands upon removing her gloves. Kho and (2) that Dr. Villegas and successfully delivered the latter’s baby. "there being no showing that the person or persons who prepared them are deceased or unable to testify on the facts therein stated . and.000.39 - prof. After examining her. since aside from the cesarean section. thus only supporting out appraisal of Dr. . For the foregoing reasons." .00 are likewise proper. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants. exemplary damages in the amount of P100. First. that the accident arose from want of care.000. . 1996 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . 1988 Dr. As such.00 as temperate damages. casis testimony and did not consider it with other portions of Dr. . Batiquin. performed a caesarian operation on Mrs. a Progress Record. Dr. In this light. Batiquin. The CA reversed the decision.Finally. and a piece of rubber material on the right side of the uterus. and that she sent it to a laboratory and then to Cebu City for examination by a pathologist. Salud Kho. all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. the phrase relied upon by the trial court does not negate the fact that Dr. it was not prepared to doubt Dr.00 in moral damages would be appropriate. not the respondents. the pains still kept recurring. it stands to reason that such could only have been a byproduct of the cesarean section performed by Dr. by way of example. regarded these documentary evidence as mere hearsay. Second. 3) P1. Mrs. Furthermore. 2) P2. Kho’s testimony.There was also doubts as to the whereabouts of the piece of rubber. in the absence of an explanation by the defendant. In the morning of September 21. will have to live with the day to day uncertainty of the patient’s illness. Villegas submitted to Dr. as she asserted before the trial court. . the entire proceedings of the cesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Dr Kho suggested that Mrs. the evidence which mentioned the piece of rubber are a Medical Certificate. when the appealed decision is clearly contradicted by the evidence on record. an award of P2.torts & damages condition remains unchanged for the next ten years.00 as moral damages. ISSUES Procedural WON the court can review questions of fact Substantive WON Dr. knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil. Aside from Dr. July 5. BATIQUIN V CA (Villegas) 258 SCRA 334 DAVIDE.The focal point of the appeal is Dr.000. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care. Kho’s testimony: 1) that it was sent to the Pathologist in Cebu as testified to in Court by Dr. as 2 versions arose from Dr. The failure of the Plaintiffs to reconcile these two different versions served only to weaken their claim against Defendant Batiquin. the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas' body.000. among which are when the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court conflict. Kho as a credible witness.000.

torts & damages
Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof DISPOSITION Decision affirmed

A2010

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prof. casis
contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights. DISPOSITION The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC, whereupon payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

D.M. CONSUNJI V CA KAPUNAN; April 20, 2001
NATURE Appeal from CA affirming decision of RTC ordering defendant D.M. Consunji, Inc. to pay damages to plaintiff Maria J. Juego FACTS - At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. Investigation disclosed that while victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo were performing their work on board a steel platform with plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the platform came loose causing the whole platform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core of the building under construction, save his 2 companions who luckily jumped out for safety. - On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow. On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. ISSUES 1. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to prove petitioner’s negligence 2. WON respondent is precluded from recovering damages under the Civil Code HELD 1. YES Ratio As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of

the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a construction site unless someone is negligent; thus, the first requisite is present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of appellant; thus, the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee’s deceased husband; thus, the last requisite is also present. A reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident. 2. NO Ratio Claimants may invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence. There is no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the

MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V REMONQUILLO 99 PHIL 117 MONTEMAYOR; May 18, 1956
NATURE Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS - August 22, 1950: Efren Magno went to the house of Antonio Peñaloza, hid stepbrother, on Rodriguez Lanuza St, Manila, to repair a leaking “media agua.” The “media agua” was just below the window of the third story. - Standing on said “media agua”, Magno received from his son thru the window a 3’x6’ galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion. The lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company parallel to the media agua and 2 ½ feet from it, causing his death by electrocution. - his widow and children filed suit to recover damages from the company. Trial court rendered judgment in their favor. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. - The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire stretched between poles pm the street and carrying a charge of 3600 volts. It was installed there some two years ago before Peñaloza’s house was constructed. During the construction of said house a similar incident took place, with less tragic consequences. The owner of the house complained to defendant about the danger which the wire presented, and defendant moved one end of the wire farther from the house by means of a brace, but left the other end where it was. - Regulations of the City required that “all wires be kept three feet from the building.” - There was no insulation that could have rendered it safe, because there is no insulation material in commercial use for such kind of wire (according to appellant, and this was not refuted). Petitioner’s Claim - Owner of the house exceeded the limit for the construction of the “media agua” (17% more). Respondent’s Comment

torts & damages
Owner was given final permit despite the excess of the “media agua”. ISSUE WON Manila Electric is guilty of negligence. HELD NO - It was the victim who was guilty of negligence Ratio the liability of electric companies for damages or personal injury is governed by the rules of negligence, nevertheless such companies are not insurers of the safety of the public. Reasoning - The death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence, and in some measure by the too close proximity of the “media agua” to the electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the “media agua.” Had the house owner followed the terms of the permit given him by the city for the construction of his “media agua”, the distance from the wires to the edge of said “media agua” would have been 3ft and 11 3/8 inches. - The company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said construction, and to change the installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance. - The violation of the permit for the construction was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it. The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. It is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so. He had training and experience for the job. He could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. - To hold the defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno, such supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate and principal cause of the accident. Disposition The appealed decision of the CA is reversed, and complaint against the Company dismissed.

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- The girl was taken to the provincial hospital. Despite his efforts, the child died that same night. - It was certified that the cause of death was "Burns, 3rd Degree, whole Body", and that the contributory causes were "Congestion of the Brain and visceras of the chest & abdomen.” - The defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow down the side of the street Gran Captain with the knowledge and consent of the authorities; that the cause of death was other than the hot water; and that in the death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and negligence. - The trial judge, however, after examination of the evidence presented by the defendants, failed to sustain their theory of the case, except as to the last mentioned special defense. He nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. ISSUE WON the action should be dismissed due to the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs

Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila dismissing the complaint on the merits filed in an action to recover damages for injuries FACTS - Due to a collision between the respective automobiles of Bernardo and Legaspi, the former filed an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by his car which he alleged were by reason of Legaspi's negligence in causing said collision. Legaspi, on the other hand, filed a cross-complaint alleging it was Bernardo's fault. He also asks for damages. - The lower court found upon the evidence that both the plaintiff and the defendant were negligent in handling their automobiles and that said negligence was of such a character and extent on the part of both as to prevent either from recovering. ISSUE WON the parties may recover damages HELD 1. NO - Where two automobiles, going in opposite directions, collide on turning a street corner, and it appears from the evidence and is found by the trial court that the drivers thereof were equally negligent and contributed equally to the principal occurrence as determining causes thereof, neither can recover of the other for damages suffered.

BERNAL V HOUSE 54 PHIL 327 MALCOLM; January 30, 1930
FACTS - Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal went to Tacloban, Leyte to attend the procession of Holy Friday. - After the procession, they, accompanied by two other persons, passed along a public street named Gran Capitan. - The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in advance of her mother and her friends. - While in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., an automobile appeared on which frightened the child. She turned to run, but fell into the street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House. - When the mother and her companions reached the child, they found her face downward in the hot water.

BERNARDO V LEGASPI 29 Phil 12 MORELAND; December 23, 1914
NATURE

HELD NO - The death of the child was the result of fault and negligence in permitting hot water to flow through the public streets, there to endanger the lives of passers-by who were unfortunately enough to fall into it - The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. - There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. - The doctrines announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages. DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from was in part be reversed and in the court of origin another judgment was issued in favor of Fortunata Enverso and against J.V. House for the amount of P1,000, and for the costs of both instances.

SEPARATE OPINION

torts & damages
ROMUALDEZ [dissent]
- Even taking the finding that the defendant by its negligence helped to bring about the accident which resulted in the death of the child Purificacion Bernal, plaintiff, by negligence, contributed to that most regrettable result. - Judgment appealed from should be affirmed.

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ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. - That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling, considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all. - It is settled that: The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means. - This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that: Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. - That presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner. - Even assuming that the cause of the collapse was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable because it was guilty of negligence, which the trial court denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure for one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence. Disposition Judgment was denying the instant petition with costs against petitioner.

GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION V CHATTO 210 SCRA 18 DAVIDE JR.; June 16, 1992
FACTS - Plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. - Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued. - Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day. - The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11. - Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, plaintiff went to Illinois, USA in July 1982 for further treatment. She was treated at the Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for about three (3) months during which time she had to return to the Cook County Hospital five (5) or, six (6) times. - Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect. - The trial court awarded actual or compensatory and moral damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. - Respondent Court found the appeal later filed to be without merit. - Its motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the respondent Court, petitioner filed the petition in the SC. ISSUE WON the collapse of the ceiling was caused by force majeur HELD

NO - Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. That Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure. - Definitions of force majeure as cited in Pons y Compañia vs. La Compañia Maritima: 1. Blackstone, in his Commentaries on English Law: Inevitable accident or casualty; an accident produced by any physical cause which is irresistible; such as lightning. tempest, perils of the sea, inundation, or earthquake; the sudden illness or death of a person. 2. Escriche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudenci,: The event which we could neither foresee nor resist; as for example, the lightning stroke, hail, inundation, hurricane, public enemy, attack by robbers; Vis major est, says Cayo, ea quae consilio humano neque provideri neque vitari potest. Accident and mitigating circumstances. 3. Bouvier: Any accident due to natural cause, directly exclusively without human intervention, such as could not have been prevented by any kind of oversight, pains and care reasonably to have been expected. 4. Corkburn, chief justice, in a well considered English case, said that were a captain uses all the known means to which prudent and experienced captains ordinarily have recourse, he does all that can be reasonably required of him; and if, under such circumstances, he is overpowered by storm or other natural agency, he is within the rule which gives immunity from the effects of such vis major. The term generally applies, broadly speaking, to natural accidents, such as those caused by lightning, earthquake, tempests, public enemy ,etc. -The real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he isincompetent. He is not an engineer, but an architect who had not even passed the government's examination. - Verily, post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the present proceedings. What is significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed by the respondent Court, that the collapse was due to construction defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding. - The building was constructed barely 4 years prior to the accident in question. It was not shown that any of the causes denominates as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the

PLDT V CA (SPS ESTEBAN) REGALADO; September 29, 1989 [CITATION]
NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the resolution of the Court of Appeals. FACTS

1520) Disposition the appealed decision is affirmed with modification as to the civil liability of the petitioner which is hereby increased to P30. promulgated on September 25. there were no side guards on the cars to keep the rails from slipping off. 1959. are hereby SET ASIDE.Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms.July 30. . is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.43 - prof. . This was reported to the foreman. but also because he was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him. casis NO . At that speed. March 29. dated March 11. 1990 and September 3.' The appellant went back to the place where the old woman was struck by his rig. The old woman started to cross when the first rig was approaching her." (People vs. if any. an independent contractor which undertook the said construction work. 44 O. In addition.000. Quiñones. at about 7:30 PM. he could have braked the vehicle the moment it struck the ACCIDENT MOUND. breaking his leg. He ran after appellant when the latter refused to stop. October 22. 1957 NATURE Petition for review of the CA’s decision affirming the conviction of the petitioner of the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Rakes."The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence. is L. GENOBIAGON V CA (PEOPLE OF THE PHILS) 178 SCRA 422 GRIÑO-AQUINO. She was then loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital where she died 3 hours later. Orbeta. Reasoning . Mangyao asked him why he bumped the old woman and his answer was. while the respondent husband suffered cut lips. . FACTS . the track sagged.Genobiagon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. although not as the primary cause. since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence (People vs. As Rakes was walking along the car’s side when the accident occurred.The alleged contributory negligence of the victim. was at work transporting iron rails from the harbor in Manila. an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. in its answer. 1980. The men were hauling the rails on 2 hand cars.PLDT. Costs against petitioner.The plaintiff. but as appellant's vehicle was going so fast not only because of the steep down-grade of the road. 321.The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident. At one point. . > If the accident did not happen because the jeep was running quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over the ACCIDENT MOUND. Barte and Company. then plaintiff husband had not exercised the deligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident.torts & damages .Genobiagon claims CA erred in not finding that the reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate cause of the accident which led to her death ISSUES WON contributory negligence can be used as defense by Genobiagon HELD RAKES V ATLANTIC [CITATION] [PONENTE] NATURE Action for damages FACTS . the appellant's rig bumped the old woman. 1968 – Jeep of Esteban spouses ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench. Also. CA-G. . The old woman was unconscious. Its original decision. denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be held responsible. No.Atlantic contends that the remedy for injury through negligence lies only in a criminal action against the official directly responsible and that the employer be held only subsidiarily liable. If it had remained on that inside lane.TC ruled in favor of Esteban spouses whereas the CA reversed the ruling. The appellant's rig was following another at a distance of two meters. . the windshield of the jeep was shattered. .G. legs and face.However. Atlantic.R. The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. but a by-stander Mangyao saw the incident and shouted at the appellant to stop. a rig driven by Genobiagon bumped an old woman who was crossing the street.On Dec 31. ISSUE WON there was contributory negligence on the part of petitioner . it would not have hit the accident mound > That plaintiffs’ jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit the ACCIDENT MOUND could have been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street to the south of the ACCIDEN MOUND. does not exonerate the accused. he was found to have contributed in some degree to the injury inflicted. > Plaintiffs’ jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as plaintiff husband claimed.The accident was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT.The plaintiff’s witness alleged that a noticeable depression in the track had appeared after a typhoon. Overtaking the appellant. leaving a permanent scar on her cheek. 1979. 'it was the old woman that bumped him. Mckenna. the tie broke. some behind or at it sides and some pulling the cars in the front by a rope. but it had not been proven that Atlantic inspected the track or had any proper system of inspection. if at all. as one of its determining factors. . ISSUE WON the Esteban spouses can claim damages from PLDT HELD NO Ratio A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. the car canted and the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff who was walking by the car’s side. Disposition resolutions of respondent CA. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. The appellant continued to drive on.R. 1947). which was later amputated at the knee. the company’s officers and 3 of the workers testified that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all against walking by the side of cars. who fell at the middle of the road. one of a group of 8 AfricanAmerican laborers in the employment of defendant. > Jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. A2010 . . CA affirmed .

thru its teller Ms. officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms." In this case.Trial court assessed that damages to plaintiff amount to PhP5. In the testimony of Mr. it appears that the bank's teller. Islands v. The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information — that of the name of the account holder — should have already put Ms. Yabut to Ms. . and inexcusable negligence in the appellant bank's supervision of its employees. 1975 to July. at times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"). to the effect that. common sense. as insisted by the petitioners. A2010 . absent the act of Ms. in natural and continuous sequence. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. March 14.It was this negligence of Ms. presented by Ms. produces the injury. was negligent in validating. Azucena Mabayad. -The negligence of the injured person contributing to his injury but not being one of the determining causes of the principal accident. petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. Irene Yabut to the effect that since the duplicate copy was only for her personal record. . . or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. she should have proceeded more cautiously by being more probing as to the true reason why the name of the account holder in the duplicate . Undoubtedly. Azucena Mabayad.Test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not.torts & damages HELD YES .Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic. as testified to by Ms. there is no dispute as to the damage suffered by the private respondent. states that where both parties are negligent. and were instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas.There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff. this was not how bank teller Mabayad proceeded thus resulting in huge losses to the private respondent. Unfortunately.74 representing various deposits it had made in its current account with the bank but which were not credited. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip. Ms.The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits should not relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility.It was in fact only when he testified in this case in February. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. The law considers what would be reckless. the amount fairly attributable to his own negligence.500. while he ordered the investigation of the incident. original or duplicate. Ratio Art. . or after the lapse of more than seven (7) years counted from the period when the funds in question were deposited in plaintiff's accounts (May. Romeo Bonifacio.Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. there being fault or negligence. casis slip was left blank while that in the original was filled up. coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller. line and sinker the too shallow excuse of Ms. this is gross. plaintiff should not be afforded relief PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE V CA (ROMMEL’S MARKETING CORP.the case stems from a complaint filed by Rommel’s Marketing Corporation (RMC) to recover from the former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) the sum of P304. and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. in essence. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. Mabayad on guard. and without which the result would not have occurred. Mabayad. would do. allegedly due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of the petitioner bank. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. This doctrine.000. . (b) fault or negligence of the defendant. Ms. blameworthy. and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other. . policy and precedent. Bank of the Phil. Mabayad. wanton.LAST CLEAR CHANCE: under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to. . is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter Reasoning . Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity. he never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's validation procedures.In the case at bench. 1983. then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner. 1997 NATURE Petition for review challenging the CA decision affirming the RTC decision in a civil case FACTS . . notwithstanding the fact that one of the deposit slips was not completely accomplished. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man.the negligence of the defendant alone was insufficient to cause the accident—it also required the negligence of the plaintiff. . which. does not operate as a bar to recovery. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. Rather than readily validating the incomplete duplicate copy. then he is guilty of negligence. . despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.44 - prof. Each party is chargeable with damages in proportion to his fault.) 269 SCRA 695 HERMOSISIMA JR.979. which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent. Such fault or negligence.Petitioner had walked along the side of the car despite a prohibition to do so by the foreman.979. or when it is impossible to SEPARATE OPINION WILLARD AND CARSON [dissent] .74. or some other person for whose acts he must respond. to the tune of P304.Applying the above test. 17 defines proximate cause as "that cause. is obliged to pay for the damage done. in validating the deposit slips. suffered by the private respondent RMC — petitioner bank's negligence or that of private respondent's? HELD .The proximate cause of the loss was the negligent act of the bank. 2176. Azucena Mabayad. Mabayad herself. ISSUE What is the proximate cause of the loss. She should not have been so naive in accepting hook. but only in reduction of his damages. 1976) that bank manager Bonifacio admittedly became aware of the practice of his teller Mabayad of validating blank deposit slips. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. both original and duplicate. . Yabut. . . she would simply fill up the blank space later on. 11 A "reasonable man of ordinary prudence" 12 would not have given credence to such explanation and would have insisted that the space left blank be filled up as a condition for validation. Court of Appeals. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Because of this. SC deducted PhP2.

Since a sizable amount of cash was entrusted to Yabut. had two parts. is not contributory but the immediate and proximate cause of its injury. could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. If it did. Stated otherwise. Irene Yabut. said act only served to cover-up the loss already caused by her to RMC. . . casis but for a personal record to complement the original validated depositor's stub. the appellate court's decision is AFFIRMED. The teller. the genuineness and due execution of the document become an issue in resolving whether or not the transaction had been fair and regular and whether the ordinary course of business had been followed by the bank. she would accomplish two (2) copies of the current account deposit slip. except the award of P25. the date of the deposit. In short. RMC's own employee. who had the last fair chance. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. if the latter.In the earlier days before the age of full computerization. Both parts were detachable from each other. . Private respondent failed to examine these bank statements not because it was prevented by some cause in not doing so.00 attorney's fees. only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the petitioners. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent 23 under A2179 CC. The upper part was called the depositor's stub and the lower part was called the bank copy. Private respondent shall have recourse against Ms. not the validation of the deposit slip by the teller as the deposit slip was made out by Yabut in her husband's name and to his account. to wit: . and superimposed RMC's account number. Precisely. Thus. we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio. there must be a last and a clear chance. . tampered with its account number. her employer. when there is a clear evidence of tampering with any of the material entries in a deposit slip.In the case of banks. .Since Yabut deposited money in cash. had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. who should have been charged with estafa or estafa through falsification of private document. assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee.torts & damages determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident. have taken ordinary care of its concerns.It was private respondent who had the last and clear chance to prevent any further misappropriation by Yabut had it only reviewed the status of its current accounts on the bank statements sent to it monthly or regularly. it was the criminal act of Yabut that directly caused damage to RMC. SEPARATE OPINION PADILLA [dissent] . but with the account name purposely left blank by Yabut. private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. thru its teller.Thus. Irene Yabut. the company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. the name of the depositor or current account holder.LAST CLEAR CHANCE: As for the doctrine of "last clear chance. Irene Yabut from liability when in fact she orchestrated the entire fraud on RMC. . private respondent should. . A2010 . . then the teller proceeded to verify whether the current account number matched with the current account name as written in the deposit slip. to avoid the accident or injury. it cannot be denied that. The rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of. it is not disputed that each time Yabut would transact business with PBC's tellers. the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. or after the deposit slip was validated by the teller in favor of Yabut's husband. her employer? . on the assumption that it would serve no other purpose JUNTILLA V FONTANAR . Azucena Mabayad the amount they would pay the private respondent. the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father of a family. It must have been a chance as would have enabled a reasonably prudent man in like position to have acted effectively to avoid the injury and the resulting damage to himself.000. as what the law presumes. when Yabut wrote the name of RMC on the blank account name on the validated duplicate copy of the deposit slip. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC. the usual bank procedure then was for the teller to count whether the cash deposit tallied with the amount written down by the depositor in the deposit slip. Here. But if his negligence was only contributory. he cannot recover damages. the rightful owner of such deposited funds. PBC's deposit slip. deposited the money of RMC in her husband's name and account number instead of that of RMC. simply by faithfully observing their selfimposed validation procedure. but because it was purposely negligent as it admitted that it does not normally check bank statements given by banks. or bar a defense against liability sought by another. ." it is my considered view that the doctrine assumes that the negligence of the defendant was subsequent to the negligence of the plaintiff and the same must be the proximate cause of the injury. its employee. indeed. not a last possible chance. . Thus. had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client. therefore. yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank. . a bank normally maintained a ledger which served as a repository of accounts to which debits and credits resulting from transactions with the bank were posted from books of original entry.Going back to Yabut's modus operandi. however. at least. In all other respects. Its negligence. it was only after the transaction was posted in the ledger that the teller proceeded to machine validate the deposit slip and then affix his signature or initial to serve as proof of the completed transaction. Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors. The deposit slip was prepared and signed by the depositor or his representative.In the case at bar. . Petitioners may recover from Ms. banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care.45 - prof. the plaintiff may recover damages.The foregoing notwithstanding. Had it done so. detached the validated depositor's stub on the original deposit slip and allowed Yabut to retain the whole validated duplicate deposit slip that bore the same account number as the original deposit slip. the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care. The award of attorney's fees shall be borne exclusively by the petitioner. particularly Romeo Lipana. shall be borne by private respondent RMC. Disposition the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is modified by reducing the amount of actual damages private respondent is entitled to by 40%.It seems that an innocent bank teller is being unduly burdened with what should fall on Ms. and the amount of the deposit either in cash or in checks. In view of this. as issued in 1975. Why is RMC insulating Ms. 40% of the damage awarded by the respondent appellate court. the bank was not remiss in its duty of sending monthly bank statements to private respondent RMC so that any error or discrepancy in the entries therein could be brought to the bank's attention at the earliest opportunity. thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company. who indicated therein the current account number to which the deposit was to be credited. as advanced by the petitioner.It should be noted that the teller validated the depositor's stub in the upper portion and the bank copy on the lower portion on both the original and duplicate copies of the deposit slips presented by Yabut.The legal or proximate cause of RMC's loss was when Yabut.

It must be impossible to foresee the even which constitutes the caso fortuito. ISSUES 1. Disposition Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Teodoro M. Bulacan. Paras. the manufacturer is considered as being in law the agent or servant of the carrier. November 6. The respondents then appealed to the CFI of Cebu.Petitioner then filed a civil case for breach of contract with damages before the City Court of Cebu against Fontanar. The petitioner had two choices: (1) return to Cavite that same afternoon and arrive there in the early evening. v De Jesus. 1989 NATURE A petition to reverse Commission on Audit’s denial of relief FACTS . Hernandez. Petitioner’s MFR was denied. casis under the circumstances was incumbent upon it. and by entering into the said contract. The records show that the passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a A2010 . or (2) take the money with him to his house in Marilao. right thigh and on his back and also found this “Omega” wrist watch was lost. . and Camoro. the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the human will. with regard to inspection and application of the necessary tests. immediately followed in desperate pursuit. 1985 NATURE Petition to review the decision of CFI of Cebu FACTS . “ not only are the rulings of the CA in Rodriguez v Red Line Trans. it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. WON the CFI erred in absolving the carrier from any liability upon a finding that the tire blow out is a fortuitous event 2. thinking it the safer one. hence this appeal. He opted for the second. there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents. For the purposes of this doctrine. He went to the main office in Manila to encash 2 checks covering the wages of the employees and the operating expenses of the Project. We agree with the observation of the petitioner that a public utility jeep running at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up. He caught up with Virgilio Alvarez and overcame him after a scuffle. It was while the vehicle was along EDSA that two persons with knives boarded and forcibly took the money he was carrying. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence. May 31. that “a tire blow-out does not constitute negligence unless the tire was already old and should not have been used at all. v. as far as regards the work of constructing the appliance. or if it can be foreseen. The petitioner stated that there were 3 passengers in the front seat and 14 in the rear.The CFI relied on the ruling of the CA in Rodriguez v Red Line Transportation Co. And so. could have been caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident. . The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire. He estimated that the money would be available by 10am and that he would be back in Ternate by about 2pm of the same day. spend the night there. The evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident.torts & damages 136 SCRA 624 GUITERREZ JR. injuries on his left arm. after the initial shock. must be independent of the human will 2. who filed their answer.Petitioner Roberto Juntilla was sitting a the front seat of a jeepney (driven by one Berfol Camoro.Relative to the contingency of mechanical defects. alleging that the accident was beyond their control taking into account that the tire that exploded was newly bought and slightly used at the time it blew up.City Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner.46 - prof. 2. NO Ratio A caso fortuito (fortuitous event) presents the following essential characteristics: 1. According to this theory. In La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. Banzon. The sudden blowing-up. that: “The preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer. whenever it appears that the defect would have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which HERNANDEZ V COMMISSION ON AUDIT 179 SCRA 39 CRUZ. with a due regard for all the circumstances. No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents.” In the case at bar. The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner 4. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles not to exceed safe and legal speed limits and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times. therefore. the processing of the checks was completed only at 3pm. The petitioner decided nevertheless to encash them because the Project employees would be waiting for their pay the following day. or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation. but actually owned by Fernando Banzon) when its right rear tire exploded causing it to turn turtle. he found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm. . et al.While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the tire were still visible. There is also evidence to show that the passenger jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident. this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. it must be impossible to avoid 3. et al. However. . registered under the franchise of Clemente Fontanar. which reversed the judgment upon a finding that the accident in question was due to a fortuitous event. et al.In the case at bar. . But the hold-upper who . Co. Alvarez was subsequently charged with robbery and pleaded guilty. the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The records show that this obligation was not met by the respondents.It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage. Plaintiff was thrown out of the vehicle and lost consciousness upon landing on the ground.. Hernandez was the officer-in-charge and special disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach Project of the Philippine Tourism Authority in Cavite. We held that. YES . When he came back to his senses. The obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor Reasoning . WON the accident was due to a fortuitous event HELD 1. using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person. He went to Danao city and upon arrival there he entered the City Hospital to attend to his injuries and asked his father-in-law to go to site of the accident to look for his watch but the watch was nowhere to be found.” This conclusion is based on a misapprehension of overall facts. not binding on this Court but they were also based on considerations quite different from those that obtain in the case at bar. Decision of City Court is REINSTATED ditch immediately after its right rear tire exploded. we held in Necesito. and leave for Ternate the following morning. He took a passenger jeep bound for his house in Bulacan. he collected the cash value of the checks.

It does not appear he has passed the government examination for architects. — When a loss of government funds or property occurs while the same is in transit or is caused by fire. or other casualty. Chatto. through then Chairman Francisco S. NO . Credit for loss occurring in transit or due to casualty — Notice to Auditor. 1982 Gloria E.47 - prof. ISSUE WON petitioner’s acts are so tainted with negligence or recklessness as to justify the denial of the petitioner's request for relief from accountability for the stolen money HELD NO . . the ignorance of Mr. Its 3 Section 638. WON the collapse was due to force majeure HELD 1. who was eventually convicted. as an act. Hernandez claims that the respondent COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying him relief and in holding him negligent for the loss of the stolen money.3 . owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued. The memo concludes that in deciding to take the money with him to Marilao after imprudently withdrawing it from the main office. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure. Louie University in Baguio City." Having interposed it as a defense.COA insists that the petitioner should not be relieved from his money accountability because it was his own negligence that led to the loss of the cash he had sought to take not to Ternate but to Marilao. 2. He is a graduate of architecture from the St. but an architect who had not even passed the government's examination. as the respondent Court impliedly held. and her 15-year old daughter.In the afternoon of June 4. according as a matter is within the original jurisdiction of the one or the other. He avers he has done only what any reasonable man would have done and should not be held accountable for a fortuitous event over which he had no control. however. Verily. they transferred to the UST hospital. or provincial auditor. of God. Jesus Lim Ong. that what happened was a fortuitous event that could not have reasonably been foreseen. the petition is GRANTED. . Shocked and hurt. To Our mind. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11. Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. Hernandez can be attributed to his negligence because had he brought the cash proceeds of the checks (replenishment fund) to the Beach Park in Ternate immediately after encashment for safekeeping in his office. the real reason why Mr. plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling.Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. He is not an engineer. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day. Ong about the cause of the collapse of the ceiling of their theater cannot be equated. based on common sense and our own experiences. or the provincial auditor. post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the contention is that the petitioner should not have encashed the checks as the hour was already late and he knew he could not return to Ternate before nightfall. theft. WON Jesus Lim Ong’s investigation maybe given weight in the trial 2. it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. . "C") issued by Dr. the loss of the P10. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he is. he says that the first course was more prudent as he saw it. For most of us.however. . and did. Ernesto G. . which is the normal procedure in the handling of public funds. Jesus Lim Ong is not an engineer. denied the petitioner's request. his successor sided with the petitioner. admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed. assuming he was guilty of contributory negligence.This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by the said provisions.the petitioner. something that could not have been reasonably foreseen although it could have happened.Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness. That Mr.It is true that the petitioner miscalculated. Disposition The petitioner is entitled to be relieved from accountability for the money forcibly taken from him. Lina Delza E. the Commission on Audit. and within thirty days or such longer period as the Auditor. Brion. . with the available evidence in support thereof. may in the particular case allow.then Solicitor-General argued that Hernandez was negligent in the safekeeping of the stolen funds.there was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial civil and structural engineers on the cause of the collapse of the theater's ceiling. June 16. the petitioner was assuming a risk from which he cannot now be excused after the loss of the money as a result of the robbery to which it was unreasonably exposed. invoking the foregoing facts. GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION V CHATTO 210 SCRA 18 DAVIDE JR. ACCORDINGLY. So it was with the petitioner. 1992 NATURE Petition for Review FACTS . Hardly ten (10) minutes after . Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater.torts & damages escaped is still at large and the stolen money he took with him has not been recovered. In fine. . jr. shall present his application for relief. Later. if only because his home in Marilao was much nearer than his office in Ternate.00 under the accountability of Mr. had made up for it with his efforts to retrieve the money and his capture of one of the robbers.In the petition at bar. To sustain that proposition is to introduce sacrilege in our jurisprudence.175. Mr. incompetent. They bought balcony tickets but even then were unable to find seats considering the number of people patronizing the movie. and without any mystic ability to peer into the future. A2010 . that the likelihood of robbery during the time in question was stronger in Ternate than in Marilao. especially on that busy highway. but the Court feels he should not be blamed for that. or our intuition. the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. observing inter alia: In the instant case. An officer who fails to comply with this requirement shall not be relieved of liability or allowed credit for any such loss in the settlement of his accounts. ISSUES 1. casis entering the theater. filed a request for relief from money accountability under Section 638 of the Revised Administrative Code. agreeing that Hernandez had not committed any negligence or. all we can rely on is a reasoned conjecture of what might happen. NO . the officer accountable therefor or having custody thereof shall immediately notify the Auditor General. Per Medico Legal Certificate (Exh.On his decision to take the money home that afternoon instead of returning directly to Ternate. if you will. the loss of said cash thru robbery could have been aborted. The decision he made seemed logical at that time and was one that could be expected of a reasonable and prudent person. plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto suffered the following injuries: . Tantuico. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect. It could not have collapsed without a cause.The next day.

. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. morals. 1962 Ed. . especially as regards the ceiling. Justice J. though foreseen. What is significant is the finding of the trial court. (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the 'caso fortuito'. in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other. the doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means.. It was not shown that any of the causes denominates as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. declaring appellant Philippine Steam Navigation liable for damages for the loss of the 4 Article 1174.L. The stipulation which merely iterates the principle of caso fortuito is for all intents and purposes valid. . IV. Examples of this are destruction of houses. originally brought to the Court of Appeals. At about 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day. Lawyer's Journal.torts & damages present proceedings. Philippine Steam on the other hand relies on the following: Clause 14. and that they did not sign the same. if he adheres. morals or public policy. . war.On November 6. p." (Tolentino. or which.It is settled that . unexpected fire. inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. Reasoning . casis letters on the back-of the bills of lading.The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises. 'Such provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage.Appellees would contend that the above stipulation does not bind them because it was printed in fine SERVANDO V PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO 117 SCRA 832 ESCOLIN. 1963. Disposition judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the instant petition with costs against petitioner. and since the burning of the warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees. The court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736. were inevitable. shipwreck. considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all. A2010 . Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless such loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. Vol.We sustain the validity of the above stipulation. 1982 NATURE This appeal. the obligor is exempt from liability for non-performance. the burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened independently of the will of the appellant. the lower court rendered a decision. the cargoes were discharged. and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the defendant. violence of robbers. 3 where the Court held that while it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket . Before the fire." In the case at bar. Jan. in the morning of November 18. Negros Occidental several cargoes (cavans of rice. and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation'. destroying appellees' cargoes. 462. fire . that the collapse was due to construction defects. ordering Philippine Steam to pay for damages. .48 - prof. . consequently. promulgated June 29. where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss. and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. the antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil Code. Reyes. must be independent of the human will. The Partidas. dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters. defines 'caso fortuito' as 'an event that takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely. (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. toys etc) as evidenced by the corresponding bills of lading issued by the appellant. public enemies. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr.This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured. The building was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the accident in question. . Ong. His answers to the leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said. or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation. 49). the loss is chargeable against the appellant. 7354 and 7428.. the agreement contained in the above quoted Clause 14 is a mere iteration of the basic principle of law written in Article 1 1 7 4 of the Civil Code4 Thus.Besides. 1979. he gives his consent. 1963. p. there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. 31. colored papers. its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. This argument overlooks the pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu vs. however. or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation. it must be impossible to avoid. It is what is known as a contract of 'adhesion'. .On the bases of the foregoing facts. complete and in good order. affirmed by the respondent Court. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had been exercised. public policy. as the plane ticket in the case at bar. he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. also in relation to contracts. are contracts not entirely prohibited. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage caused by force majeure. The latter could not have foreseen the event.' . unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. citing Mr. a 'caso fortuito' presents the following essential characteristics: (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence. appellee Uy Bico was able to take delivery of 907 cavans of rice Appellees' claims for the value of said goods were rejected by the appellant. said warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown origin. appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed.. appellees Clara Uy Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on board the appellant's vessel for carriage from Manila to Pulupandan. no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen. Civil Code. . Court of Appeals. 1951. Negros Occidental. there is nothing therein that is contrary to law. Except in cases expressly specified by the law. FACTS . appellees' cargoes as a result of a fire which gutted the Bureau of Customs' warehouse in Pulupandan. .B. seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Cases Nos. or if it can be foreseen. or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk. ISSUE WON the above stipulation validly limits the liability of the shipowner in this case HELD YES Ratio The parties may stipulate anything in the contract for so long as the stipulation is not contrary to law. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding.In its dissertation of the phrase 'caso fortuito' the Enciclopedia Juridicada Espanola 5 says: "In a legal sense and. Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan. That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction.

Since the warehouse belonged to and was maintained by the government." involving the very same SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE V CA . until the consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods and has had reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose of them". Disposition judgment appealed from is hereby set aside. the defendants suddenly.The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent release by the defendants of water through the spillways of the Angst Dam (Hydroelectric Plant). May 21. diligence and prudence in the operation and maintenance of the hydroelectric plant . WON (applying the ruling of NAkpil & Sons v. the consignees. to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code. negligently and recklessly opened three (3) of the dam's spillways. which results in loss or damage. the cause of which is to be considered.I concur. Plaintiffs claim: . and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in. Under article 1738 of the Civil Code "the extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues to be operative even during the time the goods are stored in the warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination.' the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor. .When the water level in the Angat dam went beyond the allowable limit at the height of typhoon Kading NPC opened three of the dam’s spillways to release the excess water in the dam. . the same notice involved in the case at bar. they could still not contain or control the flood that resulted . 1174-1175). thereby releasing a large amount of water which inundated the banks of the Angat River causing the death of members of the household of the plaintiffs.despite the defendants' knowledge of the impending entry of typhoon "Kading. and carelessness.the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in the nature and character of damnum absque injuria. vs.incurred in delay in the performance of its obligation.There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier . Servando and Clara Uy Bico. et al. CA) NPC is liable given that the inundation was caused by force majeure HELD 1. No amount of extraordinary diligence on the part of the carrier could have prevented the loss of the goods by fire which was of accidental origin. and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. imprudence and negligence in the management and operation of Angat Dam.when the said water level went beyond the maximum allowable limit at the height of the typhoon. SEPARATE OPINION AQUINO [concur] . When the effect. public respondent found as conclusively established that indeed. the obligor cannot escape liability.torts & damages . WON NPC was guilty of negligence 2. are all but products of defendants-appellees headlessness. for a breach of an obligation due to an 'act of God. Moreover." and that "the extent of the opening of the spillways. Disposition Petition dismissed. (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner.NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection of its employees . The court there declared that the proximate cause of the loss and damage sustained by the plaintiffs therein--who were similarly situated as the private respondents hereinwas the negligence of the petitioners. CV Nos. pursuant to such demand. Nakipil & Sons vs. YES . there concurs a corresponding fraud. Clara had removed more than one-half of the rice consigned to her. the latter having no control whatsoever over the same. Nor can the appellant or its employees be charged with negligence. The storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the appellees was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent. had reasonable opportunity to remove the goods. the shipping company had no more control and responsibility over the goods after they were deposited in the customs warehouse by the arrastre and stevedoring operator. This however caused the inundation of the banks of the Angat river which caused persons and animals to drown and properties to be washed away. 2. NATIONAL POWER CORP V CA (RAYO ET AL) DAVIDE JR.NPC exercised due care.A similar case entitled National Power Corporation. A2010 . together with their animals Respondents comments: . Court of Appeals. Juan F. as it were.written notices were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about the impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and advising them to take the necessary Precautions . the whole occurrence is thereby humanized. YES . when the warehouse was burned. casis incident subject of the instant petition.R. It appears that appellant had not only notified appellees of the arrival of their shipment. ISSUES 1. is found to be in part the result of the participation of man whether it be from active intervention or neglect.49 - prof. and the magnitude of the water released. negligence.on the basis of its meticulous analysis and evaluation of the evidence a dduced by the parties in the cases subject of CA-G.the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid greater damage to people and property .In the Nakpil case it was held that "To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code."and that the 24 October 1978 'early warning notice" supposedly sent to the affected municipalities. Thus. appellee Uy Bico had taken delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the burning of the warehouse.From the time the goods in question were deposited in the Bureau of Customs' warehouse in the morning of their arrival up to two o' clock in the afternoon of the same day.given that NPC is guilty of negligence." they failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam .. Court of Appeals is still good law as far as the concurrent liability of an obligor in the case of force majeure is concerned. 27290-93. slovenliness.The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are. . or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised.NPC operated and maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River . et al. if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God. . the petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of foresight. Amparo C. but had demanded that the same be withdrawn. it would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant. was insufficient. pp. 1993 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court FACTS . (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable. (1 Corpus Juris. . or failure to act. In fact.

Jesus L. as actual damages. within legal contemplation. de Dimaano. we find exception to this rule and hold that the lower courts misappreciated the evidence proffered. In order to be exempt from liability arising from any adverse consequence engendered thereby. FACTS . Pasay City. diligence or care. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. would do. And so they sought to recover from petitioner P117. An act of God . 1998 NATURE Petition for review seeking to set aside the Decision promulgated on July 31.116. at about 6:30 in the morning. When the effect is found to be partly the result of the participation of man – whether it be from active intervention. Tolentino adds that “[f]ortuitous events may be produced by two general causes: (1) by nature.00. forcing them to stay temporarily in others’ houses. After a careful scrutiny of the records and the pleadings submitted by the parties. as exemplary damages and P100. a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of foresight. such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event.vii[20] What is visual to the eye though. precaution. though foreseen. ISSUES WON the damage on the roof of the building of private respondents resulting from the impact of the falling portions of the school building’s roof ripped off by the strong winds of typhoon “Saling”. . as moral damages. are binding and conclusive upon this Court. and Resolution dated September 12. In other words. and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand.The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the ocular inspection made by the city engineer. especially when affirmed by the appellate court. it is necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned. is “in tip-top condition”. there are other steel bars which were not even bent to the trusses. Branch 117. fires. such as an armed invasion. no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen. such that if it were not. It may be the failure to observe that degree of care. Negligence.In their Complaintii[6] before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The Resolution under attack denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. petitioner averred that subject school building had withstood several devastating typhoons and other calamities in the past. or which. the general formation of the buildings becomes a big funnel-like structure. Pertinent aspects of the latter’s Reporti[5] dated October 18. there are portions of the roofing. the damage caused to private respondents’ house could have been avoided? . were inevitable. which reduced the moral damages awarded below from P1. or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk. July 10.00 to P200. typhoon “Saling” was “an act of God and therefore beyond human control” such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages wrought thereby.000.v[17] or the omission to do something which a prudent and reasonable man. On October 11. which remained intact after the storm. P300.In its Answer. vs. . 1996 of the Court of Appeals in “Juanita de Jesus vda. such as earthquakes. faculty members. notwithstanding the general rule that factual findings by the trial court. and (2) by the act of man. et al. Buffeted by very strong winds. This conclusion finds support in Article 1174 of the Civil Code. etc.In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability. Engr. or failure to act – the whole occurrence is hereby humanized. those located on both ends of the building.. epidemics.50 - prof. we proceed to determine whether petitioner was negligent. which provides: “Art 1174. From these premises.” .”iv .00. a powerful typhoon “Saling” hit Metro Manila. was. as commonly understood. which houses school children. Inc. Southeastern College. 1989 stated. and employees. or neglect. this Court believes otherwise.torts & damages PURISIMA. Private respondents.” . is not always reflective of the real cause to their house rendered the same uninhabitable. that it has not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that said school building. while petitioner owns a fourstorey school building along the same College Road. Still.At the outset. One of the factors that may have led to this calamitous event is the formation of the buildings in the area and the general direction of the wind.00. After the typhoon had passed.After a thorough study and evaluation of the evidence on record.” Civilist Arturo M. an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or viewing. Thus. Reyna. due to fortuitous event HELD YES .Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road. or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation. 1996. limbs and property of persons living in the vicinity.000. As the term imparts.000. as follows: “5. with the strong winds having a westerly direction. for damages based on culpa aquiliana. landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents’ house. robbery.000.” . is conduct which naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others.”. 6.vi[19] not merely by presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact.000. the one situated along College Road. merely relied on the aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of petitioner’s school building after the typhoon. . Except in cases expressly specified by the law.” the fourth floor of subject school building be declared as a “structural hazard. etc. Hence.00. and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.000. receiving the heaviest impact of the strong winds. absent any negligence on its part. an ocular inspection of the destroyed buildings was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official.It then recommended that “to avoid any further loss and damage to lives. there should have been no human participation amounting to a negligent act. those trusses are not anchored at all to the roof beams.00.There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event. for and as attorney’s fees. plus costs. attack by bandits.000. floods. governmental prohibitions.”iii[9] Escriche elaborates it as “an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted.Petitioner cannot be held liable for the damages suffered by the private respondents. it bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence causative of his injury or loss. storms. this appeal. casis cannot be invoked for the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences. P1. private respondents alleged that the damage A2010 . guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. and furthermore. Situated in the peripheral lot is an almost U-shaped formation of 4-storey building. Thus. the roof of petitioner’s building was partly ripped off and blown away. Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason for the dislodging of the roofings structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the said trusses to the roof beams. . The 1/2” diameter steel bars embedded on the concrete roof beams which serve as truss anchorage are not bolted nor nailed to the trusses. without its roofing or any portion thereof giving way. 1989. thus.The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the Partidas which defines it as “an event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. the person seeking exoneration from liability must not be guilty of negligence. When a person’s negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to another. in establishing the culpability of petitioner.

passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current. . and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable of fault under article 1902 only if he had been negligent or at the same code. but were afraid because they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water.The lower court took the view that under the abovequoted provision of the CC. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause.This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an animal.torts & damages behind.Spouses moved for dismissal for lack of cause of action. On the left palm of the deceased. cited by Manresa. While tending the animals. We thus hold that petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon “Saling” was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents’ house. . NO Ratio It was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone.In the present case. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had 5 ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY V CA (LUIS ET AL) 179 SCRA 5 PARAS.Engineer Juan. it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone. admitted in open court that no complaint regarding any defect on the same structure has ever been lodged before his office prior to the institution of the case at bench. 2183. two girls (sales girlls) attempted to help.strong typhoon "Gening" in Ilocos Norte brought floods and heavy rain. the son-in law. Five Sisters Emporium. one who hears a gunshot and then sees a wounded person. the animal was in the custody and under the control of the caretaker. . although it may escape or be lost. including himself.Engr.On the other hand. the owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger. which the CFI granted. it could not have withstood long years and several typhoons even stronger than “Saling. Her companions. Wading in waist-deep flood. But the complaint contains no allegation on those points. If subject school building’s roofing was not firmly anchored to its trusses. however. For the statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for “any damages it may cause” and this for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage.In light of the foregoing. ISSUE WON the owner of the animal is liable when the damage is caused to its caretaker (as opposed to a stranger) HELD 1. 1967. is liable for any damages it may cause. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. AFIALDA V HISOLE 85 Phil 67 REYES. Juan suddenly screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. Neither did they prove any substantial deviation from the approved plans and specifications. noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or shortcircuited lines. casis voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection and saw grounded and disconnected lines. “This liability shall cease only in case the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it.2183 ) as ground for the liability: “The possessor of an animal.51 5 prof.In a decision of the Spanish SC. . it is essential that there be fault or negligence on the part of the defendants as owners of the animal that caused the damage. . and contended that the mishap was due neither to Loreto’s own fault nor to force majeure. . he was “gored by one of them and later died as consequence of his injuries. the city building official. to look after the merchandise to see if they were damaged. we find no clear and convincing evidence to sustain the judgment of the appellate court. . Reasoning . there was a hollow wound. Loreto Afialda was the caretaker of the carabaos of spouses Hisole. Isabel Lao Juan. other than the said ocular inspection. Yabes. he could not see any INELCO lineman. .” The action was filed by the sister of Loreto. 1902.4AM June 29. The present action.1905.Moreover.In the present case. 1905 does not distinguish between damage caused to a stranger and damage caused to the caretaker and makes the owner liable whether or not he has been negligent or at fault. 1967. In the afternoon. . the appeal. .She uses Art. Private respondents did not even show that the plans. A2010 . It is a matter of judicial notice that typhoons are common occurrences in this country. who was paid for his work as such. no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of petitioner’s school building. 1949 NATURE Appeal from judgment of CFI Iloilo FACTS . Nor did they conclusively establish that the construction of such building was basically flawed. the death of an employee who was bitten by a feline which his master had asked him to take to his establishment was by said tribunal declared to be “a veritable accident of labor” which should come under the labor laws rather than under article 1905. Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the ground.6-6:30AM June 29. CC (now Art. When he went to INELCO office. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.1905. (Nana Belen) went to her store. 1967 . The body was recovered about two meters from an electric post. 1989 FACTS . November 29. Obviously. Disposition Judgment AFFIRMED.The distinction (between stranger and caretaker) is important.5. who has been in the city government service since 1974. obviously. .” . Hence. but under Art. November 6.Claiming that the lower court was in error. . plaintiff contends that art. Power Plant Engineer of NPC at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant. is not brought under labor laws in effect. For instance.” . upon hearing the electrocution of his mother-in-law. if action is to be based on Art. the dangling wire was no longer there. cannot always definitely conclude that a third person shot the victim. Rigor mortis was setting in. even if such animal should escape from him or stray away. The relationship of cause and effect must be clearly shown. including himself.6AM June 29. Art. or the one who uses the same. It could have been self-inflicted or caused accidentally by a stray bullet. specifications and design of said school building were deficient and defective. CC. Juan attempted to resuscitate Nana Belen but his efforts proved futile.

but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. ISSUE WON Pepsi Cola is liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability HELD NO . considering that electricity is an agency. the court citing its ruling on Bahia as follows: “ From this article (2180) two things are apparent: (1) that when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arise a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the employer or master either n the selection of the servant or employee. Castro examined the body and noted that the skin was grayish or cyanotic.CA: P30. except for the slight modification that actual damages be increased to P48. casis RAMOS V PEPSI COLA 19 SCRA 289 1967 NATURE Appeal from a CA decision FACTS . is AFFIRMED.229. the deceased.INELCO was negligent in seeing that no harm is done to the general public". it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event.In defense and exculpation. safety devices were installed to prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural calamities such as floods. The switch must have been left on. . It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place. . It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon." As such. an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property. evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area. and 6 the salesgirls.. P45. was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to INELCO’s consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. hence.45. This being the case.229. shall We punish her for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. The SC ruled that the issue brought before it with regard the credibility of Anasco is one of fact and not of law. . a source of her livelihood. (6) Lastly.45 for funeral expenses). at the time the fatal incident occurred. About the base of the thumb on the left hand was a burned wound.The petiton for appeal questioned the testimony of one Anasco with regard the process and procedures followed by Pepsi in the hiring and supervision of its drivers.Dr. As testified by A2010 . as heirs.000 attys fees . however.torts & damages . the Company is relieved of any responsibility from the accident.000 in compensatory damages. that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences. was faced with an impending loss.CFI: awarded P25. On the contrary.The Court ruled that based on the evidence and testimonies presented during the trial.000 in exemplary damages. the doctor found an "electrically charged wound" or a first degree burn. subtle and deadly.In its ruling.000 as average annual income of the deceased. charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on. if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. private respondents. may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by INELCO’s negligence Reasoning .000 moral damages.52 - prof. Reasoning . typhoons. (3) Also. The evidence does not show that defendant did that.'circulatory shock electrocution" . which indicated death by electrocution..INELCO can be exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be" The negligence of petitioner having been shown. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible. causing the deceased's electrocution when she tried to open her gate that early morning of June 29. The cause of' death was . or both. 2180. . thus. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions. computed in accordance with the formula set in the Villa-Rey Transit case (31 SCRA 511) with the base of P15. (4) 12 linesmen are charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the areas respectively assigned to them. Art. (5) They also presented own medical expert and said that cyanosis could not have been the noted 3 hours after the death because it is only manifest in live persons. Pepsi Cola exercised the due diligence of a good father in the hiring and supervision of its drivers. 1967. The Court limited its ruling on the decision of the CA to absolve defendant Pepsi Cola from liability under Article 21806 of the Civil Code. extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. or in the supervision over him after the selection. 1967 . … The responsibility treated of this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. nor even manning its office. the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission" Disposition CA decision. which sought to prove that (1) on and even before June 29.The facts with regard the accident that Andres Bonifacio caused is not in the case. (2) The service lines and devices had been newly-installed prior to the date in question.229. 1967 the electric service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area did not suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life and property. P3. P12.000 attorney's fees ISSUE WON the legal principle of "assumption of risk" bars private respondents from collecting damages from INELCO HELD NO Ratio The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. On the left palm. P50. … Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Hence. INELCO presented the testimonies of its officers and employees..e. fire and others.45 in actual damages (i. or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property. P10. Furthermore. Clearly. the deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and not to INELCO because of the installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting. It went on to stay that the CA is a better judge of the facts. the deceased went to the Five Star Emporium "to see to it that the goods were not flooded. There was. it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim's death.In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag City on the night of June 28 until the early hours of June 29. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury.000 for the victim's death and P18. For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule. a finding that Bonifacio was in fact negligent.

25 a day. Leonardo was negotiating Honeydew Road.A complaint for damages was filed by herein private respondent. it is paramount that the best and most complete evidence be formally entered. Metro Manila bound for its terminal at Bicutan. and for failure to submit all evidence within its control. The collision impact caused plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio to hit the front windshield of the passenger jeepney and (she) was thrown out therefrom. who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of presenting at the trial such amount of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable judgment. 1979. In any event. neither did they blow their horns to warn approaching vehicles. . the proof called for under Article 2180 to show diligence of a good father of a family has been met. tests and examinations preparatory to actual employment. as its transport supervisor. because the latter's negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the accident and that MMTC failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. a collision between them occurred. . Taguig.As both vehicles approached the intersection of DBP Avenue and Honeydew Road they failed to slow down and slacken their speed. As a consequence. In making proof in its or his case. Given this. Taguig. falling onto the pavement unconscious with serious physical injuries. must be corroborated by documentary evidence. A2010 . ISSUES 1. Disposition Decision of the CA is affirmed. the passenger jeepney ramming the left side portion of the MMTC bus. who failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees and should thus be held solidarily liable for damages caused to the MMTC bus through the fault and negligence of its employees. Bicutan. to hold sway. which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony. who being then a minor was assisted by her parents. WON petitioner exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees HELD 1. object or documentary. a Metro Manila Transit Corp. Further.It was shown in this case that Pesi Cola did not merely satisfy itself that Bonifacio possessed a driver’s license. a government-owned corporation and one of the defendants in the court a quo.She was brought to the Medical City Hospital where she regained consciousness only after one (1) week.Petitioner's attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of employees . contrarily averred in its answer with cross-claim and counterclaim that the MMTC bus was driven in a prudent and careful manner by driver Leonardo and that it was the passenger jeepney which was driven recklessly considering that it hit the left middle portion of the MMTC bus. and consequently may be rebutted . the owner of the jeepney and employer of driver Calebag. bound for her work. Bicutan.Petitioner attempted to essay in detail the company's procedure for screening job applicants and supervising its employees in the field. to use an oft-quoted phrase. . then driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his codefendant Victorino Lamayo. which for an employer doctrinally translates into its observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees but which mandate. whether plaintiff or defendant. to present all available evidence at its or his disposal in the manner which may be deemed necessary and beneficial to prove its or his position. or even subject evidence for that matter. . Godofredo Leonardo. prove that driver Leonardo had complied with all the hiring and clearance requirements and had undergone all trainings. The party. and Christian Bautista. 2. of the Civil Code provisions on quasi-delicts as all the elements thereof are present. and that it was defendant Lamayo. herein petitioner MMTC. and that said positive testimonies spell out the rigid procedure for screening of job applicants and the supervision of its employees in the field 2. casis through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence. While there is no rule which requires that testimonial evidence. WON the oral testimonies of witnesses even without the presentation documentary evidence. through the testimonies of Milagros Garbo. . and medical records. It is not felt by the Court that there is enough evidence on record as would overturn the presumption of negligence. (MMTC) bus driven by defendant Godofredo C. previous experience. .At about six o'clock in the morning of August 28. the petitioners raised no questions. . against all of therein named defendants following their refusal to pay the expenses incurred by the former as a result of the collision. . to wit: (1) damages suffered by the plaintiff. . . both of whom naturally and expectedly testified for MMTC. (2) fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond. He was also made to undergo both theoretical and practical driving tests prior to being hired as driver. in relation to Article 2180. .Whether or not the diligence of a good father of a family has been observed by petitioner is a matter of proof which under the circumstances in the case at bar has not been clearly established. . the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. . along with its driver. we do not find the evidence presented by petitioner sufficiently convincing to prove the diligence of a good father of a family. she was unable to work for three and one half months (31/2). June 21. 1993 FACTS .Defendant Victorino Lamayo alleged that the damages suffered by therein plaintiff should be borne by defendants MMTC and its driver. is more often honored in the breach than in the observance. . she was confined for twenty-four (24) days.torts & damages (2) that they presumption is juris tantum ( so much or so little of law) and not juris et de jure (of law and from law). another fast moving vehicle. where she then worked as a machine operator earning P16. consonant with the theory of the case it or he seeks to advance and subject to such procedural strategy followed thereby. couched in generalities and shorn of any supporting evidence to boost their verity. A background check was done and he was required to submit various clearances. In terms of the aspect of supervision. and as a consequence.While the jeepney was travelling at a fast clip along DBP Avenue.Their statements strike us as both presumptuous and in the nature of petitio principii. plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio boarded as a paying passenger a public utility jeepney. assuming the putative existence thereof. Thereat. inasmuch as the witnesses' testimonies dwelt on mere generalities. we cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there was observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. as its training officer. petitioner MMTC must suffer the consequences of its own inaction and indifference.It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family. provided only that the same shall measure up to the quantum of evidence required by law.53 - prof.The case at bar is clearly within the coverage of Article 2176 and 2177.Said defendants denied all the material allegations in the complaint and pointed an accusing finger at each other as being the party at fault. Godofredo Leonardo. and (3) the connection of cause and effect between fault or negligence of the defendant and the METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORP V CA (CUSTODIA) 223 SCRA 521 REGALADO. It is entirely within each of the parties discretion.It is procedurally required for each party in a case to prove his own affirmative assertion by the degree of evidence required by law.

a fishing boat owned by Ernesto Kramer. and that accordingly. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry. and that the ALLIED BANKING V CA (YUJUICO) 178 SCRA 526 GANCAYCO. When the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties. rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. As a consequence of the collision. i. interest as a part of the damages may be awarded in the discretion of the court. was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila.. that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff . The Kramers instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent before Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City.With the allegation and subsequent proof of negligence against the defendant driver and of an employer-employee relation between him and his codefendant MMTC in this instance. taking with it its fish catch. . the plaintiff must show. casis four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the said date. But. It is only then that the defendant. Inc.In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible. . the F/B Marjolea sank. from April 8. this Court held: The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action. the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff. that is. . 1989 FACTS .54 - prof. It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of 2 vessels the 4 year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision.e. In Paulan vs. the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years. 1 985. Jr. and Marta Kramer. it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. although it is not necessary that the employer be engaged in business or industry. .torts & damages damages incurred by plaintiff. Petitioner’s claim: . without requiring the payment of interest thereon as an item of damages just because of delay in the determination thereof. training and experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve . The complaint for damages was filed in court only on May 30. it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place. was beyond the 4 year prescriptive period. b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right. it is necessary first to establish the employment relationship. especially since private respondent did not specifically pray therefor in her complaint. ISSUE WON a Complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by presciption HELD YES .In Espanol vs. Sarabia. Article 2211 of the Civil Code provides that in quasi-delicts. He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code.that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued only on April 29. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer. the M/V Asia Philippines owned byTrans-Asia Shipping Lines. 1982.Due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. 1976 when the maritime collision took place. namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created. Philippine Veterans Administration. the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. Employer is liable for torts committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned tasks. The collision occurred on April 8. we believe that respondent court acted in the exercise of sound discretion when it affirmed the trial court's award. . Disposition petition is dismissed.The Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was due to the negligence of the employees of Trans-Asia. It is to be noted that petitioner was originally sued as employer of driver Leonardo under Article 2180. the basis of the liability being the relationship of pater familias or on the employer's own negligence. and not as a matter of right. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners. the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel. October 13. to hold the employer liable.Under A1146 CC. the Complaint filed on May 30. the case in undoubtedly based on a quasi-delict under Article 2180. the employer is likewise responsible for damages. Thus. agents or personnel of the other vessel. . For failure to rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of employees. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action accrued. 1989 . October 13. the date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed.that maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with special skill.. The diligence of a good father of a family required to be observed by employers to prevent damages under Article 2180 refers to due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees in order to protect the public. Trans-Asia filed a motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription. Chairman. . this Court ruled that in an action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks. which is the time when the cause of action arises. that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages. Once this is done. diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. 1976. may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period. the latter has the burden of proving that it has been A2010 . Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago..Finally. there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent.The F/B Marjolea. which consists of 3 elements. the action being based on a quasidelict. as employer. From the foregoing ruling.Article 2180 applicable only where there is an employer-employee relationship. KRAMER VS CA (TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES) 178 SCRA 289 GANCAYCO. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen.

.torts & damages NATURE Petition seeking the reversal of the decision of CA in "Joselito Z.Respondent Yujuico. Panis. .The judgment of the CA in its first decision is the substantive basis of private respondent's proposed third-party complaint. although the third-party defendant's liability arises out of another transaction. the date when the Monetary Board ordered GENBANK to desist from doing business in the Philippines. it cannot be outrightly asserted that it would not serve any purpose. The complaint alleged that by reason of the tortuous interference by the CB with the affairs of GENBANK.1987. RTC Judge Mintu denied the third-party complaint but admitted the amended/supplemental answer. The third party complaint is independent of. or whether the third-party's claim. 1981." petitioner asserts that under the CC on quasi-delict" the action against third-party defendants should have been filed within four (4) years from the date the cause of action accrued. 1957 FACTS A third-party complaint is a procedural device whereby a "third-party" who is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff. The third party complaint should not be admitted. ISSUE 1. which were both denied. rendered a decision nullifying the RTC order. in respect of the plaintiffs claim. FACTS . by means of the third-party complaint. Yujuico vs. who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such thirdparty defendant a right for contribution. to transfer unto the third-party defendants liability on the note by reason of the illegal liquidation of GENBANK which was the basis for the assignment of the promissory note.1986 when the decision in CA (first case)became final and executory. separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint. .Mar 25. Philippine Veterans Admistration) . private respondent relies on the "Doctrine of Relations" or "Relations Back Doctrine" to support his claim that the cause of action as against the proposed third-party defendant accrued only on December 12. 1977 . .While the third party complaint in this case may be admitted as above discussed. casis complaint may cause delay in the disposition of the main suit.CA..Yujuico failed to comply with his obligation prompting Allied to file a complaint for the collection of a sum of money before the CFI Manila (now RTC). may be brought into the case with leave of court. and another judgment is hereby rendered sustaining the orders of the RTC denying the admission of the third party complaint made by Judge Mintu. The RTC judge was found to be in grave abuse of discretion and was ordered to admit the third-party complaint. they are seeking. WON the cause of action under the third-party complaint prescribed HELD 1. . the action has prescribed.55 - prof. a ranking officer in General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) and a member of the family owning control of the said bank. Chairman. Private respondent issued a promissory note in favor of GENBANK. by the defendant. YES . RTC Judge of Manila and Allied Banking Corp. Both parties filed for motions of partial reconsideration. (Español vs. While these allegations in the proposed third-party CAUSATION BATACLAN V MEDINA 102 PHIL 181 MONTEMAYOR. Allied acquired all the assets and assumed the liabilityies of GENBANK. . 1979 when the complaint in the case was filed."1 and the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said decision. . or (c) whether the third-party defendant may assert any defense which the third-party plaintiff has. It is contended that while the third party complaint was filed only on June 17. is connected with the plaintiffs claim.The first instance is allowable and should be allowed if it will help in clarifying in a single proceeding the multifarious issues involved arising from a single transaction. he was prevented from performing his obligation such that he should not be held liable thereon. can be accommodated under tests (a) and (b) abovementioned. 1980 when the Monetary Board ordered the GENBANK to desist from doing business in the Philippines while the third party complaint was filed only on June 17. On the other hand. . in a petition for certiorari questioning the denied motions. 1977. it was the claim of third-party plaintiff for other damages in addition to any amount which he may be called upon to pay under the original complaint. consequently. The case was reraffled where presiding Judge Panis reiterated the order 7 A2010 . It was followed by another resolution ordering the liquidation of GENBANK.Petitioner claims that the cause of action alleged in the third-party complaint has already prescribed.It is from the date of the act or omission violative of the right of a party when the cause of action arises and it is from this date that the prescriptive period must be reckoned. On the theory that the cause of action accrued on March 25. This decision declared as null and void the liquidation of GENBANK.In the Memorandum of Agreement between Allied Banking Corp (Allied) and Amulfo Aurellano as liquidator of GENBANK. Domingo D.March 25. . (Capayas v CFI Albay) The claim of third-party plaintiff. petitioner maintains that the claim should have been filed at the latest on March 25.First case: CA affirmed RTC decision in a special proceeding finding that the liquidation of GENBANK was made in bad faith. . although arising out of another or different contract or transaction. The decision of CA denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner are hereby reversed and set aside and declared null and void. (b) whether the third-party defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant. 1977 – the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued a resolution forbidding GENBANK from doing business in the Phil. including the receivable due from Yujuico. YES . private respondent herein. Disposition petition is GRANTED. 2. . indemnity. it must be deemed to have been instituted on February 7. 1987. since the cause of action accrued on March 25. October 22.Second and current proceeding (1987) – Yujuico filed a motion to admit Ammended/Supplemental Answer and a Third Party Complaint to impead the Central Bank and Aurellano as third-party defendants.The action for damages instituted by private respondent arising from the quasidelict or alleged "tortious interference" should be filed within four 4 years from the day the cause of action accrued.The tests to determine whether the claim for indemnity in a third-party claim is "in respect of plaintiff 's claim" are: (a) whether it arises out of the same transaction on which the plaintiff's claim is based. If there was any confusion at all on the ground/s alleged in the thirdparty complaint. Hon. obtained a loan from the said institution in the amount of 500K. WON there was ground to admit the third-party complaint 2. It was then that Yujuico filed the third party complaint to transfer liability for the default imputed against him by the petitioner to the proposed third-party7 defendants because of their tortious acts which prevented him from performing his obligations. Being founded on what was termed as "tortious interference. There is merit in private respondent's position that if held liable on the promissory note. or may have against plaintiffs claim. subrogation or any other relief.

this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled. one of the bidders. public respondent’s failure to empty the tank had not caused any sanitary accidents despite its proximity to several homes and the public market as it was covered in lead and was air-tight. unexpected and extraordinary. A2010 . but rather. According to the witnesses.torts & damages . through its driver and its conductor. NO . ISSUES What is the proximate cause of death of the four passengers? HELD The proximate cause of death is the overturning of the bus.Petitioner’s contention that the market master should have been supervising the area of the tank is also untenable. The autopsy showed that the victims died of asphyxia caused by lack of oxygen supply in the body. which was won by Bascon. made not only by the passengers. Four passengers could not get out. WON such negligence is the proximate cause of the deaths of the victims HELD 1.Petitioners in fussing over the lack of ventilation in the tanks backfired as their witnesses were no experts. we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus. such negligence was not a continuing one.It may be that ordinarily. the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. But in the present case and under the circumstances obtaining in the same. It appeared that gasoline began to leak from the overturned bus. pero mukhang kinasuhan ni Sofia Fernando yung Davao City for negligence in a previous case dahil namatay yung asawa nya . there was nothing to supervise. .see definition of proximate cause under A1 . granting the families of the deceased men P30k each in . While the bus was running very fast on a highway. the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier. 30 of the Medina Transportation.Although public respondent had been remiss in its duty to re-empty the tank annually (for almost 20 years). when a passenger bus overturns. shortly after midnight. and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Public respondent lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet the situation. this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on 'Its side but completely on its back. gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus. but for the physical injuries suffered by him. What is more. including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it. They apparently did the re-emptying as the tank was nearly empty. May 8. the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth.56 - prof. In other words. and so damages were awarded. The bus fell into a canal and turned turtle. Also. produces the injury. before the date they were to work. the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was. or at least. one of the front tires burst. it immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service. and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. but most probably. not for his death. the fire that burned the bus. was still alive. WON Davao City is guilty of negligence 2. petitioners appealed to then IAC (now CA) which set aside the judgment and rendered a new one. The City Engineer’s office. they had to use a torch. if not for the overturning of the bus… then the leak and the fire wouldn’t have happened) FERNANDO V CA (City of Davao) 208 SCRA 714 MEDIALDEA. by the driver and the conductor themselves. driven by Saylon. 1992 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . the most handy and available. Work on the tank was still forthcoming since the awarding to the winning bidder was yet to be made by the Committee on Awards—hence. and without which the result would not have occurred. can be smelt and detected -even from a distance.The Court also does not agree with petitioner’s contention that warning signs of noxious gas should be placed around the area of the toilets and septic tank. including Bataclan. As defined in Art 694 of the NCC. Bataclan. "If through some event. and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning).Both parties filed their separate MFRs. specially over a large area. and pins down a passenger. . and even then no reports of casualties from gas poising emerged. the public toilet connected to it was used several times daily all those years. though he must have suffered physical injuries. Ten men came to help. ISSUES 1. or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire. and all those people have remained unscathed which is ironically evidenced by the petitioner’s witnesses. the overturned bus is set on fire. that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help. . perhaps serious. Neither did they present competent evidence to corroborate their testimonies and rebut the city government engineer Alindada’s testimony that safety requirements for the tank had been complied with. They. 2. one must prove under Art 2179 of the NCC that the defendant’s negligence was the the coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus. the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected. they are not nuisances per se which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public. the rescuers had to carry a light with them. Upon learning from the market master about the need to clean said tank. . and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available. and four other companions including an Alberto Fernando were found dead inside the septic tank. P20k each as moral damages and P10k for attorney’s fees. by lightning. Bertulano. One of them carried a torch and when he approached the bus. casis compensatory damages. Their lungs had burst due to their intake of toxic sulfide gas produced from the waste matter in said tank. However. that at the time the fire started. a fierce fire started. upon investigation. . Hence this petition.Juan Bataclan rode Bus No. -(I guess this case says. . and the passenger is burned to death. market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property for the re-emptying of the septic tank of Agdao.Upon dismissal of the case by the TC. dismissing the case.Bibiano Morta.Proximate cause is defined as that cause which in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. found that the men entered without clearance or consent of the market master. In fact. The only indication that the tank was full was when water began to leak. Invitations to bid for cleaning out the tanks were issued. NO . burning the four passengers trapped inside. say.The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus. To be entitled to damages. the CA rendered an amended decision granting Davao City’s MFR. *Di nakalagay sa case. merely causing him physical injuries. one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle.

Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City. A test for such a relationship is given in Taylor v Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. . rigidity becomes generalized. or back and difficulty swallowing. Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition. but ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw.. an interval referred to as the onset time. and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record. Marcelo Javier was hacked by the Filomeno Urbano using a bolo. the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation URBANO V IAC 157 SCRA 1 GUTIERREZ JR.57 - prof. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death. . . the victims would not have died. but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. However. in natural and continuous sequence. The lower courts held that Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. . As in the case of the incubation period. . the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and . As the CA observed. In a small proportion of patients. ISSUE WON there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death HELD YES. which. 1980. Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm.In an information. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. 1980. abdomen. . 1981.A toxic gas leakage could only have happened by opening the tank’s cover. which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery.. i.torts & damages proximate cause of the injury. which was the 22nd day after the incident. independent of it. As the progresses. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus. As a result of which. In fact. produces the injury. over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. . Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. . trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. A short incubation period indicates severe disease. dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present. irritability. and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected. and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The victims’ failure to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident. between the event itself."And more comprehensively. as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person. This was especially true for the victim. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. ranges from 2 to 56 days. only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. somehow got infected with tetanus However. had they not opened the tank which they were not authorized to open in the first place. especially since no other deaths or injuries related to the tank had ever occurred. trismus is marked. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. and without which the result would not have occurred. January 7. which states that a distinction must be made between the accident and the injury. . Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Trismus is usually present. and headache are encountered occasionally.When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill. Bertulano." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom.e. however. Disposition amended decision of the CA is AFFIRMED A2010 . Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days. casis probable result of the cause which first acted. and that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November. On November 15." . As the disease progresses. The accident is thus of the victims’ own doing—an ordinarily prudent person should be aware of the attended risks of cleaning out the tank.The incubation period of tetanus.The trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. that Dr. Javier died in the hospital. without which there could have been no accident. As more muscles are involved.The record is clear that . 1988 NATURE Petition to review the decision of the then IAC FACTS ON oct. a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis.The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended . since he was an old hand to septic services and is expected to know the hazards of the job. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time. "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury.Appellant alleges that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed. either immediately or by setting other events in motion. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. He was sentenced accordingly.Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness. 23. most muscles are involved to some degree. which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment. . They find it illogical that the septic tank which had been around since the 50’s would be the proximate cause of an accident which occurred only 20 years later.PROXIMATE CAUSE "that cause. In the vast majority. On November 14. and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent. he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill required in what he attempts to do. He states that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence. and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom.The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound. and those acts of the victim not entering into it." . Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. When admitted to the hospital. 1980.The then IAC affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal. but contributing to his own proper hurt. stiffness gives way to rigidity.. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. Dr.

If. reduced the damages awarded ISSUES Factual issues: (court discussed this to administer substantial justice without remanding the case to the lower court – since both TC and IAC did not consider defenses set by petitioners) 1. WON the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked a. which was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (DIONISIO’s lane). he died. without his headlights on and . WON Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident. 1980. WON Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before the collision with the dump truck. died on the second day from the onset time. The dump truck was parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the street. This incident took place on October 23. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U." and that consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel b. however. the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time. a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death. DIONISIO suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars. front or rear. 3. that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening. Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. severe trismus. medically speaking. WON the driver’s negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause. As a result of the collision. Makati (not far from his home) and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street without headlights when he hit a dump truck owned by Phoenix Construction Inc. unrelated. (It is important to determine if he had a curfew pass to shed light to the 2nd and 3rd factual issues) -Testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who had taken DIONISIO to Makati Med testified that none was found with Dionisio. Javier. Substantial Issues: 5. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant. the happened but for such condition or occasion. awarded damages in favor of Dionisio IAC: in favor of Dionisio. efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. He had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Sts.. with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. based on the “last clear chance” doctrine. therefore. the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction.A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible. Makati) from cocktails/dinner meeting with his boss where he had taken “a shot or two” of liquor. 1980. in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning. the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. Carbonel (CARBONEL). casis without a curfew pass. WON Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights before contact with the dump truck 4. none was found with Dionisio. 1004-1005. if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. distinct and foreign to the crime. should hold Dionisio alone responsible for his accident 6. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION. FACTS -About 1:30 am. or on November 14. lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. Emphasis supplied) Therefore. successive. (PHOENIX). November 15. and an onset time of 72 hrs. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause. dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged. NO. natural. He was not able to produce any curfew pass during the trial. or less. Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. DIONISIO claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. like lockjaw and muscle spasms. After 22 days. 1983 Edition. The infection was. Leonardo Dionisio (DIONISIO) was driving home (he lived in Bangkal. even though such injury would not have A2010 . and efficient cause of the injury. Therefore.58 - prof. Although Dionisio offered a certification attesting that he did have a valid curfew pass.torts & damages time. its regular driver. DIONISIO’s claim: the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix PHOENIX + CARBONEL’s claim: the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident. The medical findings. with the permission of his employer PHOENIX. the onset time should have been more than six days. Consequently. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection. . and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. pp. for failure to take necessary precautions. 1987 NATURE Petition for review INC. such condition was not the proximate cause. while under the influence of liquor. . if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct. The following day. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct.Doubts are present. WON the amount of damages awarded should be modified HELD FACTUAL 1. WON private respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful night 2. IAC (DIONISIO) 148 SCRA 353 FELICIANO. WON the court.In the case at bar. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition. therefore. such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause DISPOSITION :. At Bangkal. . WON Phoenix has successfully proven that they exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver 7. 1980. he suffered the symptoms of tetanus. TC: in favor of Dionisio. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck. however. MARCH 10. (CARBONEL) VS. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine. generalized convulsive spasms.

YES. NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE ANYTHING. SUBSTANTIAL 5. it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible. or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason Thus one who sets a fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary. Private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory. that one who leaves an obstruction on the road or a railroad track should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into it. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno is admissible not under the official records exception to the hearsay rule but rather as part of the res gestae. Phoenix’s theory more credible than Dionisio’s. was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. A2010 ." but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. PROSSER AND KEETON: "Cause and condition. YES. The petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created. -Dionisio claimed that he was traveling at 30kph and had just crossed the intersection of General Santos and General Lacuna Streets and had started to accelerate when his headlights failed just before the collision took place. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk. it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. FROM PROF. The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of others.not enough evidence to show how much liquor Dionisio had in fact taken and the effects of that upon his physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness." "Foreseeable Intervening Causes. nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who falls b.the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. and hence of the defendant's negligence. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. if any. as is invariably the case the latter am the result of other active forces which have gone before. -BUT: an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a stationary object in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned. even though it did not. Smith but it is a matter for debate whether. even though the car is negligently driven.' Thus. but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause. Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to anticipate the usual weather of the vicinity. the distinctions between" cause" and "condition" have already been "almost entirely discredited. x x x In all of these cases there is an intervening cause combining with the defendant's conduct to produce the result and in each case the defendant's negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk. 3. the defendant is said not to be liable. it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as part of the res gestae and should have been considered by the trial court.59 - prof. Ratio. the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump track was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. 4. because of failure to guard against it. in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions. but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited So far as it has any validity at all. the defendant may be negligent. NO. DIONISIO’S CLAIM: he had his headlights on but that. the defendant will not escape responsibility. The person who leaves the combustible or explosive material exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of fire from some independent source. Dionisio's negligence. But even in such cases. "One shot or two" of hard liquor may affect different people differently. including all ordinary forces of nature such as usual wind or rain." that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts a. although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck PHOENIX’s CLAIM: Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection (less than 200m away). and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created. the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark. and not the result of reflective thought. or to what extent. although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident. at the crucial moment. NO. as it were. Testimony of Patrolman Cuyno attesting that people gathered at the scene of the accident told him that Dionisio’s Car was MOVING FAST and that he DID NOT have its HEADLIGTS ON. reactions from observers who happened to be around at that time. YES. substantial weight should have been ascribed to such testimony. or snow or frost or fog or even lightning. and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it --" EVIDENCE PRESENTED: Patrolman Cuyno attested that Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken to Makati med + Dionisio admitted he had taken “a shot or two” . Testimonial evidence under this exception to the hearsay rule consists of excited utterances made on the occasion of an occurrence or event sufficiently startling in nature so as to render inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of the observer and hence made as a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event.torts & damages certification did not specify any serial number or date or period of effectivity of the supposed curfew pass. or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances. as it could not. He also asserts that Patrolman Cuyno’s testimony was hearsay and did not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule since the facts he testified to were not acquired by him through official information and had not been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so. Besides. have purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at which Dionisio was travelling just before impact with the Phoenix dump truck. it is difficult to see what role. and therefore to be anticipated. x x x [T]he standard of reasonable conduct may require the defendant to protect the plaintiff against 'that occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life. Accordingly. a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car. particularly since. usual and customary wind arising later will spread it beyond the defendant's own property. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated. x x x. casis into it a month afterward. Clearly. and some new force intervenes. it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. . When a spark ignites the gasoline. the common law last clear chance . these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition. this argument had no validity under our jurisdiction and even in the United States. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of the original risk. among other reasons. rather than reflective. 2. and therefore to take precautions to prevent that event.

1979 and for Vicente TUI in amount of P11.500. . but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. filed a Complaint for damages against Quezon City and Engr. RTC: ordered petitioner to pay P200T compensatory damages.000. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. Ramir Tiamzon. the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care. -As a result. The payee then demanded a cash payment of the check’s face value which REYES did if only to save his name. -Fulgencio P. He. The same thing happened to the Oct.11. Costs against the petitioners. yielded negative results. JUNE 15.M. aggregate amount of compensatory damages. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. 1994 NATURE .. only the balance of 800% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarily liable therefor to the former. . the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by reducing the A2010 . CA: modified amount to just P50T moral damages and P25T attorney’s fees and costs of suit. ON LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE: The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule-that of contributory negligence.PILIPINAS BANK’S Current Account Bookkeeper made an error in depositing the amount: he thought it was for a certain FLORENCIO AMADOR." Reasoning The proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of petitioner's employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit of private respondent in the name of another depositor who had a similar first name. Disposition. Jr. 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court. These are for WINNER INDUSTRIAL CORP. SO ORDERED. sustain. casis NO . But if his negligence was only contributory. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. would result therefrom as a natural and probable consequence. WHEREFORE. -The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions.00 as attorney's fees and costs..10 check in favor of WINNER INDUSTRIAL was presented for payment. owner of ’87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan. . 6.21798 of NCC is applicable HELD 8 Art. Dacara.torts & damages doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff. ISSUE WON Art. . he requested PCIB Money Shop's manager to effect the withdrawal of P32T from his savings account and have it deposited with his current account with PILIPINAS BANK. shall be home by private respondent Dionisio. Quezon City.The bank employee is deemed to have failed to exercise the degree of care required in the performance of his duties. defendants claimed that they exercised due care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident. Definition of Proximate Cause: "any cause which. it was dishonored and the payee was advised to try it for next clearing. 2005 NATURE Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS -On February 28. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be home exclusively by the petitioners. produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury complained of or some similar injury.12 check. Jr. in amount of P21T due Oct. P100T moral damages. as well as costs of suit.FLORENCIO REYES issued two postdated checks. the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. the Oct. YES. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises. in natural and continuous sequence. -In short. The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent. July 25. thus. Dispositive Petition denied. That was only when they noticed the error. . which however. As to the other awards of damages.12. and that the reason why Fulgencio Dacara.078. -Indemnification was sought from the city government. except the award of P10.. posted the deposit in the latter's account not noticing that the depositor's surname in the deposit slip was REYES. which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government.To cover the face value of the checks. has itself been rejected. he immediately proceeded to the bank and urged an immediate verification of his account.10.43. it must be established that private respondent's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. P25T attorney’s fees. is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Fulgencio Dacara. he cannot recover damages. PILIPINAS BANK V CA (REYES) 234 SCRA 435 PUNO. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth. . NO.Furious. Jr. Since the ledger of Florencio REYES indicated that his account had only a balance of P4. as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. fell into the diggings was precisely . The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its track driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning.00 as exemplary damages and P4.Petition for review of CA decision FACTS . for and in behalf of his minor son.On Oct.4T due Oct. QUEZON CITY V DACARA PANGANIBAN. Dacara. 1988 at about 1:00 A.60 - prof. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. loss of expected income and moral damages private respondent Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount. while driving the said vehicle. even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix. Taking into account the comparative negligence ot DIONISIO and the petitioners.For it to apply. -Defendants admitted the occurrence of the incident but alleged that the subject diggings was provided with a mound of soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or after it which was visible during the incident. 2179. rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St. 7. the plaintiff may recover damages.It was redeposited but was again dishonored.

-These matters were. public buildings. was driving at the speed of 60 kilometers per hour (kph) when he met the accident. -Moral damages are not punitive in nature. -“The provisions of Article 21899 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same. WON petitioner’s negligence is the proximate cause of the incident 2. The award of moral damages must be solidly anchored on a definite showing that respondent actually experienced emotional and mental sufferings. No. 1988 which caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara. -Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence. and other public works under their control or supervision. casis -In the present case. Yes. upon a combined consideration of logic. -The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the accident bars us from supplanting their findings and substituting these with our own. and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219. and that they must have nevertheless been indifferent (or worse) to the danger of injury to the person or property of others. cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of. there was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral damages based on Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code. -It is too late in the day for them to raise this new issue. temperate or compensatory damages. -Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. If indeed signs were placed thereat. or injuries suffered by. however. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case. fright. moral shock. none was ever presented to stress the point that A2010 . that no other evidence (such as a medical certificate or proof of medical expenses) was presented to prove Fulgencio Jr. -Gross negligence means such utter want of care as to raise a presumption that the persons at fault must have been conscious of the probable consequences of their carelessness. streets. -To award moral damages. any person by reason of the defective condition of roads. which are amply substantiated by the evidence on record. Jr. -Indeed. besmirched reputation. -RTC ruled in favor of Dacara. when his car turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth from a digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an adequate warning to motorists especially during the thick of the night where darkness is pervasive.. the Complaint alleged that respondent’s son Fulgencio Jr.00 as attorney’s fees and other costs of suit. a court must be satisfied with proof of the following requisites: (1) an injury-whether physical. The award of these sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed. or psychological--clearly sustained by the claimant.000. such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. mental.61 - prof.00 as exemplary damages. P10. absent any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment by the lower courts or an ample showing that they lacked any basis for their conclusions. (3) a wrongful act or omission of the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant. . -It is apparent from the Decisions of the trial and the appellate courts. This speed was allegedly well above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on “city streets with light traffic. gasera which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade. both the trial and the appellate courts’ findings. fright. not raised by petitioners at any time during the trial. none was found at the scene of the accident. wounded feelings. 2.00 as moral damages. Thus. respondent sufficiently proved before the courts a quo that petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the incident.000. provided that the act or omission caused physical injuries. -The facts of the case show a complete disregard by petitioners of any adverse consequence of their failure to install even a single warning device at the area under renovation. moral shock. mental anguish. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision is tantamount to negligence which renders the City government liable -Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. how then could it be explained that according to the report even of the policeman. 3. exemplary damages may be recovered if the defendant acted with gross negligence.torts & damages because of the latter’s negligence and failure to exercise due care. social humiliation. policy and precedent. -Hence. petitioners assert that Fulgencio Jr. -That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the accident was aptly discussed in the lower court’s finding: “Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of February 28. -What really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is a factual issue that this Court cannot pass upon. and similar injury unjustly inflicted on a person. He has adduced adequate proof to justify his claim for the damages caused his car. serious anxiety. serious anxiety. justice. wounded feelings. -Well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be awarded in the absence of proof of physical suffering.’s bare assertion of physical injury. The negligence must amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property. common sense. P5. Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs. having violated a traffic regulation. CA agreed with the RTC’s finding that petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by respondent. ordering the defendants to indemnify the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand pesos as actual/compensatory damages. social humiliation. 9 .000. It is evident from the records that they brought up for the first time in their Motion for Reconsideration. No adequate reason has been given to overturn this factual conclusion. this Petition ISSUES 1. they can be awarded only after claimants have shown their entitlement to moral. besmirched reputation. -Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts. Yes. bridges. thereby establishing his right to actual or compensatory damages. WON exemplary damages and attorney’s fees are recoverable HELD 1. -Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. -Such a circumstance obtains in the instant case. -Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for quasi-delicts. To consider their belatedly raised arguments at this stage of the proceedings would trample on the basic principles of fair play. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. P10. mental anguish. sustained physical injuries. clearly point to petitioners’ negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered by respondent’s car. and due process. WON moral damages are recoverable 3. but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering. -In the case before us.” as provided under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code Thus. however. (2) a culpable act or omission factually established. or similar injury. Provinces. should be presumed negligent pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code. -Upon appeal. There can be no recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted in physical injury.

He noticed the presence of a healing Art. thereby causing the bit to come out of the horse's mouth. the defendant. the bit came out of the horse's mouth. The medical findings lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. in doing which he pulled one of the wheels of the carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed Julio Pagnaya over. ARANETA 42 Phil 252. and Fermin Gayetano. On November 14. in order to fix the bridle. Reasoning: -The case involves the application of Article 410 of the Revised Penal Code. On November 15. at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called this carromata first. with the modification that the award of moral damages is deleted. A2010 . produces the injury. Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended x x x. which he did.1980. Owing. replied to the effect that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta. It is as follows: "x x x 'that cause. October 17. in order that the vehicle might pass on. Issue: WON the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof Held: NO. Agaton Araneta. feeling himself free from control. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. and as guardian ad litem of the three children. ISSUE: WON there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death HELD: Yes. as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record. and without which the result would 10 GABETO V. but the other. 1980 Javier died in the hospital. Judge awarded damages to the widow to which decision Araneta appealed. one Julio Pagnaya. Disposition: Judgment is REVERSED. 1980 . -The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. with a view to going to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma in the same City. The evidence merely confirms that the wound. While he was thus engaged. the said Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig. which. et al. 1181). the horse. after alighting. After going a few yards further the side of the carromata struck a police telephone box which was fixed to a post on the sidewalk. started to go away. and laying his hands on the reins. The driver. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. in her own right as widow of Proceso Gayetano.torts & damages damages is meant to be a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. led the horse over to the curb. to wit. which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment. This action was brought by Consolacion Gabeto. Dr. when the horse.62 - prof. Dispositive The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. supposedly caused by the wrongful act of the defendant Agaton Araneta. we adopted the following definition of proximate cause: "x x x A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38. for the purpose of recovering damages incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the death of the said Proceso Gayetano.Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs. 4. in natural and continuous sequence. had alighted while the carromata was as yet alongside the sidewalk. Conchita Gayetano. cited by plaintiffsappellants in their brief." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom . The horse was then pulled over to near the curb. in the City of Iloilo. stopped the horse. A quarrel between them ensued. that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November. and after the runaway horse had proceeded up the street to a point in front of the Mission Hospital. and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off. Basilio Ilano. Urbano hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand . to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which it was made. had unfortunately retained his seat. v. causing a swelling on said leg. being free from the control of the bit. 1921 Street Facts: Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata near Plaza Gay. stepped out into the street. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. and proceeded to fix the bridle. pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence. and in so doing received injuries from which he soon died. by one or the other — it makes no difference which — and Pagnaya tried to fix the bridle. upon which the box came down with a crash and frightened the horse to such an extent that he set out at full speed up the street. somehow got infected with tetanus However. January 7. The infection was. When the driver of the carromata had turned his horse and started in the direction indicated. Appellant’s claim: -there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death -the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed. URBANO V IAC (PEOPLE PHILIPPINES) 157 SCRA 1 GUTIERREZ. Rosita Gayetano. Meanwhile one of the passengers. and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. and Julio. The evidence indicates that the bridle was old. it was Julio who jerked the rein. -In Vda. casis wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus. At or about the same time Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Agaton Araneta. and lately. Medina (102 Phil. and it became necessary for the driver to get out. de Bataclan. 1988 OF THE Nature : This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court Facts:When Filomeno Urbano found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed he went to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier admitted that he was the one responsible for what happened. Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. however. and that he had taken up the two passengers then in the carromata as the first who had offered employment. became disturbed and moved forward. therefore. distinct and foreign to the crime. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo. Proceso Gayetano.

If. Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. such condition was not the proximate cause. he ordered the engines half-astern. 931932). the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC). 118). Abellana. 185-186) -The court looked into the nature of tetanus to determine the cause -Medically speaking.' And more comprehensively. any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said Master Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined by competent "'A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. Gavino submitted his report to the Chief Pilot who referred the report to the Philippine Ports Authority. Control of vessels and liability for damage. 1980. arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver. Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it. the M/V PAVLODAR. or on November 14. When the vessel was already about 2. In such event. the anchor did not take hold as expected. — On compulsory pilotage grounds." (at p.The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is under compulsory pilotage pursuant to Section 8. . all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events.torts & damages not have occurred. November 15. The infection was. the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier.Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him.The rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the Philippine Ports Authority the amount of P1. with 2 shackles. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause. which result in injury because of the prior defective condition. Kavankov filed his sea protest. as its berthing space. the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted. — For entering a harbor and anchoring thereat. pp. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. The vessel sustained damage too.Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge. distinct and foreign to the crime.When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier. therefore. The speed of . Article III of Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Javier. The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on board. the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease. . 1998 NATURE Review on certiorari the CA decision affirming TC decision holding FESC and Gavino solidarily liable FACTS .the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time. British Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning. et al. . Consequently. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct. Cardenas. Abellana likewise submitted his report of the incident. October 1. . 03-85: SEC. beside him. However. Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person. were dropped. A brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew members. 1980. or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage district. PERTINENT RULES on PILOTAGE . When Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about. The medical findings lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. 125) FAR EAST SHIPPING CO V CA (PPA) 297 SCRA 30 REGALADO. or shifting from one berth or another. -Therefore. 1980. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. . The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port. This incident took place on October 23. who was then on the pier apron noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. natural. died on the second day from the onset time. casis the vessel did not slacken.On June 20. if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct. and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. Gavino ordered the engine stopped.63 - prof. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances.In case of compulsory pilotage. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service. Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. v. unrelated. flying under the flagship of the USSR. with the master of the vessel. and efficient cause of the injury. the respective duties and responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the master have been specified by the same regulation: SEC.126. the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The left anchor.J. Victor Kavankov. the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his negligence or fault. he suffered the symptoms of tetanus. every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage. as well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf.25. such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. He can only be absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize damage.132. either immediately or by setting other events in motion. '(45 C. even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death. he died. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo.therefore.000 feet from the pier. successive. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped. The following day. 1980. it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. . The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant. the onset time should have been more than six days. After 22 days. 11. however. his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.' (at pp. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel. supra) As we ruled in Manila Electric Co.After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Remaquillo. A commotion ensued between the crew members. (People v. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. A2010 . 4. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. (99 Phil.

that a master of a ship may not know because the pilot is familiar with the port. However. As a result. — Pilots shall properly and safely secure or anchor vessels under their control when requested to do so by the master of such vessels. As an expert he should’ve been reacting quickly to any such happenings. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons. owner Sabido and driver Lagunda (tsn. and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. . was sideswiped by the truck driven by Lagunda. and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened. the pilot momentarily becomes the master of the vessel. in maritime law. . Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party.In compulsory pilotage. — The duties and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows: xxx xxx xxx f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed safely. and the other driven by Lagunda and owned by Prospero Sabido. and licensed. CONCURRENT TORTFEASORS . ET AL 17 SCRA 1088 CONCEPCION. 308-309. where several causes combine to produce injuries. He is charged to perform his duties with extraordinary care because the safety of people and property on the vessel and on the dock are at stake. person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them. — A Pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes control thereof until he leaves it anchored free from shoal. or in certain waters. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. going in opposite directions met each other in a road curve. . the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case. Despite the presence of a shallow canal on the right side of the road which he could pass over with ease. widoy of Custodio. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots' Association. without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. — hereinafter referred to as the carrier — and its driver Mudales (none of whom has . testified that the 6 x 6 truck was running fast when it met the LTB Bus. CA affirmed. Based upon these facts. The court found that his reaction time (4 minutes) to the anchor not holding ground and the vessel still going too fast was too slow. Makabuhay. he never sensed the any danger even when the anchor didn’t hold and they were approaching the dock too fast. 1966 NATURE Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS In Barrio Halang. that his responsibility shall cease at the moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry out his order. It then went on to determine who between the pilot and the master was negligent. to conduct a vessel into or out of ports. ISSUE WON both the pilot and the master were negligent HELD YES. is a person duly qualified.Customs Administrative Order No. two trucks. 1955 when the LTB bus with full load to passengers was negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and sliding downward a slope. Capt.Capt. That his responsibility shall cease at the moment the master neglects or refuses to carry out his instructions. it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent. It is sufficient that his negligence.Based on Capt. . He is an expert who’s supposed to know the seabed. one driven by Mudales and belonging to Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company. August 31. although acting independently. whereas the six by six truck was climbing up with no cargoes or passengers on board but for three helpers. Kavankov’s testimony.torts & damages authority in appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. XXXIX. casis Disposition Petition denied. Mendoza). PILOT . Accordingly. LTB bus passenger who was riding on the running board as truck was full of passengers. Lagunda did not avert the accident simply because to use his own language the canal "is not a passage of trucks. He was right beside the pilot during the docking. it may appear that one of them was more culpable. 32. so he could see and hear everything that the pilot was seeing and hearing. The master. concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's. .There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Driver Lagunda admitted that three passengers rode on the running board of the bus when his vehicle was still at a distance of 5 or 7 meters from the bus. however may intervene or countermand the pilot if he A2010 . the 6 x 6 truck could have avoided hitting Custodio. . they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. SABIDO AND LAGUNDA V CUSTODIO. 15-65 issued twenty years earlier likewise provided in Chapter I thereof for the responsibilities of pilots: Par. that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. MASTER . xxx xxx xxx Par. XLIV.The SC started by saying that in a collision between a stationary object and a moving object. Custodio was injured and died. and in turn means negligence on the part of FESC. Gavino was found to be negligent. however. By simply swerving to the right side of the road. Lagunda and Sabido throw all the blame on Mudales. are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person.64 - prof. Custodia. To avoid any liability. LTB passengers had testified to the effect that the 6 x 6 cargo truck was running at a fast rate of speed. etc. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone. Provided. is the proximate cause of the injury.A pilot. Gavino and FESC are solidarily liable.As a general rule. Provided. there is a presumption of fault against the moving object (based on common sense and logic). The master’s negligence translates to unseaworthiness of the vessel. He blindly trusted the pilot. the Court of First Instance of Laguna and the Court of Appeals concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. And Lagunda had time and opportunity to avoid the mishap if he had been sufficiently careful and cautious because the two trucks never collided with each other. deems there is danger to the vessel because of the incompetence of the pilot or if the pilot is drunk. The sideswiping of the deceased and his two fellow passengers took place on broad daylight at about 9:30 in the morning of June 9. This is negligence on his part. SEC.

because that vehicle was running at a considerable speed despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve. from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging. WON petitioners were guilty of negligence 2. Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent. a fierce fire started. its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle. including the driver and conductor. YES Ratio Tthe proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. the correctness of said findings is borne out by the very testimony of petitioner Lagunda to the effect that he saw the passengers riding on the running board of the bus while the same was still five or seven meters away from the truck driven by him. Indeed. October 22.That same day. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons. It would appear that as the bus overturned. WON the the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus. YES. Salud Villanueva brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory. petitioners' truck had the last clear chance. and. in combination. HELD 1. Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. . are. one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end. including that of the defense. burning and all but consuming the bus. as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person. of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner. Dispositive Judgment affirmed.torts & damages appealed). in this sense. came about ten men. the A2010 . Where the carrier bus and its driver were clearly guilty of contributory negligence for having allowed a passenger to ride on the running board of the bus. must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus. 1759 ART.65 - prof. Ratio There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out. Cavite. . casis ISSUES 1. this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back. although acting independently of each other. Cavite. either immediately or by setting other events in motion. for Custodio was on the running board of the carrier's bus sometime before petitioners' truck came from the opposite direction. and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87. in its execution. driven by its regular chauffeur. 1755 ART. even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury. VDA. operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience. but rather. or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor. the owners of the two vehicles are liable solidarily for the death of the passenger. the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were removed and duly identified that of Bataclan. but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running. the rescuers had to carry a light with them. the negligence of the first two would not have produced this result without the negligence of petitioners' herein. 2.Some of the passengers. After half an hour. a bus of the Medina Transportation. At any rate. instead of being close to its right side of the road. through his agent. ISSUES 1. so that. one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. it was driven on its middle portion thereof and so near the passenger bus coming from the opposite as to sideswipe a passenger on its running board. including the 4 passengers trapped inside it. YES. . 1763 direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person. that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help. whereas that of the other springs from a quasi-delict. Calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood.150. while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus. 1957 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Cavite FACTS . the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan . petitioners' negligence was the last. by reason of which all of them were held solidarity liable. the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted. In fact.At about 2am. in point of time. and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses. moral. there was a distance of about 150 meters. MEDINA 102 PHIL 181 MONTEMAYOR. on its way to Pasay City.11 2. and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning). heard groans and moans from inside the bus. such as the one at bar. The views of the Court of Appeals on the speed of the truck and its location at the time of the accident are in the nature of findings of fact. although the liability of one arises from a breach of contract.the three passengers Bataclan. thus making him liable. 1733 ART. both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio. after the blow-out. whereas petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict. the driver Saylon. NO. These men presumably approach the overturned bus. The chauffeur. the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected.000 plus P600 as attorney's fee.Shortly after midnight. by the driver and the conductor themselves. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. and coming as they did from a rural 11 ART. the distance between the two vehicles was such that he could have avoided sideswiping said passengers if his truck were not running at a great speed. What is more. His widow. we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus. left the town of Amadeo. and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury. Reasoning Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and their goods.the CFI awarded P1. had violated the contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio. WON there was negligence on the part of the defendant. could not get out of the overturned bus. WON petitioners should be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its driver HELD 1. the bus was speeding. . . and where the driver of the other vehicle was also guilty of contributory negligence. but most probably. either is responsible for the whole injury. 2. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. plus P100. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. There were about 18 passengers. which we cannot disturb in a petition for review by certiorari. the fire that burned the bus. gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank. Reasoning under the circumstances obtaining in the case. and almost immediately. evidently fueled with petroleum. as testified to by one of the passengers. after they had clambered up to the road. DE BATACLAN VS. Conrado Saylon. made not only by the passengers.

. she was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina. INC v. but these were the only ones that contained “but for”. ordered to pay jointly and severally with Rabbit the plaintiffs. but that the driver did not follow his instructions. Rabbit Bus. (3) The observation of witness Police Corporal Cacalda also of the San Manuel Police that the path of the jeepney they found on the road \was shown by skid marks which he described as "scratches on the road caused by the iron of the jeep. moral damages and attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. there were no vehicles following the jeepney. and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. . for exemplary damages. telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus changed immediately because they were already old. (the insurer of the jeepney) was also impleaded as additional defendant in the civil case filed by the Pascuas.In the public interest the prosecution of said erring driver should be pursued. Rabbit and (Rabbit’s driver)delos Reyes were all impleaded as defendants.Rabbit filed a cross-claim for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. If this be true. perhaps serious. ordered them to pay the damages.The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus.. casis . PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES. Rabbit’s bus driven by Tomas delos Reyes and the jeepney driven by Tranquilino Manalo. the fire that burned the bus. -Manalo stepped on the brake. Applied primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear chance. burial expenses. -The jeepney practically occupied and blocked the greater portion of the western lane. and in the course of his visit.IAC reversed this ruling in the sense that it found delos Reyes to be negligent. and (3) the substantial factor test to conclude that delos Reyes was negligent. 753 of Rabbit .66 - prof.Almost at the time when the jeepney made a sudden U-turn and encroached on the western lane of the highway. ***As regards the damages. though he must have suffered physical injuries.Manalo was eventually convicted and was imprisoned. crossing the Eastern lane and the (imaginary) center line and encroaching fully into the western lane where the collision took place as evidenced by the point of impact. . (jeepney driver)Manalo. respectively. and so damages were awarded. the jeepney’s right rear wheel detached which caused it to run in an unbalanced position. and while in the hospital.A criminal complaint against the two drivers for Multiple Homicide. The weather condition of that day was fair. spouses Mangune and Carreon filed a cross-claim for the repair of the jeepney and for its non-use during the period of repairs. (2) the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence. but rather.Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses Mangune and Carreon and Manalo on their contractual liability. 189 SCRA 158 MEDIALDEA/August 30. .TC: found the couple and Manalo to be NEGLIGENT and held that there was a breach of the contract of carriage with their passengers. plaintiffs based their suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict. . for the death of Bataclan and for the attorney's fees. . and his commitment to prison and service of his sentence (5) The application of the doctrine of res-ipsa loquitar attesting to the circumstance that the collision occured on the right of way of the Phil. she overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors. he had been telling the driver to change the said tires. including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it. not only as a matter of justice. . I don’t know if the italicized phrases are pertinent. DISPOSITION In view of the foregoing. one of the passengers who. ISSUE: WON THE JEEPNEY OWNERS AND ITS DRIVER ARE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES AND DEATH SUFFERED BY THE PASSENGERS OF THE JEEPNEY HELD: YES. invading and eventually stopping on the western lane of the road in such a manner that the jeepney's front faced the south (from where it came) and its rear faced the north (towards where it was going). The case against delos Reyes was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. . with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are increased to P6. not for his death. but for the physical injuries suffered by him. or after stopping for a couple of minutes. Note: This case was under the heading “but for”. Rabbit was to be paid by the jeepney party for actual damages. Filriters was jointly and severally liable as it was the jeepney’s insurer. REASONING: TC WAS CORRECT IN APPRECIATING THE FF FACTS CONCERNING MANALO’S NEGLIGENCE. but for the promotion of the safety of passengers on public utility buses. and that as a matter of fact. was hospitalized.At the time and in the vicinity of the accident. the bus bumped from behind the right rear portion of the jeepney which resulted in the said deaths and injuries. which is the right of way of vehicles coming from the north.According to the evidence. among which was Bus No. as a result of the collision.Other passengers of the jeepney sustained physical injuries. BUT ONLY THE SPOUSES AND FILRITERS ARE LIABLE.It was said that upon reaching a certain barrio. as a result of which.Damages sought to be claimed in the 3 cases were for medical expenses.Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation. . this.000 and P800. .As against Rabbit and delos Reyes. loss of wages. . Bataclan. the jeepney which was then running on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn. ET AL. it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers ." (4) His conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious Physical Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence by the CFI of Tarlac. that at the time the fire started. neither were there oncoming vehicles except the bus. . 1990 NATURE: CERTIORARI FACTS: . was still alive. because of the injuries suffered by her. . . SC: . after its wheel was removed.Three cases were filed and in all 3 the spouses (owners of the jeepney) Mangune and Carreon. Inc. IAC & CASIANO PASCUA. . (1) That the unrebutted testimony of his passenger Caridad Pascua that the Mangune jeepney was "running fast" that his passengers cautioned driver Manalo to slow down but did not heed the warning (2) The likewise unrebutted testimony of Police Investigator Tacpal of the San Manuel (Tarlac) Police who found that the tracks of the jeepney ran on the Eastern shoulder (outside the concrete paved road) until it returned to the concrete road at a sharp angle. A2010 . Neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.torts & damages area where lanterns and flashlights were not available.This case is for recovery of damages for the 3 jeepney passengers who died as a result of the collision between the Phil.On the other hand.

facing the oncoming traffic. . That it was not successful in fully clearing the Mangune jeepney as its (Rabbit's) left front hit said jeepney must have been due to limitations of space and time.To escape liability. . distance in only 2. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely pro hac vice. Necesito. . If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour. etc. delos Reyes covered the distance of 45 meters in 3. the moment a passenger dies or is injured. in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning. v. . ***With regard to the substantial factor test: . . . not only because he was driving fast and did not even attempt to avoid the mishap but also because it was the bus which was the physical force which brought about the injury and death to the passengers of the jeepney. Carbonel. . assuming such calculation to be correct. is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways. 75). . there were no options available to him. the last on Dec. -SC: The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon.In culpa contractual. CA. 2d). 657). (Anuran. The bus driver's conduct is thus a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passengers of the jeepney. Said defendant did not even attempt to explain. he had little time to react to the situation.. is not a caso fortuito which would avoid the carriers liability for damages (Son v. 892 citing Lasam. et al. There were no lights or any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck. measured from the time its right rear wheel was detached up to the point of collision. . casis -the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger. Torts. Paras. and in the event of contractual liability. .” -The speed of the bus was even calculated by the IAC.The IAC held that “. He switched his headlights on "bright" and saw a Ford dump truck about 21/2meters away from his car.67 - prof. and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733. contradictory to the explicit provision of A 2181 of the NCC. Verily.) -On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident. which included the tightening of the bolts. . partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. But the SC was not convinced. ***On the sole liability of the Jeepney Owners (excluding Manalo) PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION (DIONISIO) 148 SCRA 353 FELICIANO. was parked on the right hand side of the street (i. 1966. owned by and registered in the name of Phoenix Construction Inc. the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable (Restatement. unless contradicted by other evidence: would have been correct were it not for the undisputed fact that the U-turn made by the jeepney was abrupt. 94 Phil. he would run the greater risk of running smack in the Mangune jeepney either head on or broadside as the jeepney then was abruptly making a U-turn. Delos Reyes could not have anticipated the sudden U-turn executed by Manalo. Jr. Here. AFFIRMED TOO THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BUT MODIFIED THE INDEMNITY FOR LOSS OF LIFE FROM 3K (AS PER A1746 TO A2206 NCC) TO 30K.. April 29.Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed an intersection when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.24 seconds.That delos Reyes of the Rabbit bus could also have swerved to its left (eastern lane) to avoid bumping the Mangune jeepney which was then on the western lane: Under such a situation. 23.025 seconds. As to the cause thereof no evidence was offered.. . the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger. 16 SCRA 742). . v.Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more or less 50 kph at the time of the accident. . . . Smith.Also. INC WERE LIABLE. .e. Aside from the time element involved. Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. that he periodically checks and maintains the jeepney of said defendants. 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code 2 or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event 3 (Lasam v. defendants Mangune and Carreon offered to show thru their witness Natalio Navarro. 657. Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-anddinner meeting with his boss.if the driver is to be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier. Cebu Autobus Company. Buño et al.The dump truck. ("Phoenix"). It was shown by the pictures that driver delos Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to the right attempt to avoid hitting the Mangune's jeepney. et al. front or rear. 104 Phil. v.. with the permission of his employer Phoenix. DISPOSITION: TC’ S DECISION WAS REINSTATED and AFFIRMED BUT MODIFICATION THAT ONLY THE COUPLE AND THE FILRITERS GUARANTY ASSURANCE CORP. Smith. the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently.torts & damages -The principle about "the last clear" chance would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street.The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. it to be one caused by a caso fortuito. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. 45 Phil. 1987 INC v IAC Nature: Petition to review the decision of the IAC Facts: - at about 1:30 am on November 15 1975. that would make the carrier's liability personal. on the right hand side of a person facing in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding).To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too much from him. an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver. This notwithstanding the right rear wheel of the vehicle was detached while in transit. an alleged mechanic. delos Reyes would have covered that A2010 . 45 Phil. et al.Delos Reyes cannot be faulted for not having avoided the collision because as was shown. . the day before the collision. much less establish. We find defendant bus running at a fast speed when the accident occurred and did not even make the slightest effort to avoid the accident. "[i]n an action for damages against the carrier for his failure to safely carry his passenger to his destination. It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another. even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver (Viluan v. Jr. . . Using this speed. . It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour. et al.. the jeepney left a skid mark of about 45 meters. its regular driver. Mar 10. -In any event.

(see previous digest) . the defendant is said not to be liable. . And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition." - petitioners' arguments are drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United States. Dionisio's negligence. Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars. but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution. but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited." Professors Prosser and Keeton make this quite clear: “Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. Ratio A prior and remote cause (which furnishes the condition or gives rise to the occasion by which an injury was made possible) cannot be the basis of an action if a distinct. was an indispensable and efficient cause. So far as it has any validity at all. successive. while under the influence of liquor. it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety. May 18. as is invariably the case the latter (is) the result of other active forces which have gone before. casis NATURE Review by certiorari of a CA decision FACTS .68 - prof. .the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident. It is this CA decision the Company now seeks to appeal.the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix Issue: WON the proximate cause of the accident was Dionisio’s negligence (driving faster than he should have. After grabbing hold of the sheet. and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions. evidently a remote cause. a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. which affirmed the judgment. unrelated and efficient cause of the injury intervenes between such prior and remote cause and the injury. It merely provided the condition from which the cause arose (it set the stage for the cause of the injury to occur). without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. do not have any validity in this jurisdiction. such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire. and without headlights) or the negligence of the driver in parking the truck. considering the latter's length of 6 feet. the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark. however. But even in such cases. although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident. A2010 . Petitioners’comments . that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening.it is the driver’s negligence. far from being a "passive and static condition". Held: . 1956 . If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible. electrocuting him and killing him.As a result of the collision.” (downspout). the defendant will not escape responsibility. IAC affirmed the lower court’s ruling. He climbed up to the media agua which was just below the 3 rd floor window and stood on it to receive a galvanized iron sheet through the said window. The collision would not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The Company appealed to the CA. such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet.His widow and children filed a suit to recover damages from the company and the TC rendered judgment in their favor. efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. When a spark ignites the gasoline. he turned around and a portion of the iron sheet he was holding came into contact with an electric wire of Manila Electric Company (the Company) strung 2. in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result. Reasoning We fail to see how the Company could be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence. particularly since. the truck driver must be held responsible.Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. with modification on award of damages. These arguments. it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important.Efren Magno went to his stepbrother’s 3-story house to fix a leaking “media agua.The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition. such condition was not the proximate cause. and some new force intervenes.torts & damages ." but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause. . The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down that street and for having so created this risk. page 5 of outline) - concerned. But so far as the fact of causation is the truck driver's negligence. Even in the United States. (NOTE: this was the contention of petitioners which SC noted in is decision) Private respondent’s comments . When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the media agua - if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked.Trial court ruled in favor of Dionisio. ISSUE WON the Company’s negligence in the installation and maintenance of its wires was the proximate cause of the death HELD No. it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations. the distinctions between" cause" and "condition" have already been "almost entirely discredited. one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who falls into it a month afterward. . If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause.ON CAUSE v CONDITION (under IV A 3c. What the petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was only a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the truck driver’s negligence MANILA ELECTRIC v REMOQUILLO 99 PHIL 117 MONTEMAYOR.5 ft parallel to the edge of the media agua.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. . Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc. then he is guilty of negligence. . and attorney’s fee. . . Complaint against company dismissed A2010 . Disposition CA decision reversed. and driven by Ruben Galang. November 19.Two civil cases were filed on Jan 31. it was further asserted that these defendants did not allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising the said employee.69 - prof. Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee. swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car. and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. he could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. which appealed. Trial judge decided against Manila Railroad. his training and experience failed him. it reversed the ruling of the trial court and ordered the defendants to pay damages. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck. . two boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car. resulted from the company’s negligence. the decision for the consolidated civil cases was reversed. His house’s materials included nipa and cogon. The company could have removed the house through its power of eminent domain. would do.Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals may be set aside when such findings are not supported by the evidence or when the trial court failed to consider the material facts which would have led to a conclusion different from what was stated in its judgment. That Rodrigueza’s house was near was an ANTECEDENT CONDITION but that can’t be imputed to him as CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE because that condition was not created by himself and because his house remained by the toleration and consent of company and because even if the house was improperly there. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do .The PROXIMATE AND ONLY CAUSE of the damage was the negligent act of the company. Petitioners appealed to IAC. an Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was filed with the trial court.A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck owned by private respondents.In an MFR. 1921 NATURE Appeal from judgment of CFI RAILROAD MCKEE v IAC. two boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. . The fire was communicated to four houses nearby. IAC immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh's negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the southern end of the bridge. Before he could do so. no negligence can be imputed to Jose Koh. his car collided with the truck. applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. and forgetting where he was standing. They also say that the sparks were produced by an inferior fuel used by the company – Bataan coal. All of these houses were of light construction. . in the instant case. 1992 NATURE Appeal from decision of the IAC FACTS . was negligent. The appellate court further said that the law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants. Defense said Rodigueza’s house stood partly within limits of land owned by company. on the said bridge.torts & damages just below the third story window. as employers of Galang.Judge Capulong found Galang guilty of the criminal charge and ordered him to pay damages. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh. evidently without looking. July 16. this indicates contributory negligence on his part. His house was there before the railroad company’s property.When the northbound Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge. Rodrigueza didn’t mind the warnings from the company. MANILA COMPANY STREET. But unfortunately. TAYAG 211 SCRA 517 DAVIDE. IAC affirmed decision. ISSUES WON respondent Court's findings in its challenged resolution are supported by evidence or are based on mere speculations.Using the test.Manila Railroad’s defense is not a bar to recovery by the other plaintiffs.On 1 March 1977. So. HELD YES . in the selection and supervision of the latter. Hence this petition.There was no proof that Rodrigueza unlawfully intruded upon company’s property. Galang appealed to IAC. He may be at risk for fire. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had had training and experience for the job. he turned around swinging his arms with the motion of his body. The decision is anchored principally on the findings that it was FACTS Rodrigueza et al seek damages fr fire kindled by sparks fr a locomotive engine. it is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so. thereby causing his own electrocution. he then switched on the headlights of the car. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. . all passengers of the Ford Escort. On the basis of this presumed negligence. RODRIGUEZA V. which was the opposite lane. In its consolidated decision of the civil cases. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. but should not bear loss if the fire . holding the 6-ft iron sheet with both hands and at arms length. company had no right to negligently destroy it. and throwing all prudence and discretion to the winds.Judge Castaneda dismissed the 2 civil cases and awarded private respondents moral damages and exemplary damages. casis Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused the accident. except that of Rodrigueza which was of strong materials. Jose Koh. . . . ISSUE WON damage was caused by Rodrigueza’s contributory negligence HELD Yes. 1977.The respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that the driver of the car. . and physical injuries to George Koh McKee. Plaintiffs say that the company failed to supervise their employees properly and was negligent in allowing locomotive to operate without smokestack protection for arresting sparks.Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man. conjectures and presumptions.

clear congested dockets to simplify the work of the trial court. by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor.The Realistic Institute. which seeks to avoid a multiplicity of suits. which was the actual cause of the tragedy. or to use the fire-escapes. had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. whether acquittal or conviction. . might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. which. in natural and continuous sequence. it had eight windows. . A2010 . each of which was provided with two fire-escape ladders.50 meters in width. directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action. subject to the modification that the indemnity for death is increased from P12. The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff. tried to calm down the students. In the case of independent civil actions under the new Civil Code.The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. The panic. He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 km) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kph. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might. . 1973 FACTS . of about 1. across the street. according to their respective orientation. owned and operated by Mercedes M. by exercising reasonable care and prudence. 1955. The second floor was unpartitioned. to consolidate criminal case with the civil cases. a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters away from the institute.00 to P50. it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event. if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method. the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. and without which the result would not have occurred.000. Such was what happened in this case. Dispositive Petition granted. What remains to be the most important consideration as to why the decision in the criminal case should not be considered in this appeal is the fact that private respondents were not parties therein. unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.The civil cases. semi-concrete edifice located at the comer of Quezon Boulevard and Soler Street. casis preventing the unseeming. . aware of the plaintiff's peril. and it may therefore be reasonably concluded that none was made. and that the fire was anyway. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. a panic ensued. could not . either immediately or by setting other events in motion. . Soler Street lay between that store and the institute.Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh. guard against oppression and abuse. a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident.In the afternoon of October 24. Upon seeing the fire. The answers of the private respondents in the civil cases did not interpose this defense. the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee . which were for the recovery of civil liability arising from a quasi-delict under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. FERNANDEZ 51 SCRA 181 MAKALINTAL.000. and an injury results. They were eventually consolidated for joint trial. would have easily sustained a consolidation. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. thereby TEAGUE VS. is not guilty of negligence. Four instructresses and six assistant instructresses of the institute were present and they. it cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof.Moreover. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. perception and perhaps even prejudice. if at all negligent.Assuming. notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. telling them not to be afraid because the Gil-Armi Building would not get burned as it is made of concrete. a two-storey.torts & damages . attain justice with the least expense to the parties litigants. or in short. Proximate cause has been defined as: that cause. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road. should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care. together with the registrar.The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. They told the students not to rush out but just to go down the stairway two by two. . not juris et de jure. the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car.Last clear chance: The doctrine is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant. under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent. a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should.Section 1. Neither did they attempt to prove it. if no ludicrous. the injured person is entitled to recovery. the private respondents are. the result of the criminal case. if he.As employers of the truck driver. and although it had only one stairway. Teague. or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril. were filed ahead of criminal case. Assailed decision set aside while its original is REINSTATED. The doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril. arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent. and the presence of each of the fire exits was indicated on the wall. spectacle of two judges appreciating. Quiapo. and thereafter rendering conflicting decisions. Manila. was the initial act in the chain of events. however. however. "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger. who numbered about 180 at the time. That presumption. . the negligent act of the truck driver. or according to some authorities. produces the injury. under what is known as the emergency rule. was a vocational school for hair and beauty culture situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building. had a total area of about 400 square meters. some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter. the same facts differently. as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person. The records do not indicate any attempt on the part of the parties. which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances. or vice-versa. the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted. On the separate civil and criminal actions . . is only juris tantum. Rule 31 of the Rules of Court. he was violating any traffic regulation.70 - prof. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code. June 4. In such cases. and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger. prevent delays.

According to the petitioner "the events of fire. exits and stairways . although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had a second stairway under construction. but if it is devoted to any one of the purposes mentioned in the ordinance .To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does not portray the situation in its true perspective. (4) panic in the Institute. WON the failure to comply with the requirement of the ordinance was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez HELD 1. YES. ISSUES 1. who is a mere lessee. Dispositive Decision appealed from is affirmed. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events.71 - prof. it is argued.then the building is within the coverage of the ordinance. (3) shouts of "Fire!. Reasoning It was the use of the building for school purposes which brought the same within the coverage of the ordinance. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause. Ratio The violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident. .2 meters each. and all public or quasipublic buildings having less than three stories. instead of two of at least 1. which. Fireproof partitions. since the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the building. it would be more accurate to say that the overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one.000. said stairways shall be placed as far apart as possible. including Lourdes Fernandez. was only a remote cause. if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct. This provision reads as follows: "Sec. Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the respondents. Reasoning The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. were found dead and several others injured on account of the stampede. (5) stampede. sanitarium. either immediately or by settling other events in motion. . WON the ordinance devolved upon the owners of the building and therefore it is they and not the petitioner. was bound to happen under emergency conditions if there was only one stairway available. but rather the use or the purpose for which a particular building. But. such as hospitals. . This finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with in connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building. who should be liable for the violation A2010 . and (6) injuries and death. NO. as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person. is utilized. NO. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result there from. such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause." The weakness in the argument springs from a faulty juxtaposition of the events which formed a chain and resulted in the injury. Fire!". March 15. unrelated. But the violation was a continuing one. 1. and it was the petitioner and not the owners who were responsible for such use. No part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire.All buildings and separate sections of buildings or buildings otherwise known as accessorias having less than three stories. and efficient cause of the injury. four students. plus interest at the legal rate from the date the complaint was filed. schools. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition.The petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death of Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of ordinance. after the panic was over. the principle of proximate cause applies to such violation. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor.The CA declared that Teague was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. PICART V SMITH STREET. 2. The plaintiffs appealed to the CA. Indeed the requirement that such a building should have two (2) separate stairways instead of only one (1) has no relevance or reasonable relation to the fact of ownership.The CFI of Manila found for the defendant and dismissed the case. 3. But it was precisely such contingencies or events that the authors of the ordinance had in mind. successive. for under normal conditions one stairway would be adequate for the occupants of the building. thereby causing stampede.5 meters wide. 3. it could be reasonably foreseen. but does have such relation to the use or purpose for which the building is devoted.A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible. in case of large buildings more than two stairways shall likewise be provided when required by the chief of the fire department. in the manner in which it happened. clubs. sister of plaintiffs. 1918 . such condition was not the proximate cause. Reasoning Thus the same may be privately owned. It is true that in this particular case there would have been no overcrowding in the single stairway if there had not been a fire in the neighborhood which caused the students to panic and rush headlong for the stairs in order to go down. The violation of the ordinance." The alleged violation of the ordinance consisted is that the second storey of the building had only one stairway. restaurants or panciterias. shall be provided with at least two unobstructed stairways of not less than one meter and twenty centimeters in width and an inclination of not less than forty degrees from the perpendicular. It is true that the petitioner's noncompliance with the ordinance in question was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of time. the final event in the chain immediately affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted. in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the building. Ratio it is not ownership which determines the character of buildings subject to its requirements.torts & damages be subdued and the students kept on rushing and pushing their way through the stairs. reformatories. (2) fire at a neighboring place. [Citing MERALCO v Remoquillo] . casis .for instance as a school. and the like. even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. which by a divided vote of 3 to 2 (a special division of five members having been constituted) rendered a judgment of reversal and sentenced the defendant to pay damages to the plaintiffs in the sum of P11. having one or more persons domiciled therein either temporarily or permanently. WON Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila refers only to public buildings and hence did not apply to the Gil-Armi building which was of private ownership 2. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. panic and stampede were independent causes with no causal connection at all with the violation of the ordinance. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become necessary to evacuate the building. places of human detention. was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent. and cannot be the basis of liability since there intervened a number of independent causes which produced the injury complained of. assembly halls. 491. which the Realistic Institute precisely was . [Citing Bataclan v Medina] .

and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. Could a prudent man. continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision.  But in view of the known nature of horses.  The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing. plaintiff was riding on his pony over the Carlatan Bridge. but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done. in the case under consideration.  CFI absolved defendant from liability  Hence. The law considers what would be reckless. placed in the position of the defendant.  When he had gotten quite near.  He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge.  As a result of its injuries the horse died. without reference to the prior negligence of the other part. A prudent man. in our opinion. It will be noted however. Reasonable foresight of harm. it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. La Union. 1912.  The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. that the negligent acts of . seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge. negligence is clearly established. that being the proper side of the road for the machine. instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down.  The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. the appeal ISSUE WON the defendant. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm. or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. blameworthy. and from this moment it was no longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety.  The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. he might get excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side.  In so doing. to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. was guilty of negligence that would give rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done Ratio: The person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences.  Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case.  As the defendant started across the bridge. deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or. for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road.torts & damages NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of La Union FACTS  On December 12. but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. He was.  Stated in these terms. going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. the defendant guided it toward his left.  Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet. at San Fernando. would have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk. he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side. A2010 . if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles. he gave two more successive blasts.  In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away.  The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. he was. HELD Yes. foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so. the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.  The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.  As the defendant neared the bridge he saw the plaintiff and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.  In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. then he is guilty of negligence.  The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. the court thinks.  He did this because he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side.72 - prof. is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. given the novelty of the apparition and the rapidity of the approach.  The pony had not as yet exhibited fright. casis  When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger.  The defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile.  As the automobile approached.  However.  The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant. in maneuvering his car in the manner above described. negligent in the eye of the law. the defendant.  The plaintiff himself was not free from fault. there was an appreciable risk that.  Before he had gotten half way across. he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left.

The historical function of that doctrine in BUSTAMANTE V CA (DEL PILAR AND MONTESIANO) 193 SCRA 603 MEDIALDEA. Disposition: Petition GRANTED. 1991 NATURE: petition for certiorari to review decision of CA FACTS: a truck and a passenger bus sideswept each other. Obiter . since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. but was granted on MFR. a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident. the injured person is entitled to recovery. and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone. in order to overtake a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the highway. had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (Am. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. was traversing an inclined road when the driver saw from 30 meters away an approaching truck (driven by Montesiano). aware of the plaintiff's peril. This is the way the collision happened: The bus.torts & damages the two parties were not contemporaneous. not far from his home. Reasoning: The doctrine of last clear chance. its regular driver. It does not apply in a case wherein a victim (who is an outsider to the cause of the accident) demands liability from the negligent parties. The bus driver also observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. was on his way home to Makati from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss where had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs.We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory. which was denied at first. A negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff. causing the deaths of the passengers of the bus. In other words. The heirs of the victims filed for damages. and an injury results. owned and registered by Phoenix Construction Inc. February 6. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck.Phoenix and Carbonel also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. Not minding this circumstance due to his belief that the truck driver was merely joking. Susulin shifted from 4th to 3rd gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus. 1987 INC V IAC NATURE PETITION for review of the decision of the IAC FACTS . The RTC awarded damages. driving his Volkswagen car.IAC: affirmed TC but modified amounts ISSUE (obiter) WON last clear chance doctrine should be applied therefore exculpating Phoenix from paying any damages HELD NO . while under the influence of liquor. The driver and owner of the truck appealed to the CA. is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant. A2010 . private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries. the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril. Makati. The theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent. which was ascending the inclined part of the road. a negligent actor can’t defend by saying that another had negligently failed to take action which would have avoided injury. Civil Code of the Philippines). He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he .Dionisio commenced an action for damages claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck. should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due case. by exercising reasonable care and prudence. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by Carbonel.CFI: in favor of Dionisio . ." that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179. might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence. when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident (Sangco). without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. As a result of the collision. Phoenix and Carbonel countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident. As against 3rd persons.130AM 15 November 1975 . or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril. thus their liability must be solidary. Defendants Del Pilar and Montesiano ordered to pay damages with other defendants PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION (DIONISIO) 148 SCRA 353 FELICIANO. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. Dispositive: Appealed decision is reversed. driven by Susulin. saying that the negligent acts of both drivers were the cause of the accident. The dump truck. ISSUES: 1. and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the same. As the doctrine is usually stated. if he. Smith but it is a matter for debate whether. While the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing the hand tractor and the truck was approaching the bus.Leonardo Dionisio.73 - prof. Crossing the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal. or to what extent. March 10. absolving the defendants based on the doctrine of last clear chance. WON the CA was correct in absolving the driver and owner of the truck (answered by WON CA correctly applied the doctrine of last clear chance) HELD: 1. saying that the bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. NO Ratio: The doctrine of last clear chance applies only between the negligent parties. Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars. without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver. Jur). was parked askew (partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic) on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming traffic. or according to some authorities. . stated broadly. the two vehicles sideswiped each other at each other's left side. casis saw a Ford dump truck looming some 21/2meters away from his car. going very fast and the front wheels wiggling. it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines.

as it has been in A2179 CC . they were being deposited by her and credited by the petitioner bank in the account of Cotas. and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Irene Yabut. 979. now absorbed by the Philippine Commercial International Bank.979. The original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number.72. which found petitioner bank negligent and ordered the bank and Mabayad to pay RMC jointly and severally P304." The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions.During this period. as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. . 1976. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. it is difficult to see what role. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. Held: It was the negligence of Ms. if any. PBC's teller. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. Issue: Whether the proximate cause of the loss. or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. . On the duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank. the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff. the task of a court. were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to Account No. would. The law considers what would be reckless. or some other person for whose acts he must respond. To accept the petitioners' proposition must tend to weaken the very bonds of society. loss of expected income and moral damages Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount A2010 . coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller.74. which is that of her husband's. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Yabut and submitted to private . attornet’s fees and costs of suit. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not.Upon discovery of the loss of its funds. Bienvenido Cotas who likewise maintains an account with the same bank.979. but as its demand went unheeded. The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent. in truth and in fact. Accordingly.CA affirmed. even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. then he is guilty of negligence. represented by its President and General Manager Romeo Lipana. March 14. . .74 - prof. 1975 to July 16. on all occasions. .Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC). To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. With the daily remittance records also prepared by Ms. petitioner bank had been regularly furnishing private respondent with monthly statements showing its current accounts balances. that these deposits. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE v CA (LIPANA) 269 SCRA 695 HERMOSISIMA. she made her company believe that all the while the amounts she deposited were being credited to its account when. and make it appear to be RMC's account number. it filed a collection suit before RTC Pasig. . would do. . but modified the award of damages. casis respondent RMC together with the validated duplicate slips with the latter's name and account number.From May 5. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. however. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband.74 representing various deposits RMC made in its current account with said bank. is to determine whose negligence-the plaintiff's or the defendant's-was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. The second copy was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record purposes. RMC demanded from petitioner bank the return of its money. (b) fault or negligence of the defendant. petitioner Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalling P304. however. plus damages. in technical terms. which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent. Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number written thereon. P304.Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man.74 to his secretary. . has itself been rejected. Disposition CA decision is modified by reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory damages. -Irene Yabut would accomplish two copies of the deposit slip.979. 1997 Nature: Petition to review decision of CA Facts: . it had never been the practice of Romeo Lipana to check these monthly statements of account reposing complete trust and confidence on petitioner bank. blameworthy. for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC with PBC.Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so. to the tune of P304. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. After validation. suffered by the private respondent RMC is petitioner bank's negligence or that of private respondent's.Picart v. Azucena Mabayad. an original and a duplicate. Azucena Mabayad. filed a complaint to recover from the former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC). Unfortunately.torts & damages the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule-that of contributory negligence.RMC maintained two separate current accounts with the Pasig Branch of PBC in connection with its business of selling appliances. Under A2179. validate and stamp both the original and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip. The amount was not credited to RMC’s account but was instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas. It turned out. Smith. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs.There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff.

was negligent in validating. thru its teller. at least. the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. . .the bank was not remiss in its duty of sending monthly bank statements to private respondent RMC so that any error or discrepancy in the entries therein could be brought to the bank's attention at the earliest opportunity. . This doctrine. Yabut. In short. absent the act of Ms. petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the truck. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank. . the latter would have discovered the loss early on. South Cotabato. Ms.it cannot be denied that private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure. was extensively damaged. plywood. Considering. ignored or ran counter to the established facts. as advanced by the petitioner.. as what the law presumes. assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. common human experience dictates that the same would not have been possible without any form of collusion between Ms. except the award of P25. states that where both parties are negligent. loaded with cement bags. It was private respondent who had the last and clear chance to prevent any further misappropriation by Yabut had it only reviewed the status of its current accounts on the bank statement sent to it monthly or regularly. could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. shall be borne by private respondent RMC. 1989 NATURE Petition for certiorari praying for a reversal of the judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court which.00 attorney's fees. Unlike Zacarias who readily submitted himself to investigation by the police. however. produces the injury. that the fraud was committed in a span of more than one (1) year covering various deposits. . have taken care of its concerns. The demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio. such cannot be used by the petitioners to escape liability. the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. At about that time. with Calibo at the wheel. Private respondent failed to examine these bank statements not because it was prevented by some cause in not doing so. private respondent should. 40% of the damage awarded by the respondent appellate court. This omission on the part of the private respondent does not change the fact that were it not for the wanton and reckless negligence of the petitioners' employee in validating the A2010 . Mabayad was negligent in the performance of her duties as bank teller nonetheless. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC. therefore. original or duplicate. which. including its fender and hood. . the instant case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the late Engineer Calibo who are residents of Tagbilaran City against the driver and owners of the cargo truck. . driven by defendant Paul Zacarias y Infants.70493 NARVASA. in natural and continuous sequence. not a last possible chance. Had it done so. common sense. It must have been a chance as would have enabled a reasonably prudent man in like position to have acted effectively to avoid the injury and the resulting damage to himself. the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of. Ms. particularly Romeo Lipana. May 18. Yabut and bank teller Mabayad. only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the petitioners. coming from the opposite direction of Davao City and bound for Glan.the bank's teller. Calibo.000. Ms." In this case." 2. As a result of the impact. but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other.the doctrine of "last clear chance" assumes that the negligence of the defendant was subsequent to the negligence of the plaintiff and the same must be the proximate cause of the injury. refused to ." The circumstances leading to the conclusion just mentioned: 1.Trial Court dismissed the complaint (and defendants' counterclaim) "for insufficiency of evidence.Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. 1979. there must be a last and a clear chance. the left side of the truck was slightly damaged while the left side of the jeep. Azucena Mabayad. Stated differently. is not contributory but the immediate and proximate cause of its injury. . . the cargo track. Calibo's companions who suffered injuries on account of the collision. Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity. DE CALIBO and kids) GR No. under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to. At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge. or bar a defense against liability sought by another. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code Disposition CA decision modified. and without which the result would not have occurred. Zacarias was unhurt. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause.1979. in essence. Here. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip. but because it was purposely negligent as it admitted that it does not normally check bank statements given by banks. had just crossed said bridge. despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the selfimposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips. Proximate cause is "that cause. Moments before its collission with the truck being operated by Zacarias. had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client. The award of attorney's fees shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. at times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"). and Maximo Patos were on the jeep owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries. casis sizable amount of cash was entrusted to Yabut. to avoid the accident or injury. Irene Yabut. PADILLA [dissent] . FACTS . Agripino Roranes. while the truck stopped on its wheels on the road. or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident. . it is claimed. incomplete duplicate deposit slips presented by Ms.While it is true that had private respondent checked the monthly statements of account sent by the petitioner bank to RMC. the jeep of the deceased Calibo was "zigzagging. Its negligence.75 - prof. officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Inc. who had the last fair chance. thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company. Mabayad. the company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary.On November 27. policy and precedent. as it approached from the South Lizada Bridge going towards the direction of Davao City at about 1:45 in the afternoon of July 4.Furthermore. the loss would not have occurred. After the impact. GI sheets. Since a GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER AND HARDWARE V IAC (VDA.Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic. . if the latter. had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs.torts & damages . Thus.Engineer Orlando T.

concur. the defendant was also negligent." 3) the waiver of the right to file criminal charges against Zacarias should not be taken against "plaintiffs" Roranes and Patos who had the right. Reasoning Both drivers. After the accident the driver of the PANTRANCO Bus. the jeepney turned right and proceeded to MaIalam. JJ. Ratio The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a defense to accident liability. . the spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children Harold Jim. either of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. 1981." 2) Zacarias had no license at the time. not merely rely on a supposed right to expect. to wit: 1) "the truck driven by defendant Zacarias occupied the lane of the jeep when the collision occurred." and was "uncertain and even contradicted by the physical facts and the police investigators Dimaano and Esparcia. were "telling indications that they did not attribute the happening to defendant Zacarias' negligence or fault. Ramirez has never been seen and has apparently remained in hiding. -Picart v Smith: The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge. casis PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS. 3283 of the Court of First Instance of Bohol. under the law. Ambrosio Ramirez. 5. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. Engr. Griño-Aquino and Medialdea. it was the driver of the passenger jeepney who had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and was therefore negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the harm. Both vehicles were travelling at a speed of approximately thirty kilometers per hour. as the Appellate Court would have it." what is worse. to celebrate the fifth wedding anniversary of Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa. on the latter's demand. "the truck driver suddenly applied his brakes even as he knew that he was still within the lane of the jeep. . He then turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse that the latter being frightened. . as the Appellate Court found." had both vehicles stayed in their respective lanes. or he could simply have braked to a full stop. filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO. HELD: YES -Petitioner claims that under the circumstances of the case. The private respondents have admitted that the truck was already at a full stop when the jeep plowed into it.David Ico.76 - prof. This. since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. together with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Upon reaching the highway. In those circumstances. demonstrates that the driver of the truck had applied the brakes and the jeep's driver had not. his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance.. and the complaint against herein petitioners in Civil Case No. But as we have already stated. in that he had caused his truck to run some 25 centimeters to the left of the center of the road." 3. The jeepney was extensively damaged. INC v CAR BASCOS BAESA 179 SCRA 384 CORTES J. and none by the jeep.. Branch IV. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous. what he handed to Pfc. Gancayco.Maricar Baesa through her guardian Francisca O. Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa. were aboard a passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at Malalam River. invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver. and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible.IAC reversed TC. . Calibo had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident because he still had ample room in his own lane to steer clear of the truck.: November 1989 FACTS: At about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of June 12. a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri. Seeing an automobile ahead he improperly pulled his horse over to the railing on the right. . however guided his car toward the plaintiff without diminution of speed until he was only few feet away. jumped around and was killed by the passing car. plus Roranes' waiver of the right to institute criminal proceedings against Zacarias. Voting Cruz. boarded a car and proceeded to Santiago. Marceline and Maricar. Appeal dismissed for lack of merit ISSUE: WON PANTRANCO is liable for damages. encroached on the jeepney's lane while negotiating a curve. Bascos and Fe O. Roranes' testimony. to opt merely to bring a civil suit. Other victims settled with Bus Company. From that time on up to the present. the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path. the collision would never have occurred. while still at that distance of thirty meters from the truck. without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. given in plaintiffs' behalf. . HELD NO. and that the jeep had on impact fallen on its right side is indication that it was running at high speed. was "not as clear and detailed as that of Zacarias. and the fact that indeed no criminal case was ever instituted in Court against Zacarias. died while the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. (Picart v Smith) A2010 . aside from pointing to the late David Ico's alleged negligence as the proximate cause of the accident. . No pronouncement as to costs." 4. Isabela.torts & damages be so investigated or give statements to the police officers. spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa and their children. -PANTRANCO. ISSUES WON respondent court is correct in reversing the decision of trial court. Ambrosio Ramirez -TC ruled against PANTRANCO and ordered them to pay damages. . Dispositive WHEREFORE. The driver of the automobile. Ilagan. they would have passed "along side each other safely. the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby REVERSED. Esparcia. -Pantranco appealed the decision. was the 'driver's license of his co-driver Leonardo Baricuatro. And they have not seen fit to deny or impugn petitioners' imputation that they also admitted the truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away.' and although Zacarias saw the jeep from a distance of about 150 meters. It found Zacarias to be negligent on the basis of the following circumstances. That there were skid marks left by the truck's tires at the scene. Isabela. is DISMISSED. It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault. Ico with their son Erwin Ico and seven other persons. Ico for herself and for her minor children. and collided with it. had had a full view of each other's vehicle from a distance of one hundred fifty meters. River at a speed of about 20 kph. From these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident. . he "did not drive his truck back to his lane in order to avoid collision with the oncoming jeep . Even if it be considered that there was some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias shortly before the collision. While they were proceeding towards Malalam River. . by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck. on its regular route to Manila.

a passenger jeepney was parked on the road to Taal. . ISSUE WON the driver and owners of the jeepney should also be made liable. and Vicente Mañosca. 1982. HELD CANLAS V. FACTS .In this case. 4136** which provides that the driver of a vehicle entering a through highway or a stop intersection shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching in either direction on such through highway. both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at the time of the accident the Pantranco bus was speeding towards Manila. P500.Moreover. February 28. This principle does not apply in this case.On January 12. At the time David Ico must have realized that the bus was not returning to its own lane. Osmundo Canlas delivered to Vicente Mañosca the transfer certificates of title of the parcels of land involved. A2010 . The cited law itself provides that it applies only to vehicles entering a through highway or a stop intersection. who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so.00.Petitioner likewise insists that David Ico was negligent in failing to observe Section 43 (c). 1958. Thus. May 20. for and in consideration of P850. Plaintiffs appealed to the CA insisting that the driver and the owners of the jeepney should also be made liable for damages. have been aware of it . DISPOSITION: Judgment modified. on the right shoulder of the said road. petitioner claims that it had observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. issued two postdated checks in favor of Osmundo Canlas in the amounts of P40. conformably to the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code -When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee. 2000 Nature Petition for Review on Certiorari Facts -Sometime in August. It must be remembered that the obligation of the carrier to transport its passengers safely is such that the New Civil Code requires “utmost diligence” from the carriers (Art. Although this presumption is only a disputable presumption which could be overcome by proof of diligence of a good father of a family.This Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine "can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously. with exercise of due care. .000. 1982. there instantly arises a presumption that the employer has been negligent either in the selection of his employees or in the supervision over their acts. as a company driver is far from sufficient ANURAN V BUÑO 17 SCRA 224 BENGZON. by exercising reasonable care and prudence.000. respectively.00 and P460. to recover consequently damages against the drivers and the owners of the trucks and also against the driver and the owners of the jeepney. Osmundo S.torts & damages -petitioner claims that the original negligence of its driver was not the proximate cause of the accident and that the sole proximate cause was the supervening negligence of the jeepney driver David Ico in failing to avoid the accident . the doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case . decided to venture in business and to raise the capital needed therefor.00 to a . When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane.00. The former then executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing the latter to mortgage two parcels of land situated in San Dionisio.000. it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should. -Petitioner's misplaced reliance on the aforesaid law is readily apparent in this case. Osmundo Canlas agreed to sell the said parcels of land to Vicente Mañosca. it was already too late to swerve the jeepney to his right to prevent an accident. negligently bumped it from behind. Contrary to the petitioner's contention. An error of law was committed in releasing the jeepney from liability.000. 1756). A motor truck speeding along. CA Purisima. and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered" . and the balance of P350. each lot with semi-concrete residential house in the name of the SPS Canlas. Obiter on Application of Principle of Last Clear Chance: The principle about the “last clear chance” applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. but it required the truck driver and the owners o make compensation. (BF Homes) Paranaque.00 to serve as his (Osmundo's) investment in the business. Metro Manila. this Court believes that the evidence submitted by the defendant to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family iti the case of Ramirez. the doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case. means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter. -On September 3.Contrary to the petitioner's contention. But he parked his jeepney in such a way that ½ of its width (the left wheels) was on the asphalted pavement of the road and the other half. as his part of the transaction. but it turned out that the check covering the bigger amount was not sufficiently funded. Vicente Mañosca was able to mortgage the same parcels of land for P100.CFI Batangas absolved the driver of the jeepney and its owners. 1755) who are “presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. It must follow that the driver – and the owners – of the jeepney must answer for injuries to its passengers. there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger.00 of which payable within one week. 1966 NATURE: Petition for Review by certiorari of CA decision.The above contention of petitioner is manifestly devoid of merit. this legal presumption of negligence is confirmed by the CA’s finding that jeepney driver in question was at fault in parking the vehicle improperly. At the time of the accident. Article III Chapter IV of Republic Act No. Canlas. -The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.Suits were instituted by the representatives of the dead and the injured.000. casis YES. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. which such violence that three of its passengers died. he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction. Batangas.77 - prof.000. unless they prove that they have observed extraordinary diligence” (Art. . . is made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff . For the doctrine to be applicable. Buño. driver of said jeepney stopped his vehicle in order to allow one of his passengers to alight. In this instance.The doctrine of the last clear chance simply. even as 2 other passengers suffered injuries that required their confinement at the Provincial Hospital for many days. the jeepney had already crossed the intersection and was on its way to Malalam River -On the issue of its liability as an employer. Vicente Mañosca. might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence.

But such fact CONSOLIDATED BANK V CA (L. Calapre then deposited in Solidbank. Osmundo Canlas wrote a letter informing the respondent bank that the execution of subject mortgage over the two parcels of land in question was without their (Canlas spouses) authority. The negligence of respondent bank was magnified by the fact that the previous deed of mortgage (which was used as the basis for checking the genuineness of the signatures of the supposed Canlas spouses) did not bear the tax account number of the spouses. the bank acted on their representations simply on the basis of the residence certificates bearing signatures which tended to match the signatures affixed on a previous deed of mortgage to a certain Atty. covering the same parcels of land in question. Considering that it was established indubitably that the contract of mortgage sued upon was entered into and signed by impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. and request that steps be taken to annul and/or revoke the questioned mortgage. the Court is of the ineluctible conclusion and finding that subject contract of mortgage is a complete nullity. asking that the auction sale scheduled on February 3. On September 29. 1983 the herein petitioners instituted the present case for annulment of deed of real estate mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. In essence. 1982.” Also. It is worthy to note that not even a single identification card was exhibited by the said impostors to show their true identity. Vicente Mañosca was declared in default. as well as the Community Tax Certificate of Angelina Canlas. LC diaz. private respondent Vicente Mañosca was granted a loan by the respondent Asian Savings Bank (ASB) in the amount of P500. Contreras. whose business is impressed with public interest. Contreras and Asian Savings Bank refused to heed petitioner Canlas' stance and proceeded with the scheduled auction sale. On 14 August 1991. On January 18. 1983 be cancelled or held in abeyance. CV No. 2003 NATURE Review of the decision of the CA FACTS . dated September 30.An information for estafa was filed against one of their messengers (Ilagan) and one Roscoe Verdazola. The rules state that “possession of this book shall raise the presumption of ownership and any payment or payments made by the bank upon the production of the said book and entry therein of the withdrawal shall have the same effect as if made to the depositor personally. 1993. the trial court issued an Order restraining the respondent sheriff from issuing the corresponding Certificate of Sheriff's Sale. Disposition WHEREFORE. Asian Savings Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals and CA reversed the lower court decision. with the use of subject parcels of land as security. .For failure to file his answer. . or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident. from the evidence on hand it can be gleaned unerringly that respondent bank did not observe the requisite diligence in ascertaining or verifying the real identity of the couple who introduced themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. Diaz with Allied Bank. -On January 15. in CA-G. Applying Art. respondent bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. -Consequently. SO ORDERED. is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. the Petition is GRANTED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals. the respondent bank must suffer the resulting loss. The next day. which bank deposits the bank should guard against loss due to negligence or bad faith. thru its cashier. their act was not the proximate cause of the loss.) GR No. 1983.00. the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter. Evidently. Lower court a quo came out with a decision annulling subject deed of mortgage and disposing. 138569 CARPIO. The Decision of Branch 59 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil Case No. the efforts exerted by the bank to verify the identity of the couple posing as Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas fell short of the responsibility of the bank to observe more than the diligence of a good father of a family. 1983. the doctrine of last clear chance is to the effect that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other. No pronouncement as to costs. a mortgage. petitioner Osmundo Canlas also wrote the office of Sheriff Maximo O. 1173 It could be said that the degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family in keeping with their responsibility to exercise the necessary care and prudence in dealing even on a registered or titled property. The proximate cause was LC Diaz’ negligence. who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. respondent Asian Savings Bank has to bear the loss sued upon.R. Calapre. In the case under consideration.TC applied rules on savings account written on the passbook. 25242 SET ASIDE. casis notwithstanding. M-028 is hereby REINSTATED. and with the involvement of the same impostors who again introduced themselves as the Canlas spouses. he left the passbook with Solidbank.000. But respondents Maximo C. The business of a bank is affected with public interest. it was learned that 300k was withdrawn from the account. Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L. despite several motions for extension of time for the filing thereof. WON ASB must incur the resulting loss A2010 .torts & damages certain Attorney Manuel Magno.78 - prof.nêt Yes. instructed their messenger. the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so. The doctrine of last clear chance is applicable. they applied the rule that the holder of the passport is presumed the owner. by reason of which the bank would be denied the protective mantle of the land registration law. the bank did not require the impostors to submit additional proof of their true identity.C. Magno. When he came back. Issue/s and Held WON CA erred in holding that the mortgage is valid Settled is the rule that a contract of mortgage must be constituted only by the absolute owner on the property mortgaged. constituted by an impostor is void. and on May 23. accorded only to purchasers or mortgagees for value and in good faith.C. to deposit money in Solidbank. Stated differently. on February 3. LC Diaz demanded SolidBank the return of their money. and yet.LC Diaz is a professional partnership engaged in accounting. holding in trust the money of the depositors. with the help of impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses. the teller told him that somebody else got the passbook. It was also held that Solidbank did not have any participation in the custody and care of the passbook and as such.DIAZ AND CO. When the loan it extended was not paid.1âwphi1. 1983. The latter refused and a case for recovery of a sum of money was filed against them . For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking institutions. September 11.

For failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on drivers of vehicles abandoning their lane. December 6.torts & damages . hitting the latter at its right front passenger side. . is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. WON petitioner’s negligence was the proximate cause of the accident HELD 1. or culpa contractual. .C.In culpa contractual. is chargeable with the loss.C. which was already on a head to head position going against Iran’s Tamaraw jeepney immediately before the vehicles collided. ISSUES WON Solidbank was liable HELD . the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so. Iran could not be faulted when in his attempt to avoid the pick-up.” Solidbank could have averted the injury suffered by L. or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss.C.” She was discharged after nine days but was re-admitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva. unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.When the passbook is in the possession of Solidbank’s tellers during withdrawals. casis overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot do so in safety. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the impostor. the Isuzu pick-up’s right signal light flashed.The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other. 1975. Iran swerved to the left only to avoid petitioner’s pickup. once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract. Solidbank’s tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative . petitioner must be held liable. Diaz to verify the withdrawal. encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw and headed towards a head-on collision course with it. the pick-up collided with the Tamaraw. Solidbank could not escape liability because of the doctrine of “last clear chance. The teller could have called up LC Diaz since the amount being drawn was significant. After completion of the transaction.L. it swerved to its left. notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent. Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney bound for Iloilo City.July 29. Solidbank was in possession of the passbook while it was processing the deposit. But what has been shown is the presence of an emergency and the proper application of the emergency rule. Ratio It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of STRICT LIABILITY VESTIL V IAC (UY) 179 SCRA 47 CRUZ. An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger. who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. .We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case.000 in medical expenses.On November 29.000. Iran swerved to his left but the pick-up also swerved to its right. where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead. Reasoning The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident. 1975: Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda. 1989 NATURE Petition to reinstate the decision of the Appellate Court." The following day. The impact caused the head and chassis of the Tamaraw to separate from its body. A2010 .C. would exonerate the defendant from liability.C. When it was just a few meters away from the Tamaraw. Diaz. Petitioner’s acts had put Iran in an emergency situation which forced him to act quickly. Thus. Diaz. the bank is liable to its depositor. No convincing proof was adduced by petitioner that Iran could have avoided a head-on collision. The Tamaraw passengers allegedly saw from the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pick-up. Its total loss was computed at P80. This is a case of culpa contractual. DISPOSITIVE Decision affirmed. (they could have presented the teller to whom the passbook was left. Stated differently. Solidbank had the contractual obligation to return the passbook only to Calapre. It applied the provision on the CC on quasi delicts and found that the requisite elements were present. SolidBank’s negligence in returning the passbook was the proximate cause. driven by petitioner Rogelio Engada. the law imposes on Solidbank and its tellers an even higher degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook. There was no clear chance to speak of. but they didn’t) .: June 20. The Toyota Tamaraw jeepney ended up in the junk heap. Likewise. Diaz was also negligent in entrusting its deposits to its messenger and its messenger in leaving the passbook with the teller. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital. It ruled that Solidbank’s negligence was the proximate cause. is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution. modification only to damages ENGADA V CA QUISUMBING. the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant. there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent. Seyan incurred P130. YES. the child died.CA revered. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the performance of its contractual obligation to L. at the same time. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up. Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract. They found that the teller made no inquiry upon the withdrawal of 300k. the authorized representative of L. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent.C. the father of Purita Vestil. Diaz had it called up L. on August 15. at about 1:30 in the afternoon. Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. Solidbank failed to discharge this burden. On board was Sheila Seyan.For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence. where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss. 2003 NATURE Petition for review seeking the reversal of the decision of the CA which affirmed with modification the judgment of the RTC of Iloilo City FACTS . he swerved to his left. The appellate court ruled that while L. Dispositive The appealed decision is AFFIRMED.79 - prof. . FACTS . the registered owner of the Tamaraw. ISSUES 1. 1989. J.

80 - prof.Obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. HELD Ratio The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. and second.Seven months later. Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed. as a result of the dog bites. 1941 NATURE Petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA FACTS -The brothers Loreto and Jose Dingcong rented the house of Emilia Saenz (in Jose Ma. a symptom of rabies. L-47033 AVANCEÑA. As for the alleged provocation. and he was supposed to be residing in his district according to the records of the company. in Manila without notifying the company." thereafter filed this complaint for damages against Loreto Dingcong. that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia. as a result of the dog bites. if collectors made collections on Sunday they were required to deliver the amount collected to the company the next morning. . DINGCONG vs.While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house. Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria. occupies the ground floor of the hotel and established his "American Bazaar" dedicated to the purchase and sale of articles and merchandise. by his negligence in leaving open the faucet. ISSUE WON the Vestils are liable for the damage caused by the dog. -Jose Dingcong. carelessly left the faucet open that with only an ordinary basin without drainage. 14. . representing the establishment "American Bazaar. . Nasri and Michael). March 6.61. April 25. when retiring to bed. 1933 NATURE Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila FACTS . and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. .According to the practice of the company. the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine Company in the district of San Francisco del Monte. CA reversed and declared Jose Dingcong responsible. Kanaan. the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. ISSUE WON Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria are liable for damages HELD YES. . -Around 11pm of 19 September 1933.torts & damages The cause of death was certified as bronchopneumonia. and occupying room no. 2183. the water run off the pipes and spilled to the ground.Judge Jose R. pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.One Sunday afternoon. despite his power and authority to cause the repair of the pipes. sentencing him to pay the plaintiffs damages. on the other hand. AFABLE V SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY 58 PHIL 14 VICKERS. . . A2010 . This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. which ultimately caused her death. the hotel guest. G.It appears that Madlangbayan had moved to Teodora Alonso St. and that at the time of his death he was returning home after making some collections in San Francisco del Monte. pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility. that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia. Petitioners’ Claim The Vestils are liable for the death of Theness. 10 of said hotel. once or twice weekly." the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. That time. Echevarria. although it may escape or be lost. DISPOSITION The Court approves the time. Among the hotel's guests is Francisco Echevarria. . -Francisco Echevarria. . The Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. casis -CFI held Francisco Echevarria liable. the pipes of the hotel were under repair. wetting the articles and merchandise of the "American Bazaar.The widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan brought an action to recover from the defendant .Theness developed hydrophobia. which ultimately caused her death. Basa Street of the City of Iloilo) and established the Central Hotel.On the strength of the foregoing testimony. there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. was a complication of rabies. the Uys sued for damages. . Reasoning ART. which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate.It does not matter that the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. that it was a tame animal. KANAAN 72 Phil. -The Kanaans (Halim.Theness developed hydrophobia. outside of the limits of the City of Manila. being a co-renter and manager of the hotel. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility. a symptom of rabies. Respondents’ Comments The dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda. is liable for being the one who directly. IAC found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy. caused the water to spill to the ground and wet the articles and merchandise of the plaintiffs." causing a loss which the CFI sets at P1. and acquitted Jose Dingcong.089. . and second. He failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent these damages. was a complication of rabies . The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants.R. with the costs against apellant. Leopoldo Madlangbayan while riding a bicycle was run over and fatally injured at the corner of O'Donnel and Zurbaran streets in the City of Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay. . with complete possession of the house.There is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house. paying P30 a month. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause. No. must also be responsible for the damages caused. since they own the dog that bit her.

or furnish or require its agents to use bicycles.She demanded payment of damages from plaintiff Coca-Cola but the latter did not accede to her demands. JR. DISPOSITION The decision appealed from was affirmed. and they sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No.These are additional reasons for holding that the accident was not due to and pursuance of the employment of the deceased.12 plus P100 for burial expenses. Her losses amounted to P200 to P300 a day which later on forced her to close down her business on December 12. casis DAVIDE. . Industrial Board. while the words "in the course of" refer to the time.. If the deceased saw fit to change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make use a bicycle in going back and forth. and deprives the Courts of First Instance of their probate jurisdiction over the estate of deceased persons and nullifies Chapters XXIX. 3428. the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Mueller Construction Co. it appears that the deceased had never notified the defendant corporation of his removal from San Francisco del Monte of Manila. She brought the bottles to the Department of Health office in their region and was informed that the soda samples she sent were adulterated. XXX. P100 for burial expenses and P1. and are descriptive of its character. .Since the complaint is for breach of warranty (under A1561. .torts & damages corporation under Act No. and if he made collections on Sunday. but was on his way home after he had finished his work for the day and had left the territory where he was authorized to take collections for the defendant. Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the particular employment are excluded. . . .A group of parents complained that they found fibrous material in the bottles of Coke and Sprite that their children bought from Geronimo’s store. Thus the complaint should have been filed within 6 months from the delivery of the thing sold. . No. as the defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to use one. . 1993 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS .Geronimo alleges that her complaint is one for damages which does not involve an administrative action. . because such an accident does no arise out of and in the course of his employment. . By the use of these words it was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment. .Furthermore. . . he did so at his own risk. the plaintiffs would undoubtedly have the right. 3428 fifty per cent of P16.The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and in pursuance of his employment.Coca-Cola moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and prescription.The trial court however annulled the questioned orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further proceedings in the civil case.12 for compensation. Respondents’ Comments: . COCA-COLA BOTTLERS (GERONIMO) 227 SCRA 292 PHILS V CA . 1989.Plaintiffs' complaint was subsequently amended. According to the CA: “the allegations in the complaint plainly show that it is an action for damages arising from respondent’s act of recklessly and negligently manufacturing adulterated food items intended to be sol for public consumption. and impairs the obligation of the contract between the defendant and Leopoldo Madlangbayan. . and circumstances under which the accident takes place. is unconstitutional and void because it denies the defendant the equal protection of the law. or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment or the result of the nature of such employment. Petitioners’ Claim: .Lydia Geronimo was engaged in the business of selling food and drinks to children in the Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen located in Dagupan. 3428. it is apparent that the law which is applicable is Act No. with the costs against the appellants. RULING NO. it should have been brought within 6 months from the delivery of the goods. 3428 was changed in Act No.The trial court ruled in favor of Coca-Cola.The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in section 2 of Act No. his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified. and XXXIV of the Civil Code Procedure and related articles of the Civil Code. Discussing this phrase.Because of this. prima facie. to recover. and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by reason of such employment.At the time that he was over by the truck Leopoldo Madlangbayan was not in the pursuance of his employment with the defendant corporation. CC). as amended by Act. and as a general rule an employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment.81 - prof. Geronimo’s sales plummeted with her regular sales of 10 cases day dwindling to about 2 or 3 cases. A2010 . Geronimo examined her stock of softdrinks and found that there were indeed fibrous materials in the unopened soda bottles. vs. 1930. he did not do so in pursuance of his employment. section 23 of which reads as follows: When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident due to in the pursuance of the employment.As the deceased Leopoldo Madlangbayan was killed on November 16. place. that the defendant company did not require its employees to work on Sunday.The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment". as amended. XXXIII.If the deceased had been killed while going from house to house in San Francisco del Monte in the pursuance of his employment. . 1930 and Act No.745. XXXII. but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's employment of incidental to such employment.” It also noted that the availability of an action for breach of warranty does not bar an action for torts in a sale of defective goods. 1989 . 3812 to "arising out of and in the course of". 3812 was not approved until December 8.August 12.In the case at bar the deceased was going from work in his own conveyance. October 18.Defendant as special defenses alleged that Leopoldo Madlangbayan at the time that he sustained the injuries resulting in his death was violating an ordinance of the City of Manila which prohibits work on Sunday. and that Act No. XXXI. 3812. and his employer is not liable for any injury sustained by him. ISSUE WON the employer is liable to pay the employee’s heirs. said: The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident.745. . and that the company did not know that he was living in Manila on the day of the accident. 3428.78 for 208 weeks of P1. . stating that the complaint was based on a contract and not a quasidelict because of pre-existing relation between the parties.

Under American law.Since there were existing lease contracts between Tek Hua and DC Chuan. DISPOSITION The instant petition is denied for lack of merit. . shall be obliged to pay for the damage done.WON So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference of contract HELD. occupied the same stalls under the business name. In 1976. This liability arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. through its Managing Director So Pek Giok. CC). A2010 . and as a result petitioner deprived respondent of the latter’s property right. ISSUE .Appellants have the legal liability for interfering with the contract and causing its breach.On the other hand. c) the defendant’s conduct is a legal cause of the invasion. and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one party of the enjoyment of the other of his private property. CC.Damage is the loss. breach of warranty. He also prayed for damages against Espejo and Zaldarriaga for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of the tortfeasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damage. Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to execute lease contracts in its favor.The vendee’s remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in A1567. No such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover for the damages suffered. GILCHRIST v CUDDY 29 Phil 542 TRENT. One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with. Chuan covering four stalls in Binondo. Reasoning.Cuddy returned the money already paid by Gilchrist days before the delivery date so that he can lease the film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga instead and receive P350 for the film for the same period. 120554 Quisumbing.Her cause of action is based on an injury to plaintiff’s right which can be brought within 4 years (based on A1146. ISSUE WON Espejo and Zaldarriaga is liable for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy. The contracts were initially for one year but after expiry of the same. .torts & damages . Tek hua Trading. Instead of vacating the stalls. hurt.82 - prof. 1999 NATURE Appeal on certiorari for review of CA decision FACTS . on appeal. Tiong wrote a letter to So Ping Bun asking him to vacate the four stalls as the same were going to be used by them. Both the trial court and the CA awarded legal fees only. . Tek Hua Enterprises with Manuel Tiong as one of the incorporators. the same were not rescinded. 1989. Tek Hua was dissolved with the original members forming a new corporation. they not knowing at the time the identity of the parties . 1990 was implemented. DC Chuan sent a letter to Tek Hua advising it of a 25% increase in rent effective September 1. While the letters contained a statement that the leases will be terminated if the contracts were not signed. September 21.So Ping Bun. So Pek Giok. The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud in which case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable. casis . tort or other grounds. HELD YES . b) the invasion is substantial. A duty which the law on torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others.Tek Hua filed an injunction and an action for nullification of the contracts between Trendsetter and DC Chuan.C. Gilchrist was the owner of a theatre in Iloilo. entered into a lease agreement with D. The action of Trendsetter in asking DC Chuan to execute the contracts in their favor was unlawful interference. .Yes. the lessor. Tek Hua in fact had property rights over the leased stalls. DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed SON PING BUN vs CA (Tek Hua) GR No. by act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence. Espejo and Zaldarriaga. The lower Court ruled in favor of Tek Hua. d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under the general negligence rules. 1915 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the CFI FACTS -Cuddy was the owner of the film “Zigomar”. ISSUE WON the complaint is founded on a quasi-delict and pursuant to A1146(12). and damges are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. The CA. In the case at bar. They entered into a contract whereby Cuddy leased to Gilchrist the Zigomar” for exhibition in his theatre for a week for P125. on the death of his grandfather. upheld the trial court. they continued on a month to month basis. Trendsetter Marketing. . February 18. . the liabilities of the manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on negligence. the action prescribes in 4 years HELD YES Reasoning .Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against Cuddy.In 1991. Enclosed in both letters were new lease contracts for signing.In 1963. . So was able to secure lease agreements from DC Chuan. the elemts of tort interference are a) existence of a valid contract b) knowledge on the part of the third party of its existence c) interference of the third party is without legal justification or excuse .Article 1902 of the Civil Code provides that a person who. A further rent increase of 30% effective January 1.In 1989. petitioner. or harm which results from injury. .

. decision of trial court reinstated with modification. due to which she was hospitalized.Police confirmed existence of the manhole. - The charter only lays down general rules regulating that liability of the city. unworthy of the position which he held.Exemplary damages of P50000 reduced to P10000. are also owned by the National Government. . control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer. the judge of the CFI rendered judgment in favor of petitioner.Plaintiff Dean Worcester. or injuries suffered by.Award of P7420 as lost income for one year. Held YES . CA reversed the lower court’s ruling on the ground that no evidence was presented to prove that City of Dagupan had control or supervision over Perez Blvd.000 as punitive damages. 1912 NATURE Appeal from judgment of CFI FACTS . Aguilar and Liquete who were found to be editors but in a subordinate position and found to have merely acted under the direction of their superiors) liable jointly and severally for sustained damages on account of petitioner’s wounded feelings. cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of.She averred that she suffered mental and physical pain.It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province. PERSONS LIABLE WORCESTER v OCAMPO 22 PHIL 42 Johnson.City contends that Perez Blvd is a national road that is not under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. . He said that he supervises the maintenance of said manholes and sees to it that they are properly covered. . operated on. found the award exorbitant. and the job is specifically done by his subordinates. which was partially covered by a concrete flower pot by leaving a gaping hole about 2 ft long by 1 ½ feet wide or 42 cm wide by 75 cm long by 150 cm deep.After hearing the evidence adduced during trial. 27. plus attorney’s fees. public buildings and other public works. Her right leg was fractured.Moral damages of P150000 is excessive and is reduced to P20000. The said editorial alluded to him as an eagle that surprises and devours. bridges. Reyes. accidentally fell into a manhole while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk at Perez Blvd. Arellano.000 as well as P25. . she has been unable to perform her religious. mental suffering and injuries to his standing and reputation in the sum of P35. . a vulture that gorges himself on dead and rotten meat. . due to defendant’s action of interference. and other public works under their control or supervision. In this casse.65. moral and exemplary damages. . The Court ratiocinated that the recovery of legal fees is in the concept of actual or compensatory damages as provided in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.83 - prof. conjecture or guess work as to the amount. and a vampire that sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless. plaintiff was forced to seek relief through the Court snd thereby incur expenses to protect his interests. Feb. and that she has difficulty in locomotion. city or municipality for liability to attach.The SC handled the question of whether the interference may be justified considering that So acted solely for the purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. and she is no longer her former jovial self. Santos.00 Disposition – Petition denied. CA decision affirmed subject to the modified award of attorney’s fees. Lichauco. and confined. The Court.Trial court ordered the city to pay Guilatco actual. any person by reason of the defective condition of roads. Palma. plus P450 bonus remain the same . She also lost weight. an owl that affects a petulant omniscience. She has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter (at the time of filing of complaint) and thus lost income. 1989 Nature: Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of CA Facts: . Hence.P3000 as attorney’s fees remain the same Disposition Petition granted. Barretto and Cansipit (owners. no liability should attach to the city. article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from “defective streets. . Jose. directors.In this case. Kalaw. Provinces. A2010 . The court can not rely on “speculation. It was reduced to Pesos 100. CA decision reversed and set aside. Moreover. 1978. Aguilar. . Issue WON control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists. Guilatco’s handicap was not permanent and disabled her only during her treatment which lasted for one year. The trial court should not have rounded off the amount.City Engineer of Dagupan Alfredo Tangco admitted that the manhole is owned by the National Government and the sidewalk on which they are found along Perez Blvd. Mar 21.The editorial “Birds of Prey” was alleged to have incited the Filipino people into believing that plaintiff was a vile despot and a corrupt person.on July 25.The liability of private corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows: Article 2189. and other activities which she used to do prior to the incident. On the other hand. holding all the defendants (except for Reyes.” On Damages awarded .000. however. Hence the lack of malice precludes the award of damages. streets. Nothing on the record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on the part of So. . Liquete. in effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with article 2189 CC. member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior of the Insular Government commenced an action against defendants Ocampo. public buildings. casis . social. editors and administrators of a certain newspaper known as “El Renacimiento” or “Muling Pagsilang”) for the purpose of recovering damages resulting from an alleged libelous publication. .The provision in the Civil Code with regard tortuous interference is Article 1314 which states that “ any third party who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party”.torts & damages . . It stated that it is sufficient that the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives to conclude that So was not a malicious interferer. writers. GUILATCO v CITY OF DAGUPAN 171 SCRA 382 SARMIENTO. a court interpreter.Actual damages of P10000 reduced to proven expenses of P8053. Florentina Guilatco.

C. Plaintiff attempted to board the front platform but. A street car bound from Manila to Sta. a competent driver. assisted or counseled. the entrance being from the front or the rear platform.Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. They are each liable as principals. if done for their benefit. seeing that he could not reach it without extra exertion.torts & damages . As recognized by Section 6 of Act 277 of the Philippine Commission: “Every author. went off the main line to the left upon the switch lying alongside of the main track.This judgment prompted defendants to appeal to the SC. and without not liable. . as a genuine gift. Barretto. Being told by his friend that the car was approaching. and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts. nor were they owners or proprietors of the newspaper. to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. and waited for it to come abreast of him in order to board. in this case. ***If several persons jointly commit a tort. Jose. after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom. Barretto. except with reference to the liability imposed upon Lichauco. Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. CHAPMAN V UNDERWOOD 27 Phil 374 . Ratio An owner who sits in his automobile or other vehicle. regardless of their participation in the commission of the actual tort.The plaintiff-appellant. When the front of the "San Marcelino" car was almost in front of the defendant's automobile. ISSUE WON Underwood is responsible for the negligence of his driver. [concurring] . and altogether jointly liable for the whole damage. Each is liable for the whole damage caused by all. Ocampo. It is not necessary that the cooperation should be a direct. March 28. has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly. that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants. . Arellano. claiming that the CFI committed several errors in rendering said judgment among which was that the lower court committed an error in rendering a judgment jointly and severally against the defendants. Ocampo. he immediately. if the driver.J. J. **note: Ponente used examples of torts as held under common law** (In a case of assault and battery committed by various persons. passed into the street for the purpose of signaling and boarding the car. 1914 NATURE Appeal from the judgment of trial court finding for the defendant FACTS . They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tortfeasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates. editing. And this is true even though they are charged jointly and severally. the lower court. On the other hand. neither is it comprehensible how one could share in the losses thereof. jointly and severally with the director and manager. may be held jointly and severally liable as joint tortfeasors HELD YES. and still less incur liability for damages on account of some act of the said company.I concur in regard to the defendants Ocampo and Kalaw. with occasional switches to allow cars to meet and pass each other). he followed along behind it. nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as compared with that of the others. he who aided. ARELLANO. and issuing the said newspaper. all are principals). promote. . aids. explicitly stated that the other so-called founders subscribed and paid sums of money to aid the paper but as to Lichauco. TORRES [dissenting in part] . Disposition Judgment of the lower court modified. or who approve of it after it is done. Thereupon the defendant either kept straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to the right. because tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual. The real owner and founder. or assists in any way the commission of a wrong. under the common law.The defendant entered Calle Herran at Calle Peñafrancia in his automobile driven by his chauffeur. The person injured may sue all of them. While in this position he was struck from behind and run over by the defendant's (Underwood) automobile. Under the common law. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort. or proprietor * * * is chargeable with the publication of any words in any part * * * or number of each newspaper. Kalaw. as though he were a regular general partner when he was not such. was as much a principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual tort. it is improper to deduce that the contributors formed a company of either a civil or commercial nature. Reasoning Defendants fail to recognize that the basis of the present action is a tort. as they were. as fully as if he were the author of the same. the donors ceased to be the owners of and surrendered all right to the money donated and to the objects that were acquired therewith. Chapman. countenance. The car was a closed one. Ratio Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command. aid or abet the commission of a tort. but did not carry out his offer and in fact paid nothing. encourage. Palma.We concur. desired to board a certain "San Marcelino" car coming from Sta. It is no defense for one sued alone. defendant's driver suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the plaintiff. committed no error in rendering a joint and several judgment against the defendants. becomes himself responsible for such acts. Therefore they can not incur. Jose. for the purpose of founding. However. Ana and bound for Manila. . but dissent as regards Palma. Lichauco.After Ocampo had accepted the various amounts proffered. facing toward the rear platform. stopped beside the car. instigate.84 - prof. They might have sued jointly and severally. he offered to contribute. or any number less than all. Ana being immediately in front of him. 000 with interest at 6%. corporeal act. an unrestricted liability to the extent of all his property. and somewhat hurriedly. or one of them separately. and MAPA. casis MORELAND. They were donors who merely contributed a sum of money. . Just before reaching the scene of the accident the street car which was following took the switch (there was a single-track street-car line running along Calle Herran. cooperate in. its press or other equipment. ISSUE WON the defendants. advise. So also is the person who counsels. The car which the plaintiff intended to board was on the main line and bound in an opposite direction to that in which the defendant was going. but is also jointly liable with his tortfeasors.The judgment of the trial court was for defendant. It is incomprehensible how one could claim the right or title to share the earnings or profits of a company when he had put no capital into it. HELD NO. by a sudden act of negligence.that is.The courts during the trial may find that some of the alleged joint tortfeasors are liable and that others are A2010 . the plaintiff or person injured. and Cansipit for they had neither direct nor indirect participation in the act that gave rise to the present suit for damages. and Cansipit held jointly and severally liable for the sum of P25. in any way the commission of a crime. editor. Lichauco. Santos absolved from any liability. Arellano. The defendants might have been sued separately for the commission of the tort.

He was driving the latter’s Cadillac along highway 54. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel. The act complained of must be continued in the presence or the owner for such a length of time that the owner by his acquiescence. It was a risky maneuver either way. L-20392 MAKALINTAL. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai. . going in the same direction. .The Caedos were injured. casis Decision modified. judged the distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the Cadillac would wait behind.1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant would be responsible. with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel. L-20392 MAKALINTAL. ISSUES WON Yu Khe Thai should be held solidarily liable as Bernardo’s employer HELD CAEDO V YU KHE THAI GR NO. or else squeeze in between them in any case. Bernardo. however. Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not present at the time the alleged negligent acts were committed by the driver. is not responsible. Bernardo did not see the carretela from afar. DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is affirmed.No negligence can be imputed. the owner of the automobile. . where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro's son. On the other side of the road. decided to take a gamble — beat the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with the carretela. Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. as they were the only ones under the law permitted to pass upon that side of the street car. taking the owner from his Parañaque home to Wack Wack. .Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of him. Ahead of the Cadillac. one on each side. if any. The car was running at a reasonable speed. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel.Bernardo is the driver of Yu Khe Thai. where his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro. the same rule applies where the owner is present. where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. With them in the car were Mrs. Yu Khe Thai is free from liability car of the Caedos’ approaching from the opposite lane. although present herein at5 the time the act was committed.The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds. Bernardo. Reasoning Defendant's driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and over the plaintiff.in the case of Johnson vs.The plaintiff needed only to watch for cars coming from his right. . he slackened his speed. a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another DISPOSITIVE . and the risk should have been quite obvious. December 18. was a caretella owned by a certain Pedro Bautista. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. must be sought in the immediate setting. The carretela was provided with two lights. .. . makes his driver’s act his own. He was with his family. unless the negligent act of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. injures a person or violates the criminal law. No negligence of having employed him maybe imputed to his master. . 1968 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CFI of Iloilo FACTS . Caedo and three daughters. And even if he did not notice the lights. . he decided to overtake it even though he had already seen the No.Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from his home in Quezon City to the airport. within the meaning of Article 2184. either civilly or criminally. the driver does not fall within the list of persons in Art. David. and they should have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary precautions. .torts & damages the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance. wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane.85 - prof. Caedo was driving his Mercury car.Bernardo had no record of any traffic violation. December 18. veered to the left in order to pass. The CFI ruled in favor of the Caedos and held Bernardo and Yu solidarily liable. the carretela should anyway have been visible to him from afar if he had been careful. therefore. 1968 FACTS .In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the opposite direction. considering the condition of the road and the absence of traffic — the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour. YU KHE THAI GR No. Julian Bautista. He had reason to rely on the skill of his driver.A carretela was in front of the Cadillac. They filed a suit for recovery of damages against Bernardo and Yu Khe Thai. . CAEDO v.it appears with fair clearness that the interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver. only eight meters away. And as far as perception is concerned. The road was wide and open. as it must have been in the beam of his headlights for a considerable while. This is the first clear indication of his negligence. wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane.The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. absent a minimum level imposed by law. On his part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane. that is. The test of his intelligence. as he claimed later on at the trial. There was no reason for Yu to be specially alert. in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. He was passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side. instead of slowing down or stopping altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear.Negligence on the employer’s part. When he approached the carritela. and the Cadillac at approximately 48 to 56 kilometers. is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. . A2010 .

If YES. tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to the right. as a consequence. was not with his son at the time of the accident. . plaintiff contends. father of Dante. J. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. absent a minimum level imposed by law. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. And so. . with other students. SABINA EXCONDE vs. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. casis defense was sustained by the lower court and. DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO G. Sabina Exconde. for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno. ISSUE Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable. have real need of drivers' services.It was already too late to apply the brakes when Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front of him. From this decision. paragraph 1 and 5. NO. There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that he must be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness. teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperiña.The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is. the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. The car was not running at an unreasonable speed. by -their very inadequacies. plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals but the case was certified to the Supreme Court on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of law. the former was not under the control. The father. in case of his death or incapacity. and is otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo. defendant Yu Khe Thai.86 - prof. it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the complaint. within the meaning of Article 2184. reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage. the mother. The road was wide and open. and devoid of traffic that early morning. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. No. WON defendant Rafael Bernardo is liable for the accident. HELD 1. as already stated. and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed. RULING YES. supervision and custody of the latter.torts & damages . Dante Capuno was only fifteen (15) years old when he committed the crime. He only came to know it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher. died as a consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno.R.959. the civil liability of the father is evident. And as far as perception is concerned. YES. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. The test of his intelligence. necessarily subjective. The photographs taken at the scene show that the right wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at the moment of impact.Rafael Bernardo had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. son of Delfin Capuno.: FACTS Dante Capuno. Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged and. the clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side was insufficient. 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna. he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident. Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question jointly and severally with his son Dante because at the time the latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim. he was a minor and was then living with his father." car owners who. WON his employer. . jointly and severally with his son Dante. employment of professional drivers by A2010 . caught the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose. 2. is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident.12 12 The case involves an interpretation of Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code. was accused of double homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperiña and Amado Ticzon on March 31. ISSUE 1. 1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr. but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible. with costs against the latter. In line with her reservation. in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. boarded a jeep and when the same started to run. After trial. It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the Balintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31. would be effectively proscribed. reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages against the accused. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperiña. the lower court erred in relieving the father from liability. Negligence on the part of the latter. 1903. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant. confronted with the unexpected situation. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers. if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him. he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. Its rear bumper. Caedo. No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master. During the trial. 2. As it was. Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of P2. must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident. nor did he know that his son was going to attend a parade. If the causative factor was the driver's negligence. xxx xxx xxx Finally. are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperiña. if any. the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. and so he had to swerve to the left in spite of the presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane. This .The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. and. to a great degree. a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. (school’s liability versus parental liability) which provides: "ART. DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from liability. that is. but was unsuccessful. Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperiña. 1957 BAUTISTA ANGELO. is solidarily liable with him.The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. From the school Dante. The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions. on appeal. L-10068-70 June 29. .

Facts: Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas. and. 1903 of the old Civil Code. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. he attended the parade in honor of Dr. last paragraph. Spanish Civil Code). keeping them in their company. could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an institution of arts and trades as provided for by law. in connection with Art. prom. and the costs of action. etc. If. the act of the minor must be one wherein "fault or negligence" is present. 2180 of the Civil Code. his right arm was broken after Rico pushed him on the ground. 1903 and the burden of proof shifted to the claimant to show actual negligence on the part of the parent in order to render him liable. G. Spanish Civil Code). This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them. on September 16. this tribunal gave the following reasons for the rule: — The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and.. June 29. submits that the appellate Court erred in holding him liable for damages for the deliberate criminal act of his minor son. teachers. And it was in connection with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it. the words "arts and trades" does not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of establishments".torts & damages RATIO Parents shall be liable for the tortious conduct of their minor children living with them although at the time of the tort. on the other hand. The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms "preceptores y artesanos" used in the Italian and French Civil Codes. the children were under the direct control or supervision of an academic institution.. only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Art. the father of the minor who caused the injuries . (THIS IS A LANDMARK DOCTRINE. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority. gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155.87 - prof. educating them in proportion to their means". is obvious. SALEN V. In the circumstances. defendants failed to prove. L-10132. 2176 of the same Code. the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. nor the city school's supervisor. educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means". son of defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas. 134 and 135. And if there is no authority. gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Arts.R. Padilla and Reyes. Spanish Civil Code). therefore. Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular activity. in case of his death or incapacity. I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article 1903. 2180 of the new Civil Code for damages. Issue: WON the father is liable civilly for the criminal act of his son? Held: Yes. the above mentioned articles are not applicable.. the petitioner-appellant was ordered to pay damages for the deliberate injury caused by his son. casis to Pepito Cadano. now appellant Agapito Fuellas. WHICH WAS LATER MODIFIED BY J CRUZ IN AMADORA VS. This. 1903. JJ. it is clear that neither the head of that school. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents. I submit that the father should not be held liable for a tort that he was in no way able to prevent. 2 of Art. the father has rebutted the presumption of Art. Capuno. that the said court held the petitioner liable pursuant to par. jointly and severally. 1954. and not the parent. J. CADANO Nature: Appeal from the Decision of the Trial Court making defendant therein. as conceded by all commentators. were both 13 years old. the mother. The civil liability which the law impose upon the father. but deliberate intent. What substantial difference is there between them in so far as concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons. there can be no responsibility. the latter. arising from the criminal act committed by the latter. for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them. holding the defendants jointly and severally liable with his minor son Dante for damages. while on the other hand. In an earlier case (Exconde vs. It is contended that in the decision of the Court of Appeals. in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades" used in Art. also a minor. that according to the last article. the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff. Dansalan City. liable under Art. it would seem clear that where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher. and that there being no fault or negligence on the part of petitioner-appellant's minor son. COURT OF APPEALS) REASONING The provision “Teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody". for the existence of deliberate intent in the commission of an act negatives the presence of fault or negligence in its commission. for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. BALCE FUELLAS V.B. keeping them in their company. Wherefore. They were classmates at St. This defendants failed to prove. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them. should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody. and which he had every right to assume the school authorities would avoid. Appellant. Mary's High School. the accident occurred. concur. A. 1957).00 as damages.959. so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and supervision over the pupil... In my opinion.L. They had a quarrel that lead to Pepito’s injury. the mother. et al. REYES. in case of his death or incapacity. is obvious. the sum of P2. last paragraph. 1903 of the old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. dissenting: A2010 . No. for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them. I believe we should affirm the judgment relieving the father of liability. Having proved that he entrusted his child to the custody of school authorities that were competent to exercise vigilance over him. while. J. Spanish Civil Code).

and the costs of both instances. stating that the civil liability of the minor son of defendant arising from his criminal liability must be determined under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and not under Art. The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his son. The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180. Gumersindo was found guilty of homicide for having killed Carlos Salen. for physical injuries suffered as a result of an automobile accident. Mr. subdivisions 1. below 18 years of age who was living with him.88 - prof.torts & damages In another case. Yes. under 9 years of age. the owner of an automobile. any discussion as to the minor's criminal responsibility is of no moment. are responsible for damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. At the time of the collision. and the lack of care employed by the chauffeur. as may be gleaned from some recent A2010 . Facts: A passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the municipality of Las Piñas. And responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the action in the present case was instituted. the judgment appealed from will be modified. casis father alone and not the minor or the mother. and of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on a different basis. a father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile. Revised Penal Code). the void apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code. and the plaintiff will have judgment in his favor against the defendants Manuel Gutierrez. Salen and Salbanera vs. who acts without discernment. WON the father of Bonifacio (car) is liable. would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son.000. the case is one of two drivers approaching a narrow bridge from opposite directions. Verily. Held: 1. Narcisso Gutierrez blames both the bus and the car while the truck blames the car and the car in turn blames the truck. jointly and severally. a lad 18 years of age. so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and servant. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case. resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil Code. would be liable for the damages caused by the minor." To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses. or over 9 but under 15 years of age. and that. he lost his head and so contributed by his negligence to the accident. it is uniformly held that the head of a house. Disposition In consonance with the foregoing rulings. were accommodated therein. Moreover. the decision appealed from is affirmed GUTIERREZ VS GUTIERREZ MALCOLM. 101 of the Revised Penal Code. Jose Balce. The reason for this conclusion reaches to the findings of the trial court concerning the position of the truck on the bridge. Issue: 1. a businessman. minor son of plaintiffs. In its broader aspects. with the inevitable result of a collision and an accident decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical cases. Manuel Gutierrez. the youth Bonifacio was in incompetent chauffeur. the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of the evidence submitted therein by both parties. the speed in operating the machine. and was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother. the mother. was killed in a vehicular collision (between Luna. namely. with neither being willing to slow up and give the right of way to the other. no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. the owner of the truck. and was owned by Saturnino Cortez. pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code. In that case. the petition is dismissed. seven in all. independently of the criminal case. where the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the owner's family than the child driving it. WON the owner of the truck is liable. the 2. in case of his death or incapacity. RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA) 135 SCRA 242 ABAD SANTOS. The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority or control. an insane. But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability. September 23. 2180 of the new Civil Code. 2. 2 and 3. 2177). This is because a son who commits the act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12. The automobile was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez. IN VIEW HEREOF. But. He had a fracture on his right leg. Based on these facts.000. to recover damages in the amount of P10. and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore stated. In reversing the decision. and Saturnino Cortez. It was conceded that the collision was caused by negligence pure and simple. The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco. the father was not in the car. and Mrs. and . unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. Province of Rizal. whom he designates or permits to run it. Yes. In the United States. on approaching the bridge and the truck. for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted. Abelardo Velasco. The liability of Saturnino Cortez. who maintains it for the general use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children. together will several other members of the Gutierrez family. but the mother. the defendant Balce was the father of a minor Gumersindo Balce. The theory of the law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of the owner's business. is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault of negligence under the Penal Code (Art. Narcisso Gutierrez was a passenger of the bus. the pertinent portion of which provides: "The father and. for the sum of P5. 1931 Nature: an action brought by the plaintiff in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the five defendants. that he was driving at an excessive rate of speed. 1985 NATURE: Petition to review a decision of CA FACTS: Roberto Luna. that of contract. driving a gokart. February 28. this tribunal held: — It is true that under Art.

but since the son had attained majority. Reasoning: the RTC based its computation of the net unearned earnings on 2 factors: life expectancy of the deceased of another 30 years. thus is void.000 gross income less P20. The writ of execution produced only a nominal amount. The Dela Rosas failed to pay the amounts.000 (P75. . The instant petition is the one filed by Lunas. as a matter of equity. which affirmed in toto the RTC.Julie and Wendell died from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm licensed under Cresencio Libi. with 2 kids. WON the CA erred in reducing the unearned income 2. Pending the decision. the liability of Atty.000. A2010 . interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the court. YES Ratio: The reduction of the award of net unearned earnings had no basis. saying that they had no cash money. contending that the CA erred in reducing the award for unearned income.IAC: CFI decision set aside and found Libis subsidiarily liable ISSUE WON A2180 CC is applicable in making Libi’s liable for vicarious liability . In a MFR filed by the Dela Rosas. awarding P1.1979.Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the Julie refused. the CA modified this by factoring in the “engagement of Luna in car racing. all with legal interest. to pay the Lunas P450. Hill nothwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of his son. then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents. However.” Disposition: resolution of CA SET ASIDE.650. CA erred in ruling that the engagement with car racing reduced the life expectancy. Malou Alfonso .both set of parents came up with versions of the story Gotiongs: > Wendell caused her death by shooting her and thereafter turning the gun on himself to commit suicide Libis: > an unknown third party.89 - prof. In order to avoid him. (Note: father and son solidarily liable for damages. Luna's social standing’ [a statement which lacks complete basis]. “It stands to reason that if his annual personal expenses should increase because of the ‘escalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R. P50. Also. 1979 . CFI dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of the evidence.January 14. with legal interest from date of the decision. Both parties filed separate petitions for review in the SC.1992 NATURE Petition for review of the Intermediate Appellate Court. the CA increased the annual personal expenses to P30. Heirs of Luna brought a suit for damages against Luis and his father. and an annual net income of P55. P12.000 for unearned net earnings. was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos. he has no property in the Phils or elsewhere. “That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low slung.000 compensatory damages.000. 13 years old.respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who. . the court is “unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law because to do so will not serve the ends of justice. However. due to the escalating gasoline expenses.torts & damages Luis dela Rosa. in the interest of justice (since the death took place in 1970.1979 . Luis is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine Courts. within 30 days.000. whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU). married. In the meantime.000 (no interest mentioned).000 compensatory damages. Cebu City. at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from which she died on January 14. only slightly larger than foot-pedaled four wheeled conveyances. which the CFI ruled in favor of the Lunas. ISSUES: 1. YES Ratio: The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and under the circumstances. while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi. He has no assets of his own as yet”). FACTS .) Obiter: The Dela Rosas invoke the ruling in Elcano v Hilll. the CA modified the decision.January. and that the award for atty’s fees should include legal interest. (The atty’s fees should accrue interest from the date of filing of the compliant. RTC considered the age and health of the deceased.000 personal expenses). reinstating the earlier decision with slight modification regarding the award of atty’s fees. father of Wendell . RTC considered the various positions the deceased held at the time of his death. and 15 years after the process of litigation is still not over). September 18.000. It was error on the part of the CA to have disturbed the determination of the RTC which it had previously affirmed. it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would also increase considering the manifold sources thereof” 2. and living in Spain but only causally employed (“His compensation is hardly enough to support his family.000 for loss of companionship. Hill became merely subsidiarily to that of his son. In coming out with the life expectancy.More than 2 years before their deaths.000. it was an error to increase the expenses without increasing the gross income. 1978 when Julie Ann broke up with Wendell after she found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. and who also died in the same event on the same date.CFI Cebu: Gotiongs filed civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter's vicarious liability under A2180 CC. thus lowering the net annual unearned income to P45. driving a Toyota car without a license) at a gokart practice area. The Dela Rosas now invoke that the father should also be held only subsidiarily. this time reducing the unearned income to P450. casis LIBI V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SPS GOTIONG) 214 SCRA 16 REGALADO.000 as unearned net earnings of Luna. . There is nothing on record that supports the claim that the car racing was a dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy. WON the award for atty’s fees should have legal interest HELD: 1.000 for loss of his companionship (come on!!). Petition of the Dela Rosas was denied for lack of merit.” thus lowering the life expectancy to only 10 years. Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December. must have caused Wendell's death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification . and P50. Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend. the SC came out with a resolution ordering the Dela Rosas. and the trend of his earnings over the span of his last few years. low powered vehicles. Luis is already of age. thus coming up with a potential gross income of P75.” Also. To this contention. and atty’s fees of P50. and attorney’s fees of P50. prompting him to resort to threats against her. P12. where the court held that A2180 applied to Atty.) The Dela Rosas appealed in the CA. decision of the then WRT to the gross income.

COURT OF APPEALS AND QUISUMBING L-14342 LABRADOR. is the son of his co-plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L. however. Quisumbing. Reasoning. then aged ten. She admitted. the mother are responsible for the damages caused by the children who live in their company… The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was. . It should be emphasized. Reasoning . shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. incase of his death or incapacity. they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible… The father and. and disciplining of the child. however.Yes. Wendell. 1982 via an adoption decree granted by the CFI of Ilocos Sur. Decision set aside. + for civil liability from crimes committed by minors under the legal authority and control or who live in the company of the parents: PRIMARY = premised on A101 RPC fot damages ex delicto by kids 9 or under or 9-15 but without discernment = premised on A2180 CC for kids 9-15 with discernment or 15-21 (now 18) + liability effected against father or mother? BOTH PARENTS AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE PARENTAL AUHTORITY OVER THE MINOR = youth welfare code = FC: responsibility of parents + for civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors: same rules in A2180 and A2182 Disposition Instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED TAMARGO vs CA (Rubio. mother of Wendell. Therefore. J. HENCE. The presumption under law is that when a child under their care commits a tortuous act the parents were negligent in the performance of these duties and responsibilities. cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. they they can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damages. Article 2180 reads “ the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions. The adopting parents had no actual or physical custody of Adelberto at the time of the incident as they were then in the US were they live. The adopting and natural parents of Jennifer filed a civil complaint for damages against the parents of Bundoc. Thus.WON the spouses Bundoc were indispensable party to the tort action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him under Article 2176. They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun.' . Cresencio Libi. that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. 1982.The parents of Adelberto claimed that they are not the indispensable party in the action as their son adopted by the spouses Rapisura on November 18. The SC however decided to hear the appeal based on substantial justice. The Court held that parental authority did not retroactively transfer to and vested in the adopting MERCADO v. owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Jr.Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing. . .BUT Liability is not subsidiary BUT primary > if the liability of the parents for crimes and QDs of their minor children is subsidiary. .Amelita Libi. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita's key is always in her bag.90 - prof. a person is not only liable for torts committed by him also torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsibility. He was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide but was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability ob the ground that he had acted without discernment. appellants are liable under A2180 CC. A101 RPC SAYS SO > RULES: A2010 . Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their son. accordingly. HELD. Thus parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of the parents which include the instructing. 1960 NATURE This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR QDS OF THEIR MINOR KIDS AS CONTEMPLATED IN A2180 ID PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY > applying A2194 (solidary liability of joint tortfeasors) the parent is also solidarily liable with the child. Disposition – Petition granted. Bundoc) 209 SCRA 518 Feliciano. controlling. To do so and hold them liable for the tortious act when be unfair and unconscionable. under this doctrine. the provision of Article 2180 would be applicable. because of his minority. of the instruction and supervision of the child. THE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR FELONIES IS LIKEWISE PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY. testified that her husband. We.A2180': The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by A2180 CC covers obligations wising from both quasidelicts and criminal offenses. that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not as the body was cleaned already in the funeral parlor . 1992 NATURE Appeal for review of CA decision FACTS . The trial Court agreed with the respondents and dismissed the complaint. Mercado. while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L. casis parents at the time the shooting incident occurred.torts & damages HELD YES Ratio The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists. As stated.undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. all of which facts were known to Wendell. to a large extent. However. and in keeping said gun from his reach. sufficient proof can be presented to overcome this presumption. May 30. ISSUE . But if the liability id direct and primary.The principle of parental liability is designated as vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed liability under the Anglo-American tort law. the diligence would constitute a valid substantial defense.On October 20. Adelberto Bundoc.The case contained procedural questions which were raised in the appeal. Manuel .

of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries. so he was immediately taken to a hospital. . Brillantes. 1956. at the laboratory room of the said Institute. it was duly incorporated. and hence. direction and influence. Jr. WON the moral damages fixed at P2. absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute. such that the control." In the law of torts. the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over. in retaliation.000 are excessive. He never regained consciousness. As a result.Palisoc spouses as parents of their 16-year old son. but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face. including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody.the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.. was shown to have existed. Jr. within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219.The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's dictum in Mercado vs. and a student in automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute filed the action below for damages arising from the death of their son at the hands of a fellow student. however. 2179. YES. HELD a. PALISOC VS. may be described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank. Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them. in this wise: “In the opinion of the Court.91 - prof. Civil Code. . direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. which motivated the assault. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply.. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. 1971 NATURE An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the CFI Manila. . was A2010 . (Art. in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should be made liable. the grant of moral damages is not justified. so long as they remain in their custody. Daffon. Quibulue. which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach.torts & damages Quisumbing. casis the class to which the deceased belonged. defendant Virgilio L. Court of Appeals. . It is true that occasioned by the fact that Manuel. since this contemplates the situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parents. ISSUES 1. . Jr.the deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy. Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages. Quezon City. on the right cheek with a piece of razor. to a certain extent..The trial court. finally he died. BRILLANTES 41 SCRA 548 TEEHANKEE.. respectively) Ratio The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students. October 4. quarrelled over a "pitogo". instructor of . NO. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher. .The clause "so long as they remain in their custody" contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher. at the time when the incident occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute. . On February 22. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows. Teodosio Valenton.” ISSUE WON the school officials are jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors with Daffon. Lastly. that "(I)t would seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody. and one afternoon. . and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. HELD 1. this article(art. as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated. including recess time. Daffon were classmates. together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. 2180. Valenton and Quibulue. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Daffon. Palisoc became pale and fainted.Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar. Jr. Reasoning . yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augusto's resentment. Daffon. YES (head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute. which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. we find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. . which authorizes the grant of moral damages. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. . the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents. Augusto wounded Manuel. the president thereof.2180) of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar. as to their pupils and students." contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher. WON the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the of the father since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time) 2. 2. At that time the classes were in recess.A "pitogo". which figures prominently in this case.There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the school. Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing. and Virgilio L. is that they stand. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty. therefore.Defendants were: Antonio C.At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship. so long as they remain in their custody.) After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals. is as follows: ART. . had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get "his pitogo from Renato. nor does paragraph 2 of said article. The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Consequently. FACTS . Dominador Palisoc. Santiago M." contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher. they. and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon. a fellow student of the deceased. it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school." It is. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived. such that the control. but lately.

hewas shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon. but it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. In any event. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury. the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter.the school had been incorporated since and therefore the school itself. Held: Yes. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the student under their control and supervision. the teacher is physically present and in a position to prevent it.92 - prof. the parents of the student at fault. are not involved. as thus incorporated. NO (Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of directors and the school) itself cannot be held similarly liable.At any rate. and the dicta in Mercado on which it relied. 1988 Facts: . I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results. since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident.00 for moral. teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody." In the light of the factual findings of the lower court's decision.B. but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution" . in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180. Sentencing the Daffon.. DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows: ." Note that for parental responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their company. The fact that it has not done so indicates an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age. as such. so should teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category. Valenton and Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P12.00 for attorney's fee. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school.I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v.000. whether the semester has not ended. the article expressly so provides. ISSUE: WON Art 2180 is applicable. their authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age. (c) P5.00 for loss of earning power and (e) P2. or has ended or has not yet begun. April 15. J. Such defense they had taken necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of and thus be exonerated from liability imposed by Art 2180. The teacher in charge is the one designated by the dean. Further. Basis of teacher’s vicarious liability is. dissenting: .It would demand responsibility without commensurate authority. Alfredo went to the school to submit his “Report in Physic”. . . Brillantes from the complaint. since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant . dismissing defendants' counterclaims.it stands to reason that (1) the clause "so long as they remain in their custody" as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase "who live in their company" as used in reference to parents. The opinion of the majority states: "Here.375. The term “custody” signifies that the student is within the control and influence of the school authorities. for injuries caused by the student. J. casis It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to graduate at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes. principal.. (d) P10. . It is natural to expect that if the law had intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of persons enumerated in the article. to hold their teachers and/or the administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts committed by them. b. Thus. and 3. absolving defendant Antonio C.. Civil Code. academic or non-academic. it would have expressly so stated.finally.torts & damages under the law abovequoted. J.000. (b) P3. .L. the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability.000. However . 2.. rendering teachers and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control. concurring: -I would like to clarify that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect that the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils who are minors is not in accord with the plain text of the law. including recess time. must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision. the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him. by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc. it is not without significance that . Court of Appeals. defendant Daffon. x x x “ The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises. as well as the temper. Teachers are liable for acts of their student except where the school is technical in nature (arts and trade establishment) in which case the head thereof shall be answerable. AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLLETOS) 160 SCRA 315 CRUZ. While they were in the auditorium of their school. the school may be held to answer for the acts of its teacher or the head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior. MAKALINTAL. Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools. and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer minors. as in the case of the parents and of the guardians.Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority. that while in the case of parents and guardians. 1.000. “There is really no substantial difference distinction between the academic and non-academic schools in so far as torts committed by their students are concerned. or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils or students in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. A2010 .. they acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents).phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school. attitudes and often destructive activism of the students. should have been brought in as party defendant. considering the size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions. academic and non-academic. said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. plus the costs of this action in both instances. REYES. as erroneously held by the lower court.00 for actual and compensatory expenses. damages. whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching”.one other factor constrains me to dissent. “x x x x The distinction no longer obtains at present.

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. so long as they remain in their custody. Guttierez. Fransico Alcantara. These four pupils ---. They also claim that the civil liability in this case arose from a crime. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde. private respondent Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging.Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng and Arante University based on Art 2190 CC . and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence. casis continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging. The court cannot make law. Deciding to help his colleague.Reynaldo Alonso. Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope. also after classes. Ylarde's parents.93 - prof. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education. Motion was denied due to insufficient justification to disturb ruling. 1988 July 29 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari AQUINO PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY) 160 SCRA 785 PARAS. without any warning at all. 2176. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. The answer is no since the provision speaks of “teachers or heads” Dispositive WHEREFORE. The work was left unfinished. private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils. Being their teacher-in-charge.torts & damages teachers are not expected to have the same measure of responsibility as that imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree. private respondent Aquino alone 13 "Lastly. the school was littered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II. they were exonerated of liability." A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left. it can only apply the law with its imperfections. Such fault or negligence. respondent school claims that a demand should have been made by the plaintiff rendering it premature to bring an action for damages against respondent school. said private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away. 1988 NATURE Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order dismissing the complaint as against the respondent school and denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal. . 2180. x x x The parent can instill more lasting discipline more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or the head for the tort committed by the child. he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person. filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides: "Art. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren. It seems most unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship. pinning him to the wall in a standing position. The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has outlived its purpose. The following day. As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent nor the school remised in the discharged of their duties. ISSUE WON the Art 2180 CC13 applies to academic institutions HELD It is unnecessary to answer the issue.A group of students walking inside Araneta University were accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karin Madidis alias “Teng”. aged ten to eleven. . is obliged to pay for the damage done." On the other hand. A2010 . Alcantara and Ylarde. the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. As a result thereof. April 25. Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. Petitioner (Reynaldo) was subsequently stabbed by Teng requiring him to be hospitalized and to undergo surgery. At that time. . dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep. Since it was a civil case. another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez stated burying them all by himself." . the concrete block caught him before he could get out. At this point. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. (Note – the court view on increasing students activism likely causing violence resulting to injuries. However the court can suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed. GANCAYCO. Then. Jr concurringly said many student x x x view some teachers as part of the bourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice on behavior deportment and other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively rejected. petitioners in this case. Alonso. What the petitioner wants to know is WON the school or the university itself is liable. private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. .Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the provision only applies to vocational schools and not to academic institutions. YLARDE vs. which they did FACTS Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School and private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. ISSUE WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Ylarde sustained injuries and died three (3) days later. Before leaving. three of the four kids. this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. . playfully jumped into the pit. there being fault or negligence. the applicable provision of Article 2180 states: "Art. MTD was granted by the CA. private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone. When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block. not commit. in or out of the school premises – J. FACTS . Then.Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of Dismissal. both private respondents can be held liable for damages.

Reasoning: This is in line with the Court’s ruling in Amadora vs. so long as they remain in their custody. when he shot Napoleon Castro. 17 a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. casis Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. Ratio: ST." Reasoning: a. the ROTC Commandant. Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF). teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. 1988 FACTS Jimmy Abon. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult. Subsequently. or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Abon. but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience. it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students." as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school. but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit. including recess time. The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the CA.94 - prof. the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages. (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging. Ratio: Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-incharge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons. Abon for damages resulting from his acts. the latter "stands. an obviously attractive nuisance. so long as they remain in their custody. petitioners cannot under Art. the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school. and (3) dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit. A "recess. Logically. must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age. 1991 SCHOOL v NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS . at around 8:00 p. Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior. "the phrase used in [Art. We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence. BCF is both an academic and arts and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP. After hearing. to pay private respondents. The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself.: Feb. wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Abon. (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling. In line with the case of Palisoc. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal.torts & damages xxx xxx xxx "Lastly. a student of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977. Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation. and (5) left the children close to the excavation. (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B. he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. (2) absolving the other defendants.. he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher. Jimmy B. Court of Appeals. is liable. 25. supra. According to the CA. Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc. Inc." or in the custody of BCF. J. while it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident. The time interval is safely within the "recess time" that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case. capacity. in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student]..: October 5. impleading Jimmy B. as contemplated in the law. This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades. (6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school. J. it is only the head of the school who can be held liable. in the parking space of BCF. a commerce student of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro. therefore. the Trial Court rendered a decision. knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. 2180 — 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school. jointly and severally. as party defendants. discretion. Likewise. Abon." HELD Only Aquino. HELD NO. DISPOSITION Granted. We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde. Libertad D. This should not be the case. IAC (CASTRO) 166 SCRA 274 PADILLA. 2180 of the Civil Code. Ratio: As regards the principal. Bearing this in mind. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity. (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the children's safety. b." contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises. SALVOSA v. the teacher. when he shot Napoleon Castro." Likewise. Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF). teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. Jimmy B. ISSUE WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area. to a certain extent. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. as heirs of Napoleon Castro.m. The standard of conduct to which a child A2010 . which was at about 8 o'clock in the evening. as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. FRANCIS HIGH CA(Castillo/Cadiz) 194 SCRA 340 Paras. Reasoning: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task.

the questioned decision is SET ASIDE PSBA v CA (BENITEZ/BAUTISTA) 205 SCRA 729 Padilla. both are jointly and severally liable w/ the teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the owner/manager (St. If the CA’s findings are to be upheld. it should be noted that the victim’s parents allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination. in relation to 2176 is applicable (3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper HELD A2010 . the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. the teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity. His parents didn’t allow him to go due to short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home. Also. Francis and the principal). the male teachers who were to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking. there was SOLIMAN. (2) NO. Illumin. a school cannot be an insurer for its students against all risks. The Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence of their liability. ISSUES (1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180 HELD (1) NO. The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which was not school sanctioned. Also. Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them. (3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence required of them. enrolled in the 3rd year commerce course of PSBA. ISSUE (1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants (2) WON Art. (1) NO. From the evidence. This prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w/ Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers. a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBA’s liability. he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher. Francis HS and the Illumin. alleging that since they were presumably sued under Art 2180. However. The records also show that the 2 P. 2180. WHEREFORE.E. -Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroad:”… the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person.In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was breached due to PSBA’s negligence in providing proper security measures. In fact. However. The CA erred in applying Art. one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons. At this stage. In the case at bar. -No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised diligence of a good father of the family. teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim. Hence this petition. the student abides by the school’s academic requirements and observes its rules and regulations. any finding of negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual obligation only. 1992 FACTS -Carlitos Bautista. For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his employee. The TC found against the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim. the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task. -When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment.: Feb. -his parents filed a complaint against St. The school is obliged to provide the student with an education. teachers were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming. means and methods before. 2 P. On the issue of the liability of St. a contract is established between them. Hence this petition. PREMISES CONSIDERED.E. As such. yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA. J. -A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by the TC. under Article 2180. during and after the attack of the victim. the petition is DENIED. Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach. was stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants who were from outside the school’s academic community. but the court has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a contract. Life savers were brought in the event of such an accident. it was shown that the principal had known of the picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the event. alleging negligence. then a freshman student at St. the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondent’s complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC can determine. Petitioners contend that the victim’s parents failed to prove by evidence that they didn’t give their son consent to join the picnic.95 - prof. along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge. V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 . the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st. JR. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extracontractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties” -Using the test in Cangco. contending that it occurred due to petitioners’ failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family. particularly par 4. time and place. . represented by its principal. Costs against the petitioners. At the outset. resulting in a bilateral obligation. Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the parties. 2180. 4th. Quezon. In turn. employers will be forever exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the performance of their duties. no moral or exemplary damages under Art. 2177 may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses. Francis HS. -Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it. 2 of the teachers who arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers. casis no cause of action since academic institutions are not subject to the said provision. and several teachers for damages incurred from the death of their son. recklessness and lack of security precautions. The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180. hence. 4. and as the latter had her own class to supervise then and was not actually invited. They cannot escape liability simply because it wasn’t an “extra-curricular activity of the HS”. -PSBA sought to dismiss the case. -Both parties appealed to the CA.torts & damages -Ferdinand Castillo.

It held: When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment. the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment. It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon. The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. And.The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils. the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for one's own act or omission. The plaintiff was confined in a hospital.Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or 'built-in' obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. represented by his guardian. he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months. the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon. the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon. 1992 NATURE Civil complaint for damages FACTS . Petitioner. as here. this appeal.L. another student of the Institute. while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman. without any provocation. of the Civil Code did not apply. acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.. This would be for the trial court to determine. Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following: xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper. Using the test of Cangco. . but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case. he being in fact an employee of the R. Security Agency Inc. a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC). The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student. WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law. a student of that Institute. resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with.torts & damages FELICIANO. the defendant. xxx xxx xxx Art. the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC and Solomon. In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced. YES . and not to the clients of such agency. the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. student or apprentice of the school. May 18. while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil. 7th paragraph. recruits. while the school was the client of the latter.On August 13. The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority: xxx xxx xxx (2) Teachers and professors. was in the campus premises thereof. even if there be a finding of negligence. the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180. hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards. 350 and 352 of the Civil Code 2. 1982. Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner. filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC. the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen. their students or apprentices. Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency. that negligence xxx xxx xxx Lastly. In fact. 2180. It is settled that where the security agency. 352. Necessarily. casis paragraph of Article 2180. Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th . Jr. contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it.In the case of PSBA v CA.Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority. The employer of Solomon was the R. 350. RL Security Agency and Solomon.In Palisoc v. Certainly. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. Petitioner’s MFR was denied. In the instant case. professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution. supra. since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1. 2.L. and the students who are enrolled. who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant R. . Brillantes. NO Under Art. petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon. The relations between teacher and pupil. no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision. . Hence. the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Security Agency. It further argued that Article 2180. as well as those of Articles 349. quoted above.It was also pointed out in said case that: "In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. which contract results in obligations for both parties.. so long as they remain in their custody. It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v.The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows: Art. on the one hand. as yet. ISSUES 1.Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCC’s motion to dismiss. . which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon.RCC filed a motion to dismiss. . and as per doctor's opinion." .L. was not a pupil. however.96 - prof. xxx xxx xxx (4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices. there is. there is established a contract between them. Security Agency Inc. but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible. the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc. Jr. On the other hand. . RCC was not the employer of Solomon. no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. on the other hand. student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges. J. Jimmy Solomon. shot the plaintiff on the abdomen.. xxx xxx xxx Art. Inc. For its part. A2010 . At the same time. .Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges. 349. and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon. however..

-Liability for the accident. No costs. Between the remote cause and the injury. to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer. . acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation. . February 6. -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities. only on Art. the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events. It was Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep. This deprived the company of earnings of about P8. the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court. along the nat’l highway at Sto. but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. SO ORDERED. and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS. PINEDA. it must be shown that the ‘injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done. and therefore. . unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code. FC. casis case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants. must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. But this was not alleged in their complaint. Inc.PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines. allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC. the trial court had denied the school's motion to dismiss the complaint against it. -TC: absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.2180 CC. Pampanga.Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St.In the PSBA case. Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva . Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. A2010 . . Mary’s Academy) WON St.This case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings.It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK. For the school to be liable. Carpitanos sued the school. held parents and school liable -CA: school liable under A218 and 219. . . As PSBA.It is not the school. finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them. It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached. The negligence of petitioner St. ISSUE (regarding liability of St. Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition. his parents. and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial court's order. The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.200. Mary’s Academy had no control. in the interest of justice. owned by Phil Rabbit.97 - prof. and could have been based. In the case at bar. petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident. its manager BALINGIT and the driver. Reasoning. owned by Phil-Am. Ratio. or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded. 2180 NCC (Art. Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have. driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep.2180 uses the term ST. The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan. upon the assumption that petitioner's cause of action was based. together with James Daniel II (then 15.In the appeal.1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue!) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments: Art. -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. liable for damages HELD NO. and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the case. the bus company also argued that PhilAm is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41. Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days. the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC. Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract. The negligence of petitioner St. WHEREFORE. Tomas.600.the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle. Between the remote cause and the injury.Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pineda's employer. Inc. 2180 of the Civil Code. In other words. there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Mary’s Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos. 2002 NATURE Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos. states. excluding petitioner St. Dipolog City.CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art. unbroken by intervening efficient causes. James Daniel II. CARPITANOS PARDO. and which was the proximate cause of the accident. Mary’s Academy. This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that PhilAm and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality. however. MARY’S ACADEMY VS. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him..[19] The Court remands the PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO. March 25. and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep. whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T. 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision FACTS .* ISSUE WON the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise" used in Art. and Vivencio Villanueva.torts & damages becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. . Disposition.

thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A.” . As to solidarity. 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine. -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. 1999. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions. -As the bus was pushed. Such fault or negligence. xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. the victim. or to Belvic St. Phil-American Forwarders. 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. * This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now. Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. GBW794.  Petitioner’s Version -Manilhig. the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. direct and solidary. recklessness.Hence. Dispositive Lower court’s order of dismissal is AFFIRMED. and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street. no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine. professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur.. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 217614 and 218015 of the Civil (limited to that involved in the outline) 14 ∗ CASTILEX V. which caused the death of the victim **Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Davide Facts: At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning. June 17. 2176. violation of traffic rules and regulations. Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation. under the allegations of the complaint. Article 2194 expressly provides: the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondents’ Version -In the early morning of March 24. -Since the employer's liability is primary. this appeal ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes. -Civil Case No. warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog. respectively. -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 15 Art. its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A. Art. Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus. abandonment of victim. Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd. -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle. The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses. In the process. He was also only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed. Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence. casis Code against petitioner Manilhig and his employer. thereafter. A2010 . the victim Ramon A. Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides: Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. and denied MFR -Hence. in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City. He was traveling counterclockwise.98 - prof. (with regard to this issue) PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE. including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired. there being fault or negligence. -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. petitioner Philtranco. 21. It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills. 2180. suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. who was biking towards the same direction as the bus. was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. Romeo So Vasquez. 1990. direct.. xxxxxxxxx The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage . and joint and several or solidary with the driver. as a result thereof fell and. runs perpendicular to Gomez St. Upon the other hand. its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. On the same date and time. 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A. the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus. without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear. like petitioner Philtranco. for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary. Inc.torts & damages "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) to mean "employer. -The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn. was run over by the said bus. (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. Inc. Inc. xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. about 6:00 o’clock. in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer. registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. Acuesta who. -The Magsaysay Blvd. VASQUEZ Dec. is obliged to pay for the damage done. (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No. defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises. -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly.

the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employer's motor vehicle. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner. registered under the name of petitioner. On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks. an employee is engaged in his employer's business in the operation of a motor vehicle.torts & damages After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident. the fourth paragraph should apply.This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks. Operation of Employer's Vehicle in Going to or from Work In the same vein. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to . Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180. to hold the employer liable. admittedly. which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative. the courts have frequently applied what has been called the "special errand" or "roving commission" rule. to employers in general. The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance. 14 cda The employer may. but rather. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph. Evidence that by using the employer's vehicle to go to and from meals. he was driving a company-issued vehicle. Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours within the call of duty. III. Such exception obtain in the present case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioner's vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager. however. a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship. whether or not engaged in any business or industry. the result varies with each state of facts. II. and not a part of his services to his employer. are still A2010 . whether or not engaged in any business or industry. It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez. the plaintiff must show. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Jr. traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee. surmises. The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances. so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employee's action or inaction. No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment. even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employer's motor vehicle: I. presumably. Hence. Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task. in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed. and Luisa So Vasquez. Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect. This rule is. under which it can be found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions. or conjectures. Instead. while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task. and the fifth paragraph. the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident. So. an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. Negligent acts of employees. even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employer's vehicle. Operation of Employer's Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer. an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle. testified that at the time of the incident. For. As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact. ABAD. Where the employee's duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work. the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included. title or designation but which. against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case. A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable. spending more time at his actual duties. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work. Issue: WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle. or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work. Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry. employees oftentimes wear different hats. whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry. and even finality at times. therefore. casis charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. In the same action. The phrase "even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task. who was presented as a hostile witness. The Court of Appeals cannot. They perform functions which are beyond their office. however. once this is done. be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employer's vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and. Held: Castilez is absolved from any liability. subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations. Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD. However.99 - prof. that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. Cebu Doctor's Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez. The SC does not agree. nevertheless. the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez.

However. his overtime work had already been completed. or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours. it has been held that he has not resumed his employment. . then go home in the school jeep. The president of FCI is Agustin Masa. as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers. . A2010 . NPC v CA (PHESCO INC. the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff. has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle.m.." had no connection to petitioner's business. Hence. the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees. It was then about 2:00 a. In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees. and drug pushers and addicts. Allan's job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day. . Funtecha definitely was not. Allan lives with his dad. then go back to the school. the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's business.Funtecha is a scholar of FCI.Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan let Funtecha drive.In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house. Even if somehow. Rather. Funtecha wanted to drive home. pimps.One night. ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. was known as a "haven for prostitutes.On July 22. Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan. and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip. way beyond the normal working hours.TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan. August 17. having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately. 1998 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS .It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home. even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians). The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan. The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw. or in the supervision over him. primary and solidary. He is also employed as a janitor. . The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep.Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI. a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City. as petitioner put it. The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver. 1992 NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS . saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable. the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act. includes any act done by an employee. the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer. Unfortunately.It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose. Funtecha also lives in the president’s house free of charge while a student at FCI. His being at a place which.torts & damages An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use. August 14. for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. . neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR. enroute to its destination. it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtecha's possession of a student driver's license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms. Moreover. ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES . 1979. The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night. SC reversed. Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence. and seeing that the road was clear.) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO. thus. . Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept. Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights. it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning he’s supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school. After a dangerous curb. There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver. Agustin has a son.100 - prof. casis of the infliction of the injury or damage. Allan. . . ABAD's working day had ended. using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position. under Article 2180.The petitioner. not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. He need not have an official appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act. The liability of the employer is. it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employer's business or within the scope of his assigned task. He has a student license.

101 - prof. denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards. Rodolfo Roman. c) Attorney’s fees of P20. The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. . In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers.The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin. instead of presenting evidence.A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight.00 as actual damages. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train. ISSUES: WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.520. .PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions. casis from liability. in its answer.000. and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier. . Navidad was struck by the moving train. .00 as and for attorney’s fees. . .Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides: "Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.SC) LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD.000. 2) Compensatory damages of P443.Marjorie Navidad (Nicanor’s widow). In a "labor only" contract. . delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. In either case.While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks.00. the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him.00. a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. b) P50. A2010 . the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage. Prudent. was coming in.000. .000.NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA. NPC's liability is direct. shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action. an LRT train. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman. driver of the dump truck. between the two. 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE: APPEAL from CA’s DECISION . -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train.A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter. WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTA’s CLAIMS: -Escartin’s assault upon Navidad. JR. d) Costs of suit.00. . b) Moral damages of P50. instead.14 Oct 1993.TC: dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit. and he was killed instantaneously.000. . d) P50. was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented. the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad.13 of the Civil Code. was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who.In the provisions of the "Memorandum of Understanding" entered into by PHESCO and NPC. and Prudent for the death of her husband.830. In exempting Prudent . Finding that a contractor was a "labor-only" contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the "labor-only" contractor. DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed. the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50. . in conjunction with Article 2180. Nicanor Navidad. ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba. c) P50. -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. J/February 6.000. Inc. along with their children. Navidads Contention: .00 as moral damages. NO. holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts: a) P44.TC: Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following: "a) 1) Actual damages of P44.830. . entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation. and e) P20. filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task." . (But there wasn’t any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case. Of course. primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver. filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin. but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks). if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it.No evidence. . the LRTA. entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare). NPC. about 730pm. which reversed the trial court's judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages. PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals. Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG. the Metro Transit Organization. which caused the latter to fall on the tracks. we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in "labor only" contracting.The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability. operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman.At the exact moment that Navidad fell. then drunk.In this regard. .00 as nominal damages. Junelito Escartin. however. . including the latter's workers.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased.CA: exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and.CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000. (Metro Transit). which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES . HELD: 1.LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent.torts & damages .The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latter's projects.000.00.

" "Article 1759. "Article 1756." "Article 1763. using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons. 13 Art. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. with a due regard for all the circumstances. which LRTA and Roman. although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.102 - prof. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent. 1977. .The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. the cargo truck. on the other hand. was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. MCKEE V IAC (TAYAG & MANALO) 221 SCRA 517 Davide. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. owned by private respondents..Petition to review the resolution of the CA FACTS . Needless to say. are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. 2194. . In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. have failed to show. Such fault or negligence. a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent. in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. YES. is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. ______________ 12 Art. both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy. is obliged to pay for the damage done. Article 219414 of the Civil Code can well apply. DISPOSITION: CA’S DECISION AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. . 2180. however. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers. . provides: "Article 1755. . was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh. No costs. The Ford Escort. the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently.000 kilos. . Jr. the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman. when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties. a factual matter that has not been shown. and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. the mother.In fine. .torts & damages The premise.A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury. a liability for tort may arise even under a contract. Kim McKee and Loida Bondoc." -The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. there being fault or negligence. but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains. Pampanga. and physical injuries to George McKee. for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee.Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier. governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers. and was bound for Manila. 1992 NATURE . and by simple proof of injury. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees. and driven by Ruben Galang. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.On January 8. July 16. Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence. he must also be absolved from liability as Prudent is. in case of his death or incapacity. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. 2. REASONING: . Christopher McKee and Araceli McKee. so long as they remain in their custody. A2010 . . the presumption would be that it has been at fault. 2176. Stated differently. according to the CA.Immediately before the collision. In case of death of or injuries to passengers.Once such fault is established. thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. Lastly. Loadstar. a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck. one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana. an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage . 14 Art. thus. which was loaded with 200 cavans of rice weighing about 10. the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. the contract can be said to have been breached by tort. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. where tort is that which breaches the contract. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. all passengers of the Ford Escort. There is no showing that Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission.The Civil Code. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. casis The father and.In case of such death or injury. in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. Jaime Tayag and Rosalina Manalo. "This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.

is only juris tantum.Ma. Before he could do so. alcohol. Given a light rainfall. The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her. ISSUE WON the owners of the cargo truck (Tayag and Manalo) are liable for the resulting damages HELD YES The Court rules that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was. which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. 2 boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. whereby such other person suffers injury. She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. . in law. Neither did they attempt to prove it. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck. . as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others. Physiological "fight or flight" mechanisms are at work. and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol. She filed a claim for damages against defendant. .Please see first Mckee digest for details on the collision. He instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving when she realized she had a flat tire. provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs. rather than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly apply his brakes.103 - prof. negligent in driving his companyissued Mitsubishi Lancer 2. but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. February 7. swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck.While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought or the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent. he then switched on the headlights of the car. precaution. Inc. however.Civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were filed as a result of a vehicular accident. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car. put on her emergency lights. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. xxx xxx xxx The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. on the said bridge. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. . ISSUE 1. unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. As employers of the truck driver. which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color. directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. and bumped plaintiff's car. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. YES . It is the failure to observe that degree of care.) . an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger. unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. WON Li was grossly negligent in driving the company issued car 2. the conduct which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoroughful care.Li was. casis every driver should be to those conditions.Li’s alibi was that he was driving at 55kph when he was suddenly confronted with a speeding car coming from the opposite direction. therefore. etc. under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Li would have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were alert as VALENZUELA v CA (LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL. Court of Appeals. and went to the rear to open the trunk. which was the opposite lane.Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party. since normally he would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela's car.torts & damages When the northbound car was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge. contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh. . which was destroyed. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense. WON Alexander Commercial is liable as Li’s employer HELD 1. and the area was poorly lighted.Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises.The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard. Manalo and Tayag are. The boys were moving back and forth. CA absolved Alexander. . not juris et de jure. 1996 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . exhaustion. Defendants counterclaimed for damages. the provision for the unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the 253 SCRA 303 KAPUNAN. Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. his car collided with the truck. 3. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. -RTC found Li and Alexander solidarily liable. She was pulled out from under defendant's car. A2010 . with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. That presumption. and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a car driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial. She parked along the sidewalk of Aurora Blvd. WON Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence 3. Either factor working independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road conditions. the visibility of the street.Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. and then fell to the ground. YES . INC. with no parking lights or early warning device. NO .Negligence. alighted from the car. drowsiness. the proximate cause of the collision. Li's failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident could therefore have been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very fast" speed as testified by one of the witneses. . . Article 2180 reads as follows: The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions. alleging that plaintiff was the one who was reckless or negligent. is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution..

Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. by his own fault or negligence. the state. Title 15. to defendant said Government at the same. No. A2010 . He was one of the best contractors of wooden buildings. and to determine the amount of the damages. since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments. by virtue of such provisions of law. except when it acts through the agency of a special agent. Alexander Commercial. are found. thus: By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. . Witnesses testified that plaintiff’s physical and mental condition before the accident was excellent. guardians and owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise. . to which Mr.The obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or negligence is based. but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. It follows therefrom that the state. that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. the fault or negligence. and the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands. as held in the last paragraph of article 1903.Act No. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital. because. reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage.torts & damages business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car. The patient apparently was slightly deaf. DISPOSITION Judgment of RTC reinstated.Trial court held that the collision was due solely on the negligence of the chauffeur and awarded the plaintiff the sum of P14. . or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court. This legal presumption gives way to proof.. difficulties and losses. however. where the general principle is laid down that where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence. which would be subversive of the public interest. especially when he attempted to use his money for mathematical calculations. said company. In fine. .Plaintiff was so severely injured. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision. Partida 7. It states that “E. He had to dissolve a partnership that he had with an engineer and give up a contract for the construction of a building. has not demonstrated.104 - prof. in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of furthering the company's image.As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract. on the contrary. in contravention of an ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act. and among these persons. officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903. except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. as is evidenced by the same Law 3. had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition. regulates the obligations which arise out of fault or negligence. subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car.” ISSUES WON the government is liable for the damages resulting from a tort committed by an agent or employee of the government HELD NO Ratio The State is only liable for the acts of its agents. in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. if any. which is the He could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. As such. takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. to our satisfaction. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff. riding on a motorcycle.Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: MERRITT v GOVERNMENT 34 Phil 311 TRENT. Between these latter and the state. 1916 NATURE Appeal from decision of the CFI FACTS . 2457 was enacted. . we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal an that of private persons interested in its operation. responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. His leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li.E. but not always. 741. the rule is stated in 36 Cyc. because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li. shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. therefore. E. or create any cause of action in his favor. . 915. because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. the following articles refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage. no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident. casis The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent. is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office. book 4. This latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor. based on the principle of bonus pater familias. Reasoning . Merritt. . was hit by the General Hospital ambulance.In the United States the rule is that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs. the managerial employee or company sales agent. in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case. . called upon to answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner. title 16. 1902. March 31. doubtless because and only in this case.The Civil Code in chap 2. a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly. The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs. which turned suddenly and unexpectedly to Taft Avenue without sounding any whistle or horn. and whereas in the first article thereof. on that the person obligated. inc.

that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1.741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a) P5. As to the second.In the case of Merritt v. by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor. . 327) authorizing the filing of claims against the government with the Insular Auditor.666. 1903 of the Civil Code reads: “Art. ROSETE v AUDITOR GENERAL 81 Phil 453 FERIA. In this we think there was error. and appeal by private persons or entities from the latter’s decision to the Supreme Court. he executes the trust confided to him.Although there is an act (Act No. . in the sense in which these words are employed. foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof. . must be presumed to lie with the state.105 - prof.000. thereby giving rise to this claim for damages against Panlilio for his negligence and the officers of ECA for storing gasoline in said warehouse contrary to the provisions of ordinances of the City of Manila (ordinance requires a license for storing flammable substances. is one who receives a definite and fixed order by the commission. limited the time to 2months and 21 days. August 31. DE LEON FONTANILLA V MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINSITRATION 194 SCRA 486 PARAS. find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff.There being no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to the ECA or its officers. . . February 27. is P18. . This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. was done by a special agent. 1903. which ECA didn’t have). a government agency).” . .The fire destroyed the building owned by the petitioner. and (b) the P2.075. he executes the trust confided to him. in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of the property which they hold in sublease. We find nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the first. yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official. 1948 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the Insular Auditor FACTS . The obligation imposed in the preceding article is enforceable not only for personal acts and omission but also for those persons for whom another is responsible. because the officers of the ECA did not act as special agents of the government within the above defined meaning of that wod in Article 1903 of the Civil Code in storing gasoline in the warehouse of ECA. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.000 per month. in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.The responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission.’ xx “ ‘That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent. which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. therefore. ISSUE WON the government is liable for the damages HELD NO . without any fault on his part. which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees. the government is not responsible for damages caused through such negligence. foreign to the exercise of duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof. the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated A2010 .Insular Auditor dismissed the claim hence this appeal. casis damage should have been caused by the official to whom it properly pertained to do the act performed. and the latter responsible for all claims. and the trial court so found.torts & damages original basis of this kind of objections. but not when the MENDOZA V. xx “The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent. 1991 . the record shows. and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. would not prevent recovery for the whole time. The court. Government.The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent. Dispositive Judgment appealed from reversed.The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903 On the computation of damages The two items which constitute a part of the P14. the court held the following: “ ’… The state is not responsible for the damage suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office… n relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a juridical person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim. it does not make any and all claims against the government allowable.Art.Jose Panlilio ignited his lighter near a drum into which gasoline was being drained causing fire in the warehouse of Emergency Control Administration (ECA. the award awarded for permanent injuries. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only 2 months and 21 days while the remainder of the 6 months was spent in his home. for a period of 6 months. acting in the exercise of his powers. however. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth. we are not called upon to determine. DISPOSITION Decision appealed from is affirmed. We.Although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in the name and representation of the state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers. .

January 29. . 3601 provides: Sec. As blood flowed therefrom. an accountant. after which he was taken home. thereby opening it up to the possibility that it may be held liable for the damages caused by its driver. NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government. to say that it is liable for damages arising from tort committed by its employees. 1. where his injuries were treated. was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital. including all communal and pump irrigation projects. . and to recover the cost of construction within a reasonable period of time to the extent consistent with government policy. thus is governed by the Corporation Law. . a strong dissenting opinion held that Angat River system is a government entity exercising proprietary functions. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory. incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above powers and objectives. which came into effect some 3 years after the perfection of the contract. he fell inside a manhole on P. The state or a government agency performing governmental functions may be held liable for tort committed by its employees only when it acts through a special agent. insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. casis It has its own assets and liabilities. o NIA believes this bases this on:  PD 552 – amended some provisions of RA 3601 (the law which created the NIA)  The case of Angat River Irrigation System v. Section 2. Teotico - ISSUE WON the NIR is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government.R. Therefore. DISPOSITION We conclude that the National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. rehabilitating.torts & damages NATURE Resolution FACTS The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions. such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a "government-function" corporation. . to recover funds or portions thereof expended for the construction and/or rehabilitation of communal irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a special fund for irrigation development under section 2 hereof. Burgos Avenue. Section 1 of Republic Act No. and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines. and to transact such business. for the proper conduct of its business. which liens shall have preference over all other liens except for taxes on the land. . and such preferred liens shall not be removed until all fees or administration charges are paid or the property is levied upon and sold by the National Irrigation Administration for the satisfaction thereof. After waiting 5 mins. . 1990 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare. and is therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its driver Garcia. subsection (f): (f) . ACCORDINGLY. Name and Domicile — A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration. 1968 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis for emphasis). It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. subsection b of P. DISSENTING: PADILLA: to say that NIA has opened itself to suit is one thing. He argued that although his contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17. 552 provides that: (b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water from all irrigation systems constructed by or under its administration. The Angat dissenting opinion: Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. which is the irrigation of lands. No. several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional. is still another thing. who was not its special agent HELD YES Reasoning the functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. Besides. Section 2. as are directly or indirectly necessary. exercised a governmental function because the nature of its powers and functions does not show that it was intended to “bring to the Government any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit”.Genaro N. but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency. and took a few steps. No. impairing his vision. . the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders. it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent. Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be preferred liens first. 1976. The decision of this Court in G. his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. such fees or administration charges as may be necessary to cover the cost of operation. Due to the fall. The National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local government. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeep. Burgos Avenue. FACTS . CITY OF MANILA V TEOTICA 22 SCRA 267 CONCEPCION. Manila. 55963 and G. and then on the crops raised thereon. he had acquired the status of regular employee and could not be removed except for valid cause.106 - prof.R. to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law." Certainly. and his employment had lasted for five years. since his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer. . like the NIA. It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces. upon the land benefited. 61045 dated December 1. The employment contract of 1971 was executed when the Labor Code of the Philippines had not yet been promulgated. and in general. who was not its special agent.D. the Motion for Reconsideration dated January 26. improving. It also has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors. maintenance and insurance. which shall be organized immediately after the approval of this Act. 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED. but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing. including the power to establish and maintain subsidiaries. Teotico. - - Angat Case: Although the majority opinion declares that the Angat System. waiting for a jeep. . The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court. he hailed a jeep that came to a stop. Angat River Workers’ Union A2010 .

streets. or any other city officer. on account of Taylor's travel and studies -the Ace Advertising filed a complaint with the court of first instance of Manila against the respondent for recovery of the total sum disbursed to Taylor. under Article 2189 of the Civil Code. city engineer. the left upper arm. said Article 2189 is decisive thereon. The others were signed by either the respondent. ARANETA v JOYA 57 SCRA 59 CASTRO J. whereas the Civil Code is a general law.The petitioner's assertion that he signed the questioned payroll checks in good faith has not been substantiated. Dizon. Burgos Avenue were. subsequently. the determination of whether or not P. intended exclusively for the City of Manila. Dispositive WHEREFORE. Zaldivar.CFI Manila sustained the theory of the defendants and dismissed the amended complaint. that the Office of the City Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting from theft of said iron covers. These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital. The respondent. JJ. without costs. amended for damages against the City of Manila. the city government has changed the position and layout of catchbasins in the City by constructing them under the sidewalks with concrete cement covers and openings on the side of the gutter. A2010 . that in order to prevent such thefts. “…were also privy to the unauthorized disbursement of the corporate moneys jointly with the appellant. again. both petitioners knew and through their acts showed that they approved of the trip.P.. the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. to the damage of the firm of which he was an officer. 1954 until full payment. The Ace . and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review. The petitioner signed three of these checks. demonstrate quite distinctly that the petitioner neglected to perform his duties properly. he in particular not having testified or offered testimony to prove such claim.043. Voting Reyes. public buildings.torts & damages suffered contusions on the left thigh. under Republic Act 409.. . Angeles and Fernando. cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of. respondent answered that these were not shouldered by the company and instead by other parties -while abroad. in connection with the maintenance of said road. this appeal by the City of Manila. city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. This plus the fact that he even approved thrice payroll checks for the payment of Taylor's salary. Municipal Board. concerning the unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds for the latter. Reasoning The assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made. Bengzon.sec. . . is one of fact. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence.043. . city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted.20 with interest at the legal rate from August 23. he continued to receive his salaries in the form of vouchers ordered and signed by respondent Joya.The first issue raised by the Manila is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of RA 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading: The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor." in particular. city health officer. except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned. HELD YES. Ratio RA 409. and that in any event under the by-laws he had the discretion. J.Defense pointed out that because of the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing. throughout the period of Taylor's stay abroad. Even if P. Sanchez. bridges. or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides: Provinces. with costs against the City of Manila. When asked about the expenses of the trip. a complaint which was. and other public works under their control or supervision. denied the charge and claimed that the trip was nonetheless ratified by the company's board of directors. whereas Article 2189. in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals.00. Makalintal. J. concur. and it was these three without whose acts the same could not have happened. authority or ratification. to enforce the provisions of this chapter. is a special law. Hence. stealing of iron catchbasin covers was rampant.750. and as it was an unauthorized act of expenditure of corporate funds.20. the petitioner remained passive. its mayor. any person by reason of defective conditions of road. ISSUES WON City of Manila should be held liable for the damages suffered by Teotica. because RA 409. alleging that the trip was made without its knowledge. Upon the contrary. and that these changes had been undertaken by the city from time to time whenever funds were available. in general. which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6. CC governs liability due to "defective streets.Teotico filed with CFI Manila.. a national highway. the Municipal Board.B. Then.This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 1974 FACTS: -An employee of the Ace ADVERTISING Company was sent to the States to pursue studies in television. applicable to the entire Philippines. regardless of the object thereof. as general manager.L.4 refers to liability arising from negligence. this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila. what had happened was in truth and in fact a venture by them given their stamp of approval.107 - prof. in spite of his being a vice-president and director of the Ace Advertising. or any other law or ordinance. Castro. all told. What said article requires is that the province. in his answer. for which solidary liability should have been imposed upon all in the first place” ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict HELD: Yes . required further medical treatment by a private practitioner. for the first time. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road. 3rd party complaint dismissed -CA affirmed however dismissal of 3rd party complaint was reversed stating that Taylor's trip had been neither authorized nor ratified by the company -CA noted that based on the facts. therefore.: May 24. city treasurer and chief of police. or from negligence of said Mayor. At any rate. or Vicente Araneta (company treasurer) who put up part of the bill connected with Taylor's trip and also handed him letters for delivery in the United States. it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province. or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions. to authorize the trip which was for the company's benefit -Joya also filed a 3rd party complaint against the two Aranetas proving that they were involved in sending Taylor abroad -trial court rendered judgment ordering the respondent to pay the Ace Advertising "the sum of P5. or injuries suffered by.Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter. the juridical situation was a simple quasi-delict by them committed upon the corporation. . the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed. . which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative. casis Advertising disbursed P5.

elements of the TFM raided several places. 1988 NATURE: Petition for certiorari FACTS This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. No. Upon order of the Provincial Commander.Any public officer or employee. on the ground that the same was the subject of a criminal offense. defeats. . papers. L-69866 YAP. constitutes no bar to the commission of a tort by one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages A2010 . DISPOSITION Decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one entered declaring the seizure illegal and ordering defendant-appellee Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon to pay to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim the sum of P3. NO . 28. Palawan.00 moral damages.Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch. tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them. seized property to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim but Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused. that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts. and. that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize. house. Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages of P39. Likewise. WON defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure of the motor launch in question without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same was admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime 2.Defendant-appellees admitted that when Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim and impounded the motor launch he was not armed with a search warrant. A year later or on April 9. ISSUES 1.00 for attorney's fees. as has been repeatedly held by this Court. Detachment Commander of Balabac. 34 and 36. Palawan. they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. that for some period after their arrest.R. defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela. 26. that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel.Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their claim for damages on Articles 32 and 2219 of the New Civil Code which provide in part as follows: "ART. that military men who interrogated them employed threats.torts & damages -The fact that he was occupying a contractual position at the Ace Advertising is of no moment. 2. wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander in Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch. And since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a warrant. No. exemplary damages may also be awarded. 1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him. a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor.108 - prof. that he effected the seizure of the motor launch in the absence of and without the consent of Delfin Lim.Plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL".R. casis "(1)Acts and action referred to in Articles 21. 32.000. August 29. violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages. harass and punish them.Plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim pleaded with Orlando Maddela to return the motor launch but the latter refused. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. L-22554 MARTIN. known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communistterrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila. xxx "(9)The rights to be secure in one's person." "ART. certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs.June 15. no public official has the right to enter the premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. The existence of a contract between the parties. xxx TORTS INDEPENDENT ACTION LIM v DE LEON G. 32. plus P1. .Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: xxx "(6)Illegal search. xxx "The indemnity shall include moral damages. who directly or indirectly obstructs.00 as actual damages." Plaintiffs’ allegations: That complying with said order of Ver. moral damages of at least P150K each or a FACTS . YES . in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan. Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon. said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants." .030. explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party. 1975 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the CFI WITH CIVIL ABERCA V VER G. WON defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful HELD 1. employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants. April 15. In addition. P750. Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon. .After conducting a preliminary investigation. they have violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search and seizure. 1962. 29. Jikil Taha through his counsel made representations with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return the . that during these raids. 30. in addition. upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac. filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha. There can be no question that without the proper search warrant. seized the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it. plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim.000. .Pursuant to the foregoing provisions. 27. or any private individual. 2219. cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same.

when the temptation is strongest to yield to the law of force rather than the force of law. 22 September 1994 Nature . to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated. CA PUNO. Art. Balaba.109 - prof. which was never done in this case. violate or in any manner impede or impair the constitutional rights and civil liberties of another person. For this purpose. it is not the actor alone (i. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. NO. Its message is clear. the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and acquires a larger dimension. C. Estelito Mendoza. defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties. the decisive factor in this case is the language of Art. responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors. Respondents’ contentions: A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants. 32 CC is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. At the same time it rejects the automatic application of the principle of respondent superior or command responsibility that would hold a superior officer jointly and severally accountable for damages. no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates. 32 governs.The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all persons. including moral and exemplary.. owe obedience and allegiance at all times. the judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer must not abdicate his duty to properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk of being held responsible for gross negligence and of being held under the cited provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with the tortfeasor. . civilian or military. it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings. the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiff. 32 of CC. would be sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action against all of them under Art. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. through their counsel. [b] By this provision. 2.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Art. then SolGen. It cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint. 3. only the facts alleged in the complaint. Hence. the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party Reasoning: [a] The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i. it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. 32 CC. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress. it is difficult to justify the TC’s dismissal for lack of cause of action the complaint against all the MHP GARMENTS. 3. high or low. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials. employer and employee) relationship. NO. [d] Even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention. NO Ratio: Although the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case.The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the civil action for damages filed in the court below by petitioners-plaintiffs for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of their constitutional rights and liberties. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. not just to the lawyers who signed the motion. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article. However. The complaint contained allegations against all the defendants which. Art. [d] So. They needed no specific authority to do that. SEPARATE OPINION: TEEHANKEE. to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution.J. WON trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to (dome of the) plaintiffs on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file MFR of the court's resolution granting the respondent's motion to dismiss HELD 1. DISPOSITION: Petition granted. (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action. and attorney's fees not less than P200K. under the above principles. with his subordinates who committed such transgressions. WON a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages. Case remanded to the respondent court for further proceedings. Thus. But in this case.torts & damages total of P3M. A superior have to answer for the transgressions of his subordinates against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen.e. should be considered. 2. 32. ISSUES 1. stand liable and may be sued in court for damages as provided in Art. concurring: . jointly and severally with his subordinates. if admitted hypothetically. exemplary damages of at least P150K each or a total of P3M. the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment. and no others. alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. INC. 32 of CC makes the persons who are directly. Reasoning: [a] The purpose Art. vs. Ratio: The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. [c] Art. as well as indirectly. but to all the lawyers of plaintiffs In filing the motion to set aside the resolution. unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party concerned. 32 of CC which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. except Maj. The body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs.Aguinaldo and MSgt. be they public officers or employees. he furnished copies thereof. or members of the military or police force or private individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct. 32 of CC. as contended by respondents. The authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be assumed. the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the RPC or other penal statute. and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the defendants. [b] The invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. [c] To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action. casis defendants. defeat. And this must have been also the understanding of defendants' counsel himself for when he filed his comment on the motion. A2010 .

in lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%). or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law.His bus collided with the jeep driven by Clemente Marcia. There was no probable cause for the seizure.00) for the unreturned twenty-six (26) pieces of girl scouts items and a TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest. The other items returned were of inferior quality. op." -Sometime in October 1983. Conformably with our ruling in Lim vs.. 1299 already directs all law enforcement agencies of the Republic of the Philippines. The omission will not exculpate petitioners. and to impound the said paraphernalia to be used as evidence in court or other appropriate administrative body it orders the immediate and strict compliance with the Instructions which the petitioners miserably failed to do. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition. WON an award for moral damages should be awarded Yes. And thirdly. In doing so. They reported to the Philippine Constabulary and on October 25. It is consistently ruled that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered. upon proper application by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the Philippines for warrant of arrest and/or search warrant with a judge. He also ordered the return of the seized items which was not immediately returned despite demands. was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines. De Guzman. Larry de Guzman who did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. The specific date and time are not established in the evidence adduced by the parties. WON MHP Garments is liable Yes. January 27. on the said amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment thereof. Probable cause for a search has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. the supposed illicit goods were seized.110 - prof. 1987 on the TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents. The search and seizure were clearly illegal. and insignias.Petition for Certiorari Facts -MHP Garments. the raid was made on the stores of private respondents and A2010 ." These facts and circumstances were not in any way shown by the petitioners to justify their warrantless search and seizure. they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. Ponce de Leon. The decision was appealed to the respondent court. the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents.Paje is a driver of a Victory Liner Bus . It affirmed the decision with modification MHP filed a petition for certiorari before the SC. Secondly. causing the latter’s death and physical injuries to herein petitioners. Again. supplies. serious anxiety. There can be no doubt that petitioners must have suffered sleepless nights. they seized the boy and girl scouts pants. In their Memorandum Agreement. not all the seized items were turned. the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint for unfair competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods. they should have filed a third-party MARCIA V CA (PAJE) 205 PHIL 147 RELOVA. We impose a SIX PERCENT (6%) interest from January 9. badges. Even then. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto. So with the petitioner corporation which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman. Peñafiel. 1983. It will also serve as a stern reminder to all and sundry that the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a virile reality and not a mere burst of rhetoric. casis complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief. and wounded feelings due the tortious raid caused by petitioners. they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages. De Guzman then made a surveillance of the stores of private respondents. and two (2) other constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market. after a preliminary investigation. After a preliminary investigation. to apprehend immediately unauthorized manufacturers and distributors of Scout paraphernalia.torts & damages . Without any warrant. the appealed decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms. Firstly.000. they did not. The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Mirasol Lugatiman. 1983 NATURE FACTS Petition for certiorari . A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents. Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap . they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. was tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). Petitioner corporation received information that private respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia in October 1983. Letter of Instruction No. Despite the sufficiency of time. he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. The respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents. and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. Private respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of business to recover their goods. The all encompassing protection extends against intrusions directly done both by government and indirectly by private entities. Costs against petitioners. The items were then turned over by Captain Peñafiel to petitioner corporation for safekeeping. dresses. moral damages can be awarded in the case at bench. De Guzman. Private respondents' avowals of embarrassment and humiliation during the seizure of their merchandise were supported by their testimonies. The evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private respondents' goods. The trial court ruled for the private respondents. Inc. petitioner corporation was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies. The wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies the award of exemplary damages. and suits on display at respondents' stalls. The progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. Issue/s and Held WON the search and seizure was legal No. MHP received information that private respondents Agnes Villa Cruz. Disposition IN VIEW WHEREFORE. Private respondent then filed a Civil Case against the petitioners for sums of money and damages.. cit. an employee of petitioner corporation. Indeed.

She alleged that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. The civil case was dismissed. al. Hence. " . . ISSUES 1. Madeja. he was not able to do so. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated. based on doctrine of fair comment ISSUE WON the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages HELD NO. the extinction of the criminal liability will not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability DISPOSITIVE Decision affirmed A2010 ."Art. may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case. .. fraud and physical injuries. Eva A. Morales attempted to contact Arafiles but since the latter’s office was still closed at that time (past 12mn – he works for NIAS-PAGASA). YES. Otherwise stated. Japzon is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting. .In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately. namely: 1.The defendants presented the copy of said criminal case to the court handling the civil case against them.… an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision. However. for the case was of pure accident. he was acquitted in the CA. However. . The CA ruled that criminal negligence is wanting and that Paje was not even guilty of civil negligence.The criminal case still pending. Japzon for damages in the same court. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages." Obiter . Independent civil action. the injured individual is the one most concerned because it is he who has suffered directly. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In cases of defamation. Ratio Section 2. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our MADEJA V CARO ABAD SANTOS.The acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.He was convicted in the criminal case in the RTC. Dispositive Petition is GRANTED. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. et. The respondent judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss which invoked Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads: "Sec. but we do not consider that the respondents. Ratio. J. WON an independent civil action may be filed during the pendency of the criminal case HELD 1. 3. ARAFILES v PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS. under the circumstances of this case. 33. The two enactments are quoted hereinbelow: "Sec. This is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution. and physical injuries.111 - prof.Paje was charged with homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. 141 is SET ASIDE FACTS ." 2. unless the act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be non-existent in the final judgment. but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.". Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. 2004 NATURE Petition for review of CA Deci FACTS (Consti II Case) -Respondent Morales wrote an article for People’s Journal Tonight based on the sworn statement in the police blotter and interview of Emelita Despuig where Despuig alleged that Arafiles raped her the month before then attempted to rape her the night she filed a complaint. Japzon. the order dismissing Civil Case No. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence. ISSUES WON the acquittal in the criminal case would result to a dismissal in the civil case HELD YES . Arafiles filed action for damages based on the alleged “grossly malicious and overly sensationalized” report by Morales which cast aspersions on his character. a civil action for damages. frustrated and attempted homicide. Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation. Carmen L. fraud. A civil case was also instituted against him by herein petitioners for reckless imprudence and negligence in driving the passenger bus. 1983 NATURE Petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the defendant's motion to dismiss . no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith. 2. -About a year following the published article.torts & damages .There are at least two things about Art." . Madeja sued Dr. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. -RTC: in favor of Arafiles -CA: in favor of Morales.Dr. they were not inflicted with malice. INC CARPIO MORALES. casis He should be permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him. March 25. The complaining witness is the widow of the deceased. Other civil actions arising from offenses. . had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code.Petitioner also relies on Art 33 CC.: December 21. the said article speaks only of defamation. . Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. J. may be brought by the injured party. being the object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist." Tolentino says: "While the State is the complainant in the criminal case. The information states that: "The offended party Carmen L. .

they should not be held to account. 4. -then discussed the petitioner’s allegation that the news item as a “malicious sensationalization” failed: even though the police blotter only shows 1 count of abduction and rape.The purported damage caused by the published article falls under principle of relational harm . . 2003 NATURE Petition to review decision of CA FACTS . they should not be held to account. et. Torts with independent civil action: DEFAMATION An "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature. and since no particular individual was identified in the disputed article. but was about to happen) – so respondent’s article was not maliciously sensationalized. but it is not per se illegal. Decision reversed. . In the preparation of stories. to the effect that although it may not constitute a criminal offense. and consistently with good faith and reasonable care. January 28. cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam.R. as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm . and some individual Muslims filed in the RTC Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS. it did not mention respondents as object of the article. it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. CARPIO [dissent] . to a point of suppression. CC recognizes the possibility of such a civil action either pursuant to Art 26. anxiety. First discussed applicable provisions (A33. esp. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal case.I dissent not because the newspaper article in question is libelous. however.which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form of defamation. . that the narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had reported at the police headquarters. (c) causal connection between defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress. WHEREFORE. 19. (d) the plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe. NO.The present controversy stems from a civil action for damages and not from a criminal complaint.torts & damages democracy. Reasoning Defamation means the offense of injuring a person's character. . -then mentioned doctrine: The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy.” ISSUE 1. A civil action for libel under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely independent of the institution. Reasoning. “vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs xxx” can give rise to a cause of action for damages. for such action is personal in nature. The succeeding paragraphs (in which petitioner and complainant Emelita were eventually identified) sufficiently convey to the readers.In the present case. for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. SO ORDERED A2010 . or anger. Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se. No.Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry. . WON elements of libel exist 2. par. CA reversed: it was "clear from the disputed article that the defamation was directed to all adherents of Islamic faith. (b) conduct was extreme and outrageous. respondent was present when Emelita executed her sworn-statement where she reported an abduction with rape and an abduction incident (where no rape occurred. and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious. whether written or spoken. There is no direct reference or allusion to the federation or any of its members. RTC dismissed: plaintiffs failed to establish their cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically identified. Disposition. pendency or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom. and consistently with good faith and reasonable care. 21 NCC): Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. casis case. the article relates to the entire Muslim population and not just to the IDCP or to any of the individual respondents. In the preparation of stories. Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. Ratio Action arising from an intentional tortuous act causing mental distress cannot be sustained in this SEPARATE OPINION VITUG [concur] . but because it constitutes an . that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings. or vexatious.112 - prof.al. a local federation of more than 70 Muslim religious orgs. . press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines. to a point of suppression. embarrassment.MVRS claimed it was merely an expression of belief/opinion and was published without malice. hence. press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines. Respondents scarcely can claim having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in damages. The presentation of the news item subject of petitioner’s complaint may have been in a sensational manner. 33 which provides that in case of defamation. such cause of action cannot be sustained. it is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character. MVRS V ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL G. a civil complaint for damages. that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Phil but the entire Muslim world. do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. were not entitled to damages.Complaint alleged that what was published in BULGAR was insulting and damaging to the Muslims. Also.To recover for this the plaintiff must show that: (a) conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of plaintiff. fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. and. The present case falls within the application of the relational harm principle of tort actions for defamation. or to Art. NO. 135306 BELLOSILLO. every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries. ill-natured. 2. the petition is hereby DENIED.The ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHIL (IDCP). may be brought by the injured party. WON the cause of action should rise from an intentional tortuous act causing mental distress HELD 1. The cause of action is libel.which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distress. or to any of the individual complainants. (AmJur) Disposition Petition granted. -then discussed how to determine if a published work is libelous: In actions for damages for libel.

that they may be made the subject of a separate civil action because of the distinct separability of their respective juridical cause or basis of action. ISSUE . in manner characterized by negligence. that the greatest sin in Islam is to worship things or persons other than Allah. 74886 December 8. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. -Sometime in 1967.JUSTICE JBL REYES: “…in the case of an independent civil actions under the Civil Code. two of these drafts were accepted by the Phil Rayon through its president. Liability for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer.. fraud. To enable the Phil Rayon to take delivery of the machineries. His duty was to grant loans. while the others were not. by prior arrangement with the Prudential Bank. where the civil case may be filed separately and proceed independently of the criminal case. may be brought by the injured party. With this the bank filed a criminal action against Salta. whether acquittal or conviction. it is made clear that the civil action permitted therein to be filed separately from the criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings "regardless of the result of the latter. For a uniform ruling that would authoritatively settle this regrettable conflict of opinion.The filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is fully warranted under the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code. of Japan for the importation of textile machineries under a five-year deferred payment plan. Chi in his capacity as president of Phil Rayon.. Phil Rayon's factory was leased by Yupangco Cotton Mills for an annual rental of P200. but on the fact of defamation. WON a decision of acquittal in a criminal case operates to dismiss a separate civil action filed on the basis of the same facts as alleged in the criminal case (AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act). The Phil Rayon was able to take delivery of the textile machineries and installed the same at its factory site at 69 Obudan Street. entered into a contract with Nissho Co. drafts were drawn and issued by Nissho. . Chi. -At the back of the trust receipt is a printed form to be accomplished by two sureties who. Chi. the accused would not be liable. Inc.humiliating persons because of their religious beliefs. by the very terms and conditions thereof.Both RTC and CA found the article insulting and humiliating to Muslims.000. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. 1992 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of IAC. 88343). fraud and manifest partiality. Rayon applied for and was granted a commercial letter of credit with the Prudential Bank and Trust Company in favor of Nissho. a civil action for damages. FACTS -August 8.Focal point of claim for damages: insult caused by the article that the Muslims worship the pig as their God which is absolutely contrary to their basic belief as Muslims that there is only one God. one of the kinds of crime mentioned in the aforecited provision. which were all paid by the Prudential Bank through its correspondent in Japan.R.torts & damages intentional tortious act causing mental distress to those whom private respondent IDCP represents.00. To effect payment for said machineries. The criminal case is for the prosecution of an offense the main element of which is fraud. the Prudential Bank indorsed the shipping documents to the Phil Rayon which accepted delivery of the same. HELD NO. As indicated on their faces.That there was fraud committed by the defendant in granting the aforesaid loans which rendered him liable for his acts. G. which affirmed in toto the decision of CFI Quezon City in a civil action instituted by the petitioner for the recovery of a sum of money representing the amount paid by it to the Nissho Company Ltd. .The article is not only an imputation of irreligious conduct but also a downright misrepresentation of the religious beliefs of Muslims. were to be jointly and severally liable to the Prudential Bank should the Phil Rayon fail to pay the total amount or any portion of the drafts issued by Nissho and paid for by Prudential Bank.. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.” AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ [dissent] . and upon securities not commensurate with the amount of the loans. of Japan for textile machinery imported by the Philippine Rayon Mills. This seems to be the spirit of the law when it decided to make these actions `entirely separate and distinct' from the criminal action.The offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature. and filed Motions to Dismiss in each of the two civil cases. casis . the Bank of Tokyo. It is in the resolution of the motions to dismiss that Judges de Veyra and Purisima of the CFI of Manila took diametrically opposing views. Anacleto R. unlike other offenses not mentioned." DISPOSITION The decision of Justice De Veyra is affirmed. a specie of an offense committed by means of fraud. In cases of defamation. A2010 . Against this letter of credit. . the former denying the motion. 1962: Philippine Rayon Mills. . Hence in these cases. regardless of the result of the latter. 1982 FACTS . would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action. . which fraud is positively and easily identifiable in the manner and scheme aforementioned. the two cases have been consolidated for a single decision. This is clearly illustrated in the case of swindling. and physical injuries. On December 29.Two cases involving the same issue disposed of by two judges in a manner directly in opposition of each other. September 30. I think Rule 107 Sec. Ratio The civil action permitted therein to be filed separately from the criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings "regardless of the result of the latter. Quezon City. PRUDENTIAL BANK V IAC (Philippine Rayon Mills & Anacleto Chi) 216 SCRA 257 DAVIDE. . depending on the amount of the loan applied for. -Upon arrival of the machineries. Ltd. 1969. Based on the same acts for which the criminal action was filed. a trust receipt which was signed by Anacleto R. the result of the criminal case. SALTA V DE VEYRA 202 Phil 527 DE CASTRO.PNB filed two civil actions to recover losses the bank suffered (Civil Case No. . This finding of fact establishes that petitioners have inflicted on private respondents an intentional wrongful act . . . causing wounded feelings and mental anguish to believers of Islam. Salta indiscriminately granted certain loans mentioned in the complaints filed by PNB. 79583. Civil Case No." Acquittal in the criminal case will not be an obstacle for the civil case to prosper unless in the criminal case the Court makes a finding that even civilly.Salta was an employee of the PNB assigned as Manager of the Malolos' branch. the latter granting it. Phil. JR. the civil actions very clearly alleged fraud and negligence as having given rise to the cause of action averred in the complaints. and. Inc. for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. or only to recommend the granting of loans.Salta was acquitted in the criminal case. Reasoning ART 33. No. 1(d) does not apply. it executed. the Phil Rayon ceased business operation. represented by co-defendant Anacleto R.113 - prof. regulations and policies of the respondent bank. Ltd.It is significant to note that under Article 31 [11] of the New Civil Code. .In disregard of the pertinent rules.

As a matter of fact. SC’s own reading of the questioned solidary guaranty clause yields the conclusion that the obligation of Chi is only that of a guarantor. WON he may be considered a guarantor 3b.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs of Capuno under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The attestation by witnesses and the acknowledgement before a notary public are not required by law to make a party liable on the instrument. it can be enforced to its full extent against any one of them. It is based on trial convenience and is designed to permit the joinder of plaintiffs or defendants whenever there is a common question of law or fact.000. However. however. prescription. documents or instruments covered by a trust receipt to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appear in the trust receipt or to return said goods. payable on demand. Chi. HELD: 1. 115: It is clear that if the violation or offense is committed by a corporation. drafts are sight drafts which do not require presentment for acceptance. 2. Repeated formal demands for the payment of the said trust receipt yielded no result Hence. is a contract of adhesion which must be strictly construed against the party responsible for its preparation. -Any doubt as to the import.Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence in the CFI of Pampanga. . trouble and expense. Ilagan. Chi declared secondarily liable on the trust receipt. under Article 1358 of the Civil Code. the law merely requires that it. a civil action for damages. both courts concluded that acceptance of the drafts by Philippine Rayon was indispensable to make the latter liable thereon. . If he is a guarantor. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.Included in the complaint was a claim for indemnity in the sum of P2. . together with the questioned solidary guaranty clause. punishable under the provisions of Art. Presentment for acceptance is necessary only in the cases expressly provided for in Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL). It will save the parties unnecessary work. thereby necessitating acceptance. or that it be proved in a certain way. be in writing. Private respondent Chi's signature in the dorsal portion of the trust receipt did not bind him solidarily with Philippine Rayon. that the subject.114 - prof. also for damages. YES.95 was filed on October 3. however. The liability for the remaining ten (10) drafts did not arise because the same were not presented for acceptance. documents or instruments if they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa. the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras. or some note or memorandum thereof.315. the present action for the collection of the principal amount of P956. 3. Whether presentment for acceptance of the drafts was indispensable to make Philippine Rayon liable thereon. etc. 1965 FACTS . With respect to a guaranty. -This is the equity rule relating to multifariousness. 1974. Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on permissive joinder of parties explicitly allows it. it is these corporations. 3a. In short. association or other juridical entities. 3.The collision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers. The information was subsequently amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of the three victims. While the acknowledgement of a surety before a notary public is required to make the same a public document. Contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into. Attorney's fees may even be allowed in appropriate cases. -And although it is true that the petitioner commenced a criminal action for the violation of the Trust Receipts Law. 1974 against the Phil Rayon and Anacleto R. pursuant to Section 7 of the NIL. . WON the case should have been dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of action as there was no prior exhaustion of Philippine Rayon's properties. Excussion is not a condition sine qua non for the institution of an action against a guarantor. the penalty of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the directors. which. Philippine Rayon Mills. i. the failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods. A2010 . the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civil action. 1973. associations.While the criminal case was pending. which are made liable for the civil liability arising from the criminal offense. no legal obstacle prevented it from enforcing the civil liability arising out of the trust. Reasoning Last sentence of the clause speaks of waiver of exhaustion. -The obligation of the Phil Rayon arising from the letter of credit and the trust receipt remained unpaid and unliquidated.623.e. 1(b) of the RPC. may be brought by the injured party in cases of defamation. Interest and damages. being accessories of the principal obligation. The parties herein agree. . receipt in a separate civil action. Elsewise stated. in the CFI of Tarlac against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. Under Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law. ISSUES: 1. YES. these. employees or other officials or persons therein responsible for the offense. Inc. Diokno and Augusto M.384. Chi became the sole guarantor. declared liable on the 12 drafts in question and on the trust receipt. 3b. Defendant’s Defenses lack of cause of action. Section 6. It does not refer to the undertaking between either one or both of them on the one hand and the petitioner on the other with respect to the liability described under the trust receipt. NO. NO. NO. casis enforce the civil liability arising therefrom against Philippine Rayon. They are.torts & damages The lease was renewed on January 3. it would be the petitioner — and not Philippine Rayon — which had to accept the same for the latter was not the drawee. it would be unenforceable unless ratified. Estafa falls under fraud. partnership.The case arose from a vehicular collision. or true intent of the solidary guaranty clause should be resolved against the petitioner since the trust receipt. Whether private respondent Chi is jointly and severally liable with Philippine Rayon for the obligation sought to be enforced 3a. nevertheless. -Since that violation of a trust receipt constitutes fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code. petitioner was acting well within its rights in filing an independent civil action to CAPUNO V PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES MAKALINTAL. Otherwise. Whether Philippine Rayon is liable on the basis of the trust receipt. is ineffective in this case because the space therein for the party whose property may not be exhausted was not filled up. -Under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Disposition Petition granted. . all the textile machineries in the Phil Rayon's factory were sold to AIC Development Corporation for P300.. There was nothing procedurally objectionable in impleading private respondent Chi as a co-defendant in the civil case for the collection of a sum of money. a contract of guaranty does not have to appear in a public document.00. -However. with respect to the latter. Private respondent Anacleto R. If not. and the trial court explicitly ruled. -The clause "we jointly and severally agree and undertake" refers to the undertaking of the two (2) parties who are to sign it or to the liability existing between themselves. 2. when the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or enforceable. Chi's liability is limited to the principal obligation in the trust receipt plus all the accessories thereof including judicial costs. shall run only from the date of the filing of the complaint. -Reading Section 13 of PD No. officers. which is a promise to answer for the debt or default of another. Navarro and Attorneys Jose W. should also be paid. fraud and physical injuries. -By his signing. their liability is not divisible as between them. -In the criminal case both the heirs of Capuno and the Estate of were represented by their respective counsel as private prosecutors: Attorney Ricardo Y. par. laches Lower Court’s Ruling Both the CFI and the IAC ruled that Philippine Rayon could be held liable for the two (2) drafts because only these appear to have been accepted by the latter after due presentment. that requirement is absolute and indispensable. provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. And even if these were not sight drafts. partnerships. he shall only be liable for those costs incurred after being judicially required to pay. On January 5. April 30.Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno.

without having made it they could file — as in fact they did — a separate civil action even during the pendency of the criminal case. supra.00 the Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages. . Prior thereto.00 by the Buan Estate under the Workmen's Compensation Act. . (1) that the action had already prescribed. was dismissed by the Court a quo in its order of February 29." . which action must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146. and 2177 of the Civil Code affects the question of prescription. Cipriano Capuno. In other words. . which sum. . RULING YES. 33." For P290. Section 2. 1960. This was obviously of no avail.00 previously paid to the heirs of Capuno "under the Workmen's Compensation Act. .This is the action which.December 29. the window and children of Marcia instituted the separate civil action for damages arising from the accident against Paje and Victory Liner.November 21. praying that the defendants be jointly and severally liable. was amended precisely to include an allegation concerning damages suffered by the heirs of the victims of the accident for which Elordi was being prosecuted. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. for otherwise that action would have been premature and in any event would have been concluded by the subsequent judgment of acquittal in the criminal case. . . Pampanga.” Respondents’ Comments: > At the pre-trial of the civil case. from which order the present appeal has been taken. or after the lapse of more than five years. "the institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict. . 1960.At that time the criminal case was still pending. 1958.623.There can be no doubt that the present action is one for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict. CORPUS V PAJE 28 SCRA 1062 CAPISTRANO.In filing the civil action as they did appellants correctly considered it as entirely independent of the criminal action.An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against Paje. pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code. they no longer had any interest to protect in the criminal case since they had already claimed and received compensation for the death of their decedent. casis 34. 1956 – Felardo Paje was driving a Victory Liner bus.The Court approved the compromise and accordingly dismissed the case. Grounds for the motion were (1) that as the Capuno heirs were concerned. Marcia died while two other people were physically injured. 1958 the criminal case was still pending. 838 but finally settled by them in their compromise. Paje was later found guilty on November 7. 32. But the complaint here was filed only on September 26. saying that the collision was purely an accident. inasmuch as there resulted a judgment for the defendant. Abaroai: “It is true that one of the plaintiffs in the present case reserved whatever right he may have had to bring a civil action. . the said rule does not apply in the present case. and the plain inference from the foregoing is that a verdict of acquittal must carry with it exemption from civil responsibility.The parties in the civil case entered into a "Compromise and Settlement. and physical injuries. Sarabia. without costs. The information therein. which read: ART. It collided with a jeepney driven by Clemente Marcia in Lubao. 1969 NATURE Direct appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal FACTS . Such reservation was not then necessary. . Elordi. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. ART. that is. in turn. as held in Paulan v. it may be recalled.623. July 31. -The appearance and intervention of Attorneys Diokno and Ilagan was disallowed by the Court and that of Attorney Navarro was disallowed in an amending order. Petitioners’ Claim > The petitioners claim that the Lower Court erred in acquitting Paje and that his acquittal was a bar to the civil action. Quoting Chantangco vs. the defendants asked the court to rule on their special defense that plaintiffs' cause of action based upon a quasi-delict had prescribed considering that the complaint was brought four years and eleven months after the collision and . herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi." .In view of the filing of the civil action the accused Jon Elordi moved to strike out the appearances of these private prosecutors in the criminal case.And when they commenced the civil action on September 26.The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing death. the civil action for damages could have been commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent.November 9. such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants' contention that the four-year period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither waived the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately. showing that appellants then chose to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code. and (2) that on the part of the Estate of Buan its right to intervene in said case had been abated by the civil action.115 - prof. . . including the claim for reimbursement of the sum of P2. was sought to be recovered by the said Estate from appellees in Civil Case No. judgment was rendered wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the charges against him. In cases of defamation. under the provisions of the Penal Code. DISPOSTIION The order appealed from was affirmed.000. 1962 – Paje was acquitted by the appellate court. . and consequently. 1961 – Pending Paje’s appeal. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony. . a civil action for damages. ISSUE WON the action had already prescribed. As a result of the collision. Marcia’s heirs reserved their right to institute a separate civil action against Paje. when they intervened in the criminal case against Jon A2010 .But appellants' intervention was subsequently disallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's order to the effect. and the same would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence. .December 23. fraud. of the Revised Rules of Court which requires the reservation of the right to institute a separate and independent civil action in the cases provided for in Articles 31. Civil Code). 31. 33. No appeal was taken from either of the two orders. and (2) that appellees had been released from appellants' claim for damages by virtue of the payment to the latter of the sum of P2. upon appellees' motion. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. may be brought by the injured party.Appellants originally sought to enforce their claim exdelicto.As to whether or not Rule 111.The grounds upon which appellees based their motion for dismissal and which the Court found to be "well taken" were.torts & damages . 1962 – Paje filed a motion to dismiss the civil action on the ground that his acquittal barred the said action but the motion was denied.

it is evident that the terms 'physical injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code. Of eleven justices only nine took part in the decision and four of them merely concurred in the result.The Article in question uses the words 'defamation'. the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries. December 21. may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case. not the crime of physical injuries. and not for homicide and physical injuries. not the result thereof. . (estafa) and physical injuries. provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. In cases of defamation. it is to be borne in mind that the charge against Felardo Paje was for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. . the term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury. A2010 . 32. This is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution.Art. . A .In the information. .' Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein.There are at least two things about Art. an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.” . 33. Reasoning .) Obiter . Yatco this Court held that the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 of the Civil Code includes homicide. Rules of Court. 1995 . Other civil actions arising from offenses. as the Code Commission states. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.In any case the Code Commission recommended that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in American Law. With this in mind. the offended party Carmen L. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Japzon. Paje. JAPZON was accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act. Disposition PREMISES CONSIDERED. 1983 NATURE 16 Sec. CC) and began to run on the day the quasi-delict was committed.The defendant filed a motion to dismiss. a civil action for damages. would be punishable as a felony. 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. or frustrated homicide.Homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party reserved. that is.Although in the case of Dyogi vs. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting. (Civil Code. . entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. casis 1. . 'fraud' and 'physical injuries. frustrated and attempted homicide. 141 is hereby set aside. Buan. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery. Eva A. Independent civil action. and physical injuries.In People vs. which states that reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative. 2.With regard to the issue of prescription. EVA A.. Petition seeking to set aside the order of the CFI dismissing the civil case against Japzon FACTS . April 3. namely: MADEJA V CARO 211 PHIL 469 ABAD SANTOS. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated. may be brought by the injured party.The criminal case still pending. for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article-some in their general and another in its technical sense.DR. Thearticle mentions only the crimes of defamation. Madeja sued Dr.Sec. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. that is. The lower court ruled that the action had already prescribed. if intentionally done. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision. of an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages. but in their generic sense.In other words. 3. 33. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto.Section 2. or even death" **(end of obiter) . reckless imprudence. which shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderance of evidence. SUPERGUARD) 243 SCRA 220 BIDIN. and this recommendation must hove been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article intact as recommended. because the terms used with the latter are general terms. Disposition Petition is granted.116 - prof. the Court ruled that the “offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that. the order dismissing Civil Case No. is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes the institution of an independent civil action." 2.Corpus vs. without special pronouncement as to costs.torts & damages that according to Article 1144 of the Civil Code an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years. the order appealed from is affirmed. so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines. the Court ruled that the action had indeed prescribed because the prescription period was pegged at 4 years (A1146.) . . . Carmen L. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31. ISSUE WON the civil action against Paje can still prosper despite his acquittal HELD NO Ratio Criminal negligence. fraud. which the respondent judge granted on the basis of Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court16 ISSUE WON a civil action for damages may be instituted pending the resolution of a criminal case HELD YES . DULAY V CA (SAFEGUARD." (Rule 111. fraud. — In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately. Japzon for damages. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. alleging that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. or attempted homicide. Madeja reserved her right to file a separate civil action for damages .

Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Art 2176 > that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Art 3317 and Section 3. regarding the proposed sale to PAL of the aviation equipment of CALI. the accused in the case at bar. .There was a general understanding among all creditors present on the desirability of consummating the sale in favor of PAL. Alexander Sycip. and attempted homicide (Madeja v. . . October 31. (Shell). a security guard on duty at the "Big Bang sa Alabang. Respondent: > that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties. When civil action may proceed independently . Auditor of CALI. Inc’s (CALI) operations. > that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 > that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary. Carandang v. Institution of criminal and civil actions. > that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability. and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed w/ deliberate intent (dolo). 1948. 33. Shell’s Credit Manager was in charge of collecting payment.Aug 9. Dulay. However.Since the start of Commercial Air Line. The balance sheet made mention of the Douglas C-54 plane. the independent civil-action which has been reserved may .. citing Andamo v. Shell had reasons to believe that the financial condition of Shell was far from being satisfactory. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court18 17 A2010 . Santiago).Aug 6. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. which were to preserve the assets of CALI and to study the way of making a fair division of all the assets among the creditors. or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Caro). a civil action based on Article 33 lies. Art. and physical injuries. since the civil liability under Art 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Art 365 of the RPC. and the National Airports Corp. (SUPERGUARD). .. Mr. Then followed a discussion on the payment of claims of creditors and the preferences claimed for the accounts due to employees. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated. 3.. Thus. while the negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury. No understanding was reached on the matter of preference of payment and it was then generally agreed that the matter be further studied by a working committee to be formed. The other creditors disputed such contention of preference. and damages under Articles 32. INTENTIONAL TORTS VELAYO V SHELL CO OF THE PHILS 100 PHIL 186 FELIX.Although in the Marcia case. 33. offered to Fitzgerald CALI’s Douglas C-54 plane. however. which was then in California. . and Atty. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code. Agcaoili of National Airports Corp.. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. > that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed (Marcia v CA) Petitioner > the incident resulting in the death of Dulay was due to the concurring negligence of the defendants. Desmond Fitzgerald. discussed the balance sheets of CALI. . management of CALI informally convened its principal creditors in a luncheon.58 in its favor for goods it sold and delivered to CALI. assigning its credit amounting to $79. fraud. its fuel needs were all supplied by Shell Company of the P.. the Government. is charged with homicide. it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence.On the same day (Aug 9). in this case. Alfonso Sycip.Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: "Sec 1. > that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Art 2176 (the one filed by petitioners) cannot lie.I. and informed them that CALI was in a state of insolvency and had to stop operation. Alexander Sycip were appointed to the working committee. frustrated. The management of CALI announced that in case of non-agreement of the creditors.It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation. Inc.Maria Benita Dulay. had to be decided by Stephen Crawford and later by Wildred Wooding . 33. When a criminal action is instituted. Napoleon Dulay had an altercation. Alfredo Velayo. The offer was declined by Crawford. Secretary of the Board of Directors of CALI. that Torzuela. Fitzgerald of Shell. . it would file insolvency proceedings.162. IAC. and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. Shell’s books showed a balance of P170. the civil liability is governed by Art 100 of the RPC. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. negotiation on the division of assets was left pending. whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence.The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v.Sec. reserves his right to institute it separately. Inc. shall proceed independently of the criminal action. filed an action for damages against Torzuela and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co.torts & damages FACTS . 1956 NATURE Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila be brought by the offended party.. Shell effected a telegraphic transfer of all its credit against CALI to the American Corporation Shell Oil Co. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. . and shall require only a preponderance of evidence 18 Rule 111. Torzuela's wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury. Atty." and Atty.440. CALI”s President of Board of Directors.Benigno Torzuela. In cases of defamation.As of August 1948. may be brought by the injured party. Ltd.Those present in the meeting were of the unanimous opinion that it would be advantageous not to present suits against CALI but to strive for a fair pro-rata division of its assets. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. casis FACTS . Any extensions of term of payment. alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. unless the offended party waives the civil action. . 34. Torzuela shot and killed Atty. a civil action for damages.117 - prof." . This was followed on Aug 10 by ISSUE WON civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action HELD YES . 1948. explained the memorandum agreement executed by CALI with Phil Air Lines Inc on Aug 4. not with reckless imprudence. This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. it must be noted however. widow of Dulay. (SAFEGUARD) and/or Superguard Security Corp.In the cases provided for in Articles 32. working committee discussed methods of achieving objectives. Therefore.

440.. for the benefit of CALI and its creditors. Moreover. casis scheme. it could not get much of its outstanding credit because of the preferred claims of other creditors. the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited. 1948 CALI filed a petition for voluntary insolvency.Plaintiff confined his action to the recovery of damages against Shell. acted in bad faith and betrayed the A2010 . .” . to the detriment and prejudice of other CALI creditors who were consequently deprived of their share in the distribution of said value 2. taking advantage of its knowledge of the existence of CALI’s airplane C-54 at California. goods.It is evident that Shell. (It) is a prudent earnest of justice in the face of the impossibility of enumerating. YES. 2.29 and a supplemental attachment for a higher sum against the C-54 plane. although this was practically the effect and result of the VELAYO V SHELL CO OF THE PHILS RESOLUTION 100 PHIL 207 FELIX. to be received for the benefit of the insolvent estate. Shell acted in bad faith. WON by reason of said betrayal of confidence and trust. with much more reason that Shell should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of confidence. Any person must. upon learning the precarious economic situation of CALI and that will all probability. . thus defeating the purpose of the informal meetings of CALI’s principal creditors and depriving the plaintiff of the means of obtaining the plane. Shell did not have any vested or acquired right to betray confidence of CALI or of its creditors. but the Court of Justice (SC) cannot countenance such attitude at all.Unaware of Shell’s assignment of credit.Oct 7. “no vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the right of others. Inc. If any person. one by one. > Fitzgerald was merely invited to the luncheonmeeting.Aug 12.. as it is contented that what Shell really disposed of was its own credit and not CALI’s property. . . . or effects of the insolvent. The same result. however.If Article 23 of Civil Code goes as far as to provide that “Even if an act or event causing damage to another’s property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant.I. chattels. without knowing the purpose for which it was called. Shell must answer for damages. . Court denied petition because whether the conveyance of Shell’s credit was fraudulent or not. CALI on Aug 12. .Code Commission on Article 21: (it) would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. Mr. give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Shell may be made to answer for the damages. or its value.torts & damages a deed of assignment of credit amounting to $85. WON Shell Co. or having reason to believe that insolvency proceedings are about to be commenced.” Disposition Shell is liable to pay plaintiff.First week of Sept 1948. which is outside the jurisdiction of the Phils. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. but so far no definite agreement had been reached. entirely disregarded all moral inhibitory tenets. and a writ of attachment was applied for and issued against a C-54 plane. 1948 an amended complaint was filed to recover assigned credit of $85. as they are separate and distinct corporations. as to the applicability of this provision. that Shell be ordered to pay damages double the value of the plane if the case in the US will defeat the procurement of CALI of its plane. Defendant’s Comments > Assignment of credit in favor of American Shell was for valuable consideration and made in accordance with established commercial practices > It has no interest in the case instituted by American Shell. An order of insolvency was issued by the court on the same day. having notice of the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency.118 - prof. . Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals.”.Velayo instituted case against Shell for the purpose of securing writ of injunction restraining Shell from prosecuting against CALI. Sept 17. ISSUES 1. according to Art 2254 of Civil Code. Article 19 of the Civil Code provides Art 19.29.Section 37 of the Insolvency Law states Sec 37. . . But then.Anent the argument that Civil Code provisions cannot be applicable as they came into effect only on Aug 30. and liable to an action by the assignee for double the value of the property sought to be embezzled or disposed of. and as an alternative. Ltd. and much less from a foreign corporation to the detriment of Philippine Government and local business. may be achieved in applying the provisions of the Civil Code. and if so. confidence and trust of other creditors of CALI present in said meeting by affecting a hasty telegraphic transfer of its credit to the American corporation Shell Oil Company. of the P. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties. however.081.While Art 19 contains a mere declaration of principles. 1948.Dec 22. the Phil court would not be in a position to enforce its orders as against the American corporation Shell Oil Co.081. and another equal sum as exemplary damages. such information would have dissolved all attempts to come to an amicable conciliation and would have precipitated the filing of CALI’s voluntary insolvency proceedings and nullified the intended transfer of Shell’s credit to American Shell. which states Art 21. all wrongs which cause damage. YES. he is chargeable therewith.There are doubts. Fitzgerald could not have officially represented Shell because authority resides on Crawford. Alfredo Velayo was appointed Assignee in the proceedings. embezzles or disposes of ay money.. USA. Art 2252 of Civil Code provides by implication that when new provisions of the Code does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation. 1948 American Shell Oil Co filed a complaint against CALI in the Superior Court of the State of California.Shell’s transfer of credit would have been justified only if Fitzgerald had declined to take part in the working committee and frankly and honestly informed the other creditors present that he had no authority to bind his principal and that the latter was to be left free to collect its credit from CALI by whatever means his principal deemed wise and were available to it. July 30.The telegraphic transfer made without knowledge and at the back of other creditors of CALI may be a shrewd and surprise move that enabled Shell to collect almost all if not the entire amount of its credit.. 1948 approved the memorandum agreement of sale to PAL. before the assignment is made. such declaration is implemented by Article 21 of the Civil Code. . they may be given retroactive effect. 1957 Defendant-appellee’s contentions . . for the collection of assigned credit of $79. USA. . and noted that “the Board had been trying to reach an agreement with creditors… to prevent insolvency proceedings. National Airports Corp learned of Shell’s action in the US and hastened to file its own complaint with attachment against CALI in the CFI of Manila. act with justice. Lower court dismissed the case. Inc. the amount of such damages HELD 1. . compensatory damages a sum equivalent to the value of the plane at the time Shell assigned its credit to American Shell. plus miscellaneous personal properties. . 1950.

torts & damages
- It is not guilty of bad faith, it having done nothing but to protect legitimately its own interest or credit against the bad faith of its debtor, the insolvent CALI, under the control of the latter’s president Alfonso Sycip - The transfer of credit to its sister corporation in the US did not prejudice the Government, because its claims were fully paid, not caused any loss or injury to other creditors, except the entities and groups controlled by Alfonso Sycip. It is not liable for exemplary damages because the provisions of the new Civil Code on the matter are not applicable to this case - Plaintiff-appellant has no cause of action against it and is not the real party in interest - Plaintiff’s right of action was based and prosecuted in the lower court under the provisions of the Insolvency Law and consequently he is stopped from pursuing another theory and is not entitled to damages under the provisions of the new Civil Code. HELD - The facts on which Court based its conclusion that Shell acted in bad faith are not and cannot be denied or contradicted by defendant. - There is no sensible reason for disturbing the finding that Shell is liable for exemplary damages. The amount of the award, however, may be modified. - According to the Civil Code, exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages, and that the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, for it is left to the sound discretion of the Court. - Majority of the Court is of the opinion that the value of the C-54 plane might result too high, and that exemplary damages should not be left to speculation but properly determined by a certain and fixed amount. The amount of exemplary damages is thus modified, and fixed at P25,000.

A2010

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she was terminated from the service by Saudia without being informed of the cause. - She then filed a complaint for damages against Saudia and Mr. Al-Balawi, its country manager. Saudia filed a motion to dismiss raising the issues of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss by Saudia, as well as the subsequent MFR. Saudia then filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO with the CA. The CA issued a TRO prohibiting respondent judge from conducting any proceeding unless otherwise directed. The CA, however, in another resolution, denied Saudia’s prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. Saudia then filed to the SC this instant petition. However, during the pendency of this petition, respondent CA rendered a decision that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the Amended Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is Art.21 CC, thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court. ISSUES 1. WON Morada had a cause of action 2. Which law should govern (Phil. Law or Saudi Law) HELD 1. YES - She aptly predicated her cause of action on Art.19 and Art.21 of the CC. As held in PNB v CA, “the aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold no. of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.” Although Art.19 merely declares a principle of law, Art.21 gives flesh to its provisions. Reasoning - After a careful study of the pleadings, We are convinced that there is reasonable basis for private respondent’s assertion that although she was already working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the two crew members for the attack on her person. As it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition. - There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that in “handing over” or “turning over” the person of private respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its duties as employer. Petitioner’s purported act contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V CA (MORADA) 297 SCRA 469 QUISUMBING; October 8, 1998
NATURE Petition for certiorari to annul and set aside CA resolution and decision FACTS - Private respondent Milagros Morada was a flight attendant of Petitioner Company. During a stop-over in Jakarta, she went to a disco with 2 of her fellow crew members Thamer and Allah (both surnamed Al-

Gazzawi) and had breakfast in their hotel room. While there, Allah left and Thamer attempted to rape her. She was saved by hotel security personnel who heard her cries for help. She later filed a case against them. The two were arrested and detained by Jakarta police. When Morada returned to Jeddah (the base of operations of petitioner), she was asked to go to Jakarta to arrange for the release of the two men. She proceeded to Jakarta but she refused to cooperate. She was eventually allowed to return to Jeddah but barred from Jakarta flights. The Indonesian authorities eventually deported the 2 men, through the intercession of the Saudi govt., after 2 weeks of detention. They were put back in service while respondent Morada was transferred to Manila. - 2 years later, she was asked by her superiors to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of Saudia, in Jeddah. When they met, he brought her to the police station where her passport was taken and she was questioned about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy merely stood as the police put pressure on her to drop the case against the two men. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch a later flight out of Jeddah. - A year and a half later, she was again asked to go to Jeddah to see Miniewy. When she did, a certain Khalid of Saudia brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. She was told that it was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, she signed a document to appear before the court a week later. When the date of appearance came, she complied but only after being assured by Saudia’s Manila manager that the investigation was routinary and posed no danger to her. She was brought before the court and was interrogated by a Saudi judge and let go, however, just as she was about to board a plane home, she was told that she had been forbidden to take flight. She was later told to remain in Jeddah and her passport was again confiscated. A few days later, she was again brought before the same court where the Saudi judge, to her astonishment and shock, sentenced her to 5 months imprisonment and 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah for what happened in Jakarta. The court found her guilty of adultery; going to a disco, dancing and listening to music in violation of Islamic laws; and socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition. - Facing conviction, she sought help from her employer, petitioner Saudia but she was denied assistance of any kind. She asked the Phil. Embassy to help her. Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila,

torts & damages
prosecution of private respondent under the guise of petitioner’s authority as employer, taking advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment of Morada was wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person and reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redress for the wrongs done, once duly proven. 2. Philippine Law Ratio Choice of law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing. Reasoning - Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the “connecting factor” or “point of contact” could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, “act with justice, give her due and observe honesty and good faith.” Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view, what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged according to the private respondent. All told, it is not without basis to identify the Phil. as the situs of the alleged tort. - In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, We find here an occasion to apply the “State of the most significant relationship” rule, which should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of the case. In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (A) the place where the injury occurred; (B) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (C) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and; (D) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

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anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime report reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results. - Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies petitioners filed a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial documents, later amended to just estafa. - Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four of which were for estafa while the fifth was for of Art.290 of' RPC (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence). - All of the 6 criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. - In the meantime, Tobias received a notice from petitioners that his employment has been terminated. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. - Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision and dismissed the complaint. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President. - Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company. However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. - Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. - Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during the hearings. - The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Tobias by ordering petitioners to pay him P80,000.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs. - CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. ISSUE WON petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent HELD YES Ratio Art.19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore,

- As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that the over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Phils. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged in international air carriage business here. Thus, the “relationship” between the parties was centered here. Disposition petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. Civil case entitled “Milagros Morada v Saudi Arabia Airlines” REMANDED to RTC

GLOBE MACKAY V CA 176 SCRA 778 CORTES; August 25, 1989
NATURE An appeal from the decision of CA FACTS - Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager. - GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos. According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive VP and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY. - one day after Tobias made the report, Hendry confronted him by stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys. - when Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, Hendry went up to him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies. - the Manila police investigators cleared Tobias of participation in the anomalies. - Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator who submitted a report finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be conducted. - Nevertheless, Hendry issued a memo suspending Tobias from work preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him. - the Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged

torts & damages
recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Reasoning - One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order." Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. - But while Art.19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. - Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that: Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. - However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that: Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. - In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. - the Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.

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malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias. - It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing several actionable tortious acts. Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the circumstances. - Petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of damnum absque injuria. It is argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage that private respondent could have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed from his employment, which was a valid and legal act of the defendants-appellants. According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable. This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners. - Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled that moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. - Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. The nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter. Disposition petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

- An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. - The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee. - Several other tortious acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from work: Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling him to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." - The threat unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity - The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code. - Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias. While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights, the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith. Considering the haste in which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by

ALBENSON V CA BIDIN; January 11, 1993
NATURE Petition assailing the decision of respondent CA which modified the judgment of the RTC and ordered petitioner to pay private respondent moral damages and attorney's fees. FACTS - Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. the mild steel plates

a Complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their house was filed by respondents against petitioner before the RTC on December 15. In filing said information. Baltao for Violation of BP 22. (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Woodworks. was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao". Woodworks. his son Eugenio Baltao III. In its January 27. As they were not able to . The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty.Thus. . with the very same business address as Guaranteed. Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given Eugenio S. a single proprietorship business. and that is. . causes damage to another. The possibility is that it was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio Baltao III.92. its employee.00 and drawn against the account of E. and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal. Woodworks. resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law. What prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of BP 22 against private respondent was their failure to collect the amountdue on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private respondent. public order. and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on 22 July 1981. good custom. On 6 February 1973. Upon a judgment on merits later on. Jesse Yap. .00 as value of the harvests." After obtaining the foregoing information. the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates. Asuncion Pasamba died on 24 February 1969 while Alfonso Fornilda passed away on 2 July 1969. was one "Eugenio S. immediately filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation.645. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration. upon verification with the drawee bank. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith. But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the above-mentioned Decision. Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed. the RTC dismissed respondents’ suit. respondent Baltao filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises. and Benjamin Mendiona. private respondent has a namesake. the check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed.L. claiming ignorance of the complaint against him.Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him. Private respondent. did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand.L. the CFI on 25 July 1985 issued a Writ of Possession and pursuant to which a notice to vacate was made on 26 August 1985.00 as another round of attorney’s fees. Albenson was informed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry that E. (2) which is exercised in bad faith. depends on the circumstances of each case. Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. supposedly in accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court. that the defendants may have been dealing with . .695. the CA set aside the lower court’s ruling and ordered petitioner to pay respondents P250. . plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting evidence." Upon further inquiry. Baltao. . who manages a business establishment. Among the heirs of the latter was his daughter.Petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. Amonoy was ordered to return said properties to the rightful owners. however. was deemed to have waived his right. The heirs sought the annulment of the auction sale. respondents’ house had already been destroyed. . Rizal.Because his attorney’s fees thus secured by the two lots were not paid. which was granted by the same." ISSUE WON private respondent's cause of action is not one based on malicious prosecution but one for abuse of rights under Article 21 of the CC HELD A2010 . Baltao. But on 28 September 1972 judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay within 90 days the P27. Albenson was advised that the signature appearing on the subject check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao. However. shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Amonoy was the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale." .Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S. Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated respondent Baltao. Thus. As part payment thereof.L. Baltao to replace and/or make good the dishonored check. He found that the signature on the check is not the signature of Eugenio S. Disposition petition is GRANTED and the decision of the CA is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 2001 FACTS . the Orders of 25 April 1986 and 6 May 1986 were issued for the demolition of structures in the said lots. Baltao. He won the case for them and charged P27600 as attorney’s fees.The Gutierrez spouses sought a restraining order from the Supreme Court. When presented for payment. a son of plaintiff. Considering that Guaranteed. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores. Albenson was given a check in the amount of P2.600." not of Guaranteed Industries of which plaintiff used to be President.torts & damages which the latter ordered. . Failing in that.122 - prof. in the exercise of his legal right or duty. as a legal consequence. 1989. P11. the absence of malice.000 as actual damages.From the records of the SEC. 1993 Decision. Reasoning . The heirs opposed. Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and had ceased to exist as a corporation since 1975. moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages. and P9. On Amonoy’s motion of 24 April 1986. which was also denied.Amonoy was the counsel of therein Francisca Catolos. There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21. casis pay. petitioner acted in good faith and probable cause in filing the complaint before the provincial fiscal.L. which received the goods in payment of which the bouncing check was issued is owned by respondent. On appeal. or public policy.00 secured by the mortgage. Thereafter. whether willfully or negligently. 2) but which is contrary to morals.880. . Woodworks. In its decision. but the latter failed to do so and therefore. his clients executed real estate mortgages on their lands and the house thereon.575. 3) and it is done with intent to injure. the act must be intentional. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction. ISSUE WON Amonoy may properly invoke damnum absque injuria in this case since at the time of the demolition he had color of authority over said properties HELD NO NO Ratio The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated. contending that the attorney’s fees charged were unconscionable and that the agreed sum was only P11. on 21 January 1970 Amonoy filed for their foreclosure before the CFI of Pasig. The case was dismissed by the CFI on 7 November 1977. Hence. In addition. Agnes Catolos. the lower court observed that "the check is drawn against the account of "E. the two (2) lots would be sold at public auction. E. for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. including the house of the Gutierrez spouses. AMONOY V GUTIERREZ 351 SCRA 731 PANGANIBAN. The presence of probable cause signifies.They failed to pay. anyone who. this recourse. . Albenson made an extrajudicial demand upon private respondent Eugenio S. its owner. the said lots were foreclosed.

For this reason.123 - prof. Consequently.Considering that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which is engaged in legal education. was issued by the Supreme Court on June 2. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. Art.Petitioner. It cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another x x x. Indubitably. He took a leave of absence without pay from his job and enrolled at the pre-bar review class. it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code.In the mean time. He failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade . more specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which states: Art. one must Reasoning .UE had a contractual obligation to inform his students as to whether or not they have met all the requirements for the conferment of a degree.Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life. 1986 under the authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. 1986. Schools and professors cannot just take observe honesty and good faith. Every person must.UE elevated the case to this Court on a petition for review arguing that it has no liability to respondent Romeo A.Petitioner invokes this legal precept in arguing that he is not liable for the demolition of respondents’ house.TC rendered judgment in favor of the Jader and ordered UE to pay Jader P35. may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. UE in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination. men must be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury – that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them.00 . sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.Article 19. We agree with the CA that he unlawfully pursued the demolition of respondents’ house well until the middle of 1987. would render the transaction unconscientious. But the records show that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right. Damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case.470. he was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition. and to A2010 .A commentator on this topic explains: “The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears. and it disappears when it is abused. shall indemnify the latter for the same. in the availment of one’s rights. Had he not insisted on completing the demolition. 1986. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society. and he who violates them violates the law. Jader later learned of the deficiency and he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examination. At the foot of the list of the names of the candidates there appeared however an annotation saying that it was a tentative list and that degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily complete requirements as stated in the University Bulletin . Verily. to give everyone his due. A right. Over and above the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice x x x. therefore. . recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise. . 1986.In civilized society. His name also appeared in the invitation for the graduation as one of the candidates for graduation. but an invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when he received the TRO from this Court on June 4.00 for moral damages . did not heed the TRO of this Court.CA Affirmed and added an award of P50. Jader. his actions were tainted with bad faith. their continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indeed. the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outset. 20. especially to the prejudice of others. . When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another. wilfully or negligently causes damage to another. 19. .UE denied liability arguing that it never led respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating students. . that a copy of the TRO was served on petitioner himself on June 4. cannot be said to have acted in good faith.” . in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties. . when they act affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that those with whom they deal in the general course of society will act in good faith. These standards are the following: to act with justice. The law. even though the forms and technicalities of the law. though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such.Jader was enrolled in the UE College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. Thus. that their fellowmen. . particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams. 2000 FACTS . considering that the proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by . petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents’ house on May 30. known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights. his name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation with an annotation regarding his deficiencies. . By then. Jader attended the graduation and brought his family with him.He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student . contrary to law. February 17.000. The CA also found.torts & damages Ratio Damnum absque injuria may not be invoked by a person who claims to exercise a right but does so in an abusive manner violative of Article 19 of the Civil Code. based on the Certificate of Service of the Supreme Court process server.True. however. a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible” UE V JADER 325 SCRA 804 YNARES-SANTIAGO. give everyone his due. casis the latter arose out of his own negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned the result of his removal exam.We reject this submission. He maintains that he was merely acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC. respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the RTC. he sued UE for damages. it is not permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others. act with justice. is repugnant to the modern concept of social law. ISSUE WON an educational institution may be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case HELD YES .He filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade but got a grade of five (5). Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another. and observe honesty and good faith. . enjoining the demolition of respondents’ house. together with the absence of all information or belief of facts. Every person who.

the former are useless. Volenti non fit injuria. GARCIANO V CA 212 SCRA 436 GRIÑO-AQUINO. and prayed for atty’s fees of 25% of the amt. or before the school year ended. 1982. the members of the Board of Directors of the school.The petitioner was hired to teach during the 1981-82 school year in the Immaculate Concepcion Institute in the Island of Camotes. Wiertz disagreed with the Board's decision to retain her. That the school principal and Fr. If mere fault or negligence in one’s acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby. vice president. Joseph Wiertz. . February 9. Upon her return from Austria in the later part of June. against Fr.The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner's discontinuance from teaching was her own choice. Emerito Labajo. and some members of the faculty of the school for discrimination and unjust and illegal dismissal. signed a letter notifying her that she was "reinstated to report and do your usual duties as Classroom Teacher . The application was recommended for approval by the school principal. for without the latter. Barons was given 60 days credit for its purchases of Phelp’s products. .Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. good customs or public policy. with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. even if true.On June 1." and that "any letter or notice of termination received by you before this date has no sanction or authority by the Board of Directors of this Institution.8m plus interest. Emerito Labajo addressed a letter to the petitioner through her husband. 1982. the school's founder.From Dec1986 to Aug1987. to terminate her services as a member of the teaching staff because of: (1) the absence of any written contract of employment between her and the school due to her refusal to sign one.Barons admitted the purchase of the wires and cables. FACTS . Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable. Phelps sent several demands.On September 3.1m. that is. when he acts with prudence and in good faith.Phelps Dodge appointed Barons Marketing as one of its dealers of electrical wires and cables. with the exception of Fr. or morals. Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. .torts & damages students for granted and be indifferent to them. It instead wrote Phelps requesting if it could pay the outstanding account in monthly installments of P500k plus 1% interest. thereby questioning the integrity of the Board's decision". she received the letter informing her that her services at the Immaculate Concepcion Institute had been terminated.On July 9. As such dealer. concurred in by the president of the Parent-Teachers Association and the school faculty. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right. While the respondents admittedly wanted her BARONS MARKETING V CA (PHELPS DODGE PHILS) 286 SCRA 96 KAPUNAN. willful or negligent acts that are contrary to law. good customs or public policy. Branch XI." . graduate. resigned their positions from the Board "for the reason that the ICI Faculty. The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right. she applied for an indefinite leave of absence because her daughter was taking her to Austria where her daughter was employed. but Barons still did not pay. Their acts were not contrary to law. instead of responding to the request of Barons. 1982. but she did not comply with that order. but disputed the amt claimed by Phelps. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL. They did not "illegally dismiss" her for the Board's decision to retain her prevailed. did not make them liable to her for damages. 1998 NATURE Petition for review decision of CA FACTS . 1992 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint for damages filed by the petitioner against the private respondents. They were simply exercising their right of free speech or their right to dissent from the Board's decision. it was stipulated that an interest of 12% would be imposed. as ordered by the school's Board of Directors. In the sales invoice. they actually did nothing to physically prevent her from reassuming her post. and three members of the Board of Directors. even when the act is not illicit. Petitioner cannot just give out its student’s grades at any time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking the bar.Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to the delayed relay of information to respondent. August 10. Garciano. secretary.Phelps. . therefore it is declared null and void. ISSUE WON the defendants prevented the petitioner from reporting to the school and thus making them liable for damages HELD NO . The RTC rendered decision in favor of Phelps. Cebu. has reacted acidly to the Board's deliberations for the reinstatement of Mrs. plus 25% for atty’s fees and collection. . and exemplary damages amounting to P100k.124 - prof. 20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises only from unlawful. When one of two innocent parties must suffer. 1982. . he through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it. which it in turn supplied to MERALCO. Consequently. Sotero Garciano (for she was still abroad). on July 7. Esteria F. CA affirmed (with modification. Barons purchased on credit wires and cables worth P4. and (2) the difficulty of getting a substitute for her on a temporary basis as no one would accept the position without a written contract. Labajo. Emerito O. Barons paid P300k (thereby leaving an unpaid account of P3. reducing . effective July 5. and approved by the President of the school's Board of Directors. out of a membership of nine (9). A2010 . . whatever loss she may have incurred in the form of lost earnings was self-inflicted. 1982. She was ordered to report for work on July 5. On January 13. She made inquiries from the school about the matter and. the president. informing her of the decision of Fr. morals. . 1982. but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. . casis service terminated. On Sept1987. It failed to act seasonably. ordering Barons to pay the debt and interest of 12% and awarding 25% as atty’s fees. and some teachers allegedly threatened to resign en masse. petitioner filed a complaint for damages in the Regional Trial Court. 1982. 1982. filed a complaint for recovery of the P3. Ratio Liability for damages under Articles 19.8m).B. Joseph Wiertz. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. Wiertz. Petitioner’s liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the course.

ISSUES 1. 1989 by Tess Lorenzo. WON there was creditors’ abuse of rights in this case 2. atty’s fees should be reduced to 10% Disposition CA decision modified WRT atty’s fees but AFFIRMED in other respects BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION V CA (MARASIGAN) 296 SCRA 260 KAPUNAN. Roberto Maniquiz.1m is almost P2m. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate. WON BPI abused its right to suspend the credit card 2. otherwise the necessary court action shall be filed to hold defendant responsible for the humiliation and embarrassment suffered by him . NO collection. 1990 . 1989 . the bill amounting to P735.” 2.000.In this case. head of the collection department of defendant was formally informed of the postdated check about a week later.000.000. this should be reduced to 10% for being manifestly exorbitant. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties. alleging that Phelps should have been held guilty of “creditor’s abuse of rights”. It is plain to see that what we have here is a mere exercise of rights. there must be bad faith or intent to prejudice the plaintiff. a co-employee who handles the account of the plaintiff. . 2989 . and was threatening to suspend his credit card. otherwise the plaintiff will file a case against them . bad faith on the part of Phelps was not proved. Thus.000.00 which would include his future bills.TC: ruled for MARASIGAN finding that BPI abused its right in contravention of A19 CC ordering BPI to pay P 100. to withhold the deposit of his postdated check and that said check be returned to him because he had already instructed his bank to stop the payment because BPI violated their agreement that when MARASIGAN issued the check to cover his account amounting to only P8.CA: AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION P50. P 50. by way of penal clause. Reasoning . 1989 – MARASIGAN sent letter to the manager of FEBTC requesting the bank to stop the payment of the check . . give everyone his due. an employee of the defendant who in turn gave to Jeng Angeles. his membership will be permanently cancelled .the contract expressly provided for the imposition of the 12% interest plus 25% for attorney’s fees and A2010 . the inclusion of Art.torts & damages atty’s fees to 5%) Barons now assail the CA decision.May 7.000. . and Barons should not be liable for atty’s fees. act with justice. The check remained in the custody of Jeng Angeles.To constitute abuse of rights. 1990 .00 and with a monthly billing every 27th of the month His membership was renewed for another year or until February 1990 and the credit limit was increased to P5. . by Café Adriatico when the he entertained some guests.December 8.125 - prof.00 by way of attorney's fees.00. xxx The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established.December 16.However.final demand by BPI requiring him to pay in full his overdue account. Mr. postdated December 15. September 25. . 1989.MARASIGAN oftentimes exceeded his credit limits but this was never taken against him by BPI and even his mode of paying his monthly bills in check was tolerated.March 12.000. MARASIGAN admitted having failed to pay his account because he was in Quezon attending to some professional and personal commitments. the mere exercise of a right cannot be said to be an abuse of right.987. this (the request of Barons) would be inimical to the interests of any enterprise.32. and P10. 1998 FACTS . Also. paid the bill by using her own credit card a Unibankard . there must be no intention to injure another.84 on the condition that BPI will not suspend the effectivity of the card .December 12. Ricardo J.Atty.987. Thus. 1990 – MARASIGAN sent another letter reminding the manager of FEBTC that he had long rescinded and cancelled whatever arrangement he entered into with BPI and requesting for his correct billing.000.000. WON Barons should be liable for interest and atty’s fees HELD 1. . He was also told to refrain from further use of his credit card to avoid any inconvenience/embarrassment and . and must not be excessive or unduly harsh. 1990 within three (3) days from receipt. since 25% if P4.BPI served MARASIGAN a letter by ordinary mail informing him of the temporary suspension of the privileges of his credit card and the inclusion of his account number in their Caution List.April 5. It merely wanted to avoid a situation wherein its cash position would be compromised.000. including stipulated fees and charges. Phelps was driven by legitimate reasons for rejecting Barons offer. Mary Ellen Ringler. Marasigan’s credit card was dishonored. YES Ratio the penal clause included in the contract should be complied with in the event of breach. especially a profit-oriented one like Phelps. and observe honesty and good faith.March 21.the law prescribes a "primordial limitation on all rights" by setting certain standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof. He was informed that bpi was demanding immediate payment of his outstanding account.November 28. “Clearly. making it harder for them to pay its own obligations.00. Reasoning . not an abuse thereof.00 by way of attorney's fees. *note: Barons contends that Phelps abused its rights when it rejected Barons’ offer to settle the debt in installments **right involved: right of a creditor to refuse partial fulfillment of a prestation due to him ISSUES 1. WON MARASIGAN can recover moral damages arising from the cancellation of his credit card by BPI HELD 1. and P 20.00 as moral damages: P25. .October 1989 – statement amounting to P8. More importantly.00 as exemplary damages. 1989 – MARASIGAN requested that he be sent the exact billing due him as of December 15. 1989 which was received on November 23. NO Ratio there is no abuse of rights when there is no bad faith nor intent to prejudice another. and for an explanation within five (5) days from receipt thereof why his card was dishonored on December 8. .MARASIGAN filed a complaint for damages against petitioner before the RTC Makati .19 in the CC: Every person must.00 as moral damages. 1989 despite assurance to the contrary by defendant's personnel-in-charge.MARASIGAN issued Far East Bank Check of P15. Citing Tolentino: There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. casis that unless he settles his outstanding account with the defendant within 5 days from receipt of the letter.There is no showing that the plaintiff received this letter before December 8. within 5 days from receipt thereof or face court action and also to replace the postdated check with cash within the same period or face criminal suit for violation of Bouncing Check Law . 1990 – MARASIGAN demanded BPI compliance with his request in his first letter dated March 12. less the improper charges and penalties. Thus. One of his guests. Barons is bound to pay the said amounts. 1989. was requiring him to issue a check for P15.000. .MARASIGAN was a complimentary member of BECC from February 1988 to February 1989 and was issued Credit Card with a credit limit of P3.00 as exemplary damages.84 was not paid in due time. the illicit act cannot be concealed under the guise of exercising a right.

“Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals.L. Albenson was given a check drawn against the account of E. good custom. . The award of damages by the CA is clearly unjustified. BPI could automatically suspend his credit card. there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the results of a violation of a legal duty. Ruiz and Herrera want to be recognized as architects of the building also citing Article 21 of the Civil Code as their base for he cause of action.Albenson made an extrajudicial demand but Balbao denied issuing the check.Albenson Enterprises Corp. The Court then proceeded with the other cause of action which was deemed to be the controversy between Ruiz and Panlilio over the said 15%.MARASIGAN’S own negligence was the proximate cause of his embarrassing and humiliating experience in not reading the letter of notice of cancellation. .While the word “injury” may also refer to honor or credit.126 - prof. Reasoning .The sole object of the appellants was to secure for themselves recognition that they were co-architects of the Veterans Hospital. there is no need or necessity for a judicial declaration. their pleas for recognition as architects should have been heard by the lower court. Any CARD with outstanding balances unpaid after thirty (30) days from original billing/statement date shall automatically be suspended and those with accounts unpaid after sixty (60) days from said original billing/statement date shall automatically be cancelled without prejudice to BECC's right to suspend or cancel any CARD any time and for whatever reason. so as to enhance their standing and prestige.Under the terms and conditions of the credit card.As it turned out. filed an action against the Secretary of National Defense and also against their own company (together with Pablo Panlilio who is also a shareholder of the company) in connection with the 15% retention fund withheld by the DND relating to the construction of the Veterans Hospital. casis ISSUE WON the lower court erred in dismissing the case HELD NO . Reasoning . the application contained the stipulation that the petitioner could automatically suspend a card whose billing has not been paid for more than thirty days. BPI was therefore justified in suspending his credit card. Thus. the article envisions a situation where a person has a legal right which was violated by another in a manner contrary to morals. delivered to Guaranteed Industries Inc. Article 21.Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right. ALBENSON V CA (BALTAO) 217 SCRA 16 BIDIN.Good faith is presumed and the burden of proving bad faith is on the party alleging it. As quoted earlier. Prestige and recognition are bestowed on the deserving even if there is no judicial declaration. Thus.” . (2) which is exercised in bad faith. . the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone.By his own admission MARASIGAN made no payment within 30 days for his billing/statement dated 27 September 1989. As part payment.L. 2.” . Woodworks was registered in the name Eugenio Baltao.Check was dishonored for the reason “Account closed. A check is not considered as cash especially when it is postdated sent to BPI. . (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Albenson filed a . Reasoning . Ratio The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. .It was petitioner's failure to settle his obligation which caused the suspension of his credit card and subsequent dishonor at Café Adriatico. BPI allowed him to use his card for several weeks. the mild steel plates which the latter ordered. good custom. Woodworks. or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. Ratio To find the existence of an abuse of right A19 the following elements must be present (1) There is a legal right or duty. or public policy. hurt or harm which results from the injury. Hence. 1966 NATURE Appeal from an order of the Manila CFI FACTS . The signature on the subject check belonged to Eugenio Baltao. amount to a legal injury or wrong. BPI could have suspended MARASIGAN’S card outright. he modified award of attorney’s fees.The amended complaint of appellants claimed that the non inclusion of their names as architects resulted in their professional prestige and standing being seriously impaired. Thus. Consequently as early as 28 October 1989 thirty days from the non-payment of his billing dated 27 September 1989. Baltao and that E. they claim that even if the retention fund was in act released. Inc. or public policy.And under the facts and circumstances obtaining. 1993 NATURE Appeal from decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . the real issue was the credit as to the architects of the building were. the named architect was only Panlilio.Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed was one Eugenio S. Instead. which was used as basis of the action. He can not now pass the blame to the petitioner for not notifying him of the suspension of his card. NO . signed by MARASIGAN. As early as 28 October 1989. Neither did he make payment for his original billing/statement dated 27 October 1989. Order appealed from is affirmed. the issuance of the postdated check was not effective payment. any card with outstanding balances after thirty (30) days from original billing/statement shall automatically be suspended. RUIZ V SECRETARY PAREDES. BPI did not capriciously and arbitrarily canceled the use of the card. Hence it presupposes losses or injuries which are suffered as a result of said violation. If this is so. The pleadings in this case do not show damages were ever asked or alleged. . together with Panlilio. It turned out that said retention was already released by the DND to the Company. and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus. Disposition Petition denied.Enrique Ruiz and Jose Herrera. the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not A2010 . January 11. both shareholders of Allied Technilogists. one cannot sustain the contention that the failure or refusal to extend recognition was an act contrary to morals. Nowhere is it stated in the terms and conditions of the application that there is a need of notice before suspension may be affected as private respondent claims. good customs. In such cases. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria . states. Under the contract and all other documents relating to the construction of the Veterans Hospital. and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury. there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded.torts & damages Ratio The agreement was for the immediate payment of the outstanding account. damage is the loss. On the other hand no amount of declaration will help an incompetent person achieve prestige and recognition.

1966 NATURE Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals revoking an order of the CFI dismissing appellant's action for support and damages. he shall compensate the latter for damages. But Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. oppressive. Regularly until December 1959. was bought. both being of adult age.127 - prof. or malevolent manner. moral and exemplary damages. and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal. reckless. job or occupation — and the same must be proved. 1964 FACTS .. otherwise. casis is the abuse of right which can be a cause for moral and material damages. that he expressed and professed his undying love and affection for her who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings". Article 21 of the Civil Code says that when the person willfully causes loss or injury contrary to good custom. To formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity.Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. P25. . if the proof is flimsy and unsubstantiated. and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly. ISSUES WON Baltao should be awarded damages (based on malicious prosecution) HELD NO . . profession. fraudulent. Woodworks. reckless [and] oppressive manner. which was subsequently issued. FACTS . through his protestations of love and promises of marriage. it is damnum absque injuria. 1954 as the big day. the prosecutor acted without probable cause. and the costs.L. 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage. and one employee.Baltao filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation. with accessories. ISSUE WON Velez is liable for the preparations spent by Wassmer cost of wedding TANJANCO V SANTOS REYES. there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person. Velez left a note for Wassmer saying that he has to postpone the wedding because his mother opposes it. Proof and motive that the institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to damages . If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights. decided to get married and set September 4.Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code. . following their mutual promise of love. . .But the next day. moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives. Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S.Francisco X. P2.An award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith.Trial court granted Baltao’s claim for actual or compensatory. only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized.000. in a reasonable mind. attorney's fees and costs. (3) The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice . Their wedding was set.Where there is no evidence of the other party having acted in wanton. It appears that private respondent has a namesake. December 24.Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos. he sent a telegram assuring Wassmer that nothing has changed and he will return soon.While mere breach of contract is not an actionable wrong. Baltao for violation of BP 22. that in consideration of his promise of marriage Araceli consented and acceded to Tanjanco’s pleas for carnal knowledge. even if he is later on absolved. Tanjanco succeeded in having carnal access to Araceli.torts & damages complaint against Eugenio S.Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss — in business. as a result of which she conceived a child. who manages E. On September 2. . (2) That in bringing the action.000 as moral and exemplary damages. . . Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated respondent Baltao. defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton. fraudulent or reckless. Araceli had to resign her job as secretary in HELD YES . Baltao for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Wassmer.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.Baltao filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against Albenson Enterprises.This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. CA decision reversed and set aside WASSMER V VELEZ 12 SCRA 648 BENGZON.In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith. Due to her pregnant condition.000 as actual damages. The bride-to-be's trousseau. its owner. A matrimonial bed. In order that such a case can prosper. friends and acquaintances.The record reveals that on August 23. Velez and Beatriz P. may file a case for damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights. .Sued by Beatriz for damages. or on malicious prosecution." P15. trade. party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased. .500 as attorney's fees. .Asst.. however. It .A party injured by the filing of a court case against him. neither may exemplary damages be awarded Disposition Petition granted. is quite different. to wit: (1) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor. Bridal showers were given and gifts received. acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor. . to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation. Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. his son Eugenio Baltao III.Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief. As to exemplary damages. . no damages will be given . or oppressive manner. moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton . A2010 . December 17. the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner Judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate . .To constitute malicious prosecution. the following three (3) elements must be present.CA modified by reducing the moral damages and the attorney's fees awarded. property.

The girl becomes pregnant. maintained intimate sexual relations with Tanjanco.. and social humiliation. plus P10.Bearing these principles in mind. CFI dismissed the complaint. petitioner. much less for one year. and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable.000. filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. Over and above the partisan allegations. . on the other hand. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. she and her parents would have such a right of action. under Article 21. and no other cause of action being alleged. and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. which was in October of that year. enticement. for had Araceli been deceived. with repeated acts of intercourse. and finally. . reimbursement for actual expenses. single. even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury. The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion. A promise of marriage either has not been made. or a breach of a promise of marriage. To constitute seduction there must A2010 . persuasions and wiles. Under the present laws. but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport. she was a virgin before she began living with him. February 19. But under the proposed article. and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City. she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. she suffered mental anguish. they therefore argued to get married after the end of the school semester. attorney's fees and costs. she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. The essential feature is seduction. before 20 August 1987.00 in moral and exemplary damages. it connotes essentially the idea of deceit. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes.In his Answer with Counterclaim. persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury.00 attorney's fees. a woman of adult age. is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments. wounded feelings. She alleges in said complaint that: she is 22 years old.128 - prof. he maltreated and threatened to kill her. the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission where it stated. which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless. though the grievous moral wrong has been committed. petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire. and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer. BAKSH V CA 219 SCRA 115 DAVIDE JR." They gave an example  "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages. the Commission has deemed it necessary.In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages. Bugallon. to pay her not less than P430. to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule: ART. sometime in 20 August 1987. which are calculated to have and do have that effect. in an action by the woman. casis Private respondent. that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof. and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit. from 1958 to 1959. we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code. the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. or can not be proved. the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments. She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts. moral shock. as a result of such maltreatment. and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. Dagupan City. during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint.00 a month for her support and that of her baby. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. without the assistance of counsel. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex. petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and. she sustained injuries. artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant.torts & damages IBM Philippines. She became unable to support herself and her baby and duer to Tanjanco's refusal to marry her as promised. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. and though the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage. he did not maltreat her. The Court of Appeals. he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment. no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover. a week before the filing of the complaint. Disposition the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. . she would not have again yielded to his embraces. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing. in the interest of justice. and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent.000. and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation. the facts stand out that for one whole year. entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of origin to proceed with the case. no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. the latter courted and proposed to marry her. 23. 1993 NATURE Appeal by certioriari to review and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . plus P100. Insisting. as the girl is above eighteen years of age. there is no crime. Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the female. the enticement.And in American Jurisprudence: On the other hand. let us examine the complaint. Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage. “but the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. petitioner's attitude towards her started to change. without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage. in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga. there is no seduction. Inc. that in law it is more than mere sexual intercourse. ISSUE WON CS erred in reversing the CFI decision HELD YES . besmirched reputation. Hence. Therefore. he prayed for an award for miscellaneous expenses and moral damages. Guilig. in his Counterclaim. superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community. Araceli Santos.

private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens.A complaint fro breach of promise to marry was filed against Bunag Sr and Bunag Jr. have offended our sense of morality. They never got to the restaurant where they were supposed to eat. .After filing for the ML. Article 21. deceit and false pretenses. the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing. Later that evening. which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors. however. The Court a quo adopted her evidence." BUNAG V CA (CIRILO) 211 SCRA 441 REGALADO. (c) petitioner. he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. 21 is applicable to the case at bar HELD YES . and Cirilo applied for their respective Marriage Licenses. the lower court. such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent. .129 - prof. the said Code contains a provision. (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances. Cirilo was ashamed when she went home and could not sleep and eat because of the deception done against her by Bunag. . On the day of the said rape. 1992 NATURE Petition for review from the decision of CA FACTS . . who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality. proof that he had. Bunag Jr came riding in a car with an unidentified man. so much so that she promised not to make any scandal and to marry him. traditions and culture. and P10K for atty’s fees. respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent. he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. casis Disposition Petition denied been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. P20K by way of temperate damage. they proceeded to Bunag’s grandmother’s house. Bunag Sr was absolved from liability. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry.Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals. (d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her. This notwithstanding. Cirilo contends that she was abducted by Bunag Jr along with unidentified man and brought her to the motel where she was raped. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. good customs or public policy. It is essential.torts & damages . petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her. As an Iranian Moslem. . could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. in reality. rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision 5 favoring the private respondent. Bunag Sr arrived and assured them that they would apply for the ML the next day. they lived as husband and wife for 21 days. that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals. (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner. good customs. ISSUE WON Art. applying Article 21 of the Civil Code. and so holds. . she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.The Court found that Cirilo and Bunag Jr were sweethearts but for 2eeks before the alleged rape. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because. .The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers. and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner. but after leaving. Bunag Jr withdrew his application. the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. he is not conversant with such Filipino customs. Bunag then left and never returned. Bunag.In light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21. his controversial "common law wife" is now his legal wife as their marriage had A2010 . Finally. P20K for exemplary damage. that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress. . Jr brought Zenaida Cirilo to a hotel where they had sex. July 10. Unfazed by his second defeat. Cirilo rode in the passenger’s seat while Bunag Jr was driving. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees. Respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto the trial court's ruling. Moreover.Conrado Bunag. Jr. the trial court erred in ruling that he does not possess good moral character. . she allowed herself to be deflowered by him.It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy. inter alia. Jr.Bunag initially allowed her to go home but later refused to consent and stated that he would only let her go after they were married. In the instant case. Bunag jr invited her for merienda to talk things over. and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. That night. . Bunag brough her to his grandmother’s house in Las Pinas where they liver together as husband and wife for 21 days.She was then dragged by the 2 men in the hotel where Bunag Jr deflowered her against her will and consent. The Court is of the opinion. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs. traditions and culture. they had a quarrel.After trial on the merits. culture and traditions. petitioner filed the instant petition. through machinations. The RTC upon finding that she was forcibly abducted and raped Bunag Jr was ordered to pay for P80K for moral damages. Cirilo protested but Bunag threatened her that he would bump the car against the post if she made any noise. When she noticed they were going the wrong way. and he has never maltreated her. petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship. (e) by reason of that deceitful promise.The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. During that time. no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act. promised to marry private respondent. he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four wives and concludes that on the basis thereof.

Its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir. 1974. that on the pretext of getting something. that her pleas for help and support fell on deaf ears. While the Bunag’s assigned several errors in the TC decision. She became pregnant and despite efforts and drugs (abortion pills?) supplied by defendant.Cirilo appealed on the disculpation of Bunag Sr’s liability. “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted. sued her neighbor Icao with whom she had close and confidential relations. YES . 21. Plaintiff amended the complaint but the TC ruled such was not allowable as the original complaint averred no cause of action. . Ivan professed his love and courted Amelita. that he was a married man. Amelita prayed for the recognition of the unborn child.Petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for acknowledgment. YES . 854) 2. casis and not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan. even if such child should be born after the death of the testator (Art. CA dismissed the petitions and affirmed judgment of RTC in toto. . WON Quimiguing is entitled to damages HELD 1. that they repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and November. Quimiguing. rape or other lascivious acts.” This is furthered by Art. Repeated sexual intercourse only indicates that passion QUIMIGUING V ICAO 34 SCRA 132 REYES. that while dining. and Art 2229 and 2234 CC. except where the plaintiff incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents therrof. Disposition petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The latter. Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to which the latter agreed. the award for moral damages is allowed in cases specified and analogous to those provided in Art 2219 CC. ISSUES 1. Amelita was forced to leave her work as a waitress. Manila. although married. . that Amelita had no sexual relations with any other man except Ivan who is the father of the child yet to be born at the time of the filing of the complaint.Bunag filed for the petition for review claiming that CA failed to consider vital exhibits and testimonies and error in the proper application of the law. she could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual contact sometime in August. she claimed support of P120/mo. the payment of actual. she surrendered her virginity HELD NO Ratio Mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. 40) and may receive donations (Art. Art 2219. . Had she been induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage. moral and exemplary damages. thus the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.The court is constrained with the factual findings of the lower courts. Reasoning . whenever Ivan is in Manila. Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the latter. the extinction of the criminal liability does not extinguish civil liability unless there is a declaration of a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case may arise did not exist. particularly Icao (Art. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damage. As relief. ISSUE WON Amelita can claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 3 & 21 4 of the Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. succeeded in having sex with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation and without her consent. 1992 NATURE . abduction. Amelita Constantino alleges that she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant located at Sta.000. that because of her pregnancy. . 742). Hence. that at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening. pursuant to Art 21 in relation to par 3 and 10.Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her womanhood.000 to P8. Cruz. apart from the right to recover for money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. 1974. ISSUE WON lower courts erred in granting damages for the breach of promise to marry HELD Ratio A breach of promise to marry is not actionable per se.For a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damages caused. WON Quimiguing had a right to the support of the child 2. However. A2010 . These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which warrant and justify the award of moral and exemplary damages. As stated in Art. CONSTANTINO V MENDEZ BIDIN.Although TC granted damages on the basis of the forcible abduction and rape even after the criminal complaint’s dismissal. July 31. assisted by her parents. only the fiscal made such dismissal of the criminal complaint.In her complaint. Under Art 21 CC. that after the sexual contact. support and damages against private respondent Ivan Mendez. that Ivan is a prosperous businessman of Davao City with a monthly income of P5.Appellant. attorney's fees plus costs. that the day following their first meeting. Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . Reasoning . 1970 NATURE Appeal on points of law from an order of the CFI FACTS . the petitioner’s promising to marry Cirilo to evade criminal liability constitutes acts contrary to morals and good customs. par10. any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. independent of the right to support of the child.Hence. unborn child is given a provisional personality by law and therefore has a right to support from its progenitors.torts & damages .00.130 - prof. she had to stop studying. . 2219 which provides compensation in cases of seduction.Under the circumstances in the case at bar. that Amelita asked for time to think about Ivan's proposal. Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire.Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action as the complaint did not allege the child had been born— the motion was sustained. plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages. Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married man. May 14.A breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law.A conceived. as a result of which Amelita got pregnant. and the assailedjudgment and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED. . in relation to Art 2219. In the case. where she worked as a waitress.

Nicolas issued 5 checks which Que cannot encash. TC ruled in favor of Que. Que on his part alleged that the said defective products were only returned after he filed an estafa case.Nicolas then filed a case against Que for malicious prosecution. and there were reasonable grounds on which such a belief could DRILON V CA (ADAZA) 270 SCRA 211 HERMOSISIMA JR. under such circumstances. which were delivered. Verily. he had not. This decision is immediately executory. He just stopped payment. he has committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals. ADAZA filed a complaint for damages and charged petitioners with engaging in a deliberate. 'Under the Spanish Law. When the parents learned about this. . including private respondent ADAZA for their alleged participation in the failed Dec 1989 coup d’etat. Disposition decision of the respondent court dated March 12. The checks were dishonored. requested the DOJ (headed by Sec Franklin DRILON) to order the investigation of several individuals. If the charge.131 - prof. although false. seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. but through a clever strategy. Concededly. March 20.Feeling aggrieved by the institution of these proceedings against him. IAC reversed. the element of probable cause was not treated separately from that of malice. is REINSTATED as above modified. The affair continued just the same.Gen Renato DE VILLA. the goods which were allegedly defective were not yet returned to Que before the filing of the estafa case. . 100 SCRA 602) . was made with an honest belief in its truth and justice. as under the American Law. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. 1984. in accordance with Nicolas’ order to stop payment. casis be founded. 1989 NATURE Petition for review FACTS . Ratio. Defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that the defendant not only deliberately. an unmarried woman 24 years of age. the circumstances presented the possibility that Nicolas might cheat him. Chief of Staff of the AFP. QUE V IAC (NICOLAS) 169 SCRA 137 CRUZ. Que filed an estafa case against Nicolas. Hence. After making demands for payment. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found inside Lolita’s aparador.The circumstances under which the defendant tried to win Lolita’s affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who.This was then referred for preliminary inquiry to the Special Composite Team of Prosecutors who issued a subpoena to the said individuals after finding sufficient basis to continue the inquiry. The two had an amicable business relation until 1975. Reasoning -. willful and malicious experimentation by filing against him a charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder when petitioners were . Indeed. although. When a complaint was laid and there was probable cause to believe that the person charged had committed the acts complained of. without Que knowing that there were defects in the goods he delivered. January 13. PE V PE 5 SCRA 200 1962 FACTS . which Nicolas allegedly ignored. The present action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. as a matter of fact. ISSUE WON Que had instituted a malicious prosecution of the private respondent (WON the reversal made by IAC was correct) HELD NO .Plaintiffs are parents. did not demand for its repair. this appeal by the plaintiffs ISSUE WON the defendant can be held liable under Article 21 HELD YES . is SET ASIDE and the amended decision of the trial court dated February 21. and then issued 5 postdated checks in favor of Que. Defendant. He allegedly ordered that payment be stopped because the goods delivered to him by Que were defective and that Que allegedly refused to replace them.It is evident that the petitioner was not motivated by ill feeling but only by an anxiety to protect his his rights when he filed the criminal complaint for estafa with the fiscal's office.torts & damages Disposition the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside A2010 . Instead. frequently visited Lolita’s house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the rosary. . a married man. good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code. Lolita disappeared from her brother’s house where she was living. Information was filed before RTC QC. the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution (Manila Gas Corporation v. . succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. there was no intent to accuse falsely. The lower court dismissed the action. brothers and sisters of Lolita PE. they prohibited defendant from going to their house. One cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause.To constitute malicious prosecution. inspite of demands by the latter. 1997 NATURE Petition to reverse CA’s Resolutions FACTS . Also. The wrong he had caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. when Nicolas ordered strollers from Que. with no recommendation as to bail. the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs. 1979. 1957. On april 14. They fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts. Therefore. but not so much on the theory of probable cause as on the ground that. from Que’s point of view. the accusation could not be held to have been false in the legal sense. through an ingenious scheme or trickery. The case was dismissed for lack of merit. Court of Appeals. the complainant was fully protected.Magtanggol Que is a dealer of canvass strollers while Antonio Nicolas orders from him. Nicolas kept the goods. The panel assigned to conduct prelim investigation found that there was probable cause to hold them for trial for the crime of REBELLION WITH MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter’s family who allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of the family.

In American jurisdiction.. There was malicious intent manifested through the filing of the criminal cases as the case for illegal dismissal was pending.000. P200. SC anchored its findings on TC’s finding (re bad faith of Globe Mackay in filing the criminal complaints against Tobias). The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force. . For this injury an action on the case lies. Hendry. All of the six criminal complaints were . or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. Such a change of theory cannot be allowed. the Secretary of Labor: reinstated the LA's decision which Tobias appealed to the Office of the President. . . called the action of malicious prosecution. Bernabe. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results. 20. NONE of these requisites have been alleged. denied Globe’s MR.The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in the provisions of the NCC [Art 19. 1989 NATURE Certiorari FACTS . suit.000. . NLRC.Both parties appealed.Petitioners filed MD since there was no valid cause of action for this complaint for damages.Although Globe claims that they must not be penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints against an employee who was their principal suspect in the commission of forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded them of substantial sums of money. 21. MFR for Order of Denial was also denied. . (In Adaza’s latest Comment. P30. .00 as actual damages. for the mere purpose of vexation or injury.00 as attorney's fees. signatures. wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. . without being asked by RETELCO.Despite being cleared. and the eventual dismissal of the cases. .Yutuk V. The petitioners were of the honest conviction that there was probable cause to hold Adaza for trial. oppressive. 32. August 25. WON complaint was a suit for damages for malicious prosecution 2. (Sec 3e of RA 3019) An examination of the records would show that this latest posture as to the nature of his cause of action is only being raised for the first time on appeal. ISSUE WON there was malicious prosecution HELD YES . malicious.torts & damages fully aware of the non-existence of such crime in the statute books. after the termination of such prosecution. YES Definition of Malicious Prosecution: . and costs. . . 38 SCRA 5871. the absence of malice. thus rendering the complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. casis dismissed by the fiscal and MRs of Globe were denied too. Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). 2. 29. civil suit.RTC denied MD.Judging from the face of the complaint itself filed by Adaza.[ 2 SCRA 337]: the Court held that the right to file criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay HELD 1. (c) Suffice it to state that the presence of probable cause signifies. he maintained that his claim before the trial court was merely a suit for damages based on tort and NOT a suit for malicious prosecution. . to which Tobias was the number one suspect though he claimed he was the one who reported it.Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal upon receiving the notice of his termination.132 - prof. and abusive acts of petitioners. . This is not considered the termination of the action contemplated under Philippine jurisdiction to warrant the institution of a malicious prosecution suit against those responsible for the filing of the information against him. or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause.000.Nowhere in his complaint filed with the trial court did respondent Adaza allege that his action is one based on tort.During the pendency of the appeal with said office. the prosecutor acted without probable cause. 2217 and 2219 (8)].00 as exemplary damages. P20.The results of the investigations said that the handwritings. the plaintiff must prove these elements: (a) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal. and which terminates in favor of the person prosecuted.Unemployed.Globe Mackay found out an anomaly that has been causing them to lose money. CA: affirmed the RTC decision in toto.Petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias.CA also dismissed petition for certiorari and ordered RTC judge to proceed with the trial of civil case filed by ADAZA. it has been defined as“One begun in malice without probable cause to believe the charges can be sustained. (a) Insofar as Adaza’s Criminal Case is concerned. .This led Tobias to file a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to take no further action on civil case except to DISMISS it. complaints for estafa were filed against Tobias. that is by improper or sinister motive.However.RTC: rendered judgment in favor of Tobias by ordering petitioners to pay him P80. The filing of the cases despite the police reports exculpating Tobias.” Reasoning .000. and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of -Tobias. “the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith” [Ventura v.” . 33. and (c) That the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice. . regularly. it has been defined as“An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution. Manila Electric Co. (b) It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. Reasoning .In Philippine jurisdiction.reversed. WON petitioners are liable for malicious prosecution A2010 . (b) That in bringing the action.] . as a legal consequence.00 as moral damages. 26. Disposition Petition is GRANTED. what appears clear from the records only is that respondent has been discharged on a writ of habeas corpus and granted bail.) ISSUES 1. Instituted with intention of injuring defendant and without probable cause. 35. petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the latter's complaint for illegal dismissal. Reasoning .LA: dismissed the complaint. Hendry’s threat of more suits against Tobias. NO Ratio In order for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper. GLOBE MACKAY V CA CORTES.

Mapa Street. sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. or "negligently". He replied by denying and telling them to check the veracity of their claim. Sta. A2010 . combined with articles 19 and 20. They believed Baltao was really the one who issued the check because it was his company who ordered and received the delivery. casis may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21. good custom. Investigating fiscal found probable cause and filed info with the RTC. CA.The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty. . a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. (2) which is exercised in bad faith. despite the negative results of the lie detector tests which Globe Mackay compelled him to undergo. Baltao appealed to the Provincial Prosecutor. *Findings of bad faith (as per the TC): > After the dismissal of the 4 cases and denial of the MR by the Ministry of Justice. .575 was given as payment. 3) and it is done with intent to injure.Thus. CA.Albenson Enterprises delivered mild steel plates to 3267 V. "Indeed. oppress. resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law. the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly broadened. To do so would be a clear perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice. Fiscal de Guia. ISSUE WON Baltao is entitled to damages HELD NO . If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights. 176 SCRA 778 [1989]). A right. moral (P1M) and exemplary damages (P200k). of which Eugeneio Baltao was president. (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights. 1 SCRA 60]. no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. the filing of a suit by itself. public order. it is damnum absque injuria. He didn’t tell them that his son was his namesake and that the latter NATURE Appeal from CA judgment modifying RTC’s decision as regards amount to be paid FACTS . However. Asst. It is now difficult to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not be checked by the application of these articles" (Tolentino. The delivery was received by Guaranteed Industries. these three articles are all related to each other. CA modified by awarding only half of original moral damages and atty’s fees. depends on the circumstances of each case. .After the criminal case was dismissed.Hawpia CA. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith [Sison v. The provincial prosecutor found out that something was amiss during the investigation and upon reinvestigation. with persistence. January 11. Manila. or public policy. .ABUSE OF RIGHTS Article 19. "With this article (Article 21). Evident likewise is the flurry and haste in the filing of this case against respondent Tobias. a check in the amount of P2. They wrote to him. to give everyone his due. . When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another. . Court of Appeals.There is however. Woodworks. . Disposition CA’s decision AFFIRMED. though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such." there can be no mistaking that defendants would not but be motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass. (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated. Concededly. Ratio To constitute malicious prosecution." Globe Mackay hastily filed 6 criminal cases with the city Fiscal's Office of Manila. The law. the haphazard way this case was investigated is evident. found no probable cause. . . and to observe honesty and good faith.RTC granted actual (P133k).L.Albenson did not abuse its rights. ELW was owned by Baltao’s son. and cited the same as the bases for the award of damages.The check bounced.[20 SCRA 536]: the Court upheld the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and attorney's fees after making a finding that petitioner. . . with one of the investigating fiscals. the act must be intentional.133 - prof. . recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise. Woodworks’ business address was the same as Guaranteed Industries. the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. who is his namesake. Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully". Albenson extrajudicially demanded payment from Baltao. an act which causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of damages. 5 for estafa thru falsification of commercial document and 1 for violation of A290 of the RPC (all of which were dismissed).ACTS CONTRA BONUS MORES Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores. Although the requirements of each provision is different. The second and third elements are not present. All they wanted was to collect what is owed them. Baltao filed a complaint for damages against Albenson because the latter had unjustly filed a criminal case against him. and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal. it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. filed at least six criminal complaints against respondent.torts & damages an indebtedness.L. 2 cases were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office of the AFP to railroad Tobias’ arrest and detention in the military stockade. 1 Civil Code of the Philippines 72). drawn against the account of E. and although the police investigation was "still under follow-up and a supplementary report will be submitted after all the evidence has been gathered. and atty’s fees (P100k).IT TURNS OUT that E. David. ALBENSON V CA (BALTAO) BIDIN. Baltao denied that it was his signature on the check. These standards are the following: to act with justice. Said check was signed by a Eugenio Baltao. 2) but which is contrary to morals. therefore. commenting in one case that. The trial court as well as the respondent appellate court mistakenly lumped these three articles together. and cause damage to plaintiff. and that is. there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v.An award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. Mesa. 122 SCRA 576]. under any of these three provisions of law. but this was frustrated by a presidential decree transferring criminal cases involving civilians to the civil courts. > Despite the clearing Tobias of participation or involvement in the fraudulent transactions complained of. 100 SCRA 602]. He told the trial fiscal to move for dismissal. all of which were dismissed. Albenson filed case for violation of BP22. 1993 .

.00. When Plaintiff woke up at four o'clock in the afternoon.Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss.Subsequently. Though incapable of pecuniary computation. hence. a complaint for qualified theft was filed by petitioner against respondent Ongsip . petitioner's own mechanical engineer.000.00 as moral damages in the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. They returned however at five o'clock. . 1966. . even brutally. the complaint was dismissed . Ongsip inquired from Coronel why they were taking pictures but the latter simply gave him a calling card with instructions to go to his office. 1966. he was even willing to have his place excavated but petitioner would not dare take the consequences. the trial court rendered its decision ordering defendant to pay plaintiff:(1) P50.A burner gas was installed by petitioner's employees in respondent's kitchen at his residence.In the instant case.000. . it registered a sudden increase in gas consumption. Albenson acted in good faith and had probable cause in filing their complaint against Baltao. no gas consumption was registered in the meter. prompting petitioner to issue a 'meter order' with instructions to change the gas meter in respondent's residence." . for which respondent Ongsip was awarded moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P50. . but he was informed afterwards of what had taken place by his houseboy.The first cause of action. 1967. October 30. . wounded feelings. but it was denied . there is reason to believe that there was malicious intent in the filing of the complaint for qualified theft. secondly: the illegal closure of respondent Ongsip's gas service connection without court order and without notice of warning. he would be deported. by way of example or correction for the public good. following the dismissal by the investigating fiscal of the complaint for qualified theft and the disconnection by petitioner of his gas service. testified that the second gas meter was replaced as MANILA GAS CORPORATION V CA (ONGSIP) MAKASIAR. 1964. this petition ISSUE WON the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of appeals is excessive HELD YES .00 and P10. . pending investigation of the criminal complaint.By the end of August. to the moral. Private respondent was then taking a nap. (8) malicious prosecution. A2010 . in addition. however.Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals . there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person. liquidated or compensatory damages. Right then and there Coronel should have told Plaintiff that he was using a by-pass valve and in effect stealing gas from Defendant.134 - prof. -Thereafter.The installations and connections were all done solely by petitioner's employees. . Here was then the opportunity for Coronel to confront Plaintiff with the allegedly discovered 'by-pass valve' and bluntly. petitioner disconnected respondent's gas service for alleged failure and/or refusal to pay his gas consumptions from July. 1965 to January. .CA affirmed the lower court’s decision in toto. (4) P5. .. respondent Ongsip applied for gas service connection with petitioner Manila Gas Corporation. a reading was made on the new meter and expectedly.000. 1967. Disposition Petition granted.00 as exemplary damages in the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. is predicated on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which states that "moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: . Article 2229 provides that "exemplary or corrective damages are imposed. . Delfin Custodio.00 as attorney's fees. the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. respondent Ongsip filed a complaint for moral and exemplary damages against petitioner Manila Gas Corporation based on two causes of action. Coronel and his men had already made the changes and had already gone. this time with a photographer. mental anguish.On that same afternoon. serious anxiety. and on May and June 1966. There. temperate. . . .000. . moral damages may be recovered if they . moral shock. oppressive and malevolent filing of the criminal complaint. there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. respondent Ongsip did not show any sign of fear or remorse and did not yield to the threatening demand of Coronel—this is the attitude of someone who knows how to take a firm stand where his principles and rights are concerned.Article 2217 of the Civil Code states that "moral damages include physical suffering. respondent Ongsip requested petitioner to install additional appliances as well as additional gas service connections in his 46-door Reyno Apartment: petitioner installed two 20-gallon capacity water storage heaters and two heavy-duty gas burners and replaced the original gas meter with a bigger 50light capacity gas meter. The circumstance was familiar to that of catching a thief in flagrante delicto. petitioner's employees returned with a photographer who took pictures of the premises. .000. . casis are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. petitioner's employees went to Ongsip's place. besmirched reputation..There was no malicious prosecution.00 as moral damages in the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. respectively. . he was informed about the existence of a by-pass valve or "jumper" in the gas connection and that unless he gave P3.000. To prove his innocence.Without notifying or informing respondent Ongsip.On May 2.00 as exemplary damages in the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. (5) P10. (3) P30. Plaintiff was sleeping. firstly: the malicious." . .On August 17. social humiliation. The presence of probable cause means the absence of malice. .As correctly observed by the trial court in its decision —A significant fact brought about by the testimony of Coronel himself is the total absence of immediate accusation against Plaintiff right at the very moment when the by-pass valve was allegedly discovered. .On May 20.Respondent Ongsip refused to give the money .Concededly.torts & damages operated a business in the same building.To constitute malicious prosecution." On the other hand. 1972. and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. (2) P10.000.On July 14.000. To constitute malicious prosecution. they changed the gas meter and installed new tube connections. in October. tell him that there was thievery of gas. This was the time when Plaintiff met Coronel. and (6) the costs of the suit. 1965. 1967. and.On July 27. Besides.On February.There was no significant change in the meter reading despite additional installations.It bears noting that when he was informed as to the existence of a 'jumper' in his gas connection. This. CA reversed and set aside.00. But the truth is that when Coronel and his men entered Plaintiff's compound and made changes therein. and similar injury. Coronel did not do. .. . 1980 NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA (treated as a special civil action) FACTS . fright.

slander or any other form of defamation. petitioner together with two (2) policemen were posted near the gate of the public auditorium to check on the assigned watchers of the gate. hit petitioner's face with his bloodied hand.Rafael Patricio. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. (3) Seduction. such damages are justly due.00 The award of P5. petitioner's financial capability must also be considered. temperate or compensatory damages Disposition Decision in favor of Patricio. It was actually intended to vex and humiliate private respondent and to blacken his reputation not only as a businessman but also as a person. Disposition Decision of CA modified as regards the amount of damages. In consequence thereof.Respondent Ongsip's default in payment cannot be utilized by petitioner to defeat or nullify the claim for damages. Qualified theft is a serious offense indicating moral depravity in an individual. casis (8) Malicious prosecution. A2010 .P.The Court gives due consideration to respondent Ongsip's social and financial status as a businessman and the mental anguish he suffered as a result of the false imputation.000. a Philippine government pensionado of the United States for six months. and actively engaged in social and civic affairs in Pilar. rape. is sustained. member of the Philippine Veterans Legion. and 35. At most. where he is residing. 2219 of the same Code. this circumstance can be considered as a mitigating factor in ascertaining the amount of damages to which respondent Ongsip is entitled. he and his wife and their two daughters went to shop at South Supermarket (owned ." . 3713. ISSUE WON Patricio is entitled to damages for the humiliation he experienced during the town fiesta HELD YES . Capiz. (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. April 26. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith" . . and before petitioner could respond. abduction. in failing to recover its lost revenue caused by the gas meter's incorrect recording. . Petitioner is a public utility corporation whose primary concern is service to the people. was appointed Director General of the 1976 Religious and Municipal Town Fiesta of Pilar. respectively. he approached petitioner in a hostile manner and asked the latter if he had seen his wounded hand. Inc. the award of moral and exemplary damages should be reduced to P25. private respondent. It was established before the court a quo that there was an existing feud between the families of both petitioner and private respondent and that private respondent slapped the petitioner without provocation in the presence of several persons. As a consequence. To be accused of such crime without basis is shocking and libelous. petitioner Manila Gas Corporation.Private respondent's contention that there was no bad faith on his part in slapping petitioner on the face and that the incident was merely accidental is not tenable.torts & damages being defective because "some of its parts were worn out and that it was not properly registering. Capiz. 34.00 and P5. author of articles published in the Manila Sunday Times and Philippines Free Press. the court ruled in favor of herein petitioner (as complainant). The amount of exemplary damages need not be proved where it is shown that plaintiff is entitled to either moral. moral shock and social humiliation caused by private respondent's act of hitting petitioner on the face in public. the profit motive being merely secondary. (4) Adultery or concubinage.Evidently.The act of private respondent in hitting petitioner on the face is contrary to morals and good customs and caused the petitioner mental anguish. We reduce the amount of moral damages to P15.Espino is a graduate Mechanical Engineer from U. son of the late Jose Maria Espino. President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Pilar. Private respondent Bienvenido Bacalocos." . retired Minister. (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest. . GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET INC V ESPINO GUERRERO. (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21. . 21 of the Civil Code in relation to par. member of the Knights of Columbus. wounded feelings and social humiliation.In addition to the award of moral damages. Then. (10) of Art. The prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to cause additional mental and moral suffering to private respondent.. 27. struck a bottle of beer on the table causing an injury on his hand which started to bleed. under the circumstances. (7) Libel. or other lascivious acts. 2219. 1979 NATURE Certiorari from CA’s decision to grant P75k.135 - prof. Class 1950. on the other hand.000. moral shock. Capiz and a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.The award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which provides that "willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that. This is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. Department of Foreign Affairs at the Philippine Embassy. . Washington. The fact that the complaint for qualified theft was dismissed by the Pasay City fiscal is no consolation. holding private respondent liable to the former for moral damages as a result of the physical suffering. However.. Council No. being similarly warranted by Article 2234 of the Civil Code as complemented by Article 2220. a corporate manager incharge of motoring and warehousing therein. exemplary damages and atty’s fees. It stigmatized private respondent causing him emotional depression and social degradation. 26. Patricio filed a complaint for Slander by Deed. FACTS . who was in a state of drunkenness and standing near the same gate together with his companions. employed as an executive of Proctor & Gamble Phils. Pursuant to Art. Under the circumstances. December 28. P25k and P5k to Espino for moral damages. While a benefit dance was ongoing in connection with the celebration of the town fiesta.00. PATRICIO V LEVISTE PADILLA. sought to vindicate its financial loss by filing the complaint for qualified theft against respondent Ongsip knowing it to be false. (6) Illegal search. 1989 FACTS . 29.00 as exemplary damages. Necessarily. honorably discharged from the Philippine Army in 1946. As a result. indemnification had to be made. The damage had been done. a commotion ensued and private respondent was brought by the policemen to the municipal building.As to moral damages.One morning in 1970.000. 30 32. exemplary or corrective damages may be imposed upon herein private respondent by way of example or correction for the public good. "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals.000. . without provocation.Petitioner's act in disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas service without prior notice constitutes breach of contract amounting to an independent tort. (9) Acts mentioned in article 309. to wit: "ART. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. An award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. an ordained Catholic priest. 28.

thereby causing him mental anguish. It is against morals. The CFI dismissed. good customs and public policy to humiliate. Del Rosario and Sierra engaged her services for their church wedding on 10 October 1996. saying he was a regular customer of the supermarket. Moreover.85 file.nakaw na naman ito. that many people were present and they saw and heard the ensuing interrogation and altercation appears to be simply a matter of coincidence in a supermarket which is a public place and the crowd of onlookers.” Espino said he was going to pay for it. The Court does not believe that private respondent was intentionally paraded in order to humiliate or embarrass him because petitioner's business depended for its success and patronage the good will of the buying public which can only be preserved and promoted by good public relations. private respondent's act of omission contributed to the occurrence of his injury or loss and such contributory negligence is a factor which may reduce the damages that private respondent may recover (Art.Fandino read the report and remarked: “Ano. wounded feelings and serious anxiety. give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith (Article 19. liquidated or exemplary damages may be adjudicated. the people whom we cause not paying for the goods say .A few days after the incident. gave the meal allowance to the band. he went around the store and found a cylindrical “rat-tail” file that he had wanted to buy for his hobby. but he forgot about the file in his pocket. petitioner kept on saying the words “Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto. Disposition Petition denied.While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral. ikaw ang kumuha. There. moral and exemplary damages. It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties. Among those present was petitioner Carpio. He was then brought to the front of the grocery. according to the circumstances of each case (Art. with a good part of the merchandise exposed.Respondent Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. He was totally embarrassed. police officers arrived and interviewed all persons who had access to the suite and fingerprinted them including Valmonte. privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons (Article 26. Espino and wife objected and said that he was not a common criminal.136 - prof. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched. He apologized and said he had forgotten. near the cashiers to a Mrs. petitioner denied having uttered words or done any act to confront or single out Valmonte during the investigation and claimed that liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. threatening to call the police and in the presence and hearing of many people at the Supermarket which brought and caused him humiliation and embarrassment. petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag were lost. Fandino reached over and took the P5 bill and said it was a fine.m. personality. CA modified: moral damages = P5k. . All the time the people were staring at him. CA awarded him damages. . and the fashion designer. It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: “Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto. . good customs or public policy. The whole incident that befell respondent had arisen in such a manner that was created unwittingly by his own act of forgetting to pay for the file. He started towards the cashier to pay. It was his forgetfulness in checking out the item and paying for it that started the chain of events which led to his embarrassment and humiliation.After reporting to the bride. temperate. interrogated and trailed by a security guard throughout the evening. he didn’t put it in the grocery cart because it might fall and get lost.” Valmonte's car which was parked at the hotel premises was also searched but the search yielded nothing. the bride's parents and relatives. 2214. except liquidated ones. the official photographers. People started milling around and stared at Espino. 2004 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . as well as attorney's fees. sufficiently rendered the petitioners A2010 . He was directed to get in line at the cashier to pay for the file. Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the items needed for the wedding rites and the gifts from the principal sponsors. nominal. The bags and personal belongings of all the people inside the room were searched. And one must act with justice. . nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto. It was around 9am and the many people were at the store. Civil Code).He paid for the items in his wife’s cart. is left to the discretion of the court. Because it was small. Valmonte filed a suit for damages against her before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. She paid the suppliers. on that day. Yet. but decided to file a case. September 9. . New Civil Code). a report was made. . She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the reception was to be held. Everyone must respect the dignity. While still shopping. While his wife was shopping for groceries. no exemplary damages. but the guard stopped him and said they were to go to the back of the supermarket. At about 4:30 p. 2216. While they were talking he stuck the file in his breast pocket. atty’s fees = P2k.After paying he and his wife walked out quickly. an aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress up for the occasion. embarrass and degrade the dignity of a person. hearers or bystanders was not deliberately sought or called by management to witness private respondent's predicament. where Espino said that he just forgot that he placed it in his pocket while talking to the maid and his wife. Valmonte noticed the people staring at her. shouting at him. Thus. Later. The hotel security was called in to help in the search.torts & damages by Grand Union) in Makati. the make-up artist and his assistant. petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of apology which she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds' relatives and guests to redeem her smeared reputation as a result of petitioner's imputations against her.Responding to the complaint. . New Civil Code). . casis . the assessment of such damages. ISSUE WON Espino is entitled to damages for the humiliation he experienced at the supermarket HELD YES . he and his wife ran into his aunt’s maid. Petitioner did not respond to the letter. Espino took out a P5 bill to pay for the P3. several persons were already there including the bride. imposing upon him a fine. On their way out. Fandino said it was a reward for guards who apprehend pilferers.The false accusation charged against the private respondent after detaining and interrogating him by the uniformed guards and the mode and manner in which he was subjected. He thought about going back that night to throw stones at the supermarket. In her complaint.” Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search Valmonte's bag. the guard stopped him and told him he hadn’t paid for the file. Upon entering the suite.” Espino objected. Petitioners wilfully caused loss or injury to private respondent in a manner that was contrary to morals. Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were billeted. Fandino. Branch 268. When she arrived at Suite 326-A. and went back to the suite. . He instead held it in his hand. Civil Code). They all intended to pay for the things that are found to them. Fandino replied: “That is all they say. During all the time Valmonte was being interrogated by the police officers. Valmonte prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay actual. CARPIO V VALMONTE 438 SCRA 38 TINGA.

serious anxiety. asserting that the proper forum is the NLRC established by Presidential Decree No. Though no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be adjudicated.00 as moral QUISABA V STA. Considering respondent's social standing. courts are mandated to take into account all the circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages according to their discretion. This being the case.the NLRC's authorized representative in Davao City opined that the NLRC no power to award damages . is exclusively cognizable by the regular courts of justice or by the NLRC HELD . moral shock and social humiliate on. and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched.Petitioner's verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. award of moral damages must be proportionate to the sufferings inflicted. besmirched reputation. social humiliation.Quisaba avers in his complaint that for 18 yrs prior to his dismissal. .000. fright. arising from an employer's constructive dismissal of an employee. Disposition Petition denied reasonable . moral shock. but to enable the latter to obtain means.The trial court rendered its Decision dismissing Valmonte's complaint for damages. The court concluded that petitioner's verbal assault upon Valmonte was done with malice and in bad faith since it was made in the presence of many people without any solid proof except petitioner's suspicion. by any standard or principle of law is impermissible. True. The complaint does not pray for reinstatement or payment of backwages. August 30. affect her future dealings with her clients.Respondent is clearly entitled to an award of moral damages.torts & damages everything that transpired after the theft incident was purely a police matter in which she had no participation." and that because of the said acts of the defendants. She adds that even on the assumption that she uttered the words complained of.That Robert Hyde instructed him to purchase logs for the company's plant to which he refused on the ground that the work of purchasing logs is inconsistent with his position as internal auditor . but to malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewelry is an act which. petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable. she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent. moral shock. and he was warned that his failure to comply would be considered a ground for his dismissal . . Petitioner contends that the appellate court's conclusion that she publicly humiliated respondent does not conform to the evidence presented.Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court erred in finding that petitioner did not slander her good name and reputation and in disregarding the evidence she presented. and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.137 - prof. by reason of defendant's culpable action. the seriousness of the imputations made by petitioner has greatly tarnished her reputation and will in one way or the other. The appellate court held that Valmonte's claim for damages is not predicated on the fact that she was subjected to body search and interrogation by the police but rather petitioner's act of publicly accusing her of taking the missing jewelry. the court found no sufficient evidence to justify the award of actual damages. petitioner virtually branded respondent as the thief. Worthy of note is that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant. this petition. The Court of Appeals ruled differently. INES CASTRO. mental anguish. It categorized petitioner's utterance defamatory considering that it imputed upon Valmonte the crime of theft. casis damages appears to be a fair and assessment of respondent's damages. ISSUE WON a complaint for moral damages. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. . Such unfounded accusation entitles Valmonte to an award of moral damages in the amount of P100. It added that no proof was presented by Valmonte to show that petitioner acted maliciously and in bad faith in pointing to her as the culprit.Sta Ines et al moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Davao CFI.00 for she was publicly humiliated. petitioner had the right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor. It opined that Valmonte has clearly established that she was singled out by petitioner as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. but not when he acts with negligence and abuse. wounded feelings. diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone.000. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for the court to adjudge Valmonte liable on her counterclaim.CFI granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint basically involves an employee-employer relationship. and the fact that her profession is based primarily on trust reposed in her by her clients. However. or that her reputation was besmirched due to petitioner's wrongful act. .That on the following day Hyde informed him of his temporary relief as internal auditor so that he could carry out immediately the instructions thus given. he was in the employ of the defendant corporation. besmirched reputation. she had no right to attack respondent with her innuendos which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly accusatory. 21. it was not shown that she did so with malice and in bad faith. . the award of P100. or to enrich a complainant. that is when he acts with prudence and good faith. It ruled that when petitioner sought investigation for the loss of her jewelry. exemplary damages. She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently. she was merely exercising her right and if damage results from a person exercising his legal right. termination pay and attorney's fees.Hence. it is damnum absque injuria. By openly accusing respondent as the only person who went out of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests therein. Her firmness and resolve to find her missing jewelry cannot justify her acts toward respondent. In any case. and embarrassed. social humiliation. wounded feelings. deeply insulted. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right. he suffered mental anguish. . . ISSUE WON petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner that is contrary to morals and good customs HELD YES A2010 .Quisaba opposed the motion.He pleaded for fairness but was instead demoted from a position of dignity to a servile and menial job. Certainly. The court said that Valmonte failed to show that she suffered serious anxiety. that the defendants did not reconsider their "clever and subterfugial dismissal" of him which for all purposes constituted a "constructive discharge. serious anxiety. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant's wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's physical suffering. 1974 NATURE Special civil action for certiorari FACTS .

. 1081. The trial court denied the motion because civil damage complaint is not based on employer-employee relationship but on manner of dismissal. Medina was the former Plant General Manager and Ong was the former Plant Comptroller.If the dismissal was done anti-socially or oppressively. But after preliminary investigation.. PD 1367 provides that Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages. 1982 FACTS . therefore. No. Governing statute is Civil Code and not Labor Code. .The dismissal was effected on the very day that plaintiffs were awarded rings of loyalty to the Company. 875. . . not by the National Labor Relations Commission. and (3) All pending cases in the Bureau of Labor Relations. complaint was dismissed allegedly because the expression was not intended to slander but to express anger. Disposition CASE REMANDED to the CFI for further proceedings in accordance with law. is provided in article 2219. . they didn't know what to do and so they cried.138 - prof. . 2219. September 11. Theirs is a simple action for damages for tortuous acts allegedly committed by defendants. OTHER TORTS AMARO V SUMANGUIT G. casis ISSUE WON Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs MEDINA V CASTRO-BARTOLOME ABAD SANTOS. . . 3 . They said the case arose from such employer-employee relationship.. ordering them thru his police to appear in his office when he is absent. and does not involve an existing EE-ER relation within the meaning of section 2(1) of LC.Upon advice of the City Mayor an investigation was conducted and as a result the city attorney of Silay was about to file or had already filed an information for illegal discharge of firearm against the assailant . “GOD DAMN IT. De Aboitiz shouted at plaintiffs in the presence of the plaintiffs’ subordinates. HELD NO . Deputy Minister of Justice issued resolution sustaining complaint. L-14986 MAKALINTAL. the defendant chief of police is now harassing the plaintiffs in their daily work.It was alleged that the defendants dismissed the plaintiffs because of an alleged delay in the use of promotional crowns when such delay was true with respect to the other plants. A2010 . the sanction for which.R. . . (1) All matters involving employee employer relations including all disputes and grievances which may otherwise