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Torts Digests

Torts Digests

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Published by: Jaimmie Hans on Aug 07, 2011
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03/13/2013

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  • NAGUIAT V NLRC (National Organization of Workingmen and Galang)
  • BARREDO V GARCIA
  • ELCANO V HILL
  • CINCO V CANONOY
  • BAKSH V CA (Gonzales)
  • CUSTODIO V CA (Heirs Of Mabasa)
  • GARCIA V FLORIDO
  • SEPARATE OPINION
  • BARREDO [concur]
  • TAYLOR V MANILA ELECTRIC
  • TAYAG V ALCANTARA
  • AQUINO [concur]
  • PEOPLE V LIGON
  • PADILLA V CA (Vergara)
  • CRUZ V CA (UMALI)
  • PHIL. RABBIT V PEOPLE
  • CANGCO V MANILA RAILROAD CO
  • MALCOLM, [dissent]
  • FORES V MIRANDA
  • M.H. RAKES V THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY
  • WILLARD AND CARSON [dissent]
  • FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V CA
  • AIR FRANCE V CA (Carrascoso, Et. Al)
  • PSBA V CA
  • SYQUIA V CA (Mla Memorial Park)
  • PICART V SMITH
  • JARCO MARKETING CORP V CA (AGUILAR)
  • MAGTIBAY V TIANGCO
  • DEL ROSARIO V MANILA ELECTRIC CO
  • ABAD SANTOS [concur in part and dissent in part]
  • YLARDE V AQUINO
  • CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO V PHILIPPINE MOTORS CORPORATION
  • UNITED STATES V PINEDA
  • BPI V CA
  • E.M. WRIGHT V MANILA ELECTRIC R.R & LIGHT CO.
  • US V BAGGAY
  • AMEDO V RIO
  • MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS V WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION
  • LAYUGAN V IAC
  • RAMOS V CA
  • BATIQUIN V CA (Villegas)
  • D.M. CONSUNJI V CA
  • MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V REMONQUILLO
  • BERNARDO V LEGASPI
  • BERNAL V HOUSE
  • ROMUALDEZ [ dissent]
  • PLDT V CA (SPS ESTEBAN)
  • GENOBIAGON V CA (PEOPLE OF THE PHILS)
  • RAKES V ATLANTIC
  • PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE V CA (ROMMEL’S MARKETING CORP.)
  • PADILLA [dissent]
  • HERNANDEZ V COMMISSION ON AUDIT
  • GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION V CHATTO
  • SERVANDO V PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO
  • AQUINO [ concur]
  • NATIONAL POWER CORP V CA (RAYO ET AL)
  • AFIALDA V HISOLE
  • ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY V CA (LUIS ET AL)
  • RAMOS V PEPSI COLA
  • METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORP V CA (CUSTODIA)
  • KRAMER VS CA (TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES)
  • ALLIED BANKING V CA (YUJUICO)
  • BATACLAN V MEDINA
  • FERNANDO V CA (City of Davao)
  • URBANO V IAC
  • PILIPINAS BANK V CA (REYES)
  • QUEZON CITY V DACARA
  • GABETO V. ARANETA
  • FAR EAST SHIPPING CO V CA (PPA)
  • SABIDO AND LAGUNDA V CUSTODIO, ET AL
  • DISPOSITION
  • MANILA ELECTRIC v REMOQUILLO
  • RODRIGUEZA V. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
  • MCKEE v IAC, TAYAG
  • TEAGUE VS. FERNANDEZ
  • BUSTAMANTE V CA (DEL PILAR AND MONTESIANO)
  • PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC V IAC (DIONISIO)
  • GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER AND HARDWARE V IAC (VDA. DE CALIBO and kids)
  • ANURAN V BUÑO
  • CONSOLIDATED BANK V CA (L.C.DIAZ AND CO.)
  • ENGADA V CA
  • VESTIL V IAC (UY) 179 SCRA 47
  • AFABLE V SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY
  • GILCHRIST v CUDDY
  • SON PING BUN vs CA (Tek Hua) GR No. 120554
  • GUILATCO v CITY OF DAGUPAN 171 SCRA 382 SARMIENTO; Mar 21, 1989
  • WORCESTER v OCAMPO
  • CHAPMAN V UNDERWOOD
  • CAEDO V YU KHE THAI
  • SABINA EXCONDE vs. DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO
  • SALEN V. BALCE
  • FUELLAS V. CADANO
  • GUTIERREZ VS GUTIERREZ
  • RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA)
  • LIBI V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SPS GOTIONG)
  • MERCADO v. COURT OF APPEALS AND QUISUMBING
  • PALISOC VS. BRILLANTES
  • AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLLETOS)
  • PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY)
  • YLARDE vs. AQUINO GANCAYCO; 1988 July 29
  • SALVOSA v. IAC (CASTRO)
  • ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v CA(Castillo/Cadiz)
  • PSBA v CA (BENITEZ/BAUTISTA)
  • SOLIMAN, JR. V JUDGE TUAZON
  • ST. MARY’S ACADEMY VS. CARPITANOS
  • PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS
  • PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA)
  • CASTILEX V. VASQUEZ
  • FILAMER V IAC
  • NPC v CA (PHESCO INC.)
  • MERRITT v GOVERNMENT
  • ROSETE v AUDITOR GENERAL
  • MENDOZA V. DE LEON
  • FONTANILLA V MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINSITRATION
  • CITY OF MANILA V TEOTICA
  • ARANETA v JOYA
  • LIM v DE LEON
  • ABERCA V VER
  • MHP GARMENTS, INC. vs. CA
  • MARCIA V CA (PAJE)
  • ARAFILES v PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC
  • MVRS V ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL
  • VITUG [concur]
  • CARPIO [dissent]
  • AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ [dissent]
  • SALTA V DE VEYRA
  • PRUDENTIAL BANK V IAC (Philippine Rayon Mills & Anacleto Chi)
  • CAPUNO V PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES
  • CORPUS V PAJE
  • MADEJA V CARO
  • DULAY V CA (SAFEGUARD, SUPERGUARD)
  • VELAYO V SHELL CO OF THE PHILS
  • SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V CA (MORADA)
  • GLOBE MACKAY V CA
  • ALBENSON V CA
  • AMONOY V GUTIERREZ
  • UE V JADER
  • GARCIANO V CA
  • BARONS MARKETING V CA (PHELPS DODGE PHILS)
  • BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION V CA (MARASIGAN)
  • RUIZ V SECRETARY
  • WASSMER V VELEZ
  • TANJANCO V SANTOS
  • BAKSH V CA
  • BUNAG V CA (CIRILO)
  • CONSTANTINO V MENDEZ
  • QUIMIGUING V ICAO
  • PE V PE
  • QUE V IAC (NICOLAS)
  • DRILON V CA (ADAZA)
  • ALBENSON V CA (BALTAO)
  • MANILA GAS CORPORATION V CA (ONGSIP)
  • PATRICIO V LEVISTE
  • GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET INC V ESPINO
  • CARPIO V VALMONTE
  • QUISABA V STA. INES
  • MEDINA V CASTRO-BARTOLOME
  • AQUINO [dissent]
  • AMARO V SUMANGUIT
  • ST. LOUIS REALTY V ARAMIL
  • CONCEPCION V CA
  • CUSTODIO V CA
  • ALGARRA V SANDEJAS
  • PNOC V CA (MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING CORPORATION)
  • INTEGRATED PACKING V CA
  • DBP V CA (CUBA)
  • FUENTES V CA
  • TALISAY SILAY V ASSOCIACION
  • PNOC V CA
  • RAMOS V CA (DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. HOSAKA)
  • GATCHALIAN V DELIM
  • VICTORY LINER V HEIRS OF ANDRES MALECDAN
  • QUIRANTE V IAC
  • CRISMINA GARMENTS V CA
  • CERRANO V TAN
  • KIERULF V CA (PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS)
  • VISAYAN SAWMILL V CA
  • COMPAÑIA MARITIMA V ALLIED FREE WORKERS UNION
  • MIRANDA-RIBAYA V BAUTISTA
  • DEL ROSARIO V CA (METAL FORMING CORP)
  • RAAGAS v TRAYA
  • ENERVIDA v DELA TORRE
  • PEOPLE V BUGAYONG
  • FRANCISCO V GSIS
  • EXPERT TRAVEL & TOURS INC V CA (LO)
  • MIJARES V CA (METRO DRUG INC)
  • DE LA PEÑA V CA (TAN)
  • J MARKETING V SIA
  • COMETA V CA (MACLI-ING ET AL)
  • INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE COMPANY V BONDAD
  • TRIPLE EIGHT INTEGRATED SERVICES, INC V NLRC
  • PEOPLE V PIRAME
  • ARCONA V CA (PEOPLE)
  • PNB V CA (FLORES)
  • FULE V CA (CRUZ, BELARMINO)
  • PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC V CA (PANTEJO)
  • VALENZUELA V CA
  • SUMALPONG V CA (PEOPLE)
  • LOPEZ V PAN AM WORLD AIRWAYS
  • PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILS V CA (SPS CHUA)
  • STREBEL V FIGUERAS
  • ABS-CBN V CA (REPUBLIC BROADCASTING CORP, VIVA FILMS)
  • NPC v PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC
  • VENTANILLA V CENTENO
  • ROBES-FRANCISCO REALTY V CFI AND MILLAN
  • PEOPLE V GOPIO
  • ARMOVIT V CA (NORTHWEST AIRLINES)
  • FRANCISCO V FERRER
  • PLENO V CA (PHILIPPINE PAPER PRODUCTS INC ET AL)
  • PEOPLE V SINGH
  • PEOPLE V PLAZO
  • PNB V CA
  • DEL ROSARIO V CA (METAL FORMING CORP.)

torts & damages

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prof. casis
1. NO, the NLRC did not act in excess of jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion. Ratio Findings of fact of administrative bodies and quasi-judicial bodies are afforded great respect by the Court and are binding except when there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or the decision was arrived at arbitrarily. Reasoning - Respondents showed that their monthly take home pay amounted to no less than $240 and this was not disputed by petitioners. - There is no record or evidence which shows that the closure of the taxi business was brought about by great financial losses no thanks to the Pinatubo eruption. It was rather brought about by the closure of the military bases. - Art. 283 of the CC provides that separation pay shall be equivalent to 1 month pay or at least ½ month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. The NLRC ruling was correct in terms of US$120 as the computed separation pay. 2. Petitioners can no longer question the authority of NOWM and are held in estoppel. Reasoning - NOWM was already representing the respondents before the labor arbiter and the petitioners did not assail their juridical personality then. - Petitioners also acknowledged before the Court that the taxi drivers are themselves parties in the case. 3. Naguiat Enterprises is not liable, Antolin Naguiat is not personally liable whereas Sergio Naguiat is solidarily liable. - Re: Naguiat Enterprises’ liability Reasoning - The respondents were regular employees of CFTI who received wages on a boundary basis. They offered no evidence that Naguiat Enterprises managed, supervised and controlled their employment. They instead submitted documents which had to do with CFTI, not Naguiat Enterprises. - Labor-only contractors are those where 1) the person supplying workers to the employer does no have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools or machinery and 2) the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of the employer. - Independent contractors are those who exercise independent employment, contracting to do a piece of work according to their own methods without being subject to the control of their employer except as to the result of their work. - Sergio Naguiat was a stockholder and director of Naguiat Enterprises but, in supervising the taxi drivers

INTRODUCTION
NAGUIAT V NLRC (National Organization of Workingmen and Galang) 269 SCRA 565 PANGANIBAN; March 13, 1997
NATURE Special civil action in the Supreme Court, certiorari FACTS - Clark Field Taxi, Inc. held a concessionaire’s contract with the Army Air Force Exchange Services for the operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base. Sergio Naguiat was the president of CFTI while Antolin Naguiat was its vice president. Like Naguiat Enterprises, Inc. which was a trading firm, it was also a family-owned corporation. - Respondents were employed by the CFTI as taxicab drivers. > They were required to pay a daily boundary fee of US$26.50 (for those on duty from 1AM-12N) or US$27 (for those on duty from 12N to 12 MN) > Incidental expenses were maintained by the drivers (including gasoline expenses). > Drivers worked 3-4 times a week depending on the availability of vehicles and earned no less than US$15.00 a day. In excess of that amount, they had to make cash deposits to the company which they could withdraw every fifteen days. - AAFES was dissolved because of the phase-out of the military bases in Clark and the services of the respondents were officially terminated on November 26, 1991. - AAFES Taxi Drivers Association, the drivers union, and CFTI held negotiations as regards separation benefits. They arrived at an agreement that the separated drivers would be given P500 for ever year as severance pay. Most of the drivers accepted this but some refused to do so. - Those who did not accept the initial severance pay disaffiliated themselves with drivers union and through the National Organization of Workingmen, they filed a complaint against Sergio Naguiat under the name and style Naguiat Enterprises, AAFES and AAFES union. - The labor arbiter ordered the petitioner to pay the drivers P1,200 for every year of service for humanitarian consideration, setting aside the earlier agreement between the CFTI and the drivers union. It

also rejected the idea that the CFTI was forced to close it business due to great financial losses and lose opportunity since at the time of its closure it was profitably earning. The labor arbiter however did not award separation pay because to “impose a monetary obligation to an employer whose profitable business was abruptly shot (sic) shot down by force majeur would be unfair and unjust.” - The NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter after respondents appealed by granting separation pay to the private respondents. It said that half of the monthly salary should be US$120 which should be paid in Philippine pesos. Naguiat Enterprieses should be joined with Sergio and Antolin Naguiat as jointly and severally liable. Petitioners’ Claim: - Petitioners claim that the cessation of the business was due to the great financial losses and lost business opportunity when Clark Air Base was phased out due to the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement and the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. - They admitted that CFTI had agreed with the drivers union to grant the taxi drivers separation pay equivalent to P500 for every year of service. - They allege that Sergio and Antolin Naguiat were denied due process beause the petitioners were not furnished copies of the appeal to the NLRC. - They also allege that NOWM cannot make legal representation in behalf of the respondents because the latter should be bound by the decision of the drivers union. Respondents’ Comments: - The drivers alleged that they were employees of Naguiat Enterprises although their individual applications were approved by CFTI. They claimed to have been assigned to Naguiat Enterprises after having been hired by CFTO and that Naguia Enterprises managed, controlled and supervised their employment. - They averred that they should be entitled to separation pay based on their latest daily earnings or US$15 for working 16 days a month. ISSUES 1. WON the NLRC acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in granting separation pay 2. WON NOWM was authorized to represent the private respondents 3. WON Naguiat Enterprieses, Sergio Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat were liable 4. WON Sergio and Antolin Naguiat were denied due process HELD

torts & damages
and determining their employment terms, he was carrying out his responsibility as president of CFTI. - Naguiat Enterprises was in the trading business while CFTI was in the taxi business. - The Constitution of the CFTI-AAFES Taxi Drivers Association states that the members of the union are employees of CFTI and for collective and bargaining purposes, the employer is also CFTI. - Re: Antolin Naguiat’s liability Reasoning - Although he carried the title of general manager, it has not been shown that he had acted in such capacity. - No evidence on the extent of his participation in the management or operation of the business was proferred. - Re: Sergio Naguiat’s liability Ratio A director or officer may be held solidarly liable with a corporation by a specific provision of law because a corporation, being a juridical entity, may act only through its directors and officers. Obligations incurred by them, acting as such corporation agents, are not theirs but the direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent. In the absence of definite proof of who clearly are the officers of the corporation, the assumption falls on the President of the corporation. Reasoning - In his capacity as President, Sergio Naguiat cannot be exonerated. - An employer is defined to be any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. - Case in point is A.C. Ransom Labor Union CCLU vs. NLRC held that the identified employer A.C. Ransom Corporation, being an artificial person, must have an officer and in the absence of proof, the president is assumed to be the head of the corporation. - Both CFTI and Naguiat Enterprises were close family corporations owned by the same family. To the extent that stockholders are actively engaged in the management or business affairs of a close corporation, the stockholders shall be held to strict fiduciary duties to each other and among themselves. Said stockholders shall be liable for corporate torts unless the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance. > Nothing in the records indicate that CFTI obtained reasonable adequate liability insurance. > Jurisprudence is wanting in the definition of corporate tort. Tort essentially consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Tort is a breach of legal duty. > Art. 238 mandates the employer to grant separation pay to employees in case of cessation of operations or closure of the business not due to

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prof. casis
directly responsible under A1903CC as employer of Fontanilla HELD YES - There are two actions available for parents of Garcia. One is under the A100RPC wherein the employer is only subsidiarily liable for the damages arising from the crime thereby first exhausting the properties of Fontanilla. The other action is under A1903CC (quasidelict or culpa aquiliana) wherein as the negligent employer of Fontanilla, Barredo is held primarily liable subject to proving that he exercising diligence of a good father of the family. The parents simply took the action under the Civil Code as it is more practical to get damages from the employer bec he has more money to give than Fontanilla who is yet to serve his sentence. Obiter Difference bet Crime and Quasi-delict 1) crimes – public interest; quasi-delict – only private interest 2) Penal code punishes or corrects criminal acts; Civil Code by means of indemnification merely repairs the damage 3) delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts; crimes are only punished if there is a penal law; quasi-delicts include any kind of fault or negligence intervenes NOTE: not all violations of penal law produce civil responsibility e.g. contravention of ordinances, violation of game laws, infraction of rules of traffic when nobody is hurt 4) crime – guilt beyond reasonable doubt; civil – mere preponderance of evidence - Presumptions: 1) injury is caused by servant or employee, there instantly arises presumption of negligence of master or employer in selection, in supervision or both 2) presumption is juris tantum not juris et de jure TF may be rebutted by proving exercise of diligence of a good father of the family - basis of civil law liability: not respondent superior bu the relationship of pater familias - motor accidents – need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles

serious business losses or financial reverses which is the condition on this case. 4. There was no denial of due process. Reasoning - Even if the individual Naguiats were not impleaded as parties of the complaint, they could still be held liable because of jurisprudence (A.C. Ransom case). - Both also voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter when they filed a position paper. DISPOSITION The petition is partly granted. 1) CFTI and Sergio Naguiat are ordered to pay jointly and severally the individual respondents of US$120 for every year of service and 2) Naguiat Enterprises and Antolin Naguiat are absolved from liability.

BARREDO V GARCIA BOCOBO; July 8, 1942
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - from CA, holding Fausto Barredo liable for damages for death pf Faustino Garcia caused by negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by Fausto Barredo - May 3, 1936 – in road between Malabon and Navotas, head-on collision between taxi of Malate Taxicab and carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis thereby causing overturning of the carretela and the eventual death of Garcia, 16-yo boy and one of the passengers - Fontanilla convicted in CFI and affirmed by CA and separate civil action is reserved - Parents of Garcia filed action against Barredo as sole proprietor of Malate Taxicab as employer of Fontanilla - CFI and CA awarded damages bec Fontanilla’s negligence apparent as he was driving on the wrong side of the road and at a high speed > no proof he exercised diligence of a good father of the family as Barredo is careless in employing (selection and supervision) Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of Automobile Law and speeding > CA applied A1903CC that makes inapplicable civil liability arising from crime bec this is under obligations arising from wrongful act or negligent acts or omissions punishable by law - Barredo’s defense is that his liability rests on RPC TF liability only subsidiary and bec no civil action against Fontanilla TF he too cannot be held responsible ISSUE WON parents of Garcia may bring separate civil action against Barredo making him primarily liable and

ELCANO V HILL 77 SCRA 98 BARREDO; May 26, 1977
NATURE Appeal from an order of the CFI Quezon City FACTS

torts & damages
- Reginald Hill, a minor yet married at the time of occurrence, was criminally prosecuted for the killing of Agapito Elcano (son of Pedro), and was acquitted for “lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.” - Pedro Elcano filed a complaint for recovery of damages from Reginald and his father Atty Marvin. CFI dismissed it. ISSUES 1. WON the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability was not reversed 2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last par) of the CC can be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the occurrence, Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married HELD 1. NO -The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him. -Barredo v Garcia (dual character—civil and criminal — of fault or negligence as a source of obligation): "The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued." "It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1402 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case aria for which, after un a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.” -Culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of a penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. -ART 1162: "Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of

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prof. casis
- Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. 2. YES (but…) - Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. (However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.) - While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he was of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian." - Under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." - In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual. - It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. - On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.

this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, Article 2177 of the new code provides: "ART 277. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising front negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant." - According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a 'culpa aquilian' or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and 'culpa extracontractual' or 'cuasi-delito' has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery," - Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth life" rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that me preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 12) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it’s "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress", to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. - Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.

CINCO V CANONOY 90 SCRA 369

Petitioner appealed this decision to respondent CA. and is an exchange student taking up medicine at the Lyceum in Dagupan. raising the single issue of WON Art. . may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case. and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.In the instant case. is so broad that in includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. Reasoning . 33.. Art.That she is a 22 yr. admitting only the personal circumstances of the parties in the complaint but denied the rest of the allegations. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court: Sec 2. as specifically provided for in Art 2177 of the Civil Code. a criminal case was filed against the driver Romeo Hilot arising from the same accident. **MG’s allegations in the complaint: .At the pre-trial in the civil case. Respondents’ Comments: . The word damage is used in two concepts: the “harm” done and “reparation” for the harm done. casis claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married.it was the fault r negligence of the driver in the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision. . The concept of quasi-delict. And with respect to “harm” it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since “harm” is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. Such civil action shall A2010 -4- prof. 21 applies to this case. ISSUE WON there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action HELD YES . A week before the filing of the complaint. particularly of Romeo Hilot. Independent civil action. respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise. .torts & damages Melencio-Herrera. as enunciated in Art 2176 of the Civil Code. 32. He also prayed for 25.That Baksh is an Iranian citizen. which in turn dismissed the petition.That Baksh later courted and proposed to marry her.Subsequently. It makes no distinction between “damage to persons” on the one hand and “damage to property” on the other. . Petitioner’s MFR having been denied. A day before the filing of the complaint. fees plus litigation expenses. that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals. proof that he had. petitioner started maltreating her even threatening to kill her and as a result of such maltreatment. . could justify the award of damages pursuant to Art.Petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasidelict.000 plus additional costs.Private respondent Marilou Gonzales (MG) filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married.Damages were sustained by petitioner because of the collision . ISSUE WON damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Art. He .19. It is essential however. 1993 NATURE Appeal by certiorari to review and set aside the CA decision which affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision FACTS . MG accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. old Filipina. an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. May 31. etc. he elevated the matter on Certiorari to the CFI Cebu. applying Art. she sustained injuries. .Respondent CA promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto the trial court’s ruling which prompted Baksh to file this petition for certiorari. atty’s fees. in reality.Where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress.They observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Petitioner had visited MG’s parents to secure their approval of the marriage.There was a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private respondents. single. contending that the trial court erred in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and in ordering him to pay moral damages.21 of the Civil Code HELD 1.000 as moral damages and 3.. Feb.Baksh answered with a counterclaim. 21 CC decided in favor of private respondent.000 as moral damages plus misc. Plaintiff’s claims: .21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. 19701 a complaint for recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito. 21 may be applied. counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit. expenses. . did not maltreat her but only told her to stop coming to his place after having discovered that she stole his money and passport.000 pesos atty’s.The City Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the civil case. BAKSH V CA (Gonzales) 219 SCRA 115 DAVIDE. . the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action.The RTC. They later agreed to get married at the end of the school semester. – In the cases prvided for in Articles 31. Baksh repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that he is already married to someone in Bacolod. Petitioner was thus ordered to pay Php 20. JR. good customs or public policy.Liability being predicated on quasi-delict. 1979 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . She prayed for payment for damages amounting to Php 45. of good moral character and respected reputation in her community. . . YES Ratio In a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code f the Philippines. no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act.Cinco filed on Feb 25. neither sought the consent of her parents nor forced her to live in his apt. . residing in Dagupan. Baksh later forced MG to live with him.The separate and independent civil action for quasidelict is also clearly recognized in sec 2. . DISPOSITION Writ of Certiorari granted. provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section.

In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which.The trial court found the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. the Commission has deemed it necessary. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Vidal Agliam. which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless. which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.21 Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. The girl becomes pregnant. his brother Jerry Agliam. Carmelo Agliam. if considered. as the girl is above 18 yrs of age. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or value which could alter the result of the case. the private respondent surrendered her virginity. They proceeded to attend a dance but did not stay long because they sensed some hostility from Cesar Galo and his companions who were giving them dagger looks. even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury. in the absence of Art.000. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code.torts & damages preparatory to their supposed marriage.The group had barely left when their owner jeep was fired upon from the rear. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Art. in fact. with certain exceptions.00. from which We quote: “The elimination of this chapter is proposed. there is no crime. . DISPOSITION finding no reversible error in the challenged decision. is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. “An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: 'A' seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of 'X.All pleaded not guilty. if the foregoing rule is approved. Lastly. and that his hand may have been contaminated by a nitrogenous compound. Article 21. Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino sustained injuries.In his testimony. in the interest of justice. he busied himself with some chores. Bulusan was not tested for nitrates. just consumed eight cigarette sticks prior to the test. are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Art. . Therefore. . The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in the amount of P50. which defines a quasi-delict. the cherished possession of every single Filipina. He handled the fertilizers without gloves. Eduardo Tolentino was not even able to move from his seat and was hit with a bullet which punctured his right kidney which caused his death. Raymundo Bangi and Marcial Barid converged at a carinderia owned by Ronnel Tolentino. 1998 NATURE An appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. and ordered them to pay jointly and solidarily: 1. Art.00. qualified by treachery. The next morning. though the grievous moral wrong has been committed. Galo attempted to exculpate himself from the results by confessing that he had been a cigarette smoker for the past ten years and had. it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. they decided to head for home instead of reacting to the perceived provocation of Galo and his companions. that he went to a nearby store to purchase some cigarettes. **Obiter: on Torts and Quasi-delicts . the legislator.337 or Art. Paraffin tests conducted on Galo and Ballesteros produced positive results. with interest. she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages.2176 CC. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes. false imprisonment and deceit. Art. unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which. would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.. His younger brother Jerry also managed to jump out. Under the present laws. the said Code contains a provision.” A2010 -5- prof. his halfbrother Eduardo Tolentino.2176 CC. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs. moral damages in the amount of P20. the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying. and although the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage. qualified by treachery.Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo and Vidal Agliam.Ballesteros interposed the defense of alibi. Galo claimed that he did not even talk to Bulusan or any of his companions. warrants for the arrest of Ballesteros. and actual damages in the amount of P35. not because of lust but because of moral seduction. Carmelo Agliam.338 of the RPC because the private respondent was above 18 years of age at the time of the seduction.00. But under the proposed article. to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule: “Art. He returned home and cleaned his garlic bulbs before retiring at 9:00 o’clock. is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept.. He said that he uses his left hand in lighting cigarettes and he had no motive to kill the victims. it is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses.21.. The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. would have been beyond redress. Having been found with gunpowder residue in his hands. or can not be proved. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. casis . Thus at one stroke. .As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report: “But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. January 29. In order to avoid trouble.755.' A promise of marriage either has not been made. Thus. FACTS . good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Syquia. the source of which is urine.Moreover.21 fills that vacuum. but was shot in the stomach and died.000. Galo and Bulusan were issued. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code.” . known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana.This notwithstanding. Robert Cacal.Bulusan echoed the defense of alibi of Galo and Ballesteros . scurried to the side of the road and hid in the ricefield. . . she and her parents would have such a right of action.evening of May 28.” . but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and battery. might affect the result of the case.Art. he said that he was not even present at the crime scene . Ronnel Tolentino. which included fertilizing his pepper plants with sulfate. especially during the festivity. the instant petition is hereby DENIED PEOPLE V BALLESTEROS 285 SCRA 438 ROMERO. intentional and malicious acts. Vidal Agliam was able to jump out from the jeep and landed just beside it. . 1991. Quasi-delict. In short.The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.

In granting actual or compensatory damages. compensatory damages in the amount of P50. vouchers. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. Defendant Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because there was an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first passageway. there were tenants occupying the remises and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. from behind. Palingon. February 9. And it was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area.00. although inestimable. Carmelo and Vidal Agliam both described the area to be well illumined by the moon. 3. 1996 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA FACTS . As regards moral damages. and had furthermore shown that these were the proximate result of the offender’s wrongful act or omission. . receipts. serious anxiety.000.000. 5.None of them attempted to corroborate their alibi through the testimony of witnesses. 2. Burgos St. it is obvious that the accused-appellants had sufficient opportunity to reflect on their heinous plan. Considering the luminescence of the moon and the proximity between them. The doubt to the benefit of which an accused is entitled in a criminal trial is a reasonable doubt. with interest. loss or injury sustained.. Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino. Reasonable doubt is that engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and inability. WON the trial court was correct in finding accusedappellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt 2. the same having been fully substantiated by receipts accumulated by them and presented to the CUSTODIO V CA (Heirs Of Mabasa) 253 SCRA 483 REGALADO. the accused must prove. the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. unlike those found in gunpowder. to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. the amount of psychological pain.When said property was purchased by Mabasa. Intent. method or form of attack employed by him. and actual damages in the total amount of P61. The costs. WON the Court was correct in the award of damages to the heirs of the victims HELD 1. YES Ratio The requisites of treachery are twofold: (1) (t)hat at the time of the attack. or as otherwise expressed. Positive identification prevails over denials and alibis. The prosecution need not prove motive on the part of the accused when the latter has been positively identified as the author of the crime. with interest. one would have been able to recognize the other easily . She also mentioned some other .on their excuses regarding the source of the gunpowder traces found on their hands: Experts confirm the possibility that cigarettes. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20m distant from Mabasa's residence to P. Such path is passing in between the row of houses of defendants. he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. the victims could distinctly identify their assailants. they never attempted to present as witnesses those who could have testified to having seen them elsewhere on the night in question. They were well-armed and approached the homebound victims. Reasoning . . The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino. Burgos Street from plaintiff's property. and the like.000. has to be traversed. and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means. However. there are 2 possible passageways. As access to P. but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Tipas. Therefore.00. one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises. Also. recompense. YES Ratio Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation. the constant interaction between them through the years (in the buying and selling of cattle and Bulusan was a classmate of Vidal) would necessarily lead to familiarity with each other such that.00. moral shock and so forth.00 each. must be amended.00. not a whimsical or fanciful doubt based on imagined but wholly improbable possibilities and unsupported by evidence. There was no opportunity for the latter to defend themselves 3.on the defense of alibi: for the defense of alibi to prosper. YES Ratio Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by law to convict a person of a criminal charge. sometime in February.00 is given to the heirs of the victims by way of indemnity. damage and injury caused to the heirs of the victims. the claim for actual damages by the heirs of the victims is not controverted. physical suffering. at the very least. Sr. is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result. actual damages in the amount of P2. fertilizers and A2010 -6- prof. after such investigation. as corroborated by his testimony. may be washed off with tap water. . Hence.torts & damages 2. Manifestations of their evil designs were already apparent as early as the time of the dance. In passing thru said passageway. on the other hand. urine may leave traces of nitrates. and moral damages in the amount of P10. may be determined by the trial court in its discretion.003.000. or satisfaction for an injury sustained. ISSUES 1. moral damages in the amount of P5. or in recompense for. Here.The plaintiff-appellee Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P. 1982.Here. a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6m in length. DISPOSITION The decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Reasoning . with interest. the victim was not in a position to defend himself.That accused-appellants had no motive in perpetrating the offense is irrelevant.. the amount of P 50.785. moral damages in the amount of P20.. 4. Metro Manila. Reasoning .000. . Vidal Agliam Jr. Carmelo Agliam. the party making a claim for such must present the best evidence available. However. whereas moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has experienced mental anguish. This accused-appellants failed to satisfactorily prove. Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result. viz. totally unaware of their presence. the order granting compensatory damages to the heirs of Jerry Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr. we see no reason to disturb its findings as to this matter. The facts show that the attack was well-planned and not merely a result of the impulsiveness of the offenders. Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of. The second passageway is about 3m in width. not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime. Consistent with the policy of this Court.In their testimonies.40. the award of actual damages is proper. WON the Court correctly ruled in finding that the offense was qualified by treachery 3. but these are minimal and. In fact.. Burgos St. and not as compensatory damages. casis court. Tagig. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway.

Garcia. or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages. 7 at Zamboanga City.Petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Luminosa L. Zamboanga del Norte. 2. Al. the filing of the instant civil action is premature. Sindangan. therefore. It is within the right of petitioners. good customs or public policy. [DATE] NATURE Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental. and dismissed the complaint ISSUES 1. to enclose and fence their property (See Art. As a result of the aforesaid collision. FACTS . while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan. and driven by defendant. petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization. German C. upon his own property) in a lawful and proper manner. Mfr denied. Garcia. The injury must result from a breach of duty or a legal wrong. Ricardo Vayson. no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated. went to CA raising the sole issue of WON lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. Pedro Tumala. Some of their footwear were even lost. but wrongful. and driven by respondent. CA affirming TC judgment with modification. said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners. casis bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No.000 as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the collision.The principal argument advanced by Mactan Inc. an appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court Reasoning . .Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip. al to in a motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11.torts & damages inconveniences of having at the front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Inc. German C. there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the A2010 -7- prof. and Ester Francisco. Marcelino Inesin. . 4960 of the Municipal Court of Sindangan. . "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan. and . that act must be not only hurtful. petitioners. pursuant to Sec. there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant. Hence this appeal. petitioners. 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No.. hurt. because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver. and from the order of said Court dated January 21. in a reckless. not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver. owners and drivers. damage is the loss. dismissing petitioners' action for damages against respondents. (b) the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses P8. filed on September 1. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Pedro Tumala. hired and boarded a PU car with plate No. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way. hospital administrative officers. There must be damnum et injuria.N. is not applicable because Art 33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide. hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right (Art. . . hence not contrary to morals. the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.At about 9:30 a. Ratio Whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case. without other limitations than those established by law. although there was damage. the civil aspect of the criminal case would have to be determined only after the termination of the criminal case result of a violation of a legal duty. Garcia. Mactan Transit Co. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co. Reasoning [1] To warrant the recovery of damages. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. 1971. bookkeeper of said hospital. et. and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government hospitals. 25) with plate No. DISPOSITION The appealed decision of CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the trial court is REINSTATED. as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. there was no legal injury. and Pedro Tumala. Garcia.. Contrary to the claim of private respondents. 1971. Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital. to the public street. grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car. as owners. [2] Obiter: There is a material distinction between damages and injury. for a roundtrip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City. Zamboanga del Norte". P30K as moral damages and P10K as exemplary damages). THE CONCEPT OF QUASIDELICT GARCIA V FLORIDO [CITATION] ANTONIO. with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case. 77-4 W Z. together with his wife. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right. respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. WON CA erred in awarding damages to plaintiffappellee Mabasa HELD 1. WON the grant of right of way to herein private respondents is proper 2. YES Ratio There is no cause of action for acts done by one person (in this case. [3] In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage. or harm which results from the injury.. although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent. Thus. in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police and that. and.The lower court sustained Mactan Inc. guilty of negligence. that Art.430 CC). and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. 2850) against the private respondents. with prayer for preliminary attachment. 33 of the New Civil Code. [4] In this case. and Ester Francisco.On August 4.TC ordered (a) defendant-appellants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access — ingress and egress. denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. et. Inc.Private respondents.m. WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint for damages on the ground that since no express reservation was made by the complainants. . ISSUES 1. 1972. respectively. Luminosa L. Zamboanga del Norte.21 CC) [5] The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing. awarding damages to plaintiffs (P65K as actual damages.

. 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles.As we have stated at the outset.The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless. d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents. it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would substantially be the same. petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein. there being no showing that prejudice could be caused by doing so. . .Accordingly. it is my considered view that the latter provision is inoperative. much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused.torts & damages 2. and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case. which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners.It is. The proviso. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which became effective on January 1. but it should be noted. Since Civil Case No. therefore. and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case. that degree of care. Ratio An action shall be deemed to be based on a quasi-delict when all the essential averments under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present. but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. ANDAMO V IAC (Missionaries Of Our Lady Of La Salette. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. 2850 should be deemed as the reservation required. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. which means that of the two possible judgments. a complainant may be deemed to abandon his/her right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case. . Reasoning . This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. the actual filing of Civil Case No. Reasoning . and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties. there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala. . . It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. Articles 32. the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso." . namely: a) act or omission of the private respondents. the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extracontractual. We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal. that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made. By instituting a civil action based on a quasi-delict. an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action. 620-621). compensatory and exemplary damages . it being substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate. YES Ratio An action based on quasi-delict may be maintained independently from a criminal action. grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract from the nature and character of the action. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court SEPARATE OPINION BARREDO [concur] . it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177. .But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners. I concur in the judgment reversing the order of dismissal of the trial court in order that Civil Case No. may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law. whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering that by the institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case.Besides. WON the lower court erred in saying that the action is not based on quasi-delict since the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations and because of the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally liable for moral. evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages. . for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action.Article 2176 and 2177 definitely create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code. while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence. . 2850 is predicated on the above civil code articles and not on the civil liability imposed by the Revised Penal Code. 2. which is procedural. as one based on culpa aquiliana. et all (73 Phil. I cannot see why a reservation had to be made in the criminal case. for these articles were drafted . under the peculiar circumstances of the case. provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately. b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 1964. may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case. Hence. the injured party is entitled exclusively to the bigger one. 607. 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code. Inc) . YES. Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. in the cases provided for by Articles 31.As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in the criminal action. not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute. 4960) and the civil action by petitioners. of the Civil Code. Articles 32. an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940. and even if it were not substantive but adjective. or one where reservation to file the civil action need not be made. "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to . The former is a violation of the criminal law. 33. having always had its own foundation and individuality. HELD 1. however.In the case at bar. Garcia. c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision. As to the specific mention of Article 2177 in Section 2 of the Rule 111. subject to the limitation mentioned in the last sentence of Article 2177 of the Civil Code. 33 and 34 A2010 -8- prof. .It is true that under Sec. 2850 may proceed. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared. casis (Criminal Case No. petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case. because the action in fact satisfies the elements of quasi-delict. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car. 2 in relation to Sec. The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others. precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand.

(if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally). to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff. whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted. were constructed. And later on dismissed the Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction. the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.The decision was based on Section 3 (a). assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two. . waterpaths and contrivances. "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence. that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence.The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 21772 of the Civil Code." Reasoning .Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang.In July 1982. As held in In Azucena vs. in quasi-delicts. adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence.On April 26. There can be no logical conclusion than this. . Potenciano. Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent. 1983. but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. the recitals of the complaint. like the rest of the residents. an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. of ancient origin.A careful examination of the complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict. . Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land.While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the instant case is privately owned. or some other person for whose acts he must respond. and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction. to recover damages on both scores. and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. respondent Appellate Court affirmed the order of the trial court. Consequently.On February 17. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. November 6. including an artificial lake. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court . prohibition and mandamus FACTS . Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately. ISSUE WON a corporation. washed away costly fences. which has built through its agents. and the causal connection between the act and the damage.The waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. Moreover. quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case HELD Ratio YES. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter. (b) fault or negligence of the defendant. endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons. . separate from criminal negligence. . the trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in the civil case until after judgment in the related Criminal Case. . such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature.Article 2176. which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land. . whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. damaged petitioners' crops and plants.It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. a religious corporation. petitioners instituted a criminal action against Efren Musngi. . casis between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana. Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin. . . officers and directors of respondent corporation. 1 Article 2176.In the case of Samson vs. The former is a violation of the criminal law." . 1990 NATURE Petition for certiorari.Article 2176 1of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person. thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land.Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. waterpaths. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the land. thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who. All the elements of a quasidelict are present. is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake.On February 22. the Court applied Article 1902. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Such fault or negligence. stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river. shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party. There is therefore. Inc. can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on A2010 -9- prof. petitioners filed a civil case for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent corporation. Indeed. covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character.. water conductors and contrivances within its land.torts & damages 191 SCRA 195 FERNAN. caused a young man to drown. there being fault or negligence. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person. According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight startling. as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners. having always had its own foundation and individuality. . . 1984." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. is obliged to pay for the damage done. whenever it refers to "fault or negligence". . a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act. 1986. for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31. the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike. Dionisio. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.Within the land of respondent corporation. with no pre-existing contractual obligation 2 Article 2177. provided that the offended party is not allowed.

as under the generally accepted doctrine in the United States. elementary. A2010 . The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. for the purpose of visiting one Murphy. entered upon the defendant's premises. spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. An explosion followed.But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience. this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own. ART. the boys. Jessie. must establish by competent evidence: (1) Damages to the plaintiff. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded. . The father. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability. and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics. In the case of Castillo vs. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code. 1089 Obligations are created by law. was at the time when he received the injuries complained of. . one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds. March 22. and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents. or some person for whose acts it must respond. not only for personal acts and omissions. or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place. who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap. . . Finding on inquiry that Mr.10 - prof. and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. causing more or less serious injuries to all three. received a slight cut in the neck.. . crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor. is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with them. . his nearest relative. . ART. plaintiff. for his own pleasure and convenience. or create an action for quasidelicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. (3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage. Murphy was not in his quarters.On the 30th of September. . 1903. instituted by David Taylor. Court of Appeals.The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. by his father. and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime — a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual.The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on the defendant's premises. but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not. the real difficulty arising in the application of these principles to the particular facts developed in the case under consideration. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. . upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902. and 1908 of that code. unless. the son of a mechanical engineer. and on his death or incapacity the mother. Therefore. his entry upon defendant company's premises. more mature than the average boy of his age. about 12 years of age. 15 years of age.No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premises unattended. 1910 NATURE An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries. Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties. with a boy named Manuel Claparols. ART. nor how long they had been there when the boys found them.We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code. 1905.These proposition are.It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where they were found. the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case.. who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. . and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches. awarding damages to the plaintiff. by contracts. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused — 1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence. and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule. but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible. they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. became frightened and started to run away. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite. impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery. by quasi-contracts. of course.Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts proven at the trial do not established the liability of the defendant company under the provisions of these articles. an employee of the defendant. casis ART. (2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally.After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal. and illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. was guilty. The plaintiff. in order to establish his right to a recovery.The trial court's decision. and for kindling of explosive substances which may not have been placed in a safe and proper place. the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration. ISSUE WON the defendants negligence is the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries HELD NO . David Taylor. and the intervention of his action between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the TAYLOR V MANILA ELECTRIC 16 PHIL 8 CARSON. of course. when they felt disposed so to do. and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises. a minor. and strolled around thereon without the express permission of the defendant. and do not admit of discussion.We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff. . in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist. they opened one of the caps with a knife. FACTS .torts & damages Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain .

more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age. . (84 U. we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate A2010 . or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances. and it is because we can not agree with this proposition. plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15. the company and driver filed a motion to suspend trial of the civil case on the ground that the criminal case was still pending. was able to earn P2. . we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff.As laid down in Railroad Co. and necessity. and the cases based thereon. upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases. NCC provides: “When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony. has failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a . attributable to the negligence of the company). he had been to sea as a cabin boy. 31. driven by Romeo Villa. The complaint itself shows that the claim was based on quasi-delit. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only. Inc. ISSUE WON Judge Alcantara correctly dismissed the civil case on the ground of no cause of action due to the acquittal of the driver HELD 1. which should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place where they were found by the plaintiff. so as to prevent their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient weight to put in doubt. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lino. such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter” . vs. without other fault on his part. wherein the principal question was whether a railroad company was liable for in injury received by an infant while upon its premises.Evidently." . the driver as acquitted based on reasonable doubt. But the doctrine of the case is controlling in our jurisdiction. it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts. if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant.The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Judge Alcantara granted this motion. July 23. viz: “6. ." and. In turn. but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act.. S.In the criminal case. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault. and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred. 1980 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari the order of CFI Tarlac (dismissing petition for damages) FACTS . and neither is contention that a man has a right to do what will with his own property or that children should be kept under the care of their parents or guardians. the heirs of Tayag instituted a civil action to recover damages from the company (Phil Rabbit Bus Inc) and the driver. despite his denials on the witness stand. from idle curiosity.torts & damages accident which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident. the principles on which these cases turn are that "while a railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it. The company and driver then filed for dismissal of the civil case on the ground that the heirs do not have a cause of action because of the acquittal. that we have thought proper to discuss and to consider that doctrine at length in this decision. or for purposes of amusement.In support of his contention.But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff. . nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury. if such injury was. such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years." and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of adult.True. casis not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises. he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap. recklessly. and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case. and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. "attributable to the negligence of the defendant. We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap. that because of plaintiff's youth the intervention of his action between the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the explosion which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident. NO Ratio The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi-delict. he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that. Stout (17 Wall. counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last resort in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases. which therefore was not. and that the defendant. under circumstances. . justice. this provision refers to a civil action based on an obligation arising from quasi-delict. therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. Plaintiff contends. 657). Judge Alcantara granted this and dismissed the civil case. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him.This conclusion is founded on reason.Pedro Tayag was riding a motorcycle when he was bumped by a Philippine Rabbit Bus. properly speaking. although we accept the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases. that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act. and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act.Art. and this latter the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the injuries sustained by him. . and knowingly produced the explosion.11 - prof.In the case at bar.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred. so that while it may be true that these injuries would TAYAG V ALCANTARA 98 SCRA 723 CONCEPCION.). which caused his instantaneous death. cause of the injury received by the plaintiff. and yet he willfully. . Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in several courts. the acquittal of the driver of the crime charged is not a bar to the prosecution for damages based on quasi-delict Reasoning . Pending the criminal case against the driver. on the other hand.

October 31.February 17. . Patrolmen Leonardo Pugao and Peter Ignacio. dated October 23. 100 Phil. as plaintiffs in the civil case.I concur because petitioners' action for damages is based on article 2177 of the Civil Code. there could be no reason for the latter to run after the Kombi and hang on to its window." . the latter could not have fallen down. RTC convicted Fernando Gabat. 1983 . Rogelio Ligon. The court said that it is of common knowledge that cigarette vendors plying their trade in the streets do not let go of their cigarette box. Citing Elcano v Hill: a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act. Yatco. Ligon which was coming from España Street going towards the direction of Quiapo. and his companion. .The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's version. not for civil liability from criminal negligence. When they reached the Luneta near the Rizal monument. Rosales approached the Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of cigarettes. 1984 . . Rosales was rushed by some bystanders to the Philippine General Hospital.torts & damages family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Recto Avenue. The petitioners. 1983. they stopped. who allegedly witnessed the incident . where he was treated for multiple physical injuries and was confined thereat until his death on October 30. July 29.Following close behind (about 3 meters) the Kombi at the time of the incident was a taxicab driven by Castillo. Castillo saw an owner-type jeep with two persons in it. bilateral.Investigating Fiscal Cantos. Gabat. of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua where he robbed and killed Jose Rosales y Ortiz. It is not controverted. under which according to the Code Commission. no vendor lets go of his precious box of cigarettes in order to change a peso bill given by a customer. also went along with them. Gabat beckoned a cigarette vendor. otherwise. The Kombi did not stop after the victim fell down on the pavement near the foot of the underpass. . the acquittal of Romeo Villa was based on reasonable doubt. 1987 . holding it with his left hand. through the sole testimony of the taxicab driver that Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales and pried loose the latter's hand from the window of the Kombi. Rogelio Ligon. was riding in a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father and driven by the other accused. 1984. These affidavits were already prepared and merely sworn to before Fiscal Cantos on January 17.the co-accused. and damage to his property would not have occurred.” All the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action are present: (1) act or omission constituting fault /negligence on the part of respondent (2) damage caused by the said act or omission (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or omission and (4) no preexisting contractual relation between the parties. Rosales to buy some cigarettes from him.prosecution tried to establish. having already been able to balance himself on the stepboard. otherwise.June 28. They drew their SEPARATE OPINION AQUINO [concur] .On the other hand.an autopsy was conducted by the medico-legal officer of NBI which stated the cause of death of Rosales as "pneumonia hypostatic. while he was trying to get from his pocket the change for the 5peso bill of Gabat. particularly defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan. NATURE Appeal from the judgment of the RTC Manila FACTS . filed an information against Rogelio Ligon charging him with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. casis guns and told the driver. . . .October 23. "acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence. can amend their complaint and base their action also on article 29 NCC which allows an independent civil action for damages in case of acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt. The taxicab driver. . . .12 - prof. secondary to traumatic injuries of the head. a seventeen-year old working student who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. Article 33 of the Civil Code also justifies the petitioners' independent civil action for damages since the term "physical injuries" therein embraces death (Dyogi vs. The two men on board the jeep turned out to be police officers. resulting in the latter falling down and hitting the pavement. the traffic light changed to green. Prudencio Castillo. PEOPLE V LIGON 152 SCRA 419 YAP. He was traveling on the same lane in a slightly oblique position. Sr. to alight from the Kombi. WON he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted." The two men in the jeep joined the chase and at the intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard. Fermin Payuan. A2010 .Moreover. 1095). Rule III of the Rules of Court that there should be a reservation in the criminal cases of the right to institute an independent civil action is contrary to law. the trial court dismissed as incredible the testimony of Gabat that the cigarette vendor placed the cigarette box on the windowsill of the Kombi. Castillo pursued it as it sped towards Roxas Boulevard. cigarette vendors. stating that there can be no doubt that Gabat forcibly took or grabbed the cigarette box from Rosales because. At the intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street before turning left towards the underpass at C. As to what precisely happened between Gabat and Rosales at the crucial moment. Payuan also prepared a Traffic Accident Report. and immediately thereafter.The three were all brought by the police officers to the Western Police District and turned over to Pfc.The requirement in section 2. The court also believed Castillo's testimony that Gabat forcibly removed or pried off the right hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi. 1986. While waiting.M. the accident in question which resulted in the death of Pedro Tayag. a certain Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at the rear seat. Fernando Gabat. that as the Kombi continued to speed towards Quiapo. He sought their assistance in chasing the Kombi. but for damages due to a quasidelict or culpa aquiliana".6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias were released early morning the following day.Assistant Fiscal Cantos filed another information against Rogelio Ligon and Fernando Gabat for Robbery with Homicide based on a Supplemental Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo and a joint affidavit of Armando Espino and Romeo Castil. Order of CFI Tarlac set aside. He immediately blocked the Kombi while the jeep pulled up right behind it.m. shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action. Castillo was able to overtake the Kombi when the traffic light turned red. While this transaction was occurring. provided that offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores DISPOSITION petition granted. Rosales clung to the window of the Kombi but apparently lost his grip and fell down on the pavement. is the subject of conflicting versions by the prosecution and the defense. Otherwise. 1983. He was allegedly robbed of his cigarette box containing cigarettes worth P300. case REMANDED to lower court for further proceedings. but Rogelio Ligon was detained and turned over to the City Fiscal's Office for further investigation. was never apprehended and is still at large.00 more or less. however. It was found out that there was a third person inside the Kombi. beeping his horn to make the driver stop. 1983 .at about 6:10 p. and the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved forward. telling them "nakaaksidente ng tao. whether on reasonable doubt or not.December 6. 1983 .

These are circumstances which must be taken into consideration in evaluating Castillo's testimony as to what exactly happened between Gabat and the cigarette vendor during that crucial moment before the latter fell down. the CA reversed the findings of the CFI and acquitted the appellants based on reasonable doubt but nonetheless ordered them to pay P9.a careful review of the record shows that certain material facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which.Article 29 of the Civil Code. casis FACTS . 1964. Castillo's line of vision was partially obstructed by the back part of the Kombi.torts & damages ISSUE WON the prosecution’s set of facts should be given credence HELD NO . In the process however the stock in trade and certain furniture of Vergara were lost and destroyed. which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission. He is therefore entitled to acquittal on reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party. His testimony that he saw Gabat grab the cigarette box from Rosales and forcibly pry loose the latter's hand from the windowsill of the Kombi is thus subject to a reasonable doubt. occupying approximately one-third (1/3) of the rear end of the vehicle. on or about February 8." It is just and proper that. why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? DISPOSITION Appellant acquitted for the crime of robbery and homicide. . "This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences.Judicial notice may also be taken of the fact that the rear windshield of the 1978 Volkswagon Kombi is on the upper portion.600. only a A2010 . if taken into account. . for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused." his testimony. civil liability cannot be demanded.13 - prof. where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. As the taxicab was right behind the Kombi. In the case at bar. when the latter is not proved. the judgment of not guilty was based on reasonable doubt. and to determine the logical result of the distinction. but sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales y Ortiz. following it at a distance of about three meters. held that extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime.While the prosecution witness. The decision of the CA was based on the fact that the petitioners were charged with coercion when they should have been more appropriately charged with crime against person. the court express a finding that the defendants’ offenses are civil in nature. according to the court a quo. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. would alter the result of the case in that they would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused to acquittal. the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Since the standard of proof to be used in civil cases is preponderance of evidence. is not entirely free from doubt because his observation of the event could have been faulty or mistaken. went to the public market to execute an alleged order of the Mayor to clear the public market of stalls which were considered as nuisance per se. PADILLA V CA (Vergara) 129 SCRA 558 GUTIERREZ.Petitioners.On appeal.Considering the above circumstances. The SC took the position that the said provision merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice. . The stall of one Antonio Vergara was demolished pursuant to this order. One affects the social order and the other. has been explained by the Code Commission as follows: "The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. ISSUE WON the CA committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge HELD NO . thus making it visually difficult for Castillo to observe clearly what transpired inside the Kombi at the front end where Gabat was seated. even if not tainted with bias.The SC. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense.The petitioners were found guilty of grave coercion after trial at the CFI and were sentenced to five months and one day imprisonment and ordered to pay fines. but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished. preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt. the Court is not convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of the accused Fernando Gabat has been established beyond reasonable doubt.The Court also tackled the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code to clarify whether a separate civil action is required when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. "other than to see that justice be done. quoting Section 3 (C) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and various jurisprudence including PNB vs Catipon. In our view.00 as actual damages. . Castillo. [date] NATURE Petition of rcertiorari to revies the decision of the Court of Appeals . may be a disinterested witness with no motive. the quantum of proof necessary to sustain Gabat's conviction of so serious a crime as robbery with homicide has not been met in this case. specially considering that this occurrence happened in just a matter of seconds. and both vehicles during that time were moving fast in the traffic. .However. . De Guzman vs Alvia. .The petitioner filed the appeal to the SC questioning the grant of actual damages despite a no guilty verdict. The taxicab which Castillo was driving was lower in height compared to the Kombi in which Gabat was riding-a fact admitted by Castillo at the trial. . the crime of grave coercion was not proved in accordance with the law. unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the facts from which the civil action might arise did not exist. it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. Hence. The acquittal extinguishes the criminal liability but not the civil liability particularly if the finding is not guilty based on reasonable ground. private rights.

April 14. gasping for breath. RABBIT V PEOPLE [citation] PANGANIBAN. who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee. she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant for a rag to wipe the window and the floor with. 2004 NATURE Petition for Review FACTS . a matter of expert opinion. she was wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr. casis of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating. Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation. . she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50. Thus. Ercillo came out again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia.After the lapse of a few hours. Ercillo went out of the operating room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister immediately bought. the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence. in the generality of cases. Because of the untidy state of the clinic. as soon as it arrived. 1991 as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients. . Rowena then noticed her mother. The petitioner called Lydia into her office and the two had a conversation.For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is. physical condition. . Her death certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause. . The attending physicians summoned Dr. and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23. the patient died. 1991. . the accused jumped bail and remained at large.Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital. They bought type "A" blood and the same was brought by the attendant into the operating room.14 - prof. who was attached to an oxygen tank. . Bartolome Angeles. . However.Thereafter. Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead as her blood pressure was already 0/0. Some thirty minutes after. But in the event the the accused becoems insolvent. (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence. It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted. Ercillo re-operated on her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. the absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence: that the injury to the person or property was a consequence of the reckless imprudence.Rowena Umali De Ocampo accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital. The operating staff then went inside the petitioner's clinic to take their snacks. (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. The transfer to the San Pablo City District Hospital was without the prior consent of Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out about the intended transfer only when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo District Hospital. Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could be postponed. But admittedly. a person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she must be operated on as scheduled. head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the San Pablo District Hospital. While they were waiting. Unfortunately. and to pay damages. Rowena and her other relatives then boarded a tricycle and followed the ambulance. no cogent proof exists that any of these circumstances caused petitioner's death. 1997 NATURE Civil action for damages in a medical malpractice suit. 9 months and 11 days to 6 years. as in the instant case. they were not able to comply with petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank. Dr. Angeles arrived. Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years. degree of intelligence.torts & damages CRUZ V CA (UMALI) 282 SCRA 188 FRANCISCO.In litigations involving medical negligence. While petitioner was closing the abdominal wall. time and place. Prior to March 22.Rowena and her other relatives waited outside the operating room while Lydia underwent operation. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen A2010 . 1991. This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking in the case at bench. Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a "myoma" in her uterus.At around 10pm. when Dr. (3) that it be without malice. Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband together with the driver of the accused had to go to the San Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a casual connection of such breach and the resulting death of his patient. According to Rowena. and other circumstances regarding persons. Rabbit will be held liable for the civil liabilities.Napoleon Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide. the petitioner informed them that the operation was finished.WON has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. Phil.The following day. Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in good standing when performing the same operation.Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22. ISSUE WON the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide HELD NO . unless the contrary is sufficiently established. . The deference of courts to the expert opinion PHIL. that petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon. FACTS .Even without expert testimony. ISSUE WON an employer. About one hour had passed when Dr. . taking into consideration his employment or occupation. . may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused HELD .The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act. .

The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability. petitioner admits that by helping the accusedemployee. especially to a person emerging from a lighted car. 1918 NATURE An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance disallowing the claim of the plaintiff for P1. nevertheless. he used a pass. took his position upon the steps of the coach. then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.The sack of melons on the platform is because it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station for shipment to the market. whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age.Its liability is direct and immediate. . and the train station was lit dimly by a single light located some distance away. the plaintiff was returning home by rail from his daily labors. and although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars. they cannot seek relief from the court. Their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train. and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger. it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of due process. which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. located upon the line of the defendant railroad company. it participated in the proceedings before the RTC. the trial judge.In fact. . . but it was not denied its day in court. one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. sex. vested rights are acquired by the winning party.000 against the estate of the deceased James P.torts & damages NO . founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. October 14. as they are deemed to have waived the appeal. 1915.January 20. imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code.The accident occurred on a dark night. Expenses reached the sum of P790. Consequently. and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked. and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform.August 31.25 in the form of . . and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. It follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. thus. but only to extra-contractual obligations . His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited.After a judgment has become final. the judgment against him has become final and executory. was employed by Manila Railroad Company as clerk. . he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa. At the hearing in the CFI.The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them. the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities.To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend. This row of sacks was so placed that there was a space of only about two feet between the sacks of melons and the edge of the platform. By the same token.The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition. and with serious injuries. While at large. substantive CANGCO V MANILA RAILROAD CO 38 Phil 768 FISHER. also an employee of the railroad company. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company. The plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second operation was performed and the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder.On Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment: .The employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform. and as the train drew up to the station in San Mateo the plaintiff while making his exit through the door. not the court. He lived in San Mateo. nullifying or defeating the judgment. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car. . to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent would also result in improperly amending. the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering. the accusedemployee.15 - prof. Costs against petitioner. and the plaintiff appealed. He was immediately brought to a hospital where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. . . . FACTS . thus.Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. but also with regard to its amount.In commenting upon article 1093. McElroy. . In fact.that is to say. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee. When Jose Cangco stepped off. It might have lost its right to appeal. found the facts substantially as above stated. casis medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of his curation. In the case before us. . A2010 . where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period.Jose Cangco. Rizal. . and should be considered. After the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop. alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. . which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Emilio Zuniga.The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage. employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency. As the train slowed down another passenger. 1915. deprived petitioner of the right to appeal. it can be said that by jumping bail. and that they constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. got off the same car. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu. Reasoning . he instituted this proceeding in the CFI Manilato recover damages of the defendant company.On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. ISSUE WON there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff HELD NO Ratio In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act . DISPOSITION Petition is hereby DENIED. objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to discern. supplied by the company.

. should be absolved from the complaint." . but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances. the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. do injury to another. It is the Court’s conclusion that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced. after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code. without willful intent. and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3.Under the Spanish law.Every legal obligation must of necessity be extracontractual or contractual. by reason of the negligence of his servants. we are of full accord. taking into consideration the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them. the obligation of making good the damage caused. the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting. would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. The plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood.torts & damages and independent. or both. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention. and directs them with equal diligence. The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff." With the general rule relative to a passenger's contributory negligence.The Court is of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence: "The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train. but by mere negligence or inattention. and he incurs no liability whatever if. an action is brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for the damage caused by the carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of his employment The Court. which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of society. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties. whereas if the accident was caused by defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury. therefore..B. such third persons suffer damage. or in supervision over him after the selection.In considering the probability of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff the following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the SEPARATE OPINION MALCOLM. .Respondent was one of the passengers on a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga. whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation. no liability is imposed upon defendant. important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence. [dissent] . J. FORES V MIRANDA [citation] REYES. to avoid injury.290. March 4. and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure. may be rebutted. has caused damage to another. This care has been defined to be. The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract. the damages should be apportioned.L. "It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person. the particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred. and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person.The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains.The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which. even within the scope of their employment. or which arise from these relations. we are likewise in full accord. A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant. is that of ordinary or reasonable care. Article 1903 presumes negligence. we have the logical result . thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties. other than contractual. Gulf and Pacific Co. thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. . There could be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. and judgment affirmed. such is not based upon the principle of respondent superior . Atlantic.the Manila Railroad Co. not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally. and consequently.but upon the principle announced in article 1902 which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or negligence. if productive of injury. the court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that article 1903 is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a contract. which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an "accident in the performance of an obligation already existing . gives rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. It is. said: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee.With one sentence in the majority decision. namely. Litonjua and Leynes. Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual A2010 . . The cement platform also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. duties which civilized society imposes upon its members.In Bahia vs. sex and condition of the passenger. 1959 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of ." Adding these two points together. of certain members of society to others. as it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at this station." .25. in cases imposed upon employers with respect to damages due to the negligence of their employees to persons to whom they are not bound by contract. While the vehicle was descending the Sta. and for the costs of both instances. casis roadbed and the surrounding ground. . but that presumption is refutable.16 - prof. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. . . of the age. . if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence. generally embraced in the concept of status. DISPOSITION The decision of the lower court is reversed.In the Rakes vs. namely. rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris. "An attempt to alight from a moving train is negligence per se.

. Rakes. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisting contractual relation between the parties. GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY 7 Phil 359 TRACEY. Petitioner’s negligence contributed only to his own injury and not to the principal occurrence—it was merely an element to the damage caused upon him. that entitles the spouse. xxx xxx xxx ART. Five of the passengers were injured. under the circumstance.The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. casis the cars in the front by a rope. and later was subjected to a series of operations. which was later amputated at the knee. is obliged to pay for the damage done. as well as the codal concept of quasi-delict as essentially extra contractual negligence. defenses and proof. Whoever by act or omission caused damage to another. not only because Art. but it had not been proven that Atlantic inspected the track or had any proper system of inspection. At one point. As Rakes was walking along the car’s side when the accident occurred. 2206. the tie broke.the plaintiff’s witness alleged that a noticeable depression in the track had appeared after a typhoon. there being fault or negligence. by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence. The law has no scales to determine in such cases whose wrongdoing weighed most in the compound that occasioned the mischief” (Railroad v Norton). Had it been otherwise. when wire loops were wound around the broken bones and screwed into place. The men were hauling the rails on 2 hand cars. 2219. “… parties being mutually in fault. At the time of the trial. 2.00 by way of moral damages M. wanton or deliberately injurious conduct. Manila Railroad Co. Atlantic.Reason: the advantageous position of a party suing a carrier for breach of the contract of transportation explains. the limitation imposed by the new Code on the amount of the recovery. . causing it to swerve and to hit the bridge wall. 2176. RAKES V THE ATLANTIC. may not escape liability by proving that it has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees . January 23. but because the definition of quasi-delict in Act. The accident occurred on the morning of March 22. was at work transporting iron rails from the harbor in Manila.Petitioner had walked along the side of the car despite a prohibition to do so by the foreman.However. 2220. a criminal action is not a requisite for the enforcement of a civil action. .e. and (b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the description term "analogous cases" used in Art.000. and actions quasi ex delicto. there were no side guards on the cars to keep the rails from slipping off. relation between the parties. and a third one to remove such splint. have avoided the consequences of the injured party's negligence. the driver lost control thereof. Mckenna. in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code. ISSUE WON the defendant is entitled to moral damages HELD NO. petitioner may recover from the defendant.Atlantic contends that the remedy for injury through negligence lies only in a criminal action against the official directly responsible and that the employer be held only subsidiarily liable. Moreover. (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries.By virtue of culpa contractual. Such fault or negligence. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter. 38 Phil. he was found to have contributed in some degree to the injury inflicted. there can be no appointment of damages. Ratio Moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation. effected to insert a metal splint. a second. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. such damages are justly due. is essential to justify an award of moral damages. the first on May 23. Petitioner need not file charges with the foreman to claim damages from Atlantic. and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly. and the burden is placed on the carrier to prove the it was due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure (Cangco vs. the track sagged.In sum the rule is: Delict (breach of contract) Gen. Rule: no moral damages . Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that. although not as the primary cause. 1953. He was taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment. WON Atlantic is only subsidiarily liable 2.. WON it bars him from recovery HELD 1. DISPOSITION The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified by eliminating the award of P5.Exception: with moral damages if: • defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith • result in the death of a passenger in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. if there is no pro-existing contractual A2010 . which provide as follows: "ART.The difference in conditions. 1907 NATURE Action for damages FACTS . In this case. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused by contractual breach. the carrier. and prevent us from viewing the action for breach of contract as simultaneously embodying an action on tort. one of a group of 8 AfricanAmerican laborers in the employment of defendant. less a sum deemed suitable equivalent for his own imprudence. ISSUES 1.. the car canted and the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff who was walking by the car’s side.the plaintiff. This was reported to the foreman. the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might.torts & damages speed. The action for breach of contract imposes on the defendant carrier a presumption of liability upon mere proof of injury to the passenger." Reasoning (a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus). to some extent. i.. Atlantic may be held primarily liable as it failed in its duty to provide safe appliances for the use of its employees.17 - prof. including the respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. 1953. compel us to differentiate between action ex contractu." . some behind or at it sides and some pulling . or of his employees. that latter is relieved from the duty to establish the fault of the carrier.H. WON there was contributory negligence on the part of petitioner and if so. . unlike in suits for quasi-delict. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. NO . YES . However. Also. the company’s officers and 3 of the workers testified that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all against walking by the side of cars. 2219." "ART. 768 777). descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased" . breaking his leg. it appears that respondent had not yet recovered the use of his right arm.

however. it should be observed.Festejo also sent a letter to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant to assure the latter that Luis was a "very valued clients" of FEBTC. FEBTC has come to this Court with this petition for review. . a FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at its Pasig Branch. even if we are to assume that the provision could properly relate to a breach of contract. we quote: Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries.In culpa contractual. under the circumstances. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. F&B Manager of the Intercon. . expressed the bank's apologies to Luis in his letter which stated that: In cases when a card is reported to our office as lost. Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend. 2220. Naturally. can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. However. the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. In order to replace the lost card. dated 11 Oct.000. .Bad faith. Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. and (b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the descriptive term "analogous cases" used in Art. Luis filed a complaint for damages with the RTC of Pasig against FEBTC.Art. (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. under the circumstances. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisitng contractual relations between the parties.000.In August 1988. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused contractual breach. In cases of this nature. and another guest at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel Intercon Manila. its application can be warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. the unfortunate incident occurred). . . Furthermore.On 30 March 1990.Fores vs.500. demanded from FEBTC the payment of damages. in any case. . as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file. moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed ) of the common carrier.Article 21 of the Code.000. Wilful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that. 1995 NATURE Petition for review FACTS . it failed to inform him about its security policy.Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.to meanwhile so record the lost card. Luna applied for. deducting Php 2. along with the principal card. it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. Luna. . such damages are justly due. . Luis A. Because of this. give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith. FAREASTCARD undertakes the necessary action to avert its unauthorized use to protect its cardholders. the bank's internal security procedures and policy would appear to be. contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. A2010 . good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. i.18 - prof.torts & damages . plaintiff should not be afforded relief FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V CA 241 SCRA 671 VITUG.00 attorney's fees. moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. 21. the amount fairly attributable to his own negligence. the bank also issued a supplemental card to Clarita S. The Civil Code provides: . 2219. (b) P50.Article 21 states: Art. Luis presented his FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter who promptly had it verified through a telephone call to the bank's Credit Card Department. Miranda explained with great clarity the predominance that we should give to Article 2220 in contractual relations. Luis was forced to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588. the RTC of Pasig ordered FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300.00 exemplary damages. ISSUE WON the petitioner is entitled to moral and exemplary damages HELD NO . in this context. negligence. the same must be discarded. is essential to justify an award of moral damages." SEPARATE OPINION WILLARD AND CARSON [dissent] -the negligence of the defendant alone was insufficient to cause the accident—it also required the negligence of the plaintiff." A copy of this reply was sent to Luis by Festejo. We have repeatedly ruled that moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation.In a letter.Damages are awarded to petitioner at Php5. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.In October 1986. Upon his request. Clarita lost her credit card. an overzealous employee of the Bank's Credit Card Department did not consider the possibility that it may have been him who was presenting the card at that time (for which reason. a Fil-Am. Exceptionally. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. but not simple. February 23. .By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes apparent that: (a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus). Adrian V. and was accorded. Most importantly.Art.Still evidently feeling aggrieved. . 2219. 1988. Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human relations that clearly must..13. . Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the appellate court. wanton or deliberately injurious conduct. Luis Luna.00 moral damages.On appeal to the Court of Appeals.Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court. William Anthony King. Luis felt embarrassed by this incident. casis .000. xxx xxx xxx . such damages are justly due. Since the card was not honored. . includes gross. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that. the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation.Art. . wrote back to say that the credibility of Luis had never been "in question. which provide as follows: . but because the definition of quasidelict in Art. FEBTC was forthwith informed. a VP of the bank. through counsel.Concededly. . 2220.e. not only because Art. To pay for the lunch. in a contract of carriage. in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code. Festejo.On 06 October 1988. Thus. and (c) P20.

and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. when they found out that Mr. which has been violated or invaded by the defendant. the bank's failure. 2201. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. are intended to serve as an example or as correction for the public good in addition to moral. reckless.Given the above premises and the factual circumstances here obtaining. . the Manager alleged. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff. malice or wanton attitude. therefore. 1966 NATURE PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. and plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class' seat in the plane. Such fault or negligence. cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.Art. through PAL. exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances (Art. Carrascoso traveled in “first class” but at Bangkok. issued plaintiff a “first class” round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.Nevertheless. Civil Code). there being fault or negligence. an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself. Here.000. even perhaps inadvertent. in turn.It is to be presumed. left Manila for Lourdes w/ 48 other Filipino pilgrims. Cuento. descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.19 - prof. had a 'better right' to the seat. . temperate. refused. In contracts and quasi-contracts. xxx xxx xxx . When asked to vacate his 'first class' seat. without such agreement. WON the Court could review the questions of fact Substantive 2. fraudulent.Art. to honor its credit card issued to private respondent Luis should entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code providing thusly: . Air France. In criminal offenses. they came all across to Mr. Al) 18 SCRA 155 SANCHEZ. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Civil Code. oppressive. as proved by written documents (tickets…) 3.Carrascoso. casis DISPOSITION The appealed decision is MODIFIED by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to private respondents. may be vindicated or recognized. Et. many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class. in the words of the witness Ernesto G. the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton. September 28. private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship. in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort. and if such.00 by way of nominal damages. unfortunately. would be to violate the clear provisions of the law. that this difference was in the mind of the lawmakers when in Art. there was a 'white man'. WON Carrascoso was entitled to moral damages. Civil Code). if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. Carrascoso to give his seat to the 'white man. as was to be expected. .The distinction between fraud. The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger. and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body. and. It is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to malice. in its stead. and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation. 1170-1172). or malevolent manner (Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured passenger does not die. bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored (Arts. A2010 .In case of fraud. We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier. FACTS . a commotion ensued. In contracts and quasi-contracts. Cuento. But the exceptional rule of Art. the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying because. there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith which the CA allegedly failed to find . From Manila to Bangkok.both TC and CA decided in favor of Carrascoso ISSUES Procedural 1. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. 2230.torts & damages . Luna an amount of P5. it would also be just as arduous to sustain the exemplary damages granted by the courts below. is obliged to pay for the damage done. bad faith. and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. the appealed decision is AFFIRMED. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad faith. WON Carrascoso was entitled to the “first class” seat he claims. . and a carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was breached through negligence of the carrier's employees. the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation. such damages are granted if the defendant is shown to have been so guilty of gross negligence as to approximate malice. 2229.Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered where the court deems such recovery to be just and equitable (Art. . In quasi-delicts. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager]. AIR FRANCE V CA (Carrascoso. We see no issue of sound discretion on the part of the appellate court in allowing the award thereof by the trial court. petitioner is ordered to pay private respondent Luis A. . To award moral damages for breach of contract. according to said Ernesto G. the plaintiff. that entitles the spouse. 2208. when his action is planted upon breach of contract and thus. . as required by Art. without a pre-existing contract between two parties. in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary. Civil Code). without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant.The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort even where there is a preexisting contract between the plaintiff and the defendant This doctrine. 2232. their consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code. who. but the fact must be shown in evidence. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where. WON the CA failed to make a complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it. a civil engineer." . 2206. In all other respects. 2220. 2176.Exemplary or corrective damages. 2221. .Art. the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case.

when Carrascoso was asked to confirm his seat in Bangkok."The mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution". be essayed. Obiter. action as we have said. adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. nor proved that the “white man” had “better right” over the seat. . The contract of air carriage. but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats. YES. however. naturally. "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes 4. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. Testimony of the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees. If there had been no seat. in this environment. However.16 They consist of the court's "conclusions with respect to the determinative facts in issue" . YES . Certainly. respect. was cured by the evidence. then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. and if the “white man” had a better right to the seat. may result. Reasoning . if any. Reasoning . So it is. could give ground for an action for damages. must answer. worse. thereby causing him mental anguish. the plaintiff was issued. then why did they confirm Carrasco his seat? 3. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct.If. -Also. YES Ratio.A written document speaks a uniform language. of course. contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions. WON moral damages could be recovered from Air France.The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat. courtesy and due consideration. 6.Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. it. WON Carrascoso was entitled to exemplary damages 8. they should have presented the manager to testify in court – but they did not do so . that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. that any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.QUESTION OF LAW: one which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties 2. made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment-just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been . the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. Statements then. because of the relation which an aircarrier sustains with the public. granted that their employee was accused of the tortuous act 5. Unless. 5. The excitement had not as yet died down.also…From a reading of the transcript just quoted. . accordingly. if the manager’s actions could be justified. petitioner. injurious language. that. Damages are proper. although he had tourist class protection. and paid for. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals. this is bad faith. WON Carrascoso was entitled to attorney’s fees 9. . Ratio . It is (therefore) unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages.Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso. serious anxiety. the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride. also. CA held that Air France should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness. NO. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager.43 And is. are admissible as part of the res gestae. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier. solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn.There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering. there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class. is no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense". It invites people to avail of the comforts and I advantages it offers. his employer.20 - prof. he was granted the “first class” seat. For. amongst others. if not confusion. WON the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso regarding the account made by the air-carrier’s purser is admissible in evidence as hearsay 7. The stress of Carrascoso's. therefore. WON damages are proper in a breach contract 6. a first class ticket without any reservation whatever. he imposed his arbitrary will. Carrasco was issued a “first class ticket”. a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat. he forcibly ejected him from his seat. by reason of which he suffered inconvenience. they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant".xxx The law. as petitioner underscores. notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed.torts & damages 4. is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. casis established. when the dialogue happened. YES . (note: it was held that it was a case of quasi-delict even though it was a breach of contract) Ratio A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. . wounded feelings and social humiliation. and Third. if forms part of the res gestae Ratio. "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. Deficiency in the complaint. Constitution mandates that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based" and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before".FINDINGS OF FACT: "the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered thereon".Air France did not present evidence that the “white man” made a prior reservation. indignities and abuses from such employees. bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. resulting in moral damages. Reasoning . Reasoning . generates a relation attended with a public duty. YES.Petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the A2010 .The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not. said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok. Second. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner-air carrier-a case of quasi-delict. embarrassments and humiliations. that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight. NO Ratio A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity. is one attended with public duty. Such testimony is admissible.Carrascoso testified that the purser of the air-carrier made an entry in his notebooks reading "First class parties. WON the amounts awarded to Carrascoso was excessive HELD 1. The trial court also accepted as evidence the written documents submitted by Carrasco and even the testimony of the air-carrier’s employees attested that indeed. For. the BangkokTeheran leg.

the Syquias discovered that the vault had a hole approx 3 in. no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or explore the realm of arts when bullets are flying or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Because. but the ouster incident. father of the deceased Vicente Syquia. beyond the terms of the contract. YES Ratio. (2) gross negligence in failing to seal the concrete vault (Art. filth and silt causing the wooden parts to separate and to crack the viewing glass panel located directly above the head and torso of the deceased. However. clothing of the deceased. Costs against petitioner. As the concrete vault was being raised to the surface.CA affirmed judgment of dismissal. And the MFR was similarly dealt with. . authorized and instructed the defendant to inter the remains of deceased. PSBA V CA [citation] PADILLA. Chief of Security and Assistant Chief of Security. .SYQUIAS base their claim for damages against Mla Memorial on either: (1) breach of its obligation to deliver a defect-free concrete vault.torts & damages passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will. NO Ratio Parties are bound by the terms of their contract. the school makes itself responsible in providing their students with an atmosphere that is conducive for learning. But when an academic institution accepts students for enrollment. Also. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar Judgment for attorneys' fees.Respondent Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept 8. and the exposed parts of the deceased's remains were damaged and soiled. PSBA is not liable.Contract between the parties did not guarantee that the cement vault would be waterproof.After about a month. Juan Syquia. MFR was also denied. are beyond the ambit of that rule. we. casis same cemetery. (b) coffin was entirely damaged by water. Reasoning . Costs against the petitioners. as it was only hearsay. DISPOSITION the foregoing premises considered. (c) entire lining of coffin. NO Ratio. it may still be liable under the law on contracts. (RCBC v CA) . FACTS . the said entry was made outside the Philippines and by an employee of petitioner. It would have been easy for Air France to contradict Carrascoso’s testimony if they had presented the purser. In this sense. It sought to adjudge them liable for the victim’s death due to their alleged negligence. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. and because there was a pre-existing contractual relation between the Syquias and Mla Memorial. or alternatively 2. say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from 'reversible error.A stabbing incident on August 30. It was established that his assailants were not members of the school’s academic community but were outsiders. February 4. or malevolent manner". The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given.\ 9. reckless. oppressive. VP. the concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased was removed from its niche underground. YES Ratio The Civil Code gives the Court ample power to grant exemplary damages-in contracts and quasicontracts. JR.The suit impleaded PSBA. ISSUES 1.Whatever kind of negligence it has committed. recklessness and lack of security precautions. the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof. January 27. .Pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal Court of Parañaque. in diameter near the bottom and it appeared that water drained out of the hole. they caused the opening of the concrete vault and discovered that: (a) the interior walls showed evidence of total flooding. WON it can be liable for culpa aquiliana HELD 1. ISSUE WON respondent court is correct in denying dismissal of the case HELD Ratio Although a school may not be liable under Art. . The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent wit this ruling of the Court. 1993 NATURE Petition for review of CA decision dismissing Syquia family’s complaint for damages against Manila Memorial Park Cemetery. It cannot be extended by implication. .Defendants (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed alleging that since they are presumably sued under Art. It is expressly mentioned in Art. WON Mla Memorial breached its contract with petitioners. . which is the law between them. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a wanton. preparatory to transferring the remains to a newly purchased family plot also at the .The act of boring a hole in the vault was necessary so as to prevent the vault from floating away..No quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty of any fault or negligence.21 - prof. like PSBA.The father himself. But respondent court’s premise is incorrect. The petitioner contents that it should not be admitted as evidence. 1992 NATURE Petition to review the decision of Court of Appeals. its President. Petitioners the assailed the trial court’s dispositions before the respondent appellate court which affirmed the trial court’s ruling. A2010 . 2180 on quasi-delicts. . Reasoning . 2180 that the liability arises from acts done by pupils or students of the institution. Certainly. 7. We accordingly vote to affirm the same. chose the gravesite despite knowing that said area had to be constantly sprinkled with water to keep the grass green and that water would eventually seep through the vault. 2176) . SYQUIA V CA (Mla Memorial Park) 217 SCRA 624 CAMPOS. MLA MEMORIAL is deemed to be liable for desecrating the grave of the dead. and that the captain refused to intervene". fraudulent. (Mla Memorial) FACTS . the complaint states no cause of action against them since academic institutions. the petition is DENIED. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. Trial Court’s Ruling .Juan SYQUIA. 2180 of the Civil Code. Inc. DISPOSITION On balance. . the subject of inquiry is not the entry.The case should be tried on its merits. Treasure. . 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista on the premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Manila RTC. A contracting party cannot incur a liability more than what is expressly specified in his undertaking.

. . in our opinion. to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision.In so doing. the diligence to be observed in the performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family.They entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care." In the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary. .Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of MLA MEMORIAL provides that: “Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a concrete box. he might get excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him.The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would NEGLIGENCE PICART V SMITH [citation] STREET. . . He was.However. who said that: “When the vault was placed on the grave a hole was placed on the vault so that water could come into the vault because it was raining heavily then because the vault has no hole the vault will float and the grave would be filled with water. March 15. he was. but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. . . continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. . Finding no evidence of negligence. . casis . . instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down. the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing. . he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. 1918 NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of La Union FACTS . then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control. 1912." .Before he had gotten half way across. if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles.The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. in maneuvering his car in the manner above described. given the novelty of the apparition and the rapidity of the approach. .Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet. and from this moment it was no longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety.22 - prof. ." Standard dictionaries define seal as any of various closures or fastenings that cannot be opened without rupture and that serve as a check against tampering or unauthorized opening. and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or. the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile.The pony had not as yet exhibited fright.He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge.Hence.When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger.In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. . . .CFI absolved defendant from liability . Dispositive CA decision affirmed in toto. as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. a concrete vault was installed and after the burial.As the defendant neared the bridge he saw the plaintiff and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. circumstances of the case do not show negligence.The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant. .The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.He did this because he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. .Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana. the defendant.When he had gotten quite near. brick or concrete. the court thinks. Interment Foreman. 2. but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done. . . Reasoning . . he gave two more successive blasts.Syquias claim that there was a breach of contract because it was stated in the brochures that “lot may hold single or double internment underground in sealed concrete vault. there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side. the appeal ISSUE WON the defendant. The reason for the boring of the hole was explained by Henry Flores. When the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties. there is no reason to award damages. A2010 . of the time and of the place. the actual installment of which shall be made by the employees of the Association. it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. the vault was covered by a cement lid. there was an appreciable risk that. he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side. and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop.” Pursuant to this. . that being the proper side of the road for the machine. plaintiff was riding on his pony over the Carlatan Bridge. NO Ratio Negligence is defined by law as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons.The defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright.The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.As the defendant started across the bridge. La Union.As a result of its injuries the horse died.On December 12.torts & damages Reasoning .In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away.Private respondent has exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave." Mla Memorial bound itself to provide the concrete box to be sent in the interment. was guilty of negligence that would give rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done HELD YES .” . seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge. negligent in the eye of the law. and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle.As the automobile approached. . at San Fernando. ."Sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof".But in view of the known nature of horses. the defendant guided it toward his left. or in an outer wall of stone. ."Sealed" meant "closed. going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour.

who had promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. 15 years of age. and carried them home. casis three went to the home of the boy Manuel. crossed the footbridge of the Isla del Provisor. DISPOSITION Appealed decision is reversed. and their right to take them. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite. with a boy named Manuel Claparols. the boys. the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. and 1908 of that Code. The law considers what would be reckless. less than 9 years old.The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. xxx xxx xxx "Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprises are equally liable for the damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties. more mature than the average boy of his age. Finding on inquiry that Mr. hung them of a stick. or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.Plaintiff Taylor appears to have rested his case.After watching the operation of the traveling crane used in handling the defendant's coal. Obligations are created by law. for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road.The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches. and all TAYLOR V MANILA RAILROAD . and on his death or incapacity the mother. 1903. .Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case. 1089. . became frightened and started to run away. FACTS . . foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so. blameworthy. They then opened one of the caps with a knife.The plaintiff. upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902. It will be noted however. placed in the position of the defendant. at the westerly end of the island. that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous. They thrust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. An explosion followed. impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery. but could not find one.The Defendant Company’s defense that the caps were under the duty of independent contractors deserves scant consideration since these workers have been under the supervision of one of the company’s foremen.23 - prof. Murphy was not in his quarters."ART. negligence is clearly established. and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. . about 12 years of age. Murphy. A prudent man. . Manuel had his hand burned and wounded. causing more or less serious injuries to all three."ART. by contracts. These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. 1905. After crossing the footbridge.Stated in these terms. . known as the Isla del Provisor. but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.The plaintiff himself was not free from fault. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within the city of Manila. xxx xxx xxx "The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. by his father. his nearest relative. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm. .torts & damages have used in the same situation? If not. would have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk. followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision. since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. received a slight cut in the neck. . when the boys proposed purring a match to the contents of the cap." [citation] CARSON. plaintiff. 1902. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable. then he is guilty of negligence. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. by quasi—contracts. David Taylor. and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. A2010 . . they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. . the boys picked up all they could find. Jessie. and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. . as did the trial judge his decision in plaintiff's favor. . Could a prudent man. The power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge."The father. who. one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds. The visit made on a Sunday afternoon.The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. in the case under consideration. it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Manuel looked for a hammer. ." . they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian. spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. impassable for vehicles. was at the same time when he received the injuries complained of. . March 22. 1903. an employee of the defendant.On the 30th of September. and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. a minor. not only for personal acts and omission. is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. After some discussion as to the ownership of caps. 1910 NATURE An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries. Reasonable foresight of harm.The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. for the purpose of visiting one Murphy. of which each took one end. instituted by David Taylor."ART. and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule. the son of a mechanical engineer. is liable for the damages caused by the minors who alive with them. and have in themselves considerable explosive power.

we also have to look at the proximate cause and the maturity of the plaintiff if it was his negligence that contributed to the principal occurrence of the tragedy. and in a great variety of similar cases. In the case at bar. or for purposed of amusement. 1908. if such injury was. after an exhaustive and critical analysis and review of may of the adjudged cases. Stout. attributable to the negligence of the company).torts & damages .As regards the maturity of the child. "While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault. and there found explosive signal torpedoes left exposed by the railroad company's employees." . one of which when carried away by the visitor. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in severally state courts. properly speaking. such as a turntable left in such condition as to make it probable that children in playing with it would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where the infant did in fact suffer injury in playing with such machine. In these. therefore. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only. making the company liable HELD 1. enters upon the railroad company's premises. (84 U. it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts. not due to his wanton or willful acts. . must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and impulses.).Just because the kids trespassed doesn’t mean that the company is not liable for anything bad that might happen to them. placed upon such premises by the owner. under the circumstances. "must calculate upon this. and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward them must calculate upon this. By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence. exploded and injured him.As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. and this is to be determined in such case by the circumstances of the case. admit of no other explanation. which therefore was not. both English and America. such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. at a place where the railroad company knew." and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of an adult. or where such infant found upon the premises a dangerous machine. we are satisfied that plaintiff's action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting a match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff."ART.The owners shall be also be liable for the damages caused —"1. he had been to sea as a cabin boy. voicing the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan. formally declared that it adhered "to the principles announced in the case of Railroad Co." Chief Justice Cooley. therefore. followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer. they should expect that liberty to be taken." . was able to earn P2. casis occupants of land upon which they might naturally and reasonably be expected to enter. more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only. Marlow. this has to be examined on a case-to-case basis.In the typical cases. a negligent omission. as described by the little girl who was present. vs. on the other hand. and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstance of the case. and which they in their immature judgment might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with. from idle curiosity. and that the defendant. at a place where the railroad company's premises. such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. WON the defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries. or upon which the public are expressively or impliedly permitted to enter to or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play. for which he may and should be held responsible. saying that (1) That A2010 . 657). Stout ( 17 Wall. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child form entering premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are accustomed to roam about or to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to enter. is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. (2) that no exception to this rule exists in favor of children who are injured by dangerous machinery naturally calculated to attract them to the premises. In the case at bar." ." In such cases the owner of the premises can not be heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation whatever.The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care. and the cases based thereon." and. "attributable to the negligence of the defendant. and take precautions accordingly.24 - prof.S. and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of the cap. who from mere idle curiosity. (4) that there is no difference between children and adults of an invitation or a license to enter upon another's premises. and take precautions accordingly. children who would likely to come. the Court said that it is of the opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff. and for kindling of explosive substance which may not have been placed in a safe and proper place. if the child is actually injured. To hold otherwise would be expose to all the children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or . His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity. the great weight of authority holds the owner of the premises liable. ISSUE 1. wherever they go. (3) that an invitation of license to cross the premises of another can not be predicated on the mere fact that no steps have been taken to interfere with such practice. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault. or for purposes of amusement. counsel for plaintiff relied on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last result in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases. or had a good reason to suppose. the question involved has been whether a railroad company is liable for an injury received by an infant of tender years. despite his denials on the witness stands. show clearly that he the owner of land is not liable to trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by them. without other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his express invitation or permission. NO . he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. said that: “Children. is clearly a breach of duty. However." .50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred. in the case of Powers vs.In support of his contention. plaintiff at the time of the accident was well—grown youth of 15. However.The owners of premises. If they leave exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to them. the principles on which these cases turn are that "while railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it. (wherein the principal question was whether a railroad company was liable for an injury received by an infant while upon its premises. and where the child does not enter under such conditions the owner's failure to make reasonable precaution to guard the child against the injury from unknown or unseen dangers. whereon things attractive to children are exposed.

a child of such tender age and in extreme pain. She looked behind her and saw her daughter on the floor. in view of the fact that the little girl. ET AL." Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory. Gonzales. for the protection of the interest of another person. which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence." . event or happening.” with a base smaller than the top.RTC – for Jarco Marketing Corp. Negligence is "the failure to observe. Criselda never let go of her daughter except to sign the credit card slip. the immediate cause of the explosion . Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous. unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment. under our law. So the Aguilars filed a complaint for damages wherein they sought the payment of P157." DISPOSITION The petition is DISMISSED. that degree of care. therefore.000 for attorney's fees and an unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary damages. on that account. JARCO MKTG. was his own act of putting a match to the contents of the cap. No contributory negligence from Zhieneth . It was deliberately placed at a corner to avoid such accidents.torts & damages knew what he was about.On the other hand. The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained.She was operated on immediately at the hospital. one cannot exist with the other. or if happening wholly or partly through human agency. It is "a fortuitous circumstance. . The testimony of two former employees. All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling event before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who testified in court. Zhieneth was guilty of contributory negligence because she tried to climb the counter. pinned by the gift-wrapping counter. 1999 FACTS . et al’s side: Criselda was negligent in taking care of her daughter for allowing her to roam freely. The counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong base and was used without incident for the past 15 years. Zhieneth was crying and screaming for help.The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v. She suddenly felt a gust of wind and heard a loud thud.We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated. i. the Aguilars demanded from the petitioners the reimbursement of hospital and medical bills.Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvel's Department Store. and wake and funeral expenses. neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Petitioners refused to pay. P20. Gonzales and Guevarra. precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand.After the burial of their daughter. by analogy. They both had informed management (while they were still working there) that the counter should be nailed to the floor. Store.An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. This means she wasn’t making it up. thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not.The conclusive presumption favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. If negligence. et al. Criselda was able to ask people to help her and bring her daughter to the hospital. as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family. Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2nd flr or Syvel’s Dept. NEGLIGENCE.25 - prof. and is. and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence. an event happening without any human agency. ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. P300. Thus. Sadly.Petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter.The Aguilars’ side: While in the dept store. it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH.On May 9. A2010 . ISSUE 1. Criselda momentarily let go of her daughter’s hand to sign her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter. as one of its determining factors. Petitioners Leonardo Kong. who was negligent? HELD 1. The protruding part of the counter was at the costumer side. became frightened and ran away. a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment. through their negligence or omission to secure or make stable the counter's base. 1983. Under the circumstances thus described. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age. should not be believed because he might have ill feelings towards petitioners. She was 6 years old. . to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. either criminal or civil. . heard her tell the doctor that she “nothing. negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man. Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability. RTC mfr – for the Aguilars. I did not come near the counter and the counter just fell on me. then he is guilty of negligence. The testimony of the present employees (that Zhieneth climbed the counter so it fell) should instead be believed. 9 years of age. . WON the incident is accident or attributable to negligence 2. . Both Gonzales and Guevarra testified to the structural instability and shakiness of the counter which is in the shape of and inverted “L.. . December 21. operations manager. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs.Gonzales’ testimony about what Zhieneth said to the doctor should be accepted because at the time she said it. he can not recover.” when asked “what did you do?” She died 14 days later. 2. would do. who was with him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap. The rule. In our jurisdiction. exempt from criminal liability. the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury. The management did nothing. she was in so much pain and she answered right away. respectively. Makati City.000 for moral damages. an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.86 for actual damages. . whereby such other person suffers injury.e.522. casis . Smith. Private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar. . CA and CA mfr – for the Aguilars. is that a child under nine years of JARCO MARKETING CORP V CA (AGUILAR) DAVIDE. a child under nine years of age is. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter. conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence. Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's branch manager. petitioners did. . on the hospital bed. Yet. and supervisor. Gonzales testified that the gift wrapping counter was right beside the verification counter where Criselda was signing. and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one. a former employee of Syvel’s Dept Store who helped bring Zhieneth to the hospital. It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a physician are generally considered declarations and admissions. . .Jarco Mktg Corp.

It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not secured.80 of the Revised Penal Code.Jose Noguera saw that the wire was burning and its connections smoking. . The CFI gave judgment for plaintiffs for P2. of whom plaintiffs-appellees are the lawful heirs. One of the ends of the wire fell to the ground among some shrubbery close to the way. and that without reference to the question of moral guilt. Hence this appeal. Shaped like an-inverted "L" the counter was heavy.Soco transmitted the message at 2. and its top laden with formica.Jose rejoined that he should into touch wires as they carry a current. Subsequently. . the infant tort-feasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an adult. .Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter.25 p. ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist.The engineer of the company says that it was customary for the company to make a special inspection of these wires at least once in six months. At this precise moment. If property has been destroyed or other loss occasioned by a wrongful act. .000 as damages. .Alang St for the purpose of conducting . it is just that the loss should upon the estate of the wrongdoer rather than that of a guiltless person. but as he was under 18 years of age.telling him that the wire might be charged. Disposition The instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED A2010 .A crowd soon collected. . Jose Salvador and Saturnino Endrina. until Tiangco would reach his majority. . 9 yrs old. a minor under 18 years of age. who was a few paces ahead of his classmates. she was just a foot away from her mother. but simply that he would suffer no penalty.Aug 4. casis electricity used in lighting the City of Manila and its suburbs.As soon as Noguera took cognizance of the trouble. 57 PHIL 478 STREET. exonerated him from the crime charged HELD NO . but Alberto. Liability of an infant for his torts is imposed as a mode. no doubt feeling that he was challenged in the matter.torts & damages age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.Defendant-appellant Tiangco. . . . 80 of the RPC.CRISELDA too. no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy.stopped Saturnino.As the three neared the place where the wire was down. Initially. it was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Saturnino made a motion as if it touch it. who was somewhat ahead. subject to the supervision of the Superintendent of Public Schools of DEL ROSARIO V MANILA ELECTRIC CO.The wire was cased in the usual covering.The wire was an ordinary number 6 triple braid weather proof wire.At 4 p. Accordingly. When.At the time that message was sent the wire had not yet parted. Consequently. and some one cut the wire and disengaged the body. “I have for some time been in the habit of touching wires”. . said. The Court of First Instance (CFI) Batangas found Tiangco guilty as charged. it is clear that the end of the wire was on the ground shortly after 3 p. but reserved such right as the heirs of the deceased might have to recover damages in a civil action against said Tiangco. . not of punishment. he stepped into a garage which was located nearby and asked Jose Soco to telephone the Malabon station of MERALCO that an electrical wire was burning at that place. and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA. resulting from a shock from a wire used by the defendant for the transmission of electricity. . She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything. Abaya. the counter just fell on her.The end of the wire remained in contact with his body which fell near the post. huge. ISSUE WON the suspension of the sentence under Art. The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal that it was not durable after all. No contributory negligence from Criselda . the criminal case was dismissed. February 28. 1944 NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance Batangas FACTS .m. put out his index finger and touch the wire.The suspension of the sentence under Art. at time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter. . . November 5. Abaya.He immediately fell face downwards. (Sangco) . and received answer from the station to the effect that they would send an inspector. . the sentence was suspended. ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us. CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. Luke's Hospital the child was pronounced dead. but this had been burned off for some distance from the point where the wire parted. but Alberto.m. Further. For if that was the truth. DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed. such as is commonly used by the defendant company for the purpose of conducting electricity for lighting. m. MAGTIBAY V TIANGCO 74 Phil 756 BOCOBO. . but merely put off the imposition of the corresponding penalty. 1932 FACTS ***This action was instituted by Julian del Rosario for the purpose of recovering damages from Meralco for the death of his son. the neighborhood school was dismissed and the children went home. the civil action in the instant case was filed against defendant-appellant for damages in the sum of P2. knew never to touch a broken electrical wire (as his dad told him so!). pleaded guilty to an information for homicide through reckless negligence in that he had recklessly driven an automobile and thereby caused the death of Magtibay. who happened to be the son of an electrician. and he was committed to the care and custody of Atty. all members of the second grade in the public school. for every tortuous act of violence or other pure tort. this did not mean that he was exonerated from the crime charged.Saturnino yielded to this admonition and stopped. exclaiming "Ay! madre". after he had observed good conduct. 1930 – 2pm: a wire used by the defendant on Dimas.Jose. Nor did such dismissal of the criminal case obliterate his civil liability for damages. The time and distance were both significant. later to the latter's hand.26 - prof. Alberto.000 for the death of Magtibay. in view of Tiangco’s good conduct recommended the dismissal of the case. did not wipe out his guilt. in order to give the delinquent minor a chance to be reformed. one of the witnesses for the defense.Alberto del Rosario. and that all of the company's inspectors were the Province. a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. therefore. The CFI dismissed the criminal case. after appellant had pleaded guilty. but of compensation. Upon being taken to St. after appellant herein had pleaded guilty. but from the testimony of Demetrio Bingao.

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required in their daily rounds to keep a lookout for trouble of this kind. - There is nothing in the record indicating any particular cause for the parting of the wire.l ISSUE WON Manila Electric is liable HELD YES Reasoning - When notice was received at the Malabon station at 2.25 p. m., somebody should have been dispatched to the scene of the trouble at once, or other measures taken to guard the point of danger; but more than an 1 ½ hours passed before anyone from MERALCO appeared on the scene, and in the meantime Alberto had been claimed as a victim. - The mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of Jose (8 yrs old), doesn’t alter the case. - But even supposing that contributory negligence could in some measure be properly imputed to the deceased, such negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case, not having been the determining cause of the accident. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil., 359.) - With respect to the amount of damages recoverable, Julian is entitled to recover P250 for expenses incurred in connection with the death and burial of the boy. - Citing Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Company: Julian should recover the sum of P1,000 as general damages for loss of service. Disposition judgment reversed

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- Principal Soriano cannot be held liable, being head of academic school and not school of arts and trades, in line with Amadora case and Art 2180 of Civil Code. It is only the teacher who should answer for torts committed by their students. Besides, Soriano did not order the digging. - Based on Article 2180, Aquino can be held liable. However, petition is based on Article 2176. Did the acts/omissions of Aquino cause the death of Ylarde? Yes. He is liable for damages. The work required adult laborers. He required the children to remain in the pit after they finished digging. He ordered them to level the soil when a huge stone was at brink of falling. He went to another place and left the kids. - Left by themselves, IT WAS BUT NATURAL FOR THE CHILDREN TO PLAY AROUND. IN RULING THAT YLARDE WAS IMPRUDENT, THE LOWER COURT DID NOT CONSIDER HIS AGE AND MATURITY. A MINOR SHOULD NOT BE HELD TO THE SAME DEGREE OF CARE AS AN ADULT. - Aquino also said the digging was part of Work Education. This is unacceptable. Work is too dangerous and it was not even in the lesson plan.

- The indemnity allowed in criminal case is merely incidental to the main object sought, which is the punishment of the guilty party. - In a civil action, the principal object is the recovery of damages for wrongful death; and where, as in this case, the defendant is a corporation, not subject to criminal prosecution for the act complained of, the question assumes a vastly different aspect. - There should be a distinction between the civil liability of an ordinary person who, by wrongful act, has caused the death of another; and the civil liability of a corporation, organized primarily for profit, which has caused the death of a person by failure to exercise due care in the prosecution of its business. - The liability of such a corporation for damages must be regarded as a part of the risks which it assumes when it undertakes to promote its own business; and just as it is entitled to earn adequate profits from its business, so it should be made adequately to compensate those who have suffered damage by its negligence.

YLARDE V AQUINO [citation] GANCAYCO; July 29, 1988
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - Soriano was principal. Aquino was a teacher. The school was littered with concrete blocks. Teacher Banez started burying them. Aquino gathered 18 male pupils to help. He ordered them to dig. Work was unfinished. - Ff day, Aquino called 4 of the 18 to continue. Aquino continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil. Aquino left the children to level the loose soil and borrowed a key from Banez. Aquino told the kids not to touch the stone. - 3 of the 4 kids jumped into the pit. The remaining Abaga jumped on the concrete block causing it to slide down. 2 were able to escape but student Ylarde sustained injuries. 3 days later he died. Parents filed suit against Aquino and Soriano. Lower court dismissed and CA affirmed and said child Ylarde was negligent. ISSUE WON Aquino and Soriano can be held liable for damages HELD

CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO V PHILIPPINE MOTORS CORPORATION [citation] STREET; November 3, 1930
NATURE Appeal from decision of the CFI FACTS - Cranston was the representative of the plaintiff in Manila and plaintiff was the registered owner of the motor schooner Gwendoline. - Cranston decided to have the engine on the Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner. He had a conference with Quest, Phil. Motors manager, who agreed to do the job, with the understanding that payment should be made upon completion of the work. - The work was begun and conducted under the supervision of Quest, chiefly by a mechanic whom Quest took with him to the boat. Quest had the assistance of the members of the crew of the Gwendoline, who had been directed by Cranston to place themselves under Quest's directions. - Upon preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest concluded that a new carburetor was needed and thus installed a Zenith carburetor. The engine was tried with gasoline and the result was satisfactory. The next problem was to introduce into the carburetor the baser fuel, consisting of a low grade of oil mixed with

SEPARATE OPINION ABAD SANTOS [concur in part and dissent in part] - He concurs that MERALCO is held liable for the death
of Alberto, but dissents in so far as the decision allows the recovery of the father of the sum of P1,250 only as damages. It should be P 2250. - His reasoning: It is well settled in this jurisdiction that an action will lie to recover damages for death caused by the wrongful act. (Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821.) - In criminal cases- indemnity to the heirs of the deceased is equivalent to P1,000 - Whatever may be the reasons for the rule followed in criminal cases, I am of the opinion that those reasons do not obtain in fixing the amount of the damages recoverable in the present case.

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distillate. A temporary tank to contain the mixture was placed on deck above and at a short distance from the compartment covering the engine. This tank was connected with the carburetor by a piece of tubing, which was apparently not well fitted at the point where it was connected with the tank. The fuel mixture leaked from the tank and dripped sown into the engine compartment. The new fuel line and that already in use between the gasoline tank and carburetor were so fixed that it was possible to change from the gasoline fuel to the mixed fuel. This arrangement enables the operator to start the engine on gasoline and then, after the engine had been operating for a few moments, to switch to the new fuel supply. - It was observed that the carburetor was flooding, and that the gasoline, or other fuel, was trickling freely from the lower part to the carburetor to the floor. This fact was called to Quest's attention, but he said that, when the engine had gotten to running well, the flooding would disappear. - The boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run. The engine stopped a few times during the first part of the course, owing to the use of an improper mixture of fuel. In the course of the trial, Quest remained outside of the engine compartment and occupied himself with making distillate, with a view to ascertaining what proportion of the two elements would give best results in the engine. - As the boat was coming in from this run, the engine stopped, and connection again had to be made with the gasoline line to get a new start. After this had been done the mechanic, or engineer, switched to the tube connecting with the new mixture. A moment later a back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass of flames, which the members of the crew were unable to subdue. The salvage from, the wreck, when sold, brought only the sum of P150. The value of the boat, before the accident occured, as the court found, was P10,000. - CFI gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff to recover of the defendant the sum of P9,850, with interest at 6 per centum per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint, until satisfaction of the judgment, with costs. ISSUE WON the loss of the boat is chargeable to the negligence and lack of skill of Quest HELD YES Ratio When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he

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be incompatible with the situation now under consideration. - This action was instituted about two years after the accident had occured, and after Quest had ceased to be manager and had gone back to the US. Upon these facts, the defendant bases the contention that the action should be considered stale. It is sufficient reply to say that the action was brought within the period limited by the statute of limitations and the situation is not one where the defense of laches can be properly invoked. DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from affirmed.

will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. Reasoning - The temporary tank in which the mixture was prepared was apparently at too great an elevation from the carburetor, so that when the fuel line was opened, the hydrostatic pressure in the carburetor was greater than the delicate parts of the carburetor could sustain. This was the cause of the flooding of the carburetor; and the result was that; when the back fire occurred, the external parts of the carburetor, already saturated with gasoline, burst into flames, whence the fire was quickly communicated to the highly inflammable material near-by. The leak along the pipe line and the flooding of the carburetor had created a dangerous situation, which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken precautions to avoid. The back fire may have been due either to the fact that the spark was too advanced or the fuel improperly mixed. - Proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats. Possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire. Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was here, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occured but for Quest's carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from blame. - The trial judge seems to have proceeded on the idea that, inasmuch as Quest had control of the Gwendoline during the experimental run, the defendant corporation was in the position of a bailee and that, as a consequence, the burden of proof was on the defendant to exculpate itself from responsibility by proving that the accident was not due to the fault of Quest. As a rule workmen who make repairs on a ship in its owner's yard, or a mechanic who repairs a coach without taking it to his shop, are not bailees, and their rights and liabilities are determined by the general rules of law, under their contract. The true bailee acquires possession and what is usually spoken of as special property in the chattel bailed. As a consequence of such possession and special property, the bailee is given a lien for his compensation. These ideas seem to

UNITED STATES V PINEDA 37 Phil 456 MALCOLM; January 22, 1918
NATURE Appeal requiring a construction and an application, for the first time, of the penal provisions of the Pharmacy Law. FACTS - Santiago Pineda is a registered pharmacist of long standing and the owner of a drug store located at Calle Santo Cristo, Manila. Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription obtained from Dr. Richardson, and which on other occasions Santos had given to his horses with good results, at Pineda's drug store for filling. The prescription read: "clorato de potasa - 120 gramos - en seis papelitos de 20 gramos, para caballo." Under the supervision of Pineda, the prescription was prepared and returned to Santos in the form of six papers marked, "Botica Pineda - Clorato potasa - 120.00 - en seis papeles - Para caballo- Sto. Cristo , Binondo, Manila." Santos, under the belief that he had purchased the potassium chlorate which he had asked for, put two of the packages in water and gave the doses to two of his sick horses. Another package was mixed with water for another horse, but was not used. The two horses, to which had been given the preparation, died shortly afterwards. Santos, thereupon, took the three remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for examination. Drs. Peña and Darjuan, of the Bureau of Science, found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate. At the instance of Santos, the two chemists also went to the drug store of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate. (Barium chlorate, it should be noted, is a poison; potassium chlorate is not.) Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses, and found that death was the result of

torts & damages
poisoning. ISSUES 1. WON the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the chemist Peña and Darjuan as to their purchase of potassium chlorate at the drug store of the accused, which proved to be barium chlorate 2. WON the lower court erred in finding that the substance sold by the accused to Feliciano Santos was barium chlorate and not potassium chlorate 3. WON the lower court erred in finding that the accused has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of an infraction of the Pharmacy Law, Act No. 597, section 17, as amended HELD 1. NO Ratio On the trial of a criminal case where the question relates to the tendency of certain testimony to throw light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a particular person, there is a certain discretion on the part of the trial judge which a court of errors will not interfere with, unless it manifestly appear that the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the question at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the accused. Reasoning - What appellant is relying on is the maxim res inter alios acta. As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is inadmissible. But appellant has confused this maxim and this rule with certain exceptions thereto. The effort is not to convict the accused of a second offense. Nor is there an attempt to draw the mind away from the point at issue and thus to prejudice defendant's case. The purpose is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent, and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified and fraudulent intent may even be established. It has been said that there is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents. 2. NO Reasoning The proof demonstrates the contrary. 3. NO Ratio In view of the tremendous and imminent danger to the public from the careless sale of poisons and medicines, we do not deem it too rigid a rule to hold that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it be through negligence or mistake. Reasoning - The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the

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unlawful is the giving of a false name to the drug asked for. This view is borne out by the Spanish translation, which we are permitted to consult to explain the English text. In the Spanish "supuesto" is used, and this word is certainly not synonymous with "fraudulent." The usual badges of fraud, falsity, deception, and injury must be present - but not scienter. Dispositive Judgment of the lower court, sentencing the defendant to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs, is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant, without prejudice to any civil action which may be instituted.

business which the law demands. - Turning to the law, certain points therein as bearing on our present facts must be admitted. Thus, defendant is a pharmacist. As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs and poisons which he sells. And finally it is provided that it shall be unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent name." It is the word "fraudulent" which has given the court trouble. What did the Legislature intend to convey by this restrictive adjective? - Were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud it would be difficult, if not impossible, to convict any druggist of a violation of the law. The prosecution would have to prove to a reasonable degree of certainty that the druggist made a material representation; that it was false; that when he made it he knew that it was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; that he made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by the purchaser; that the purchaser acted in reliance upon it, and that the purchaser suffered injury. Such a construction with a literal following of well-known principles on the subject of fraud would strip the law of at least much of its force. It would leave the innocent purchaser of drugs, who must blindly trust in the good faith and vigilance of the pharmacist, at the mercy of any unscrupulous vendor. We should not, therefore, without good reason so devitalize the law. - The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs. The vendor and the vendee do not stand at arms length as in ordinary transactions. An imperative duty is on the druggist to take precautions to prevent death or serious injury to anyone who relies on his absolute honesty and peculiar learning. The nature of drugs is such that examination would not avail the purchaser any thing. It would be idle mockery for the customer to make an examination of a compound of which he can know nothing. Consequently, it must be that the druggist warrants that he will deliver the drug called for. - Remembering particularly the care and skill which are expected of druggists, that in some jurisdictions they are liable even for their mistake and in others have the burden placed upon them to establish that they were not negligent, it cannot be that the Philippine Legislature intended to use the word "fraudulent" in all its strictness. A plea of accident and mistake cannot excuse for they cannot take place unless there be wanton and criminal carelessness and neglect. How the misfortune occurs is unimportant, if under all the circumstances the fact of occurrence is attributable to the druggist as a legal fault. Rather considering the responsibility for the quality of drugs which the law imposes on druggists and the position of the word "fraudulent" in juxtaposition to "name," what is made

BPI V CA 216 SCRA 51 GUTIERREZ; November 26, 1992
FACTS - In the afternoon of October 9, 1981, a person purporting to be Eligia G. Fernando, who had a money market placement as evidenced by a promissory note with a maturity date of November 11, 1981 and a maturity value of P2,462,243.19, called BPI's Money Market Department. The caller wanted to preterminate the placement, but Reginaldo Eustaquio, Dealer Trainee in BPI's Money Market Department, told her "trading time" was over for the day, which was a Friday, and suggested that she call again the following week. The promissory note the caller wanted to preterminate was a roll-over of an earlier 50-day money market placement that had matured on September 24, 1981. - Later that afternoon, Eustaquio conveyed the request for pretermination to the officer who before had handled Eligia G. Fernando's account, Penelope Bulan, but Eustaquio was left to attend to the pretermination process. - On October 12, 1981, the caller of the previous Friday followed up with Eustaquio, merely by phone again, on the pretermination of the placement. Although not familiar with the voice of the real Eligia G. Fernando, Eustaquio "made certain" that the caller was the real Eligia G. Fernando by "verifying" that the details the caller gave about the placement tallied with the details in "the ledger/folder" of the account. Eustaquio knew the real Eligia G. Fernando to be the Treasurer of Philippine American Life Insurance Company (Philamlife) since he was handling Philamlife's corporate money market account. But neither Eustaquio nor Bulan who originally handled Fernando's account, nor anybody else at BPI, bothered to call up Fernando at her Philamlife office to verify the request for pretermination.

CBC's guaranty of prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement was then stamped on the two checks. 1981. WON the collecting bank has absolute liability on a warranty of the validity of all prior endorsements stamped at the back of the checks 2.00. She disclaimed having preterminated her placement on October 12. passed through the position analyst. The two cashier's checks. to pick them up. and from his desk.The Arbitration Committee ruled in favor of BPI and ordered CBC to pay the former the amount of P1.00. which CBC forthwith sent to clearing and which BPI cleared on the same day. 1981 and maturity value of P2. the caller insisted on the pretermination just the same and asked that two checks be issued for the proceeds.266. by means of Check No. ISSUES 1. As finally proceeds. in fact Rosemarie Fernando who got the two checks from the dispatcher. 35623) to be preterminated. Fernando's purported signature on the letter requesting the pretermination and the latter authorizing Rosemarie Fernando to pick up the two checks. securities clerk. With her surrender of the original of the promissory note (No. not just a roll-over of the placement. 1981 for P4. . proceeded to prepare the "purchase order slip" for the requested pretermination as required by office procedure. the Board of Directors of the PCHC reversed the Arbitration Committee's decision and dismissed the complaint of BPI while ordering it to pay CBC the sum of P1. 1981. tax account number. Fernado's money market placement with BPI.BPI contends that respondent CBC's clear warranty that "all prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsements guaranteed" stamped at the back of the Fernando. These incidents led to the filing of this case with the Arbitration Committee. . casis left Current Account No. Although the checks represented the termination proceeds of Eligia G.000.000.462. WON the drawer/drawee bank (in this case BPI) may claim reimbursement from the collecting bank which earlier paid the proceeds of the checks after the same checks were cleared HELD 1. who signed the two checks that very morning. which the woman holding herself out as Eligia G. 1981. de Castro and Celestino Sampiton. the maturity date of Eligia G.61. Eustaquio had to hurriedly go to the dispatcher. and with her initials on the form signifying her approval. Rosemarie Fernando.000.It was. . Thereafter. 1981. she referred the application to the New Accounts Section for processing.500. verifier clerk and documentation clerk.” . BPI returned the two checks in controversy to CBC for the reason "Payee's endorsement forged". the real Eligia G." which was received through clearing from Far East Bank.215.00. the application form shows the signature of "Eligia G. however.Later in the same morning.However.000.. 1981 for P48. and on November 4. 240003 dated October 15. withdrawals began on Current Account No. and Check No. 240001 dated November 3. among others. 1981. 35623 with maturity value of P2.Two days after. 021759 and 021760 for P1. 1981 . the dispatcher failed to get or to require the surrender of the promissory note evidencing the placement. occupation ("business woman"). Manager and Administrative Assistant. she never received nor endorsed them and that her purported signature on the back of the checks was not hers but forged. Fernando applied at China Banking Corporation's Head Office for the opening of a current account. Fernando. .torts & damages . Fernando went to BPI for the roll-over of her placement. writing thereon "Rosemarie Fernando release only with authority to pick up.On November 11.000. earlier that year. who would pick up the checks. sex. a long-standing "valued client" of CBC. 26310-3: On October 16. her niece would have to being a written authorization from her to pick up the checks. Such purported signature has been established to be forged although it has a "close similarity" to the real signature of Eligia G.00. a woman who represented herself to be Eligia G.00 and P613. 1981. instead of the checks being delivered to her office at Philamlife. the papers. Fernando". 26310-3 with a balance of only P571. 1983. . Fernando's affidavit. . together with the papers consisting of the money market placement was to be preterminated and the promissory note (No. BPI issued her a new promissory note (No.800.58. covering the preterminated placement.500. Fernando's signature in BPI's file. upon CBC’s motion for reconsideration. As it turned out.BPI then filed a petition for review with the Regional Trial Court of Makati who dismissed said petition but modified the award by including a provision for attorney’s fees in favor of CBC. Fernando deposited the two checks in controversy with Current Account No.30 - prof. NO . She was accompanied and introduced to Emily Sylianco Cuaso. "her" date of birth. both payable to Eligia G. the woman holding herself out as Eligia G. the same person impersonated both Eligia G. however.206. nos. and that the checks be delivered to her office at Philamlife. who did not interview the new client but affixed her initials on the application form after reviewing it. What Cuaso indicated in the application form. as shown by the delivery receipt.19) evidencing the placement which matured that day. both authorized signatories for BPI. Fernando and Rosemarie Fernando. by means of Check No. nationality. The last withdrawal on November 4. were prepared. the same caller changed the delivery instructions.00. payable to "cash. payable to "cash. 40314 with maturity date of December 23. the checks went to the dispatcher for delivery. was compared or verified with Eligia G. This final approval of the new current account is indicated on the application form by the initials of Regina G.607. 1981. There is also no showing that Eligia G. payable to "cash" which the woman herself also encashed over the counter.16. Jr.206. by Antonio Concepcion whom Cuaso knew to have opened. Her endorsement on the two checks was found to conform with the depositor's specimen signature. 1981.00. she would herself pick up the checks or send her niece. Cash Supervisor.The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. This telephone conversation ended with the caller's statement that "definitely" it would be her niece." which the woman identifying herself as Eligia G. returned the checks for reason "Beyond Clearing Time". payable to "cash". on October 22.000. in fact. 240005 dated the same day for P1. thus.607. respectively. Fernando encashed over the counter. Eustaquio. supported by Eligia G. CBC.00 and the second for the balance. one for P1. 240007 dated the same day for P370. he changed the delivery instruction on the purchase order slip. Thus. Bernardo Laderas.100. . 1981. 126310-3. was that the new client was introduced by Valentin Co.800.000. Cashier. to tell him of the new delivery instructions for the checks. in turn. Fernando's placement. Eustaquio then told her that if it were her niece who was going to get the checks.000. In the afternoon of October 13.Informed that the placement would yield less than the maturity value because of its pretermination.77) to evidence a roll-over of the placement. by means of Check No.On November 12. .243. She executed an affidavit stating that while she was the payee of the two checks in controversy. by means of Check No. 240006 dated the same day for P1. and initial deposit of P10. respectively. civil status. an account upon the introduction of Valentin Co. . Fernando encashed over the counter. both of which letters were presumably handed to the dispatcher by Rosemarie A2010 . on October 19. before the two cashier's checks. Dy.58 with interest thereon at 12% per annum from August 12. Rosemarie Fernando. payable to "cash" which was received through clearing from PNB Pasay Branch.On October 14. following the processing route. In the event that the payee's signature is forged. in BPI's Treasury Operations Department. were sent to Gerlanda E. Fernando.

The issue as to who between the parties should bear the loss in the payment of the forged checks necessities the determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties involved in the controversy in relation to the forged checks. belittled petitioner BPI's negligence compared to that of respondent CBC which it declared as graver and the proximate cause of the loss of the subject checks to the impostor who impersonated Eligia G. The Arbitration Committee. Fernando. Fernando. the point that comes uppermost is whether the drawee bank was negligent in failing to discover the alteration or the forgery. NO . the drawee bank would not have paid on the checks. stamped at the back of the checks are the clear warranty: ALL PRIOR ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OF ENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED.In presenting the checks for clearing and for payment. However. the surrender of the promissory note evidencing the money market placement that was supposedly pre-terminated.In the present case. the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower court. With these circumstances. the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. Under this doctrine. respondent CBC had no way to discover the fraud at all.BPI further argues that the acts and omissions of respondent CBC are the cause "that set into motion the actual and continuous sequence of events that produced the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. In fact the records fail to show that respondent CBC had knowledge.The next issue hinges on whose negligence was the proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by an impostor. had an unquestioned liability when it turned out that the payee's signature on the checks were forged.The records show that petitioner BPI as drawee bank and respondent CBC as representing or collecting bank were both negligent resulting in the encashment of the forged checks. a hiatus. CBC had no prior notice of the fraud perpetrated by BPI's employees on the pretermination of Eligia G. 2. No amount of legal jargon can reverse the clear meaning of the warranty. however.Applying these principles. Moreover. . or knowledge of such facts’ (Sec. there was yet no loss and the impostor could have decided to desist from completing the same plan and could have held to the checks without negotiating them. . Under this premise petitioner BPI asserts that the presenting or collecting bank. yet. without any further showing that the CBC employees ‘had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect. a comparison of the signature of Eligia G. Hence. it can recover the amount paid from the collecting bank. the defendant is liable for any damage arising out of the falsity of its representation. Fernando's money market placement. a vice-president of Philamlife. respondent CBC. but which BPI neglected to take. As the warranty has proven to be false and inaccurate. an interval between the issuance and delivery of said checks by petitioner BPI to the impostor and their actual payment of CBC to the impostor.Apropos the matter of forgery in endorsements. A2010 . petitioner BPI maintains that considerations of relative negligence become totally irrelevant. they cannot erase the fact that they were both guilty in not exercising extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. 56. . While the Arbitration Committee declared the negligence of respondent CBC graver. However. To the extent that the degree of negligence is equated to the . . b) The officer who used to handle Eligia G. which respondent CBC did. Fernando.The PCHC Board of Directors. we rule that the issue as to whose negligence is graver is relevant. c) Again no verification appears to have been made on Eligia G. which nobody in BPI bothered to make to Eligia G. Petitioner BPI points out that the gap of one (1) day that elapsed from its issuance and delivery of the checks to the impostor is material on the issue of proximate cause. Fernando's money market placement and in the issuance and delivery of the subject checks in this wise: a) The impostor could have been readily unmasked by a mere telephone call. . the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower courts declared that petitioner BPI's negligence was graver. and payment made "through or under such signature" is ineffectual or does not discharge the instrument. according to petitioner BPI. care and trustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees.31 - prof.In the present petition the payee's names in the checks were forged. .torts & damages checks was an unrestrictive clearing guaranty that all prior endorsements in the checks are genuine. . Without such warranty. Fernando is not a depositor of CBC.Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos.The general rule under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law is to the effect that a forged signature is "wholly inoperative". this Court has emphasized that the collecting bank or last endorser generally suffers the loss because it has the duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior endorsements considering that the act of presenting the check for payment to the drawee is an assertion that the party making the presentment has done its duty to ascertain the genuineness of the endorsements.” . actual or implied. the checks are "wholly inoperative" and of no effect. of the fraud perpetrated by the impostor and the employees of BPI. there is no question that the banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees. If the drawee-bank discovers that the signature of the payee was forged after it has paid the amount of the check to the holder thereof. her signature was in BPI's file. could not have resulted in the discovery of the fraud. Fernando with that of the impostor Eligia G. the banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. Petitioner BPI insists that the doctrine of last clear chance should have been applied considering the circumstances of this case. Fernando's account did not do anything about the account's pre-termination. Hence. casis proximate cause of the loss. stated that “these withdrawals. where both parties were negligent and such negligence were not contemporaneous. . was requiring before the two checks in controversy were delivered. . The exception to this rule is when the party relying in the forgery is "precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority.The Arbitration Committee in its decision analyzed the negligence of the employees of petitioner BPI involved in the processing of the pre-termination of Eligia G. the collecting bank made an express guarantee on the validity of "all prior endorsements. the underlying circumstances of the case show that the general rule on forgery is not applicable. Fernando's purported signature on the letter requesting the pretermination and the letter authorizing her niece to pickup the checks. Following the general rule. At this stage. The gap of one (1) day between the issuance and delivery of the checks bearing the impostor's name as payee and the impostor's negotiating the said forged checks by opening an account and depositing the same with respondent CBC ." Petitioner BPI anchors its argument on its stance that there was "a gap." Thus. petitioner BPI's reliance on the doctrine of last clear chance to clear it from liability is not well-taken. however disagree in the evaluation of the degree of negligence of the banks. without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. and d) Another step that could have foiled the fraud. however. No matter how many justifications both banks present to avoid responsibility. Negotiable Instruments Law) that their action in accepting their checks for deposit and allowing the withdrawals against the same ‘amounted to bad faith’ cannot be considered as basis for holding CBC liable.Petitioner BPI's contention that CBC alone should bear the loss must fail. For obvious reasons. The Arbitration Committee. By the very nature of their work the degree of responsibility. In this jurisdiction we recognize negligence of the party invoking forgery as an exception to the general rule. .

. Quisamay. and such intoxication was the primary cause of the accident . if the latter. . FACTS . we apply Article 2179 of the Civil Code to the effect that while respondent CBC may recover its losses. Both banks were not able to overcome the presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. WRIGHT V MANILA ELECTRIC R. It is not unnatural or unexpected that after taking the risk of impersonating Eligia G. in crossing the tracks to enter his premises. . a sober man would not have fallen while a drunken man did. is to US V BAGGAY 20 PHIL 142 TORRES. jr. Abra. Agueng. and to conclude that. dated February 15. the horse stumbled. and the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground. .000.” (If the former. plaintiff must cross defendant’s tracks. whereby he was declared exempt from criminal liability but was obliged to indemnify the heirs if the murdered woman.For this reason the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the court of Ilocos Sur.A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the ties themselves aboveground. named Dioalan.215. stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling. Calapini. and fell. 1914 NATURE An action to recover damages for injuries sustained in an accident . Due care on the part of CBC could have prevented any loss. the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel. the rails were above-gruond. in the sum of P1. .One night.413. 1109. he cannot recover. Under these circumstances. greater reason to rule that the proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by an impostor was due to the negligence of petitioner BPI. 1909. the trial court was correct in apportioning damages) HELD NO Ratio Intoxication in itself is not negligence. still the CBC employees had ample opportunity to avoid the harm which befell both CBC and BPI. respondent CBC's negligence contributed equally to the success of the impostor in encashing the proceeds of the forged checks. While it is true that petitioner BPI's negligence may have been the proximate cause of the loss. with murder. although the law has declared their perpetrators exempt from criminal liability. 1911 NATURE Appeal by the defendant from the judgment rendered on April 28. without provocation suddenly attacked the woman Bil-liingan with a bolo. casis draw a conclusion which enters the realm of speculation and guesswork. because of the violent death of the woman Bil-liingan.32 - prof. Bil-liingan. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. 28 Phil 122 MORELAND. It was the gross negligence of the employees of both banks which resulted in the fraud and the subsequent loss.It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in maintaining its tracks. inflicting a serious wound on her head from which she expired immediately. the total amount of the two (2) forged checks. making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the street. to pay the costs in the case and to be confined in an institution for the insane until further order of the court. are stated which warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent. notwithstanding. when he. To enter his premises from the street. ISSUE WON an insane person. and on his own mother.000. such losses are subject to mitigation by the courts..16. 1910. DISPOSITION Plaintiff not negligent. exempt from criminal liability can still be civilly liable HELD YES Ratio Civil liability accompanies criminal liability. and no facts. ISSUE WON the negligence of plaintiff contributed to the “principal occurrence” or “only to his own injury. This cause was instituted separately from the other. No facts to merit a higher award of damages to plaintiff.R.Defendant Manila Electric is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street railway .413. we are not inclined to rule that petitioner BPI must solely bear the loss of P2. because every person liable criminally for a crime or misdemeanor is also liable for reparation of damage and for indemnification of the harm done.At the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks.torts & damages is not controlling. & LIGHT CO. October 1.Intoxication in itself is not negligence. Province of Ilocos Sur. the impostor would complete her deception by encashing the forged checks. but that plaintiff’s negligence was not as great as defendant’s.Plaintiff’s residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which defendant’s tracks run. might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what his condition. the judge on April 28 rendered the judgment cited above. for lesiones. for the purpose of holding a song service called "buni" according to the Tinguian custom.16 A2010 . No. The conclusion that if he had been sober he would not have been injured is not warranted by the facts as found. throwing the plaintiff from the vehicle and causing injuries . several persons were assembled in the defendant's house in the township of Penarrubia. BPI shall be responsible for 60% while CBC shall share 40% of the loss of P2. It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions described. Reasoning .The Court cannot ignore the fact that the CBC employees closed their eyes to the suspicious circumstances of huge over-the-counter withdrawals made immediately after the account was opened. And while we do not apply the last clear chance doctrine as controlling in this case. leaped forward. The opening of the account itself was accompanied by inexplicable acts clearly showing negligence. They let the opportunity slip by when the ordinary prudence expected of bank employees would have sufficed to seize it. Disposition The questioned Decision and Resolution are MODIFIED.215. . FACTS .M. and with the same bolo he like wise inflicted various wounds on the women named Calabayan. other than the fact that Wright was intoxicated. but defendant claims the plaintiff was also negligent in that he was so intoxicated. charging the non-Christian Baggay. September 1. whereupon the defendant's counsel appealed to this court.Trial court held that both parties were negligent. awarded plaintiff P1. Fernando with the connivance of BPI's employees. but there may be civil liability because of acts ordinarily punishable. the nonChristian Baggay. under such circumstances. plaintiff drove home in a calesa and. There is therefore. E. This finding. After trial and proof that the defendant was suffering from mental aberration.Both banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in the encashment of the forged checks by an impostor.About the 4th of October.

was the accident caused by Filomeno’s “notorious negligence”? . It was a risk to which any person on board the M/S Pilar II. see. and circumstances under which the accident takes place .40 as compensation for the death of her son. or minors shall answer with their own property. such as a passenger thereof or an ordinary visitor.Article 17 of the Penal Code states: Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable. Point in question is whether the accident was committed under these 3 conditions . his death was the consequence of his decision to jump into the water to retrieve said bill. while Filomeno Managuit was working. his employment. . A2010 . with costs against the appellant. AMEDO V RIO [citation] CONCEPCION. 2. who has not acted with the exercise of judgment." that he displayed a "reckless disregard of the safety" of his person.It cannot be denied that in jumping into the sea. if such person be insolvent. 275.33 - prof.Plaintiff’s basis for appeal is the Workmen’s Compensation Act. also.. . his accident could be attributed to his gross negligence. but this protection does not exclude liability for damage caused to those who may have the misfortune to suffer the consequences of his acts. . would have been exposed had he. Dumarang.By gross negligence is meant "such entire want of care as to raise a presumption that the person in fault is conscious of the probable consequences of carelessness. even though they be performed unwittingly. the sum of P2.it may be conceded that the death of Filomeno took place "in the course of" his employment. Grounds for compensation. — Compensation shall not be allowed for injuries caused (1) by the voluntary intent of the employee to inflict such injury upon himself or another person. May 24. and as a consequence of which. .she was allowed to file an amended complaint which was remanded to the trial court. who worked for the defendant as a . p. or a person under 9 years of age. 7.her amended complaint stated: “That on May 27.) . performing his duties as such ordinary seaman on defendant's M/S "Pilar II". seaman of the M/S Pilar II.this is distinguishable from cases wherein the act done is not dangerous per se such as when an employee drops a cigarette on the pavement and picks it up. 2. or over this age and under 15. the judgment appealed from being in accordance with law. excepting that part which is exempted for their support in accordance with the civil law. or worse."The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident and are descriptive of its character. (3) by notorious negligence of the same. 1. The hazardous nature of this act was not due specially to the nature of his employment. . his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified. subject to the following: (1) In cases 1. or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment.Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who. However. he was drowned. he would surely be entitled to compensation. The main allegation of said original complaint was: “That on May 27. Palawan. in spite of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable condition of his deranged mind. in turn. plaintiff Elena Amedo sought to collect from defendant Rio y Olabarrieta. (2) by drunkenness on the part of the laborer who had the accident. and at the "place" where-according to the amended complaint-he was working. 1950. Law and society are under obligation to protect him during his illness and so when he is declared to be liable with his property for reparation and indemnification. or power. imbeciles. ISSUE WON Amedo could claim compensation from employer Rio HELD NO . — When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. if.038. the accident which produced this tragic result did not "arise out of" his employment. and it is hereby affirmed. Sec. while the deceased Filomeno Managuit was on board M/S "Pilar II" as such seaman. the persons who are civilly liable for acts committed by a lunatic or imbecile. Palawan." (Wall vs. he jumped into the water to retrieve a 2-peso bill belonging to him. that he could not have been but conscious of the probable consequences" of his carelessness and that he was "indifferent. Cameron [1882] 6 Colo. . at or about 11:30 o'clock in the morning while the said Filomeno Managuit was in the course of his employment. affirmation thereof is proper. and 10 of article 8 does not include exemption from civil liability. is still reasonably and justly liable with his property for the consequences of his acts. he is still entitled to the benefit of what is necessary for his decent maintenance. (2) it must happen in the course of the employment.this however was dismissed due to lack of a cause of action which defendant filed stating that the allegation does not show that the death of plaintiff's son was due to an "accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Injuries not covered. 1949.". while the words `in the course of' refer to the time. 4. the said lunatics. 1949 at about 11:30 o'clock in the morning. Sections 2 and 4 of which: Sec. Filomeno failed to exercise "even slight care and diligence. or worse. 877. and as he picked up the bill from the floor something accidentally fell upon him and injured him. and is indifferent. The Law Governing Labor Disputes in the Philippines by Francisco. his act being obviously innocent. unless they prove that there was no blame or negligence on their part. 3. DISPOSITION Therefore. one mile and a half from the seashore of Arceli.. . for the reason that his fellows ought not to suffer for the disastrous results of his harmful acts more than is necessary. his two-peso bill was blown by the breeze into the sea and in his effort to retrieve the same from the waters he was drowned.since the act done by Filomeno was dangerous. casis place.case provides for other jurisprudence which describe instances of gross negligence attributable to employee (see case). 2. 2nd ed. and 3. It was the result of a risk peculiar to his work as a seaman or incidental to such work. also.Article 18 of the same code says: The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos. which. and (3) it must not be caused by the "notorious negligence" of the employee. . in spite of his unfortunate condition. So. Filomeno Managuit. These are: (1) the accident must arise out of the employment.” .from these provisions three conditions are essential to hold an employer liable. his 2-peso bill merely fell from his pocket. In her original complaint. likewise.. has been defined as follows: . or the result of the nature of such employment. Should there be no person having them under his authority.This case was instituted on October 18. which was anchored then about 1 1/2 miles from the seashore of Arceli Dumarang."notorious negligence" has been held to be tantamount to "gross negligence".torts & damages Reasoning . . jumped into the sea. 1954 FACTS . to the danger of injury. or arisen from. legal guardian. which shall be enforced. to the danger of injury to person or property of others. The blowing of his 2-peso bill may have grown out of. legal guardianship or power. But. are those who have them under their authority. Inc. in that it happened at the "time" when. as Filomeno had.

plaintiff was injured and hospitalized. it is clear that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence. 4) CA findings are contrary to those of the trial court. said that he knew the responsibilities of a driver.Petitioner also contends that the amicable settlement entered into by Mamador's widow and Macunat barred the widow's claim against the employer because she has already elected one of the remedies.Plaintiff Pedro Layugan testified that while in Bagabag. WON Mamador has a right to compensation by Marinduque 2. because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se.34 - prof. .Daniel Serrano. Inchausti that criminal prosection of the "other person" does not affect the liability of the employer. while the same was at a stop position. . NO . WON defendant driver Serrano was negligent 2. It couldn't be. defendant driver. SC entertained review of the factual question. Nueva Vizcaya. it cannot be declared negligence because the proibition had nothing to do with the personal safety of the riders. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case HELD 1 NO . 1968 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of IAC decision FACTS . not a truck helper being a brother-in-law law of the driver of said truck. his left leg was amputated so he had to use crutches to walk.(Substantive) Ratio The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. Nueva Vizcaya. however. right after the curve. 3) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts. WON there was notorious negligence by the deceased for having violated the employer’s prohibition to ride haulage trucks A2010 . or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do [2] Applying the definition and the test.This is a question of fact. belonging to Marinduque. Disposition Award for compensation by WCC affirmed LAYUGAN V IAC 167 SCRA 363 SARMIENTO. ordinarily. even if the case was against a third person. 5) the said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. I have (sic) found out later that the fluid pipe on the rear right was cut that's why the breaks did not function. . he and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the right side of the National Highway. YES .torts & damages MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS V WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION 99 PHIL 48 BENGZON. 1956 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the WCC FACTS . it has been established clearly that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff was caused by defendant's driver. or conjecture. Defendant's truck driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff.Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence. convicted and was sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. . He has paid nothing. thereby having the effect of releasing the employer from liability. Serrano also testified that. “When I was a few meters away. "pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and probably result in injury".This contention cannot be sustained because what the widow waived was the offender's criminal proscution and not all civil action for damages. who was fixing the flat tire of the said truck. would do. and says that absent such proof of care. Reasoning . I stepped on my foot brakes but it did HELD 1. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. turned over and hit a coconut tree resulting in the death of Pedro Mamador and injury to the other laborers. plaintiff. . Whether cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder of the road is immaterial taking into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene . But this case is an exception since: 1) the finding are grounded entirely on speculation.Although the employer prohibited its employees to ride the haulage trucks. however. . Reasoning [1] Negligence defined. June 30. 2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken. however. November 14. From the evidence presented.Macunat was prosecuted. occupying almost half of the right lane towards Solano. 2.Petitioner alleges that the criminal case sentencing Macunat to indemnify the heirs of the deceased was a suit for damages against a third person. ISSUES 1. . Defendant said that the plaintiff was merely a bystander. . . its violation does not constitute negligence per se. but it may be an evidence of negligence.The criminal case. .(Procedural) Ratio Findings of fact are entitled to great respect and will not ordinarily be disturbed by this Court unless it falls down under the exceptions provided by the Court to merit review of the facts.” . it would. . that the proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of the parked truck in installing the early warning device. to the latter. He bumped the truck being repaired by Pedro Layugan.Plaintiff points to the negligence of the defendant driver while Isidro points to the driver of parked truck as negligent. surmise.At any rate. the court already decided in Nava vs. I saw the truck which was loaded with round logs. he checked the truck. was not a suit for damages against third persons because the heirs did not intervene therein and they have not received the indemnity ordered by the court. the petitioner herein. The truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving. casis not function with my many attempts.Notorious negligence means the same as gross negligence which implies "conscious indifferenece to consequences". then he is guilty of negligence. and 6) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted on record. Daniel Serrano.Deceased’s wife now seeks compensation by Marinduque as the employer. under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. . ISSUE 1. that as a result. that the truck allegedly being repaired was parked. Hence.Defendant Godofredo Isidro admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident driven by Daniel Serrano. that before leaving.A truck driven by Procopio Macunat. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man.Under the circumstance. Due to said injuries. evoke the presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his helper.

it affords reasonable evidence. She was also diagnosed to be suffering from “diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage”. assured Rogelio that he will get a good anesthesiologist. Although not a member of the hospital staff. Because the discomforts somehow interfered with her normal ways.torts & damages lamp placed 3-4m from the back of the truck. RAMOS V CA [citation] KAPUNAN. 2.Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka were also asked by the hospital to explain what happened to the patient. she saw this anesthesiologist trying to intubate the patient. whatever the source of the evidence. p. Dr.35 - prof. O lumalaki ang tiyan” (id.Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was a robust woman except for occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of a stone in her gall bladder she was as normal as any other woman.. she sought professional advice. Orlino Hozaka. They agreed that their date at the operating table at the De Los Santos Medical Center. Erlinda Ramos stayed for about four months in the hospital. the other defendant. The doctrine merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. however. direct evidence is absent and not readily available. an anesthesiologist and a hospital should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy.00 to P10. Calderon was then able to intubate the patient. 1985 at 9:00 A. she went out of the operating room. Dr. . with her husband Rogelio incurring a monthly expense ranging from P8. casis Herminda saw about two or three nurses and Dr. So. Calderon. Hosaka approached her. mali yata ang pagkakapasok.Hours later at about 12:15 P. Gutierrez. was also there for moral support. The patient’s nailbed became bluish and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position.Petitioners filed a civil case for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against herein private respondents alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos. [and] preparing the patient for the operation”. and she told Rogelio E.During the trial.In the case at bar. the Isuzu truck driven by Serrano. This is what the Court actually said in the case to prove its just obiter.Herminda Cruz immediately rushed back. As she held the hand of Erlinda Ramos. both parties presented evidence as to the possible cause of Erlinda’s injury. Plaintiff presented the testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz and where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury.000. one of the defendants in this case. December 29. She then heard Dr. But despite this warning.00. Herminda Cruz. And once the actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy. she saw the patient taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). who was the Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when.” She then saw people inside the operating room “moving. and the way we apply it in cases. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. As a direct consequence of such accident Layugan sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot.M. doing this and that. 1985. under the circumstances involved. . 17). The doctors explained that the patient had bronchospasm. Hosaka decided that she should undergo a “cholecystectomy” operation after examining the documents presented to him. asked Dr. Calderon arrived at the operating room. which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control.000. After praying. In this case it is inapplicable because it was established by clear and convincing evidence the negligence of the defendant driver. . Perfecta Gutierrez. She has been in a comatose condition. Gutierrez say. She was admitted in the hospital and was with her sister-in-law. and saw that the patient was still in trendelenburg position. Disposition Petition GRANTED with costs against private respondents. “Res ipsa loquitur. Dr. After Dr. the Court is called upon to rule whether a surgeon. At the operating room. Therefore this only Obiter Dicta. I formulated it in an issuetype. After being discharged from the hospital. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. in the absence of an explanation by the defendant. Immediately thereafter. “ Obiter [1] What is the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur? Two ways to put it: (a) This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant.. and (b) According to Black’s Law dictionary. The thing speaks for itself Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent. and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. Herminda introduced herself as Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center who was to provide moral support to the patient.M. it may be enlightening and helpful in the proper resolution of the issue of negligence to examine the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur. still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. Herminda Cruz.542. Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient. that the accident arose from want of care. she incurred hospital bills amounting to P93. no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances show that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made. still needing constant medical attention. would be on June 17. she has been staying in their residence. She was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladdershe underwent a series of examinations which included blood and urine tests which indicated she was fit for surgery. . particularly in the law of negligence: Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. who was inside the operating room with the patient. Ramos. it is inapplicable A2010 . Hosaka to look for a good anesthesiologist.. . Herminda was allowed to stay inside the operating room. Hosaka. NO Note that for our purposes this was not raised as an issue in this case. another anesthesiologist.25. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care. on June 10. 1999 NATURE Petition For Certiorari FACTS . Ramos “that something wrong was x x x happening”. Hosaka is already here. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that accident happened provided character of accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under management and control of alleged wrongdoer. At almost 3:00 P. to them. “ang hirap maintubate nito. or where there’s direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. heard somebody say that “Dr. in turn. of that fateful day.M. . She thereafter heard Dr. Gutierrez was doing.” [2] In our jurisdiction. . who was to administer anesthesia. Because of the remarks of Dra. Rogelio E. She and her husband Rogelio met for the first time Dr. she focused her attention on what Dr. she was given injections. she then saw Dr. But as far as we’re concerned and relevant to our discussion in the outline. She thereafter noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr. and its relevant to the main issue on negligence: “At this juncture.

Court of Appeals reversed. .It is elementary that when a party is represented by counsel. Sillano on 11 April 1996. Ligsay. since a copy of the decision of the appellate court was not sent to the counsel on record of petitioner. Based on this.Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners.A careful review of the records reveals that the reason behind the delay in filing the motion for reconsideration is attributable to the fact that the decision of the Court of Appeals was not sent to then counsel on record of petitioners. Sillano. as such. As will hereinafter be explained. notice to a litigant without notice to his counsel on record is no notice at all. not being a lawyer and unaware of the prescriptive period for filing a motion for reconsideration. to the effect that the cause of brain damage was Erlinda’s allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent. to replace Atty. Thus. that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. On the same day. Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care. Corollary thereto.torts & damages Dr.” No copy of the decision. the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. Each case must be viewed in its own light and scrutinized in order to be within the res ipsa loquitur coverage. and denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner. if in the affirmative. Hence. however. Atty. Upon these facts and under these circumstances the Court would be able to say. and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Hence. there can be no sufficient notice to speak of. . or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case. .” The phrase “res ipsa loquitur” is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury. Mariano Gavino to prove that the damage sustained by Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty management of her airway by private respondents during the anesthesia phase. Ligsay. Ligsay. if negligence attended the management and care of the patient. the petition before us was submitted on time. . YES . we shall also determine if the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the testimonies of the witnesses for the private respondents 4. it affords reasonable evidence. the appellate court still denied the motion to admit the motion for reconsideration of petitioners in its Resolution. WON it should be dismissed for being filed later than allowable 15 day period for the filing of the Motion for A2010 . The due date fell on 27 May 1996. we believe that the receipt of the former should be considered in determining the timeliness of the filing of the present petition. a pulmonologist. negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable 3. a copy of the decision of the appellate court was instead sent to and received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos on 9 June 1995 wherein he was mistakenly addressed as Atty. The Court granted the motion for extension of time and gave petitioners additional thirty (30) days after the expiration of the fifteen-day (15) period counted from the receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals within which to submit the petition. dated 29 March 1996. whether the alleged negligence was the proximate cause of Erlinda’s comatose condition. well within the extended period given by the Court. . The petition was filed on 9 May 1996.Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. no copy of the decision of the appellate court was furnished to the counsel on record. . In fact. Moreover. does not Reconsideration 2. Atty. the appellate court apparently mistook him for the counsel on record. Atty. Eduardo Jamora. primarily on the ground that the fifteen-day (15) period for filing a motion for reconsideration had already expired.The decision of the Court of Appeals was received on 9 June 1995 by petitioner Rogelio Ramos who was mistakenly addressed as “Atty. we hold that a practical administration of justice dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur. In the present case. With a few exceptions. . The next day.Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is injured or destroyed while the patient is unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive control of the physicians.Nonetheless. Thus. Sillano filed before this Court a motion for extension of time to file the present petition for certiorari under Rule 45. On the other hand. Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal). 2. Atty. Rogelio Ramos. Rogelio referred the decision of the appellate court to a new lawyer. Based on the other communications received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos. NO . . Atty. However. referred the same to a legal counsel only on 20 June 1995. the Coronel Law Office. since the Court of Appeals already issued a second Resolution. the liability of the physicians and the hospital in this case is not predicated upon an alleged failure to secure the desired results of an operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in the diagnosis or treatment as in fact no operation or treatment was ever performed on Erlinda.The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that. Petitioner. Rogelio Ramos. What is the cost for the damages HELD 1. as a matter of common knowledge and observation. or on 12 April 1996. as a matter of common knowledge and experience. the appellate court denied the motion for extension of time in its Resolution dated 25 July 1995.However.We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. in holding that res ipsa loquitur is available to the present case we are not saying that the doctrine is applicable in any and all cases where injury occurs to a patient while under anesthesia. casis .36 - prof. dated 29 March 1996. all notices should be sent to the party’s lawyer at his given address. which superseded the earlier resolution issued on 25 July 1995. . taken with the surrounding circumstances. ISSUES 1. or four (4) days before the expiration of the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile petitioners engaged the services of another counsel. upon all these initial determination a case is made out for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. the delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration cannot be taken against petitioner. the damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for the application of res ipsa loquitur. WON the Court of Appeals erred in finding that private respondents were not negligent in the care of Erlinda during the anesthesia phase of the operation and.A copy of the above resolution was received by Atty. The motion for reconsideration was submitted on 4 July 1995. filed with the appellate court a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. or to any and all anesthesia cases. may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence. then counsel on record of petitioners. private respondents primarily relied on the expert testimony of Dr. in the absence of explanation by the defendant. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge. was sent nor received by the Coronel Law Office. Sillano filed on 7 August 1995 a motion to admit the motion for reconsideration contending that the period to file the appropriate pleading on the assailed decision had not yet commenced to run as the Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals had not yet served a copy thereof to the counsel on record. res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge. only on 20 June 1995. Moreover. Despite this explanation. much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and.

In the above requisites. Instead. moving or producing cause. where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. who advanced private respondents' theory that the oxygen deprivation which led to anoxic encephalopathy. Thus. Until the day of the operation. Gutierrez admitted that she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation itself.Respondent Dr. he could not have been capable of properly enlightening the court about anesthesia practice and procedure and their complications. 2. casis therefore. creating an inference or presumption of negligence. or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for. On the basis of the foregoing transcript. Before this date.Proximate cause has been defined as that which.torts & damages create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability. and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice.The CA commited a reversible error.First of all. the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is called upon to explain the matter. . Towards this end. . When the doctrine is appropriate. The real question. and must establish that the essential elements of the doctrine were present in a particular incident. that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage. by evidence of exculpation. Moreover. Hosaka’s negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority (as the to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Gutierrez was unaware of the physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. Jamora’s testimony as an expert in the administration of Thiopental Sodium. a Fellow of the Philippine College of Physicians and Diplomate of the Philippine Specialty Board of Internal Medicine. in which the pulmonologist himself admitted that he could not testify about the drug with medical authority. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. on 17 June 1985. It is simply a step in the process of such proof. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results.Private respondents repeatedly hammered the view that the cerebral anoxia which led to Erlinda’s coma was due to bronchospasm mediated by her allergic response to the drug. produces injury. must show a situation where it is applicable. Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal). The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied. respondent Dra. the fundamental element is the “control of the instrumentality” which caused the damage. introduced into her system. all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is.In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable. mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. whenever it appears from the evidence in the case. If there was such extraneous interventions. was due to an unpredictable drug reaction to the short-acting barbiturate. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. and 3. . It is regarded as a mode of proof. as an expert would. depending upon the circumstances of each case. therefore. and clinical pharmacology. Since Dr. . therefore. . It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say. before resort to the doctrine may be allowed. Dr. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct. in addition to proving injury or damage. We find the theory of private respondents unacceptable. respondent Dra. Jamora is a pulmonologist. it is considered as merely evidentiary or in the nature of a procedural rule. The resulting anoxic encephalopathy belongs to the field of neurology. and relieves a plaintiff of. The measures cautioning prudence and vigilance in dealing with human lives lie at the core of the physician’s centuries-old Hippocratic Oath. Jamora. a plaintiff. without the aid of expert testimony. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act. . 3. as a matter of common knowledge and observation. enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine. Dr. . in natural and continuous sequence. Thiopental Sodium. which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. Jamora is likewise not an allergologist and could not therefore properly advance expert opinion on allergicmediated processes. Gutierrez’ act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was.37 - prof. Respondent Dra. is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such operations. .Dra. permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident. the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. and without which the result would not have occurred. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way. the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient. It is the dominant. it is clear that the appellate court erred in giving weight to Dr. an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence. as such. by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him. Private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous condition. In the case at bar. no prior consultations with. internal medicine-allergy. and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. if he could. of explaining to the court the pharmacologic and toxic effects of the supposed culprit. . res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished.An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced bronchospasm properly falls within the fields of anesthesia. could not have been capable. or pre-operative evaluation of Erlinda was done by her.It does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof A2010 . In other words. an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. . and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. which. the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown: 1. a clear indicia of her negligence. they presented Dr. he is not a pharmacologist and. Still. Jamora cannot be considered an authority in the field of anesthesiology simply because he is not an anesthesiologist. Such element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the defendant. YES . that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence. or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result. In order to have the benefit of the rule. under usual and ordinary conditions. She was likewise not properly informed of the possible difficulties she would face during the administration of anesthesia to Erlinda.

These requirements are carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital administration or by a review committee set up by the hospital who either accept or reject the application. emotional and financial cost of the care of petitioner would be virtually impossible to quantify. are difficult to predict.The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former’s responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda’s cholecystectomy. . the control exercised. Doctors who apply for “consultant” slots. it would be now much more in step with the interests of justice if the value awarded for temperate damages would allow petitioners to provide optimal care for their loved one in a facility which generally specializes in such care.38 - prof.” who are allegedly not hospital employees. and feedback from patients. the actual physical. In addition to these. teacher or employer) who should prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. and/or for the privilege of admitting patients into the hospital. The amount given as temperate damages.Meanwhile. evidence of fellowship in most cases.After a physician is accepted. though to a certain extent speculative. we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases. no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. he is normally required to attend clinico-pathological conferences. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient.In the first place. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. petitioners were able to provide only home-based nursing care for a comatose patient who has remained in that condition for over a decade. while certain to occur. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists. or a consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum standards acceptable to the hospital or its peer review committee. these provisions neglect to take into account those situations. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases. In fact. it does not escape us that respondent Dr. an award of P1. interns and residents. . up to the time of trial. a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient’s condition. . Because of this. Having failed to do this. are required to submit proof of completion of residency. he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda’s condition.500. 2199. conduct bedside rounds for clerks. . either as a visiting or attending consultant. .for the victim in such cases to constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the compensatory damages previously awarded temperate damages are appropriate. presents problems in apportioning responsibility for negligence in medical malpractice cases. .In other words. Thus. not the cost of the care the family is usually compelled to undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy. . Under the circumstances.000. where the resulting injury might be continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the injury. the question now arises as to whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors for petitioner’s condition. Given these considerations. . However.torts & damages “captain” of the operative team) in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. Furthermore. the hiring. While “consultants” are not. the amount of damages which should be awarded.Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of litigation.In these cases. . or proof of a similar nature. while the burden of proving negligence rests on the plaintiffs. no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could not. interns and residents. .00 in temperate damages would therefore be reasonable. Having premised our award for compensatory damages on the amount provided by petitioners at the onset of litigation. Accordingly. as in this case. Even the temperate damages herein awarded would be inadequate if petitioner’s technically employees. . their educational qualifications.In the instant case. However. he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. A consultant remiss in his duties. evidence of accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate). the burden shifts to the respondents (parent.Except as provided by law or by . fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting “consultant” staff. should take into account the cost of proper care. They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the aid of professionals. . In other words. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra.Art. nurses.Upon these disquisitions we hold that private respondents are solidarily liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. and was in fact over three hours late for the latter’s operation. should be one which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved. an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. generally. In other words. is normally politely terminated. from the nature of the case. failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. the amount of actual damages recoverable in suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the correct minimum cost of proper care. respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlinda’s condition. be made with certainty. moderate grand rounds and patient audits and perform other tasks and responsibilities. hire. and references. This being the case. once negligence is shown. In neglecting to offer such proof. on the basis of the foregoing. if they are to adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused. for the privilege of being able to maintain a clinic in the hospital. the difficulty is only more apparent than real. . the physician’s performance as a specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review committee on the basis of mortality and morbidity statistics. This is particularly true with respondent hospital. for anything less would be grossly inadequate. hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the conduct of their work within the hospital premises. respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180. 4. guardian. . one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. with the exception of the payment of wages. private hospitals. casis stipulation. the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has been completed and that the cost can be liquidated. apart from a general denial of its responsibility over respondent physicians.We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital in this particular incident. The unique practice (among private hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with attending and visiting “consultants. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient.In the instant case. visiting or attending. And because of the unique nature of such cases.As it would not be equitable .and certainly not in the best interests of the administration of justice . A2010 . the control test is determining. respondent hospital.

altering their long term goals to take into account their life with a comatose patient. casis testimony and did not consider it with other portions of Dr. a reading of the said testimony reveals no such infirmity and establishes Dr. .While the rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Batiquin.000. . 5) the costs of the suit. Villegas . Kho handled the piece of rubber. The trial court's following declaration shows that while it was critical of the lack of care with which Dr. a Nurse's Record. leaving her trustworthiness unimpaired.000. needless to say. which led to the different decision of the RTC and CA. Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney’s fees valued at P100. Batiquin is liable HELD Procedural YES . ISSUES Procedural WON the court can review questions of fact Substantive WON Dr. Furthermore. and that she sent it to a laboratory and then to Cebu City for examination by a pathologist.In the instant case. as 2 versions arose from Dr. Kho.While the petitioners claim that contradictions and falsities punctured Dr. After examining her. They. Well-settled is the rule that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony. the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas' body. Kho testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination. private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus. Batiquin’s testimony. Kho's knowledge of the piece of rubber could not be based on other than first hand knowledge for.352. Kho's testimony. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants. and solidarily against private respondents the following: 1) P1. the pains still kept recurring. .000. 4) P100.torts & damages condition remains unchanged for the next ten years. does not occur unless through the intervention of negligence.When Dr. 1988. Villegas submitted to Dr. dirt and pus behind the uterus. Kho’s testimony: 1) that it was sent to the Pathologist in Cebu as testified to in Court by Dr. the entire proceedings of the cesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. her positive testimony prevails over the negative testimony in favor of the petitioners. it stands to reason that such could only have been a byproduct of the cesarean section performed by Dr. no motive to state any untruth was ever imputed against Dr." . Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside. it was not prepared to doubt Dr. Villegas submit to another surgery. the evidence which mentioned the piece of rubber are a Medical Certificate.It is also worth noting that the trial court paid heed to Dr.000. Kho's testimony. performed a caesarian operation on Mrs. an Anesthesia Record. "there being no showing that the person or persons who prepared them are deceased or unable to testify on the facts therein stated . 2) P2. Kho and (2) that Dr. In this light. The CA was correct in saying that the trial court erred when it isolated the disputed portion of Dr.The husband and the children. 1996 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS .500. not the respondents.00 are likewise proper. However. The failure of the Plaintiffs to reconcile these two different versions served only to weaken their claim against Defendant Batiquin. Salud Kho. Kho's trustworthiness. July 5.00 as actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of P8. however. an award of P2. A2010 . all petitioners in this case. Kho to be a credible witness. regarded these documentary evidence as mere hearsay.00 as temperate damages. . an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus.000.The focal point of the appeal is Dr.After leaving the hospital. embedded on the ovarian cyst. Kho’s testimony. Villegas and successfully delivered the latter’s baby. exemplary damages in the amount of P100.00 each as exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. since aside from the cesarean section.This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant. As such.Finally. thus only supporting out appraisal of Dr.The piece of rubber allegedly found was not presented in court. First. or when the appellate court misapprehended the facts Substantive . The piece of rubber appeared to be a part of a rubber glove. Furthermore. For the foregoing reasons. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care. which. Kho's credibility.000. when the appealed decision is clearly contradicted by the evidence on record. the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore. BATIQUIN V CA (Villegas) 258 SCRA 334 DAVIDE. The trial court.Considering that we have assessed Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's private patient sometime before September 21. among which are when the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court conflict. This was the cause of all of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. there are exceptions.000. In the morning of September 21.There was also doubts as to the whereabouts of the piece of rubber. are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim. knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil. . Dr Kho suggested that Mrs. Kho’s . Second. She also gradually lost her appetite. Batiquin's gloves after the operation nor blood smears on her hands upon removing her gloves. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. Also. Dr. . along with other physicians and nurses. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain medicines. Kho as a credible witness.00 are hereby awarded. Kho saw a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen. a Progress Record. They have fashioned their daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner.Mrs. Mrs. and Dr.000.00 as moral damages. Batiquin. Aside from Dr. and. in the absence of an explanation by the defendant. Ma. 1988 Dr. Kho’s testimony.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives. There were inconsistencies within her own testimony. as she asserted before the trial court. She then consulted Dr.00 in moral damages would be appropriate. and a piece of rubber material on the right side of the uterus. The CA reversed the decision. . DISPOSITION the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed from are hereby modified so as to award in favor of petitioners. will have to live with the day to day uncertainty of the patient’s illness.000. Kho threw it away as told by her to Defendant. so she consulted Dr. . the phrase relied upon by the trial court does not negate the fact that Dr. Kho was frank throughout her turn on the witness stand.39 - prof. by way of example. The family’s moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. and a Physician's Discharge Summary. it affords reasonable evidence.000. But the trial court failed to recognized that these were mere denials or negative testimonies. that there was neither any tear on Dr. that the accident arose from want of care. Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. 3) P1.

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Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof DISPOSITION Decision affirmed

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contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights. DISPOSITION The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC, whereupon payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

D.M. CONSUNJI V CA KAPUNAN; April 20, 2001
NATURE Appeal from CA affirming decision of RTC ordering defendant D.M. Consunji, Inc. to pay damages to plaintiff Maria J. Juego FACTS - At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. Investigation disclosed that while victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo were performing their work on board a steel platform with plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the platform came loose causing the whole platform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core of the building under construction, save his 2 companions who luckily jumped out for safety. - On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow. On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. ISSUES 1. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to prove petitioner’s negligence 2. WON respondent is precluded from recovering damages under the Civil Code HELD 1. YES Ratio As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of

the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a construction site unless someone is negligent; thus, the first requisite is present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of appellant; thus, the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee’s deceased husband; thus, the last requisite is also present. A reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident. 2. NO Ratio Claimants may invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence. There is no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the

MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V REMONQUILLO 99 PHIL 117 MONTEMAYOR; May 18, 1956
NATURE Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS - August 22, 1950: Efren Magno went to the house of Antonio Peñaloza, hid stepbrother, on Rodriguez Lanuza St, Manila, to repair a leaking “media agua.” The “media agua” was just below the window of the third story. - Standing on said “media agua”, Magno received from his son thru the window a 3’x6’ galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion. The lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company parallel to the media agua and 2 ½ feet from it, causing his death by electrocution. - his widow and children filed suit to recover damages from the company. Trial court rendered judgment in their favor. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. - The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire stretched between poles pm the street and carrying a charge of 3600 volts. It was installed there some two years ago before Peñaloza’s house was constructed. During the construction of said house a similar incident took place, with less tragic consequences. The owner of the house complained to defendant about the danger which the wire presented, and defendant moved one end of the wire farther from the house by means of a brace, but left the other end where it was. - Regulations of the City required that “all wires be kept three feet from the building.” - There was no insulation that could have rendered it safe, because there is no insulation material in commercial use for such kind of wire (according to appellant, and this was not refuted). Petitioner’s Claim - Owner of the house exceeded the limit for the construction of the “media agua” (17% more). Respondent’s Comment

torts & damages
Owner was given final permit despite the excess of the “media agua”. ISSUE WON Manila Electric is guilty of negligence. HELD NO - It was the victim who was guilty of negligence Ratio the liability of electric companies for damages or personal injury is governed by the rules of negligence, nevertheless such companies are not insurers of the safety of the public. Reasoning - The death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence, and in some measure by the too close proximity of the “media agua” to the electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the “media agua.” Had the house owner followed the terms of the permit given him by the city for the construction of his “media agua”, the distance from the wires to the edge of said “media agua” would have been 3ft and 11 3/8 inches. - The company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said construction, and to change the installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance. - The violation of the permit for the construction was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it. The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. It is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so. He had training and experience for the job. He could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. - To hold the defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno, such supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate and principal cause of the accident. Disposition The appealed decision of the CA is reversed, and complaint against the Company dismissed.

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- The girl was taken to the provincial hospital. Despite his efforts, the child died that same night. - It was certified that the cause of death was "Burns, 3rd Degree, whole Body", and that the contributory causes were "Congestion of the Brain and visceras of the chest & abdomen.” - The defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow down the side of the street Gran Captain with the knowledge and consent of the authorities; that the cause of death was other than the hot water; and that in the death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and negligence. - The trial judge, however, after examination of the evidence presented by the defendants, failed to sustain their theory of the case, except as to the last mentioned special defense. He nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. ISSUE WON the action should be dismissed due to the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs

Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila dismissing the complaint on the merits filed in an action to recover damages for injuries FACTS - Due to a collision between the respective automobiles of Bernardo and Legaspi, the former filed an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by his car which he alleged were by reason of Legaspi's negligence in causing said collision. Legaspi, on the other hand, filed a cross-complaint alleging it was Bernardo's fault. He also asks for damages. - The lower court found upon the evidence that both the plaintiff and the defendant were negligent in handling their automobiles and that said negligence was of such a character and extent on the part of both as to prevent either from recovering. ISSUE WON the parties may recover damages HELD 1. NO - Where two automobiles, going in opposite directions, collide on turning a street corner, and it appears from the evidence and is found by the trial court that the drivers thereof were equally negligent and contributed equally to the principal occurrence as determining causes thereof, neither can recover of the other for damages suffered.

BERNAL V HOUSE 54 PHIL 327 MALCOLM; January 30, 1930
FACTS - Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal went to Tacloban, Leyte to attend the procession of Holy Friday. - After the procession, they, accompanied by two other persons, passed along a public street named Gran Capitan. - The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in advance of her mother and her friends. - While in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., an automobile appeared on which frightened the child. She turned to run, but fell into the street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House. - When the mother and her companions reached the child, they found her face downward in the hot water.

BERNARDO V LEGASPI 29 Phil 12 MORELAND; December 23, 1914
NATURE

HELD NO - The death of the child was the result of fault and negligence in permitting hot water to flow through the public streets, there to endanger the lives of passers-by who were unfortunately enough to fall into it - The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. - There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. - The doctrines announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages. DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from was in part be reversed and in the court of origin another judgment was issued in favor of Fortunata Enverso and against J.V. House for the amount of P1,000, and for the costs of both instances.

SEPARATE OPINION

torts & damages
ROMUALDEZ [dissent]
- Even taking the finding that the defendant by its negligence helped to bring about the accident which resulted in the death of the child Purificacion Bernal, plaintiff, by negligence, contributed to that most regrettable result. - Judgment appealed from should be affirmed.

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ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. - That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling, considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all. - It is settled that: The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means. - This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that: Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. - That presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner. - Even assuming that the cause of the collapse was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable because it was guilty of negligence, which the trial court denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure for one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence. Disposition Judgment was denying the instant petition with costs against petitioner.

GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION V CHATTO 210 SCRA 18 DAVIDE JR.; June 16, 1992
FACTS - Plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. - Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued. - Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day. - The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11. - Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, plaintiff went to Illinois, USA in July 1982 for further treatment. She was treated at the Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for about three (3) months during which time she had to return to the Cook County Hospital five (5) or, six (6) times. - Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect. - The trial court awarded actual or compensatory and moral damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. - Respondent Court found the appeal later filed to be without merit. - Its motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the respondent Court, petitioner filed the petition in the SC. ISSUE WON the collapse of the ceiling was caused by force majeur HELD

NO - Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. That Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure. - Definitions of force majeure as cited in Pons y Compañia vs. La Compañia Maritima: 1. Blackstone, in his Commentaries on English Law: Inevitable accident or casualty; an accident produced by any physical cause which is irresistible; such as lightning. tempest, perils of the sea, inundation, or earthquake; the sudden illness or death of a person. 2. Escriche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudenci,: The event which we could neither foresee nor resist; as for example, the lightning stroke, hail, inundation, hurricane, public enemy, attack by robbers; Vis major est, says Cayo, ea quae consilio humano neque provideri neque vitari potest. Accident and mitigating circumstances. 3. Bouvier: Any accident due to natural cause, directly exclusively without human intervention, such as could not have been prevented by any kind of oversight, pains and care reasonably to have been expected. 4. Corkburn, chief justice, in a well considered English case, said that were a captain uses all the known means to which prudent and experienced captains ordinarily have recourse, he does all that can be reasonably required of him; and if, under such circumstances, he is overpowered by storm or other natural agency, he is within the rule which gives immunity from the effects of such vis major. The term generally applies, broadly speaking, to natural accidents, such as those caused by lightning, earthquake, tempests, public enemy ,etc. -The real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he isincompetent. He is not an engineer, but an architect who had not even passed the government's examination. - Verily, post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the present proceedings. What is significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed by the respondent Court, that the collapse was due to construction defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding. - The building was constructed barely 4 years prior to the accident in question. It was not shown that any of the causes denominates as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the

PLDT V CA (SPS ESTEBAN) REGALADO; September 29, 1989 [CITATION]
NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the resolution of the Court of Appeals. FACTS

although not as the primary cause.Atlantic contends that the remedy for injury through negligence lies only in a criminal action against the official directly responsible and that the employer be held only subsidiarily liable. are hereby SET ASIDE. The men were hauling the rails on 2 hand cars. in its answer. If it had remained on that inside lane. breaking his leg. but a by-stander Mangyao saw the incident and shouted at the appellant to stop. an independent contractor which undertook the said construction work. a rig driven by Genobiagon bumped an old woman who was crossing the street. the car canted and the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff who was walking by the car’s side.The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident. At that speed.July 30.R. . as one of its determining factors.TC ruled in favor of Esteban spouses whereas the CA reversed the ruling.Genobiagon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system.R. . Quiñones.The plaintiff."The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence. 1968 – Jeep of Esteban spouses ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench. if at all. Costs against petitioner. is L. since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence (People vs. the tie broke. who fell at the middle of the road. .However.The plaintiff’s witness alleged that a noticeable depression in the track had appeared after a typhoon. This was reported to the foreman. Mckenna. 1979. the track sagged. one of a group of 8 AfricanAmerican laborers in the employment of defendant. Rakes. As Rakes was walking along the car’s side when the accident occurred. and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. 1959.43 - prof. She was then loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital where she died 3 hours later. March 29. ISSUE WON there was contributory negligence on the part of petitioner . was at work transporting iron rails from the harbor in Manila. . promulgated on September 25. The appellant continued to drive on. does not exonerate the accused. > Jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. Mangyao asked him why he bumped the old woman and his answer was. 'it was the old woman that bumped him. The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. > Plaintiffs’ jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as plaintiff husband claimed. ISSUE WON the Esteban spouses can claim damages from PLDT HELD NO Ratio A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. if any. > If the accident did not happen because the jeep was running quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over the ACCIDENT MOUND. 1947). which was later amputated at the knee. some behind or at it sides and some pulling the cars in the front by a rope. 321. . the company’s officers and 3 of the workers testified that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all against walking by the side of cars. 1990 and September 3. GENOBIAGON V CA (PEOPLE OF THE PHILS) 178 SCRA 422 GRIÑO-AQUINO. 44 O. The old woman started to cross when the first rig was approaching her." (People vs. A2010 .PLDT. at about 7:30 PM.Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms. 1957 NATURE Petition for review of the CA’s decision affirming the conviction of the petitioner of the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence. . Also. dated March 11. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. leaving a permanent scar on her cheek. No.Genobiagon claims CA erred in not finding that the reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate cause of the accident which led to her death ISSUES WON contributory negligence can be used as defense by Genobiagon HELD RAKES V ATLANTIC [CITATION] [PONENTE] NATURE Action for damages FACTS . 1520) Disposition the appealed decision is affirmed with modification as to the civil liability of the petitioner which is hereby increased to P30. the windshield of the jeep was shattered. CA affirmed . it would not have hit the accident mound > That plaintiffs’ jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit the ACCIDENT MOUND could have been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street to the south of the ACCIDEN MOUND. the appellant's rig bumped the old woman.The accident was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. CA-G.On Dec 31. FACTS . but it had not been proven that Atlantic inspected the track or had any proper system of inspection. At one point. there were no side guards on the cars to keep the rails from slipping off.000. casis NO . then plaintiff husband had not exercised the deligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident. . Atlantic. October 22. is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.torts & damages . In addition.G. while the respondent husband suffered cut lips. Orbeta. The old woman was unconscious. but also because he was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him. . denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be held responsible. Reasoning . he was found to have contributed in some degree to the injury inflicted. but as appellant's vehicle was going so fast not only because of the steep down-grade of the road. He ran after appellant when the latter refused to stop. 1980. legs and face. The appellant's rig was following another at a distance of two meters. Its original decision. Barte and Company. Disposition resolutions of respondent CA.The alleged contributory negligence of the victim.' The appellant went back to the place where the old woman was struck by his rig. he could have braked the vehicle the moment it struck the ACCIDENT MOUND. . Overtaking the appellant.

produces the injury. this was not how bank teller Mabayad proceeded thus resulting in huge losses to the private respondent. it appears that the bank's teller. Mabayad. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Ms. The law considers what would be reckless.Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic. but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other. . or when it is impossible to SEPARATE OPINION WILLARD AND CARSON [dissent] . . 17 defines proximate cause as "that cause.000. March 14. . . blameworthy. Because of this. original or duplicate. In the testimony of Mr. plaintiff should not be afforded relief PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE V CA (ROMMEL’S MARKETING CORP. . . as insisted by the petitioners. (b) fault or negligence of the defendant. Mabayad herself. but only in reduction of his damages. Court of Appeals. Ratio Art. in validating the deposit slips. and without which the result would not have occurred. then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. Mabayad on guard. Azucena Mabayad. Yabut. and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity.74 representing various deposits it had made in its current account with the bank but which were not credited. . there being fault or negligence. Islands v. coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller. 11 A "reasonable man of ordinary prudence" 12 would not have given credence to such explanation and would have insisted that the space left blank be filled up as a condition for validation.The proximate cause of the loss was the negligent act of the bank. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. SC deducted PhP2. and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 2176. Romeo Bonifacio. 1976) that bank manager Bonifacio admittedly became aware of the practice of his teller Mabayad of validating blank deposit slips. Azucena Mabayad. 1997 NATURE Petition for review challenging the CA decision affirming the RTC decision in a civil case FACTS . or after the lapse of more than seven (7) years counted from the period when the funds in question were deposited in plaintiff's accounts (May.Applying the above test. ISSUE What is the proximate cause of the loss.It was this negligence of Ms. is obliged to pay for the damage done. allegedly due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of the petitioner bank. . petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party." In this case.979. despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips.It was in fact only when he testified in this case in February. Bank of the Phil.979. policy and precedent. as testified to by Ms. which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent. A2010 . line and sinker the too shallow excuse of Ms.The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits should not relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility. 1975 to July. common sense. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff. 1983. in essence. Irene Yabut to the effect that since the duplicate copy was only for her personal record. . to the tune of P304. She should not have been so naive in accepting hook. Such fault or negligence. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter Reasoning . there is no dispute as to the damage suffered by the private respondent. or some other person for whose acts he must respond. officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. .LAST CLEAR CHANCE: under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to. . . or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. Yabut to Ms. Each party is chargeable with damages in proportion to his fault. Mabayad. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another.In the case at bench.torts & damages HELD YES . then he is guilty of negligence. she would simply fill up the blank space later on. both original and duplicate. suffered by the private respondent RMC — petitioner bank's negligence or that of private respondent's? HELD . wanton. does not operate as a bar to recovery.the negligence of the defendant alone was insufficient to cause the accident—it also required the negligence of the plaintiff. Unfortunately. notwithstanding the fact that one of the deposit slips was not completely accomplished. states that where both parties are negligent. the amount fairly attributable to his own negligence. Undoubtedly. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man. thru its teller Ms.44 - prof. .Trial court assessed that damages to plaintiff amount to PhP5.Petitioner had walked along the side of the car despite a prohibition to do so by the foreman. absent the act of Ms. Azucena Mabayad. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip. while he ordered the investigation of the incident. or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. This doctrine.Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. and inexcusable negligence in the appellant bank's supervision of its employees.74. casis slip was left blank while that in the original was filled up. this is gross. was negligent in validating.the case stems from a complaint filed by Rommel’s Marketing Corporation (RMC) to recover from the former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) the sum of P304.500. to the effect that. at times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"). and were instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas. presented by Ms. in natural and continuous sequence. he never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's validation procedures. would do. The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information — that of the name of the account holder — should have already put Ms.Test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. Ms. Rather than readily validating the incomplete duplicate copy.) 269 SCRA 695 HERMOSISIMA JR. she should have proceeded more cautiously by being more probing as to the true reason why the name of the account holder in the duplicate . -The negligence of the injured person contributing to his injury but not being one of the determining causes of the principal accident. which.

Its negligence. Why is RMC insulating Ms. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC. shall be borne by private respondent RMC. simply by faithfully observing their selfimposed validation procedure. But if his negligence was only contributory. Irene Yabut. when there is a clear evidence of tampering with any of the material entries in a deposit slip. or after the deposit slip was validated by the teller in favor of Yabut's husband. who indicated therein the current account number to which the deposit was to be credited. Petitioners may recover from Ms. Stated otherwise. Both parts were detachable from each other." it is my considered view that the doctrine assumes that the negligence of the defendant was subsequent to the negligence of the plaintiff and the same must be the proximate cause of the injury. The rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of. thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company. the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father of a family. and the amount of the deposit either in cash or in checks. the usual bank procedure then was for the teller to count whether the cash deposit tallied with the amount written down by the depositor in the deposit slip.torts & damages determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident. The award of attorney's fees shall be borne exclusively by the petitioner. is not contributory but the immediate and proximate cause of its injury. The upper part was called the depositor's stub and the lower part was called the bank copy.It was private respondent who had the last and clear chance to prevent any further misappropriation by Yabut had it only reviewed the status of its current accounts on the bank statements sent to it monthly or regularly.In the earlier days before the age of full computerization. or bar a defense against liability sought by another.The legal or proximate cause of RMC's loss was when Yabut. the rightful owner of such deposited funds.It seems that an innocent bank teller is being unduly burdened with what should fall on Ms. and superimposed RMC's account number. it was only after the transaction was posted in the ledger that the teller proceeded to machine validate the deposit slip and then affix his signature or initial to serve as proof of the completed transaction. we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio.It should be noted that the teller validated the depositor's stub in the upper portion and the bank copy on the lower portion on both the original and duplicate copies of the deposit slips presented by Yabut. to avoid the accident or injury. Thus. SEPARATE OPINION PADILLA [dissent] . then the teller proceeded to verify whether the current account number matched with the current account name as written in the deposit slip. when Yabut wrote the name of RMC on the blank account name on the validated duplicate copy of the deposit slip. .The foregoing notwithstanding. Since a sizable amount of cash was entrusted to Yabut. but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. however. not the validation of the deposit slip by the teller as the deposit slip was made out by Yabut in her husband's name and to his account. not a last possible chance. the bank was not remiss in its duty of sending monthly bank statements to private respondent RMC so that any error or discrepancy in the entries therein could be brought to the bank's attention at the earliest opportunity. at least. banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care. particularly Romeo Lipana. indeed. .Going back to Yabut's modus operandi. the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care.Since Yabut deposited money in cash. the appellate court's decision is AFFIRMED. who had the last fair chance. . Private respondent failed to examine these bank statements not because it was prevented by some cause in not doing so. A2010 . . had two parts. Azucena Mabayad the amount they would pay the private respondent. said act only served to cover-up the loss already caused by her to RMC. as issued in 1975. private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. there must be a last and a clear chance. but because it was purposely negligent as it admitted that it does not normally check bank statements given by banks. she would accomplish two (2) copies of the current account deposit slip. .45 - prof. In all other respects. In short. . he cannot recover damages. Thus.00 attorney's fees. could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. her employer? . tampered with its account number. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. as what the law presumes. Private respondent shall have recourse against Ms. Had it done so. but with the account name purposely left blank by Yabut. It must have been a chance as would have enabled a reasonably prudent man in like position to have acted effectively to avoid the injury and the resulting damage to himself.In the case at bar.In the case of banks. the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. . who should have been charged with estafa or estafa through falsification of private document. In view of this. have taken ordinary care of its concerns. If it did. 40% of the damage awarded by the respondent appellate court. yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank. on the assumption that it would serve no other purpose JUNTILLA V FONTANAR . The teller. except the award of P25. .000.Thus. Disposition the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is modified by reducing the amount of actual damages private respondent is entitled to by 40%. had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client. Precisely. deposited the money of RMC in her husband's name and account number instead of that of RMC. therefore. had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. the name of the depositor or current account holder. it was the criminal act of Yabut that directly caused damage to RMC. private respondent should. its employee. PBC's deposit slip. her employer. assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. detached the validated depositor's stub on the original deposit slip and allowed Yabut to retain the whole validated duplicate deposit slip that bore the same account number as the original deposit slip. as advanced by the petitioner. only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the petitioners. if the latter. the genuineness and due execution of the document become an issue in resolving whether or not the transaction had been fair and regular and whether the ordinary course of business had been followed by the bank. .LAST CLEAR CHANCE: As for the doctrine of "last clear chance. RMC's own employee. Irene Yabut from liability when in fact she orchestrated the entire fraud on RMC. Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors. a bank normally maintained a ledger which served as a repository of accounts to which debits and credits resulting from transactions with the bank were posted from books of original entry. . the plaintiff may recover damages. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent 23 under A2179 CC. Irene Yabut. Here. . it is not disputed that each time Yabut would transact business with PBC's tellers. thru its teller. it cannot be denied that. . the company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. casis but for a personal record to complement the original validated depositor's stub. the date of the deposit. The deposit slip was prepared and signed by the depositor or his representative. to wit: .

“ not only are the rulings of the CA in Rodriguez v Red Line Trans. that: “The preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer. Disposition Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. WON the accident was due to a fortuitous event HELD 1. In La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents. The petitioner had two choices: (1) return to Cavite that same afternoon and arrive there in the early evening. and by entering into the said contract. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles not to exceed safe and legal speed limits and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times. there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents. the manufacturer is considered as being in law the agent or servant of the carrier. . v De Jesus. He opted for the second. therefore. could have been caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident. the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the human will. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence. The records show that the passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a A2010 . Paras.torts & damages 136 SCRA 624 GUITERREZ JR. injuries on his left arm. Decision of City Court is REINSTATED ditch immediately after its right rear tire exploded. The respondents then appealed to the CFI of Cebu.. et al. 1989 NATURE A petition to reverse Commission on Audit’s denial of relief FACTS . 2. whenever it appears that the defect would have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which HERNANDEZ V COMMISSION ON AUDIT 179 SCRA 39 CRUZ.It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage. 1985 NATURE Petition to review the decision of CFI of Cebu FACTS . . NO Ratio A caso fortuito (fortuitous event) presents the following essential characteristics: 1. or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation. thinking it the safer one.” This conclusion is based on a misapprehension of overall facts. using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person. he collected the cash value of the checks.46 - prof.” In the case at bar. He went to the main office in Manila to encash 2 checks covering the wages of the employees and the operating expenses of the Project. after the initial shock. There is also evidence to show that the passenger jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident. It must be impossible to foresee the even which constitutes the caso fortuito. it must be impossible to avoid 3.Petitioner then filed a civil case for breach of contract with damages before the City Court of Cebu against Fontanar. The records show that this obligation was not met by the respondents. as far as regards the work of constructing the appliance. Co. and Camoro. It was while the vehicle was along EDSA that two persons with knives boarded and forcibly took the money he was carrying. with regard to inspection and application of the necessary tests. v. we held in Necesito. or (2) take the money with him to his house in Marilao. registered under the franchise of Clemente Fontanar. who filed their answer. For the purposes of this doctrine.Relative to the contingency of mechanical defects. Hernandez was the officer-in-charge and special disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach Project of the Philippine Tourism Authority in Cavite. But the hold-upper who . The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner 4. or if it can be foreseen.City Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. must be independent of the human will 2. which reversed the judgment upon a finding that the accident in question was due to a fortuitous event. November 6. Petitioner’s MFR was denied.The CFI relied on the ruling of the CA in Rodriguez v Red Line Transportation Co. The petitioner decided nevertheless to encash them because the Project employees would be waiting for their pay the following day. He went to Danao city and upon arrival there he entered the City Hospital to attend to his injuries and asked his father-in-law to go to site of the accident to look for his watch but the watch was nowhere to be found. the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The sudden blowing-up. he found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm. but actually owned by Fernando Banzon) when its right rear tire exploded causing it to turn turtle. We held that. alleging that the accident was beyond their control taking into account that the tire that exploded was newly bought and slightly used at the time it blew up. According to this theory. not binding on this Court but they were also based on considerations quite different from those that obtain in the case at bar. He took a passenger jeep bound for his house in Bulacan. right thigh and on his back and also found this “Omega” wrist watch was lost. casis under the circumstances was incumbent upon it. WON the CFI erred in absolving the carrier from any liability upon a finding that the tire blow out is a fortuitous event 2. When he came back to his senses. that “a tire blow-out does not constitute negligence unless the tire was already old and should not have been used at all. He caught up with Virgilio Alvarez and overcame him after a scuffle. . this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event.Petitioner Roberto Juntilla was sitting a the front seat of a jeepney (driven by one Berfol Camoro. et al. with a due regard for all the circumstances. May 31. spend the night there. He estimated that the money would be available by 10am and that he would be back in Ternate by about 2pm of the same day. and leave for Ternate the following morning. The petitioner stated that there were 3 passengers in the front seat and 14 in the rear. The evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident. et al. immediately followed in desperate pursuit. We agree with the observation of the petitioner that a public utility jeep running at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up. Plaintiff was thrown out of the vehicle and lost consciousness upon landing on the ground. And so. Hernandez.While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the tire were still visible. Bulacan.Teodoro M.In the case at bar. hence this appeal. The obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor Reasoning . it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire. Banzon. . ISSUES 1. . However. Alvarez was subsequently charged with robbery and pleaded guilty. YES . the processing of the checks was completed only at 3pm.

he says that the first course was more prudent as he saw it. the petition is GRANTED. according as a matter is within the original jurisdiction of the one or the other.The next day.the petitioner. Jesus Lim Ong. casis entering the theater. — When a loss of government funds or property occurs while the same is in transit or is caused by fire. Tantuico. and her 15-year old daughter. . ACCORDINGLY.COA insists that the petitioner should not be relieved from his money accountability because it was his own negligence that led to the loss of the cash he had sought to take not to Ternate but to Marilao.torts & damages escaped is still at large and the stolen money he took with him has not been recovered. theft. something that could not have been reasonably foreseen although it could have happened. In fine. . based on common sense and our own experiences.3 . Jesus Lim Ong is not an engineer. Per Medico Legal Certificate (Exh. with the available evidence in support thereof. invoking the foregoing facts. Its 3 Section 638." Having interposed it as a defense. 1992 NATURE Petition for Review FACTS . It does not appear he has passed the government examination for architects. Hernandez claims that the respondent COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying him relief and in holding him negligent for the loss of the stolen money. Hernandez can be attributed to his negligence because had he brought the cash proceeds of the checks (replenishment fund) to the Beach Park in Ternate immediately after encashment for safekeeping in his office. of God. or the provincial auditor. the real reason why Mr. the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. Chatto. Later. WON Jesus Lim Ong’s investigation maybe given weight in the trial 2. .On his decision to take the money home that afternoon instead of returning directly to Ternate. assuming he was guilty of contributory negligence. He is a graduate of architecture from the St. plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto suffered the following injuries: . NO . To Our mind. Ernesto G. A2010 . especially on that busy highway. Shocked and hurt.This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by the said provisions. incompetent. if you will. Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. "C") issued by Dr. Louie University in Baguio City. but the Court feels he should not be blamed for that. 1982 Gloria E. To sustain that proposition is to introduce sacrilege in our jurisprudence. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day. the ignorance of Mr. denied the petitioner's request. For most of us. June 16. ISSUE WON petitioner’s acts are so tainted with negligence or recklessness as to justify the denial of the petitioner's request for relief from accountability for the stolen money HELD NO . plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. agreeing that Hernandez had not committed any negligence or. Ong about the cause of the collapse of the ceiling of their theater cannot be equated. may in the particular case allow.then Solicitor-General argued that Hernandez was negligent in the safekeeping of the stolen funds. Mr. or our intuition. He avers he has done only what any reasonable man would have done and should not be held accountable for a fortuitous event over which he had no control. 2. .47 - prof. jr. GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION V CHATTO 210 SCRA 18 DAVIDE JR. the loss of said cash thru robbery could have been aborted. had made up for it with his efforts to retrieve the money and his capture of one of the robbers. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11. Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater.however. the Commission on Audit. and within thirty days or such longer period as the Auditor.It is true that the petitioner miscalculated. they transferred to the UST hospital. An officer who fails to comply with this requirement shall not be relieved of liability or allowed credit for any such loss in the settlement of his accounts.00 under the accountability of Mr. through then Chairman Francisco S. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued. and without any mystic ability to peer into the future. as an act. Hardly ten (10) minutes after . . It could not have collapsed without a cause. The memo concludes that in deciding to take the money with him to Marilao after imprudently withdrawing it from the main office. That Mr. the officer accountable therefor or having custody thereof shall immediately notify the Auditor General. The decision he made seemed logical at that time and was one that could be expected of a reasonable and prudent person. the loss of the P10.In the afternoon of June 4.there was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial civil and structural engineers on the cause of the collapse of the theater's ceiling. filed a request for relief from money accountability under Section 638 of the Revised Administrative Code.In the petition at bar. . . They bought balcony tickets but even then were unable to find seats considering the number of people patronizing the movie. post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the contention is that the petitioner should not have encashed the checks as the hour was already late and he knew he could not return to Ternate before nightfall. that what happened was a fortuitous event that could not have reasonably been foreseen. that the likelihood of robbery during the time in question was stronger in Ternate than in Marilao. ISSUES 1. the petitioner was assuming a risk from which he cannot now be excused after the loss of the money as a result of the robbery to which it was unreasonably exposed. all we can rely on is a reasoned conjecture of what might happen. however. which is the normal procedure in the handling of public funds. Verily. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure. owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. but an architect who had not even passed the government's examination. He is not an engineer. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect. who was eventually convicted. or provincial auditor.Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. or other casualty. observing inter alia: In the instant case. if only because his home in Marilao was much nearer than his office in Ternate. Brion.Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he is. NO . Credit for loss occurring in transit or due to casualty — Notice to Auditor. shall present his application for relief. WON the collapse was due to force majeure HELD 1.175. Disposition The petitioner is entitled to be relieved from accountability for the money forcibly taken from him. his successor sided with the petitioner. admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed. Lina Delza E. as the respondent Court impliedly held. it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. and did. So it was with the petitioner.

462. the burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened independently of the will of the appellant. It was not shown that any of the causes denominates as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. the antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil Code. and since the burning of the warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees.We sustain the validity of the above stipulation. FACTS . that the collapse was due to construction defects. The building was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the accident in question. defines 'caso fortuito' as 'an event that takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. especially as regards the ceiling.On the bases of the foregoing facts. colored papers. toys etc) as evidenced by the corresponding bills of lading issued by the appellant. The court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736. must be independent of the human will. p. where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss. At about 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day. Vol. That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction. the doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means. Negros Occidental several cargoes (cavans of rice. The latter could not have foreseen the event. Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan. originally brought to the Court of Appeals. citing Mr. . a 'caso fortuito' presents the following essential characteristics: (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence. Before the fire. and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the defendant. Reasoning . Disposition judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the instant petition with costs against petitioner. or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation. it must be impossible to avoid.In its dissertation of the phrase 'caso fortuito' the Enciclopedia Juridicada Espanola 5 says: "In a legal sense and. The stipulation which merely iterates the principle of caso fortuito is for all intents and purposes valid. inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely.48 - prof. complete and in good order. . It is what is known as a contract of 'adhesion'. 31. though foreseen. the lower court rendered a decision. public policy. p. dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters. 7354 and 7428. The Partidas. unexpected fire. shipwreck." (Tolentino. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had been exercised. consequently. or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk. Lawyer's Journal. appellees Clara Uy Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on board the appellant's vessel for carriage from Manila to Pulupandan. there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident.. 1979. . 1982 NATURE This appeal. he gives his consent. there is nothing therein that is contrary to law. appellees' cargoes as a result of a fire which gutted the Bureau of Customs' warehouse in Pulupandan. the obligor is exempt from liability for non-performance. he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. IV. appellee Uy Bico was able to take delivery of 907 cavans of rice Appellees' claims for the value of said goods were rejected by the appellant. public enemies. the agreement contained in the above quoted Clause 14 is a mere iteration of the basic principle of law written in Article 1 1 7 4 of the Civil Code4 Thus. 1951. Court of Appeals. or which. if he adheres. . . declaring appellant Philippine Steam Navigation liable for damages for the loss of the 4 Article 1174.. the cargoes were discharged. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. and that they did not sign the same. Justice J. (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the 'caso fortuito'. 1963. as the plane ticket in the case at bar. Civil Code. or if it can be foreseen. . 1963. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding. in the morning of November 18. ." In the case at bar. What is significant is the finding of the trial court. said warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown origin. seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Cases Nos.The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises. His answers to the leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said.On November 6.L. . unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. Negros Occidental. 49). Except in cases expressly specified by the law. however. Philippine Steam on the other hand relies on the following: Clause 14. were inevitable. appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed. and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. This argument overlooks the pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu vs. . its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. Reyes.Besides.. Ong. fire . no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen. and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation'. promulgated June 29. A2010 .' . . also in relation to contracts. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage caused by force majeure. affirmed by the respondent Court. war. 'Such provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage.This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured.Appellees would contend that the above stipulation does not bind them because it was printed in fine SERVANDO V PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO 117 SCRA 832 ESCOLIN. morals or public policy. or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation. morals.torts & damages present proceedings. Jan. in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other. are contracts not entirely prohibited. 3 where the Court held that while it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket . But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. violence of robbers.It is settled that . destroying appellees' cargoes. ISSUE WON the above stipulation validly limits the liability of the shipowner in this case HELD YES Ratio The parties may stipulate anything in the contract for so long as the stipulation is not contrary to law. casis letters on the back-of the bills of lading. (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. ordering Philippine Steam to pay for damages.B. the loss is chargeable against the appellant. 1962 Ed. Examples of this are destruction of houses. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless such loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier.

public respondent found as conclusively established that indeed.A similar case entitled National Power Corporation. Nakipil & Sons vs.R. WON (applying the ruling of NAkpil & Sons v.the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid greater damage to people and property . it would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant. was insufficient. May 21. (1 Corpus Juris. 1174-1175). delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code. Servando and Clara Uy Bico. A2010 .NPC operated and maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River . . to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. or failure to act. the latter having no control whatsoever over the same. casis incident subject of the instant petition. 2. they could still not contain or control the flood that resulted . . ISSUES 1. Nor can the appellant or its employees be charged with negligence. (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. In fact. Disposition Petition dismissed. YES . The court there declared that the proximate cause of the loss and damage sustained by the plaintiffs therein--who were similarly situated as the private respondents hereinwas the negligence of the petitioners. when the warehouse was burned.In the Nakpil case it was held that "To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code. Under article 1738 of the Civil Code "the extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues to be operative even during the time the goods are stored in the warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination. SEPARATE OPINION AQUINO [concur] .in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised. . YES . or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable. .I concur. as it were. Court of Appeals. et al.despite the defendants' knowledge of the impending entry of typhoon "Kading. and carelessness. for a breach of an obligation due to an 'act of God. Juan F. Thus. the petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of foresight. pursuant to such demand.From the time the goods in question were deposited in the Bureau of Customs' warehouse in the morning of their arrival up to two o' clock in the afternoon of the same day. CA) NPC is liable given that the inundation was caused by force majeure HELD 1. No amount of extraordinary diligence on the part of the carrier could have prevented the loss of the goods by fire which was of accidental origin. diligence and prudence in the operation and maintenance of the hydroelectric plant . the same notice involved in the case at bar. vs.the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in the nature and character of damnum absque injuria. the shipping company had no more control and responsibility over the goods after they were deposited in the customs warehouse by the arrastre and stevedoring operator. but had demanded that the same be withdrawn. 27290-93.When the water level in the Angat dam went beyond the allowable limit at the height of typhoon Kading NPC opened three of the dam’s spillways to release the excess water in the dam. et al. The storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the appellees was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent. there concurs a corresponding fraud.incurred in delay in the performance of its obligation. WON NPC was guilty of negligence 2. 1993 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court FACTS . NATIONAL POWER CORP V CA (RAYO ET AL) DAVIDE JR. and the magnitude of the water released." involving the very same SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE V CA . Plaintiffs claim: . appellee Uy Bico had taken delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the burning of the warehouse.on the basis of its meticulous analysis and evaluation of the evidence a dduced by the parties in the cases subject of CA-G.NPC exercised due care. This however caused the inundation of the banks of the Angat river which caused persons and animals to drown and properties to be washed away.written notices were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about the impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and advising them to take the necessary Precautions . pp.torts & damages . the defendants suddenly. is found to be in part the result of the participation of man whether it be from active intervention or neglect." they failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam ." and that "the extent of the opening of the spillways. Clara had removed more than one-half of the rice consigned to her.' the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor. which results in loss or damage. if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God. and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. thereby releasing a large amount of water which inundated the banks of the Angat River causing the death of members of the household of the plaintiffs."and that the 24 October 1978 'early warning notice" supposedly sent to the affected municipalities. Moreover.given that NPC is guilty of negligence. the whole occurrence is thereby humanized. negligently and recklessly opened three (3) of the dam's spillways. until the consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods and has had reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose of them". the cause of which is to be considered.. together with their animals Respondents comments: . and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in. imprudence and negligence in the management and operation of Angat Dam. had reasonable opportunity to remove the goods.49 - prof. Disposition judgment appealed from is hereby set aside. the obligor cannot escape liability. . negligence.The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are. It appears that appellant had not only notified appellees of the arrival of their shipment.NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection of its employees . Since the warehouse belonged to and was maintained by the government. CV Nos. Court of Appeals is still good law as far as the concurrent liability of an obligor in the case of force majeure is concerned.when the said water level went beyond the maximum allowable limit at the height of the typhoon. When the effect. slovenliness.There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier . Amparo C. are all but products of defendants-appellees headlessness.The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent release by the defendants of water through the spillways of the Angst Dam (Hydroelectric Plant). the consignees.

When a person’s negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to another. In other words. typhoon “Saling” was “an act of God and therefore beyond human control” such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages wrought thereby. or neglect. is not always reflective of the real cause to their house rendered the same uninhabitable. without its roofing or any portion thereof giving way.00. Pertinent aspects of the latter’s Reporti[5] dated October 18.000. Private respondents. due to fortuitous event HELD YES . and (2) by the act of man.” the fourth floor of subject school building be declared as a “structural hazard. it is necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned. is “in tip-top condition”. such that if it were not. etc. As the term imparts. this appeal. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. Buffeted by very strong winds. notwithstanding the general rule that factual findings by the trial court. The 1/2” diameter steel bars embedded on the concrete roof beams which serve as truss anchorage are not bolted nor nailed to the trusses.00.000. Inc. are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Hence. is conduct which naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. as exemplary damages and P100. or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation. From these premises. for damages based on culpa aquiliana.50 - prof. and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. de Dimaano. with the strong winds having a westerly direction. private respondents alleged that the damage A2010 .00. such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event. in establishing the culpability of petitioner. and employees. or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk.” . there are other steel bars which were not even bent to the trusses. receiving the heaviest impact of the strong winds. the person seeking exoneration from liability must not be guilty of negligence. Southeastern College. It may be the failure to observe that degree of care. 6. diligence or care. etc. P1. that it has not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that said school building.It then recommended that “to avoid any further loss and damage to lives.”iii[9] Escriche elaborates it as “an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted. and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. or which. attack by bandits.000. 1989 stated. an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or viewing. In order to be exempt from liability arising from any adverse consequence engendered thereby.116. When the effect is found to be partly the result of the participation of man – whether it be from active intervention.Petitioner cannot be held liable for the damages suffered by the private respondents.torts & damages PURISIMA. as commonly understood. thus. fires. casis cannot be invoked for the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences.” . FACTS . One of the factors that may have led to this calamitous event is the formation of the buildings in the area and the general direction of the wind. which reduced the moral damages awarded below from P1.After a thorough study and evaluation of the evidence on record.” Civilist Arturo M. Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason for the dislodging of the roofings structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the said trusses to the roof beams.vi[19] not merely by presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact. a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of foresight. Still.In its Answer. On October 11.There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event.” . After the typhoon had passed. .00 to P200. at about 6:30 in the morning. After a careful scrutiny of the records and the pleadings submitted by the parties. those located on both ends of the building. especially when affirmed by the appellate court. the one situated along College Road. which remained intact after the storm. Reyna. robbery. this Court believes otherwise. the general formation of the buildings becomes a big funnel-like structure. P300. such as an armed invasion. or failure to act – the whole occurrence is hereby humanized. as follows: “5. Situated in the peripheral lot is an almost U-shaped formation of 4-storey building.. the damage caused to private respondents’ house could have been avoided? . merely relied on the aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of petitioner’s school building after the typhoon.000. Tolentino adds that “[f]ortuitous events may be produced by two general causes: (1) by nature. while petitioner owns a fourstorey school building along the same College Road. floods. we find exception to this rule and hold that the lower courts misappreciated the evidence proffered.v[17] or the omission to do something which a prudent and reasonable man. 1989. 1996. guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. . . ISSUES WON the damage on the roof of the building of private respondents resulting from the impact of the falling portions of the school building’s roof ripped off by the strong winds of typhoon “Saling”. Jesus L. it bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence causative of his injury or loss. Branch 117. the roof of petitioner’s building was partly ripped off and blown away. et al.00. precaution. such as earthquakes. Engr. forcing them to stay temporarily in others’ houses. plus costs.vii[20] What is visual to the eye though. and furthermore. absent any negligence on its part.”. The Resolution under attack denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. limbs and property of persons living in the vicinity. faculty members. no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen. there should have been no human participation amounting to a negligent act.Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road. we proceed to determine whether petitioner was negligent. . though foreseen. a powerful typhoon “Saling” hit Metro Manila. July 10. as moral damages. Negligence. those trusses are not anchored at all to the roof beams. landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents’ house. epidemics. 1996 of the Court of Appeals in “Juanita de Jesus vda.At the outset. Except in cases expressly specified by the law. which houses school children. were inevitable.The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the ocular inspection made by the city engineer. An act of God . vs.In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability. Pasay City. for and as attorney’s fees. an ocular inspection of the destroyed buildings was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official. petitioner averred that subject school building had withstood several devastating typhoons and other calamities in the past. there are portions of the roofing.The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the Partidas which defines it as “an event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen.000. and Resolution dated September 12. And so they sought to recover from petitioner P117. was. which provides: “Art 1174. 1998 NATURE Petition for review seeking to set aside the Decision promulgated on July 31. as actual damages. governmental prohibitions.000. This conclusion finds support in Article 1174 of the Civil Code.In their Complaintii[6] before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.”iv .00.000. within legal contemplation. would do. Thus. storms. Thus.

the appeal.Spouses moved for dismissal for lack of cause of action. but under Art. 1967.In a decision of the Spanish SC. Power Plant Engineer of NPC at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant.51 5 prof. We thus hold that petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon “Saling” was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents’ house.torts & damages behind. . 1949 NATURE Appeal from judgment of CFI Iloilo FACTS . the son-in law. 1989 FACTS .Engineer Juan.Moreover.In the present case. NO Ratio It was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone.Claiming that the lower court was in error. Her companions. . cited by Manresa.The lower court took the view that under the abovequoted provision of the CC. While tending the animals. even if such animal should escape from him or stray away.6-6:30AM June 29. 1902. including himself. Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the ground. other than the said ocular inspection. Obviously. The present action.This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an animal. November 29. . A2010 . two girls (sales girlls) attempted to help. Art. On the left palm of the deceased. . November 6.6AM June 29. it is essential that there be fault or negligence on the part of the defendants as owners of the animal that caused the damage.” .he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection and saw grounded and disconnected lines. In the afternoon. CC. there was a hollow wound. Juan suddenly screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or shortcircuited lines. . Wading in waist-deep flood. cannot always definitely conclude that a third person shot the victim.The distinction (between stranger and caretaker) is important. specifications and design of said school building were deficient and defective. plaintiff contends that art.” The action was filed by the sister of Loreto.5. the animal was in the custody and under the control of the caretaker. . Isabel Lao Juan. Hence. Private respondents did not even show that the plans. 1967 .Engr. casis voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences. . And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had 5 ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY V CA (LUIS ET AL) 179 SCRA 5 PARAS. When he went to INELCO office. passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current.In light of the foregoing. Disposition Judgment AFFIRMED. however. and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable of fault under article 1902 only if he had been negligent or at the same code. which the CFI granted.On the other hand. Rigor mortis was setting in.” .strong typhoon "Gening" in Ilocos Norte brought floods and heavy rain. admitted in open court that no complaint regarding any defect on the same structure has ever been lodged before his office prior to the institution of the case at bench. The relationship of cause and effect must be clearly shown. (Nana Belen) went to her store. and contended that the mishap was due neither to Loreto’s own fault nor to force majeure. including himself. .In the present case. but were afraid because they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. . upon hearing the electrocution of his mother-in-law. For instance. he could not see any INELCO lineman. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause. CC (now Art.1905.2183 ) as ground for the liability: “The possessor of an animal. Neither did they prove any substantial deviation from the approved plans and specifications. one who hears a gunshot and then sees a wounded person. “This liability shall cease only in case the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it. who was paid for his work as such. he was “gored by one of them and later died as consequence of his injuries. ISSUE WON the owner of the animal is liable when the damage is caused to its caretaker (as opposed to a stranger) HELD 1. who has been in the city government service since 1974. or the one who uses the same. Loreto Afialda was the caretaker of the carabaos of spouses Hisole. Nor did they conclusively establish that the construction of such building was basically flawed. It could have been self-inflicted or caused accidentally by a stray bullet. the city building official. the owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger. the dangling wire was no longer there. 2183. But the complaint contains no allegation on those points. AFIALDA V HISOLE 85 Phil 67 REYES. it could not have withstood long years and several typhoons even stronger than “Saling. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences. if action is to be based on Art. 1905 does not distinguish between damage caused to a stranger and damage caused to the caretaker and makes the owner liable whether or not he has been negligent or at fault. Five Sisters Emporium. we find no clear and convincing evidence to sustain the judgment of the appellate court.1905. although it may escape or be lost. is not brought under labor laws in effect. is liable for any damages it may cause. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. If subject school building’s roofing was not firmly anchored to its trusses.4AM June 29. obviously. it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone. It is a matter of judicial notice that typhoons are common occurrences in this country. 1967.She uses Art. . Reasoning . . . no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of petitioner’s school building. Yabes. to look after the merchandise to see if they were damaged. For the statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for “any damages it may cause” and this for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage. the death of an employee who was bitten by a feline which his master had asked him to take to his establishment was by said tribunal declared to be “a veritable accident of labor” which should come under the labor laws rather than under article 1905. Juan attempted to resuscitate Nana Belen but his efforts proved futile. The body was recovered about two meters from an electric post.

.000 moral damages. (6) Lastly. . .45. which indicated death by electrocution. 1967 the electric service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area did not suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life and property. considering that electricity is an agency. Castro examined the body and noted that the skin was grayish or cyanotic.INELCO was negligent in seeing that no harm is done to the general public". The Court limited its ruling on the decision of the CA to absolve defendant Pepsi Cola from liability under Article 21806 of the Civil Code. About the base of the thumb on the left hand was a burned wound. or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be" The negligence of petitioner having been shown. This being the case. Hence.INELCO can be exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. The evidence does not show that defendant did that. the court citing its ruling on Bahia as follows: “ From this article (2180) two things are apparent: (1) that when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arise a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the employer or master either n the selection of the servant or employee. or both. The switch must have been left on. 1967. hence. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. however. causing the deceased's electrocution when she tried to open her gate that early morning of June 29. thus. safety devices were installed to prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural calamities such as floods.45 in actual damages (i. the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission" Disposition CA decision. is AFFIRMED. the deceased went to the Five Star Emporium "to see to it that the goods were not flooded. except for the slight modification that actual damages be increased to P48. was faced with an impending loss. As testified by A2010 . it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. P50. P10. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.In its ruling. the deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and not to INELCO because of the installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting. … Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. the deceased. a source of her livelihood. INELCO presented the testimonies of its officers and employees.229.CA: P30.The facts with regard the accident that Andres Bonifacio caused is not in the case.52 - prof.The petiton for appeal questioned the testimony of one Anasco with regard the process and procedures followed by Pepsi in the hiring and supervision of its drivers. Reasoning . was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to INELCO’s consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by INELCO’s negligence Reasoning . the doctor found an "electrically charged wound" or a first degree burn. On the contrary.45 for funeral expenses). Clearly. and 6 the salesgirls.Dr. 1967 . typhoons.000 for the victim's death and P18. subtle and deadly. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury. an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property." As such. if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril. evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area. .In defense and exculpation. the Company is relieved of any responsibility from the accident. (3) Also. computed in accordance with the formula set in the Villa-Rey Transit case (31 SCRA 511) with the base of P15.000 attorney's fees ISSUE WON the legal principle of "assumption of risk" bars private respondents from collecting damages from INELCO HELD NO Ratio The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar.000 attys fees .229. extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. … The responsibility treated of this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. It went on to stay that the CA is a better judge of the facts. Furthermore.000 in exemplary damages. that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place.. 2180. P12.. fire and others. (5) They also presented own medical expert and said that cyanosis could not have been the noted 3 hours after the death because it is only manifest in live persons. as heirs.229. Pepsi Cola exercised the due diligence of a good father in the hiring and supervision of its drivers. For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule. which sought to prove that (1) on and even before June 29. casis RAMOS V PEPSI COLA 19 SCRA 289 1967 NATURE Appeal from a CA decision FACTS . charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on. On the left palm. Art.000 as average annual income of the deceased. or in the supervision over him after the selection.000 in compensatory damages. P45. ISSUE WON Pepsi Cola is liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability HELD NO . nor even manning its office.In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag City on the night of June 28 until the early hours of June 29. a finding that Bonifacio was in fact negligent.torts & damages . shall We punish her for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. at the time the fatal incident occurred. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions. (4) 12 linesmen are charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the areas respectively assigned to them. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. private respondents. . The cause of' death was .The Court ruled that based on the evidence and testimonies presented during the trial.'circulatory shock electrocution" . (2) The service lines and devices had been newly-installed prior to the date in question.e. There was.CFI: awarded P25. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible. P3. The SC ruled that the issue brought before it with regard the credibility of Anasco is one of fact and not of law.

to hold sway.As both vehicles approached the intersection of DBP Avenue and Honeydew Road they failed to slow down and slacken their speed.53 - prof. of the Civil Code provisions on quasi-delicts as all the elements thereof are present. to wit: (1) damages suffered by the plaintiff. . (2) fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond. . both of whom naturally and expectedly testified for MMTC. 2. . couched in generalities and shorn of any supporting evidence to boost their verity. falling onto the pavement unconscious with serious physical injuries.She was brought to the Medical City Hospital where she regained consciousness only after one (1) week. whether plaintiff or defendant. Further. as its training officer. to present all available evidence at its or his disposal in the manner which may be deemed necessary and beneficial to prove its or his position.While the jeepney was travelling at a fast clip along DBP Avenue. who being then a minor was assisted by her parents. 1979. or even subject evidence for that matter. prove that driver Leonardo had complied with all the hiring and clearance requirements and had undergone all trainings. bound for her work. . must be corroborated by documentary evidence. we cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there was observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.torts & damages (2) that they presumption is juris tantum ( so much or so little of law) and not juris et de jure (of law and from law). Taguig. It is entirely within each of the parties discretion. WON the oral testimonies of witnesses even without the presentation documentary evidence. 1993 FACTS . . a Metro Manila Transit Corp. Godofredo Leonardo. .Petitioner's attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of employees . It is not felt by the Court that there is enough evidence on record as would overturn the presumption of negligence. provided only that the same shall measure up to the quantum of evidence required by law. petitioner MMTC must suffer the consequences of its own inaction and indifference. contrarily averred in its answer with cross-claim and counterclaim that the MMTC bus was driven in a prudent and careful manner by driver Leonardo and that it was the passenger jeepney which was driven recklessly considering that it hit the left middle portion of the MMTC bus. along with its driver. June 21. neither did they blow their horns to warn approaching vehicles. tests and examinations preparatory to actual employment. . . is more often honored in the breach than in the observance. she was unable to work for three and one half months (31/2).It was shown in this case that Pesi Cola did not merely satisfy itself that Bonifacio possessed a driver’s license. who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of presenting at the trial such amount of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable judgment. and (3) the connection of cause and effect between fault or negligence of the defendant and the METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORP V CA (CUSTODIA) 223 SCRA 521 REGALADO. A background check was done and he was required to submit various clearances. Bicutan. as its transport supervisor. the owner of the jeepney and employer of driver Calebag. . Bicutan. the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. inasmuch as the witnesses' testimonies dwelt on mere generalities. consonant with the theory of the case it or he seeks to advance and subject to such procedural strategy followed thereby. then driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his codefendant Victorino Lamayo. object or documentary. Godofredo Leonardo. to use an oft-quoted phrase. . assuming the putative existence thereof.25 a day. Disposition Decision of the CA is affirmed. which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony. Thereat. . In terms of the aspect of supervision. While there is no rule which requires that testimonial evidence. in relation to Article 2180.Defendant Victorino Lamayo alleged that the damages suffered by therein plaintiff should be borne by defendants MMTC and its driver. As a consequence. another fast moving vehicle. and that it was defendant Lamayo.A complaint for damages was filed by herein private respondent. A2010 . and consequently may be rebutted . Given this. she was confined for twenty-four (24) days. plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio boarded as a paying passenger a public utility jeepney. . who failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees and should thus be held solidarily liable for damages caused to the MMTC bus through the fault and negligence of its employees. and for failure to submit all evidence within its control.Whether or not the diligence of a good father of a family has been observed by petitioner is a matter of proof which under the circumstances in the case at bar has not been clearly established. and Christian Bautista. a government-owned corporation and one of the defendants in the court a quo. The collision impact caused plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio to hit the front windshield of the passenger jeepney and (she) was thrown out therefrom. ISSUES 1. we do not find the evidence presented by petitioner sufficiently convincing to prove the diligence of a good father of a family. (MMTC) bus driven by defendant Godofredo C. He was also made to undergo both theoretical and practical driving tests prior to being hired as driver. the petitioners raised no questions. . through the testimonies of Milagros Garbo. a collision between them occurred. casis through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence. In any event. . the proof called for under Article 2180 to show diligence of a good father of a family has been met.Petitioner attempted to essay in detail the company's procedure for screening job applicants and supervising its employees in the field. In making proof in its or his case. and that said positive testimonies spell out the rigid procedure for screening of job applicants and the supervision of its employees in the field 2. previous experience. the passenger jeepney ramming the left side portion of the MMTC bus. where she then worked as a machine operator earning P16.At about six o'clock in the morning of August 28. which for an employer doctrinally translates into its observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees but which mandate. and medical records. and as a consequence.It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family. WON petitioner exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees HELD 1. Leonardo was negotiating Honeydew Road. against all of therein named defendants following their refusal to pay the expenses incurred by the former as a result of the collision. it is paramount that the best and most complete evidence be formally entered. The party.Their statements strike us as both presumptuous and in the nature of petitio principii.Said defendants denied all the material allegations in the complaint and pointed an accusing finger at each other as being the party at fault.It is procedurally required for each party in a case to prove his own affirmative assertion by the degree of evidence required by law.The case at bar is clearly within the coverage of Article 2176 and 2177. Metro Manila bound for its terminal at Bicutan. herein petitioner MMTC. Taguig. because the latter's negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the accident and that MMTC failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.

which consists of 3 elements. there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent. rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family.Under A1146 CC. namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created. and not as a matter of right. the plaintiff must show. Chairman. the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed.torts & damages damages incurred by plaintiff.The Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was due to the negligence of the employees of Trans-Asia. 1982.. When the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties. It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of 2 vessels the 4 year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. . KRAMER VS CA (TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES) 178 SCRA 289 GANCAYCO.54 - prof. ISSUE WON a Complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by presciption HELD YES . as employer. training and experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve . He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code.Finally. Employer is liable for torts committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned tasks. to hold the employer liable.. the Complaint filed on May 30. casis four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the said date. The complaint for damages was filed in court only on May 30. which is the time when the cause of action arises. . the M/V Asia Philippines owned byTrans-Asia Shipping Lines. and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff . the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff. this Court ruled that in an action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks. was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. The Kramers instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent before Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City. interest as a part of the damages may be awarded in the discretion of the court. was beyond the 4 year prescriptive period. may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. Thus. Inc. taking with it its fish catch.In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible.e.Due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. although it is not necessary that the employer be engaged in business or industry. i. and that accordingly. the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years. . b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right. From the foregoing ruling. Sarabia. Once this is done. an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed.In Espanol vs. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago. it is necessary first to establish the employment relationship. the action being based on a quasidelict.Article 2180 applicable only where there is an employer-employee relationship. Petitioner’s claim: . we believe that respondent court acted in the exercise of sound discretion when it affirmed the trial court's award. and that the ALLIED BANKING V CA (YUJUICO) 178 SCRA 526 GANCAYCO. the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel. For failure to rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of employees. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry. But. from April 8. Trans-Asia filed a motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription.that maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with special skill. this Court held: The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action. it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period. diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. Article 2211 of the Civil Code provides that in quasi-delicts. 1976. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action accrued. . a fishing boat owned by Ernesto Kramer. and Marta Kramer. October 13. The collision occurred on April 8. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer. the case in undoubtedly based on a quasi-delict under Article 2180. without requiring the payment of interest thereon as an item of damages just because of delay in the determination thereof. the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. . that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages. that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. Disposition petition is dismissed. In Paulan vs. The diligence of a good father of a family required to be observed by employers to prevent damages under Article 2180 refers to due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees in order to protect the public. that is.With the allegation and subsequent proof of negligence against the defendant driver and of an employer-employee relation between him and his codefendant MMTC in this instance. 1 985.. . It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen. the employer is likewise responsible for damages. the date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final. the latter has the burden of proving that it has been A2010 . 1989 . It is to be noted that petitioner was originally sued as employer of driver Leonardo under Article 2180. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners. agents or personnel of the other vessel. especially since private respondent did not specifically pray therefor in her complaint. the basis of the liability being the relationship of pater familias or on the employer's own negligence. 1976 when the maritime collision took place. 1989 FACTS . October 13.that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued only on April 29. Philippine Veterans Administration. the F/B Marjolea sank. It is only then that the defendant. Jr. it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place. . As a consequence of the collision.The F/B Marjolea.

casis complaint may cause delay in the disposition of the main suit. 1981. (Español vs. ISSUE 1. may be brought into the case with leave of court. a ranking officer in General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) and a member of the family owning control of the said bank. Allied acquired all the assets and assumed the liabilityies of GENBANK.CA. private respondent herein.Mar 25. Panis. .First case: CA affirmed RTC decision in a special proceeding finding that the liquidation of GENBANK was made in bad faith. While these allegations in the proposed third-party CAUSATION BATACLAN V MEDINA 102 PHIL 181 MONTEMAYOR. . RTC Judge of Manila and Allied Banking Corp. The decision of CA denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner are hereby reversed and set aside and declared null and void. can be accommodated under tests (a) and (b) abovementioned. . which were both denied. FACTS . Domingo D. This decision declared as null and void the liquidation of GENBANK. If there was any confusion at all on the ground/s alleged in the thirdparty complaint. WON there was ground to admit the third-party complaint 2. 1979 when the complaint in the case was filed. October 22.The action for damages instituted by private respondent arising from the quasidelict or alleged "tortious interference" should be filed within four 4 years from the day the cause of action accrued. it must be deemed to have been instituted on February 7. The case was reraffled where presiding Judge Panis reiterated the order 7 A2010 . private respondent relies on the "Doctrine of Relations" or "Relations Back Doctrine" to support his claim that the cause of action as against the proposed third-party defendant accrued only on December 12. it was the claim of third-party plaintiff for other damages in addition to any amount which he may be called upon to pay under the original complaint. they are seeking. Yujuico vs. separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint.1986 when the decision in CA (first case)became final and executory. or may have against plaintiffs claim. by the defendant. although the third-party defendant's liability arises out of another transaction. 1980 when the Monetary Board ordered the GENBANK to desist from doing business in the Philippines while the third party complaint was filed only on June 17. On the other hand. The RTC judge was found to be in grave abuse of discretion and was ordered to admit the third-party complaint.The first instance is allowable and should be allowed if it will help in clarifying in a single proceeding the multifarious issues involved arising from a single transaction.The judgment of the CA in its first decision is the substantive basis of private respondent's proposed third-party complaint. although arising out of another or different contract or transaction." petitioner asserts that under the CC on quasi-delict" the action against third-party defendants should have been filed within four (4) years from the date the cause of action accrued. obtained a loan from the said institution in the amount of 500K. On the theory that the cause of action accrued on March 25.55 - prof.torts & damages NATURE Petition seeking the reversal of the decision of CA in "Joselito Z. Being founded on what was termed as "tortious interference. The complaint alleged that by reason of the tortuous interference by the CB with the affairs of GENBANK. 1977 – the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued a resolution forbidding GENBANK from doing business in the Phil. in respect of the plaintiffs claim. indemnity.Yujuico failed to comply with his obligation prompting Allied to file a complaint for the collection of a sum of money before the CFI Manila (now RTC). since the cause of action accrued on March 25. There is merit in private respondent's position that if held liable on the promissory note. . The third party complaint is independent of.Petitioner claims that the cause of action alleged in the third-party complaint has already prescribed. by means of the third-party complaint. The third party complaint should not be admitted. It was followed by another resolution ordering the liquidation of GENBANK. who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such thirdparty defendant a right for contribution.It is from the date of the act or omission violative of the right of a party when the cause of action arises and it is from this date that the prescriptive period must be reckoned.1987. or whether the third-party's claim.Respondent Yujuico. it cannot be outrightly asserted that it would not serve any purpose. RTC Judge Mintu denied the third-party complaint but admitted the amended/supplemental answer. It was then that Yujuico filed the third party complaint to transfer liability for the default imputed against him by the petitioner to the proposed third-party7 defendants because of their tortious acts which prevented him from performing his obligations. 1977. subrogation or any other relief. (Capayas v CFI Albay) The claim of third-party plaintiff. (b) whether the third-party defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant. is connected with the plaintiffs claim. . he was prevented from performing his obligation such that he should not be held liable thereon. 2. WON the cause of action under the third-party complaint prescribed HELD 1. . Disposition petition is GRANTED. . . YES .While the third party complaint in this case may be admitted as above discussed. to transfer unto the third-party defendants liability on the note by reason of the illegal liquidation of GENBANK which was the basis for the assignment of the promissory note. YES . . 1957 FACTS A third-party complaint is a procedural device whereby a "third-party" who is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff. Hon. It is contended that while the third party complaint was filed only on June 17.In the Memorandum of Agreement between Allied Banking Corp (Allied) and Amulfo Aurellano as liquidator of GENBANK.. or (c) whether the third-party defendant may assert any defense which the third-party plaintiff has. rendered a decision nullifying the RTC order. Private respondent issued a promissory note in favor of GENBANK. and another judgment is hereby rendered sustaining the orders of the RTC denying the admission of the third party complaint made by Judge Mintu.Second and current proceeding (1987) – Yujuico filed a motion to admit Ammended/Supplemental Answer and a Third Party Complaint to impead the Central Bank and Aurellano as third-party defendants. Philippine Veterans Admistration) . the action has prescribed. consequently. including the receivable due from Yujuico. Chairman. 1977 . . petitioner maintains that the claim should have been filed at the latest on March 25."1 and the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said decision. the date when the Monetary Board ordered GENBANK to desist from doing business in the Philippines. in a petition for certiorari questioning the denied motions.The tests to determine whether the claim for indemnity in a third-party claim is "in respect of plaintiff 's claim" are: (a) whether it arises out of the same transaction on which the plaintiff's claim is based. Both parties filed for motions of partial reconsideration. 1987.March 25. .

merely causing him physical injuries. they had to use a torch. was still alive. there was nothing to supervise. say. Bertulano. when a passenger bus overturns. Their lungs had burst due to their intake of toxic sulfide gas produced from the waste matter in said tank. shortly after midnight. "If through some event. and so damages were awarded. To be entitled to damages. or at least. a fierce fire started. the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. As defined in Art 694 of the NCC. the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected. unexpected and extraordinary.It may be that ordinarily. 2. and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available. casis compensatory damages. Invitations to bid for cleaning out the tanks were issued. market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property for the re-emptying of the septic tank of Agdao. and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. The City Engineer’s office. May 8. by lightning. According to the witnesses.Juan Bataclan rode Bus No. They. the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier. petitioners appealed to then IAC (now CA) which set aside the judgment and rendered a new one. ISSUES What is the proximate cause of death of the four passengers? HELD The proximate cause of death is the overturning of the bus.Proximate cause is defined as that cause which in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. public respondent’s failure to empty the tank had not caused any sanitary accidents despite its proximity to several homes and the public market as it was covered in lead and was air-tight. and the passenger is burned to death. gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus.The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus. pero mukhang kinasuhan ni Sofia Fernando yung Davao City for negligence in a previous case dahil namatay yung asawa nya . one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. WON Davao City is guilty of negligence 2. and four other companions including an Alberto Fernando were found dead inside the septic tank. 1992 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . *Di nakalagay sa case. NO . and all those people have remained unscathed which is ironically evidenced by the petitioner’s witnesses.Upon dismissal of the case by the TC. we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus. A2010 . Bataclan. NO . However. Public respondent lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet the situation. One of them carried a torch and when he approached the bus.Petitioners in fussing over the lack of ventilation in the tanks backfired as their witnesses were no experts.Both parties filed their separate MFRs. that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help.56 - prof. The only indication that the tank was full was when water began to leak. driven by Saylon. though he must have suffered physical injuries. dismissing the case. before the date they were to work. one of the bidders. granting the families of the deceased men P30k each in . The bus fell into a canal and turned turtle. Upon learning from the market master about the need to clean said tank. through its driver and its conductor. . . this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on 'Its side but completely on its back. WON such negligence is the proximate cause of the deaths of the victims HELD 1. P20k each as moral damages and P10k for attorney’s fees. this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled. the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it. specially over a large area.Although public respondent had been remiss in its duty to re-empty the tank annually (for almost 20 years). it immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service. burning the four passengers trapped inside. What is more. .see definition of proximate cause under A1 .torts & damages . the public toilet connected to it was used several times daily all those years. . Also. -(I guess this case says. which was won by Bascon. not for his death. Hence this petition. and even then no reports of casualties from gas poising emerged. The autopsy showed that the victims died of asphyxia caused by lack of oxygen supply in the body. They apparently did the re-emptying as the tank was nearly empty. the most handy and available. they are not nuisances per se which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public.The Court also does not agree with petitioner’s contention that warning signs of noxious gas should be placed around the area of the toilets and septic tank. can be smelt and detected -even from a distance. . In fact. the rescuers had to carry a light with them. or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire. ISSUES 1. but rather. It appeared that gasoline began to leak from the overturned bus. including Bataclan. the CA rendered an amended decision granting Davao City’s MFR. by the driver and the conductor themselves. such negligence was not a continuing one. Ten men came to help. the overturned bus is set on fire. In other words. Four passengers could not get out. and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. Neither did they present competent evidence to corroborate their testimonies and rebut the city government engineer Alindada’s testimony that safety requirements for the tank had been complied with. and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning). but most probably. While the bus was running very fast on a highway. and without which the result would not have occurred. one must prove under Art 2179 of the NCC that the defendant’s negligence was the the coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus.Petitioner’s contention that the market master should have been supervising the area of the tank is also untenable. one of the front tires burst. Work on the tank was still forthcoming since the awarding to the winning bidder was yet to be made by the Committee on Awards—hence. the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was. 30 of the Medina Transportation. found that the men entered without clearance or consent of the market master. and pins down a passenger. But in the present case and under the circumstances obtaining in the same.Bibiano Morta. perhaps serious. . produces the injury. but for the physical injuries suffered by him. upon investigation. if not for the overturning of the bus… then the leak and the fire wouldn’t have happened) FERNANDO V CA (City of Davao) 208 SCRA 714 MEDIALDEA. the fire that burned the bus. that at the time the fire started. made not only by the passengers.

only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury.Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness. a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time. . the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms. he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill required in what he attempts to do. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor.. They find it illogical that the septic tank which had been around since the 50’s would be the proximate cause of an accident which occurred only 20 years later. but contributing to his own proper hurt. as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person. In the vast majority. which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom.The incubation period of tetanus. had they not opened the tank which they were not authorized to open in the first place. When admitted to the hospital. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death. which. 1988 NATURE Petition to review the decision of the then IAC FACTS ON oct. trismus is marked. however. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. or back and difficulty swallowing. over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days.A toxic gas leakage could only have happened by opening the tank’s cover. abdomen.e. As the CA observed. and those acts of the victim not entering into it.The record is clear that .Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. As the progresses. Marcelo Javier was hacked by the Filomeno Urbano using a bolo. . and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent. The accident is thus of the victims’ own doing—an ordinarily prudent person should be aware of the attended risks of cleaning out the tank. which states that a distinction must be made between the accident and the injury. A test for such a relationship is given in Taylor v Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present." . but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. He states that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence. most muscles are involved to some degree. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. As the disease progresses. without which there could have been no accident. which was the 22nd day after the incident. In a small proportion of patients. . Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days.The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended . Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm. A short incubation period indicates severe disease. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. This was especially true for the victim. 1981. He was sentenced accordingly.. and without which the result would not have occurred. either immediately or by setting other events in motion. On November 15. irritability. casis probable result of the cause which first acted. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery.. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus. i. . Trismus is usually present. and headache are encountered occasionally. . since he was an old hand to septic services and is expected to know the hazards of the job. minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency. In fact. an interval referred to as the onset time. and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. but ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. . in natural and continuous sequence. and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill. The lower courts held that Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. somehow got infected with tetanus However. As in the case of the incubation period. as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record. and that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November. 1980. the victims would not have died. Bertulano.57 - prof. 23. As a result of which."And more comprehensively. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. stiffness gives way to rigidity. produces the injury.torts & damages proximate cause of the injury. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury." .The then IAC affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal. but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw. and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. . that Dr. . January 7.The trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. Dr. The victims’ failure to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident.PROXIMATE CAUSE "that cause. Javier died in the hospital. which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists. 1980. Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. However. ISSUE WON there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death HELD YES. the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and . The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation URBANO V IAC 157 SCRA 1 GUTIERREZ JR. ranges from 2 to 56 days. 1980. As more muscles are involved. On November 14. Disposition amended decision of the CA is AFFIRMED A2010 . "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. independent of it.The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs. The evidence merely confirms that the wound. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. rigidity becomes generalized.Appellant alleges that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed. Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City. . .In an information. especially since no other deaths or injuries related to the tank had ever occurred. between the event itself.

And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction. DIONISIO’s claim: the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix PHOENIX + CARBONEL’s claim: the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident. however.58 - prof. WON the court. his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. . the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. 1980. the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease. WON Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights before contact with the dump truck 4. IAC (DIONISIO) 148 SCRA 353 FELICIANO. Leonardo Dionisio (DIONISIO) was driving home (he lived in Bangkal. Makati (not far from his home) and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street without headlights when he hit a dump truck owned by Phoenix Construction Inc. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Carbonel (CARBONEL)." and that consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel b. and efficient cause of the injury. pp.. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct. and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. however. the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. WON Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before the collision with the dump truck. or on November 14. with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time. that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening. Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. WON private respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful night 2. WON the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked a. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine. Emphasis supplied) Therefore. if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked. (It is important to determine if he had a curfew pass to shed light to the 2nd and 3rd factual issues) -Testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who had taken DIONISIO to Makati Med testified that none was found with Dionisio. with the permission of his employer PHOENIX. November 15. 1983 Edition. As a result of the collision.In the case at bar. lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death.Doubts are present. and an onset time of 72 hrs. if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct. NO. efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. awarded damages in favor of Dionisio IAC: in favor of Dionisio. its regular driver. dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged. . generalized convulsive spasms. which was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (DIONISIO’s lane). (CARBONEL) VS. 1980. none was found with Dionisio. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause. reduced the damages awarded ISSUES Factual issues: (court discussed this to administer substantial justice without remanding the case to the lower court – since both TC and IAC did not consider defenses set by petitioners) 1. WON Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident. casis without a curfew pass. the onset time should have been more than six days. died on the second day from the onset time. natural. WON Phoenix has successfully proven that they exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver 7. After 22 days. The following day. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition. he suffered the symptoms of tetanus. based on the “last clear chance” doctrine. Although Dionisio offered a certification attesting that he did have a valid curfew pass. DIONISIO suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars. DIONISIO claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. while under the influence of liquor. in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck. like lockjaw and muscle spasms. or less. unrelated.torts & damages time. If. front or rear. successive. severe trismus. Consequently. 1987 NATURE Petition for review INC. This incident took place on October 23. for failure to take necessary precautions. 1004-1005. such condition was not the proximate cause. FACTS -About 1:30 am. the happened but for such condition or occasion. . The medical findings. Therefore. 3. medically speaking.A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible. WON the driver’s negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause. Makati) from cocktails/dinner meeting with his boss where he had taken “a shot or two” of liquor. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. He had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Sts. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death. therefore. without his headlights on and . such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause DISPOSITION :. WON the amount of damages awarded should be modified HELD FACTUAL 1. even though such injury would not have A2010 . distinct and foreign to the crime. Javier. a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. therefore. should hold Dionisio alone responsible for his accident 6. TC: in favor of Dionisio. At Bangkal. 1980. Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. MARCH 10. The infection was. The dump truck was parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the street. he died. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection. He was not able to produce any curfew pass during the trial. partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. Substantial Issues: 5. (PHOENIX).

The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as part of the res gestae and should have been considered by the trial court. NO. or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason Thus one who sets a fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary. and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it --" EVIDENCE PRESENTED: Patrolman Cuyno attested that Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken to Makati med + Dionisio admitted he had taken “a shot or two” . "One shot or two" of hard liquor may affect different people differently. and therefore to be anticipated. including all ordinary forces of nature such as usual wind or rain. 4. casis into it a month afterward. it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important. the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark. -Dionisio claimed that he was traveling at 30kph and had just crossed the intersection of General Santos and General Lacuna Streets and had started to accelerate when his headlights failed just before the collision took place. and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created. reactions from observers who happened to be around at that time. Accordingly. Phoenix’s theory more credible than Dionisio’s. But even in such cases. ." but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. as is invariably the case the latter am the result of other active forces which have gone before. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition. DIONISIO’S CLAIM: he had his headlights on but that.59 - prof. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump track was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. Testimony of Patrolman Cuyno attesting that people gathered at the scene of the accident told him that Dionisio’s Car was MOVING FAST and that he DID NOT have its HEADLIGTS ON. but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause. it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations. the defendant will not escape responsibility. -BUT: an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a stationary object in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous. Besides. rather than reflective. these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut. but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited So far as it has any validity at all. even though the car is negligently driven. although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident. A2010 . Clearly. SUBSTANTIAL 5. YES. it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety. He also asserts that Patrolman Cuyno’s testimony was hearsay and did not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule since the facts he testified to were not acquired by him through official information and had not been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so. was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. FROM PROF. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability." that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts a. Ratio. The petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created. in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result. NO. a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car. or snow or frost or fog or even lightning. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible. the common law last clear chance . But so far as the fact of causation is concerned. if any. that one who leaves an obstruction on the road or a railroad track should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into it. Dionisio's negligence. and hence of the defendant's negligence. particularly since." "Foreseeable Intervening Causes. as it could not.the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. the defendant may be negligent. the distinctions between" cause" and "condition" have already been "almost entirely discredited. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. usual and customary wind arising later will spread it beyond the defendant's own property. it is difficult to see what role. and some new force intervenes. PROSSER AND KEETON: "Cause and condition. The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of others. this argument had no validity under our jurisdiction and even in the United States. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions. Smith but it is a matter for debate whether. 3. the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident. When a spark ignites the gasoline. x x x In all of these cases there is an intervening cause combining with the defendant's conduct to produce the result and in each case the defendant's negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk. and not the result of reflective thought. 2. or to what extent. substantial weight should have been ascribed to such testimony. it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. and therefore to take precautions to prevent that event. The person who leaves the combustible or explosive material exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of fire from some independent source. Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk. among other reasons. nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. because of failure to guard against it. NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE ANYTHING. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno is admissible not under the official records exception to the hearsay rule but rather as part of the res gestae. the defendant is said not to be liable. have purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at which Dionisio was travelling just before impact with the Phoenix dump truck. x x x. or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances. Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to anticipate the usual weather of the vicinity. YES. although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck PHOENIX’s CLAIM: Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection (less than 200m away). Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of the original risk.torts & damages certification did not specify any serial number or date or period of effectivity of the supposed curfew pass. Private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory. x x x [T]he standard of reasonable conduct may require the defendant to protect the plaintiff against 'that occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life. YES. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. even though it did not.' Thus. Testimonial evidence under this exception to the hearsay rule consists of excited utterances made on the occasion of an occurrence or event sufficiently startling in nature so as to render inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of the observer and hence made as a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event. as it were. one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who falls b. at the crucial moment.not enough evidence to show how much liquor Dionisio had in fact taken and the effects of that upon his physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass.

P25T attorney’s fees. Fulgencio Dacara. while driving the said vehicle. 7.11.21798 of NCC is applicable HELD 8 Art. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. ON LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE: The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule-that of contributory negligence.10 check in favor of WINNER INDUSTRIAL was presented for payment. -In short. the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by reducing the A2010 . The same thing happened to the Oct. As to the other awards of damages. July 25. . NO. SO ORDERED.FLORENCIO REYES issued two postdated checks. Ramir Tiamzon. -Fulgencio P. thus. -Defendants admitted the occurrence of the incident but alleged that the subject diggings was provided with a mound of soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or after it which was visible during the incident. 6.To cover the face value of the checks. Disposition. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its track driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning. -Indemnification was sought from the city government. -As a result. has itself been rejected. is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix. sustain. 1979 and for Vicente TUI in amount of P11.43. ISSUE WON Art. it was dishonored and the payee was advised to try it for next clearing.12.60 - prof. . That was only when they noticed the error. These are for WINNER INDUSTRIAL CORP. is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account.12 check. as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. QUEZON CITY V DACARA PANGANIBAN. posted the deposit in the latter's account not noticing that the depositor's surname in the deposit slip was REYES.Furious. Definition of Proximate Cause: "any cause which. But if his negligence was only contributory. the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care. it must be established that private respondent's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury.500. Jr. he cannot recover damages. shall be home by private respondent Dionisio. casis NO ..M.The bank employee is deemed to have failed to exercise the degree of care required in the performance of his duties. loss of expected income and moral damages private respondent Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. YES. The payee then demanded a cash payment of the check’s face value which REYES did if only to save his name. and that the reason why Fulgencio Dacara. he immediately proceeded to the bank and urged an immediate verification of his account. RTC: ordered petitioner to pay P200T compensatory damages. Quezon City. the Oct. 1994 NATURE . 1988 at about 1:00 A.Petition for review of CA decision FACTS . produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury complained of or some similar injury." Reasoning The proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of petitioner's employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit of private respondent in the name of another depositor who had a similar first name. PILIPINAS BANK V CA (REYES) 234 SCRA 435 PUNO. aggregate amount of compensatory damages. in natural and continuous sequence.000. -The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions. the plaintiff may recover damages. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. would result therefrom as a natural and probable consequence.PILIPINAS BANK’S Current Account Bookkeeper made an error in depositing the amount: he thought it was for a certain FLORENCIO AMADOR.. JUNE 15. which however.On Oct.078. Dacara. when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises.torts & damages doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff.00 as attorney's fees and costs. Since the ledger of Florencio REYES indicated that his account had only a balance of P4.00 as exemplary damages and P4.For it to apply. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be home exclusively by the petitioners. Jr. 2005 NATURE Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS -On February 28. . owner of ’87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan. fell into the diggings was precisely . only the balance of 800% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarily liable therefor to the former.It was redeposited but was again dishonored. filed a Complaint for damages against Quezon City and Engr. CA: modified amount to just P50T moral damages and P25T attorney’s fees and costs of suit. Dacara. WHEREFORE.4T due Oct. 2179. the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. except the award of P10. defendants claimed that they exercised due care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident. he requested PCIB Money Shop's manager to effect the withdrawal of P32T from his savings account and have it deposited with his current account with PILIPINAS BANK. which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. yielded negative results. The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent. . Costs against the petitioners. rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St. for and in behalf of his minor son. Dispositive Petition denied. . even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. . 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court. in amount of P21T due Oct. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. He. as well as costs of suit. Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.10. Taking into account the comparative negligence ot DIONISIO and the petitioners.. P100T moral damages.

-Moral damages are not punitive in nature. cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of. -Such a circumstance obtains in the instant case. It is evident from the records that they brought up for the first time in their Motion for Reconsideration.” as provided under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code Thus. when his car turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth from a digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an adequate warning to motorists especially during the thick of the night where darkness is pervasive.000. 1988 which caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara. -Upon appeal. exemplary damages may be recovered if the defendant acted with gross negligence. -What really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is a factual issue that this Court cannot pass upon. thereby establishing his right to actual or compensatory damages. -Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision is tantamount to negligence which renders the City government liable -Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause.000. -Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for quasi-delicts. respondent sufficiently proved before the courts a quo that petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the incident. should be presumed negligent pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code.61 - prof. provided that the act or omission caused physical injuries. -RTC ruled in favor of Dacara. the Complaint alleged that respondent’s son Fulgencio Jr. or injuries suffered by. upon a combined consideration of logic. how then could it be explained that according to the report even of the policeman. this Petition ISSUES 1. The award of moral damages must be solidly anchored on a definite showing that respondent actually experienced emotional and mental sufferings. social humiliation.00 as attorney’s fees and other costs of suit. such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. -These matters were. -Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. Jr. -Well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be awarded in the absence of proof of physical suffering. serious anxiety. social humiliation. but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering. -Indeed. moral shock. however. any person by reason of the defective condition of roads. -To award moral damages. -Gross negligence means such utter want of care as to raise a presumption that the persons at fault must have been conscious of the probable consequences of their carelessness. mental anguish. bridges. absent any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment by the lower courts or an ample showing that they lacked any basis for their conclusions. -It is apparent from the Decisions of the trial and the appellate courts. WON petitioner’s negligence is the proximate cause of the incident 2. The award of these sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed. -That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the accident was aptly discussed in the lower court’s finding: “Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of February 28. casis -In the present case. wounded feelings. serious anxiety. and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219. 9 . there was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral damages based on Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code. This speed was allegedly well above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on “city streets with light traffic. besmirched reputation. The negligence must amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property. and that they must have nevertheless been indifferent (or worse) to the danger of injury to the person or property of others. that no other evidence (such as a medical certificate or proof of medical expenses) was presented to prove Fulgencio Jr. fright. P5. P10. temperate or compensatory damages. Provinces. streets. sustained physical injuries.torts & damages because of the latter’s negligence and failure to exercise due care. There can be no recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted in physical injury. Yes. -“The provisions of Article 21899 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same. WON moral damages are recoverable 3. which are amply substantiated by the evidence on record. policy and precedent. He has adduced adequate proof to justify his claim for the damages caused his car. not raised by petitioners at any time during the trial. -Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence. 2. petitioners assert that Fulgencio Jr. If indeed signs were placed thereat. was driving at the speed of 60 kilometers per hour (kph) when he met the accident. fright. or similar injury. Thus. moral shock. 3. and other public works under their control or supervision. common sense. however. gasera which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade. -The facts of the case show a complete disregard by petitioners of any adverse consequence of their failure to install even a single warning device at the area under renovation. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case. -It is too late in the day for them to raise this new issue. mental anguish. -The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the accident bars us from supplanting their findings and substituting these with our own. No adequate reason has been given to overturn this factual conclusion. (2) a culpable act or omission factually established. justice. WON exemplary damages and attorney’s fees are recoverable HELD 1. wounded feelings. they can be awarded only after claimants have shown their entitlement to moral. To consider their belatedly raised arguments at this stage of the proceedings would trample on the basic principles of fair play. -Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts. besmirched reputation. -Hence. No. .000. or psychological--clearly sustained by the claimant.. CA agreed with the RTC’s finding that petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by respondent. ordering the defendants to indemnify the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand pesos as actual/compensatory damages.’s bare assertion of physical injury. Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs. public buildings. (3) a wrongful act or omission of the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant. mental. a court must be satisfied with proof of the following requisites: (1) an injury-whether physical.00 as exemplary damages. -In the case before us. having violated a traffic regulation. and similar injury unjustly inflicted on a person. none was ever presented to stress the point that A2010 . clearly point to petitioners’ negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered by respondent’s car. none was found at the scene of the accident. P10. both the trial and the appellate courts’ findings. and due process. Yes.00 as moral damages.

and that he had taken up the two passengers then in the carromata as the first who had offered employment. distinct and foreign to the crime. Dr. as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record. ISSUE: WON there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death HELD: Yes. and lately. A quarrel between them ensued. which. to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which it was made. It is as follows: "x x x 'that cause. Judge awarded damages to the widow to which decision Araneta appealed. The driver. but the other. stopped the horse. and in so doing received injuries from which he soon died. produces the injury. January 7. which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment. October 17. 1988 OF THE Nature : This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court Facts:When Filomeno Urbano found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed he went to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier admitted that he was the one responsible for what happened. Dispositive The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The infection was. This action was brought by Consolacion Gabeto. He noticed the presence of a healing Art. after alighting. v. which he did. ARANETA 42 Phil 252. feeling himself free from control. to wit. 1980 . Disposition: Judgment is REVERSED. Proceso Gayetano. became disturbed and moved forward. and proceeded to fix the bridle. On November 14. Reasoning: -The case involves the application of Article 410 of the Revised Penal Code. pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo. supposedly caused by the wrongful act of the defendant Agaton Araneta. Conchita Gayetano. stepped out into the street. in doing which he pulled one of the wheels of the carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed Julio Pagnaya over. Issue: WON the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof Held: NO. one Julio Pagnaya. and after the runaway horse had proceeded up the street to a point in front of the Mission Hospital. in order to fix the bridle. A2010 . had unfortunately retained his seat. replied to the effect that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta. Rosita Gayetano. and Fermin Gayetano. Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. URBANO V IAC (PEOPLE PHILIPPINES) 157 SCRA 1 GUTIERREZ.62 - prof. 1921 Street Facts: Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata near Plaza Gay. the said Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig. On November 15. in the City of Iloilo. the bit came out of the horse's mouth. and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. led the horse over to the curb. The horse was then pulled over to near the curb. The evidence merely confirms that the wound. with a view to going to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma in the same City. somehow got infected with tetanus However. While he was thus engaged. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. The medical findings lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. being free from the control of the bit. and laying his hands on the reins. Medina (102 Phil. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. with the modification that the award of moral damages is deleted. however. upon which the box came down with a crash and frightened the horse to such an extent that he set out at full speed up the street. the defendant. thereby causing the bit to come out of the horse's mouth. Owing. causing a swelling on said leg. Agaton Araneta. After going a few yards further the side of the carromata struck a police telephone box which was fixed to a post on the sidewalk. the horse. had alighted while the carromata was as yet alongside the sidewalk. Appellant’s claim: -there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death -the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed. we adopted the following definition of proximate cause: "x x x A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38. for the purpose of recovering damages incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the death of the said Proceso Gayetano. Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended x x x. et al. 1181).Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs. -The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. and it became necessary for the driver to get out. and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off. Urbano hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand . and without which the result would 10 GABETO V. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. de Bataclan." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom . by one or the other — it makes no difference which — and Pagnaya tried to fix the bridle.1980. and Julio. therefore. 4. cited by plaintiffsappellants in their brief. At or about the same time Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Agaton Araneta. Meanwhile one of the passengers. when the horse.torts & damages damages is meant to be a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. it was Julio who jerked the rein. -In Vda. that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November. and as guardian ad litem of the three children. When the driver of the carromata had turned his horse and started in the direction indicated. Basilio Ilano. started to go away. The evidence indicates that the bridle was old. in order that the vehicle might pass on. in natural and continuous sequence. casis wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus. at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called this carromata first. in her own right as widow of Proceso Gayetano. Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. 1980 Javier died in the hospital.

Javier. However. the onset time should have been more than six days. with 2 shackles. therefore. his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers.63 - prof. Remaquillo. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause. . and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. 03-85: SEC. He can only be absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize damage. successive. such condition was not the proximate cause. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. 8. like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should.torts & damages not have occurred. . pp.When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier. beside him. (99 Phil. The following day. (People v.Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. '(45 C.The rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the Philippine Ports Authority the amount of P1. as well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf. . 4. owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC). the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted.therefore. as its berthing space. et al. 11. 1980. The vessel sustained damage too. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo. or shifting from one berth or another. If. 185-186) -The court looked into the nature of tetanus to determine the cause -Medically speaking. — For entering a harbor and anchoring thereat. v. In such event. every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage. and efficient cause of the injury. who was then on the pier apron noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast.The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is under compulsory pilotage pursuant to Section 8. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. 1998 NATURE Review on certiorari the CA decision affirming TC decision holding FESC and Gavino solidarily liable FACTS . if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct. Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. — On compulsory pilotage grounds. PERTINENT RULES on PILOTAGE . casis the vessel did not slacken. 1980. When Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about.126. however. The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on board. he died. Gavino ordered the anchor dropped.In case of compulsory pilotage.' (at pp. or on November 14. either immediately or by setting other events in motion. When the vessel was already about 2. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port.the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time. The medical findings lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. This incident took place on October 23. the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. October 1. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Abellana likewise submitted his report of the incident. Abellana. the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his negligence or fault. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. supra) As we ruled in Manila Electric Co." (at p. 1980. the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. Compulsory Pilotage Service. the respective duties and responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the master have been specified by the same regulation: SEC. the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. The infection was. the anchor did not take hold as expected. 931932). November 15. the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease. or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage district. unrelated.J. flying under the flagship of the USSR.' And more comprehensively. distinct and foreign to the crime. Cardenas. such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge. . Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. natural. the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. The speed of . Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel. 118). Kavankov filed his sea protest. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct. he ordered the engines half-astern. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped. After 22 days. arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. Gavino submitted his report to the Chief Pilot who referred the report to the Philippine Ports Authority.000 feet from the pier.After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Consequently. Control of vessels and liability for damage. as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person. . Victor Kavankov. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. he suffered the symptoms of tetanus. which result in injury because of the prior defective condition.On June 20. -Therefore. Article III of Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. . the M/V PAVLODAR. any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said Master Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined by competent "'A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible. 125) FAR EAST SHIPPING CO V CA (PPA) 297 SCRA 30 REGALADO. with the master of the vessel. The left anchor. British Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning. Gavino ordered the engine stopped.132. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death. A brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew members. were dropped. A commotion ensued between the crew members. died on the second day from the onset time. 1980. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances.25. A2010 . it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound.

concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's. going in opposite directions met each other in a road curve. August 31. Custodia.There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. one driven by Mudales and belonging to Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company. That his responsibility shall cease at the moment the master neglects or refuses to carry out his instructions. PILOT . testified that the 6 x 6 truck was running fast when it met the LTB Bus. He was right beside the pilot during the docking. Accordingly.In compulsory pilotage. was sideswiped by the truck driven by Lagunda. . the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case. 32. and in turn means negligence on the part of FESC.A pilot. to conduct a vessel into or out of ports. This is negligence on his part. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. CA affirmed. person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them. . He is charged to perform his duties with extraordinary care because the safety of people and property on the vessel and on the dock are at stake. in maritime law. — A Pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes control thereof until he leaves it anchored free from shoal. where several causes combine to produce injuries.64 - prof. owner Sabido and driver Lagunda (tsn. It is sufficient that his negligence. Provided.As a general rule. 1955 when the LTB bus with full load to passengers was negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and sliding downward a slope. To avoid any liability. He blindly trusted the pilot. It then went on to determine who between the pilot and the master was negligent. — The duties and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows: xxx xxx xxx f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed safely. 15-65 issued twenty years earlier likewise provided in Chapter I thereof for the responsibilities of pilots: Par. MASTER . etc. however. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone. 308-309. . CONCURRENT TORTFEASORS . Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party. the 6 x 6 truck could have avoided hitting Custodio. there is a presumption of fault against the moving object (based on common sense and logic). Despite the presence of a shallow canal on the right side of the road which he could pass over with ease. widoy of Custodio. Custodio was injured and died. The court found that his reaction time (4 minutes) to the anchor not holding ground and the vessel still going too fast was too slow. As an expert he should’ve been reacting quickly to any such happenings. that a master of a ship may not know because the pilot is familiar with the port. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. although acting independently. Gavino was found to be negligent. . they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. 1966 NATURE Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS In Barrio Halang. is a person duly qualified. The master’s negligence translates to unseaworthiness of the vessel. Gavino and FESC are solidarily liable. the Court of First Instance of Laguna and the Court of Appeals concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons. ISSUE WON both the pilot and the master were negligent HELD YES. Lagunda and Sabido throw all the blame on Mudales. or in certain waters. He is an expert who’s supposed to know the seabed. . Kavankov’s testimony. LTB bus passenger who was riding on the running board as truck was full of passengers. is the proximate cause of the injury. two trucks. XXXIX. Mendoza). it may appear that one of them was more culpable. By simply swerving to the right side of the road. however may intervene or countermand the pilot if he A2010 . so he could see and hear everything that the pilot was seeing and hearing. and the other driven by Lagunda and owned by Prospero Sabido.The SC started by saying that in a collision between a stationary object and a moving object. However. As a result. XLIV. it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Capt. ET AL 17 SCRA 1088 CONCEPCION. The sideswiping of the deceased and his two fellow passengers took place on broad daylight at about 9:30 in the morning of June 9. the pilot momentarily becomes the master of the vessel. and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. deems there is danger to the vessel because of the incompetence of the pilot or if the pilot is drunk. Driver Lagunda admitted that three passengers rode on the running board of the bus when his vehicle was still at a distance of 5 or 7 meters from the bus. — Pilots shall properly and safely secure or anchor vessels under their control when requested to do so by the master of such vessels. xxx xxx xxx Par. The master. are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person.Based on Capt. that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. that his responsibility shall cease at the moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry out his order. SABIDO AND LAGUNDA V CUSTODIO. LTB passengers had testified to the effect that the 6 x 6 cargo truck was running at a fast rate of speed. and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened. Lagunda did not avert the accident simply because to use his own language the canal "is not a passage of trucks.Capt. Based upon these facts. .torts & damages authority in appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. whereas the six by six truck was climbing up with no cargoes or passengers on board but for three helpers. And Lagunda had time and opportunity to avoid the mishap if he had been sufficiently careful and cautious because the two trucks never collided with each other. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots' Association.Customs Administrative Order No. Provided. it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent. SEC. Makabuhay. casis Disposition Petition denied. he never sensed the any danger even when the anchor didn’t hold and they were approaching the dock too fast. and licensed. — hereinafter referred to as the carrier — and its driver Mudales (none of whom has .

gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank. the negligence of the first two would not have produced this result without the negligence of petitioners' herein. as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person. Reasoning under the circumstances obtaining in the case. left the town of Amadeo. the bus was speeding.the CFI awarded P1. although acting independently of each other. one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end. which we cannot disturb in a petition for review by certiorari. Cavite. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. but rather. the correctness of said findings is borne out by the very testimony of petitioner Lagunda to the effect that he saw the passengers riding on the running board of the bus while the same was still five or seven meters away from the truck driven by him. Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent. instead of being close to its right side of the road.150. in this sense. 2. casis ISSUES 1. Cavite. came about ten men. after the blow-out. heard groans and moans from inside the bus. evidently fueled with petroleum. and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning). The views of the Court of Appeals on the speed of the truck and its location at the time of the accident are in the nature of findings of fact. WON petitioners should be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its driver HELD 1. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons. on its way to Pasay City. and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses. a bus of the Medina Transportation. Reasoning Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and their goods. so that. could not get out of the overturned bus.That same day. moral. are. NO. 1763 direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person. including the 4 passengers trapped inside it. 1733 ART. the owners of the two vehicles are liable solidarily for the death of the passenger. of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner. Salud Villanueva brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory. What is more. the rescuers had to carry a light with them. Indeed. made not only by the passengers. the fire that burned the bus. the A2010 . each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor.Some of the passengers. through his agent.11 2. Where the carrier bus and its driver were clearly guilty of contributory negligence for having allowed a passenger to ride on the running board of the bus. . such as the one at bar. WON there was negligence on the part of the defendant. and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury. including that of the defense.65 - prof. the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted. a fierce fire started. October 22. . . operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience. whereas petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict. 1957 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Cavite FACTS . although the liability of one arises from a breach of contract. one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. At any rate. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. there was a distance of about 150 meters. burning and all but consuming the bus. but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running. by reason of which all of them were held solidarity liable. its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle. and coming as they did from a rural 11 ART. the driver Saylon. whereas that of the other springs from a quasi-delict. while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus.the three passengers Bataclan. we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus. after they had clambered up to the road. Conrado Saylon. either immediately or by setting other events in motion. this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back. as testified to by one of the passengers. It would appear that as the bus overturned. or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor. WON petitioners were guilty of negligence 2. YES. must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus. Dispositive Judgment affirmed. because that vehicle was running at a considerable speed despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve. 2. There were about 18 passengers. had violated the contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio. both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio. .torts & damages appealed). even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury. In fact. and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87. YES Ratio Tthe proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. but most probably. ISSUES 1.Shortly after midnight.000 plus P600 as attorney's fee. 1759 ART. These men presumably approach the overturned bus. including the driver and conductor. for Custodio was on the running board of the carrier's bus sometime before petitioners' truck came from the opposite direction. the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan . it was driven on its middle portion thereof and so near the passenger bus coming from the opposite as to sideswipe a passenger on its running board. either is responsible for the whole injury. plus P100. . the distance between the two vehicles was such that he could have avoided sideswiping said passengers if his truck were not running at a great speed. from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging. the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were removed and duly identified that of Bataclan. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. in point of time. petitioners' truck had the last clear chance. that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help. After half an hour. His widow. HELD 1. DE BATACLAN VS. the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected. The chauffeur. YES. by the driver and the conductor themselves. and almost immediately. VDA. Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva. WON the the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus. 1755 ART. petitioners' negligence was the last. driven by its regular chauffeur. Ratio There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out. and where the driver of the other vehicle was also guilty of contributory negligence. MEDINA 102 PHIL 181 MONTEMAYOR.At about 2am. thus making him liable. in its execution. Calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood. in combination. and.

but for the promotion of the safety of passengers on public utility buses. 1990 NATURE: CERTIORARI FACTS: . for the death of Bataclan and for the attorney's fees. INC v. -Manalo stepped on the brake. spouses Mangune and Carreon filed a cross-claim for the repair of the jeepney and for its non-use during the period of repairs. neither were there oncoming vehicles except the bus. and so damages were awarded. the jeepney’s right rear wheel detached which caused it to run in an unbalanced position. one of the passengers who. .66 - prof. and his commitment to prison and service of his sentence (5) The application of the doctrine of res-ipsa loquitar attesting to the circumstance that the collision occured on the right of way of the Phil.TC: found the couple and Manalo to be NEGLIGENT and held that there was a breach of the contract of carriage with their passengers.Rabbit filed a cross-claim for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.Three cases were filed and in all 3 the spouses (owners of the jeepney) Mangune and Carreon. that at the time the fire started. ordered them to pay the damages. plaintiffs based their suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict. .The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus. was hospitalized. and in the course of his visit. but rather. he had been telling the driver to change the said tires. The weather condition of that day was fair. DISPOSITION In view of the foregoing. . Inc.000 and P800. but for the physical injuries suffered by him. IAC & CASIANO PASCUA. (jeepney driver)Manalo. for exemplary damages. . . (2) the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence. this.Almost at the time when the jeepney made a sudden U-turn and encroached on the western lane of the highway. (1) That the unrebutted testimony of his passenger Caridad Pascua that the Mangune jeepney was "running fast" that his passengers cautioned driver Manalo to slow down but did not heed the warning (2) The likewise unrebutted testimony of Police Investigator Tacpal of the San Manuel (Tarlac) Police who found that the tracks of the jeepney ran on the Eastern shoulder (outside the concrete paved road) until it returned to the concrete road at a sharp angle. A2010 . the bus bumped from behind the right rear portion of the jeepney which resulted in the said deaths and injuries. Rabbit’s bus driven by Tomas delos Reyes and the jeepney driven by Tranquilino Manalo. and while in the hospital." (4) His conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious Physical Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence by the CFI of Tarlac. with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are increased to P6. .Manalo was eventually convicted and was imprisoned. she overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors. after its wheel was removed. REASONING: TC WAS CORRECT IN APPRECIATING THE FF FACTS CONCERNING MANALO’S NEGLIGENCE.In the public interest the prosecution of said erring driver should be pursued. not for his death. Rabbit was to be paid by the jeepney party for actual damages.Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation. and (3) the substantial factor test to conclude that delos Reyes was negligent.Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses Mangune and Carreon and Manalo on their contractual liability. among which was Bus No. (3) The observation of witness Police Corporal Cacalda also of the San Manuel Police that the path of the jeepney they found on the road \was shown by skid marks which he described as "scratches on the road caused by the iron of the jeep. -The jeepney practically occupied and blocked the greater portion of the western lane. . not only as a matter of justice. ET AL. BUT ONLY THE SPOUSES AND FILRITERS ARE LIABLE. . .. telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus changed immediately because they were already old. as a result of which.Other passengers of the jeepney sustained physical injuries.Damages sought to be claimed in the 3 cases were for medical expenses. it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers .This case is for recovery of damages for the 3 jeepney passengers who died as a result of the collision between the Phil. but that the driver did not follow his instructions. invading and eventually stopping on the western lane of the road in such a manner that the jeepney's front faced the south (from where it came) and its rear faced the north (towards where it was going). PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES. . the fire that burned the bus. as a result of the collision. or after stopping for a couple of minutes. the jeepney which was then running on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn. Note: This case was under the heading “but for”. respectively. crossing the Eastern lane and the (imaginary) center line and encroaching fully into the western lane where the collision took place as evidenced by the point of impact. Filriters was jointly and severally liable as it was the jeepney’s insurer.A criminal complaint against the two drivers for Multiple Homicide. loss of wages. there were no vehicles following the jeepney. . Applied primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear chance. 189 SCRA 158 MEDIALDEA/August 30. casis . perhaps serious. Neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. ordered to pay jointly and severally with Rabbit the plaintiffs. I don’t know if the italicized phrases are pertinent. ***As regards the damages. including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it. (the insurer of the jeepney) was also impleaded as additional defendant in the civil case filed by the Pascuas. was still alive. because of the injuries suffered by her. she was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina. Rabbit Bus.On the other hand.torts & damages area where lanterns and flashlights were not available.At the time and in the vicinity of the accident.IAC reversed this ruling in the sense that it found delos Reyes to be negligent. moral damages and attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. If this be true. though he must have suffered physical injuries. . but these were the only ones that contained “but for”. and that as a matter of fact. Rabbit and (Rabbit’s driver)delos Reyes were all impleaded as defendants. ISSUE: WON THE JEEPNEY OWNERS AND ITS DRIVER ARE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES AND DEATH SUFFERED BY THE PASSENGERS OF THE JEEPNEY HELD: YES. . SC: . . Bataclan.It was said that upon reaching a certain barrio.According to the evidence. The case against delos Reyes was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. 753 of Rabbit . which is the right of way of vehicles coming from the north. and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them.As against Rabbit and delos Reyes. . burial expenses.

assuming such calculation to be correct. Smith. et al. facing the oncoming traffic. . They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely pro hac vice. is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways. even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver (Viluan v. But the SC was not convinced.Delos Reyes cannot be faulted for not having avoided the collision because as was shown. We find defendant bus running at a fast speed when the accident occurred and did not even make the slightest effort to avoid the accident. There were no lights or any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck. he would run the greater risk of running smack in the Mangune jeepney either head on or broadside as the jeepney then was abruptly making a U-turn. unless contradicted by other evidence: would have been correct were it not for the undisputed fact that the U-turn made by the jeepney was abrupt. et al. Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. -In any event. was parked on the right hand side of the street (i.In culpa contractual.. .torts & damages -The principle about "the last clear" chance would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. . (Anuran. Aside from the time element involved. .To escape liability. with the permission of his employer Phoenix. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour. Mar 10. The bus driver's conduct is thus a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passengers of the jeepney. . Delos Reyes could not have anticipated the sudden U-turn executed by Manalo.That delos Reyes of the Rabbit bus could also have swerved to its left (eastern lane) to avoid bumping the Mangune jeepney which was then on the western lane: Under such a situation. 104 Phil. . 657). As to the cause thereof no evidence was offered. casis -the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger.Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed an intersection when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. Jr. AFFIRMED TOO THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BUT MODIFIED THE INDEMNITY FOR LOSS OF LIFE FROM 3K (AS PER A1746 TO A2206 NCC) TO 30K. This notwithstanding the right rear wheel of the vehicle was detached while in transit. DISPOSITION: TC’ S DECISION WAS REINSTATED and AFFIRMED BUT MODIFICATION THAT ONLY THE COUPLE AND THE FILRITERS GUARANTY ASSURANCE CORP.” -The speed of the bus was even calculated by the IAC.24 seconds. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable (Restatement. not only because he was driving fast and did not even attempt to avoid the mishap but also because it was the bus which was the physical force which brought about the injury and death to the passengers of the jeepney. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. and in the event of contractual liability. He switched his headlights on "bright" and saw a Ford dump truck about 21/2meters away from his car. -SC: The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon. an alleged mechanic. etc. is not a caso fortuito which would avoid the carriers liability for damages (Son v. . 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code 2 or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event 3 (Lasam v. CA. . v. front or rear.67 - prof. the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. .To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too much from him. v. the last on Dec. the jeepney left a skid mark of about 45 meters.Also.The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. which included the tightening of the bolts. that would make the carrier's liability personal. 45 Phil. that he periodically checks and maintains the jeepney of said defendants. Verily. Smith. the day before the collision.e. It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another. Buño et al. Cebu Autobus Company. . 1987 INC v IAC Nature: Petition to review the decision of the IAC Facts: - at about 1:30 am on November 15 1975. Here. v. . much less establish. et al. April 29. Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-anddinner meeting with his boss.if the driver is to be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier. and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733. If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour.. . Torts. ***With regard to the substantial factor test: . 16 SCRA 742). delos Reyes would have covered that A2010 . there were no options available to him. . . it to be one caused by a caso fortuito. "[i]n an action for damages against the carrier for his failure to safely carry his passenger to his destination. on the right hand side of a person facing in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding). . delos Reyes covered the distance of 45 meters in 3. 1966. the moment a passenger dies or is injured. an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver. . 94 Phil. he had little time to react to the situation. Jr.The dump truck. Necesito. It was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street.Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more or less 50 kph at the time of the accident. .. . in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning. Using this speed. 45 Phil. . partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. distance in only 2. Carbonel.. ***On the sole liability of the Jeepney Owners (excluding Manalo) PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION (DIONISIO) 148 SCRA 353 FELICIANO. .025 seconds. the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger. measured from the time its right rear wheel was detached up to the point of collision. et al. 75). defendants Mangune and Carreon offered to show thru their witness Natalio Navarro. contradictory to the explicit provision of A 2181 of the NCC. 892 citing Lasam. INC WERE LIABLE.) -On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident. Paras. owned by and registered in the name of Phoenix Construction Inc. . 2d)..The IAC held that “. 23. ("Phoenix"). That it was not successful in fully clearing the Mangune jeepney as its (Rabbit's) left front hit said jeepney must have been due to limitations of space and time. It was shown by the pictures that driver delos Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to the right attempt to avoid hitting the Mangune's jeepney. 657. Said defendant did not even attempt to explain. its regular driver.

but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause. and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created. page 5 of outline) - concerned. evidently a remote cause. casis NATURE Review by certiorari of a CA decision FACTS . although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible.His widow and children filed a suit to recover damages from the company and the TC rendered judgment in their favor. it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety. IAC affirmed the lower court’s ruling. however. (see previous digest) .ON CAUSE v CONDITION (under IV A 3c. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions. the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark. Even in the United States. the defendant is said not to be liable. After grabbing hold of the sheet. unrelated and efficient cause of the injury intervenes between such prior and remote cause and the injury. It merely provided the condition from which the cause arose (it set the stage for the cause of the injury to occur). The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down that street and for having so created this risk." - petitioners' arguments are drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United States. far from being a "passive and static condition". particularly since. . as is invariably the case the latter (is) the result of other active forces which have gone before. Dionisio's negligence. A2010 . such condition was not the proximate cause.Efren Magno went to his stepbrother’s 3-story house to fix a leaking “media agua. (NOTE: this was the contention of petitioners which SC noted in is decision) Private respondent’s comments . and some new force intervenes. He climbed up to the media agua which was just below the 3 rd floor window and stood on it to receive a galvanized iron sheet through the said window.torts & damages . in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result. while under the influence of liquor. Held: ." Professors Prosser and Keeton make this quite clear: “Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. But so far as the fact of causation is the truck driver's negligence. successive. such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet. . 1956 .Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck.Trial court ruled in favor of Dionisio. a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition.the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident. the distinctions between" cause" and "condition" have already been "almost entirely discredited. electrocuting him and killing him. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause. The collision would not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The Company appealed to the CA. with modification on award of damages.68 - prof. So far as it has any validity at all. To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire.As a result of the collision. Reasoning We fail to see how the Company could be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence. it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations. . May 18. such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. But even in such cases. the defendant will not escape responsibility.it is the driver’s negligence. which affirmed the judgment.” (downspout)." but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. he turned around and a portion of the iron sheet he was holding came into contact with an electric wire of Manila Electric Company (the Company) strung 2. Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars. do not have any validity in this jurisdiction.The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. . When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the media agua - if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked. but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. It is this CA decision the Company now seeks to appeal.the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix Issue: WON the proximate cause of the accident was Dionisio’s negligence (driving faster than he should have. that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening. but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution. ISSUE WON the Company’s negligence in the installation and maintenance of its wires was the proximate cause of the death HELD No. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition. These arguments. Ratio A prior and remote cause (which furnishes the condition or gives rise to the occasion by which an injury was made possible) cannot be the basis of an action if a distinct.5 ft parallel to the edge of the media agua. it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important. When a spark ignites the gasoline. and without headlights) or the negligence of the driver in parking the truck. was an indispensable and efficient cause. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. What the petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was only a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the truck driver’s negligence MANILA ELECTRIC v REMOQUILLO 99 PHIL 117 MONTEMAYOR. one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who falls into it a month afterward. considering the latter's length of 6 feet. efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. Petitioners’comments . the truck driver must be held responsible.

and attorney’s fee. an Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was filed with the trial court. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do . But unfortunately. his car collided with the truck. resulted from the company’s negligence. two boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car. which was the opposite lane.Using the test. thereby causing his own electrocution. as employers of Galang.On 1 March 1977. the decision for the consolidated civil cases was reversed. In its consolidated decision of the civil cases. IAC immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh's negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee. . except that of Rodrigueza which was of strong materials. his training and experience failed him.torts & damages just below the third story window. Trial judge decided against Manila Railroad. Rodrigueza didn’t mind the warnings from the company. would do. then he is guilty of negligence. he could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. . all passengers of the Ford Escort. and physical injuries to George Koh McKee. applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. ISSUE WON damage was caused by Rodrigueza’s contributory negligence HELD Yes. November 19. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. which appealed. 1921 NATURE Appeal from judgment of CFI RAILROAD MCKEE v IAC. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had had training and experience for the job. RODRIGUEZA V. . The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh.The respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that the driver of the car. 1977. .Judge Capulong found Galang guilty of the criminal charge and ordered him to pay damages. MANILA COMPANY STREET. . Galang appealed to IAC. two boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. it is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so. ISSUES WON respondent Court's findings in its challenged resolution are supported by evidence or are based on mere speculations. he turned around swinging his arms with the motion of his body.In an MFR. . Complaint against company dismissed A2010 . . this indicates contributory negligence on his part.69 - prof. . company had no right to negligently destroy it.Two civil cases were filed on Jan 31. in the selection and supervision of the latter. Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc. in the instant case.The PROXIMATE AND ONLY CAUSE of the damage was the negligent act of the company.When the northbound Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge. Disposition CA decision reversed. The fire was communicated to four houses nearby. 1992 NATURE Appeal from decision of the IAC FACTS . he then switched on the headlights of the car. HELD YES . His house’s materials included nipa and cogon. . but should not bear loss if the fire . So. and throwing all prudence and discretion to the winds. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck.Manila Railroad’s defense is not a bar to recovery by the other plaintiffs.The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. IAC affirmed decision. They also say that the sparks were produced by an inferior fuel used by the company – Bataan coal. was negligent. conjectures and presumptions. it reversed the ruling of the trial court and ordered the defendants to pay damages. On the basis of this presumed negligence.There was no proof that Rodrigueza unlawfully intruded upon company’s property. July 16. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the southern end of the bridge. . The appellate court further said that the law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants. and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh.A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck owned by private respondents. and driven by Ruben Galang. Petitioners appealed to IAC. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car. He may be at risk for fire. Plaintiffs say that the company failed to supervise their employees properly and was negligent in allowing locomotive to operate without smokestack protection for arresting sparks. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck. . holding the 6-ft iron sheet with both hands and at arms length. evidently without looking. TAYAG 211 SCRA 517 DAVIDE. Jose Koh. The decision is anchored principally on the findings that it was FACTS Rodrigueza et al seek damages fr fire kindled by sparks fr a locomotive engine. no negligence can be imputed to Jose Koh.Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals may be set aside when such findings are not supported by the evidence or when the trial court failed to consider the material facts which would have led to a conclusion different from what was stated in its judgment.Judge Castaneda dismissed the 2 civil cases and awarded private respondents moral damages and exemplary damages.Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man. Hence this petition. His house was there before the railroad company’s property. Before he could do so. and forgetting where he was standing. Defense said Rodigueza’s house stood partly within limits of land owned by company. That Rodrigueza’s house was near was an ANTECEDENT CONDITION but that can’t be imputed to him as CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE because that condition was not created by himself and because his house remained by the toleration and consent of company and because even if the house was improperly there. All of these houses were of light construction. on the said bridge. it was further asserted that these defendants did not allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising the said employee. The company could have removed the house through its power of eminent domain. . casis Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused the accident.

not juris et de jure. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. clear congested dockets to simplify the work of the trial court. if he. should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care. Soler Street lay between that store and the institute. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. or according to some authorities. however. however. arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent. a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap. and without which the result would not have occurred. if no ludicrous.000. the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here. which were for the recovery of civil liability arising from a quasi-delict under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. by exercising reasonable care and prudence. Four instructresses and six assistant instructresses of the institute were present and they. a two-storey. .As employers of the truck driver. the private respondents are. . and an injury results. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 km) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kph. a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters away from the institute. Neither did they attempt to prove it. was the initial act in the chain of events. as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person. .torts & damages . Such was what happened in this case. if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method. in natural and continuous sequence.00 to P50. . The records do not indicate any attempt on the part of the parties. They were eventually consolidated for joint trial.Last clear chance: The doctrine is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant. attain justice with the least expense to the parties litigants. tried to calm down the students. 1973 FACTS . spectacle of two judges appreciating. under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. 1955. The answers of the private respondents in the civil cases did not interpose this defense.The civil cases. would have easily sustained a consolidation.Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent. . and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger. had a total area of about 400 square meters. They told the students not to rush out but just to go down the stairway two by two. was a vocational school for hair and beauty culture situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building. the negligent act of the truck driver.The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. could not . Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road. telling them not to be afraid because the Gil-Armi Building would not get burned as it is made of concrete. under what is known as the emergency rule. according to their respective orientation. A2010 . some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter. and thereafter rendering conflicting decisions. have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party.Assuming.The Realistic Institute. Manila. a panic ensued. Teague. is not guilty of negligence. Assailed decision set aside while its original is REINSTATED. and although it had only one stairway. subject to the modification that the indemnity for death is increased from P12. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might. together with the registrar. That presumption. directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. which. the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof. to consolidate criminal case with the civil cases. semi-concrete edifice located at the comer of Quezon Boulevard and Soler Street.Moreover. he was violating any traffic regulation. which seeks to avoid a multiplicity of suits. it had eight windows. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause.50 meters in width. of about 1. or in short. whether acquittal or conviction. prevent delays. which was the actual cause of the tragedy. the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted. the same facts differently. or vice-versa. the injured person is entitled to recovery.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee . had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident. The panic. or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. . it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event. who numbered about 180 at the time. Upon seeing the fire. perception and perhaps even prejudice.In the afternoon of October 24. In the case of independent civil actions under the new Civil Code. would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action. What remains to be the most important consideration as to why the decision in the criminal case should not be considered in this appeal is the fact that private respondents were not parties therein.000. owned and operated by Mercedes M. might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. Dispositive Petition granted. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code. each of which was provided with two fire-escape ladders. "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger. by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence. were filed ahead of criminal case. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. In such cases. Quiapo. if at all negligent. it cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. and the presence of each of the fire exits was indicated on the wall. the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. . a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident. casis preventing the unseeming. June 4. and that the fire was anyway. produces the injury. thereby TEAGUE VS. aware of the plaintiff's peril. guard against oppression and abuse. The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff.70 - prof. or to use the fire-escapes. Proximate cause has been defined as: that cause. The doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril.Section 1. FERNANDEZ 51 SCRA 181 MAKALINTAL. which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances. and it may therefore be reasonably concluded that none was made. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events.The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. Rule 31 of the Rules of Court. The second floor was unpartitioned. either immediately or by setting other events in motion. On the separate civil and criminal actions .Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh. is only juris tantum. across the street. the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. . the result of the criminal case.

in the manner in which it happened. But the violation was a continuing one. having one or more persons domiciled therein either temporarily or permanently.The petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death of Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of ordinance. such condition was not the proximate cause. . This provision reads as follows: "Sec. NO. places of human detention. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. casis .torts & damages be subdued and the students kept on rushing and pushing their way through the stairs. clubs. WON the failure to comply with the requirement of the ordinance was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez HELD 1. exits and stairways . (2) fire at a neighboring place. was only a remote cause. Reasoning Thus the same may be privately owned. (5) stampede. was bound to happen under emergency conditions if there was only one stairway available." The alleged violation of the ordinance consisted is that the second storey of the building had only one stairway. either immediately or by settling other events in motion. Reasoning The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. assembly halls." The weakness in the argument springs from a faulty juxtaposition of the events which formed a chain and resulted in the injury. although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had a second stairway under construction. successive. it would be more accurate to say that the overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one. The plaintiffs appealed to the CA. [Citing MERALCO v Remoquillo] . said stairways shall be placed as far apart as possible.A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible. [Citing Bataclan v Medina] . but rather the use or the purpose for which a particular building.2 meters each. The violation of the ordinance. which. sister of plaintiffs. and it was the petitioner and not the owners who were responsible for such use. Fire!". This finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with in connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition. But it was precisely such contingencies or events that the authors of the ordinance had in mind. ISSUES 1.According to the petitioner "the events of fire. unrelated. It is true that in this particular case there would have been no overcrowding in the single stairway if there had not been a fire in the neighborhood which caused the students to panic and rush headlong for the stairs in order to go down. such as hospitals. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result there from. the principle of proximate cause applies to such violation. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. March 15. even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person. No part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. but if it is devoted to any one of the purposes mentioned in the ordinance . YES.The CFI of Manila found for the defendant and dismissed the case. which by a divided vote of 3 to 2 (a special division of five members having been constituted) rendered a judgment of reversal and sentenced the defendant to pay damages to the plaintiffs in the sum of P11.for instance as a school. and (6) injuries and death.All buildings and separate sections of buildings or buildings otherwise known as accessorias having less than three stories. Ratio it is not ownership which determines the character of buildings subject to its requirements.5 meters wide. But. .The CA declared that Teague was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. schools. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become necessary to evacuate the building. . Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the respondents. PICART V SMITH STREET. plus interest at the legal rate from the date the complaint was filed. It is true that the petitioner's noncompliance with the ordinance in question was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of time. Indeed the requirement that such a building should have two (2) separate stairways instead of only one (1) has no relevance or reasonable relation to the fact of ownership. and efficient cause of the injury. which the Realistic Institute precisely was . the final event in the chain immediately affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted. 3. shall be provided with at least two unobstructed stairways of not less than one meter and twenty centimeters in width and an inclination of not less than forty degrees from the perpendicular. it is argued. panic and stampede were independent causes with no causal connection at all with the violation of the ordinance. (3) shouts of "Fire!. 491. is utilized. for under normal conditions one stairway would be adequate for the occupants of the building. sanitarium. Reasoning It was the use of the building for school purposes which brought the same within the coverage of the ordinance. if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct. such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. but does have such relation to the use or purpose for which the building is devoted. after the panic was over. NO. who should be liable for the violation A2010 . restaurants or panciterias. thereby causing stampede. 1918 . reformatories. 3. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause. WON Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila refers only to public buildings and hence did not apply to the Gil-Armi building which was of private ownership 2. was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent. and the like. and cannot be the basis of liability since there intervened a number of independent causes which produced the injury complained of. four students. WON the ordinance devolved upon the owners of the building and therefore it is they and not the petitioner. 1.then the building is within the coverage of the ordinance. including Lourdes Fernandez.000. and all public or quasipublic buildings having less than three stories. Ratio The violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident. Fireproof partitions.To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does not portray the situation in its true perspective. were found dead and several others injured on account of the stampede. who is a mere lessee. (4) panic in the Institute. Dispositive Decision appealed from is affirmed. 2. in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the building.71 - prof. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. instead of two of at least 1. in case of large buildings more than two stairways shall likewise be provided when required by the chief of the fire department. since the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the building. it could be reasonably foreseen.

 But in view of the known nature of horses.  Stated in these terms. as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision. Could a prudent man. in the case under consideration. instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down. The law considers what would be reckless. going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so. blameworthy. he might get excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. without reference to the prior negligence of the other part. and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle.  As the defendant neared the bridge he saw the plaintiff and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. Reasonable foresight of harm. given the novelty of the apparition and the rapidity of the approach. the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing.  As the automobile approached.  The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law.  The defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. there was an appreciable risk that.  The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.  Before he had gotten half way across. La Union. was guilty of negligence that would give rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done Ratio: The person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. in maneuvering his car in the manner above described. negligent in the eye of the law.  However.  The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done. he gave two more successive blasts. there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side. at San Fernando. A2010 .  He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge. casis  When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger. seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge. is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. that being the proper side of the road for the machine.  The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant. to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision.  Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case. deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright.  He did this because he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side.  In so doing.  The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. would have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk. or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. the defendant guided it toward his left. A prudent man. and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm.  The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.  In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. the defendant. negligence is clearly established.  Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet. and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. the appeal ISSUE WON the defendant. he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. and from this moment it was no longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. in our opinion. it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences. He was. the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. plaintiff was riding on his pony over the Carlatan Bridge.  CFI absolved defendant from liability  Hence. he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side.72 - prof. HELD Yes. 1912.torts & damages NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of La Union FACTS  On December 12.  The plaintiff himself was not free from fault.  As a result of its injuries the horse died. placed in the position of the defendant.  The pony had not as yet exhibited fright. the court thinks. It will be noted however. if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles.  The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not.  As the defendant started across the bridge.  In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away.  The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him.  When he had gotten quite near. then he is guilty of negligence. he was. that the negligent acts of .

Obiter . Phoenix and Carbonel countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident. is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant. In other words.Leonardo Dionisio. the injured person is entitled to recovery. a negligent actor can’t defend by saying that another had negligently failed to take action which would have avoided injury. absolving the defendants based on the doctrine of last clear chance.IAC: affirmed TC but modified amounts ISSUE (obiter) WON last clear chance doctrine should be applied therefore exculpating Phoenix from paying any damages HELD NO . saying that the bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. going very fast and the front wheels wiggling. The historical function of that doctrine in BUSTAMANTE V CA (DEL PILAR AND MONTESIANO) 193 SCRA 603 MEDIALDEA. causing the deaths of the passengers of the bus. Makati. owned and registered by Phoenix Construction Inc. Dispositive: Appealed decision is reversed. ISSUES: 1. or according to some authorities. The driver and owner of the truck appealed to the CA. Disposition: Petition GRANTED.torts & damages the two parties were not contemporaneous. casis saw a Ford dump truck looming some 21/2meters away from his car.130AM 15 November 1975 . and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone. The theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent. . Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver. without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he . had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (Am. While the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing the hand tractor and the truck was approaching the bus. and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the same. March 10. NO Ratio: The doctrine of last clear chance applies only between the negligent parties. Civil Code of the Philippines). in order to overtake a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the highway. . Defendants Del Pilar and Montesiano ordered to pay damages with other defendants PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION (DIONISIO) 148 SCRA 353 FELICIANO. February 6. aware of the plaintiff's peril.73 - prof. As against 3rd persons. The bus driver also observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. As the doctrine is usually stated. which was denied at first. stated broadly. Susulin shifted from 4th to 3rd gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus. The dump truck. A negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff. 1991 NATURE: petition for certiorari to review decision of CA FACTS: a truck and a passenger bus sideswept each other. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by Carbonel. or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril. a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. not far from his home. WON the CA was correct in absolving the driver and owner of the truck (answered by WON CA correctly applied the doctrine of last clear chance) HELD: 1. should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due case. since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. and an injury results. by exercising reasonable care and prudence. driving his Volkswagen car.Phoenix and Carbonel also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. while under the influence of liquor. This is the way the collision happened: The bus. was on his way home to Makati from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss where had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. thus their liability must be solidary. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck. 1987 INC V IAC NATURE PETITION for review of the decision of the IAC FACTS .CFI: in favor of Dionisio .We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory. Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars. driven by Susulin. notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident (Sangco). A2010 . the two vehicles sideswiped each other at each other's left side. Crossing the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal.Dionisio commenced an action for damages claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck. Jur). without reference to the prior negligence of the other party." that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179. saying that the negligent acts of both drivers were the cause of the accident. It does not apply in a case wherein a victim (who is an outsider to the cause of the accident) demands liability from the negligent parties. Reasoning: The doctrine of last clear chance. its regular driver. private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries. was parked askew (partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic) on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming traffic. The heirs of the victims filed for damages. but was granted on MFR. which was ascending the inclined part of the road. if he. the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril. when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident. it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. As a result of the collision. The RTC awarded damages. might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence. Smith but it is a matter for debate whether. or to what extent. was traversing an inclined road when the driver saw from 30 meters away an approaching truck (driven by Montesiano). Not minding this circumstance due to his belief that the truck driver was merely joking.

if any. . It turned out. now absorbed by the Philippine Commercial International Bank. would do. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him.Upon discovery of the loss of its funds. 1997 Nature: Petition to review decision of CA Facts: . however.979. and make it appear to be RMC's account number. as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate. the task of a court. P304. would. it had never been the practice of Romeo Lipana to check these monthly statements of account reposing complete trust and confidence on petitioner bank. The original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number. she made her company believe that all the while the amounts she deposited were being credited to its account when. Yabut and submitted to private . even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. . The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent. as it has been in A2179 CC . Unfortunately.From May 5.979. . . plus damages.Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man. in truth and in fact. attornet’s fees and costs of suit. however. is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Disposition CA decision is modified by reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory damages. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community.torts & damages the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule-that of contributory negligence.Picart v. it filed a collection suit before RTC Pasig. 1975 to July 16. on all occasions. petitioner Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalling P304. Azucena Mabayad. or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. to the tune of P304. Smith. casis respondent RMC together with the validated duplicate slips with the latter's name and account number. the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff. . that these deposits. were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to Account No. . validate and stamp both the original and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip. in technical terms. Irene Yabut.979. it is difficult to see what role.74 representing various deposits RMC made in its current account with said bank." The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions. they were being deposited by her and credited by the petitioner bank in the account of Cotas. an original and a duplicate. Held: It was the negligence of Ms. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not.74 to his secretary. . RMC demanded from petitioner bank the return of its money. or some other person for whose acts he must respond. which found petitioner bank negligent and ordered the bank and Mabayad to pay RMC jointly and severally P304. The amount was not credited to RMC’s account but was instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas. March 14. Bienvenido Cotas who likewise maintains an account with the same bank. but modified the award of damages. To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. filed a complaint to recover from the former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC). (b) fault or negligence of the defendant.There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff. petitioner bank had been regularly furnishing private respondent with monthly statements showing its current accounts balances. To accept the petitioners' proposition must tend to weaken the very bonds of society. On the duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs.74 - prof. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law.RMC maintained two separate current accounts with the Pasig Branch of PBC in connection with its business of selling appliances. The second copy was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record purposes. Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number written thereon. The law considers what would be reckless. blameworthy. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE v CA (LIPANA) 269 SCRA 695 HERMOSISIMA. is to determine whose negligence-the plaintiff's or the defendant's-was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. Issue: Whether the proximate cause of the loss. . 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband. suffered by the private respondent RMC is petitioner bank's negligence or that of private respondent's. but as its demand went unheeded. represented by its President and General Manager Romeo Lipana. -Irene Yabut would accomplish two copies of the deposit slip.Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC). Azucena Mabayad. Under A2179. coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller.Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so. which is that of her husband's.During this period. for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC with PBC. has itself been rejected. Accordingly. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission.74. With the daily remittance records also prepared by Ms. PBC's teller. 979. and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. loss of expected income and moral damages Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount A2010 .CA affirmed.72. then he is guilty of negligence. After validation. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. 1976. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics. which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent.

and without which the result would not have occurred. in essence. particularly Romeo Lipana. the loss would not have occurred. Considering. states that where both parties are negligent. After the impact. 1979. . could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. .On November 27.torts & damages . and Maximo Patos were on the jeep owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries. This doctrine. was extensively damaged. Its negligence. As a result of the impact. or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident.the doctrine of "last clear chance" assumes that the negligence of the defendant was subsequent to the negligence of the plaintiff and the same must be the proximate cause of the injury. . the left side of the truck was slightly damaged while the left side of the jeep. Moments before its collission with the truck being operated by Zacarias. the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of. had just crossed said bridge.Trial Court dismissed the complaint (and defendants' counterclaim) "for insufficiency of evidence. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC. while the truck stopped on its wheels on the road. not a last possible chance. Proximate cause is "that cause. at least. original or duplicate. which." In this case. thru its teller. common human experience dictates that the same would not have been possible without any form of collusion between Ms. It was private respondent who had the last and clear chance to prevent any further misappropriation by Yabut had it only reviewed the status of its current accounts on the bank statement sent to it monthly or regularly. 40% of the damage awarded by the respondent appellate court. is not contributory but the immediate and proximate cause of its injury." 2. refused to . .it cannot be denied that private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account.the bank was not remiss in its duty of sending monthly bank statements to private respondent RMC so that any error or discrepancy in the entries therein could be brought to the bank's attention at the earliest opportunity. . At about that time. there must be a last and a clear chance. 1989 NATURE Petition for certiorari praying for a reversal of the judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court which. it is claimed. the cargo track. In short. May 18. was negligent in validating. Ms. therefore. Zacarias was unhurt. This omission on the part of the private respondent does not change the fact that were it not for the wanton and reckless negligence of the petitioners' employee in validating the A2010 . policy and precedent. petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. Unlike Zacarias who readily submitted himself to investigation by the police. Mabayad was negligent in the performance of her duties as bank teller nonetheless. despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the selfimposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips. such cannot be used by the petitioners to escape liability. at times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"). the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. in natural and continuous sequence. shall be borne by private respondent RMC. Yabut and bank teller Mabayad. thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company. Stated differently. It must have been a chance as would have enabled a reasonably prudent man in like position to have acted effectively to avoid the injury and the resulting damage to himself. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity. with Calibo at the wheel. PADILLA [dissent] .70493 NARVASA.1979. Calibo. the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries.the bank's teller. as what the law presumes. incomplete duplicate deposit slips presented by Ms. the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the truck. but because it was purposely negligent as it admitted that it does not normally check bank statements given by banks. or bar a defense against liability sought by another.While it is true that had private respondent checked the monthly statements of account sent by the petitioner bank to RMC. but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other. Calibo's companions who suffered injuries on account of the collision.Furthermore. loaded with cement bags. Here. including its fender and hood. The demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio. The award of attorney's fees shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the petitioners. if the latter. .Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic. produces the injury. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip. plywood. Irene Yabut. Had it done so. Thus. common sense. who had the last fair chance. . . ignored or ran counter to the established facts. driven by defendant Paul Zacarias y Infants. that the fraud was committed in a span of more than one (1) year covering various deposits. casis sizable amount of cash was entrusted to Yabut. assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. . Inc. except the award of P25. however. the latter would have discovered the loss early on.75 - prof. Since a GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER AND HARDWARE V IAC (VDA. absent the act of Ms. At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge. have taken care of its concerns. Mabayad.00 attorney's fees. Agripino Roranes. . FACTS . Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. coming from the opposite direction of Davao City and bound for Glan. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code Disposition CA decision modified.Engineer Orlando T. as it approached from the South Lizada Bridge going towards the direction of Davao City at about 1:45 in the afternoon of July 4. GI sheets. . as advanced by the petitioner. the company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. Yabut. Private respondent failed to examine these bank statements not because it was prevented by some cause in not doing so.Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms.000. the instant case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the late Engineer Calibo who are residents of Tagbilaran City against the driver and owners of the cargo truck. had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client. DE CALIBO and kids) GR No. private respondent should.. Azucena Mabayad. yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank. South Cotabato. Ms. under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to. had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs." The circumstances leading to the conclusion just mentioned: 1. Ms. to avoid the accident or injury. the jeep of the deceased Calibo was "zigzagging. simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure.

boarded a car and proceeded to Santiago. 3283 of the Court of First Instance of Bohol.. No pronouncement as to costs. jumped around and was killed by the passing car. Esparcia. as the Appellate Court found. . Bascos and Fe O. what he handed to Pfc. Voting Cruz. Ambrosio Ramirez. the jeepney turned right and proceeded to MaIalam. Ico for herself and for her minor children. died while the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. HELD NO. or he could simply have braked to a full stop. The private respondents have admitted that the truck was already at a full stop when the jeep plowed into it. under the law. -PANTRANCO. Even if it be considered that there was some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias shortly before the collision. . together with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa. Calibo had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident because he still had ample room in his own lane to steer clear of the truck.torts & damages be so investigated or give statements to the police officers. the collision would never have occurred. Roranes' testimony.Maricar Baesa through her guardian Francisca O. It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault. . After the accident the driver of the PANTRANCO Bus. Ratio The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a defense to accident liability. spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa and their children. Gancayco. the spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children Harold Jim.. The jeepney was extensively damaged. encroached on the jeepney's lane while negotiating a curve." had both vehicles stayed in their respective lanes. Other victims settled with Bus Company. to celebrate the fifth wedding anniversary of Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa. and collided with it. And they have not seen fit to deny or impugn petitioners' imputation that they also admitted the truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away. invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver. "the truck driver suddenly applied his brakes even as he knew that he was still within the lane of the jeep. It found Zacarias to be negligent on the basis of the following circumstances. it was the driver of the passenger jeepney who had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and was therefore negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the harm. by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck. . while still at that distance of thirty meters from the truck. Branch IV. The driver of the automobile. had had a full view of each other's vehicle from a distance of one hundred fifty meters. (Picart v Smith) A2010 . the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby REVERSED." 3. is DISMISSED. given in plaintiffs' behalf. This. he "did not drive his truck back to his lane in order to avoid collision with the oncoming jeep . and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible.IAC reversed TC. in that he had caused his truck to run some 25 centimeters to the left of the center of the road. to wit: 1) "the truck driven by defendant Zacarias occupied the lane of the jeep when the collision occurred." 2) Zacarias had no license at the time. and the complaint against herein petitioners in Civil Case No. Griño-Aquino and Medialdea. Engr. his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance. HELD: YES -Petitioner claims that under the circumstances of the case. casis PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS. That there were skid marks left by the truck's tires at the scene. River at a speed of about 20 kph.76 - prof. not merely rely on a supposed right to expect. Dispositive WHEREFORE. plus Roranes' waiver of the right to institute criminal proceedings against Zacarias. either of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. Both vehicles were travelling at a speed of approximately thirty kilometers per hour. a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri. Upon reaching the highway. as the Appellate Court would have it. and the fact that indeed no criminal case was ever instituted in Court against Zacarias. Marceline and Maricar. But as we have already stated. Isabela. . Isabela. Reasoning Both drivers. ISSUES WON respondent court is correct in reversing the decision of trial court. were aboard a passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at Malalam River." and was "uncertain and even contradicted by the physical facts and the police investigators Dimaano and Esparcia. however guided his car toward the plaintiff without diminution of speed until he was only few feet away. INC v CAR BASCOS BAESA 179 SCRA 384 CORTES J.David Ico. . 1981. aside from pointing to the late David Ico's alleged negligence as the proximate cause of the accident. and none by the jeep." 3) the waiver of the right to file criminal charges against Zacarias should not be taken against "plaintiffs" Roranes and Patos who had the right. to opt merely to bring a civil suit. Ramirez has never been seen and has apparently remained in hiding. From that time on up to the present. -Picart v Smith: The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge. Ambrosio Ramirez -TC ruled against PANTRANCO and ordered them to pay damages. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous. was "not as clear and detailed as that of Zacarias. filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO. demonstrates that the driver of the truck had applied the brakes and the jeep's driver had not. JJ. the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path. He then turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse that the latter being frightened. . . the defendant was also negligent. on the latter's demand. . Seeing an automobile ahead he improperly pulled his horse over to the railing on the right. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences.: November 1989 FACTS: At about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of June 12. were "telling indications that they did not attribute the happening to defendant Zacarias' negligence or fault. In those circumstances.' and although Zacarias saw the jeep from a distance of about 150 meters. Ilagan. . for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. -Pantranco appealed the decision. From these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident. Ico with their son Erwin Ico and seven other persons. While they were proceeding towards Malalam River. Appeal dismissed for lack of merit ISSUE: WON PANTRANCO is liable for damages. 5." what is worse. on its regular route to Manila. concur. and that the jeep had on impact fallen on its right side is indication that it was running at high speed. was the 'driver's license of his co-driver Leonardo Baricuatro. they would have passed "along side each other safely." 4. since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

00 and P460. DISPOSITION: Judgment modified. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. Thus. Contrary to the petitioner's contention. . 1958.torts & damages -petitioner claims that the original negligence of its driver was not the proximate cause of the accident and that the sole proximate cause was the supervening negligence of the jeepney driver David Ico in failing to avoid the accident . -On September 3. with exercise of due care.Petitioner likewise insists that David Ico was negligent in failing to observe Section 43 (c). Vicente Mañosca. . as a company driver is far from sufficient ANURAN V BUÑO 17 SCRA 224 BENGZON. means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter. the doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case . P500. 1966 NATURE: Petition for Review by certiorari of CA decision. 1756). on the right shoulder of the said road. HELD CANLAS V. who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so.000. At the time David Ico must have realized that the bus was not returning to its own lane. respectively. . .00 to serve as his (Osmundo's) investment in the business. issued two postdated checks in favor of Osmundo Canlas in the amounts of P40.00.The above contention of petitioner is manifestly devoid of merit. 4136** which provides that the driver of a vehicle entering a through highway or a stop intersection shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching in either direction on such through highway. and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered" . this Court believes that the evidence submitted by the defendant to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family iti the case of Ramirez. At the time of the accident.00 of which payable within one week. the doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case. he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction. Osmundo Canlas delivered to Vicente Mañosca the transfer certificates of title of the parcels of land involved.In this case. Batangas. 1755) who are “presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. this legal presumption of negligence is confirmed by the CA’s finding that jeepney driver in question was at fault in parking the vehicle improperly. 1982. petitioner claims that it had observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.This Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine "can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously. it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should. 2000 Nature Petition for Review on Certiorari Facts -Sometime in August.On January 12. CA Purisima.000. and Vicente Mañosca. Article III Chapter IV of Republic Act No. both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at the time of the accident the Pantranco bus was speeding towards Manila. it was already too late to swerve the jeepney to his right to prevent an accident. A motor truck speeding along.CFI Batangas absolved the driver of the jeepney and its owners.000. to recover consequently damages against the drivers and the owners of the trucks and also against the driver and the owners of the jeepney. It must be remembered that the obligation of the carrier to transport its passengers safely is such that the New Civil Code requires “utmost diligence” from the carriers (Art. For the doctrine to be applicable.Moreover. Although this presumption is only a disputable presumption which could be overcome by proof of diligence of a good father of a family. the jeepney had already crossed the intersection and was on its way to Malalam River -On the issue of its liability as an employer. 1982.The doctrine of the last clear chance simply. Vicente Mañosca was able to mortgage the same parcels of land for P100. Canlas. there instantly arises a presumption that the employer has been negligent either in the selection of his employees or in the supervision over their acts.000. It must follow that the driver – and the owners – of the jeepney must answer for injuries to its passengers.000. even as 2 other passengers suffered injuries that required their confinement at the Provincial Hospital for many days. a passenger jeepney was parked on the road to Taal. Buño. ISSUE WON the driver and owners of the jeepney should also be made liable. might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. for and in consideration of P850. The cited law itself provides that it applies only to vehicles entering a through highway or a stop intersection. negligently bumped it from behind. Osmundo S. Plaintiffs appealed to the CA insisting that the driver and the owners of the jeepney should also be made liable for damages. driver of said jeepney stopped his vehicle in order to allow one of his passengers to alight. each lot with semi-concrete residential house in the name of the SPS Canlas. An error of law was committed in releasing the jeepney from liability. but it turned out that the check covering the bigger amount was not sufficiently funded. which such violence that three of its passengers died. Osmundo Canlas agreed to sell the said parcels of land to Vicente Mañosca.000. Metro Manila. The former then executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing the latter to mortgage two parcels of land situated in San Dionisio. decided to venture in business and to raise the capital needed therefor. and the balance of P350. by exercising reasonable care and prudence. conformably to the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code -When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee. there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. May 20. but it required the truck driver and the owners o make compensation.Suits were instituted by the representatives of the dead and the injured. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane. as his part of the transaction. (BF Homes) Paranaque. -Petitioner's misplaced reliance on the aforesaid law is readily apparent in this case.Contrary to the petitioner's contention. A2010 .77 - prof. -The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant. This principle does not apply in this case. FACTS . In this instance.00. Obiter on Application of Principle of Last Clear Chance: The principle about the “last clear chance” applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles.00 to a . unless they prove that they have observed extraordinary diligence” (Art. have been aware of it . is made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff . casis YES. February 28. But he parked his jeepney in such a way that ½ of its width (the left wheels) was on the asphalted pavement of the road and the other half.

1983. and yet. respondent Asian Savings Bank has to bear the loss sued upon. Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L. a mortgage. When he came back. But such fact CONSOLIDATED BANK V CA (L. asking that the auction sale scheduled on February 3. dated September 30. . Vicente Mañosca was declared in default. he left the passbook with Solidbank. the bank did not require the impostors to submit additional proof of their true identity.torts & damages certain Attorney Manuel Magno. from the evidence on hand it can be gleaned unerringly that respondent bank did not observe the requisite diligence in ascertaining or verifying the real identity of the couple who introduced themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. the efforts exerted by the bank to verify the identity of the couple posing as Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas fell short of the responsibility of the bank to observe more than the diligence of a good father of a family. thru its cashier.An information for estafa was filed against one of their messengers (Ilagan) and one Roscoe Verdazola. the teller told him that somebody else got the passbook.DIAZ AND CO. . and request that steps be taken to annul and/or revoke the questioned mortgage. The business of a bank is affected with public interest. 1983.For failure to file his answer. respondent bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. On September 29.) GR No. Contreras and Asian Savings Bank refused to heed petitioner Canlas' stance and proceeded with the scheduled auction sale. 2003 NATURE Review of the decision of the CA FACTS . whose business is impressed with public interest. 138569 CARPIO. Calapre. September 11. they applied the rule that the holder of the passport is presumed the owner. the trial court issued an Order restraining the respondent sheriff from issuing the corresponding Certificate of Sheriff's Sale. 1173 It could be said that the degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family in keeping with their responsibility to exercise the necessary care and prudence in dealing even on a registered or titled property. the respondent bank must suffer the resulting loss. accorded only to purchasers or mortgagees for value and in good faith. their act was not the proximate cause of the loss. on February 3. When the loan it extended was not paid. The proximate cause was LC Diaz’ negligence.000. with the help of impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses. who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.nêt Yes. as well as the Community Tax Certificate of Angelina Canlas. is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. Issue/s and Held WON CA erred in holding that the mortgage is valid Settled is the rule that a contract of mortgage must be constituted only by the absolute owner on the property mortgaged. covering the same parcels of land in question.00. In the case under consideration. 1983. by reason of which the bank would be denied the protective mantle of the land registration law. in CA-G. private respondent Vicente Mañosca was granted a loan by the respondent Asian Savings Bank (ASB) in the amount of P500. It was also held that Solidbank did not have any participation in the custody and care of the passbook and as such. Diaz with Allied Bank. the doctrine of last clear chance is to the effect that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other. holding in trust the money of the depositors. the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so.LC Diaz is a professional partnership engaged in accounting. it was learned that 300k was withdrawn from the account. instructed their messenger. Disposition WHEREFORE. The rules state that “possession of this book shall raise the presumption of ownership and any payment or payments made by the bank upon the production of the said book and entry therein of the withdrawal shall have the same effect as if made to the depositor personally. Osmundo Canlas wrote a letter informing the respondent bank that the execution of subject mortgage over the two parcels of land in question was without their (Canlas spouses) authority. The latter refused and a case for recovery of a sum of money was filed against them . 25242 SET ASIDE. On January 18. In essence. despite several motions for extension of time for the filing thereof. Magno.” Also. 1983 be cancelled or held in abeyance.R. the Court is of the ineluctible conclusion and finding that subject contract of mortgage is a complete nullity. Applying Art. Asian Savings Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals and CA reversed the lower court decision. Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. -On January 15. 1993. For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking institutions. M-028 is hereby REINSTATED. Considering that it was established indubitably that the contract of mortgage sued upon was entered into and signed by impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. On 14 August 1991. which bank deposits the bank should guard against loss due to negligence or bad faith.C. Stated differently. 1982. -Consequently. the Petition is GRANTED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals.78 - prof. CV No. It is worthy to note that not even a single identification card was exhibited by the said impostors to show their true identity. The Decision of Branch 59 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil Case No. The next day. petitioner Osmundo Canlas also wrote the office of Sheriff Maximo O. with the use of subject parcels of land as security. The negligence of respondent bank was magnified by the fact that the previous deed of mortgage (which was used as the basis for checking the genuineness of the signatures of the supposed Canlas spouses) did not bear the tax account number of the spouses. constituted by an impostor is void. Lower court a quo came out with a decision annulling subject deed of mortgage and disposing. the bank acted on their representations simply on the basis of the residence certificates bearing signatures which tended to match the signatures affixed on a previous deed of mortgage to a certain Atty. No pronouncement as to costs. Evidently. and on May 23. The doctrine of last clear chance is applicable. But respondents Maximo C. 1983 the herein petitioners instituted the present case for annulment of deed of real estate mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.C. WON ASB must incur the resulting loss A2010 . casis notwithstanding. or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident. SO ORDERED.TC applied rules on savings account written on the passbook. LC Diaz demanded SolidBank the return of their money. Calapre then deposited in Solidbank. and with the involvement of the same impostors who again introduced themselves as the Canlas spouses.1âwphi1. the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter. to deposit money in Solidbank. LC diaz. Contreras.

A2010 . the pick-up collided with the Tamaraw. the child died.When the passbook is in the possession of Solidbank’s tellers during withdrawals. Iran swerved to the left only to avoid petitioner’s pickup. After completion of the transaction. on August 15. When it was just a few meters away from the Tamaraw. or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss. modification only to damages ENGADA V CA QUISUMBING. It applied the provision on the CC on quasi delicts and found that the requisite elements were present.On November 29. Solidbank’s tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative . or culpa contractual. ISSUES 1.C. Solidbank was in possession of the passbook while it was processing the deposit. there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent. hitting the latter at its right front passenger side. is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.79 - prof.We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case.000 in medical expenses. Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. On board was Sheila Seyan. Petitioner’s acts had put Iran in an emergency situation which forced him to act quickly.C. 1989. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the impostor. Iran swerved to his left but the pick-up also swerved to its right. the bank is liable to its depositor. The Tamaraw passengers allegedly saw from the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pick-up. Diaz was also negligent in entrusting its deposits to its messenger and its messenger in leaving the passbook with the teller. the father of Purita Vestil. Likewise. the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant.July 29. Solidbank failed to discharge this burden. Iran could not be faulted when in his attempt to avoid the pick-up.The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent. .: June 20. is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution. the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so.L. notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent. YES.C. . where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead. There was no clear chance to speak of. SolidBank’s negligence in returning the passbook was the proximate cause.In culpa contractual. 1989 NATURE Petition to reinstate the decision of the Appellate Court. . Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up. It ruled that Solidbank’s negligence was the proximate cause. Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract. casis overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot do so in safety. Its total loss was computed at P80. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital. Ratio It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of STRICT LIABILITY VESTIL V IAC (UY) 179 SCRA 47 CRUZ. Stated differently. who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. The appellate court ruled that while L.C. An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger. the authorized representative of L. Diaz. The impact caused the head and chassis of the Tamaraw to separate from its body. For failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on drivers of vehicles abandoning their lane. unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. Diaz to verify the withdrawal. The Toyota Tamaraw jeepney ended up in the junk heap. but they didn’t) . Solidbank could not escape liability because of the doctrine of “last clear chance. FACTS . Diaz had it called up L. DISPOSITIVE Decision affirmed. Dispositive The appealed decision is AFFIRMED.CA revered. at the same time. petitioner must be held liable. is chargeable with the loss. Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney bound for Iloilo City. Diaz." The following day. Reasoning The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident.torts & damages . 1975: Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda. (they could have presented the teller to whom the passbook was left. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the performance of its contractual obligation to L. ISSUES WON Solidbank was liable HELD . once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract. encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw and headed towards a head-on collision course with it. it swerved to its left. 2003 NATURE Petition for review seeking the reversal of the decision of the CA which affirmed with modification the judgment of the RTC of Iloilo City FACTS .” She was discharged after nine days but was re-admitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva. the registered owner of the Tamaraw. December 6. But what has been shown is the presence of an emergency and the proper application of the emergency rule. . would exonerate the defendant from liability.For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence. Seyan incurred P130. Solidbank had the contractual obligation to return the passbook only to Calapre. the Isuzu pick-up’s right signal light flashed. where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss. the law imposes on Solidbank and its tellers an even higher degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook. he swerved to his left. No convincing proof was adduced by petitioner that Iran could have avoided a head-on collision. WON petitioner’s negligence was the proximate cause of the accident HELD 1.000. Thus. driven by petitioner Rogelio Engada.C. This is a case of culpa contractual. The teller could have called up LC Diaz since the amount being drawn was significant.” Solidbank could have averted the injury suffered by L. 1975. which was already on a head to head position going against Iran’s Tamaraw jeepney immediately before the vehicles collided. at about 1:30 in the afternoon. J. They found that the teller made no inquiry upon the withdrawal of 300k.C.

On the strength of the foregoing testimony.Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine Company in the district of San Francisco del Monte. Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed.Theness developed hydrophobia. A2010 . 14. and second. . the pipes of the hotel were under repair.Theness developed hydrophobia. -Francisco Echevarria. April 25. occupies the ground floor of the hotel and established his "American Bazaar" dedicated to the purchase and sale of articles and merchandise. Reasoning ART. That time. and second. ISSUE WON Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria are liable for damages HELD YES. DINGCONG vs. once or twice weekly. casis -CFI held Francisco Echevarria liable. Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria. the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. since they own the dog that bit her.80 - prof. 1941 NATURE Petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA FACTS -The brothers Loreto and Jose Dingcong rented the house of Emilia Saenz (in Jose Ma.Seven months later. March 6. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants. and acquitted Jose Dingcong. was a complication of rabies . As for the alleged provocation. must also be responsible for the damages caused. there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. Kanaan.61. He failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent these damages. L-47033 AVANCEÑA.R. -Jose Dingcong. Among the hotel's guests is Francisco Echevarria. wetting the articles and merchandise of the "American Bazaar. by his negligence in leaving open the faucet.According to the practice of the company. was a complication of rabies. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility. Respondents’ Comments The dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda. in Manila without notifying the company. .The widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan brought an action to recover from the defendant . -Around 11pm of 19 September 1933. being a co-renter and manager of the hotel. . and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. sentencing him to pay the plaintiffs damages. when retiring to bed. paying P30 a month." causing a loss which the CFI sets at P1. CA reversed and declared Jose Dingcong responsible. 1933 NATURE Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila FACTS . the water run off the pipes and spilled to the ground.089.While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house. DISPOSITION The Court approves the time. carelessly left the faucet open that with only an ordinary basin without drainage." thereafter filed this complaint for damages against Loreto Dingcong.It does not matter that the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. as a result of the dog bites. . .torts & damages The cause of death was certified as bronchopneumonia. which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate. which ultimately caused her death. as a result of the dog bites. G. the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal. Nasri and Michael). on the other hand. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause. . .Judge Jose R. outside of the limits of the City of Manila. . . Petitioners’ Claim The Vestils are liable for the death of Theness. a symptom of rabies. although it may escape or be lost. . despite his power and authority to cause the repair of the pipes.There is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house. if collectors made collections on Sunday they were required to deliver the amount collected to the company the next morning.One Sunday afternoon. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. the hotel guest.Obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. a symptom of rabies. No. IAC found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. with the costs against apellant. caused the water to spill to the ground and wet the articles and merchandise of the plaintiffs. . ISSUE WON the Vestils are liable for the damage caused by the dog." the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter.It appears that Madlangbayan had moved to Teodora Alonso St. -The Kanaans (Halim. with complete possession of the house. Echevarria. 2183. that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia. and that at the time of his death he was returning home after making some collections in San Francisco del Monte. HELD Ratio The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. representing the establishment "American Bazaar. AFABLE V SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY 58 PHIL 14 VICKERS. Leopoldo Madlangbayan while riding a bicycle was run over and fatally injured at the corner of O'Donnel and Zurbaran streets in the City of Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay. and he was supposed to be residing in his district according to the records of the company. alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy. the Uys sued for damages. and occupying room no. 10 of said hotel. . KANAAN 72 Phil. which ultimately caused her death. pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. Basa Street of the City of Iloilo) and established the Central Hotel. that it was a tame animal. pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility. that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia. is liable for being the one who directly. The Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established.

but was on his way home after he had finished his work for the day and had left the territory where he was authorized to take collections for the defendant.12 plus P100 for burial expenses. CC). Discussing this phrase.745. . or furnish or require its agents to use bicycles.Since the complaint is for breach of warranty (under A1561.August 12. Respondents’ Comments: . DISPOSITION The decision appealed from was affirmed. it is apparent that the law which is applicable is Act No. that the defendant company did not require its employees to work on Sunday. and that Act No. Her losses amounted to P200 to P300 a day which later on forced her to close down her business on December 12. and impairs the obligation of the contract between the defendant and Leopoldo Madlangbayan. it appears that the deceased had never notified the defendant corporation of his removal from San Francisco del Monte of Manila. She brought the bottles to the Department of Health office in their region and was informed that the soda samples she sent were adulterated. By the use of these words it was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment. because such an accident does no arise out of and in the course of his employment. casis DAVIDE. . and that the company did not know that he was living in Manila on the day of the accident. XXXII.Because of this. 3428. . .Defendant as special defenses alleged that Leopoldo Madlangbayan at the time that he sustained the injuries resulting in his death was violating an ordinance of the City of Manila which prohibits work on Sunday. 3428. Industrial Board.12 for compensation.Lydia Geronimo was engaged in the business of selling food and drinks to children in the Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen located in Dagupan. If the deceased saw fit to change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make use a bicycle in going back and forth. as amended. JR. . .At the time that he was over by the truck Leopoldo Madlangbayan was not in the pursuance of his employment with the defendant corporation. as amended by Act. Geronimo examined her stock of softdrinks and found that there were indeed fibrous materials in the unopened soda bottles. vs.The trial court however annulled the questioned orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further proceedings in the civil case. the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Mueller Construction Co.These are additional reasons for holding that the accident was not due to and pursuance of the employment of the deceased. Thus the complaint should have been filed within 6 months from the delivery of the thing sold.The trial court ruled in favor of Coca-Cola. 3812 was not approved until December 8.The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and in pursuance of his employment. 3812 to "arising out of and in the course of".Coca-Cola moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and prescription. ISSUE WON the employer is liable to pay the employee’s heirs.745.78 for 208 weeks of P1. 1930 and Act No. . XXXI. he did so at his own risk. . RULING NO. and as a general rule an employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment. .If the deceased had been killed while going from house to house in San Francisco del Monte in the pursuance of his employment. or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment or the result of the nature of such employment. but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's employment of incidental to such employment..The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment". P100 for burial expenses and P1. Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the particular employment are excluded. 3428. . said: The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident.81 - prof.torts & damages corporation under Act No.The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in section 2 of Act No. 1930. According to the CA: “the allegations in the complaint plainly show that it is an action for damages arising from respondent’s act of recklessly and negligently manufacturing adulterated food items intended to be sol for public consumption. and if he made collections on Sunday. place. the plaintiffs would undoubtedly have the right. is unconstitutional and void because it denies the defendant the equal protection of the law. . XXXIII. to recover. Geronimo’s sales plummeted with her regular sales of 10 cases day dwindling to about 2 or 3 cases. prima facie.” It also noted that the availability of an action for breach of warranty does not bar an action for torts in a sale of defective goods. . while the words "in the course of" refer to the time. as the defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to use one. No. 3428 was changed in Act No. stating that the complaint was based on a contract and not a quasidelict because of pre-existing relation between the parties. A2010 . 3812. and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by reason of such employment. . and XXXIV of the Civil Code Procedure and related articles of the Civil Code. and they sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No. his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified. section 23 of which reads as follows: When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident due to in the pursuance of the employment. and his employer is not liable for any injury sustained by him. he did not do so in pursuance of his employment. 1989 . . COCA-COLA BOTTLERS (GERONIMO) 227 SCRA 292 PHILS V CA .As the deceased Leopoldo Madlangbayan was killed on November 16.Furthermore. with the costs against the appellants.Plaintiffs' complaint was subsequently amended. and deprives the Courts of First Instance of their probate jurisdiction over the estate of deceased persons and nullifies Chapters XXIX.In the case at bar the deceased was going from work in his own conveyance. it should have been brought within 6 months from the delivery of the goods. and are descriptive of its character. Petitioners’ Claim: . . . October 18. .She demanded payment of damages from plaintiff Coca-Cola but the latter did not accede to her demands.A group of parents complained that they found fibrous material in the bottles of Coke and Sprite that their children bought from Geronimo’s store. 1989. 3428 fifty per cent of P16.Geronimo alleges that her complaint is one for damages which does not involve an administrative action. 1993 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . XXX. and circumstances under which the accident takes place.

Trendsetter Marketing. and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one party of the enjoyment of the other of his private property. The CA. . b) the invasion is substantial.Tek Hua filed an injunction and an action for nullification of the contracts between Trendsetter and DC Chuan.Cuddy returned the money already paid by Gilchrist days before the delivery date so that he can lease the film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga instead and receive P350 for the film for the same period. ISSUE WON the complaint is founded on a quasi-delict and pursuant to A1146(12). So was able to secure lease agreements from DC Chuan. the same were not rescinded.WON So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference of contract HELD.Under American law. on the death of his grandfather. Instead of vacating the stalls.On the other hand.C. Tek Hua Enterprises with Manuel Tiong as one of the incorporators. and damges are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. or harm which results from injury.Article 1902 of the Civil Code provides that a person who. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of the tortfeasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damage.The vendee’s remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in A1567. they continued on a month to month basis. A2010 . In 1976.Yes. He also prayed for damages against Espejo and Zaldarriaga for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy.In 1989. 1989. hurt. No such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover for the damages suffered. by act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence. 1915 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the CFI FACTS -Cuddy was the owner of the film “Zigomar”. . The lower Court ruled in favor of Tek Hua. The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud in which case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable. on appeal. So Pek Giok. Tiong wrote a letter to So Ping Bun asking him to vacate the four stalls as the same were going to be used by them. ISSUE WON Espejo and Zaldarriaga is liable for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy. The contracts were initially for one year but after expiry of the same.Her cause of action is based on an injury to plaintiff’s right which can be brought within 4 years (based on A1146. .82 - prof. tort or other grounds.In 1991. shall be obliged to pay for the damage done. In the case at bar. They entered into a contract whereby Cuddy leased to Gilchrist the Zigomar” for exhibition in his theatre for a week for P125. CC. the action prescribes in 4 years HELD YES Reasoning . 120554 Quisumbing. DC Chuan sent a letter to Tek Hua advising it of a 25% increase in rent effective September 1. DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed SON PING BUN vs CA (Tek Hua) GR No. A duty which the law on torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others. through its Managing Director So Pek Giok. February 18. the elemts of tort interference are a) existence of a valid contract b) knowledge on the part of the third party of its existence c) interference of the third party is without legal justification or excuse . and as a result petitioner deprived respondent of the latter’s property right. d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under the general negligence rules. The action of Trendsetter in asking DC Chuan to execute the contracts in their favor was unlawful interference.So Ping Bun. . One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with. 1999 NATURE Appeal on certiorari for review of CA decision FACTS . occupied the same stalls under the business name. they not knowing at the time the identity of the parties . petitioner.Appellants have the legal liability for interfering with the contract and causing its breach.Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against Cuddy. the liabilities of the manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on negligence. the lessor.Since there were existing lease contracts between Tek Hua and DC Chuan.torts & damages . upheld the trial court. Tek Hua was dissolved with the original members forming a new corporation.Damage is the loss.In 1963. Enclosed in both letters were new lease contracts for signing. Tek hua Trading. While the letters contained a statement that the leases will be terminated if the contracts were not signed. 1990 was implemented. . Reasoning. . September 21. casis . . DISPOSITION The instant petition is denied for lack of merit. Gilchrist was the owner of a theatre in Iloilo. ISSUE . Chuan covering four stalls in Binondo. A further rent increase of 30% effective January 1. GILCHRIST v CUDDY 29 Phil 542 TRENT. Espejo and Zaldarriaga. CC). Tek Hua in fact had property rights over the leased stalls. HELD YES . Both the trial court and the CA awarded legal fees only. . entered into a lease agreement with D. Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to execute lease contracts in its favor. c) the defendant’s conduct is a legal cause of the invasion. This liability arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. breach of warranty.

. . bridges. It was reduced to Pesos 100.City Engineer of Dagupan Alfredo Tangco admitted that the manhole is owned by the National Government and the sidewalk on which they are found along Perez Blvd. public buildings. the judge of the CFI rendered judgment in favor of petitioner.After hearing the evidence adduced during trial. Provinces. - The charter only lays down general rules regulating that liability of the city. It stated that it is sufficient that the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives to conclude that So was not a malicious interferer. 1989 Nature: Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of CA Facts: . In this casse. found the award exorbitant. She has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter (at the time of filing of complaint) and thus lost income.Police confirmed existence of the manhole. holding all the defendants (except for Reyes. . . editors and administrators of a certain newspaper known as “El Renacimiento” or “Muling Pagsilang”) for the purpose of recovering damages resulting from an alleged libelous publication. The trial court should not have rounded off the amount. member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior of the Insular Government commenced an action against defendants Ocampo. Santos. . He said that he supervises the maintenance of said manholes and sees to it that they are properly covered. and a vampire that sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless. She also lost weight. . moral and exemplary damages.Award of P7420 as lost income for one year. directors. . conjecture or guess work as to the amount. Her right leg was fractured. Aguilar and Liquete who were found to be editors but in a subordinate position and found to have merely acted under the direction of their superiors) liable jointly and severally for sustained damages on account of petitioner’s wounded feelings. The Court ratiocinated that the recovery of legal fees is in the concept of actual or compensatory damages as provided in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.000. due to defendant’s action of interference. Arellano.” On Damages awarded .The SC handled the question of whether the interference may be justified considering that So acted solely for the purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest. On the other hand. any person by reason of the defective condition of roads. mental suffering and injuries to his standing and reputation in the sum of P35. Held YES .City contends that Perez Blvd is a national road that is not under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan.Exemplary damages of P50000 reduced to P10000. Moreover. . public buildings and other public works. Aguilar. and the job is specifically done by his subordinates. 1978. Florentina Guilatco. . CA reversed the lower court’s ruling on the ground that no evidence was presented to prove that City of Dagupan had control or supervision over Perez Blvd. Feb. a court interpreter. Liquete.The provision in the Civil Code with regard tortuous interference is Article 1314 which states that “ any third party who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party”. Barretto and Cansipit (owners. GUILATCO v CITY OF DAGUPAN 171 SCRA 382 SARMIENTO. plus P450 bonus remain the same . are also owned by the National Government. plaintiff was forced to seek relief through the Court snd thereby incur expenses to protect his interests. city or municipality for liability to attach. . no liability should attach to the city. streets. Reyes.The liability of private corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows: Article 2189. due to which she was hospitalized. and she is no longer her former jovial self.000 as well as P25. and confined. Guilatco’s handicap was not permanent and disabled her only during her treatment which lasted for one year. Hence the lack of malice precludes the award of damages. cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of. Palma. and that she has difficulty in locomotion. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. The court can not rely on “speculation.Trial court ordered the city to pay Guilatco actual.Plaintiff Dean Worcester. operated on. plus attorney’s fees.Moral damages of P150000 is excessive and is reduced to P20000. The Court. Lichauco. article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from “defective streets.The editorial “Birds of Prey” was alleged to have incited the Filipino people into believing that plaintiff was a vile despot and a corrupt person. control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer. which was partially covered by a concrete flower pot by leaving a gaping hole about 2 ft long by 1 ½ feet wide or 42 cm wide by 75 cm long by 150 cm deep. or injuries suffered by.00 Disposition – Petition denied. The said editorial alluded to him as an eagle that surprises and devours. Kalaw.83 - prof.She averred that she suffered mental and physical pain. casis . Jose. writers. Hence. and other activities which she used to do prior to the incident. an owl that affects a petulant omniscience. . unworthy of the position which he held.P3000 as attorney’s fees remain the same Disposition Petition granted.000 as punitive damages. CA decision reversed and set aside.Actual damages of P10000 reduced to proven expenses of P8053.on July 25. accidentally fell into a manhole while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk at Perez Blvd. a vulture that gorges himself on dead and rotten meat. and other public works under their control or supervision. 27. Issue WON control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists. . PERSONS LIABLE WORCESTER v OCAMPO 22 PHIL 42 Johnson. Nothing on the record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on the part of So.torts & damages . in effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with article 2189 CC.It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province. Mar 21. CA decision affirmed subject to the modified award of attorney’s fees.In this case. social.65. decision of trial court reinstated with modification. A2010 . 1912 NATURE Appeal from judgment of CFI FACTS . she has been unable to perform her religious. however. .

nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as compared with that of the others.J. C. The person injured may sue all of them. explicitly stated that the other so-called founders subscribed and paid sums of money to aid the paper but as to Lichauco. Under the common law. after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom. seeing that he could not reach it without extra exertion. Disposition Judgment of the lower court modified. for the purpose of founding. Kalaw. March 28. The car which the plaintiff intended to board was on the main line and bound in an opposite direction to that in which the defendant was going. The car was a closed one. regardless of their participation in the commission of the actual tort.The courts during the trial may find that some of the alleged joint tortfeasors are liable and that others are A2010 . and without not liable. It is incomprehensible how one could claim the right or title to share the earnings or profits of a company when he had put no capital into it. They are each liable as principals. nor were they owners or proprietors of the newspaper. Being told by his friend that the car was approaching. Barretto. Reasoning Defendants fail to recognize that the basis of the present action is a tort. has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly. because tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual. [concurring] . As recognized by Section 6 of Act 277 of the Philippine Commission: “Every author. may be held jointly and severally liable as joint tortfeasors HELD YES.We concur. Santos absolved from any liability. it is improper to deduce that the contributors formed a company of either a civil or commercial nature.84 - prof. promote. passed into the street for the purpose of signaling and boarding the car. Plaintiff attempted to board the front platform but. the entrance being from the front or the rear platform. **note: Ponente used examples of torts as held under common law** (In a case of assault and battery committed by various persons. Jose. by a sudden act of negligence. A street car bound from Manila to Sta. stopped beside the car. desired to board a certain "San Marcelino" car coming from Sta. Therefore they can not incur. countenance. he immediately. editor. Ratio An owner who sits in his automobile or other vehicle. . or who approve of it after it is done. if done for their benefit. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tortfeasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates. Ana and bound for Manila. neither is it comprehensible how one could share in the losses thereof. And this is true even though they are charged jointly and severally. . the donors ceased to be the owners of and surrendered all right to the money donated and to the objects that were acquired therewith. Ocampo. except with reference to the liability imposed upon Lichauco. in this case. and MAPA. and still less incur liability for damages on account of some act of the said company. and issuing the said newspaper. jointly and severally with the director and manager. to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. ARELLANO. he followed along behind it. or any number less than all.After Ocampo had accepted the various amounts proffered. under the common law. was as much a principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual tort. but did not carry out his offer and in fact paid nothing. casis MORELAND. he offered to contribute. Barretto. . Each is liable for the whole damage caused by all. 1914 NATURE Appeal from the judgment of trial court finding for the defendant FACTS . with occasional switches to allow cars to meet and pass each other). or assists in any way the commission of a wrong. Ana being immediately in front of him. and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts. While in this position he was struck from behind and run over by the defendant's (Underwood) automobile. Palma.that is. its press or other equipment. On the other hand. It is no defense for one sued alone. Lichauco.The defendant entered Calle Herran at Calle Peñafrancia in his automobile driven by his chauffeur. went off the main line to the left upon the switch lying alongside of the main track. Chapman. Lichauco. but dissent as regards Palma.Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. and altogether jointly liable for the whole damage. Just before reaching the scene of the accident the street car which was following took the switch (there was a single-track street-car line running along Calle Herran. as fully as if he were the author of the same.The judgment of the trial court was for defendant. When the front of the "San Marcelino" car was almost in front of the defendant's automobile. committed no error in rendering a joint and several judgment against the defendants. The real owner and founder. Thereupon the defendant either kept straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to the right. and waited for it to come abreast of him in order to board. CHAPMAN V UNDERWOOD 27 Phil 374 . the plaintiff or person injured. and Cansipit held jointly and severally liable for the sum of P25. as though he were a regular general partner when he was not such. encourage.torts & damages . The courts may release some for lack of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort. So also is the person who counsels. HELD NO. ISSUE WON Underwood is responsible for the negligence of his driver. It is not necessary that the cooperation should be a direct. as they were. TORRES [dissenting in part] . 000 with interest at 6%.This judgment prompted defendants to appeal to the SC. They might have sued jointly and severally. The defendants might have been sued separately for the commission of the tort. ***If several persons jointly commit a tort. Ocampo. if the driver. J. becomes himself responsible for such acts. that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants. corporeal act. defendant's driver suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the plaintiff. . editing. Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit.I concur in regard to the defendants Ocampo and Kalaw. instigate. Arellano. cooperate in.The plaintiff-appellant. but is also jointly liable with his tortfeasors. an unrestricted liability to the extent of all his property. in any way the commission of a crime. facing toward the rear platform. as a genuine gift. Arellano. the lower court. and Cansipit for they had neither direct nor indirect participation in the act that gave rise to the present suit for damages. or proprietor * * * is chargeable with the publication of any words in any part * * * or number of each newspaper. Jose. and somewhat hurriedly. assisted or counseled. a competent driver. claiming that the CFI committed several errors in rendering said judgment among which was that the lower court committed an error in rendering a judgment jointly and severally against the defendants. advise. he who aided. However. or one of them separately. Ratio Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command. . ISSUE WON the defendants. all are principals). aid or abet the commission of a tort. They were donors who merely contributed a sum of money. aids.

is not responsible. . although present herein at5 the time the act was committed.1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant would be responsible. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro's son. The test of his intelligence. The act complained of must be continued in the presence or the owner for such a length of time that the owner by his acquiescence. the owner of the automobile. Reasoning Defendant's driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and over the plaintiff. Bernardo. Caedo and three daughters.85 - prof. unless the negligent act of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. as it must have been in the beam of his headlights for a considerable while. On his part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane. injures a person or violates the criminal law. that is. was a caretella owned by a certain Pedro Bautista. instead of slowing down or stopping altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear. There was no reason for Yu to be specially alert. No negligence of having employed him maybe imputed to his master. With them in the car were Mrs.No negligence can be imputed. The carretela was provided with two lights.in the case of Johnson vs. decided to take a gamble — beat the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with the carretela. Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. he decided to overtake it even though he had already seen the No. with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel. wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane. and the risk should have been quite obvious.Negligence on the employer’s part.Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from his home in Quezon City to the airport. considering the condition of the road and the absence of traffic — the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour. L-20392 MAKALINTAL. absent a minimum level imposed by law. and they should have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary precautions. . makes his driver’s act his own. the same rule applies where the owner is present. He was driving the latter’s Cadillac along highway 54. December 18. Ahead of the Cadillac. A2010 . L-20392 MAKALINTAL. David. .In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the opposite direction.The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle.it appears with fair clearness that the interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver. . . and the Cadillac at approximately 48 to 56 kilometers. This is the first clear indication of his negligence. Caedo was driving his Mercury car.Bernardo is the driver of Yu Khe Thai. He had reason to rely on the skill of his driver. as he claimed later on at the trial. The road was wide and open. casis Decision modified. . As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel. either civilly or criminally. He was passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side. . 1968 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CFI of Iloilo FACTS . The car was running at a reasonable speed. one on each side. a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another DISPOSITIVE . ISSUES WON Yu Khe Thai should be held solidarily liable as Bernardo’s employer HELD CAEDO V YU KHE THAI GR NO. however. he slackened his speed. as they were the only ones under the law permitted to pass upon that side of the street car. Bernardo. CAEDO v. . 1968 FACTS . the driver does not fall within the list of persons in Art. must be sought in the immediate setting.The Caedos were injured.The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds. And even if he did not notice the lights. On the other side of the road.Bernardo had no record of any traffic violation. going in the same direction. YU KHE THAI GR No. the carretela should anyway have been visible to him from afar if he had been careful. They filed a suit for recovery of damages against Bernardo and Yu Khe Thai. When he approached the carritela. in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it.Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of him. judged the distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the Cadillac would wait behind.torts & damages the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance. is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. The CFI ruled in favor of the Caedos and held Bernardo and Yu solidarily liable. DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is affirmed. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai.. . . He was with his family.The plaintiff needed only to watch for cars coming from his right. And as far as perception is concerned. only eight meters away. wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane. or else squeeze in between them in any case. veered to the left in order to pass. December 18. taking the owner from his Parañaque home to Wack Wack. therefore. where his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel. Yu Khe Thai is free from liability car of the Caedos’ approaching from the opposite lane.A carretela was in front of the Cadillac. within the meaning of Article 2184. Bernardo did not see the carretela from afar. if any. It was a risky maneuver either way. . where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. Julian Bautista. Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not present at the time the alleged negligent acts were committed by the driver. .

Sabina Exconde.12 12 The case involves an interpretation of Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code. Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperiña. the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO G.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperiña. Negligence on the part of the latter. and. Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperiña. with other students. if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him. and is otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo. The father. ISSUE 1. supervision and custody of the latter. as a consequence. tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to the right. This . the former was not under the control. to a great degree. boarded a jeep and when the same started to run. caught the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose. He only came to know it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher. if any. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. If the causative factor was the driver's negligence. DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from liability. the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. died as a consequence. with costs against the latter." car owners who. confronted with the unexpected situation. and so he had to swerve to the left in spite of the presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane. Its rear bumper. xxx xxx xxx Finally. for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno. 2. plaintiff contends. and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed. (school’s liability versus parental liability) which provides: "ART. The photographs taken at the scene show that the right wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at the moment of impact. There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that he must be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs.It was already too late to apply the brakes when Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front of him. RULING YES. would be effectively proscribed. And as far as perception is concerned. in case of his death or incapacity. . that is. 1957 BAUTISTA ANGELO. ISSUE Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable. . Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness. The car was not running at an unreasonable speed. father of Dante.The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. defendant Yu Khe Thai. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. the clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side was insufficient. within the meaning of Article 2184. J. must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident. NO. 1903. he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident. L-10068-70 June 29. but was unsuccessful. the mother. As it was. was accused of double homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperiña and Amado Ticzon on March 31. was not with his son at the time of the accident. he was a minor and was then living with his father. Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged and. The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions. Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question jointly and severally with his son Dante because at the time the latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim. casis defense was sustained by the lower court and. The road was wide and open. YES. are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them. but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible. is solidarily liable with him. a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. From the school Dante. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. the lower court erred in relieving the father from liability. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant. It further appears that Delfin Capuno.The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is. have real need of drivers' services. SABINA EXCONDE vs. necessarily subjective. employment of professional drivers by A2010 . absent a minimum level imposed by law. by -their very inadequacies. on appeal. It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the Balintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31. If YES.The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the complaint. is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. nor did he know that his son was going to attend a parade. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers. Dante Capuno was only fifteen (15) years old when he committed the crime. 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers.R. teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master. No.Rafael Bernardo had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. HELD 1. Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of P2. In line with her reservation. . he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. From this decision. During the trial. Caedo. plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals but the case was certified to the Supreme Court on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of law. 2. 1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr. WON defendant Rafael Bernardo is liable for the accident. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert.: FACTS Dante Capuno. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. jointly and severally with his son Dante. And so. The test of his intelligence.959.86 - prof. the civil liability of the father is evident. son of Delfin Capuno. as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperiña. and devoid of traffic that early morning. paragraph 1 and 5. WON his employer. After trial. reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages against the accused.torts & damages . as already stated. . reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.

it would seem clear that where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher. should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody. 1903 of the old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. et al. In the circumstances. Spanish Civil Code). the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff. and not the parent. is obvious. for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them. Spanish Civil Code). educating them in proportion to their means". In an earlier case (Exconde vs. he attended the parade in honor of Dr. while on the other hand.. They had a quarrel that lead to Pepito’s injury. could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an institution of arts and trades as provided for by law. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them. nor the city school's supervisor. Facts: Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas. while. No. were both 13 years old. I believe we should affirm the judgment relieving the father of liability. J. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority. 1903. WHICH WAS LATER MODIFIED BY J CRUZ IN AMADORA VS. gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155. The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Art. keeping them in their company. jointly and severally. 2180 of the Civil Code. on September 16. and that there being no fault or negligence on the part of petitioner-appellant's minor son.87 - prof.torts & damages RATIO Parents shall be liable for the tortious conduct of their minor children living with them although at the time of the tort. This. J. Spanish Civil Code). the children were under the direct control or supervision of an academic institution. casis to Pepito Cadano. the mother. this tribunal gave the following reasons for the rule: — The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and. (THIS IS A LANDMARK DOCTRINE. the father of the minor who caused the injuries . for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. 1903 of the old Civil Code. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. 1903 and the burden of proof shifted to the claimant to show actual negligence on the part of the parent in order to render him liable. and which he had every right to assume the school authorities would avoid. defendants failed to prove. keeping them in their company. the father has rebutted the presumption of Art. CADANO Nature: Appeal from the Decision of the Trial Court making defendant therein. prom. but deliberate intent. What substantial difference is there between them in so far as concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons. the sum of P2. If. the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. arising from the criminal act committed by the latter. The civil liability which the law impose upon the father. the words "arts and trades" does not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of establishments". holding the defendants jointly and severally liable with his minor son Dante for damages. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them. Mary's High School. etc. REYES. submits that the appellate Court erred in holding him liable for damages for the deliberate criminal act of his minor son. 2 of Art. concur. in case of his death or incapacity. gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Arts. I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. the above mentioned articles are not applicable. BALCE FUELLAS V. teachers. In my opinion. Appellant. as conceded by all commentators. Wherefore. also a minor. that according to the last article. the petitioner-appellant was ordered to pay damages for the deliberate injury caused by his son. the latter. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents. in case of his death or incapacity.. Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular activity. 2180 of the new Civil Code for damages. there can be no responsibility. in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades" used in Art. dissenting: A2010 . for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them. so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and supervision over the pupil. The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article 1903.. that the said court held the petitioner liable pursuant to par. the accident occurred. and. for the existence of deliberate intent in the commission of an act negatives the presence of fault or negligence in its commission. L-10132. This defendants failed to prove. June 29. it is clear that neither the head of that school. only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution.R. JJ. the mother. last paragraph. and the costs of action.. 1957). SALEN V. therefore. 1954. They were classmates at St. is obvious.B.959.. 2176 of the same Code. The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms "preceptores y artesanos" used in the Italian and French Civil Codes. now appellant Agapito Fuellas.00 as damages. Capuno. Padilla and Reyes. G. liable under Art. last paragraph. educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means". And if there is no authority. I submit that the father should not be held liable for a tort that he was in no way able to prevent. Issue: WON the father is liable civilly for the criminal act of his son? Held: Yes. Having proved that he entrusted his child to the custody of school authorities that were competent to exercise vigilance over him. COURT OF APPEALS) REASONING The provision “Teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody". in connection with Art. 134 and 135. the act of the minor must be one wherein "fault or negligence" is present. Dansalan City. And it was in connection with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it. his right arm was broken after Rico pushed him on the ground. Spanish Civil Code).L. It is contended that in the decision of the Court of Appeals. A. on the other hand. son of defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas.

as may be gleaned from some recent A2010 . the youth Bonifacio was in incompetent chauffeur. the owner of an automobile. in case of his death or incapacity. but the mother.torts & damages In another case. for physical injuries suffered as a result of an automobile accident. casis father alone and not the minor or the mother. the speed in operating the machine. resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil Code. The automobile was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez. on approaching the bridge and the truck. with neither being willing to slow up and give the right of way to the other. the judgment appealed from will be modified. This is because a son who commits the act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12. The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco. September 23. any discussion as to the minor's criminal responsibility is of no moment. Issue: 1. would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son. below 18 years of age who was living with him. namely. would be liable for the damages caused by the minor. the owner of the truck. the void apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code.000. to recover damages in the amount of P10. 2180 of the new Civil Code. 101 of the Revised Penal Code. who maintains it for the general use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children. together will several other members of the Gutierrez family. Gumersindo was found guilty of homicide for having killed Carlos Salen. for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted. In that case.88 - prof. the decision appealed from is affirmed GUTIERREZ VS GUTIERREZ MALCOLM. whom he designates or permits to run it. so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and servant. stating that the civil liability of the minor son of defendant arising from his criminal liability must be determined under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and not under Art. Yes. The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180. Moreover. driving a gokart. Narcisso Gutierrez blames both the bus and the car while the truck blames the car and the car in turn blames the truck. a lad 18 years of age. who acts without discernment. and Mrs. that he was driving at an excessive rate of speed. independently of the criminal case. were accommodated therein. WON the father of Bonifacio (car) is liable. And responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the action in the present case was instituted. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case. But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability. no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. The theory of the law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of the owner's business.000. and was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother. Narcisso Gutierrez was a passenger of the bus. 1985 NATURE: Petition to review a decision of CA FACTS: Roberto Luna. for the sum of P5. The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his son. Salen and Salbanera vs. Based on these facts. and the plaintiff will have judgment in his favor against the defendants Manuel Gutierrez. Manuel Gutierrez. Revised Penal Code). under 9 years of age. minor son of plaintiffs. RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA) 135 SCRA 242 ABAD SANTOS. and . an insane. 2177). the petition is dismissed. the father was not in the car. unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. and the lack of care employed by the chauffeur. Mr. with the inevitable result of a collision and an accident decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical cases. But. 1931 Nature: an action brought by the plaintiff in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the five defendants. In reversing the decision. the pertinent portion of which provides: "The father and. The reason for this conclusion reaches to the findings of the trial court concerning the position of the truck on the bridge. subdivisions 1. 2 and 3. the mother. the defendant Balce was the father of a minor Gumersindo Balce. Facts: A passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the municipality of Las Piñas. Jose Balce. is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault of negligence under the Penal Code (Art. The liability of Saturnino Cortez. He had a fracture on his right leg. Abelardo Velasco. was killed in a vehicular collision (between Luna. that of contract. the case is one of two drivers approaching a narrow bridge from opposite directions. a father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile. The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority or control. 2. and the costs of both instances. In the United States. At the time of the collision. it is uniformly held that the head of a house. It was conceded that the collision was caused by negligence pure and simple. and Saturnino Cortez. jointly and severally. IN VIEW HEREOF. In its broader aspects. and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore stated. and was owned by Saturnino Cortez. Verily. or over 9 but under 15 years of age. the 2. Disposition In consonance with the foregoing rulings. February 28." To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses. and of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on a different basis. Yes. Province of Rizal. he lost his head and so contributed by his negligence to the accident. and that. the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of the evidence submitted therein by both parties. a businessman. are responsible for damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. where the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the owner's family than the child driving it. WON the owner of the truck is liable. pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code. seven in all. Held: 1. this tribunal held: — It is true that under Art.

and atty’s fees of P50.CFI Cebu: Gotiongs filed civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter's vicarious liability under A2180 CC. but since the son had attained majority.January 14. YES Ratio: The reduction of the award of net unearned earnings had no basis. CA erred in ruling that the engagement with car racing reduced the life expectancy.000 for loss of his companionship (come on!!). However.” thus lowering the life expectancy to only 10 years. Malou Alfonso .000 compensatory damages. Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend. He has no assets of his own as yet”). Also.000. To this contention. A2010 . with legal interest from date of the decision. while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi.Julie and Wendell died from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm licensed under Cresencio Libi. at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from which she died on January 14.000 personal expenses). the CA modified the decision. ISSUES: 1. However. must have caused Wendell's death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification . Luna's social standing’ [a statement which lacks complete basis]. awarding P1. The Dela Rosas failed to pay the amounts. 13 years old. low powered vehicles. due to the escalating gasoline expenses. the liability of Atty. driving a Toyota car without a license) at a gokart practice area. . whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU). In the meantime. and who also died in the same event on the same date. the court is “unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law because to do so will not serve the ends of justice. The Dela Rosas now invoke that the father should also be held only subsidiarily. and 15 years after the process of litigation is still not over).” Disposition: resolution of CA SET ASIDE. father of Wendell . reinstating the earlier decision with slight modification regarding the award of atty’s fees. Heirs of Luna brought a suit for damages against Luis and his father. the SC came out with a resolution ordering the Dela Rosas. P50.both set of parents came up with versions of the story Gotiongs: > Wendell caused her death by shooting her and thereafter turning the gun on himself to commit suicide Libis: > an unknown third party. interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the court.000 (no interest mentioned). Pending the decision. FACTS . In a MFR filed by the Dela Rosas. Both parties filed separate petitions for review in the SC.IAC: CFI decision set aside and found Libis subsidiarily liable ISSUE WON A2180 CC is applicable in making Libi’s liable for vicarious liability .000 as unearned net earnings of Luna. 1978 when Julie Ann broke up with Wendell after she found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. RTC considered the various positions the deceased held at the time of his death. which the CFI ruled in favor of the Lunas. Hill nothwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of his son.000.000 for unearned net earnings.650.1992 NATURE Petition for review of the Intermediate Appellate Court. and that the award for atty’s fees should include legal interest.000 gross income less P20.000. RTC considered the age and health of the deceased. thus is void. all with legal interest. WON the award for atty’s fees should have legal interest HELD: 1. then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents.) Obiter: The Dela Rosas invoke the ruling in Elcano v Hilll.) The Dela Rosas appealed in the CA. 1979 . CFI dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of the evidence. Luis is already of age. . P12.000 compensatory damages. married. Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December. he has no property in the Phils or elsewhere.January. to pay the Lunas P450. prompting him to resort to threats against her. with 2 kids. YES Ratio: The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and under the circumstances. (Note: father and son solidarily liable for damages. where the court held that A2180 applied to Atty.” Also. It was error on the part of the CA to have disturbed the determination of the RTC which it had previously affirmed. and living in Spain but only causally employed (“His compensation is hardly enough to support his family. “That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low slung. There is nothing on record that supports the claim that the car racing was a dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy. The instant petition is the one filed by Lunas. “It stands to reason that if his annual personal expenses should increase because of the ‘escalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R. casis LIBI V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SPS GOTIONG) 214 SCRA 16 REGALADO. the CA increased the annual personal expenses to P30. which affirmed in toto the RTC.000. and the trend of his earnings over the span of his last few years. . it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would also increase considering the manifold sources thereof” 2. Cebu City.000 (P75. (The atty’s fees should accrue interest from the date of filing of the compliant. this time reducing the unearned income to P450. WON the CA erred in reducing the unearned income 2.More than 2 years before their deaths. and P50. thus coming up with a potential gross income of P75.89 - prof. In order to avoid him. only slightly larger than foot-pedaled four wheeled conveyances. as a matter of equity. saying that they had no cash money. September 18. In coming out with the life expectancy. Luis is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine Courts.respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who. in the interest of justice (since the death took place in 1970.1979. thus lowering the net annual unearned income to P45. Reasoning: the RTC based its computation of the net unearned earnings on 2 factors: life expectancy of the deceased of another 30 years. within 30 days. Petition of the Dela Rosas was denied for lack of merit. the CA modified this by factoring in the “engagement of Luna in car racing. decision of the then WRT to the gross income.000. P12. The writ of execution produced only a nominal amount. contending that the CA erred in reducing the award for unearned income. and an annual net income of P55.1979 . was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos. Hill became merely subsidiarily to that of his son. and attorney’s fees of P50.Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the Julie refused. it was an error to increase the expenses without increasing the gross income.torts & damages Luis dela Rosa.000 for loss of companionship.

Reasoning .The principle of parental liability is designated as vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed liability under the Anglo-American tort law. Quisumbing. The adopting parents had no actual or physical custody of Adelberto at the time of the incident as they were then in the US were they live. He was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide but was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability ob the ground that he had acted without discernment. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their son. . however.On October 20. Disposition – Petition granted. Jr. Adelberto Bundoc. + for civil liability from crimes committed by minors under the legal authority and control or who live in the company of the parents: PRIMARY = premised on A101 RPC fot damages ex delicto by kids 9 or under or 9-15 but without discernment = premised on A2180 CC for kids 9-15 with discernment or 15-21 (now 18) + liability effected against father or mother? BOTH PARENTS AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE PARENTAL AUHTORITY OVER THE MINOR = youth welfare code = FC: responsibility of parents + for civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors: same rules in A2180 and A2182 Disposition Instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED TAMARGO vs CA (Rubio. Reasoning.BUT Liability is not subsidiary BUT primary > if the liability of the parents for crimes and QDs of their minor children is subsidiary. Therefore. COURT OF APPEALS AND QUISUMBING L-14342 LABRADOR. they they can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damages. shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death.90 - prof. and disciplining of the child. She admitted. However. The SC however decided to hear the appeal based on substantial justice.WON the spouses Bundoc were indispensable party to the tort action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. . ISSUE . then aged ten. The trial Court agreed with the respondents and dismissed the complaint. a person is not only liable for torts committed by him also torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsibility. while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible… The father and. LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR QDS OF THEIR MINOR KIDS AS CONTEMPLATED IN A2180 ID PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY > applying A2194 (solidary liability of joint tortfeasors) the parent is also solidarily liable with the child. that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not as the body was cleaned already in the funeral parlor . Article 2180 reads “ the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions. They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. and in keeping said gun from his reach. testified that her husband. THE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR FELONIES IS LIKEWISE PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY. accordingly.torts & damages HELD YES Ratio The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists. Mercado. the provision of Article 2180 would be applicable. It should be emphasized. however. We. casis parents at the time the shooting incident occurred.A2180': The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by A2180 CC covers obligations wising from both quasidelicts and criminal offenses. 1992 NATURE Appeal for review of CA decision FACTS . under this doctrine. 1960 NATURE This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . the mother are responsible for the damages caused by the children who live in their company… The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. To do so and hold them liable for the tortious act when be unfair and unconscionable. Decision set aside.Amelita Libi. Wendell. of the instruction and supervision of the child. The adopting and natural parents of Jennifer filed a civil complaint for damages against the parents of Bundoc. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was. HENCE. Thus parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of the parents which include the instructing.The parents of Adelberto claimed that they are not the indispensable party in the action as their son adopted by the spouses Rapisura on November 18. May 30. mother of Wendell.undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita's key is always in her bag. The presumption under law is that when a child under their care commits a tortuous act the parents were negligent in the performance of these duties and responsibilities.The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him under Article 2176. appellants are liable under A2180 CC. 1982.' . incase of his death or incapacity. Thus. is the son of his co-plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L. The Court held that parental authority did not retroactively transfer to and vested in the adopting MERCADO v. that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box.Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing. the diligence would constitute a valid substantial defense. controlling. Cresencio Libi.The case contained procedural questions which were raised in the appeal. because of his minority. Bundoc) 209 SCRA 518 Feliciano.Yes. all of which facts were known to Wendell. sufficient proof can be presented to overcome this presumption. . But if the liability id direct and primary. HELD. they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. As stated. 1982 via an adoption decree granted by the CFI of Ilocos Sur. J. to a large extent. A101 RPC SAYS SO > RULES: A2010 . Manuel . .

1956. Reasoning . casis the class to which the deceased belonged. Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing. was A2010 . at the time when the incident occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute.The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's dictum in Mercado vs. Valenton and Quibulue. the president thereof. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. (Art. It is true that occasioned by the fact that Manuel. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. 2. respectively) Ratio The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students. and Virgilio L.A "pitogo". they. Quibulue. Palisoc became pale and fainted. Quezon City. .Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar. quarrelled over a "pitogo". was shown to have existed. therefore. 2180. but lately. At that time the classes were in recess.. HELD a. and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon. so he was immediately taken to a hospital. . direction and influence. that "(I)t would seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody. nor does paragraph 2 of said article. on the right cheek with a piece of razor. On February 22. in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. which motivated the assault. within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219. may be described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank. such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated. the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived.” ISSUE WON the school officials are jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors with Daffon. the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over. Court of Appeals. defendant Virgilio L." contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher. . Daffon. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students. in retaliation. of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries. NO. the grant of moral damages is not justified. and one afternoon. this article(art." It is. Daffon. It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty. upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should be made liable. Teodosio Valenton. absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute.torts & damages Quisumbing. Jr. Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them. apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy. a fellow student of the deceased. 2179. is that they stand.. Jr. ." contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher. Jr. in this wise: “In the opinion of the Court.It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody. . . Brillantes. and hence. YES (head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute.Defendants were: Antonio C. yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augusto's resentment. BRILLANTES 41 SCRA 548 TEEHANKEE.There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the school. 1971 NATURE An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the CFI Manila. but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. finally he died. as to their pupils and students. gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face. which authorizes the grant of moral damages.At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship. instructor of . . teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices.Palisoc spouses as parents of their 16-year old son. Dominador Palisoc. Santiago M..91 - prof. such that the control. WON the moral damages fixed at P2." In the law of torts. . and a student in automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute filed the action below for damages arising from the death of their son at the hands of a fellow student. and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. we find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.2180) of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar. it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school. direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. . HELD 1. Jr. so long as they remain in their custody. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply. at the laboratory room of the said Institute.The clause "so long as they remain in their custody" contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher.. Consequently.the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Daffon. which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach. YES. As a result.The trial court. is as follows: ART. which figures prominently in this case. together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. since this contemplates the situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parents. so long as they remain in their custody. October 4.) After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals. Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages. . Augusto wounded Manuel. PALISOC VS. such that the control. to a certain extent. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows. FACTS . Civil Code. including recess time. which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher.000 are excessive. He never regained consciousness. . The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get "his pitogo from Renato. Lastly. Daffon were classmates. it was duly incorporated. ISSUES 1. WON the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the of the father since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time) 2.the deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. however.

Basis of teacher’s vicarious liability is. said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability.At any rate. Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools. . the teacher is physically present and in a position to prevent it. NO (Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of directors and the school) itself cannot be held similarly liable. J. Civil Code. Teachers are liable for acts of their student except where the school is technical in nature (arts and trade establishment) in which case the head thereof shall be answerable.00 for actual and compensatory expenses. whether the semester has not ended. dissenting: .Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority. the school may be held to answer for the acts of its teacher or the head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior. “x x x x The distinction no longer obtains at present.00 for moral. damages. or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils or students in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned.000. Such defense they had taken necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of and thus be exonerated from liability imposed by Art 2180. academic or non-academic. Further. must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision. The fact that it has not done so indicates an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age. It is natural to expect that if the law had intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of persons enumerated in the article. (d) P10.. REYES. as such.. to hold their teachers and/or the administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts committed by them. Brillantes from the complaint..L.00 for attorney's fee. April 15. and 3. 1988 Facts: . that while in the case of parents and guardians. ISSUE: WON Art 2180 is applicable. The term “custody” signifies that the student is within the control and influence of the school authorities.torts & damages under the law abovequoted. for injuries caused by the student.375. and the dicta in Mercado on which it relied.000.It would demand responsibility without commensurate authority. x x x “ The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises. absolving defendant Antonio C. as well as the temper. since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant . or has ended or has not yet begun." Note that for parental responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their company. as in the case of the parents and of the guardians. the article expressly so provides. their authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age. Court of Appeals. DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows: . the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him. Thus. hewas shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon.000.B. and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer minors.phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school. principal. Sentencing the Daffon.." In the light of the factual findings of the lower court's decision.one other factor constrains me to dissent.00 for loss of earning power and (e) P2. the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability. it would have expressly so stated. rendering teachers and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control. In any event. attitudes and often destructive activism of the students. Valenton and Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P12. . (c) P5. J.000. teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. casis It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to graduate at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school. should have been brought in as party defendant. as thus incorporated. A2010 . dismissing defendants' counterclaims. but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution" . The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the student under their control and supervision.. AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLLETOS) 160 SCRA 315 CRUZ. academic and non-academic. it is not without significance that .it stands to reason that (1) the clause "so long as they remain in their custody" as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase "who live in their company" as used in reference to parents. including recess time. plus the costs of this action in both instances. since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident. Held: Yes. the parents of the student at fault. The opinion of the majority states: "Here. defendant Daffon.finally. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury. “There is really no substantial difference distinction between the academic and non-academic schools in so far as torts committed by their students are concerned. are not involved. (b) P3. they acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents). in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180. b.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc.I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v. as erroneously held by the lower court. . MAKALINTAL. whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching”.92 - prof. Alfredo went to the school to submit his “Report in Physic”. but it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. While they were in the auditorium of their school. The teacher in charge is the one designated by the dean. the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter. considering the size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions. 1. so should teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category. 2.the school had been incorporated since and therefore the school itself. . I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results. However . J. concurring: -I would like to clarify that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect that the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils who are minors is not in accord with the plain text of the law.

private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils. not commit. the applicable provision of Article 2180 states: "Art. Since it was a civil case. the concrete block caught him before he could get out. aged ten to eleven. Petitioner (Reynaldo) was subsequently stabbed by Teng requiring him to be hospitalized and to undergo surgery. Ylarde's parents. Jr concurringly said many student x x x view some teachers as part of the bourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice on behavior deportment and other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively rejected. it can only apply the law with its imperfections. the school was littered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II. Deciding to help his colleague. Alonso." . . YLARDE vs. respondent school claims that a demand should have been made by the plaintiff rendering it premature to bring an action for damages against respondent school. dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep. . . said private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away. Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde. The work was left unfinished. another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez stated burying them all by himself. 2176. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides: "Art. without any warning at all. which they did FACTS Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School and private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. At that time.Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the provision only applies to vocational schools and not to academic institutions. x x x The parent can instill more lasting discipline more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or the head for the tort committed by the child. three of the four kids. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education. When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block. However the court can suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed. The following day. the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening." On the other hand. It seems most unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship. is obliged to pay for the damage done. and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence.A group of students walking inside Araneta University were accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karin Madidis alias “Teng”. GANCAYCO. so long as they remain in their custody. Then. casis continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging. April 25. 1988 NATURE Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order dismissing the complaint as against the respondent school and denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal. As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent nor the school remised in the discharged of their duties. pinning him to the wall in a standing position. ISSUE WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code. (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person. Before leaving. Ylarde sustained injuries and died three (3) days later." A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left. Fransico Alcantara. At this point. . private respondent Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. (Note – the court view on increasing students activism likely causing violence resulting to injuries.93 - prof. The court cannot make law. private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. in or out of the school premises – J. private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone. there being fault or negligence. ISSUE WON the Art 2180 CC13 applies to academic institutions HELD It is unnecessary to answer the issue. this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. They also claim that the civil liability in this case arose from a crime. they were exonerated of liability. Then. private respondent Aquino alone 13 "Lastly. Being their teacher-in-charge. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. also after classes. Guttierez. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. 2180. 1988 July 29 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari AQUINO PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY) 160 SCRA 785 PARAS. MTD was granted by the CA. Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope. filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano. These four pupils ---. Such fault or negligence. As a result thereof. A2010 . . FACTS .Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng and Arante University based on Art 2190 CC . The answer is no since the provision speaks of “teachers or heads” Dispositive WHEREFORE. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has outlived its purpose. What the petitioner wants to know is WON the school or the university itself is liable. playfully jumped into the pit.Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of Dismissal. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde. Motion was denied due to insufficient justification to disturb ruling.torts & damages teachers are not expected to have the same measure of responsibility as that imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree. both private respondents can be held liable for damages.Reynaldo Alonso. petitioners in this case. Alcantara and Ylarde.

Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc. as heirs of Napoleon Castro. the teacher. and (3) dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit. FRANCIS HIGH CA(Castillo/Cadiz) 194 SCRA 340 Paras. Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation.: October 5." Likewise. Abon.94 - prof. casis Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. Libertad D. Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior. in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student]. Logically.. A "recess. the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages. BCF is both an academic and arts and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP. impleading Jimmy B. but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit. This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades. SALVOSA v. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. 1991 SCHOOL v NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS . a student of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977." contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises. in the parking space of BCF.: Feb. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school. Subsequently. Reasoning: This is in line with the Court’s ruling in Amadora vs. (2) absolving the other defendants. Inc. it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity. jointly and severally. (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the children's safety. Ratio: Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-incharge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons. discretion. capacity. petitioners cannot under Art. 1988 FACTS Jimmy Abon. when he shot Napoleon Castro. is liable. as party defendants. After hearing.." or in the custody of BCF. Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF). Ratio: ST. Roberto C. an obviously attractive nuisance. The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. so long as they remain in their custody. Abon. it is only the head of the school who can be held liable. when he shot Napoleon Castro. In line with the case of Palisoc. HELD NO. J. to pay private respondents. We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence. and (5) left the children close to the excavation. wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience. therefore. it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. The standard of conduct to which a child A2010 . (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging. Abon for damages resulting from his acts." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher. knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. the Trial Court rendered a decision. which was at about 8 o'clock in the evening. Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF). Abon. Reasoning: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task. We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde. knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area. he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. 2180 — 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school.m. This should not be the case. Jimmy B. or the area within which the school activity is conducted. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. supra. (6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent. Court of Appeals. b. 17 a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. while it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident. Likewise. Bearing this in mind. "the phrase used in [Art. the latter "stands. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. a commerce student of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro. Jimmy B. IAC (CASTRO) 166 SCRA 274 PADILLA. so long as they remain in their custody. DISPOSITION Granted. including recess time.torts & damages xxx xxx xxx "Lastly. According to the CA. to a certain extent. 2180 of the Civil Code. the ROTC Commandant. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. ISSUE WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. The time interval is safely within the "recess time" that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case. must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age. he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school. 25. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult. The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the CA. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B. at around 8:00 p." Reasoning: a. J. Ratio: As regards the principal. as contemplated in the law." as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school. (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling." HELD Only Aquino.

2180. no moral or exemplary damages under Art. Francis and the principal). but the court has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a contract. the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task. WHEREFORE. yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA. Francis HS and the Illumin. Also. Costs against the petitioners. -When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment. -Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it. For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his employee. The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which was not school sanctioned. the questioned decision is SET ASIDE PSBA v CA (BENITEZ/BAUTISTA) 205 SCRA 729 Padilla. a contract is established between them. there was SOLIMAN. ISSUE (1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants (2) WON Art.95 - prof. ISSUES (1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180 HELD (1) NO. 4th. 2 P. along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge. (3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence required of them. The school is obliged to provide the student with an education. under Article 2180. This prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w/ Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers. it was shown that the principal had known of the picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the event. the petition is DENIED. one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons. the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st.: Feb. enrolled in the 3rd year commerce course of PSBA. the male teachers who were to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking. At the outset. J. and as the latter had her own class to supervise then and was not actually invited. Also.In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was breached due to PSBA’s negligence in providing proper security measures. However. a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBA’s liability. Hence this petition. both are jointly and severally liable w/ the teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the owner/manager (St. teachers were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming. On the issue of the liability of St. particularly par 4. the student abides by the school’s academic requirements and observes its rules and regulations. he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher. during and after the attack of the victim. 2180. In fact. and several teachers for damages incurred from the death of their son. -his parents filed a complaint against St. -Both parties appealed to the CA. Quezon. teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim. The CA erred in applying Art. employers will be forever exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the performance of their duties. the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. means and methods before. Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the parties. was stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants who were from outside the school’s academic community. contending that it occurred due to petitioners’ failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family. Petitioners contend that the victim’s parents failed to prove by evidence that they didn’t give their son consent to join the picnic. . From the evidence. -No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised diligence of a good father of the family. -A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by the TC. hence. If the CA’s findings are to be upheld. -Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroad:”… the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. The TC found against the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim. The Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence of their liability. the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondent’s complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC can determine. Life savers were brought in the event of such an accident. The records also show that the 2 P. The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. Francis HS. His parents didn’t allow him to go due to short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home. alleging that since they were presumably sued under Art 2180. 4. In turn. They cannot escape liability simply because it wasn’t an “extra-curricular activity of the HS”.E. a school cannot be an insurer for its students against all risks. In the case at bar. the teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity. Hence this petition. (2) NO. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extracontractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties” -Using the test in Cangco. recklessness and lack of security precautions. Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them. and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180. alleging negligence. 2177 may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses. However. casis no cause of action since academic institutions are not subject to the said provision. Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach. it should be noted that the victim’s parents allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination. time and place. JR. 2 of the teachers who arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers. 1992 FACTS -Carlitos Bautista. (1) NO. As such. any finding of negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual obligation only. V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 . resulting in a bilateral obligation. PREMISES CONSIDERED.torts & damages -Ferdinand Castillo. Illumin. At this stage. in relation to 2176 is applicable (3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper HELD A2010 . represented by its principal. -PSBA sought to dismiss the case.E. then a freshman student at St.

who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant R. J. It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v. the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon. the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc. while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil. the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced.The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman. ISSUES 1.The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows: Art. Jr. but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case. filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC. Jr. At the same time. on the one hand. quoted above.. student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges.L.RCC filed a motion to dismiss. Using the test of Cangco. The plaintiff was confined in a hospital. which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon. was in the campus premises thereof. another student of the Institute. the defendant. the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision. hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards. Necessarily. WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law. he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months.It was also pointed out in said case that: "In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar.In the case of PSBA v CA. even if there be a finding of negligence. as here. NO Under Art. as well as those of Articles 349. acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon. this appeal. no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Certainly.96 - prof. their students or apprentices. xxx xxx xxx Art. the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment. It further argued that Article 2180.L. since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. RL Security Agency and Solomon. Petitioner’s MFR was denied. student or apprentice of the school. Jimmy Solomon. and the students who are enrolled. Security Agency Inc. however. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. casis paragraph of Article 2180. 1992 NATURE Civil complaint for damages FACTS . 2. There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC and Solomon. which contract results in obligations for both parties. The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. 350 and 352 of the Civil Code 2. It is settled that where the security agency. the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils. the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for one's own act or omission. . In the instant case. on the other hand. of the Civil Code did not apply. supra. the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession.. shot the plaintiff on the abdomen.L. recruits. Petitioner. Inc. no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. . The relations between teacher and pupil. petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon. The employer of Solomon was the R. xxx xxx xxx Art. he being in fact an employee of the R. The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority: xxx xxx xxx (2) Teachers and professors.In Palisoc v.On August 13. there is. . In fact. that negligence xxx xxx xxx Lastly. a student of that Institute. 1982. 2180. 349. For its part. Hence. the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon. and as per doctor's opinion." . there is established a contract between them.torts & damages FELICIANO. xxx xxx xxx (4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices.. A2010 . 352. .Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority.. Security Agency Inc. . On the other hand. WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180. without any provocation. the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution. Brillantes.Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges. the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with. 350. and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon. It held: When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment. 7th paragraph. the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen. while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman. while the school was the client of the latter.Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or 'built-in' obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. and not to the clients of such agency. represented by his guardian. was not a pupil. . This would be for the trial court to determine. however. Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner. a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC). as yet. May 18. contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it. for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1.Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCC’s motion to dismiss. Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency. Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following: xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper. YES . RCC was not the employer of Solomon. . And. Security Agency. Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th . so long as they remain in their custody. but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible.

-Liability for the accident. the bus company also argued that PhilAm is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41. held parents and school liable -CA: school liable under A218 and 219.In the PSBA case. 2180 of the Civil Code. Mary’s Academy) WON St. and could have been based. the trial court had denied the school's motion to dismiss the complaint against it. .It is not the school. Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have. 2002 NATURE Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.600. casis case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants.200. however. and Vivencio Villanueva. Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T. The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim. finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them. and which was the proximate cause of the accident. unbroken by intervening efficient causes. its manager BALINGIT and the driver. to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer.[19] The Court remands the PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO.CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art. it must be shown that the ‘injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done.97 - prof. the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court. -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. his parents. a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. Pampanga. Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days. FC. and therefore.2180 CC. 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision FACTS . -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Reasoning. together with James Daniel II (then 15. James Daniel II. excluding petitioner St. But this was not alleged in their complaint.In the appeal. owned by Phil Rabbit. . but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. liable for damages HELD NO.It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK.2180 uses the term ST.Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. It was Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep. . This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that PhilAm and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality. . Carpitanos sued the school. . -TC: absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II. Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. . Mary’s Academy. CARPITANOS PARDO. ISSUE (regarding liability of St. upon the assumption that petitioner's cause of action was based. and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep. unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code. there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Between the remote cause and the injury. petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident. acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation. This deprived the company of earnings of about P8. Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition. The negligence of petitioner St.. The negligence of petitioner St.1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue!) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments: Art. February 6. SO ORDERED. driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep. In other words. March 25. and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial court's order. In the case at bar. Mary’s Academy had no control.* ISSUE WON the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise" used in Art.the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle. Between the remote cause and the injury. The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan. the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events. Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva . Dipolog City. For the school to be liable. must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. states. Tomas. whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pineda's employer. allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC. Inc.PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines. A2010 . Disposition. or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded. in the interest of justice. the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC. Ratio. PINEDA. As PSBA. WHEREFORE. only on Art. owned by Phil-Am. Mary’s Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos. and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS. 2180 NCC (Art. . Inc. It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached.This case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings.torts & damages becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. along the nat’l highway at Sto. -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities. MARY’S ACADEMY VS. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. No costs. and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the case.

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. Inc. -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles. June 17. * This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now. 1990. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.” . He was traveling counterclockwise. 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine. under the allegations of the complaint. recklessness. there being fault or negligence.. Upon the other hand. petitioner Philtranco. -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly. the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. -The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn. casis Code against petitioner Manilhig and his employer. for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary. Romeo So Vasquez. its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A. and denied MFR -Hence. 2180. Davide Facts: At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning. Inc. thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A. the victim. without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear. 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No. Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence. in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City. Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed. no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders. -The Magsaysay Blvd. in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer. violation of traffic rules and regulations. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. is obliged to pay for the damage done. and joint and several or solidary with the driver. Article 2194 expressly provides: the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine. 21. as a result thereof fell and.. He was also only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time. or to Belvic St. Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus. (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. 1999. respectively. The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses. -As the bus was pushed. the victim Ramon A. runs perpendicular to Gomez St. Such fault or negligence. Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. GBW794. xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 15 Art. like petitioner Philtranco. Dispositive Lower court’s order of dismissal is AFFIRMED. xxxxxxxxx The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage . warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog. xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions. It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills. was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street. suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road. On the same date and time. In the process. Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides: Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A. defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises. Art. Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital.torts & damages "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) to mean "employer. -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street. A2010 . (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No.98 - prof. the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus. direct. who was biking towards the same direction as the bus. Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation. -Civil Case No. professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur. and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondents’ Version -In the early morning of March 24. its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd. abandonment of victim. which caused the death of the victim **Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired. Inc. As to solidarity. Phil-American Forwarders. direct and solidary. 2176. VASQUEZ Dec. this appeal ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes.Hence. 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 217614 and 218015 of the Civil (limited to that involved in the outline) 14 ∗ CASTILEX V. thereafter. Acuesta who. registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. (with regard to this issue) PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE. was run over by the said bus. -Since the employer's liability is primary. about 6:00 o’clock.  Petitioner’s Version -Manilhig. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital.

Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180. so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employee's action or inaction. testified that at the time of the incident. whether or not engaged in any business or industry. Operation of Employer's Vehicle in Going to or from Work In the same vein. whether or not engaged in any business or industry. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. The SC does not agree. against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect. surmises. whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry. are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task. and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work. once this is done. Negligent acts of employees. II. and even finality at times. As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact. employees oftentimes wear different hats. that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. title or designation but which. Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. under which it can be found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home. This rule is. therefore.torts & damages After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident. or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work. III. traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee. are still A2010 . Operation of Employer's Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer. Held: Castilez is absolved from any liability. the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employer's motor vehicle. who was presented as a hostile witness. In the same action. Instead. admittedly. spending more time at his actual duties. The Court of Appeals cannot. No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to . he was driving a company-issued vehicle. The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances. the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez. Such exception obtain in the present case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioner's vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager. the result varies with each state of facts. For. but rather. Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours within the call of duty. an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle. the fourth paragraph should apply. to employers in general. Where the employee's duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work. in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed. Jr. a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident. nevertheless. an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions. and not a part of his services to his employer. the courts have frequently applied what has been called the "special errand" or "roving commission" rule. however. So. subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations. while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task. be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employer's vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and. the plaintiff must show. Hence. ABAD. The phrase "even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task. even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. Evidence that by using the employer's vehicle to go to and from meals. even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employer's vehicle. 14 cda The employer may. to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise. Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD. and the fifth paragraph. A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable. It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. Issue: WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle. casis charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own. Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry. presumably. They perform functions which are beyond their office. to hold the employer liable. or conjectures. an employee is engaged in his employer's business in the operation of a motor vehicle. parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez.This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks. Cebu Doctor's Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez. On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included. It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employer's motor vehicle: I. however. and Luisa So Vasquez. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph. which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner.99 - prof. However. The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance. registered under the name of petitioner. be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision.

using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position.One night. even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. primary and solidary.100 - prof. Rather.. Unfortunately. and drug pushers and addicts. There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.Funtecha is a scholar of FCI. The president of FCI is Agustin Masa. a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City. and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip. . the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's business. way beyond the normal working hours. then go home in the school jeep. After a dangerous curb.The petitioner. not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. Even if somehow. NPC v CA (PHESCO INC. Allan lives with his dad. in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR.m. one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. He need not have an official appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act. Allan. pimps. ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES . the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees. it has been held that he has not resumed his employment. it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee. then go back to the school. Funtecha wanted to drive home. and seeing that the road was clear. Moreover. enroute to its destination. saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable. the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff. The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw.) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO. Agustin has a son. ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. Allan let Funtecha drive. . ." had no connection to petitioner's business. There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver.torts & damages An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use. 1998 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours. . He has a student license. for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning he’s supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school. Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan. The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night.It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose. The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. includes any act done by an employee. or in the supervision over him. thus.Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept. SC reversed. Hence. casis of the infliction of the injury or damage. A2010 . it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtecha's possession of a student driver's license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms. ABAD's working day had ended. . having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately. . under Article 2180. it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employer's business or within the scope of his assigned task. was known as a "haven for prostitutes. The liability of the employer is.TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan.On July 22. 1979. as petitioner put it. He is also employed as a janitor. . . In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees. the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act.It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home. August 17. neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer. as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers. However. Allan's job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day. who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver. his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place which. Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians).Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI.In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house. It was then about 2:00 a. Funtecha definitely was not. The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. 1992 NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS . August 14. Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights. Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence. Funtecha also lives in the president’s house free of charge while a student at FCI.

830.The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latter's projects. (Metro Transit). 2) Compensatory damages of P443. Prudent. including the latter's workers. 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE: APPEAL from CA’s DECISION . was coming in. NPC's liability is direct. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.14 Oct 1993.00.Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides: "Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Inc. along with their children. PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals. -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. Navidad was struck by the moving train. which reversed the trial court's judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages.torts & damages .00." . Navidads Contention: .000. Of course.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased. an LRT train. . . Junelito Escartin.830. J/February 6. and he was killed instantaneously. which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES . d) Costs of suit.While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks. . filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task.00 as nominal damages. Rodolfo Roman. primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver. .CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000. was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented. driver of the dump truck. in conjunction with Article 2180. .13 of the Civil Code.000. .A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight.00 as actual damages. . ISSUES: WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD.Marjorie Navidad (Nicanor’s widow). c) Attorney’s fees of P20.00 as moral damages. In a "labor only" contract. filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin. shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action. but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks). Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG. Finding that a contractor was a "labor-only" contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the "labor-only" contractor. b) P50.SC) LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD. Nicanor Navidad.000. .NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA. In either case.TC: dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit. which caused the latter to fall on the tracks. entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare). b) Moral damages of P50. the Metro Transit Organization. the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad.TC: Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following: "a) 1) Actual damages of P44.LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who. DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed. about 730pm. .The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin.00.CA: exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train. (But there wasn’t any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case. ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba. NO. however.In this regard. holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts: a) P44.In the provisions of the "Memorandum of Understanding" entered into by PHESCO and NPC. a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. A2010 .PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions. . . a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. and e) P20. .00 as and for attorney’s fees. entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation.000. the LRTA. . NPC. the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad.No evidence. then drunk. we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in "labor only" contracting.101 - prof. the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him. The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman.00. WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTA’s CLAIMS: -Escartin’s assault upon Navidad.000. and Prudent for the death of her husband. HELD: 1. c) P50. delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks.000. JR.The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability. d) P50. casis from liability. 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50. denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards. . the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage. . and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier. between the two.520.At the exact moment that Navidad fell. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers. if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it. instead of presenting evidence. instead. in its answer. -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train. In exempting Prudent .000.A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter.

are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. DISPOSITION: CA’S DECISION AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh. the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman. although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. thus.000 kilos.On January 8. the mother. Needless to say. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. which was loaded with 200 cavans of rice weighing about 10.Petition to review the resolution of the CA FACTS . Stated differently. with a due regard for all the circumstances. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent.torts & damages The premise. 14 Art. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. . REASONING: . A2010 . Kim McKee and Loida Bondoc. a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent.Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier. he must also be absolved from liability as Prudent is. ." "Article 1759. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. according to the CA. is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. where tort is that which breaches the contract. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. . if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. . unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons. 1977. in case of his death or incapacity. . on the other hand. Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees. In case of death of or injuries to passengers. all passengers of the Ford Escort. . casis The father and. the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains. however.Once such fault is established. 2176. was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga.102 - prof. in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway. so long as they remain in their custody. have failed to show. both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy. Pampanga. 13 Art. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company.In fine. Christopher McKee and Araceli McKee. 1992 NATURE . owned by private respondents. 2180. the cargo truck.A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers. one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana. in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. Such fault or negligence. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices." -The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh.In case of such death or injury. Jaime Tayag and Rosalina Manalo. and physical injuries to George McKee. Jr.The Civil Code. 2194. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. and driven by Ruben Galang. Article 219414 of the Civil Code can well apply.The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. No costs. the contract can be said to have been breached by tort. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. there being fault or negligence.Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage . thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply. Loadstar. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred. YES. when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties. . ______________ 12 Art. . a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck. Lastly. There is no showing that Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission. a liability for tort may arise even under a contract. a factual matter that has not been shown. July 16. the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. "This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. The Ford Escort. provides: "Article 1755. for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions. the presumption would be that it has been at fault.Immediately before the collision." "Article 1763. which LRTA and Roman. "Article 1756. and was bound for Manila. is obliged to pay for the damage done. 2.. governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers. an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. and by simple proof of injury. MCKEE V IAC (TAYAG & MANALO) 221 SCRA 517 Davide.

which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. which was the opposite lane.Li’s alibi was that he was driving at 55kph when he was suddenly confronted with a speeding car coming from the opposite direction. which was destroyed. WON Li was grossly negligent in driving the company issued car 2. applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. not juris et de jure. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. in law. . Either factor working independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road conditions. . as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others.Li was. WON Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence 3. and went to the rear to open the trunk. and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard. and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. on the said bridge. rather than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly apply his brakes.. The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. casis every driver should be to those conditions. Li's failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident could therefore have been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very fast" speed as testified by one of the witneses. . . CA absolved Alexander. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. xxx xxx xxx The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. alcohol. It is the failure to observe that degree of care. alighted from the car. He instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle.The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. exhaustion. .Ma. . Jose Koh blew the horn of the car. his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck.Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party. .) . WON Alexander Commercial is liable as Li’s employer HELD 1. precaution. 2 boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol.The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Article 2180 reads as follows: The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions. Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Li would have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were alert as VALENZUELA v CA (LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL. . As employers of the truck driver. ISSUE 1. A2010 . directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. -RTC found Li and Alexander solidarily liable. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. the conduct which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoroughful care. provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee.While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought or the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent. Manalo and Tayag are. The boys were moving back and forth. however. the visibility of the street.torts & damages When the northbound car was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge.Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises. unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. the provision for the unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the 253 SCRA 303 KAPUNAN. but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. Physiological "fight or flight" mechanisms are at work. INC. Given a light rainfall. the proximate cause of the collision. Defendants counterclaimed for damages. YES . an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger.103 - prof. Inc. contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered. She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. Before he could do so. xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. is only juris tantum. swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck. 3. whereby such other person suffers injury. since normally he would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela's car. under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. ISSUE WON the owners of the cargo truck (Tayag and Manalo) are liable for the resulting damages HELD YES The Court rules that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was. therefore. 1996 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS .Civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were filed as a result of a vehicular accident.Please see first Mckee digest for details on the collision. etc. She was pulled out from under defendant's car. That presumption.Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant.Negligence. Neither did they attempt to prove it. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh. with no parking lights or early warning device. is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution. drowsiness. She filed a claim for damages against defendant. negligent in driving his companyissued Mitsubishi Lancer 2. and the area was poorly lighted. and bumped plaintiff's car. and then fell to the ground. YES . NO . Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense. alleging that plaintiff was the one who was reckless or negligent. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving when she realized she had a flat tire. he then switched on the headlights of the car. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a car driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial. February 7. put on her emergency lights. She parked along the sidewalk of Aurora Blvd. Court of Appeals. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her.

casis The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent. and to determine the amount of the damages. doubtless because and only in this case. title 16. guardians and owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise. based on the principle of bonus pater familias. in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li. This legal presumption gives way to proof. since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments. because. to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. has not demonstrated. in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of furthering the company's image.” ISSUES WON the government is liable for the damages resulting from a tort committed by an agent or employee of the government HELD NO Ratio The State is only liable for the acts of its agents. 2457 was enacted. in contravention of an ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act. Reasoning . In fine. was hit by the General Hospital ambulance. Between these latter and the state.As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract. riding on a motorcycle. No. difficulties and losses. where the general principle is laid down that where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence. except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. however. on the contrary. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision. to which Mr. is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office. . as is evidenced by the same Law 3. to our satisfaction. . Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li. This latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor. A2010 . no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. .E.Trial court held that the collision was due solely on the negligence of the chauffeur and awarded the plaintiff the sum of P14. As such. we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal an that of private persons interested in its operation. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff.torts & damages business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car. the managerial employee or company sales agent. or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. and the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands. called upon to answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner. because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. 741. by his own fault or negligence.The Civil Code in chap 2. It follows therefrom that the state. therefore. Merritt. book 4. if any. It states that “E. but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. the following articles refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital. Witnesses testified that plaintiff’s physical and mental condition before the accident was excellent. are found. .Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: MERRITT v GOVERNMENT 34 Phil 311 TRENT. as held in the last paragraph of article 1903. . 1902. by virtue of such provisions of law. Alexander Commercial. the state.The obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or negligence is based. shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly. reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage. especially when he attempted to use his money for mathematical calculations. which would be subversive of the public interest. had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition. on that the person obligated. which is the He could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. the rule is stated in 36 Cyc. thus: By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903.In the United States the rule is that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs. Title 15. and among these persons. E. DISPOSITION Judgment of RTC reinstated. that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. 1916 NATURE Appeal from decision of the CFI FACTS . or create any cause of action in his favor. the fault or negligence.104 - prof. 915. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident. His leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture.. . to defendant said Government at the same. ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. said company. . He had to dissolve a partnership that he had with an engineer and give up a contract for the construction of a building. which turned suddenly and unexpectedly to Taft Avenue without sounding any whistle or horn. responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. Partida 7. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. except when it acts through the agency of a special agent. but not always. . and whereas in the first article thereof. inc. He was one of the best contractors of wooden buildings.Plaintiff was so severely injured. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court. The patient apparently was slightly deaf. regulates the obligations which arise out of fault or negligence. March 31.Act No. in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case. The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs.

because the officers of the ECA did not act as special agents of the government within the above defined meaning of that wod in Article 1903 of the Civil Code in storing gasoline in the warehouse of ECA. yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official.” . The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only 2 months and 21 days while the remainder of the 6 months was spent in his home. . must be presumed to lie with the state. In this we think there was error. 327) authorizing the filing of claims against the government with the Insular Auditor. but not when the MENDOZA V. he executes the trust confided to him. however. Dispositive Judgment appealed from reversed. ROSETE v AUDITOR GENERAL 81 Phil 453 FERIA. the government is not responsible for damages caused through such negligence.666. 1903 of the Civil Code reads: “Art. August 31. .There being no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to the ECA or its officers. it does not make any and all claims against the government allowable. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts. . the record shows.The fire destroyed the building owned by the petitioner.105 - prof. duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim. . we are not called upon to determine. by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor. was done by a special agent. . he executes the trust confided to him. ISSUE WON the government is liable for the damages HELD NO . is P18.075. find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff. We find nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the first. and the trial court so found. limited the time to 2months and 21 days. acting in the exercise of his powers. casis damage should have been caused by the official to whom it properly pertained to do the act performed. 1948 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the Insular Auditor FACTS . the award awarded for permanent injuries.Insular Auditor dismissed the claim hence this appeal. . As to the second. which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees.Art. . without any fault on his part. the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation.000. foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof. in the sense in which these words are employed.The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903 On the computation of damages The two items which constitute a part of the P14. therefore. the court held the following: “ ’… The state is not responsible for the damage suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office… n relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a juridical person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth.The responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission.741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a) P5. DISPOSITION Decision appealed from is affirmed. for a period of 6 months. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. would not prevent recovery for the whole time. thereby giving rise to this claim for damages against Panlilio for his negligence and the officers of ECA for storing gasoline in said warehouse contrary to the provisions of ordinances of the City of Manila (ordinance requires a license for storing flammable substances.Although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in the name and representation of the state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers.Although there is an act (Act No. in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of the property which they hold in sublease. We. 1903. 1991 . and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. The court. .Jose Panlilio ignited his lighter near a drum into which gasoline was being drained causing fire in the warehouse of Emergency Control Administration (ECA. that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1. a government agency). xx “The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent. which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital.000 per month. DE LEON FONTANILLA V MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINSITRATION 194 SCRA 486 PARAS.torts & damages original basis of this kind of objections. and (b) the P2. The obligation imposed in the preceding article is enforceable not only for personal acts and omission but also for those persons for whom another is responsible. which ECA didn’t have). and appeal by private persons or entities from the latter’s decision to the Supreme Court.In the case of Merritt v. February 27. and the latter responsible for all claims. foreign to the exercise of duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof. because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated A2010 .The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent. Government. in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. is one who receives a definite and fixed order by the commission.’ xx “ ‘That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent.

3601 provides: Sec. - - Angat Case: Although the majority opinion declares that the Angat System. . The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court. subsection (f): (f) . after which he was taken home. Therefore. maintenance and insurance. upon the land benefited. he had acquired the status of regular employee and could not be removed except for valid cause. . waiting for a jeep. No. subsection b of P. to say that it is liable for damages arising from tort committed by its employees. rehabilitating. which is the irrigation of lands. exercised a governmental function because the nature of its powers and functions does not show that it was intended to “bring to the Government any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit”.Genaro N. impairing his vision. and took a few steps. 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED. including the power to establish and maintain subsidiaries. who was not its special agent. The decision of this Court in G. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory. It also has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid. Manila. 61045 dated December 1. Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be preferred liens first. It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces." Certainly. he hailed a jeep that came to a stop. improving.R. . since his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer. including all communal and pump irrigation projects. such fees or administration charges as may be necessary to cover the cost of operation. an accountant. like the NIA. and is therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its driver Garcia. 1. No. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing. is still another thing. was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Section 1 of Republic Act No. several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. ACCORDINGLY. Teotico. The state or a government agency performing governmental functions may be held liable for tort committed by its employees only when it acts through a special agent. DISSENTING: PADILLA: to say that NIA has opened itself to suit is one thing. the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional.R. (Emphasis for emphasis). o NIA believes this bases this on:  PD 552 – amended some provisions of RA 3601 (the law which created the NIA)  The case of Angat River Irrigation System v. and to transact such business. and then on the crops raised thereon. Burgos Avenue. where his injuries were treated. He argued that although his contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17. incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above powers and objectives. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeep. for the proper conduct of its business. which came into effect some 3 years after the perfection of the contract. thus is governed by the Corporation Law. and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines. 55963 and G. 1976. thereby opening it up to the possibility that it may be held liable for the damages caused by its driver. and such preferred liens shall not be removed until all fees or administration charges are paid or the property is levied upon and sold by the National Irrigation Administration for the satisfaction thereof. which liens shall have preference over all other liens except for taxes on the land. . As blood flowed therefrom. Section 2. the Motion for Reconsideration dated January 26. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. . and his employment had lasted for five years. Besides. . Teotico - ISSUE WON the NIR is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. DISPOSITION We conclude that the National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. to recover funds or portions thereof expended for the construction and/or rehabilitation of communal irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a special fund for irrigation development under section 2 hereof. his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. . 552 provides that: (b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water from all irrigation systems constructed by or under its administration.106 - prof. Name and Domicile — A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration. Burgos Avenue. The employment contract of 1971 was executed when the Labor Code of the Philippines had not yet been promulgated. casis It has its own assets and liabilities. 1990 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. and in general. and to recover the cost of construction within a reasonable period of time to the extent consistent with government policy. FACTS . . The National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local government. but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency. but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions. The Angat dissenting opinion: Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent. . the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders. 1968 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals. he fell inside a manhole on P. to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law. NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government. CITY OF MANILA V TEOTICA 22 SCRA 267 CONCEPCION. a strong dissenting opinion held that Angat River system is a government entity exercising proprietary functions. who was not its special agent HELD YES Reasoning the functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. Section 2. January 29. as are directly or indirectly necessary. such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a "government-function" corporation. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare. Angat River Workers’ Union A2010 .D. which shall be organized immediately after the approval of this Act.torts & damages NATURE Resolution FACTS The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions. Due to the fall. After waiting 5 mins. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital.

HELD YES. what had happened was in truth and in fact a venture by them given their stamp of approval. Voting Reyes. as general manager..Defense pointed out that because of the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing. stealing of iron catchbasin covers was rampant. Municipal Board. throughout the period of Taylor's stay abroad. whereas the Civil Code is a general law. the determination of whether or not P.043. that in order to prevent such thefts. the left upper arm. Upon the contrary. he in particular not having testified or offered testimony to prove such claim. all told. These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital. the juridical situation was a simple quasi-delict by them committed upon the corporation. JJ. intended exclusively for the City of Manila. in general. the city government has changed the position and layout of catchbasins in the City by constructing them under the sidewalks with concrete cement covers and openings on the side of the gutter.This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. What said article requires is that the province.20. except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned. in his answer. or any other law or ordinance. . both petitioners knew and through their acts showed that they approved of the trip. Makalintal. 1974 FACTS: -An employee of the Ace ADVERTISING Company was sent to the States to pursue studies in television. city treasurer and chief of police. or injuries suffered by. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence. said Article 2189 is decisive thereon. ARANETA v JOYA 57 SCRA 59 CASTRO J. that the Office of the City Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting from theft of said iron covers. Even if P.Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter.L. and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review. city engineer." in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road. it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province. The Ace . this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila. and that in any event under the by-laws he had the discretion. is a special law.20 with interest at the legal rate from August 23. a national highway.The first issue raised by the Manila is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of RA 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading: The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor. authority or ratification. because RA 409. Then. to the damage of the firm of which he was an officer. The petitioner signed three of these checks. city health officer.: May 24. in spite of his being a vice-president and director of the Ace Advertising.torts & damages suffered contusions on the left thigh.107 - prof. in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals.sec. streets. which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative. with costs against the City of Manila. When asked about the expenses of the trip. city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed. . ISSUES WON City of Manila should be held liable for the damages suffered by Teotica. he continued to receive his salaries in the form of vouchers ordered and signed by respondent Joya. again.The petitioner's assertion that he signed the questioned payroll checks in good faith has not been substantiated.00.. concerning the unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds for the latter. respondent answered that these were not shouldered by the company and instead by other parties -while abroad. concur. Hence. or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides: Provinces. subsequently. Reasoning The assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made. and other public works under their control or supervision. or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions. . and it was these three without whose acts the same could not have happened. J. The respondent. CC governs liability due to "defective streets.4 refers to liability arising from negligence. A2010 . without costs. denied the charge and claimed that the trip was nonetheless ratified by the company's board of directors. 1954 until full payment. city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. alleging that the trip was made without its knowledge. amended for damages against the City of Manila. This plus the fact that he even approved thrice payroll checks for the payment of Taylor's salary. this appeal by the City of Manila. its mayor.750. the Municipal Board. or any other city officer. Angeles and Fernando. in connection with the maintenance of said road.B.Teotico filed with CFI Manila. or Vicente Araneta (company treasurer) who put up part of the bill connected with Taylor's trip and also handed him letters for delivery in the United States. . required further medical treatment by a private practitioner. Burgos Avenue were. to enforce the provisions of this chapter. demonstrate quite distinctly that the petitioner neglected to perform his duties properly. regardless of the object thereof. the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. any person by reason of defective conditions of road. the petitioner remained passive. “…were also privy to the unauthorized disbursement of the corporate moneys jointly with the appellant.043. under Article 2189 of the Civil Code.P. therefore. under Republic Act 409. for which solidary liability should have been imposed upon all in the first place” ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict HELD: Yes . Sanchez. Castro. and as it was an unauthorized act of expenditure of corporate funds. . Bengzon. or from negligence of said Mayor. Dispositive WHEREFORE. to authorize the trip which was for the company's benefit -Joya also filed a 3rd party complaint against the two Aranetas proving that they were involved in sending Taylor abroad -trial court rendered judgment ordering the respondent to pay the Ace Advertising "the sum of P5. which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6.. Dizon. is one of fact. J. a complaint which was. bridges. cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of. Zaldivar. At any rate. The others were signed by either the respondent. applicable to the entire Philippines.CFI Manila sustained the theory of the defendants and dismissed the amended complaint. whereas Article 2189. for the first time. . public buildings. casis Advertising disbursed P5. and that these changes had been undertaken by the city from time to time whenever funds were available. on account of Taylor's travel and studies -the Ace Advertising filed a complaint with the court of first instance of Manila against the respondent for recovery of the total sum disbursed to Taylor. 3rd party complaint dismissed -CA affirmed however dismissal of 3rd party complaint was reversed stating that Taylor's trip had been neither authorized nor ratified by the company -CA noted that based on the facts. Ratio RA 409.

as has been repeatedly held by this Court. Detachment Commander of Balabac. certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs. in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan. . elements of the TFM raided several places. L-69866 YAP. No. upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.00 moral damages. 1962. 30.Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their claim for damages on Articles 32 and 2219 of the New Civil Code which provide in part as follows: "ART.R. they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers. In addition. Palawan. defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela. seized property to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim but Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused. ISSUES 1. 1975 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the CFI WITH CIVIL ABERCA V VER G. casis "(1)Acts and action referred to in Articles 21." Plaintiffs’ allegations: That complying with said order of Ver.108 - prof. Palawan. 26. that for some period after their arrest. plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim. no public official has the right to enter the premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. 32.R. . A year later or on April 9.Defendant-appellees admitted that when Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim and impounded the motor launch he was not armed with a search warrant. exemplary damages may also be awarded. 2219. Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon. . DISPOSITION Decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one entered declaring the seizure illegal and ordering defendant-appellee Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon to pay to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim the sum of P3. 1988 NATURE: Petition for certiorari FACTS This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 29.Plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". And since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a warrant. employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants. 34 and 36. explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party. L-22554 MARTIN. that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize. . and. or any private individual. they have violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search and seizure. cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same.After conducting a preliminary investigation. Jikil Taha through his counsel made representations with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return the .00 for attorney's fees. a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. WON defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure of the motor launch in question without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same was admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime 2. YES . Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon.Any public officer or employee. 2.000. xxx "The indemnity shall include moral damages. xxx TORTS INDEPENDENT ACTION LIM v DE LEON G. that he effected the seizure of the motor launch in the absence of and without the consent of Delfin Lim." .Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: xxx "(6)Illegal search. harass and punish them. house. tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them. Likewise." "ART. that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel. 32. 28. on the ground that the same was the subject of a criminal offense.June 15. There can be no question that without the proper search warrant. defeats. plus P1. seized the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it. 27.Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch. NO .Plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim pleaded with Orlando Maddela to return the motor launch but the latter refused.torts & damages -The fact that he was occupying a contractual position at the Ace Advertising is of no moment.000. in addition. WON defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful HELD 1.Pursuant to the foregoing provisions.00 as actual damages. August 29. No. papers. Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages of P39. that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts.030. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. that during these raids. P750. wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander in Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch. constitutes no bar to the commission of a tort by one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages A2010 . xxx "(9)The rights to be secure in one's person. The existence of a contract between the parties. known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communistterrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila. April 15. moral damages of at least P150K each or a FACTS . who directly or indirectly obstructs. violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages. filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha. that military men who interrogated them employed threats. Upon order of the Provincial Commander. said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants. 1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him.

[b] The invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. under the above principles. Art. Case remanded to the respondent court for further proceedings. not just to the lawyers who signed the motion.109 - prof. the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. They needed no specific authority to do that. unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party concerned. to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated. . No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates. the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party Reasoning: [a] The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i. violate or in any manner impede or impair the constitutional rights and civil liberties of another person. alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. vs. as well as indirectly. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all persons.. Ratio: The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. DISPOSITION: Petition granted. the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiff. it is not the actor alone (i. he furnished copies thereof. 32. the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment. C. Its message is clear. 32 of CC which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. and attorney's fees not less than P200K. 3. responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors. high or low.e. For this purpose. be they public officers or employees. A2010 . (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action. including moral and exemplary. then SolGen. would be sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action against all of them under Art. concurring: . Art. And this must have been also the understanding of defendants' counsel himself for when he filed his comment on the motion. with his subordinates who committed such transgressions. if admitted hypothetically. and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the defendants. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress. should be considered. Hence. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Art. defeat. The authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be assumed. It cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint. WON trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to (dome of the) plaintiffs on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file MFR of the court's resolution granting the respondent's motion to dismiss HELD 1. it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings. 32 of CC. 2. except Maj. it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. CA PUNO. 3. However. when the temptation is strongest to yield to the law of force rather than the force of law. SEPARATE OPINION: TEEHANKEE. Thus. 32 CC is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. The body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs. [d] So. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials. or members of the military or police force or private individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct. the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and acquires a larger dimension. as contended by respondents. NO. INC. provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the RPC or other penal statute. civilian or military. defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties. [b] By this provision. owe obedience and allegiance at all times. the decisive factor in this case is the language of Art. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. Balaba. through their counsel. 32 governs.J. NO Ratio: Although the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. Estelito Mendoza. At the same time it rejects the automatic application of the principle of respondent superior or command responsibility that would hold a superior officer jointly and severally accountable for damages. 32 of CC makes the persons who are directly. it is difficult to justify the TC’s dismissal for lack of cause of action the complaint against all the MHP GARMENTS. the judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer must not abdicate his duty to properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk of being held responsible for gross negligence and of being held under the cited provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with the tortfeasor. casis defendants. 2. stand liable and may be sued in court for damages as provided in Art. Respondents’ contentions: A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants. But in this case. Reasoning: [a] The purpose Art. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. WON a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages. [c] Art. but to all the lawyers of plaintiffs In filing the motion to set aside the resolution. jointly and severally with his subordinates.torts & damages total of P3M. only the facts alleged in the complaint. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article. exemplary damages of at least P150K each or a total of P3M. ISSUES 1. 22 September 1994 Nature . [d] Even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. A superior have to answer for the transgressions of his subordinates against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. [c] To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action.e. which was never done in this case. 32 CC.The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the civil action for damages filed in the court below by petitioners-plaintiffs for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of their constitutional rights and liberties. employer and employee) relationship. 32 of CC. NO. and no others. The complaint contained allegations against all the defendants which.Aguinaldo and MSgt.

Mirasol Lugatiman. There can be no doubt that petitioners must have suffered sleepless nights. After a preliminary investigation. Peñafiel. He also ordered the return of the seized items which was not immediately returned despite demands. causing the latter’s death and physical injuries to herein petitioners. they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents. The evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private respondents' goods. The items were then turned over by Captain Peñafiel to petitioner corporation for safekeeping. The other items returned were of inferior quality. So with the petitioner corporation which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman. in lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%). Petitioner corporation received information that private respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia in October 1983. 1983. A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents." These facts and circumstances were not in any way shown by the petitioners to justify their warrantless search and seizure. the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint for unfair competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods. Costs against petitioners. It will also serve as a stern reminder to all and sundry that the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a virile reality and not a mere burst of rhetoric. Without any warrant. was tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). Again..His bus collided with the jeep driven by Clemente Marcia. and two (2) other constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market. January 27. they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. and wounded feelings due the tortious raid caused by petitioners. The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap . the raid was made on the stores of private respondents and A2010 . De Guzman then made a surveillance of the stores of private respondents. Inc. badges. or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law. they should have filed a third-party MARCIA V CA (PAJE) 205 PHIL 147 RELOVA.110 - prof. Conformably with our ruling in Lim vs. serious anxiety. petitioner corporation was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies.torts & damages . dresses.Paje is a driver of a Victory Liner Bus . and suits on display at respondents' stalls. they did not. We impose a SIX PERCENT (6%) interest from January 9. 1983 NATURE FACTS Petition for certiorari . In their Memorandum Agreement. The wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies the award of exemplary damages. It is consistently ruled that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered. And thirdly.Petition for Certiorari Facts -MHP Garments. on the said amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment thereof. and to impound the said paraphernalia to be used as evidence in court or other appropriate administrative body it orders the immediate and strict compliance with the Instructions which the petitioners miserably failed to do. Even then. MHP received information that private respondents Agnes Villa Cruz. Indeed. the appealed decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. the supposed illicit goods were seized. Private respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of business to recover their goods. to apprehend immediately unauthorized manufacturers and distributors of Scout paraphernalia. in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages." -Sometime in October 1983. Disposition IN VIEW WHEREFORE. In doing so. Larry de Guzman who did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. De Guzman. and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. Issue/s and Held WON the search and seizure was legal No. op. casis complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief. It affirmed the decision with modification MHP filed a petition for certiorari before the SC. an employee of petitioner corporation. They reported to the Philippine Constabulary and on October 25. Ponce de Leon. moral damages can be awarded in the case at bench. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents. The all encompassing protection extends against intrusions directly done both by government and indirectly by private entities. The trial court ruled for the private respondents. WON an award for moral damages should be awarded Yes. WON MHP Garments is liable Yes. cit. Firstly. The progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. Private respondent then filed a Civil Case against the petitioners for sums of money and damages. The specific date and time are not established in the evidence adduced by the parties.000.00) for the unreturned twenty-six (26) pieces of girl scouts items and a TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest. and insignias. Probable cause for a search has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. upon proper application by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the Philippines for warrant of arrest and/or search warrant with a judge. The omission will not exculpate petitioners. the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms. they seized the boy and girl scouts pants. not all the seized items were turned. Secondly. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto. The search and seizure were clearly illegal. Private respondents' avowals of embarrassment and humiliation during the seizure of their merchandise were supported by their testimonies. supplies. and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition. was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines. 1987 on the TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2.. 1299 already directs all law enforcement agencies of the Republic of the Philippines. The decision was appealed to the respondent court. Despite the sufficiency of time. he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. There was no probable cause for the seizure. after a preliminary investigation. The respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents. Letter of Instruction No. De Guzman.

3. had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. -RTC: in favor of Arafiles -CA: in favor of Morales. the injured individual is the one most concerned because it is he who has suffered directly.There are at least two things about Art. unless the act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be non-existent in the final judgment. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. The information states that: "The offended party Carmen L. ISSUES 1.… an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. This is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision.He was convicted in the criminal case in the RTC. . no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith." . et. he was not able to do so. Japzon.The criminal case still pending. he was acquitted in the CA. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting. Japzon for damages in the same court. . casis He should be permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him. The CA ruled that criminal negligence is wanting and that Paje was not even guilty of civil negligence. 141 is SET ASIDE FACTS .In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately. YES. Eva A. Hence. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our MADEJA V CARO ABAD SANTOS. a civil action for damages. Japzon is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. Madeja. A civil case was also instituted against him by herein petitioners for reckless imprudence and negligence in driving the passenger bus.The defendants presented the copy of said criminal case to the court handling the civil case against them. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. Carmen L. may be brought by the injured party.Paje was charged with homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. J.. Ratio. Independent civil action. may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case. . Other civil actions arising from offenses. but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. al. March 25. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated. frustrated and attempted homicide. the order dismissing Civil Case No.: December 21." Obiter . provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section."."Art. The complaining witness is the widow of the deceased. . Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. In cases of defamation. Otherwise stated. for the case was of pure accident. INC CARPIO MORALES. " . 33. Ratio Section 2.The acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. 2. Arafiles filed action for damages based on the alleged “grossly malicious and overly sensationalized” report by Morales which cast aspersions on his character.Dr. under the circumstances of this case. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. the said article speaks only of defamation. However. Madeja sued Dr." 2. and physical injuries. WON an independent civil action may be filed during the pendency of the criminal case HELD 1. However. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. the extinction of the criminal liability will not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability DISPOSITIVE Decision affirmed A2010 ." Tolentino says: "While the State is the complainant in the criminal case. being the object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist. namely: 1.111 - prof. fraud.torts & damages . The civil case was dismissed. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence. . 1983 NATURE Petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the defendant's motion to dismiss . . but we do not consider that the respondents. Dispositive Petition is GRANTED. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. ARAFILES v PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS. based on doctrine of fair comment ISSUE WON the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages HELD NO. -About a year following the published article. J. they were not inflicted with malice. . Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. ISSUES WON the acquittal in the criminal case would result to a dismissal in the civil case HELD YES . The respondent judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss which invoked Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads: "Sec. The two enactments are quoted hereinbelow: "Sec. 2004 NATURE Petition for review of CA Deci FACTS (Consti II Case) -Respondent Morales wrote an article for People’s Journal Tonight based on the sworn statement in the police blotter and interview of Emelita Despuig where Despuig alleged that Arafiles raped her the month before then attempted to rape her the night she filed a complaint. Morales attempted to contact Arafiles but since the latter’s office was still closed at that time (past 12mn – he works for NIAS-PAGASA).Petitioner also relies on Art 33 CC. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. fraud and physical injuries.

it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. (b) conduct was extreme and outrageous. Reasoning Defamation means the offense of injuring a person's character. Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. NO. Disposition. Decision reversed.The present controversy stems from a civil action for damages and not from a criminal complaint.R. casis case. it did not mention respondents as object of the article. January 28. or anger. Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se. The presentation of the news item subject of petitioner’s complaint may have been in a sensational manner. embarrassment. Also. pendency or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom. “vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs xxx” can give rise to a cause of action for damages. for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. and. respondent was present when Emelita executed her sworn-statement where she reported an abduction with rape and an abduction incident (where no rape occurred. as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm . and consistently with good faith and reasonable care. and consistently with good faith and reasonable care. esp. to the effect that although it may not constitute a criminal offense.I dissent not because the newspaper article in question is libelous.MVRS claimed it was merely an expression of belief/opinion and was published without malice. SO ORDERED A2010 . anxiety. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal case. it is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character. RTC dismissed: plaintiffs failed to establish their cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically identified. 33 which provides that in case of defamation. -then mentioned doctrine: The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. a local federation of more than 70 Muslim religious orgs.al. A civil action for libel under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely independent of the institution.which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distress. . and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious. that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Phil but the entire Muslim world. .torts & damages democracy. they should not be held to account. 135306 BELLOSILLO. press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines. for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. In the preparation of stories. to a point of suppression. were not entitled to damages. 2003 NATURE Petition to review decision of CA FACTS . There is no direct reference or allusion to the federation or any of its members. (c) causal connection between defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress. to a point of suppression. The cause of action is libel. may be brought by the injured party. No. WHEREFORE. or to Art. or to any of the individual complainants. CA reversed: it was "clear from the disputed article that the defamation was directed to all adherents of Islamic faith. they should not be held to account. for such action is personal in nature. such cause of action cannot be sustained.To recover for this the plaintiff must show that: (a) conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of plaintiff. The present case falls within the application of the relational harm principle of tort actions for defamation. but was about to happen) – so respondent’s article was not maliciously sensationalized. CC recognizes the possibility of such a civil action either pursuant to Art 26. CARPIO [dissent] .112 - prof. whether written or spoken. press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines. do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. (AmJur) Disposition Petition granted. 21 NCC): Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. . -then discussed the petitioner’s allegation that the news item as a “malicious sensationalization” failed: even though the police blotter only shows 1 count of abduction and rape. and since no particular individual was identified in the disputed article. 4. (d) the plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe. a civil complaint for damages. Respondents scarcely can claim having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in damages. 19. and some individual Muslims filed in the RTC Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS. . Torts with independent civil action: DEFAMATION An "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature.In the present case. . par. that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings.Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry. that the narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had reported at the police headquarters. but because it constitutes an .The purported damage caused by the published article falls under principle of relational harm . The succeeding paragraphs (in which petitioner and complainant Emelita were eventually identified) sufficiently convey to the readers.Complaint alleged that what was published in BULGAR was insulting and damaging to the Muslims. the petition is hereby DENIED. ill-natured. hence. cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam. fame or reputation through false and malicious statements.” ISSUE 1. Reasoning. 2. or vexatious. Ratio Action arising from an intentional tortuous act causing mental distress cannot be sustained in this SEPARATE OPINION VITUG [concur] .which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form of defamation. but it is not per se illegal. the article relates to the entire Muslim population and not just to the IDCP or to any of the individual respondents. et. First discussed applicable provisions (A33. In the preparation of stories. WON elements of libel exist 2. every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries. MVRS V ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL G. however.The ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHIL (IDCP). . WON the cause of action should rise from an intentional tortuous act causing mental distress HELD 1. -then discussed how to determine if a published work is libelous: In actions for damages for libel. NO.

Chi in his capacity as president of Phil Rayon. September 30.Focal point of claim for damages: insult caused by the article that the Muslims worship the pig as their God which is absolutely contrary to their basic belief as Muslims that there is only one God." Acquittal in the criminal case will not be an obstacle for the civil case to prosper unless in the criminal case the Court makes a finding that even civilly. where the civil case may be filed separately and proceed independently of the criminal case. Chi. ISSUE . 79583. entered into a contract with Nissho Co. This seems to be the spirit of the law when it decided to make these actions `entirely separate and distinct' from the criminal action. depending on the amount of the loan applied for. one of the kinds of crime mentioned in the aforecited provision. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.The article is not only an imputation of irreligious conduct but also a downright misrepresentation of the religious beliefs of Muslims. but on the fact of defamation.. Anacleto R. 1962: Philippine Rayon Mills. . the Phil Rayon ceased business operation. Against this letter of credit.R. 1(d) does not apply. Ltd. FACTS -August 8. the result of the criminal case. regardless of the result of the latter. and upon securities not commensurate with the amount of the loans. of Japan for textile machinery imported by the Philippine Rayon Mills. a civil action for damages. Civil Case No. causing wounded feelings and mental anguish to believers of Islam.00. Phil. while the others were not. for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Inc. The Phil Rayon was able to take delivery of the textile machineries and installed the same at its factory site at 69 Obudan Street. Phil Rayon's factory was leased by Yupangco Cotton Mills for an annual rental of P200. drafts were drawn and issued by Nissho. On December 29.PNB filed two civil actions to recover losses the bank suffered (Civil Case No. Inc. in manner characterized by negligence. the civil actions very clearly alleged fraud and negligence as having given rise to the cause of action averred in the complaints. . . the Prudential Bank indorsed the shipping documents to the Phil Rayon which accepted delivery of the same. by prior arrangement with the Prudential Bank. Hence in these cases. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. which fraud is positively and easily identifiable in the manner and scheme aforementioned. With this the bank filed a criminal action against Salta.torts & damages intentional tortious act causing mental distress to those whom private respondent IDCP represents.JUSTICE JBL REYES: “…in the case of an independent civil actions under the Civil Code.113 - prof. This is clearly illustrated in the case of swindling. would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action. . A2010 .” AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ [dissent] .Two cases involving the same issue disposed of by two judges in a manner directly in opposition of each other. Based on the same acts for which the criminal action was filed. Quezon City. which affirmed in toto the decision of CFI Quezon City in a civil action instituted by the petitioner for the recovery of a sum of money representing the amount paid by it to the Nissho Company Ltd. . the former denying the motion. casis . .That there was fraud committed by the defendant in granting the aforesaid loans which rendered him liable for his acts. which were all paid by the Prudential Bank through its correspondent in Japan. the two cases have been consolidated for a single decision. that the greatest sin in Islam is to worship things or persons other than Allah. the accused would not be liable. -Upon arrival of the machineries.Salta was an employee of the PNB assigned as Manager of the Malolos' branch. Rayon applied for and was granted a commercial letter of credit with the Prudential Bank and Trust Company in favor of Nissho. I think Rule 107 Sec. Ltd." DISPOSITION The decision of Justice De Veyra is affirmed. . In cases of defamation. -At the back of the trust receipt is a printed form to be accomplished by two sureties who.The offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature. of Japan for the importation of textile machineries under a five-year deferred payment plan. or only to recommend the granting of loans. and filed Motions to Dismiss in each of the two civil cases.Salta was acquitted in the criminal case. the Bank of Tokyo.000. it is made clear that the civil action permitted therein to be filed separately from the criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings "regardless of the result of the latter. No. by the very terms and conditions thereof. Chi. 74886 December 8. .The filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is fully warranted under the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code. the latter granting it. 1982 FACTS . WON a decision of acquittal in a criminal case operates to dismiss a separate civil action filed on the basis of the same facts as alleged in the criminal case (AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act). a specie of an offense committed by means of fraud. a trust receipt which was signed by Anacleto R. G. fraud. were to be jointly and severally liable to the Prudential Bank should the Phil Rayon fail to pay the total amount or any portion of the drafts issued by Nissho and paid for by Prudential Bank. it executed. 88343). This finding of fact establishes that petitioners have inflicted on private respondents an intentional wrongful act . To effect payment for said machineries. unlike other offenses not mentioned. SALTA V DE VEYRA 202 Phil 527 DE CASTRO. -Sometime in 1967. that they may be made the subject of a separate civil action because of the distinct separability of their respective juridical cause or basis of action. It is in the resolution of the motions to dismiss that Judges de Veyra and Purisima of the CFI of Manila took diametrically opposing views. PRUDENTIAL BANK V IAC (Philippine Rayon Mills & Anacleto Chi) 216 SCRA 257 DAVIDE. whether acquittal or conviction. regulations and policies of the respondent bank. Reasoning ART 33. Salta indiscriminately granted certain loans mentioned in the complaints filed by PNB. two of these drafts were accepted by the Phil Rayon through its president.It is significant to note that under Article 31 [11] of the New Civil Code. and.In disregard of the pertinent rules. represented by co-defendant Anacleto R. As indicated on their faces. Ratio The civil action permitted therein to be filed separately from the criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings "regardless of the result of the latter. .humiliating persons because of their religious beliefs. 1969.. The criminal case is for the prosecution of an offense the main element of which is fraud. To enable the Phil Rayon to take delivery of the machineries. fraud and manifest partiality. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. JR. HELD NO. may be brought by the injured party. Liability for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer. 1992 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of IAC. .. His duty was to grant loans. and physical injuries. For a uniform ruling that would authoritatively settle this regrettable conflict of opinion.Both RTC and CA found the article insulting and humiliating to Muslims.

. . however. There was nothing procedurally objectionable in impleading private respondent Chi as a co-defendant in the civil case for the collection of a sum of money. he shall only be liable for those costs incurred after being judicially required to pay.Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. 1965 FACTS . Interest and damages.000. 3. 3a.315. fraud and physical injuries. which are made liable for the civil liability arising from the criminal offense. also for damages. Defendant’s Defenses lack of cause of action. 2. the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civil action. 3. a contract of guaranty does not have to appear in a public document. -By his signing.623.384. However. Contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into. Presentment for acceptance is necessary only in the cases expressly provided for in Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL). casis enforce the civil liability arising therefrom against Philippine Rayon. Whether presentment for acceptance of the drafts was indispensable to make Philippine Rayon liable thereon. documents or instruments if they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa. NO. April 30. which. Private respondent Chi's signature in the dorsal portion of the trust receipt did not bind him solidarily with Philippine Rayon. Chi's liability is limited to the principal obligation in the trust receipt plus all the accessories thereof including judicial costs. association or other juridical entities. when the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or enforceable. . however. Estafa falls under fraud. the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras. -The obligation of the Phil Rayon arising from the letter of credit and the trust receipt remained unpaid and unliquidated. employees or other officials or persons therein responsible for the offense. or true intent of the solidary guaranty clause should be resolved against the petitioner since the trust receipt.e. partnership. Chi. 1974. . If he is a guarantor. that requirement is absolute and indispensable. WON he may be considered a guarantor 3b. these. It does not refer to the undertaking between either one or both of them on the one hand and the petitioner on the other with respect to the liability described under the trust receipt. may be brought by the injured party in cases of defamation. And even if these were not sight drafts. -And although it is true that the petitioner commenced a criminal action for the violation of the Trust Receipts Law. the failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods. . Reasoning Last sentence of the clause speaks of waiver of exhaustion. payable on demand. HELD: 1. -In the criminal case both the heirs of Capuno and the Estate of were represented by their respective counsel as private prosecutors: Attorney Ricardo Y.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs of Capuno under the Workmen's Compensation Act.The case arose from a vehicular collision. officers. drafts are sight drafts which do not require presentment for acceptance. A2010 . 2. or that it be proved in a certain way. under Article 1358 of the Civil Code. YES. Whether private respondent Chi is jointly and severally liable with Philippine Rayon for the obligation sought to be enforced 3a. It is based on trial convenience and is designed to permit the joinder of plaintiffs or defendants whenever there is a common question of law or fact. Whether Philippine Rayon is liable on the basis of the trust receipt. laches Lower Court’s Ruling Both the CFI and the IAC ruled that Philippine Rayon could be held liable for the two (2) drafts because only these appear to have been accepted by the latter after due presentment.. While the acknowledgement of a surety before a notary public is required to make the same a public document. no legal obstacle prevented it from enforcing the civil liability arising out of the trust.torts & damages The lease was renewed on January 3. declared liable on the 12 drafts in question and on the trust receipt. both courts concluded that acceptance of the drafts by Philippine Rayon was indispensable to make the latter liable thereon. Chi became the sole guarantor. it is these corporations. nevertheless. 1974 against the Phil Rayon and Anacleto R. shall run only from the date of the filing of the complaint. -This is the equity rule relating to multifariousness. YES. Elsewise stated. Section 6. 115: It is clear that if the violation or offense is committed by a corporation. which is a promise to answer for the debt or default of another. NO. It will save the parties unnecessary work. is ineffective in this case because the space therein for the party whose property may not be exhausted was not filled up. The parties herein agree. pursuant to Section 7 of the NIL. that the subject. Diokno and Augusto M. receipt in a separate civil action. If not. They are. it would be the petitioner — and not Philippine Rayon — which had to accept the same for the latter was not the drawee. prescription. SC’s own reading of the questioned solidary guaranty clause yields the conclusion that the obligation of Chi is only that of a guarantor.Included in the complaint was a claim for indemnity in the sum of P2.While the criminal case was pending. -Any doubt as to the import. As a matter of fact. . or some note or memorandum thereof. be in writing.114 - prof. i. WON the case should have been dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of action as there was no prior exhaustion of Philippine Rayon's properties. and the trial court explicitly ruled. Attorney's fees may even be allowed in appropriate cases. it would be unenforceable unless ratified. The information was subsequently amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of the three victims. Inc. should also be paid. ISSUES: 1. partnerships. Chi declared secondarily liable on the trust receipt. The attestation by witnesses and the acknowledgement before a notary public are not required by law to make a party liable on the instrument. associations. Philippine Rayon Mills. their liability is not divisible as between them. a civil action for damages. etc. 1973. Private respondent Anacleto R. the law merely requires that it. being accessories of the principal obligation. -Since that violation of a trust receipt constitutes fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code. -Reading Section 13 of PD No.00. all the textile machineries in the Phil Rayon's factory were sold to AIC Development Corporation for P300. trouble and expense. it can be enforced to its full extent against any one of them. Excussion is not a condition sine qua non for the institution of an action against a guarantor. Disposition Petition granted. provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. the penalty of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the directors. thereby necessitating acceptance. -The clause "we jointly and severally agree and undertake" refers to the undertaking of the two (2) parties who are to sign it or to the liability existing between themselves. Under Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law. -Under Article 33 of the Civil Code. in the CFI of Tarlac against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. Otherwise. petitioner was acting well within its rights in filing an independent civil action to CAPUNO V PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES MAKALINTAL. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. par. 3b. the present action for the collection of the principal amount of P956. with respect to the latter. together with the questioned solidary guaranty clause. documents or instruments covered by a trust receipt to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appear in the trust receipt or to return said goods. Navarro and Attorneys Jose W. is a contract of adhesion which must be strictly construed against the party responsible for its preparation. Repeated formal demands for the payment of the said trust receipt yielded no result Hence. On January 5.95 was filed on October 3. -However.The collision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers. In short. 1(b) of the RPC. Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on permissive joinder of parties explicitly allows it. Ilagan. With respect to a guaranty. punishable under the provisions of Art. NO.Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence in the CFI of Pampanga. The liability for the remaining ten (10) drafts did not arise because the same were not presented for acceptance.

it may be recalled. pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code. As a result of the collision. (1) that the action had already prescribed. . Cipriano Capuno. 1960. and (2) that on the part of the Estate of Buan its right to intervene in said case had been abated by the civil action. Section 2. 33. 1961 – Pending Paje’s appeal.December 23. 1960. In cases of defamation.But appellants' intervention was subsequently disallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's order to the effect.00 the Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages. the civil action for damages could have been commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent. .November 9. . Such reservation was not then necessary. Marcia died while two other people were physically injured. and (2) that appellees had been released from appellants' claim for damages by virtue of the payment to the latter of the sum of P2. the said rule does not apply in the present case. of the Revised Rules of Court which requires the reservation of the right to institute a separate and independent civil action in the cases provided for in Articles 31. Sarabia. in turn.December 29. 1962 – Paje filed a motion to dismiss the civil action on the ground that his acquittal barred the said action but the motion was denied. and the plain inference from the foregoing is that a verdict of acquittal must carry with it exemption from civil responsibility. they no longer had any interest to protect in the criminal case since they had already claimed and received compensation for the death of their decedent.000. 1969 NATURE Direct appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal FACTS . .As to whether or not Rule 111.115 - prof.This is the action which. and 2177 of the Civil Code affects the question of prescription. 31. RULING YES.The parties in the civil case entered into a "Compromise and Settlement. under the provisions of the Penal Code. without costs. including the claim for reimbursement of the sum of P2.The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing death. may be brought by the injured party. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. Quoting Chantangco vs. which read: ART. or after the lapse of more than five years. 33. No appeal was taken from either of the two orders. the defendants asked the court to rule on their special defense that plaintiffs' cause of action based upon a quasi-delict had prescribed considering that the complaint was brought four years and eleven months after the collision and ." . without having made it they could file — as in fact they did — a separate civil action even during the pendency of the criminal case.The Court approved the compromise and accordingly dismissed the case. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. Abaroai: “It is true that one of the plaintiffs in the present case reserved whatever right he may have had to bring a civil action. Grounds for the motion were (1) that as the Capuno heirs were concerned. such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. Elordi. the window and children of Marcia instituted the separate civil action for damages arising from the accident against Paje and Victory Liner. . The information therein.November 21. supra. praying that the defendants be jointly and severally liable. . and the same would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence.At that time the criminal case was still pending. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. that is. Prior thereto. July 31. Petitioners’ Claim > The petitioners claim that the Lower Court erred in acquitting Paje and that his acquittal was a bar to the civil action. ART. 1962 – Paje was acquitted by the appellate court. judgment was rendered wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the charges against him.There can be no doubt that the present action is one for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict.The grounds upon which appellees based their motion for dismissal and which the Court found to be "well taken" were. was dismissed by the Court a quo in its order of February 29. 1956 – Felardo Paje was driving a Victory Liner bus.Appellants originally sought to enforce their claim exdelicto. . 32. But the complaint here was filed only on September 26. which sum. from which order the present appeal has been taken. Marcia’s heirs reserved their right to institute a separate civil action against Paje.In view of the filing of the civil action the accused Jon Elordi moved to strike out the appearances of these private prosecutors in the criminal case. when they intervened in the criminal case against Jon A2010 . "the institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict. fraud. 1958 the criminal case was still pending. saying that the collision was purely an accident. herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. . Pampanga. for otherwise that action would have been premature and in any event would have been concluded by the subsequent judgment of acquittal in the criminal case. a civil action for damages. -The appearance and intervention of Attorneys Diokno and Ilagan was disallowed by the Court and that of Attorney Navarro was disallowed in an amending order. as held in Paulan v.torts & damages .” Respondents’ Comments: > At the pre-trial of the civil case. which action must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146.The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants' contention that the four-year period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither waived the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately.00 previously paid to the heirs of Capuno "under the Workmen's Compensation Act." For P290. 1958. . was amended precisely to include an allegation concerning damages suffered by the heirs of the victims of the accident for which Elordi was being prosecuted. ." . CORPUS V PAJE 28 SCRA 1062 CAPISTRANO. and consequently. upon appellees' motion. . ISSUE WON the action had already prescribed. . showing that appellants then chose to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code. . was sought to be recovered by the said Estate from appellees in Civil Case No. Civil Code).623. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony.And when they commenced the civil action on September 26. In other words. .In filing the civil action as they did appellants correctly considered it as entirely independent of the criminal action.An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against Paje. inasmuch as there resulted a judgment for the defendant. and physical injuries. Paje was later found guilty on November 7. casis 34. .623. DISPOSTIION The order appealed from was affirmed. 838 but finally settled by them in their compromise. This was obviously of no avail. It collided with a jeepney driven by Clemente Marcia in Lubao.00 by the Buan Estate under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

because the terms used with the latter are general terms. or even death" **(end of obiter) . The lower court ruled that the action had already prescribed. A . the offended party Carmen L. Other civil actions arising from offenses. which states that reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative. — In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately. it is to be borne in mind that the charge against Felardo Paje was for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. which the respondent judge granted on the basis of Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court16 ISSUE WON a civil action for damages may be instituted pending the resolution of a criminal case HELD YES . It includes not only physical injuries but consummated. DULAY V CA (SAFEGUARD. or frustrated homicide... and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. as the Code Commission states. Independent civil action. Rules of Court.In People vs. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. and this recommendation must hove been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article intact as recommended. without special pronouncement as to costs. not the result thereof. . or attempted homicide. but in their generic sense.) . is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes the institution of an independent civil action.The defendant filed a motion to dismiss. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. Madeja reserved her right to file a separate civil action for damages .Homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party reserved. the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries." 2.DR. may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case. SUPERGUARD) 243 SCRA 220 BIDIN. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. 3. Paje. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting. . not the crime of physical injuries. .Sec. CC) and began to run on the day the quasi-delict was committed.Although in the case of Dyogi vs. the Court ruled that the action had indeed prescribed because the prescription period was pegged at 4 years (A1146. A2010 . fraud. alleging that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. 141 is hereby set aside.” .In any case the Code Commission recommended that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in American Law. April 3. December 21. EVA A. Eva A.' Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein. 2. 'fraud' and 'physical injuries. 1995 . 33. so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines. . Madeja sued Dr. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. . The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act. In cases of defamation. provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. that is. Carmen L.There are at least two things about Art. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. the order appealed from is affirmed. ISSUE WON the civil action against Paje can still prosper despite his acquittal HELD NO Ratio Criminal negligence. if intentionally done.In the information. namely: MADEJA V CARO 211 PHIL 469 ABAD SANTOS. a civil action for damages. fraud. and not for homicide and physical injuries.) Obiter . it is evident that the terms 'physical injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code. (estafa) and physical injuries. Of eleven justices only nine took part in the decision and four of them merely concurred in the result. Japzon. This is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution. Buan." (Rule 111. the order dismissing Civil Case No. Yatco this Court held that the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 of the Civil Code includes homicide.The Article in question uses the words 'defamation'. Reasoning . would be punishable as a felony. the term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury. but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. . Disposition Petition is granted. 33. With this in mind. reckless imprudence. of an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages. frustrated and attempted homicide. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery.With regard to the issue of prescription. the Court ruled that the “offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that. for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article-some in their general and another in its technical sense. JAPZON was accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.Art. Thearticle mentions only the crimes of defamation. . casis 1. (Civil Code.The criminal case still pending.In other words. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31. Disposition PREMISES CONSIDERED. that is. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto.Section 2.Corpus vs. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision. 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. may be brought by the injured party. Petition seeking to set aside the order of the CFI dismissing the civil case against Japzon FACTS .116 - prof. 32. Japzon for damages. which shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderance of evidence. 1983 NATURE 16 Sec.torts & damages that according to Article 1144 of the Civil Code an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years. . and physical injuries.

Maria Benita Dulay. Therefore. negotiation on the division of assets was left pending. 1948. 33. whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. discussed the balance sheets of CALI. casis FACTS . reserves his right to institute it separately. Mr. > that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Art 2176 (the one filed by petitioners) cannot lie. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code.In the cases provided for in Articles 32. CALI”s President of Board of Directors. . 33. 34. Auditor of CALI. . .Although in the Marcia case.It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation. 1956 NATURE Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila be brought by the offended party. 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.Aug 9. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated. offered to Fitzgerald CALI’s Douglas C-54 plane. . shall proceed independently of the criminal action.I. Inc. . and informed them that CALI was in a state of insolvency and had to stop operation.440. a civil action based on Article 33 lies. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Alfredo Velayo. regarding the proposed sale to PAL of the aviation equipment of CALI. Institution of criminal and civil actions. is charged with homicide. The management of CALI announced that in case of non-agreement of the creditors. Desmond Fitzgerald. . while the negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury. had to be decided by Stephen Crawford and later by Wildred Wooding . Santiago). Then followed a discussion on the payment of claims of creditors and the preferences claimed for the accounts due to employees. or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. When a criminal action is instituted. and Atty. Respondent: > that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties. In cases of defamation. Carandang v. and damages under Articles 32. Thus. Art. The other creditors disputed such contention of preference. October 31. Shell’s Credit Manager was in charge of collecting payment.58 in its favor for goods it sold and delivered to CALI. that Torzuela. Alexander Sycip. Caro). management of CALI informally convened its principal creditors in a luncheon.. IAC. Shell effected a telegraphic transfer of all its credit against CALI to the American Corporation Shell Oil Co.162. INTENTIONAL TORTS VELAYO V SHELL CO OF THE PHILS 100 PHIL 186 FELIX." .Since the start of Commercial Air Line. . (Shell). This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. since the civil liability under Art 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Art 365 of the RPC..As of August 1948. not with reckless imprudence. and the National Airports Corp. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. it would file insolvency proceedings. Atty. the independent civil-action which has been reserved may . Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Art 2176 > that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Art 3317 and Section 3.. Alfonso Sycip.. assigning its credit amounting to $79. Dulay.. Ltd. Shell’s books showed a balance of P170. fraud. alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. in this case.Benigno Torzuela. its fuel needs were all supplied by Shell Company of the P." and Atty. However. the accused in the case at bar. Fitzgerald of Shell. a security guard on duty at the "Big Bang sa Alabang. > that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability. > that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 > that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence 18 Rule 111. widow of Dulay. which were to preserve the assets of CALI and to study the way of making a fair division of all the assets among the creditors.On the same day (Aug 9). Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code. unless the offended party waives the civil action. and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. and attempted homicide (Madeja v. 33. Alexander Sycip were appointed to the working committee. Secretary of the Board of Directors of CALI. the civil liability is governed by Art 100 of the RPC. however. > that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed (Marcia v CA) Petitioner > the incident resulting in the death of Dulay was due to the concurring negligence of the defendants. it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence.The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. (SAFEGUARD) and/or Superguard Security Corp..torts & damages FACTS . This was followed on Aug 10 by ISSUE WON civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action HELD YES . Torzuela's wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury.Those present in the meeting were of the unanimous opinion that it would be advantageous not to present suits against CALI but to strive for a fair pro-rata division of its assets. frustrated. . (SUPERGUARD). explained the memorandum agreement executed by CALI with Phil Air Lines Inc on Aug 4. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. Agcaoili of National Airports Corp. Torzuela shot and killed Atty. When civil action may proceed independently .There was a general understanding among all creditors present on the desirability of consummating the sale in favor of PAL. The balance sheet made mention of the Douglas C-54 plane. which was then in California. a civil action for damages. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court18 17 A2010 .Aug 6. 3.117 - prof. filed an action for damages against Torzuela and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co. Any extensions of term of payment. Inc.Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: "Sec 1. and physical injuries. .Sec. No understanding was reached on the matter of preference of payment and it was then generally agreed that the matter be further studied by a working committee to be formed. the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. Shell had reasons to believe that the financial condition of Shell was far from being satisfactory. citing Andamo v. and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed w/ deliberate intent (dolo). may be brought by the injured party. working committee discussed methods of achieving objectives. it must be noted however. Inc’s (CALI) operations. the Government. Napoleon Dulay had an altercation. 1948. The offer was declined by Crawford.

he is chargeable therewith. Court denied petition because whether the conveyance of Shell’s credit was fraudulent or not. The same result. of the P. 1948. ISSUES 1. USA. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals.. such declaration is implemented by Article 21 of the Civil Code. Shell must answer for damages. . or having reason to believe that insolvency proceedings are about to be commenced. 2. one by one. Shell did not have any vested or acquired right to betray confidence of CALI or of its creditors. . chattels. plus miscellaneous personal properties. National Airports Corp learned of Shell’s action in the US and hastened to file its own complaint with attachment against CALI in the CFI of Manila. embezzles or disposes of ay money. but so far no definite agreement had been reached. and much less from a foreign corporation to the detriment of Philippine Government and local business. . . to the detriment and prejudice of other CALI creditors who were consequently deprived of their share in the distribution of said value 2. .torts & damages a deed of assignment of credit amounting to $85.Section 37 of the Insolvency Law states Sec 37. however. confidence and trust of other creditors of CALI present in said meeting by affecting a hasty telegraphic transfer of its credit to the American corporation Shell Oil Company. casis scheme. Inc. and if so. Ltd. they may be given retroactive effect. Defendant’s Comments > Assignment of credit in favor of American Shell was for valuable consideration and made in accordance with established commercial practices > It has no interest in the case instituted by American Shell. for the benefit of CALI and its creditors.Code Commission on Article 21: (it) would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. Alfredo Velayo was appointed Assignee in the proceedings. it could not get much of its outstanding credit because of the preferred claims of other creditors. as it is contented that what Shell really disposed of was its own credit and not CALI’s property. having notice of the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency.There are doubts. the Phil court would not be in a position to enforce its orders as against the American corporation Shell Oil Co. Moreover.Dec 22. as they are separate and distinct corporations. Any person must. acted in bad faith and betrayed the A2010 . give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. . 1948 American Shell Oil Co filed a complaint against CALI in the Superior Court of the State of California.Shell’s transfer of credit would have been justified only if Fitzgerald had declined to take part in the working committee and frankly and honestly informed the other creditors present that he had no authority to bind his principal and that the latter was to be left free to collect its credit from CALI by whatever means his principal deemed wise and were available to it. Mr. with much more reason that Shell should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of confidence. 1957 Defendant-appellee’s contentions . according to Art 2254 of Civil Code. ..Unaware of Shell’s assignment of credit.. may be achieved in applying the provisions of the Civil Code. 1948 CALI filed a petition for voluntary insolvency.Aug 12. CALI on Aug 12. Shell acted in bad faith. .Oct 7. Shell may be made to answer for the damages. .” Disposition Shell is liable to pay plaintiff.The telegraphic transfer made without knowledge and at the back of other creditors of CALI may be a shrewd and surprise move that enabled Shell to collect almost all if not the entire amount of its credit. to be received for the benefit of the insolvent estate. If any person. Article 19 of the Civil Code provides Art 19. all wrongs which cause damage. upon learning the precarious economic situation of CALI and that will all probability. USA. the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited.081.Velayo instituted case against Shell for the purpose of securing writ of injunction restraining Shell from prosecuting against CALI. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties. But then. Inc. which states Art 21. and liable to an action by the assignee for double the value of the property sought to be embezzled or disposed of.29. WON Shell Co. .First week of Sept 1948. Sept 17. . and another equal sum as exemplary damages. July 30. “no vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the right of others.081. the amount of such damages HELD 1.. and as an alternative. . which is outside the jurisdiction of the Phils. WON by reason of said betrayal of confidence and trust. thus defeating the purpose of the informal meetings of CALI’s principal creditors and depriving the plaintiff of the means of obtaining the plane. (It) is a prudent earnest of justice in the face of the impossibility of enumerating. or effects of the insolvent.I.29 and a supplemental attachment for a higher sum against the C-54 plane. without knowing the purpose for which it was called. or its value.”. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. that Shell be ordered to pay damages double the value of the plane if the case in the US will defeat the procurement of CALI of its plane. goods.440. 1950. . YES. although this was practically the effect and result of the VELAYO V SHELL CO OF THE PHILS RESOLUTION 100 PHIL 207 FELIX. compensatory damages a sum equivalent to the value of the plane at the time Shell assigned its credit to American Shell.It is evident that Shell. 1948 an amended complaint was filed to recover assigned credit of $85. 1948 approved the memorandum agreement of sale to PAL. act with justice. .118 - prof. Art 2252 of Civil Code provides by implication that when new provisions of the Code does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation. however. YES. and noted that “the Board had been trying to reach an agreement with creditors… to prevent insolvency proceedings. and a writ of attachment was applied for and issued against a C-54 plane. taking advantage of its knowledge of the existence of CALI’s airplane C-54 at California. for the collection of assigned credit of $79. Fitzgerald could not have officially represented Shell because authority resides on Crawford. Lower court dismissed the case. An order of insolvency was issued by the court on the same day.Plaintiff confined his action to the recovery of damages against Shell. such information would have dissolved all attempts to come to an amicable conciliation and would have precipitated the filing of CALI’s voluntary insolvency proceedings and nullified the intended transfer of Shell’s credit to American Shell.If Article 23 of Civil Code goes as far as to provide that “Even if an act or event causing damage to another’s property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant. .While Art 19 contains a mere declaration of principles. > Fitzgerald was merely invited to the luncheonmeeting.” . before the assignment is made. entirely disregarded all moral inhibitory tenets.Anent the argument that Civil Code provisions cannot be applicable as they came into effect only on Aug 30. but the Court of Justice (SC) cannot countenance such attitude at all. as to the applicability of this provision.

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- It is not guilty of bad faith, it having done nothing but to protect legitimately its own interest or credit against the bad faith of its debtor, the insolvent CALI, under the control of the latter’s president Alfonso Sycip - The transfer of credit to its sister corporation in the US did not prejudice the Government, because its claims were fully paid, not caused any loss or injury to other creditors, except the entities and groups controlled by Alfonso Sycip. It is not liable for exemplary damages because the provisions of the new Civil Code on the matter are not applicable to this case - Plaintiff-appellant has no cause of action against it and is not the real party in interest - Plaintiff’s right of action was based and prosecuted in the lower court under the provisions of the Insolvency Law and consequently he is stopped from pursuing another theory and is not entitled to damages under the provisions of the new Civil Code. HELD - The facts on which Court based its conclusion that Shell acted in bad faith are not and cannot be denied or contradicted by defendant. - There is no sensible reason for disturbing the finding that Shell is liable for exemplary damages. The amount of the award, however, may be modified. - According to the Civil Code, exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages, and that the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, for it is left to the sound discretion of the Court. - Majority of the Court is of the opinion that the value of the C-54 plane might result too high, and that exemplary damages should not be left to speculation but properly determined by a certain and fixed amount. The amount of exemplary damages is thus modified, and fixed at P25,000.

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she was terminated from the service by Saudia without being informed of the cause. - She then filed a complaint for damages against Saudia and Mr. Al-Balawi, its country manager. Saudia filed a motion to dismiss raising the issues of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss by Saudia, as well as the subsequent MFR. Saudia then filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO with the CA. The CA issued a TRO prohibiting respondent judge from conducting any proceeding unless otherwise directed. The CA, however, in another resolution, denied Saudia’s prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. Saudia then filed to the SC this instant petition. However, during the pendency of this petition, respondent CA rendered a decision that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the Amended Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is Art.21 CC, thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court. ISSUES 1. WON Morada had a cause of action 2. Which law should govern (Phil. Law or Saudi Law) HELD 1. YES - She aptly predicated her cause of action on Art.19 and Art.21 of the CC. As held in PNB v CA, “the aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold no. of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.” Although Art.19 merely declares a principle of law, Art.21 gives flesh to its provisions. Reasoning - After a careful study of the pleadings, We are convinced that there is reasonable basis for private respondent’s assertion that although she was already working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the two crew members for the attack on her person. As it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition. - There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that in “handing over” or “turning over” the person of private respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its duties as employer. Petitioner’s purported act contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V CA (MORADA) 297 SCRA 469 QUISUMBING; October 8, 1998
NATURE Petition for certiorari to annul and set aside CA resolution and decision FACTS - Private respondent Milagros Morada was a flight attendant of Petitioner Company. During a stop-over in Jakarta, she went to a disco with 2 of her fellow crew members Thamer and Allah (both surnamed Al-

Gazzawi) and had breakfast in their hotel room. While there, Allah left and Thamer attempted to rape her. She was saved by hotel security personnel who heard her cries for help. She later filed a case against them. The two were arrested and detained by Jakarta police. When Morada returned to Jeddah (the base of operations of petitioner), she was asked to go to Jakarta to arrange for the release of the two men. She proceeded to Jakarta but she refused to cooperate. She was eventually allowed to return to Jeddah but barred from Jakarta flights. The Indonesian authorities eventually deported the 2 men, through the intercession of the Saudi govt., after 2 weeks of detention. They were put back in service while respondent Morada was transferred to Manila. - 2 years later, she was asked by her superiors to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of Saudia, in Jeddah. When they met, he brought her to the police station where her passport was taken and she was questioned about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy merely stood as the police put pressure on her to drop the case against the two men. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch a later flight out of Jeddah. - A year and a half later, she was again asked to go to Jeddah to see Miniewy. When she did, a certain Khalid of Saudia brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. She was told that it was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, she signed a document to appear before the court a week later. When the date of appearance came, she complied but only after being assured by Saudia’s Manila manager that the investigation was routinary and posed no danger to her. She was brought before the court and was interrogated by a Saudi judge and let go, however, just as she was about to board a plane home, she was told that she had been forbidden to take flight. She was later told to remain in Jeddah and her passport was again confiscated. A few days later, she was again brought before the same court where the Saudi judge, to her astonishment and shock, sentenced her to 5 months imprisonment and 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah for what happened in Jakarta. The court found her guilty of adultery; going to a disco, dancing and listening to music in violation of Islamic laws; and socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition. - Facing conviction, she sought help from her employer, petitioner Saudia but she was denied assistance of any kind. She asked the Phil. Embassy to help her. Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila,

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prosecution of private respondent under the guise of petitioner’s authority as employer, taking advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment of Morada was wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person and reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redress for the wrongs done, once duly proven. 2. Philippine Law Ratio Choice of law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing. Reasoning - Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the “connecting factor” or “point of contact” could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, “act with justice, give her due and observe honesty and good faith.” Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view, what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged according to the private respondent. All told, it is not without basis to identify the Phil. as the situs of the alleged tort. - In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, We find here an occasion to apply the “State of the most significant relationship” rule, which should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of the case. In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (A) the place where the injury occurred; (B) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (C) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and; (D) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

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anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime report reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results. - Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies petitioners filed a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial documents, later amended to just estafa. - Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four of which were for estafa while the fifth was for of Art.290 of' RPC (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence). - All of the 6 criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. - In the meantime, Tobias received a notice from petitioners that his employment has been terminated. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. - Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision and dismissed the complaint. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President. - Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company. However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. - Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. - Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during the hearings. - The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Tobias by ordering petitioners to pay him P80,000.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs. - CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. ISSUE WON petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent HELD YES Ratio Art.19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore,

- As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that the over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Phils. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged in international air carriage business here. Thus, the “relationship” between the parties was centered here. Disposition petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. Civil case entitled “Milagros Morada v Saudi Arabia Airlines” REMANDED to RTC

GLOBE MACKAY V CA 176 SCRA 778 CORTES; August 25, 1989
NATURE An appeal from the decision of CA FACTS - Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager. - GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos. According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive VP and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY. - one day after Tobias made the report, Hendry confronted him by stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys. - when Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, Hendry went up to him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies. - the Manila police investigators cleared Tobias of participation in the anomalies. - Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator who submitted a report finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be conducted. - Nevertheless, Hendry issued a memo suspending Tobias from work preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him. - the Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged

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recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Reasoning - One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order." Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. - But while Art.19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. - Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that: Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. - However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that: Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. - In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. - the Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.

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malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias. - It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing several actionable tortious acts. Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the circumstances. - Petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of damnum absque injuria. It is argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage that private respondent could have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed from his employment, which was a valid and legal act of the defendants-appellants. According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable. This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners. - Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled that moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. - Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. The nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter. Disposition petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

- An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. - The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee. - Several other tortious acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from work: Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling him to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." - The threat unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity - The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code. - Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias. While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights, the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith. Considering the haste in which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by

ALBENSON V CA BIDIN; January 11, 1993
NATURE Petition assailing the decision of respondent CA which modified the judgment of the RTC and ordered petitioner to pay private respondent moral damages and attorney's fees. FACTS - Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. the mild steel plates

torts & damages which the latter ordered. moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages. the check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed. Baltao. When presented for payment. which received the goods in payment of which the bouncing check was issued is owned by respondent. Woodworks. anyone who. depends on the circumstances of each case. contending that the attorney’s fees charged were unconscionable and that the agreed sum was only P11. Hence. Rizal. including the house of the Gutierrez spouses. The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty. The presence of probable cause signifies. The case was dismissed by the CFI on 7 November 1977. Woodworks. 2001 FACTS . a son of plaintiff. the CA set aside the lower court’s ruling and ordered petitioner to pay respondents P250. Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and had ceased to exist as a corporation since 1975.They failed to pay. which was granted by the same. in the exercise of his legal right or duty. private respondent has a namesake. resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law. In filing said information. AMONOY V GUTIERREZ 351 SCRA 731 PANGANIBAN. the lower court observed that "the check is drawn against the account of "E. causes damage to another.600. upon verification with the drawee bank. The heirs opposed.Amonoy was the counsel of therein Francisca Catolos. Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Woodworks.00 as value of the harvests. . was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao". 3) and it is done with intent to injure. Amonoy was ordered to return said properties to the rightful owners. Considering that Guaranteed. Upon a judgment on merits later on. .Thus. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores. Woodworks.Petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. As they were not able to . 1989.L. 1993 Decision. but the latter failed to do so and therefore. the absence of malice. Albenson was advised that the signature appearing on the subject check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao. Albenson was informed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry that E. Agnes Catolos. was deemed to have waived his right.From the records of the SEC. On appeal. The possibility is that it was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio Baltao III. and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on 22 July 1981." not of Guaranteed Industries of which plaintiff used to be President.575. this recourse.00 secured by the mortgage. for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. the act must be intentional. respondent Baltao filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises.92. On Amonoy’s motion of 24 April 1986. Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given Eugenio S. his son Eugenio Baltao III. a single proprietorship business. In its decision." ISSUE WON private respondent's cause of action is not one based on malicious prosecution but one for abuse of rights under Article 21 of the CC HELD A2010 . Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated respondent Baltao. . P11. (2) which is exercised in bad faith.00 as another round of attorney’s fees.L. . the Orders of 25 April 1986 and 6 May 1986 were issued for the demolition of structures in the said lots. . a Complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their house was filed by respondents against petitioner before the RTC on December 15. or public policy. Baltao to replace and/or make good the dishonored check. The heirs sought the annulment of the auction sale. good custom. Asuncion Pasamba died on 24 February 1969 while Alfonso Fornilda passed away on 2 July 1969. supposedly in accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court. was one "Eugenio S.122 - prof. the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates. on 21 January 1970 Amonoy filed for their foreclosure before the CFI of Pasig.00 and drawn against the account of E. Baltao. Albenson made an extrajudicial demand upon private respondent Eugenio S. Disposition petition is GRANTED and the decision of the CA is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. its owner. which was also denied. 2) but which is contrary to morals. Thus. as a legal consequence. Failing in that. its employee. In its January 27. In addition. shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby.Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S. however. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction." . respondents’ house had already been destroyed.L." After obtaining the foregoing information. He found that the signature on the check is not the signature of Eugenio S. Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed. the CFI on 25 July 1985 issued a Writ of Possession and pursuant to which a notice to vacate was made on 26 August 1985. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith. Private respondent. the said lots were foreclosed. claiming ignorance of the complaint against him. with the very same business address as Guaranteed. But on 28 September 1972 judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay within 90 days the P27. But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the above-mentioned Decision. his clients executed real estate mortgages on their lands and the house thereon. Baltao for Violation of BP 22. E. and P9. . Amonoy was the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale. What prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of BP 22 against private respondent was their failure to collect the amountdue on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private respondent. However. (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Thereafter. Jesse Yap.L.000 as actual damages.695." Upon further inquiry. public order. immediately filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation. petitioner acted in good faith and probable cause in filing the complaint before the provincial fiscal. . who manages a business establishment. and that is. . On 6 February 1973. Baltao. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration. and Benjamin Mendiona. Reasoning . As part payment thereof. did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand. There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21. casis pay.Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him. the RTC dismissed respondents’ suit. . Among the heirs of the latter was his daughter. He won the case for them and charged P27600 as attorney’s fees.645.Because his attorney’s fees thus secured by the two lots were not paid. that the defendants may have been dealing with . whether willfully or negligently. the two (2) lots would be sold at public auction.The Gutierrez spouses sought a restraining order from the Supreme Court. . and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting evidence. ISSUE WON Amonoy may properly invoke damnum absque injuria in this case since at the time of the demolition he had color of authority over said properties HELD NO NO Ratio The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated. Albenson was given a check in the amount of P2.880. plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez. Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda.

sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. together with the absence of all information or belief of facts. though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another. in the availment of one’s rights. especially to the prejudice of others. contrary to law. act with justice. .470. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. . but an invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when he received the TRO from this Court on June 4. casis the latter arose out of his own negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned the result of his removal exam. These standards are the following: to act with justice.He filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade but got a grade of five (5). Had he not insisted on completing the demolition. Over and above the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice x x x. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life.00 for moral damages . it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students. the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. therefore. His name also appeared in the invitation for the graduation as one of the candidates for graduation. Schools and professors cannot just take observe honesty and good faith. and to A2010 . Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another. even though the forms and technicalities of the law. ISSUE WON an educational institution may be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case HELD YES . it is not permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others.Petitioner invokes this legal precept in arguing that he is not liable for the demolition of respondents’ house. He maintains that he was merely acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC. Jader later learned of the deficiency and he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examination. give everyone his due. that their fellowmen. Art. The law. based on the Certificate of Service of the Supreme Court process server. he was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition. cannot be said to have acted in good faith. and it disappears when it is abused.123 - prof. Thus.” . .torts & damages Ratio Damnum absque injuria may not be invoked by a person who claims to exercise a right but does so in an abusive manner violative of Article 19 of the Civil Code.UE denied liability arguing that it never led respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating students. particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams. and he who violates them violates the law.UE had a contractual obligation to inform his students as to whether or not they have met all the requirements for the conferment of a degree. may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. By then. Every person who.A commentator on this topic explains: “The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears. Damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case. he sued UE for damages.000.He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student . their continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties. respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the RTC. known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights. Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outset. But the records show that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). .TC rendered judgment in favor of the Jader and ordered UE to pay Jader P35. more specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which states: Art. is repugnant to the modern concept of social law.Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.Jader was enrolled in the UE College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. . recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise. . Every person must. wilfully or negligently causes damage to another. however. 1986 under the authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. .UE elevated the case to this Court on a petition for review arguing that it has no liability to respondent Romeo A. 2000 FACTS . and observe honesty and good faith. that a copy of the TRO was served on petitioner himself on June 4. would render the transaction unconscientious. when they act affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that those with whom they deal in the general course of society will act in good faith. Indeed.Considering that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which is engaged in legal education. petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents’ house on May 30. We agree with the CA that he unlawfully pursued the demolition of respondents’ house well until the middle of 1987. He failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade . one must Reasoning . enjoining the demolition of respondents’ house. his name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation with an annotation regarding his deficiencies.CA Affirmed and added an award of P50. 19. his actions were tainted with bad faith. February 17. Jader. to give everyone his due. It cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another x x x. UE in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination. For this reason. a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible” UE V JADER 325 SCRA 804 YNARES-SANTIAGO. 1986. was issued by the Supreme Court on June 2.We reject this submission. did not heed the TRO of this Court. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. . considering that the proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by . A right. shall indemnify the latter for the same.In the mean time. At the foot of the list of the names of the candidates there appeared however an annotation saying that it was a tentative list and that degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily complete requirements as stated in the University Bulletin . 20.00 . his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right. Indubitably. 1986. Verily. Jader attended the graduation and brought his family with him. He took a leave of absence without pay from his job and enrolled at the pre-bar review class. 1986. . men must be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury – that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them. The CA also found. Consequently.True.Petitioner.In civilized society.Article 19. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society.

It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.1m. GARCIANO V CA 212 SCRA 436 GRIÑO-AQUINO. Esteria F.8m). he through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right. but Barons still did not pay. it was stipulated that an interest of 12% would be imposed." and that "any letter or notice of termination received by you before this date has no sanction or authority by the Board of Directors of this Institution. 1982. filed a complaint for recovery of the P3. therefore it is declared null and void.Barons admitted the purchase of the wires and cables. Branch XI. . Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. morals. Cebu. but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. 1992 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint for damages filed by the petitioner against the private respondents." . 1982. and some teachers allegedly threatened to resign en masse. and prayed for atty’s fees of 25% of the amt. on July 7.B. They were simply exercising their right of free speech or their right to dissent from the Board's decision. . As such dealer.8m plus interest. secretary. the school's founder. Barons purchased on credit wires and cables worth P4. did not make them liable to her for damages. Sotero Garciano (for she was still abroad). she applied for an indefinite leave of absence because her daughter was taking her to Austria where her daughter was employed. the president. Barons was given 60 days credit for its purchases of Phelp’s products. the members of the Board of Directors of the school. Petitioner cannot just give out its student’s grades at any time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking the bar. 1982. or morals. If mere fault or negligence in one’s acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby. even when the act is not illicit. thereby questioning the integrity of the Board's decision". petitioner filed a complaint for damages in the Regional Trial Court.Phelps Dodge appointed Barons Marketing as one of its dealers of electrical wires and cables. graduate. when he acts with prudence and in good faith. has reacted acidly to the Board's deliberations for the reinstatement of Mrs. Wiertz.On June 1. The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right. the former are useless.On September 3. Wiertz disagreed with the Board's decision to retain her. as ordered by the school's Board of Directors. or before the school year ended. August 10. Emerito O. against Fr. February 9. they actually did nothing to physically prevent her from reassuming her post. Emerito Labajo.Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to the delayed relay of information to respondent. and three members of the Board of Directors. but disputed the amt claimed by Phelps. that is. Upon her return from Austria in the later part of June. informing her of the decision of Fr. 1998 NATURE Petition for review decision of CA FACTS . with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. Joseph Wiertz. and exemplary damages amounting to P100k.The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner's discontinuance from teaching was her own choice. On Sept1987. She made inquiries from the school about the matter and. It failed to act seasonably. That the school principal and Fr. Phelps sent several demands.torts & damages students for granted and be indifferent to them. to terminate her services as a member of the teaching staff because of: (1) the absence of any written contract of employment between her and the school due to her refusal to sign one. CA affirmed (with modification. They did not "illegally dismiss" her for the Board's decision to retain her prevailed. even if true. Garciano. Consequently.From Dec1986 to Aug1987. and approved by the President of the school's Board of Directors. good customs or public policy. . 1982. Labajo. . Barons paid P300k (thereby leaving an unpaid account of P3. and (2) the difficulty of getting a substitute for her on a temporary basis as no one would accept the position without a written contract. whatever loss she may have incurred in the form of lost earnings was self-inflicted.Phelps. In the sales invoice.Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. When one of two innocent parties must suffer. ISSUE WON the defendants prevented the petitioner from reporting to the school and thus making them liable for damages HELD NO . ordering Barons to pay the debt and interest of 12% and awarding 25% as atty’s fees. . effective July 5. Volenti non fit injuria. but she did not comply with that order. for without the latter. willful or negligent acts that are contrary to law. Their acts were not contrary to law. .The petitioner was hired to teach during the 1981-82 school year in the Immaculate Concepcion Institute in the Island of Camotes. Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable. While the respondents admittedly wanted her BARONS MARKETING V CA (PHELPS DODGE PHILS) 286 SCRA 96 KAPUNAN.124 - prof. resigned their positions from the Board "for the reason that the ICI Faculty. It instead wrote Phelps requesting if it could pay the outstanding account in monthly installments of P500k plus 1% interest. . The application was recommended for approval by the school principal. 1982. Joseph Wiertz. 1982. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. . 20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises only from unlawful. A2010 . . Ratio Liability for damages under Articles 19. She was ordered to report for work on July 5. FACTS . 1982. good customs or public policy. she received the letter informing her that her services at the Immaculate Concepcion Institute had been terminated. casis service terminated. Emerito Labajo addressed a letter to the petitioner through her husband. and some members of the faculty of the school for discrimination and unjust and illegal dismissal. plus 25% for atty’s fees and collection. signed a letter notifying her that she was "reinstated to report and do your usual duties as Classroom Teacher . vice president. concurred in by the president of the Parent-Teachers Association and the school faculty.On July 9. On January 13. instead of responding to the request of Barons. with the exception of Fr. The RTC rendered decision in favor of Phelps. out of a membership of nine (9). which it in turn supplied to MERALCO. reducing . 1982. Petitioner’s liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the course.

the contract expressly provided for the imposition of the 12% interest plus 25% for attorney’s fees and A2010 . give everyone his due. and Barons should not be liable for atty’s fees.32.Atty.December 16.May 7. within 5 days from receipt thereof or face court action and also to replace the postdated check with cash within the same period or face criminal suit for violation of Bouncing Check Law . . act with justice.00. 1990 . head of the collection department of defendant was formally informed of the postdated check about a week later.00 which would include his future bills. and observe honesty and good faith.00 as exemplary damages. It is plain to see that what we have here is a mere exercise of rights. WON Barons should be liable for interest and atty’s fees HELD 1. Phelps was driven by legitimate reasons for rejecting Barons offer. It merely wanted to avoid a situation wherein its cash position would be compromised. atty’s fees should be reduced to 10% Disposition CA decision modified WRT atty’s fees but AFFIRMED in other respects BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION V CA (MARASIGAN) 296 SCRA 260 KAPUNAN.000. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties. alleging that Phelps should have been held guilty of “creditor’s abuse of rights”. One of his guests. and P 20. Barons is bound to pay the said amounts. Mr.November 28.CA: AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION P50. the inclusion of Art.MARASIGAN was a complimentary member of BECC from February 1988 to February 1989 and was issued Credit Card with a credit limit of P3. .987.BPI served MARASIGAN a letter by ordinary mail informing him of the temporary suspension of the privileges of his credit card and the inclusion of his account number in their Caution List. a co-employee who handles the account of the plaintiff. and was threatening to suspend his credit card. the mere exercise of a right cannot be said to be an abuse of right. 1989 despite assurance to the contrary by defendant's personnel-in-charge. Marasigan’s credit card was dishonored. 1989.December 12.final demand by BPI requiring him to pay in full his overdue account. 1989. not an abuse thereof. there must be no intention to injure another.000. otherwise the necessary court action shall be filed to hold defendant responsible for the humiliation and embarrassment suffered by him . especially a profit-oriented one like Phelps.There is no showing that the plaintiff received this letter before December 8. since 25% if P4. 2989 .19 in the CC: Every person must. He was also told to refrain from further use of his credit card to avoid any inconvenience/embarrassment and . September 25. 1989 – MARASIGAN sent letter to the manager of FEBTC requesting the bank to stop the payment of the check . an employee of the defendant who in turn gave to Jeng Angeles.October 1989 – statement amounting to P8. Roberto Maniquiz.March 21.TC: ruled for MARASIGAN finding that BPI abused its right in contravention of A19 CC ordering BPI to pay P 100. WON BPI abused its right to suspend the credit card 2. to withhold the deposit of his postdated check and that said check be returned to him because he had already instructed his bank to stop the payment because BPI violated their agreement that when MARASIGAN issued the check to cover his account amounting to only P8.the law prescribes a "primordial limitation on all rights" by setting certain standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof. He was informed that bpi was demanding immediate payment of his outstanding account. by Café Adriatico when the he entertained some guests. by way of penal clause.000.00 and with a monthly billing every 27th of the month His membership was renewed for another year or until February 1990 and the credit limit was increased to P5. postdated December 15.84 on the condition that BPI will not suspend the effectivity of the card .April 5. Thus. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate. . . was requiring him to issue a check for P15. Citing Tolentino: There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another.000. including stipulated fees and charges. Also. WON MARASIGAN can recover moral damages arising from the cancellation of his credit card by BPI HELD 1. 1990 – MARASIGAN sent another letter reminding the manager of FEBTC that he had long rescinded and cancelled whatever arrangement he entered into with BPI and requesting for his correct billing. The check remained in the custody of Jeng Angeles. . *note: Barons contends that Phelps abused its rights when it rejected Barons’ offer to settle the debt in installments **right involved: right of a creditor to refuse partial fulfillment of a prestation due to him ISSUES 1. WON there was creditors’ abuse of rights in this case 2. YES Ratio the penal clause included in the contract should be complied with in the event of breach. P 50. .000. 1990 within three (3) days from receipt. less the improper charges and penalties. bad faith on the part of Phelps was not proved. 1989 which was received on November 23.MARASIGAN filed a complaint for damages against petitioner before the RTC Makati .00 by way of attorney's fees.December 8.125 - prof. and for an explanation within five (5) days from receipt thereof why his card was dishonored on December 8.In this case. Reasoning . NO collection.1m is almost P2m. xxx The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established. 1990 – MARASIGAN demanded BPI compliance with his request in his first letter dated March 12. .000. More importantly. “Clearly. 1989 – MARASIGAN requested that he be sent the exact billing due him as of December 15. this (the request of Barons) would be inimical to the interests of any enterprise.000. there must be bad faith or intent to prejudice the plaintiff.MARASIGAN oftentimes exceeded his credit limits but this was never taken against him by BPI and even his mode of paying his monthly bills in check was tolerated. 1989 by Tess Lorenzo. making it harder for them to pay its own obligations.987. this should be reduced to 10% for being manifestly exorbitant. the illicit act cannot be concealed under the guise of exercising a right.84 was not paid in due time. and P10. the bill amounting to P735. and must not be excessive or unduly harsh.000. paid the bill by using her own credit card a Unibankard . .MARASIGAN issued Far East Bank Check of P15. . Ricardo J. 1990 .To constitute abuse of rights.00 as moral damages. Thus. ISSUES 1. 1998 FACTS .” 2.00 by way of attorney's fees. MARASIGAN admitted having failed to pay his account because he was in Quezon attending to some professional and personal commitments.00 as exemplary damages.March 12.000.torts & damages atty’s fees to 5%) Barons now assail the CA decision.However.000. otherwise the plaintiff will file a case against them . his membership will be permanently cancelled . Reasoning . casis that unless he settles his outstanding account with the defendant within 5 days from receipt of the letter. Mary Ellen Ringler. Thus.00. NO Ratio there is no abuse of rights when there is no bad faith nor intent to prejudice another.00 as moral damages: P25. 1989 .

the real issue was the credit as to the architects of the building were. Any CARD with outstanding balances unpaid after thirty (30) days from original billing/statement date shall automatically be suspended and those with accounts unpaid after sixty (60) days from said original billing/statement date shall automatically be cancelled without prejudice to BECC's right to suspend or cancel any CARD any time and for whatever reason. BPI allowed him to use his card for several weeks.Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right. or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. or public policy. there is no need or necessity for a judicial declaration. good custom. BPI could automatically suspend his credit card. hurt or harm which results from the injury.The amended complaint of appellants claimed that the non inclusion of their names as architects resulted in their professional prestige and standing being seriously impaired. Reasoning . The signature on the subject check belonged to Eugenio Baltao. ALBENSON V CA (BALTAO) 217 SCRA 16 BIDIN. Baltao and that E. and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury. Hence it presupposes losses or injuries which are suffered as a result of said violation. any card with outstanding balances after thirty (30) days from original billing/statement shall automatically be suspended. Ratio To find the existence of an abuse of right A19 the following elements must be present (1) There is a legal right or duty. BPI could have suspended MARASIGAN’S card outright. the issuance of the postdated check was not effective payment. The award of damages by the CA is clearly unjustified. amount to a legal injury or wrong. together with Panlilio. On the other hand no amount of declaration will help an incompetent person achieve prestige and recognition. delivered to Guaranteed Industries Inc.As it turned out. Consequently as early as 28 October 1989 thirty days from the non-payment of his billing dated 27 September 1989.” . . A check is not considered as cash especially when it is postdated sent to BPI. the application contained the stipulation that the petitioner could automatically suspend a card whose billing has not been paid for more than thirty days. Albenson filed a . the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not A2010 .126 - prof. 2. the mild steel plates which the latter ordered. Nowhere is it stated in the terms and conditions of the application that there is a need of notice before suspension may be affected as private respondent claims. NO . It turned out that said retention was already released by the DND to the Company. casis ISSUE WON the lower court erred in dismissing the case HELD NO . Order appealed from is affirmed. He can not now pass the blame to the petitioner for not notifying him of the suspension of his card. Ruiz and Herrera want to be recognized as architects of the building also citing Article 21 of the Civil Code as their base for he cause of action. Disposition Petition denied. there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded. Woodworks.torts & damages Ratio The agreement was for the immediate payment of the outstanding account. signed by MARASIGAN. Neither did he make payment for his original billing/statement dated 27 October 1989. As early as 28 October 1989. If this is so. Under the contract and all other documents relating to the construction of the Veterans Hospital. both shareholders of Allied Technilogists. the article envisions a situation where a person has a legal right which was violated by another in a manner contrary to morals.Albenson made an extrajudicial demand but Balbao denied issuing the check. January 11. damage is the loss. good customs. .Albenson Enterprises Corp. (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. BPI did not capriciously and arbitrarily canceled the use of the card. 1993 NATURE Appeal from decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS .By his own admission MARASIGAN made no payment within 30 days for his billing/statement dated 27 September 1989. Instead.Enrique Ruiz and Jose Herrera. (2) which is exercised in bad faith. Ratio The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. . Prestige and recognition are bestowed on the deserving even if there is no judicial declaration. As quoted earlier.L. one cannot sustain the contention that the failure or refusal to extend recognition was an act contrary to morals. Thus. or public policy. . Thus. . states.L. 1966 NATURE Appeal from an order of the Manila CFI FACTS . Woodworks was registered in the name Eugenio Baltao.MARASIGAN’S own negligence was the proximate cause of his embarrassing and humiliating experience in not reading the letter of notice of cancellation. BPI was therefore justified in suspending his credit card. Reasoning . In such cases.Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed was one Eugenio S. Albenson was given a check drawn against the account of E. .The sole object of the appellants was to secure for themselves recognition that they were co-architects of the Veterans Hospital. good custom. Thus. Article 21.Check was dishonored for the reason “Account closed. The pleadings in this case do not show damages were ever asked or alleged. filed an action against the Secretary of National Defense and also against their own company (together with Pablo Panlilio who is also a shareholder of the company) in connection with the 15% retention fund withheld by the DND relating to the construction of the Veterans Hospital. Inc. which was used as basis of the action. so as to enhance their standing and prestige. they claim that even if the retention fund was in act released. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria . As part payment.” .And under the facts and circumstances obtaining. he modified award of attorney’s fees. “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the results of a violation of a legal duty. the named architect was only Panlilio. The Court then proceeded with the other cause of action which was deemed to be the controversy between Ruiz and Panlilio over the said 15%. RUIZ V SECRETARY PAREDES.It was petitioner's failure to settle his obligation which caused the suspension of his credit card and subsequent dishonor at Café Adriatico. Reasoning . Hence.Good faith is presumed and the burden of proving bad faith is on the party alleging it.Under the terms and conditions of the credit card.While the word “injury” may also refer to honor or credit. their pleas for recognition as architects should have been heard by the lower court. the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. Thus.

Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated respondent Baltao. friends and acquaintances. FACTS . 1954 as the big day. or malevolent manner. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid. Baltao for violation of BP 22. .Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief.To constitute malicious prosecution. P2. there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person. who manages E.In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith. ISSUE WON Velez is liable for the preparations spent by Wassmer cost of wedding TANJANCO V SANTOS REYES. December 17. CA decision reversed and set aside WASSMER V VELEZ 12 SCRA 648 BENGZON. . fraudulent or reckless. through his protestations of love and promises of marriage. .Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos. reckless [and] oppressive manner. the prosecutor acted without probable cause.Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss — in business. or oppressive manner. A matrimonial bed. and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal. (2) That in bringing the action. Tanjanco succeeded in having carnal access to Araceli. no damages will be given . December 24. It . party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased. the following three (3) elements must be present.Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code. with accessories. P25. .000. defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton. decided to get married and set September 4. and the costs.Francisco X.000 as actual damages.. he sent a telegram assuring Wassmer that nothing has changed and he will return soon. to wit: (1) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor.torts & damages complaint against Eugenio S. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives. On September 2.But the next day. which was subsequently issued.While mere breach of contract is not an actionable wrong. neither may exemplary damages be awarded Disposition Petition granted. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner Judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2. Concededly. was bought. otherwise. A2010 . in a reasonable mind. only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized. Bridal showers were given and gifts received." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton . acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor. 1966 NATURE Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals revoking an order of the CFI dismissing appellant's action for support and damages. .Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. As to exemplary damages. reckless. But Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. that he expressed and professed his undying love and affection for her who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings". trade.. following their mutual promise of love. .The record reveals that on August 23. It appears that private respondent has a namesake. Wassmer. profession. may file a case for damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights. Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S. moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code.A party injured by the filing of a court case against him. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights. Araceli had to resign her job as secretary in HELD YES . . Article 21 of the Civil Code says that when the person willfully causes loss or injury contrary to good custom. (3) The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice . if the proof is flimsy and unsubstantiated.500 as attorney's fees.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award. ISSUES WON Baltao should be awarded damages (based on malicious prosecution) HELD NO . 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage.Sued by Beatriz for damages.L. even if he is later on absolved. Proof and motive that the institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to damages . casis is the abuse of right which can be a cause for moral and material damages. Due to her pregnant condition.An award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith.Where there is no evidence of the other party having acted in wanton. as a result of which she conceived a child. Regularly until December 1959.Baltao filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against Albenson Enterprises. and one employee. moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages. In order that such a case can prosper." P15.Baltao filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation. is quite different.Asst. Velez and Beatriz P. both being of adult age. . . Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. To formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity. . for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate . Woodworks. Velez left a note for Wassmer saying that he has to postpone the wedding because his mother opposes it. his son Eugenio Baltao III. oppressive. . Their wedding was set.000 as moral and exemplary damages. and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. he shall compensate the latter for damages. that in consideration of his promise of marriage Araceli consented and acceded to Tanjanco’s pleas for carnal knowledge. .This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. . fraudulent. it is damnum absque injuria.CA modified by reducing the moral damages and the attorney's fees awarded. to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation. . The bride-to-be's trousseau.Trial court granted Baltao’s claim for actual or compensatory. Baltao for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. job or occupation — and the same must be proved. property. its owner. that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. however.127 - prof. attorney's fees and costs. moral and exemplary damages. or on malicious prosecution. 1964 FACTS .

without the assistance of counsel. She alleges in said complaint that: she is 22 years old. reimbursement for actual expenses. moral shock. even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury. To constitute seduction there must A2010 . 23. there is no crime. Dagupan City. or a breach of a promise of marriage. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex. Inc. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing. no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. single. maintained intimate sexual relations with Tanjanco. Therefore. the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments. and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act.Bearing these principles in mind. ISSUE WON CS erred in reversing the CFI decision HELD YES . a week before the filing of the complaint. is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments. and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover. and though the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage. during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint. attorney's fees and costs. Guilig. 1993 NATURE Appeal by certioriari to review and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule: ART. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent. on the other hand. The Court of Appeals. Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community. The essential feature is seduction. he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment. with repeated acts of intercourse. petitioner. and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises.000. from 1958 to 1959. filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. . superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded.00 in moral and exemplary damages.00 attorney's fees. he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses. for had Araceli been deceived. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. they therefore argued to get married after the end of the school semester. though the grievous moral wrong has been committed. much less for one year. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. which are calculated to have and do have that effect. Araceli Santos. in an action by the woman. the enticement. no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage. in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement.In his Answer with Counterclaim. and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire. we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code. plus P100. but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport. she suffered mental anguish. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. the facts stand out that for one whole year. and no other cause of action being alleged. under Article 21. in his Counterclaim. she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages.000. petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga. . Hence. “but the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. CFI dismissed the complaint. Disposition the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. or can not be proved. Over and above the partisan allegations. he did not maltreat her. which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes. Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage. he prayed for an award for miscellaneous expenses and moral damages. and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City. besmirched reputation.And in American Jurisprudence: On the other hand. before 20 August 1987.128 - prof. a woman of adult age. and social humiliation. there is no seduction. The girl becomes pregnant. that in law it is more than mere sexual intercourse. petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and. February 19. to pay her not less than P430. plus P10. She became unable to support herself and her baby and duer to Tanjanco's refusal to marry her as promised. and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit. and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant. in the interest of justice. which was in October of that year. . the latter courted and proposed to marry her. Insisting." They gave an example  "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X".In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages. the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission where it stated. she would not have again yielded to his embraces. She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts. and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation. persuasions and wiles. let us examine the complaint.torts & damages IBM Philippines. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. enticement. petitioner's attitude towards her started to change. the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. casis Private respondent. had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit. it connotes essentially the idea of deceit. The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. she was a virgin before she began living with him. sometime in 20 August 1987. Under the present laws. A promise of marriage either has not been made.. BAKSH V CA 219 SCRA 115 DAVIDE JR. that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof.00 a month for her support and that of her baby. he maltreated and threatened to kill her. entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of origin to proceed with the case. she sustained injuries. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages. Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the female. wounded feelings. as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion. persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury. Bugallon. the Commission has deemed it necessary. But under the proposed article. she and her parents would have such a right of action. as a result of such maltreatment. and finally.

21 is applicable to the case at bar HELD YES . but after leaving. Moreover. July 10. rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision 5 favoring the private respondent. and so holds. he is not conversant with such Filipino customs. and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner. Bunag then left and never returned.Bunag initially allowed her to go home but later refused to consent and stated that he would only let her go after they were married. the said Code contains a provision. have offended our sense of morality. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry. On the day of the said rape. . 1992 NATURE Petition for review from the decision of CA FACTS . deceit and false pretenses. Cirilo contends that she was abducted by Bunag Jr along with unidentified man and brought her to the motel where she was raped. Bunag Jr withdrew his application. traditions and culture. The Court is of the opinion. inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors. the trial court erred in ruling that he does not possess good moral character.torts & damages . proof that he had. Bunag. Finally. . who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality. through machinations. which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees. In the instant case. Bunag jr invited her for merienda to talk things over." BUNAG V CA (CIRILO) 211 SCRA 441 REGALADO. good customs. petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent.Conrado Bunag. Cirilo rode in the passenger’s seat while Bunag Jr was driving.Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals. Unfazed by his second defeat. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because. that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress. and P10K for atty’s fees.A complaint fro breach of promise to marry was filed against Bunag Sr and Bunag Jr.It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy. traditions and culture. his controversial "common law wife" is now his legal wife as their marriage had A2010 . (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances. Bunag Sr arrived and assured them that they would apply for the ML the next day. Later that evening. and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. The RTC upon finding that she was forcibly abducted and raped Bunag Jr was ordered to pay for P80K for moral damages. could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. Jr brought Zenaida Cirilo to a hotel where they had sex. During that time.In light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21. they proceeded to Bunag’s grandmother’s house. . petitioner filed the instant petition. inter alia. petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her. They never got to the restaurant where they were supposed to eat. . culture and traditions. he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. . private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens. Respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto the trial court's ruling. (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner. applying Article 21 of the Civil Code. (c) petitioner. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. the lower court. P20K for exemplary damage. The Court a quo adopted her evidence. in reality. It is essential. Jr. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. P20K by way of temperate damage. . Bunag Jr came riding in a car with an unidentified man. . Article 21. the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. This notwithstanding. respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise.The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers. Bunag Sr was absolved from liability. so much so that she promised not to make any scandal and to marry him. they lived as husband and wife for 21 days. . and he has never maltreated her. however. Cirilo protested but Bunag threatened her that he would bump the car against the post if she made any noise. no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act. he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent. they had a quarrel. casis Disposition Petition denied been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. promised to marry private respondent.The Court found that Cirilo and Bunag Jr were sweethearts but for 2eeks before the alleged rape. That night. she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals. (d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her. .She was then dragged by the 2 men in the hotel where Bunag Jr deflowered her against her will and consent. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs. ISSUE WON Art.After filing for the ML. and Cirilo applied for their respective Marriage Licenses. (e) by reason of that deceitful promise. When she noticed they were going the wrong way. he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four wives and concludes that on the basis thereof. . good customs or public policy.After trial on the merits.129 - prof. such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. Bunag brough her to his grandmother’s house in Las Pinas where they liver together as husband and wife for 21 days. the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing. Cirilo was ashamed when she went home and could not sleep and eat because of the deception done against her by Bunag. she allowed herself to be deflowered by him. Jr. As an Iranian Moslem.

July 31. WON Quimiguing is entitled to damages HELD 1. Repeated sexual intercourse only indicates that passion QUIMIGUING V ICAO 34 SCRA 132 REYES. that at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening.” This is furthered by Art. YES . While the Bunag’s assigned several errors in the TC decision. rape or other lascivious acts. 21. YES . independent of the right to support of the child. Reasoning . Quimiguing.Bunag filed for the petition for review claiming that CA failed to consider vital exhibits and testimonies and error in the proper application of the law. she had to stop studying.Cirilo appealed on the disculpation of Bunag Sr’s liability. Amelita Constantino alleges that she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant located at Sta. and the assailedjudgment and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED. CONSTANTINO V MENDEZ BIDIN.The court is constrained with the factual findings of the lower courts. that because of her pregnancy. thus the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error. Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to which the latter agreed. As relief. that Amelita had no sexual relations with any other man except Ivan who is the father of the child yet to be born at the time of the filing of the complaint. Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. May 14.A conceived. Reasoning .130 - prof.Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action as the complaint did not allege the child had been born— the motion was sustained.torts & damages . apart from the right to recover for money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. Art 2219. the extinction of the criminal liability does not extinguish civil liability unless there is a declaration of a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case may arise did not exist. A2010 . attorney's fees plus costs. that her pleas for help and support fell on deaf ears. CA dismissed the petitions and affirmed judgment of RTC in toto. only the fiscal made such dismissal of the criminal complaint. par10. any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. 742). ISSUES 1. Manila. that after the sexual contact. pursuant to Art 21 in relation to par 3 and 10.Petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for acknowledgment. However.Hence. 1974. moral and exemplary damages.00. she could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual contact sometime in August. the petitioner’s promising to marry Cirilo to evade criminal liability constitutes acts contrary to morals and good customs. assisted by her parents. Amelita prayed for the recognition of the unborn child. 1970 NATURE Appeal on points of law from an order of the CFI FACTS . .Appellant. Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married man. WON Quimiguing had a right to the support of the child 2. Amelita was forced to leave her work as a waitress. The latter. that on the pretext of getting something. 854) 2. abduction. unborn child is given a provisional personality by law and therefore has a right to support from its progenitors. succeeded in having sex with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation and without her consent. Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . that Ivan is a prosperous businessman of Davao City with a monthly income of P5. . good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the latter. 2219 which provides compensation in cases of seduction. Disposition petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which warrant and justify the award of moral and exemplary damages. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damage.Under the circumstances in the case at bar. As stated in Art. she surrendered her virginity HELD NO Ratio Mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. particularly Icao (Art. support and damages against private respondent Ivan Mendez. .Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her womanhood. plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages. the award for moral damages is allowed in cases specified and analogous to those provided in Art 2219 CC. . she claimed support of P120/mo.000 to P8. ISSUE WON Amelita can claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 3 & 21 4 of the Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage. Its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir.Although TC granted damages on the basis of the forcible abduction and rape even after the criminal complaint’s dismissal. except where the plaintiff incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents therrof. 1992 NATURE . in relation to Art 2219. that they repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and November. where she worked as a waitress. In the case. “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals.For a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damages caused. casis and not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.A breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law.000. that Amelita asked for time to think about Ivan's proposal. sued her neighbor Icao with whom she had close and confidential relations. that he was a married man. 40) and may receive donations (Art. . that while dining. Hence. . Ivan professed his love and courted Amelita. Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted.In her complaint. even if such child should be born after the death of the testator (Art. She became pregnant and despite efforts and drugs (abortion pills?) supplied by defendant. Had she been induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage. Plaintiff amended the complaint but the TC ruled such was not allowable as the original complaint averred no cause of action. Cruz. . as a result of which Amelita got pregnant. that the day following their first meeting. whenever Ivan is in Manila. 1974. ISSUE WON lower courts erred in granting damages for the breach of promise to marry HELD Ratio A breach of promise to marry is not actionable per se. the payment of actual. Under Art 21 CC. although married. and Art 2229 and 2234 CC.

the element of probable cause was not treated separately from that of malice. March 20.Gen Renato DE VILLA.To constitute malicious prosecution. there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless.Nicolas issued 5 checks which Que cannot encash. 1989 NATURE Petition for review FACTS . . requested the DOJ (headed by Sec Franklin DRILON) to order the investigation of several individuals. the circumstances presented the possibility that Nicolas might cheat him. . frequently visited Lolita’s house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the rosary. from Que’s point of view.Plaintiffs are parents.Magtanggol Que is a dealer of canvass strollers while Antonio Nicolas orders from him. Therefore. He just stopped payment. Defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home.Feeling aggrieved by the institution of these proceedings against him. The affair continued just the same. the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution (Manila Gas Corporation v. as under the American Law. 1957. He allegedly ordered that payment be stopped because the goods delivered to him by Que were defective and that Que allegedly refused to replace them. good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code. After making demands for payment. 1997 NATURE Petition to reverse CA’s Resolutions FACTS .This was then referred for preliminary inquiry to the Special Composite Team of Prosecutors who issued a subpoena to the said individuals after finding sufficient basis to continue the inquiry. inspite of demands by the latter. is REINSTATED as above modified. although false. This decision is immediately executory. the accusation could not be held to have been false in the legal sense.torts & damages Disposition the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside A2010 . Indeed. no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that the defendant not only deliberately. Disposition decision of the respondent court dated March 12. TC ruled in favor of Que. Information was filed before RTC QC. there was no intent to accuse falsely. which were delivered. When a complaint was laid and there was probable cause to believe that the person charged had committed the acts complained of. The panel assigned to conduct prelim investigation found that there was probable cause to hold them for trial for the crime of REBELLION WITH MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER. a married man. QUE V IAC (NICOLAS) 169 SCRA 137 CRUZ.It is evident that the petitioner was not motivated by ill feeling but only by an anxiety to protect his his rights when he filed the criminal complaint for estafa with the fiscal's office. is SET ASIDE and the amended decision of the trial court dated February 21. Verily. On april 14. this appeal by the plaintiffs ISSUE WON the defendant can be held liable under Article 21 HELD YES .131 - prof. The two had an amicable business relation until 1975. Nicolas kept the goods. an unmarried woman 24 years of age. the goods which were allegedly defective were not yet returned to Que before the filing of the estafa case. did not demand for its repair. he had not. but not so much on the theory of probable cause as on the ground that. with no recommendation as to bail. January 13. 1984. Concededly. Reasoning -. The lower court dismissed the action. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found inside Lolita’s aparador. succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. . willful and malicious experimentation by filing against him a charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder when petitioners were . When the parents learned about this. They fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts. Also. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. the complainant was fully protected. Instead. in accordance with Nicolas’ order to stop payment. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter’s family who allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of the family. but through a clever strategy. as a matter of fact. Defendant. when Nicolas ordered strollers from Que. The present action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs. . 100 SCRA 602) . The wrong he had caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Court of Appeals. If the charge. Chief of Staff of the AFP. casis be founded. 'Under the Spanish Law. Que on his part alleged that the said defective products were only returned after he filed an estafa case. brothers and sisters of Lolita PE. PE V PE 5 SCRA 200 1962 FACTS . he has committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals. which Nicolas allegedly ignored. Que filed an estafa case against Nicolas. without Que knowing that there were defects in the goods he delivered.Nicolas then filed a case against Que for malicious prosecution. The case was dismissed for lack of merit. was made with an honest belief in its truth and justice. although.The circumstances under which the defendant tried to win Lolita’s affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who. Hence. through an ingenious scheme or trickery. The checks were dishonored. IAC reversed. 1979. including private respondent ADAZA for their alleged participation in the failed Dec 1989 coup d’etat. ADAZA filed a complaint for damages and charged petitioners with engaging in a deliberate. and there were reasonable grounds on which such a belief could DRILON V CA (ADAZA) 270 SCRA 211 HERMOSISIMA JR. under such circumstances. Lolita disappeared from her brother’s house where she was living. ISSUE WON Que had instituted a malicious prosecution of the private respondent (WON the reversal made by IAC was correct) HELD NO . Ratio. One cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. they prohibited defendant from going to their house. and then issued 5 postdated checks in favor of Que. seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him.

and costs. 2217 and 2219 (8)].” Reasoning . civil suit.Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal upon receiving the notice of his termination. P20. Reasoning . . ISSUE WON there was malicious prosecution HELD YES .torts & damages fully aware of the non-existence of such crime in the statute books. 35. All of the six criminal complaints were .Nowhere in his complaint filed with the trial court did respondent Adaza allege that his action is one based on tort. (Sec 3e of RA 3019) An examination of the records would show that this latest posture as to the nature of his cause of action is only being raised for the first time on appeal. .00 as exemplary damages. 20.The results of the investigations said that the handwritings. 21. NO Ratio In order for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to take no further action on civil case except to DISMISS it. 1989 NATURE Certiorari FACTS . CA: affirmed the RTC decision in toto. after the termination of such prosecution.000. and which terminates in favor of the person prosecuted. . “the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith” [Ventura v.CA also dismissed petition for certiorari and ordered RTC judge to proceed with the trial of civil case filed by ADAZA.] . or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. P200. (b) That in bringing the action. (b) It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. SC anchored its findings on TC’s finding (re bad faith of Globe Mackay in filing the criminal complaints against Tobias). suit. Hendry’s threat of more suits against Tobias. Hendry. 2. .[ 2 SCRA 337]: the Court held that the right to file criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay HELD 1.reversed. without being asked by RETELCO. signatures. The filing of the cases despite the police reports exculpating Tobias. oppressive. he maintained that his claim before the trial court was merely a suit for damages based on tort and NOT a suit for malicious prosecution.” . the prosecutor acted without probable cause. NONE of these requisites have been alleged. For this injury an action on the case lies. Disposition Petition is GRANTED.This led Tobias to file a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful. thus rendering the complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. the Secretary of Labor: reinstated the LA's decision which Tobias appealed to the Office of the President. The petitioners were of the honest conviction that there was probable cause to hold Adaza for trial. WON complaint was a suit for damages for malicious prosecution 2. 38 SCRA 5871.However. . 33. that is by improper or sinister motive.The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in the provisions of the NCC [Art 19.) ISSUES 1. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results. P30. MFR for Order of Denial was also denied. complaints for estafa were filed against Tobias. . GLOBE MACKAY V CA CORTES. Bernabe. Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). This is not considered the termination of the action contemplated under Philippine jurisdiction to warrant the institution of a malicious prosecution suit against those responsible for the filing of the information against him.Judging from the face of the complaint itself filed by Adaza.Petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. the absence of malice. called the action of malicious prosecution. . Such a change of theory cannot be allowed.Both parties appealed. YES Definition of Malicious Prosecution: . denied Globe’s MR. regularly. the plaintiff must prove these elements: (a) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal. (a) Insofar as Adaza’s Criminal Case is concerned. to which Tobias was the number one suspect though he claimed he was the one who reported it.In American jurisdiction. Instituted with intention of injuring defendant and without probable cause.During the pendency of the appeal with said office. There was malicious intent manifested through the filing of the criminal cases as the case for illegal dismissal was pending..000. . WON petitioners are liable for malicious prosecution A2010 .Petitioners filed MD since there was no valid cause of action for this complaint for damages. wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. casis dismissed by the fiscal and MRs of Globe were denied too.Although Globe claims that they must not be penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints against an employee who was their principal suspect in the commission of forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded them of substantial sums of money.Yutuk V. Reasoning . and the eventual dismissal of the cases. malicious. for the mere purpose of vexation or injury.00 as actual damages. 29. as a legal consequence. . Manila Electric Co. August 25. .000. .Unemployed.132 - prof. and abusive acts of petitioners. The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force.00 as attorney's fees. .In Philippine jurisdiction. it has been defined as“An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution. and (c) That the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice. (In Adaza’s latest Comment. . (c) Suffice it to state that the presence of probable cause signifies.LA: dismissed the complaint.RTC: rendered judgment in favor of Tobias by ordering petitioners to pay him P80. petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the latter's complaint for illegal dismissal.Globe Mackay found out an anomaly that has been causing them to lose money.Despite being cleared. .00 as moral damages. what appears clear from the records only is that respondent has been discharged on a writ of habeas corpus and granted bail. or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause. it has been defined as“One begun in malice without probable cause to believe the charges can be sustained. and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of -Tobias. 32. NLRC. 26.000.RTC denied MD.

CA. an act which causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of damages. . . though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such. public order. To do so would be a clear perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice. and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal. Baltao filed a complaint for damages against Albenson because the latter had unjustly filed a criminal case against him. or "negligently". casis may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. David.[20 SCRA 536]: the Court upheld the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and attorney's fees after making a finding that petitioner. with one of the investigating fiscals." Globe Mackay hastily filed 6 criminal cases with the city Fiscal's Office of Manila. Fiscal de Guia.The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty. 2) but which is contrary to morals. depends on the circumstances of each case. no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. and although the police investigation was "still under follow-up and a supplementary report will be submitted after all the evidence has been gathered.IT TURNS OUT that E. who is his namesake. despite the negative results of the lie detector tests which Globe Mackay compelled him to undergo. Court of Appeals. The provincial prosecutor found out that something was amiss during the investigation and upon reinvestigation. Sta. a check in the amount of P2. . These standards are the following: to act with justice. All they wanted was to collect what is owed them. Investigating fiscal found probable cause and filed info with the RTC. ELW was owned by Baltao’s son.L. Asst. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith [Sison v. the act must be intentional. Concededly. good custom. the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. Albenson filed case for violation of BP22.133 - prof. The trial court as well as the respondent appellate court mistakenly lumped these three articles together. However.Thus. .575 was given as payment. combined with articles 19 and 20.Albenson Enterprises delivered mild steel plates to 3267 V. "With this article (Article 21). moral (P1M) and exemplary damages (P200k). it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. . and that is.L. 176 SCRA 778 [1989]). oppress. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another. . drawn against the account of E. under any of these three provisions of law. They wrote to him. .Albenson did not abuse its rights. They believed Baltao was really the one who issued the check because it was his company who ordered and received the delivery. Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully". CA. there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. to give everyone his due. A right. Ratio To constitute malicious prosecution. > Despite the clearing Tobias of participation or involvement in the fraudulent transactions complained of. the haphazard way this case was investigated is evident. Manila. . sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. 5 for estafa thru falsification of commercial document and 1 for violation of A290 of the RPC (all of which were dismissed). . ALBENSON V CA (BALTAO) BIDIN. commenting in one case that. It is now difficult to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not be checked by the application of these articles" (Tolentino. The second and third elements are not present. Said check was signed by a Eugenio Baltao. the filing of a suit by itself. all of which were dismissed. The law. He didn’t tell them that his son was his namesake and that the latter NATURE Appeal from CA judgment modifying RTC’s decision as regards amount to be paid FACTS .Hawpia CA. . with persistence. 1 Civil Code of the Philippines 72). of which Eugeneio Baltao was president. .RTC granted actual (P133k). January 11.There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21. therefore. A2010 . He replied by denying and telling them to check the veracity of their claim. He told the trial fiscal to move for dismissal. 3) and it is done with intent to injure. known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights.The check bounced. and cited the same as the bases for the award of damages. Although the requirements of each provision is different. and atty’s fees (P100k). but this was frustrated by a presidential decree transferring criminal cases involving civilians to the civil courts.torts & damages an indebtedness. resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law. recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise.ABUSE OF RIGHTS Article 19.An award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs.After the criminal case was dismissed. 122 SCRA 576]. Mapa Street.ACTS CONTRA BONUS MORES Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores." there can be no mistaking that defendants would not but be motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass. filed at least six criminal complaints against respondent. Disposition CA’s decision AFFIRMED. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights. *Findings of bad faith (as per the TC): > After the dismissal of the 4 cases and denial of the MR by the Ministry of Justice.There is however. does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. ISSUE WON Baltao is entitled to damages HELD NO . 1993 . and cause damage to plaintiff. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated. Mesa. Baltao denied that it was his signature on the check. 1 SCRA 60]. Woodworks. and to observe honesty and good faith. 2 cases were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office of the AFP to railroad Tobias’ arrest and detention in the military stockade. or public policy. . Woodworks’ business address was the same as Guaranteed Industries. CA modified by awarding only half of original moral damages and atty’s fees. Baltao appealed to the Provincial Prosecutor. Albenson extrajudicially demanded payment from Baltao. "Indeed. (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. (2) which is exercised in bad faith. the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly broadened. Evident likewise is the flurry and haste in the filing of this case against respondent Tobias. these three articles are all related to each other. The delivery was received by Guaranteed Industries. it is damnum absque injuria. found no probable cause. 100 SCRA 602]. a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

petitioner's employees returned with a photographer who took pictures of the premises. When Plaintiff woke up at four o'clock in the afternoon. 1964. .00 and P10. temperate. (5) P10. 1966." On the other hand. . Though incapable of pecuniary computation. (8) malicious prosecution. . A2010 . he was informed about the existence of a by-pass valve or "jumper" in the gas connection and that unless he gave P3.Respondent Ongsip refused to give the money .000. there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. 1965.On February.000. . ." . serious anxiety.00.By the end of August. .It bears noting that when he was informed as to the existence of a 'jumper' in his gas connection. October 30.On July 27. . and on May and June 1966. petitioner disconnected respondent's gas service for alleged failure and/or refusal to pay his gas consumptions from July. the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. 1967.Without notifying or informing respondent Ongsip. oppressive and malevolent filing of the criminal complaint. and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Here was then the opportunity for Coronel to confront Plaintiff with the allegedly discovered 'by-pass valve' and bluntly. besmirched reputation. it registered a sudden increase in gas consumption.00 as exemplary damages in the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.000. pending investigation of the criminal complaint. 1972. . .torts & damages operated a business in the same building.To constitute malicious prosecution. firstly: the malicious. in addition. tell him that there was thievery of gas.134 - prof. testified that the second gas meter was replaced as MANILA GAS CORPORATION V CA (ONGSIP) MAKASIAR. moral shock. no gas consumption was registered in the meter. There. he would be deported. . this petition ISSUE WON the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of appeals is excessive HELD YES .On that same afternoon. however. petitioner's employees went to Ongsip's place. . (2) P10. Coronel did not do. and similar injury. . . social humiliation.Concededly. Ongsip inquired from Coronel why they were taking pictures but the latter simply gave him a calling card with instructions to go to his office. a complaint for qualified theft was filed by petitioner against respondent Ongsip . .00 as attorney's fees. moral damages may be recovered if they .. Albenson acted in good faith and had probable cause in filing their complaint against Baltao. (3) P30. but he was informed afterwards of what had taken place by his houseboy.. 1980 NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA (treated as a special civil action) FACTS . . is predicated on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which states that "moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: . by way of example or correction for the public good. to the moral.Article 2217 of the Civil Code states that "moral damages include physical suffering. respondent Ongsip applied for gas service connection with petitioner Manila Gas Corporation. mental anguish. and (6) the costs of the suit. respectively.000. liquidated or compensatory damages.The installations and connections were all done solely by petitioner's employees. and. casis are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. To constitute malicious prosecution. prompting petitioner to issue a 'meter order' with instructions to change the gas meter in respondent's residence. But the truth is that when Coronel and his men entered Plaintiff's compound and made changes therein.In the instant case. Article 2229 provides that "exemplary or corrective damages are imposed.000. Besides. secondly: the illegal closure of respondent Ongsip's gas service connection without court order and without notice of warning. petitioner's own mechanical engineer. but it was denied . . . .A burner gas was installed by petitioner's employees in respondent's kitchen at his residence. . respondent Ongsip filed a complaint for moral and exemplary damages against petitioner Manila Gas Corporation based on two causes of action. Right then and there Coronel should have told Plaintiff that he was using a by-pass valve and in effect stealing gas from Defendant. there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person. Private respondent was then taking a nap. Delfin Custodio. This. Plaintiff was sleeping.On May 20. The circumstance was familiar to that of catching a thief in flagrante delicto.00 as exemplary damages in the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. this time with a photographer. This was the time when Plaintiff met Coronel.On May 2. Disposition Petition granted. for which respondent Ongsip was awarded moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P50. 1966. 1967. they changed the gas meter and installed new tube connections.00 as moral damages in the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. They returned however at five o'clock. there is reason to believe that there was malicious intent in the filing of the complaint for qualified theft.On August 17. .CA affirmed the lower court’s decision in toto. . a reading was made on the new meter and expectedly.Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. -Thereafter. To prove his innocence.There was no significant change in the meter reading despite additional installations..00. CA reversed and set aside. the complaint was dismissed . (4) P5. even brutally. the trial court rendered its decision ordering defendant to pay plaintiff:(1) P50. respondent Ongsip did not show any sign of fear or remorse and did not yield to the threatening demand of Coronel—this is the attitude of someone who knows how to take a firm stand where his principles and rights are concerned. Coronel and his men had already made the changes and had already gone.000. respondent Ongsip requested petitioner to install additional appliances as well as additional gas service connections in his 46-door Reyno Apartment: petitioner installed two 20-gallon capacity water storage heaters and two heavy-duty gas burners and replaced the original gas meter with a bigger 50light capacity gas meter. in October.On July 14." .There was no malicious prosecution.Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals . he was even willing to have his place excavated but petitioner would not dare take the consequences.000.. fright.000. wounded feelings. following the dismissal by the investigating fiscal of the complaint for qualified theft and the disconnection by petitioner of his gas service. The presence of probable cause means the absence of malice.As correctly observed by the trial court in its decision —A significant fact brought about by the testimony of Coronel himself is the total absence of immediate accusation against Plaintiff right at the very moment when the by-pass valve was allegedly discovered.00 as moral damages in the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. 1967. 1965 to January. hence.Subsequently. .The first cause of action.

. (10) of Art. petitioner Manila Gas Corporation. a corporate manager incharge of motoring and warehousing therein. (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21. Necessarily.. temperate or compensatory damages Disposition Decision in favor of Patricio. this circumstance can be considered as a mitigating factor in ascertaining the amount of damages to which respondent Ongsip is entitled. a commotion ensued and private respondent was brought by the policemen to the municipal building. We reduce the amount of moral damages to P15. (7) Libel.000. The prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to cause additional mental and moral suffering to private respondent.Respondent Ongsip's default in payment cannot be utilized by petitioner to defeat or nullify the claim for damages. exemplary or corrective damages may be imposed upon herein private respondent by way of example or correction for the public good. 26.The act of private respondent in hitting petitioner on the face is contrary to morals and good customs and caused the petitioner mental anguish. indemnification had to be made. casis (8) Malicious prosecution. was appointed Director General of the 1976 Religious and Municipal Town Fiesta of Pilar. While a benefit dance was ongoing in connection with the celebration of the town fiesta. Inc. slander or any other form of defamation. The damage had been done. an ordained Catholic priest. PATRICIO V LEVISTE PADILLA. 1979 NATURE Certiorari from CA’s decision to grant P75k. 3713.Evidently. the award of moral and exemplary damages should be reduced to P25.000.. It was established before the court a quo that there was an existing feud between the families of both petitioner and private respondent and that private respondent slapped the petitioner without provocation in the presence of several persons. petitioner's financial capability must also be considered. Washington. retired Minister. sought to vindicate its financial loss by filing the complaint for qualified theft against respondent Ongsip knowing it to be false. he approached petitioner in a hostile manner and asked the latter if he had seen his wounded hand. "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals.As to moral damages. It stigmatized private respondent causing him emotional depression and social degradation. As a result.000. exemplary damages and atty’s fees. Department of Foreign Affairs at the Philippine Embassy. .135 - prof. ." . . (9) Acts mentioned in article 309. moral shock. respectively. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.00 and P5." . The fact that the complaint for qualified theft was dismissed by the Pasay City fiscal is no consolation. To be accused of such crime without basis is shocking and libelous. Disposition Decision of CA modified as regards the amount of damages. employed as an executive of Proctor & Gamble Phils. and actively engaged in social and civic affairs in Pilar. rape. (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. without provocation. who was in a state of drunkenness and standing near the same gate together with his companions.torts & damages being defective because "some of its parts were worn out and that it was not properly registering. author of articles published in the Manila Sunday Times and Philippines Free Press. he and his wife and their two daughters went to shop at South Supermarket (owned . P25k and P5k to Espino for moral damages. Capiz.In addition to the award of moral damages. The amount of exemplary damages need not be proved where it is shown that plaintiff is entitled to either moral. 28.00. Qualified theft is a serious offense indicating moral depravity in an individual. ISSUE WON Patricio is entitled to damages for the humiliation he experienced during the town fiesta HELD YES .Petitioner's act in disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas service without prior notice constitutes breach of contract amounting to an independent tort. 1989 FACTS . FACTS . hit petitioner's face with his bloodied hand. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. member of the Philippine Veterans Legion. Capiz and a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. 30 32.P. such damages are justly due. Patricio filed a complaint for Slander by Deed. 27. being similarly warranted by Article 2234 of the Civil Code as complemented by Article 2220. and before petitioner could respond. An award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. . (4) Adultery or concubinage. Petitioner is a public utility corporation whose primary concern is service to the people. in failing to recover its lost revenue caused by the gas meter's incorrect recording. abduction. 2219 of the same Code. member of the Knights of Columbus.Rafael Patricio. 34. However. Private respondent Bienvenido Bacalocos. the profit motive being merely secondary. A2010 . In consequence thereof. (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest. under the circumstances. Under the circumstances. Capiz. Class 1950. or other lascivious acts. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith" . 29. son of the late Jose Maria Espino. private respondent. President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Pilar. struck a bottle of beer on the table causing an injury on his hand which started to bleed. December 28. honorably discharged from the Philippine Army in 1946.000. This is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code.One morning in 1970.Espino is a graduate Mechanical Engineer from U. wounded feelings and social humiliation.00 The award of P5. 2219. petitioner together with two (2) policemen were posted near the gate of the public auditorium to check on the assigned watchers of the gate. holding private respondent liable to the former for moral damages as a result of the physical suffering. It was actually intended to vex and humiliate private respondent and to blacken his reputation not only as a businessman but also as a person. on the other hand. . where he is residing. As a consequence. is sustained. April 26. the court ruled in favor of herein petitioner (as complainant). to wit: "ART. and 35. At most.00 as exemplary damages. (3) Seduction.Private respondent's contention that there was no bad faith on his part in slapping petitioner on the face and that the incident was merely accidental is not tenable. (6) Illegal search. 21 of the Civil Code in relation to par. a Philippine government pensionado of the United States for six months. Then. Council No.The award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which provides that "willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that. GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET INC V ESPINO GUERRERO. moral shock and social humiliation caused by private respondent's act of hitting petitioner on the face in public. Pursuant to Art.The Court gives due consideration to respondent Ongsip's social and financial status as a businessman and the mental anguish he suffered as a result of the false imputation.

but the guard stopped him and said they were to go to the back of the supermarket.After reporting to the bride. It was his forgetfulness in checking out the item and paying for it that started the chain of events which led to his embarrassment and humiliation. He was totally embarrassed.While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral. Yet. . the official photographers. threatening to call the police and in the presence and hearing of many people at the Supermarket which brought and caused him humiliation and embarrassment. private respondent's act of omission contributed to the occurrence of his injury or loss and such contributory negligence is a factor which may reduce the damages that private respondent may recover (Art. good customs or public policy. on that day. ISSUE WON Espino is entitled to damages for the humiliation he experienced at the supermarket HELD YES . Petitioners wilfully caused loss or injury to private respondent in a manner that was contrary to morals. shouting at him.” Espino said he was going to pay for it. It was around 9am and the many people were at the store. thereby causing him mental anguish. New Civil Code). moral and exemplary damages. police officers arrived and interviewed all persons who had access to the suite and fingerprinted them including Valmonte. All the time the people were staring at him.” Valmonte's car which was parked at the hotel premises was also searched but the search yielded nothing.85 file. hearers or bystanders was not deliberately sought or called by management to witness private respondent's predicament. the make-up artist and his assistant.The false accusation charged against the private respondent after detaining and interrogating him by the uniformed guards and the mode and manner in which he was subjected. The CFI dismissed. During all the time Valmonte was being interrogated by the police officers. that many people were present and they saw and heard the ensuing interrogation and altercation appears to be simply a matter of coincidence in a supermarket which is a public place and the crowd of onlookers. except liquidated ones.Fandino read the report and remarked: “Ano.” Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search Valmonte's bag. Petitioner did not respond to the letter.m. atty’s fees = P2k. Fandino said it was a reward for guards who apprehend pilferers. Because it was small. interrogated and trailed by a security guard throughout the evening.A few days after the incident.nakaw na naman ito. Civil Code). he and his wife ran into his aunt’s maid. with a good part of the merchandise exposed. an aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress up for the occasion. saying he was a regular customer of the supermarket. petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of apology which she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds' relatives and guests to redeem her smeared reputation as a result of petitioner's imputations against her. . Everyone must respect the dignity. good customs and public policy to humiliate. It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: “Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto. a report was made. and the fashion designer. While they were talking he stuck the file in his breast pocket. Valmonte filed a suit for damages against her before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. People started milling around and stared at Espino. wounded feelings and serious anxiety. . He was then brought to the front of the grocery. where Espino said that he just forgot that he placed it in his pocket while talking to the maid and his wife. There. September 9. They all intended to pay for the things that are found to them.torts & damages by Grand Union) in Makati. Thus. petitioner kept on saying the words “Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto. the people whom we cause not paying for the goods say .Respondent Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. embarrass and degrade the dignity of a person. Valmonte prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay actual. ikaw ang kumuha. She paid the suppliers. according to the circumstances of each case (Art. casis . Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were billeted. Moreover. is left to the discretion of the court. he didn’t put it in the grocery cart because it might fall and get lost. temperate. Branch 268.After paying he and his wife walked out quickly. He thought about going back that night to throw stones at the supermarket. . give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith (Article 19. gave the meal allowance to the band. He started towards the cashier to pay. . CA modified: moral damages = P5k. privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons (Article 26. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched. He apologized and said he had forgotten. New Civil Code). petitioner denied having uttered words or done any act to confront or single out Valmonte during the investigation and claimed that lia