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1. NO, the NLRC did not act in excess of jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion. Ratio Findings of fact of administrative bodies and quasi-judicial bodies are afforded great respect by the Court and are binding except when there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or the decision was arrived at arbitrarily. Reasoning - Respondents showed that their monthly take home pay amounted to no less than $240 and this was not disputed by petitioners. - There is no record or evidence which shows that the closure of the taxi business was brought about by great financial losses no thanks to the Pinatubo eruption. It was rather brought about by the closure of the military bases. - Art. 283 of the CC provides that separation pay shall be equivalent to 1 month pay or at least ½ month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. The NLRC ruling was correct in terms of US$120 as the computed separation pay. 2. Petitioners can no longer question the authority of NOWM and are held in estoppel. Reasoning - NOWM was already representing the respondents before the labor arbiter and the petitioners did not assail their juridical personality then. - Petitioners also acknowledged before the Court that the taxi drivers are themselves parties in the case. 3. Naguiat Enterprises is not liable, Antolin Naguiat is not personally liable whereas Sergio Naguiat is solidarily liable. - Re: Naguiat Enterprises’ liability Reasoning - The respondents were regular employees of CFTI who received wages on a boundary basis. They offered no evidence that Naguiat Enterprises managed, supervised and controlled their employment. They instead submitted documents which had to do with CFTI, not Naguiat Enterprises. - Labor-only contractors are those where 1) the person supplying workers to the employer does no have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools or machinery and 2) the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of the employer. - Independent contractors are those who exercise independent employment, contracting to do a piece of work according to their own methods without being subject to the control of their employer except as to the result of their work. - Sergio Naguiat was a stockholder and director of Naguiat Enterprises but, in supervising the taxi drivers

INTRODUCTION
NAGUIAT V NLRC (National Organization of Workingmen and Galang) 269 SCRA 565 PANGANIBAN; March 13, 1997
NATURE Special civil action in the Supreme Court, certiorari FACTS - Clark Field Taxi, Inc. held a concessionaire’s contract with the Army Air Force Exchange Services for the operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base. Sergio Naguiat was the president of CFTI while Antolin Naguiat was its vice president. Like Naguiat Enterprises, Inc. which was a trading firm, it was also a family-owned corporation. - Respondents were employed by the CFTI as taxicab drivers. > They were required to pay a daily boundary fee of US$26.50 (for those on duty from 1AM-12N) or US$27 (for those on duty from 12N to 12 MN) > Incidental expenses were maintained by the drivers (including gasoline expenses). > Drivers worked 3-4 times a week depending on the availability of vehicles and earned no less than US$15.00 a day. In excess of that amount, they had to make cash deposits to the company which they could withdraw every fifteen days. - AAFES was dissolved because of the phase-out of the military bases in Clark and the services of the respondents were officially terminated on November 26, 1991. - AAFES Taxi Drivers Association, the drivers union, and CFTI held negotiations as regards separation benefits. They arrived at an agreement that the separated drivers would be given P500 for ever year as severance pay. Most of the drivers accepted this but some refused to do so. - Those who did not accept the initial severance pay disaffiliated themselves with drivers union and through the National Organization of Workingmen, they filed a complaint against Sergio Naguiat under the name and style Naguiat Enterprises, AAFES and AAFES union. - The labor arbiter ordered the petitioner to pay the drivers P1,200 for every year of service for humanitarian consideration, setting aside the earlier agreement between the CFTI and the drivers union. It

also rejected the idea that the CFTI was forced to close it business due to great financial losses and lose opportunity since at the time of its closure it was profitably earning. The labor arbiter however did not award separation pay because to “impose a monetary obligation to an employer whose profitable business was abruptly shot (sic) shot down by force majeur would be unfair and unjust.” - The NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter after respondents appealed by granting separation pay to the private respondents. It said that half of the monthly salary should be US$120 which should be paid in Philippine pesos. Naguiat Enterprieses should be joined with Sergio and Antolin Naguiat as jointly and severally liable. Petitioners’ Claim: - Petitioners claim that the cessation of the business was due to the great financial losses and lost business opportunity when Clark Air Base was phased out due to the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement and the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. - They admitted that CFTI had agreed with the drivers union to grant the taxi drivers separation pay equivalent to P500 for every year of service. - They allege that Sergio and Antolin Naguiat were denied due process beause the petitioners were not furnished copies of the appeal to the NLRC. - They also allege that NOWM cannot make legal representation in behalf of the respondents because the latter should be bound by the decision of the drivers union. Respondents’ Comments: - The drivers alleged that they were employees of Naguiat Enterprises although their individual applications were approved by CFTI. They claimed to have been assigned to Naguiat Enterprises after having been hired by CFTO and that Naguia Enterprises managed, controlled and supervised their employment. - They averred that they should be entitled to separation pay based on their latest daily earnings or US$15 for working 16 days a month. ISSUES 1. WON the NLRC acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in granting separation pay 2. WON NOWM was authorized to represent the private respondents 3. WON Naguiat Enterprieses, Sergio Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat were liable 4. WON Sergio and Antolin Naguiat were denied due process HELD

torts & damages
and determining their employment terms, he was carrying out his responsibility as president of CFTI. - Naguiat Enterprises was in the trading business while CFTI was in the taxi business. - The Constitution of the CFTI-AAFES Taxi Drivers Association states that the members of the union are employees of CFTI and for collective and bargaining purposes, the employer is also CFTI. - Re: Antolin Naguiat’s liability Reasoning - Although he carried the title of general manager, it has not been shown that he had acted in such capacity. - No evidence on the extent of his participation in the management or operation of the business was proferred. - Re: Sergio Naguiat’s liability Ratio A director or officer may be held solidarly liable with a corporation by a specific provision of law because a corporation, being a juridical entity, may act only through its directors and officers. Obligations incurred by them, acting as such corporation agents, are not theirs but the direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent. In the absence of definite proof of who clearly are the officers of the corporation, the assumption falls on the President of the corporation. Reasoning - In his capacity as President, Sergio Naguiat cannot be exonerated. - An employer is defined to be any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. - Case in point is A.C. Ransom Labor Union CCLU vs. NLRC held that the identified employer A.C. Ransom Corporation, being an artificial person, must have an officer and in the absence of proof, the president is assumed to be the head of the corporation. - Both CFTI and Naguiat Enterprises were close family corporations owned by the same family. To the extent that stockholders are actively engaged in the management or business affairs of a close corporation, the stockholders shall be held to strict fiduciary duties to each other and among themselves. Said stockholders shall be liable for corporate torts unless the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance. > Nothing in the records indicate that CFTI obtained reasonable adequate liability insurance. > Jurisprudence is wanting in the definition of corporate tort. Tort essentially consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Tort is a breach of legal duty. > Art. 238 mandates the employer to grant separation pay to employees in case of cessation of operations or closure of the business not due to

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directly responsible under A1903CC as employer of Fontanilla HELD YES - There are two actions available for parents of Garcia. One is under the A100RPC wherein the employer is only subsidiarily liable for the damages arising from the crime thereby first exhausting the properties of Fontanilla. The other action is under A1903CC (quasidelict or culpa aquiliana) wherein as the negligent employer of Fontanilla, Barredo is held primarily liable subject to proving that he exercising diligence of a good father of the family. The parents simply took the action under the Civil Code as it is more practical to get damages from the employer bec he has more money to give than Fontanilla who is yet to serve his sentence. Obiter Difference bet Crime and Quasi-delict 1) crimes – public interest; quasi-delict – only private interest 2) Penal code punishes or corrects criminal acts; Civil Code by means of indemnification merely repairs the damage 3) delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts; crimes are only punished if there is a penal law; quasi-delicts include any kind of fault or negligence intervenes NOTE: not all violations of penal law produce civil responsibility e.g. contravention of ordinances, violation of game laws, infraction of rules of traffic when nobody is hurt 4) crime – guilt beyond reasonable doubt; civil – mere preponderance of evidence - Presumptions: 1) injury is caused by servant or employee, there instantly arises presumption of negligence of master or employer in selection, in supervision or both 2) presumption is juris tantum not juris et de jure TF may be rebutted by proving exercise of diligence of a good father of the family - basis of civil law liability: not respondent superior bu the relationship of pater familias - motor accidents – need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles

serious business losses or financial reverses which is the condition on this case. 4. There was no denial of due process. Reasoning - Even if the individual Naguiats were not impleaded as parties of the complaint, they could still be held liable because of jurisprudence (A.C. Ransom case). - Both also voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter when they filed a position paper. DISPOSITION The petition is partly granted. 1) CFTI and Sergio Naguiat are ordered to pay jointly and severally the individual respondents of US$120 for every year of service and 2) Naguiat Enterprises and Antolin Naguiat are absolved from liability.

BARREDO V GARCIA BOCOBO; July 8, 1942
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - from CA, holding Fausto Barredo liable for damages for death pf Faustino Garcia caused by negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by Fausto Barredo - May 3, 1936 – in road between Malabon and Navotas, head-on collision between taxi of Malate Taxicab and carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis thereby causing overturning of the carretela and the eventual death of Garcia, 16-yo boy and one of the passengers - Fontanilla convicted in CFI and affirmed by CA and separate civil action is reserved - Parents of Garcia filed action against Barredo as sole proprietor of Malate Taxicab as employer of Fontanilla - CFI and CA awarded damages bec Fontanilla’s negligence apparent as he was driving on the wrong side of the road and at a high speed > no proof he exercised diligence of a good father of the family as Barredo is careless in employing (selection and supervision) Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of Automobile Law and speeding > CA applied A1903CC that makes inapplicable civil liability arising from crime bec this is under obligations arising from wrongful act or negligent acts or omissions punishable by law - Barredo’s defense is that his liability rests on RPC TF liability only subsidiary and bec no civil action against Fontanilla TF he too cannot be held responsible ISSUE WON parents of Garcia may bring separate civil action against Barredo making him primarily liable and

ELCANO V HILL 77 SCRA 98 BARREDO; May 26, 1977
NATURE Appeal from an order of the CFI Quezon City FACTS

torts & damages
- Reginald Hill, a minor yet married at the time of occurrence, was criminally prosecuted for the killing of Agapito Elcano (son of Pedro), and was acquitted for “lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.” - Pedro Elcano filed a complaint for recovery of damages from Reginald and his father Atty Marvin. CFI dismissed it. ISSUES 1. WON the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability was not reversed 2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last par) of the CC can be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the occurrence, Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married HELD 1. NO -The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him. -Barredo v Garcia (dual character—civil and criminal — of fault or negligence as a source of obligation): "The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued." "It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1402 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case aria for which, after un a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.” -Culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of a penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. -ART 1162: "Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of

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- Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. 2. YES (but…) - Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. (However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.) - While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he was of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian." - Under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." - In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual. - It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. - On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.

this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, Article 2177 of the new code provides: "ART 277. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising front negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant." - According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a 'culpa aquilian' or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and 'culpa extracontractual' or 'cuasi-delito' has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery," - Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth life" rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that me preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 12) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it’s "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress", to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. - Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.

CINCO V CANONOY 90 SCRA 369

good customs or public policy.The City Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the civil case. ISSUE WON there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action HELD YES .000 pesos atty’s. Reasoning .Baksh answered with a counterclaim. Independent civil action.In the instant case. He also prayed for 25. proof that he had. . Petitioner had visited MG’s parents to secure their approval of the marriage. A day before the filing of the complaint. He . expenses. A week before the filing of the complaint. Baksh repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that he is already married to someone in Bacolod. petitioner started maltreating her even threatening to kill her and as a result of such maltreatment.Petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasidelict.21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. casis claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married.. could justify the award of damages pursuant to Art.it was the fault r negligence of the driver in the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision. 32.The RTC. may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case. BAKSH V CA (Gonzales) 219 SCRA 115 DAVIDE. and is an exchange student taking up medicine at the Lyceum in Dagupan. 19701 a complaint for recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito. YES Ratio In a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Feb. raising the single issue of WON Art. provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals. 33. – In the cases prvided for in Articles 31.torts & damages Melencio-Herrera. Baksh later forced MG to live with him. . respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise. Art. is so broad that in includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property.Respondent CA promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto the trial court’s ruling which prompted Baksh to file this petition for certiorari. Petitioner appealed this decision to respondent CA. 21 CC decided in favor of private respondent. did not maltreat her but only told her to stop coming to his place after having discovered that she stole his money and passport. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court: Sec 2.Cinco filed on Feb 25. no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act.000 as moral damages plus misc. old Filipina.Private respondent Marilou Gonzales (MG) filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. . as enunciated in Art 2176 of the Civil Code. atty’s fees. . . of good moral character and respected reputation in her community. single. Such civil action shall A2010 -4- prof. admitting only the personal circumstances of the parties in the complaint but denied the rest of the allegations. **MG’s allegations in the complaint: . She prayed for payment for damages amounting to Php 45. in reality. Petitioner’s MFR having been denied. Petitioner was thus ordered to pay Php 20. 1993 NATURE Appeal by certiorari to review and set aside the CA decision which affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision FACTS . It is essential however. MG accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. Plaintiff’s claims: . counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. JR.The separate and independent civil action for quasidelict is also clearly recognized in sec 2. . 21 may be applied. The concept of quasi-delict.000 as moral damages and 3. . DISPOSITION Writ of Certiorari granted. 1979 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. It makes no distinction between “damage to persons” on the one hand and “damage to property” on the other. neither sought the consent of her parents nor forced her to live in his apt. Respondents’ Comments: . she sustained injuries.19.They observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.Liability being predicated on quasi-delict. The word damage is used in two concepts: the “harm” done and “reparation” for the harm done. 21 applies to this case. residing in Dagupan.There was a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private respondents. 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code f the Philippines.At the pre-trial in the civil case. .That Baksh later courted and proposed to marry her. . And with respect to “harm” it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since “harm” is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. . May 31. which in turn dismissed the petition. contending that the trial court erred in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and in ordering him to pay moral damages. applying Art.That Baksh is an Iranian citizen. . particularly of Romeo Hilot.000 plus additional costs.That she is a 22 yr.Where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress. .21 of the Civil Code HELD 1. They later agreed to get married at the end of the school semester. etc.. as specifically provided for in Art 2177 of the Civil Code. he elevated the matter on Certiorari to the CFI Cebu. ISSUE WON damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Art. fees plus litigation expenses. the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action.Damages were sustained by petitioner because of the collision .Subsequently. a criminal case was filed against the driver Romeo Hilot arising from the same accident. an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.

337 or Art. He said that he uses his left hand in lighting cigarettes and he had no motive to kill the victims. there is no crime.Bulusan echoed the defense of alibi of Galo and Ballesteros . In short. the cherished possession of every single Filipina. Having been found with gunpowder residue in his hands. Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino sustained injuries. in the interest of justice. Therefore. qualified by treachery. in the absence of Art. “An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: 'A' seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of 'X. Galo attempted to exculpate himself from the results by confessing that he had been a cigarette smoker for the past ten years and had. Carmelo Agliam. especially during the festivity. that he went to a nearby store to purchase some cigarettes. January 29. it is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses. in fact. the legislator. **Obiter: on Torts and Quasi-delicts . and although the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage. unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which. His younger brother Jerry also managed to jump out. are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Art.755. would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.evening of May 28. to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule: “Art.” .21. 1991. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code. she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. Lastly. scurried to the side of the road and hid in the ricefield. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which. as the girl is above 18 yrs of age. Syquia. Raymundo Bangi and Marcial Barid converged at a carinderia owned by Ronnel Tolentino. The girl becomes pregnant.338 of the RPC because the private respondent was above 18 years of age at the time of the seduction. Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or value which could alter the result of the case. Art.' A promise of marriage either has not been made. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Art. or can not be proved.00. with interest.torts & damages preparatory to their supposed marriage. warrants for the arrest of Ballesteros. not because of lust but because of moral seduction. Vidal Agliam was able to jump out from the jeep and landed just beside it. if considered. though the grievous moral wrong has been committed. he said that he was not even present at the crime scene . The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. . with certain exceptions. false imprisonment and deceit. but was shot in the stomach and died.21 fills that vacuum.The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in the amount of P50. which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.The group had barely left when their owner jeep was fired upon from the rear. Under the present laws. she and her parents would have such a right of action. He handled the fertilizers without gloves.Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo and Vidal Agliam. if the foregoing rule is approved. .All pleaded not guilty. just consumed eight cigarette sticks prior to the test. it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. Art. even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury. intentional and malicious acts. and that his hand may have been contaminated by a nitrogenous compound. Eduardo Tolentino was not even able to move from his seat and was hit with a bullet which punctured his right kidney which caused his death. They proceeded to attend a dance but did not stay long because they sensed some hostility from Cesar Galo and his companions who were giving them dagger looks. The next morning. the Commission has deemed it necessary. they decided to head for home instead of reacting to the perceived provocation of Galo and his companions. known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana.” .2176 CC. . He returned home and cleaned his garlic bulbs before retiring at 9:00 o’clock. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code.00. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying. which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless. Ronnel Tolentino. from which We quote: “The elimination of this chapter is proposed. Galo claimed that he did not even talk to Bulusan or any of his companions. Quasi-delict. Galo and Bulusan were issued.This notwithstanding.2176 CC. and actual damages in the amount of P35. the said Code contains a provision. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. DISPOSITION finding no reversible error in the challenged decision. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. . the instant petition is hereby DENIED PEOPLE V BALLESTEROS 285 SCRA 438 ROMERO.000.In his testimony. Robert Cacal. Thus. Vidal Agliam. casis . he busied himself with some chores. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence. which included fertilizing his pepper plants with sulfate.21 Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals.As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report: “But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law.Art. qualified by treachery. his brother Jerry Agliam.” A2010 -5- prof. Article 21. the private respondent surrendered her virginity. and ordered them to pay jointly and solidarily: 1. might affect the result of the case. 1998 NATURE An appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. moral damages in the amount of P20.. In order to avoid trouble.Ballesteros interposed the defense of alibi. but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and battery. Bulusan was not tested for nitrates. Carmelo Agliam. . the source of which is urine. Thus at one stroke. which defines a quasi-delict..00. FACTS .000.21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs. But under the proposed article. Paraffin tests conducted on Galo and Ballesteros produced positive results. is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. . It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.Moreover. is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. would have been beyond redress. . his halfbrother Eduardo Tolentino.The trial court found the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder..

Sr. Defendant Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because there was an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first passageway. unlike those found in gunpowder.003.When said property was purchased by Mabasa.In their testimonies. Considering the luminescence of the moon and the proximity between them. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway. casis court.000. Reasoning . . urine may leave traces of nitrates. In passing thru said passageway. on the other hand. or in recompense for.. However. although inestimable. 5. Intent. . Such path is passing in between the row of houses of defendants. Palingon.That accused-appellants had no motive in perpetrating the offense is irrelevant. with interest. Consistent with the policy of this Court. The doubt to the benefit of which an accused is entitled in a criminal trial is a reasonable doubt. WON the Court was correct in the award of damages to the heirs of the victims HELD 1. the same having been fully substantiated by receipts accumulated by them and presented to the CUSTODIO V CA (Heirs Of Mabasa) 253 SCRA 483 REGALADO. method or form of attack employed by him. As access to P. or as otherwise expressed. fertilizers and A2010 -6- prof. The prosecution need not prove motive on the part of the accused when the latter has been positively identified as the author of the crime. moral damages in the amount of P5. Tagig. and actual damages in the total amount of P61. he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width.40.. but these are minimal and.00. the amount of P 50. damage and injury caused to the heirs of the victims. 4. with interest. as corroborated by his testimony. Reasonable doubt is that engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and inability.on the defense of alibi: for the defense of alibi to prosper.Here. 1982. In fact. As regards moral damages. one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises. there were tenants occupying the remises and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants.. the victim was not in a position to defend himself. The costs. the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. loss or injury sustained. but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.00. 1996 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA FACTS . from behind.The plaintiff-appellee Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P.00 is given to the heirs of the victims by way of indemnity. it is obvious that the accused-appellants had sufficient opportunity to reflect on their heinous plan.000. a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6m in length. serious anxiety. WON the Court correctly ruled in finding that the offense was qualified by treachery 3.. totally unaware of their presence. 2. Carmelo Agliam. there are 2 possible passageways. not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime. However. moral shock and so forth. and moral damages in the amount of P10. Reasoning . we see no reason to disturb its findings as to this matter. Reasoning .000. WON the trial court was correct in finding accusedappellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt 2. The facts show that the attack was well-planned and not merely a result of the impulsiveness of the offenders. Burgos St. may be washed off with tap water. may be determined by the trial court in its discretion. at the very least. . one would have been able to recognize the other easily .785.00. moral damages in the amount of P20. receipts. is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result. the party making a claim for such must present the best evidence available.In granting actual or compensatory damages. The second passageway is about 3m in width. There was no opportunity for the latter to defend themselves 3. whereas moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has experienced mental anguish. viz. physical suffering.on their excuses regarding the source of the gunpowder traces found on their hands: Experts confirm the possibility that cigarettes. must be amended. YES Ratio The requisites of treachery are twofold: (1) (t)hat at the time of the attack. they never attempted to present as witnesses those who could have testified to having seen them elsewhere on the night in question. and not as compensatory damages.000. Hence. Here. the accused must prove. . not a whimsical or fanciful doubt based on imagined but wholly improbable possibilities and unsupported by evidence. They were well-armed and approached the homebound victims. actual damages in the amount of P2. recompense. Manifestations of their evil designs were already apparent as early as the time of the dance. And it was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. the award of actual damages is proper. Burgos Street from plaintiff's property. Carmelo and Vidal Agliam both described the area to be well illumined by the moon. after such investigation. to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of.00.00 each. and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means. Also.000. This accused-appellants failed to satisfactorily prove. Burgos St. compensatory damages in the amount of P50. the claim for actual damages by the heirs of the victims is not controverted. Positive identification prevails over denials and alibis. February 9.torts & damages 2. the victims could distinctly identify their assailants. Vidal Agliam Jr. DISPOSITION The decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20m distant from Mabasa's residence to P. The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino. with interest. Tipas. Therefore. YES Ratio Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation. ISSUES 1. sometime in February. vouchers. Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result. the constant interaction between them through the years (in the buying and selling of cattle and Bulusan was a classmate of Vidal) would necessarily lead to familiarity with each other such that. and had furthermore shown that these were the proximate result of the offender’s wrongful act or omission. Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. 3. Metro Manila. She also mentioned some other . the order granting compensatory damages to the heirs of Jerry Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr. has to be traversed.None of them attempted to corroborate their alibi through the testimony of witnesses. or satisfaction for an injury sustained. YES Ratio Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by law to convict a person of a criminal charge. the amount of psychological pain. and the like.

and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. hired and boarded a PU car with plate No. 2850) against the private respondents. and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. that act must be not only hurtful. 1972. casis bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No.torts & damages inconveniences of having at the front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. awarding damages to plaintiffs (P65K as actual damages. in a reckless.N. Contrary to the claim of private respondents. and Ester Francisco. As a result of the aforesaid collision. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing. with prayer for preliminary attachment. the filing of the instant civil action is premature. as owners. and. Garcia. 1971. the civil aspect of the criminal case would have to be determined only after the termination of the criminal case result of a violation of a legal duty. 1971. Inc. or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages. (b) the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses P8.m. upon his own property) in a lawful and proper manner. Thus. is not applicable because Art 33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide. Garcia. guilty of negligence. 25) with plate No. [2] Obiter: There is a material distinction between damages and injury. . in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police and that. of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the collision. Hence this appeal. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right.The lower court sustained Mactan Inc. Sindangan. while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan. bookkeeper of said hospital. Mactan Transit Co. WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint for damages on the ground that since no express reservation was made by the complainants. hurt.The principal argument advanced by Mactan Inc. went to CA raising the sole issue of WON lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. respectively. because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver. 77-4 W Z. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent. and . With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners. pursuant to Sec. Luminosa L. damage is the loss. . grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car. and driven by defendant. filed on September 1. with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case. said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No. that Art. WON CA erred in awarding damages to plaintiffappellee Mabasa HELD 1. Zamboanga del Norte". hospital administrative officers. respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No.Petitioners are already barred from raising the same. the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.At about 9:30 a. [4] In this case. without other limitations than those established by law. and from the order of said Court dated January 21. FACTS . although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another. there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant. Luminosa L. or harm which results from the injury. DISPOSITION The appealed decision of CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the trial court is REINSTATED. for a roundtrip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City. owners and drivers.. Zamboanga del Norte. Garcia. It is within the right of petitioners. Al. an appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court Reasoning . Zamboanga del Norte. The injury must result from a breach of duty or a legal wrong. there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the A2010 -7- prof. there was no legal injury. to the public street. CA affirming TC judgment with modification. 7 at Zamboanga City. and Ester Francisco. together with his wife. dismissing petitioners' action for damages against respondents. .TC ordered (a) defendant-appellants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access — ingress and egress. and driven by respondent. "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan. petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right (Art. Ricardo Vayson. Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital. Garcia. WON the grant of right of way to herein private respondents is proper 2. 4960 of the Municipal Court of Sindangan. 2. and dismissed the complaint ISSUES 1.Private respondents. good customs or public policy. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.. Pedro Tumala. . ISSUES 1. There must be damnum et injuria. hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. German C. Inc. [DATE] NATURE Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co. P30K as moral damages and P10K as exemplary damages). and Pedro Tumala.Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip. al to in a motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11. but wrongful. Marcelino Inesin. no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated. to enclose and fence their property (See Art. et. Ratio Whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case. for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government hospitals. . et. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way.On August 4.430 CC). petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization. Some of their footwear were even lost. although there was damage. . petitioners. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. petitioners.21 CC) [5] The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners. Mfr denied. YES Ratio There is no cause of action for acts done by one person (in this case. [3] In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage. hence not contrary to morals. 33 of the New Civil Code. Reasoning [1] To warrant the recovery of damages.000 as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver. Pedro Tumala.. German C. THE CONCEPT OF QUASIDELICT GARCIA V FLORIDO [CITATION] ANTONIO. therefore.

an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action. . which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso.The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless." . it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177. but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940. Articles 32. and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties.As we have stated at the outset. 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code. there being no showing that prejudice could be caused by doing so. Garcia. 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles. By instituting a civil action based on a quasi-delict. petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case. may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law. while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence. Ratio An action shall be deemed to be based on a quasi-delict when all the essential averments under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present. for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action. I concur in the judgment reversing the order of dismissal of the trial court in order that Civil Case No. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which became effective on January 1. "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to . b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No.It is. subject to the limitation mentioned in the last sentence of Article 2177 of the Civil Code. ANDAMO V IAC (Missionaries Of Our Lady Of La Salette. HELD 1. Since Civil Case No. whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering that by the institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case. . provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case. 620-621). Articles 32. 4960) and the civil action by petitioners. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car. 2 in relation to Sec. Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. As to the specific mention of Article 2177 in Section 2 of the Rule 111. . which is procedural. it being substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate. d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents.Accordingly. for these articles were drafted . the injured party is entitled exclusively to the bigger one. it is my considered view that the latter provision is inoperative. as one based on culpa aquiliana. 2. . 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. of the Civil Code. which means that of the two possible judgments. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31. I cannot see why a reservation had to be made in the criminal case. compensatory and exemplary damages . the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extracontractual. however. c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision. and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case. not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute.Article 2176 and 2177 definitely create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code. et all (73 Phil. there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala. namely: a) act or omission of the private respondents. It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. and even if it were not substantive but adjective. 2850 may proceed. it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would substantially be the same. . 2850 is predicated on the above civil code articles and not on the civil liability imposed by the Revised Penal Code. because the action in fact satisfies the elements of quasi-delict. or one where reservation to file the civil action need not be made.Besides. 1964. petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein.But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners. that degree of care.As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in the criminal action. .It is true that under Sec. grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract from the nature and character of the action. The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others. 2850 should be deemed as the reservation required. Reasoning . the actual filing of Civil Case No. 33 and 34 A2010 -8- prof. Hence.In the case at bar. . YES Ratio An action based on quasi-delict may be maintained independently from a criminal action. . a complainant may be deemed to abandon his/her right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case. We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal. The proviso. and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court SEPARATE OPINION BARREDO [concur] . WON the lower court erred in saying that the action is not based on quasi-delict since the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations and because of the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally liable for moral. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. YES. in the cases provided for by Articles 31. much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused. casis (Criminal Case No. but it should be noted. which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. under the peculiar circumstances of the case. . For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared. the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages. having always had its own foundation and individuality. 607. Inc) . therefore. precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. . The former is a violation of the criminal law. may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case. that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made. 33.torts & damages 2. Reasoning .

It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. including an artificial lake. (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally). which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict. a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act. respondent Appellate Court affirmed the order of the trial court. the recitals of the complaint. petitioners filed a civil case for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent corporation. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person. . adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person. that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. waterpaths. . whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. whenever it refers to "fault or negligence". as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. .. Moreover. Indeed. can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on A2010 -9- prof. the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence. the Court applied Article 1902. waterpaths and contrivances.torts & damages 191 SCRA 195 FERNAN. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land. . 1990 NATURE Petition for certiorari. . stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages. and the causal connection between the act and the damage.Within the land of respondent corporation. is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake.Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang. washed away costly fences. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the land. whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted.Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court.In the case of Samson vs." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Inc.On February 22. petitioners instituted a criminal action against Efren Musngi. 1984. Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately. for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31. were constructed. Such fault or negligence. All the elements of a quasidelict are present. The former is a violation of the criminal law. the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin. . now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike. a religious corporation. there being fault or negligence.The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 21772 of the Civil Code. with no pre-existing contractual obligation 2 Article 2177. the trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in the civil case until after judgment in the related Criminal Case.On April 26. having always had its own foundation and individuality. in quasi-delicts. There can be no logical conclusion than this. but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.In July 1982. . is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.On February 17. water conductors and contrivances within its land. or some other person for whose acts he must respond. 1 Article 2176. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Dionisio. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence. to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff. Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent. casis between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana. thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who." Reasoning . of ancient origin. which has built through its agents. . shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party. As held in In Azucena vs.The waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. . damaged petitioners' crops and plants. assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. ISSUE WON a corporation. 1983. like the rest of the residents. "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. provided that the offended party is not allowed. prohibition and mandamus FACTS . the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners. to recover damages on both scores. endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. 1986. separate from criminal negligence.While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the instant case is privately owned.The decision was based on Section 3 (a). November 6. thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land. such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. Consequently. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court . Potenciano. is obliged to pay for the damage done. quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case HELD Ratio YES. And later on dismissed the Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction.A careful examination of the complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. caused a young man to drown." . an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. There is therefore. . covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character. officers and directors of respondent corporation. (b) fault or negligence of the defendant. . which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land. According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight startling.Article 2176. and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two. .Article 2176 1of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence. the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered. . and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette.

spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. a minor. . this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own.torts & damages Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain .We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code. awarding damages to the plaintiff. Therefore. his nearest relative.The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on the defendant's premises. ART. The plaintiff. in order to establish his right to a recovery. is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with them. The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. .We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff.Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts proven at the trial do not established the liability of the defendant company under the provisions of these articles. by his father. casis ART. A2010 . was at the time when he received the injuries complained of. more mature than the average boy of his age. Court of Appeals. in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist. the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case. 1903. by quasi-contracts. . nor how long they had been there when the boys found them. his entry upon defendant company's premises. Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties. and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule. and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises.. David Taylor. not only for personal acts and omissions. FACTS . and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents. (2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. 15 years of age. who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place. . an employee of the defendant. In the case of Castillo vs. and on his death or incapacity the mother. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite. the real difficulty arising in the application of these principles to the particular facts developed in the case under consideration. unless. and for kindling of explosive substances which may not have been placed in a safe and proper place. with a boy named Manuel Claparols. instituted by David Taylor. . . and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics. and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime — a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. 1910 NATURE An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries. The father. 1905. by contracts. the boys. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused — 1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence. when they felt disposed so to do.On the 30th of September. and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. entered upon the defendant's premises. and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches.No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premises unattended. who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap. and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. received a slight cut in the neck. must establish by competent evidence: (1) Damages to the plaintiff.But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience. March 22.. but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible. or create an action for quasidelicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. for the purpose of visiting one Murphy. Finding on inquiry that Mr. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor. . the son of a mechanical engineer. impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery. of course. one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds. An explosion followed. as under the generally accepted doctrine in the United States. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable. and 1908 of that code. 1089 Obligations are created by law. of course.The trial court's decision. they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not. . and do not admit of discussion. ART. (3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage. the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration. . . in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code. plaintiff. . Jessie. for his own pleasure and convenience. and the intervention of his action between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the TAYLOR V MANILA ELECTRIC 16 PHIL 8 CARSON. or some person for whose acts it must respond. causing more or less serious injuries to all three.It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where they were found. they opened one of the caps with a knife. ART. was guilty. and illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal. became frightened and started to run away. and strolled around thereon without the express permission of the defendant. ISSUE WON the defendants negligence is the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries HELD NO . Murphy was not in his quarters. upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902. about 12 years of age.10 - prof.These proposition are. elementary.

or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.. and neither is contention that a man has a right to do what will with his own property or that children should be kept under the care of their parents or guardians. but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act. and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act. counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last resort in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases. we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate A2010 . and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred. In turn. so as to prevent their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient weight to put in doubt. so that while it may be true that these injuries would TAYAG V ALCANTARA 98 SCRA 723 CONCEPCION. this provision refers to a civil action based on an obligation arising from quasi-delict. and it is because we can not agree with this proposition. .Pedro Tayag was riding a motorcycle when he was bumped by a Philippine Rabbit Bus. vs. . . The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that. he had been to sea as a cabin boy.11 - prof. more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault.). and this latter the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the injuries sustained by him. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lino. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him. Plaintiff contends. July 23. that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act. But the doctrine of the case is controlling in our jurisdiction." and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of adult. that because of plaintiff's youth the intervention of his action between the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the explosion which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident. despite his denials on the witness stand. . Judge Alcantara granted this and dismissed the civil case. which should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place where they were found by the plaintiff. and necessity. therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter” . such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years." and. (84 U. he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. NCC provides: “When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only. although we accept the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases. Stout (17 Wall. the acquittal of the driver of the crime charged is not a bar to the prosecution for damages based on quasi-delict Reasoning . it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts. and yet he willfully.But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff.torts & damages accident which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident.Evidently. Judge Alcantara granted this motion. and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. the heirs of Tayag instituted a civil action to recover damages from the company (Phil Rabbit Bus Inc) and the driver. 31. under circumstances. Pending the criminal case against the driver. NO Ratio The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi-delict. or for purposes of amusement. and that the defendant. was able to earn P2. upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases. the principles on which these cases turn are that "while a railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it. recklessly. that we have thought proper to discuss and to consider that doctrine at length in this decision. and knowingly produced the explosion. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in several courts.In the criminal case. S. from idle curiosity. we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff. and the cases based thereon.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred." . justice. which therefore was not. 657). "attributable to the negligence of the defendant.In the case at bar. if such injury was. nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury. .As laid down in Railroad Co. which caused his instantaneous death. viz: “6. . on the other hand. . the driver as acquitted based on reasonable doubt. attributable to the negligence of the company).This conclusion is founded on reason. and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case. the company and driver filed a motion to suspend trial of the civil case on the ground that the criminal case was still pending. Inc. properly speaking.The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap. wherein the principal question was whether a railroad company was liable for in injury received by an infant while upon its premises. cause of the injury received by the plaintiff.True. without other fault on his part. The complaint itself shows that the claim was based on quasi-delit. 1980 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari the order of CFI Tarlac (dismissing petition for damages) FACTS . ISSUE WON Judge Alcantara correctly dismissed the civil case on the ground of no cause of action due to the acquittal of the driver HELD 1. casis not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises.In support of his contention. if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant. has failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a . driven by Romeo Villa. plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15. he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap.Art. The company and driver then filed for dismissal of the civil case on the ground that the heirs do not have a cause of action because of the acquittal.

. is the subject of conflicting versions by the prosecution and the defense. . 1984 . A2010 . Payuan also prepared a Traffic Accident Report. .M.October 31. WON he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted. telling them "nakaaksidente ng tao. The Kombi did not stop after the victim fell down on the pavement near the foot of the underpass.an autopsy was conducted by the medico-legal officer of NBI which stated the cause of death of Rosales as "pneumonia hypostatic. While waiting. and immediately thereafter. casis guns and told the driver. secondary to traumatic injuries of the head. He was allegedly robbed of his cigarette box containing cigarettes worth P300. 1983.prosecution tried to establish. 1095). particularly defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan. otherwise. they stopped." The two men in the jeep joined the chase and at the intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard. Rosales approached the Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of cigarettes.torts & damages family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Castillo pursued it as it sped towards Roxas Boulevard. . bilateral. Fernando Gabat. Yatco. Rosales to buy some cigarettes from him. PEOPLE V LIGON 152 SCRA 419 YAP. Fermin Payuan. as plaintiffs in the civil case. but for damages due to a quasidelict or culpa aquiliana". July 29.December 6. no vendor lets go of his precious box of cigarettes in order to change a peso bill given by a customer. He immediately blocked the Kombi while the jeep pulled up right behind it.June 28.Investigating Fiscal Cantos. case REMANDED to lower court for further proceedings. was never apprehended and is still at large. and the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved forward.The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's version. Recto Avenue. through the sole testimony of the taxicab driver that Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales and pried loose the latter's hand from the window of the Kombi. Rosales was rushed by some bystanders to the Philippine General Hospital. stating that there can be no doubt that Gabat forcibly took or grabbed the cigarette box from Rosales because.Following close behind (about 3 meters) the Kombi at the time of the incident was a taxicab driven by Castillo. cigarette vendors. The taxicab driver. Rogelio Ligon. Gabat beckoned a cigarette vendor. the accident in question which resulted in the death of Pedro Tayag. who allegedly witnessed the incident . The two men on board the jeep turned out to be police officers. Patrolmen Leonardo Pugao and Peter Ignacio. 1983 . the trial court dismissed as incredible the testimony of Gabat that the cigarette vendor placed the cigarette box on the windowsill of the Kombi. 1983 . RTC convicted Fernando Gabat. 1984. 100 Phil. Castillo was able to overtake the Kombi when the traffic light turned red. NATURE Appeal from the judgment of the RTC Manila FACTS .m. 1987 . filed an information against Rogelio Ligon charging him with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. Prudencio Castillo. The court also believed Castillo's testimony that Gabat forcibly removed or pried off the right hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi. Order of CFI Tarlac set aside. but Rogelio Ligon was detained and turned over to the City Fiscal's Office for further investigation. It is not controverted. At the intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street before turning left towards the underpass at C. the acquittal of Romeo Villa was based on reasonable doubt. under which according to the Code Commission. Ligon which was coming from España Street going towards the direction of Quiapo. 1983. 1986. while he was trying to get from his pocket the change for the 5peso bill of Gabat. however. that as the Kombi continued to speed towards Quiapo. where he was treated for multiple physical injuries and was confined thereat until his death on October 30. Rogelio Ligon.” All the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action are present: (1) act or omission constituting fault /negligence on the part of respondent (2) damage caused by the said act or omission (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or omission and (4) no preexisting contractual relation between the parties. there could be no reason for the latter to run after the Kombi and hang on to its window. Article 33 of the Civil Code also justifies the petitioners' independent civil action for damages since the term "physical injuries" therein embraces death (Dyogi vs.Assistant Fiscal Cantos filed another information against Rogelio Ligon and Fernando Gabat for Robbery with Homicide based on a Supplemental Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo and a joint affidavit of Armando Espino and Romeo Castil.at about 6:10 p. Citing Elcano v Hill: a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act. These affidavits were already prepared and merely sworn to before Fiscal Cantos on January 17. Gabat.6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias were released early morning the following day. "acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence. provided that offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores DISPOSITION petition granted.12 - prof.The requirement in section 2. . When they reached the Luneta near the Rizal monument. The court said that it is of common knowledge that cigarette vendors plying their trade in the streets do not let go of their cigarette box. also went along with them. shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action. It was found out that there was a third person inside the Kombi. a certain Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at the rear seat. Otherwise. dated October 23. He was traveling on the same lane in a slightly oblique position.Moreover. can amend their complaint and base their action also on article 29 NCC which allows an independent civil action for damages in case of acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt. whether on reasonable doubt or not. the traffic light changed to green. He sought their assistance in chasing the Kombi. and damage to his property would not have occurred. The petitioners. beeping his horn to make the driver stop. . having already been able to balance himself on the stepboard.I concur because petitioners' action for damages is based on article 2177 of the Civil Code. 1983 . a seventeen-year old working student who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. Rosales clung to the window of the Kombi but apparently lost his grip and fell down on the pavement. . They drew their SEPARATE OPINION AQUINO [concur] . to alight from the Kombi. of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua where he robbed and killed Jose Rosales y Ortiz. the latter could not have fallen down. .February 17. Castillo saw an owner-type jeep with two persons in it. As to what precisely happened between Gabat and Rosales at the crucial moment. resulting in the latter falling down and hitting the pavement. Rule III of the Rules of Court that there should be a reservation in the criminal cases of the right to institute an independent civil action is contrary to law.October 23.the co-accused. not for civil liability from criminal negligence. . . holding it with his left hand. and his companion. otherwise.On the other hand. was riding in a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father and driven by the other accused. Sr.00 more or less.The three were all brought by the police officers to the Western Police District and turned over to Pfc. While this transaction was occurring." .

In the process however the stock in trade and certain furniture of Vergara were lost and destroyed. "other than to see that justice be done. but sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales y Ortiz. why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? DISPOSITION Appellant acquitted for the crime of robbery and homicide. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime.a careful review of the record shows that certain material facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which. which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission." his testimony. even if not tainted with bias. As the taxicab was right behind the Kombi. . may be a disinterested witness with no motive. 1964. casis FACTS . His testimony that he saw Gabat grab the cigarette box from Rosales and forcibly pry loose the latter's hand from the windowsill of the Kombi is thus subject to a reasonable doubt.On appeal. Since the standard of proof to be used in civil cases is preponderance of evidence.13 - prof. unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the facts from which the civil action might arise did not exist. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility. In the case at bar.600. [date] NATURE Petition of rcertiorari to revies the decision of the Court of Appeals . for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused. but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished. . following it at a distance of about three meters. . . Castillo. "This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. the court express a finding that the defendants’ offenses are civil in nature. and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The acquittal extinguishes the criminal liability but not the civil liability particularly if the finding is not guilty based on reasonable ground. In our view.Article 29 of the Civil Code. ISSUE WON the CA committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge HELD NO . One affects the social order and the other. . One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. the crime of grave coercion was not proved in accordance with the law. . the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt." It is just and proper that. went to the public market to execute an alleged order of the Mayor to clear the public market of stalls which were considered as nuisance per se. civil liability cannot be demanded. the Court is not convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of the accused Fernando Gabat has been established beyond reasonable doubt. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice.The Court also tackled the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code to clarify whether a separate civil action is required when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.00 as actual damages.The SC. held that extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil. where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. has been explained by the Code Commission as follows: "The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. on or about February 8.The petitioners were found guilty of grave coercion after trial at the CFI and were sentenced to five months and one day imprisonment and ordered to pay fines. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt.Petitioners. thus making it visually difficult for Castillo to observe clearly what transpired inside the Kombi at the front end where Gabat was seated. These are circumstances which must be taken into consideration in evaluating Castillo's testimony as to what exactly happened between Gabat and the cigarette vendor during that crucial moment before the latter fell down. Castillo's line of vision was partially obstructed by the back part of the Kombi. De Guzman vs Alvia. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party.The petitioner filed the appeal to the SC questioning the grant of actual damages despite a no guilty verdict.torts & damages ISSUE WON the prosecution’s set of facts should be given credence HELD NO . when the latter is not proved. occupying approximately one-third (1/3) of the rear end of the vehicle. preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. The SC took the position that the said provision merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act. . would alter the result of the case in that they would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused to acquittal. He is therefore entitled to acquittal on reasonable doubt. is not entirely free from doubt because his observation of the event could have been faulty or mistaken. private rights. the CA reversed the findings of the CFI and acquitted the appellants based on reasonable doubt but nonetheless ordered them to pay P9. The stall of one Antonio Vergara was demolished pursuant to this order. Hence. the quantum of proof necessary to sustain Gabat's conviction of so serious a crime as robbery with homicide has not been met in this case. only a A2010 . The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. PADILLA V CA (Vergara) 129 SCRA 558 GUTIERREZ. if taken into account.However. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense. it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. The taxicab which Castillo was driving was lower in height compared to the Kombi in which Gabat was riding-a fact admitted by Castillo at the trial.Considering the above circumstances.While the prosecution witness. specially considering that this occurrence happened in just a matter of seconds. The decision of the CA was based on the fact that the petitioners were charged with coercion when they should have been more appropriately charged with crime against person. . according to the court a quo. . quoting Section 3 (C) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and various jurisprudence including PNB vs Catipon. and both vehicles during that time were moving fast in the traffic.Judicial notice may also be taken of the fact that the rear windshield of the 1978 Volkswagon Kombi is on the upper portion. the judgment of not guilty was based on reasonable doubt.

However. RABBIT V PEOPLE [citation] PANGANIBAN. 1991. (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence. This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking in the case at bench. They bought type "A" blood and the same was brought by the attendant into the operating room. a person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence.Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she must be operated on as scheduled. taking into consideration his employment or occupation. Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could be postponed. who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee. they were not able to comply with petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank. casis of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen A2010 . multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years. About one hour had passed when Dr. Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead as her blood pressure was already 0/0.Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital. unless the contrary is sufficiently established. But admittedly. .The following day.After the lapse of a few hours. Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a "myoma" in her uterus. the petitioner informed them that the operation was finished. But in the event the the accused becoems insolvent. . (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary. 1991. and other circumstances regarding persons.Napoleon Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide. The attending physicians summoned Dr.torts & damages CRUZ V CA (UMALI) 282 SCRA 188 FRANCISCO. as in the instant case. Her death certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause.For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is. (3) that it be without malice. Unfortunately. gasping for breath. April 14.Rowena Umali De Ocampo accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital. The petitioner called Lydia into her office and the two had a conversation. Bartolome Angeles.14 - prof. . . as soon as it arrived. Ercillo went out of the operating room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister immediately bought. Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation. ISSUE WON an employer. the absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence: that the injury to the person or property was a consequence of the reckless imprudence. and to pay damages. While they were waiting. she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50. According to Rowena.At around 10pm. Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. . Because of the untidy state of the clinic. Prior to March 22. Dr. time and place. and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender. The transfer to the San Pablo City District Hospital was without the prior consent of Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out about the intended transfer only when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo District Hospital. she was wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr. and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23. physical condition. . in the generality of cases. Ercillo re-operated on her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. ISSUE WON the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide HELD NO . there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients. . Some thirty minutes after. Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband together with the driver of the accused had to go to the San Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. . that petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon. degree of intelligence. Phil. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined.Even without expert testimony. Rowena and her other relatives then boarded a tricycle and followed the ambulance. head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the San Pablo District Hospital. Rabbit will be held liable for the civil liabilities. may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused HELD . who was attached to an oxygen tank. The operating staff then went inside the petitioner's clinic to take their snacks. there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a casual connection of such breach and the resulting death of his patient. Angeles arrived. Rowena then noticed her mother.In litigations involving medical negligence. she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant for a rag to wipe the window and the floor with. when Dr. It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted. The deference of courts to the expert opinion PHIL. FACTS . a matter of expert opinion. 9 months and 11 days to 6 years. 2004 NATURE Petition for Review FACTS . the patient died. . 1991 as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. the accused jumped bail and remained at large. While petitioner was closing the abdominal wall. Ercillo came out again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. 1997 NATURE Civil action for damages in a medical malpractice suit. .The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act. Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in good standing when performing the same operation. . Thus. no cogent proof exists that any of these circumstances caused petitioner's death.Rowena and her other relatives waited outside the operating room while Lydia underwent operation.WON has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science.Thereafter.

The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them. nullifying or defeating the judgment. . one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. ISSUE WON there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff HELD NO Ratio In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act . also an employee of the railroad company. A2010 . where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period.25 in the form of . substantive CANGCO V MANILA RAILROAD CO 38 Phil 768 FISHER. thus. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company. took his position upon the steps of the coach. but also with regard to its amount. Their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train. casis medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of his curation.15 - prof. but it was not denied its day in court. It follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. 1915. he used a pass.August 31.The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage. . . Reasoning . . His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car. as they are deemed to have waived the appeal. not the court. sex. and as the train drew up to the station in San Mateo the plaintiff while making his exit through the door.000 against the estate of the deceased James P. . Costs against petitioner. After the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.In commenting upon article 1093. which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. but only to extra-contractual obligations .The employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform. and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger. he instituted this proceeding in the CFI Manilato recover damages of the defendant company. they cannot seek relief from the court. was employed by Manila Railroad Company as clerk. and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform.Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. He lived in San Mateo. the accusedemployee. and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked. By the same token. it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of due process. whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age. . the trial judge. . the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering. . 1915. At the hearing in the CFI. Expenses reached the sum of P790. This row of sacks was so placed that there was a space of only about two feet between the sacks of melons and the edge of the platform. alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground.On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. Consequently. and although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars. . employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency. It might have lost its right to appeal. the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities. and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. When Jose Cangco stepped off.The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition.The sack of melons on the platform is because it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station for shipment to the market. nevertheless. Emilio Zuniga. to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent would also result in improperly amending. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend. deprived petitioner of the right to appeal. FACTS .January 20. 1918 NATURE An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance disallowing the claim of the plaintiff for P1. In the case before us.The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability. and the plaintiff appealed. . . Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu. founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to discern. and the train station was lit dimly by a single light located some distance away. DISPOSITION Petition is hereby DENIED. and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. .that is to say. he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal.torts & damages NO . He was immediately brought to a hospital where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. thus. petitioner admits that by helping the accusedemployee. it can be said that by jumping bail. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited. Rizal.Its liability is direct and immediate. . and should be considered. then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case. In fact. got off the same car. the judgment against him has become final and executory. supplied by the company.In fact. and with serious injuries. As the train slowed down another passenger. The plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second operation was performed and the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. and that they constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. McElroy. October 14.Jose Cangco. the plaintiff was returning home by rail from his daily labors.After a judgment has become final.The accident occurred on a dark night. Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa. it participated in the proceedings before the RTC. imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code. especially to a person emerging from a lighted car. vested rights are acquired by the winning party.On Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment: . found the facts substantially as above stated. While at large. located upon the line of the defendant railroad company.

1959 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS ." Adding these two points together.In the Rakes vs." With the general rule relative to a passenger's contributory negligence. It is the Court’s conclusion that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence. March 4. sex and condition of the passenger. an action is brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for the damage caused by the carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of his employment The Court. but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances.but upon the principle announced in article 1902 which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or negligence. The plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood. in cases imposed upon employers with respect to damages due to the negligence of their employees to persons to whom they are not bound by contract. namely. should be absolved from the complaint. thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties. Atlantic. The cement platform also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. casis roadbed and the surrounding ground. and for the costs of both instances. The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff. other than contractual. of the age. by reason of the negligence of his servants. may be rebutted. or both. "It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting.. is that of ordinary or reasonable care. not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally. .The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains. said: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee.16 - prof.290.the Manila Railroad Co. Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual A2010 . J. . or in supervision over him after the selection. but by mere negligence or inattention. if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence. we have the logical result . which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of society. we are likewise in full accord. . even within the scope of their employment. important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence. therefore. such third persons suffer damage. we are of full accord. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced. The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract. and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure.In considering the probability of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff the following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the SEPARATE OPINION MALCOLM. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties. There could be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. such is not based upon the principle of respondent superior .With one sentence in the majority decision. "An attempt to alight from a moving train is negligence per se.Every legal obligation must of necessity be extracontractual or contractual. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case. the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability." . and directs them with equal diligence. to avoid injury. do injury to another. after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code. Litonjua and Leynes. the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting. While the vehicle was descending the Sta. gives rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. the particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred. . . whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation. without willful intent. would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. has caused damage to another.25. Article 1903 presumes negligence. the damages should be apportioned. and judgment affirmed. This care has been defined to be.Under the Spanish law. . whereas if the accident was caused by defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury. DISPOSITION The decision of the lower court is reversed. as it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at this station. Gulf and Pacific Co. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris.The Court is of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence: "The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train. which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an "accident in the performance of an obligation already existing . the court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that article 1903 is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a contract.L.torts & damages and independent. [dissent] . A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant. and consequently. . the obligation of making good the damage caused. taking into consideration the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person.In Bahia vs. thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of . of certain members of society to others. or which arise from these relations. . no liability is imposed upon defendant. but that presumption is refutable. namely." . generally embraced in the concept of status. and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3. FORES V MIRANDA [citation] REYES.B. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention. if productive of injury. duties which civilized society imposes upon its members. and he incurs no liability whatever if..The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which. and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. It is.Respondent was one of the passengers on a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga.

The action for breach of contract imposes on the defendant carrier a presumption of liability upon mere proof of injury to the passenger.. and (b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the description term "analogous cases" used in Art. Petitioner’s negligence contributed only to his own injury and not to the principal occurrence—it was merely an element to the damage caused upon him. in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code. that entitles the spouse.the plaintiff’s witness alleged that a noticeable depression in the track had appeared after a typhoon.torts & damages speed. but because the definition of quasi-delict in Act. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused by contractual breach. was at work transporting iron rails from the harbor in Manila. there were no side guards on the cars to keep the rails from slipping off.17 - prof. He was taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment. At the time of the trial. a criminal action is not a requisite for the enforcement of a civil action." . such damages are justly due. (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. Also. Moreover.The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. one of a group of 8 AfricanAmerican laborers in the employment of defendant. .e.Atlantic contends that the remedy for injury through negligence lies only in a criminal action against the official directly responsible and that the employer be held only subsidiarily liable. there can be no appointment of damages. .The difference in conditions. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisting contractual relation between the parties. and a third one to remove such splint.. the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might. RAKES V THE ATLANTIC. Manila Railroad Co. he was found to have contributed in some degree to the injury inflicted. and actions quasi ex delicto. is obliged to pay for the damage done. 2206. some behind or at it sides and some pulling . it appears that respondent had not yet recovered the use of his right arm. have avoided the consequences of the injured party's negligence. 2220. WON there was contributory negligence on the part of petitioner and if so. petitioner may recover from the defendant. i. and later was subjected to a series of operations. under the circumstance. effected to insert a metal splint. and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly. that latter is relieved from the duty to establish the fault of the carrier. the tie broke. the track sagged. At one point. defenses and proof. The accident occurred on the morning of March 22.By virtue of culpa contractual. YES . Atlantic." Reasoning (a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus). but it had not been proven that Atlantic inspected the track or had any proper system of inspection. as well as the codal concept of quasi-delict as essentially extra contractual negligence. 1953. relation between the parties. Ratio Moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. is essential to justify an award of moral damages. and prevent us from viewing the action for breach of contract as simultaneously embodying an action on tort.the plaintiff. breaking his leg. descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased" . the carrier. January 23. Mckenna. . As Rakes was walking along the car’s side when the accident occurred. a second. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. ISSUE WON the defendant is entitled to moral damages HELD NO. 2176. Five of the passengers were injured. Such fault or negligence. to some extent. WON Atlantic is only subsidiarily liable 2. xxx xxx xxx ART. Had it been otherwise. including the respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. not only because Art. However.Exception: with moral damages if: • defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith • result in the death of a passenger in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art.Petitioner had walked along the side of the car despite a prohibition to do so by the foreman. the first on May 23. the limitation imposed by the new Code on the amount of the recovery. compel us to differentiate between action ex contractu. which provide as follows: "ART. the driver lost control thereof. the company’s officers and 3 of the workers testified that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all against walking by the side of cars. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter. This was reported to the foreman.Reason: the advantageous position of a party suing a carrier for breach of the contract of transportation explains. the car canted and the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff who was walking by the car’s side. 2219. 768 777). GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY 7 Phil 359 TRACEY. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that. there being fault or negligence. when wire loops were wound around the broken bones and screwed into place. may not escape liability by proving that it has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees . 38 Phil." "ART. The law has no scales to determine in such cases whose wrongdoing weighed most in the compound that occasioned the mischief” (Railroad v Norton). or of his employees. although not as the primary cause. Rakes. Atlantic may be held primarily liable as it failed in its duty to provide safe appliances for the use of its employees. if there is no pro-existing contractual A2010 . ISSUES 1.However. 2219. WON it bars him from recovery HELD 1. Whoever by act or omission caused damage to another. The men were hauling the rails on 2 hand cars. Petitioner need not file charges with the foreman to claim damages from Atlantic.. which was later amputated at the knee. “… parties being mutually in fault. less a sum deemed suitable equivalent for his own imprudence. wanton or deliberately injurious conduct. causing it to swerve and to hit the bridge wall. 1907 NATURE Action for damages FACTS .In sum the rule is: Delict (breach of contract) Gen. by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence. NO .000. casis the cars in the front by a rope. Rule: no moral damages . . DISPOSITION The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified by eliminating the award of P5. 1953. In this case. 2.H. unlike in suits for quasi-delict. and the burden is placed on the carrier to prove the it was due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure (Cangco vs.00 by way of moral damages M.

even if we are to assume that the provision could properly relate to a breach of contract. In cases of this nature. However. . The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.00 attorney's fees. Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human relations that clearly must. The Civil Code provides: . dated 11 Oct. a Fil-Am. contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. a VP of the bank. We have repeatedly ruled that moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation. Miranda explained with great clarity the predominance that we should give to Article 2220 in contractual relations. Because of this.Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court. Thus. the unfortunate incident occurred). William Anthony King. give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith. an overzealous employee of the Bank's Credit Card Department did not consider the possibility that it may have been him who was presenting the card at that time (for which reason.00 exemplary damages. . (b) P50. wrote back to say that the credibility of Luis had never been "in question. as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. ISSUE WON the petitioner is entitled to moral and exemplary damages HELD NO . Naturally.Concededly. the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation.000. Adrian V.Still evidently feeling aggrieved." A copy of this reply was sent to Luis by Festejo.On 06 October 1988. 1995 NATURE Petition for review FACTS .In culpa contractual. Luis filed a complaint for damages with the RTC of Pasig against FEBTC. moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract.Art. such damages are justly due. i.By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes apparent that: (a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus). under the circumstances.000. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. Festejo. Furthermore.. Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend. (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. In order to replace the lost card. xxx xxx xxx .Art.to meanwhile so record the lost card. and another guest at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel Intercon Manila. we quote: Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent. expressed the bank's apologies to Luis in his letter which stated that: In cases when a card is reported to our office as lost. Exceptionally.In August 1988. such damages are justly due.000. plaintiff should not be afforded relief FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V CA 241 SCRA 671 VITUG.On appeal to the Court of Appeals. the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.In a letter. Wilful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that.Article 21 states: Art.Damages are awarded to petitioner at Php5. the amount fairly attributable to his own negligence. but because the definition of quasidelict in Art. in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code. wanton or deliberately injurious conduct. 2220. Upon his request. and (b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the descriptive term "analogous cases" used in Art. deducting Php 2. and was accorded. Luna. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. its application can be warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. the bank's internal security procedures and policy would appear to be. Clarita lost her credit card. negligence. Since the card was not honored. . 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused contractual breach.Article 21 of the Code.500.Fores vs. it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. is essential to justify an award of moral damages. the same must be discarded. Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. Luis A. not only because Art.torts & damages . the RTC of Pasig ordered FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300. can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. Luis felt embarrassed by this incident.e. moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed ) of the common carrier. Luis presented his FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter who promptly had it verified through a telephone call to the bank's Credit Card Department. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that. casis .000. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. the bank also issued a supplemental card to Clarita S.18 - prof. and (c) P20. in any case. 1988. . . demanded from FEBTC the payment of damages. .Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. through counsel. a FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at its Pasig Branch. . 2219. along with the principal card. which provide as follows: .Bad faith.In October 1986. FAREASTCARD undertakes the necessary action to avert its unauthorized use to protect its cardholders. Most importantly.13. 2220.Art. 2219. . Luis Luna. however. Luna applied for. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. F&B Manager of the Intercon. Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the appellate court. FEBTC has come to this Court with this petition for review.Festejo also sent a letter to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant to assure the latter that Luis was a "very valued clients" of FEBTC.On 30 March 1990. under the circumstances. in a contract of carriage. ." SEPARATE OPINION WILLARD AND CARSON [dissent] -the negligence of the defendant alone was insufficient to cause the accident—it also required the negligence of the plaintiff. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisitng contractual relations between the parties. it failed to inform him about its security policy. . it should be observed.00 moral damages. FEBTC was forthwith informed. . . A2010 . in this context. includes gross. . To pay for the lunch. . Luis was forced to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588. but not simple. February 23.

. or malevolent manner (Art. is obliged to pay for the damage done. it would also be just as arduous to sustain the exemplary damages granted by the courts below. 1170-1172). The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger. WON Carrascoso was entitled to moral damages. petitioner is ordered to pay private respondent Luis A. In all other respects. descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant. 2230.In case of fraud. From Manila to Bangkok. which has been violated or invaded by the defendant. refused. that entitles the spouse. the appealed decision is AFFIRMED. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. WON Carrascoso was entitled to the “first class” seat he claims. We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier. in its stead. Cuento. When asked to vacate his 'first class' seat. and plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class' seat in the plane.Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered where the court deems such recovery to be just and equitable (Art. private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship.torts & damages . that this difference was in the mind of the lawmakers when in Art. 2220. Civil Code)." . Air France. the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. WON the Court could review the questions of fact Substantive 2. exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances (Art. a commotion ensued. reckless. 2208.000. Such fault or negligence. unfortunately. cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. In contracts and quasi-contracts. and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. Cuento. such damages are granted if the defendant is shown to have been so guilty of gross negligence as to approximate malice. 2201. . there was a 'white man'. but the fact must be shown in evidence. the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. It is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to malice. 2206.both TC and CA decided in favor of Carrascoso ISSUES Procedural 1. without a pre-existing contract between two parties. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured passenger does not die. the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort.00 by way of nominal damages. in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary. 1966 NATURE PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. even perhaps inadvertent. moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. temperate. We see no issue of sound discretion on the part of the appellate court in allowing the award thereof by the trial court. But the exceptional rule of Art. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager]. and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation. many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class. . as was to be expected. an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself. are intended to serve as an example or as correction for the public good in addition to moral. Here. when his action is planted upon breach of contract and thus. 2176. bad faith. and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. would be to violate the clear provisions of the law. Carrascoso traveled in “first class” but at Bangkok. in turn. 2232. there being fault or negligence. without such agreement. left Manila for Lourdes w/ 48 other Filipino pilgrims. and.Nevertheless. the bank's failure. fraudulent. malice or wanton attitude. 2229. In quasi-delicts. . Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. A2010 . had a 'better right' to the seat. 2221. therefore. .Given the above premises and the factual circumstances here obtaining. according to said Ernesto G.Art. through PAL. Luna an amount of P5. the Manager alleged. as proved by written documents (tickets…) 3. Et.The distinction between fraud. Civil Code). the plaintiff. they came all across to Mr. and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body. In contracts and quasi-contracts. when they found out that Mr. casis DISPOSITION The appealed decision is MODIFIED by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to private respondents. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Civil Code). WON the CA failed to make a complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it. bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored (Arts. xxx xxx xxx . the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton. . 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad faith. and a carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was breached through negligence of the carrier's employees. there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith which the CA allegedly failed to find . The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where. oppressive. who.The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort even where there is a preexisting contract between the plaintiff and the defendant This doctrine. To award moral damages for breach of contract. may be vindicated or recognized. the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation. liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. AIR FRANCE V CA (Carrascoso. . Al) 18 SCRA 155 SANCHEZ. .It is to be presumed. as required by Art.Carrascoso. September 28. Civil Code.Art. the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying because.19 - prof. to honor its credit card issued to private respondent Luis should entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code providing thusly: . a civil engineer. Carrascoso to give his seat to the 'white man. and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. FACTS . their consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code.Exemplary or corrective damages. and if such. In criminal offenses.Art. issued plaintiff a “first class” round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. in the words of the witness Ernesto G.

. if not confusion. indignities and abuses from such employees. The stress of Carrascoso's. his employer. however. may result. Damages are proper. For. generates a relation attended with a public duty. 5. Certainly. the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride.xxx The law. Second. Testimony of the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. is no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense". then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. 6.also…From a reading of the transcript just quoted. WON the amounts awarded to Carrascoso was excessive HELD 1. It is (therefore) unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. YES. and if the “white man” had a better right to the seat. be essayed. WON damages are proper in a breach contract 6. wounded feelings and social humiliation. (note: it was held that it was a case of quasi-delict even though it was a breach of contract) Ratio A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. NO Ratio A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity. thereby causing him mental anguish. Reasoning . although he had tourist class protection. resulting in moral damages. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager. WON the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso regarding the account made by the air-carrier’s purser is admissible in evidence as hearsay 7. YES . also. this is bad faith.Petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the A2010 . they should have presented the manager to testify in court – but they did not do so . The excitement had not as yet died down. that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight.A written document speaks a uniform language. serious anxiety. by reason of which he suffered inconvenience. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees. If there had been no seat.Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso. is one attended with public duty. Such testimony is admissible. NO. accordingly. Obiter. WON Carrascoso was entitled to attorney’s fees 9. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. courtesy and due consideration. it. adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. injurious language. Its business is mainly with the travelling public.The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier.Air France did not present evidence that the “white man” made a prior reservation. WON Carrascoso was entitled to exemplary damages 8. "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. that any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. petitioner. but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats. that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable.16 They consist of the court's "conclusions with respect to the determinative facts in issue" . . in this environment. Reasoning . nor proved that the “white man” had “better right” over the seat. the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. must answer. Deficiency in the complaint. when the dialogue happened. could give ground for an action for damages.torts & damages 4. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct. he was granted the “first class” seat.Carrascoso testified that the purser of the air-carrier made an entry in his notebooks reading "First class parties. if any. amongst others. embarrassments and humiliations. is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. a first class ticket without any reservation whatever. YES. . The contract of air carriage.If. . the plaintiff was issued. the BangkokTeheran leg. "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes 4. a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat. Statements then. when Carrascoso was asked to confirm his seat in Bangkok. Reasoning .The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat. and paid for.There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering. granted that their employee was accused of the tortuous act 5.FINDINGS OF FACT: "the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered thereon". said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok. he forcibly ejected him from his seat. then why did they confirm Carrasco his seat? 3.43 And is. therefore. Carrasco was issued a “first class ticket”. YES Ratio. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner-air carrier-a case of quasi-delict. So it is. WON moral damages could be recovered from Air France. The trial court also accepted as evidence the written documents submitted by Carrasco and even the testimony of the air-carrier’s employees attested that indeed. there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class. CA held that Air France should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not. Ratio . notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed. worse. made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment-just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been . solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. of course. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals."The mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution". action as we have said. are admissible as part of the res gestae.20 - prof. Reasoning . as petitioner underscores. bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For. and Third.QUESTION OF LAW: one which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties 2. that. was cured by the evidence. contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions. Unless. if forms part of the res gestae Ratio. casis established. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness. Constitution mandates that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based" and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before". because of the relation which an aircarrier sustains with the public. they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". respect.Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. However. naturally. -Also. if the manager’s actions could be justified. YES . he imposed his arbitrary will. It invites people to avail of the comforts and I advantages it offers.

father of the deceased Vicente Syquia. It sought to adjudge them liable for the victim’s death due to their alleged negligence. they caused the opening of the concrete vault and discovered that: (a) the interior walls showed evidence of total flooding. VP. However. authorized and instructed the defendant to inter the remains of deceased. MLA MEMORIAL is deemed to be liable for desecrating the grave of the dead. DISPOSITION On balance.\ 9. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar Judgment for attorneys' fees.. 7.SYQUIAS base their claim for damages against Mla Memorial on either: (1) breach of its obligation to deliver a defect-free concrete vault.The case should be tried on its merits. We accordingly vote to affirm the same. JR. the school makes itself responsible in providing their students with an atmosphere that is conducive for learning. the complaint states no cause of action against them since academic institutions. . In this sense. Reasoning .A stabbing incident on August 30.The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept 8. MFR was also denied. the subject of inquiry is not the entry. but the ouster incident. and that the captain refused to intervene". 2180 that the liability arises from acts done by pupils or students of the institution. Inc. no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or explore the realm of arts when bullets are flying or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb.The act of boring a hole in the vault was necessary so as to prevent the vault from floating away. The petitioner contents that it should not be admitted as evidence. But when an academic institution accepts students for enrollment. or malevolent manner". casis same cemetery. say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from 'reversible error. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a wanton. It cannot be extended by implication.torts & damages passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will. Because. A2010 . 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista on the premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Manila RTC. the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof. the said entry was made outside the Philippines and by an employee of petitioner. And the MFR was similarly dealt with. NO Ratio. and the exposed parts of the deceased's remains were damaged and soiled. DISPOSITION the foregoing premises considered. Also. 2176) . . Trial Court’s Ruling . Costs against the petitioners. as it was only hearsay.Contract between the parties did not guarantee that the cement vault would be waterproof. It would have been easy for Air France to contradict Carrascoso’s testimony if they had presented the purser. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. clothing of the deceased. preparatory to transferring the remains to a newly purchased family plot also at the . FACTS .21 - prof. YES Ratio. NO Ratio Parties are bound by the terms of their contract. Chief of Security and Assistant Chief of Security. (c) entire lining of coffin. February 4. recklessness and lack of security precautions. 1992 NATURE Petition to review the decision of Court of Appeals. the petition is DENIED. the Syquias discovered that the vault had a hole approx 3 in. WON Mla Memorial breached its contract with petitioners.Juan SYQUIA. fraudulent. chose the gravesite despite knowing that said area had to be constantly sprinkled with water to keep the grass green and that water would eventually seep through the vault. ISSUES 1. . beyond the terms of the contract. or alternatively 2.Defendants (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed alleging that since they are presumably sued under Art. its President.Pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal Court of Parañaque. PSBA V CA [citation] PADILLA. It was established that his assailants were not members of the school’s academic community but were outsiders. oppressive. (Mla Memorial) FACTS . SYQUIA V CA (Mla Memorial Park) 217 SCRA 624 CAMPOS. As the concrete vault was being raised to the surface. January 27.After about a month. WON it can be liable for culpa aquiliana HELD 1.CA affirmed judgment of dismissal.Whatever kind of negligence it has committed. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. .The father himself. Costs against petitioner. like PSBA. filth and silt causing the wooden parts to separate and to crack the viewing glass panel located directly above the head and torso of the deceased. . YES Ratio The Civil Code gives the Court ample power to grant exemplary damages-in contracts and quasicontracts.No quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty of any fault or negligence. (b) coffin was entirely damaged by water. . . Petitioners the assailed the trial court’s dispositions before the respondent appellate court which affirmed the trial court’s ruling. ISSUE WON respondent court is correct in denying dismissal of the case HELD Ratio Although a school may not be liable under Art. and because there was a pre-existing contractual relation between the Syquias and Mla Memorial. PSBA is not liable. (RCBC v CA) . 2180 on quasi-delicts. Treasure. Certainly. 1993 NATURE Petition for review of CA decision dismissing Syquia family’s complaint for damages against Manila Memorial Park Cemetery. are beyond the ambit of that rule. the concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased was removed from its niche underground. But respondent court’s premise is incorrect. . which is the law between them. 2180 of the Civil Code. It is expressly mentioned in Art. The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent wit this ruling of the Court.The suit impleaded PSBA. in diameter near the bottom and it appeared that water drained out of the hole.Respondent Trial court denied the motion to dismiss. we. A contracting party cannot incur a liability more than what is expressly specified in his undertaking. it may still be liable under the law on contracts. Reasoning . . (2) gross negligence in failing to seal the concrete vault (Art. Juan Syquia. reckless. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given.

and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. .As the automobile approached. .On December 12.The defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. casis .Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet. the appeal ISSUE WON the defendant.Hence. . . He was.Private respondent has exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave. 1918 NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of La Union FACTS ." Mla Memorial bound itself to provide the concrete box to be sent in the interment. there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side.” Pursuant to this. a concrete vault was installed and after the burial."Sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof". the court thinks.The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. the actual installment of which shall be made by the employees of the Association. there is no reason to award damages.CFI absolved defendant from liability .In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away. Reasoning . ." . was guilty of negligence that would give rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done HELD YES .Syquias claim that there was a breach of contract because it was stated in the brochures that “lot may hold single or double internment underground in sealed concrete vault. he might get excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him.When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger.The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant.In so doing. . he was. .22 - prof. it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. A2010 . .As a result of its injuries the horse died. the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing. .As the defendant neared the bridge he saw the plaintiff and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. in maneuvering his car in the manner above described. negligent in the eye of the law.Before he had gotten half way across. he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. NO Ratio Negligence is defined by law as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons. . and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. or in an outer wall of stone. the defendant guided it toward his left. When the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties. .The pony had not as yet exhibited fright. 2.The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would NEGLIGENCE PICART V SMITH [citation] STREET. of the time and of the place.” . seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge.He did this because he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side.torts & damages Reasoning . instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down.They entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care. . 1912. Dispositive CA decision affirmed in toto." Standard dictionaries define seal as any of various closures or fastenings that cannot be opened without rupture and that serve as a check against tampering or unauthorized opening.However.The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. that being the proper side of the road for the machine. Finding no evidence of negligence. as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. . then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control. .As the defendant started across the bridge. but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour."Sealed" meant "closed. continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. the defendant. given the novelty of the apparition and the rapidity of the approach. The reason for the boring of the hole was explained by Henry Flores. . the diligence to be observed in the performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family. . . the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. La Union. Interment Foreman. there was an appreciable risk that. and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or. at San Fernando.The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. March 15. brick or concrete. . . ." In the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary.Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of MLA MEMORIAL provides that: “Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a concrete box. he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side. circumstances of the case do not show negligence. . in our opinion. the vault was covered by a cement lid. . if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles. and from this moment it was no longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety.When he had gotten quite near.He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge. . . to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. plaintiff was riding on his pony over the Carlatan Bridge.But in view of the known nature of horses. but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done. . deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright.In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side.Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana. who said that: “When the vault was placed on the grave a hole was placed on the vault so that water could come into the vault because it was raining heavily then because the vault has no hole the vault will float and the grave would be filled with water. he gave two more successive blasts.

The plaintiff. . placed in the position of the defendant. . with a boy named Manuel Claparols. the son of a mechanical engineer.The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. but could not find one. They then opened one of the caps with a knife. that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous. . his nearest relative. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. causing more or less serious injuries to all three. by his father. and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches.After watching the operation of the traveling crane used in handling the defendant's coal. FACTS ."ART. by contracts. and 1908 of that Code. After some discussion as to the ownership of caps." . they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian.On the 30th of September. for the purpose of visiting one Murphy."ART. the boys. an employee of the defendant. but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. Obligations are created by law. upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902. Jessie. and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. who had promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. The power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge. After crossing the footbridge. David Taylor.The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The law considers what would be reckless. Could a prudent man. . It will be noted however. who.torts & damages have used in the same situation? If not. 1902. . known as the Isla del Provisor. Manuel looked for a hammer. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Reasonable foresight of harm. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded. impassable for vehicles. and all TAYLOR V MANILA RAILROAD . . They thrust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result.23 - prof. when the boys proposed purring a match to the contents of the cap. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within the city of Manila. received a slight cut in the neck. the boys picked up all they could find. . of which each took one end. xxx xxx xxx "Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprises are equally liable for the damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties. 1905. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm. instituted by David Taylor. . plaintiff."The father. more mature than the average boy of his age. Murphy. and their right to take them. 1903. was at the same time when he received the injuries complained of. and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. An explosion followed. March 22. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable. 1903.Plaintiff Taylor appears to have rested his case. Murphy was not in his quarters. and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. negligence is clearly established. . impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery. and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule. for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road." [citation] CARSON. the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences. xxx xxx xxx "The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. 1089. spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm.The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. by quasi—contracts. one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds. not only for personal acts and omission. a minor. and on his death or incapacity the mother.The Defendant Company’s defense that the caps were under the duty of independent contractors deserves scant consideration since these workers have been under the supervision of one of the company’s foremen. since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. crossed the footbridge of the Isla del Provisor. would have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk. as did the trial judge his decision in plaintiff's favor. A prudent man. and have in themselves considerable explosive power. . Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. The visit made on a Sunday afternoon. . or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. about 12 years of age. . became frightened and started to run away. 1910 NATURE An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries. 15 years of age. followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision. is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist."ART. they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Finding on inquiry that Mr. and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics. at the westerly end of the island. casis three went to the home of the boy Manuel. . in the case under consideration. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite.The plaintiff himself was not free from fault. DISPOSITION Appealed decision is reversed. A2010 .The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. less than 9 years old. is liable for the damages caused by the minors who alive with them.Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case. hung them of a stick.Stated in these terms. then he is guilty of negligence. and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. blameworthy. . foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so. and carried them home.

The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only. and take precautions accordingly.The owners of premises. However. must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and impulses. and which they in their immature judgment might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with. and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward them must calculate upon this. exploded and injured him." . attributable to the negligence of the company). the principles on which these cases turn are that "while railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it. vs. such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. casis occupants of land upon which they might naturally and reasonably be expected to enter. he had been to sea as a cabin boy. the question involved has been whether a railroad company is liable for an injury received by an infant of tender years. is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. and where the child does not enter under such conditions the owner's failure to make reasonable precaution to guard the child against the injury from unknown or unseen dangers. and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care. 1908. or upon which the public are expressively or impliedly permitted to enter to or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play." . followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer. and in a great variety of similar cases.). vs. such as a turntable left in such condition as to make it probable that children in playing with it would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where the infant did in fact suffer injury in playing with such machine. enters upon the railroad company's premises. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity." Chief Justice Cooley. which therefore was not. (wherein the principal question was whether a railroad company was liable for an injury received by an infant while upon its premises. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in severally state courts. and there found explosive signal torpedoes left exposed by the railroad company's employees.As laid down in Railroad Co." .In the typical cases. after an exhaustive and critical analysis and review of may of the adjudged cases. who from mere idle curiosity. this has to be examined on a case-to-case basis. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that.S." and. making the company liable HELD 1. both English and America. such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. was able to earn P2. WON the defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries. formally declared that it adhered "to the principles announced in the case of Railroad Co." and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of an adult. properly speaking. Marlow.The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. therefore. is clearly a breach of duty. voicing the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan. In these. without other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his express invitation or permission. we are satisfied that plaintiff's action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting a match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff. in the case of Powers vs. it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts. counsel for plaintiff relied on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last result in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases. if the child is actually injured. . if such injury was. despite his denials on the witness stands.torts & damages . and take precautions accordingly. plaintiff at the time of the accident was well—grown youth of 15. a negligent omission." . Stout. and this is to be determined in such case by the circumstances of the case. or where such infant found upon the premises a dangerous machine. In the case at bar. not due to his wanton or willful acts. "must calculate upon this. In the case at bar. the great weight of authority holds the owner of the premises liable. as described by the little girl who was present. from idle curiosity. or for purposed of amusement. (3) that an invitation of license to cross the premises of another can not be predicated on the mere fact that no steps have been taken to interfere with such practice. under the circumstances. "While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault. more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age. and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of the cap.As regards the maturity of the child.24 - prof. and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstance of the case."ART. children who would likely to come. at a place where the railroad company's premises. and for kindling of explosive substance which may not have been placed in a safe and proper place. one of which when carried away by the visitor. ISSUE 1. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only. NO . or had a good reason to suppose. 657). By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence. he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. wherever they go. show clearly that he the owner of land is not liable to trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by them. and that the defendant. on the other hand. at a place where the railroad company knew. said that: “Children. (2) that no exception to this rule exists in favor of children who are injured by dangerous machinery naturally calculated to attract them to the premises. (4) that there is no difference between children and adults of an invitation or a license to enter upon another's premises. saying that (1) That A2010 . we also have to look at the proximate cause and the maturity of the plaintiff if it was his negligence that contributed to the principal occurrence of the tragedy. Stout ( 17 Wall. the Court said that it is of the opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff. they should expect that liberty to be taken. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child form entering premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are accustomed to roam about or to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to enter. (84 U. placed upon such premises by the owner." In such cases the owner of the premises can not be heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation whatever. If they leave exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to them. "attributable to the negligence of the defendant.The owners shall be also be liable for the damages caused —"1.Just because the kids trespassed doesn’t mean that the company is not liable for anything bad that might happen to them. To hold otherwise would be expose to all the children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or .50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred. or for purposes of amusement. for which he may and should be held responsible. whereon things attractive to children are exposed. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion. therefore. and the cases based thereon. admit of no other explanation. However. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault.In support of his contention.

The management did nothing. that degree of care. The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained. Gonzales testified that the gift wrapping counter was right beside the verification counter where Criselda was signing.On the other hand. under our law.Petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age. and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence. . The protruding part of the counter was at the costumer side. JARCO MKTG. .522. Both Gonzales and Guevarra testified to the structural instability and shakiness of the counter which is in the shape of and inverted “L. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter. thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one.After the burial of their daughter. petitioners did. P300. the immediate cause of the explosion . et al.Gonzales’ testimony about what Zhieneth said to the doctor should be accepted because at the time she said it. It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a physician are generally considered declarations and admissions. Makati City.The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v. It is "a fortuitous circumstance. They both had informed management (while they were still working there) that the counter should be nailed to the floor. The testimony of two former employees. ISSUE 1. Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's branch manager.On May 9.The Aguilars’ side: While in the dept store. on the hospital bed. The testimony of the present employees (that Zhieneth climbed the counter so it fell) should instead be believed. conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence. Gonzales and Guevarra. Gonzales. Under the circumstances thus described. which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence. . She was 6 years old. a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment." Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory. by analogy. The rule. It was deliberately placed at a corner to avoid such accidents. exempt from criminal liability.We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated. pinned by the gift-wrapping counter. then he is guilty of negligence. .” with a base smaller than the top. Sadly. he can not recover. The counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong base and was used without incident for the past 15 years. Zhieneth was guilty of contributory negligence because she tried to climb the counter. heard her tell the doctor that she “nothing. for the protection of the interest of another person. 2. NEGLIGENCE. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability. she was in so much pain and she answered right away. negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man. 1983. an event happening without any human agency. a former employee of Syvel’s Dept Store who helped bring Zhieneth to the hospital. neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. whereby such other person suffers injury.torts & damages knew what he was about. CA and CA mfr – for the Aguilars. Yet. I did not come near the counter and the counter just fell on me. would do. This means she wasn’t making it up.” when asked “what did you do?” She died 14 days later. one cannot exist with the other. Smith. No contributory negligence from Zhieneth . unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment.Jarco Mktg Corp. as one of its determining factors. respectively.000 for attorney's fees and an unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary damages.. .An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. P20. She suddenly felt a gust of wind and heard a loud thud. an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens. i. She looked behind her and saw her daughter on the floor. A2010 . the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury. . Negligence is "the failure to observe. ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. Store. was his own act of putting a match to the contents of the cap. and supervisor. ET AL. . or if happening wholly or partly through human agency. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. In our jurisdiction. December 21. is that a child under nine years of JARCO MARKETING CORP V CA (AGUILAR) DAVIDE. 9 years of age. Criselda was able to ask people to help her and bring her daughter to the hospital. through their negligence or omission to secure or make stable the counter's base.Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvel's Department Store. . .000 for moral damages. event or happening.e." . casis . Thus. Petitioners Leonardo Kong. Private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar. WON the incident is accident or attributable to negligence 2.86 for actual damages. Criselda momentarily let go of her daughter’s hand to sign her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter.She was operated on immediately at the hospital. Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2nd flr or Syvel’s Dept. to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. Criselda never let go of her daughter except to sign the credit card slip. therefore. RTC mfr – for the Aguilars. operations manager.The conclusive presumption favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. a child of such tender age and in extreme pain. Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care. it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH.25 - prof. and wake and funeral expenses. who was with him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap. either criminal or civil. the Aguilars demanded from the petitioners the reimbursement of hospital and medical bills. 1999 FACTS . Petitioners refused to pay. If negligence. All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling event before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who testified in court. in view of the fact that the little girl. should not be believed because he might have ill feelings towards petitioners. became frightened and ran away. So the Aguilars filed a complaint for damages wherein they sought the payment of P157. et al’s side: Criselda was negligent in taking care of her daughter for allowing her to roam freely. a child under nine years of age is.RTC – for Jarco Marketing Corp. Zhieneth was crying and screaming for help. as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous. . on that account. who was negligent? HELD 1. and is. ." DISPOSITION The petition is DISMISSED. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.

the criminal case was dismissed. but of compensation. ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us. the sentence was suspended. . this did not mean that he was exonerated from the crime charged. it is clear that the end of the wire was on the ground shortly after 3 p. MAGTIBAY V TIANGCO 74 Phil 756 BOCOBO.Soco transmitted the message at 2. The CFI dismissed the criminal case.As the three neared the place where the wire was down. after he had observed good conduct. “I have for some time been in the habit of touching wires”.Jose. the neighborhood school was dismissed and the children went home. Consequently. later to the latter's hand. . It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not secured. casis electricity used in lighting the City of Manila and its suburbs. Further. but merely put off the imposition of the corresponding penalty. huge. The CFI gave judgment for plaintiffs for P2.The wire was cased in the usual covering.At 4 p.80 of the Revised Penal Code.At the time that message was sent the wire had not yet parted. but Alberto. Jose Salvador and Saturnino Endrina. . February 28. all members of the second grade in the public school. at time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything. Shaped like an-inverted "L" the counter was heavy.m. . . DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed. after appellant had pleaded guilty. Hence this appeal. 1932 FACTS ***This action was instituted by Julian del Rosario for the purpose of recovering damages from Meralco for the death of his son. CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. Luke's Hospital the child was pronounced dead. and he was committed to the care and custody of Atty. put out his index finger and touch the wire.The engineer of the company says that it was customary for the company to make a special inspection of these wires at least once in six months. but reserved such right as the heirs of the deceased might have to recover damages in a civil action against said Tiangco. .Alang St for the purpose of conducting .Jose rejoined that he should into touch wires as they carry a current. Upon being taken to St. he stepped into a garage which was located nearby and asked Jose Soco to telephone the Malabon station of MERALCO that an electrical wire was burning at that place.25 p. exonerated him from the crime charged HELD NO .The end of the wire remained in contact with his body which fell near the post.A crowd soon collected. did not wipe out his guilt. 1944 NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance Batangas FACTS . . in view of Tiangco’s good conduct recommended the dismissal of the case. but simply that he would suffer no penalty. it was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Initially. . ISSUE WON the suspension of the sentence under Art.26 - prof. a minor under 18 years of age. At this precise moment.stopped Saturnino. Alberto. Accordingly. for every tortuous act of violence or other pure tort.As soon as Noguera took cognizance of the trouble. exclaiming "Ay! madre". . Abaya. knew never to touch a broken electrical wire (as his dad told him so!). Saturnino made a motion as if it touch it.000 for the death of Magtibay.Defendant-appellant Tiangco. Disposition The instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED A2010 . Abaya. not of punishment. . . but this had been burned off for some distance from the point where the wire parted. and received answer from the station to the effect that they would send an inspector.000 as damages. 57 PHIL 478 STREET. Subsequently. . until Tiangco would reach his majority. 1930 – 2pm: a wire used by the defendant on Dimas.Aug 4. For if that was the truth.Saturnino yielded to this admonition and stopped.He immediately fell face downwards. and some one cut the wire and disengaged the body. one of the witnesses for the defense. When.The wire was an ordinary number 6 triple braid weather proof wire. The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal that it was not durable after all. and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA. it is just that the loss should upon the estate of the wrongdoer rather than that of a guiltless person.Alberto del Rosario. November 5.torts & damages age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. and its top laden with formica. she was just a foot away from her mother. therefore. the civil action in the instant case was filed against defendant-appellant for damages in the sum of P2. but as he was under 18 years of age. who was a few paces ahead of his classmates. pleaded guilty to an information for homicide through reckless negligence in that he had recklessly driven an automobile and thereby caused the death of Magtibay. The Court of First Instance (CFI) Batangas found Tiangco guilty as charged.CRISELDA too. said. after appellant herein had pleaded guilty. of whom plaintiffs-appellees are the lawful heirs. the counter just fell on her. who was somewhat ahead. subject to the supervision of the Superintendent of Public Schools of DEL ROSARIO V MANILA ELECTRIC CO. who happened to be the son of an electrician. . No contributory negligence from Criselda . One of the ends of the wire fell to the ground among some shrubbery close to the way. (Sangco) . such as is commonly used by the defendant company for the purpose of conducting electricity for lighting. Liability of an infant for his torts is imposed as a mode.Jose Noguera saw that the wire was burning and its connections smoking.Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter. and that without reference to the question of moral guilt. m. the infant tort-feasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an adult. but from the testimony of Demetrio Bingao.The suspension of the sentence under Art.m.telling him that the wire might be charged. resulting from a shock from a wire used by the defendant for the transmission of electricity. . 80 of the RPC. If property has been destroyed or other loss occasioned by a wrongful act. no doubt feeling that he was challenged in the matter. . but Alberto. in order to give the delinquent minor a chance to be reformed. no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. . . a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. and that all of the company's inspectors were the Province. Nor did such dismissal of the criminal case obliterate his civil liability for damages. 9 yrs old. should be absolved from any contributory negligence. ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist. The time and distance were both significant.

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required in their daily rounds to keep a lookout for trouble of this kind. - There is nothing in the record indicating any particular cause for the parting of the wire.l ISSUE WON Manila Electric is liable HELD YES Reasoning - When notice was received at the Malabon station at 2.25 p. m., somebody should have been dispatched to the scene of the trouble at once, or other measures taken to guard the point of danger; but more than an 1 ½ hours passed before anyone from MERALCO appeared on the scene, and in the meantime Alberto had been claimed as a victim. - The mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of Jose (8 yrs old), doesn’t alter the case. - But even supposing that contributory negligence could in some measure be properly imputed to the deceased, such negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case, not having been the determining cause of the accident. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil., 359.) - With respect to the amount of damages recoverable, Julian is entitled to recover P250 for expenses incurred in connection with the death and burial of the boy. - Citing Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Company: Julian should recover the sum of P1,000 as general damages for loss of service. Disposition judgment reversed

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- Principal Soriano cannot be held liable, being head of academic school and not school of arts and trades, in line with Amadora case and Art 2180 of Civil Code. It is only the teacher who should answer for torts committed by their students. Besides, Soriano did not order the digging. - Based on Article 2180, Aquino can be held liable. However, petition is based on Article 2176. Did the acts/omissions of Aquino cause the death of Ylarde? Yes. He is liable for damages. The work required adult laborers. He required the children to remain in the pit after they finished digging. He ordered them to level the soil when a huge stone was at brink of falling. He went to another place and left the kids. - Left by themselves, IT WAS BUT NATURAL FOR THE CHILDREN TO PLAY AROUND. IN RULING THAT YLARDE WAS IMPRUDENT, THE LOWER COURT DID NOT CONSIDER HIS AGE AND MATURITY. A MINOR SHOULD NOT BE HELD TO THE SAME DEGREE OF CARE AS AN ADULT. - Aquino also said the digging was part of Work Education. This is unacceptable. Work is too dangerous and it was not even in the lesson plan.

- The indemnity allowed in criminal case is merely incidental to the main object sought, which is the punishment of the guilty party. - In a civil action, the principal object is the recovery of damages for wrongful death; and where, as in this case, the defendant is a corporation, not subject to criminal prosecution for the act complained of, the question assumes a vastly different aspect. - There should be a distinction between the civil liability of an ordinary person who, by wrongful act, has caused the death of another; and the civil liability of a corporation, organized primarily for profit, which has caused the death of a person by failure to exercise due care in the prosecution of its business. - The liability of such a corporation for damages must be regarded as a part of the risks which it assumes when it undertakes to promote its own business; and just as it is entitled to earn adequate profits from its business, so it should be made adequately to compensate those who have suffered damage by its negligence.

YLARDE V AQUINO [citation] GANCAYCO; July 29, 1988
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - Soriano was principal. Aquino was a teacher. The school was littered with concrete blocks. Teacher Banez started burying them. Aquino gathered 18 male pupils to help. He ordered them to dig. Work was unfinished. - Ff day, Aquino called 4 of the 18 to continue. Aquino continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil. Aquino left the children to level the loose soil and borrowed a key from Banez. Aquino told the kids not to touch the stone. - 3 of the 4 kids jumped into the pit. The remaining Abaga jumped on the concrete block causing it to slide down. 2 were able to escape but student Ylarde sustained injuries. 3 days later he died. Parents filed suit against Aquino and Soriano. Lower court dismissed and CA affirmed and said child Ylarde was negligent. ISSUE WON Aquino and Soriano can be held liable for damages HELD

CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO V PHILIPPINE MOTORS CORPORATION [citation] STREET; November 3, 1930
NATURE Appeal from decision of the CFI FACTS - Cranston was the representative of the plaintiff in Manila and plaintiff was the registered owner of the motor schooner Gwendoline. - Cranston decided to have the engine on the Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner. He had a conference with Quest, Phil. Motors manager, who agreed to do the job, with the understanding that payment should be made upon completion of the work. - The work was begun and conducted under the supervision of Quest, chiefly by a mechanic whom Quest took with him to the boat. Quest had the assistance of the members of the crew of the Gwendoline, who had been directed by Cranston to place themselves under Quest's directions. - Upon preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest concluded that a new carburetor was needed and thus installed a Zenith carburetor. The engine was tried with gasoline and the result was satisfactory. The next problem was to introduce into the carburetor the baser fuel, consisting of a low grade of oil mixed with

SEPARATE OPINION ABAD SANTOS [concur in part and dissent in part] - He concurs that MERALCO is held liable for the death
of Alberto, but dissents in so far as the decision allows the recovery of the father of the sum of P1,250 only as damages. It should be P 2250. - His reasoning: It is well settled in this jurisdiction that an action will lie to recover damages for death caused by the wrongful act. (Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821.) - In criminal cases- indemnity to the heirs of the deceased is equivalent to P1,000 - Whatever may be the reasons for the rule followed in criminal cases, I am of the opinion that those reasons do not obtain in fixing the amount of the damages recoverable in the present case.

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distillate. A temporary tank to contain the mixture was placed on deck above and at a short distance from the compartment covering the engine. This tank was connected with the carburetor by a piece of tubing, which was apparently not well fitted at the point where it was connected with the tank. The fuel mixture leaked from the tank and dripped sown into the engine compartment. The new fuel line and that already in use between the gasoline tank and carburetor were so fixed that it was possible to change from the gasoline fuel to the mixed fuel. This arrangement enables the operator to start the engine on gasoline and then, after the engine had been operating for a few moments, to switch to the new fuel supply. - It was observed that the carburetor was flooding, and that the gasoline, or other fuel, was trickling freely from the lower part to the carburetor to the floor. This fact was called to Quest's attention, but he said that, when the engine had gotten to running well, the flooding would disappear. - The boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run. The engine stopped a few times during the first part of the course, owing to the use of an improper mixture of fuel. In the course of the trial, Quest remained outside of the engine compartment and occupied himself with making distillate, with a view to ascertaining what proportion of the two elements would give best results in the engine. - As the boat was coming in from this run, the engine stopped, and connection again had to be made with the gasoline line to get a new start. After this had been done the mechanic, or engineer, switched to the tube connecting with the new mixture. A moment later a back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass of flames, which the members of the crew were unable to subdue. The salvage from, the wreck, when sold, brought only the sum of P150. The value of the boat, before the accident occured, as the court found, was P10,000. - CFI gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff to recover of the defendant the sum of P9,850, with interest at 6 per centum per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint, until satisfaction of the judgment, with costs. ISSUE WON the loss of the boat is chargeable to the negligence and lack of skill of Quest HELD YES Ratio When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he

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be incompatible with the situation now under consideration. - This action was instituted about two years after the accident had occured, and after Quest had ceased to be manager and had gone back to the US. Upon these facts, the defendant bases the contention that the action should be considered stale. It is sufficient reply to say that the action was brought within the period limited by the statute of limitations and the situation is not one where the defense of laches can be properly invoked. DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from affirmed.

will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. Reasoning - The temporary tank in which the mixture was prepared was apparently at too great an elevation from the carburetor, so that when the fuel line was opened, the hydrostatic pressure in the carburetor was greater than the delicate parts of the carburetor could sustain. This was the cause of the flooding of the carburetor; and the result was that; when the back fire occurred, the external parts of the carburetor, already saturated with gasoline, burst into flames, whence the fire was quickly communicated to the highly inflammable material near-by. The leak along the pipe line and the flooding of the carburetor had created a dangerous situation, which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken precautions to avoid. The back fire may have been due either to the fact that the spark was too advanced or the fuel improperly mixed. - Proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats. Possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire. Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was here, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occured but for Quest's carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from blame. - The trial judge seems to have proceeded on the idea that, inasmuch as Quest had control of the Gwendoline during the experimental run, the defendant corporation was in the position of a bailee and that, as a consequence, the burden of proof was on the defendant to exculpate itself from responsibility by proving that the accident was not due to the fault of Quest. As a rule workmen who make repairs on a ship in its owner's yard, or a mechanic who repairs a coach without taking it to his shop, are not bailees, and their rights and liabilities are determined by the general rules of law, under their contract. The true bailee acquires possession and what is usually spoken of as special property in the chattel bailed. As a consequence of such possession and special property, the bailee is given a lien for his compensation. These ideas seem to

UNITED STATES V PINEDA 37 Phil 456 MALCOLM; January 22, 1918
NATURE Appeal requiring a construction and an application, for the first time, of the penal provisions of the Pharmacy Law. FACTS - Santiago Pineda is a registered pharmacist of long standing and the owner of a drug store located at Calle Santo Cristo, Manila. Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription obtained from Dr. Richardson, and which on other occasions Santos had given to his horses with good results, at Pineda's drug store for filling. The prescription read: "clorato de potasa - 120 gramos - en seis papelitos de 20 gramos, para caballo." Under the supervision of Pineda, the prescription was prepared and returned to Santos in the form of six papers marked, "Botica Pineda - Clorato potasa - 120.00 - en seis papeles - Para caballo- Sto. Cristo , Binondo, Manila." Santos, under the belief that he had purchased the potassium chlorate which he had asked for, put two of the packages in water and gave the doses to two of his sick horses. Another package was mixed with water for another horse, but was not used. The two horses, to which had been given the preparation, died shortly afterwards. Santos, thereupon, took the three remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for examination. Drs. Peña and Darjuan, of the Bureau of Science, found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate. At the instance of Santos, the two chemists also went to the drug store of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate. (Barium chlorate, it should be noted, is a poison; potassium chlorate is not.) Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses, and found that death was the result of

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poisoning. ISSUES 1. WON the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the chemist Peña and Darjuan as to their purchase of potassium chlorate at the drug store of the accused, which proved to be barium chlorate 2. WON the lower court erred in finding that the substance sold by the accused to Feliciano Santos was barium chlorate and not potassium chlorate 3. WON the lower court erred in finding that the accused has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of an infraction of the Pharmacy Law, Act No. 597, section 17, as amended HELD 1. NO Ratio On the trial of a criminal case where the question relates to the tendency of certain testimony to throw light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a particular person, there is a certain discretion on the part of the trial judge which a court of errors will not interfere with, unless it manifestly appear that the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the question at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the accused. Reasoning - What appellant is relying on is the maxim res inter alios acta. As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is inadmissible. But appellant has confused this maxim and this rule with certain exceptions thereto. The effort is not to convict the accused of a second offense. Nor is there an attempt to draw the mind away from the point at issue and thus to prejudice defendant's case. The purpose is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent, and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified and fraudulent intent may even be established. It has been said that there is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents. 2. NO Reasoning The proof demonstrates the contrary. 3. NO Ratio In view of the tremendous and imminent danger to the public from the careless sale of poisons and medicines, we do not deem it too rigid a rule to hold that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it be through negligence or mistake. Reasoning - The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the

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unlawful is the giving of a false name to the drug asked for. This view is borne out by the Spanish translation, which we are permitted to consult to explain the English text. In the Spanish "supuesto" is used, and this word is certainly not synonymous with "fraudulent." The usual badges of fraud, falsity, deception, and injury must be present - but not scienter. Dispositive Judgment of the lower court, sentencing the defendant to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs, is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant, without prejudice to any civil action which may be instituted.

business which the law demands. - Turning to the law, certain points therein as bearing on our present facts must be admitted. Thus, defendant is a pharmacist. As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs and poisons which he sells. And finally it is provided that it shall be unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent name." It is the word "fraudulent" which has given the court trouble. What did the Legislature intend to convey by this restrictive adjective? - Were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud it would be difficult, if not impossible, to convict any druggist of a violation of the law. The prosecution would have to prove to a reasonable degree of certainty that the druggist made a material representation; that it was false; that when he made it he knew that it was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; that he made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by the purchaser; that the purchaser acted in reliance upon it, and that the purchaser suffered injury. Such a construction with a literal following of well-known principles on the subject of fraud would strip the law of at least much of its force. It would leave the innocent purchaser of drugs, who must blindly trust in the good faith and vigilance of the pharmacist, at the mercy of any unscrupulous vendor. We should not, therefore, without good reason so devitalize the law. - The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs. The vendor and the vendee do not stand at arms length as in ordinary transactions. An imperative duty is on the druggist to take precautions to prevent death or serious injury to anyone who relies on his absolute honesty and peculiar learning. The nature of drugs is such that examination would not avail the purchaser any thing. It would be idle mockery for the customer to make an examination of a compound of which he can know nothing. Consequently, it must be that the druggist warrants that he will deliver the drug called for. - Remembering particularly the care and skill which are expected of druggists, that in some jurisdictions they are liable even for their mistake and in others have the burden placed upon them to establish that they were not negligent, it cannot be that the Philippine Legislature intended to use the word "fraudulent" in all its strictness. A plea of accident and mistake cannot excuse for they cannot take place unless there be wanton and criminal carelessness and neglect. How the misfortune occurs is unimportant, if under all the circumstances the fact of occurrence is attributable to the druggist as a legal fault. Rather considering the responsibility for the quality of drugs which the law imposes on druggists and the position of the word "fraudulent" in juxtaposition to "name," what is made

BPI V CA 216 SCRA 51 GUTIERREZ; November 26, 1992
FACTS - In the afternoon of October 9, 1981, a person purporting to be Eligia G. Fernando, who had a money market placement as evidenced by a promissory note with a maturity date of November 11, 1981 and a maturity value of P2,462,243.19, called BPI's Money Market Department. The caller wanted to preterminate the placement, but Reginaldo Eustaquio, Dealer Trainee in BPI's Money Market Department, told her "trading time" was over for the day, which was a Friday, and suggested that she call again the following week. The promissory note the caller wanted to preterminate was a roll-over of an earlier 50-day money market placement that had matured on September 24, 1981. - Later that afternoon, Eustaquio conveyed the request for pretermination to the officer who before had handled Eligia G. Fernando's account, Penelope Bulan, but Eustaquio was left to attend to the pretermination process. - On October 12, 1981, the caller of the previous Friday followed up with Eustaquio, merely by phone again, on the pretermination of the placement. Although not familiar with the voice of the real Eligia G. Fernando, Eustaquio "made certain" that the caller was the real Eligia G. Fernando by "verifying" that the details the caller gave about the placement tallied with the details in "the ledger/folder" of the account. Eustaquio knew the real Eligia G. Fernando to be the Treasurer of Philippine American Life Insurance Company (Philamlife) since he was handling Philamlife's corporate money market account. But neither Eustaquio nor Bulan who originally handled Fernando's account, nor anybody else at BPI, bothered to call up Fernando at her Philamlife office to verify the request for pretermination.

Fernando".000. Fernando deposited the two checks in controversy with Current Account No.BPI then filed a petition for review with the Regional Trial Court of Makati who dismissed said petition but modified the award by including a provision for attorney’s fees in favor of CBC.61. passed through the position analyst. In the afternoon of October 13. . and from his desk. Eustaquio. before the two cashier's checks. Fernando's signature in BPI's file. 26310-3: On October 16.00.The Arbitration Committee ruled in favor of BPI and ordered CBC to pay the former the amount of P1. de Castro and Celestino Sampiton. As it turned out.” . WON the collecting bank has absolute liability on a warranty of the validity of all prior endorsements stamped at the back of the checks 2.torts & damages .However. 1981 for P4. Dy. in BPI's Treasury Operations Department. The two cashier's checks. however.00. supported by Eligia G.BPI contends that respondent CBC's clear warranty that "all prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsements guaranteed" stamped at the back of the Fernando. both authorized signatories for BPI. payable to "cash" which was received through clearing from PNB Pasay Branch.Informed that the placement would yield less than the maturity value because of its pretermination. covering the preterminated placement. by means of Check No. who would pick up the checks. The last withdrawal on November 4. Thereafter. and on November 4. Fernando. the Board of Directors of the PCHC reversed the Arbitration Committee's decision and dismissed the complaint of BPI while ordering it to pay CBC the sum of P1. payable to "cash. 1981..000. verifier clerk and documentation clerk. nationality. 1981. She was accompanied and introduced to Emily Sylianco Cuaso. There is also no showing that Eligia G. . and with her initials on the form signifying her approval. the maturity date of Eligia G. she would herself pick up the checks or send her niece.30 - prof. not just a roll-over of the placement. Fernando's affidavit. in fact. Cash Supervisor. BPI returned the two checks in controversy to CBC for the reason "Payee's endorsement forged". 1981 . upon CBC’s motion for reconsideration. was compared or verified with Eligia G. securities clerk. a woman who represented herself to be Eligia G. 40314 with maturity date of December 23. 126310-3. . by means of Check No.607. and initial deposit of P10. Fernando and Rosemarie Fernando.It was. 240007 dated the same day for P370.000. proceeded to prepare the "purchase order slip" for the requested pretermination as required by office procedure. which the woman holding herself out as Eligia G. 240001 dated November 3. Rosemarie Fernando. sex.000. 021759 and 021760 for P1. the application form shows the signature of "Eligia G. ." which the woman identifying herself as Eligia G. "her" date of birth. Jr.607. Fernando's placement. he changed the delivery instruction on the purchase order slip. CBC.On November 11. . by Antonio Concepcion whom Cuaso knew to have opened. 1981. Cashier. 1981. 35623 with maturity value of P2. 1981. payable to "cash" which the woman herself also encashed over the counter. This final approval of the new current account is indicated on the application form by the initials of Regina G.215. respectively. 240006 dated the same day for P1. the woman holding herself out as Eligia G. and Check No. the checks went to the dispatcher for delivery. withdrawals began on Current Account No. one for P1. 35623) to be preterminated. She executed an affidavit stating that while she was the payee of the two checks in controversy. She disclaimed having preterminated her placement on October 12. her niece would have to being a written authorization from her to pick up the checks.On November 12.206. Fernando applied at China Banking Corporation's Head Office for the opening of a current account.266.00 and the second for the balance. both of which letters were presumably handed to the dispatcher by Rosemarie A2010 . Fernando encashed over the counter. 1981 for P48. in fact Rosemarie Fernando who got the two checks from the dispatcher. 26310-3 with a balance of only P571.00.243. 240003 dated October 15. .On October 14. on October 19. and that the checks be delivered to her office at Philamlife. 1981. who did not interview the new client but affixed her initials on the application form after reviewing it.00.19) evidencing the placement which matured that day. the same caller changed the delivery instructions. WON the drawer/drawee bank (in this case BPI) may claim reimbursement from the collecting bank which earlier paid the proceeds of the checks after the same checks were cleared HELD 1. 1981 and maturity value of P2.000. 1981. Fernando's purported signature on the letter requesting the pretermination and the latter authorizing Rosemarie Fernando to pick up the two checks. Such purported signature has been established to be forged although it has a "close similarity" to the real signature of Eligia G.16. both payable to Eligia G.462.800. . returned the checks for reason "Beyond Clearing Time".The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. a long-standing "valued client" of CBC. among others.00. together with the papers consisting of the money market placement was to be preterminated and the promissory note (No.500.00. to pick them up. to tell him of the new delivery instructions for the checks. however. ISSUES 1. . were sent to Gerlanda E. following the processing route.58. Eustaquio then told her that if it were her niece who was going to get the checks. tax account number. This telephone conversation ended with the caller's statement that "definitely" it would be her niece. which CBC forthwith sent to clearing and which BPI cleared on the same day." which was received through clearing from Far East Bank. Fernando encashed over the counter. Manager and Administrative Assistant.206. the same person impersonated both Eligia G. were prepared.Two days after. . payable to "cash. In the event that the payee's signature is forged. in turn.800. As finally proceeds. respectively. the caller insisted on the pretermination just the same and asked that two checks be issued for the proceeds. nos. payable to "cash". What Cuaso indicated in the application form. Although the checks represented the termination proceeds of Eligia G. Fernado's money market placement with BPI. With her surrender of the original of the promissory note (No.000. instead of the checks being delivered to her office at Philamlife. BPI issued her a new promissory note (No. the real Eligia G.58 with interest thereon at 12% per annum from August 12. the dispatcher failed to get or to require the surrender of the promissory note evidencing the placement.000. 1981. by means of Check No. earlier that year. an account upon the introduction of Valentin Co.00 and P613. Thus.500. civil status. who signed the two checks that very morning. writing thereon "Rosemarie Fernando release only with authority to pick up. as shown by the delivery receipt.100. by means of Check No. NO . she never received nor endorsed them and that her purported signature on the back of the checks was not hers but forged. was that the new client was introduced by Valentin Co. 240005 dated the same day for P1. Rosemarie Fernando. she referred the application to the New Accounts Section for processing. on October 22. 1983. CBC's guaranty of prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement was then stamped on the two checks. Bernardo Laderas. occupation ("business woman").77) to evidence a roll-over of the placement. Fernando. Eustaquio had to hurriedly go to the dispatcher. Her endorsement on the two checks was found to conform with the depositor's specimen signature. the papers. These incidents led to the filing of this case with the Arbitration Committee. Fernando went to BPI for the roll-over of her placement. thus. casis left Current Account No.000. 1981.Later in the same morning.

but which BPI neglected to take. . the collecting bank made an express guarantee on the validity of "all prior endorsements. To the extent that the degree of negligence is equated to the . For obvious reasons. casis proximate cause of the loss. Fernando is not a depositor of CBC. the banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. a vice-president of Philamlife. Negotiable Instruments Law) that their action in accepting their checks for deposit and allowing the withdrawals against the same ‘amounted to bad faith’ cannot be considered as basis for holding CBC liable. the underlying circumstances of the case show that the general rule on forgery is not applicable. a comparison of the signature of Eligia G.In the present petition the payee's names in the checks were forged. which nobody in BPI bothered to make to Eligia G.” . 56. could not have resulted in the discovery of the fraud. petitioner BPI's reliance on the doctrine of last clear chance to clear it from liability is not well-taken. NO .31 - prof. Fernando with that of the impostor Eligia G. Without such warranty. the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. yet. care and trustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. the surrender of the promissory note evidencing the money market placement that was supposedly pre-terminated.The next issue hinges on whose negligence was the proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by an impostor. Fernando. If the drawee-bank discovers that the signature of the payee was forged after it has paid the amount of the check to the holder thereof. No amount of legal jargon can reverse the clear meaning of the warranty. petitioner BPI maintains that considerations of relative negligence become totally irrelevant.Applying these principles. stated that “these withdrawals. the checks are "wholly inoperative" and of no effect. belittled petitioner BPI's negligence compared to that of respondent CBC which it declared as graver and the proximate cause of the loss of the subject checks to the impostor who impersonated Eligia G. Fernando's money market placement. In this jurisdiction we recognize negligence of the party invoking forgery as an exception to the general rule. 2. Fernando's account did not do anything about the account's pre-termination. the defendant is liable for any damage arising out of the falsity of its representation." Petitioner BPI anchors its argument on its stance that there was "a gap. respondent CBC had no way to discover the fraud at all. the drawee bank would not have paid on the checks.Apropos the matter of forgery in endorsements. and payment made "through or under such signature" is ineffectual or does not discharge the instrument. c) Again no verification appears to have been made on Eligia G. had an unquestioned liability when it turned out that the payee's signature on the checks were forged. however. an interval between the issuance and delivery of said checks by petitioner BPI to the impostor and their actual payment of CBC to the impostor. The gap of one (1) day between the issuance and delivery of the checks bearing the impostor's name as payee and the impostor's negotiating the said forged checks by opening an account and depositing the same with respondent CBC . however disagree in the evaluation of the degree of negligence of the banks. Following the general rule. . . b) The officer who used to handle Eligia G. The exception to this rule is when the party relying in the forgery is "precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority. Fernando.In the present case. However.In presenting the checks for clearing and for payment.torts & damages checks was an unrestrictive clearing guaranty that all prior endorsements in the checks are genuine. CBC had no prior notice of the fraud perpetrated by BPI's employees on the pretermination of Eligia G. Petitioner BPI points out that the gap of one (1) day that elapsed from its issuance and delivery of the checks to the impostor is material on the issue of proximate cause. Hence. Fernando. However. it can recover the amount paid from the collecting bank.Petitioner BPI's contention that CBC alone should bear the loss must fail. the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower courts declared that petitioner BPI's negligence was graver. Hence. without any further showing that the CBC employees ‘had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect. Under this premise petitioner BPI asserts that the presenting or collecting bank. the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower court. however. Under this doctrine. . . While the Arbitration Committee declared the negligence of respondent CBC graver. Petitioner BPI insists that the doctrine of last clear chance should have been applied considering the circumstances of this case. Fernando's purported signature on the letter requesting the pretermination and the letter authorizing her niece to pickup the checks. By the very nature of their work the degree of responsibility. her signature was in BPI's file. the point that comes uppermost is whether the drawee bank was negligent in failing to discover the alteration or the forgery. there is no question that the banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees.Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. Moreover. The Arbitration Committee. . we rule that the issue as to whose negligence is graver is relevant.BPI further argues that the acts and omissions of respondent CBC are the cause "that set into motion the actual and continuous sequence of events that produced the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. The issue as to who between the parties should bear the loss in the payment of the forged checks necessities the determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties involved in the controversy in relation to the forged checks. and d) Another step that could have foiled the fraud. or knowledge of such facts’ (Sec. which respondent CBC did.The Arbitration Committee in its decision analyzed the negligence of the employees of petitioner BPI involved in the processing of the pre-termination of Eligia G. where both parties were negligent and such negligence were not contemporaneous.The general rule under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law is to the effect that a forged signature is "wholly inoperative". was requiring before the two checks in controversy were delivered. according to petitioner BPI. . Fernando's money market placement and in the issuance and delivery of the subject checks in this wise: a) The impostor could have been readily unmasked by a mere telephone call. stamped at the back of the checks are the clear warranty: ALL PRIOR ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OF ENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED. a hiatus. The Arbitration Committee. they cannot erase the fact that they were both guilty in not exercising extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.The PCHC Board of Directors. . this Court has emphasized that the collecting bank or last endorser generally suffers the loss because it has the duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior endorsements considering that the act of presenting the check for payment to the drawee is an assertion that the party making the presentment has done its duty to ascertain the genuineness of the endorsements. A2010 . actual or implied. .The records show that petitioner BPI as drawee bank and respondent CBC as representing or collecting bank were both negligent resulting in the encashment of the forged checks. respondent CBC. As the warranty has proven to be false and inaccurate. With these circumstances. without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. In fact the records fail to show that respondent CBC had knowledge. there was yet no loss and the impostor could have decided to desist from completing the same plan and could have held to the checks without negotiating them. . At this stage. No matter how many justifications both banks present to avoid responsibility." Thus. of the fraud perpetrated by the impostor and the employees of BPI.

to pay the costs in the case and to be confined in an institution for the insane until further order of the court. . and on his own mother. we apply Article 2179 of the Civil Code to the effect that while respondent CBC may recover its losses. a sober man would not have fallen while a drunken man did. jr.M. And while we do not apply the last clear chance doctrine as controlling in this case. are stated which warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent. . the trial court was correct in apportioning damages) HELD NO Ratio Intoxication in itself is not negligence. the rails were above-gruond. Due care on the part of CBC could have prevented any loss.” (If the former.Plaintiff’s residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which defendant’s tracks run. with murder.It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in maintaining its tracks. The opening of the account itself was accompanied by inexplicable acts clearly showing negligence.32 - prof. .16 A2010 . FACTS . It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions described.215. we are not inclined to rule that petitioner BPI must solely bear the loss of P2. and fell. greater reason to rule that the proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by an impostor was due to the negligence of petitioner BPI. BPI shall be responsible for 60% while CBC shall share 40% of the loss of P2. After trial and proof that the defendant was suffering from mental aberration. might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what his condition. The conclusion that if he had been sober he would not have been injured is not warranted by the facts as found.413. throwing the plaintiff from the vehicle and causing injuries . in crossing the tracks to enter his premises.Both banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in the encashment of the forged checks by an impostor. the nonChristian Baggay. While it is true that petitioner BPI's negligence may have been the proximate cause of the loss. for the purpose of holding a song service called "buni" according to the Tinguian custom. without provocation suddenly attacked the woman Bil-liingan with a bolo. Disposition The questioned Decision and Resolution are MODIFIED. he cannot recover. in the sum of P1. 1909. September 1. . and with the same bolo he like wise inflicted various wounds on the women named Calabayan. Abra. the total amount of the two (2) forged checks.16. Bil-liingan. and to conclude that.. if the latter. 28 Phil 122 MORELAND. leaped forward. is to US V BAGGAY 20 PHIL 142 TORRES. dated February 15. notwithstanding. They let the opportunity slip by when the ordinary prudence expected of bank employees would have sufficed to seize it. Under these circumstances. To enter his premises from the street. and no facts.One night. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. & LIGHT CO.Defendant Manila Electric is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street railway . awarded plaintiff P1. respondent CBC's negligence contributed equally to the success of the impostor in encashing the proceeds of the forged checks. whereby he was declared exempt from criminal liability but was obliged to indemnify the heirs if the murdered woman. because every person liable criminally for a crime or misdemeanor is also liable for reparation of damage and for indemnification of the harm done. October 1. Agueng. . No facts to merit a higher award of damages to plaintiff. charging the non-Christian Baggay. Fernando with the connivance of BPI's employees. inflicting a serious wound on her head from which she expired immediately. plaintiff drove home in a calesa and.torts & damages is not controlling. plaintiff must cross defendant’s tracks. but there may be civil liability because of acts ordinarily punishable. Province of Ilocos Sur. under such circumstances. when he. This finding. 1109. other than the fact that Wright was intoxicated. WRIGHT V MANILA ELECTRIC R. stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling. . the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel.215.About the 4th of October. ISSUE WON the negligence of plaintiff contributed to the “principal occurrence” or “only to his own injury. There is therefore. named Dioalan.000.For this reason the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the court of Ilocos Sur. whereupon the defendant's counsel appealed to this court. FACTS . ISSUE WON an insane person.Trial court held that both parties were negligent. the horse stumbled. exempt from criminal liability can still be civilly liable HELD YES Ratio Civil liability accompanies criminal liability. This cause was instituted separately from the other. still the CBC employees had ample opportunity to avoid the harm which befell both CBC and BPI. No.At the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks.The Court cannot ignore the fact that the CBC employees closed their eyes to the suspicious circumstances of huge over-the-counter withdrawals made immediately after the account was opened. Quisamay. 1914 NATURE An action to recover damages for injuries sustained in an accident . It was the gross negligence of the employees of both banks which resulted in the fraud and the subsequent loss. casis draw a conclusion which enters the realm of speculation and guesswork. although the law has declared their perpetrators exempt from criminal liability. but defendant claims the plaintiff was also negligent in that he was so intoxicated. the judge on April 28 rendered the judgment cited above. It is not unnatural or unexpected that after taking the risk of impersonating Eligia G. making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the street.Intoxication in itself is not negligence. Reasoning . 1910. several persons were assembled in the defendant's house in the township of Penarrubia. but that plaintiff’s negligence was not as great as defendant’s. and the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground.A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the ties themselves aboveground.R. Calapini. the impostor would complete her deception by encashing the forged checks.413. E. DISPOSITION Plaintiff not negligent. Both banks were not able to overcome the presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. and such intoxication was the primary cause of the accident . such losses are subject to mitigation by the courts. for lesiones. because of the violent death of the woman Bil-liingan. 1911 NATURE Appeal by the defendant from the judgment rendered on April 28.000.

also. affirmation thereof is proper.33 - prof. or minors shall answer with their own property. 275. 3. which was anchored then about 1 1/2 miles from the seashore of Arceli Dumarang..038. at or about 11:30 o'clock in the morning while the said Filomeno Managuit was in the course of his employment. Should there be no person having them under his authority.torts & damages Reasoning . likewise. So. in spite of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable condition of his deranged mind. legal guardianship or power. 1950. Injuries not covered. The blowing of his 2-peso bill may have grown out of. . 7. 2. Dumarang.By gross negligence is meant "such entire want of care as to raise a presumption that the person in fault is conscious of the probable consequences of carelessness.case provides for other jurisprudence which describe instances of gross negligence attributable to employee (see case). his employment. Inc. 2. . his accident could be attributed to his gross negligence.Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who. or arisen from. seaman of the M/S Pilar II. who worked for the defendant as a . These are: (1) the accident must arise out of the employment. The main allegation of said original complaint was: “That on May 27. p. Grounds for compensation. or worse."The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident and are descriptive of its character. 4. his death was the consequence of his decision to jump into the water to retrieve said bill. or a person under 9 years of age. or over this age and under 15."notorious negligence" has been held to be tantamount to "gross negligence". Law and society are under obligation to protect him during his illness and so when he is declared to be liable with his property for reparation and indemnification. performing his duties as such ordinary seaman on defendant's M/S "Pilar II". the said lunatics. also. and circumstances under which the accident takes place . and as he picked up the bill from the floor something accidentally fell upon him and injured him. The hazardous nature of this act was not due specially to the nature of his employment. AMEDO V RIO [citation] CONCEPCION. excepting that part which is exempted for their support in accordance with the civil law.Plaintiff’s basis for appeal is the Workmen’s Compensation Act. subject to the following: (1) In cases 1. Cameron [1882] 6 Colo. that he could not have been but conscious of the probable consequences" of his carelessness and that he was "indifferent. see. 877. the sum of P2. while the deceased Filomeno Managuit was on board M/S "Pilar II" as such seaman.) . A2010 . . while the words `in the course of' refer to the time. legal guardian. or power.from these provisions three conditions are essential to hold an employer liable. Sections 2 and 4 of which: Sec. May 24. (2) by drunkenness on the part of the laborer who had the accident. who has not acted with the exercise of judgment. . Palawan. if. one mile and a half from the seashore of Arceli. if such person be insolvent.” .it may be conceded that the death of Filomeno took place "in the course of" his employment. 1949. in turn. But. such as a passenger thereof or an ordinary visitor. his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified. and as a consequence of which.Article 18 of the same code says: The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos. his two-peso bill was blown by the breeze into the sea and in his effort to retrieve the same from the waters he was drowned. It was a risk to which any person on board the M/S Pilar II.. to the danger of injury.this is distinguishable from cases wherein the act done is not dangerous per se such as when an employee drops a cigarette on the pavement and picks it up. with costs against the appellant. he was drowned. 2. unless they prove that there was no blame or negligence on their part. and at the "place" where-according to the amended complaint-he was working. In her original complaint.her amended complaint stated: “That on May 27. for the reason that his fellows ought not to suffer for the disastrous results of his harmful acts more than is necessary." (Wall vs. or the result of the nature of such employment. and (3) it must not be caused by the "notorious negligence" of the employee. he jumped into the water to retrieve a 2-peso bill belonging to him. is still reasonably and justly liable with his property for the consequences of his acts. plaintiff Elena Amedo sought to collect from defendant Rio y Olabarrieta. in that it happened at the "time" when. . the persons who are civilly liable for acts committed by a lunatic or imbecile. but this protection does not exclude liability for damage caused to those who may have the misfortune to suffer the consequences of his acts. 2nd ed. Palawan. the judgment appealed from being in accordance with law.Article 17 of the Penal Code states: Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable. or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment.was the accident caused by Filomeno’s “notorious negligence”? . would have been exposed had he. — When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.she was allowed to file an amended complaint which was remanded to the trial court. Filomeno failed to exercise "even slight care and diligence. jumped into the sea. the accident which produced this tragic result did not "arise out of" his employment.It cannot be denied that in jumping into the sea. . (3) by notorious negligence of the same. (2) it must happen in the course of the employment. to the danger of injury to person or property of others. in spite of his unfortunate condition. and is indifferent.40 as compensation for the death of her son. . Sec. he would surely be entitled to compensation. . while Filomeno Managuit was working. It was the result of a risk peculiar to his work as a seaman or incidental to such work. . However. 1954 FACTS . Filomeno Managuit." that he displayed a "reckless disregard of the safety" of his person. are those who have them under their authority. has been defined as follows: . his 2-peso bill merely fell from his pocket. or worse. imbeciles. and it is hereby affirmed.since the act done by Filomeno was dangerous. DISPOSITION Therefore.This case was instituted on October 18.. as Filomeno had.this however was dismissed due to lack of a cause of action which defendant filed stating that the allegation does not show that the death of plaintiff's son was due to an "accident arising out of and in the course of employment. — Compensation shall not be allowed for injuries caused (1) by the voluntary intent of the employee to inflict such injury upon himself or another person. and 10 of article 8 does not include exemption from civil liability.". 1. 1949 at about 11:30 o'clock in the morning. even though they be performed unwittingly. which shall be enforced. which. casis place. ISSUE WON Amedo could claim compensation from employer Rio HELD NO . and 3. his act being obviously innocent. he is still entitled to the benefit of what is necessary for his decent maintenance. The Law Governing Labor Disputes in the Philippines by Francisco. Point in question is whether the accident was committed under these 3 conditions .

would do. 4) CA findings are contrary to those of the trial court. belonging to Marinduque. Defendant's truck driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff.(Procedural) Ratio Findings of fact are entitled to great respect and will not ordinarily be disturbed by this Court unless it falls down under the exceptions provided by the Court to merit review of the facts. YES . that the truck allegedly being repaired was parked. . however.34 - prof. But this case is an exception since: 1) the finding are grounded entirely on speculation. Defendant said that the plaintiff was merely a bystander. . its violation does not constitute negligence per se. that as a result. Daniel Serrano. or conjecture. SC entertained review of the factual question.Under the circumstance. he and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the right side of the National Highway. He bumped the truck being repaired by Pedro Layugan. "pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and probably result in injury". it would. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs.(Substantive) Ratio The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. Serrano also testified that. Inchausti that criminal prosection of the "other person" does not affect the liability of the employer. 3) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts. Hence. his left leg was amputated so he had to use crutches to walk. surmise. it has been established clearly that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff was caused by defendant's driver. 1956 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the WCC FACTS . turned over and hit a coconut tree resulting in the death of Pedro Mamador and injury to the other laborers. . .” . Reasoning . the petitioner herein.At any rate. evoke the presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his helper. . I have (sic) found out later that the fluid pipe on the rear right was cut that's why the breaks did not function.This contention cannot be sustained because what the widow waived was the offender's criminal proscution and not all civil action for damages. right after the curve. Nueva Vizcaya.Petitioner also contends that the amicable settlement entered into by Mamador's widow and Macunat barred the widow's claim against the employer because she has already elected one of the remedies. Nueva Vizcaya. November 14. and 6) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted on record. then he is guilty of negligence.Notorious negligence means the same as gross negligence which implies "conscious indifferenece to consequences". The truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving. WON defendant driver Serrano was negligent 2. . 2. however. but it may be an evidence of negligence. Disposition Award for compensation by WCC affirmed LAYUGAN V IAC 167 SCRA 363 SARMIENTO. it cannot be declared negligence because the proibition had nothing to do with the personal safety of the riders. thereby having the effect of releasing the employer from liability. . defendant driver. the court already decided in Nava vs. he checked the truck. it is clear that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence. convicted and was sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. .Deceased’s wife now seeks compensation by Marinduque as the employer. and says that absent such proof of care.This is a question of fact. WON there was notorious negligence by the deceased for having violated the employer’s prohibition to ride haulage trucks A2010 . because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. who was fixing the flat tire of the said truck.Plaintiff points to the negligence of the defendant driver while Isidro points to the driver of parked truck as negligent. 2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken. . that the proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of the parked truck in installing the early warning device. was not a suit for damages against third persons because the heirs did not intervene therein and they have not received the indemnity ordered by the court. occupying almost half of the right lane towards Solano.The criminal case. NO . ISSUE 1. I stepped on my foot brakes but it did HELD 1. . while the same was at a stop position. however. . said that he knew the responsibilities of a driver.Although the employer prohibited its employees to ride the haulage trucks. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case HELD 1 NO . not a truck helper being a brother-in-law law of the driver of said truck. “When I was a few meters away. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man. I saw the truck which was loaded with round logs.Plaintiff Pedro Layugan testified that while in Bagabag. Reasoning [1] Negligence defined.Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence. to the latter. Due to said injuries. ISSUES 1.torts & damages MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS V WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION 99 PHIL 48 BENGZON. plaintiff was injured and hospitalized. under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.A truck driven by Procopio Macunat. .Daniel Serrano. From the evidence presented. that before leaving.Petitioner alleges that the criminal case sentencing Macunat to indemnify the heirs of the deceased was a suit for damages against a third person. June 30. 1968 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of IAC decision FACTS . 5) the said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. casis not function with my many attempts. It couldn't be.Macunat was prosecuted. WON Mamador has a right to compensation by Marinduque 2. Whether cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder of the road is immaterial taking into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene . even if the case was against a third person. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do [2] Applying the definition and the test. plaintiff. ordinarily.Defendant Godofredo Isidro admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident driven by Daniel Serrano. He has paid nothing.

. or where there’s direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. Calderon arrived at the operating room. and its relevant to the main issue on negligence: “At this juncture. Ramos. At almost 3:00 P. she was given injections. she saw the patient taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. After being discharged from the hospital. [and] preparing the patient for the operation”. The doctors explained that the patient had bronchospasm. she then saw Dr. whatever the source of the evidence.Hours later at about 12:15 P. Although not a member of the hospital staff. As she held the hand of Erlinda Ramos.542. who was inside the operating room with the patient.000. As a direct consequence of such accident Layugan sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot. Hosaka to look for a good anesthesiologist. Hosaka is already here. The doctrine merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. 1985 at 9:00 A. After praying. Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient.M. assured Rogelio that he will get a good anesthesiologist. it may be enlightening and helpful in the proper resolution of the issue of negligence to examine the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur. Ramos “that something wrong was x x x happening”. direct evidence is absent and not readily available. Because of the remarks of Dra. no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances show that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made. She was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladdershe underwent a series of examinations which included blood and urine tests which indicated she was fit for surgery. it is inapplicable A2010 .torts & damages lamp placed 3-4m from the back of the truck. with her husband Rogelio incurring a monthly expense ranging from P8. particularly in the law of negligence: Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. Dr. she sought professional advice. Hosaka approached her. and the way we apply it in cases. was also there for moral support.Herminda Cruz immediately rushed back.Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was a robust woman except for occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of a stone in her gall bladder she was as normal as any other woman. “ Obiter [1] What is the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur? Two ways to put it: (a) This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant. another anesthesiologist. But despite this warning. Herminda Cruz.000.During the trial. that the accident arose from want of care. Herminda was allowed to stay inside the operating room. Gutierrez. under the circumstances involved. At the operating room. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that accident happened provided character of accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under management and control of alleged wrongdoer. Rogelio E. the Court is called upon to rule whether a surgeon.In the case at bar. both parties presented evidence as to the possible cause of Erlinda’s injury. She thereafter noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr.M. Hosaka decided that she should undergo a “cholecystectomy” operation after examining the documents presented to him. Calderon was then able to intubate the patient. mali yata ang pagkakapasok. and (b) According to Black’s Law dictionary.. Dr. 1999 NATURE Petition For Certiorari FACTS . p. one of the defendants in this case. who was the Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center. Orlino Hozaka.00 to P10. This is what the Court actually said in the case to prove its just obiter. She and her husband Rogelio met for the first time Dr. After Dr. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when. . an anesthesiologist and a hospital should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy. NO Note that for our purposes this was not raised as an issue in this case. she focused her attention on what Dr. it affords reasonable evidence. December 29. the other defendant. The patient’s nailbed became bluish and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position. I formulated it in an issuetype.” She then saw people inside the operating room “moving. So. Gutierrez was doing.. in the absence of an explanation by the defendant. she saw this anesthesiologist trying to intubate the patient.Petitioners filed a civil case for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against herein private respondents alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos. of that fateful day. And once the actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy. She has been in a comatose condition. heard somebody say that “Dr. . casis Herminda saw about two or three nurses and Dr. Herminda introduced herself as Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center who was to provide moral support to the patient. They agreed that their date at the operating table at the De Los Santos Medical Center. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care. on June 10. Calderon. “ang hirap maintubate nito.00. who was to administer anesthesia. Gutierrez say. In this case it is inapplicable because it was established by clear and convincing evidence the negligence of the defendant driver. the Isuzu truck driven by Serrano. she has been staying in their residence.” [2] In our jurisdiction. O lumalaki ang tiyan” (id. She thereafter heard Dr.M.25. which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control. she incurred hospital bills amounting to P93. But as far as we’re concerned and relevant to our discussion in the outline.35 - prof. and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. asked Dr. 2. 17). Immediately thereafter. Disposition Petition GRANTED with costs against private respondents. . Perfecta Gutierrez. “Res ipsa loquitur. to them. She was admitted in the hospital and was with her sister-in-law. . Herminda Cruz. in turn. Hosaka. and saw that the patient was still in trendelenburg position. . . She then heard Dr. however. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. She was also diagnosed to be suffering from “diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage”. and she told Rogelio E. she went out of the operating room. Plaintiff presented the testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz and where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury.Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka were also asked by the hospital to explain what happened to the patient. Because the discomforts somehow interfered with her normal ways. would be on June 17. 1985. Therefore this only Obiter Dicta. RAMOS V CA [citation] KAPUNAN. doing this and that. Dr. The thing speaks for itself Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent. still needing constant medical attention.. Erlinda Ramos stayed for about four months in the hospital.

Meanwhile petitioners engaged the services of another counsel. the damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for the application of res ipsa loquitur.Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. In fact. Sillano. which superseded the earlier resolution issued on 25 July 1995. 2. the liability of the physicians and the hospital in this case is not predicated upon an alleged failure to secure the desired results of an operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in the diagnosis or treatment as in fact no operation or treatment was ever performed on Erlinda. and denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner. the appellate court denied the motion for extension of time in its Resolution dated 25 July 1995. What is the cost for the damages HELD 1. Atty.Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. . negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. . . Rogelio referred the decision of the appellate court to a new lawyer. to replace Atty. private respondents primarily relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Atty. Petitioner.However. not being a lawyer and unaware of the prescriptive period for filing a motion for reconsideration.The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that.36 - prof. Eduardo Jamora. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable 3. Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal). In the present case. On the same day. referred the same to a legal counsel only on 20 June 1995. With a few exceptions. . or to any and all anesthesia cases. Based on the other communications received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos. the Coronel Law Office. whether the alleged negligence was the proximate cause of Erlinda’s comatose condition. only on 20 June 1995. as such. Atty. Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care. casis . as a matter of common knowledge and experience. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge. the appellate court still denied the motion to admit the motion for reconsideration of petitioners in its Resolution. much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and. taken with the surrounding circumstances. however. WON it should be dismissed for being filed later than allowable 15 day period for the filing of the Motion for A2010 . . we believe that the receipt of the former should be considered in determining the timeliness of the filing of the present petition. in holding that res ipsa loquitur is available to the present case we are not saying that the doctrine is applicable in any and all cases where injury occurs to a patient while under anesthesia. The due date fell on 27 May 1996. dated 29 March 1996. Ligsay. Each case must be viewed in its own light and scrutinized in order to be within the res ipsa loquitur coverage. since a copy of the decision of the appellate court was not sent to the counsel on record of petitioner. in the absence of explanation by the defendant. . Moreover. to the effect that the cause of brain damage was Erlinda’s allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent.The decision of the Court of Appeals was received on 9 June 1995 by petitioner Rogelio Ramos who was mistakenly addressed as “Atty. notice to a litigant without notice to his counsel on record is no notice at all. Sillano filed before this Court a motion for extension of time to file the present petition for certiorari under Rule 45. the appellate court apparently mistook him for the counsel on record.” The phrase “res ipsa loquitur” is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury. The petition was filed on 9 May 1996. Court of Appeals reversed. the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. there can be no sufficient notice to speak of.torts & damages Dr. may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence. Atty. the delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration cannot be taken against petitioner. The Court granted the motion for extension of time and gave petitioners additional thirty (30) days after the expiration of the fifteen-day (15) period counted from the receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals within which to submit the petition. it affords reasonable evidence. we hold that a practical administration of justice dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur. The next day. Moreover.It is elementary that when a party is represented by counsel. Ligsay. a copy of the decision of the appellate court was instead sent to and received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos on 9 June 1995 wherein he was mistakenly addressed as Atty. The motion for reconsideration was submitted on 4 July 1995. or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case. Sillano filed on 7 August 1995 a motion to admit the motion for reconsideration contending that the period to file the appropriate pleading on the assailed decision had not yet commenced to run as the Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals had not yet served a copy thereof to the counsel on record. upon all these initial determination a case is made out for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. dated 29 March 1996. since the Court of Appeals already issued a second Resolution. NO . no copy of the decision of the appellate court was furnished to the counsel on record. . as a matter of common knowledge and observation.We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. Mariano Gavino to prove that the damage sustained by Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty management of her airway by private respondents during the anesthesia phase. Thus. that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.” No copy of the decision. or four (4) days before the expiration of the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. if in the affirmative. a pulmonologist. Hence.Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is injured or destroyed while the patient is unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive control of the physicians. . Based on this. Rogelio Ramos. YES . and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Despite this explanation. Thus. primarily on the ground that the fifteen-day (15) period for filing a motion for reconsideration had already expired. ISSUES 1.A copy of the above resolution was received by Atty. filed with the appellate court a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. WON the Court of Appeals erred in finding that private respondents were not negligent in the care of Erlinda during the anesthesia phase of the operation and. was sent nor received by the Coronel Law Office. the petition before us was submitted on time. Atty. Rogelio Ramos. As will hereinafter be explained. Hence. On the other hand. then counsel on record of petitioners. or on 12 April 1996.Nonetheless. Sillano on 11 April 1996. Corollary thereto. However. . we shall also determine if the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the testimonies of the witnesses for the private respondents 4. if negligence attended the management and care of the patient. all notices should be sent to the party’s lawyer at his given address. well within the extended period given by the Court. does not Reconsideration 2. Ligsay.A careful review of the records reveals that the reason behind the delay in filing the motion for reconsideration is attributable to the fact that the decision of the Court of Appeals was not sent to then counsel on record of petitioners. Upon these facts and under these circumstances the Court would be able to say.

Proximate cause has been defined as that which. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence. the fundamental element is the “control of the instrumentality” which caused the damage.torts & damages create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability. therefore.First of all. . The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. he could not have been capable of properly enlightening the court about anesthesia practice and procedure and their complications. In order to have the benefit of the rule. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants. Until the day of the operation. as such. . could not have been capable. enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine. Gutierrez was unaware of the physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. .In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable. Jamora.Respondent Dr. . depending upon the circumstances of each case. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is. no prior consultations with. or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for. and relieves a plaintiff of. therefore. an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such operations. It is the dominant. Respondent Dra. We find the theory of private respondents unacceptable. a Fellow of the Philippine College of Physicians and Diplomate of the Philippine Specialty Board of Internal Medicine. . an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence. who advanced private respondents' theory that the oxygen deprivation which led to anoxic encephalopathy. mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. Towards this end. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause.In the above requisites. and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice.Dra. internal medicine-allergy. by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him. . whenever it appears from the evidence in the case. . all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied. Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal).37 - prof. he is not a pharmacologist and. a plaintiff. that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. Still. the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident. respondent Dra. Hosaka’s negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority (as the to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. under usual and ordinary conditions. . it is clear that the appellate court erred in giving weight to Dr. Before this date. The measures cautioning prudence and vigilance in dealing with human lives lie at the core of the physician’s centuries-old Hippocratic Oath. and clinical pharmacology. 2. or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result.An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced bronchospasm properly falls within the fields of anesthesia. Gutierrez admitted that she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation itself. Thiopental Sodium. Moreover. and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. Private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous condition. without the aid of expert testimony.The CA commited a reversible error. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. Gutierrez’ act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was. and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. Dr. where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Instead.It does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof A2010 . in addition to proving injury or damage. and without which the result would not have occurred. In other words. Jamora is likewise not an allergologist and could not therefore properly advance expert opinion on allergicmediated processes. a clear indicia of her negligence. or pre-operative evaluation of Erlinda was done by her. if he could. as an expert would. in natural and continuous sequence. When the doctrine is appropriate. res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say. On the basis of the foregoing transcript. as a matter of common knowledge and observation. which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. of explaining to the court the pharmacologic and toxic effects of the supposed culprit. it is considered as merely evidentiary or in the nature of a procedural rule.Private respondents repeatedly hammered the view that the cerebral anoxia which led to Erlinda’s coma was due to bronchospasm mediated by her allergic response to the drug. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct. they presented Dr. Since Dr. YES . In the case at bar. that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage. respondent Dra. on 17 June 1985. Jamora’s testimony as an expert in the administration of Thiopental Sodium. must show a situation where it is applicable. introduced into her system. The real question. creating an inference or presumption of negligence. moving or producing cause. . by evidence of exculpation. Thus. 3. the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown: 1. produces injury. Jamora cannot be considered an authority in the field of anesthesiology simply because he is not an anesthesiologist. Dr. the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is called upon to explain the matter. the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient. was due to an unpredictable drug reaction to the short-acting barbiturate. It is regarded as a mode of proof. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results. She was likewise not properly informed of the possible difficulties she would face during the administration of anesthesia to Erlinda. before resort to the doctrine may be allowed. if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence. If there was such extraneous interventions. and 3. casis therefore. in which the pulmonologist himself admitted that he could not testify about the drug with medical authority. Such element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the defendant. It is simply a step in the process of such proof. . Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way. which. and must establish that the essential elements of the doctrine were present in a particular incident. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised. The resulting anoxic encephalopathy belongs to the field of neurology. Jamora is a pulmonologist.

not the cost of the care the family is usually compelled to undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy. either as a visiting or attending consultant. 2199. the amount of actual damages recoverable in suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the correct minimum cost of proper care. temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. 4. up to the time of trial.Except as provided by law or by . evidence of fellowship in most cases. A consultant remiss in his duties. guardian.Art.As it would not be equitable . and feedback from patients. the control test is determining. A2010 . . are difficult to predict. . once negligence is shown. nurses. with the exception of the payment of wages.for the victim in such cases to constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the compensatory damages previously awarded temperate damages are appropriate. Even the temperate damages herein awarded would be inadequate if petitioner’s technically employees. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. interns and residents. we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases. In addition to these. While “consultants” are not. apart from a general denial of its responsibility over respondent physicians. the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has been completed and that the cost can be liquidated. from the nature of the case. their educational qualifications. Doctors who apply for “consultant” slots. one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital in this particular incident. he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. or proof of a similar nature.500. an award of P1. Given these considerations. or a consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum standards acceptable to the hospital or its peer review committee. Having failed to do this.Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of litigation. These requirements are carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital administration or by a review committee set up by the hospital who either accept or reject the application. Accordingly. . he is normally required to attend clinico-pathological conferences. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.Upon these disquisitions we hold that private respondents are solidarily liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180. these provisions neglect to take into account those situations. while certain to occur.In the instant case. and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could not. generally. . fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting “consultant” staff. if they are to adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused. casis stipulation. . the amount of damages which should be awarded.00 in temperate damages would therefore be reasonable. Under the circumstances. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. the actual physical. an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. .The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former’s responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. . Because of this. respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlinda’s condition. should take into account the cost of proper care.In the instant case. the hiring. the control exercised.000. while the burden of proving negligence rests on the plaintiffs. and was in fact over three hours late for the latter’s operation. no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. though to a certain extent speculative.Meanwhile. hire. In fact. . In other words. This is particularly true with respondent hospital. the difficulty is only more apparent than real. In other words. for anything less would be grossly inadequate. Furthermore. However. teacher or employer) who should prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. on the basis of the foregoing.torts & damages “captain” of the operative team) in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols.In other words. . private hospitals. evidence of accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate). conduct bedside rounds for clerks. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists. it does not escape us that respondent Dr. and/or for the privilege of admitting patients into the hospital. no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. where the resulting injury might be continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the injury. the physician’s performance as a specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review committee on the basis of mortality and morbidity statistics. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient’s condition.and certainly not in the best interests of the administration of justice . he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda’s condition. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient. This being the case. hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the conduct of their work within the hospital premises. be made with certainty. moderate grand rounds and patient audits and perform other tasks and responsibilities. is normally politely terminated. . Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda’s cholecystectomy. Thus. failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. emotional and financial cost of the care of petitioner would be virtually impossible to quantify.After a physician is accepted. should be one which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved. They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the aid of professionals. presents problems in apportioning responsibility for negligence in medical malpractice cases. The amount given as temperate damages.38 - prof. respondent hospital. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. for the privilege of being able to maintain a clinic in the hospital. The unique practice (among private hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with attending and visiting “consultants. . and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship.In the first place.” who are allegedly not hospital employees. are required to submit proof of completion of residency. the burden shifts to the respondents (parent. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases. And because of the unique nature of such cases. it would be now much more in step with the interests of justice if the value awarded for temperate damages would allow petitioners to provide optimal care for their loved one in a facility which generally specializes in such care. . In neglecting to offer such proof. . the question now arises as to whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors for petitioner’s condition.In these cases. However. . as in this case. Having premised our award for compensatory damages on the amount provided by petitioners at the onset of litigation. and references. visiting or attending. interns and residents. petitioners were able to provide only home-based nursing care for a comatose patient who has remained in that condition for over a decade.

5) the costs of the suit. the phrase relied upon by the trial court does not negate the fact that Dr. the pains still kept recurring. They.The husband and the children. an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus. however. the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore.000. First. Kho handled the piece of rubber. a Progress Record. and Dr.00 as temperate damages. The trial court's following declaration shows that while it was critical of the lack of care with which Dr.00 are likewise proper. altering their long term goals to take into account their life with a comatose patient. Also.352.000.00 as moral damages. 1996 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . After examining her. will have to live with the day to day uncertainty of the patient’s illness. Villegas submitted to Dr. among which are when the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court conflict. . Villegas submit to another surgery.39 - prof. which. that the accident arose from want of care. Batiquin’s testimony. by way of example. 4) P100.There was also doubts as to the whereabouts of the piece of rubber. 3) P1. an award of P2. leaving her trustworthiness unimpaired. along with other physicians and nurses. Well-settled is the rule that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony. Kho's testimony. all petitioners in this case. The piece of rubber appeared to be a part of a rubber glove. .Considering that we have assessed Dr.When Dr. an Anesthesia Record. The CA was correct in saying that the trial court erred when it isolated the disputed portion of Dr. Dr Kho suggested that Mrs.While the petitioners claim that contradictions and falsities punctured Dr. Batiquin is liable HELD Procedural YES .000. which led to the different decision of the RTC and CA. Villegas . Salud Kho. The CA reversed the decision. ISSUES Procedural WON the court can review questions of fact Substantive WON Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain medicines. there are exceptions. Kho threw it away as told by her to Defendant. all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. Batiquin. Second. thus only supporting out appraisal of Dr.000. so she consulted Dr. exemplary damages in the amount of P100. when the appealed decision is clearly contradicted by the evidence on record.After leaving the hospital. In the morning of September 21. . Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish.00 are hereby awarded. Kho’s . She also gradually lost her appetite. Kho testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination. are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim.Finally. Batiquin's gloves after the operation nor blood smears on her hands upon removing her gloves. Batiquin.It is also worth noting that the trial court paid heed to Dr. Villegas and successfully delivered the latter’s baby. a Nurse's Record. and a piece of rubber material on the right side of the uterus. Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside. needless to say. Kho's trustworthiness. But the trial court failed to recognized that these were mere denials or negative testimonies. and solidarily against private respondents the following: 1) P1. or when the appellate court misapprehended the facts Substantive . her positive testimony prevails over the negative testimony in favor of the petitioners.000. not the respondents. . Kho to be a credible witness. Aside from Dr. the evidence which mentioned the piece of rubber are a Medical Certificate.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's private patient sometime before September 21.500. DISPOSITION the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed from are hereby modified so as to award in favor of petitioners. A2010 . BATIQUIN V CA (Villegas) 258 SCRA 334 DAVIDE. . the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas' body. the entire proceedings of the cesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. "there being no showing that the person or persons who prepared them are deceased or unable to testify on the facts therein stated . In this light. As such.This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant.000. 1988 Dr. knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil. They have fashioned their daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner. private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus. Kho’s testimony.Mrs. The failure of the Plaintiffs to reconcile these two different versions served only to weaken their claim against Defendant Batiquin. that there was neither any tear on Dr. Furthermore. Dr.000. Kho and (2) that Dr. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care. in the absence of an explanation by the defendant. 1988.While the rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. regarded these documentary evidence as mere hearsay. . Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs.In the instant case. Kho’s testimony: 1) that it was sent to the Pathologist in Cebu as testified to in Court by Dr. Kho's knowledge of the piece of rubber could not be based on other than first hand knowledge for.00 as actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of P8.000. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants.000. The family’s moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. Kho as a credible witness." .00 in moral damages would be appropriate. it affords reasonable evidence. Furthermore. it stands to reason that such could only have been a byproduct of the cesarean section performed by Dr. Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney’s fees valued at P100. July 5. and. Ma. performed a caesarian operation on Mrs. since aside from the cesarean section.The focal point of the appeal is Dr. does not occur unless through the intervention of negligence.The piece of rubber allegedly found was not presented in court. Kho. embedded on the ovarian cyst. For the foregoing reasons. She then consulted Dr. Kho’s testimony. and a Physician's Discharge Summary. dirt and pus behind the uterus. as she asserted before the trial court.000. However. and that she sent it to a laboratory and then to Cebu City for examination by a pathologist.00 each as exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.torts & damages condition remains unchanged for the next ten years. There were inconsistencies within her own testimony. as 2 versions arose from Dr. This was the cause of all of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. a reading of the said testimony reveals no such infirmity and establishes Dr. 2) P2. Kho saw a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen. Mrs. . no motive to state any untruth was ever imputed against Dr. Kho's testimony. The trial court. . Dr. it was not prepared to doubt Dr. Kho's credibility. Kho was frank throughout her turn on the witness stand. casis testimony and did not consider it with other portions of Dr.

torts & damages
Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof DISPOSITION Decision affirmed

A2010

- 40 -

prof. casis
contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights. DISPOSITION The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC, whereupon payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

D.M. CONSUNJI V CA KAPUNAN; April 20, 2001
NATURE Appeal from CA affirming decision of RTC ordering defendant D.M. Consunji, Inc. to pay damages to plaintiff Maria J. Juego FACTS - At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. Investigation disclosed that while victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo were performing their work on board a steel platform with plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the platform came loose causing the whole platform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core of the building under construction, save his 2 companions who luckily jumped out for safety. - On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow. On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. ISSUES 1. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to prove petitioner’s negligence 2. WON respondent is precluded from recovering damages under the Civil Code HELD 1. YES Ratio As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of

the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a construction site unless someone is negligent; thus, the first requisite is present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of appellant; thus, the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee’s deceased husband; thus, the last requisite is also present. A reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident. 2. NO Ratio Claimants may invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence. There is no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the

MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V REMONQUILLO 99 PHIL 117 MONTEMAYOR; May 18, 1956
NATURE Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS - August 22, 1950: Efren Magno went to the house of Antonio Peñaloza, hid stepbrother, on Rodriguez Lanuza St, Manila, to repair a leaking “media agua.” The “media agua” was just below the window of the third story. - Standing on said “media agua”, Magno received from his son thru the window a 3’x6’ galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion. The lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company parallel to the media agua and 2 ½ feet from it, causing his death by electrocution. - his widow and children filed suit to recover damages from the company. Trial court rendered judgment in their favor. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. - The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire stretched between poles pm the street and carrying a charge of 3600 volts. It was installed there some two years ago before Peñaloza’s house was constructed. During the construction of said house a similar incident took place, with less tragic consequences. The owner of the house complained to defendant about the danger which the wire presented, and defendant moved one end of the wire farther from the house by means of a brace, but left the other end where it was. - Regulations of the City required that “all wires be kept three feet from the building.” - There was no insulation that could have rendered it safe, because there is no insulation material in commercial use for such kind of wire (according to appellant, and this was not refuted). Petitioner’s Claim - Owner of the house exceeded the limit for the construction of the “media agua” (17% more). Respondent’s Comment

torts & damages
Owner was given final permit despite the excess of the “media agua”. ISSUE WON Manila Electric is guilty of negligence. HELD NO - It was the victim who was guilty of negligence Ratio the liability of electric companies for damages or personal injury is governed by the rules of negligence, nevertheless such companies are not insurers of the safety of the public. Reasoning - The death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence, and in some measure by the too close proximity of the “media agua” to the electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the “media agua.” Had the house owner followed the terms of the permit given him by the city for the construction of his “media agua”, the distance from the wires to the edge of said “media agua” would have been 3ft and 11 3/8 inches. - The company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said construction, and to change the installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance. - The violation of the permit for the construction was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it. The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. It is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so. He had training and experience for the job. He could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. - To hold the defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno, such supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate and principal cause of the accident. Disposition The appealed decision of the CA is reversed, and complaint against the Company dismissed.

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- The girl was taken to the provincial hospital. Despite his efforts, the child died that same night. - It was certified that the cause of death was "Burns, 3rd Degree, whole Body", and that the contributory causes were "Congestion of the Brain and visceras of the chest & abdomen.” - The defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow down the side of the street Gran Captain with the knowledge and consent of the authorities; that the cause of death was other than the hot water; and that in the death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and negligence. - The trial judge, however, after examination of the evidence presented by the defendants, failed to sustain their theory of the case, except as to the last mentioned special defense. He nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. ISSUE WON the action should be dismissed due to the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs

Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila dismissing the complaint on the merits filed in an action to recover damages for injuries FACTS - Due to a collision between the respective automobiles of Bernardo and Legaspi, the former filed an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by his car which he alleged were by reason of Legaspi's negligence in causing said collision. Legaspi, on the other hand, filed a cross-complaint alleging it was Bernardo's fault. He also asks for damages. - The lower court found upon the evidence that both the plaintiff and the defendant were negligent in handling their automobiles and that said negligence was of such a character and extent on the part of both as to prevent either from recovering. ISSUE WON the parties may recover damages HELD 1. NO - Where two automobiles, going in opposite directions, collide on turning a street corner, and it appears from the evidence and is found by the trial court that the drivers thereof were equally negligent and contributed equally to the principal occurrence as determining causes thereof, neither can recover of the other for damages suffered.

BERNAL V HOUSE 54 PHIL 327 MALCOLM; January 30, 1930
FACTS - Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal went to Tacloban, Leyte to attend the procession of Holy Friday. - After the procession, they, accompanied by two other persons, passed along a public street named Gran Capitan. - The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in advance of her mother and her friends. - While in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., an automobile appeared on which frightened the child. She turned to run, but fell into the street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House. - When the mother and her companions reached the child, they found her face downward in the hot water.

BERNARDO V LEGASPI 29 Phil 12 MORELAND; December 23, 1914
NATURE

HELD NO - The death of the child was the result of fault and negligence in permitting hot water to flow through the public streets, there to endanger the lives of passers-by who were unfortunately enough to fall into it - The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. - There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. - The doctrines announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages. DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from was in part be reversed and in the court of origin another judgment was issued in favor of Fortunata Enverso and against J.V. House for the amount of P1,000, and for the costs of both instances.

SEPARATE OPINION

torts & damages
ROMUALDEZ [dissent]
- Even taking the finding that the defendant by its negligence helped to bring about the accident which resulted in the death of the child Purificacion Bernal, plaintiff, by negligence, contributed to that most regrettable result. - Judgment appealed from should be affirmed.

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ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. - That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling, considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all. - It is settled that: The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means. - This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that: Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. - That presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner. - Even assuming that the cause of the collapse was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable because it was guilty of negligence, which the trial court denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure for one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence. Disposition Judgment was denying the instant petition with costs against petitioner.

GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION V CHATTO 210 SCRA 18 DAVIDE JR.; June 16, 1992
FACTS - Plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. - Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued. - Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day. - The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11. - Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, plaintiff went to Illinois, USA in July 1982 for further treatment. She was treated at the Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for about three (3) months during which time she had to return to the Cook County Hospital five (5) or, six (6) times. - Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect. - The trial court awarded actual or compensatory and moral damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. - Respondent Court found the appeal later filed to be without merit. - Its motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the respondent Court, petitioner filed the petition in the SC. ISSUE WON the collapse of the ceiling was caused by force majeur HELD

NO - Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. That Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure. - Definitions of force majeure as cited in Pons y Compañia vs. La Compañia Maritima: 1. Blackstone, in his Commentaries on English Law: Inevitable accident or casualty; an accident produced by any physical cause which is irresistible; such as lightning. tempest, perils of the sea, inundation, or earthquake; the sudden illness or death of a person. 2. Escriche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudenci,: The event which we could neither foresee nor resist; as for example, the lightning stroke, hail, inundation, hurricane, public enemy, attack by robbers; Vis major est, says Cayo, ea quae consilio humano neque provideri neque vitari potest. Accident and mitigating circumstances. 3. Bouvier: Any accident due to natural cause, directly exclusively without human intervention, such as could not have been prevented by any kind of oversight, pains and care reasonably to have been expected. 4. Corkburn, chief justice, in a well considered English case, said that were a captain uses all the known means to which prudent and experienced captains ordinarily have recourse, he does all that can be reasonably required of him; and if, under such circumstances, he is overpowered by storm or other natural agency, he is within the rule which gives immunity from the effects of such vis major. The term generally applies, broadly speaking, to natural accidents, such as those caused by lightning, earthquake, tempests, public enemy ,etc. -The real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he isincompetent. He is not an engineer, but an architect who had not even passed the government's examination. - Verily, post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the present proceedings. What is significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed by the respondent Court, that the collapse was due to construction defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding. - The building was constructed barely 4 years prior to the accident in question. It was not shown that any of the causes denominates as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the

PLDT V CA (SPS ESTEBAN) REGALADO; September 29, 1989 [CITATION]
NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the resolution of the Court of Appeals. FACTS

44 O. it would not have hit the accident mound > That plaintiffs’ jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit the ACCIDENT MOUND could have been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street to the south of the ACCIDEN MOUND. > Plaintiffs’ jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as plaintiff husband claimed. and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. but also because he was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him. The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs.G. at about 7:30 PM. . he could have braked the vehicle the moment it struck the ACCIDENT MOUND. . He ran after appellant when the latter refused to stop.The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident.' The appellant went back to the place where the old woman was struck by his rig. breaking his leg. the track sagged. leaving a permanent scar on her cheek. Also. does not exonerate the accused. one of a group of 8 AfricanAmerican laborers in the employment of defendant. who fell at the middle of the road.43 - prof.torts & damages . Quiñones. Mangyao asked him why he bumped the old woman and his answer was. She was then loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital where she died 3 hours later. but it had not been proven that Atlantic inspected the track or had any proper system of inspection. is L. CA-G. The men were hauling the rails on 2 hand cars. in its answer. October 22. Atlantic. The old woman was unconscious. are hereby SET ASIDE. there were no side guards on the cars to keep the rails from slipping off. . 1979. he was found to have contributed in some degree to the injury inflicted. > If the accident did not happen because the jeep was running quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over the ACCIDENT MOUND. As Rakes was walking along the car’s side when the accident occurred. since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence (People vs. 1947).R. promulgated on September 25. which was later amputated at the knee. some behind or at it sides and some pulling the cars in the front by a rope.The plaintiff’s witness alleged that a noticeable depression in the track had appeared after a typhoon.However. At one point. The appellant's rig was following another at a distance of two meters. CA affirmed . but a by-stander Mangyao saw the incident and shouted at the appellant to stop. FACTS .R. 1968 – Jeep of Esteban spouses ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. Orbeta. Barte and Company. Overtaking the appellant. . 321. if any. while the respondent husband suffered cut lips.On Dec 31. Rakes. as one of its determining factors. an independent contractor which undertook the said construction work. 1957 NATURE Petition for review of the CA’s decision affirming the conviction of the petitioner of the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence.Atlantic contends that the remedy for injury through negligence lies only in a criminal action against the official directly responsible and that the employer be held only subsidiarily liable. Disposition resolutions of respondent CA. dated March 11. if at all. . an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. A2010 .The accident was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. . legs and face. Costs against petitioner. ISSUE WON there was contributory negligence on the part of petitioner .Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms. then plaintiff husband had not exercised the deligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident. Its original decision. . . 1520) Disposition the appealed decision is affirmed with modification as to the civil liability of the petitioner which is hereby increased to P30.PLDT. 1959. 1990 and September 3. GENOBIAGON V CA (PEOPLE OF THE PHILS) 178 SCRA 422 GRIÑO-AQUINO. the company’s officers and 3 of the workers testified that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all against walking by the side of cars.The plaintiff. the tie broke. In addition.July 30. is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. the windshield of the jeep was shattered. The old woman started to cross when the first rig was approaching her. . March 29. 1980. denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be held responsible. Reasoning . > Jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. a rig driven by Genobiagon bumped an old woman who was crossing the street. At that speed.The alleged contributory negligence of the victim. If it had remained on that inside lane.000. casis NO . The appellant continued to drive on. was at work transporting iron rails from the harbor in Manila. 'it was the old woman that bumped him. Mckenna. the car canted and the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff who was walking by the car’s side."The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence." (People vs. the appellant's rig bumped the old woman. although not as the primary cause. ISSUE WON the Esteban spouses can claim damages from PLDT HELD NO Ratio A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof.TC ruled in favor of Esteban spouses whereas the CA reversed the ruling.Genobiagon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. This was reported to the foreman. but as appellant's vehicle was going so fast not only because of the steep down-grade of the road. No.Genobiagon claims CA erred in not finding that the reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate cause of the accident which led to her death ISSUES WON contributory negligence can be used as defense by Genobiagon HELD RAKES V ATLANTIC [CITATION] [PONENTE] NATURE Action for damages FACTS .

Petitioner had walked along the side of the car despite a prohibition to do so by the foreman. as insisted by the petitioners.979.the negligence of the defendant alone was insufficient to cause the accident—it also required the negligence of the plaintiff. Ratio Art. and without which the result would not have occurred.LAST CLEAR CHANCE: under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to. original or duplicate. to the effect that. blameworthy.Applying the above test. Islands v. Bank of the Phil. and were instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas. common sense. he never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's validation procedures. 11 A "reasonable man of ordinary prudence" 12 would not have given credence to such explanation and would have insisted that the space left blank be filled up as a condition for validation. at times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"). Irene Yabut to the effect that since the duplicate copy was only for her personal record. was negligent in validating." In this case.the case stems from a complaint filed by Rommel’s Marketing Corporation (RMC) to recover from the former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) the sum of P304. Mabayad herself.The proximate cause of the loss was the negligent act of the bank. the amount fairly attributable to his own negligence. .74 representing various deposits it had made in its current account with the bank but which were not credited. policy and precedent. ISSUE What is the proximate cause of the loss. 1976) that bank manager Bonifacio admittedly became aware of the practice of his teller Mabayad of validating blank deposit slips. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man.Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic. casis slip was left blank while that in the original was filled up. or after the lapse of more than seven (7) years counted from the period when the funds in question were deposited in plaintiff's accounts (May. and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Mabayad. absent the act of Ms. 1983. (b) fault or negligence of the defendant. . Ms. 1975 to July. or some other person for whose acts he must respond. Mabayad on guard. notwithstanding the fact that one of the deposit slips was not completely accomplished. 2176.) 269 SCRA 695 HERMOSISIMA JR. In the testimony of Mr. which. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. . and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner. Such fault or negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Court of Appeals. as testified to by Ms. states that where both parties are negligent. wanton. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. SC deducted PhP2. Because of this. Unfortunately. Azucena Mabayad. in essence. The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information — that of the name of the account holder — should have already put Ms.In the case at bench. to the tune of P304.500. . this was not how bank teller Mabayad proceeded thus resulting in huge losses to the private respondent. Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity. . and inexcusable negligence in the appellant bank's supervision of its employees. . Azucena Mabayad. Rather than readily validating the incomplete duplicate copy. both original and duplicate. there is no dispute as to the damage suffered by the private respondent. . but only in reduction of his damages.Trial court assessed that damages to plaintiff amount to PhP5. suffered by the private respondent RMC — petitioner bank's negligence or that of private respondent's? HELD . plaintiff should not be afforded relief PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE V CA (ROMMEL’S MARKETING CORP. there being fault or negligence. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter Reasoning . it appears that the bank's teller. coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller. petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. does not operate as a bar to recovery. Romeo Bonifacio. Azucena Mabayad. . . presented by Ms. she should have proceeded more cautiously by being more probing as to the true reason why the name of the account holder in the duplicate .The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits should not relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility. Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. is obliged to pay for the damage done. allegedly due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of the petitioner bank. then he is guilty of negligence. produces the injury. Each party is chargeable with damages in proportion to his fault.torts & damages HELD YES . March 14. .979. This doctrine. thru its teller Ms. A2010 . Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip. which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent.It was this negligence of Ms. in validating the deposit slips. 17 defines proximate cause as "that cause. line and sinker the too shallow excuse of Ms. in natural and continuous sequence.Test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips.44 - prof. Mabayad. she would simply fill up the blank space later on. She should not have been so naive in accepting hook. -The negligence of the injured person contributing to his injury but not being one of the determining causes of the principal accident. Yabut.74. but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other. or when it is impossible to SEPARATE OPINION WILLARD AND CARSON [dissent] .There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff. . or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. while he ordered the investigation of the incident. would do. The law considers what would be reckless. this is gross. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. Undoubtedly. .Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. . 1997 NATURE Petition for review challenging the CA decision affirming the RTC decision in a civil case FACTS . Yabut to Ms.000.It was in fact only when he testified in this case in February. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another.

In all other respects. . the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care.In the case of banks. it is not disputed that each time Yabut would transact business with PBC's tellers. Private respondent shall have recourse against Ms. the rightful owner of such deposited funds. her employer? . . Stated otherwise. .Since Yabut deposited money in cash. Why is RMC insulating Ms. who should have been charged with estafa or estafa through falsification of private document.torts & damages determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury.The legal or proximate cause of RMC's loss was when Yabut. he cannot recover damages. Precisely." it is my considered view that the doctrine assumes that the negligence of the defendant was subsequent to the negligence of the plaintiff and the same must be the proximate cause of the injury. . private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. not the validation of the deposit slip by the teller as the deposit slip was made out by Yabut in her husband's name and to his account. Azucena Mabayad the amount they would pay the private respondent. Here. Since a sizable amount of cash was entrusted to Yabut. the plaintiff may recover damages. A2010 . to wit: . The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC. Disposition the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is modified by reducing the amount of actual damages private respondent is entitled to by 40%. RMC's own employee. the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father of a family. The teller. had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client. Petitioners may recover from Ms. the name of the depositor or current account holder. could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. as issued in 1975. private respondent should. not a last possible chance. The upper part was called the depositor's stub and the lower part was called the bank copy. the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. she would accomplish two (2) copies of the current account deposit slip. particularly Romeo Lipana. and the amount of the deposit either in cash or in checks. thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company.LAST CLEAR CHANCE: As for the doctrine of "last clear chance. thru its teller. Thus. it was the criminal act of Yabut that directly caused damage to RMC. we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio. . This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent 23 under A2179 CC. detached the validated depositor's stub on the original deposit slip and allowed Yabut to retain the whole validated duplicate deposit slip that bore the same account number as the original deposit slip. who indicated therein the current account number to which the deposit was to be credited. or after the deposit slip was validated by the teller in favor of Yabut's husband. the appellate court's decision is AFFIRMED. but with the account name purposely left blank by Yabut. her employer. shall be borne by private respondent RMC. had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. the date of the deposit. however. a bank normally maintained a ledger which served as a repository of accounts to which debits and credits resulting from transactions with the bank were posted from books of original entry. In view of this. it cannot be denied that.000. only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the petitioners. But if his negligence was only contributory. yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank. who had the last fair chance. SEPARATE OPINION PADILLA [dissent] . at least. but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. If it did. tampered with its account number. the company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary.In the case at bar.45 - prof.The foregoing notwithstanding. casis but for a personal record to complement the original validated depositor's stub. The award of attorney's fees shall be borne exclusively by the petitioner. . Irene Yabut.It should be noted that the teller validated the depositor's stub in the upper portion and the bank copy on the lower portion on both the original and duplicate copies of the deposit slips presented by Yabut. Private respondent failed to examine these bank statements not because it was prevented by some cause in not doing so. . had two parts. to avoid the accident or injury. the usual bank procedure then was for the teller to count whether the cash deposit tallied with the amount written down by the depositor in the deposit slip. then the teller proceeded to verify whether the current account number matched with the current account name as written in the deposit slip. if the latter. banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care. when Yabut wrote the name of RMC on the blank account name on the validated duplicate copy of the deposit slip. deposited the money of RMC in her husband's name and account number instead of that of RMC. In short. as advanced by the petitioner.00 attorney's fees. but because it was purposely negligent as it admitted that it does not normally check bank statements given by banks.Thus. Irene Yabut. is not contributory but the immediate and proximate cause of its injury. the genuineness and due execution of the document become an issue in resolving whether or not the transaction had been fair and regular and whether the ordinary course of business had been followed by the bank. Thus. The deposit slip was prepared and signed by the depositor or his representative. or bar a defense against liability sought by another. the bank was not remiss in its duty of sending monthly bank statements to private respondent RMC so that any error or discrepancy in the entries therein could be brought to the bank's attention at the earliest opportunity. indeed. . its employee. said act only served to cover-up the loss already caused by her to RMC. It must have been a chance as would have enabled a reasonably prudent man in like position to have acted effectively to avoid the injury and the resulting damage to himself. there must be a last and a clear chance. PBC's deposit slip.It seems that an innocent bank teller is being unduly burdened with what should fall on Ms. . it was only after the transaction was posted in the ledger that the teller proceeded to machine validate the deposit slip and then affix his signature or initial to serve as proof of the completed transaction.It was private respondent who had the last and clear chance to prevent any further misappropriation by Yabut had it only reviewed the status of its current accounts on the bank statements sent to it monthly or regularly. when there is a clear evidence of tampering with any of the material entries in a deposit slip. therefore. simply by faithfully observing their selfimposed validation procedure. Both parts were detachable from each other. on the assumption that it would serve no other purpose JUNTILLA V FONTANAR . Had it done so. . . have taken ordinary care of its concerns. Its negligence. 40% of the damage awarded by the respondent appellate court. and superimposed RMC's account number. Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors. as what the law presumes. Irene Yabut from liability when in fact she orchestrated the entire fraud on RMC. The rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of. except the award of P25. .In the earlier days before the age of full computerization. assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee.Going back to Yabut's modus operandi.

The petitioner stated that there were 3 passengers in the front seat and 14 in the rear. The records show that this obligation was not met by the respondents. as far as regards the work of constructing the appliance. and by entering into the said contract. but actually owned by Fernando Banzon) when its right rear tire exploded causing it to turn turtle. the processing of the checks was completed only at 3pm. He took a passenger jeep bound for his house in Bulacan. not binding on this Court but they were also based on considerations quite different from those that obtain in the case at bar. . He caught up with Virgilio Alvarez and overcame him after a scuffle. It was while the vehicle was along EDSA that two persons with knives boarded and forcibly took the money he was carrying. Co. There is also evidence to show that the passenger jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident. et al. Disposition Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner’s MFR was denied. ISSUES 1. therefore.46 - prof. injuries on his left arm. alleging that the accident was beyond their control taking into account that the tire that exploded was newly bought and slightly used at the time it blew up. He opted for the second. this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. However. could have been caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire. But the hold-upper who . Banzon. or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation. spend the night there. The petitioner decided nevertheless to encash them because the Project employees would be waiting for their pay the following day. it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide.. The obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor Reasoning . whenever it appears that the defect would have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which HERNANDEZ V COMMISSION ON AUDIT 179 SCRA 39 CRUZ. .It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage. we held in Necesito. and leave for Ternate the following morning. Alvarez was subsequently charged with robbery and pleaded guilty. right thigh and on his back and also found this “Omega” wrist watch was lost. v. that “a tire blow-out does not constitute negligence unless the tire was already old and should not have been used at all. The records show that the passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a A2010 . or (2) take the money with him to his house in Marilao. the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person. must be independent of the human will 2.City Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence. Hernandez. et al. who filed their answer. The petitioner had two choices: (1) return to Cavite that same afternoon and arrive there in the early evening. thinking it the safer one. that: “The preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer. The sudden blowing-up. casis under the circumstances was incumbent upon it. May 31. or if it can be foreseen. YES . WON the CFI erred in absolving the carrier from any liability upon a finding that the tire blow out is a fortuitous event 2. The evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident. Bulacan.torts & damages 136 SCRA 624 GUITERREZ JR. Plaintiff was thrown out of the vehicle and lost consciousness upon landing on the ground.Relative to the contingency of mechanical defects.Teodoro M. and Camoro. We held that. the manufacturer is considered as being in law the agent or servant of the carrier. he collected the cash value of the checks. .While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the tire were still visible. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles not to exceed safe and legal speed limits and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times. 2. there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents.” In the case at bar. Hernandez was the officer-in-charge and special disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach Project of the Philippine Tourism Authority in Cavite. v De Jesus. the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the human will.Petitioner Roberto Juntilla was sitting a the front seat of a jeepney (driven by one Berfol Camoro. He estimated that the money would be available by 10am and that he would be back in Ternate by about 2pm of the same day. He went to Danao city and upon arrival there he entered the City Hospital to attend to his injuries and asked his father-in-law to go to site of the accident to look for his watch but the watch was nowhere to be found. . . 1985 NATURE Petition to review the decision of CFI of Cebu FACTS . The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner 4. registered under the franchise of Clemente Fontanar. it must be impossible to avoid 3. with regard to inspection and application of the necessary tests. after the initial shock. with a due regard for all the circumstances. 1989 NATURE A petition to reverse Commission on Audit’s denial of relief FACTS . No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents. For the purposes of this doctrine. The respondents then appealed to the CFI of Cebu. et al. which reversed the judgment upon a finding that the accident in question was due to a fortuitous event. We agree with the observation of the petitioner that a public utility jeep running at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up. he found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm. November 6. In La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. WON the accident was due to a fortuitous event HELD 1.Petitioner then filed a civil case for breach of contract with damages before the City Court of Cebu against Fontanar.The CFI relied on the ruling of the CA in Rodriguez v Red Line Transportation Co. When he came back to his senses. According to this theory. It must be impossible to foresee the even which constitutes the caso fortuito. hence this appeal.In the case at bar. Decision of City Court is REINSTATED ditch immediately after its right rear tire exploded. “ not only are the rulings of the CA in Rodriguez v Red Line Trans. He went to the main office in Manila to encash 2 checks covering the wages of the employees and the operating expenses of the Project.” This conclusion is based on a misapprehension of overall facts. Paras. NO Ratio A caso fortuito (fortuitous event) presents the following essential characteristics: 1. immediately followed in desperate pursuit. And so.

The next day. shall present his application for relief. with the available evidence in support thereof. Shocked and hurt. or the provincial auditor. through then Chairman Francisco S. . "C") issued by Dr. plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto suffered the following injuries: .In the afternoon of June 4. Its 3 Section 638. invoking the foregoing facts. and without any mystic ability to peer into the future. An officer who fails to comply with this requirement shall not be relieved of liability or allowed credit for any such loss in the settlement of his accounts. the loss of the P10. who was eventually convicted. Per Medico Legal Certificate (Exh. It could not have collapsed without a cause. plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect. theft. the ceiling of its balcony collapsed.47 - prof. casis entering the theater. his successor sided with the petitioner. which is the normal procedure in the handling of public funds. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11. the officer accountable therefor or having custody thereof shall immediately notify the Auditor General. the loss of said cash thru robbery could have been aborted. Jesus Lim Ong.however.This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by the said provisions. ISSUES 1. The decision he made seemed logical at that time and was one that could be expected of a reasonable and prudent person. So it was with the petitioner. as an act.175. Ong about the cause of the collapse of the ceiling of their theater cannot be equated. owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. according as a matter is within the original jurisdiction of the one or the other. all we can rely on is a reasoned conjecture of what might happen. It does not appear he has passed the government examination for architects. denied the petitioner's request. incompetent. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he is. if only because his home in Marilao was much nearer than his office in Ternate.Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness. That Mr. observing inter alia: In the instant case. however. the Commission on Audit. ACCORDINGLY. ISSUE WON petitioner’s acts are so tainted with negligence or recklessness as to justify the denial of the petitioner's request for relief from accountability for the stolen money HELD NO . and did. or our intuition. may in the particular case allow.there was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial civil and structural engineers on the cause of the collapse of the theater's ceiling. but an architect who had not even passed the government's examination. Chatto. Brion.Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. To Our mind. filed a request for relief from money accountability under Section 638 of the Revised Administrative Code. . Hernandez can be attributed to his negligence because had he brought the cash proceeds of the checks (replenishment fund) to the Beach Park in Ternate immediately after encashment for safekeeping in his office. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure. He is a graduate of architecture from the St.then Solicitor-General argued that Hernandez was negligent in the safekeeping of the stolen funds. NO . post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the contention is that the petitioner should not have encashed the checks as the hour was already late and he knew he could not return to Ternate before nightfall. 1992 NATURE Petition for Review FACTS . had made up for it with his efforts to retrieve the money and his capture of one of the robbers. and her 15-year old daughter. Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater. of God. NO . Louie University in Baguio City. assuming he was guilty of contributory negligence. A2010 . he says that the first course was more prudent as he saw it.3 . something that could not have been reasonably foreseen although it could have happened. WON the collapse was due to force majeure HELD 1. ." Having interposed it as a defense. Verily. Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. or other casualty. that the likelihood of robbery during the time in question was stronger in Ternate than in Marilao. especially on that busy highway. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued.torts & damages escaped is still at large and the stolen money he took with him has not been recovered. June 16. For most of us. it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure.It is true that the petitioner miscalculated. Jesus Lim Ong is not an engineer. . Mr. . To sustain that proposition is to introduce sacrilege in our jurisprudence. The memo concludes that in deciding to take the money with him to Marilao after imprudently withdrawing it from the main office. He is not an engineer. the petitioner was assuming a risk from which he cannot now be excused after the loss of the money as a result of the robbery to which it was unreasonably exposed. the real reason why Mr. GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION V CHATTO 210 SCRA 18 DAVIDE JR.On his decision to take the money home that afternoon instead of returning directly to Ternate. they transferred to the UST hospital. Credit for loss occurring in transit or due to casualty — Notice to Auditor. 2. — When a loss of government funds or property occurs while the same is in transit or is caused by fire. jr. WON Jesus Lim Ong’s investigation maybe given weight in the trial 2.00 under the accountability of Mr.the petitioner. He avers he has done only what any reasonable man would have done and should not be held accountable for a fortuitous event over which he had no control. admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed. Lina Delza E. Ernesto G. 1982 Gloria E. that what happened was a fortuitous event that could not have reasonably been foreseen.COA insists that the petitioner should not be relieved from his money accountability because it was his own negligence that led to the loss of the cash he had sought to take not to Ternate but to Marilao. based on common sense and our own experiences. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day. but the Court feels he should not be blamed for that. if you will. Tantuico. Disposition The petitioner is entitled to be relieved from accountability for the money forcibly taken from him. . In fine. and within thirty days or such longer period as the Auditor. as the respondent Court impliedly held. or provincial auditor.In the petition at bar. the ignorance of Mr. agreeing that Hernandez had not committed any negligence or. Hernandez claims that the respondent COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying him relief and in holding him negligent for the loss of the stolen money. Hardly ten (10) minutes after . Later. the petition is GRANTED. . They bought balcony tickets but even then were unable to find seats considering the number of people patronizing the movie.

Besides. said warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown origin. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage caused by force majeure.Appellees would contend that the above stipulation does not bind them because it was printed in fine SERVANDO V PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO 117 SCRA 832 ESCOLIN. . promulgated June 29. and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the defendant. the agreement contained in the above quoted Clause 14 is a mere iteration of the basic principle of law written in Article 1 1 7 4 of the Civil Code4 Thus. as the plane ticket in the case at bar. were inevitable. Jan. shipwreck. the burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened independently of the will of the appellant. .This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured. The building was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the accident in question. seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Cases Nos. 49). 7354 and 7428. in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other. and that they did not sign the same.. he gives his consent.It is settled that . he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. especially as regards the ceiling. . At about 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day. Civil Code.torts & damages present proceedings. . His answers to the leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said. there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident.B. (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the 'caso fortuito'. 1979. It was not shown that any of the causes denominates as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding." (Tolentino. Reasoning . 31. Before the fire.. morals. and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation'.The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises. defines 'caso fortuito' as 'an event that takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss. Examples of this are destruction of houses. ISSUE WON the above stipulation validly limits the liability of the shipowner in this case HELD YES Ratio The parties may stipulate anything in the contract for so long as the stipulation is not contrary to law. no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen. a 'caso fortuito' presents the following essential characteristics: (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence. (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. or if it can be foreseen. That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction. p. It is what is known as a contract of 'adhesion'. A2010 . . colored papers. Lawyer's Journal. complete and in good order. casis letters on the back-of the bills of lading. Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan. 1982 NATURE This appeal. public enemies. public policy. however. are contracts not entirely prohibited. the obligor is exempt from liability for non-performance. or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation. 1962 Ed. Court of Appeals. and since the burning of the warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees. appellees Clara Uy Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on board the appellant's vessel for carriage from Manila to Pulupandan. and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.. that the collapse was due to construction defects. violence of robbers. Vol. destroying appellees' cargoes. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely. What is significant is the finding of the trial court. Philippine Steam on the other hand relies on the following: Clause 14. also in relation to contracts. ordering Philippine Steam to pay for damages. consequently." In the case at bar. the cargoes were discharged. the doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means. p. there is nothing therein that is contrary to law. it must be impossible to avoid. originally brought to the Court of Appeals. Disposition judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the instant petition with costs against petitioner. fire . considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all. . 1951. the lower court rendered a decision. though foreseen. war. morals or public policy. unexpected fire. The latter could not have foreseen the event. Ong. The Partidas. its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation. Negros Occidental several cargoes (cavans of rice. The court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736. Justice J. Except in cases expressly specified by the law. IV. appellees' cargoes as a result of a fire which gutted the Bureau of Customs' warehouse in Pulupandan. in the morning of November 18. toys etc) as evidenced by the corresponding bills of lading issued by the appellant. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had been exercised. citing Mr. dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters.On November 6. 462.We sustain the validity of the above stipulation. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr.L. declaring appellant Philippine Steam Navigation liable for damages for the loss of the 4 Article 1174. Negros Occidental.On the bases of the foregoing facts. if he adheres. 1963. The stipulation which merely iterates the principle of caso fortuito is for all intents and purposes valid.' . appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed. inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. 3 where the Court held that while it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket . . 1963. affirmed by the respondent Court. Reyes. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. . . FACTS . Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless such loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk. .In its dissertation of the phrase 'caso fortuito' the Enciclopedia Juridicada Espanola 5 says: "In a legal sense and.48 - prof. appellee Uy Bico was able to take delivery of 907 cavans of rice Appellees' claims for the value of said goods were rejected by the appellant. the loss is chargeable against the appellant. must be independent of the human will. 'Such provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage. unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. This argument overlooks the pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu vs. or which. the antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil Code.

when the warehouse was burned. When the effect. the whole occurrence is thereby humanized. No amount of extraordinary diligence on the part of the carrier could have prevented the loss of the goods by fire which was of accidental origin.the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in the nature and character of damnum absque injuria. YES . WON (applying the ruling of NAkpil & Sons v. In fact. if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God. public respondent found as conclusively established that indeed. YES . .NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection of its employees .In the Nakpil case it was held that "To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code. had reasonable opportunity to remove the goods. and carelessness. 2. the same notice involved in the case at bar. imprudence and negligence in the management and operation of Angat Dam. et al. Clara had removed more than one-half of the rice consigned to her.NPC operated and maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River . (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable. ISSUES 1.' the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor. the obligor cannot escape liability. Moreover. The storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the appellees was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent. or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. was insufficient. et al. Nor can the appellant or its employees be charged with negligence. are all but products of defendants-appellees headlessness. May 21. is found to be in part the result of the participation of man whether it be from active intervention or neglect. thereby releasing a large amount of water which inundated the banks of the Angat River causing the death of members of the household of the plaintiffs. Amparo C. SEPARATE OPINION AQUINO [concur] .written notices were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about the impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and advising them to take the necessary Precautions .given that NPC is guilty of negligence. Since the warehouse belonged to and was maintained by the government. It appears that appellant had not only notified appellees of the arrival of their shipment. This however caused the inundation of the banks of the Angat river which caused persons and animals to drown and properties to be washed away."and that the 24 October 1978 'early warning notice" supposedly sent to the affected municipalities. together with their animals Respondents comments: . for a breach of an obligation due to an 'act of God. appellee Uy Bico had taken delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the burning of the warehouse." involving the very same SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE V CA . it would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant. pp.R. casis incident subject of the instant petition.From the time the goods in question were deposited in the Bureau of Customs' warehouse in the morning of their arrival up to two o' clock in the afternoon of the same day. . vs. Disposition Petition dismissed.I concur. (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. A2010 .The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are.There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier . the petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of foresight. . NATIONAL POWER CORP V CA (RAYO ET AL) DAVIDE JR. Under article 1738 of the Civil Code "the extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues to be operative even during the time the goods are stored in the warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination. Juan F. Thus.When the water level in the Angat dam went beyond the allowable limit at the height of typhoon Kading NPC opened three of the dam’s spillways to release the excess water in the dam. as it were. the defendants suddenly. and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. diligence and prudence in the operation and maintenance of the hydroelectric plant . and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in." and that "the extent of the opening of the spillways.despite the defendants' knowledge of the impending entry of typhoon "Kading.torts & damages . CV Nos.on the basis of its meticulous analysis and evaluation of the evidence a dduced by the parties in the cases subject of CA-G. Court of Appeals. CA) NPC is liable given that the inundation was caused by force majeure HELD 1.in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised. negligently and recklessly opened three (3) of the dam's spillways. pursuant to such demand. Disposition judgment appealed from is hereby set aside. but had demanded that the same be withdrawn..NPC exercised due care. and the magnitude of the water released.when the said water level went beyond the maximum allowable limit at the height of the typhoon. Plaintiffs claim: . the consignees.The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent release by the defendants of water through the spillways of the Angst Dam (Hydroelectric Plant). The court there declared that the proximate cause of the loss and damage sustained by the plaintiffs therein--who were similarly situated as the private respondents hereinwas the negligence of the petitioners. 1174-1175). . the latter having no control whatsoever over the same. Servando and Clara Uy Bico. WON NPC was guilty of negligence 2. which results in loss or damage.A similar case entitled National Power Corporation. the shipping company had no more control and responsibility over the goods after they were deposited in the customs warehouse by the arrastre and stevedoring operator.the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid greater damage to people and property . 1993 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court FACTS ." they failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam . negligence. Nakipil & Sons vs. there concurs a corresponding fraud. 27290-93. they could still not contain or control the flood that resulted . slovenliness. delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code. . to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief.49 - prof. (1 Corpus Juris.incurred in delay in the performance of its obligation. Court of Appeals is still good law as far as the concurrent liability of an obligor in the case of force majeure is concerned. or failure to act. until the consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods and has had reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose of them". the cause of which is to be considered.

The Resolution under attack denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. due to fortuitous event HELD YES . Hence.50 - prof. private respondents alleged that the damage A2010 . would do. and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. 1989. casis cannot be invoked for the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences. governmental prohibitions. receiving the heaviest impact of the strong winds.In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability. in establishing the culpability of petitioner. as exemplary damages and P100. merely relied on the aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of petitioner’s school building after the typhoon. The 1/2” diameter steel bars embedded on the concrete roof beams which serve as truss anchorage are not bolted nor nailed to the trusses. for damages based on culpa aquiliana. such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event. It may be the failure to observe that degree of care.000. and employees. Pertinent aspects of the latter’s Reporti[5] dated October 18.000. epidemics. a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of foresight. . In other words. Southeastern College. an ocular inspection of the destroyed buildings was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official. a powerful typhoon “Saling” hit Metro Manila.” . 1989 stated. diligence or care.000. Jesus L.There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event. or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation. P300. One of the factors that may have led to this calamitous event is the formation of the buildings in the area and the general direction of the wind.”iv .000. or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk. we proceed to determine whether petitioner was negligent. de Dimaano. no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen. is not always reflective of the real cause to their house rendered the same uninhabitable. which reduced the moral damages awarded below from P1. is conduct which naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. it bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence causative of his injury or loss. Reyna. After the typhoon had passed. Engr. such as an armed invasion. attack by bandits. fires. Buffeted by very strong winds.116. such as earthquakes. Thus. plus costs.00. And so they sought to recover from petitioner P117. guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs.torts & damages PURISIMA. are binding and conclusive upon this Court.v[17] or the omission to do something which a prudent and reasonable man. floods. an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or viewing. there are other steel bars which were not even bent to the trusses. the person seeking exoneration from liability must not be guilty of negligence. From these premises.In their Complaintii[6] before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. When the effect is found to be partly the result of the participation of man – whether it be from active intervention. petitioner averred that subject school building had withstood several devastating typhoons and other calamities in the past. limbs and property of persons living in the vicinity. precaution.” Civilist Arturo M. notwithstanding the general rule that factual findings by the trial court.” the fourth floor of subject school building be declared as a “structural hazard. absent any negligence on its part. were inevitable. Branch 117. we find exception to this rule and hold that the lower courts misappreciated the evidence proffered.In its Answer. Tolentino adds that “[f]ortuitous events may be produced by two general causes: (1) by nature. As the term imparts.The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the Partidas which defines it as “an event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. This conclusion finds support in Article 1174 of the Civil Code. this appeal. this Court believes otherwise.vi[19] not merely by presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact. and (2) by the act of man. as follows: “5. July 10.” . Thus. . On October 11. which remained intact after the storm. typhoon “Saling” was “an act of God and therefore beyond human control” such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages wrought thereby.Petitioner cannot be held liable for the damages suffered by the private respondents.”iii[9] Escriche elaborates it as “an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted. ISSUES WON the damage on the roof of the building of private respondents resulting from the impact of the falling portions of the school building’s roof ripped off by the strong winds of typhoon “Saling”. and furthermore. those trusses are not anchored at all to the roof beams.000. there are portions of the roofing. Negligence. . landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents’ house. etc.. at about 6:30 in the morning. the one situated along College Road. et al. Inc. the roof of petitioner’s building was partly ripped off and blown away. while petitioner owns a fourstorey school building along the same College Road. P1. as actual damages.vii[20] What is visual to the eye though. thus.”. After a careful scrutiny of the records and the pleadings submitted by the parties. it is necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned. as commonly understood. or neglect. and Resolution dated September 12. In order to be exempt from liability arising from any adverse consequence engendered thereby.00. within legal contemplation. 6. storms.It then recommended that “to avoid any further loss and damage to lives.000.00 to P200. When a person’s negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to another. though foreseen. or which. faculty members. there should have been no human participation amounting to a negligent act. 1998 NATURE Petition for review seeking to set aside the Decision promulgated on July 31. those located on both ends of the building.000. FACTS . robbery. as moral damages.At the outset. vs. the general formation of the buildings becomes a big funnel-like structure.00.00. Private respondents. . 1996. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. especially when affirmed by the appellate court. Still. Pasay City.After a thorough study and evaluation of the evidence on record. such that if it were not. forcing them to stay temporarily in others’ houses. without its roofing or any portion thereof giving way.00. for and as attorney’s fees.The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the ocular inspection made by the city engineer.Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road. and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. which provides: “Art 1174. Situated in the peripheral lot is an almost U-shaped formation of 4-storey building. was. An act of God . which houses school children.” . etc. or failure to act – the whole occurrence is hereby humanized. the damage caused to private respondents’ house could have been avoided? . 1996 of the Court of Appeals in “Juanita de Jesus vda. that it has not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that said school building. Except in cases expressly specified by the law. Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason for the dislodging of the roofings structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the said trusses to the roof beams. is “in tip-top condition”. with the strong winds having a westerly direction.

and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable of fault under article 1902 only if he had been negligent or at the same code.In a decision of the Spanish SC. including himself. . But the complaint contains no allegation on those points. . it is essential that there be fault or negligence on the part of the defendants as owners of the animal that caused the damage.She uses Art. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause. Obviously.1905. the owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger. who was paid for his work as such. CC.51 5 prof. the death of an employee who was bitten by a feline which his master had asked him to take to his establishment was by said tribunal declared to be “a veritable accident of labor” which should come under the labor laws rather than under article 1905. . 1989 FACTS .Moreover. the son-in law. the city building official. 1967 . Disposition Judgment AFFIRMED. there was a hollow wound. (Nana Belen) went to her store. November 29.strong typhoon "Gening" in Ilocos Norte brought floods and heavy rain. Nor did they conclusively establish that the construction of such building was basically flawed. Loreto Afialda was the caretaker of the carabaos of spouses Hisole. Private respondents did not even show that the plans. although it may escape or be lost.torts & damages behind. passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current.6-6:30AM June 29. and contended that the mishap was due neither to Loreto’s own fault nor to force majeure.In the present case. the appeal. On the left palm of the deceased. 2183. to look after the merchandise to see if they were damaged. .” The action was filed by the sister of Loreto.This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an animal. if action is to be based on Art. If subject school building’s roofing was not firmly anchored to its trusses. November 6. including himself.The distinction (between stranger and caretaker) is important. two girls (sales girlls) attempted to help. but were afraid because they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had 5 ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY V CA (LUIS ET AL) 179 SCRA 5 PARAS. is liable for any damages it may cause. Juan suddenly screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. . CC (now Art. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. . 1967. admitted in open court that no complaint regarding any defect on the same structure has ever been lodged before his office prior to the institution of the case at bench. Neither did they prove any substantial deviation from the approved plans and specifications. . Yabes. but under Art.4AM June 29.” .The lower court took the view that under the abovequoted provision of the CC. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.Engr. the dangling wire was no longer there. Her companions.In the present case.Engineer Juan. upon hearing the electrocution of his mother-in-law. casis voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences. Reasoning . who has been in the city government service since 1974. Isabel Lao Juan. which the CFI granted. Power Plant Engineer of NPC at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant. he could not see any INELCO lineman. Rigor mortis was setting in.6AM June 29. .1905.” . A2010 . “This liability shall cease only in case the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it. however. It is a matter of judicial notice that typhoons are common occurrences in this country. Wading in waist-deep flood.Claiming that the lower court was in error. one who hears a gunshot and then sees a wounded person. 1905 does not distinguish between damage caused to a stranger and damage caused to the caretaker and makes the owner liable whether or not he has been negligent or at fault. NO Ratio It was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone. 1902.2183 ) as ground for the liability: “The possessor of an animal. it could not have withstood long years and several typhoons even stronger than “Saling. ISSUE WON the owner of the animal is liable when the damage is caused to its caretaker (as opposed to a stranger) HELD 1. is not brought under labor laws in effect. noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or shortcircuited lines. . Juan attempted to resuscitate Nana Belen but his efforts proved futile. even if such animal should escape from him or stray away. . plaintiff contends that art. . specifications and design of said school building were deficient and defective.On the other hand. he was “gored by one of them and later died as consequence of his injuries. . cannot always definitely conclude that a third person shot the victim.he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection and saw grounded and disconnected lines. Five Sisters Emporium. other than the said ocular inspection. It could have been self-inflicted or caused accidentally by a stray bullet. AFIALDA V HISOLE 85 Phil 67 REYES. For the statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for “any damages it may cause” and this for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage. it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone. The body was recovered about two meters from an electric post.5. We thus hold that petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon “Saling” was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents’ house.Spouses moved for dismissal for lack of cause of action.In light of the foregoing. we find no clear and convincing evidence to sustain the judgment of the appellate court. or the one who uses the same. When he went to INELCO office. Art. 1967. While tending the animals. cited by Manresa. 1949 NATURE Appeal from judgment of CFI Iloilo FACTS . Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the ground. In the afternoon. obviously. no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of petitioner’s school building. The present action. Hence. The relationship of cause and effect must be clearly shown. For instance. the animal was in the custody and under the control of the caretaker.

was faced with an impending loss.000 attys fees .000 as average annual income of the deceased. was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to INELCO’s consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise.229. 2180. About the base of the thumb on the left hand was a burned wound. On the left palm. it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. shall We punish her for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not.52 - prof. evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions. 1967. The switch must have been left on. Clearly.229.INELCO can be exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. . the doctor found an "electrically charged wound" or a first degree burn. Hence. . (2) The service lines and devices had been newly-installed prior to the date in question. casis RAMOS V PEPSI COLA 19 SCRA 289 1967 NATURE Appeal from a CA decision FACTS .000 moral damages. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be" The negligence of petitioner having been shown. which sought to prove that (1) on and even before June 29. . Furthermore.torts & damages . It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon.CA: P30. a finding that Bonifacio was in fact negligent. the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger.. however. … The responsibility treated of this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." As such. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury. may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by INELCO’s negligence Reasoning . even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.The petiton for appeal questioned the testimony of one Anasco with regard the process and procedures followed by Pepsi in the hiring and supervision of its drivers. On the contrary. the deceased.INELCO was negligent in seeing that no harm is done to the general public". ISSUE WON Pepsi Cola is liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability HELD NO . causing the deceased's electrocution when she tried to open her gate that early morning of June 29. the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission" Disposition CA decision. The SC ruled that the issue brought before it with regard the credibility of Anasco is one of fact and not of law.45 in actual damages (i. 1967 . which indicated death by electrocution.CFI: awarded P25.000 in exemplary damages.000 for the victim's death and P18. thus. INELCO presented the testimonies of its officers and employees. the deceased went to the Five Star Emporium "to see to it that the goods were not flooded. P45. . (5) They also presented own medical expert and said that cyanosis could not have been the noted 3 hours after the death because it is only manifest in live persons. that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences. (3) Also. Reasoning . (6) Lastly. typhoons. subtle and deadly. The cause of' death was . the court citing its ruling on Bahia as follows: “ From this article (2180) two things are apparent: (1) that when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arise a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the employer or master either n the selection of the servant or employee.e. a source of her livelihood. For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule. or both. private respondents. except for the slight modification that actual damages be increased to P48. The Court limited its ruling on the decision of the CA to absolve defendant Pepsi Cola from liability under Article 21806 of the Civil Code. Pepsi Cola exercised the due diligence of a good father in the hiring and supervision of its drivers. is AFFIRMED. or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property.. P3. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible. and 6 the salesgirls. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place. or in the supervision over him after the selection.45 for funeral expenses). As testified by A2010 . 1967 the electric service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area did not suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life and property. considering that electricity is an agency. It went on to stay that the CA is a better judge of the facts.The facts with regard the accident that Andres Bonifacio caused is not in the case. nor even manning its office. Art. The evidence does not show that defendant did that. an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property. if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril.In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag City on the night of June 28 until the early hours of June 29. P50.45.'circulatory shock electrocution" .. charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on. (4) 12 linesmen are charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the areas respectively assigned to them. computed in accordance with the formula set in the Villa-Rey Transit case (31 SCRA 511) with the base of P15. as heirs. P12.In defense and exculpation. Castro examined the body and noted that the skin was grayish or cyanotic. P10. hence. the deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and not to INELCO because of the installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting. it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. … Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.000 attorney's fees ISSUE WON the legal principle of "assumption of risk" bars private respondents from collecting damages from INELCO HELD NO Ratio The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar.000 in compensatory damages. There was.In its ruling.229. safety devices were installed to prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural calamities such as floods. at the time the fatal incident occurred.The Court ruled that based on the evidence and testimonies presented during the trial. the Company is relieved of any responsibility from the accident.Dr. fire and others. This being the case. extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

In terms of the aspect of supervision.A complaint for damages was filed by herein private respondent. . As a consequence. of the Civil Code provisions on quasi-delicts as all the elements thereof are present.Petitioner's attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of employees . In making proof in its or his case. she was confined for twenty-four (24) days. . . Further.It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family. and that it was defendant Lamayo. the proof called for under Article 2180 to show diligence of a good father of a family has been met. The collision impact caused plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio to hit the front windshield of the passenger jeepney and (she) was thrown out therefrom. Bicutan. the owner of the jeepney and employer of driver Calebag. contrarily averred in its answer with cross-claim and counterclaim that the MMTC bus was driven in a prudent and careful manner by driver Leonardo and that it was the passenger jeepney which was driven recklessly considering that it hit the left middle portion of the MMTC bus. and Christian Bautista. both of whom naturally and expectedly testified for MMTC. who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of presenting at the trial such amount of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable judgment.Defendant Victorino Lamayo alleged that the damages suffered by therein plaintiff should be borne by defendants MMTC and its driver. (2) fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond. While there is no rule which requires that testimonial evidence.Said defendants denied all the material allegations in the complaint and pointed an accusing finger at each other as being the party at fault. WON petitioner exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees HELD 1. along with its driver. provided only that the same shall measure up to the quantum of evidence required by law.Their statements strike us as both presumptuous and in the nature of petitio principii. as its training officer. is more often honored in the breach than in the observance. which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony. bound for her work. . must be corroborated by documentary evidence. Godofredo Leonardo. . to present all available evidence at its or his disposal in the manner which may be deemed necessary and beneficial to prove its or his position.It is procedurally required for each party in a case to prove his own affirmative assertion by the degree of evidence required by law. we cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there was observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. and consequently may be rebutted . and for failure to submit all evidence within its control. plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio boarded as a paying passenger a public utility jeepney. who being then a minor was assisted by her parents. where she then worked as a machine operator earning P16. the petitioners raised no questions. and (3) the connection of cause and effect between fault or negligence of the defendant and the METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORP V CA (CUSTODIA) 223 SCRA 521 REGALADO. then driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his codefendant Victorino Lamayo. A background check was done and he was required to submit various clearances. .As both vehicles approached the intersection of DBP Avenue and Honeydew Road they failed to slow down and slacken their speed. June 21. .At about six o'clock in the morning of August 28. and that said positive testimonies spell out the rigid procedure for screening of job applicants and the supervision of its employees in the field 2. the passenger jeepney ramming the left side portion of the MMTC bus. . petitioner MMTC must suffer the consequences of its own inaction and indifference. object or documentary.While the jeepney was travelling at a fast clip along DBP Avenue. which for an employer doctrinally translates into its observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees but which mandate. to hold sway. .The case at bar is clearly within the coverage of Article 2176 and 2177. Taguig.Whether or not the diligence of a good father of a family has been observed by petitioner is a matter of proof which under the circumstances in the case at bar has not been clearly established. the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. Given this. It is entirely within each of the parties discretion. because the latter's negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the accident and that MMTC failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. . another fast moving vehicle. Taguig. a collision between them occurred. falling onto the pavement unconscious with serious physical injuries. a Metro Manila Transit Corp. to use an oft-quoted phrase. casis through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence. tests and examinations preparatory to actual employment. it is paramount that the best and most complete evidence be formally entered. He was also made to undergo both theoretical and practical driving tests prior to being hired as driver.53 - prof. 2. she was unable to work for three and one half months (31/2). A2010 . couched in generalities and shorn of any supporting evidence to boost their verity.It was shown in this case that Pesi Cola did not merely satisfy itself that Bonifacio possessed a driver’s license. Godofredo Leonardo. as its transport supervisor. It is not felt by the Court that there is enough evidence on record as would overturn the presumption of negligence. through the testimonies of Milagros Garbo. and medical records. assuming the putative existence thereof. ISSUES 1. In any event. 1979. . Bicutan.Petitioner attempted to essay in detail the company's procedure for screening job applicants and supervising its employees in the field. (MMTC) bus driven by defendant Godofredo C.25 a day. a government-owned corporation and one of the defendants in the court a quo.torts & damages (2) that they presumption is juris tantum ( so much or so little of law) and not juris et de jure (of law and from law). The party. consonant with the theory of the case it or he seeks to advance and subject to such procedural strategy followed thereby. whether plaintiff or defendant. 1993 FACTS . we do not find the evidence presented by petitioner sufficiently convincing to prove the diligence of a good father of a family. inasmuch as the witnesses' testimonies dwelt on mere generalities. prove that driver Leonardo had complied with all the hiring and clearance requirements and had undergone all trainings. neither did they blow their horns to warn approaching vehicles. in relation to Article 2180. against all of therein named defendants following their refusal to pay the expenses incurred by the former as a result of the collision. previous experience. .She was brought to the Medical City Hospital where she regained consciousness only after one (1) week. or even subject evidence for that matter. herein petitioner MMTC. . Disposition Decision of the CA is affirmed. . Thereat. who failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees and should thus be held solidarily liable for damages caused to the MMTC bus through the fault and negligence of its employees. Leonardo was negotiating Honeydew Road. to wit: (1) damages suffered by the plaintiff. and as a consequence. WON the oral testimonies of witnesses even without the presentation documentary evidence. Metro Manila bound for its terminal at Bicutan.

The collision occurred on April 8.. Disposition petition is dismissed. that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages. . the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel. diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. the date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final.that maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with special skill. there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent. . the basis of the liability being the relationship of pater familias or on the employer's own negligence.In Espanol vs. was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila.. 1989 FACTS . Thus. . interest as a part of the damages may be awarded in the discretion of the court. casis four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the said date. 1982. namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created. the plaintiff must show. .Finally. and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff . KRAMER VS CA (TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES) 178 SCRA 289 GANCAYCO. the latter has the burden of proving that it has been A2010 . the M/V Asia Philippines owned byTrans-Asia Shipping Lines. an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. 1976 when the maritime collision took place. to hold the employer liable. without requiring the payment of interest thereon as an item of damages just because of delay in the determination thereof. which consists of 3 elements. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago. It is only then that the defendant. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer. the F/B Marjolea sank. October 13. As a consequence of the collision. From the foregoing ruling. b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right. although it is not necessary that the employer be engaged in business or industry. from April 8. taking with it its fish catch. October 13.With the allegation and subsequent proof of negligence against the defendant driver and of an employer-employee relation between him and his codefendant MMTC in this instance. . Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners. It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of 2 vessels the 4 year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. this Court ruled that in an action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks.. training and experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve . it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. a fishing boat owned by Ernesto Kramer. Chairman.Due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. and not as a matter of right. especially since private respondent did not specifically pray therefor in her complaint.Article 2180 applicable only where there is an employer-employee relationship.that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued only on April 29.e. the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years. it is necessary first to establish the employment relationship. 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period. may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. Once this is done. the case in undoubtedly based on a quasi-delict under Article 2180. Trans-Asia filed a motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription. was beyond the 4 year prescriptive period.The F/B Marjolea. When the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties. that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. Sarabia. 1 985. The Kramers instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent before Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City. But. 1989 . Article 2211 of the Civil Code provides that in quasi-delicts. . we believe that respondent court acted in the exercise of sound discretion when it affirmed the trial court's award. The complaint for damages was filed in court only on May 30. the action being based on a quasidelict. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. In Paulan vs. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action accrued. Petitioner’s claim: . the employer is likewise responsible for damages.torts & damages damages incurred by plaintiff. as employer. it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place. this Court held: The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action. agents or personnel of the other vessel.Under A1146 CC. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen. It is to be noted that petitioner was originally sued as employer of driver Leonardo under Article 2180. Philippine Veterans Administration. 1976. and that accordingly. The diligence of a good father of a family required to be observed by employers to prevent damages under Article 2180 refers to due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees in order to protect the public. Jr. that is. Inc. He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code. the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff. and that the ALLIED BANKING V CA (YUJUICO) 178 SCRA 526 GANCAYCO.54 - prof. rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family.In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible. i. ISSUE WON a Complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by presciption HELD YES . and Marta Kramer.The Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was due to the negligence of the employees of Trans-Asia. For failure to rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of employees. . which is the time when the cause of action arises. the Complaint filed on May 30. Employer is liable for torts committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned tasks. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry.

While these allegations in the proposed third-party CAUSATION BATACLAN V MEDINA 102 PHIL 181 MONTEMAYOR. Domingo D. separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint. he was prevented from performing his obligation such that he should not be held liable thereon. There is merit in private respondent's position that if held liable on the promissory note. rendered a decision nullifying the RTC order. may be brought into the case with leave of court. ISSUE 1. . . in a petition for certiorari questioning the denied motions.First case: CA affirmed RTC decision in a special proceeding finding that the liquidation of GENBANK was made in bad faith. Panis. Private respondent issued a promissory note in favor of GENBANK. It was followed by another resolution ordering the liquidation of GENBANK. it must be deemed to have been instituted on February 7.The tests to determine whether the claim for indemnity in a third-party claim is "in respect of plaintiff 's claim" are: (a) whether it arises out of the same transaction on which the plaintiff's claim is based. . YES . . petitioner maintains that the claim should have been filed at the latest on March 25. can be accommodated under tests (a) and (b) abovementioned. . it was the claim of third-party plaintiff for other damages in addition to any amount which he may be called upon to pay under the original complaint. .CA. by means of the third-party complaint. The complaint alleged that by reason of the tortuous interference by the CB with the affairs of GENBANK. or whether the third-party's claim. October 22.It is from the date of the act or omission violative of the right of a party when the cause of action arises and it is from this date that the prescriptive period must be reckoned. Chairman. indemnity. Philippine Veterans Admistration) . It was then that Yujuico filed the third party complaint to transfer liability for the default imputed against him by the petitioner to the proposed third-party7 defendants because of their tortious acts which prevented him from performing his obligations.torts & damages NATURE Petition seeking the reversal of the decision of CA in "Joselito Z.March 25.. . including the receivable due from Yujuico. to transfer unto the third-party defendants liability on the note by reason of the illegal liquidation of GENBANK which was the basis for the assignment of the promissory note. (Capayas v CFI Albay) The claim of third-party plaintiff.Respondent Yujuico. since the cause of action accrued on March 25. . Yujuico vs. 1987.The judgment of the CA in its first decision is the substantive basis of private respondent's proposed third-party complaint. in respect of the plaintiffs claim. a ranking officer in General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) and a member of the family owning control of the said bank.While the third party complaint in this case may be admitted as above discussed. 1977 – the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued a resolution forbidding GENBANK from doing business in the Phil. by the defendant. who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such thirdparty defendant a right for contribution. casis complaint may cause delay in the disposition of the main suit. Allied acquired all the assets and assumed the liabilityies of GENBANK. subrogation or any other relief. RTC Judge of Manila and Allied Banking Corp.55 - prof. On the theory that the cause of action accrued on March 25. it cannot be outrightly asserted that it would not serve any purpose. private respondent herein. or may have against plaintiffs claim. RTC Judge Mintu denied the third-party complaint but admitted the amended/supplemental answer. which were both denied. Both parties filed for motions of partial reconsideration. . 1977 . WON the cause of action under the third-party complaint prescribed HELD 1. (Español vs. consequently. The RTC judge was found to be in grave abuse of discretion and was ordered to admit the third-party complaint. 1979 when the complaint in the case was filed. 1981. WON there was ground to admit the third-party complaint 2. the date when the Monetary Board ordered GENBANK to desist from doing business in the Philippines.1986 when the decision in CA (first case)became final and executory. 1980 when the Monetary Board ordered the GENBANK to desist from doing business in the Philippines while the third party complaint was filed only on June 17. YES . On the other hand.Mar 25.1987. the action has prescribed. It is contended that while the third party complaint was filed only on June 17. and another judgment is hereby rendered sustaining the orders of the RTC denying the admission of the third party complaint made by Judge Mintu. Being founded on what was termed as "tortious interference. Disposition petition is GRANTED. 2. . FACTS . is connected with the plaintiffs claim.The first instance is allowable and should be allowed if it will help in clarifying in a single proceeding the multifarious issues involved arising from a single transaction. Hon. This decision declared as null and void the liquidation of GENBANK. The third party complaint should not be admitted. 1957 FACTS A third-party complaint is a procedural device whereby a "third-party" who is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff." petitioner asserts that under the CC on quasi-delict" the action against third-party defendants should have been filed within four (4) years from the date the cause of action accrued."1 and the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said decision. 1977. obtained a loan from the said institution in the amount of 500K.Petitioner claims that the cause of action alleged in the third-party complaint has already prescribed. private respondent relies on the "Doctrine of Relations" or "Relations Back Doctrine" to support his claim that the cause of action as against the proposed third-party defendant accrued only on December 12. although arising out of another or different contract or transaction. they are seeking. . although the third-party defendant's liability arises out of another transaction.Second and current proceeding (1987) – Yujuico filed a motion to admit Ammended/Supplemental Answer and a Third Party Complaint to impead the Central Bank and Aurellano as third-party defendants. The decision of CA denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner are hereby reversed and set aside and declared null and void. (b) whether the third-party defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant. or (c) whether the third-party defendant may assert any defense which the third-party plaintiff has. The third party complaint is independent of.The action for damages instituted by private respondent arising from the quasidelict or alleged "tortious interference" should be filed within four 4 years from the day the cause of action accrued. The case was reraffled where presiding Judge Panis reiterated the order 7 A2010 .In the Memorandum of Agreement between Allied Banking Corp (Allied) and Amulfo Aurellano as liquidator of GENBANK.Yujuico failed to comply with his obligation prompting Allied to file a complaint for the collection of a sum of money before the CFI Manila (now RTC). If there was any confusion at all on the ground/s alleged in the thirdparty complaint.

the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier. we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus. and even then no reports of casualties from gas poising emerged. one of the front tires burst. that at the time the fire started. Four passengers could not get out. this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled. Bataclan. the CA rendered an amended decision granting Davao City’s MFR. The City Engineer’s office. What is more. ISSUES What is the proximate cause of death of the four passengers? HELD The proximate cause of death is the overturning of the bus. "If through some event. one of the bidders. produces the injury. 2. Upon learning from the market master about the need to clean said tank. Bertulano. burning the four passengers trapped inside. It appeared that gasoline began to leak from the overturned bus. WON Davao City is guilty of negligence 2. Their lungs had burst due to their intake of toxic sulfide gas produced from the waste matter in said tank. the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. the overturned bus is set on fire.Petitioners in fussing over the lack of ventilation in the tanks backfired as their witnesses were no experts. To be entitled to damages. -(I guess this case says. Neither did they present competent evidence to corroborate their testimonies and rebut the city government engineer Alindada’s testimony that safety requirements for the tank had been complied with. including Bataclan. . . In fact. WON such negligence is the proximate cause of the deaths of the victims HELD 1. Hence this petition. that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help. it immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service. by the driver and the conductor themselves. which was won by Bascon. and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. when a passenger bus overturns. In other words. market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property for the re-emptying of the septic tank of Agdao. though he must have suffered physical injuries. casis compensatory damages. But in the present case and under the circumstances obtaining in the same. A2010 . one must prove under Art 2179 of the NCC that the defendant’s negligence was the the coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus.Petitioner’s contention that the market master should have been supervising the area of the tank is also untenable. by lightning. According to the witnesses. including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it. 30 of the Medina Transportation. or at least. they are not nuisances per se which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public. granting the families of the deceased men P30k each in . perhaps serious. dismissing the case. . The only indication that the tank was full was when water began to leak. May 8. this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on 'Its side but completely on its back. say. they had to use a torch. However. *Di nakalagay sa case.The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus. unexpected and extraordinary. and all those people have remained unscathed which is ironically evidenced by the petitioner’s witnesses. made not only by the passengers. specially over a large area. the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth.It may be that ordinarily. Invitations to bid for cleaning out the tanks were issued.Proximate cause is defined as that cause which in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected. As defined in Art 694 of the NCC. but most probably. but for the physical injuries suffered by him. petitioners appealed to then IAC (now CA) which set aside the judgment and rendered a new one. the public toilet connected to it was used several times daily all those years. the fire that burned the bus. P20k each as moral damages and P10k for attorney’s fees.Bibiano Morta. the most handy and available. a fierce fire started. and four other companions including an Alberto Fernando were found dead inside the septic tank. . if not for the overturning of the bus… then the leak and the fire wouldn’t have happened) FERNANDO V CA (City of Davao) 208 SCRA 714 MEDIALDEA. can be smelt and detected -even from a distance.The Court also does not agree with petitioner’s contention that warning signs of noxious gas should be placed around the area of the toilets and septic tank. . merely causing him physical injuries. ISSUES 1. gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus.Both parties filed their separate MFRs. shortly after midnight.Although public respondent had been remiss in its duty to re-empty the tank annually (for almost 20 years). 1992 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . pero mukhang kinasuhan ni Sofia Fernando yung Davao City for negligence in a previous case dahil namatay yung asawa nya . While the bus was running very fast on a highway. there was nothing to supervise. the rescuers had to carry a light with them. NO . through its driver and its conductor. and pins down a passenger. not for his death.torts & damages . and so damages were awarded. upon investigation. and without which the result would not have occurred. and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. Work on the tank was still forthcoming since the awarding to the winning bidder was yet to be made by the Committee on Awards—hence. and the passenger is burned to death. found that the men entered without clearance or consent of the market master. one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. such negligence was not a continuing one. They. The bus fell into a canal and turned turtle.Upon dismissal of the case by the TC. NO . driven by Saylon.Juan Bataclan rode Bus No.56 - prof. the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was. .see definition of proximate cause under A1 . public respondent’s failure to empty the tank had not caused any sanitary accidents despite its proximity to several homes and the public market as it was covered in lead and was air-tight. was still alive. They apparently did the re-emptying as the tank was nearly empty. and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available. Also. before the date they were to work. Ten men came to help. but rather. and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning). or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire. Public respondent lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet the situation. The autopsy showed that the victims died of asphyxia caused by lack of oxygen supply in the body. One of them carried a torch and when he approached the bus.

independent of it. In the vast majority. however. ISSUE WON there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death HELD YES. .torts & damages proximate cause of the injury. he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill required in what he attempts to do. which was the 22nd day after the incident. ranges from 2 to 56 days. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation URBANO V IAC 157 SCRA 1 GUTIERREZ JR. dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present. . as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person. which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists. This was especially true for the victim. When admitted to the hospital.. On November 15. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery. The evidence merely confirms that the wound. 1980. The victims’ failure to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident.The record is clear that . between the event itself. most muscles are involved to some degree. 1988 NATURE Petition to review the decision of the then IAC FACTS ON oct. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. and headache are encountered occasionally.. and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. but contributing to his own proper hurt. . a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. which states that a distinction must be made between the accident and the injury. He states that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence. . and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs. which. stiffness gives way to rigidity.When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill. Trismus is usually present. Marcelo Javier was hacked by the Filomeno Urbano using a bolo. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time. January 7. The lower courts held that Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and .57 - prof. . trismus is marked. minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency.PROXIMATE CAUSE "that cause. As more muscles are involved. . rigidity becomes generalized. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. i. but ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. . As a result of which. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. that Dr. 23. Disposition amended decision of the CA is AFFIRMED A2010 . They find it illogical that the septic tank which had been around since the 50’s would be the proximate cause of an accident which occurred only 20 years later. Dr. and that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November.. The accident is thus of the victims’ own doing—an ordinarily prudent person should be aware of the attended risks of cleaning out the tank.A toxic gas leakage could only have happened by opening the tank’s cover.Appellant alleges that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed. somehow got infected with tetanus However. but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw. A short incubation period indicates severe disease. the victims would not have died. Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City. On November 14. As the CA observed. 1980."And more comprehensively. As in the case of the incubation period. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom. or back and difficulty swallowing." . since he was an old hand to septic services and is expected to know the hazards of the job. Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition. . Bertulano. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable.The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. In fact. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. and those acts of the victim not entering into it.The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended . under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. 1980. especially since no other deaths or injuries related to the tank had ever occurred. in natural and continuous sequence. abdomen. but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Javier died in the hospital.Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness. . In a small proportion of patients." . an interval referred to as the onset time. and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. A test for such a relationship is given in Taylor v Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. As the progresses.The then IAC affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal. only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected. which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment. irritability. Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days. the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms.e. and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent. However. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. produces the injury. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death. He was sentenced accordingly. 1981. had they not opened the tank which they were not authorized to open in the first place. either immediately or by setting other events in motion. casis probable result of the cause which first acted. without which there could have been no accident.The trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury.In an information.The incubation period of tetanus. as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm. and without which the result would not have occurred. . As the disease progresses.

lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. Makati) from cocktails/dinner meeting with his boss where he had taken “a shot or two” of liquor. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause. none was found with Dionisio. WON the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked a. DIONISIO suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars. medically speaking. with the permission of his employer PHOENIX. Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. WON Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before the collision with the dump truck. MARCH 10. 1983 Edition. Although Dionisio offered a certification attesting that he did have a valid curfew pass. .. and efficient cause of the injury. . Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death. After 22 days.Doubts are present. TC: in favor of Dionisio. . Leonardo Dionisio (DIONISIO) was driving home (he lived in Bangkal. that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening. the onset time should have been more than six days. (It is important to determine if he had a curfew pass to shed light to the 2nd and 3rd factual issues) -Testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who had taken DIONISIO to Makati Med testified that none was found with Dionisio. he died. generalized convulsive spasms. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide.torts & damages time. WON Phoenix has successfully proven that they exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver 7. Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. the happened but for such condition or occasion. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine. its regular driver. the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time. The infection was. such condition was not the proximate cause. if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct. The dump truck was parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the street. while under the influence of liquor. WON Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights before contact with the dump truck 4. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction. He was not able to produce any curfew pass during the trial. or on November 14. awarded damages in favor of Dionisio IAC: in favor of Dionisio. therefore. (PHOENIX). Therefore." and that consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel b. like lockjaw and muscle spasms. for failure to take necessary precautions. Consequently. such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause DISPOSITION :. died on the second day from the onset time. reduced the damages awarded ISSUES Factual issues: (court discussed this to administer substantial justice without remanding the case to the lower court – since both TC and IAC did not consider defenses set by petitioners) 1. he suffered the symptoms of tetanus. with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. distinct and foreign to the crime. The medical findings. or less. without his headlights on and . Emphasis supplied) Therefore. IAC (DIONISIO) 148 SCRA 353 FELICIANO. (CARBONEL) VS. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant. Substantial Issues: 5. front or rear. As a result of the collision. his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. WON the court. the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease. however. He had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Sts. If. should hold Dionisio alone responsible for his accident 6. This incident took place on October 23. 3. partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. Carbonel (CARBONEL). NO. even though such injury would not have A2010 . which was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (DIONISIO’s lane). severe trismus. successive. efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition. 1980. WON Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident. casis without a curfew pass. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection.A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible. and an onset time of 72 hrs. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct.In the case at bar. natural. DIONISIO claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. November 15. DIONISIO’s claim: the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix PHOENIX + CARBONEL’s claim: the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident. the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. FACTS -About 1:30 am. therefore. in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning. and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. WON the driver’s negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause. unrelated. At Bangkal. if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked. dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck. 1980. based on the “last clear chance” doctrine. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION. 1980. WON the amount of damages awarded should be modified HELD FACTUAL 1. WON private respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful night 2.58 - prof. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. pp. The following day. 1004-1005. Makati (not far from his home) and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street without headlights when he hit a dump truck owned by Phoenix Construction Inc. 1987 NATURE Petition for review INC. Javier. however. it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound.

Testimony of Patrolman Cuyno attesting that people gathered at the scene of the accident told him that Dionisio’s Car was MOVING FAST and that he DID NOT have its HEADLIGTS ON. substantial weight should have been ascribed to such testimony.torts & damages certification did not specify any serial number or date or period of effectivity of the supposed curfew pass. at the crucial moment. YES. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated. the common law last clear chance . and some new force intervenes. if any. and not the result of reflective thought. it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car. and therefore to take precautions to prevent that event. among other reasons. and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it --" EVIDENCE PRESENTED: Patrolman Cuyno attested that Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken to Makati med + Dionisio admitted he had taken “a shot or two” . have purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at which Dionisio was travelling just before impact with the Phoenix dump truck. He also asserts that Patrolman Cuyno’s testimony was hearsay and did not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule since the facts he testified to were not acquired by him through official information and had not been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so. YES. the defendant will not escape responsibility. it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety. PROSSER AND KEETON: "Cause and condition. because of failure to guard against it. Besides. Phoenix’s theory more credible than Dionisio’s. the distinctions between" cause" and "condition" have already been "almost entirely discredited. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump track was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause. 2.59 - prof. But even in such cases.the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as part of the res gestae and should have been considered by the trial court. Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to anticipate the usual weather of the vicinity. -BUT: an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a stationary object in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous. or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason Thus one who sets a fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary. x x x. as it could not. DIONISIO’S CLAIM: he had his headlights on but that. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions. but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited So far as it has any validity at all. it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important. YES. and hence of the defendant's negligence. even though it did not." that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts a. rather than reflective. including all ordinary forces of nature such as usual wind or rain." but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. "One shot or two" of hard liquor may affect different people differently. The petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created. to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is a matter for debate whether." "Foreseeable Intervening Causes. Accordingly. as it were. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of the original risk. in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result. FROM PROF. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition. it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations. Ratio. A2010 . nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned. and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created. the defendant may be negligent. Private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno is admissible not under the official records exception to the hearsay rule but rather as part of the res gestae. or snow or frost or fog or even lightning. one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who falls b. the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident. Dionisio's negligence. Clearly. When a spark ignites the gasoline. particularly since. 3. or to what extent. . Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. usual and customary wind arising later will spread it beyond the defendant's own property.not enough evidence to show how much liquor Dionisio had in fact taken and the effects of that upon his physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. -Dionisio claimed that he was traveling at 30kph and had just crossed the intersection of General Santos and General Lacuna Streets and had started to accelerate when his headlights failed just before the collision took place. reactions from observers who happened to be around at that time. Testimonial evidence under this exception to the hearsay rule consists of excited utterances made on the occasion of an occurrence or event sufficiently startling in nature so as to render inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of the observer and hence made as a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event. SUBSTANTIAL 5. x x x In all of these cases there is an intervening cause combining with the defendant's conduct to produce the result and in each case the defendant's negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk. and therefore to be anticipated. NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE ANYTHING. the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark. NO. NO. the defendant is said not to be liable. The person who leaves the combustible or explosive material exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of fire from some independent source. casis into it a month afterward. that one who leaves an obstruction on the road or a railroad track should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into it. Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk. was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. this argument had no validity under our jurisdiction and even in the United States.' Thus. although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck PHOENIX’s CLAIM: Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection (less than 200m away). these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off. 4. even though the car is negligently driven. as is invariably the case the latter am the result of other active forces which have gone before. although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident. or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances. The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of others. it is difficult to see what role. x x x [T]he standard of reasonable conduct may require the defendant to protect the plaintiff against 'that occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life.

Definition of Proximate Cause: "any cause which. posted the deposit in the latter's account not noticing that the depositor's surname in the deposit slip was REYES. PILIPINAS BANK V CA (REYES) 234 SCRA 435 PUNO. it must be established that private respondent's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. Jr.43.On Oct. the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care. casis NO . Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. Dispositive Petition denied. 2179. even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. P100T moral damages. . 1979 and for Vicente TUI in amount of P11.For it to apply. he cannot recover damages.. Costs against the petitioners. -In short.12 check. The payee then demanded a cash payment of the check’s face value which REYES did if only to save his name. Ramir Tiamzon.500. .60 - prof. SO ORDERED. 7. QUEZON CITY V DACARA PANGANIBAN.FLORENCIO REYES issued two postdated checks.. 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court. the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by reducing the A2010 . RTC: ordered petitioner to pay P200T compensatory damages.PILIPINAS BANK’S Current Account Bookkeeper made an error in depositing the amount: he thought it was for a certain FLORENCIO AMADOR.11. Jr. That was only when they noticed the error.078.To cover the face value of the checks.00 as attorney's fees and costs. for and in behalf of his minor son.Furious. the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. aggregate amount of compensatory damages. 6. ISSUE WON Art. yielded negative results. Since the ledger of Florencio REYES indicated that his account had only a balance of P4. thus. the plaintiff may recover damages.12. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. . NO. which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. in amount of P21T due Oct. Dacara. He. P25T attorney’s fees. produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury complained of or some similar injury. in natural and continuous sequence. . YES. -As a result. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. Jr. filed a Complaint for damages against Quezon City and Engr.It was redeposited but was again dishonored. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises. July 25.Petition for review of CA decision FACTS . he requested PCIB Money Shop's manager to effect the withdrawal of P32T from his savings account and have it deposited with his current account with PILIPINAS BANK. only the balance of 800% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarily liable therefor to the former. JUNE 15. sustain. Taking into account the comparative negligence ot DIONISIO and the petitioners. Quezon City. has itself been rejected. which however. Dacara. CA: modified amount to just P50T moral damages and P25T attorney’s fees and costs of suit. -Fulgencio P. except the award of P10.10. -Indemnification was sought from the city government. -The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions. shall be home by private respondent Dionisio. the Oct. The same thing happened to the Oct.torts & damages doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff. and that the reason why Fulgencio Dacara. 2005 NATURE Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS -On February 28. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. 1994 NATURE .4T due Oct. As to the other awards of damages. but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.10 check in favor of WINNER INDUSTRIAL was presented for payment. rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St. loss of expected income and moral damages private respondent Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount. These are for WINNER INDUSTRIAL CORP.00 as exemplary damages and P4.21798 of NCC is applicable HELD 8 Art. -Defendants admitted the occurrence of the incident but alleged that the subject diggings was provided with a mound of soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or after it which was visible during the incident. . it was dishonored and the payee was advised to try it for next clearing. ON LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE: The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule-that of contributory negligence..The bank employee is deemed to have failed to exercise the degree of care required in the performance of his duties. But if his negligence was only contributory. he immediately proceeded to the bank and urged an immediate verification of his account. .M. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its track driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning. as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.000. is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix. would result therefrom as a natural and probable consequence. Fulgencio Dacara." Reasoning The proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of petitioner's employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit of private respondent in the name of another depositor who had a similar first name. 1988 at about 1:00 A. owner of ’87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be home exclusively by the petitioners. while driving the said vehicle. Disposition. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth. The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent. fell into the diggings was precisely . is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. as well as costs of suit. defendants claimed that they exercised due care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident. WHEREFORE.

Yes. fright.00 as exemplary damages. absent any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment by the lower courts or an ample showing that they lacked any basis for their conclusions.000. moral shock. Thus. This speed was allegedly well above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on “city streets with light traffic. mental anguish. -“The provisions of Article 21899 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case. -RTC ruled in favor of Dacara. -Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. It is evident from the records that they brought up for the first time in their Motion for Reconsideration. respondent sufficiently proved before the courts a quo that petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the incident. -These matters were. CA agreed with the RTC’s finding that petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by respondent. P5. -Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for quasi-delicts. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision is tantamount to negligence which renders the City government liable -Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. mental anguish. . public buildings.000. The award of these sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed.’s bare assertion of physical injury.000. and that they must have nevertheless been indifferent (or worse) to the danger of injury to the person or property of others. was driving at the speed of 60 kilometers per hour (kph) when he met the accident. how then could it be explained that according to the report even of the policeman. -Hence. No. social humiliation. -That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the accident was aptly discussed in the lower court’s finding: “Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of February 28. WON exemplary damages and attorney’s fees are recoverable HELD 1. -Moral damages are not punitive in nature. serious anxiety.00 as moral damages. however. There can be no recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted in physical injury. 3. casis -In the present case. P10. which are amply substantiated by the evidence on record. (3) a wrongful act or omission of the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant. (2) a culpable act or omission factually established. however. upon a combined consideration of logic. -Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts. ordering the defendants to indemnify the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand pesos as actual/compensatory damages. they can be awarded only after claimants have shown their entitlement to moral. The award of moral damages must be solidly anchored on a definite showing that respondent actually experienced emotional and mental sufferings. besmirched reputation. a court must be satisfied with proof of the following requisites: (1) an injury-whether physical. -Indeed. 2. when his car turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth from a digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an adequate warning to motorists especially during the thick of the night where darkness is pervasive. -It is apparent from the Decisions of the trial and the appellate courts. exemplary damages may be recovered if the defendant acted with gross negligence.torts & damages because of the latter’s negligence and failure to exercise due care. there was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral damages based on Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code. -It is too late in the day for them to raise this new issue. provided that the act or omission caused physical injuries. and other public works under their control or supervision. sustained physical injuries. P10. No adequate reason has been given to overturn this factual conclusion. WON petitioner’s negligence is the proximate cause of the incident 2. To consider their belatedly raised arguments at this stage of the proceedings would trample on the basic principles of fair play. -Such a circumstance obtains in the instant case. gasera which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade. bridges. -Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence. serious anxiety. streets. thereby establishing his right to actual or compensatory damages. clearly point to petitioners’ negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered by respondent’s car. Provinces. wounded feelings. and similar injury unjustly inflicted on a person. common sense. besmirched reputation. that no other evidence (such as a medical certificate or proof of medical expenses) was presented to prove Fulgencio Jr. -The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the accident bars us from supplanting their findings and substituting these with our own. none was found at the scene of the accident. -Upon appeal.00 as attorney’s fees and other costs of suit. moral shock.. this Petition ISSUES 1. fright. such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. none was ever presented to stress the point that A2010 . -Well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be awarded in the absence of proof of physical suffering. cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of. social humiliation. having violated a traffic regulation. not raised by petitioners at any time during the trial. any person by reason of the defective condition of roads.61 - prof. wounded feelings. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering. Yes. Jr. -In the case before us. or similar injury. petitioners assert that Fulgencio Jr. If indeed signs were placed thereat. mental. -What really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is a factual issue that this Court cannot pass upon. -Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs.” as provided under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code Thus. He has adduced adequate proof to justify his claim for the damages caused his car. and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219. or injuries suffered by. and due process. 9 . the Complaint alleged that respondent’s son Fulgencio Jr. -The facts of the case show a complete disregard by petitioners of any adverse consequence of their failure to install even a single warning device at the area under renovation. temperate or compensatory damages. both the trial and the appellate courts’ findings. 1988 which caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara. policy and precedent. should be presumed negligent pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code. -Gross negligence means such utter want of care as to raise a presumption that the persons at fault must have been conscious of the probable consequences of their carelessness. -To award moral damages. justice. The negligence must amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property. or psychological--clearly sustained by the claimant. WON moral damages are recoverable 3.

The horse was then pulled over to near the curb. and laying his hands on the reins. in the City of Iloilo. 1980 . ARANETA 42 Phil 252. being free from the control of the bit. Appellant’s claim: -there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death -the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed. in her own right as widow of Proceso Gayetano. the bit came out of the horse's mouth. At or about the same time Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Agaton Araneta. de Bataclan. Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. -The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. Meanwhile one of the passengers. Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. produces the injury. and after the runaway horse had proceeded up the street to a point in front of the Mission Hospital. 1988 OF THE Nature : This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court Facts:When Filomeno Urbano found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed he went to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier admitted that he was the one responsible for what happened. we adopted the following definition of proximate cause: "x x x A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38. 1181). It is as follows: "x x x 'that cause. Dr. and Fermin Gayetano. causing a swelling on said leg. After going a few yards further the side of the carromata struck a police telephone box which was fixed to a post on the sidewalk. with the modification that the award of moral damages is deleted. which he did. and it became necessary for the driver to get out. therefore. for the purpose of recovering damages incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the death of the said Proceso Gayetano. Rosita Gayetano. and without which the result would 10 GABETO V. and lately. by one or the other — it makes no difference which — and Pagnaya tried to fix the bridle. started to go away. the horse. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. January 7.Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs. in natural and continuous sequence. Urbano hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand . one Julio Pagnaya. when the horse. the said Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom . stopped the horse. upon which the box came down with a crash and frightened the horse to such an extent that he set out at full speed up the street. This action was brought by Consolacion Gabeto. Disposition: Judgment is REVERSED. had alighted while the carromata was as yet alongside the sidewalk. thereby causing the bit to come out of the horse's mouth. as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record. A2010 . at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called this carromata first. Agaton Araneta. Owing. A quarrel between them ensued.1980. Basilio Ilano. The evidence indicates that the bridle was old. which. the defendant. and as guardian ad litem of the three children. had unfortunately retained his seat. On November 14. to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which it was made. October 17. stepped out into the street. after alighting. in order that the vehicle might pass on. 4. 1921 Street Facts: Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata near Plaza Gay. He noticed the presence of a healing Art. somehow got infected with tetanus However. -In Vda. and that he had taken up the two passengers then in the carromata as the first who had offered employment. led the horse over to the curb. URBANO V IAC (PEOPLE PHILIPPINES) 157 SCRA 1 GUTIERREZ. supposedly caused by the wrongful act of the defendant Agaton Araneta.torts & damages damages is meant to be a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. ISSUE: WON there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death HELD: Yes. replied to the effect that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta. casis wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus. The evidence merely confirms that the wound. Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended x x x. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. and Julio. in order to fix the bridle. v. and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo. When the driver of the carromata had turned his horse and started in the direction indicated. and in so doing received injuries from which he soon died. to wit. The infection was. Reasoning: -The case involves the application of Article 410 of the Revised Penal Code. with a view to going to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma in the same City. became disturbed and moved forward. and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off. in doing which he pulled one of the wheels of the carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed Julio Pagnaya over. Dispositive The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Judge awarded damages to the widow to which decision Araneta appealed. cited by plaintiffsappellants in their brief. distinct and foreign to the crime. which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment. but the other.62 - prof. however. it was Julio who jerked the rein. The medical findings lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. Conchita Gayetano. pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence. Proceso Gayetano. While he was thus engaged. Issue: WON the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof Held: NO. The driver. On November 15. and proceeded to fix the bridle. Medina (102 Phil. feeling himself free from control. et al. 1980 Javier died in the hospital.

November 15. 931932). successive. 125) FAR EAST SHIPPING CO V CA (PPA) 297 SCRA 30 REGALADO.After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold. A2010 . In such event. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Kavankov filed his sea protest. (99 Phil. Cardenas.In case of compulsory pilotage. The medical findings lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death.Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. 1998 NATURE Review on certiorari the CA decision affirming TC decision holding FESC and Gavino solidarily liable FACTS . even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion.132.' And more comprehensively. the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. 1980. the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. British Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning. owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC). the M/V PAVLODAR. the anchor did not take hold as expected. This incident took place on October 23. and efficient cause of the injury. -Therefore. died on the second day from the onset time. If. October 1. . flying under the flagship of the USSR.J. — For entering a harbor and anchoring thereat. casis the vessel did not slacken. He can only be absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize damage. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct. as its berthing space. 1980.The rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the Philippine Ports Authority the amount of P1.the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time. 1980. with the master of the vessel. The speed of . Gavino ordered the engine stopped. if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances. The following day. were dropped. or on November 14. who was then on the pier apron noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person. 185-186) -The court looked into the nature of tetanus to determine the cause -Medically speaking. as well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf. unrelated. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. 1980. Gavino submitted his report to the Chief Pilot who referred the report to the Philippine Ports Authority. or shifting from one berth or another.torts & damages not have occurred. therefore. any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said Master Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined by competent "'A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible. he ordered the engines half-astern. Control of vessels and liability for damage. Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. Remaquillo. natural. Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it. Victor Kavankov.25.63 - prof. 8. the respective duties and responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the master have been specified by the same regulation: SEC. 03-85: SEC. et al. his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his negligence or fault. 4. like lockjaw and muscle spasms. however. or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage district. he died.000 feet from the pier. the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease. . with 2 shackles. . Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped.Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge. Consequently. A commotion ensued between the crew members. . every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage.therefore.The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is under compulsory pilotage pursuant to Section 8. distinct and foreign to the crime. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. — On compulsory pilotage grounds.126. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. Compulsory Pilotage Service. the onset time should have been more than six days. PERTINENT RULES on PILOTAGE . The vessel sustained damage too. supra) As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. pp.On June 20.When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier. . the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. such condition was not the proximate cause. The left anchor. A brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew members. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. he suffered the symptoms of tetanus. Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. beside him. Abellana. v. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. 118). (People v. which result in injury because of the prior defective condition. However.' (at pp. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel. The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on board. After 22 days. Abellana likewise submitted his report of the incident. either immediately or by setting other events in motion. 11. arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver. the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. When Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about. . Javier. and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. '(45 C. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port. Article III of Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause. The infection was. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo. the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port." (at p. such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. When the vessel was already about 2.

Lagunda and Sabido throw all the blame on Mudales. And Lagunda had time and opportunity to avoid the mishap if he had been sufficiently careful and cautious because the two trucks never collided with each other. and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. . although acting independently. . that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. LTB passengers had testified to the effect that the 6 x 6 cargo truck was running at a fast rate of speed. Gavino and FESC are solidarily liable. That his responsibility shall cease at the moment the master neglects or refuses to carry out his instructions. widoy of Custodio. Custodio was injured and died.There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. XLIV. 15-65 issued twenty years earlier likewise provided in Chapter I thereof for the responsibilities of pilots: Par. Custodia. . However. LTB bus passenger who was riding on the running board as truck was full of passengers. SABIDO AND LAGUNDA V CUSTODIO. SEC.64 - prof. and licensed. Provided. — A Pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes control thereof until he leaves it anchored free from shoal. Makabuhay. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons.As a general rule. and in turn means negligence on the part of FESC. ISSUE WON both the pilot and the master were negligent HELD YES. that a master of a ship may not know because the pilot is familiar with the port. without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor.The SC started by saying that in a collision between a stationary object and a moving object. casis Disposition Petition denied. He is charged to perform his duties with extraordinary care because the safety of people and property on the vessel and on the dock are at stake. The court found that his reaction time (4 minutes) to the anchor not holding ground and the vessel still going too fast was too slow. He was right beside the pilot during the docking. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots' Association. to conduct a vessel into or out of ports. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. is a person duly qualified. the 6 x 6 truck could have avoided hitting Custodio. is the proximate cause of the injury. He blindly trusted the pilot. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. PILOT . It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone. concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's. however. Accordingly. The master’s negligence translates to unseaworthiness of the vessel. Based upon these facts. in maritime law. Driver Lagunda admitted that three passengers rode on the running board of the bus when his vehicle was still at a distance of 5 or 7 meters from the bus. . owner Sabido and driver Lagunda (tsn. It then went on to determine who between the pilot and the master was negligent. August 31. Lagunda did not avert the accident simply because to use his own language the canal "is not a passage of trucks. Provided. To avoid any liability. the Court of First Instance of Laguna and the Court of Appeals concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co.Capt. 1966 NATURE Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS In Barrio Halang. — The duties and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows: xxx xxx xxx f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed safely. they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. This is negligence on his part. etc. or in certain waters. Capt. however may intervene or countermand the pilot if he A2010 . By simply swerving to the right side of the road. one driven by Mudales and belonging to Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company. are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person. As an expert he should’ve been reacting quickly to any such happenings. — hereinafter referred to as the carrier — and its driver Mudales (none of whom has . — Pilots shall properly and safely secure or anchor vessels under their control when requested to do so by the master of such vessels. and the other driven by Lagunda and owned by Prospero Sabido. He is an expert who’s supposed to know the seabed. The master. and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. testified that the 6 x 6 truck was running fast when it met the LTB Bus. it may appear that one of them was more culpable. the pilot momentarily becomes the master of the vessel. XXXIX. 308-309.torts & damages authority in appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. where several causes combine to produce injuries. whereas the six by six truck was climbing up with no cargoes or passengers on board but for three helpers. so he could see and hear everything that the pilot was seeing and hearing. person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them. It is sufficient that his negligence. deems there is danger to the vessel because of the incompetence of the pilot or if the pilot is drunk. 32. Kavankov’s testimony. . The sideswiping of the deceased and his two fellow passengers took place on broad daylight at about 9:30 in the morning of June 9. Gavino was found to be negligent. it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened. it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party. As a result.Based on Capt. MASTER . Mendoza). going in opposite directions met each other in a road curve.In compulsory pilotage. that his responsibility shall cease at the moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry out his order. ET AL 17 SCRA 1088 CONCEPCION. Despite the presence of a shallow canal on the right side of the road which he could pass over with ease. two trucks. CA affirmed. xxx xxx xxx Par. there is a presumption of fault against the moving object (based on common sense and logic).A pilot. .Customs Administrative Order No. he never sensed the any danger even when the anchor didn’t hold and they were approaching the dock too fast. the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case. CONCURRENT TORTFEASORS . 1955 when the LTB bus with full load to passengers was negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and sliding downward a slope. was sideswiped by the truck driven by Lagunda.

have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. 1755 ART. YES. in this sense. petitioners' truck had the last clear chance. YES. there was a distance of about 150 meters.Shortly after midnight. . after the blow-out.65 - prof. Calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood. There were about 18 passengers. and almost immediately. either immediately or by setting other events in motion. both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio. the fire that burned the bus. Cavite. and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87. Ratio There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out. in point of time. heard groans and moans from inside the bus. although the liability of one arises from a breach of contract. . one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end. because that vehicle was running at a considerable speed despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve. from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging. and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses. Reasoning Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and their goods. driven by its regular chauffeur. NO. this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back. evidently fueled with petroleum. although acting independently of each other. 2. and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury. are. including the 4 passengers trapped inside it. could not get out of the overturned bus.the CFI awarded P1. Salud Villanueva brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory. 1733 ART. the driver Saylon. HELD 1. that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help. The chauffeur. WON there was negligence on the part of the defendant. . of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner.150. the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were removed and duly identified that of Bataclan. a bus of the Medina Transportation. and where the driver of the other vehicle was also guilty of contributory negligence. thus making him liable. plus P100. It would appear that as the bus overturned. 1759 ART. so that. must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus. on its way to Pasay City. and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning). by reason of which all of them were held solidarity liable.000 plus P600 as attorney's fee. including that of the defense. the A2010 . In fact. its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle. 1957 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Cavite FACTS . or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor. the bus was speeding. Conrado Saylon. by the driver and the conductor themselves.That same day. The views of the Court of Appeals on the speed of the truck and its location at the time of the accident are in the nature of findings of fact. the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan . Dispositive Judgment affirmed. it was driven on its middle portion thereof and so near the passenger bus coming from the opposite as to sideswipe a passenger on its running board. but most probably. the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted. but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running. after they had clambered up to the road. the correctness of said findings is borne out by the very testimony of petitioner Lagunda to the effect that he saw the passengers riding on the running board of the bus while the same was still five or seven meters away from the truck driven by him. petitioners' negligence was the last. in its execution.torts & damages appealed). operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience. one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. At any rate.the three passengers Bataclan. YES Ratio Tthe proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. Cavite. left the town of Amadeo. through his agent. VDA. WON petitioners were guilty of negligence 2. After half an hour. but rather. His widow. whereas petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict. 1763 direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person. casis ISSUES 1.At about 2am. . while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus. WON petitioners should be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its driver HELD 1. the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected. for Custodio was on the running board of the carrier's bus sometime before petitioners' truck came from the opposite direction. had violated the contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio. Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent. as testified to by one of the passengers. burning and all but consuming the bus. such as the one at bar.11 2. Indeed. including the driver and conductor. What is more. which we cannot disturb in a petition for review by certiorari. Reasoning under the circumstances obtaining in the case. we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus. the owners of the two vehicles are liable solidarily for the death of the passenger. and coming as they did from a rural 11 ART. either is responsible for the whole injury.Some of the passengers. Where the carrier bus and its driver were clearly guilty of contributory negligence for having allowed a passenger to ride on the running board of the bus. came about ten men. the rescuers had to carry a light with them. instead of being close to its right side of the road. MEDINA 102 PHIL 181 MONTEMAYOR. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons. a fierce fire started. 2. even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury. These men presumably approach the overturned bus. gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank. as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person. moral. WON the the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus. the distance between the two vehicles was such that he could have avoided sideswiping said passengers if his truck were not running at a great speed. October 22. DE BATACLAN VS. Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva. ISSUES 1. and. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. the negligence of the first two would not have produced this result without the negligence of petitioners' herein. in combination. made not only by the passengers. . whereas that of the other springs from a quasi-delict.

after its wheel was removed. as a result of the collision. perhaps serious. though he must have suffered physical injuries.torts & damages area where lanterns and flashlights were not available. (1) That the unrebutted testimony of his passenger Caridad Pascua that the Mangune jeepney was "running fast" that his passengers cautioned driver Manalo to slow down but did not heed the warning (2) The likewise unrebutted testimony of Police Investigator Tacpal of the San Manuel (Tarlac) Police who found that the tracks of the jeepney ran on the Eastern shoulder (outside the concrete paved road) until it returned to the concrete road at a sharp angle.. ordered them to pay the damages. the jeepney’s right rear wheel detached which caused it to run in an unbalanced position.Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation. (3) The observation of witness Police Corporal Cacalda also of the San Manuel Police that the path of the jeepney they found on the road \was shown by skid marks which he described as "scratches on the road caused by the iron of the jeep. The case against delos Reyes was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. casis .This case is for recovery of damages for the 3 jeepney passengers who died as a result of the collision between the Phil. REASONING: TC WAS CORRECT IN APPRECIATING THE FF FACTS CONCERNING MANALO’S NEGLIGENCE. Applied primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear chance.Three cases were filed and in all 3 the spouses (owners of the jeepney) Mangune and Carreon. Inc. and that as a matter of fact. . that at the time the fire started. ISSUE: WON THE JEEPNEY OWNERS AND ITS DRIVER ARE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES AND DEATH SUFFERED BY THE PASSENGERS OF THE JEEPNEY HELD: YES. the fire that burned the bus. was still alive. -Manalo stepped on the brake. spouses Mangune and Carreon filed a cross-claim for the repair of the jeepney and for its non-use during the period of repairs. he had been telling the driver to change the said tires. SC: .On the other hand.Other passengers of the jeepney sustained physical injuries. (jeepney driver)Manalo. . as a result of which.Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses Mangune and Carreon and Manalo on their contractual liability. (2) the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence. including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it. and in the course of his visit. the bus bumped from behind the right rear portion of the jeepney which resulted in the said deaths and injuries. -The jeepney practically occupied and blocked the greater portion of the western lane.In the public interest the prosecution of said erring driver should be pursued. If this be true.IAC reversed this ruling in the sense that it found delos Reyes to be negligent. but rather. . .66 - prof. 189 SCRA 158 MEDIALDEA/August 30. ET AL. invading and eventually stopping on the western lane of the road in such a manner that the jeepney's front faced the south (from where it came) and its rear faced the north (towards where it was going). one of the passengers who. Neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. and (3) the substantial factor test to conclude that delos Reyes was negligent. loss of wages.000 and P800.At the time and in the vicinity of the accident. IAC & CASIANO PASCUA. plaintiffs based their suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict. with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are increased to P6. which is the right of way of vehicles coming from the north. . . but for the promotion of the safety of passengers on public utility buses. there were no vehicles following the jeepney. she was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina. it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers . INC v. ordered to pay jointly and severally with Rabbit the plaintiffs. 1990 NATURE: CERTIORARI FACTS: . PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES. and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. for exemplary damages. neither were there oncoming vehicles except the bus.It was said that upon reaching a certain barrio. not only as a matter of justice. . not for his death. the jeepney which was then running on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn. because of the injuries suffered by her. but for the physical injuries suffered by him. burial expenses. but that the driver did not follow his instructions.The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus. Rabbit was to be paid by the jeepney party for actual damages. crossing the Eastern lane and the (imaginary) center line and encroaching fully into the western lane where the collision took place as evidenced by the point of impact. this.Almost at the time when the jeepney made a sudden U-turn and encroached on the western lane of the highway.Rabbit filed a cross-claim for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. . DISPOSITION In view of the foregoing. BUT ONLY THE SPOUSES AND FILRITERS ARE LIABLE. moral damages and attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. or after stopping for a couple of minutes. telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus changed immediately because they were already old. . . for the death of Bataclan and for the attorney's fees. . Note: This case was under the heading “but for”.Manalo was eventually convicted and was imprisoned. and his commitment to prison and service of his sentence (5) The application of the doctrine of res-ipsa loquitar attesting to the circumstance that the collision occured on the right of way of the Phil. A2010 .A criminal complaint against the two drivers for Multiple Homicide. ***As regards the damages. she overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors. I don’t know if the italicized phrases are pertinent. ." (4) His conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious Physical Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence by the CFI of Tarlac. (the insurer of the jeepney) was also impleaded as additional defendant in the civil case filed by the Pascuas. and so damages were awarded.As against Rabbit and delos Reyes. . respectively.Damages sought to be claimed in the 3 cases were for medical expenses. among which was Bus No. but these were the only ones that contained “but for”. Rabbit and (Rabbit’s driver)delos Reyes were all impleaded as defendants. Bataclan. Filriters was jointly and severally liable as it was the jeepney’s insurer. was hospitalized. Rabbit Bus.According to the evidence.TC: found the couple and Manalo to be NEGLIGENT and held that there was a breach of the contract of carriage with their passengers. and while in the hospital. 753 of Rabbit . The weather condition of that day was fair. . Rabbit’s bus driven by Tomas delos Reyes and the jeepney driven by Tranquilino Manalo. .

Jr. . If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour.To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too much from him. v.torts & damages -The principle about "the last clear" chance would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. it to be one caused by a caso fortuito. . .The dump truck. He switched his headlights on "bright" and saw a Ford dump truck about 21/2meters away from his car.. and in the event of contractual liability. . ("Phoenix"). v.Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more or less 50 kph at the time of the accident. Here. . DISPOSITION: TC’ S DECISION WAS REINSTATED and AFFIRMED BUT MODIFICATION THAT ONLY THE COUPLE AND THE FILRITERS GUARANTY ASSURANCE CORP. . It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour. and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733. much less establish. . the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently.. the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable (Restatement. -SC: The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon. he had little time to react to the situation. delos Reyes covered the distance of 45 meters in 3. that would make the carrier's liability personal. . For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely pro hac vice.The IAC held that “. . is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways.67 - prof. partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic.e.025 seconds. . April 29. -In any event.In culpa contractual. the day before the collision. etc. . But the SC was not convinced. 892 citing Lasam. not only because he was driving fast and did not even attempt to avoid the mishap but also because it was the bus which was the physical force which brought about the injury and death to the passengers of the jeepney. Smith. This notwithstanding the right rear wheel of the vehicle was detached while in transit. delos Reyes would have covered that A2010 . It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.. There were no lights or any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck. The bus driver's conduct is thus a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passengers of the jeepney. casis -the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger. . 2d). . 1966. the jeepney left a skid mark of about 45 meters. that he periodically checks and maintains the jeepney of said defendants. its regular driver. "[i]n an action for damages against the carrier for his failure to safely carry his passenger to his destination. defendants Mangune and Carreon offered to show thru their witness Natalio Navarro. is not a caso fortuito which would avoid the carriers liability for damages (Son v. unless contradicted by other evidence: would have been correct were it not for the undisputed fact that the U-turn made by the jeepney was abrupt. the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger. It was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street. 45 Phil. ***On the sole liability of the Jeepney Owners (excluding Manalo) PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION (DIONISIO) 148 SCRA 353 FELICIANO. Buño et al. Aside from the time element involved. owned by and registered in the name of Phoenix Construction Inc. there were no options available to him. ***With regard to the substantial factor test: . Torts. 657). Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-anddinner meeting with his boss. . Jr. Using this speed.) -On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident. assuming such calculation to be correct. Verily. which included the tightening of the bolts. in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning. et al. . Delos Reyes could not have anticipated the sudden U-turn executed by Manalo. As to the cause thereof no evidence was offered. on the right hand side of a person facing in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding). even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver (Viluan v.. et al. an alleged mechanic. 16 SCRA 742).Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed an intersection when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed.if the driver is to be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier.That delos Reyes of the Rabbit bus could also have swerved to its left (eastern lane) to avoid bumping the Mangune jeepney which was then on the western lane: Under such a situation.24 seconds. he would run the greater risk of running smack in the Mangune jeepney either head on or broadside as the jeepney then was abruptly making a U-turn. 657. Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. 23. We find defendant bus running at a fast speed when the accident occurred and did not even make the slightest effort to avoid the accident. . distance in only 2. . measured from the time its right rear wheel was detached up to the point of collision. 104 Phil. the moment a passenger dies or is injured. Cebu Autobus Company. It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another. . was parked on the right hand side of the street (i. facing the oncoming traffic. . 75). AFFIRMED TOO THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BUT MODIFIED THE INDEMNITY FOR LOSS OF LIFE FROM 3K (AS PER A1746 TO A2206 NCC) TO 30K. with the permission of his employer Phoenix.Also.” -The speed of the bus was even calculated by the IAC. et al. (Anuran.The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. the last on Dec.. an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver. 45 Phil. Necesito. Said defendant did not even attempt to explain. 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code 2 or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event 3 (Lasam v. front or rear. . Smith. INC WERE LIABLE. Paras. CA. It was shown by the pictures that driver delos Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to the right attempt to avoid hitting the Mangune's jeepney. Carbonel. 1987 INC v IAC Nature: Petition to review the decision of the IAC Facts: - at about 1:30 am on November 15 1975. v. et al.To escape liability. 94 Phil. Mar 10. That it was not successful in fully clearing the Mangune jeepney as its (Rabbit's) left front hit said jeepney must have been due to limitations of space and time. . contradictory to the explicit provision of A 2181 of the NCC.Delos Reyes cannot be faulted for not having avoided the collision because as was shown.

Ratio A prior and remote cause (which furnishes the condition or gives rise to the occasion by which an injury was made possible) cannot be the basis of an action if a distinct. Reasoning We fail to see how the Company could be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence. it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety.68 - prof. the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark. such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet. . To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire. that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening. Petitioners’comments . page 5 of outline) - concerned.ON CAUSE v CONDITION (under IV A 3c. It is this CA decision the Company now seeks to appeal." but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important. particularly since. Held: .Efren Magno went to his stepbrother’s 3-story house to fix a leaking “media agua. but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution. while under the influence of liquor." - petitioners' arguments are drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United States. one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who falls into it a month afterward. was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. the defendant will not escape responsibility. .the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident.the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix Issue: WON the proximate cause of the accident was Dionisio’s negligence (driving faster than he should have. The Company appealed to the CA.His widow and children filed a suit to recover damages from the company and the TC rendered judgment in their favor.” (downspout). as is invariably the case the latter (is) the result of other active forces which have gone before. When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the media agua - if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause. considering the latter's length of 6 feet. But even in such cases. When a spark ignites the gasoline. It merely provided the condition from which the cause arose (it set the stage for the cause of the injury to occur). "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions. in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result. do not have any validity in this jurisdiction.5 ft parallel to the edge of the media agua. successive. (NOTE: this was the contention of petitioners which SC noted in is decision) Private respondent’s comments . the defendant is said not to be liable. efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. the distinctions between" cause" and "condition" have already been "almost entirely discredited. far from being a "passive and static condition". IAC affirmed the lower court’s ruling. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition. casis NATURE Review by certiorari of a CA decision FACTS .Trial court ruled in favor of Dionisio. and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created. he turned around and a portion of the iron sheet he was holding came into contact with an electric wire of Manila Electric Company (the Company) strung 2.The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. was an indispensable and efficient cause.Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause. and without headlights) or the negligence of the driver in parking the truck. ISSUE WON the Company’s negligence in the installation and maintenance of its wires was the proximate cause of the death HELD No.torts & damages . A2010 . May 18. The collision would not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. . which affirmed the judgment. such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. however. He climbed up to the media agua which was just below the 3 rd floor window and stood on it to receive a galvanized iron sheet through the said window. But so far as the fact of causation is the truck driver's negligence. (see previous digest) . If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible. a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability." Professors Prosser and Keeton make this quite clear: “Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. electrocuting him and killing him. Even in the United States. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down that street and for having so created this risk. Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars. So far as it has any validity at all. such condition was not the proximate cause. unrelated and efficient cause of the injury intervenes between such prior and remote cause and the injury.As a result of the collision. Dionisio's negligence. What the petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was only a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the truck driver’s negligence MANILA ELECTRIC v REMOQUILLO 99 PHIL 117 MONTEMAYOR. it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations. with modification on award of damages. and some new force intervenes. but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. 1956 .it is the driver’s negligence. These arguments. . although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident. without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. After grabbing hold of the sheet. evidently a remote cause. the truck driver must be held responsible.

RODRIGUEZA V. all passengers of the Ford Escort.The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. 1992 NATURE Appeal from decision of the IAC FACTS .Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals may be set aside when such findings are not supported by the evidence or when the trial court failed to consider the material facts which would have led to a conclusion different from what was stated in its judgment. . Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the southern end of the bridge. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car. On the basis of this presumed negligence. then he is guilty of negligence. Rodrigueza didn’t mind the warnings from the company. That Rodrigueza’s house was near was an ANTECEDENT CONDITION but that can’t be imputed to him as CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE because that condition was not created by himself and because his house remained by the toleration and consent of company and because even if the house was improperly there. an Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was filed with the trial court. no negligence can be imputed to Jose Koh. TAYAG 211 SCRA 517 DAVIDE. and throwing all prudence and discretion to the winds. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do . Defense said Rodigueza’s house stood partly within limits of land owned by company. it reversed the ruling of the trial court and ordered the defendants to pay damages. except that of Rodrigueza which was of strong materials. and physical injuries to George Koh McKee. and attorney’s fee. two boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car. . Disposition CA decision reversed. his car collided with the truck. . The decision is anchored principally on the findings that it was FACTS Rodrigueza et al seek damages fr fire kindled by sparks fr a locomotive engine. Complaint against company dismissed A2010 .A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck owned by private respondents. Plaintiffs say that the company failed to supervise their employees properly and was negligent in allowing locomotive to operate without smokestack protection for arresting sparks. . . . Galang appealed to IAC. company had no right to negligently destroy it.Judge Capulong found Galang guilty of the criminal charge and ordered him to pay damages. Jose Koh.Using the test. two boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car.69 - prof. Petitioners appealed to IAC. Trial judge decided against Manila Railroad. was negligent. IAC affirmed decision. . ISSUES WON respondent Court's findings in its challenged resolution are supported by evidence or are based on mere speculations. on the said bridge. . guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. resulted from the company’s negligence. in the selection and supervision of the latter. he then switched on the headlights of the car. 1977. he could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. . Hence this petition.On 1 March 1977. The fire was communicated to four houses nearby. Before he could do so. his training and experience failed him. So. All of these houses were of light construction. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck. The company could have removed the house through its power of eminent domain. it was further asserted that these defendants did not allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising the said employee. His house was there before the railroad company’s property. HELD YES .When the northbound Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge. MANILA COMPANY STREET. applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. 1921 NATURE Appeal from judgment of CFI RAILROAD MCKEE v IAC. he turned around swinging his arms with the motion of his body. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had had training and experience for the job.Two civil cases were filed on Jan 31.The PROXIMATE AND ONLY CAUSE of the damage was the negligent act of the company. this indicates contributory negligence on his part. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh. The appellate court further said that the law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants. November 19. casis Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused the accident. it is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so. the decision for the consolidated civil cases was reversed. Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc. But unfortunately. Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee. as employers of Galang. They also say that the sparks were produced by an inferior fuel used by the company – Bataan coal. ISSUE WON damage was caused by Rodrigueza’s contributory negligence HELD Yes. In its consolidated decision of the civil cases. . which was the opposite lane.There was no proof that Rodrigueza unlawfully intruded upon company’s property. and forgetting where he was standing. but should not bear loss if the fire .Manila Railroad’s defense is not a bar to recovery by the other plaintiffs. His house’s materials included nipa and cogon. July 16. . which appealed. thereby causing his own electrocution. holding the 6-ft iron sheet with both hands and at arms length.torts & damages just below the third story window. swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck. . in the instant case.The respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that the driver of the car.Judge Castaneda dismissed the 2 civil cases and awarded private respondents moral damages and exemplary damages. IAC immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh's negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. would do.Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man.In an MFR. evidently without looking. conjectures and presumptions. and driven by Ruben Galang. He may be at risk for fire.

Neither did they attempt to prove it. . In such cases. whether acquittal or conviction. Four instructresses and six assistant instructresses of the institute were present and they. should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care. according to their respective orientation. The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff. A2010 . Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Upon seeing the fire. who numbered about 180 at the time.70 - prof. the same facts differently.000. 1973 FACTS . casis preventing the unseeming. if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method. prevent delays.50 meters in width. . it had eight windows. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 km) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kph. FERNANDEZ 51 SCRA 181 MAKALINTAL. under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence. and it may therefore be reasonably concluded that none was made. would have easily sustained a consolidation. the negligent act of the truck driver. Quiapo. either immediately or by setting other events in motion. the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here. semi-concrete edifice located at the comer of Quezon Boulevard and Soler Street. under what is known as the emergency rule. The records do not indicate any attempt on the part of the parties. Soler Street lay between that store and the institute. or to use the fire-escapes. were filed ahead of criminal case. arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent. or according to some authorities. could not . the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof. 1955.The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. by exercising reasonable care and prudence.Assuming.The Realistic Institute. the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car. it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event. or vice-versa. however. They told the students not to rush out but just to go down the stairway two by two. and without which the result would not have occurred. the private respondents are. if at all negligent. The doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril.torts & damages . the result of the criminal case. and the presence of each of the fire exits was indicated on the wall. not juris et de jure.Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent. owned and operated by Mercedes M.Moreover. On the separate civil and criminal actions . Such was what happened in this case. Proximate cause has been defined as: that cause. a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap. or in short.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee . What remains to be the most important consideration as to why the decision in the criminal case should not be considered in this appeal is the fact that private respondents were not parties therein. which were for the recovery of civil liability arising from a quasi-delict under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In the case of independent civil actions under the new Civil Code. clear congested dockets to simplify the work of the trial court. which seeks to avoid a multiplicity of suits. have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. and an injury results. across the street. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. had a total area of about 400 square meters. had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident.The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. aware of the plaintiff's peril. tried to calm down the students.Last clear chance: The doctrine is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant. Rule 31 of the Rules of Court. if no ludicrous. spectacle of two judges appreciating. Manila.As employers of the truck driver. if he. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road. . all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. in natural and continuous sequence.Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh. a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident.Section 1. and although it had only one stairway. produces the injury. and thereafter rendering conflicting decisions. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. each of which was provided with two fire-escape ladders. Assailed decision set aside while its original is REINSTATED. which. is only juris tantum. notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. That presumption. it cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. together with the registrar. the injured person is entitled to recovery. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might. perception and perhaps even prejudice. The answers of the private respondents in the civil cases did not interpose this defense. . Teague.The civil cases. the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury.In the afternoon of October 24. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted. or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters away from the institute. however.000. might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. . he was violating any traffic regulation. which was the actual cause of the tragedy. a panic ensued. . subject to the modification that the indemnity for death is increased from P12. and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger. thereby TEAGUE VS. June 4. some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter. . telling them not to be afraid because the Gil-Armi Building would not get burned as it is made of concrete. The second floor was unpartitioned. . as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person.00 to P50. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances. "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger. directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action. Dispositive Petition granted. guard against oppression and abuse. was the initial act in the chain of events. to consolidate criminal case with the civil cases. attain justice with the least expense to the parties litigants. The panic. is not guilty of negligence. They were eventually consolidated for joint trial. a two-storey. of about 1. was a vocational school for hair and beauty culture situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code. and that the fire was anyway.

ISSUES 1.The CFI of Manila found for the defendant and dismissed the case. casis . That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become necessary to evacuate the building.then the building is within the coverage of the ordinance. NO. in the manner in which it happened. four students. (5) stampede. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause. 2.According to the petitioner "the events of fire. including Lourdes Fernandez.5 meters wide. and (6) injuries and death. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result there from. but rather the use or the purpose for which a particular building. was bound to happen under emergency conditions if there was only one stairway available. 3. it is argued. Dispositive Decision appealed from is affirmed. But. it would be more accurate to say that the overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one. exits and stairways .The CA declared that Teague was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez.The petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death of Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of ordinance. [Citing Bataclan v Medina] . and cannot be the basis of liability since there intervened a number of independent causes which produced the injury complained of. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition. was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent. panic and stampede were independent causes with no causal connection at all with the violation of the ordinance. the principle of proximate cause applies to such violation. instead of two of at least 1. Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the respondents.A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible. Indeed the requirement that such a building should have two (2) separate stairways instead of only one (1) has no relevance or reasonable relation to the fact of ownership. sanitarium. reformatories.torts & damages be subdued and the students kept on rushing and pushing their way through the stairs. if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct. after the panic was over. This provision reads as follows: "Sec. It is true that in this particular case there would have been no overcrowding in the single stairway if there had not been a fire in the neighborhood which caused the students to panic and rush headlong for the stairs in order to go down. in case of large buildings more than two stairways shall likewise be provided when required by the chief of the fire department. and the like. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had a second stairway under construction. Ratio The violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident. as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person. 1918 . This finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with in connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building." The alleged violation of the ordinance consisted is that the second storey of the building had only one stairway." The weakness in the argument springs from a faulty juxtaposition of the events which formed a chain and resulted in the injury. shall be provided with at least two unobstructed stairways of not less than one meter and twenty centimeters in width and an inclination of not less than forty degrees from the perpendicular. and it was the petitioner and not the owners who were responsible for such use. Fireproof partitions. schools. the final event in the chain immediately affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted. assembly halls. sister of plaintiffs. successive.71 - prof. is utilized. March 15.All buildings and separate sections of buildings or buildings otherwise known as accessorias having less than three stories. which. was only a remote cause. but if it is devoted to any one of the purposes mentioned in the ordinance . having one or more persons domiciled therein either temporarily or permanently.000. (4) panic in the Institute. Fire!". PICART V SMITH STREET. . No part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. but does have such relation to the use or purpose for which the building is devoted. since the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the building. (3) shouts of "Fire!. But it was precisely such contingencies or events that the authors of the ordinance had in mind. (2) fire at a neighboring place. for under normal conditions one stairway would be adequate for the occupants of the building. . [Citing MERALCO v Remoquillo] . . Reasoning Thus the same may be privately owned. Ratio it is not ownership which determines the character of buildings subject to its requirements. in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the building. who should be liable for the violation A2010 . such condition was not the proximate cause. Reasoning The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. The plaintiffs appealed to the CA. It is true that the petitioner's noncompliance with the ordinance in question was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of time. 491. which the Realistic Institute precisely was . YES. restaurants or panciterias. 3. thereby causing stampede. The violation of the ordinance. said stairways shall be placed as far apart as possible. such as hospitals. WON the ordinance devolved upon the owners of the building and therefore it is they and not the petitioner. either immediately or by settling other events in motion. and all public or quasipublic buildings having less than three stories. it could be reasonably foreseen. clubs. But the violation was a continuing one. NO. and efficient cause of the injury.To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does not portray the situation in its true perspective. which by a divided vote of 3 to 2 (a special division of five members having been constituted) rendered a judgment of reversal and sentenced the defendant to pay damages to the plaintiffs in the sum of P11. were found dead and several others injured on account of the stampede. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. Reasoning It was the use of the building for school purposes which brought the same within the coverage of the ordinance.for instance as a school.2 meters each. plus interest at the legal rate from the date the complaint was filed. unrelated. who is a mere lessee. 1. such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. places of human detention. WON Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila refers only to public buildings and hence did not apply to the Gil-Armi building which was of private ownership 2. WON the failure to comply with the requirement of the ordinance was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez HELD 1.

torts & damages NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of La Union FACTS  On December 12. placed in the position of the defendant. the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences. A prudent man.  The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. the court thinks. plaintiff was riding on his pony over the Carlatan Bridge.  The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side. instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down. seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge. without reference to the prior negligence of the other part.  As a result of its injuries the horse died.  The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. He was. as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles.  The defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. at San Fernando. it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. was guilty of negligence that would give rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done Ratio: The person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. It will be noted however.  The pony had not as yet exhibited fright.  However.  As the defendant started across the bridge.  Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet. going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour.  But in view of the known nature of horses. or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. 1912. foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so. blameworthy. and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course.  The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant.  The plaintiff himself was not free from fault. followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision.  Stated in these terms.  In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away.  As the defendant neared the bridge he saw the plaintiff and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Reasonable foresight of harm. he was. La Union.  CFI absolved defendant from liability  Hence. he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side.  The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. A2010 . negligent in the eye of the law.  When he had gotten quite near. and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or. that the negligent acts of . the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing. he might get excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him.  He did this because he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle.  In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. then he is guilty of negligence. for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. negligence is clearly established. he gave two more successive blasts. the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. in maneuvering his car in the manner above described. HELD Yes. the defendant guided it toward his left.  He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge.  In so doing. casis  When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger. the defendant.  Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case. The law considers what would be reckless.  The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. there was an appreciable risk that. and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. in the case under consideration. but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done. he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. given the novelty of the apparition and the rapidity of the approach. Could a prudent man. it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision.72 - prof. and from this moment it was no longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. the appeal ISSUE WON the defendant. that being the proper side of the road for the machine. in our opinion. but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing.  The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm. would have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk. deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright.  As the automobile approached.  The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.  Before he had gotten half way across.

or to what extent. private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries. which was denied at first. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. but was granted on MFR. This is the way the collision happened: The bus. As the doctrine is usually stated. and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone. and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the same. Smith but it is a matter for debate whether. The heirs of the victims filed for damages. The theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent. The bus driver also observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. and an injury results. should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due case. was on his way home to Makati from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss where had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. stated broadly. aware of the plaintiff's peril.torts & damages the two parties were not contemporaneous. casis saw a Ford dump truck looming some 21/2meters away from his car. a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. 1987 INC V IAC NATURE PETITION for review of the decision of the IAC FACTS .Phoenix and Carbonel also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. February 6. A2010 .IAC: affirmed TC but modified amounts ISSUE (obiter) WON last clear chance doctrine should be applied therefore exculpating Phoenix from paying any damages HELD NO . There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck. Defendants Del Pilar and Montesiano ordered to pay damages with other defendants PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION (DIONISIO) 148 SCRA 353 FELICIANO. As a result of the collision. Obiter . by exercising reasonable care and prudence. the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril." that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179. Jur). ISSUES: 1. is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant.73 - prof. owned and registered by Phoenix Construction Inc. Crossing the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal.We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver. its regular driver.Dionisio commenced an action for damages claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck. had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (Am. it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. in order to overtake a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the highway. was traversing an inclined road when the driver saw from 30 meters away an approaching truck (driven by Montesiano). which was ascending the inclined part of the road. 1991 NATURE: petition for certiorari to review decision of CA FACTS: a truck and a passenger bus sideswept each other. notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident (Sangco). The dump truck. saying that the negligent acts of both drivers were the cause of the accident. Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars. driven by Susulin. or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril. Not minding this circumstance due to his belief that the truck driver was merely joking. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he . NO Ratio: The doctrine of last clear chance applies only between the negligent parties. saying that the bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident.CFI: in favor of Dionisio . While the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing the hand tractor and the truck was approaching the bus. The driver and owner of the truck appealed to the CA. while under the influence of liquor. March 10. It does not apply in a case wherein a victim (who is an outsider to the cause of the accident) demands liability from the negligent parties. A negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff. Makati. . As against 3rd persons.Leonardo Dionisio. going very fast and the front wheels wiggling. the injured person is entitled to recovery. WON the CA was correct in absolving the driver and owner of the truck (answered by WON CA correctly applied the doctrine of last clear chance) HELD: 1. Civil Code of the Philippines). the two vehicles sideswiped each other at each other's left side. without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. not far from his home. In other words.130AM 15 November 1975 . since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. or according to some authorities. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident. Reasoning: The doctrine of last clear chance. might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence. absolving the defendants based on the doctrine of last clear chance. causing the deaths of the passengers of the bus. Phoenix and Carbonel countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident. Susulin shifted from 4th to 3rd gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus. was parked askew (partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic) on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming traffic. if he. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Dispositive: Appealed decision is reversed. Disposition: Petition GRANTED. a negligent actor can’t defend by saying that another had negligently failed to take action which would have avoided injury. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by Carbonel. without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. The historical function of that doctrine in BUSTAMANTE V CA (DEL PILAR AND MONTESIANO) 193 SCRA 603 MEDIALDEA. thus their liability must be solidary. driving his Volkswagen car. The RTC awarded damages. .

would. petitioner Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalling P304. . 1997 Nature: Petition to review decision of CA Facts: . but as its demand went unheeded. plus damages. Under A2179. suffered by the private respondent RMC is petitioner bank's negligence or that of private respondent's. The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent. loss of expected income and moral damages Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount A2010 . March 14. an original and a duplicate. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics. The second copy was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record purposes. blameworthy. 979. as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate. is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. the task of a court. After validation.Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man. validate and stamp both the original and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip. she made her company believe that all the while the amounts she deposited were being credited to its account when. which is that of her husband's. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE v CA (LIPANA) 269 SCRA 695 HERMOSISIMA. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society.979. it filed a collection suit before RTC Pasig. .RMC maintained two separate current accounts with the Pasig Branch of PBC in connection with its business of selling appliances. With the daily remittance records also prepared by Ms. . Disposition CA decision is modified by reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory damages. if any. but modified the award of damages. attornet’s fees and costs of suit. it is difficult to see what role. on all occasions. Held: It was the negligence of Ms. or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law.74 representing various deposits RMC made in its current account with said bank.74 - prof. . guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller. Accordingly. and make it appear to be RMC's account number.Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC). the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff.979. has itself been rejected. they were being deposited by her and credited by the petitioner bank in the account of Cotas. now absorbed by the Philippine Commercial International Bank. in truth and in fact. and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. The amount was not credited to RMC’s account but was instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas. is to determine whose negligence-the plaintiff's or the defendant's-was the legal or proximate cause of the injury.torts & damages the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule-that of contributory negligence. then he is guilty of negligence. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. . The original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number. which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent. Azucena Mabayad. casis respondent RMC together with the validated duplicate slips with the latter's name and account number.Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so. Azucena Mabayad. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. . Irene Yabut. it had never been the practice of Romeo Lipana to check these monthly statements of account reposing complete trust and confidence on petitioner bank. RMC demanded from petitioner bank the return of its money. It turned out. which found petitioner bank negligent and ordered the bank and Mabayad to pay RMC jointly and severally P304. Unfortunately. would do. petitioner bank had been regularly furnishing private respondent with monthly statements showing its current accounts balances.74 to his secretary.From May 5. as it has been in A2179 CC . P304. To accept the petitioners' proposition must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.979. 1976.74. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. however.Picart v. Smith. that these deposits.During this period. filed a complaint to recover from the former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC). however. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. 1975 to July 16. Bienvenido Cotas who likewise maintains an account with the same bank. .Upon discovery of the loss of its funds. Yabut and submitted to private . 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband. represented by its President and General Manager Romeo Lipana. PBC's teller. or some other person for whose acts he must respond. . -Irene Yabut would accomplish two copies of the deposit slip. On the duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank. were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to Account No. to the tune of P304. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so." The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions. Issue: Whether the proximate cause of the loss.There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff. Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number written thereon. for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC with PBC. in technical terms. (b) fault or negligence of the defendant. To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission.72. The law considers what would be reckless.CA affirmed.

produces the injury. Unlike Zacarias who readily submitted himself to investigation by the police. common sense. 1989 NATURE Petition for certiorari praying for a reversal of the judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court which. while the truck stopped on its wheels on the road. the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of. states that where both parties are negligent. the loss would not have occurred. if the latter. original or duplicate." 2. South Cotabato. however. as what the law presumes. in natural and continuous sequence. Here. the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries." The circumstances leading to the conclusion just mentioned: 1. or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident. with Calibo at the wheel.it cannot be denied that private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other.Engineer Orlando T. private respondent should. DE CALIBO and kids) GR No. only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the petitioners. Mabayad. under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to. absent the act of Ms. and Maximo Patos were on the jeep owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries. . not a last possible chance. . . yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank. loaded with cement bags. such cannot be used by the petitioners to escape liability. It must have been a chance as would have enabled a reasonably prudent man in like position to have acted effectively to avoid the injury and the resulting damage to himself. At about that time. including its fender and hood. It was private respondent who had the last and clear chance to prevent any further misappropriation by Yabut had it only reviewed the status of its current accounts on the bank statement sent to it monthly or regularly. was extensively damaged. despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the selfimposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips. Private respondent failed to examine these bank statements not because it was prevented by some cause in not doing so. Stated differently. This omission on the part of the private respondent does not change the fact that were it not for the wanton and reckless negligence of the petitioners' employee in validating the A2010 . Zacarias was unhurt. had just crossed said bridge. Its negligence.Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic.000. FACTS . it is claimed. refused to . coming from the opposite direction of Davao City and bound for Glan. as advanced by the petitioner. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC. . Calibo's companions who suffered injuries on account of the collision.the bank's teller." In this case. Had it done so. Ms.Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. GI sheets. or bar a defense against liability sought by another. In short. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip. casis sizable amount of cash was entrusted to Yabut. had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. is not contributory but the immediate and proximate cause of its injury. the left side of the truck was slightly damaged while the left side of the jeep.. driven by defendant Paul Zacarias y Infants. there must be a last and a clear chance.the bank was not remiss in its duty of sending monthly bank statements to private respondent RMC so that any error or discrepancy in the entries therein could be brought to the bank's attention at the earliest opportunity. Yabut and bank teller Mabayad. . the company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary.70493 NARVASA. the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the truck. Yabut. Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity. Inc. Proximate cause is "that cause. The award of attorney's fees shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Agripino Roranes. As a result of the impact. therefore. which.torts & damages . . could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. 40% of the damage awarded by the respondent appellate court. have taken care of its concerns. except the award of P25.On November 27.the doctrine of "last clear chance" assumes that the negligence of the defendant was subsequent to the negligence of the plaintiff and the same must be the proximate cause of the injury. Calibo.While it is true that had private respondent checked the monthly statements of account sent by the petitioner bank to RMC. . Azucena Mabayad. Ms. simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure. at least. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. The demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio. shall be borne by private respondent RMC. the jeep of the deceased Calibo was "zigzagging. and without which the result would not have occurred. the instant case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the late Engineer Calibo who are residents of Tagbilaran City against the driver and owners of the cargo truck. as it approached from the South Lizada Bridge going towards the direction of Davao City at about 1:45 in the afternoon of July 4. This doctrine. PADILLA [dissent] . thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company. was negligent in validating. Irene Yabut. common human experience dictates that the same would not have been possible without any form of collusion between Ms. but because it was purposely negligent as it admitted that it does not normally check bank statements given by banks.75 - prof. ignored or ran counter to the established facts. policy and precedent. at times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"). petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. the latter would have discovered the loss early on. After the impact. plywood. Mabayad was negligent in the performance of her duties as bank teller nonetheless. .00 attorney's fees. in essence. the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. . At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge. particularly Romeo Lipana. the cargo track. to avoid the accident or injury. Thus. thru its teller. 1979. officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. that the fraud was committed in a span of more than one (1) year covering various deposits.Trial Court dismissed the complaint (and defendants' counterclaim) "for insufficiency of evidence. Moments before its collission with the truck being operated by Zacarias. who had the last fair chance. assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code Disposition CA decision modified. . had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client. Considering.1979. incomplete duplicate deposit slips presented by Ms. Ms. May 18. .Furthermore. Since a GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER AND HARDWARE V IAC (VDA. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause.

a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri. Dispositive WHEREFORE. Ico for herself and for her minor children. 1981. Ratio The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a defense to accident liability. or he could simply have braked to a full stop. were aboard a passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at Malalam River. . Bascos and Fe O.IAC reversed TC. No pronouncement as to costs." 3) the waiver of the right to file criminal charges against Zacarias should not be taken against "plaintiffs" Roranes and Patos who had the right. and the fact that indeed no criminal case was ever instituted in Court against Zacarias. aside from pointing to the late David Ico's alleged negligence as the proximate cause of the accident. Seeing an automobile ahead he improperly pulled his horse over to the railing on the right. Ilagan. ." 2) Zacarias had no license at the time. In those circumstances. together with spouses David Ico and Fe O.: November 1989 FACTS: At about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of June 12. . however guided his car toward the plaintiff without diminution of speed until he was only few feet away. the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby REVERSED.' and although Zacarias saw the jeep from a distance of about 150 meters. was "not as clear and detailed as that of Zacarias. . the collision would never have occurred.David Ico. 3283 of the Court of First Instance of Bohol. . on its regular route to Manila. And they have not seen fit to deny or impugn petitioners' imputation that they also admitted the truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away. as the Appellate Court would have it. without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. and that the jeep had on impact fallen on its right side is indication that it was running at high speed. to opt merely to bring a civil suit." 3. (Picart v Smith) A2010 . Voting Cruz. is DISMISSED. it was the driver of the passenger jeepney who had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and was therefore negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the harm. While they were proceeding towards Malalam River. From that time on up to the present. in that he had caused his truck to run some 25 centimeters to the left of the center of the road. Upon reaching the highway. the spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children Harold Jim." 4. either of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. had had a full view of each other's vehicle from a distance of one hundred fifty meters. Calibo had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident because he still had ample room in his own lane to steer clear of the truck. -Pantranco appealed the decision. his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance. while still at that distance of thirty meters from the truck. Isabela. he "did not drive his truck back to his lane in order to avoid collision with the oncoming jeep ." had both vehicles stayed in their respective lanes. and collided with it. -Picart v Smith: The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge.76 - prof. what he handed to Pfc. The private respondents have admitted that the truck was already at a full stop when the jeep plowed into it." what is worse. -PANTRANCO. JJ. they would have passed "along side each other safely. the defendant was also negligent. River at a speed of about 20 kph.torts & damages be so investigated or give statements to the police officers. Marceline and Maricar. died while the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. the jeepney turned right and proceeded to MaIalam. demonstrates that the driver of the truck had applied the brakes and the jeep's driver had not. HELD NO. Gancayco. concur. and the complaint against herein petitioners in Civil Case No.. plus Roranes' waiver of the right to institute criminal proceedings against Zacarias. the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path. invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver. Ramirez has never been seen and has apparently remained in hiding. Engr. casis PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS. on the latter's demand. Reasoning Both drivers. spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa and their children. But as we have already stated. . Griño-Aquino and Medialdea. The driver of the automobile. . He then turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse that the latter being frightened. given in plaintiffs' behalf. Even if it be considered that there was some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias shortly before the collision. HELD: YES -Petitioner claims that under the circumstances of the case.. was the 'driver's license of his co-driver Leonardo Baricuatro. ." and was "uncertain and even contradicted by the physical facts and the police investigators Dimaano and Esparcia. under the law. Ico with their son Erwin Ico and seven other persons. This. Both vehicles were travelling at a speed of approximately thirty kilometers per hour. It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault. encroached on the jeepney's lane while negotiating a curve. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. boarded a car and proceeded to Santiago. as the Appellate Court found. not merely rely on a supposed right to expect. jumped around and was killed by the passing car. After the accident the driver of the PANTRANCO Bus. The jeepney was extensively damaged. by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck. Other victims settled with Bus Company. That there were skid marks left by the truck's tires at the scene. INC v CAR BASCOS BAESA 179 SCRA 384 CORTES J. Esparcia. "the truck driver suddenly applied his brakes even as he knew that he was still within the lane of the jeep. . From these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident. to celebrate the fifth wedding anniversary of Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa. were "telling indications that they did not attribute the happening to defendant Zacarias' negligence or fault. 5. It found Zacarias to be negligent on the basis of the following circumstances. Ambrosio Ramirez. and none by the jeep. to wit: 1) "the truck driven by defendant Zacarias occupied the lane of the jeep when the collision occurred. Appeal dismissed for lack of merit ISSUE: WON PANTRANCO is liable for damages. since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Branch IV. Roranes' testimony.Maricar Baesa through her guardian Francisca O. filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO. and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. . It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous. ISSUES WON respondent court is correct in reversing the decision of trial court. Ambrosio Ramirez -TC ruled against PANTRANCO and ordered them to pay damages. Isabela. Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa.

and Vicente Mañosca. have been aware of it .000. casis YES.00 and P460. and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered" . The former then executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing the latter to mortgage two parcels of land situated in San Dionisio. both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at the time of the accident the Pantranco bus was speeding towards Manila. February 28. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane. Osmundo Canlas delivered to Vicente Mañosca the transfer certificates of title of the parcels of land involved. . is made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff . For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. petitioner claims that it had observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Batangas. 1982. it was already too late to swerve the jeepney to his right to prevent an accident.77 - prof.torts & damages -petitioner claims that the original negligence of its driver was not the proximate cause of the accident and that the sole proximate cause was the supervening negligence of the jeepney driver David Ico in failing to avoid the accident .Contrary to the petitioner's contention. as a company driver is far from sufficient ANURAN V BUÑO 17 SCRA 224 BENGZON. FACTS . It must follow that the driver – and the owners – of the jeepney must answer for injuries to its passengers. Although this presumption is only a disputable presumption which could be overcome by proof of diligence of a good father of a family. Vicente Mañosca was able to mortgage the same parcels of land for P100. but it turned out that the check covering the bigger amount was not sufficiently funded.00 to serve as his (Osmundo's) investment in the business. ISSUE WON the driver and owners of the jeepney should also be made liable.Suits were instituted by the representatives of the dead and the injured. by exercising reasonable care and prudence.00. each lot with semi-concrete residential house in the name of the SPS Canlas. the doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case. this legal presumption of negligence is confirmed by the CA’s finding that jeepney driver in question was at fault in parking the vehicle improperly. Contrary to the petitioner's contention. negligently bumped it from behind. In this instance. May 20. there instantly arises a presumption that the employer has been negligent either in the selection of his employees or in the supervision over their acts. -The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant. the jeepney had already crossed the intersection and was on its way to Malalam River -On the issue of its liability as an employer.The doctrine of the last clear chance simply.00 of which payable within one week. (BF Homes) Paranaque. The cited law itself provides that it applies only to vehicles entering a through highway or a stop intersection. conformably to the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code -When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee. even as 2 other passengers suffered injuries that required their confinement at the Provincial Hospital for many days. This principle does not apply in this case. means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter. Osmundo Canlas agreed to sell the said parcels of land to Vicente Mañosca.Petitioner likewise insists that David Ico was negligent in failing to observe Section 43 (c). unless they prove that they have observed extraordinary diligence” (Art.000.The above contention of petitioner is manifestly devoid of merit.This Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine "can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously. respectively. . An error of law was committed in releasing the jeepney from liability. this Court believes that the evidence submitted by the defendant to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family iti the case of Ramirez. It must be remembered that the obligation of the carrier to transport its passengers safely is such that the New Civil Code requires “utmost diligence” from the carriers (Art. Buño. with exercise of due care. Vicente Mañosca. which such violence that three of its passengers died.00. the doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case . Canlas.CFI Batangas absolved the driver of the jeepney and its owners. CA Purisima. At the time of the accident. Plaintiffs appealed to the CA insisting that the driver and the owners of the jeepney should also be made liable for damages.000. for and in consideration of P850. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. decided to venture in business and to raise the capital needed therefor. -On September 3. driver of said jeepney stopped his vehicle in order to allow one of his passengers to alight. issued two postdated checks in favor of Osmundo Canlas in the amounts of P40.000. Metro Manila. Thus.00 to a . 1966 NATURE: Petition for Review by certiorari of CA decision. Article III Chapter IV of Republic Act No. who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so.In this case. A motor truck speeding along. Obiter on Application of Principle of Last Clear Chance: The principle about the “last clear chance” applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. and the balance of P350. Osmundo S. might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. on the right shoulder of the said road. P500. a passenger jeepney was parked on the road to Taal. but it required the truck driver and the owners o make compensation.On January 12. DISPOSITION: Judgment modified. to recover consequently damages against the drivers and the owners of the trucks and also against the driver and the owners of the jeepney. 1755) who are “presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. 2000 Nature Petition for Review on Certiorari Facts -Sometime in August. 1756). as his part of the transaction. 4136** which provides that the driver of a vehicle entering a through highway or a stop intersection shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching in either direction on such through highway.000. -Petitioner's misplaced reliance on the aforesaid law is readily apparent in this case. he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction. 1982. For the doctrine to be applicable. A2010 . . But he parked his jeepney in such a way that ½ of its width (the left wheels) was on the asphalted pavement of the road and the other half. it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should. .000. 1958.Moreover. HELD CANLAS V. At the time David Ico must have realized that the bus was not returning to its own lane.

On September 29. casis notwithstanding. Osmundo Canlas wrote a letter informing the respondent bank that the execution of subject mortgage over the two parcels of land in question was without their (Canlas spouses) authority.nêt Yes. In the case under consideration. Calapre then deposited in Solidbank. Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L. the efforts exerted by the bank to verify the identity of the couple posing as Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas fell short of the responsibility of the bank to observe more than the diligence of a good father of a family. the respondent bank must suffer the resulting loss.C. The business of a bank is affected with public interest. private respondent Vicente Mañosca was granted a loan by the respondent Asian Savings Bank (ASB) in the amount of P500. The next day. It is worthy to note that not even a single identification card was exhibited by the said impostors to show their true identity. as well as the Community Tax Certificate of Angelina Canlas. . The doctrine of last clear chance is applicable. 25242 SET ASIDE. . Disposition WHEREFORE. despite several motions for extension of time for the filing thereof. 1982. It was also held that Solidbank did not have any participation in the custody and care of the passbook and as such. 1983 the herein petitioners instituted the present case for annulment of deed of real estate mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. respondent Asian Savings Bank has to bear the loss sued upon.torts & damages certain Attorney Manuel Magno. which bank deposits the bank should guard against loss due to negligence or bad faith. The Decision of Branch 59 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil Case No. the trial court issued an Order restraining the respondent sheriff from issuing the corresponding Certificate of Sheriff's Sale. it was learned that 300k was withdrawn from the account. On January 18. LC Diaz demanded SolidBank the return of their money. WON ASB must incur the resulting loss A2010 . the Court is of the ineluctible conclusion and finding that subject contract of mortgage is a complete nullity. Magno.00. SO ORDERED. But such fact CONSOLIDATED BANK V CA (L. Stated differently. the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter. the teller told him that somebody else got the passbook.) GR No. the bank did not require the impostors to submit additional proof of their true identity. Contreras. on February 3. The proximate cause was LC Diaz’ negligence. Diaz with Allied Bank. No pronouncement as to costs. with the help of impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses. -Consequently. Considering that it was established indubitably that the contract of mortgage sued upon was entered into and signed by impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. LC diaz.78 - prof. Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. and request that steps be taken to annul and/or revoke the questioned mortgage.For failure to file his answer. and on May 23.000. respondent bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage.An information for estafa was filed against one of their messengers (Ilagan) and one Roscoe Verdazola. The latter refused and a case for recovery of a sum of money was filed against them . instructed their messenger. covering the same parcels of land in question. their act was not the proximate cause of the loss. the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so. 138569 CARPIO. Applying Art. they applied the rule that the holder of the passport is presumed the owner. the Petition is GRANTED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals. whose business is impressed with public interest. September 11. petitioner Osmundo Canlas also wrote the office of Sheriff Maximo O. For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking institutions. 1983 be cancelled or held in abeyance. who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. But respondents Maximo C. the bank acted on their representations simply on the basis of the residence certificates bearing signatures which tended to match the signatures affixed on a previous deed of mortgage to a certain Atty. The negligence of respondent bank was magnified by the fact that the previous deed of mortgage (which was used as the basis for checking the genuineness of the signatures of the supposed Canlas spouses) did not bear the tax account number of the spouses. 1983. When the loan it extended was not paid. 1173 It could be said that the degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family in keeping with their responsibility to exercise the necessary care and prudence in dealing even on a registered or titled property. a mortgage. 1983. 2003 NATURE Review of the decision of the CA FACTS . by reason of which the bank would be denied the protective mantle of the land registration law. Contreras and Asian Savings Bank refused to heed petitioner Canlas' stance and proceeded with the scheduled auction sale. accorded only to purchasers or mortgagees for value and in good faith.TC applied rules on savings account written on the passbook. 1983. he left the passbook with Solidbank. CV No.1âwphi1. The rules state that “possession of this book shall raise the presumption of ownership and any payment or payments made by the bank upon the production of the said book and entry therein of the withdrawal shall have the same effect as if made to the depositor personally. Calapre. the doctrine of last clear chance is to the effect that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other. 1993.LC Diaz is a professional partnership engaged in accounting.” Also.DIAZ AND CO. Lower court a quo came out with a decision annulling subject deed of mortgage and disposing. -On January 15.C. and with the involvement of the same impostors who again introduced themselves as the Canlas spouses. Evidently.R. in CA-G. Issue/s and Held WON CA erred in holding that the mortgage is valid Settled is the rule that a contract of mortgage must be constituted only by the absolute owner on the property mortgaged. On 14 August 1991. constituted by an impostor is void. is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident. Vicente Mañosca was declared in default. dated September 30. M-028 is hereby REINSTATED. from the evidence on hand it can be gleaned unerringly that respondent bank did not observe the requisite diligence in ascertaining or verifying the real identity of the couple who introduced themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. asking that the auction sale scheduled on February 3. thru its cashier. holding in trust the money of the depositors. In essence. to deposit money in Solidbank. and yet. Asian Savings Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals and CA reversed the lower court decision. When he came back. with the use of subject parcels of land as security.

the Isuzu pick-up’s right signal light flashed.The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other. There was no clear chance to speak of. DISPOSITIVE Decision affirmed. Dispositive The appealed decision is AFFIRMED. the law imposes on Solidbank and its tellers an even higher degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook. No convincing proof was adduced by petitioner that Iran could have avoided a head-on collision. encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw and headed towards a head-on collision course with it. 1975.” She was discharged after nine days but was re-admitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva. Solidbank could not escape liability because of the doctrine of “last clear chance. . Diaz.C. is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. is chargeable with the loss. Iran swerved to the left only to avoid petitioner’s pickup.CA revered. or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss.We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case. This is a case of culpa contractual. modification only to damages ENGADA V CA QUISUMBING. A2010 . petitioner must be held liable. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent. For failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on drivers of vehicles abandoning their lane. Stated differently. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the impostor.C. It applied the provision on the CC on quasi delicts and found that the requisite elements were present. once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract. ISSUES 1." The following day.” Solidbank could have averted the injury suffered by L. Solidbank failed to discharge this burden. After completion of the transaction. . where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss. The appellate court ruled that while L. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the performance of its contractual obligation to L.: June 20. the registered owner of the Tamaraw. the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant. Thus. but they didn’t) . unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence. The teller could have called up LC Diaz since the amount being drawn was significant.torts & damages .July 29. 2003 NATURE Petition for review seeking the reversal of the decision of the CA which affirmed with modification the judgment of the RTC of Iloilo City FACTS . would exonerate the defendant from liability. Diaz.In culpa contractual. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital. . where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead. They found that the teller made no inquiry upon the withdrawal of 300k.C. Iran could not be faulted when in his attempt to avoid the pick-up. Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. the father of Purita Vestil. Diaz to verify the withdrawal. or culpa contractual. Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract.C. Reasoning The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident. Solidbank was in possession of the passbook while it was processing the deposit. Petitioner’s acts had put Iran in an emergency situation which forced him to act quickly. Iran swerved to his left but the pick-up also swerved to its right. Diaz had it called up L. which was already on a head to head position going against Iran’s Tamaraw jeepney immediately before the vehicles collided. the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so. On board was Sheila Seyan.79 - prof. on August 15. ISSUES WON Solidbank was liable HELD . WON petitioner’s negligence was the proximate cause of the accident HELD 1. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up. YES. 1989. 1989 NATURE Petition to reinstate the decision of the Appellate Court. he swerved to his left. When it was just a few meters away from the Tamaraw. . The Tamaraw passengers allegedly saw from the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pick-up. J. casis overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot do so in safety. (they could have presented the teller to whom the passbook was left. Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney bound for Iloilo City. Likewise. December 6. it swerved to its left.000. Solidbank had the contractual obligation to return the passbook only to Calapre. is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution. who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Diaz was also negligent in entrusting its deposits to its messenger and its messenger in leaving the passbook with the teller. the child died. hitting the latter at its right front passenger side. at the same time. Ratio It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of STRICT LIABILITY VESTIL V IAC (UY) 179 SCRA 47 CRUZ.On November 29. driven by petitioner Rogelio Engada. the pick-up collided with the Tamaraw. 1975: Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda. But what has been shown is the presence of an emergency and the proper application of the emergency rule.C. notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent. The impact caused the head and chassis of the Tamaraw to separate from its body.L. at about 1:30 in the afternoon. Seyan incurred P130. The Toyota Tamaraw jeepney ended up in the junk heap. the bank is liable to its depositor. Solidbank’s tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative .000 in medical expenses. Its total loss was computed at P80. An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger. SolidBank’s negligence in returning the passbook was the proximate cause. It ruled that Solidbank’s negligence was the proximate cause.When the passbook is in the possession of Solidbank’s tellers during withdrawals.C. there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent. FACTS . the authorized representative of L.

since they own the dog that bit her.On the strength of the foregoing testimony. March 6. L-47033 AVANCEÑA. which ultimately caused her death. KANAAN 72 Phil. and acquitted Jose Dingcong. there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. . was a complication of rabies . G. with the costs against apellant. is liable for being the one who directly. a symptom of rabies.It does not matter that the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. -The Kanaans (Halim. -Around 11pm of 19 September 1933. and second. . . on the other hand. the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate. Echevarria. 14. Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria. . Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants.It appears that Madlangbayan had moved to Teodora Alonso St. Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed. 10 of said hotel." the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. DINGCONG vs. AFABLE V SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY 58 PHIL 14 VICKERS. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause. carelessly left the faucet open that with only an ordinary basin without drainage.One Sunday afternoon. the pipes of the hotel were under repair. That time.R. Reasoning ART. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. despite his power and authority to cause the repair of the pipes. DISPOSITION The Court approves the time. No. as a result of the dog bites. A2010 . 1933 NATURE Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila FACTS . paying P30 a month. April 25." thereafter filed this complaint for damages against Loreto Dingcong. Leopoldo Madlangbayan while riding a bicycle was run over and fatally injured at the corner of O'Donnel and Zurbaran streets in the City of Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay. if collectors made collections on Sunday they were required to deliver the amount collected to the company the next morning. when retiring to bed. the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.Theness developed hydrophobia. and that at the time of his death he was returning home after making some collections in San Francisco del Monte. caused the water to spill to the ground and wet the articles and merchandise of the plaintiffs. ISSUE WON Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria are liable for damages HELD YES. sentencing him to pay the plaintiffs damages. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury.The widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan brought an action to recover from the defendant . and he was supposed to be residing in his district according to the records of the company.80 - prof. . although it may escape or be lost. . casis -CFI held Francisco Echevarria liable. Nasri and Michael). wetting the articles and merchandise of the "American Bazaar. with complete possession of the house. He failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent these damages. that it was a tame animal. occupies the ground floor of the hotel and established his "American Bazaar" dedicated to the purchase and sale of articles and merchandise. in Manila without notifying the company.Obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. and occupying room no. the hotel guest. Petitioners’ Claim The Vestils are liable for the death of Theness. HELD Ratio The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. being a co-renter and manager of the hotel. .Seven months later. Basa Street of the City of Iloilo) and established the Central Hotel.torts & damages The cause of death was certified as bronchopneumonia. -Francisco Echevarria. IAC found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. as a result of the dog bites. and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. the water run off the pipes and spilled to the ground. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility." causing a loss which the CFI sets at P1. ISSUE WON the Vestils are liable for the damage caused by the dog. As for the alleged provocation. was a complication of rabies. pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia. which ultimately caused her death.Theness developed hydrophobia. that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia.While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house.According to the practice of the company. 2183. Among the hotel's guests is Francisco Echevarria. alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy. by his negligence in leaving open the faucet. . the Uys sued for damages. Respondents’ Comments The dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda. and second.089. CA reversed and declared Jose Dingcong responsible. must also be responsible for the damages caused. . 1941 NATURE Petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA FACTS -The brothers Loreto and Jose Dingcong rented the house of Emilia Saenz (in Jose Ma. a symptom of rabies.Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine Company in the district of San Francisco del Monte. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility. outside of the limits of the City of Manila. Kanaan. once or twice weekly. -Jose Dingcong.There is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house.Judge Jose R.61. . representing the establishment "American Bazaar. The Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. . . pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.

81 - prof. but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's employment of incidental to such employment. Geronimo examined her stock of softdrinks and found that there were indeed fibrous materials in the unopened soda bottles. . JR. is unconstitutional and void because it denies the defendant the equal protection of the law. that the defendant company did not require its employees to work on Sunday. Her losses amounted to P200 to P300 a day which later on forced her to close down her business on December 12. 1930. According to the CA: “the allegations in the complaint plainly show that it is an action for damages arising from respondent’s act of recklessly and negligently manufacturing adulterated food items intended to be sol for public consumption.Since the complaint is for breach of warranty (under A1561.As the deceased Leopoldo Madlangbayan was killed on November 16. Petitioners’ Claim: . and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by reason of such employment. RULING NO. A2010 .Geronimo alleges that her complaint is one for damages which does not involve an administrative action. because such an accident does no arise out of and in the course of his employment. . and impairs the obligation of the contract between the defendant and Leopoldo Madlangbayan. 3812 was not approved until December 8. and XXXIV of the Civil Code Procedure and related articles of the Civil Code. 1989. P100 for burial expenses and P1.Furthermore. 3428. 3428 was changed in Act No. Thus the complaint should have been filed within 6 months from the delivery of the thing sold. said: The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident.745. Respondents’ Comments: . . to recover. the plaintiffs would undoubtedly have the right.A group of parents complained that they found fibrous material in the bottles of Coke and Sprite that their children bought from Geronimo’s store. and as a general rule an employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment. 1930 and Act No. . or furnish or require its agents to use bicycles.The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in section 2 of Act No. She brought the bottles to the Department of Health office in their region and was informed that the soda samples she sent were adulterated. October 18. DISPOSITION The decision appealed from was affirmed.12 for compensation.Coca-Cola moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and prescription. XXXII. his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified.Lydia Geronimo was engaged in the business of selling food and drinks to children in the Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen located in Dagupan. as the defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to use one. By the use of these words it was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment. . it is apparent that the law which is applicable is Act No.12 plus P100 for burial expenses.745. .The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and in pursuance of his employment. and his employer is not liable for any injury sustained by him. Industrial Board.Because of this.These are additional reasons for holding that the accident was not due to and pursuance of the employment of the deceased.The trial court ruled in favor of Coca-Cola.torts & damages corporation under Act No.The trial court however annulled the questioned orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further proceedings in the civil case. Discussing this phrase. and deprives the Courts of First Instance of their probate jurisdiction over the estate of deceased persons and nullifies Chapters XXIX. ISSUE WON the employer is liable to pay the employee’s heirs. XXX. it appears that the deceased had never notified the defendant corporation of his removal from San Francisco del Monte of Manila. 3428 fifty per cent of P16. . he did not do so in pursuance of his employment. XXXI. 3428. casis DAVIDE. and if he made collections on Sunday. it should have been brought within 6 months from the delivery of the goods. while the words "in the course of" refer to the time. . section 23 of which reads as follows: When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident due to in the pursuance of the employment. If the deceased saw fit to change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make use a bicycle in going back and forth. . as amended.If the deceased had been killed while going from house to house in San Francisco del Monte in the pursuance of his employment.The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment". 3812 to "arising out of and in the course of". . . vs. . XXXIII. . CC). he did so at his own risk. but was on his way home after he had finished his work for the day and had left the territory where he was authorized to take collections for the defendant.Defendant as special defenses alleged that Leopoldo Madlangbayan at the time that he sustained the injuries resulting in his death was violating an ordinance of the City of Manila which prohibits work on Sunday. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS (GERONIMO) 227 SCRA 292 PHILS V CA .August 12. and that Act No. 1989 .78 for 208 weeks of P1. the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Mueller Construction Co..She demanded payment of damages from plaintiff Coca-Cola but the latter did not accede to her demands.Plaintiffs' complaint was subsequently amended. .In the case at bar the deceased was going from work in his own conveyance. 3428. prima facie. as amended by Act. and they sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No. place. or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment or the result of the nature of such employment. and are descriptive of its character.” It also noted that the availability of an action for breach of warranty does not bar an action for torts in a sale of defective goods. Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the particular employment are excluded. 1993 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . 3812. stating that the complaint was based on a contract and not a quasidelict because of pre-existing relation between the parties. . Geronimo’s sales plummeted with her regular sales of 10 cases day dwindling to about 2 or 3 cases. and circumstances under which the accident takes place. . with the costs against the appellants.At the time that he was over by the truck Leopoldo Madlangbayan was not in the pursuance of his employment with the defendant corporation. No. and that the company did not know that he was living in Manila on the day of the accident. .

Trendsetter Marketing. This liability arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. and damges are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. 1990 was implemented. Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to execute lease contracts in its favor. petitioner. The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud in which case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable. ISSUE WON Espejo and Zaldarriaga is liable for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy.In 1989. DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed SON PING BUN vs CA (Tek Hua) GR No. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of the tortfeasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damage. No such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover for the damages suffered.So Ping Bun. A further rent increase of 30% effective January 1. 120554 Quisumbing. c) the defendant’s conduct is a legal cause of the invasion. February 18.Yes. the same were not rescinded. . they not knowing at the time the identity of the parties .In 1963. on the death of his grandfather. GILCHRIST v CUDDY 29 Phil 542 TRENT. Tek Hua was dissolved with the original members forming a new corporation. Espejo and Zaldarriaga. In 1976. September 21. Chuan covering four stalls in Binondo. or harm which results from injury. Tek Hua Enterprises with Manuel Tiong as one of the incorporators.Under American law. Both the trial court and the CA awarded legal fees only. He also prayed for damages against Espejo and Zaldarriaga for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy. hurt. tort or other grounds. The lower Court ruled in favor of Tek Hua. 1989.In 1991. ISSUE . shall be obliged to pay for the damage done. So Pek Giok.WON So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference of contract HELD. occupied the same stalls under the business name.Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against Cuddy. and as a result petitioner deprived respondent of the latter’s property right. Enclosed in both letters were new lease contracts for signing. entered into a lease agreement with D. Instead of vacating the stalls. breach of warranty. The CA. the liabilities of the manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on negligence. CC. ISSUE WON the complaint is founded on a quasi-delict and pursuant to A1146(12). Gilchrist was the owner of a theatre in Iloilo. the elemts of tort interference are a) existence of a valid contract b) knowledge on the part of the third party of its existence c) interference of the third party is without legal justification or excuse . . So was able to secure lease agreements from DC Chuan. One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with. . b) the invasion is substantial. DISPOSITION The instant petition is denied for lack of merit. A duty which the law on torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others.Since there were existing lease contracts between Tek Hua and DC Chuan.On the other hand. . The contracts were initially for one year but after expiry of the same. CC). They entered into a contract whereby Cuddy leased to Gilchrist the Zigomar” for exhibition in his theatre for a week for P125.The vendee’s remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in A1567. 1999 NATURE Appeal on certiorari for review of CA decision FACTS . casis . Tiong wrote a letter to So Ping Bun asking him to vacate the four stalls as the same were going to be used by them. DC Chuan sent a letter to Tek Hua advising it of a 25% increase in rent effective September 1.Damage is the loss. . they continued on a month to month basis. . While the letters contained a statement that the leases will be terminated if the contracts were not signed. the lessor.torts & damages . and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one party of the enjoyment of the other of his private property. . Reasoning.Her cause of action is based on an injury to plaintiff’s right which can be brought within 4 years (based on A1146. HELD YES .Cuddy returned the money already paid by Gilchrist days before the delivery date so that he can lease the film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga instead and receive P350 for the film for the same period.Appellants have the legal liability for interfering with the contract and causing its breach. Tek hua Trading. by act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence. through its Managing Director So Pek Giok.82 - prof. A2010 .C. The action of Trendsetter in asking DC Chuan to execute the contracts in their favor was unlawful interference. Tek Hua in fact had property rights over the leased stalls. on appeal. d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under the general negligence rules. 1915 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the CFI FACTS -Cuddy was the owner of the film “Zigomar”. In the case at bar. the action prescribes in 4 years HELD YES Reasoning . . upheld the trial court.Tek Hua filed an injunction and an action for nullification of the contracts between Trendsetter and DC Chuan.Article 1902 of the Civil Code provides that a person who.

. holding all the defendants (except for Reyes. CA decision affirmed subject to the modified award of attorney’s fees. Provinces. she has been unable to perform her religious. and other public works under their control or supervision. Aguilar. due to which she was hospitalized. Reyes. the judge of the CFI rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. social. plaintiff was forced to seek relief through the Court snd thereby incur expenses to protect his interests. and confined. and that she has difficulty in locomotion. Lichauco. .In this case. public buildings. The Court. streets.65. CA reversed the lower court’s ruling on the ground that no evidence was presented to prove that City of Dagupan had control or supervision over Perez Blvd. 1989 Nature: Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of CA Facts: . She has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter (at the time of filing of complaint) and thus lost income. operated on. .torts & damages . public buildings and other public works. due to defendant’s action of interference.City Engineer of Dagupan Alfredo Tangco admitted that the manhole is owned by the National Government and the sidewalk on which they are found along Perez Blvd. writers. cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of. Mar 21. . Feb. She also lost weight. member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior of the Insular Government commenced an action against defendants Ocampo. city or municipality for liability to attach. or injuries suffered by. - The charter only lays down general rules regulating that liability of the city. Jose. . . bridges.City contends that Perez Blvd is a national road that is not under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. unworthy of the position which he held.83 - prof.Moral damages of P150000 is excessive and is reduced to P20000. and the job is specifically done by his subordinates.00 Disposition – Petition denied.It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province. Issue WON control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists. Palma. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. plus P450 bonus remain the same . 27.Actual damages of P10000 reduced to proven expenses of P8053. Barretto and Cansipit (owners. however. no liability should attach to the city. Liquete.Plaintiff Dean Worcester. . Her right leg was fractured. The court can not rely on “speculation.The provision in the Civil Code with regard tortuous interference is Article 1314 which states that “ any third party who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party”.The liability of private corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows: Article 2189. Aguilar and Liquete who were found to be editors but in a subordinate position and found to have merely acted under the direction of their superiors) liable jointly and severally for sustained damages on account of petitioner’s wounded feelings. He said that he supervises the maintenance of said manholes and sees to it that they are properly covered.The SC handled the question of whether the interference may be justified considering that So acted solely for the purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest. mental suffering and injuries to his standing and reputation in the sum of P35. which was partially covered by a concrete flower pot by leaving a gaping hole about 2 ft long by 1 ½ feet wide or 42 cm wide by 75 cm long by 150 cm deep.on July 25. . a court interpreter. PERSONS LIABLE WORCESTER v OCAMPO 22 PHIL 42 Johnson. any person by reason of the defective condition of roads. The trial court should not have rounded off the amount. decision of trial court reinstated with modification. editors and administrators of a certain newspaper known as “El Renacimiento” or “Muling Pagsilang”) for the purpose of recovering damages resulting from an alleged libelous publication. In this casse.Exemplary damages of P50000 reduced to P10000. in effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with article 2189 CC. . accidentally fell into a manhole while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk at Perez Blvd.Police confirmed existence of the manhole. .After hearing the evidence adduced during trial. a vulture that gorges himself on dead and rotten meat. and she is no longer her former jovial self.The editorial “Birds of Prey” was alleged to have incited the Filipino people into believing that plaintiff was a vile despot and a corrupt person. 1978. The Court ratiocinated that the recovery of legal fees is in the concept of actual or compensatory damages as provided in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. directors.She averred that she suffered mental and physical pain. Nothing on the record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on the part of So. . found the award exorbitant.000 as punitive damages. conjecture or guess work as to the amount.Trial court ordered the city to pay Guilatco actual. are also owned by the National Government.” On Damages awarded . GUILATCO v CITY OF DAGUPAN 171 SCRA 382 SARMIENTO. It was reduced to Pesos 100. CA decision reversed and set aside. On the other hand. A2010 . Florentina Guilatco. Held YES . moral and exemplary damages. Santos.P3000 as attorney’s fees remain the same Disposition Petition granted. Moreover. It stated that it is sufficient that the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives to conclude that So was not a malicious interferer. and a vampire that sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless. 1912 NATURE Appeal from judgment of CFI FACTS . Hence. Kalaw. control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer. casis . an owl that affects a petulant omniscience. Hence the lack of malice precludes the award of damages. Guilatco’s handicap was not permanent and disabled her only during her treatment which lasted for one year. Arellano. plus attorney’s fees. and other activities which she used to do prior to the incident. The said editorial alluded to him as an eagle that surprises and devours. . article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from “defective streets.000. .Award of P7420 as lost income for one year.000 as well as P25.

seeing that he could not reach it without extra exertion. When the front of the "San Marcelino" car was almost in front of the defendant's automobile. passed into the street for the purpose of signaling and boarding the car. Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. and altogether jointly liable for the whole damage. and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts. The car which the plaintiff intended to board was on the main line and bound in an opposite direction to that in which the defendant was going. Arellano. 000 with interest at 6%. ISSUE WON the defendants. went off the main line to the left upon the switch lying alongside of the main track. that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants. in any way the commission of a crime. or who approve of it after it is done.The judgment of the trial court was for defendant. editing. . defendant's driver suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the plaintiff.Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort. ARELLANO. if done for their benefit. Therefore they can not incur. the plaintiff or person injured. So also is the person who counsels. has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly. nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as compared with that of the others. . except with reference to the liability imposed upon Lichauco. may be held jointly and severally liable as joint tortfeasors HELD YES. assisted or counseled. committed no error in rendering a joint and several judgment against the defendants. after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom. Kalaw.After Ocampo had accepted the various amounts proffered.84 - prof. CHAPMAN V UNDERWOOD 27 Phil 374 . Ocampo. Ratio Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command. the lower court. encourage. Santos absolved from any liability. Plaintiff attempted to board the front platform but. Barretto. as fully as if he were the author of the same. It is incomprehensible how one could claim the right or title to share the earnings or profits of a company when he had put no capital into it. The car was a closed one. because tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual. A street car bound from Manila to Sta. Palma. The person injured may sue all of them. Each is liable for the whole damage caused by all.The defendant entered Calle Herran at Calle Peñafrancia in his automobile driven by his chauffeur. becomes himself responsible for such acts. it is improper to deduce that the contributors formed a company of either a civil or commercial nature. Lichauco. under the common law. and still less incur liability for damages on account of some act of the said company. As recognized by Section 6 of Act 277 of the Philippine Commission: “Every author. and Cansipit for they had neither direct nor indirect participation in the act that gave rise to the present suit for damages.I concur in regard to the defendants Ocampo and Kalaw. . They are each liable as principals. cooperate in. Under the common law. aid or abet the commission of a tort. its press or other equipment.We concur. he immediately. he who aided.The plaintiff-appellant. C. regardless of their participation in the commission of the actual tort.This judgment prompted defendants to appeal to the SC. J.The courts during the trial may find that some of the alleged joint tortfeasors are liable and that others are A2010 . facing toward the rear platform. Barretto. While in this position he was struck from behind and run over by the defendant's (Underwood) automobile. neither is it comprehensible how one could share in the losses thereof. claiming that the CFI committed several errors in rendering said judgment among which was that the lower court committed an error in rendering a judgment jointly and severally against the defendants. for the purpose of founding. the entrance being from the front or the rear platform. promote. and without not liable. It is not necessary that the cooperation should be a direct. Ocampo. Lichauco. explicitly stated that the other so-called founders subscribed and paid sums of money to aid the paper but as to Lichauco. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tortfeasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates. They were donors who merely contributed a sum of money. And this is true even though they are charged jointly and severally. or any number less than all.torts & damages . nor were they owners or proprietors of the newspaper. Being told by his friend that the car was approaching. by a sudden act of negligence. but did not carry out his offer and in fact paid nothing. or assists in any way the commission of a wrong. Thereupon the defendant either kept straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to the right. countenance. in this case. editor. a competent driver. if the driver. desired to board a certain "San Marcelino" car coming from Sta. The defendants might have been sued separately for the commission of the tort. corporeal act. It is no defense for one sued alone. Ana and bound for Manila. They might have sued jointly and severally. but is also jointly liable with his tortfeasors. Arellano. or one of them separately. and issuing the said newspaper. Disposition Judgment of the lower court modified. [concurring] . and MAPA. Reasoning Defendants fail to recognize that the basis of the present action is a tort. Jose. **note: Ponente used examples of torts as held under common law** (In a case of assault and battery committed by various persons. was as much a principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual tort. 1914 NATURE Appeal from the judgment of trial court finding for the defendant FACTS . stopped beside the car. all are principals). the donors ceased to be the owners of and surrendered all right to the money donated and to the objects that were acquired therewith. However. he offered to contribute.J. TORRES [dissenting in part] . ***If several persons jointly commit a tort. Ana being immediately in front of him. casis MORELAND. aids. and somewhat hurriedly. Ratio An owner who sits in his automobile or other vehicle. instigate. HELD NO. as they were. Jose. March 28. advise. ISSUE WON Underwood is responsible for the negligence of his driver. jointly and severally with the director and manager. as a genuine gift. The real owner and founder. as though he were a regular general partner when he was not such. . an unrestricted liability to the extent of all his property. to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. but dissent as regards Palma. and Cansipit held jointly and severally liable for the sum of P25. or proprietor * * * is chargeable with the publication of any words in any part * * * or number of each newspaper. Just before reaching the scene of the accident the street car which was following took the switch (there was a single-track street-car line running along Calle Herran. On the other hand. . and waited for it to come abreast of him in order to board.that is. Chapman. he followed along behind it. with occasional switches to allow cars to meet and pass each other).

Caedo and three daughters. .No negligence can be imputed. in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. absent a minimum level imposed by law.The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. as they were the only ones under the law permitted to pass upon that side of the street car. makes his driver’s act his own. injures a person or violates the criminal law. The test of his intelligence. as he claimed later on at the trial. With them in the car were Mrs. And as far as perception is concerned. And even if he did not notice the lights. only eight meters away. Ahead of the Cadillac. although present herein at5 the time the act was committed.. Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance.Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from his home in Quezon City to the airport. He had reason to rely on the skill of his driver. and the risk should have been quite obvious. L-20392 MAKALINTAL. must be sought in the immediate setting. Reasoning Defendant's driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and over the plaintiff. judged the distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the Cadillac would wait behind. The CFI ruled in favor of the Caedos and held Bernardo and Yu solidarily liable. if any. the owner of the automobile. unless the negligent act of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. . either civilly or criminally. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai. instead of slowing down or stopping altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear. going in the same direction.Bernardo had no record of any traffic violation. casis Decision modified. however.The Caedos were injured. There was no reason for Yu to be specially alert. wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane. Bernardo. December 18. one on each side.it appears with fair clearness that the interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver. Julian Bautista. . On his part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane. DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is affirmed. Caedo was driving his Mercury car. The act complained of must be continued in the presence or the owner for such a length of time that the owner by his acquiescence. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. 1968 FACTS .1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant would be responsible. When he approached the carritela. He was driving the latter’s Cadillac along highway 54.The plaintiff needed only to watch for cars coming from his right. the carretela should anyway have been visible to him from afar if he had been careful. . They filed a suit for recovery of damages against Bernardo and Yu Khe Thai.85 - prof. . . L-20392 MAKALINTAL. The car was running at a reasonable speed. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro's son. he slackened his speed. He was passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side. considering the condition of the road and the absence of traffic — the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour. is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane.Bernardo is the driver of Yu Khe Thai. where his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro. taking the owner from his Parañaque home to Wack Wack. therefore. that is. the same rule applies where the owner is present. 1968 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CFI of Iloilo FACTS . was a caretella owned by a certain Pedro Bautista. or else squeeze in between them in any case. YU KHE THAI GR No.A carretela was in front of the Cadillac.Negligence on the employer’s part. Bernardo did not see the carretela from afar. with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel. the driver does not fall within the list of persons in Art.The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel. David.in the case of Johnson vs. . where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. veered to the left in order to pass. Bernardo. a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another DISPOSITIVE . This is the first clear indication of his negligence. . No negligence of having employed him maybe imputed to his master. Yu Khe Thai is free from liability car of the Caedos’ approaching from the opposite lane. On the other side of the road. . Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not present at the time the alleged negligent acts were committed by the driver. December 18. within the meaning of Article 2184. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel. ISSUES WON Yu Khe Thai should be held solidarily liable as Bernardo’s employer HELD CAEDO V YU KHE THAI GR NO.In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the opposite direction. It was a risky maneuver either way. and they should have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary precautions. is not responsible. . . decided to take a gamble — beat the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with the carretela.torts & damages the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance.Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of him. The carretela was provided with two lights. . as it must have been in the beam of his headlights for a considerable while. CAEDO v. he decided to overtake it even though he had already seen the No. A2010 . and the Cadillac at approximately 48 to 56 kilometers. The road was wide and open. where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. He was with his family.

This . WON defendant Rafael Bernardo is liable for the accident. employment of professional drivers by A2010 . Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. nor did he know that his son was going to attend a parade. Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperiña. casis defense was sustained by the lower court and. Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged and. SABINA EXCONDE vs.959. reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage. if any. No. boarded a jeep and when the same started to run. by -their very inadequacies. but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible. the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. and so he had to swerve to the left in spite of the presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions. HELD 1. As it was. If the causative factor was the driver's negligence. RULING YES. 2. it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the complaint. necessarily subjective. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. within the meaning of Article 2184. DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO G. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. . caught the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose. plaintiff contends. If YES. (school’s liability versus parental liability) which provides: "ART. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant. the mother. paragraph 1 and 5. the civil liability of the father is evident." car owners who. Sabina Exconde. He only came to know it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher. Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperiña. . but was unsuccessful. No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master. YES. confronted with the unexpected situation.torts & damages . From the school Dante. Its rear bumper. . The test of his intelligence. Caedo. the former was not under the control. And as far as perception is concerned. have real need of drivers' services. as a consequence. Dante Capuno was only fifteen (15) years old when he committed the crime. 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna. ISSUE Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable. and is otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo. supervision and custody of the latter. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers. he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident. 1957 BAUTISTA ANGELO.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperiña. in case of his death or incapacity.It was already too late to apply the brakes when Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front of him. There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that he must be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. NO. the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question jointly and severally with his son Dante because at the time the latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim. is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. with costs against the latter. It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the Balintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31. From this decision. absent a minimum level imposed by law. The road was wide and open.R. Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of P2. as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperiña. L-10068-70 June 29. 1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr. with other students. must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident. teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. and. would be effectively proscribed. defendant Yu Khe Thai. if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him. WON his employer. J. as already stated. And so. to a great degree. The photographs taken at the scene show that the right wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at the moment of impact. that is. the clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side was insufficient.The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is. died as a consequence. In line with her reservation. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them. is solidarily liable with him. and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed. 1903. 2.Rafael Bernardo had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations.: FACTS Dante Capuno. After trial.12 12 The case involves an interpretation of Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code. the lower court erred in relieving the father from liability. son of Delfin Capuno. The car was not running at an unreasonable speed. father of Dante.The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to the right. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The father. jointly and severally with his son Dante. plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals but the case was certified to the Supreme Court on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of law. was accused of double homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperiña and Amado Ticzon on March 31. was not with his son at the time of the accident. During the trial. DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from liability.86 - prof.The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. xxx xxx xxx Finally. It further appears that Delfin Capuno. and devoid of traffic that early morning. on appeal. for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno. reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages against the accused. Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness. in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. Negligence on the part of the latter. ISSUE 1. a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. . he was a minor and was then living with his father.

JJ. so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and supervision over the pupil. In the circumstances. jointly and severally. No. in connection with Art.. 1957). And it was in connection with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it. Padilla and Reyes. dissenting: A2010 . Issue: WON the father is liable civilly for the criminal act of his son? Held: Yes. nor the city school's supervisor. Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular activity. A. this tribunal gave the following reasons for the rule: — The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and. on September 16. on the other hand. the mother. The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms "preceptores y artesanos" used in the Italian and French Civil Codes. holding the defendants jointly and severally liable with his minor son Dante for damages. in case of his death or incapacity. submits that the appellate Court erred in holding him liable for damages for the deliberate criminal act of his minor son. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Art. now appellant Agapito Fuellas. Mary's High School. 2180 of the new Civil Code for damages. for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them. and which he had every right to assume the school authorities would avoid. 2180 of the Civil Code. What substantial difference is there between them in so far as concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons. I believe we should affirm the judgment relieving the father of liability. his right arm was broken after Rico pushed him on the ground. liable under Art. he attended the parade in honor of Dr. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority.L. WHICH WAS LATER MODIFIED BY J CRUZ IN AMADORA VS. and. CADANO Nature: Appeal from the Decision of the Trial Court making defendant therein. the above mentioned articles are not applicable.959. 1903.R. in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades" used in Art. I submit that the father should not be held liable for a tort that he was in no way able to prevent. for the existence of deliberate intent in the commission of an act negatives the presence of fault or negligence in its commission. The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article 1903. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents. This defendants failed to prove. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them. Having proved that he entrusted his child to the custody of school authorities that were competent to exercise vigilance over him. COURT OF APPEALS) REASONING The provision “Teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody". son of defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas. In my opinion. 1903 of the old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. teachers. the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them.87 - prof. only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art.00 as damages. J. Spanish Civil Code). G. L-10132. They were classmates at St. also a minor. Spanish Civil Code). arising from the criminal act committed by the latter. et al. the sum of P2. gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155. They had a quarrel that lead to Pepito’s injury. And if there is no authority. casis to Pepito Cadano. last paragraph.. could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an institution of arts and trades as provided for by law.torts & damages RATIO Parents shall be liable for the tortious conduct of their minor children living with them although at the time of the tort. educating them in proportion to their means".. that according to the last article. in case of his death or incapacity. If. while. should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody. J. 134 and 135. educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means". It is contended that in the decision of the Court of Appeals. Spanish Civil Code). 2176 of the same Code. the father of the minor who caused the injuries . but deliberate intent. and that there being no fault or negligence on the part of petitioner-appellant's minor son. Facts: Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas. the latter. June 29. concur. This. REYES. the act of the minor must be one wherein "fault or negligence" is present.. the mother. Dansalan City. 1903 of the old Civil Code. the accident occurred. etc.. Appellant. SALEN V. 1954. is obvious. Spanish Civil Code). last paragraph.B. and not the parent. 1903 and the burden of proof shifted to the claimant to show actual negligence on the part of the parent in order to render him liable. (THIS IS A LANDMARK DOCTRINE. the father has rebutted the presumption of Art. there can be no responsibility. the children were under the direct control or supervision of an academic institution. and the costs of action. 2 of Art. In an earlier case (Exconde vs. defendants failed to prove. is obvious. gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Arts. the petitioner-appellant was ordered to pay damages for the deliberate injury caused by his son. while on the other hand. keeping them in their company. The civil liability which the law impose upon the father. it is clear that neither the head of that school. keeping them in their company. therefore. the words "arts and trades" does not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of establishments". BALCE FUELLAS V. Wherefore. as conceded by all commentators. Capuno. I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. were both 13 years old. that the said court held the petitioner liable pursuant to par. prom. it would seem clear that where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher. for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them.

no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. WON the father of Bonifacio (car) is liable. casis father alone and not the minor or the mother. together will several other members of the Gutierrez family. pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code. and of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on a different basis. 1931 Nature: an action brought by the plaintiff in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the five defendants. Moreover. this tribunal held: — It is true that under Art. would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son. that of contract. who maintains it for the general use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children. In its broader aspects. any discussion as to the minor's criminal responsibility is of no moment. Issue: 1. Abelardo Velasco. Narcisso Gutierrez was a passenger of the bus. In reversing the decision. This is because a son who commits the act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12. Revised Penal Code). the 2. on approaching the bridge and the truck. The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco. In the United States. 101 of the Revised Penal Code. The theory of the law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of the owner's business. Verily. was killed in a vehicular collision (between Luna. the owner of the truck. The reason for this conclusion reaches to the findings of the trial court concerning the position of the truck on the bridge. would be liable for the damages caused by the minor. were accommodated therein. the defendant Balce was the father of a minor Gumersindo Balce. with neither being willing to slow up and give the right of way to the other. unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. a father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile. that he was driving at an excessive rate of speed. the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of the evidence submitted therein by both parties.torts & damages In another case. September 23. the case is one of two drivers approaching a narrow bridge from opposite directions. under 9 years of age. in case of his death or incapacity. and that. so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and servant. The automobile was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez. Salen and Salbanera vs. and was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother. The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his son. and Saturnino Cortez. And responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the action in the present case was instituted. Narcisso Gutierrez blames both the bus and the car while the truck blames the car and the car in turn blames the truck. but the mother. The liability of Saturnino Cortez. who acts without discernment. for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted. the pertinent portion of which provides: "The father and.88 - prof. the speed in operating the machine. driving a gokart. the decision appealed from is affirmed GUTIERREZ VS GUTIERREZ MALCOLM. Yes. resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil Code. minor son of plaintiffs. or over 9 but under 15 years of age. 2. jointly and severally. to recover damages in the amount of P10. where the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the owner's family than the child driving it. whom he designates or permits to run it. and the lack of care employed by the chauffeur. the judgment appealed from will be modified. Mr. The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority or control. the petition is dismissed. But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability. Based on these facts. At the time of the collision. and the costs of both instances. is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault of negligence under the Penal Code (Art. The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180. In that case. subdivisions 1." To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses. as may be gleaned from some recent A2010 . namely. 1985 NATURE: Petition to review a decision of CA FACTS: Roberto Luna. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case. for the sum of P5. WON the owner of the truck is liable. Disposition In consonance with the foregoing rulings. 2177). the owner of an automobile. He had a fracture on his right leg. below 18 years of age who was living with him. are responsible for damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. the mother. and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore stated. independently of the criminal case. RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA) 135 SCRA 242 ABAD SANTOS. the father was not in the car. 2180 of the new Civil Code. it is uniformly held that the head of a house. stating that the civil liability of the minor son of defendant arising from his criminal liability must be determined under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and not under Art. and the plaintiff will have judgment in his favor against the defendants Manuel Gutierrez. and was owned by Saturnino Cortez. and Mrs. with the inevitable result of a collision and an accident decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical cases. for physical injuries suffered as a result of an automobile accident. a businessman. Yes. IN VIEW HEREOF. February 28. a lad 18 years of age.000. It was conceded that the collision was caused by negligence pure and simple. the void apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code.000. Manuel Gutierrez. Facts: A passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the municipality of Las Piñas. Province of Rizal. and . But. seven in all. Jose Balce. an insane. Held: 1. he lost his head and so contributed by his negligence to the accident. 2 and 3. Gumersindo was found guilty of homicide for having killed Carlos Salen. the youth Bonifacio was in incompetent chauffeur.

” Also.000 for loss of companionship.January 14. “That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low slung. and an annual net income of P55. must have caused Wendell's death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification . this time reducing the unearned income to P450.650. as a matter of equity. Also. YES Ratio: The reduction of the award of net unearned earnings had no basis.000. then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents. “It stands to reason that if his annual personal expenses should increase because of the ‘escalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R. only slightly larger than foot-pedaled four wheeled conveyances. low powered vehicles. Hill nothwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of his son.) Obiter: The Dela Rosas invoke the ruling in Elcano v Hilll. Luis is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine Courts.1992 NATURE Petition for review of the Intermediate Appellate Court.000. married. . all with legal interest. but since the son had attained majority. RTC considered the age and health of the deceased. it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would also increase considering the manifold sources thereof” 2. the SC came out with a resolution ordering the Dela Rosas. interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the court. FACTS . Malou Alfonso . The Dela Rosas now invoke that the father should also be held only subsidiarily. the CA modified the decision. and who also died in the same event on the same date. the liability of Atty. It was error on the part of the CA to have disturbed the determination of the RTC which it had previously affirmed. CFI dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of the evidence.000 compensatory damages.000 as unearned net earnings of Luna. within 30 days.respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who.January. due to the escalating gasoline expenses. WON the CA erred in reducing the unearned income 2. Hill became merely subsidiarily to that of his son.000 for unearned net earnings. he has no property in the Phils or elsewhere. which the CFI ruled in favor of the Lunas.000 (no interest mentioned).000 compensatory damages. the court is “unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law because to do so will not serve the ends of justice. Both parties filed separate petitions for review in the SC. (Note: father and son solidarily liable for damages. He has no assets of his own as yet”). . 1978 when Julie Ann broke up with Wendell after she found him to be sadistic and irresponsible.000 gross income less P20. Cebu City. casis LIBI V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SPS GOTIONG) 214 SCRA 16 REGALADO. to pay the Lunas P450.000.More than 2 years before their deaths. thus is void. whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU). driving a Toyota car without a license) at a gokart practice area. (The atty’s fees should accrue interest from the date of filing of the compliant. P50. father of Wendell . In coming out with the life expectancy. decision of the then WRT to the gross income. Heirs of Luna brought a suit for damages against Luis and his father. CA erred in ruling that the engagement with car racing reduced the life expectancy. P12. it was an error to increase the expenses without increasing the gross income.1979 .IAC: CFI decision set aside and found Libis subsidiarily liable ISSUE WON A2180 CC is applicable in making Libi’s liable for vicarious liability . prompting him to resort to threats against her. WON the award for atty’s fees should have legal interest HELD: 1. the CA increased the annual personal expenses to P30. thus coming up with a potential gross income of P75. thus lowering the net annual unearned income to P45. 1979 . and 15 years after the process of litigation is still not over). Reasoning: the RTC based its computation of the net unearned earnings on 2 factors: life expectancy of the deceased of another 30 years. and the trend of his earnings over the span of his last few years. P12. To this contention. In the meantime. . RTC considered the various positions the deceased held at the time of his death.000 (P75. while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi.Julie and Wendell died from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm licensed under Cresencio Libi. and P50.000 for loss of his companionship (come on!!). The writ of execution produced only a nominal amount.CFI Cebu: Gotiongs filed civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter's vicarious liability under A2180 CC. YES Ratio: The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and under the circumstances. and attorney’s fees of P50. contending that the CA erred in reducing the award for unearned income. The instant petition is the one filed by Lunas. Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December.Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the Julie refused. There is nothing on record that supports the claim that the car racing was a dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy. reinstating the earlier decision with slight modification regarding the award of atty’s fees.000.000. A2010 .) The Dela Rosas appealed in the CA. and atty’s fees of P50.000 personal expenses). In order to avoid him.89 - prof. saying that they had no cash money. at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from which she died on January 14.1979.both set of parents came up with versions of the story Gotiongs: > Wendell caused her death by shooting her and thereafter turning the gun on himself to commit suicide Libis: > an unknown third party. Petition of the Dela Rosas was denied for lack of merit. and that the award for atty’s fees should include legal interest. with 2 kids. Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend. September 18. ISSUES: 1. with legal interest from date of the decision. Luna's social standing’ [a statement which lacks complete basis]. However.torts & damages Luis dela Rosa.” Disposition: resolution of CA SET ASIDE. the CA modified this by factoring in the “engagement of Luna in car racing. where the court held that A2180 applied to Atty. In a MFR filed by the Dela Rosas. in the interest of justice (since the death took place in 1970. Luis is already of age. and living in Spain but only causally employed (“His compensation is hardly enough to support his family.” thus lowering the life expectancy to only 10 years. which affirmed in toto the RTC. was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos. Pending the decision. awarding P1. The Dela Rosas failed to pay the amounts. However. 13 years old.

Amelita Libi. THE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR FELONIES IS LIKEWISE PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY. shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not as the body was cleaned already in the funeral parlor . Reasoning . A101 RPC SAYS SO > RULES: A2010 . they they can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damages. Article 2180 reads “ the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions.torts & damages HELD YES Ratio The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists. because of his minority. casis parents at the time the shooting incident occurred. and in keeping said gun from his reach. a person is not only liable for torts committed by him also torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsibility. is the son of his co-plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their son. The adopting and natural parents of Jennifer filed a civil complaint for damages against the parents of Bundoc. owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. As stated. The trial Court agreed with the respondents and dismissed the complaint. . They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun.BUT Liability is not subsidiary BUT primary > if the liability of the parents for crimes and QDs of their minor children is subsidiary. . the mother are responsible for the damages caused by the children who live in their company… The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Mercado. COURT OF APPEALS AND QUISUMBING L-14342 LABRADOR. to a large extent. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible… The father and.Yes. However.On October 20. Thus. that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. Wendell. Decision set aside. the diligence would constitute a valid substantial defense. . and disciplining of the child. LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR QDS OF THEIR MINOR KIDS AS CONTEMPLATED IN A2180 ID PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY > applying A2194 (solidary liability of joint tortfeasors) the parent is also solidarily liable with the child. they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong.90 - prof. then aged ten. however. cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. HENCE. appellants are liable under A2180 CC. incase of his death or incapacity. ISSUE . 1982. + for civil liability from crimes committed by minors under the legal authority and control or who live in the company of the parents: PRIMARY = premised on A101 RPC fot damages ex delicto by kids 9 or under or 9-15 but without discernment = premised on A2180 CC for kids 9-15 with discernment or 15-21 (now 18) + liability effected against father or mother? BOTH PARENTS AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE PARENTAL AUHTORITY OVER THE MINOR = youth welfare code = FC: responsibility of parents + for civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors: same rules in A2180 and A2182 Disposition Instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED TAMARGO vs CA (Rubio. The Court held that parental authority did not retroactively transfer to and vested in the adopting MERCADO v. mother of Wendell. Bundoc) 209 SCRA 518 Feliciano. of the instruction and supervision of the child.The case contained procedural questions which were raised in the appeal. sufficient proof can be presented to overcome this presumption. all of which facts were known to Wendell.The parents of Adelberto claimed that they are not the indispensable party in the action as their son adopted by the spouses Rapisura on November 18. Cresencio Libi. May 30. 1992 NATURE Appeal for review of CA decision FACTS . Manuel . however. Therefore. J. controlling. We.The principle of parental liability is designated as vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed liability under the Anglo-American tort law. Thus parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of the parents which include the instructing. He was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide but was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability ob the ground that he had acted without discernment. Jr. It should be emphasized. . 1960 NATURE This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS .undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. The adopting parents had no actual or physical custody of Adelberto at the time of the incident as they were then in the US were they live. while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L.Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing. testified that her husband. under this doctrine. Reasoning.A2180': The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by A2180 CC covers obligations wising from both quasidelicts and criminal offenses. accordingly. the provision of Article 2180 would be applicable. To do so and hold them liable for the tortious act when be unfair and unconscionable. But if the liability id direct and primary. HELD.WON the spouses Bundoc were indispensable party to the tort action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 1982 via an adoption decree granted by the CFI of Ilocos Sur. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita's key is always in her bag.The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him under Article 2176. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was. The SC however decided to hear the appeal based on substantial justice. Adelberto Bundoc.' . The presumption under law is that when a child under their care commits a tortuous act the parents were negligent in the performance of these duties and responsibilities. She admitted. Disposition – Petition granted. Quisumbing.

Jr. Daffon. we find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code." contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher.the deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Civil Code. .. and Virgilio L. . and one afternoon. (Art. . Jr.. The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. casis the class to which the deceased belonged. in this wise: “In the opinion of the Court. as to their pupils and students. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply. at the laboratory room of the said Institute. so long as they remain in their custody. and hence.torts & damages Quisumbing. which authorizes the grant of moral damages. . the president thereof. to a certain extent. such that the control. but lately. gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher. in retaliation. . Quezon City. is as follows: ART. Daffon. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows. on the right cheek with a piece of razor. including recess time. this article(art. BRILLANTES 41 SCRA 548 TEEHANKEE.The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's dictum in Mercado vs. Jr." contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher. that "(I)t would seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody. absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute.2180) of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar. which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. As a result. On February 22. so long as they remain in their custody. of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries.A "pitogo". yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augusto's resentment. .) After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals. together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor." In the law of torts. upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should be made liable.There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the school. which figures prominently in this case. quarrelled over a "pitogo"..Defendants were: Antonio C. 2.” ISSUE WON the school officials are jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors with Daffon. It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty. within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219. At that time the classes were in recess. YES. it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school. direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. Palisoc became pale and fainted. NO. Consequently. defendant Virgilio L. was shown to have existed. and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon. . finally he died. WON the moral damages fixed at P2.Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar. 1971 NATURE An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the CFI Manila. however. Teodosio Valenton. but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward.It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody. the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over. Daffon were classmates. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. so he was immediately taken to a hospital. 1956. Augusto wounded Manuel. direction and influence.the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Court of Appeals. . is that they stand. Quibulue. . instructor of . was A2010 . a fellow student of the deceased. HELD 1. YES (head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute. which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach. ISSUES 1. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Santiago M. Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages.91 - prof. Daffon.The trial court. October 4. they. It is true that occasioned by the fact that Manuel. 2180. therefore. and a student in automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute filed the action below for damages arising from the death of their son at the hands of a fellow student. He never regained consciousness.Palisoc spouses as parents of their 16-year old son. Jr.The clause "so long as they remain in their custody" contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher. since this contemplates the situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parents. and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. WON the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the of the father since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time) 2. in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. the grant of moral damages is not justified. HELD a. Lastly. it was duly incorporated. Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing. 2179. Dominador Palisoc. including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students. Valenton and Quibulue. had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get "his pitogo from Renato. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived. respectively) Ratio The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students. nor does paragraph 2 of said article. which motivated the assault. may be described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank. . Reasoning . such that the control. PALISOC VS. such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents.000 are excessive. at the time when the incident occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute. . the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. FACTS . Brillantes.At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship." It is.. apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy. as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated.

The fact that it has not done so indicates an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age.92 - prof.I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v. and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer minors..00 for loss of earning power and (e) P2. The teacher in charge is the one designated by the dean. dismissing defendants' counterclaims.It would demand responsibility without commensurate authority. However . In any event. Held: Yes. (d) P10. defendant Daffon. whether the semester has not ended. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury. academic and non-academic. The opinion of the majority states: "Here. principal. attitudes and often destructive activism of the students.000.375. While they were in the auditorium of their school. the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him. absolving defendant Antonio C. 1988 Facts: . must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision.. DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows: . . Thus.torts & damages under the law abovequoted. rendering teachers and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control. Valenton and Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P12.At any rate. hewas shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon.000. J. are not involved. as thus incorporated. should have been brought in as party defendant. including recess time. so should teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category. Alfredo went to the school to submit his “Report in Physic”. (c) P5. concurring: -I would like to clarify that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect that the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils who are minors is not in accord with the plain text of the law. and 3. MAKALINTAL. It is natural to expect that if the law had intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of persons enumerated in the article. or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils or students in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. x x x “ The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises. it would have expressly so stated. the article expressly so provides. Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools. plus the costs of this action in both instances. Brillantes from the complaint.the school had been incorporated since and therefore the school itself." Note that for parental responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their company.00 for attorney's fee. as well as the temper. since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant . REYES. “There is really no substantial difference distinction between the academic and non-academic schools in so far as torts committed by their students are concerned. b..00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc. . the teacher is physically present and in a position to prevent it.phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school. as in the case of the parents and of the guardians. “x x x x The distinction no longer obtains at present. AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLLETOS) 160 SCRA 315 CRUZ. April 15. teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. The term “custody” signifies that the student is within the control and influence of the school authorities. ISSUE: WON Art 2180 is applicable. the school may be held to answer for the acts of its teacher or the head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior.00 for actual and compensatory expenses.it stands to reason that (1) the clause "so long as they remain in their custody" as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase "who live in their company" as used in reference to parents. the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter. but it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school. Civil Code. Further. . (b) P3.. considering the size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions.Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority. J. A2010 . that while in the case of parents and guardians. to hold their teachers and/or the administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts committed by them." In the light of the factual findings of the lower court's decision. by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution" .000. for injuries caused by the student. Basis of teacher’s vicarious liability is. . since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident. I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results. it is not without significance that . Teachers are liable for acts of their student except where the school is technical in nature (arts and trade establishment) in which case the head thereof shall be answerable. casis It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to graduate at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes. or has ended or has not yet begun. the parents of the student at fault.000.finally. their authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age. NO (Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of directors and the school) itself cannot be held similarly liable. in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180.00 for moral. academic or non-academic. whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching”.one other factor constrains me to dissent. dissenting: . they acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents). J. as such.. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the student under their control and supervision.B. Such defense they had taken necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of and thus be exonerated from liability imposed by Art 2180. 2. as erroneously held by the lower court. Court of Appeals. Sentencing the Daffon. the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability. and the dicta in Mercado on which it relied. 1. said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. damages.L.

(Note – the court view on increasing students activism likely causing violence resulting to injuries. Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope. Alcantara and Ylarde. casis continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging. The court cannot make law. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde. Deciding to help his colleague. it can only apply the law with its imperfections. Guttierez." A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left. also after classes. What the petitioner wants to know is WON the school or the university itself is liable. pinning him to the wall in a standing position. 1988 NATURE Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order dismissing the complaint as against the respondent school and denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal. Since it was a civil case.torts & damages teachers are not expected to have the same measure of responsibility as that imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree. These four pupils ---. At that time. When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block. The answer is no since the provision speaks of “teachers or heads” Dispositive WHEREFORE. Fransico Alcantara. A2010 . .Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng and Arante University based on Art 2190 CC . private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils. so long as they remain in their custody." . . teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. As a result thereof. Ylarde sustained injuries and died three (3) days later. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides: "Art. YLARDE vs. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education. Alonso.Reynaldo Alonso." On the other hand. three of the four kids. . said private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away. private respondent Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging. Petitioner (Reynaldo) was subsequently stabbed by Teng requiring him to be hospitalized and to undergo surgery. ISSUE WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code. At this point. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. However the court can suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed. 2180. the applicable provision of Article 2180 states: "Art. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. April 25. filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano. in or out of the school premises – J. Then. without any warning at all. the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Before leaving. private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone. playfully jumped into the pit. petitioners in this case.93 - prof. both private respondents can be held liable for damages. Being their teacher-in-charge. Jr concurringly said many student x x x view some teachers as part of the bourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice on behavior deportment and other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively rejected. . not commit. GANCAYCO. MTD was granted by the CA.Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the provision only applies to vocational schools and not to academic institutions. The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has outlived its purpose. FACTS . is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence. is obliged to pay for the damage done. another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez stated burying them all by himself. dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep. (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person. The work was left unfinished. which they did FACTS Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School and private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde. x x x The parent can instill more lasting discipline more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or the head for the tort committed by the child. ISSUE WON the Art 2180 CC13 applies to academic institutions HELD It is unnecessary to answer the issue. Such fault or negligence. the concrete block caught him before he could get out. It seems most unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship. The following day. . respondent school claims that a demand should have been made by the plaintiff rendering it premature to bring an action for damages against respondent school. Then. 2176. private respondent Aquino alone 13 "Lastly. aged ten to eleven. They also claim that the civil liability in this case arose from a crime. the school was littered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II. there being fault or negligence. 1988 July 29 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari AQUINO PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY) 160 SCRA 785 PARAS. As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent nor the school remised in the discharged of their duties. they were exonerated of liability. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren.A group of students walking inside Araneta University were accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karin Madidis alias “Teng”. private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of Dismissal. Motion was denied due to insufficient justification to disturb ruling. Ylarde's parents.

Inc. Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF). 1988 FACTS Jimmy Abon. DISPOSITION Granted. BCF is both an academic and arts and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP. Abon." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher. but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit. the ROTC Commandant. in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student]. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B.: Feb. After hearing. Abon. as party defendants. Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. Court of Appeals. Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF). so long as they remain in their custody. at around 8:00 p. but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience. 2180 — 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school. Likewise. This should not be the case. knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area. Ratio: Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-incharge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons." Reasoning: a. (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling. he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence. Jimmy B. The standard of conduct to which a child A2010 . supra. a commerce student of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro." contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises. Reasoning: This is in line with the Court’s ruling in Amadora vs. SALVOSA v. petitioners cannot under Art. as heirs of Napoleon Castro. In line with the case of Palisoc. Jimmy B. HELD NO. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. or the area within which the school activity is conducted. so long as they remain in their custody. Ratio: ST. The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. capacity.: October 5. the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages. 1991 SCHOOL v NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS . jointly and severally. the teacher. (2) absolving the other defendants. ISSUE WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.. is liable. Ratio: As regards the principal. FRANCIS HIGH CA(Castillo/Cadiz) 194 SCRA 340 Paras. 25. wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. (6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent.." HELD Only Aquino. IAC (CASTRO) 166 SCRA 274 PADILLA. therefore. We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde. to a certain extent." as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school. when he shot Napoleon Castro. A "recess. J. The time interval is safely within the "recess time" that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case. (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging. Subsequently. to pay private respondents. According to the CA. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. impleading Jimmy B. the Trial Court rendered a decision. (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the children's safety. This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades. and (5) left the children close to the excavation. as contemplated in the law. and (3) dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit. Abon. 17 a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult. while it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident. (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B. Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc. 2180 of the Civil Code. he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. which was at about 8 o'clock in the evening. including recess time. b. Bearing this in mind." Likewise. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school. as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. an obviously attractive nuisance. casis Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity. when he shot Napoleon Castro. in the parking space of BCF. knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. Roberto C. it is only the head of the school who can be held liable. must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age. a student of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977. Libertad D. discretion. Logically.94 - prof. the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school. The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the CA." or in the custody of BCF. Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior. the latter "stands. "the phrase used in [Art.torts & damages xxx xxx xxx "Lastly. J.m. Reasoning: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task.

-When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment.E. In fact. Costs against the petitioners. Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them. Francis HS. PREMISES CONSIDERED. was stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants who were from outside the school’s academic community. the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st. time and place. The TC found against the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim. a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBA’s liability. during and after the attack of the victim. 2180. 2 P. They cannot escape liability simply because it wasn’t an “extra-curricular activity of the HS”. Francis and the principal). there was SOLIMAN. Petitioners contend that the victim’s parents failed to prove by evidence that they didn’t give their son consent to join the picnic. but the court has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a contract. ISSUES (1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180 HELD (1) NO. 2180. The school is obliged to provide the student with an education. In the case at bar. in relation to 2176 is applicable (3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper HELD A2010 . Illumin. 2177 may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses. Also. the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondent’s complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC can determine.In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was breached due to PSBA’s negligence in providing proper security measures. Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach. Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the parties. the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. The Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence of their liability. If the CA’s findings are to be upheld. resulting in a bilateral obligation. J. Francis HS and the Illumin. particularly par 4. The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extracontractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties” -Using the test in Cangco. For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his employee. casis no cause of action since academic institutions are not subject to the said provision. JR. (1) NO. (2) NO. and as the latter had her own class to supervise then and was not actually invited. and several teachers for damages incurred from the death of their son. (3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence required of them.torts & damages -Ferdinand Castillo. As such. -Both parties appealed to the CA. This prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w/ Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers. 1992 FACTS -Carlitos Bautista. under Article 2180. the petition is DENIED. -Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it. In turn. then a freshman student at St. a contract is established between them.95 - prof. On the issue of the liability of St. Hence this petition. The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which was not school sanctioned. employers will be forever exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the performance of their duties. means and methods before. However.E. WHEREFORE. 2 of the teachers who arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers. he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher. From the evidence. hence. Life savers were brought in the event of such an accident. recklessness and lack of security precautions. any finding of negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual obligation only. -A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by the TC. teachers were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming. both are jointly and severally liable w/ the teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the owner/manager (St. it should be noted that the victim’s parents allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination. -his parents filed a complaint against St. The CA erred in applying Art. -No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised diligence of a good father of the family. enrolled in the 3rd year commerce course of PSBA. -Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroad:”… the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person.: Feb. Quezon. it was shown that the principal had known of the picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the event. At this stage. the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task. a school cannot be an insurer for its students against all risks. 4. represented by its principal. However. The records also show that the 2 P. Also. V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 . 4th. one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons. contending that it occurred due to petitioners’ failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family. the teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity. Hence this petition. and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180. along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge. . yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA. no moral or exemplary damages under Art. the male teachers who were to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking. ISSUE (1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants (2) WON Art. His parents didn’t allow him to go due to short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home. At the outset. teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim. alleging that since they were presumably sued under Art 2180. alleging negligence. the student abides by the school’s academic requirements and observes its rules and regulations. the questioned decision is SET ASIDE PSBA v CA (BENITEZ/BAUTISTA) 205 SCRA 729 Padilla. -PSBA sought to dismiss the case.

torts & damages FELICIANO. the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon. as here. recruits. . which contract results in obligations for both parties. 350 and 352 of the Civil Code 2.Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or 'built-in' obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th . Jimmy Solomon. . 7th paragraph. acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Inc. he being in fact an employee of the R. In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced. the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1. since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner. Petitioner’s MFR was denied. Petitioner.In Palisoc v.L.RCC filed a motion to dismiss. the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen.The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman.. .Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority. no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. their students or apprentices. of the Civil Code did not apply. the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon. NO Under Art. contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it.On August 13. Security Agency Inc. 1982.. and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon. resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with. . and not to the clients of such agency. even if there be a finding of negligence. on the other hand. The employer of Solomon was the R. Jr.Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges. 349. There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC and Solomon. while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman. The plaintiff was confined in a hospital. the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. . casis paragraph of Article 2180. 1992 NATURE Civil complaint for damages FACTS . WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law. so long as they remain in their custody. xxx xxx xxx (4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices. there is.. It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v. xxx xxx xxx Art. as yet. The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority: xxx xxx xxx (2) Teachers and professors. May 18. the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment. however. Jr. this appeal.. which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon. In fact. And. Brillantes. Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following: xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper. 2180. In the instant case. For its part. however. It held: When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment. there is established a contract between them. Using the test of Cangco. Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency. another student of the Institute. Necessarily. while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil. It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon. without any provocation. A2010 .L. professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution. Hence. RCC was not the employer of Solomon. supra. the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180. filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC.It was also pointed out in said case that: "In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. YES ." . 352. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student. he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months. 2. . teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils. the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. shot the plaintiff on the abdomen. as well as those of Articles 349. but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible. the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision. the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc. petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon. the defendant. . a student of that Institute. The relations between teacher and pupil. was in the campus premises thereof.96 - prof. At the same time. no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for one's own act or omission. that negligence xxx xxx xxx Lastly. student or apprentice of the school.In the case of PSBA v CA. Security Agency. ISSUES 1. represented by his guardian. hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards. student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges. while the school was the client of the latter. Certainly. It is settled that where the security agency. quoted above. xxx xxx xxx Art. a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC). but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case. The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. J. on the one hand. 350.The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows: Art. On the other hand. was not a pupil. who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant R. This would be for the trial court to determine. Security Agency Inc. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.L. It further argued that Article 2180. the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only.Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCC’s motion to dismiss. and as per doctor's opinion. and the students who are enrolled. RL Security Agency and Solomon.

2180 CC. there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision FACTS . Reasoning. February 6. it must be shown that the ‘injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done. in the interest of justice. Mary’s Academy had no control. along the nat’l highway at Sto. finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them. Pampanga. The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan. must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. owned by Phil Rabbit. and which was the proximate cause of the accident. This deprived the company of earnings of about P8. Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition. Disposition. only on Art. The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pineda's employer. acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation. It was Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep. . .the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle. But this was not alleged in their complaint. CARPITANOS PARDO. For the school to be liable. but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. . March 25. 2180 NCC (Art. In the case at bar. and therefore. Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days. . Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. 2002 NATURE Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos.PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines. Between the remote cause and the injury. Tomas. the trial court had denied the school's motion to dismiss the complaint against it. Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have. however. WHEREFORE. ISSUE (regarding liability of St.[19] The Court remands the PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO. Ratio. and Vivencio Villanueva. his parents.Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St.torts & damages becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. and could have been based. The negligence of petitioner St.200. the bus company also argued that PhilAm is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract. allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC. the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court. It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached. the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC. Carpitanos sued the school. Mary’s Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos. . together with James Daniel II (then 15. or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded. a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability.. -TC: absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II. Mary’s Academy) WON St.600.This case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings. states. SO ORDERED.97 - prof. -Liability for the accident. -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva.In the PSBA case. and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial court's order. Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T. and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the case. No costs. Between the remote cause and the injury. 2180 of the Civil Code. owned by Phil-Am. In other words. there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS. Mary’s Academy. MARY’S ACADEMY VS.It is not the school.2180 uses the term ST.In the appeal.It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK. held parents and school liable -CA: school liable under A218 and 219. This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that PhilAm and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality.* ISSUE WON the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise" used in Art. . Inc. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him. excluding petitioner St. to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer. unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code. and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep. A2010 . the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events. petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident. upon the assumption that petitioner's cause of action was based. As PSBA. -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities. Inc. The negligence of petitioner St. unbroken by intervening efficient causes. -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva.1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue!) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments: Art. Dipolog City. liable for damages HELD NO. PINEDA. whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. James Daniel II.CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art. driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep. FC. Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva . casis case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants. . its manager BALINGIT and the driver.

the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus. respectively. GBW794. Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence. -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly. 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No. there being fault or negligence. who was biking towards the same direction as the bus. the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur.. and denied MFR -Hence. Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides: Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. and joint and several or solidary with the driver. He was also only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Inc. under the allegations of the complaint. The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses. direct and solidary. 2180. -The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 15 Art. -As the bus was pushed. On the same date and time. its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A. thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A. It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills. As to solidarity. casis Code against petitioner Manilhig and his employer. Such fault or negligence. recklessness. xxxxxxxxx The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage . its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. was run over by the said bus. the victim Ramon A. Upon the other hand. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. Article 2194 expressly provides: the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Phil-American Forwarders. (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No. Romeo So Vasquez. (with regard to this issue) PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE. Acuesta who.torts & damages "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) to mean "employer. -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street. June 17. -The Magsaysay Blvd. this appeal ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes. (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. like petitioner Philtranco. Dispositive Lower court’s order of dismissal is AFFIRMED. its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine. -Civil Case No. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions. A2010 . VASQUEZ Dec. 2176. Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. violation of traffic rules and regulations. Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation. 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine. no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders. is obliged to pay for the damage done. Davide Facts: At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning. direct. and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondents’ Version -In the early morning of March 24.  Petitioner’s Version -Manilhig. In the process. 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A. Art. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle. warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog. or to Belvic St. for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary.98 - prof. Inc. as a result thereof fell and. which caused the death of the victim **Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. 21. about 6:00 o’clock. and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street. without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear. -Since the employer's liability is primary. Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed. Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus. He was traveling counterclockwise. suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road. 1999. * This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now. abandonment of victim. -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles. -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks..” . the victim. including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired. Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd. in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City. Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital.Hence. was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. thereafter. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises. runs perpendicular to Gomez St. petitioner Philtranco. Inc. 1990. 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 217614 and 218015 of the Civil (limited to that involved in the outline) 14 ∗ CASTILEX V.

and even finality at times. even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employer's vehicle. therefore. For. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. an employee is engaged in his employer's business in the operation of a motor vehicle. once this is done. the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own. nevertheless. are still A2010 . while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task. or conjectures. The SC does not agree. 14 cda The employer may. Operation of Employer's Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer. It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. Operation of Employer's Vehicle in Going to or from Work In the same vein. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship. the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez. Such exception obtain in the present case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioner's vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager. parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez. subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph. Where the employee's duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work. This rule is. Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD. be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employer's vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and. even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. Jr. traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee. In the same action. whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry. and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions. On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks. The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance. however.torts & damages After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident. but rather. Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate.This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks. which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative. The phrase "even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task. Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180. that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. to employers in general. the courts have frequently applied what has been called the "special errand" or "roving commission" rule. to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise. ABAD. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner. III. title or designation but which. a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute.99 - prof. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. testified that at the time of the incident. Issue: WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle. The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances. who was presented as a hostile witness. Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect. be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case. As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact. II. admittedly. the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident. the result varies with each state of facts. casis charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employer's motor vehicle. It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employer's motor vehicle: I. whether or not engaged in any business or industry. presumably. registered under the name of petitioner. to hold the employer liable. he was driving a company-issued vehicle. The Court of Appeals cannot. whether or not engaged in any business or industry. so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employee's action or inaction. However. an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. however. are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task. the plaintiff must show. and not a part of his services to his employer. So. Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours within the call of duty. and the fifth paragraph. spending more time at his actual duties. Cebu Doctor's Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez. Negligent acts of employees. No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment. an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle. A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable. or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work. and Luisa So Vasquez. Instead. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to . against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. under which it can be found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home. Held: Castilez is absolved from any liability. employees oftentimes wear different hats. Hence. surmises. Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry. They perform functions which are beyond their office. the fourth paragraph should apply. Evidence that by using the employer's vehicle to go to and from meals. in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed.

The liability of the employer is. The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night. way beyond the normal working hours. Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan.. Funtecha wanted to drive home. using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position. Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence. Rather.) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO. it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtecha's possession of a student driver's license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms. enroute to its destination. even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Allan lives with his dad.It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home. was known as a "haven for prostitutes. It was then about 2:00 a.One night. After a dangerous curb. There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver. casis of the infliction of the injury or damage. the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee.TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan. Moreover. a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City. 1992 NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS . or in the supervision over him. not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours.In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house. August 17.100 - prof.Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR. one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept. . . Funtecha definitely was not. as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers. The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw. ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident.It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose. However. includes any act done by an employee. Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights. 1979. Allan. neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. . Allan's job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day. 1998 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . The president of FCI is Agustin Masa. . the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees. thus. his overtime work had already been completed. ABAD's working day had ended. His being at a place which. Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians). . A2010 . the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's business. and drug pushers and addicts.On July 22. having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately.Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI. There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep. then go back to the school. Allan let Funtecha drive. Agustin has a son. The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable. under Article 2180. or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours. has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. as petitioner put it. He need not have an official appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act. Even if somehow. He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning he’s supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school. and seeing that the road was clear. and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip.Funtecha is a scholar of FCI.torts & damages An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use. the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act. it has been held that he has not resumed his employment. Funtecha also lives in the president’s house free of charge while a student at FCI. it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner." had no connection to petitioner's business. pimps. for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. primary and solidary. ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES . who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver. He is also employed as a janitor. Unfortunately. In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees. Hence. NPC v CA (PHESCO INC. it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employer's business or within the scope of his assigned task. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer. . . He has a student license.m. the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff. August 14. SC reversed. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan. then go home in the school jeep.The petitioner. .

000.In this regard. A2010 . c) Attorney’s fees of P20. b) Moral damages of P50. WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTA’s CLAIMS: -Escartin’s assault upon Navidad. the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. . instead of presenting evidence. -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.Marjorie Navidad (Nicanor’s widow). ISSUES: WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD.00 as actual damages. between the two. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers. b) P50.While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks. if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it. ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba. Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG. about 730pm.000.000.00 as nominal damages.SC) LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman.830. holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts: a) P44." . which reversed the trial court's judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages.No evidence. Prudent. In either case.00 as moral damages. Navidad was struck by the moving train. casis from liability. c) P50.PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions. (But there wasn’t any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case. NPC's liability is direct. the Metro Transit Organization.CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000.101 - prof. we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in "labor only" contracting. . in its answer. was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented. which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES . driver of the dump truck.At the exact moment that Navidad fell. PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a "labor only" contract. 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50. .000.00. instead. primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver. a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation.In the provisions of the "Memorandum of Understanding" entered into by PHESCO and NPC. .520. filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin. an LRT train.00. denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards.torts & damages . . . delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks.The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability. .13 of the Civil Code. and Prudent for the death of her husband.000. 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE: APPEAL from CA’s DECISION . 2) Compensatory damages of P443. Of course.CA: exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and. Junelito Escartin. and e) P20. . shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action.000. d) Costs of suit.14 Oct 1993. operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman. the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad. however.A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter. Nicanor Navidad. J/February 6.00. then drunk. DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed.TC: Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following: "a) 1) Actual damages of P44. was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who. but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks).The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latter's projects. filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. . Rodolfo Roman. the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage. including the latter's workers. In exempting Prudent . Inc.00 as and for attorney’s fees.The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin. in conjunction with Article 2180.Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides: "Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. JR. -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train. .NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare). NO. .830.A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. (Metro Transit).TC: dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit. was coming in. . . .00. d) P50. the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him. .00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased. NPC. a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. Finding that a contractor was a "labor-only" contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the "labor-only" contractor.000. and he was killed instantaneously. along with their children. The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. the LRTA. which caused the latter to fall on the tracks. HELD: 1.LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Navidads Contention: . The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train.

provides: "Article 1755.Immediately before the collision. and driven by Ruben Galang. the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. "Article 1756.000 kilos. Pampanga.102 - prof. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers. Stated differently.A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.Once such fault is established. Jaime Tayag and Rosalina Manalo. Christopher McKee and Araceli McKee. "This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees. in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway. and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. Article 219414 of the Civil Code can well apply.torts & damages The premise.The Civil Code. The Ford Escort. . although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. a liability for tort may arise even under a contract. in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. A2010 . 13 Art." "Article 1763.Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage . was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons. . The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh. the cargo truck. casis The father and. 1977. the presumption would be that it has been at fault. . Needless to say. YES. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent. REASONING: . thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. on the other hand. which LRTA and Roman. was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga. and was bound for Manila." -The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. the contract can be said to have been breached by tort.. a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck. MCKEE V IAC (TAYAG & MANALO) 221 SCRA 517 Davide. have failed to show. 2176. if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. according to the CA. all passengers of the Ford Escort. DISPOSITION: CA’S DECISION AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability.The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. . and by simple proof of injury. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred. unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. thus.On January 8. 2180. In case of death of or injuries to passengers. owned by private respondents. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. . the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman. July 16. Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence. are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. 2. is obliged to pay for the damage done. There is no showing that Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains. where tort is that which breaches the contract. he must also be absolved from liability as Prudent is. ______________ 12 Art. . however.Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier. No costs. the mother. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties. Jr. governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers. Loadstar. Such fault or negligence. 14 Art. for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions.In case of such death or injury. Lastly. 1992 NATURE . Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another.Petition to review the resolution of the CA FACTS . the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. there being fault or negligence. in case of his death or incapacity. so long as they remain in their custody." "Article 1759. Kim McKee and Loida Bondoc. . 2194. a factual matter that has not been shown. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.In fine. both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy. common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. which was loaded with 200 cavans of rice weighing about 10. . and physical injuries to George McKee. is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees. one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana. with a due regard for all the circumstances. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.

Neither did they attempt to prove it. 2 boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her.Li’s alibi was that he was driving at 55kph when he was suddenly confronted with a speeding car coming from the opposite direction. Court of Appeals. which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color. with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. alighted from the car. not juris et de jure. put on her emergency lights. and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard. unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. whereby such other person suffers injury.Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party. She parked along the sidewalk of Aurora Blvd. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. . INC. as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others. WON Alexander Commercial is liable as Li’s employer HELD 1. .While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought or the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent.The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. . in law.Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant. Given a light rainfall. provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs. Manalo and Tayag are.Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises. YES . Li would have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were alert as VALENZUELA v CA (LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL. which was destroyed. . Before he could do so. .. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. is only juris tantum. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck. February 7. his car collided with the truck. the visibility of the street. WON Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence 3. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. with no parking lights or early warning device. ISSUE WON the owners of the cargo truck (Tayag and Manalo) are liable for the resulting damages HELD YES The Court rules that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was. . xxx xxx xxx The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. 3. It is the failure to observe that degree of care.Ma. applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. The boys were moving back and forth. exhaustion. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a car driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial. and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol. casis every driver should be to those conditions. Li's failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident could therefore have been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very fast" speed as testified by one of the witneses. -RTC found Li and Alexander solidarily liable. 1996 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . CA absolved Alexander.Negligence. alleging that plaintiff was the one who was reckless or negligent. Defendants counterclaimed for damages. however. therefore. That presumption. A2010 .Civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were filed as a result of a vehicular accident. on the said bridge. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving when she realized she had a flat tire. She was pulled out from under defendant's car. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. NO . Jose Koh blew the horn of the car. negligent in driving his companyissued Mitsubishi Lancer 2. and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh. He instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle. swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck. and went to the rear to open the trunk. which was the opposite lane. Inc. and bumped plaintiff's car. Physiological "fight or flight" mechanisms are at work. As employers of the truck driver.Li was. ISSUE 1. . She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. She filed a claim for damages against defendant. which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution. and then fell to the ground.) . and the area was poorly lighted. . the proximate cause of the collision. drowsiness. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense. etc. the provision for the unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the 253 SCRA 303 KAPUNAN. directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. alcohol. the conduct which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoroughful care. precaution.103 - prof. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. WON Li was grossly negligent in driving the company issued car 2. Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered. since normally he would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela's car.torts & damages When the northbound car was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge.The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. he then switched on the headlights of the car. YES .Please see first Mckee digest for details on the collision. an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger. rather than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly apply his brakes. Article 2180 reads as follows: The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions. Either factor working independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road conditions. xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.

Act No. and the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands. regulates the obligations which arise out of fault or negligence. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident. therefore. inc. is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office. to our satisfaction. by his own fault or negligence. . the fault or negligence. It states that “E. but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. but not always.Trial court held that the collision was due solely on the negligence of the chauffeur and awarded the plaintiff the sum of P14. a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly. He had to dissolve a partnership that he had with an engineer and give up a contract for the construction of a building. we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal an that of private persons interested in its operation. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li.In the United States the rule is that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs. Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li. No. except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case. E. His leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture.torts & damages business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car. takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. 741. Witnesses testified that plaintiff’s physical and mental condition before the accident was excellent. The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs. the following articles refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage. and among these persons. based on the principle of bonus pater familias. and to determine the amount of the damages.The Civil Code in chap 2. shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.The obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or negligence is based. guardians and owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise. reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage. and whereas in the first article thereof. in contravention of an ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act. said company. that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. especially when he attempted to use his money for mathematical calculations. The patient apparently was slightly deaf. by virtue of such provisions of law. title 16. or create any cause of action in his favor. ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. the state. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital. however. book 4. subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff. In fine. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court. 1916 NATURE Appeal from decision of the CFI FACTS . to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. the rule is stated in 36 Cyc. because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. difficulties and losses. A2010 . because. or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It follows therefrom that the state. in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of furthering the company's image. which turned suddenly and unexpectedly to Taft Avenue without sounding any whistle or horn. Reasoning . no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. Alexander Commercial. . He was one of the best contractors of wooden buildings.Plaintiff was so severely injured. 2457 was enacted. 915. since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments.E. where the general principle is laid down that where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence. called upon to answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner. to defendant said Government at the same. responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition. was hit by the General Hospital ambulance. as held in the last paragraph of article 1903. . Partida 7. March 31.As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract. riding on a motorcycle. . are found. doubtless because and only in this case. 1902. .Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: MERRITT v GOVERNMENT 34 Phil 311 TRENT. except when it acts through the agency of a special agent. in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. DISPOSITION Judgment of RTC reinstated.104 - prof. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. has not demonstrated. casis The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent. on that the person obligated. to which Mr. because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. Between these latter and the state. if any. Merritt. . . Merritt is entitled on account of said collision. This latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor. thus: By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. which would be subversive of the public interest..” ISSUES WON the government is liable for the damages resulting from a tort committed by an agent or employee of the government HELD NO Ratio The State is only liable for the acts of its agents. officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903. the managerial employee or company sales agent. This legal presumption gives way to proof. which is the He could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. . on the contrary. Title 15. as is evidenced by the same Law 3. As such.

in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. was done by a special agent. . duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim. and appeal by private persons or entities from the latter’s decision to the Supreme Court.Jose Panlilio ignited his lighter near a drum into which gasoline was being drained causing fire in the warehouse of Emergency Control Administration (ECA. by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor. and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. we are not called upon to determine.The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903 On the computation of damages The two items which constitute a part of the P14. is P18. limited the time to 2months and 21 days.In the case of Merritt v.” . the award awarded for permanent injuries.Although there is an act (Act No.torts & damages original basis of this kind of objections. and (b) the P2.The responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission. Government.There being no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to the ECA or its officers. As to the second. 1991 . The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only 2 months and 21 days while the remainder of the 6 months was spent in his home. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.000 per month. in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of the property which they hold in sublease. acting in the exercise of his powers.’ xx “ ‘That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent. must be presumed to lie with the state. We. DISPOSITION Decision appealed from is affirmed. is one who receives a definite and fixed order by the commission. because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated A2010 . which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. but not when the MENDOZA V. that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1. We find nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the first. ROSETE v AUDITOR GENERAL 81 Phil 453 FERIA. February 27.Although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in the name and representation of the state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers.The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent. foreign to the exercise of duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof. . . . which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees. foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof. . without any fault on his part. and the latter responsible for all claims. which ECA didn’t have). he executes the trust confided to him. casis damage should have been caused by the official to whom it properly pertained to do the act performed. .000. 1903. The obligation imposed in the preceding article is enforceable not only for personal acts and omission but also for those persons for whom another is responsible. . would not prevent recovery for the whole time.105 - prof.Art. a government agency). thereby giving rise to this claim for damages against Panlilio for his negligence and the officers of ECA for storing gasoline in said warehouse contrary to the provisions of ordinances of the City of Manila (ordinance requires a license for storing flammable substances. because the officers of the ECA did not act as special agents of the government within the above defined meaning of that wod in Article 1903 of the Civil Code in storing gasoline in the warehouse of ECA. 1903 of the Civil Code reads: “Art. The court.666. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth. the record shows. DE LEON FONTANILLA V MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINSITRATION 194 SCRA 486 PARAS.The fire destroyed the building owned by the petitioner.Insular Auditor dismissed the claim hence this appeal. it does not make any and all claims against the government allowable. the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. however. he executes the trust confided to him. In this we think there was error. the government is not responsible for damages caused through such negligence.741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a) P5. 327) authorizing the filing of claims against the government with the Insular Auditor. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. 1948 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the Insular Auditor FACTS . the court held the following: “ ’… The state is not responsible for the damage suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office… n relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a juridical person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. therefore. . Dispositive Judgment appealed from reversed. ISSUE WON the government is liable for the damages HELD NO . find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff. xx “The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent. August 31. for a period of 6 months. and the trial court so found. yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official. in the sense in which these words are employed.075.

and such preferred liens shall not be removed until all fees or administration charges are paid or the property is levied upon and sold by the National Irrigation Administration for the satisfaction thereof. Burgos Avenue. (Emphasis for emphasis). and is therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its driver Garcia. CITY OF MANILA V TEOTICA 22 SCRA 267 CONCEPCION. 3601 provides: Sec. - - Angat Case: Although the majority opinion declares that the Angat System. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeep. The decision of this Court in G. he had acquired the status of regular employee and could not be removed except for valid cause. Burgos Avenue. which shall be organized immediately after the approval of this Act.Genaro N. . One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital. It also has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors. such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a "government-function" corporation. maintenance and insurance. No. Teotico - ISSUE WON the NIR is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. which liens shall have preference over all other liens except for taxes on the land. . after which he was taken home. for the proper conduct of its business.R.R. which came into effect some 3 years after the perfection of the contract. 61045 dated December 1. DISSENTING: PADILLA: to say that NIA has opened itself to suit is one thing. improving. The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court. upon the land benefited. he hailed a jeep that came to a stop. . as are directly or indirectly necessary. and took a few steps. but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency. including the power to establish and maintain subsidiaries. an accountant. After waiting 5 mins. The Angat dissenting opinion: Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. 1976. to recover funds or portions thereof expended for the construction and/or rehabilitation of communal irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a special fund for irrigation development under section 2 hereof. o NIA believes this bases this on:  PD 552 – amended some provisions of RA 3601 (the law which created the NIA)  The case of Angat River Irrigation System v. No. subsection b of P. January 29. Section 2. casis It has its own assets and liabilities. DISPOSITION We conclude that the National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. 55963 and G. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing. several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. and his employment had lasted for five years. and then on the crops raised thereon. 1.D. . thus is governed by the Corporation Law. 1990 is DENIED WITH FINALITY.106 - prof." Certainly. subsection (f): (f) . In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid. . Due to the fall. the Motion for Reconsideration dated January 26. Therefore. it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent. which is the irrigation of lands. thereby opening it up to the possibility that it may be held liable for the damages caused by its driver. his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory. he fell inside a manhole on P. and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines. The employment contract of 1971 was executed when the Labor Code of the Philippines had not yet been promulgated. 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED. like the NIA. incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above powers and objectives. who was not its special agent. and to transact such business. The National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local government. FACTS . waiting for a jeep. impairing his vision. insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. where his injuries were treated. The state or a government agency performing governmental functions may be held liable for tort committed by its employees only when it acts through a special agent. is still another thing. . Besides. and to recover the cost of construction within a reasonable period of time to the extent consistent with government policy. Section 2. Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be preferred liens first. but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions. the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional. As blood flowed therefrom.torts & damages NATURE Resolution FACTS The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions. . Name and Domicile — A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare. Angat River Workers’ Union A2010 . exercised a governmental function because the nature of its powers and functions does not show that it was intended to “bring to the Government any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit”. NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government. and in general. 1968 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals. since his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer. who was not its special agent HELD YES Reasoning the functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. . He argued that although his contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17. . It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces. Teotico. Manila. ACCORDINGLY. 552 provides that: (b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water from all irrigation systems constructed by or under its administration. including all communal and pump irrigation projects. such fees or administration charges as may be necessary to cover the cost of operation. rehabilitating. to say that it is liable for damages arising from tort committed by its employees. Section 1 of Republic Act No. a strong dissenting opinion held that Angat River system is a government entity exercising proprietary functions.

required further medical treatment by a private practitioner. the petitioner remained passive. he in particular not having testified or offered testimony to prove such claim.CFI Manila sustained the theory of the defendants and dismissed the amended complaint. in general. or injuries suffered by. and it was these three without whose acts the same could not have happened.4 refers to liability arising from negligence. the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed.107 - prof. the left upper arm. under Republic Act 409. Reasoning The assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made. The Ace . or any other city officer.750. city health officer. its mayor.P. Upon the contrary. ISSUES WON City of Manila should be held liable for the damages suffered by Teotica. or any other law or ordinance. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence. Zaldivar..: May 24. Sanchez. subsequently. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road. Castro. A2010 . regardless of the object thereof. Burgos Avenue were. applicable to the entire Philippines. except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned. any person by reason of defective conditions of road. this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila. public buildings.sec. . under Article 2189 of the Civil Code. in spite of his being a vice-president and director of the Ace Advertising. What said article requires is that the province. all told. Ratio RA 409. the juridical situation was a simple quasi-delict by them committed upon the corporation. stealing of iron catchbasin covers was rampant. or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides: Provinces.L. . These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital. because RA 409. as general manager. . he continued to receive his salaries in the form of vouchers ordered and signed by respondent Joya. HELD YES.The petitioner's assertion that he signed the questioned payroll checks in good faith has not been substantiated. to the damage of the firm of which he was an officer." in particular. which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative. Voting Reyes. the determination of whether or not P. J. on account of Taylor's travel and studies -the Ace Advertising filed a complaint with the court of first instance of Manila against the respondent for recovery of the total sum disbursed to Taylor. the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. and other public works under their control or supervision.torts & damages suffered contusions on the left thigh.043. what had happened was in truth and in fact a venture by them given their stamp of approval. is a special law. The respondent. both petitioners knew and through their acts showed that they approved of the trip. respondent answered that these were not shouldered by the company and instead by other parties -while abroad. a complaint which was. is one of fact. At any rate. and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review. 1974 FACTS: -An employee of the Ace ADVERTISING Company was sent to the States to pursue studies in television. Hence. .. therefore. Dizon.043. JJ.B. city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. and as it was an unauthorized act of expenditure of corporate funds. this appeal by the City of Manila. to authorize the trip which was for the company's benefit -Joya also filed a 3rd party complaint against the two Aranetas proving that they were involved in sending Taylor abroad -trial court rendered judgment ordering the respondent to pay the Ace Advertising "the sum of P5. that the Office of the City Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting from theft of said iron covers. again. or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions. The others were signed by either the respondent. casis Advertising disbursed P5. authority or ratification. Municipal Board. for the first time. amended for damages against the City of Manila. streets. .Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter. concerning the unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds for the latter. a national highway. When asked about the expenses of the trip. intended exclusively for the City of Manila.The first issue raised by the Manila is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of RA 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading: The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor. for which solidary liability should have been imposed upon all in the first place” ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict HELD: Yes . alleging that the trip was made without its knowledge. in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. concur.00. J. the city government has changed the position and layout of catchbasins in the City by constructing them under the sidewalks with concrete cement covers and openings on the side of the gutter. and that in any event under the by-laws he had the discretion. or from negligence of said Mayor.. throughout the period of Taylor's stay abroad. whereas the Civil Code is a general law. and that these changes had been undertaken by the city from time to time whenever funds were available. without costs. Angeles and Fernando. city engineer.Defense pointed out that because of the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing. city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. ARANETA v JOYA 57 SCRA 59 CASTRO J. Dispositive WHEREFORE. which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6. demonstrate quite distinctly that the petitioner neglected to perform his duties properly. denied the charge and claimed that the trip was nonetheless ratified by the company's board of directors.20 with interest at the legal rate from August 23. or Vicente Araneta (company treasurer) who put up part of the bill connected with Taylor's trip and also handed him letters for delivery in the United States. Then. Bengzon. . Even if P. The petitioner signed three of these checks. This plus the fact that he even approved thrice payroll checks for the payment of Taylor's salary.This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. that in order to prevent such thefts. with costs against the City of Manila. the Municipal Board.20. Makalintal. cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of. city treasurer and chief of police. to enforce the provisions of this chapter. in his answer.Teotico filed with CFI Manila. CC governs liability due to "defective streets. said Article 2189 is decisive thereon. bridges. it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province. “…were also privy to the unauthorized disbursement of the corporate moneys jointly with the appellant. in connection with the maintenance of said road. whereas Article 2189. 1954 until full payment. 3rd party complaint dismissed -CA affirmed however dismissal of 3rd party complaint was reversed stating that Taylor's trip had been neither authorized nor ratified by the company -CA noted that based on the facts.

Palawan. 34 and 36. . filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha. No. NO . that for some period after their arrest.Defendant-appellees admitted that when Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim and impounded the motor launch he was not armed with a search warrant. Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon.Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch. harass and punish them. cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same. 1988 NATURE: Petition for certiorari FACTS This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela. Detachment Commander of Balabac. 2. certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs. Likewise. L-69866 YAP.R. that military men who interrogated them employed threats. . In addition. employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants. 26. elements of the TFM raided several places.000. they have violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search and seizure.00 for attorney's fees. And since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a warrant. that he effected the seizure of the motor launch in the absence of and without the consent of Delfin Lim. 29. explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party. who directly or indirectly obstructs. and. seized the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it. plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim. Jikil Taha through his counsel made representations with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return the . tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them." Plaintiffs’ allegations: That complying with said order of Ver. in addition." . YES . P750. that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel.Any public officer or employee. 28. xxx "(9)The rights to be secure in one's person. Palawan. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. 30. xxx TORTS INDEPENDENT ACTION LIM v DE LEON G.Plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim pleaded with Orlando Maddela to return the motor launch but the latter refused. DISPOSITION Decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one entered declaring the seizure illegal and ordering defendant-appellee Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon to pay to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim the sum of P3. that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts. papers. August 29.After conducting a preliminary investigation.Plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". 1975 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the CFI WITH CIVIL ABERCA V VER G.000. No.R. xxx "The indemnity shall include moral damages. that during these raids. 1962. A year later or on April 9. they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers. 2219. seized property to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim but Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused. 1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him. plus P1.Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: xxx "(6)Illegal search." "ART.00 moral damages. in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan. upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac. house. said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants. WON defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful HELD 1. constitutes no bar to the commission of a tort by one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages A2010 . exemplary damages may also be awarded.Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their claim for damages on Articles 32 and 2219 of the New Civil Code which provide in part as follows: "ART. a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander in Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch. known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communistterrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila. 27. . Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon. April 15. . or any private individual. violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages. casis "(1)Acts and action referred to in Articles 21. The existence of a contract between the parties. L-22554 MARTIN. Upon order of the Provincial Commander.torts & damages -The fact that he was occupying a contractual position at the Ace Advertising is of no moment. ISSUES 1. moral damages of at least P150K each or a FACTS .Pursuant to the foregoing provisions. Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages of P39.108 - prof. There can be no question that without the proper search warrant.June 15. as has been repeatedly held by this Court. no public official has the right to enter the premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. WON defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure of the motor launch in question without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same was admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime 2.00 as actual damages.030. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 32. 32. that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize. on the ground that the same was the subject of a criminal offense. defeats.

e.The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all persons. it is not the actor alone (i. no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. but to all the lawyers of plaintiffs In filing the motion to set aside the resolution. NO. Art. not just to the lawyers who signed the motion. C. it is difficult to justify the TC’s dismissal for lack of cause of action the complaint against all the MHP GARMENTS. the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiff. 3. jointly and severally with his subordinates. through their counsel. owe obedience and allegiance at all times. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. The complaint contained allegations against all the defendants which. and no others. Thus. [b] The invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. [c] Art. At the same time it rejects the automatic application of the principle of respondent superior or command responsibility that would hold a superior officer jointly and severally accountable for damages. only the facts alleged in the complaint. to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. employer and employee) relationship. exemplary damages of at least P150K each or a total of P3M. But in this case. 2.. WON trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to (dome of the) plaintiffs on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file MFR of the court's resolution granting the respondent's motion to dismiss HELD 1. However. alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the defendants. the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party Reasoning: [a] The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i. Ratio: The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties. The authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be assumed. 2. For this purpose. casis defendants. 32. as contended by respondents. responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.Aguinaldo and MSgt. he furnished copies thereof. provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the RPC or other penal statute.e. Respondents’ contentions: A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants. under the above principles. unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party concerned. 3. be they public officers or employees. or members of the military or police force or private individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. violate or in any manner impede or impair the constitutional rights and civil liberties of another person. with his subordinates who committed such transgressions. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates. [d] Even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article. which was never done in this case. including moral and exemplary. to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated.J.109 - prof. NO Ratio: Although the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. as well as indirectly. vs. when the temptation is strongest to yield to the law of force rather than the force of law. 32 CC. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress. Case remanded to the respondent court for further proceedings.torts & damages total of P3M. the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. [d] So. civilian or military. except Maj. SEPARATE OPINION: TEEHANKEE. [c] To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action. Its message is clear. high or low. it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. They needed no specific authority to do that. ISSUES 1. A2010 . and attorney's fees not less than P200K. 32 of CC. Estelito Mendoza. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and acquires a larger dimension. 32 CC is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials. the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment. Art. the judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer must not abdicate his duty to properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk of being held responsible for gross negligence and of being held under the cited provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with the tortfeasor. defeat. then SolGen. It cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint. INC. WON a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages. would be sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action against all of them under Art. And this must have been also the understanding of defendants' counsel himself for when he filed his comment on the motion. Hence. 32 governs. it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings. The body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs. Reasoning: [a] The purpose Art. 32 of CC makes the persons who are directly. should be considered. stand liable and may be sued in court for damages as provided in Art. if admitted hypothetically. [b] By this provision. 32 of CC which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. CA PUNO. . (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action. Balaba. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Art.The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the civil action for damages filed in the court below by petitioners-plaintiffs for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of their constitutional rights and liberties. the decisive factor in this case is the language of Art. concurring: . 32 of CC. DISPOSITION: Petition granted. NO. A superior have to answer for the transgressions of his subordinates against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. 22 September 1994 Nature .

De Guzman. the appealed decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION." -Sometime in October 1983. In their Memorandum Agreement. MHP received information that private respondents Agnes Villa Cruz. We impose a SIX PERCENT (6%) interest from January 9. in lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%). and insignias. Even then. causing the latter’s death and physical injuries to herein petitioners. casis complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief. Firstly.torts & damages . and suits on display at respondents' stalls. the supposed illicit goods were seized. dresses.. and to impound the said paraphernalia to be used as evidence in court or other appropriate administrative body it orders the immediate and strict compliance with the Instructions which the petitioners miserably failed to do. they seized the boy and girl scouts pants. Private respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of business to recover their goods. There can be no doubt that petitioners must have suffered sleepless nights. an employee of petitioner corporation. And thirdly. 1983 NATURE FACTS Petition for certiorari . to apprehend immediately unauthorized manufacturers and distributors of Scout paraphernalia. The omission will not exculpate petitioners. The all encompassing protection extends against intrusions directly done both by government and indirectly by private entities. upon proper application by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the Philippines for warrant of arrest and/or search warrant with a judge.110 - prof. and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines. the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents. In doing so." These facts and circumstances were not in any way shown by the petitioners to justify their warrantless search and seizure. He also ordered the return of the seized items which was not immediately returned despite demands. It will also serve as a stern reminder to all and sundry that the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a virile reality and not a mere burst of rhetoric. Without any warrant. Letter of Instruction No. the raid was made on the stores of private respondents and A2010 . the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms. The evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private respondents' goods. Again. Indeed. Ponce de Leon. moral damages can be awarded in the case at bench. Conformably with our ruling in Lim vs. he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint for unfair competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods. Petitioner corporation received information that private respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia in October 1983. It affirmed the decision with modification MHP filed a petition for certiorari before the SC. The decision was appealed to the respondent court. WON an award for moral damages should be awarded Yes. after a preliminary investigation. Probable cause for a search has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents. op. Private respondents' avowals of embarrassment and humiliation during the seizure of their merchandise were supported by their testimonies. serious anxiety. and wounded feelings due the tortious raid caused by petitioners. The search and seizure were clearly illegal. Inc. There was no probable cause for the seizure.. and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition. they should have filed a third-party MARCIA V CA (PAJE) 205 PHIL 147 RELOVA. After a preliminary investigation. was tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). By standing by and apparently assenting thereto. badges. De Guzman. Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap . they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies.00) for the unreturned twenty-six (26) pieces of girl scouts items and a TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest. 1987 on the TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2. and two (2) other constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market. Despite the sufficiency of time. A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents. supplies. The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. January 27. The trial court ruled for the private respondents. or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law. Mirasol Lugatiman. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. they did not.Paje is a driver of a Victory Liner Bus . They reported to the Philippine Constabulary and on October 25. cit. It is consistently ruled that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered.His bus collided with the jeep driven by Clemente Marcia. The other items returned were of inferior quality.000. Disposition IN VIEW WHEREFORE. in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages. on the said amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment thereof. WON MHP Garments is liable Yes. Secondly. The wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies the award of exemplary damages. Issue/s and Held WON the search and seizure was legal No. not all the seized items were turned. The items were then turned over by Captain Peñafiel to petitioner corporation for safekeeping. So with the petitioner corporation which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents. Peñafiel. 1983. The specific date and time are not established in the evidence adduced by the parties. De Guzman then made a surveillance of the stores of private respondents. Costs against petitioners. they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. Private respondent then filed a Civil Case against the petitioners for sums of money and damages. The progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. petitioner corporation was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies.Petition for Certiorari Facts -MHP Garments. Larry de Guzman who did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. 1299 already directs all law enforcement agencies of the Republic of the Philippines.

but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated. Arafiles filed action for damages based on the alleged “grossly malicious and overly sensationalized” report by Morales which cast aspersions on his character. J. The CA ruled that criminal negligence is wanting and that Paje was not even guilty of civil negligence. Ratio. -About a year following the published article. provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. . WON an independent civil action may be filed during the pendency of the criminal case HELD 1. may be brought by the injured party. . fraud and physical injuries. This is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision. Japzon is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. based on doctrine of fair comment ISSUE WON the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages HELD NO. Ratio Section 2. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. 1983 NATURE Petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the defendant's motion to dismiss .There are at least two things about Art. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. a civil action for damages.111 - prof. 2004 NATURE Petition for review of CA Deci FACTS (Consti II Case) -Respondent Morales wrote an article for People’s Journal Tonight based on the sworn statement in the police blotter and interview of Emelita Despuig where Despuig alleged that Arafiles raped her the month before then attempted to rape her the night she filed a complaint. no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith. The complaining witness is the widow of the deceased." 2. frustrated and attempted homicide.: December 21. he was acquitted in the CA. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. Otherwise stated. .He was convicted in the criminal case in the RTC.The acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages. In cases of defamation. INC CARPIO MORALES. However." Tolentino says: "While the State is the complainant in the criminal case. being the object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist. 3. casis He should be permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him. Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation. Morales attempted to contact Arafiles but since the latter’s office was still closed at that time (past 12mn – he works for NIAS-PAGASA). The two enactments are quoted hereinbelow: "Sec.. . Eva A. . the injured individual is the one most concerned because it is he who has suffered directly. However. Carmen L.… an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. J. unless the act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be non-existent in the final judgment. et. 2. the order dismissing Civil Case No. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. fraud. Other civil actions arising from offenses. 141 is SET ASIDE FACTS . ISSUES WON the acquittal in the criminal case would result to a dismissal in the civil case HELD YES ." Obiter . ISSUES 1." . The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense.The criminal case still pending. ."Art.In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately. . The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our MADEJA V CARO ABAD SANTOS. Madeja. namely: 1. had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. The civil case was dismissed. al. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence. for the case was of pure accident. YES. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. A civil case was also instituted against him by herein petitioners for reckless imprudence and negligence in driving the passenger bus. they were not inflicted with malice. The information states that: "The offended party Carmen L. The respondent judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss which invoked Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads: "Sec. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting. " . he was not able to do so.The defendants presented the copy of said criminal case to the court handling the civil case against them.". may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case.Dr. ARAFILES v PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS. the said article speaks only of defamation.Paje was charged with homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. but we do not consider that the respondents. -RTC: in favor of Arafiles -CA: in favor of Morales. Japzon for damages in the same court. Hence. 33. under the circumstances of this case. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. Japzon. Dispositive Petition is GRANTED. Independent civil action. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. and physical injuries. March 25.Petitioner also relies on Art 33 CC. Madeja sued Dr. the extinction of the criminal liability will not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability DISPOSITIVE Decision affirmed A2010 .torts & damages . Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.

CA reversed: it was "clear from the disputed article that the defamation was directed to all adherents of Islamic faith. .In the present case. the article relates to the entire Muslim population and not just to the IDCP or to any of the individual respondents. respondent was present when Emelita executed her sworn-statement where she reported an abduction with rape and an abduction incident (where no rape occurred. it did not mention respondents as object of the article. or to any of the individual complainants. esp. they should not be held to account.which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distress. they should not be held to account. -then discussed how to determine if a published work is libelous: In actions for damages for libel. it is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character.which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form of defamation. There is no direct reference or allusion to the federation or any of its members. that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings. casis case. No. Disposition. WON the cause of action should rise from an intentional tortuous act causing mental distress HELD 1. embarrassment. et. 135306 BELLOSILLO. but it is not per se illegal. WHEREFORE. the petition is hereby DENIED. or anger. 19. or vexatious. such cause of action cannot be sustained. but because it constitutes an . that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Phil but the entire Muslim world. and since no particular individual was identified in the disputed article. . ill-natured. for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.MVRS claimed it was merely an expression of belief/opinion and was published without malice. Decision reversed. fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. The succeeding paragraphs (in which petitioner and complainant Emelita were eventually identified) sufficiently convey to the readers. cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam. and consistently with good faith and reasonable care. First discussed applicable provisions (A33. it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. .The ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHIL (IDCP). In the preparation of stories. RTC dismissed: plaintiffs failed to establish their cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically identified. CC recognizes the possibility of such a civil action either pursuant to Art 26. or to Art. .I dissent not because the newspaper article in question is libelous.The present controversy stems from a civil action for damages and not from a criminal complaint. (d) the plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe.” ISSUE 1. press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines. however. Also. (c) causal connection between defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress. and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious. to the effect that although it may not constitute a criminal offense. WON elements of libel exist 2. and some individual Muslims filed in the RTC Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS. whether written or spoken. a local federation of more than 70 Muslim religious orgs.Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry. do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. January 28.al. and. NO. (AmJur) Disposition Petition granted.The purported damage caused by the published article falls under principle of relational harm . 2003 NATURE Petition to review decision of CA FACTS . entirely separate and distinct from the criminal case. A civil action for libel under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely independent of the institution. “vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs xxx” can give rise to a cause of action for damages. SO ORDERED A2010 . The presentation of the news item subject of petitioner’s complaint may have been in a sensational manner. -then mentioned doctrine: The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. -then discussed the petitioner’s allegation that the news item as a “malicious sensationalization” failed: even though the police blotter only shows 1 count of abduction and rape. hence. The present case falls within the application of the relational harm principle of tort actions for defamation. every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries. were not entitled to damages. MVRS V ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL G. Respondents scarcely can claim having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in damages. par.Complaint alleged that what was published in BULGAR was insulting and damaging to the Muslims. Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se. Reasoning Defamation means the offense of injuring a person's character. that the narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had reported at the police headquarters. . may be brought by the injured party.To recover for this the plaintiff must show that: (a) conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of plaintiff. The cause of action is libel. 2. 33 which provides that in case of defamation. (b) conduct was extreme and outrageous. as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm . Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. to a point of suppression. but was about to happen) – so respondent’s article was not maliciously sensationalized. to a point of suppression. NO. 4. pendency or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom.112 - prof. In the preparation of stories. 21 NCC): Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. anxiety. for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. . CARPIO [dissent] .torts & damages democracy.R. and consistently with good faith and reasonable care. Reasoning. a civil complaint for damages. press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines. for such action is personal in nature. Torts with independent civil action: DEFAMATION An "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature. Ratio Action arising from an intentional tortuous act causing mental distress cannot be sustained in this SEPARATE OPINION VITUG [concur] .

causing wounded feelings and mental anguish to believers of Islam. unlike other offenses not mentioned.Salta was acquitted in the criminal case.The article is not only an imputation of irreligious conduct but also a downright misrepresentation of the religious beliefs of Muslims. regulations and policies of the respondent bank.Focal point of claim for damages: insult caused by the article that the Muslims worship the pig as their God which is absolutely contrary to their basic belief as Muslims that there is only one God. Against this letter of credit. and filed Motions to Dismiss in each of the two civil cases. that they may be made the subject of a separate civil action because of the distinct separability of their respective juridical cause or basis of action. but on the fact of defamation. Liability for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer. . the latter granting it. It is in the resolution of the motions to dismiss that Judges de Veyra and Purisima of the CFI of Manila took diametrically opposing views.. -Upon arrival of the machineries.R. the result of the criminal case. a trust receipt which was signed by Anacleto R. the civil actions very clearly alleged fraud and negligence as having given rise to the cause of action averred in the complaints. . 79583. A2010 .The filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is fully warranted under the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code." DISPOSITION The decision of Justice De Veyra is affirmed. Based on the same acts for which the criminal action was filed. . which fraud is positively and easily identifiable in the manner and scheme aforementioned. September 30. Phil. the former denying the motion. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. may be brought by the injured party. 1992 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of IAC. -Sometime in 1967.000. Chi in his capacity as president of Phil Rayon. PRUDENTIAL BANK V IAC (Philippine Rayon Mills & Anacleto Chi) 216 SCRA 257 DAVIDE. or only to recommend the granting of loans. of Japan for the importation of textile machineries under a five-year deferred payment plan. represented by co-defendant Anacleto R. a civil action for damages. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. the two cases have been consolidated for a single decision. .That there was fraud committed by the defendant in granting the aforesaid loans which rendered him liable for his acts. 1982 FACTS . it is made clear that the civil action permitted therein to be filed separately from the criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings "regardless of the result of the latter. which affirmed in toto the decision of CFI Quezon City in a civil action instituted by the petitioner for the recovery of a sum of money representing the amount paid by it to the Nissho Company Ltd. Ltd. . ISSUE . Rayon applied for and was granted a commercial letter of credit with the Prudential Bank and Trust Company in favor of Nissho. of Japan for textile machinery imported by the Philippine Rayon Mills.The offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature. Chi. 1962: Philippine Rayon Mills. Chi. Ratio The civil action permitted therein to be filed separately from the criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings "regardless of the result of the latter. In cases of defamation.00. depending on the amount of the loan applied for.113 - prof.. fraud and manifest partiality. No. WON a decision of acquittal in a criminal case operates to dismiss a separate civil action filed on the basis of the same facts as alleged in the criminal case (AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act). which were all paid by the Prudential Bank through its correspondent in Japan. This seems to be the spirit of the law when it decided to make these actions `entirely separate and distinct' from the criminal action. Civil Case No. for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. and. the Phil Rayon ceased business operation. whether acquittal or conviction.torts & damages intentional tortious act causing mental distress to those whom private respondent IDCP represents. the accused would not be liable.humiliating persons because of their religious beliefs.In disregard of the pertinent rules. by the very terms and conditions thereof. This is clearly illustrated in the case of swindling. while the others were not. Phil Rayon's factory was leased by Yupangco Cotton Mills for an annual rental of P200. JR. To enable the Phil Rayon to take delivery of the machineries. For a uniform ruling that would authoritatively settle this regrettable conflict of opinion. Ltd. To effect payment for said machineries. With this the bank filed a criminal action against Salta. SALTA V DE VEYRA 202 Phil 527 DE CASTRO. 88343). and upon securities not commensurate with the amount of the loans.Two cases involving the same issue disposed of by two judges in a manner directly in opposition of each other. one of the kinds of crime mentioned in the aforecited provision. 1(d) does not apply. -At the back of the trust receipt is a printed form to be accomplished by two sureties who. Inc. regardless of the result of the latter. Hence in these cases. ." Acquittal in the criminal case will not be an obstacle for the civil case to prosper unless in the criminal case the Court makes a finding that even civilly. The criminal case is for the prosecution of an offense the main element of which is fraud. drafts were drawn and issued by Nissho.JUSTICE JBL REYES: “…in the case of an independent civil actions under the Civil Code. Salta indiscriminately granted certain loans mentioned in the complaints filed by PNB.. Quezon City. fraud. . the Bank of Tokyo. casis . Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. This finding of fact establishes that petitioners have inflicted on private respondents an intentional wrongful act . . Reasoning ART 33.It is significant to note that under Article 31 [11] of the New Civil Code. by prior arrangement with the Prudential Bank. HELD NO. On December 29. the Prudential Bank indorsed the shipping documents to the Phil Rayon which accepted delivery of the same. His duty was to grant loans. I think Rule 107 Sec. As indicated on their faces.Both RTC and CA found the article insulting and humiliating to Muslims. Inc. . would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action. in manner characterized by negligence. . were to be jointly and severally liable to the Prudential Bank should the Phil Rayon fail to pay the total amount or any portion of the drafts issued by Nissho and paid for by Prudential Bank.Salta was an employee of the PNB assigned as Manager of the Malolos' branch. a specie of an offense committed by means of fraud. The Phil Rayon was able to take delivery of the textile machineries and installed the same at its factory site at 69 Obudan Street. where the civil case may be filed separately and proceed independently of the criminal case. it executed. G. two of these drafts were accepted by the Phil Rayon through its president. 74886 December 8. that the greatest sin in Islam is to worship things or persons other than Allah. and physical injuries. FACTS -August 8. 1969. entered into a contract with Nissho Co.PNB filed two civil actions to recover losses the bank suffered (Civil Case No.” AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ [dissent] . Anacleto R.

623. and the trial court explicitly ruled. however. a contract of guaranty does not have to appear in a public document. that requirement is absolute and indispensable. par. Elsewise stated. . Chi. WON the case should have been dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of action as there was no prior exhaustion of Philippine Rayon's properties. trouble and expense. also for damages. ISSUES: 1.Included in the complaint was a claim for indemnity in the sum of P2. If he is a guarantor. with respect to the latter. is ineffective in this case because the space therein for the party whose property may not be exhausted was not filled up. associations. in the CFI of Tarlac against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. being accessories of the principal obligation. -In the criminal case both the heirs of Capuno and the Estate of were represented by their respective counsel as private prosecutors: Attorney Ricardo Y. . However. -And although it is true that the petitioner commenced a criminal action for the violation of the Trust Receipts Law. Private respondent Chi's signature in the dorsal portion of the trust receipt did not bind him solidarily with Philippine Rayon. In short. -However. he shall only be liable for those costs incurred after being judicially required to pay. receipt in a separate civil action.e. payable on demand. 3b. -Under Article 33 of the Civil Code. together with the questioned solidary guaranty clause. provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. Reasoning Last sentence of the clause speaks of waiver of exhaustion. no legal obstacle prevented it from enforcing the civil liability arising out of the trust. a civil action for damages. all the textile machineries in the Phil Rayon's factory were sold to AIC Development Corporation for P300. 2. Excussion is not a condition sine qua non for the institution of an action against a guarantor. employees or other officials or persons therein responsible for the offense. It does not refer to the undertaking between either one or both of them on the one hand and the petitioner on the other with respect to the liability described under the trust receipt. Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on permissive joinder of parties explicitly allows it. April 30. SC’s own reading of the questioned solidary guaranty clause yields the conclusion that the obligation of Chi is only that of a guarantor. both courts concluded that acceptance of the drafts by Philippine Rayon was indispensable to make the latter liable thereon.While the criminal case was pending. which. NO. 3. fraud and physical injuries. Under Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law. YES. it would be unenforceable unless ratified. Disposition Petition granted.95 was filed on October 3.000. pursuant to Section 7 of the NIL. the failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods. Repeated formal demands for the payment of the said trust receipt yielded no result Hence. Private respondent Anacleto R. Chi's liability is limited to the principal obligation in the trust receipt plus all the accessories thereof including judicial costs. Section 6. may be brought by the injured party in cases of defamation. Estafa falls under fraud. their liability is not divisible as between them. Navarro and Attorneys Jose W. 1973. the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civil action. . Otherwise. the penalty of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the directors. 1(b) of the RPC.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs of Capuno under the Workmen's Compensation Act. It is based on trial convenience and is designed to permit the joinder of plaintiffs or defendants whenever there is a common question of law or fact. -Since that violation of a trust receipt constitutes fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code. the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras.00. The attestation by witnesses and the acknowledgement before a notary public are not required by law to make a party liable on the instrument. Whether presentment for acceptance of the drafts was indispensable to make Philippine Rayon liable thereon. . Presentment for acceptance is necessary only in the cases expressly provided for in Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL). 1974. when the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or enforceable. -The clause "we jointly and severally agree and undertake" refers to the undertaking of the two (2) parties who are to sign it or to the liability existing between themselves. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. the present action for the collection of the principal amount of P956.384. that the subject. 1974 against the Phil Rayon and Anacleto R. They are. WON he may be considered a guarantor 3b. It will save the parties unnecessary work. it would be the petitioner — and not Philippine Rayon — which had to accept the same for the latter was not the drawee. partnerships. If not. Defendant’s Defenses lack of cause of action.Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence in the CFI of Pampanga. is a contract of adhesion which must be strictly construed against the party responsible for its preparation. 3a. Contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into. or that it be proved in a certain way. With respect to a guaranty. HELD: 1. Diokno and Augusto M. partnership. punishable under the provisions of Art. which is a promise to answer for the debt or default of another. documents or instruments if they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa.The case arose from a vehicular collision.. association or other juridical entities. And even if these were not sight drafts. 1965 FACTS . . should also be paid. A2010 . Whether Philippine Rayon is liable on the basis of the trust receipt. -This is the equity rule relating to multifariousness.114 - prof. nevertheless. petitioner was acting well within its rights in filing an independent civil action to CAPUNO V PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES MAKALINTAL. NO. Chi declared secondarily liable on the trust receipt. it is these corporations. Whether private respondent Chi is jointly and severally liable with Philippine Rayon for the obligation sought to be enforced 3a. Inc. -Any doubt as to the import. it can be enforced to its full extent against any one of them. Interest and damages. laches Lower Court’s Ruling Both the CFI and the IAC ruled that Philippine Rayon could be held liable for the two (2) drafts because only these appear to have been accepted by the latter after due presentment. Philippine Rayon Mills. While the acknowledgement of a surety before a notary public is required to make the same a public document. -The obligation of the Phil Rayon arising from the letter of credit and the trust receipt remained unpaid and unliquidated. . or true intent of the solidary guaranty clause should be resolved against the petitioner since the trust receipt. be in writing. these. NO. Ilagan. The information was subsequently amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of the three victims. There was nothing procedurally objectionable in impleading private respondent Chi as a co-defendant in the civil case for the collection of a sum of money. i. Chi became the sole guarantor. The liability for the remaining ten (10) drafts did not arise because the same were not presented for acceptance. thereby necessitating acceptance. -Reading Section 13 of PD No. etc.torts & damages The lease was renewed on January 3. however. shall run only from the date of the filing of the complaint. 3. As a matter of fact. prescription. under Article 1358 of the Civil Code. or some note or memorandum thereof. the law merely requires that it. Attorney's fees may even be allowed in appropriate cases. 2. 115: It is clear that if the violation or offense is committed by a corporation.The collision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers. The parties herein agree. which are made liable for the civil liability arising from the criminal offense.Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. casis enforce the civil liability arising therefrom against Philippine Rayon. On January 5.315. YES. documents or instruments covered by a trust receipt to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appear in the trust receipt or to return said goods. drafts are sight drafts which do not require presentment for acceptance. -By his signing. officers. declared liable on the 12 drafts in question and on the trust receipt.

may be brought by the injured party. As a result of the collision. which read: ART. inasmuch as there resulted a judgment for the defendant. fraud. CORPUS V PAJE 28 SCRA 1062 CAPISTRANO.Appellants originally sought to enforce their claim exdelicto. was sought to be recovered by the said Estate from appellees in Civil Case No. and physical injuries. DISPOSTIION The order appealed from was affirmed. 1956 – Felardo Paje was driving a Victory Liner bus.And when they commenced the civil action on September 26. 838 but finally settled by them in their compromise.The grounds upon which appellees based their motion for dismissal and which the Court found to be "well taken" were.623.An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against Paje. 1961 – Pending Paje’s appeal. 33.At that time the criminal case was still pending. such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. .November 9. (1) that the action had already prescribed. July 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony. .December 29. 32. which sum. Elordi. supra. and consequently. was amended precisely to include an allegation concerning damages suffered by the heirs of the victims of the accident for which Elordi was being prosecuted. that is. . . and (2) that appellees had been released from appellants' claim for damages by virtue of the payment to the latter of the sum of P2.00 the Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages. -The appearance and intervention of Attorneys Diokno and Ilagan was disallowed by the Court and that of Attorney Navarro was disallowed in an amending order.In view of the filing of the civil action the accused Jon Elordi moved to strike out the appearances of these private prosecutors in the criminal case.There can be no doubt that the present action is one for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict. ." For P290. herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Sarabia. including the claim for reimbursement of the sum of P2. 1969 NATURE Direct appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal FACTS . . Petitioners’ Claim > The petitioners claim that the Lower Court erred in acquitting Paje and that his acquittal was a bar to the civil action.But appellants' intervention was subsequently disallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's order to the effect. RULING YES. it may be recalled. in turn. from which order the present appeal has been taken. Pampanga. "the institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict. It collided with a jeepney driven by Clemente Marcia in Lubao.In filing the civil action as they did appellants correctly considered it as entirely independent of the criminal action. or after the lapse of more than five years.The Court approved the compromise and accordingly dismissed the case. Quoting Chantangco vs.” Respondents’ Comments: > At the pre-trial of the civil case. . when they intervened in the criminal case against Jon A2010 . Grounds for the motion were (1) that as the Capuno heirs were concerned. was dismissed by the Court a quo in its order of February 29. Cipriano Capuno. which action must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146. . and 2177 of the Civil Code affects the question of prescription.The parties in the civil case entered into a "Compromise and Settlement. In cases of defamation. casis 34. without costs. 1960.00 by the Buan Estate under the Workmen's Compensation Act.623.November 21. 1958 the criminal case was still pending. No appeal was taken from either of the two orders. 1958. the said rule does not apply in the present case. saying that the collision was purely an accident. Paje was later found guilty on November 7. 31. under the provisions of the Penal Code.115 - prof. This was obviously of no avail.This is the action which.00 previously paid to the heirs of Capuno "under the Workmen's Compensation Act. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. 1962 – Paje filed a motion to dismiss the civil action on the ground that his acquittal barred the said action but the motion was denied. a civil action for damages.The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing death.000.torts & damages . the civil action for damages could have been commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent. Marcia died while two other people were physically injured. . . as held in Paulan v.December 23.The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants' contention that the four-year period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither waived the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Prior thereto. Marcia’s heirs reserved their right to institute a separate civil action against Paje. showing that appellants then chose to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code. praying that the defendants be jointly and severally liable.As to whether or not Rule 111. . . 1960. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. Section 2. the window and children of Marcia instituted the separate civil action for damages arising from the accident against Paje and Victory Liner. . for otherwise that action would have been premature and in any event would have been concluded by the subsequent judgment of acquittal in the criminal case. In other words." . Abaroai: “It is true that one of the plaintiffs in the present case reserved whatever right he may have had to bring a civil action. But the complaint here was filed only on September 26. and (2) that on the part of the Estate of Buan its right to intervene in said case had been abated by the civil action. Such reservation was not then necessary. they no longer had any interest to protect in the criminal case since they had already claimed and received compensation for the death of their decedent. and the same would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence. ISSUE WON the action had already prescribed. Civil Code). of the Revised Rules of Court which requires the reservation of the right to institute a separate and independent civil action in the cases provided for in Articles 31. and the plain inference from the foregoing is that a verdict of acquittal must carry with it exemption from civil responsibility. 33. 1962 – Paje was acquitted by the appellate court. upon appellees' motion. without having made it they could file — as in fact they did — a separate civil action even during the pendency of the criminal case. . pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code. judgment was rendered wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the charges against him. The information therein. ART." . . the defendants asked the court to rule on their special defense that plaintiffs' cause of action based upon a quasi-delict had prescribed considering that the complaint was brought four years and eleven months after the collision and .

April 3. Japzon for damages." (Rule 111. A2010 . but in their generic sense. Of eleven justices only nine took part in the decision and four of them merely concurred in the result. it is to be borne in mind that the charge against Felardo Paje was for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.Corpus vs. Madeja reserved her right to file a separate civil action for damages . is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes the institution of an independent civil action. and not for homicide and physical injuries. the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries.The criminal case still pending.torts & damages that according to Article 1144 of the Civil Code an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years. but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.116 - prof. without special pronouncement as to costs. 2. namely: MADEJA V CARO 211 PHIL 469 ABAD SANTOS. In cases of defamation. the order appealed from is affirmed. which shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderance of evidence.Sec.DR. DULAY V CA (SAFEGUARD. . which the respondent judge granted on the basis of Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court16 ISSUE WON a civil action for damages may be instituted pending the resolution of a criminal case HELD YES . because the terms used with the latter are general terms. and physical injuries. Disposition PREMISES CONSIDERED. 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. not the crime of physical injuries. (estafa) and physical injuries.In any case the Code Commission recommended that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in American Law.) Obiter . If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery. Reasoning . Eva A. the offended party Carmen L. Independent civil action. . 1995 . or attempted homicide. Petition seeking to set aside the order of the CFI dismissing the civil case against Japzon FACTS .) . or even death" **(end of obiter) . provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. casis 1.. 3. . Japzon. if intentionally done. CC) and began to run on the day the quasi-delict was committed. Yatco this Court held that the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 of the Civil Code includes homicide. 'fraud' and 'physical injuries.' Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein. Carmen L. . It includes not only physical injuries but consummated. for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article-some in their general and another in its technical sense. so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines. the order dismissing Civil Case No. JAPZON was accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. frustrated and attempted homicide. alleging that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. 32. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. it is evident that the terms 'physical injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code.Homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party reserved.” .In other words. as the Code Commission states. of an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages. may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting. that is. A . SUPERGUARD) 243 SCRA 220 BIDIN. 33. 141 is hereby set aside.The Article in question uses the words 'defamation'. Disposition Petition is granted. This is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution.In People vs.The defendant filed a motion to dismiss. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. . the term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury.Although in the case of Dyogi vs. Rules of Court. Thearticle mentions only the crimes of defamation. EVA A. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. .Art. . With this in mind. fraud. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31. reckless imprudence. and this recommendation must hove been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article intact as recommended. . not the result thereof.With regard to the issue of prescription. the Court ruled that the “offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act. ISSUE WON the civil action against Paje can still prosper despite his acquittal HELD NO Ratio Criminal negligence. would be punishable as a felony..There are at least two things about Art. or frustrated homicide. (Civil Code.In the information. which states that reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative.Section 2. the Court ruled that the action had indeed prescribed because the prescription period was pegged at 4 years (A1146. Buan. 33. an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case. The lower court ruled that the action had already prescribed. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. that is. — In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. 1983 NATURE 16 Sec. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. fraud. Other civil actions arising from offenses." 2. Paje. a civil action for damages. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. Madeja sued Dr. December 21.

" and Atty. the civil liability is governed by Art 100 of the RPC. The management of CALI announced that in case of non-agreement of the creditors.I..440. Torzuela shot and killed Atty. Secretary of the Board of Directors of CALI. frustrated. and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. CALI”s President of Board of Directors. 33. The balance sheet made mention of the Douglas C-54 plane. 1948. Desmond Fitzgerald. 3. . that Torzuela. not with reckless imprudence. negotiation on the division of assets was left pending. Shell’s Credit Manager was in charge of collecting payment.117 - prof. This was followed on Aug 10 by ISSUE WON civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action HELD YES . .There was a general understanding among all creditors present on the desirability of consummating the sale in favor of PAL. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. however. Alexander Sycip. This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. Mr. > that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 > that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary. unless the offended party waives the civil action.torts & damages FACTS . and shall require only a preponderance of evidence 18 Rule 111.. and the National Airports Corp. . it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence. regarding the proposed sale to PAL of the aviation equipment of CALI. casis FACTS . Thus. a civil action based on Article 33 lies." . . 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Fitzgerald of Shell. the accused in the case at bar. may be brought by the injured party. a security guard on duty at the "Big Bang sa Alabang. 1956 NATURE Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila be brought by the offended party. (SUPERGUARD). reserves his right to institute it separately. IAC. Carandang v.It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation. Then followed a discussion on the payment of claims of creditors and the preferences claimed for the accounts due to employees. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. which were to preserve the assets of CALI and to study the way of making a fair division of all the assets among the creditors. Respondent: > that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties. is charged with homicide. In cases of defamation. Santiago).As of August 1948. Torzuela's wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury. assigning its credit amounting to $79. Agcaoili of National Airports Corp.In the cases provided for in Articles 32. and informed them that CALI was in a state of insolvency and had to stop operation. since the civil liability under Art 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Art 365 of the RPC. When civil action may proceed independently .Aug 9. . Any extensions of term of payment.. management of CALI informally convened its principal creditors in a luncheon. 34. alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed w/ deliberate intent (dolo). while the negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury. Inc’s (CALI) operations.Maria Benita Dulay. explained the memorandum agreement executed by CALI with Phil Air Lines Inc on Aug 4. Inc. and Atty. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court18 17 A2010 .58 in its favor for goods it sold and delivered to CALI. Auditor of CALI. Dulay. INTENTIONAL TORTS VELAYO V SHELL CO OF THE PHILS 100 PHIL 186 FELIX. Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Art 2176 > that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Art 3317 and Section 3. When a criminal action is instituted. citing Andamo v. Alfonso Sycip. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated. it would file insolvency proceedings. Napoleon Dulay had an altercation. (SAFEGUARD) and/or Superguard Security Corp. the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action.Aug 6. Shell’s books showed a balance of P170. Art. > that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Art 2176 (the one filed by petitioners) cannot lie. > that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability. it must be noted however.Although in the Marcia case. widow of Dulay. Therefore. working committee discussed methods of achieving objectives. . the Government. in this case. October 31.. or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Shell had reasons to believe that the financial condition of Shell was far from being satisfactory. and physical injuries. had to be decided by Stephen Crawford and later by Wildred Wooding .Benigno Torzuela. which was then in California. 1948. Shell effected a telegraphic transfer of all its credit against CALI to the American Corporation Shell Oil Co.Sec. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. No understanding was reached on the matter of preference of payment and it was then generally agreed that the matter be further studied by a working committee to be formed.162.Since the start of Commercial Air Line. Institution of criminal and civil actions. filed an action for damages against Torzuela and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co. The offer was declined by Crawford. 33. Ltd. Atty. Alfredo Velayo.. 33. . discussed the balance sheets of CALI. .The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v.On the same day (Aug 9). However. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code.Those present in the meeting were of the unanimous opinion that it would be advantageous not to present suits against CALI but to strive for a fair pro-rata division of its assets. the independent civil-action which has been reserved may . whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. shall proceed independently of the criminal action.Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: "Sec 1. Inc. (Shell).. Caro). and damages under Articles 32. offered to Fitzgerald CALI’s Douglas C-54 plane. and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. a civil action for damages. . its fuel needs were all supplied by Shell Company of the P. > that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed (Marcia v CA) Petitioner > the incident resulting in the death of Dulay was due to the concurring negligence of the defendants. The other creditors disputed such contention of preference. fraud. Alexander Sycip were appointed to the working committee.

(It) is a prudent earnest of justice in the face of the impossibility of enumerating. or its value.. 1957 Defendant-appellee’s contentions . casis scheme. . . and if so. But then. .The telegraphic transfer made without knowledge and at the back of other creditors of CALI may be a shrewd and surprise move that enabled Shell to collect almost all if not the entire amount of its credit. Mr. 1948 American Shell Oil Co filed a complaint against CALI in the Superior Court of the State of California. although this was practically the effect and result of the VELAYO V SHELL CO OF THE PHILS RESOLUTION 100 PHIL 207 FELIX.Velayo instituted case against Shell for the purpose of securing writ of injunction restraining Shell from prosecuting against CALI. YES.There are doubts. to be received for the benefit of the insolvent estate. may be achieved in applying the provisions of the Civil Code.” Disposition Shell is liable to pay plaintiff. An order of insolvency was issued by the court on the same day. chattels. CALI on Aug 12.081. acted in bad faith and betrayed the A2010 . entirely disregarded all moral inhibitory tenets. having notice of the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency.”. Art 2252 of Civil Code provides by implication that when new provisions of the Code does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation. as it is contented that what Shell really disposed of was its own credit and not CALI’s property.118 - prof.Anent the argument that Civil Code provisions cannot be applicable as they came into effect only on Aug 30.. they may be given retroactive effect.Dec 22. 1948 CALI filed a petition for voluntary insolvency.Unaware of Shell’s assignment of credit.Section 37 of the Insolvency Law states Sec 37. and noted that “the Board had been trying to reach an agreement with creditors… to prevent insolvency proceedings. . of the P. and a writ of attachment was applied for and issued against a C-54 plane. Shell may be made to answer for the damages. . Ltd. . or having reason to believe that insolvency proceedings are about to be commenced. 1950... it could not get much of its outstanding credit because of the preferred claims of other creditors. 1948.Oct 7.It is evident that Shell. Shell acted in bad faith. and much less from a foreign corporation to the detriment of Philippine Government and local business. Shell must answer for damages. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties. Inc. he is chargeable therewith.torts & damages a deed of assignment of credit amounting to $85.First week of Sept 1948. . the Phil court would not be in a position to enforce its orders as against the American corporation Shell Oil Co. such declaration is implemented by Article 21 of the Civil Code. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. 1948 an amended complaint was filed to recover assigned credit of $85. USA. Moreover. but so far no definite agreement had been reached. . 1948 approved the memorandum agreement of sale to PAL. and another equal sum as exemplary damages. before the assignment is made. . but the Court of Justice (SC) cannot countenance such attitude at all. as to the applicability of this provision. to the detriment and prejudice of other CALI creditors who were consequently deprived of their share in the distribution of said value 2.Shell’s transfer of credit would have been justified only if Fitzgerald had declined to take part in the working committee and frankly and honestly informed the other creditors present that he had no authority to bind his principal and that the latter was to be left free to collect its credit from CALI by whatever means his principal deemed wise and were available to it. Court denied petition because whether the conveyance of Shell’s credit was fraudulent or not. Inc. > Fitzgerald was merely invited to the luncheonmeeting. the amount of such damages HELD 1. however. Fitzgerald could not have officially represented Shell because authority resides on Crawford. 2. Any person must. compensatory damages a sum equivalent to the value of the plane at the time Shell assigned its credit to American Shell. plus miscellaneous personal properties. thus defeating the purpose of the informal meetings of CALI’s principal creditors and depriving the plaintiff of the means of obtaining the plane. for the benefit of CALI and its creditors. Sept 17.Plaintiff confined his action to the recovery of damages against Shell. as they are separate and distinct corporations. If any person. confidence and trust of other creditors of CALI present in said meeting by affecting a hasty telegraphic transfer of its credit to the American corporation Shell Oil Company. or effects of the insolvent.081. Lower court dismissed the case. which states Art 21. all wrongs which cause damage. upon learning the precarious economic situation of CALI and that will all probability.Aug 12. with much more reason that Shell should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of confidence. July 30. however. . Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. such information would have dissolved all attempts to come to an amicable conciliation and would have precipitated the filing of CALI’s voluntary insolvency proceedings and nullified the intended transfer of Shell’s credit to American Shell. give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.29. National Airports Corp learned of Shell’s action in the US and hastened to file its own complaint with attachment against CALI in the CFI of Manila. . for the collection of assigned credit of $79.440. The same result. .29 and a supplemental attachment for a higher sum against the C-54 plane.While Art 19 contains a mere declaration of principles. Shell did not have any vested or acquired right to betray confidence of CALI or of its creditors.Code Commission on Article 21: (it) would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. and as an alternative. “no vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the right of others. . that Shell be ordered to pay damages double the value of the plane if the case in the US will defeat the procurement of CALI of its plane. one by one. goods. which is outside the jurisdiction of the Phils. Alfredo Velayo was appointed Assignee in the proceedings. WON Shell Co. . . without knowing the purpose for which it was called. according to Art 2254 of Civil Code. USA. the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited. YES. and liable to an action by the assignee for double the value of the property sought to be embezzled or disposed of. act with justice. taking advantage of its knowledge of the existence of CALI’s airplane C-54 at California. WON by reason of said betrayal of confidence and trust. ISSUES 1.I.” . Defendant’s Comments > Assignment of credit in favor of American Shell was for valuable consideration and made in accordance with established commercial practices > It has no interest in the case instituted by American Shell. Article 19 of the Civil Code provides Art 19.If Article 23 of Civil Code goes as far as to provide that “Even if an act or event causing damage to another’s property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant. embezzles or disposes of ay money.

torts & damages
- It is not guilty of bad faith, it having done nothing but to protect legitimately its own interest or credit against the bad faith of its debtor, the insolvent CALI, under the control of the latter’s president Alfonso Sycip - The transfer of credit to its sister corporation in the US did not prejudice the Government, because its claims were fully paid, not caused any loss or injury to other creditors, except the entities and groups controlled by Alfonso Sycip. It is not liable for exemplary damages because the provisions of the new Civil Code on the matter are not applicable to this case - Plaintiff-appellant has no cause of action against it and is not the real party in interest - Plaintiff’s right of action was based and prosecuted in the lower court under the provisions of the Insolvency Law and consequently he is stopped from pursuing another theory and is not entitled to damages under the provisions of the new Civil Code. HELD - The facts on which Court based its conclusion that Shell acted in bad faith are not and cannot be denied or contradicted by defendant. - There is no sensible reason for disturbing the finding that Shell is liable for exemplary damages. The amount of the award, however, may be modified. - According to the Civil Code, exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages, and that the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, for it is left to the sound discretion of the Court. - Majority of the Court is of the opinion that the value of the C-54 plane might result too high, and that exemplary damages should not be left to speculation but properly determined by a certain and fixed amount. The amount of exemplary damages is thus modified, and fixed at P25,000.

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she was terminated from the service by Saudia without being informed of the cause. - She then filed a complaint for damages against Saudia and Mr. Al-Balawi, its country manager. Saudia filed a motion to dismiss raising the issues of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss by Saudia, as well as the subsequent MFR. Saudia then filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO with the CA. The CA issued a TRO prohibiting respondent judge from conducting any proceeding unless otherwise directed. The CA, however, in another resolution, denied Saudia’s prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. Saudia then filed to the SC this instant petition. However, during the pendency of this petition, respondent CA rendered a decision that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the Amended Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is Art.21 CC, thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court. ISSUES 1. WON Morada had a cause of action 2. Which law should govern (Phil. Law or Saudi Law) HELD 1. YES - She aptly predicated her cause of action on Art.19 and Art.21 of the CC. As held in PNB v CA, “the aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold no. of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.” Although Art.19 merely declares a principle of law, Art.21 gives flesh to its provisions. Reasoning - After a careful study of the pleadings, We are convinced that there is reasonable basis for private respondent’s assertion that although she was already working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the two crew members for the attack on her person. As it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition. - There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that in “handing over” or “turning over” the person of private respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its duties as employer. Petitioner’s purported act contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V CA (MORADA) 297 SCRA 469 QUISUMBING; October 8, 1998
NATURE Petition for certiorari to annul and set aside CA resolution and decision FACTS - Private respondent Milagros Morada was a flight attendant of Petitioner Company. During a stop-over in Jakarta, she went to a disco with 2 of her fellow crew members Thamer and Allah (both surnamed Al-

Gazzawi) and had breakfast in their hotel room. While there, Allah left and Thamer attempted to rape her. She was saved by hotel security personnel who heard her cries for help. She later filed a case against them. The two were arrested and detained by Jakarta police. When Morada returned to Jeddah (the base of operations of petitioner), she was asked to go to Jakarta to arrange for the release of the two men. She proceeded to Jakarta but she refused to cooperate. She was eventually allowed to return to Jeddah but barred from Jakarta flights. The Indonesian authorities eventually deported the 2 men, through the intercession of the Saudi govt., after 2 weeks of detention. They were put back in service while respondent Morada was transferred to Manila. - 2 years later, she was asked by her superiors to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of Saudia, in Jeddah. When they met, he brought her to the police station where her passport was taken and she was questioned about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy merely stood as the police put pressure on her to drop the case against the two men. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch a later flight out of Jeddah. - A year and a half later, she was again asked to go to Jeddah to see Miniewy. When she did, a certain Khalid of Saudia brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. She was told that it was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, she signed a document to appear before the court a week later. When the date of appearance came, she complied but only after being assured by Saudia’s Manila manager that the investigation was routinary and posed no danger to her. She was brought before the court and was interrogated by a Saudi judge and let go, however, just as she was about to board a plane home, she was told that she had been forbidden to take flight. She was later told to remain in Jeddah and her passport was again confiscated. A few days later, she was again brought before the same court where the Saudi judge, to her astonishment and shock, sentenced her to 5 months imprisonment and 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah for what happened in Jakarta. The court found her guilty of adultery; going to a disco, dancing and listening to music in violation of Islamic laws; and socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition. - Facing conviction, she sought help from her employer, petitioner Saudia but she was denied assistance of any kind. She asked the Phil. Embassy to help her. Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila,

torts & damages
prosecution of private respondent under the guise of petitioner’s authority as employer, taking advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment of Morada was wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person and reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redress for the wrongs done, once duly proven. 2. Philippine Law Ratio Choice of law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing. Reasoning - Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the “connecting factor” or “point of contact” could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, “act with justice, give her due and observe honesty and good faith.” Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view, what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged according to the private respondent. All told, it is not without basis to identify the Phil. as the situs of the alleged tort. - In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, We find here an occasion to apply the “State of the most significant relationship” rule, which should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of the case. In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (A) the place where the injury occurred; (B) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (C) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and; (D) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

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anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime report reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results. - Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies petitioners filed a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial documents, later amended to just estafa. - Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four of which were for estafa while the fifth was for of Art.290 of' RPC (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence). - All of the 6 criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. - In the meantime, Tobias received a notice from petitioners that his employment has been terminated. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. - Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision and dismissed the complaint. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President. - Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company. However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. - Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. - Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during the hearings. - The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Tobias by ordering petitioners to pay him P80,000.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs. - CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. ISSUE WON petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent HELD YES Ratio Art.19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore,

- As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that the over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Phils. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged in international air carriage business here. Thus, the “relationship” between the parties was centered here. Disposition petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. Civil case entitled “Milagros Morada v Saudi Arabia Airlines” REMANDED to RTC

GLOBE MACKAY V CA 176 SCRA 778 CORTES; August 25, 1989
NATURE An appeal from the decision of CA FACTS - Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager. - GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos. According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive VP and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY. - one day after Tobias made the report, Hendry confronted him by stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys. - when Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, Hendry went up to him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies. - the Manila police investigators cleared Tobias of participation in the anomalies. - Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator who submitted a report finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be conducted. - Nevertheless, Hendry issued a memo suspending Tobias from work preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him. - the Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged

torts & damages
recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Reasoning - One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order." Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. - But while Art.19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. - Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that: Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. - However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that: Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. - In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. - the Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.

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malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias. - It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing several actionable tortious acts. Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the circumstances. - Petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of damnum absque injuria. It is argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage that private respondent could have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed from his employment, which was a valid and legal act of the defendants-appellants. According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable. This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners. - Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled that moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. - Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. The nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter. Disposition petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

- An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. - The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee. - Several other tortious acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from work: Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling him to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." - The threat unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity - The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code. - Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias. While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights, the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith. Considering the haste in which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by

ALBENSON V CA BIDIN; January 11, 1993
NATURE Petition assailing the decision of respondent CA which modified the judgment of the RTC and ordered petitioner to pay private respondent moral damages and attorney's fees. FACTS - Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. the mild steel plates

Amonoy was the counsel of therein Francisca Catolos. When presented for payment. AMONOY V GUTIERREZ 351 SCRA 731 PANGANIBAN. He found that the signature on the check is not the signature of Eugenio S. the act must be intentional.Because his attorney’s fees thus secured by the two lots were not paid. who manages a business establishment. a Complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their house was filed by respondents against petitioner before the RTC on December 15. ISSUE WON Amonoy may properly invoke damnum absque injuria in this case since at the time of the demolition he had color of authority over said properties HELD NO NO Ratio The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated. the two (2) lots would be sold at public auction. Woodworks.L. . In filing said information. casis pay. In its January 27. Albenson was given a check in the amount of P2.00 and drawn against the account of E. this recourse. Albenson made an extrajudicial demand upon private respondent Eugenio S. or public policy. for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. . . Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given Eugenio S. Baltao. whether willfully or negligently. shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates. Upon a judgment on merits later on. Thereafter. 2001 FACTS . plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez. his son Eugenio Baltao III. its owner. private respondent has a namesake. and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal. a son of plaintiff.880.L.Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S. Amonoy was ordered to return said properties to the rightful owners.Petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages. Albenson was informed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry that E.00 secured by the mortgage. . Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda.92. Agnes Catolos." ISSUE WON private respondent's cause of action is not one based on malicious prosecution but one for abuse of rights under Article 21 of the CC HELD A2010 . On Amonoy’s motion of 24 April 1986. that the defendants may have been dealing with .00 as another round of attorney’s fees. ." Upon further inquiry. with the very same business address as Guaranteed. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores. respondent Baltao filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises. Albenson was advised that the signature appearing on the subject check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao. 1993 Decision.600. Considering that Guaranteed. On 6 February 1973. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration. was deemed to have waived his right. In its decision. Baltao to replace and/or make good the dishonored check. the said lots were foreclosed. which received the goods in payment of which the bouncing check was issued is owned by respondent. On appeal.The Gutierrez spouses sought a restraining order from the Supreme Court. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting evidence. 2) but which is contrary to morals. Jesse Yap." . and that is.575. Reasoning . which was also denied. There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21. and Benjamin Mendiona. resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law.L. Baltao for Violation of BP 22.From the records of the SEC. Rizal. in the exercise of his legal right or duty. the absence of malice. The heirs opposed. including the house of the Gutierrez spouses.They failed to pay." After obtaining the foregoing information. which was granted by the same. Disposition petition is GRANTED and the decision of the CA is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. claiming ignorance of the complaint against him. Woodworks. Failing in that. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction. however. As they were not able to . anyone who. (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Among the heirs of the latter was his daughter. Woodworks. . Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. and P9. causes damage to another. Private respondent. (2) which is exercised in bad faith. P11. but the latter failed to do so and therefore. 1989. as a legal consequence. But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the above-mentioned Decision. was one "Eugenio S.Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him. Baltao.L. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith. its employee. In addition. Baltao. But on 28 September 1972 judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay within 90 days the P27. . petitioner acted in good faith and probable cause in filing the complaint before the provincial fiscal. The possibility is that it was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio Baltao III. the lower court observed that "the check is drawn against the account of "E. Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated respondent Baltao. the check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed. the Orders of 25 April 1986 and 6 May 1986 were issued for the demolition of structures in the said lots. The presence of probable cause signifies. Hence. on 21 January 1970 Amonoy filed for their foreclosure before the CFI of Pasig. the CA set aside the lower court’s ruling and ordered petitioner to pay respondents P250. good custom. Amonoy was the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale. Thus. the RTC dismissed respondents’ suit. He won the case for them and charged P27600 as attorney’s fees.Thus. Woodworks. Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed. was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao". did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand. The heirs sought the annulment of the auction sale. his clients executed real estate mortgages on their lands and the house thereon." not of Guaranteed Industries of which plaintiff used to be President.00 as value of the harvests. upon verification with the drawee bank. The case was dismissed by the CFI on 7 November 1977. The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty. respondents’ house had already been destroyed.000 as actual damages. supposedly in accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court.122 - prof. Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and had ceased to exist as a corporation since 1975.695. the CFI on 25 July 1985 issued a Writ of Possession and pursuant to which a notice to vacate was made on 26 August 1985. . Asuncion Pasamba died on 24 February 1969 while Alfonso Fornilda passed away on 2 July 1969. 3) and it is done with intent to injure. As part payment thereof. public order. E.torts & damages which the latter ordered.645. and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on 22 July 1981. What prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of BP 22 against private respondent was their failure to collect the amountdue on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private respondent. However. . a single proprietorship business. . depends on the circumstances of each case. contending that the attorney’s fees charged were unconscionable and that the agreed sum was only P11. immediately filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation.

Jader attended the graduation and brought his family with him.UE elevated the case to this Court on a petition for review arguing that it has no liability to respondent Romeo A. is repugnant to the modern concept of social law. and he who violates them violates the law. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties. Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outset.In the mean time. Indubitably. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. These standards are the following: to act with justice. therefore. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another. enjoining the demolition of respondents’ house. For this reason. 1986. to give everyone his due.Article 19. Verily. 1986.” . sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life. Art. particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams. By then.Considering that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which is engaged in legal education. .In civilized society. petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents’ house on May 30.00 for moral damages . . that a copy of the TRO was served on petitioner himself on June 4. February 17. shall indemnify the latter for the same. 19.000. Indeed. however. may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. But the records show that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise.TC rendered judgment in favor of the Jader and ordered UE to pay Jader P35.True. it is not permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others.We reject this submission.Jader was enrolled in the UE College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. He maintains that he was merely acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC. He failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade . and observe honesty and good faith. his name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation with an annotation regarding his deficiencies. his actions were tainted with bad faith. .470. he was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition. especially to the prejudice of others.Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. wilfully or negligently causes damage to another. Had he not insisted on completing the demolition. Every person who.torts & damages Ratio Damnum absque injuria may not be invoked by a person who claims to exercise a right but does so in an abusive manner violative of Article 19 of the Civil Code. It cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another x x x. the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. Consequently. contrary to law. that their fellowmen. . His name also appeared in the invitation for the graduation as one of the candidates for graduation.123 - prof. We agree with the CA that he unlawfully pursued the demolition of respondents’ house well until the middle of 1987. .UE had a contractual obligation to inform his students as to whether or not they have met all the requirements for the conferment of a degree. cannot be said to have acted in good faith. give everyone his due. he sued UE for damages. At the foot of the list of the names of the candidates there appeared however an annotation saying that it was a tentative list and that degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily complete requirements as stated in the University Bulletin . Every person must. He took a leave of absence without pay from his job and enrolled at the pre-bar review class. . 2000 FACTS . . but an invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when he received the TRO from this Court on June 4. their continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Schools and professors cannot just take observe honesty and good faith.UE denied liability arguing that it never led respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating students.He filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade but got a grade of five (5). was issued by the Supreme Court on June 2.Petitioner invokes this legal precept in arguing that he is not liable for the demolition of respondents’ house. a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible” UE V JADER 325 SCRA 804 YNARES-SANTIAGO. and it disappears when it is abused. considering that the proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by . respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the RTC. Over and above the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice x x x. 1986. act with justice. The CA also found.He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student . when they act affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that those with whom they deal in the general course of society will act in good faith. . though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society. The law. Jader.Petitioner. 20.CA Affirmed and added an award of P50. UE in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination. together with the absence of all information or belief of facts. Jader later learned of the deficiency and he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examination. Thus. casis the latter arose out of his own negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned the result of his removal exam. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students. A right. more specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which states: Art.A commentator on this topic explains: “The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears. did not heed the TRO of this Court. and to A2010 . in the availment of one’s rights. . known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights. one must Reasoning . 1986 under the authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. based on the Certificate of Service of the Supreme Court process server. his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right.00 . ISSUE WON an educational institution may be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case HELD YES . men must be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury – that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them. Damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case. would render the transaction unconscientious. even though the forms and technicalities of the law. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another.

Consequently. for without the latter. The application was recommended for approval by the school principal. Garciano. When one of two innocent parties must suffer. Phelps sent several demands. has reacted acidly to the Board's deliberations for the reinstatement of Mrs. . but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. therefore it is declared null and void. 20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises only from unlawful.torts & damages students for granted and be indifferent to them. thereby questioning the integrity of the Board's decision". concurred in by the president of the Parent-Teachers Association and the school faculty. Upon her return from Austria in the later part of June. she applied for an indefinite leave of absence because her daughter was taking her to Austria where her daughter was employed. signed a letter notifying her that she was "reinstated to report and do your usual duties as Classroom Teacher . the president. 1982.B. or before the school year ended. She was ordered to report for work on July 5. which it in turn supplied to MERALCO.8m). The RTC rendered decision in favor of Phelps. even when the act is not illicit. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right.Barons admitted the purchase of the wires and cables. They were simply exercising their right of free speech or their right to dissent from the Board's decision. graduate. but she did not comply with that order. 1992 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint for damages filed by the petitioner against the private respondents. good customs or public policy. 1982. 1982. . 1982. when he acts with prudence and in good faith. February 9. ISSUE WON the defendants prevented the petitioner from reporting to the school and thus making them liable for damages HELD NO . It failed to act seasonably. August 10.On July 9. effective July 5. .The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner's discontinuance from teaching was her own choice. . whatever loss she may have incurred in the form of lost earnings was self-inflicted. The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right. If mere fault or negligence in one’s acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby. While the respondents admittedly wanted her BARONS MARKETING V CA (PHELPS DODGE PHILS) 286 SCRA 96 KAPUNAN. Labajo. Barons purchased on credit wires and cables worth P4. Cebu. instead of responding to the request of Barons. she received the letter informing her that her services at the Immaculate Concepcion Institute had been terminated. or morals. and prayed for atty’s fees of 25% of the amt. She made inquiries from the school about the matter and. A2010 . the former are useless.The petitioner was hired to teach during the 1981-82 school year in the Immaculate Concepcion Institute in the Island of Camotes. and some members of the faculty of the school for discrimination and unjust and illegal dismissal. the members of the Board of Directors of the school. and exemplary damages amounting to P100k. 1982. as ordered by the school's Board of Directors. Emerito Labajo. the school's founder.124 - prof. 1982. willful or negligent acts that are contrary to law. resigned their positions from the Board "for the reason that the ICI Faculty. It instead wrote Phelps requesting if it could pay the outstanding account in monthly installments of P500k plus 1% interest. on July 7. As such dealer. Emerito Labajo addressed a letter to the petitioner through her husband. ordering Barons to pay the debt and interest of 12% and awarding 25% as atty’s fees. Wiertz.On June 1. vice president. they actually did nothing to physically prevent her from reassuming her post.1m. . Branch XI. even if true. Volenti non fit injuria. morals. out of a membership of nine (9). The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. . and some teachers allegedly threatened to resign en masse. 1982. Petitioner’s liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the course. That the school principal and Fr. Esteria F. against Fr. plus 25% for atty’s fees and collection. Joseph Wiertz. Their acts were not contrary to law. Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable. filed a complaint for recovery of the P3.8m plus interest." and that "any letter or notice of termination received by you before this date has no sanction or authority by the Board of Directors of this Institution. 1982. On Sept1987.From Dec1986 to Aug1987. They did not "illegally dismiss" her for the Board's decision to retain her prevailed. reducing . Ratio Liability for damages under Articles 19. Petitioner cannot just give out its student’s grades at any time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking the bar.Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. Barons was given 60 days credit for its purchases of Phelp’s products. CA affirmed (with modification. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL. GARCIANO V CA 212 SCRA 436 GRIÑO-AQUINO. Wiertz disagreed with the Board's decision to retain her. secretary. petitioner filed a complaint for damages in the Regional Trial Court. to terminate her services as a member of the teaching staff because of: (1) the absence of any written contract of employment between her and the school due to her refusal to sign one. he through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it. casis service terminated. Emerito O. 1998 NATURE Petition for review decision of CA FACTS . .On September 3. informing her of the decision of Fr. but disputed the amt claimed by Phelps. Barons paid P300k (thereby leaving an unpaid account of P3. and approved by the President of the school's Board of Directors. Sotero Garciano (for she was still abroad). good customs or public policy.Phelps. and three members of the Board of Directors. FACTS . but Barons still did not pay. In the sales invoice. Joseph Wiertz. and (2) the difficulty of getting a substitute for her on a temporary basis as no one would accept the position without a written contract.Phelps Dodge appointed Barons Marketing as one of its dealers of electrical wires and cables. . it was stipulated that an interest of 12% would be imposed.Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to the delayed relay of information to respondent. with the exception of Fr. . that is. with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable." . On January 13. did not make them liable to her for damages. Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade.

Thus. not an abuse thereof. and observe honesty and good faith. . head of the collection department of defendant was formally informed of the postdated check about a week later.84 on the condition that BPI will not suspend the effectivity of the card .MARASIGAN filed a complaint for damages against petitioner before the RTC Makati .December 12.000. to withhold the deposit of his postdated check and that said check be returned to him because he had already instructed his bank to stop the payment because BPI violated their agreement that when MARASIGAN issued the check to cover his account amounting to only P8. Thus.the law prescribes a "primordial limitation on all rights" by setting certain standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof. and must not be excessive or unduly harsh. bad faith on the part of Phelps was not proved. 1989 despite assurance to the contrary by defendant's personnel-in-charge. 1989 which was received on November 23.MARASIGAN issued Far East Bank Check of P15.00.March 21. by way of penal clause.December 8.00 by way of attorney's fees. alleging that Phelps should have been held guilty of “creditor’s abuse of rights”.1m is almost P2m. WON Barons should be liable for interest and atty’s fees HELD 1.00 and with a monthly billing every 27th of the month His membership was renewed for another year or until February 1990 and the credit limit was increased to P5. 1989 – MARASIGAN requested that he be sent the exact billing due him as of December 15.000. WON there was creditors’ abuse of rights in this case 2. casis that unless he settles his outstanding account with the defendant within 5 days from receipt of the letter.November 28. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate.May 7. He was also told to refrain from further use of his credit card to avoid any inconvenience/embarrassment and . More importantly.000. 1989 . Reasoning . and P 20.00 as exemplary damages.TC: ruled for MARASIGAN finding that BPI abused its right in contravention of A19 CC ordering BPI to pay P 100. making it harder for them to pay its own obligations. 1989 – MARASIGAN sent letter to the manager of FEBTC requesting the bank to stop the payment of the check . MARASIGAN admitted having failed to pay his account because he was in Quezon attending to some professional and personal commitments. and for an explanation within five (5) days from receipt thereof why his card was dishonored on December 8. . by Café Adriatico when the he entertained some guests.December 16.In this case. WON MARASIGAN can recover moral damages arising from the cancellation of his credit card by BPI HELD 1. a co-employee who handles the account of the plaintiff. the bill amounting to P735.987.Atty.00 as moral damages. Citing Tolentino: There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another.00 by way of attorney's fees. . .torts & damages atty’s fees to 5%) Barons now assail the CA decision. Mary Ellen Ringler. the mere exercise of a right cannot be said to be an abuse of right.MARASIGAN was a complimentary member of BECC from February 1988 to February 1989 and was issued Credit Card with a credit limit of P3. an employee of the defendant who in turn gave to Jeng Angeles. the inclusion of Art. 1990 .00. act with justice.000.April 5.00 as exemplary damages. especially a profit-oriented one like Phelps. less the improper charges and penalties. YES Ratio the penal clause included in the contract should be complied with in the event of breach.000.” 2. 1990 . He was informed that bpi was demanding immediate payment of his outstanding account.84 was not paid in due time. NO Ratio there is no abuse of rights when there is no bad faith nor intent to prejudice another. .00 as moral damages: P25. Roberto Maniquiz. Ricardo J.final demand by BPI requiring him to pay in full his overdue account. there must be bad faith or intent to prejudice the plaintiff. xxx The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established. and Barons should not be liable for atty’s fees. since 25% if P4.MARASIGAN oftentimes exceeded his credit limits but this was never taken against him by BPI and even his mode of paying his monthly bills in check was tolerated.19 in the CC: Every person must. It is plain to see that what we have here is a mere exercise of rights. “Clearly. and was threatening to suspend his credit card.CA: AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION P50. this (the request of Barons) would be inimical to the interests of any enterprise. *note: Barons contends that Phelps abused its rights when it rejected Barons’ offer to settle the debt in installments **right involved: right of a creditor to refuse partial fulfillment of a prestation due to him ISSUES 1. .000. including stipulated fees and charges. within 5 days from receipt thereof or face court action and also to replace the postdated check with cash within the same period or face criminal suit for violation of Bouncing Check Law . 1989. his membership will be permanently cancelled . . P 50.the contract expressly provided for the imposition of the 12% interest plus 25% for attorney’s fees and A2010 . 1998 FACTS . 1989 by Tess Lorenzo.000. One of his guests. The check remained in the custody of Jeng Angeles. otherwise the plaintiff will file a case against them .00 which would include his future bills. there must be no intention to injure another. 1990 – MARASIGAN demanded BPI compliance with his request in his first letter dated March 12.To constitute abuse of rights. Barons is bound to pay the said amounts. . 1990 – MARASIGAN sent another letter reminding the manager of FEBTC that he had long rescinded and cancelled whatever arrangement he entered into with BPI and requesting for his correct billing.BPI served MARASIGAN a letter by ordinary mail informing him of the temporary suspension of the privileges of his credit card and the inclusion of his account number in their Caution List. Mr.32.There is no showing that the plaintiff received this letter before December 8.000. NO collection. 1990 within three (3) days from receipt. otherwise the necessary court action shall be filed to hold defendant responsible for the humiliation and embarrassment suffered by him . Also. Phelps was driven by legitimate reasons for rejecting Barons offer. Thus.000. postdated December 15. ISSUES 1. the illicit act cannot be concealed under the guise of exercising a right. 1989. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties. this should be reduced to 10% for being manifestly exorbitant.000. was requiring him to issue a check for P15. Reasoning . and P10.125 - prof. It merely wanted to avoid a situation wherein its cash position would be compromised. give everyone his due.March 12. 2989 .987. paid the bill by using her own credit card a Unibankard .However. WON BPI abused its right to suspend the credit card 2. atty’s fees should be reduced to 10% Disposition CA decision modified WRT atty’s fees but AFFIRMED in other respects BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION V CA (MARASIGAN) 296 SCRA 260 KAPUNAN. Marasigan’s credit card was dishonored. . September 25.October 1989 – statement amounting to P8.

both shareholders of Allied Technilogists.L. January 11. (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. As early as 28 October 1989.The sole object of the appellants was to secure for themselves recognition that they were co-architects of the Veterans Hospital. there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded.L. states. so as to enhance their standing and prestige. . . Reasoning .Under the terms and conditions of the credit card. filed an action against the Secretary of National Defense and also against their own company (together with Pablo Panlilio who is also a shareholder of the company) in connection with the 15% retention fund withheld by the DND relating to the construction of the Veterans Hospital. delivered to Guaranteed Industries Inc. the article envisions a situation where a person has a legal right which was violated by another in a manner contrary to morals. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria .As it turned out. and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury.” . Baltao and that E. he modified award of attorney’s fees. BPI was therefore justified in suspending his credit card. or public policy. which was used as basis of the action. Woodworks. He can not now pass the blame to the petitioner for not notifying him of the suspension of his card. .torts & damages Ratio The agreement was for the immediate payment of the outstanding account. the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not A2010 . good custom. the real issue was the credit as to the architects of the building were. there is no need or necessity for a judicial declaration. hurt or harm which results from the injury. signed by MARASIGAN. As quoted earlier. On the other hand no amount of declaration will help an incompetent person achieve prestige and recognition. 2. Reasoning . The pleadings in this case do not show damages were ever asked or alleged. . Disposition Petition denied.” . any card with outstanding balances after thirty (30) days from original billing/statement shall automatically be suspended. ALBENSON V CA (BALTAO) 217 SCRA 16 BIDIN. casis ISSUE WON the lower court erred in dismissing the case HELD NO . amount to a legal injury or wrong.Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed was one Eugenio S. NO .Enrique Ruiz and Jose Herrera. If this is so. together with Panlilio.The amended complaint of appellants claimed that the non inclusion of their names as architects resulted in their professional prestige and standing being seriously impaired. the application contained the stipulation that the petitioner could automatically suspend a card whose billing has not been paid for more than thirty days.By his own admission MARASIGAN made no payment within 30 days for his billing/statement dated 27 September 1989. RUIZ V SECRETARY PAREDES. The Court then proceeded with the other cause of action which was deemed to be the controversy between Ruiz and Panlilio over the said 15%. In such cases. As part payment.MARASIGAN’S own negligence was the proximate cause of his embarrassing and humiliating experience in not reading the letter of notice of cancellation. Hence. Ratio To find the existence of an abuse of right A19 the following elements must be present (1) There is a legal right or duty. Albenson was given a check drawn against the account of E. BPI did not capriciously and arbitrarily canceled the use of the card. Woodworks was registered in the name Eugenio Baltao. Inc. Order appealed from is affirmed. their pleas for recognition as architects should have been heard by the lower court. . there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the results of a violation of a legal duty. Neither did he make payment for his original billing/statement dated 27 October 1989. Nowhere is it stated in the terms and conditions of the application that there is a need of notice before suspension may be affected as private respondent claims. . BPI could automatically suspend his credit card.126 - prof. Ruiz and Herrera want to be recognized as architects of the building also citing Article 21 of the Civil Code as their base for he cause of action. the mild steel plates which the latter ordered.And under the facts and circumstances obtaining. or public policy. the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone.It was petitioner's failure to settle his obligation which caused the suspension of his credit card and subsequent dishonor at Café Adriatico.Albenson made an extrajudicial demand but Balbao denied issuing the check. good custom.Good faith is presumed and the burden of proving bad faith is on the party alleging it. Any CARD with outstanding balances unpaid after thirty (30) days from original billing/statement date shall automatically be suspended and those with accounts unpaid after sixty (60) days from said original billing/statement date shall automatically be cancelled without prejudice to BECC's right to suspend or cancel any CARD any time and for whatever reason. Consequently as early as 28 October 1989 thirty days from the non-payment of his billing dated 27 September 1989. A check is not considered as cash especially when it is postdated sent to BPI. Ratio The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. the issuance of the postdated check was not effective payment. The signature on the subject check belonged to Eugenio Baltao.Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right. or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. Thus. BPI could have suspended MARASIGAN’S card outright. Under the contract and all other documents relating to the construction of the Veterans Hospital. 1966 NATURE Appeal from an order of the Manila CFI FACTS . Albenson filed a . one cannot sustain the contention that the failure or refusal to extend recognition was an act contrary to morals. Prestige and recognition are bestowed on the deserving even if there is no judicial declaration. they claim that even if the retention fund was in act released. Thus. It turned out that said retention was already released by the DND to the Company. Article 21. 1993 NATURE Appeal from decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . (2) which is exercised in bad faith. BPI allowed him to use his card for several weeks. Instead. good customs. damage is the loss. “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. The award of damages by the CA is clearly unjustified. Thus.While the word “injury” may also refer to honor or credit. Thus.Check was dishonored for the reason “Account closed. Reasoning . the named architect was only Panlilio.Albenson Enterprises Corp. Hence it presupposes losses or injuries which are suffered as a result of said violation.

A2010 . friends and acquaintances. however.The record reveals that on August 23. P2. . there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person. neither may exemplary damages be awarded Disposition Petition granted.A party injured by the filing of a court case against him. . that he expressed and professed his undying love and affection for her who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings". (2) That in bringing the action. reckless. may file a case for damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights. Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S. acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor. 1954 as the big day. . It appears that private respondent has a namesake. in a reasonable mind. It .000 as moral and exemplary damages. is quite different. was bought. December 17. Tanjanco succeeded in having carnal access to Araceli. profession. the prosecutor acted without probable cause.But the next day.Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code. .Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss — in business. decided to get married and set September 4. following their mutual promise of love. Baltao for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. he shall compensate the latter for damages. otherwise. and one employee. with accessories. Velez left a note for Wassmer saying that he has to postpone the wedding because his mother opposes it.127 - prof. moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate . Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated respondent Baltao.000 as actual damages. the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. . ISSUES WON Baltao should be awarded damages (based on malicious prosecution) HELD NO . 1964 FACTS . casis is the abuse of right which can be a cause for moral and material damages. to wit: (1) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor. 1966 NATURE Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals revoking an order of the CFI dismissing appellant's action for support and damages. On September 2. Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Article 21 of the Civil Code says that when the person willfully causes loss or injury contrary to good custom.Baltao filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation. defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton. both being of adult age. which was subsequently issued. or on malicious prosecution. the following three (3) elements must be present. its owner.While mere breach of contract is not an actionable wrong.Where there is no evidence of the other party having acted in wanton. Baltao for violation of BP 22. Due to her pregnant condition. his son Eugenio Baltao III.Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief. party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased.Provincial Fiscal Mauro M.In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith. To formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity. even if he is later on absolved. trade.Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos. fraudulent. FACTS . P25. who manages E. Araceli had to resign her job as secretary in HELD YES . If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights. reckless [and] oppressive manner.. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives.To constitute malicious prosecution. it is damnum absque injuria. that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. . and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal. CA decision reversed and set aside WASSMER V VELEZ 12 SCRA 648 BENGZON.Baltao filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against Albenson Enterprises. . no damages will be given . oppressive. Wassmer. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.Sued by Beatriz for damages. attorney's fees and costs.An award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith.. . In order that such a case can prosper. . Their wedding was set. fraudulent or reckless. Velez and Beatriz P. or oppressive manner.000." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton . Bridal showers were given and gifts received.500 as attorney's fees. to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation.This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner Judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2. .Trial court granted Baltao’s claim for actual or compensatory. The bride-to-be's trousseau. through his protestations of love and promises of marriage. moral and exemplary damages. A matrimonial bed.L. . . But Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. Woodworks. As to exemplary damages. and the costs. ISSUE WON Velez is liable for the preparations spent by Wassmer cost of wedding TANJANCO V SANTOS REYES. if the proof is flimsy and unsubstantiated.Francisco X. 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage. Regularly until December 1959. job or occupation — and the same must be proved. or malevolent manner.torts & damages complaint against Eugenio S. that in consideration of his promise of marriage Araceli consented and acceded to Tanjanco’s pleas for carnal knowledge. moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages. Proof and motive that the institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to damages .00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award. and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. . he sent a telegram assuring Wassmer that nothing has changed and he will return soon. as a result of which she conceived a child. . December 24." P15. only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized.Asst. property. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. Concededly. (3) The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice .CA modified by reducing the moral damages and the attorney's fees awarded.

In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages. there is no seduction. 23. filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married.00 attorney's fees. To constitute seduction there must A2010 . Therefore. on the other hand. the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. to pay her not less than P430. wounded feelings. we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code. petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and.00 in moral and exemplary damages. Insisting. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes. to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule: ART.000. no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. ISSUE WON CS erred in reversing the CFI decision HELD YES . persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury. in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. a week before the filing of the complaint.. had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit. that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing. or a breach of a promise of marriage. reimbursement for actual expenses. and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. maintained intimate sexual relations with Tanjanco.000. Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community. petitioner's attitude towards her started to change. in an action by the woman. he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses. Araceli Santos. in his Counterclaim. superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the female. there is no crime. She became unable to support herself and her baby and duer to Tanjanco's refusal to marry her as promised. single. without the assistance of counsel. the enticement. which are calculated to have and do have that effect. but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages. he did not maltreat her. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. She alleges in said complaint that: she is 22 years old. . and though the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage. a woman of adult age. or can not be proved. entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of origin to proceed with the case. The essential feature is seduction. for had Araceli been deceived. let us examine the complaint. casis Private respondent. petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses.128 - prof. enticement. Bugallon. attorney's fees and costs. in the interest of justice. without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage. it connotes essentially the idea of deceit. much less for one year. the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission where it stated. though the grievous moral wrong has been committed. during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint. and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire. Dagupan City. from 1958 to 1959. plus P100. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion. as a result of such maltreatment. he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment. Disposition the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. the Commission has deemed it necessary.00 a month for her support and that of her baby. that in law it is more than mere sexual intercourse. the latter courted and proposed to marry her. The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. with repeated acts of intercourse.Bearing these principles in mind. they therefore argued to get married after the end of the school semester. Over and above the partisan allegations. and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer. she was a virgin before she began living with him. she and her parents would have such a right of action. and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover. Under the present laws. persuasions and wiles. and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit. before 20 August 1987. The girl becomes pregnant. petitioner. which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless.And in American Jurisprudence: On the other hand. under Article 21. plus P10. Guilig. he prayed for an award for miscellaneous expenses and moral damages. she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent. and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City. sometime in 20 August 1987. A promise of marriage either has not been made. she sustained injuries. and no other cause of action being alleged. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. moral shock. is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments. no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. he maltreated and threatened to kill her. she suffered mental anguish. artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant. she would not have again yielded to his embraces. besmirched reputation. the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Inc.In his Answer with Counterclaim. and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. 1993 NATURE Appeal by certioriari to review and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex. and social humiliation. Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage. She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts. BAKSH V CA 219 SCRA 115 DAVIDE JR. February 19. the facts stand out that for one whole year. petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga. even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury. “but the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. . Hence. and finally. and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. .torts & damages IBM Philippines. which was in October of that year. as the girl is above eighteen years of age. she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages." They gave an example  "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". CFI dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals. But under the proposed article.

good customs. rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision 5 favoring the private respondent. who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality. the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing. the said Code contains a provision. Jr. he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. This notwithstanding. ISSUE WON Art. and so holds. Bunag. 1992 NATURE Petition for review from the decision of CA FACTS . and Cirilo applied for their respective Marriage Licenses. When she noticed they were going the wrong way. that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals. (e) by reason of that deceitful promise. The RTC upon finding that she was forcibly abducted and raped Bunag Jr was ordered to pay for P80K for moral damages. P20K for exemplary damage. deceit and false pretenses. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent. have offended our sense of morality. culture and traditions.After filing for the ML. inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors. 21 is applicable to the case at bar HELD YES . they had a quarrel. . that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress. he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four wives and concludes that on the basis thereof.Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals. . such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship. no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act. Jr brought Zenaida Cirilo to a hotel where they had sex. In the instant case. traditions and culture. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees.Conrado Bunag. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. . good customs or public policy. Bunag Sr was absolved from liability. which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. . applying Article 21 of the Civil Code.The Court found that Cirilo and Bunag Jr were sweethearts but for 2eeks before the alleged rape. Bunag Jr withdrew his application. respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise. his controversial "common law wife" is now his legal wife as their marriage had A2010 . .129 - prof. P20K by way of temperate damage. Finally. July 10. (d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her. Moreover. the trial court erred in ruling that he does not possess good moral character.torts & damages . . Unfazed by his second defeat. Cirilo was ashamed when she went home and could not sleep and eat because of the deception done against her by Bunag. Jr. however. petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her.A complaint fro breach of promise to marry was filed against Bunag Sr and Bunag Jr. On the day of the said rape.After trial on the merits. private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens. she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry. petitioner filed the instant petition." BUNAG V CA (CIRILO) 211 SCRA 441 REGALADO. The Court a quo adopted her evidence. through machinations. and he has never maltreated her. traditions and culture. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because. and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner. Cirilo rode in the passenger’s seat while Bunag Jr was driving. the lower court. he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. Bunag brough her to his grandmother’s house in Las Pinas where they liver together as husband and wife for 21 days. and P10K for atty’s fees. The Court is of the opinion. they proceeded to Bunag’s grandmother’s house. in reality. Bunag jr invited her for merienda to talk things over. During that time.Bunag initially allowed her to go home but later refused to consent and stated that he would only let her go after they were married. Bunag then left and never returned. That night. they lived as husband and wife for 21 days. promised to marry private respondent.It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy. .The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. They never got to the restaurant where they were supposed to eat. Article 21. (c) petitioner. Later that evening. .The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers. but after leaving. she allowed herself to be deflowered by him. Respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto the trial court's ruling. he is not conversant with such Filipino customs. Bunag Jr came riding in a car with an unidentified man. (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner. so much so that she promised not to make any scandal and to marry him. casis Disposition Petition denied been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs.In light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21. . could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. As an Iranian Moslem. (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances. proof that he had. Cirilo contends that she was abducted by Bunag Jr along with unidentified man and brought her to the motel where she was raped. Cirilo protested but Bunag threatened her that he would bump the car against the post if she made any noise. .She was then dragged by the 2 men in the hotel where Bunag Jr deflowered her against her will and consent. inter alia. Bunag Sr arrived and assured them that they would apply for the ML the next day. It is essential.

attorney's fees plus costs. WON Quimiguing had a right to the support of the child 2. The latter. that Ivan is a prosperous businessman of Davao City with a monthly income of P5. Its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir. Amelita was forced to leave her work as a waitress. where she worked as a waitress. that her pleas for help and support fell on deaf ears. as a result of which Amelita got pregnant. In the case. While the Bunag’s assigned several errors in the TC decision. .A breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law. 1974. 1992 NATURE .Although TC granted damages on the basis of the forcible abduction and rape even after the criminal complaint’s dismissal. plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages. Reasoning . assisted by her parents. 742). 40) and may receive donations (Art.000 to P8. As stated in Art. As relief. However. that because of her pregnancy. that on the pretext of getting something. 2219 which provides compensation in cases of seduction.Bunag filed for the petition for review claiming that CA failed to consider vital exhibits and testimonies and error in the proper application of the law.The court is constrained with the factual findings of the lower courts. CONSTANTINO V MENDEZ BIDIN. only the fiscal made such dismissal of the criminal complaint. that while dining. succeeded in having sex with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation and without her consent. that after the sexual contact. whenever Ivan is in Manila. particularly Icao (Art. ISSUES 1. she had to stop studying. unborn child is given a provisional personality by law and therefore has a right to support from its progenitors. . She became pregnant and despite efforts and drugs (abortion pills?) supplied by defendant. the petitioner’s promising to marry Cirilo to evade criminal liability constitutes acts contrary to morals and good customs. Disposition petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. although married.torts & damages .00. .000. 1974.Under the circumstances in the case at bar. July 31. thus the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error. . Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted. Plaintiff amended the complaint but the TC ruled such was not allowable as the original complaint averred no cause of action. the extinction of the criminal liability does not extinguish civil liability unless there is a declaration of a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case may arise did not exist. apart from the right to recover for money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. in relation to Art 2219. sued her neighbor Icao with whom she had close and confidential relations. that at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening. Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married man. Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. that they repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and November. and the assailedjudgment and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED. 1970 NATURE Appeal on points of law from an order of the CFI FACTS . These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which warrant and justify the award of moral and exemplary damages. May 14. Quimiguing. and Art 2229 and 2234 CC.In her complaint. abduction.Petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for acknowledgment.A conceived. that Amelita had no sexual relations with any other man except Ivan who is the father of the child yet to be born at the time of the filing of the complaint. Cruz. Repeated sexual intercourse only indicates that passion QUIMIGUING V ICAO 34 SCRA 132 REYES. 854) 2. Had she been induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage. WON Quimiguing is entitled to damages HELD 1.Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her womanhood. ISSUE WON lower courts erred in granting damages for the breach of promise to marry HELD Ratio A breach of promise to marry is not actionable per se. rape or other lascivious acts. 21. she surrendered her virginity HELD NO Ratio Mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery.130 - prof. Under Art 21 CC. Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . that the day following their first meeting. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damage. Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the latter.” This is furthered by Art. par10.Appellant. “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. Ivan professed his love and courted Amelita. Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to which the latter agreed. . casis and not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan. even if such child should be born after the death of the testator (Art. support and damages against private respondent Ivan Mendez.Hence.Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action as the complaint did not allege the child had been born— the motion was sustained. moral and exemplary damages. . pursuant to Art 21 in relation to par 3 and 10. YES . any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. CA dismissed the petitions and affirmed judgment of RTC in toto. Hence. A2010 . Manila. she could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual contact sometime in August.For a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damages caused. that he was a married man. independent of the right to support of the child. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. Reasoning . Amelita prayed for the recognition of the unborn child. that Amelita asked for time to think about Ivan's proposal. YES . Art 2219. . she claimed support of P120/mo. the payment of actual. Amelita Constantino alleges that she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant located at Sta. ISSUE WON Amelita can claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 3 & 21 4 of the Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage.Cirilo appealed on the disculpation of Bunag Sr’s liability. the award for moral damages is allowed in cases specified and analogous to those provided in Art 2219 CC. except where the plaintiff incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents therrof.

Gen Renato DE VILLA. IAC reversed. He allegedly ordered that payment be stopped because the goods delivered to him by Que were defective and that Que allegedly refused to replace them. although false. Information was filed before RTC QC. including private respondent ADAZA for their alleged participation in the failed Dec 1989 coup d’etat. They fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts. This decision is immediately executory. He just stopped payment. Concededly.131 - prof. Court of Appeals. The affair continued just the same. seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. the complainant was fully protected. The two had an amicable business relation until 1975. but not so much on the theory of probable cause as on the ground that. Instead. . succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found inside Lolita’s aparador.torts & damages Disposition the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside A2010 .Feeling aggrieved by the institution of these proceedings against him. the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution (Manila Gas Corporation v. . 1957. but through a clever strategy. which Nicolas allegedly ignored. . is SET ASIDE and the amended decision of the trial court dated February 21. ISSUE WON Que had instituted a malicious prosecution of the private respondent (WON the reversal made by IAC was correct) HELD NO . Indeed. Disposition decision of the respondent court dated March 12. Chief of Staff of the AFP.Nicolas issued 5 checks which Que cannot encash.It is evident that the petitioner was not motivated by ill feeling but only by an anxiety to protect his his rights when he filed the criminal complaint for estafa with the fiscal's office. frequently visited Lolita’s house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the rosary. a married man. Defendant. 1997 NATURE Petition to reverse CA’s Resolutions FACTS . the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs. the circumstances presented the possibility that Nicolas might cheat him.The circumstances under which the defendant tried to win Lolita’s affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who. On april 14. TC ruled in favor of Que. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter’s family who allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of the family. After making demands for payment. The lower court dismissed the action. an unmarried woman 24 years of age. with no recommendation as to bail. The case was dismissed for lack of merit. he has committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals.Magtanggol Que is a dealer of canvass strollers while Antonio Nicolas orders from him. Lolita disappeared from her brother’s house where she was living. Hence. the element of probable cause was not treated separately from that of malice. The wrong he had caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. inspite of demands by the latter. March 20.Plaintiffs are parents. there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. without Que knowing that there were defects in the goods he delivered. QUE V IAC (NICOLAS) 169 SCRA 137 CRUZ. The checks were dishonored. ADAZA filed a complaint for damages and charged petitioners with engaging in a deliberate. and then issued 5 postdated checks in favor of Que. 'Under the Spanish Law. Reasoning -. 1984. they prohibited defendant from going to their house. which were delivered. PE V PE 5 SCRA 200 1962 FACTS . the accusation could not be held to have been false in the legal sense. when Nicolas ordered strollers from Que. . Que on his part alleged that the said defective products were only returned after he filed an estafa case. this appeal by the plaintiffs ISSUE WON the defendant can be held liable under Article 21 HELD YES .To constitute malicious prosecution. Also. The present action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. 100 SCRA 602) . did not demand for its repair. When a complaint was laid and there was probable cause to believe that the person charged had committed the acts complained of. If the charge. was made with an honest belief in its truth and justice. there was no intent to accuse falsely. Verily. he had not. no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that the defendant not only deliberately. brothers and sisters of Lolita PE. as a matter of fact. Que filed an estafa case against Nicolas. 1979. through an ingenious scheme or trickery. Defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. and there were reasonable grounds on which such a belief could DRILON V CA (ADAZA) 270 SCRA 211 HERMOSISIMA JR. in accordance with Nicolas’ order to stop payment. willful and malicious experimentation by filing against him a charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder when petitioners were . Nicolas kept the goods. 1989 NATURE Petition for review FACTS .Nicolas then filed a case against Que for malicious prosecution. under such circumstances. Ratio. although. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The panel assigned to conduct prelim investigation found that there was probable cause to hold them for trial for the crime of REBELLION WITH MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER. Therefore. is REINSTATED as above modified. casis be founded. from Que’s point of view. the goods which were allegedly defective were not yet returned to Que before the filing of the estafa case. When the parents learned about this. January 13. good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code. requested the DOJ (headed by Sec Franklin DRILON) to order the investigation of several individuals.This was then referred for preliminary inquiry to the Special Composite Team of Prosecutors who issued a subpoena to the said individuals after finding sufficient basis to continue the inquiry. One cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. as under the American Law.

000. . called the action of malicious prosecution. 1989 NATURE Certiorari FACTS . casis dismissed by the fiscal and MRs of Globe were denied too. This is not considered the termination of the action contemplated under Philippine jurisdiction to warrant the institution of a malicious prosecution suit against those responsible for the filing of the information against him. There was malicious intent manifested through the filing of the criminal cases as the case for illegal dismissal was pending. that is by improper or sinister motive.The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in the provisions of the NCC [Art 19. 38 SCRA 5871. petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the latter's complaint for illegal dismissal. NLRC.000.The results of the investigations said that the handwritings.Despite being cleared. . signatures. .” . and the eventual dismissal of the cases. WON petitioners are liable for malicious prosecution A2010 . Manila Electric Co. . and (c) That the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice. 32. (a) Insofar as Adaza’s Criminal Case is concerned. P200. (b) It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. SC anchored its findings on TC’s finding (re bad faith of Globe Mackay in filing the criminal complaints against Tobias). denied Globe’s MR. P30. 2. . Such a change of theory cannot be allowed. Reasoning . WON complaint was a suit for damages for malicious prosecution 2. . wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. oppressive. what appears clear from the records only is that respondent has been discharged on a writ of habeas corpus and granted bail.Both parties appealed.RTC: rendered judgment in favor of Tobias by ordering petitioners to pay him P80. .00 as moral damages.RTC denied MD. as a legal consequence. All of the six criminal complaints were . 26.Nowhere in his complaint filed with the trial court did respondent Adaza allege that his action is one based on tort. 33.000.Although Globe claims that they must not be penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints against an employee who was their principal suspect in the commission of forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded them of substantial sums of money. NONE of these requisites have been alleged.] . Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). (c) Suffice it to state that the presence of probable cause signifies.00 as attorney's fees. .In American jurisdiction. . YES Definition of Malicious Prosecution: .In Philippine jurisdiction. it has been defined as“An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution. For this injury an action on the case lies. the Secretary of Labor: reinstated the LA's decision which Tobias appealed to the Office of the President.) ISSUES 1. and costs. . (In Adaza’s latest Comment.CA also dismissed petition for certiorari and ordered RTC judge to proceed with the trial of civil case filed by ADAZA. Hendry’s threat of more suits against Tobias. NO Ratio In order for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper. (Sec 3e of RA 3019) An examination of the records would show that this latest posture as to the nature of his cause of action is only being raised for the first time on appeal. and which terminates in favor of the person prosecuted.This led Tobias to file a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful. thus rendering the complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. suit. Hendry. and abusive acts of petitioners. after the termination of such prosecution. MFR for Order of Denial was also denied. to which Tobias was the number one suspect though he claimed he was the one who reported it. Bernabe. for the mere purpose of vexation or injury.During the pendency of the appeal with said office.However. without being asked by RETELCO. Disposition Petition is GRANTED. Reasoning . it has been defined as“One begun in malice without probable cause to believe the charges can be sustained. “the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith” [Ventura v.Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal upon receiving the notice of his termination.Petitioners filed MD since there was no valid cause of action for this complaint for damages. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results. .Globe Mackay found out an anomaly that has been causing them to lose money. 21.” Reasoning .LA: dismissed the complaint. .[ 2 SCRA 337]: the Court held that the right to file criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay HELD 1. or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. The filing of the cases despite the police reports exculpating Tobias. the plaintiff must prove these elements: (a) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal. complaints for estafa were filed against Tobias.torts & damages fully aware of the non-existence of such crime in the statute books. August 25. . (b) That in bringing the action. 2217 and 2219 (8)]. or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause.00 as exemplary damages. civil suit. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to take no further action on civil case except to DISMISS it. he maintained that his claim before the trial court was merely a suit for damages based on tort and NOT a suit for malicious prosecution. CA: affirmed the RTC decision in toto.. malicious.Yutuk V.Judging from the face of the complaint itself filed by Adaza.Unemployed. 20. regularly. The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force. 29. Instituted with intention of injuring defendant and without probable cause. . ISSUE WON there was malicious prosecution HELD YES . P20.00 as actual damages. The petitioners were of the honest conviction that there was probable cause to hold Adaza for trial. the absence of malice.Petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. 35. GLOBE MACKAY V CA CORTES.reversed. the prosecutor acted without probable cause.000. and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of -Tobias.132 - prof.

the haphazard way this case was investigated is evident. Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully".The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty. and cause damage to plaintiff. who is his namesake. Said check was signed by a Eugenio Baltao. a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. 5 for estafa thru falsification of commercial document and 1 for violation of A290 of the RPC (all of which were dismissed). When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another. the filing of a suit by itself. *Findings of bad faith (as per the TC): > After the dismissal of the 4 cases and denial of the MR by the Ministry of Justice. Concededly. . The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated. combined with articles 19 and 20. does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. oppress. Court of Appeals. However. commenting in one case that. . . Woodworks. "With this article (Article 21). Manila. He told the trial fiscal to move for dismissal.[20 SCRA 536]: the Court upheld the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and attorney's fees after making a finding that petitioner. sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. 100 SCRA 602]. drawn against the account of E. and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal. of which Eugeneio Baltao was president. recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise. CA. 1993 . Baltao denied that it was his signature on the check. and cited the same as the bases for the award of damages. . Albenson filed case for violation of BP22.575 was given as payment. . but this was frustrated by a presidential decree transferring criminal cases involving civilians to the civil courts. or public policy. . They wrote to him. with persistence. Sta. He didn’t tell them that his son was his namesake and that the latter NATURE Appeal from CA judgment modifying RTC’s decision as regards amount to be paid FACTS . Woodworks’ business address was the same as Guaranteed Industries. . . 1 Civil Code of the Philippines 72). . Mapa Street. 1 SCRA 60]." Globe Mackay hastily filed 6 criminal cases with the city Fiscal's Office of Manila. to give everyone his due. a check in the amount of P2.After the criminal case was dismissed. The trial court as well as the respondent appellate court mistakenly lumped these three articles together.There is however. (2) which is exercised in bad faith. CA modified by awarding only half of original moral damages and atty’s fees. casis may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. 2 cases were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office of the AFP to railroad Tobias’ arrest and detention in the military stockade. They believed Baltao was really the one who issued the check because it was his company who ordered and received the delivery. (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. ISSUE WON Baltao is entitled to damages HELD NO . known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights. depends on the circumstances of each case. Baltao appealed to the Provincial Prosecutor. The law. The provincial prosecutor found out that something was amiss during the investigation and upon reinvestigation. > Despite the clearing Tobias of participation or involvement in the fraudulent transactions complained of. Asst.Albenson Enterprises delivered mild steel plates to 3267 V. despite the negative results of the lie detector tests which Globe Mackay compelled him to undergo. moral (P1M) and exemplary damages (P200k).Thus. January 11. and to observe honesty and good faith. with one of the investigating fiscals. 176 SCRA 778 [1989]).L. Disposition CA’s decision AFFIRMED. . The delivery was received by Guaranteed Industries. no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. ELW was owned by Baltao’s son.There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21.IT TURNS OUT that E. Investigating fiscal found probable cause and filed info with the RTC. public order. or "negligently". The second and third elements are not present.133 - prof. there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. it is damnum absque injuria. A2010 . and that is. 3) and it is done with intent to injure. . therefore. Ratio To constitute malicious prosecution. To do so would be a clear perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice. 122 SCRA 576]. David. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights.torts & damages an indebtedness. the act must be intentional. though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such. filed at least six criminal complaints against respondent.RTC granted actual (P133k). The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith [Sison v. the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly broadened. under any of these three provisions of law. Fiscal de Guia. All they wanted was to collect what is owed them.ABUSE OF RIGHTS Article 19. good custom.Albenson did not abuse its rights. the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed.L. "Indeed. these three articles are all related to each other. and atty’s fees (P100k). found no probable cause. and although the police investigation was "still under follow-up and a supplementary report will be submitted after all the evidence has been gathered. These standards are the following: to act with justice.An award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. Although the requirements of each provision is different." there can be no mistaking that defendants would not but be motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass. CA. It is now difficult to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not be checked by the application of these articles" (Tolentino.ACTS CONTRA BONUS MORES Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores. Albenson extrajudicially demanded payment from Baltao. ALBENSON V CA (BALTAO) BIDIN. Mesa. 2) but which is contrary to morals.The check bounced. A right. all of which were dismissed. . an act which causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of damages. resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law. Evident likewise is the flurry and haste in the filing of this case against respondent Tobias. it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.Hawpia CA. Baltao filed a complaint for damages against Albenson because the latter had unjustly filed a criminal case against him. He replied by denying and telling them to check the veracity of their claim.

Delfin Custodio. . respectively. to the moral. 1967. 1972.000. Right then and there Coronel should have told Plaintiff that he was using a by-pass valve and in effect stealing gas from Defendant. Coronel did not do. . and similar injury. 1965 to January. besmirched reputation. Coronel and his men had already made the changes and had already gone. (8) malicious prosecution. wounded feelings. and on May and June 1966.000. Ongsip inquired from Coronel why they were taking pictures but the latter simply gave him a calling card with instructions to go to his office. 1966. . To constitute malicious prosecution. testified that the second gas meter was replaced as MANILA GAS CORPORATION V CA (ONGSIP) MAKASIAR. CA reversed and set aside.000.000. . they changed the gas meter and installed new tube connections. . . prompting petitioner to issue a 'meter order' with instructions to change the gas meter in respondent's residence. The circumstance was familiar to that of catching a thief in flagrante delicto.It bears noting that when he was informed as to the existence of a 'jumper' in his gas connection. October 30.00. Albenson acted in good faith and had probable cause in filing their complaint against Baltao." . even brutally. and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. is predicated on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which states that "moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: . . Private respondent was then taking a nap.By the end of August.00 as moral damages in the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. a complaint for qualified theft was filed by petitioner against respondent Ongsip . serious anxiety.00 and P10. casis are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.The installations and connections were all done solely by petitioner's employees. . petitioner's own mechanical engineer.To constitute malicious prosecution. 1980 NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA (treated as a special civil action) FACTS . There. 1967.Article 2217 of the Civil Code states that "moral damages include physical suffering.Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals . and. .000. petitioner's employees returned with a photographer who took pictures of the premises.00 as exemplary damages in the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. 1965. no gas consumption was registered in the meter. respondent Ongsip filed a complaint for moral and exemplary damages against petitioner Manila Gas Corporation based on two causes of action. and (6) the costs of the suit. there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person. respondent Ongsip requested petitioner to install additional appliances as well as additional gas service connections in his 46-door Reyno Apartment: petitioner installed two 20-gallon capacity water storage heaters and two heavy-duty gas burners and replaced the original gas meter with a bigger 50light capacity gas meter. Disposition Petition granted. .00 as moral damages in the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION.The first cause of action.On July 14. the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. Plaintiff was sleeping. (2) P10.000. for which respondent Ongsip was awarded moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P50. . in October.000. . . secondly: the illegal closure of respondent Ongsip's gas service connection without court order and without notice of warning. this time with a photographer. (3) P30. Though incapable of pecuniary computation.On May 2.On that same afternoon.There was no malicious prosecution. (4) P5. in addition.In the instant case.A burner gas was installed by petitioner's employees in respondent's kitchen at his residence. But the truth is that when Coronel and his men entered Plaintiff's compound and made changes therein. 1966.As correctly observed by the trial court in its decision —A significant fact brought about by the testimony of Coronel himself is the total absence of immediate accusation against Plaintiff right at the very moment when the by-pass valve was allegedly discovered.Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. moral damages may be recovered if they .On August 17. fright. When Plaintiff woke up at four o'clock in the afternoon.Without notifying or informing respondent Ongsip.Subsequently. They returned however at five o'clock. he was even willing to have his place excavated but petitioner would not dare take the consequences. firstly: the malicious.On July 27. following the dismissal by the investigating fiscal of the complaint for qualified theft and the disconnection by petitioner of his gas service. .00 as attorney's fees. .There was no significant change in the meter reading despite additional installations. The presence of probable cause means the absence of malice. moral shock." On the other hand. . by way of example or correction for the public good." . (5) P10. mental anguish. a reading was made on the new meter and expectedly. hence. .134 - prof. but it was denied .Concededly. however. To prove his innocence.. .. 1964. 1967.On May 20. social humiliation. this petition ISSUE WON the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of appeals is excessive HELD YES . This was the time when Plaintiff met Coronel. ..00. Here was then the opportunity for Coronel to confront Plaintiff with the allegedly discovered 'by-pass valve' and bluntly. pending investigation of the criminal complaint. he was informed about the existence of a by-pass valve or "jumper" in the gas connection and that unless he gave P3.On February. -Thereafter.. respondent Ongsip did not show any sign of fear or remorse and did not yield to the threatening demand of Coronel—this is the attitude of someone who knows how to take a firm stand where his principles and rights are concerned. Article 2229 provides that "exemplary or corrective damages are imposed. petitioner's employees went to Ongsip's place. he would be deported. it registered a sudden increase in gas consumption. there is reason to believe that there was malicious intent in the filing of the complaint for qualified theft. liquidated or compensatory damages. petitioner disconnected respondent's gas service for alleged failure and/or refusal to pay his gas consumptions from July. oppressive and malevolent filing of the criminal complaint. the complaint was dismissed . This. . respondent Ongsip applied for gas service connection with petitioner Manila Gas Corporation. Besides.torts & damages operated a business in the same building. temperate. there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless.00 as exemplary damages in the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. tell him that there was thievery of gas.000.CA affirmed the lower court’s decision in toto. the trial court rendered its decision ordering defendant to pay plaintiff:(1) P50. .Respondent Ongsip refused to give the money . but he was informed afterwards of what had taken place by his houseboy. A2010 . .

(4) Adultery or concubinage. This is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. FACTS . casis (8) Malicious prosecution. the award of moral and exemplary damages should be reduced to P25. member of the Knights of Columbus. rape. Capiz and a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. employed as an executive of Proctor & Gamble Phils. in failing to recover its lost revenue caused by the gas meter's incorrect recording. or other lascivious acts. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith" ." . At most. such damages are justly due. (10) of Art. To be accused of such crime without basis is shocking and libelous. 29. April 26.00. sought to vindicate its financial loss by filing the complaint for qualified theft against respondent Ongsip knowing it to be false.Private respondent's contention that there was no bad faith on his part in slapping petitioner on the face and that the incident was merely accidental is not tenable. President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Pilar.One morning in 1970. under the circumstances. The damage had been done. exemplary or corrective damages may be imposed upon herein private respondent by way of example or correction for the public good. who was in a state of drunkenness and standing near the same gate together with his companions. As a consequence. Inc. an ordained Catholic priest. 30 32. member of the Philippine Veterans Legion. Then. (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest. is sustained. wounded feelings and social humiliation. ISSUE WON Patricio is entitled to damages for the humiliation he experienced during the town fiesta HELD YES .000.. being similarly warranted by Article 2234 of the Civil Code as complemented by Article 2220.000. moral shock and social humiliation caused by private respondent's act of hitting petitioner on the face in public.000. Capiz. "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. exemplary damages and atty’s fees.torts & damages being defective because "some of its parts were worn out and that it was not properly registering. GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET INC V ESPINO GUERRERO. It was actually intended to vex and humiliate private respondent and to blacken his reputation not only as a businessman but also as a person. 26. 21 of the Civil Code in relation to par. 28. While a benefit dance was ongoing in connection with the celebration of the town fiesta. (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21. a Philippine government pensionado of the United States for six months. The fact that the complaint for qualified theft was dismissed by the Pasay City fiscal is no consolation. Patricio filed a complaint for Slander by Deed.As to moral damages. Private respondent Bienvenido Bacalocos." . (3) Seduction. slander or any other form of defamation. was appointed Director General of the 1976 Religious and Municipal Town Fiesta of Pilar.. without provocation. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The amount of exemplary damages need not be proved where it is shown that plaintiff is entitled to either moral. 2219 of the same Code. 2219. holding private respondent liable to the former for moral damages as a result of the physical suffering. a commotion ensued and private respondent was brought by the policemen to the municipal building. Qualified theft is a serious offense indicating moral depravity in an individual. this circumstance can be considered as a mitigating factor in ascertaining the amount of damages to which respondent Ongsip is entitled. son of the late Jose Maria Espino. Necessarily. he approached petitioner in a hostile manner and asked the latter if he had seen his wounded hand. on the other hand. (9) Acts mentioned in article 309. It was established before the court a quo that there was an existing feud between the families of both petitioner and private respondent and that private respondent slapped the petitioner without provocation in the presence of several persons. to wit: "ART.The Court gives due consideration to respondent Ongsip's social and financial status as a businessman and the mental anguish he suffered as a result of the false imputation. Washington. PATRICIO V LEVISTE PADILLA. A2010 .Rafael Patricio.The award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which provides that "willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that. . temperate or compensatory damages Disposition Decision in favor of Patricio. where he is residing.000. Class 1950. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. abduction.Respondent Ongsip's default in payment cannot be utilized by petitioner to defeat or nullify the claim for damages. Department of Foreign Affairs at the Philippine Embassy. author of articles published in the Manila Sunday Times and Philippines Free Press. 34. However.Evidently. .The act of private respondent in hitting petitioner on the face is contrary to morals and good customs and caused the petitioner mental anguish. Council No. private respondent.In addition to the award of moral damages. and before petitioner could respond.00 and P5.P. We reduce the amount of moral damages to P15. P25k and P5k to Espino for moral damages. 1989 FACTS . Petitioner is a public utility corporation whose primary concern is service to the people. In consequence thereof. .Petitioner's act in disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas service without prior notice constitutes breach of contract amounting to an independent tort. . moral shock. Pursuant to Art. Capiz. It stigmatized private respondent causing him emotional depression and social degradation. petitioner Manila Gas Corporation. petitioner together with two (2) policemen were posted near the gate of the public auditorium to check on the assigned watchers of the gate. As a result. the profit motive being merely secondary. honorably discharged from the Philippine Army in 1946. The prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to cause additional mental and moral suffering to private respondent. 27. . respectively. the court ruled in favor of herein petitioner (as complainant). December 28. 3713. 1979 NATURE Certiorari from CA’s decision to grant P75k. Under the circumstances. petitioner's financial capability must also be considered.00 as exemplary damages.135 - prof. struck a bottle of beer on the table causing an injury on his hand which started to bleed.00 The award of P5. a corporate manager incharge of motoring and warehousing therein. retired Minister. Disposition Decision of CA modified as regards the amount of damages.Espino is a graduate Mechanical Engineer from U. (6) Illegal search. he and his wife and their two daughters went to shop at South Supermarket (owned . hit petitioner's face with his bloodied hand. and actively engaged in social and civic affairs in Pilar. indemnification had to be made. An award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. . (7) Libel. and 35.

according to the circumstances of each case (Art.torts & damages by Grand Union) in Makati. he went around the store and found a cylindrical “rat-tail” file that he had wanted to buy for his hobby. no exemplary damages. Petitioner did not respond to the letter. Civil Code). He thought about going back that night to throw stones at the supermarket.The false accusation charged against the private respondent after detaining and interrogating him by the uniformed guards and the mode and manner in which he was subjected. And one must act with justice. imposing upon him a fine. . wounded feelings and serious anxiety. . . Petitioners wilfully caused loss or injury to private respondent in a manner that was contrary to morals. When she arrived at Suite 326-A. Valmonte noticed the people staring at her. Fandino. but decided to file a case. Del Rosario and Sierra engaged her services for their church wedding on 10 October 1996.A few days after the incident. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched. he and his wife ran into his aunt’s maid. It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties. . is left to the discretion of the court. petitioner kept on saying the words “Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto.Respondent Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. liquidated or exemplary damages may be adjudicated. moral and exemplary damages. an aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress up for the occasion.Responding to the complaint.After reporting to the bride. .” Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search Valmonte's bag. New Civil Code). and the fashion designer. While his wife was shopping for groceries. police officers arrived and interviewed all persons who had access to the suite and fingerprinted them including Valmonte. The Court does not believe that private respondent was intentionally paraded in order to humiliate or embarrass him because petitioner's business depended for its success and patronage the good will of the buying public which can only be preserved and promoted by good public relations.” Valmonte's car which was parked at the hotel premises was also searched but the search yielded nothing. the guard stopped him and told him he hadn’t paid for the file. There. The hotel security was called in to help in the search. petitioner denied having uttered words or done any act to confront or single out Valmonte during the investigation and claimed that liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were billeted. he didn’t put it in the grocery cart because it might fall and get lost. threatening to call the police and in the presence and hearing of many people at the Supermarket which brought and caused him humiliation and embarrassment. While they were talking he stuck the file in his breast pocket. the assessment of such damages. several persons were already there including the bride. the official photographers. He apologized and said he had forgotten. Yet. It was his forgetfulness in checking out the item and paying for it that started the chain of events which led to his embarrassment and humiliation. New Civil Code). where Espino said that he just forgot that he placed it in his pocket while talking to the maid and his wife. private respondent's act of omission contributed to the occurrence of his injury or loss and such contributory negligence is a factor which may reduce the damages that private respondent may recover (Art. personality. the people whom we cause not paying for the goods say . . . He was then brought to the front of the grocery. Espino took out a P5 bill to pay for the P3. Valmonte filed a suit for damages against her before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. It was around 9am and the many people were at the store.” Espino said he was going to pay for it. but the guard stopped him and said they were to go to the back of the supermarket.136 - prof.While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral. At about 4:30 p. Valmonte prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay actual. that many people were present and they saw and heard the ensuing interrogation and altercation appears to be simply a matter of coincidence in a supermarket which is a public place and the crowd of onlookers. but he forgot about the file in his pocket. good customs and public policy to humiliate. Thus. They all intended to pay for the things that are found to them. atty’s fees = P2k. petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of apology which she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds' relatives and guests to redeem her smeared reputation as a result of petitioner's imputations against her. The CFI dismissed. Because it was small.After paying he and his wife walked out quickly.85 file. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the reception was to be held. ISSUE WON Espino is entitled to damages for the humiliation he experienced at the supermarket HELD YES . CA awarded him damages. He instead held it in his hand. She paid the suppliers. ikaw ang kumuha. a report was made. Civil Code). Fandino said it was a reward for guards who apprehend pilferers. . temperate.m. with a good part of the merchandise exposed.Fandino read the report and remarked: “Ano. He started towards the cashier to pay. on that day. . CA modified: moral damages = P5k. Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the items needed for the wedding rites and the gifts from the principal sponsors. During all the time Valmonte was being interrogated by the police officers. embarrass and degrade the dignity of a person. Later. Among those present was petitioner Carpio. People started milling around and stared at Espino. and went back to the suite. While still shopping. Moreover. saying he was a regular customer of the supermarket. Espino and wife objected and said that he was not a common criminal. 2004 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . Fandino replied: “That is all they say. nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto. 2216. He was directed to get in line at the cashier to pay for the file. In her complaint. sufficiently rendered the petitioners A2010 . On their way out. Disposition Petition denied.He paid for the items in his wife’s cart. except liquidated ones. The bags and personal belongings of all the people inside the room were searched. interrogated and trailed by a security guard throughout the evening. 2214. Upon entering the suite. the make-up artist and his assistant. It is against morals.nakaw na naman ito. good customs or public policy. hearers or bystanders was not deliberately sought or called by management to witness private respondent's predicament. gave the meal allowance to the band. CARPIO V VALMONTE 438 SCRA 38 TINGA. as well as attorney's fees. He was totally embarrassed.” Espino objected. shouting at him. give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith (Article 19. nominal. All the time the people were staring at him. near the cashiers to a Mrs. casis . September 9. petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag were lost. Fandino reached over and took the P5 bill and said it was a fine. Branch 268. privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons (Article 26. The whole incident that befell respondent had arisen in such a manner that was created unwittingly by his own act of forgetting to pay for the file. It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: “Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto. Everyone must respect the dignity. the bride's parents and relatives. thereby causing him mental anguish.

Respondent is clearly entitled to an award of moral damages. by reason of defendant's culpable action. INES CASTRO. but to enable the latter to obtain means. she was merely exercising her right and if damage results from a person exercising his legal right.Sta Ines et al moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Davao CFI. social humiliation.Quisaba avers in his complaint that for 18 yrs prior to his dismissal. Petitioner contends that the appellate court's conclusion that she publicly humiliated respondent does not conform to the evidence presented. and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.000. casis damages appears to be a fair and assessment of respondent's damages. he suffered mental anguish. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for the court to adjudge Valmonte liable on her counterclaim. moral shock. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right. She adds that even on the assumption that she uttered the words complained of. and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched. She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently. ISSUE WON petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner that is contrary to morals and good customs HELD YES A2010 . or that her reputation was besmirched due to petitioner's wrongful act. Worthy of note is that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant. In any case. Disposition Petition denied reasonable . by any standard or principle of law is impermissible. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant's wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's physical suffering.CFI granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint basically involves an employee-employer relationship. and embarrassed. the award of P100. ." and that because of the said acts of the defendants. deeply insulted.137 - prof. termination pay and attorney's fees. The appellate court held that Valmonte's claim for damages is not predicated on the fact that she was subjected to body search and interrogation by the police but rather petitioner's act of publicly accusing her of taking the missing jewelry. petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable. wounded feelings. . serious anxiety.000. is exclusively cognizable by the regular courts of justice or by the NLRC HELD . ISSUE WON a complaint for moral damages. serious anxiety. arising from an employer's constructive dismissal of an employee. besmirched reputation. she had no right to attack respondent with her innuendos which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly accusatory. asserting that the proper forum is the NLRC established by Presidential Decree No. it was not shown that she did so with malice and in bad faith.Quisaba opposed the motion. Though no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be adjudicated. This being the case. besmirched reputation.Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court erred in finding that petitioner did not slander her good name and reputation and in disregarding the evidence she presented. social humiliation. she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent. award of moral damages must be proportionate to the sufferings inflicted. but not when he acts with negligence and abuse.Hence. However. and he was warned that his failure to comply would be considered a ground for his dismissal . The court concluded that petitioner's verbal assault upon Valmonte was done with malice and in bad faith since it was made in the presence of many people without any solid proof except petitioner's suspicion. the seriousness of the imputations made by petitioner has greatly tarnished her reputation and will in one way or the other. 21. he was in the employ of the defendant corporation. It ruled that when petitioner sought investigation for the loss of her jewelry. . Certainly.That Robert Hyde instructed him to purchase logs for the company's plant to which he refused on the ground that the work of purchasing logs is inconsistent with his position as internal auditor . and the fact that her profession is based primarily on trust reposed in her by her clients. that the defendants did not reconsider their "clever and subterfugial dismissal" of him which for all purposes constituted a "constructive discharge. It categorized petitioner's utterance defamatory considering that it imputed upon Valmonte the crime of theft. it is damnum absque injuria. or to enrich a complainant. fright.00 as moral QUISABA V STA. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and good customs.The trial court rendered its Decision dismissing Valmonte's complaint for damages.the NLRC's authorized representative in Davao City opined that the NLRC no power to award damages . diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone.That on the following day Hyde informed him of his temporary relief as internal auditor so that he could carry out immediately the instructions thus given. 1974 NATURE Special civil action for certiorari FACTS . petitioner had the right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor.torts & damages everything that transpired after the theft incident was purely a police matter in which she had no participation.Petitioner's verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. . Considering respondent's social standing. this petition. Such unfounded accusation entitles Valmonte to an award of moral damages in the amount of P100.00 for she was publicly humiliated. True. . but to malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewelry is an act which. Her firmness and resolve to find her missing jewelry cannot justify her acts toward respondent. moral shock. August 30. exemplary damages. mental anguish. moral shock and social humiliate on. The Court of Appeals ruled differently. the court found no sufficient evidence to justify the award of actual damages. . that is when he acts with prudence and good faith. affect her future dealings with her clients. petitioner virtually branded respondent as the thief. wounded feelings. The court said that Valmonte failed to show that she suffered serious anxiety. The complaint does not pray for reinstatement or payment of backwages.He pleaded for fairness but was instead demoted from a position of dignity to a servile and menial job. courts are mandated to take into account all the circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages according to their discretion. It opined that Valmonte has clearly established that she was singled out by petitioner as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. It added that no proof was presented by Valmonte to show that petitioner acted maliciously and in bad faith in pointing to her as the culprit. By openly accusing respondent as the only person who went out of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests therein. .

together with his father and his witnesses. and does not involve an existing EE-ER relation within the meaning of section 2(1) of LC. YOU SHUT UP! FUCK YOU! YOU ARE BOTH SHIT TO ME! YOU ARE FIRED! (Medina) YOU TOO ARE FIRED! (Ong)” Plaintiffs filed joint criminal complaint for oral defamation. The ruling with respect to defendants' first motion to dismiss. then the respondents violated article 1701 of the Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other. . reversing the resolution of the Provincial Fiscal. complaint was dismissed allegedly because the expression was not intended to slander but to express anger. They said the case arose from such employer-employee relationship. . ordering them thru his police to appear in his office when he is absent..torts & damages NO . Governing statute is Civil Code and not Labor Code. SEPARATE OPINION AQUINO [dissent] . "went to the office of the defendant but instead of obtaining assistance to their complaint they were harassed and terrorized" -In view thereof. . 10. not by the National Labor Relations Commission. no longer holds. casis ISSUE WON Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs MEDINA V CASTRO-BARTOLOME ABAD SANTOS. OTHER TORTS AMARO V SUMANGUIT G. The complaint is thus properly and exclusively cognizable by the regular courts of justice. the sanction for which. as the complaint alleges.The following day he. that exist between members of a society for the protection of private interests. no.138 - prof.The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with the manner in which the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. 21(AKA LC) which reads: SEC. September 11. . Medina was the former Plant General Manager and Ong was the former Plant Comptroller. Reasoning -The jurisdiction of the NLRC is defined by section 2 of PD No.October 5.. Theirs is a simple action for damages for tortuous acts allegedly committed by defendants. which under PD No 1691.Upon advice of the City Mayor an investigation was conducted and as a result the city attorney of Silay was about to file or had already filed an information for illegal discharge of firearm against the assailant . and article 21. 1958: Jose Amaro was assaulted and shot at near the city government building of Silay . 1982 FACTS . good customs or public policy.R. and (3) All pending cases in the Bureau of Labor Relations. (2) All strikes overtaken by Proclamation No. The Commission shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the following.. now under courts’ jurisdiction. by way of moral damages. 875.Without provocation. The trial court denied the motion because civil damage complaint is not based on employer-employee relationship but on manner of dismissal. 2219. ." . 1081. No. “GOD DAMN IT. But after preliminary investigation.Motion to reconsider was filed but was denied. Deputy Minister of Justice issued resolution sustaining complaint. Art. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cages: (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21.. is under exclusive original jurisdiction of labor arbiter.. is provided in article 2219.D