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1. NO, the NLRC did not act in excess of jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion. Ratio Findings of fact of administrative bodies and quasi-judicial bodies are afforded great respect by the Court and are binding except when there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or the decision was arrived at arbitrarily. Reasoning - Respondents showed that their monthly take home pay amounted to no less than $240 and this was not disputed by petitioners. - There is no record or evidence which shows that the closure of the taxi business was brought about by great financial losses no thanks to the Pinatubo eruption. It was rather brought about by the closure of the military bases. - Art. 283 of the CC provides that separation pay shall be equivalent to 1 month pay or at least ½ month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. The NLRC ruling was correct in terms of US$120 as the computed separation pay. 2. Petitioners can no longer question the authority of NOWM and are held in estoppel. Reasoning - NOWM was already representing the respondents before the labor arbiter and the petitioners did not assail their juridical personality then. - Petitioners also acknowledged before the Court that the taxi drivers are themselves parties in the case. 3. Naguiat Enterprises is not liable, Antolin Naguiat is not personally liable whereas Sergio Naguiat is solidarily liable. - Re: Naguiat Enterprises’ liability Reasoning - The respondents were regular employees of CFTI who received wages on a boundary basis. They offered no evidence that Naguiat Enterprises managed, supervised and controlled their employment. They instead submitted documents which had to do with CFTI, not Naguiat Enterprises. - Labor-only contractors are those where 1) the person supplying workers to the employer does no have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools or machinery and 2) the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of the employer. - Independent contractors are those who exercise independent employment, contracting to do a piece of work according to their own methods without being subject to the control of their employer except as to the result of their work. - Sergio Naguiat was a stockholder and director of Naguiat Enterprises but, in supervising the taxi drivers

INTRODUCTION
NAGUIAT V NLRC (National Organization of Workingmen and Galang) 269 SCRA 565 PANGANIBAN; March 13, 1997
NATURE Special civil action in the Supreme Court, certiorari FACTS - Clark Field Taxi, Inc. held a concessionaire’s contract with the Army Air Force Exchange Services for the operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base. Sergio Naguiat was the president of CFTI while Antolin Naguiat was its vice president. Like Naguiat Enterprises, Inc. which was a trading firm, it was also a family-owned corporation. - Respondents were employed by the CFTI as taxicab drivers. > They were required to pay a daily boundary fee of US$26.50 (for those on duty from 1AM-12N) or US$27 (for those on duty from 12N to 12 MN) > Incidental expenses were maintained by the drivers (including gasoline expenses). > Drivers worked 3-4 times a week depending on the availability of vehicles and earned no less than US$15.00 a day. In excess of that amount, they had to make cash deposits to the company which they could withdraw every fifteen days. - AAFES was dissolved because of the phase-out of the military bases in Clark and the services of the respondents were officially terminated on November 26, 1991. - AAFES Taxi Drivers Association, the drivers union, and CFTI held negotiations as regards separation benefits. They arrived at an agreement that the separated drivers would be given P500 for ever year as severance pay. Most of the drivers accepted this but some refused to do so. - Those who did not accept the initial severance pay disaffiliated themselves with drivers union and through the National Organization of Workingmen, they filed a complaint against Sergio Naguiat under the name and style Naguiat Enterprises, AAFES and AAFES union. - The labor arbiter ordered the petitioner to pay the drivers P1,200 for every year of service for humanitarian consideration, setting aside the earlier agreement between the CFTI and the drivers union. It

also rejected the idea that the CFTI was forced to close it business due to great financial losses and lose opportunity since at the time of its closure it was profitably earning. The labor arbiter however did not award separation pay because to “impose a monetary obligation to an employer whose profitable business was abruptly shot (sic) shot down by force majeur would be unfair and unjust.” - The NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter after respondents appealed by granting separation pay to the private respondents. It said that half of the monthly salary should be US$120 which should be paid in Philippine pesos. Naguiat Enterprieses should be joined with Sergio and Antolin Naguiat as jointly and severally liable. Petitioners’ Claim: - Petitioners claim that the cessation of the business was due to the great financial losses and lost business opportunity when Clark Air Base was phased out due to the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement and the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. - They admitted that CFTI had agreed with the drivers union to grant the taxi drivers separation pay equivalent to P500 for every year of service. - They allege that Sergio and Antolin Naguiat were denied due process beause the petitioners were not furnished copies of the appeal to the NLRC. - They also allege that NOWM cannot make legal representation in behalf of the respondents because the latter should be bound by the decision of the drivers union. Respondents’ Comments: - The drivers alleged that they were employees of Naguiat Enterprises although their individual applications were approved by CFTI. They claimed to have been assigned to Naguiat Enterprises after having been hired by CFTO and that Naguia Enterprises managed, controlled and supervised their employment. - They averred that they should be entitled to separation pay based on their latest daily earnings or US$15 for working 16 days a month. ISSUES 1. WON the NLRC acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in granting separation pay 2. WON NOWM was authorized to represent the private respondents 3. WON Naguiat Enterprieses, Sergio Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat were liable 4. WON Sergio and Antolin Naguiat were denied due process HELD

torts & damages
and determining their employment terms, he was carrying out his responsibility as president of CFTI. - Naguiat Enterprises was in the trading business while CFTI was in the taxi business. - The Constitution of the CFTI-AAFES Taxi Drivers Association states that the members of the union are employees of CFTI and for collective and bargaining purposes, the employer is also CFTI. - Re: Antolin Naguiat’s liability Reasoning - Although he carried the title of general manager, it has not been shown that he had acted in such capacity. - No evidence on the extent of his participation in the management or operation of the business was proferred. - Re: Sergio Naguiat’s liability Ratio A director or officer may be held solidarly liable with a corporation by a specific provision of law because a corporation, being a juridical entity, may act only through its directors and officers. Obligations incurred by them, acting as such corporation agents, are not theirs but the direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent. In the absence of definite proof of who clearly are the officers of the corporation, the assumption falls on the President of the corporation. Reasoning - In his capacity as President, Sergio Naguiat cannot be exonerated. - An employer is defined to be any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. - Case in point is A.C. Ransom Labor Union CCLU vs. NLRC held that the identified employer A.C. Ransom Corporation, being an artificial person, must have an officer and in the absence of proof, the president is assumed to be the head of the corporation. - Both CFTI and Naguiat Enterprises were close family corporations owned by the same family. To the extent that stockholders are actively engaged in the management or business affairs of a close corporation, the stockholders shall be held to strict fiduciary duties to each other and among themselves. Said stockholders shall be liable for corporate torts unless the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance. > Nothing in the records indicate that CFTI obtained reasonable adequate liability insurance. > Jurisprudence is wanting in the definition of corporate tort. Tort essentially consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Tort is a breach of legal duty. > Art. 238 mandates the employer to grant separation pay to employees in case of cessation of operations or closure of the business not due to

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directly responsible under A1903CC as employer of Fontanilla HELD YES - There are two actions available for parents of Garcia. One is under the A100RPC wherein the employer is only subsidiarily liable for the damages arising from the crime thereby first exhausting the properties of Fontanilla. The other action is under A1903CC (quasidelict or culpa aquiliana) wherein as the negligent employer of Fontanilla, Barredo is held primarily liable subject to proving that he exercising diligence of a good father of the family. The parents simply took the action under the Civil Code as it is more practical to get damages from the employer bec he has more money to give than Fontanilla who is yet to serve his sentence. Obiter Difference bet Crime and Quasi-delict 1) crimes – public interest; quasi-delict – only private interest 2) Penal code punishes or corrects criminal acts; Civil Code by means of indemnification merely repairs the damage 3) delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts; crimes are only punished if there is a penal law; quasi-delicts include any kind of fault or negligence intervenes NOTE: not all violations of penal law produce civil responsibility e.g. contravention of ordinances, violation of game laws, infraction of rules of traffic when nobody is hurt 4) crime – guilt beyond reasonable doubt; civil – mere preponderance of evidence - Presumptions: 1) injury is caused by servant or employee, there instantly arises presumption of negligence of master or employer in selection, in supervision or both 2) presumption is juris tantum not juris et de jure TF may be rebutted by proving exercise of diligence of a good father of the family - basis of civil law liability: not respondent superior bu the relationship of pater familias - motor accidents – need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles

serious business losses or financial reverses which is the condition on this case. 4. There was no denial of due process. Reasoning - Even if the individual Naguiats were not impleaded as parties of the complaint, they could still be held liable because of jurisprudence (A.C. Ransom case). - Both also voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter when they filed a position paper. DISPOSITION The petition is partly granted. 1) CFTI and Sergio Naguiat are ordered to pay jointly and severally the individual respondents of US$120 for every year of service and 2) Naguiat Enterprises and Antolin Naguiat are absolved from liability.

BARREDO V GARCIA BOCOBO; July 8, 1942
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - from CA, holding Fausto Barredo liable for damages for death pf Faustino Garcia caused by negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by Fausto Barredo - May 3, 1936 – in road between Malabon and Navotas, head-on collision between taxi of Malate Taxicab and carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis thereby causing overturning of the carretela and the eventual death of Garcia, 16-yo boy and one of the passengers - Fontanilla convicted in CFI and affirmed by CA and separate civil action is reserved - Parents of Garcia filed action against Barredo as sole proprietor of Malate Taxicab as employer of Fontanilla - CFI and CA awarded damages bec Fontanilla’s negligence apparent as he was driving on the wrong side of the road and at a high speed > no proof he exercised diligence of a good father of the family as Barredo is careless in employing (selection and supervision) Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of Automobile Law and speeding > CA applied A1903CC that makes inapplicable civil liability arising from crime bec this is under obligations arising from wrongful act or negligent acts or omissions punishable by law - Barredo’s defense is that his liability rests on RPC TF liability only subsidiary and bec no civil action against Fontanilla TF he too cannot be held responsible ISSUE WON parents of Garcia may bring separate civil action against Barredo making him primarily liable and

ELCANO V HILL 77 SCRA 98 BARREDO; May 26, 1977
NATURE Appeal from an order of the CFI Quezon City FACTS

torts & damages
- Reginald Hill, a minor yet married at the time of occurrence, was criminally prosecuted for the killing of Agapito Elcano (son of Pedro), and was acquitted for “lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.” - Pedro Elcano filed a complaint for recovery of damages from Reginald and his father Atty Marvin. CFI dismissed it. ISSUES 1. WON the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability was not reversed 2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last par) of the CC can be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the occurrence, Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married HELD 1. NO -The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him. -Barredo v Garcia (dual character—civil and criminal — of fault or negligence as a source of obligation): "The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued." "It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1402 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case aria for which, after un a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.” -Culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of a penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. -ART 1162: "Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of

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- Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. 2. YES (but…) - Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. (However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.) - While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he was of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian." - Under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." - In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual. - It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. - On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.

this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, Article 2177 of the new code provides: "ART 277. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising front negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant." - According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a 'culpa aquilian' or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and 'culpa extracontractual' or 'cuasi-delito' has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery," - Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth life" rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that me preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 12) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it’s "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress", to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. - Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.

CINCO V CANONOY 90 SCRA 369

He also prayed for 25. Petitioner had visited MG’s parents to secure their approval of the marriage. he elevated the matter on Certiorari to the CFI Cebu. Art. Feb.. A day before the filing of the complaint.Damages were sustained by petitioner because of the collision . ISSUE WON damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Art. atty’s fees. and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. of good moral character and respected reputation in her community. .Private respondent Marilou Gonzales (MG) filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. she sustained injuries. DISPOSITION Writ of Certiorari granted. It makes no distinction between “damage to persons” on the one hand and “damage to property” on the other.it was the fault r negligence of the driver in the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision. Petitioner was thus ordered to pay Php 20. . in reality.000 as moral damages plus misc. ISSUE WON there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action HELD YES . .torts & damages Melencio-Herrera. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. residing in Dagupan.Subsequently. fees plus litigation expenses. MG accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. 1979 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . a criminal case was filed against the driver Romeo Hilot arising from the same accident. 32.21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. She prayed for payment for damages amounting to Php 45. counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit.That Baksh is an Iranian citizen. particularly of Romeo Hilot. 33. – In the cases prvided for in Articles 31. petitioner started maltreating her even threatening to kill her and as a result of such maltreatment. the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action. respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise. expenses.Where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress.They observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.That she is a 22 yr. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court: Sec 2. YES Ratio In a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. good customs or public policy.Respondent CA promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto the trial court’s ruling which prompted Baksh to file this petition for certiorari..At the pre-trial in the civil case. He . old Filipina. Baksh repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that he is already married to someone in Bacolod.000 plus additional costs. .There was a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private respondents. Reasoning . may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case. proof that he had. . single. 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code f the Philippines. is so broad that in includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. Petitioner’s MFR having been denied. It is essential however.That Baksh later courted and proposed to marry her. no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act. . 21 CC decided in favor of private respondent. May 31.The RTC. 21 applies to this case. etc. . . as enunciated in Art 2176 of the Civil Code. Plaintiff’s claims: .19. raising the single issue of WON Art. which in turn dismissed the petition.Liability being predicated on quasi-delict. Respondents’ Comments: . . Such civil action shall A2010 -4- prof.The City Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the civil case. could justify the award of damages pursuant to Art. that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals. .000 as moral damages and 3. BAKSH V CA (Gonzales) 219 SCRA 115 DAVIDE. The concept of quasi-delict.In the instant case. They later agreed to get married at the end of the school semester. 21 may be applied.Petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasidelict. JR. contending that the trial court erred in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and in ordering him to pay moral damages. an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.Baksh answered with a counterclaim. casis claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married. as specifically provided for in Art 2177 of the Civil Code. Petitioner appealed this decision to respondent CA. And with respect to “harm” it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since “harm” is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. 19701 a complaint for recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito. 1993 NATURE Appeal by certiorari to review and set aside the CA decision which affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision FACTS . Baksh later forced MG to live with him. neither sought the consent of her parents nor forced her to live in his apt.21 of the Civil Code HELD 1. Independent civil action. **MG’s allegations in the complaint: . A week before the filing of the complaint. did not maltreat her but only told her to stop coming to his place after having discovered that she stole his money and passport.000 pesos atty’s. admitting only the personal circumstances of the parties in the complaint but denied the rest of the allegations. . and is an exchange student taking up medicine at the Lyceum in Dagupan.Cinco filed on Feb 25.The separate and independent civil action for quasidelict is also clearly recognized in sec 2. The word damage is used in two concepts: the “harm” done and “reparation” for the harm done. . applying Art.

the source of which is urine.21 fills that vacuum. she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. that he went to a nearby store to purchase some cigarettes. His younger brother Jerry also managed to jump out.00. there is no crime. **Obiter: on Torts and Quasi-delicts . Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or value which could alter the result of the case. scurried to the side of the road and hid in the ricefield. He returned home and cleaned his garlic bulbs before retiring at 9:00 o’clock. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.The group had barely left when their owner jeep was fired upon from the rear. Art. The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men.755. the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying. would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.2176 CC. Art. is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. moral damages in the amount of P20. with interest. In order to avoid trouble. it is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses.All pleaded not guilty.21 Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals.Ballesteros interposed the defense of alibi. might affect the result of the case. the legislator.” . It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. 1991. . the private respondent surrendered her virginity.00. Paraffin tests conducted on Galo and Ballesteros produced positive results. and ordered them to pay jointly and solidarily: 1. though the grievous moral wrong has been committed. The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in the amount of P50.In his testimony. Carmelo Agliam.As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report: “But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law.00. the instant petition is hereby DENIED PEOPLE V BALLESTEROS 285 SCRA 438 ROMERO. but was shot in the stomach and died. he said that he was not even present at the crime scene . Robert Cacal. warrants for the arrest of Ballesteros. are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Art. He said that he uses his left hand in lighting cigarettes and he had no motive to kill the victims. . if the foregoing rule is approved. Vidal Agliam was able to jump out from the jeep and landed just beside it.evening of May 28.' A promise of marriage either has not been made. intentional and malicious acts. Thus.” A2010 -5- prof. known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana.21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs. from which We quote: “The elimination of this chapter is proposed. unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which. he busied himself with some chores. but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and battery. The next morning. In short.. Having been found with gunpowder residue in his hands. his halfbrother Eduardo Tolentino. as the girl is above 18 yrs of age. if considered.Moreover. Article 21. she and her parents would have such a right of action.torts & damages preparatory to their supposed marriage. to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule: “Art. or can not be proved.337 or Art. not because of lust but because of moral seduction.21. Ronnel Tolentino. Under the present laws. Raymundo Bangi and Marcial Barid converged at a carinderia owned by Ronnel Tolentino. Therefore. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes. especially during the festivity. Lastly.The trial court found the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. the cherished possession of every single Filipina. Carmelo Agliam. which defines a quasi-delict.This notwithstanding. .. false imprisonment and deceit. would have been beyond redress. which included fertilizing his pepper plants with sulfate. Vidal Agliam. “An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: 'A' seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of 'X. He handled the fertilizers without gloves. and that his hand may have been contaminated by a nitrogenous compound. .338 of the RPC because the private respondent was above 18 years of age at the time of the seduction. is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.” . That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. in fact. FACTS .. January 29. the said Code contains a provision.000. Galo claimed that he did not even talk to Bulusan or any of his companions. The girl becomes pregnant. Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino sustained injuries. Quasi-delict. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Art. they decided to head for home instead of reacting to the perceived provocation of Galo and his companions. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.Art. his brother Jerry Agliam. DISPOSITION finding no reversible error in the challenged decision. just consumed eight cigarette sticks prior to the test. They proceeded to attend a dance but did not stay long because they sensed some hostility from Cesar Galo and his companions who were giving them dagger looks.Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo and Vidal Agliam. Galo and Bulusan were issued. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code. . Galo attempted to exculpate himself from the results by confessing that he had been a cigarette smoker for the past ten years and had. qualified by treachery. and actual damages in the amount of P35.2176 CC. in the absence of Art. Bulusan was not tested for nitrates. Eduardo Tolentino was not even able to move from his seat and was hit with a bullet which punctured his right kidney which caused his death. . Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.000. the Commission has deemed it necessary. it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code. . and although the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage. even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury. Syquia. with certain exceptions. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which. 1998 NATURE An appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless. Thus at one stroke. But under the proposed article. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence. casis .The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. in the interest of justice.Bulusan echoed the defense of alibi of Galo and Ballesteros . qualified by treachery.

YES Ratio Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by law to convict a person of a criminal charge. we see no reason to disturb its findings as to this matter. Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result. However. or in recompense for. not a whimsical or fanciful doubt based on imagined but wholly improbable possibilities and unsupported by evidence.40. physical suffering. he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width.In granting actual or compensatory damages. on the other hand. moral damages in the amount of P20. 1982. method or form of attack employed by him. the victim was not in a position to defend himself. after such investigation. Carmelo and Vidal Agliam both described the area to be well illumined by the moon. Vidal Agliam Jr. one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises. the same having been fully substantiated by receipts accumulated by them and presented to the CUSTODIO V CA (Heirs Of Mabasa) 253 SCRA 483 REGALADO. is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result. Consistent with the policy of this Court. urine may leave traces of nitrates. Such path is passing in between the row of houses of defendants. it is obvious that the accused-appellants had sufficient opportunity to reflect on their heinous plan. Manifestations of their evil designs were already apparent as early as the time of the dance. moral damages in the amount of P5.. There was no opportunity for the latter to defend themselves 3. Hence. Considering the luminescence of the moon and the proximity between them.000..000. the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. and actual damages in the total amount of P61. Therefore. whereas moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has experienced mental anguish. the amount of psychological pain. As regards moral damages. the amount of P 50. or satisfaction for an injury sustained.000. unlike those found in gunpowder. at the very least. Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino. 2. DISPOSITION The decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. there are 2 possible passageways. . the party making a claim for such must present the best evidence available.000. the award of actual damages is proper. must be amended. with interest. The costs. the order granting compensatory damages to the heirs of Jerry Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr. As access to P. with interest.. . The prosecution need not prove motive on the part of the accused when the latter has been positively identified as the author of the crime.That accused-appellants had no motive in perpetrating the offense is irrelevant.Here. . WON the Court was correct in the award of damages to the heirs of the victims HELD 1. not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime. In fact. a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6m in length. YES Ratio The requisites of treachery are twofold: (1) (t)hat at the time of the attack. Reasoning . vouchers. and the like. may be determined by the trial court in its discretion. Also. She also mentioned some other . with interest. The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino. actual damages in the amount of P2. but these are minimal and.00 each. casis court. The facts show that the attack was well-planned and not merely a result of the impulsiveness of the offenders. February 9. 1996 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA FACTS .000. Carmelo Agliam. The second passageway is about 3m in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway. 3.The plaintiff-appellee Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P. Tipas.00. there were tenants occupying the remises and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. may be washed off with tap water. although inestimable. WON the Court correctly ruled in finding that the offense was qualified by treachery 3. Positive identification prevails over denials and alibis. This accused-appellants failed to satisfactorily prove. Metro Manila.None of them attempted to corroborate their alibi through the testimony of witnesses. fertilizers and A2010 -6- prof.00. Reasoning . and had furthermore shown that these were the proximate result of the offender’s wrongful act or omission. has to be traversed. Sr. Burgos Street from plaintiff's property. 4. they never attempted to present as witnesses those who could have testified to having seen them elsewhere on the night in question. as corroborated by his testimony. WON the trial court was correct in finding accusedappellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt 2. They were well-armed and approached the homebound victims.003.00. Burgos St. damage and injury caused to the heirs of the victims. the victims could distinctly identify their assailants. the constant interaction between them through the years (in the buying and selling of cattle and Bulusan was a classmate of Vidal) would necessarily lead to familiarity with each other such that. to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.785. totally unaware of their presence. and not as compensatory damages.00 is given to the heirs of the victims by way of indemnity. from behind. the claim for actual damages by the heirs of the victims is not controverted. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed.on the defense of alibi: for the defense of alibi to prosper. Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of. However. but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.torts & damages 2. . Tagig. moral shock and so forth. serious anxiety. loss or injury sustained.When said property was purchased by Mabasa. ISSUES 1. Reasonable doubt is that engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and inability. viz. The doubt to the benefit of which an accused is entitled in a criminal trial is a reasonable doubt. or as otherwise expressed. one would have been able to recognize the other easily . recompense. In passing thru said passageway. Defendant Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because there was an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first passageway. Intent.In their testimonies. receipts. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20m distant from Mabasa's residence to P.. Burgos St. sometime in February.on their excuses regarding the source of the gunpowder traces found on their hands: Experts confirm the possibility that cigarettes. Reasoning . compensatory damages in the amount of P50. YES Ratio Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation. and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means. Palingon. And it was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area.00. Here. and moral damages in the amount of P10. 5. the accused must prove.

There must be damnum et injuria.Petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Luminosa L. "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan. 4960 of the Municipal Court of Sindangan. CA affirming TC judgment with modification. 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. hurt. The injury must result from a breach of duty or a legal wrong. Hence this appeal. together with his wife. and Ester Francisco.. with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case. Mfr denied. there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the A2010 -7- prof. denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 1972. as owners. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right. although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another. filed on September 1. . The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing. but wrongful. said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No.The lower court sustained Mactan Inc. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. As a result of the aforesaid collision. et. Mactan Transit Co. and driven by defendant. [3] In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage. grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car.000 as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. (b) the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses P8. 1971. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co. no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated. went to CA raising the sole issue of WON lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. al to in a motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11.Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip. [DATE] NATURE Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental. THE CONCEPT OF QUASIDELICT GARCIA V FLORIDO [CITATION] ANTONIO.torts & damages inconveniences of having at the front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. petitioners. casis bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. and . Al. YES Ratio There is no cause of action for acts done by one person (in this case. Reasoning [1] To warrant the recovery of damages. pursuant to Sec. with prayer for preliminary attachment. Sindangan. in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police and that. Marcelino Inesin. petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right (Art. while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan. Inc. German C.. hired and boarded a PU car with plate No. and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. the civil aspect of the criminal case would have to be determined only after the termination of the criminal case result of a violation of a legal duty. is not applicable because Art 33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide. respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the collision. the filing of the instant civil action is premature. Zamboanga del Norte. upon his own property) in a lawful and proper manner. . P30K as moral damages and P10K as exemplary damages).N. 2850) against the private respondents. that Art. Garcia. for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government hospitals. owners and drivers. bookkeeper of said hospital. 77-4 W Z. [4] In this case. and Ester Francisco. 33 of the New Civil Code. Luminosa L. WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint for damages on the ground that since no express reservation was made by the complainants. damage is the loss. respectively. WON the grant of right of way to herein private respondents is proper 2. there was no legal injury. to enclose and fence their property (See Art. and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein.Private respondents. 1971. Garcia. and dismissed the complaint ISSUES 1. for a roundtrip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City. Pedro Tumala. Garcia. [2] Obiter: There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Inc.On August 4. good customs or public policy. German C. not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver. and Pedro Tumala. awarding damages to plaintiffs (P65K as actual damages. or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages. 2. ISSUES 1. . and. Ratio Whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case.21 CC) [5] The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners. there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent. to the public street. . Zamboanga del Norte. . DISPOSITION The appealed decision of CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the trial court is REINSTATED.At about 9:30 a. an appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court Reasoning . as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. It is within the right of petitioners. petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization. dismissing petitioners' action for damages against respondents. et. Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital. Thus. the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest. Ricardo Vayson. Contrary to the claim of private respondents. Pedro Tumala. . or harm which results from the injury. FACTS .The principal argument advanced by Mactan Inc. Some of their footwear were even lost. although there was damage.. hence not contrary to morals.430 CC).m. that act must be not only hurtful. petitioners. without other limitations than those established by law. and from the order of said Court dated January 21. because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver. guilty of negligence. 25) with plate No. Zamboanga del Norte". hospital administrative officers. WON CA erred in awarding damages to plaintiffappellee Mabasa HELD 1. Garcia.TC ordered (a) defendant-appellants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access — ingress and egress. therefore. and driven by respondent. 7 at Zamboanga City. in a reckless. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners.

in the cases provided for by Articles 31.Besides. namely: a) act or omission of the private respondents. as one based on culpa aquiliana. may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law.As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in the criminal action. while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence. which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso. compensatory and exemplary damages . . casis (Criminal Case No. it is my considered view that the latter provision is inoperative. HELD 1. The proviso. Reasoning . Ratio An action shall be deemed to be based on a quasi-delict when all the essential averments under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present. evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages. for these articles were drafted . Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31. it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would substantially be the same. YES Ratio An action based on quasi-delict may be maintained independently from a criminal action. The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others. I cannot see why a reservation had to be made in the criminal case. . . YES. Since Civil Case No. however. By instituting a civil action based on a quasi-delict. 4960) and the civil action by petitioners. and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case. b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940. it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177. the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. WON the lower court erred in saying that the action is not based on quasi-delict since the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations and because of the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally liable for moral.It is true that under Sec. the injured party is entitled exclusively to the bigger one. much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused. 33 and 34 A2010 -8- prof. Reasoning . Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence.But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners. . under the peculiar circumstances of the case. We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal. provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately. may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case. and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties. et all (73 Phil. 620-621). 2850 should be deemed as the reservation required. which is procedural. . 2850 may proceed.Accordingly. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts.It is. that degree of care. the actual filing of Civil Case No.The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless. Inc) . 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car. having always had its own foundation and individuality. 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles. 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code. and even if it were not substantive but adjective. a complainant may be deemed to abandon his/her right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case.As we have stated at the outset. or one where reservation to file the civil action need not be made. . ANDAMO V IAC (Missionaries Of Our Lady Of La Salette. petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case. whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering that by the institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case. Articles 32. not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute. . of the Civil Code. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. because the action in fact satisfies the elements of quasi-delict. for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action. precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. but it should be noted. which means that of the two possible judgments. As to the specific mention of Article 2177 in Section 2 of the Rule 111.In the case at bar. . subject to the limitation mentioned in the last sentence of Article 2177 of the Civil Code. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court SEPARATE OPINION BARREDO [concur] . an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action. 2. The former is a violation of the criminal law. that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made. I concur in the judgment reversing the order of dismissal of the trial court in order that Civil Case No." . Hence. it being substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate. there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala.Article 2176 and 2177 definitely create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code. It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. there being no showing that prejudice could be caused by doing so. . 2 in relation to Sec. c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision.torts & damages 2. 33. therefore. but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract from the nature and character of the action. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which became effective on January 1. "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to . Articles 32. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared. 607. the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extracontractual. which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. 1964. . This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia. d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents. petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein. 2850 is predicated on the above civil code articles and not on the civil liability imposed by the Revised Penal Code.

1986. the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter. Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin. stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river. petitioners filed a civil case for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent corporation. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction. whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. (b) fault or negligence of the defendant. as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. 1984. . 1990 NATURE Petition for certiorari. whenever it refers to "fault or negligence". . casis between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana. damaged petitioners' crops and plants. such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. .Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang. 1983. there being fault or negligence. Such fault or negligence. And later on dismissed the Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person.On February 17.The decision was based on Section 3 (a). with no pre-existing contractual obligation 2 Article 2177. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person. is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake. Potenciano. . water conductors and contrivances within its land.In the case of Samson vs. waterpaths. . But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court . endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons. that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. the Court applied Article 1902. Inc. . ISSUE WON a corporation. and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff. Moreover. . petitioners instituted a criminal action against Efren Musngi.On February 22. having always had its own foundation and individuality. . covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character. . and the causal connection between the act and the damage. an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. . prohibition and mandamus FACTS . Indeed. and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two. There can be no logical conclusion than this. Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent." . a religious corporation. thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who. (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally). while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence. is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. which has built through its agents. which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land. to recover damages on both scores. thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land. Dionisio. the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the land. officers and directors of respondent corporation.The waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case HELD Ratio YES.While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the instant case is privately owned. The former is a violation of the criminal law. respondent Appellate Court affirmed the order of the trial court. of ancient origin. a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act. As held in In Azucena vs. were constructed. for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code.A careful examination of the complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners. .The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 21772 of the Civil Code. November 6.It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. washed away costly fences. There is therefore. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. waterpaths and contrivances. Consequently. According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight startling. caused a young man to drown. shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court.On April 26. 1 Article 2176. . whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted. in quasi-delicts.Within the land of respondent corporation. but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. separate from criminal negligence. including an artificial lake.. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on A2010 -9- prof. All the elements of a quasidelict are present. adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. like the rest of the residents. assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. .In July 1982. for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31.Article 2176 1of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence. provided that the offended party is not allowed. now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike.Article 2176." Reasoning . is obliged to pay for the damage done. which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict. the trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in the civil case until after judgment in the related Criminal Case.torts & damages 191 SCRA 195 FERNAN. Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately. the recitals of the complaint. or some other person for whose acts he must respond.

and 1908 of that code. or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place.After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal. and on his death or incapacity the mother. awarding damages to the plaintiff. the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case. or create an action for quasidelicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. . not only for personal acts and omissions. was guilty. was at the time when he received the injuries complained of..On the 30th of September. . the real difficulty arising in the application of these principles to the particular facts developed in the case under consideration. and the intervention of his action between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the TAYLOR V MANILA ELECTRIC 16 PHIL 8 CARSON. in order to establish his right to a recovery.The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on the defendant's premises. The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics. . a minor. spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. A2010 . March 22. by his father. must establish by competent evidence: (1) Damages to the plaintiff.We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff.No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premises unattended. elementary. and illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded. crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. entered upon the defendant's premises. in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist. 1905. and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule. by quasi-contracts. as under the generally accepted doctrine in the United States. FACTS . 1089 Obligations are created by law. The plaintiff. and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime — a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. for the purpose of visiting one Murphy. they opened one of the caps with a knife. for his own pleasure and convenience.But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience. and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches. . an employee of the defendant. David Taylor. but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not.We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code. who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap. ART. when they felt disposed so to do. Finding on inquiry that Mr. An explosion followed. with a boy named Manuel Claparols. The father. and for kindling of explosive substances which may not have been placed in a safe and proper place. or some person for whose acts it must respond. is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with them. upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902. impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery. about 12 years of age. . and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. of course. Jessie. but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible. who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own. ISSUE WON the defendants negligence is the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries HELD NO . his entry upon defendant company's premises. ART. the boys. (2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally. 1903. 1910 NATURE An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries. Therefore. his nearest relative. In the case of Castillo vs. nor how long they had been there when the boys found them. .It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where they were found.The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused — 1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence. and strolled around thereon without the express permission of the defendant. and do not admit of discussion. Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties. ART. casis ART.torts & damages Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain . .10 - prof.These proposition are. and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents. by contracts. became frightened and started to run away. instituted by David Taylor. . one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds. unless. (3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage. plaintiff. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite. of course. . in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability. and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises.The trial court's decision. the son of a mechanical engineer.Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts proven at the trial do not established the liability of the defendant company under the provisions of these articles. causing more or less serious injuries to all three. . received a slight cut in the neck.. the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration. Court of Appeals. . more mature than the average boy of his age. Murphy was not in his quarters. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code. 15 years of age.

50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred. on the other hand. which should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place where they were found by the plaintiff." and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of adult. July 23. justice. wherein the principal question was whether a railroad company was liable for in injury received by an infant while upon its premises. cause of the injury received by the plaintiff. the acquittal of the driver of the crime charged is not a bar to the prosecution for damages based on quasi-delict Reasoning . so that while it may be true that these injuries would TAYAG V ALCANTARA 98 SCRA 723 CONCEPCION. We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap." and. such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter” . and this latter the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the injuries sustained by him. that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act. we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff. (84 U. upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases. so as to prevent their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient weight to put in doubt. under circumstances. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only. ISSUE WON Judge Alcantara correctly dismissed the civil case on the ground of no cause of action due to the acquittal of the driver HELD 1. that because of plaintiff's youth the intervention of his action between the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the explosion which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident.As laid down in Railroad Co. Pending the criminal case against the driver.This conclusion is founded on reason. NO Ratio The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi-delict. S. nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff. driven by Romeo Villa. and necessity. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in several courts. Inc. . viz: “6. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that. despite his denials on the witness stand. recklessly. and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault. The company and driver then filed for dismissal of the civil case on the ground that the heirs do not have a cause of action because of the acquittal. and the cases based thereon. and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act. and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred. was able to earn P2. we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate A2010 . and knowingly produced the explosion. Judge Alcantara granted this motion. "attributable to the negligence of the defendant. such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. . Stout (17 Wall. . casis not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises.In the case at bar.Art. . he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. attributable to the negligence of the company). without other fault on his part. plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15.). properly speaking. this provision refers to a civil action based on an obligation arising from quasi-delict. 31.In the criminal case. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him. more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age. vs. But the doctrine of the case is controlling in our jurisdiction. or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances. and yet he willfully.True. although we accept the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases. if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant. he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap. that we have thought proper to discuss and to consider that doctrine at length in this decision. . Judge Alcantara granted this and dismissed the civil case. In turn. the company and driver filed a motion to suspend trial of the civil case on the ground that the criminal case was still pending. has failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a . 1980 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari the order of CFI Tarlac (dismissing petition for damages) FACTS . 657). . he had been to sea as a cabin boy. the driver as acquitted based on reasonable doubt. and neither is contention that a man has a right to do what will with his own property or that children should be kept under the care of their parents or guardians. but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act. therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. which therefore was not.Evidently." . That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lino. the heirs of Tayag instituted a civil action to recover damages from the company (Phil Rabbit Bus Inc) and the driver. from idle curiosity.torts & damages accident which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident.. counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last resort in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases. it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts. or for purposes of amusement. . and that the defendant. NCC provides: “When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony. Plaintiff contends.11 - prof.In support of his contention. the principles on which these cases turn are that "while a railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it.Pedro Tayag was riding a motorcycle when he was bumped by a Philippine Rabbit Bus. and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. and it is because we can not agree with this proposition. The complaint itself shows that the claim was based on quasi-delit.The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. which caused his instantaneous death. if such injury was.

who allegedly witnessed the incident . Order of CFI Tarlac set aside. Recto Avenue. having already been able to balance himself on the stepboard." The two men in the jeep joined the chase and at the intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard. resulting in the latter falling down and hitting the pavement. These affidavits were already prepared and merely sworn to before Fiscal Cantos on January 17. no vendor lets go of his precious box of cigarettes in order to change a peso bill given by a customer. the acquittal of Romeo Villa was based on reasonable doubt. 100 Phil. 1983 . While waiting.an autopsy was conducted by the medico-legal officer of NBI which stated the cause of death of Rosales as "pneumonia hypostatic. .The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's version. The two men on board the jeep turned out to be police officers. . there could be no reason for the latter to run after the Kombi and hang on to its window. Citing Elcano v Hill: a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act. 1984 . Article 33 of the Civil Code also justifies the petitioners' independent civil action for damages since the term "physical injuries" therein embraces death (Dyogi vs. also went along with them. the latter could not have fallen down.On the other hand. otherwise. but for damages due to a quasidelict or culpa aquiliana". filed an information against Rogelio Ligon charging him with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. Rosales was rushed by some bystanders to the Philippine General Hospital.at about 6:10 p. bilateral.December 6. and the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved forward. can amend their complaint and base their action also on article 29 NCC which allows an independent civil action for damages in case of acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt. Prudencio Castillo. stating that there can be no doubt that Gabat forcibly took or grabbed the cigarette box from Rosales because. and his companion. Castillo was able to overtake the Kombi when the traffic light turned red. Rogelio Ligon. . July 29.I concur because petitioners' action for damages is based on article 2177 of the Civil Code. The court also believed Castillo's testimony that Gabat forcibly removed or pried off the right hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi.The requirement in section 2. that as the Kombi continued to speed towards Quiapo. ." . Gabat. beeping his horn to make the driver stop. case REMANDED to lower court for further proceedings. Rule III of the Rules of Court that there should be a reservation in the criminal cases of the right to institute an independent civil action is contrary to law. 1983.Assistant Fiscal Cantos filed another information against Rogelio Ligon and Fernando Gabat for Robbery with Homicide based on a Supplemental Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo and a joint affidavit of Armando Espino and Romeo Castil. the traffic light changed to green. to alight from the Kombi. The court said that it is of common knowledge that cigarette vendors plying their trade in the streets do not let go of their cigarette box. .Moreover. Castillo pursued it as it sped towards Roxas Boulevard. telling them "nakaaksidente ng tao. however. .” All the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action are present: (1) act or omission constituting fault /negligence on the part of respondent (2) damage caused by the said act or omission (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or omission and (4) no preexisting contractual relation between the parties. under which according to the Code Commission. Gabat beckoned a cigarette vendor. 1983 . The Kombi did not stop after the victim fell down on the pavement near the foot of the underpass. not for civil liability from criminal negligence. He immediately blocked the Kombi while the jeep pulled up right behind it. Yatco. otherwise. Rosales to buy some cigarettes from him. 1986. At the intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street before turning left towards the underpass at C. .June 28. Fermin Payuan. and damage to his property would not have occurred. "acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence.prosecution tried to establish.Investigating Fiscal Cantos. The taxicab driver. Ligon which was coming from España Street going towards the direction of Quiapo. It is not controverted.12 - prof. and immediately thereafter. was never apprehended and is still at large. 1095). It was found out that there was a third person inside the Kombi. Patrolmen Leonardo Pugao and Peter Ignacio. The petitioners. of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua where he robbed and killed Jose Rosales y Ortiz.The three were all brought by the police officers to the Western Police District and turned over to Pfc. as plaintiffs in the civil case. Otherwise. Rogelio Ligon. When they reached the Luneta near the Rizal monument.February 17. PEOPLE V LIGON 152 SCRA 419 YAP. was riding in a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father and driven by the other accused. a seventeen-year old working student who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. the trial court dismissed as incredible the testimony of Gabat that the cigarette vendor placed the cigarette box on the windowsill of the Kombi. secondary to traumatic injuries of the head.October 23. dated October 23. whether on reasonable doubt or not.m. 1983. He sought their assistance in chasing the Kombi. RTC convicted Fernando Gabat. . the accident in question which resulted in the death of Pedro Tayag. shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action. They drew their SEPARATE OPINION AQUINO [concur] . holding it with his left hand. cigarette vendors.00 more or less.6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias were released early morning the following day. Sr. a certain Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at the rear seat. where he was treated for multiple physical injuries and was confined thereat until his death on October 30. While this transaction was occurring. is the subject of conflicting versions by the prosecution and the defense. Fernando Gabat. . Rosales approached the Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of cigarettes.October 31. provided that offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores DISPOSITION petition granted. particularly defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan. casis guns and told the driver. . while he was trying to get from his pocket the change for the 5peso bill of Gabat. As to what precisely happened between Gabat and Rosales at the crucial moment.torts & damages family in the selection and supervision of its employees. He was allegedly robbed of his cigarette box containing cigarettes worth P300. 1984. A2010 . Castillo saw an owner-type jeep with two persons in it.Following close behind (about 3 meters) the Kombi at the time of the incident was a taxicab driven by Castillo. they stopped.the co-accused. WON he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted. through the sole testimony of the taxicab driver that Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales and pried loose the latter's hand from the window of the Kombi. Rosales clung to the window of the Kombi but apparently lost his grip and fell down on the pavement.M. 1983 . but Rogelio Ligon was detained and turned over to the City Fiscal's Office for further investigation. Payuan also prepared a Traffic Accident Report. NATURE Appeal from the judgment of the RTC Manila FACTS . He was traveling on the same lane in a slightly oblique position. 1987 .

However. . The stall of one Antonio Vergara was demolished pursuant to this order. In the case at bar. it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. . . which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission.600. He is therefore entitled to acquittal on reasonable doubt. The SC took the position that the said provision merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act. "other than to see that justice be done. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime.Considering the above circumstances.Petitioners.The petitioners were found guilty of grave coercion after trial at the CFI and were sentenced to five months and one day imprisonment and ordered to pay fines. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party. ." It is just and proper that. Hence. and to determine the logical result of the distinction.torts & damages ISSUE WON the prosecution’s set of facts should be given credence HELD NO . on or about February 8. . and both vehicles during that time were moving fast in the traffic. 1964. These are circumstances which must be taken into consideration in evaluating Castillo's testimony as to what exactly happened between Gabat and the cigarette vendor during that crucial moment before the latter fell down. specially considering that this occurrence happened in just a matter of seconds. The acquittal extinguishes the criminal liability but not the civil liability particularly if the finding is not guilty based on reasonable ground. De Guzman vs Alvia. went to the public market to execute an alleged order of the Mayor to clear the public market of stalls which were considered as nuisance per se. would alter the result of the case in that they would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused to acquittal. Since the standard of proof to be used in civil cases is preponderance of evidence. private rights. according to the court a quo. even if not tainted with bias. unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the facts from which the civil action might arise did not exist.The Court also tackled the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code to clarify whether a separate civil action is required when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The decision of the CA was based on the fact that the petitioners were charged with coercion when they should have been more appropriately charged with crime against person. the crime of grave coercion was not proved in accordance with the law. ISSUE WON the CA committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge HELD NO . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt. held that extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil.13 - prof. occupying approximately one-third (1/3) of the rear end of the vehicle. when the latter is not proved. has been explained by the Code Commission as follows: "The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished. may be a disinterested witness with no motive. civil liability cannot be demanded. . thus making it visually difficult for Castillo to observe clearly what transpired inside the Kombi at the front end where Gabat was seated. casis FACTS . the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. the judgment of not guilty was based on reasonable doubt. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other.On appeal. preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. Castillo's line of vision was partially obstructed by the back part of the Kombi. why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? DISPOSITION Appellant acquitted for the crime of robbery and homicide. the quantum of proof necessary to sustain Gabat's conviction of so serious a crime as robbery with homicide has not been met in this case." his testimony. but sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales y Ortiz. . One affects the social order and the other.Judicial notice may also be taken of the fact that the rear windshield of the 1978 Volkswagon Kombi is on the upper portion. The taxicab which Castillo was driving was lower in height compared to the Kombi in which Gabat was riding-a fact admitted by Castillo at the trial. the court express a finding that the defendants’ offenses are civil in nature. [date] NATURE Petition of rcertiorari to revies the decision of the Court of Appeals . As the taxicab was right behind the Kombi. is not entirely free from doubt because his observation of the event could have been faulty or mistaken.The petitioner filed the appeal to the SC questioning the grant of actual damages despite a no guilty verdict. following it at a distance of about three meters. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party.The SC.a careful review of the record shows that certain material facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which. His testimony that he saw Gabat grab the cigarette box from Rosales and forcibly pry loose the latter's hand from the windowsill of the Kombi is thus subject to a reasonable doubt. "This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. only a A2010 . In the process however the stock in trade and certain furniture of Vergara were lost and destroyed. the Court is not convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of the accused Fernando Gabat has been established beyond reasonable doubt. quoting Section 3 (C) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and various jurisprudence including PNB vs Catipon. if taken into account. In our view. . for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility.Article 29 of the Civil Code. .00 as actual damages. the CA reversed the findings of the CFI and acquitted the appellants based on reasonable doubt but nonetheless ordered them to pay P9. Castillo. PADILLA V CA (Vergara) 129 SCRA 558 GUTIERREZ.While the prosecution witness. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense.

Rowena Umali De Ocampo accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital. the absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence: that the injury to the person or property was a consequence of the reckless imprudence. head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the San Pablo District Hospital.torts & damages CRUZ V CA (UMALI) 282 SCRA 188 FRANCISCO. Unfortunately. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen A2010 . This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking in the case at bench. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. .Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital.14 - prof. . a matter of expert opinion. 1991. degree of intelligence. and to pay damages. taking into consideration his employment or occupation. the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence. They bought type "A" blood and the same was brought by the attendant into the operating room. RABBIT V PEOPLE [citation] PANGANIBAN. . (3) that it be without malice. . (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence. FACTS .Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22. as soon as it arrived. there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a casual connection of such breach and the resulting death of his patient.For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is. Her death certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause. Ercillo went out of the operating room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister immediately bought. The attending physicians summoned Dr. and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender. While they were waiting. unless the contrary is sufficiently established.Even without expert testimony. no cogent proof exists that any of these circumstances caused petitioner's death. While petitioner was closing the abdominal wall. when Dr.Thereafter. Thus. The deference of courts to the expert opinion PHIL. the accused jumped bail and remained at large. .In litigations involving medical negligence. Because of the untidy state of the clinic. But admittedly. Rowena and her other relatives then boarded a tricycle and followed the ambulance. 1991. Rowena then noticed her mother. and other circumstances regarding persons. 1991 as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee. Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could be postponed. 2004 NATURE Petition for Review FACTS . gasping for breath. ISSUE WON the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide HELD NO . The petitioner called Lydia into her office and the two had a conversation.WON has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. About one hour had passed when Dr. they were not able to comply with petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank. However. Some thirty minutes after. that petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon. The operating staff then went inside the petitioner's clinic to take their snacks. ISSUE WON an employer. multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years. But in the event the the accused becoems insolvent.The following day. who was attached to an oxygen tank. Ercillo re-operated on her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a "myoma" in her uterus. Dr.At around 10pm. casis of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating. . she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant for a rag to wipe the window and the floor with. Prior to March 22. Rabbit will be held liable for the civil liabilities. 1997 NATURE Civil action for damages in a medical malpractice suit.After the lapse of a few hours. physical condition. may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused HELD . (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary. . April 14. a person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. the patient died. Phil. . she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50. Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband together with the driver of the accused had to go to the San Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. . Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in good standing when performing the same operation. time and place.The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act. as in the instant case.Rowena and her other relatives waited outside the operating room while Lydia underwent operation. there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients. The transfer to the San Pablo City District Hospital was without the prior consent of Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out about the intended transfer only when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo District Hospital. Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead as her blood pressure was already 0/0. . Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation.Napoleon Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide. Bartolome Angeles. 9 months and 11 days to 6 years. in the generality of cases. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she must be operated on as scheduled. It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted. According to Rowena. . she was wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr. Angeles arrived. the petitioner informed them that the operation was finished. Ercillo came out again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23.

000 against the estate of the deceased James P. then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case. Their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train.The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them. alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground.In commenting upon article 1093.Jose Cangco. it participated in the proceedings before the RTC. one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. nullifying or defeating the judgment. which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. This row of sacks was so placed that there was a space of only about two feet between the sacks of melons and the edge of the platform. it can be said that by jumping bail. founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. but also with regard to its amount.that is to say. and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger. ISSUE WON there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff HELD NO Ratio In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act . located upon the line of the defendant railroad company. which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. After the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop. they cannot seek relief from the court. it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of due process. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee. It follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code. objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to discern. He lived in San Mateo.The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage.Its liability is direct and immediate. . Rizal. to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent would also result in improperly amending.January 20. 1918 NATURE An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance disallowing the claim of the plaintiff for P1.In fact. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company. the trial judge. FACTS . In fact. DISPOSITION Petition is hereby DENIED. whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age.The employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform. found the facts substantially as above stated. Reasoning .The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited. casis medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of his curation. nevertheless. October 14. and that they constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering. and the train station was lit dimly by a single light located some distance away.Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. It might have lost its right to appeal. and should be considered. Costs against petitioner. and although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars. . especially to a person emerging from a lighted car. employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency. 1915.The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability. . 1915. At the hearing in the CFI. .15 - prof.25 in the form of . nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. . the accusedemployee. he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal.On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches.torts & damages NO . . not the court. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period. and with serious injuries. and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked. supplied by the company.On Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment: . . The plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second operation was performed and the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. and the plaintiff appealed.After a judgment has become final. . thus. When Jose Cangco stepped off.August 31. also an employee of the railroad company. where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform. .To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend. he used a pass. Emilio Zuniga. . Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu. By the same token. and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance.The accident occurred on a dark night.The sack of melons on the platform is because it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station for shipment to the market. McElroy. was employed by Manila Railroad Company as clerk. the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities. got off the same car. the plaintiff was returning home by rail from his daily labors. but only to extra-contractual obligations . . Consequently. . As the train slowed down another passenger. but it was not denied its day in court. While at large. took his position upon the steps of the coach. substantive CANGCO V MANILA RAILROAD CO 38 Phil 768 FISHER. deprived petitioner of the right to appeal. vested rights are acquired by the winning party. thus. petitioner admits that by helping the accusedemployee. and as the train drew up to the station in San Mateo the plaintiff while making his exit through the door. A2010 . as they are deemed to have waived the appeal. he instituted this proceeding in the CFI Manilato recover damages of the defendant company. Expenses reached the sum of P790. and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa. the judgment against him has become final and executory. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car. He was immediately brought to a hospital where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. . In the case before us. sex.

. The cement platform also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. The plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood. or which arise from these relations. which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of society. in cases imposed upon employers with respect to damages due to the negligence of their employees to persons to whom they are not bound by contract. by reason of the negligence of his servants.Every legal obligation must of necessity be extracontractual or contractual..The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which. The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract. thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties. While the vehicle was descending the Sta.290. This care has been defined to be. such is not based upon the principle of respondent superior . [dissent] . The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced. whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation. and for the costs of both instances. after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code. the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure. the damages should be apportioned. generally embraced in the concept of status. of certain members of society to others. taking into consideration the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them." . which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an "accident in the performance of an obligation already existing . The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff. we are likewise in full accord.16 - prof. and he incurs no liability whatever if. . Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case. we are of full accord. It is.Under the Spanish law. do injury to another.torts & damages and independent. would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. but by mere negligence or inattention. the particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred. we have the logical result . A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties. and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3.The Court is of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence: "The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train. There could be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. the court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that article 1903 is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a contract. no liability is imposed upon defendant. the obligation of making good the damage caused. has caused damage to another. if productive of injury. and judgment affirmed. . but that presumption is refutable. . namely.In Bahia vs. without willful intent. of the age." With the general rule relative to a passenger's contributory negligence. casis roadbed and the surrounding ground. sex and condition of the passenger. even within the scope of their employment.B. if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence.25." Adding these two points together. .With one sentence in the majority decision.The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains. important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence. rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris. thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. Article 1903 presumes negligence. or in supervision over him after the selection.but upon the principle announced in article 1902 which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or negligence.Respondent was one of the passengers on a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga.L. FORES V MIRANDA [citation] REYES. not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally. as it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at this station. . therefore. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. Atlantic. It is the Court’s conclusion that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence. namely. to avoid injury. an action is brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for the damage caused by the carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of his employment The Court. and consequently. other than contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual A2010 . "An attempt to alight from a moving train is negligence per se.the Manila Railroad Co. should be absolved from the complaint." . Litonjua and Leynes. . DISPOSITION The decision of the lower court is reversed. 1959 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . . "It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting.. may be rebutted. March 4. and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. gives rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. or both. whereas if the accident was caused by defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury. is that of ordinary or reasonable care. the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting. J. such third persons suffer damage. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of . said: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee. duties which civilized society imposes upon its members.In considering the probability of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff the following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the SEPARATE OPINION MALCOLM. and directs them with equal diligence.In the Rakes vs. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention. but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances. Gulf and Pacific Co. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person.

However. by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence. As Rakes was walking along the car’s side when the accident occurred. 2206.. casis the cars in the front by a rope. and (b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the description term "analogous cases" used in Art. there can be no appointment of damages. However. there were no side guards on the cars to keep the rails from slipping off. The action for breach of contract imposes on the defendant carrier a presumption of liability upon mere proof of injury to the passenger. that latter is relieved from the duty to establish the fault of the carrier. the driver lost control thereof. The accident occurred on the morning of March 22.00 by way of moral damages M. and later was subjected to a series of operations. effected to insert a metal splint. and actions quasi ex delicto. Also. Moreover. . 1953. a second. Mckenna. as well as the codal concept of quasi-delict as essentially extra contractual negligence. the company’s officers and 3 of the workers testified that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all against walking by the side of cars. The men were hauling the rails on 2 hand cars. In this case. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that. have avoided the consequences of the injured party's negligence. the limitation imposed by the new Code on the amount of the recovery. “… parties being mutually in fault. to some extent.Reason: the advantageous position of a party suing a carrier for breach of the contract of transportation explains. . the first on May 23. 2219." "ART.The difference in conditions. 2220. 1907 NATURE Action for damages FACTS . the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might. was at work transporting iron rails from the harbor in Manila. 2219. DISPOSITION The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified by eliminating the award of P5. This was reported to the foreman. WON there was contributory negligence on the part of petitioner and if so. which was later amputated at the knee. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. that entitles the spouse. Manila Railroad Co. defenses and proof. ISSUE WON the defendant is entitled to moral damages HELD NO. compel us to differentiate between action ex contractu. 2.Petitioner had walked along the side of the car despite a prohibition to do so by the foreman. wanton or deliberately injurious conduct. causing it to swerve and to hit the bridge wall. a criminal action is not a requisite for the enforcement of a civil action. it appears that respondent had not yet recovered the use of his right arm. At one point. RAKES V THE ATLANTIC." Reasoning (a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus). relation between the parties. Atlantic. there being fault or negligence. in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code.000.By virtue of culpa contractual. or of his employees.. and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly.the plaintiff’s witness alleged that a noticeable depression in the track had appeared after a typhoon. not only because Art. is essential to justify an award of moral damages. . GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY 7 Phil 359 TRACEY. but it had not been proven that Atlantic inspected the track or had any proper system of inspection." . such damages are justly due. if there is no pro-existing contractual A2010 . xxx xxx xxx ART. including the respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. Ratio Moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation. WON it bars him from recovery HELD 1. 38 Phil. . the carrier. some behind or at it sides and some pulling . The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. the tie broke.17 - prof. breaking his leg. Rule: no moral damages .In sum the rule is: Delict (breach of contract) Gen. Whoever by act or omission caused damage to another. Such fault or negligence. YES .torts & damages speed. Petitioner need not file charges with the foreman to claim damages from Atlantic. Rakes. and prevent us from viewing the action for breach of contract as simultaneously embodying an action on tort. ISSUES 1. petitioner may recover from the defendant. the track sagged. At the time of the trial. WON Atlantic is only subsidiarily liable 2.e. under the circumstance. and the burden is placed on the carrier to prove the it was due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure (Cangco vs. one of a group of 8 AfricanAmerican laborers in the employment of defendant. Atlantic may be held primarily liable as it failed in its duty to provide safe appliances for the use of its employees.H.Exception: with moral damages if: • defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith • result in the death of a passenger in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. Had it been otherwise. The law has no scales to determine in such cases whose wrongdoing weighed most in the compound that occasioned the mischief” (Railroad v Norton). NO . 768 777). i. is obliged to pay for the damage done. unlike in suits for quasi-delict.. Five of the passengers were injured. which provide as follows: "ART. (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. may not escape liability by proving that it has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees . and a third one to remove such splint. He was taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused by contractual breach. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter. less a sum deemed suitable equivalent for his own imprudence. he was found to have contributed in some degree to the injury inflicted. January 23. when wire loops were wound around the broken bones and screwed into place.Atlantic contends that the remedy for injury through negligence lies only in a criminal action against the official directly responsible and that the employer be held only subsidiarily liable. although not as the primary cause. Petitioner’s negligence contributed only to his own injury and not to the principal occurrence—it was merely an element to the damage caused upon him. descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased" . 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisting contractual relation between the parties. 2176. 1953.the plaintiff. the car canted and the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff who was walking by the car’s side.The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. but because the definition of quasi-delict in Act.

000.Art. the amount fairly attributable to his own negligence. a VP of the bank. 1988. (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. the bank also issued a supplemental card to Clarita S. Luis Luna. in this context. plaintiff should not be afforded relief FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V CA 241 SCRA 671 VITUG. In cases of this nature. . ISSUE WON the petitioner is entitled to moral and exemplary damages HELD NO . Since the card was not honored. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.On 30 March 1990. Naturally. FEBTC has come to this Court with this petition for review.On 06 October 1988. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. expressed the bank's apologies to Luis in his letter which stated that: In cases when a card is reported to our office as lost. the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation. Luna applied for. In order to replace the lost card. Most importantly. . casis . . Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries.Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court. William Anthony King. Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend. negligence.By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes apparent that: (a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus).torts & damages . under the circumstances. .Bad faith.Fores vs. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals.Still evidently feeling aggrieved. as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file.000. is essential to justify an award of moral damages. through counsel. not only because Art.Article 21 of the Code. .13. however. under the circumstances.Damages are awarded to petitioner at Php5. We have repeatedly ruled that moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation. Clarita lost her credit card. and another guest at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel Intercon Manila. we quote: Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent.Festejo also sent a letter to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant to assure the latter that Luis was a "very valued clients" of FEBTC. FEBTC was forthwith informed. the RTC of Pasig ordered FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300. .. contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. The Civil Code provides: . Furthermore. in a contract of carriage.Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.000. Miranda explained with great clarity the predominance that we should give to Article 2220 in contractual relations. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused contractual breach. but not simple. 1995 NATURE Petition for review FACTS .000.500.00 moral damages. it should be observed. . A2010 . in any case. moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. Adrian V. the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. wrote back to say that the credibility of Luis had never been "in question.Concededly. such damages are justly due. give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith. Thus.e. and (b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the descriptive term "analogous cases" used in Art.18 - prof. it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. wanton or deliberately injurious conduct. (b) P50. can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. even if we are to assume that the provision could properly relate to a breach of contract. . but because the definition of quasidelict in Art. demanded from FEBTC the payment of damages. . xxx xxx xxx . Luna. Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the appellate court.On appeal to the Court of Appeals. the bank's internal security procedures and policy would appear to be. . Because of this. To pay for the lunch. moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed ) of the common carrier. Festejo. such damages are justly due. February 23." A copy of this reply was sent to Luis by Festejo. Luis felt embarrassed by this incident. FAREASTCARD undertakes the necessary action to avert its unauthorized use to protect its cardholders. the unfortunate incident occurred). an overzealous employee of the Bank's Credit Card Department did not consider the possibility that it may have been him who was presenting the card at that time (for which reason. However. 2220. . in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code. a Fil-Am. F&B Manager of the Intercon. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith.Article 21 states: Art.to meanwhile so record the lost card. 2220. Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. Luis A. Luis filed a complaint for damages with the RTC of Pasig against FEBTC. Upon his request.In October 1986. Wilful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that.Art.00 exemplary damages. it failed to inform him about its security policy. 2219. Luis presented his FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter who promptly had it verified through a telephone call to the bank's Credit Card Department.00 attorney's fees. . .In culpa contractual." SEPARATE OPINION WILLARD AND CARSON [dissent] -the negligence of the defendant alone was insufficient to cause the accident—it also required the negligence of the plaintiff. 21. and was accorded. 2219. Exceptionally. deducting Php 2. along with the principal card. i. Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human relations that clearly must. a FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at its Pasig Branch. dated 11 Oct. the same must be discarded. which provide as follows: . and (c) P20. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Luis was forced to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588.Art. includes gross. .In August 1988. its application can be warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisitng contractual relations between the parties.In a letter.

Art. their consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code. It is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to malice. but the fact must be shown in evidence. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith which the CA allegedly failed to find . . the Manager alleged. as was to be expected. malice or wanton attitude. when his action is planted upon breach of contract and thus. But the exceptional rule of Art. a commotion ensued. WON the Court could review the questions of fact Substantive 2. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where. WON Carrascoso was entitled to the “first class” seat he claims. and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation. left Manila for Lourdes w/ 48 other Filipino pilgrims. in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant. In contracts and quasi-contracts. in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary.Carrascoso. 1966 NATURE PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Et. through PAL. . the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton. to honor its credit card issued to private respondent Luis should entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code providing thusly: . xxx xxx xxx .Given the above premises and the factual circumstances here obtaining. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured passenger does not die. fraudulent. temperate. September 28. therefore. and plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class' seat in the plane. had a 'better right' to the seat. moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. 2232. the bank's failure. and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. according to said Ernesto G. the plaintiff. as required by Art. . .Exemplary or corrective damages. In quasi-delicts. is obliged to pay for the damage done. refused.19 - prof. there being fault or negligence. To award moral damages for breach of contract. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. unfortunately. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad faith. 2176. petitioner is ordered to pay private respondent Luis A. a civil engineer. when they found out that Mr. 2220. in the words of the witness Ernesto G. In all other respects. as proved by written documents (tickets…) 3. . Cuento. . bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored (Arts. which has been violated or invaded by the defendant. When asked to vacate his 'first class' seat.Nevertheless. In contracts and quasi-contracts. the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort. From Manila to Bangkok. AIR FRANCE V CA (Carrascoso.Art. without a pre-existing contract between two parties. many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class. an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself. or malevolent manner (Art. A2010 . WON the CA failed to make a complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it. and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. the appealed decision is AFFIRMED. there was a 'white man'. the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances (Art. cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. in turn. We see no issue of sound discretion on the part of the appellate court in allowing the award thereof by the trial court. Civil Code). the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying because. and a carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was breached through negligence of the carrier's employees. The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger. . Carrascoso to give his seat to the 'white man. private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship. the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. Cuento.Art. Al) 18 SCRA 155 SANCHEZ.The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort even where there is a preexisting contract between the plaintiff and the defendant This doctrine. descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Luna an amount of P5. FACTS . Here. Civil Code). 1170-1172). Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager]. liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. casis DISPOSITION The appealed decision is MODIFIED by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to private respondents.torts & damages . reckless. WON Carrascoso was entitled to moral damages. 2230. may be vindicated or recognized. . In criminal offenses. in its stead. without such agreement. that entitles the spouse.both TC and CA decided in favor of Carrascoso ISSUES Procedural 1. Civil Code). the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation." . are intended to serve as an example or as correction for the public good in addition to moral. it would also be just as arduous to sustain the exemplary damages granted by the courts below. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff. 2229. 2221. would be to violate the clear provisions of the law.It is to be presumed. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another.In case of fraud. Civil Code. they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso traveled in “first class” but at Bangkok. Such fault or negligence.000. We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier.00 by way of nominal damages.Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered where the court deems such recovery to be just and equitable (Art. 2208. oppressive. who. 2206. and. 2201. that this difference was in the mind of the lawmakers when in Art. and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body.The distinction between fraud. Air France. even perhaps inadvertent. bad faith. such damages are granted if the defendant is shown to have been so guilty of gross negligence as to approximate malice. and if such. issued plaintiff a “first class” round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.

that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. serious anxiety.There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness. that any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions. a first class ticket without any reservation whatever. however.43 And is. However. "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. as petitioner underscores. resulting in moral damages. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required.FINDINGS OF FACT: "the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered thereon"."The mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution". the BangkokTeheran leg. was cured by the evidence. accordingly. Reasoning . NO. they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". The contract of air carriage. courtesy and due consideration. The trial court also accepted as evidence the written documents submitted by Carrasco and even the testimony of the air-carrier’s employees attested that indeed. It is (therefore) unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. . For. he was granted the “first class” seat. (note: it was held that it was a case of quasi-delict even though it was a breach of contract) Ratio A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. YES Ratio.Carrascoso testified that the purser of the air-carrier made an entry in his notebooks reading "First class parties.QUESTION OF LAW: one which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties 2. thereby causing him mental anguish.16 They consist of the court's "conclusions with respect to the determinative facts in issue" . Testimony of the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. injurious language. of course. Certainly. If there had been no seat. Unless. and Third. his employer. this is bad faith. and if the “white man” had a better right to the seat. petitioner. embarrassments and humiliations. YES.The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat. Deficiency in the complaint. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals. For. is no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense". So it is. naturally. WON the amounts awarded to Carrascoso was excessive HELD 1. YES . bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law.20 - prof. Damages are proper. therefore. is one attended with public duty.Petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the A2010 .xxx The law. is placed upon his wrongful expulsion.torts & damages 4. adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct. It invites people to avail of the comforts and I advantages it offers. that. worse. respect. must answer. . Reasoning . if not confusion. there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class. made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment-just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been . -Also. then why did they confirm Carrasco his seat? 3. WON damages are proper in a breach contract 6. the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride. . WON moral damages could be recovered from Air France. 6. action as we have said. if any. if forms part of the res gestae Ratio. Second. are admissible as part of the res gestae. but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats. a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat. nor proved that the “white man” had “better right” over the seat. generates a relation attended with a public duty. indignities and abuses from such employees. he forcibly ejected him from his seat. "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes 4. The stress of Carrascoso's. in this environment. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees. when Carrascoso was asked to confirm his seat in Bangkok. CA held that Air France should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not. solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. amongst others. wounded feelings and social humiliation. Obiter. they should have presented the manager to testify in court – but they did not do so . also. Constitution mandates that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based" and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before". that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight.also…From a reading of the transcript just quoted. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. NO Ratio A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity. YES. be essayed. . Carrasco was issued a “first class ticket”.If. Such testimony is admissible. notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed. Reasoning . if the manager’s actions could be justified. The excitement had not as yet died down. could give ground for an action for damages. because of the relation which an aircarrier sustains with the public. said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok. it. WON Carrascoso was entitled to exemplary damages 8. he imposed his arbitrary will.Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso. casis established. the plaintiff was issued. Ratio . and paid for.The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not. granted that their employee was accused of the tortuous act 5. Reasoning . This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner-air carrier-a case of quasi-delict. WON the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso regarding the account made by the air-carrier’s purser is admissible in evidence as hearsay 7. 5.Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. may result. WON Carrascoso was entitled to attorney’s fees 9.Air France did not present evidence that the “white man” made a prior reservation. then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. Statements then. YES . For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager. the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt.A written document speaks a uniform language. although he had tourist class protection. when the dialogue happened. by reason of which he suffered inconvenience.

it may still be liable under the law on contracts. January 27.Defendants (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed alleging that since they are presumably sued under Art. . Costs against the petitioners. NO Ratio Parties are bound by the terms of their contract.SYQUIAS base their claim for damages against Mla Memorial on either: (1) breach of its obligation to deliver a defect-free concrete vault. the complaint states no cause of action against them since academic institutions. oppressive. or alternatively 2. (RCBC v CA) . YES Ratio. (b) coffin was entirely damaged by water. WON it can be liable for culpa aquiliana HELD 1. fraudulent. The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent wit this ruling of the Court. But when an academic institution accepts students for enrollment. reckless. Reasoning . Certainly. are beyond the ambit of that rule. Treasure.\ 9. . 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista on the premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Manila RTC.Juan SYQUIA. its President. or malevolent manner". February 4. the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof. Trial Court’s Ruling . SYQUIA V CA (Mla Memorial Park) 217 SCRA 624 CAMPOS. ISSUE WON respondent court is correct in denying dismissal of the case HELD Ratio Although a school may not be liable under Art. As the concrete vault was being raised to the surface. The petitioner contents that it should not be admitted as evidence. Reasoning .Respondent Trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a wanton. and the exposed parts of the deceased's remains were damaged and soiled. WON Mla Memorial breached its contract with petitioners. Also. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. It cannot be extended by implication. the concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased was removed from its niche underground. beyond the terms of the contract. (Mla Memorial) FACTS .The suit impleaded PSBA.Contract between the parties did not guarantee that the cement vault would be waterproof. the petition is DENIED. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court.Whatever kind of negligence it has committed. . father of the deceased Vicente Syquia. Juan Syquia. Inc. However. VP. JR.A stabbing incident on August 30. 7. MLA MEMORIAL is deemed to be liable for desecrating the grave of the dead. . which is the law between them. say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from 'reversible error. FACTS . (2) gross negligence in failing to seal the concrete vault (Art.After about a month. the school makes itself responsible in providing their students with an atmosphere that is conducive for learning. and because there was a pre-existing contractual relation between the Syquias and Mla Memorial.21 - prof. the said entry was made outside the Philippines and by an employee of petitioner.The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept 8. 1992 NATURE Petition to review the decision of Court of Appeals. the Syquias discovered that the vault had a hole approx 3 in. It is expressly mentioned in Art. It sought to adjudge them liable for the victim’s death due to their alleged negligence. recklessness and lack of security precautions.CA affirmed judgment of dismissal.. casis same cemetery. they caused the opening of the concrete vault and discovered that: (a) the interior walls showed evidence of total flooding. NO Ratio. DISPOSITION On balance. MFR was also denied. . A contracting party cannot incur a liability more than what is expressly specified in his undertaking.torts & damages passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will. 2180 of the Civil Code. 2176) . (c) entire lining of coffin. It would have been easy for Air France to contradict Carrascoso’s testimony if they had presented the purser. YES Ratio The Civil Code gives the Court ample power to grant exemplary damages-in contracts and quasicontracts. clothing of the deceased. We accordingly vote to affirm the same. . But respondent court’s premise is incorrect. . the subject of inquiry is not the entry. 2180 that the liability arises from acts done by pupils or students of the institution. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given. Because.No quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty of any fault or negligence. 2180 on quasi-delicts. PSBA V CA [citation] PADILLA. . but the ouster incident. 1993 NATURE Petition for review of CA decision dismissing Syquia family’s complaint for damages against Manila Memorial Park Cemetery. chose the gravesite despite knowing that said area had to be constantly sprinkled with water to keep the grass green and that water would eventually seep through the vault. in diameter near the bottom and it appeared that water drained out of the hole. like PSBA. DISPOSITION the foregoing premises considered. preparatory to transferring the remains to a newly purchased family plot also at the . ISSUES 1. A2010 .Pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal Court of Parañaque. It was established that his assailants were not members of the school’s academic community but were outsiders. Chief of Security and Assistant Chief of Security. we. authorized and instructed the defendant to inter the remains of deceased. filth and silt causing the wooden parts to separate and to crack the viewing glass panel located directly above the head and torso of the deceased. as it was only hearsay. And the MFR was similarly dealt with.The father himself. PSBA is not liable. and that the captain refused to intervene". . In this sense. Costs against petitioner. no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or explore the realm of arts when bullets are flying or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb.The case should be tried on its merits. Petitioners the assailed the trial court’s dispositions before the respondent appellate court which affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar Judgment for attorneys' fees.The act of boring a hole in the vault was necessary so as to prevent the vault from floating away.

plaintiff was riding on his pony over the Carlatan Bridge. . . . . . . . casis . brick or concrete.Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of MLA MEMORIAL provides that: “Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a concrete box. circumstances of the case do not show negligence." Standard dictionaries define seal as any of various closures or fastenings that cannot be opened without rupture and that serve as a check against tampering or unauthorized opening.Hence.Private respondent has exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave. and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. The reason for the boring of the hole was explained by Henry Flores. in our opinion. negligent in the eye of the law. to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision.The pony had not as yet exhibited fright.The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.CFI absolved defendant from liability . at San Fernando. .As the automobile approached.As the defendant neared the bridge he saw the plaintiff and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. .As the defendant started across the bridge.But in view of the known nature of horses. there was an appreciable risk that.On December 12. . the court thinks."Sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof". and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or. . . 1912.As a result of its injuries the horse died." Mla Memorial bound itself to provide the concrete box to be sent in the interment.The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant. as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet.The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would NEGLIGENCE PICART V SMITH [citation] STREET. who said that: “When the vault was placed on the grave a hole was placed on the vault so that water could come into the vault because it was raining heavily then because the vault has no hole the vault will float and the grave would be filled with water." In the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary. and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. he was. deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side. 2. and from this moment it was no longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety.In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away. going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour.In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile.He did this because he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side." . given the novelty of the apparition and the rapidity of the approach. but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done.Before he had gotten half way across. . was guilty of negligence that would give rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done HELD YES . . the defendant. then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control.However. . . of the time and of the place.In so doing.When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger. he might get excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. Interment Foreman.He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge.22 - prof. in maneuvering his car in the manner above described. Finding no evidence of negligence. . the defendant guided it toward his left. .The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. La Union.When he had gotten quite near. .The defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. .Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana. the actual installment of which shall be made by the employees of the Association. the appeal ISSUE WON the defendant. . He was.The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.torts & damages Reasoning . . a concrete vault was installed and after the burial. Reasoning . the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing. or in an outer wall of stone. but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge. A2010 . that being the proper side of the road for the machine. . if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles. there is no reason to award damages. instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down.” . he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side.Syquias claim that there was a breach of contract because it was stated in the brochures that “lot may hold single or double internment underground in sealed concrete vault. .They entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care. 1918 NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of La Union FACTS . NO Ratio Negligence is defined by law as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons. the vault was covered by a cement lid. the diligence to be observed in the performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family. he gave two more successive blasts. March 15. Dispositive CA decision affirmed in toto. . it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. When the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties."Sealed" meant "closed.” Pursuant to this.

They thrust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. at the westerly end of the island. 1903. less than 9 years old. his nearest relative. Reasonable foresight of harm. or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.The plaintiff. These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity.The plaintiff himself was not free from fault.Stated in these terms.The Defendant Company’s defense that the caps were under the duty of independent contractors deserves scant consideration since these workers have been under the supervision of one of the company’s foremen. was at the same time when he received the injuries complained of. 15 years of age. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm. a minor. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. The visit made on a Sunday afternoon. plaintiff. hung them of a stick. blameworthy. negligence is clearly established. the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences. known as the Isla del Provisor. 1089. then he is guilty of negligence. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. of which each took one end. 1902."ART. A prudent man. and all TAYLOR V MANILA RAILROAD . an employee of the defendant. who. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps.After watching the operation of the traveling crane used in handling the defendant's coal. The law considers what would be reckless. crossed the footbridge of the Isla del Provisor. 1905. . The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable.The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. received a slight cut in the neck. . . Murphy was not in his quarters. without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. by his father. They then opened one of the caps with a knife. . is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. 1910 NATURE An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries. and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. and have in themselves considerable explosive power. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite.23 - prof.Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case. not only for personal acts and omission. . causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Could a prudent man. David Taylor. one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. . about 12 years of age. Obligations are created by law.The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge. by contracts. and their right to take them. when the boys proposed purring a match to the contents of the cap. who had promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. would have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk. the boys picked up all they could find. A2010 . foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so. placed in the position of the defendant. An explosion followed. xxx xxx xxx "Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprises are equally liable for the damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties. spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. It will be noted however. since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. . they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Manuel looked for a hammer." [citation] CARSON. the boys."The father.Plaintiff Taylor appears to have rested his case. instituted by David Taylor. it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches. . March 22. Murphy. and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian. upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902.On the 30th of September. followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision. . Manuel had his hand burned and wounded. by quasi—contracts. is liable for the damages caused by the minors who alive with them. and on his death or incapacity the mother. casis three went to the home of the boy Manuel. impassable for vehicles. . FACTS . DISPOSITION Appealed decision is reversed. 1903. After some discussion as to the ownership of caps. . but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within the city of Manila. in the case under consideration. impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery. more mature than the average boy of his age. became frightened and started to run away. and 1908 of that Code. the son of a mechanical engineer. Jessie." . xxx xxx xxx "The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. as did the trial judge his decision in plaintiff's favor."ART."ART. . and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. but could not find one. Finding on inquiry that Mr. for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. After crossing the footbridge.torts & damages have used in the same situation? If not. for the purpose of visiting one Murphy. . and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. . and carried them home. and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule. and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. with a boy named Manuel Claparols.

However." and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of an adult. WON the defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries. was able to earn P2. casis occupants of land upon which they might naturally and reasonably be expected to enter. not due to his wanton or willful acts. is clearly a breach of duty. and where the child does not enter under such conditions the owner's failure to make reasonable precaution to guard the child against the injury from unknown or unseen dangers. and there found explosive signal torpedoes left exposed by the railroad company's employees." . such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. counsel for plaintiff relied on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last result in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases.In the typical cases. and the cases based thereon. we also have to look at the proximate cause and the maturity of the plaintiff if it was his negligence that contributed to the principal occurrence of the tragedy. Stout. the question involved has been whether a railroad company is liable for an injury received by an infant of tender years. without other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his express invitation or permission. this has to be examined on a case-to-case basis. properly speaking. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in severally state courts. (3) that an invitation of license to cross the premises of another can not be predicated on the mere fact that no steps have been taken to interfere with such practice. or for purposes of amusement. and for kindling of explosive substance which may not have been placed in a safe and proper place. it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts. a negligent omission. which therefore was not. saying that (1) That A2010 . and which they in their immature judgment might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with. therefore.The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. from idle curiosity. However. To hold otherwise would be expose to all the children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or . If they leave exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to them. (4) that there is no difference between children and adults of an invitation or a license to enter upon another's premises." . after an exhaustive and critical analysis and review of may of the adjudged cases. on the other hand. ISSUE 1. such as a turntable left in such condition as to make it probable that children in playing with it would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where the infant did in fact suffer injury in playing with such machine.24 - prof.The owners of premises. exploded and injured him. both English and America. Stout ( 17 Wall. By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence. children who would likely to come. or for purposed of amusement. at a place where the railroad company's premises. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred. (2) that no exception to this rule exists in favor of children who are injured by dangerous machinery naturally calculated to attract them to the premises. he had been to sea as a cabin boy. vs. 1908. placed upon such premises by the owner. attributable to the negligence of the company). as described by the little girl who was present. .In support of his contention. one of which when carried away by the visitor. the principles on which these cases turn are that "while railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion. and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of the cap. 657). The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only. show clearly that he the owner of land is not liable to trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by them. and in a great variety of similar cases. and take precautions accordingly. or had a good reason to suppose. more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age. they should expect that liberty to be taken. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only." In such cases the owner of the premises can not be heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation whatever. and this is to be determined in such case by the circumstances of the case. therefore. NO .As laid down in Railroad Co.S." Chief Justice Cooley. must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and impulses. and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward them must calculate upon this. admit of no other explanation.The owners shall be also be liable for the damages caused —"1. if the child is actually injured. In the case at bar. followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer. if such injury was. "attributable to the negligence of the defendant. "must calculate upon this." . wherever they go. who from mere idle curiosity.As regards the maturity of the child. is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. and take precautions accordingly.torts & damages ." and. or where such infant found upon the premises a dangerous machine. in the case of Powers vs. said that: “Children." .Just because the kids trespassed doesn’t mean that the company is not liable for anything bad that might happen to them."ART. making the company liable HELD 1.). vs. In the case at bar. we are satisfied that plaintiff's action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting a match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff. for which he may and should be held responsible. under the circumstances. In these. such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. at a place where the railroad company knew. (84 U. he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child form entering premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are accustomed to roam about or to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to enter. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity. whereon things attractive to children are exposed. and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstance of the case. despite his denials on the witness stands. formally declared that it adhered "to the principles announced in the case of Railroad Co. or upon which the public are expressively or impliedly permitted to enter to or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play. Marlow. plaintiff at the time of the accident was well—grown youth of 15. the great weight of authority holds the owner of the premises liable. enters upon the railroad company's premises. "While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault. (wherein the principal question was whether a railroad company was liable for an injury received by an infant while upon its premises. and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care. and that the defendant. voicing the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan. the Court said that it is of the opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff.

" . She suddenly felt a gust of wind and heard a loud thud. If negligence." Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory. Under the circumstances thus described. conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence. .000 for moral damages. The rule. Smith. Both Gonzales and Guevarra testified to the structural instability and shakiness of the counter which is in the shape of and inverted “L. it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH. either criminal or civil. Criselda momentarily let go of her daughter’s hand to sign her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter. to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. therefore.On the other hand. NEGLIGENCE. . Criselda was able to ask people to help her and bring her daughter to the hospital. Criselda never let go of her daughter except to sign the credit card slip. It was deliberately placed at a corner to avoid such accidents. event or happening. . ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. should not be believed because he might have ill feelings towards petitioners.After the burial of their daughter. et al. one cannot exist with the other. or if happening wholly or partly through human agency. as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family. CA and CA mfr – for the Aguilars. 9 years of age. and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one. Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2nd flr or Syvel’s Dept. then he is guilty of negligence. A2010 .. a child under nine years of age is.She was operated on immediately at the hospital. Makati City. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. 2. is that a child under nine years of JARCO MARKETING CORP V CA (AGUILAR) DAVIDE. thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. Petitioners refused to pay. . and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence. This means she wasn’t making it up. Zhieneth was guilty of contributory negligence because she tried to climb the counter. . who was with him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap. a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment.The conclusive presumption favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter. Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's branch manager. The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained. Negligence is "the failure to observe. exempt from criminal liability. in view of the fact that the little girl. 1983. operations manager. JARCO MKTG. So the Aguilars filed a complaint for damages wherein they sought the payment of P157. on the hospital bed. December 21. The counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong base and was used without incident for the past 15 years. Sadly.Gonzales’ testimony about what Zhieneth said to the doctor should be accepted because at the time she said it. . Store. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age. on that account. . as one of its determining factors.Jarco Mktg Corp. The testimony of two former employees. i. she was in so much pain and she answered right away. unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment.The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v.e.000 for attorney's fees and an unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary damages. . The protruding part of the counter was at the costumer side. whereby such other person suffers injury.25 - prof. a child of such tender age and in extreme pain. pinned by the gift-wrapping counter.On May 9. respectively. casis . P300. She was 6 years old. It is "a fortuitous circumstance. Gonzales. heard her tell the doctor that she “nothing. the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury. for the protection of the interest of another person.” with a base smaller than the top. would do. 1999 FACTS . Petitioners Leonardo Kong. which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence. Private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar.RTC – for Jarco Marketing Corp.Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvel's Department Store. ISSUE 1. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability. under our law. by analogy. neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. et al’s side: Criselda was negligent in taking care of her daughter for allowing her to roam freely.An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. the Aguilars demanded from the petitioners the reimbursement of hospital and medical bills. RTC mfr – for the Aguilars. Zhieneth was crying and screaming for help. . was his own act of putting a match to the contents of the cap.torts & damages knew what he was about. Thus. P20. They both had informed management (while they were still working there) that the counter should be nailed to the floor. petitioners did. that degree of care. Yet. WON the incident is accident or attributable to negligence 2. The management did nothing. Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care. ET AL." DISPOSITION The petition is DISMISSED. .The Aguilars’ side: While in the dept store.86 for actual damages.” when asked “what did you do?” She died 14 days later. and supervisor. he can not recover. and wake and funeral expenses. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous.We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated.522. became frightened and ran away. It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a physician are generally considered declarations and admissions. In our jurisdiction. . an event happening without any human agency. The testimony of the present employees (that Zhieneth climbed the counter so it fell) should instead be believed. Gonzales and Guevarra. All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling event before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who testified in court. through their negligence or omission to secure or make stable the counter's base. negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man. No contributory negligence from Zhieneth . She looked behind her and saw her daughter on the floor. I did not come near the counter and the counter just fell on me. an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.Petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. and is. Gonzales testified that the gift wrapping counter was right beside the verification counter where Criselda was signing. the immediate cause of the explosion . a former employee of Syvel’s Dept Store who helped bring Zhieneth to the hospital. who was negligent? HELD 1.

The end of the wire remained in contact with his body which fell near the post. . the civil action in the instant case was filed against defendant-appellant for damages in the sum of P2. Further. but simply that he would suffer no penalty. and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA. . . The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal that it was not durable after all.telling him that the wire might be charged. but Alberto. put out his index finger and touch the wire. The CFI dismissed the criminal case. .Jose rejoined that he should into touch wires as they carry a current.He immediately fell face downwards. the sentence was suspended. who was somewhat ahead. who was a few paces ahead of his classmates. For if that was the truth. said. . and that without reference to the question of moral guilt. casis electricity used in lighting the City of Manila and its suburbs. and some one cut the wire and disengaged the body. the infant tort-feasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an adult. . a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. did not wipe out his guilt. the criminal case was dismissed. Liability of an infant for his torts is imposed as a mode. Nor did such dismissal of the criminal case obliterate his civil liability for damages. such as is commonly used by the defendant company for the purpose of conducting electricity for lighting. it was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. the neighborhood school was dismissed and the children went home. subject to the supervision of the Superintendent of Public Schools of DEL ROSARIO V MANILA ELECTRIC CO. no doubt feeling that he was challenged in the matter. the counter just fell on her. it is clear that the end of the wire was on the ground shortly after 3 p. . DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed.The wire was an ordinary number 6 triple braid weather proof wire. but merely put off the imposition of the corresponding penalty.Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter.Alang St for the purpose of conducting . It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not secured.Alberto del Rosario. and its top laden with formica. When.Aug 4. One of the ends of the wire fell to the ground among some shrubbery close to the way.At 4 p. 9 yrs old. February 28. 1944 NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance Batangas FACTS . Upon being taken to St. but from the testimony of Demetrio Bingao. 57 PHIL 478 STREET. ISSUE WON the suspension of the sentence under Art. ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist. The CFI gave judgment for plaintiffs for P2. not of punishment. but as he was under 18 years of age. this did not mean that he was exonerated from the crime charged. and he was committed to the care and custody of Atty. it is just that the loss should upon the estate of the wrongdoer rather than that of a guiltless person. for every tortuous act of violence or other pure tort. 80 of the RPC. (Sangco) . Initially.The wire was cased in the usual covering. CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. one of the witnesses for the defense. The Court of First Instance (CFI) Batangas found Tiangco guilty as charged. . therefore. .The engineer of the company says that it was customary for the company to make a special inspection of these wires at least once in six months. . exclaiming "Ay! madre". but Alberto. .The suspension of the sentence under Art.m.26 - prof. should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Luke's Hospital the child was pronounced dead. November 5. all members of the second grade in the public school. until Tiangco would reach his majority. exonerated him from the crime charged HELD NO . pleaded guilty to an information for homicide through reckless negligence in that he had recklessly driven an automobile and thereby caused the death of Magtibay. 1932 FACTS ***This action was instituted by Julian del Rosario for the purpose of recovering damages from Meralco for the death of his son. after appellant had pleaded guilty. . in view of Tiangco’s good conduct recommended the dismissal of the case. after he had observed good conduct. in order to give the delinquent minor a chance to be reformed. “I have for some time been in the habit of touching wires”. Subsequently. of whom plaintiffs-appellees are the lawful heirs.torts & damages age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. m.stopped Saturnino. huge.A crowd soon collected. at time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter. but reserved such right as the heirs of the deceased might have to recover damages in a civil action against said Tiangco. .CRISELDA too. MAGTIBAY V TIANGCO 74 Phil 756 BOCOBO.As soon as Noguera took cognizance of the trouble. Saturnino made a motion as if it touch it. knew never to touch a broken electrical wire (as his dad told him so!). Disposition The instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED A2010 .Soco transmitted the message at 2. but of compensation. but this had been burned off for some distance from the point where the wire parted. and received answer from the station to the effect that they would send an inspector.25 p. he stepped into a garage which was located nearby and asked Jose Soco to telephone the Malabon station of MERALCO that an electrical wire was burning at that place. Abaya. Consequently.At the time that message was sent the wire had not yet parted. she was just a foot away from her mother.000 as damages.As the three neared the place where the wire was down. If property has been destroyed or other loss occasioned by a wrongful act. and that all of the company's inspectors were the Province. Abaya.Defendant-appellant Tiangco. Accordingly. . after appellant herein had pleaded guilty.80 of the Revised Penal Code.Jose. Shaped like an-inverted "L" the counter was heavy. At this precise moment. 1930 – 2pm: a wire used by the defendant on Dimas. .Saturnino yielded to this admonition and stopped. resulting from a shock from a wire used by the defendant for the transmission of electricity. a minor under 18 years of age. No contributory negligence from Criselda . Jose Salvador and Saturnino Endrina. who happened to be the son of an electrician.m. . .000 for the death of Magtibay. no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything. The time and distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us. Alberto.Jose Noguera saw that the wire was burning and its connections smoking. later to the latter's hand. Hence this appeal.

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required in their daily rounds to keep a lookout for trouble of this kind. - There is nothing in the record indicating any particular cause for the parting of the wire.l ISSUE WON Manila Electric is liable HELD YES Reasoning - When notice was received at the Malabon station at 2.25 p. m., somebody should have been dispatched to the scene of the trouble at once, or other measures taken to guard the point of danger; but more than an 1 ½ hours passed before anyone from MERALCO appeared on the scene, and in the meantime Alberto had been claimed as a victim. - The mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of Jose (8 yrs old), doesn’t alter the case. - But even supposing that contributory negligence could in some measure be properly imputed to the deceased, such negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case, not having been the determining cause of the accident. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil., 359.) - With respect to the amount of damages recoverable, Julian is entitled to recover P250 for expenses incurred in connection with the death and burial of the boy. - Citing Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Company: Julian should recover the sum of P1,000 as general damages for loss of service. Disposition judgment reversed

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- Principal Soriano cannot be held liable, being head of academic school and not school of arts and trades, in line with Amadora case and Art 2180 of Civil Code. It is only the teacher who should answer for torts committed by their students. Besides, Soriano did not order the digging. - Based on Article 2180, Aquino can be held liable. However, petition is based on Article 2176. Did the acts/omissions of Aquino cause the death of Ylarde? Yes. He is liable for damages. The work required adult laborers. He required the children to remain in the pit after they finished digging. He ordered them to level the soil when a huge stone was at brink of falling. He went to another place and left the kids. - Left by themselves, IT WAS BUT NATURAL FOR THE CHILDREN TO PLAY AROUND. IN RULING THAT YLARDE WAS IMPRUDENT, THE LOWER COURT DID NOT CONSIDER HIS AGE AND MATURITY. A MINOR SHOULD NOT BE HELD TO THE SAME DEGREE OF CARE AS AN ADULT. - Aquino also said the digging was part of Work Education. This is unacceptable. Work is too dangerous and it was not even in the lesson plan.

- The indemnity allowed in criminal case is merely incidental to the main object sought, which is the punishment of the guilty party. - In a civil action, the principal object is the recovery of damages for wrongful death; and where, as in this case, the defendant is a corporation, not subject to criminal prosecution for the act complained of, the question assumes a vastly different aspect. - There should be a distinction between the civil liability of an ordinary person who, by wrongful act, has caused the death of another; and the civil liability of a corporation, organized primarily for profit, which has caused the death of a person by failure to exercise due care in the prosecution of its business. - The liability of such a corporation for damages must be regarded as a part of the risks which it assumes when it undertakes to promote its own business; and just as it is entitled to earn adequate profits from its business, so it should be made adequately to compensate those who have suffered damage by its negligence.

YLARDE V AQUINO [citation] GANCAYCO; July 29, 1988
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - Soriano was principal. Aquino was a teacher. The school was littered with concrete blocks. Teacher Banez started burying them. Aquino gathered 18 male pupils to help. He ordered them to dig. Work was unfinished. - Ff day, Aquino called 4 of the 18 to continue. Aquino continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil. Aquino left the children to level the loose soil and borrowed a key from Banez. Aquino told the kids not to touch the stone. - 3 of the 4 kids jumped into the pit. The remaining Abaga jumped on the concrete block causing it to slide down. 2 were able to escape but student Ylarde sustained injuries. 3 days later he died. Parents filed suit against Aquino and Soriano. Lower court dismissed and CA affirmed and said child Ylarde was negligent. ISSUE WON Aquino and Soriano can be held liable for damages HELD

CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO V PHILIPPINE MOTORS CORPORATION [citation] STREET; November 3, 1930
NATURE Appeal from decision of the CFI FACTS - Cranston was the representative of the plaintiff in Manila and plaintiff was the registered owner of the motor schooner Gwendoline. - Cranston decided to have the engine on the Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner. He had a conference with Quest, Phil. Motors manager, who agreed to do the job, with the understanding that payment should be made upon completion of the work. - The work was begun and conducted under the supervision of Quest, chiefly by a mechanic whom Quest took with him to the boat. Quest had the assistance of the members of the crew of the Gwendoline, who had been directed by Cranston to place themselves under Quest's directions. - Upon preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest concluded that a new carburetor was needed and thus installed a Zenith carburetor. The engine was tried with gasoline and the result was satisfactory. The next problem was to introduce into the carburetor the baser fuel, consisting of a low grade of oil mixed with

SEPARATE OPINION ABAD SANTOS [concur in part and dissent in part] - He concurs that MERALCO is held liable for the death
of Alberto, but dissents in so far as the decision allows the recovery of the father of the sum of P1,250 only as damages. It should be P 2250. - His reasoning: It is well settled in this jurisdiction that an action will lie to recover damages for death caused by the wrongful act. (Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821.) - In criminal cases- indemnity to the heirs of the deceased is equivalent to P1,000 - Whatever may be the reasons for the rule followed in criminal cases, I am of the opinion that those reasons do not obtain in fixing the amount of the damages recoverable in the present case.

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distillate. A temporary tank to contain the mixture was placed on deck above and at a short distance from the compartment covering the engine. This tank was connected with the carburetor by a piece of tubing, which was apparently not well fitted at the point where it was connected with the tank. The fuel mixture leaked from the tank and dripped sown into the engine compartment. The new fuel line and that already in use between the gasoline tank and carburetor were so fixed that it was possible to change from the gasoline fuel to the mixed fuel. This arrangement enables the operator to start the engine on gasoline and then, after the engine had been operating for a few moments, to switch to the new fuel supply. - It was observed that the carburetor was flooding, and that the gasoline, or other fuel, was trickling freely from the lower part to the carburetor to the floor. This fact was called to Quest's attention, but he said that, when the engine had gotten to running well, the flooding would disappear. - The boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run. The engine stopped a few times during the first part of the course, owing to the use of an improper mixture of fuel. In the course of the trial, Quest remained outside of the engine compartment and occupied himself with making distillate, with a view to ascertaining what proportion of the two elements would give best results in the engine. - As the boat was coming in from this run, the engine stopped, and connection again had to be made with the gasoline line to get a new start. After this had been done the mechanic, or engineer, switched to the tube connecting with the new mixture. A moment later a back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass of flames, which the members of the crew were unable to subdue. The salvage from, the wreck, when sold, brought only the sum of P150. The value of the boat, before the accident occured, as the court found, was P10,000. - CFI gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff to recover of the defendant the sum of P9,850, with interest at 6 per centum per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint, until satisfaction of the judgment, with costs. ISSUE WON the loss of the boat is chargeable to the negligence and lack of skill of Quest HELD YES Ratio When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he

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be incompatible with the situation now under consideration. - This action was instituted about two years after the accident had occured, and after Quest had ceased to be manager and had gone back to the US. Upon these facts, the defendant bases the contention that the action should be considered stale. It is sufficient reply to say that the action was brought within the period limited by the statute of limitations and the situation is not one where the defense of laches can be properly invoked. DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from affirmed.

will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. Reasoning - The temporary tank in which the mixture was prepared was apparently at too great an elevation from the carburetor, so that when the fuel line was opened, the hydrostatic pressure in the carburetor was greater than the delicate parts of the carburetor could sustain. This was the cause of the flooding of the carburetor; and the result was that; when the back fire occurred, the external parts of the carburetor, already saturated with gasoline, burst into flames, whence the fire was quickly communicated to the highly inflammable material near-by. The leak along the pipe line and the flooding of the carburetor had created a dangerous situation, which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken precautions to avoid. The back fire may have been due either to the fact that the spark was too advanced or the fuel improperly mixed. - Proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats. Possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire. Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was here, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occured but for Quest's carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from blame. - The trial judge seems to have proceeded on the idea that, inasmuch as Quest had control of the Gwendoline during the experimental run, the defendant corporation was in the position of a bailee and that, as a consequence, the burden of proof was on the defendant to exculpate itself from responsibility by proving that the accident was not due to the fault of Quest. As a rule workmen who make repairs on a ship in its owner's yard, or a mechanic who repairs a coach without taking it to his shop, are not bailees, and their rights and liabilities are determined by the general rules of law, under their contract. The true bailee acquires possession and what is usually spoken of as special property in the chattel bailed. As a consequence of such possession and special property, the bailee is given a lien for his compensation. These ideas seem to

UNITED STATES V PINEDA 37 Phil 456 MALCOLM; January 22, 1918
NATURE Appeal requiring a construction and an application, for the first time, of the penal provisions of the Pharmacy Law. FACTS - Santiago Pineda is a registered pharmacist of long standing and the owner of a drug store located at Calle Santo Cristo, Manila. Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription obtained from Dr. Richardson, and which on other occasions Santos had given to his horses with good results, at Pineda's drug store for filling. The prescription read: "clorato de potasa - 120 gramos - en seis papelitos de 20 gramos, para caballo." Under the supervision of Pineda, the prescription was prepared and returned to Santos in the form of six papers marked, "Botica Pineda - Clorato potasa - 120.00 - en seis papeles - Para caballo- Sto. Cristo , Binondo, Manila." Santos, under the belief that he had purchased the potassium chlorate which he had asked for, put two of the packages in water and gave the doses to two of his sick horses. Another package was mixed with water for another horse, but was not used. The two horses, to which had been given the preparation, died shortly afterwards. Santos, thereupon, took the three remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for examination. Drs. Peña and Darjuan, of the Bureau of Science, found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate. At the instance of Santos, the two chemists also went to the drug store of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate. (Barium chlorate, it should be noted, is a poison; potassium chlorate is not.) Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses, and found that death was the result of

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poisoning. ISSUES 1. WON the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the chemist Peña and Darjuan as to their purchase of potassium chlorate at the drug store of the accused, which proved to be barium chlorate 2. WON the lower court erred in finding that the substance sold by the accused to Feliciano Santos was barium chlorate and not potassium chlorate 3. WON the lower court erred in finding that the accused has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of an infraction of the Pharmacy Law, Act No. 597, section 17, as amended HELD 1. NO Ratio On the trial of a criminal case where the question relates to the tendency of certain testimony to throw light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a particular person, there is a certain discretion on the part of the trial judge which a court of errors will not interfere with, unless it manifestly appear that the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the question at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the accused. Reasoning - What appellant is relying on is the maxim res inter alios acta. As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is inadmissible. But appellant has confused this maxim and this rule with certain exceptions thereto. The effort is not to convict the accused of a second offense. Nor is there an attempt to draw the mind away from the point at issue and thus to prejudice defendant's case. The purpose is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent, and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified and fraudulent intent may even be established. It has been said that there is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents. 2. NO Reasoning The proof demonstrates the contrary. 3. NO Ratio In view of the tremendous and imminent danger to the public from the careless sale of poisons and medicines, we do not deem it too rigid a rule to hold that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it be through negligence or mistake. Reasoning - The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the

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unlawful is the giving of a false name to the drug asked for. This view is borne out by the Spanish translation, which we are permitted to consult to explain the English text. In the Spanish "supuesto" is used, and this word is certainly not synonymous with "fraudulent." The usual badges of fraud, falsity, deception, and injury must be present - but not scienter. Dispositive Judgment of the lower court, sentencing the defendant to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs, is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant, without prejudice to any civil action which may be instituted.

business which the law demands. - Turning to the law, certain points therein as bearing on our present facts must be admitted. Thus, defendant is a pharmacist. As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs and poisons which he sells. And finally it is provided that it shall be unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent name." It is the word "fraudulent" which has given the court trouble. What did the Legislature intend to convey by this restrictive adjective? - Were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud it would be difficult, if not impossible, to convict any druggist of a violation of the law. The prosecution would have to prove to a reasonable degree of certainty that the druggist made a material representation; that it was false; that when he made it he knew that it was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; that he made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by the purchaser; that the purchaser acted in reliance upon it, and that the purchaser suffered injury. Such a construction with a literal following of well-known principles on the subject of fraud would strip the law of at least much of its force. It would leave the innocent purchaser of drugs, who must blindly trust in the good faith and vigilance of the pharmacist, at the mercy of any unscrupulous vendor. We should not, therefore, without good reason so devitalize the law. - The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs. The vendor and the vendee do not stand at arms length as in ordinary transactions. An imperative duty is on the druggist to take precautions to prevent death or serious injury to anyone who relies on his absolute honesty and peculiar learning. The nature of drugs is such that examination would not avail the purchaser any thing. It would be idle mockery for the customer to make an examination of a compound of which he can know nothing. Consequently, it must be that the druggist warrants that he will deliver the drug called for. - Remembering particularly the care and skill which are expected of druggists, that in some jurisdictions they are liable even for their mistake and in others have the burden placed upon them to establish that they were not negligent, it cannot be that the Philippine Legislature intended to use the word "fraudulent" in all its strictness. A plea of accident and mistake cannot excuse for they cannot take place unless there be wanton and criminal carelessness and neglect. How the misfortune occurs is unimportant, if under all the circumstances the fact of occurrence is attributable to the druggist as a legal fault. Rather considering the responsibility for the quality of drugs which the law imposes on druggists and the position of the word "fraudulent" in juxtaposition to "name," what is made

BPI V CA 216 SCRA 51 GUTIERREZ; November 26, 1992
FACTS - In the afternoon of October 9, 1981, a person purporting to be Eligia G. Fernando, who had a money market placement as evidenced by a promissory note with a maturity date of November 11, 1981 and a maturity value of P2,462,243.19, called BPI's Money Market Department. The caller wanted to preterminate the placement, but Reginaldo Eustaquio, Dealer Trainee in BPI's Money Market Department, told her "trading time" was over for the day, which was a Friday, and suggested that she call again the following week. The promissory note the caller wanted to preterminate was a roll-over of an earlier 50-day money market placement that had matured on September 24, 1981. - Later that afternoon, Eustaquio conveyed the request for pretermination to the officer who before had handled Eligia G. Fernando's account, Penelope Bulan, but Eustaquio was left to attend to the pretermination process. - On October 12, 1981, the caller of the previous Friday followed up with Eustaquio, merely by phone again, on the pretermination of the placement. Although not familiar with the voice of the real Eligia G. Fernando, Eustaquio "made certain" that the caller was the real Eligia G. Fernando by "verifying" that the details the caller gave about the placement tallied with the details in "the ledger/folder" of the account. Eustaquio knew the real Eligia G. Fernando to be the Treasurer of Philippine American Life Insurance Company (Philamlife) since he was handling Philamlife's corporate money market account. But neither Eustaquio nor Bulan who originally handled Fernando's account, nor anybody else at BPI, bothered to call up Fernando at her Philamlife office to verify the request for pretermination.

021759 and 021760 for P1. 1983. Cashier. verifier clerk and documentation clerk. Dy. the real Eligia G. . the application form shows the signature of "Eligia G.243. following the processing route.000.Later in the same morning. What Cuaso indicated in the application form. proceeded to prepare the "purchase order slip" for the requested pretermination as required by office procedure. . payable to "cash". she never received nor endorsed them and that her purported signature on the back of the checks was not hers but forged.30 - prof. respectively. .215. earlier that year. payable to "cash. the checks went to the dispatcher for delivery. Although the checks represented the termination proceeds of Eligia G. 240003 dated October 15. and with her initials on the form signifying her approval. an account upon the introduction of Valentin Co. and from his desk. were sent to Gerlanda E. Thus. civil status.Two days after. She was accompanied and introduced to Emily Sylianco Cuaso. 1981. together with the papers consisting of the money market placement was to be preterminated and the promissory note (No.500. one for P1. WON the drawer/drawee bank (in this case BPI) may claim reimbursement from the collecting bank which earlier paid the proceeds of the checks after the same checks were cleared HELD 1. and that the checks be delivered to her office at Philamlife. in fact Rosemarie Fernando who got the two checks from the dispatcher.61. a woman who represented herself to be Eligia G. by means of Check No. . . by means of Check No.It was. CBC. securities clerk. by Antonio Concepcion whom Cuaso knew to have opened. . to tell him of the new delivery instructions for the checks. by means of Check No. Fernando's placement.800.torts & damages .58 with interest thereon at 12% per annum from August 12. both of which letters were presumably handed to the dispatcher by Rosemarie A2010 . withdrawals began on Current Account No. both authorized signatories for BPI.On October 14. 35623 with maturity value of P2. not just a roll-over of the placement. In the event that the payee's signature is forged. payable to "cash" which was received through clearing from PNB Pasay Branch. and initial deposit of P10. among others.Informed that the placement would yield less than the maturity value because of its pretermination.000. 26310-3: On October 16. NO . respectively.00 and the second for the balance. Eustaquio.800. occupation ("business woman"). In the afternoon of October 13. she referred the application to the New Accounts Section for processing. She executed an affidavit stating that while she was the payee of the two checks in controversy. who signed the two checks that very morning. With her surrender of the original of the promissory note (No. returned the checks for reason "Beyond Clearing Time". the maturity date of Eligia G.77) to evidence a roll-over of the placement. covering the preterminated placement. This telephone conversation ended with the caller's statement that "definitely" it would be her niece. "her" date of birth. the dispatcher failed to get or to require the surrender of the promissory note evidencing the placement. . Thereafter.462.00 and P613.BPI contends that respondent CBC's clear warranty that "all prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsements guaranteed" stamped at the back of the Fernando. passed through the position analyst. 1981.607. 1981 for P4. As it turned out. 1981.00. Fernando.On November 12. the caller insisted on the pretermination just the same and asked that two checks be issued for the proceeds. a long-standing "valued client" of CBC. and Check No. These incidents led to the filing of this case with the Arbitration Committee. in fact. ISSUES 1. both payable to Eligia G. writing thereon "Rosemarie Fernando release only with authority to pick up. BPI issued her a new promissory note (No. 1981.” . 240001 dated November 3. 240005 dated the same day for P1.00. instead of the checks being delivered to her office at Philamlife.000. CBC's guaranty of prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement was then stamped on the two checks. . payable to "cash. WON the collecting bank has absolute liability on a warranty of the validity of all prior endorsements stamped at the back of the checks 2. on October 22. 240006 dated the same day for P1.The Arbitration Committee ruled in favor of BPI and ordered CBC to pay the former the amount of P1. Her endorsement on the two checks was found to conform with the depositor's specimen signature. Bernardo Laderas. were prepared.266. 1981. ." which was received through clearing from Far East Bank. Fernando". Jr. 1981.206. before the two cashier's checks. and on November 4. the same person impersonated both Eligia G. nos. Fernando deposited the two checks in controversy with Current Account No. her niece would have to being a written authorization from her to pick up the checks.00. BPI returned the two checks in controversy to CBC for the reason "Payee's endorsement forged". however. the same caller changed the delivery instructions. She disclaimed having preterminated her placement on October 12.The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Rosemarie Fernando. who did not interview the new client but affixed her initials on the application form after reviewing it. Eustaquio had to hurriedly go to the dispatcher.19) evidencing the placement which matured that day.BPI then filed a petition for review with the Regional Trial Court of Makati who dismissed said petition but modified the award by including a provision for attorney’s fees in favor of CBC. Fernado's money market placement with BPI. supported by Eligia G. by means of Check No. Fernando went to BPI for the roll-over of her placement.500.206. Cash Supervisor.00.However. 1981. the papers. payable to "cash" which the woman herself also encashed over the counter. de Castro and Celestino Sampiton. 126310-3.000. Manager and Administrative Assistant. casis left Current Account No.000.On November 11. thus. 26310-3 with a balance of only P571. 1981. to pick them up.000.00." which the woman identifying herself as Eligia G. Fernando encashed over the counter. she would herself pick up the checks or send her niece. however. Fernando and Rosemarie Fernando. Fernando's purported signature on the letter requesting the pretermination and the latter authorizing Rosemarie Fernando to pick up the two checks. 1981 and maturity value of P2. There is also no showing that Eligia G. sex. Fernando's signature in BPI's file.58. Fernando's affidavit. As finally proceeds. was compared or verified with Eligia G. This final approval of the new current account is indicated on the application form by the initials of Regina G. 1981.. which CBC forthwith sent to clearing and which BPI cleared on the same day. Fernando encashed over the counter.000. 240007 dated the same day for P370. was that the new client was introduced by Valentin Co. Eustaquio then told her that if it were her niece who was going to get the checks.000. Fernando. 1981 for P48. upon CBC’s motion for reconsideration. 1981 . in turn. on October 19. The two cashier's checks. Rosemarie Fernando.100.607. 40314 with maturity date of December 23.00. Fernando applied at China Banking Corporation's Head Office for the opening of a current account. which the woman holding herself out as Eligia G. in BPI's Treasury Operations Department. the Board of Directors of the PCHC reversed the Arbitration Committee's decision and dismissed the complaint of BPI while ordering it to pay CBC the sum of P1. Such purported signature has been established to be forged although it has a "close similarity" to the real signature of Eligia G. 35623) to be preterminated. the woman holding herself out as Eligia G. who would pick up the checks.16. nationality. The last withdrawal on November 4. as shown by the delivery receipt. he changed the delivery instruction on the purchase order slip. tax account number.

we rule that the issue as to whose negligence is graver is relevant. By the very nature of their work the degree of responsibility. the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower courts declared that petitioner BPI's negligence was graver. where both parties were negligent and such negligence were not contemporaneous.The next issue hinges on whose negligence was the proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by an impostor.BPI further argues that the acts and omissions of respondent CBC are the cause "that set into motion the actual and continuous sequence of events that produced the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.The Arbitration Committee in its decision analyzed the negligence of the employees of petitioner BPI involved in the processing of the pre-termination of Eligia G. it can recover the amount paid from the collecting bank. according to petitioner BPI. If the drawee-bank discovers that the signature of the payee was forged after it has paid the amount of the check to the holder thereof. could not have resulted in the discovery of the fraud. 2. Fernando's money market placement.31 - prof. the checks are "wholly inoperative" and of no effect. In this jurisdiction we recognize negligence of the party invoking forgery as an exception to the general rule. . Fernando. The Arbitration Committee. without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. however disagree in the evaluation of the degree of negligence of the banks. Fernando is not a depositor of CBC.Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. The exception to this rule is when the party relying in the forgery is "precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority. however. a comparison of the signature of Eligia G.torts & damages checks was an unrestrictive clearing guaranty that all prior endorsements in the checks are genuine. or knowledge of such facts’ (Sec. The Arbitration Committee. but which BPI neglected to take. there was yet no loss and the impostor could have decided to desist from completing the same plan and could have held to the checks without negotiating them. . Petitioner BPI points out that the gap of one (1) day that elapsed from its issuance and delivery of the checks to the impostor is material on the issue of proximate cause." Petitioner BPI anchors its argument on its stance that there was "a gap. was requiring before the two checks in controversy were delivered. belittled petitioner BPI's negligence compared to that of respondent CBC which it declared as graver and the proximate cause of the loss of the subject checks to the impostor who impersonated Eligia G. 56.The records show that petitioner BPI as drawee bank and respondent CBC as representing or collecting bank were both negligent resulting in the encashment of the forged checks.Applying these principles. Fernando's money market placement and in the issuance and delivery of the subject checks in this wise: a) The impostor could have been readily unmasked by a mere telephone call. the banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. respondent CBC had no way to discover the fraud at all.The PCHC Board of Directors. With these circumstances. stamped at the back of the checks are the clear warranty: ALL PRIOR ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OF ENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED. . and payment made "through or under such signature" is ineffectual or does not discharge the instrument. they cannot erase the fact that they were both guilty in not exercising extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. respondent CBC. the point that comes uppermost is whether the drawee bank was negligent in failing to discover the alteration or the forgery. Fernando.” . The issue as to who between the parties should bear the loss in the payment of the forged checks necessities the determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties involved in the controversy in relation to the forged checks. yet.Apropos the matter of forgery in endorsements. However. however. NO . The gap of one (1) day between the issuance and delivery of the checks bearing the impostor's name as payee and the impostor's negotiating the said forged checks by opening an account and depositing the same with respondent CBC . there is no question that the banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees. While the Arbitration Committee declared the negligence of respondent CBC graver. No matter how many justifications both banks present to avoid responsibility. the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower court. which nobody in BPI bothered to make to Eligia G. Petitioner BPI insists that the doctrine of last clear chance should have been applied considering the circumstances of this case. petitioner BPI's reliance on the doctrine of last clear chance to clear it from liability is not well-taken. Fernando's purported signature on the letter requesting the pretermination and the letter authorizing her niece to pickup the checks. of the fraud perpetrated by the impostor and the employees of BPI. Under this premise petitioner BPI asserts that the presenting or collecting bank. . c) Again no verification appears to have been made on Eligia G.Petitioner BPI's contention that CBC alone should bear the loss must fail. At this stage. b) The officer who used to handle Eligia G. which respondent CBC did. CBC had no prior notice of the fraud perpetrated by BPI's employees on the pretermination of Eligia G. Fernando's account did not do anything about the account's pre-termination. Following the general rule.The general rule under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law is to the effect that a forged signature is "wholly inoperative". For obvious reasons. Under this doctrine.In presenting the checks for clearing and for payment. the drawee bank would not have paid on the checks. Fernando. No amount of legal jargon can reverse the clear meaning of the warranty. Moreover. casis proximate cause of the loss. had an unquestioned liability when it turned out that the payee's signature on the checks were forged. To the extent that the degree of negligence is equated to the . . Hence. a vice-president of Philamlife. In fact the records fail to show that respondent CBC had knowledge. this Court has emphasized that the collecting bank or last endorser generally suffers the loss because it has the duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior endorsements considering that the act of presenting the check for payment to the drawee is an assertion that the party making the presentment has done its duty to ascertain the genuineness of the endorsements. the collecting bank made an express guarantee on the validity of "all prior endorsements. care and trustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. and d) Another step that could have foiled the fraud. her signature was in BPI's file. actual or implied. without any further showing that the CBC employees ‘had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect. Fernando with that of the impostor Eligia G." Thus. an interval between the issuance and delivery of said checks by petitioner BPI to the impostor and their actual payment of CBC to the impostor. A2010 .In the present case. . Negotiable Instruments Law) that their action in accepting their checks for deposit and allowing the withdrawals against the same ‘amounted to bad faith’ cannot be considered as basis for holding CBC liable.In the present petition the payee's names in the checks were forged. petitioner BPI maintains that considerations of relative negligence become totally irrelevant. the surrender of the promissory note evidencing the money market placement that was supposedly pre-terminated. . Hence. . the underlying circumstances of the case show that the general rule on forgery is not applicable. the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. the defendant is liable for any damage arising out of the falsity of its representation. stated that “these withdrawals. a hiatus. . However. As the warranty has proven to be false and inaccurate. Without such warranty. .

dated February 15. because every person liable criminally for a crime or misdemeanor is also liable for reparation of damage and for indemnification of the harm done. notwithstanding. While it is true that petitioner BPI's negligence may have been the proximate cause of the loss.At the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks. It is not unnatural or unexpected that after taking the risk of impersonating Eligia G. The conclusion that if he had been sober he would not have been injured is not warranted by the facts as found. for lesiones. with murder.It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in maintaining its tracks. named Dioalan. and no facts. for the purpose of holding a song service called "buni" according to the Tinguian custom. when he. but that plaintiff’s negligence was not as great as defendant’s. No facts to merit a higher award of damages to plaintiff. The opening of the account itself was accompanied by inexplicable acts clearly showing negligence. and on his own mother. Quisamay. 1914 NATURE An action to recover damages for injuries sustained in an accident . casis draw a conclusion which enters the realm of speculation and guesswork. without provocation suddenly attacked the woman Bil-liingan with a bolo. because of the violent death of the woman Bil-liingan. in crossing the tracks to enter his premises. 1910. This cause was instituted separately from the other. although the law has declared their perpetrators exempt from criminal liability. Abra. under such circumstances. and the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground. It was the gross negligence of the employees of both banks which resulted in the fraud and the subsequent loss.Defendant Manila Electric is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street railway . FACTS . To enter his premises from the street.32 - prof. FACTS . to pay the costs in the case and to be confined in an institution for the insane until further order of the court. is to US V BAGGAY 20 PHIL 142 TORRES.215. Bil-liingan. DISPOSITION Plaintiff not negligent. This finding. Calapini. WRIGHT V MANILA ELECTRIC R. and fell. . jr. After trial and proof that the defendant was suffering from mental aberration.Trial court held that both parties were negligent. such losses are subject to mitigation by the courts. the nonChristian Baggay.One night. inflicting a serious wound on her head from which she expired immediately. still the CBC employees had ample opportunity to avoid the harm which befell both CBC and BPI.000.R. 28 Phil 122 MORELAND. . stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling. . September 1. Due care on the part of CBC could have prevented any loss. the trial court was correct in apportioning damages) HELD NO Ratio Intoxication in itself is not negligence.000.Both banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in the encashment of the forged checks by an impostor. leaped forward.M. There is therefore. the judge on April 28 rendered the judgment cited above.Intoxication in itself is not negligence. .413. ISSUE WON an insane person.16 A2010 . but defendant claims the plaintiff was also negligent in that he was so intoxicated. several persons were assembled in the defendant's house in the township of Penarrubia. and with the same bolo he like wise inflicted various wounds on the women named Calabayan. are stated which warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent. awarded plaintiff P1. the rails were above-gruond. in the sum of P1. greater reason to rule that the proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by an impostor was due to the negligence of petitioner BPI.” (If the former. if the latter. No. It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions described. . E.For this reason the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the court of Ilocos Sur. the total amount of the two (2) forged checks.Plaintiff’s residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which defendant’s tracks run. & LIGHT CO. 1909. the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel.torts & damages is not controlling.About the 4th of October. Under these circumstances. and to conclude that. Both banks were not able to overcome the presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. ISSUE WON the negligence of plaintiff contributed to the “principal occurrence” or “only to his own injury. making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the street. and such intoxication was the primary cause of the accident . . Disposition The questioned Decision and Resolution are MODIFIED. respondent CBC's negligence contributed equally to the success of the impostor in encashing the proceeds of the forged checks. might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what his condition. we are not inclined to rule that petitioner BPI must solely bear the loss of P2. They let the opportunity slip by when the ordinary prudence expected of bank employees would have sufficed to seize it. whereupon the defendant's counsel appealed to this court. the impostor would complete her deception by encashing the forged checks. a sober man would not have fallen while a drunken man did. 1109. charging the non-Christian Baggay. the horse stumbled.. Reasoning . plaintiff must cross defendant’s tracks.16. we apply Article 2179 of the Civil Code to the effect that while respondent CBC may recover its losses. Province of Ilocos Sur. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. throwing the plaintiff from the vehicle and causing injuries . exempt from criminal liability can still be civilly liable HELD YES Ratio Civil liability accompanies criminal liability. Fernando with the connivance of BPI's employees.The Court cannot ignore the fact that the CBC employees closed their eyes to the suspicious circumstances of huge over-the-counter withdrawals made immediately after the account was opened. BPI shall be responsible for 60% while CBC shall share 40% of the loss of P2. 1911 NATURE Appeal by the defendant from the judgment rendered on April 28. Agueng.A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the ties themselves aboveground. but there may be civil liability because of acts ordinarily punishable. other than the fact that Wright was intoxicated. whereby he was declared exempt from criminal liability but was obliged to indemnify the heirs if the murdered woman. he cannot recover.215. And while we do not apply the last clear chance doctrine as controlling in this case. plaintiff drove home in a calesa and. October 1.413.

the sum of P2. and 3. . seaman of the M/S Pilar II. (2) by drunkenness on the part of the laborer who had the accident. in turn. that he could not have been but conscious of the probable consequences" of his carelessness and that he was "indifferent.By gross negligence is meant "such entire want of care as to raise a presumption that the person in fault is conscious of the probable consequences of carelessness. casis place. 7.Article 17 of the Penal Code states: Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable. 2. 1950. legal guardian. but this protection does not exclude liability for damage caused to those who may have the misfortune to suffer the consequences of his acts. the persons who are civilly liable for acts committed by a lunatic or imbecile. at or about 11:30 o'clock in the morning while the said Filomeno Managuit was in the course of his employment. if. or worse. while the words `in the course of' refer to the time. p. or minors shall answer with their own property. — Compensation shall not be allowed for injuries caused (1) by the voluntary intent of the employee to inflict such injury upon himself or another person. Filomeno Managuit. However. and is indifferent. and as a consequence of which.it may be conceded that the death of Filomeno took place "in the course of" his employment. or the result of the nature of such employment.) . The blowing of his 2-peso bill may have grown out of. and 10 of article 8 does not include exemption from civil liability..40 as compensation for the death of her son. or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment. one mile and a half from the seashore of Arceli. (3) by notorious negligence of the same. or power. subject to the following: (1) In cases 1." (Wall vs.this however was dismissed due to lack of a cause of action which defendant filed stating that the allegation does not show that the death of plaintiff's son was due to an "accident arising out of and in the course of employment. even though they be performed unwittingly. would have been exposed had he. has been defined as follows: . his accident could be attributed to his gross negligence. his act being obviously innocent. It was the result of a risk peculiar to his work as a seaman or incidental to such work."notorious negligence" has been held to be tantamount to "gross negligence". The hazardous nature of this act was not due specially to the nature of his employment. Palawan. In her original complaint.torts & damages Reasoning . 1949 at about 11:30 o'clock in the morning. 2. affirmation thereof is proper. his two-peso bill was blown by the breeze into the sea and in his effort to retrieve the same from the waters he was drowned. 2nd ed. or worse. imbeciles. the judgment appealed from being in accordance with law.case provides for other jurisprudence which describe instances of gross negligence attributable to employee (see case). and at the "place" where-according to the amended complaint-he was working. to the danger of injury. DISPOSITION Therefore. Dumarang.. which. Palawan. or arisen from. (2) it must happen in the course of the employment. Should there be no person having them under his authority. likewise. in that it happened at the "time" when. which was anchored then about 1 1/2 miles from the seashore of Arceli Dumarang. . or over this age and under 15. such as a passenger thereof or an ordinary visitor.since the act done by Filomeno was dangerous. . who has not acted with the exercise of judgment. Sections 2 and 4 of which: Sec.her amended complaint stated: “That on May 27. he jumped into the water to retrieve a 2-peso bill belonging to him. also. AMEDO V RIO [citation] CONCEPCION. It was a risk to which any person on board the M/S Pilar II."." that he displayed a "reckless disregard of the safety" of his person. .Plaintiff’s basis for appeal is the Workmen’s Compensation Act. in spite of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable condition of his deranged mind. jumped into the sea. his employment. . he would surely be entitled to compensation. the said lunatics."The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident and are descriptive of its character.” .33 - prof. is still reasonably and justly liable with his property for the consequences of his acts. 3. plaintiff Elena Amedo sought to collect from defendant Rio y Olabarrieta. his 2-peso bill merely fell from his pocket. and it is hereby affirmed. legal guardianship or power. 275. the accident which produced this tragic result did not "arise out of" his employment. to the danger of injury to person or property of others. 2. . and (3) it must not be caused by the "notorious negligence" of the employee. while the deceased Filomeno Managuit was on board M/S "Pilar II" as such seaman. while Filomeno Managuit was working. 877. Cameron [1882] 6 Colo. A2010 . But. 4. May 24. and circumstances under which the accident takes place .Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who. . performing his duties as such ordinary seaman on defendant's M/S "Pilar II". Point in question is whether the accident was committed under these 3 conditions .. Grounds for compensation. with costs against the appellant. also.This case was instituted on October 18. see. in spite of his unfortunate condition.Article 18 of the same code says: The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos. who worked for the defendant as a . . he is still entitled to the benefit of what is necessary for his decent maintenance. 1954 FACTS . are those who have them under their authority. his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified. . 1949. — When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. he was drowned. excepting that part which is exempted for their support in accordance with the civil law.038. for the reason that his fellows ought not to suffer for the disastrous results of his harmful acts more than is necessary. unless they prove that there was no blame or negligence on their part. Sec. ISSUE WON Amedo could claim compensation from employer Rio HELD NO . Inc. So.she was allowed to file an amended complaint which was remanded to the trial court. and as he picked up the bill from the floor something accidentally fell upon him and injured him. if such person be insolvent. These are: (1) the accident must arise out of the employment.It cannot be denied that in jumping into the sea. 1.from these provisions three conditions are essential to hold an employer liable. as Filomeno had.was the accident caused by Filomeno’s “notorious negligence”? .this is distinguishable from cases wherein the act done is not dangerous per se such as when an employee drops a cigarette on the pavement and picks it up. his death was the consequence of his decision to jump into the water to retrieve said bill. Law and society are under obligation to protect him during his illness and so when he is declared to be liable with his property for reparation and indemnification. Filomeno failed to exercise "even slight care and diligence. or a person under 9 years of age. which shall be enforced. Injuries not covered. The main allegation of said original complaint was: “That on May 27. The Law Governing Labor Disputes in the Philippines by Francisco.

(Procedural) Ratio Findings of fact are entitled to great respect and will not ordinarily be disturbed by this Court unless it falls down under the exceptions provided by the Court to merit review of the facts.Defendant Godofredo Isidro admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident driven by Daniel Serrano. . . YES . defendant driver. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do [2] Applying the definition and the test.This is a question of fact. its violation does not constitute negligence per se. . Reasoning . ISSUE 1. however. . It couldn't be. plaintiff was injured and hospitalized. then he is guilty of negligence. it cannot be declared negligence because the proibition had nothing to do with the personal safety of the riders. however.Petitioner also contends that the amicable settlement entered into by Mamador's widow and Macunat barred the widow's claim against the employer because she has already elected one of the remedies.Macunat was prosecuted. . ISSUES 1. Daniel Serrano. right after the curve.Petitioner alleges that the criminal case sentencing Macunat to indemnify the heirs of the deceased was a suit for damages against a third person. 1968 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of IAC decision FACTS . “When I was a few meters away. 2.Under the circumstance.Deceased’s wife now seeks compensation by Marinduque as the employer. . who was fixing the flat tire of the said truck. Hence. From the evidence presented. or conjecture. Nueva Vizcaya. surmise. The truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving. not a truck helper being a brother-in-law law of the driver of said truck. evoke the presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his helper. WON Mamador has a right to compensation by Marinduque 2. casis not function with my many attempts.Plaintiff Pedro Layugan testified that while in Bagabag. he checked the truck. He has paid nothing. while the same was at a stop position. under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.” .34 - prof. thereby having the effect of releasing the employer from liability. 2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case HELD 1 NO . I saw the truck which was loaded with round logs. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. He bumped the truck being repaired by Pedro Layugan. I have (sic) found out later that the fluid pipe on the rear right was cut that's why the breaks did not function. 5) the said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. Disposition Award for compensation by WCC affirmed LAYUGAN V IAC 167 SCRA 363 SARMIENTO. Nueva Vizcaya.The criminal case.A truck driven by Procopio Macunat. said that he knew the responsibilities of a driver. occupying almost half of the right lane towards Solano. Due to said injuries. But this case is an exception since: 1) the finding are grounded entirely on speculation. 3) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts. I stepped on my foot brakes but it did HELD 1.This contention cannot be sustained because what the widow waived was the offender's criminal proscution and not all civil action for damages. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man. to the latter. convicted and was sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. . June 30.Plaintiff points to the negligence of the defendant driver while Isidro points to the driver of parked truck as negligent. it is clear that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence. would do. November 14. SC entertained review of the factual question. Defendant's truck driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff. but it may be an evidence of negligence.Although the employer prohibited its employees to ride the haulage trucks. Defendant said that the plaintiff was merely a bystander.Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence. WON defendant driver Serrano was negligent 2. Serrano also testified that. that before leaving. "pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and probably result in injury".torts & damages MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS V WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION 99 PHIL 48 BENGZON. . however. and 6) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted on record. NO . 1956 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the WCC FACTS . . it would. . he and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the right side of the National Highway.(Substantive) Ratio The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not.Daniel Serrano. and says that absent such proof of care. the petitioner herein. 4) CA findings are contrary to those of the trial court. his left leg was amputated so he had to use crutches to walk. Inchausti that criminal prosection of the "other person" does not affect the liability of the employer.Notorious negligence means the same as gross negligence which implies "conscious indifferenece to consequences". plaintiff. that as a result. that the proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of the parked truck in installing the early warning device. Reasoning [1] Negligence defined.At any rate. WON there was notorious negligence by the deceased for having violated the employer’s prohibition to ride haulage trucks A2010 . because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. even if the case was against a third person. . the court already decided in Nava vs. that the truck allegedly being repaired was parked. Whether cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder of the road is immaterial taking into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene . turned over and hit a coconut tree resulting in the death of Pedro Mamador and injury to the other laborers. it has been established clearly that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff was caused by defendant's driver. belonging to Marinduque. . ordinarily. was not a suit for damages against third persons because the heirs did not intervene therein and they have not received the indemnity ordered by the court.

or where there’s direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. and the way we apply it in cases. I formulated it in an issuetype. it may be enlightening and helpful in the proper resolution of the issue of negligence to examine the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur. to them. December 29. who was to administer anesthesia. Perfecta Gutierrez.In the case at bar. She thereafter noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr. asked Dr. 1999 NATURE Petition For Certiorari FACTS .During the trial. She and her husband Rogelio met for the first time Dr. Orlino Hozaka. The doctrine merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. Ramos.542. p. which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control. Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient. [and] preparing the patient for the operation”. it is inapplicable A2010 . however. Herminda was allowed to stay inside the operating room. one of the defendants in this case. whatever the source of the evidence. Hosaka to look for a good anesthesiologist. Erlinda Ramos stayed for about four months in the hospital. no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances show that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made. NO Note that for our purposes this was not raised as an issue in this case. Hosaka. the other defendant. doing this and that. was also there for moral support. she incurred hospital bills amounting to P93. casis Herminda saw about two or three nurses and Dr. 1985 at 9:00 A. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that accident happened provided character of accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under management and control of alleged wrongdoer. She then heard Dr. in turn. But despite this warning. and its relevant to the main issue on negligence: “At this juncture. After praying. The doctors explained that the patient had bronchospasm. “ang hirap maintubate nito. Because of the remarks of Dra. who was the Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center. Hosaka decided that she should undergo a “cholecystectomy” operation after examining the documents presented to him.torts & damages lamp placed 3-4m from the back of the truck. would be on June 17. Although not a member of the hospital staff. . it affords reasonable evidence. As she held the hand of Erlinda Ramos. she was given injections. . Herminda introduced herself as Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center who was to provide moral support to the patient. Dr. . But as far as we’re concerned and relevant to our discussion in the outline. As a direct consequence of such accident Layugan sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot. still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. At the operating room. O lumalaki ang tiyan” (id. At almost 3:00 P. an anesthesiologist and a hospital should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy. and saw that the patient was still in trendelenburg position. This is what the Court actually said in the case to prove its just obiter. “ Obiter [1] What is the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur? Two ways to put it: (a) This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant. She was also diagnosed to be suffering from “diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage”. she went out of the operating room. 2. So. Hosaka approached her. the Isuzu truck driven by Serrano. 1985. Therefore this only Obiter Dicta.00. She has been in a comatose condition. Gutierrez say. on June 10.000. she saw this anesthesiologist trying to intubate the patient. the Court is called upon to rule whether a surgeon. with her husband Rogelio incurring a monthly expense ranging from P8. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Herminda Cruz.” She then saw people inside the operating room “moving. direct evidence is absent and not readily available.. another anesthesiologist. After Dr.M.25. . 17). of that fateful day. Gutierrez was doing.Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka were also asked by the hospital to explain what happened to the patient.Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was a robust woman except for occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of a stone in her gall bladder she was as normal as any other woman. Calderon was then able to intubate the patient. in the absence of an explanation by the defendant. She thereafter heard Dr. still needing constant medical attention. and (b) According to Black’s Law dictionary. she saw the patient taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). she has been staying in their residence. Disposition Petition GRANTED with costs against private respondents. She was admitted in the hospital and was with her sister-in-law. under the circumstances involved. . RAMOS V CA [citation] KAPUNAN. mali yata ang pagkakapasok.M. that the accident arose from want of care. she then saw Dr. In this case it is inapplicable because it was established by clear and convincing evidence the negligence of the defendant driver.. She was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladdershe underwent a series of examinations which included blood and urine tests which indicated she was fit for surgery. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when. and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. . They agreed that their date at the operating table at the De Los Santos Medical Center. Dr. and she told Rogelio E.000. Hosaka is already here. who was inside the operating room with the patient. heard somebody say that “Dr. Immediately thereafter. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care. “Res ipsa loquitur.M. . The thing speaks for itself Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent. Calderon arrived at the operating room. she focused her attention on what Dr. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience.” [2] In our jurisdiction.35 - prof.Hours later at about 12:15 P. Plaintiff presented the testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz and where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury. Gutierrez. particularly in the law of negligence: Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. she sought professional advice. Calderon.Petitioners filed a civil case for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against herein private respondents alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos. Dr. Herminda Cruz.Herminda Cruz immediately rushed back. The patient’s nailbed became bluish and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position. assured Rogelio that he will get a good anesthesiologist. After being discharged from the hospital.. And once the actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy. Rogelio E. both parties presented evidence as to the possible cause of Erlinda’s injury. Because the discomforts somehow interfered with her normal ways. Ramos “that something wrong was x x x happening”.00 to P10.

However. Eduardo Jamora. 2. Rogelio referred the decision of the appellate court to a new lawyer. Atty.Nonetheless. However. since a copy of the decision of the appellate court was not sent to the counsel on record of petitioner. YES .36 - prof. ISSUES 1. casis . The Court granted the motion for extension of time and gave petitioners additional thirty (30) days after the expiration of the fifteen-day (15) period counted from the receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals within which to submit the petition. does not Reconsideration 2. since the Court of Appeals already issued a second Resolution. Atty. then counsel on record of petitioners. Rogelio Ramos. Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care. dated 29 March 1996. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable 3.” The phrase “res ipsa loquitur” is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury. a copy of the decision of the appellate court was instead sent to and received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos on 9 June 1995 wherein he was mistakenly addressed as Atty. which superseded the earlier resolution issued on 25 July 1995.” No copy of the decision. Hence. WON it should be dismissed for being filed later than allowable 15 day period for the filing of the Motion for A2010 . . however. res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge. Sillano filed on 7 August 1995 a motion to admit the motion for reconsideration contending that the period to file the appropriate pleading on the assailed decision had not yet commenced to run as the Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals had not yet served a copy thereof to the counsel on record. no copy of the decision of the appellate court was furnished to the counsel on record. Based on the other communications received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos. . The petition was filed on 9 May 1996. On the other hand. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge.We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. . much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and. Atty. to replace Atty. Meanwhile petitioners engaged the services of another counsel. not being a lawyer and unaware of the prescriptive period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Sillano. Ligsay. we hold that a practical administration of justice dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur. Court of Appeals reversed. that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. the liability of the physicians and the hospital in this case is not predicated upon an alleged failure to secure the desired results of an operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in the diagnosis or treatment as in fact no operation or treatment was ever performed on Erlinda. Each case must be viewed in its own light and scrutinized in order to be within the res ipsa loquitur coverage. Rogelio Ramos.Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. . the appellate court still denied the motion to admit the motion for reconsideration of petitioners in its Resolution.It is elementary that when a party is represented by counsel. the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. Moreover. . Sillano filed before this Court a motion for extension of time to file the present petition for certiorari under Rule 45. In the present case. Hence. With a few exceptions. to the effect that the cause of brain damage was Erlinda’s allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent. well within the extended period given by the Court. What is the cost for the damages HELD 1. Atty. and denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner. a pulmonologist. only on 20 June 1995. may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence. the damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for the application of res ipsa loquitur. or on 12 April 1996. and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.A careful review of the records reveals that the reason behind the delay in filing the motion for reconsideration is attributable to the fact that the decision of the Court of Appeals was not sent to then counsel on record of petitioners. taken with the surrounding circumstances. notice to a litigant without notice to his counsel on record is no notice at all. the petition before us was submitted on time. Ligsay. the appellate court apparently mistook him for the counsel on record. Moreover. dated 29 March 1996.Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is injured or destroyed while the patient is unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive control of the physicians. Upon these facts and under these circumstances the Court would be able to say. Corollary thereto. or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case. Mariano Gavino to prove that the damage sustained by Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty management of her airway by private respondents during the anesthesia phase. was sent nor received by the Coronel Law Office. . In fact. Ligsay. referred the same to a legal counsel only on 20 June 1995. . Despite this explanation. filed with the appellate court a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. we believe that the receipt of the former should be considered in determining the timeliness of the filing of the present petition. the delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration cannot be taken against petitioner. . the appellate court denied the motion for extension of time in its Resolution dated 25 July 1995. The next day. primarily on the ground that the fifteen-day (15) period for filing a motion for reconsideration had already expired. Thus. As will hereinafter be explained. it affords reasonable evidence. whether the alleged negligence was the proximate cause of Erlinda’s comatose condition. as such. Atty. the Coronel Law Office. On the same day. in holding that res ipsa loquitur is available to the present case we are not saying that the doctrine is applicable in any and all cases where injury occurs to a patient while under anesthesia. we shall also determine if the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the testimonies of the witnesses for the private respondents 4.The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that. there can be no sufficient notice to speak of.The decision of the Court of Appeals was received on 9 June 1995 by petitioner Rogelio Ramos who was mistakenly addressed as “Atty. upon all these initial determination a case is made out for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Sillano on 11 April 1996. in the absence of explanation by the defendant. as a matter of common knowledge and observation. WON the Court of Appeals erred in finding that private respondents were not negligent in the care of Erlinda during the anesthesia phase of the operation and. The due date fell on 27 May 1996. if negligence attended the management and care of the patient. as a matter of common knowledge and experience.Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. private respondents primarily relied on the expert testimony of Dr. The motion for reconsideration was submitted on 4 July 1995. all notices should be sent to the party’s lawyer at his given address. .A copy of the above resolution was received by Atty. or to any and all anesthesia cases. or four (4) days before the expiration of the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal). Petitioner. NO . Thus. if in the affirmative. Based on this.torts & damages Dr.

. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence. and must establish that the essential elements of the doctrine were present in a particular incident. or pre-operative evaluation of Erlinda was done by her. that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal). Gutierrez’ act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was. depending upon the circumstances of each case. Jamora is a pulmonologist. Moreover. or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants. respondent Dra. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied. Until the day of the operation. . Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way. no prior consultations with. produces injury.First of all. as an expert would. the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. It is regarded as a mode of proof. It is simply a step in the process of such proof. whenever it appears from the evidence in the case. by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him. res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished. Hosaka’s negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority (as the to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. and 3. The real question.37 - prof. Thiopental Sodium. as a matter of common knowledge and observation. Towards this end.Respondent Dr. and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof.An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced bronchospasm properly falls within the fields of anesthesia. before resort to the doctrine may be allowed.torts & damages create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability. and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. . as such. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act. Still. If there was such extraneous interventions. In other words. was due to an unpredictable drug reaction to the short-acting barbiturate. Instead. . a plaintiff. . which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred.In the above requisites. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct. It is the dominant. and without which the result would not have occurred. Thus. . could not have been capable. a clear indicia of her negligence. Jamora. they presented Dr. permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident. an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine. In order to have the benefit of the rule. On the basis of the foregoing transcript. therefore. Gutierrez admitted that she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation itself. he could not have been capable of properly enlightening the court about anesthesia practice and procedure and their complications. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is.Private respondents repeatedly hammered the view that the cerebral anoxia which led to Erlinda’s coma was due to bronchospasm mediated by her allergic response to the drug. Such element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the defendant. must show a situation where it is applicable. which. if he could. therefore. mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. Before this date. who advanced private respondents' theory that the oxygen deprivation which led to anoxic encephalopathy. 2. on 17 June 1985. introduced into her system. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results. In the case at bar. under usual and ordinary conditions.Dra. the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. Dr. Respondent Dra. Jamora’s testimony as an expert in the administration of Thiopental Sodium. Gutierrez was unaware of the physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. .Proximate cause has been defined as that which. that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage. where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence. all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. When the doctrine is appropriate. moving or producing cause. he is not a pharmacologist and. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised. in natural and continuous sequence. or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment.In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say. the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is called upon to explain the matter. in which the pulmonologist himself admitted that he could not testify about the drug with medical authority. and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. Jamora cannot be considered an authority in the field of anesthesiology simply because he is not an anesthesiologist. creating an inference or presumption of negligence. The measures cautioning prudence and vigilance in dealing with human lives lie at the core of the physician’s centuries-old Hippocratic Oath. The resulting anoxic encephalopathy belongs to the field of neurology. Dr. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient. 3. is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such operations. respondent Dra. . . Jamora is likewise not an allergologist and could not therefore properly advance expert opinion on allergicmediated processes. and relieves a plaintiff of. the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown: 1. it is clear that the appellate court erred in giving weight to Dr.The CA commited a reversible error. She was likewise not properly informed of the possible difficulties she would face during the administration of anesthesia to Erlinda. a Fellow of the Philippine College of Physicians and Diplomate of the Philippine Specialty Board of Internal Medicine. by evidence of exculpation. Private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous condition. internal medicine-allergy. without the aid of expert testimony. and clinical pharmacology. it is considered as merely evidentiary or in the nature of a procedural rule. if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence. of explaining to the court the pharmacologic and toxic effects of the supposed culprit. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. YES . Since Dr. the fundamental element is the “control of the instrumentality” which caused the damage. in addition to proving injury or damage. We find the theory of private respondents unacceptable. casis therefore. .It does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof A2010 .

. an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former’s responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas.Except as provided by law or by . Doctors who apply for “consultant” slots.00 in temperate damages would therefore be reasonable. .In these cases. up to the time of trial. Furthermore. and references. However. . 4. and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship. while certain to occur. be made with certainty. if they are to adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused. respondent hospital. hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the conduct of their work within the hospital premises. evidence of fellowship in most cases. or a consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum standards acceptable to the hospital or its peer review committee. In addition to these. presents problems in apportioning responsibility for negligence in medical malpractice cases. the hiring. . the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has been completed and that the cost can be liquidated. . Under the circumstances. with the exception of the payment of wages. he is normally required to attend clinico-pathological conferences. interns and residents. And because of the unique nature of such cases. are required to submit proof of completion of residency.for the victim in such cases to constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the compensatory damages previously awarded temperate damages are appropriate. In fact. In other words.In the instant case. the control exercised. A2010 . and was in fact over three hours late for the latter’s operation. the difficulty is only more apparent than real. This being the case.000.In the instant case. They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the aid of professionals.After a physician is accepted.Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of litigation. Thus. the question now arises as to whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors for petitioner’s condition. However. once negligence is shown. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. evidence of accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate). the burden shifts to the respondents (parent. petitioners were able to provide only home-based nursing care for a comatose patient who has remained in that condition for over a decade. apart from a general denial of its responsibility over respondent physicians.” who are allegedly not hospital employees. and/or for the privilege of admitting patients into the hospital. no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. moderate grand rounds and patient audits and perform other tasks and responsibilities. These requirements are carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital administration or by a review committee set up by the hospital who either accept or reject the application.38 - prof. nurses. he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda’s condition. either as a visiting or attending consultant. interns and residents. the physician’s performance as a specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review committee on the basis of mortality and morbidity statistics.In the first place. we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases. where the resulting injury might be continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the injury. visiting or attending. are difficult to predict. the control test is determining. . conduct bedside rounds for clerks.Art. Because of this. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. it does not escape us that respondent Dr. 2199. the actual physical. . This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient. their educational qualifications. .500. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. . In other words.We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital in this particular incident. and feedback from patients. Having premised our award for compensatory damages on the amount provided by petitioners at the onset of litigation. though to a certain extent speculative. . Having failed to do this. Even the temperate damages herein awarded would be inadequate if petitioner’s technically employees.In other words. from the nature of the case. private hospitals.Meanwhile. for the privilege of being able to maintain a clinic in the hospital. these provisions neglect to take into account those situations.As it would not be equitable . respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180. an award of P1. Given these considerations. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases. respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlinda’s condition. should be one which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved. the amount of actual damages recoverable in suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the correct minimum cost of proper care. fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting “consultant” staff. . for anything less would be grossly inadequate. casis stipulation. not the cost of the care the family is usually compelled to undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda’s cholecystectomy. While “consultants” are not. a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient’s condition. no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. generally. the amount of damages which should be awarded. hire. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. . A consultant remiss in his duties. teacher or employer) who should prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. . on the basis of the foregoing. Accordingly.and certainly not in the best interests of the administration of justice . while the burden of proving negligence rests on the plaintiffs. should take into account the cost of proper care. The unique practice (among private hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with attending and visiting “consultants. he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. it would be now much more in step with the interests of justice if the value awarded for temperate damages would allow petitioners to provide optimal care for their loved one in a facility which generally specializes in such care. temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. is normally politely terminated. as in this case. This is particularly true with respondent hospital.torts & damages “captain” of the operative team) in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. guardian. or proof of a similar nature.Upon these disquisitions we hold that private respondents are solidarily liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. emotional and financial cost of the care of petitioner would be virtually impossible to quantify. In neglecting to offer such proof. . The amount given as temperate damages. and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could not. one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists.

Second. ISSUES Procedural WON the court can review questions of fact Substantive WON Dr. . 1996 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . July 5. performed a caesarian operation on Mrs. The CA was correct in saying that the trial court erred when it isolated the disputed portion of Dr. Batiquin. For the foregoing reasons. and that she sent it to a laboratory and then to Cebu City for examination by a pathologist. . Batiquin is liable HELD Procedural YES .000. Salud Kho. an Anesthesia Record. a Progress Record. Kho was frank throughout her turn on the witness stand. that there was neither any tear on Dr. 4) P100. Aside from Dr. and a Physician's Discharge Summary. First. are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim. does not occur unless through the intervention of negligence.torts & damages condition remains unchanged for the next ten years. 1988. among which are when the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court conflict.Finally. Furthermore. which. casis testimony and did not consider it with other portions of Dr. Ma. not the respondents. thus only supporting out appraisal of Dr.000. The family’s moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one.The focal point of the appeal is Dr. There were inconsistencies within her own testimony.00 as moral damages. The CA reversed the decision. 3) P1. altering their long term goals to take into account their life with a comatose patient. 2) P2.This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant. since aside from the cesarean section. She also gradually lost her appetite. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care." . . Kho.00 as actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of P8. 1988 Dr. it stands to reason that such could only have been a byproduct of the cesarean section performed by Dr. as she asserted before the trial court. Dr. a Nurse's Record.Considering that we have assessed Dr. . . the pains still kept recurring. This was the cause of all of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. her positive testimony prevails over the negative testimony in favor of the petitioners. dirt and pus behind the uterus.When Dr.There was also doubts as to the whereabouts of the piece of rubber. Kho’s .000. which led to the different decision of the RTC and CA. A2010 . Dr Kho suggested that Mrs.00 as temperate damages. Kho's trustworthiness. In the morning of September 21. Batiquin's gloves after the operation nor blood smears on her hands upon removing her gloves. the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas' body.After leaving the hospital. Kho and (2) that Dr. Villegas submitted to Dr. embedded on the ovarian cyst. Kho's credibility. knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil. private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus. . Dr. regarded these documentary evidence as mere hearsay.000. Mrs.It is also worth noting that the trial court paid heed to Dr. Batiquin’s testimony. After examining her.00 in moral damages would be appropriate. Kho saw a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen. But the trial court failed to recognized that these were mere denials or negative testimonies. . BATIQUIN V CA (Villegas) 258 SCRA 334 DAVIDE. Kho testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants.500.In the instant case. Kho's testimony. The failure of the Plaintiffs to reconcile these two different versions served only to weaken their claim against Defendant Batiquin. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives. Kho's testimony. exemplary damages in the amount of P100. along with other physicians and nurses. Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney’s fees valued at P100. no motive to state any untruth was ever imputed against Dr.39 - prof. leaving her trustworthiness unimpaired. Kho handled the piece of rubber.352. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain medicines. all petitioners in this case.00 are hereby awarded. 5) the costs of the suit. and a piece of rubber material on the right side of the uterus. Villegas . the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore.000. when the appealed decision is clearly contradicted by the evidence on record. Also. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. As such. and solidarily against private respondents the following: 1) P1. They have fashioned their daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner.The piece of rubber allegedly found was not presented in court.000. The trial court's following declaration shows that while it was critical of the lack of care with which Dr.00 are likewise proper. Villegas and successfully delivered the latter’s baby. it affords reasonable evidence. an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus.The husband and the children. the phrase relied upon by the trial court does not negate the fact that Dr.000. there are exceptions. in the absence of an explanation by the defendant.While the petitioners claim that contradictions and falsities punctured Dr. the evidence which mentioned the piece of rubber are a Medical Certificate. The piece of rubber appeared to be a part of a rubber glove. She then consulted Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's private patient sometime before September 21. Kho threw it away as told by her to Defendant. Furthermore. Kho’s testimony.000. Kho’s testimony: 1) that it was sent to the Pathologist in Cebu as testified to in Court by Dr. Well-settled is the rule that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony. In this light. Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside. Kho as a credible witness. that the accident arose from want of care.000. by way of example. an award of P2. They. Kho's knowledge of the piece of rubber could not be based on other than first hand knowledge for. Kho’s testimony.000.Mrs. Kho to be a credible witness. all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. so she consulted Dr. or when the appellate court misapprehended the facts Substantive . Batiquin. DISPOSITION the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed from are hereby modified so as to award in favor of petitioners. However. and. it was not prepared to doubt Dr.While the rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. however. Villegas submit to another surgery. needless to say. the entire proceedings of the cesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. as 2 versions arose from Dr. The trial court. a reading of the said testimony reveals no such infirmity and establishes Dr.00 each as exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. will have to live with the day to day uncertainty of the patient’s illness. and Dr. "there being no showing that the person or persons who prepared them are deceased or unable to testify on the facts therein stated . .

torts & damages
Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof DISPOSITION Decision affirmed

A2010

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prof. casis
contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights. DISPOSITION The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC, whereupon payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

D.M. CONSUNJI V CA KAPUNAN; April 20, 2001
NATURE Appeal from CA affirming decision of RTC ordering defendant D.M. Consunji, Inc. to pay damages to plaintiff Maria J. Juego FACTS - At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. Investigation disclosed that while victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo were performing their work on board a steel platform with plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the platform came loose causing the whole platform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core of the building under construction, save his 2 companions who luckily jumped out for safety. - On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow. On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. ISSUES 1. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to prove petitioner’s negligence 2. WON respondent is precluded from recovering damages under the Civil Code HELD 1. YES Ratio As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of

the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a construction site unless someone is negligent; thus, the first requisite is present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of appellant; thus, the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee’s deceased husband; thus, the last requisite is also present. A reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident. 2. NO Ratio Claimants may invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence. There is no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the

MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V REMONQUILLO 99 PHIL 117 MONTEMAYOR; May 18, 1956
NATURE Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS - August 22, 1950: Efren Magno went to the house of Antonio Peñaloza, hid stepbrother, on Rodriguez Lanuza St, Manila, to repair a leaking “media agua.” The “media agua” was just below the window of the third story. - Standing on said “media agua”, Magno received from his son thru the window a 3’x6’ galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion. The lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company parallel to the media agua and 2 ½ feet from it, causing his death by electrocution. - his widow and children filed suit to recover damages from the company. Trial court rendered judgment in their favor. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. - The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire stretched between poles pm the street and carrying a charge of 3600 volts. It was installed there some two years ago before Peñaloza’s house was constructed. During the construction of said house a similar incident took place, with less tragic consequences. The owner of the house complained to defendant about the danger which the wire presented, and defendant moved one end of the wire farther from the house by means of a brace, but left the other end where it was. - Regulations of the City required that “all wires be kept three feet from the building.” - There was no insulation that could have rendered it safe, because there is no insulation material in commercial use for such kind of wire (according to appellant, and this was not refuted). Petitioner’s Claim - Owner of the house exceeded the limit for the construction of the “media agua” (17% more). Respondent’s Comment

torts & damages
Owner was given final permit despite the excess of the “media agua”. ISSUE WON Manila Electric is guilty of negligence. HELD NO - It was the victim who was guilty of negligence Ratio the liability of electric companies for damages or personal injury is governed by the rules of negligence, nevertheless such companies are not insurers of the safety of the public. Reasoning - The death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence, and in some measure by the too close proximity of the “media agua” to the electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the “media agua.” Had the house owner followed the terms of the permit given him by the city for the construction of his “media agua”, the distance from the wires to the edge of said “media agua” would have been 3ft and 11 3/8 inches. - The company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said construction, and to change the installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance. - The violation of the permit for the construction was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it. The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. It is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so. He had training and experience for the job. He could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. - To hold the defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno, such supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate and principal cause of the accident. Disposition The appealed decision of the CA is reversed, and complaint against the Company dismissed.

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- The girl was taken to the provincial hospital. Despite his efforts, the child died that same night. - It was certified that the cause of death was "Burns, 3rd Degree, whole Body", and that the contributory causes were "Congestion of the Brain and visceras of the chest & abdomen.” - The defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow down the side of the street Gran Captain with the knowledge and consent of the authorities; that the cause of death was other than the hot water; and that in the death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and negligence. - The trial judge, however, after examination of the evidence presented by the defendants, failed to sustain their theory of the case, except as to the last mentioned special defense. He nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. ISSUE WON the action should be dismissed due to the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs

Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila dismissing the complaint on the merits filed in an action to recover damages for injuries FACTS - Due to a collision between the respective automobiles of Bernardo and Legaspi, the former filed an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by his car which he alleged were by reason of Legaspi's negligence in causing said collision. Legaspi, on the other hand, filed a cross-complaint alleging it was Bernardo's fault. He also asks for damages. - The lower court found upon the evidence that both the plaintiff and the defendant were negligent in handling their automobiles and that said negligence was of such a character and extent on the part of both as to prevent either from recovering. ISSUE WON the parties may recover damages HELD 1. NO - Where two automobiles, going in opposite directions, collide on turning a street corner, and it appears from the evidence and is found by the trial court that the drivers thereof were equally negligent and contributed equally to the principal occurrence as determining causes thereof, neither can recover of the other for damages suffered.

BERNAL V HOUSE 54 PHIL 327 MALCOLM; January 30, 1930
FACTS - Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal went to Tacloban, Leyte to attend the procession of Holy Friday. - After the procession, they, accompanied by two other persons, passed along a public street named Gran Capitan. - The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in advance of her mother and her friends. - While in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., an automobile appeared on which frightened the child. She turned to run, but fell into the street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House. - When the mother and her companions reached the child, they found her face downward in the hot water.

BERNARDO V LEGASPI 29 Phil 12 MORELAND; December 23, 1914
NATURE

HELD NO - The death of the child was the result of fault and negligence in permitting hot water to flow through the public streets, there to endanger the lives of passers-by who were unfortunately enough to fall into it - The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. - There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. - The doctrines announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages. DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from was in part be reversed and in the court of origin another judgment was issued in favor of Fortunata Enverso and against J.V. House for the amount of P1,000, and for the costs of both instances.

SEPARATE OPINION

torts & damages
ROMUALDEZ [dissent]
- Even taking the finding that the defendant by its negligence helped to bring about the accident which resulted in the death of the child Purificacion Bernal, plaintiff, by negligence, contributed to that most regrettable result. - Judgment appealed from should be affirmed.

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ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. - That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling, considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all. - It is settled that: The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means. - This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that: Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. - That presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner. - Even assuming that the cause of the collapse was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable because it was guilty of negligence, which the trial court denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure for one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence. Disposition Judgment was denying the instant petition with costs against petitioner.

GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION V CHATTO 210 SCRA 18 DAVIDE JR.; June 16, 1992
FACTS - Plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. - Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued. - Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day. - The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11. - Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, plaintiff went to Illinois, USA in July 1982 for further treatment. She was treated at the Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for about three (3) months during which time she had to return to the Cook County Hospital five (5) or, six (6) times. - Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect. - The trial court awarded actual or compensatory and moral damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. - Respondent Court found the appeal later filed to be without merit. - Its motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the respondent Court, petitioner filed the petition in the SC. ISSUE WON the collapse of the ceiling was caused by force majeur HELD

NO - Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. That Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure. - Definitions of force majeure as cited in Pons y Compañia vs. La Compañia Maritima: 1. Blackstone, in his Commentaries on English Law: Inevitable accident or casualty; an accident produced by any physical cause which is irresistible; such as lightning. tempest, perils of the sea, inundation, or earthquake; the sudden illness or death of a person. 2. Escriche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudenci,: The event which we could neither foresee nor resist; as for example, the lightning stroke, hail, inundation, hurricane, public enemy, attack by robbers; Vis major est, says Cayo, ea quae consilio humano neque provideri neque vitari potest. Accident and mitigating circumstances. 3. Bouvier: Any accident due to natural cause, directly exclusively without human intervention, such as could not have been prevented by any kind of oversight, pains and care reasonably to have been expected. 4. Corkburn, chief justice, in a well considered English case, said that were a captain uses all the known means to which prudent and experienced captains ordinarily have recourse, he does all that can be reasonably required of him; and if, under such circumstances, he is overpowered by storm or other natural agency, he is within the rule which gives immunity from the effects of such vis major. The term generally applies, broadly speaking, to natural accidents, such as those caused by lightning, earthquake, tempests, public enemy ,etc. -The real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he isincompetent. He is not an engineer, but an architect who had not even passed the government's examination. - Verily, post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the present proceedings. What is significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed by the respondent Court, that the collapse was due to construction defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding. - The building was constructed barely 4 years prior to the accident in question. It was not shown that any of the causes denominates as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the

PLDT V CA (SPS ESTEBAN) REGALADO; September 29, 1989 [CITATION]
NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the resolution of the Court of Appeals. FACTS

In addition. it would not have hit the accident mound > That plaintiffs’ jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit the ACCIDENT MOUND could have been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street to the south of the ACCIDEN MOUND. but a by-stander Mangyao saw the incident and shouted at the appellant to stop. some behind or at it sides and some pulling the cars in the front by a rope. if any. > Plaintiffs’ jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as plaintiff husband claimed.PLDT. he was found to have contributed in some degree to the injury inflicted. Atlantic.Genobiagon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. at about 7:30 PM.Genobiagon claims CA erred in not finding that the reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate cause of the accident which led to her death ISSUES WON contributory negligence can be used as defense by Genobiagon HELD RAKES V ATLANTIC [CITATION] [PONENTE] NATURE Action for damages FACTS . breaking his leg. but as appellant's vehicle was going so fast not only because of the steep down-grade of the road. . He ran after appellant when the latter refused to stop. and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. there were no side guards on the cars to keep the rails from slipping off.000.The alleged contributory negligence of the victim. the tie broke. Its original decision.The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident. an independent contractor which undertook the said construction work. promulgated on September 25. legs and face. Mckenna. who fell at the middle of the road.The accident was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. although not as the primary cause. since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence (People vs. No. FACTS . 1980. ." (People vs. the appellant's rig bumped the old woman. She was then loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital where she died 3 hours later. This was reported to the foreman. As Rakes was walking along the car’s side when the accident occurred. .' The appellant went back to the place where the old woman was struck by his rig. Quiñones. The old woman started to cross when the first rig was approaching her.July 30. 1959. 1968 – Jeep of Esteban spouses ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench. Overtaking the appellant.Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms.On Dec 31. Mangyao asked him why he bumped the old woman and his answer was. At one point. The appellant continued to drive on. is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. .43 - prof. The old woman was unconscious. 44 O. is L. but also because he was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him. Disposition resolutions of respondent CA. the car canted and the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff who was walking by the car’s side. an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. the windshield of the jeep was shattered.R. while the respondent husband suffered cut lips. Costs against petitioner. ISSUE WON the Esteban spouses can claim damages from PLDT HELD NO Ratio A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof.R. if at all. 1990 and September 3. 1957 NATURE Petition for review of the CA’s decision affirming the conviction of the petitioner of the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence. CA-G. CA affirmed .torts & damages . GENOBIAGON V CA (PEOPLE OF THE PHILS) 178 SCRA 422 GRIÑO-AQUINO. Reasoning . .G. ISSUE WON there was contributory negligence on the part of petitioner . October 22. March 29. which was later amputated at the knee. as one of its determining factors. then plaintiff husband had not exercised the deligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident. dated March 11. . > Jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. 1979. does not exonerate the accused. in its answer. > If the accident did not happen because the jeep was running quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over the ACCIDENT MOUND. The appellant's rig was following another at a distance of two meters. Rakes. leaving a permanent scar on her cheek. are hereby SET ASIDE. A2010 .Atlantic contends that the remedy for injury through negligence lies only in a criminal action against the official directly responsible and that the employer be held only subsidiarily liable. 321. but it had not been proven that Atlantic inspected the track or had any proper system of inspection. . The men were hauling the rails on 2 hand cars. .The plaintiff. Also. the track sagged. 1520) Disposition the appealed decision is affirmed with modification as to the civil liability of the petitioner which is hereby increased to P30.TC ruled in favor of Esteban spouses whereas the CA reversed the ruling.The plaintiff’s witness alleged that a noticeable depression in the track had appeared after a typhoon. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence.However. he could have braked the vehicle the moment it struck the ACCIDENT MOUND. 1947). Orbeta. Barte and Company. 'it was the old woman that bumped him. the company’s officers and 3 of the workers testified that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all against walking by the side of cars. casis NO . a rig driven by Genobiagon bumped an old woman who was crossing the street. If it had remained on that inside lane. denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be held responsible. . was at work transporting iron rails from the harbor in Manila. one of a group of 8 AfricanAmerican laborers in the employment of defendant."The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence. At that speed.

) 269 SCRA 695 HERMOSISIMA JR. in validating the deposit slips. there being fault or negligence. This doctrine.It was this negligence of Ms. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter Reasoning .the case stems from a complaint filed by Rommel’s Marketing Corporation (RMC) to recover from the former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) the sum of P304. Yabut. .44 - prof. produces the injury. petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. Yabut to Ms. it appears that the bank's teller. she would simply fill up the blank space later on. . Ms. he never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's validation procedures. . In the testimony of Mr. . Undoubtedly. but only in reduction of his damages. 1975 to July. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another.The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits should not relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility. Ms. Bank of the Phil. Rather than readily validating the incomplete duplicate copy. 1983. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. original or duplicate. .500.979. 1997 NATURE Petition for review challenging the CA decision affirming the RTC decision in a civil case FACTS . or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. which. and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity. . Unfortunately. -The negligence of the injured person contributing to his injury but not being one of the determining causes of the principal accident. . but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other.Trial court assessed that damages to plaintiff amount to PhP5. this is gross. March 14. . line and sinker the too shallow excuse of Ms. to the effect that. does not operate as a bar to recovery. Court of Appeals. the amount fairly attributable to his own negligence. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause.000. A2010 . wanton. coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller. despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips. at times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril").74. would do. as insisted by the petitioners. presented by Ms. The law considers what would be reckless. which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent. Mabayad. absent the act of Ms.Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic. or when it is impossible to SEPARATE OPINION WILLARD AND CARSON [dissent] . . Ratio Art. Azucena Mabayad. is obliged to pay for the damage done. . 2176.It was in fact only when he testified in this case in February. Each party is chargeable with damages in proportion to his fault. then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner. to the tune of P304. or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.The proximate cause of the loss was the negligent act of the bank. The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information — that of the name of the account holder — should have already put Ms. or some other person for whose acts he must respond. officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. in natural and continuous sequence." In this case. this was not how bank teller Mabayad proceeded thus resulting in huge losses to the private respondent. states that where both parties are negligent. both original and duplicate. common sense. She should not have been so naive in accepting hook. casis slip was left blank while that in the original was filled up. Such fault or negligence. and inexcusable negligence in the appellant bank's supervision of its employees. in essence.the negligence of the defendant alone was insufficient to cause the accident—it also required the negligence of the plaintiff. was negligent in validating. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. Azucena Mabayad.Applying the above test. 11 A "reasonable man of ordinary prudence" 12 would not have given credence to such explanation and would have insisted that the space left blank be filled up as a condition for validation.979.Petitioner had walked along the side of the car despite a prohibition to do so by the foreman. as testified to by Ms.There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs.In the case at bench. while he ordered the investigation of the incident. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man. Mabayad on guard. notwithstanding the fact that one of the deposit slips was not completely accomplished. . Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms.74 representing various deposits it had made in its current account with the bank but which were not credited.torts & damages HELD YES . 1976) that bank manager Bonifacio admittedly became aware of the practice of his teller Mabayad of validating blank deposit slips. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip. Romeo Bonifacio.Test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not.Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. or after the lapse of more than seven (7) years counted from the period when the funds in question were deposited in plaintiff's accounts (May. Irene Yabut to the effect that since the duplicate copy was only for her personal record. policy and precedent. . plaintiff should not be afforded relief PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE V CA (ROMMEL’S MARKETING CORP. Azucena Mabayad. then he is guilty of negligence.LAST CLEAR CHANCE: under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to. blameworthy. Mabayad herself. she should have proceeded more cautiously by being more probing as to the true reason why the name of the account holder in the duplicate . 17 defines proximate cause as "that cause. allegedly due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of the petitioner bank. (b) fault or negligence of the defendant. Islands v. there is no dispute as to the damage suffered by the private respondent. suffered by the private respondent RMC — petitioner bank's negligence or that of private respondent's? HELD . . SC deducted PhP2. thru its teller Ms. and without which the result would not have occurred. Because of this. ISSUE What is the proximate cause of the loss. and were instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas. Mabayad.

said act only served to cover-up the loss already caused by her to RMC. assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. is not contributory but the immediate and proximate cause of its injury. private respondent should. her employer. Irene Yabut. But if his negligence was only contributory. to wit: . the bank was not remiss in its duty of sending monthly bank statements to private respondent RMC so that any error or discrepancy in the entries therein could be brought to the bank's attention at the earliest opportunity. but with the account name purposely left blank by Yabut. the genuineness and due execution of the document become an issue in resolving whether or not the transaction had been fair and regular and whether the ordinary course of business had been followed by the bank. detached the validated depositor's stub on the original deposit slip and allowed Yabut to retain the whole validated duplicate deposit slip that bore the same account number as the original deposit slip. tampered with its account number. SEPARATE OPINION PADILLA [dissent] . then the teller proceeded to verify whether the current account number matched with the current account name as written in the deposit slip. as what the law presumes. Both parts were detachable from each other. In all other respects. not a last possible chance. the appellate court's decision is AFFIRMED. Thus. Precisely. when there is a clear evidence of tampering with any of the material entries in a deposit slip. Azucena Mabayad the amount they would pay the private respondent. Irene Yabut. In short. ." it is my considered view that the doctrine assumes that the negligence of the defendant was subsequent to the negligence of the plaintiff and the same must be the proximate cause of the injury. but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. the date of the deposit. shall be borne by private respondent RMC. the plaintiff may recover damages. Had it done so. PBC's deposit slip. except the award of P25. it cannot be denied that. It must have been a chance as would have enabled a reasonably prudent man in like position to have acted effectively to avoid the injury and the resulting damage to himself. its employee.In the case at bar. banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care. Disposition the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is modified by reducing the amount of actual damages private respondent is entitled to by 40%. the name of the depositor or current account holder. The upper part was called the depositor's stub and the lower part was called the bank copy. particularly Romeo Lipana.It seems that an innocent bank teller is being unduly burdened with what should fall on Ms. it was the criminal act of Yabut that directly caused damage to RMC. it was only after the transaction was posted in the ledger that the teller proceeded to machine validate the deposit slip and then affix his signature or initial to serve as proof of the completed transaction. In view of this. casis but for a personal record to complement the original validated depositor's stub. Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors. . or after the deposit slip was validated by the teller in favor of Yabut's husband. and the amount of the deposit either in cash or in checks. 40% of the damage awarded by the respondent appellate court. Private respondent shall have recourse against Ms. only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the petitioners. Petitioners may recover from Ms. could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.The legal or proximate cause of RMC's loss was when Yabut. Thus.In the case of banks. had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client. who had the last fair chance. or bar a defense against liability sought by another.45 - prof. yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank. but because it was purposely negligent as it admitted that it does not normally check bank statements given by banks.It was private respondent who had the last and clear chance to prevent any further misappropriation by Yabut had it only reviewed the status of its current accounts on the bank statements sent to it monthly or regularly. . the rightful owner of such deposited funds. the company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. when Yabut wrote the name of RMC on the blank account name on the validated duplicate copy of the deposit slip.It should be noted that the teller validated the depositor's stub in the upper portion and the bank copy on the lower portion on both the original and duplicate copies of the deposit slips presented by Yabut. to avoid the accident or injury. A2010 . Private respondent failed to examine these bank statements not because it was prevented by some cause in not doing so. The deposit slip was prepared and signed by the depositor or his representative. if the latter. Stated otherwise. . simply by faithfully observing their selfimposed validation procedure.The foregoing notwithstanding.Since Yabut deposited money in cash.000. . had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. it is not disputed that each time Yabut would transact business with PBC's tellers. as issued in 1975. thru its teller. If it did.00 attorney's fees. The rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of. we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio. . . he cannot recover damages. not the validation of the deposit slip by the teller as the deposit slip was made out by Yabut in her husband's name and to his account.Thus.In the earlier days before the age of full computerization. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent 23 under A2179 CC. The award of attorney's fees shall be borne exclusively by the petitioner. the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father of a family. . . as advanced by the petitioner. . deposited the money of RMC in her husband's name and account number instead of that of RMC. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC. The teller. the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care.LAST CLEAR CHANCE: As for the doctrine of "last clear chance.torts & damages determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident. however. on the assumption that it would serve no other purpose JUNTILLA V FONTANAR . had two parts. therefore. there must be a last and a clear chance. a bank normally maintained a ledger which served as a repository of accounts to which debits and credits resulting from transactions with the bank were posted from books of original entry. . and superimposed RMC's account number. Irene Yabut from liability when in fact she orchestrated the entire fraud on RMC. Here. who indicated therein the current account number to which the deposit was to be credited. the usual bank procedure then was for the teller to count whether the cash deposit tallied with the amount written down by the depositor in the deposit slip. Since a sizable amount of cash was entrusted to Yabut.Going back to Yabut's modus operandi. who should have been charged with estafa or estafa through falsification of private document. RMC's own employee. thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company. . the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. Its negligence. her employer? . indeed. have taken ordinary care of its concerns. she would accomplish two (2) copies of the current account deposit slip. Why is RMC insulating Ms. at least. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury.

whenever it appears that the defect would have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which HERNANDEZ V COMMISSION ON AUDIT 179 SCRA 39 CRUZ. v. Disposition Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.In the case at bar. According to this theory. The respondents then appealed to the CFI of Cebu. therefore. with a due regard for all the circumstances. Banzon.” This conclusion is based on a misapprehension of overall facts. 2. For the purposes of this doctrine. injuries on his left arm. or if it can be foreseen. The records show that this obligation was not met by the respondents. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire. There is also evidence to show that the passenger jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident. alleging that the accident was beyond their control taking into account that the tire that exploded was newly bought and slightly used at the time it blew up. et al. It must be impossible to foresee the even which constitutes the caso fortuito. He estimated that the money would be available by 10am and that he would be back in Ternate by about 2pm of the same day. . It was while the vehicle was along EDSA that two persons with knives boarded and forcibly took the money he was carrying. He opted for the second. right thigh and on his back and also found this “Omega” wrist watch was lost. it must be impossible to avoid 3. WON the CFI erred in absolving the carrier from any liability upon a finding that the tire blow out is a fortuitous event 2. Hernandez was the officer-in-charge and special disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach Project of the Philippine Tourism Authority in Cavite. . after the initial shock. 1989 NATURE A petition to reverse Commission on Audit’s denial of relief FACTS . . May 31. the processing of the checks was completed only at 3pm. “ not only are the rulings of the CA in Rodriguez v Red Line Trans. this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. Co. immediately followed in desperate pursuit. When he came back to his senses. hence this appeal.Petitioner Roberto Juntilla was sitting a the front seat of a jeepney (driven by one Berfol Camoro. The obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor Reasoning . But the hold-upper who . registered under the franchise of Clemente Fontanar. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence. et al. YES . thinking it the safer one.Teodoro M. The petitioner decided nevertheless to encash them because the Project employees would be waiting for their pay the following day. Petitioner’s MFR was denied. it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. with regard to inspection and application of the necessary tests. the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the human will.Petitioner then filed a civil case for breach of contract with damages before the City Court of Cebu against Fontanar. The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner 4. or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation. We agree with the observation of the petitioner that a public utility jeep running at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up. which reversed the judgment upon a finding that the accident in question was due to a fortuitous event. et al. or (2) take the money with him to his house in Marilao. using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person. and leave for Ternate the following morning. he collected the cash value of the checks. He took a passenger jeep bound for his house in Bulacan. as far as regards the work of constructing the appliance. The petitioner stated that there were 3 passengers in the front seat and 14 in the rear. who filed their answer. and by entering into the said contract. must be independent of the human will 2.While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the tire were still visible.It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage.” In the case at bar. November 6. casis under the circumstances was incumbent upon it. but actually owned by Fernando Banzon) when its right rear tire exploded causing it to turn turtle.Relative to the contingency of mechanical defects. the manufacturer is considered as being in law the agent or servant of the carrier. However. The petitioner had two choices: (1) return to Cavite that same afternoon and arrive there in the early evening. not binding on this Court but they were also based on considerations quite different from those that obtain in the case at bar. Plaintiff was thrown out of the vehicle and lost consciousness upon landing on the ground. Decision of City Court is REINSTATED ditch immediately after its right rear tire exploded. Bulacan. And so. NO Ratio A caso fortuito (fortuitous event) presents the following essential characteristics: 1. Hernandez.The CFI relied on the ruling of the CA in Rodriguez v Red Line Transportation Co. WON the accident was due to a fortuitous event HELD 1. there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents. Alvarez was subsequently charged with robbery and pleaded guilty. He went to Danao city and upon arrival there he entered the City Hospital to attend to his injuries and asked his father-in-law to go to site of the accident to look for his watch but the watch was nowhere to be found. Paras. we held in Necesito. The evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident.46 - prof. The sudden blowing-up. 1985 NATURE Petition to review the decision of CFI of Cebu FACTS . that “a tire blow-out does not constitute negligence unless the tire was already old and should not have been used at all. He went to the main office in Manila to encash 2 checks covering the wages of the employees and the operating expenses of the Project. The records show that the passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a A2010 . Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles not to exceed safe and legal speed limits and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times. that: “The preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer. In La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. and Camoro. He caught up with Virgilio Alvarez and overcame him after a scuffle.City Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. We held that. spend the night there. v De Jesus. the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. . ISSUES 1. he found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm. . could have been caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident..torts & damages 136 SCRA 624 GUITERREZ JR. No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents.

denied the petitioner's request. as an act.3 . based on common sense and our own experiences. agreeing that Hernandez had not committed any negligence or. To sustain that proposition is to introduce sacrilege in our jurisprudence. assuming he was guilty of contributory negligence. Jesus Lim Ong. "C") issued by Dr. if only because his home in Marilao was much nearer than his office in Ternate. admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed. An officer who fails to comply with this requirement shall not be relieved of liability or allowed credit for any such loss in the settlement of his accounts. incompetent. casis entering the theater.Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. To Our mind. had made up for it with his efforts to retrieve the money and his capture of one of the robbers. and without any mystic ability to peer into the future.Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day. that the likelihood of robbery during the time in question was stronger in Ternate than in Marilao. Its 3 Section 638.00 under the accountability of Mr. Tantuico." Having interposed it as a defense. or our intuition. ISSUE WON petitioner’s acts are so tainted with negligence or recklessness as to justify the denial of the petitioner's request for relief from accountability for the stolen money HELD NO . it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. all we can rely on is a reasoned conjecture of what might happen. the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. That Mr. Per Medico Legal Certificate (Exh. ISSUES 1. Verily. owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the contention is that the petitioner should not have encashed the checks as the hour was already late and he knew he could not return to Ternate before nightfall. and her 15-year old daughter. Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater. the loss of said cash thru robbery could have been aborted. . Ong about the cause of the collapse of the ceiling of their theater cannot be equated. WON Jesus Lim Ong’s investigation maybe given weight in the trial 2.47 - prof. A2010 . Shocked and hurt. The decision he made seemed logical at that time and was one that could be expected of a reasonable and prudent person. shall present his application for relief. the loss of the P10. jr. It could not have collapsed without a cause. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he is. . GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION V CHATTO 210 SCRA 18 DAVIDE JR. Ernesto G.however. Brion.On his decision to take the money home that afternoon instead of returning directly to Ternate. He is not an engineer. the petitioner was assuming a risk from which he cannot now be excused after the loss of the money as a result of the robbery to which it was unreasonably exposed. Hernandez claims that the respondent COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying him relief and in holding him negligent for the loss of the stolen money. 1982 Gloria E. of God. For most of us. and did. but the Court feels he should not be blamed for that. . according as a matter is within the original jurisdiction of the one or the other. NO .then Solicitor-General argued that Hernandez was negligent in the safekeeping of the stolen funds. 1992 NATURE Petition for Review FACTS . Lina Delza E. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect. ACCORDINGLY. . as the respondent Court impliedly held. especially on that busy highway. The memo concludes that in deciding to take the money with him to Marilao after imprudently withdrawing it from the main office.In the afternoon of June 4. observing inter alia: In the instant case. Credit for loss occurring in transit or due to casualty — Notice to Auditor.there was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial civil and structural engineers on the cause of the collapse of the theater's ceiling. Chatto.175. Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. and within thirty days or such longer period as the Auditor. however. Jesus Lim Ong is not an engineer. Mr. through then Chairman Francisco S. They bought balcony tickets but even then were unable to find seats considering the number of people patronizing the movie. that what happened was a fortuitous event that could not have reasonably been foreseen. invoking the foregoing facts. the real reason why Mr. filed a request for relief from money accountability under Section 638 of the Revised Administrative Code. theft. or the provincial auditor. the Commission on Audit. they transferred to the UST hospital. So it was with the petitioner. his successor sided with the petitioner. or other casualty.torts & damages escaped is still at large and the stolen money he took with him has not been recovered.COA insists that the petitioner should not be relieved from his money accountability because it was his own negligence that led to the loss of the cash he had sought to take not to Ternate but to Marilao. . In fine. the petition is GRANTED. may in the particular case allow.The next day. the ignorance of Mr. he says that the first course was more prudent as he saw it. Hardly ten (10) minutes after . Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure.In the petition at bar. with the available evidence in support thereof. the officer accountable therefor or having custody thereof shall immediately notify the Auditor General. who was eventually convicted. June 16.This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by the said provisions. if you will. It does not appear he has passed the government examination for architects. NO . He avers he has done only what any reasonable man would have done and should not be held accountable for a fortuitous event over which he had no control. plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling.the petitioner.It is true that the petitioner miscalculated. which is the normal procedure in the handling of public funds. . Hernandez can be attributed to his negligence because had he brought the cash proceeds of the checks (replenishment fund) to the Beach Park in Ternate immediately after encashment for safekeeping in his office. but an architect who had not even passed the government's examination. 2. — When a loss of government funds or property occurs while the same is in transit or is caused by fire. plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto suffered the following injuries: . The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11. . WON the collapse was due to force majeure HELD 1. Disposition The petitioner is entitled to be relieved from accountability for the money forcibly taken from him. or provincial auditor. He is a graduate of architecture from the St. Later. something that could not have been reasonably foreseen although it could have happened. Louie University in Baguio City.

ordering Philippine Steam to pay for damages. A2010 . the agreement contained in the above quoted Clause 14 is a mere iteration of the basic principle of law written in Article 1 1 7 4 of the Civil Code4 Thus. .B. Negros Occidental several cargoes (cavans of rice. defines 'caso fortuito' as 'an event that takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk." In the case at bar. 'Such provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage. . p. ISSUE WON the above stipulation validly limits the liability of the shipowner in this case HELD YES Ratio The parties may stipulate anything in the contract for so long as the stipulation is not contrary to law. Except in cases expressly specified by the law. Civil Code. IV. (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. 462. 1962 Ed. he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. he gives his consent. as the plane ticket in the case at bar. Philippine Steam on the other hand relies on the following: Clause 14. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding. Examples of this are destruction of houses. also in relation to contracts. the loss is chargeable against the appellant.. p. 1982 NATURE This appeal. Vol. 1963. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. . affirmed by the respondent Court. violence of robbers. . appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed. 1963. .This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured. declaring appellant Philippine Steam Navigation liable for damages for the loss of the 4 Article 1174. inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. must be independent of the human will.In its dissertation of the phrase 'caso fortuito' the Enciclopedia Juridicada Espanola 5 says: "In a legal sense and. seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Cases Nos. appellees Clara Uy Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on board the appellant's vessel for carriage from Manila to Pulupandan. the obligor is exempt from liability for non-performance. are contracts not entirely prohibited. It is what is known as a contract of 'adhesion'. and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the defendant. morals. unexpected fire. 49). toys etc) as evidenced by the corresponding bills of lading issued by the appellant. fire .The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises. were inevitable. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage caused by force majeure. and that they did not sign the same. 3 where the Court held that while it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket . It was not shown that any of the causes denominates as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation. . the antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil Code. 1979. The latter could not have foreseen the event." (Tolentino. The stipulation which merely iterates the principle of caso fortuito is for all intents and purposes valid.' . and since the burning of the warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees. FACTS . the lower court rendered a decision.It is settled that . . 7354 and 7428. 1951. Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan. no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen. dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters. The building was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the accident in question. though foreseen. that the collapse was due to construction defects.We sustain the validity of the above stipulation. public enemies.Besides. The court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736. (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the 'caso fortuito'. said warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown origin. At about 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day. in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other. Negros Occidental. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless such loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. complete and in good order. The Partidas. however. and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation'. casis letters on the back-of the bills of lading. What is significant is the finding of the trial court. appellee Uy Bico was able to take delivery of 907 cavans of rice Appellees' claims for the value of said goods were rejected by the appellant.On the bases of the foregoing facts. if he adheres.L. Reyes. Justice J. originally brought to the Court of Appeals. a 'caso fortuito' presents the following essential characteristics: (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence. 31. Reasoning . That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction. where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss. appellees' cargoes as a result of a fire which gutted the Bureau of Customs' warehouse in Pulupandan. Ong. . consequently. and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. Disposition judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the instant petition with costs against petitioner.torts & damages present proceedings. Lawyer's Journal. the cargoes were discharged. destroying appellees' cargoes..48 - prof.Appellees would contend that the above stipulation does not bind them because it was printed in fine SERVANDO V PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO 117 SCRA 832 ESCOLIN. especially as regards the ceiling. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely. the doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had been exercised. . or which. Jan. there is nothing therein that is contrary to law. unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs.. considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all. promulgated June 29. colored papers. war. Before the fire. there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. This argument overlooks the pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu vs. citing Mr. the burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened independently of the will of the appellant. its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. in the morning of November 18. or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation. it must be impossible to avoid. . morals or public policy. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. or if it can be foreseen. public policy. Court of Appeals. His answers to the leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said.On November 6. shipwreck.

"and that the 24 October 1978 'early warning notice" supposedly sent to the affected municipalities. . 27290-93. negligence.incurred in delay in the performance of its obligation. YES .given that NPC is guilty of negligence. Disposition judgment appealed from is hereby set aside. the whole occurrence is thereby humanized.torts & damages . until the consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods and has had reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose of them".in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised. YES . the shipping company had no more control and responsibility over the goods after they were deposited in the customs warehouse by the arrastre and stevedoring operator.From the time the goods in question were deposited in the Bureau of Customs' warehouse in the morning of their arrival up to two o' clock in the afternoon of the same day.written notices were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about the impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and advising them to take the necessary Precautions . casis incident subject of the instant petition. Nakipil & Sons vs.' the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor. 2. .R. et al. Court of Appeals. pursuant to such demand. . Thus. slovenliness." they failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam . had reasonable opportunity to remove the goods. In fact. A2010 . delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code. The court there declared that the proximate cause of the loss and damage sustained by the plaintiffs therein--who were similarly situated as the private respondents hereinwas the negligence of the petitioners. It appears that appellant had not only notified appellees of the arrival of their shipment. was insufficient. et al.the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid greater damage to people and property . Plaintiffs claim: . is found to be in part the result of the participation of man whether it be from active intervention or neglect.NPC operated and maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River . May 21. No amount of extraordinary diligence on the part of the carrier could have prevented the loss of the goods by fire which was of accidental origin. the latter having no control whatsoever over the same. Servando and Clara Uy Bico. or failure to act. .I concur. vs.In the Nakpil case it was held that "To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code.There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier . and the magnitude of the water released. the same notice involved in the case at bar. public respondent found as conclusively established that indeed. diligence and prudence in the operation and maintenance of the hydroelectric plant . 1174-1175). (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. (1 Corpus Juris. (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable. WON (applying the ruling of NAkpil & Sons v. the obligor cannot escape liability. and carelessness. When the effect. when the warehouse was burned. Court of Appeals is still good law as far as the concurrent liability of an obligor in the case of force majeure is concerned. NATIONAL POWER CORP V CA (RAYO ET AL) DAVIDE JR. pp. and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. Nor can the appellant or its employees be charged with negligence. if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God. together with their animals Respondents comments: . they could still not contain or control the flood that resulted .49 - prof. the cause of which is to be considered." and that "the extent of the opening of the spillways. Amparo C. CV Nos.When the water level in the Angat dam went beyond the allowable limit at the height of typhoon Kading NPC opened three of the dam’s spillways to release the excess water in the dam. or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. it would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant. are all but products of defendants-appellees headlessness.NPC exercised due care.when the said water level went beyond the maximum allowable limit at the height of the typhoon. Clara had removed more than one-half of the rice consigned to her. but had demanded that the same be withdrawn. the defendants suddenly. for a breach of an obligation due to an 'act of God. and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in.despite the defendants' knowledge of the impending entry of typhoon "Kading. . appellee Uy Bico had taken delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the burning of the warehouse. WON NPC was guilty of negligence 2. as it were. This however caused the inundation of the banks of the Angat river which caused persons and animals to drown and properties to be washed away. imprudence and negligence in the management and operation of Angat Dam. Disposition Petition dismissed.on the basis of its meticulous analysis and evaluation of the evidence a dduced by the parties in the cases subject of CA-G.NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection of its employees .A similar case entitled National Power Corporation. Under article 1738 of the Civil Code "the extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues to be operative even during the time the goods are stored in the warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination.The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are.the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in the nature and character of damnum absque injuria. the consignees. SEPARATE OPINION AQUINO [concur] ." involving the very same SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE V CA . thereby releasing a large amount of water which inundated the banks of the Angat River causing the death of members of the household of the plaintiffs.The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent release by the defendants of water through the spillways of the Angst Dam (Hydroelectric Plant). Since the warehouse belonged to and was maintained by the government. the petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of foresight. Juan F. ISSUES 1. 1993 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court FACTS . The storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the appellees was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent. to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. negligently and recklessly opened three (3) of the dam's spillways. which results in loss or damage.. CA) NPC is liable given that the inundation was caused by force majeure HELD 1. Moreover. there concurs a corresponding fraud.

receiving the heaviest impact of the strong winds. there are other steel bars which were not even bent to the trusses. storms. we proceed to determine whether petitioner was negligent.Petitioner cannot be held liable for the damages suffered by the private respondents. et al. and furthermore. casis cannot be invoked for the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences.v[17] or the omission to do something which a prudent and reasonable man. such that if it were not.vi[19] not merely by presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact.00. It may be the failure to observe that degree of care. is “in tip-top condition”. typhoon “Saling” was “an act of God and therefore beyond human control” such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages wrought thereby. Reyna. One of the factors that may have led to this calamitous event is the formation of the buildings in the area and the general direction of the wind. Pasay City. Jesus L. As the term imparts. An act of God . we find exception to this rule and hold that the lower courts misappreciated the evidence proffered.” .”iv . etc. precaution. petitioner averred that subject school building had withstood several devastating typhoons and other calamities in the past. And so they sought to recover from petitioner P117. with the strong winds having a westerly direction. . at about 6:30 in the morning. Engr.There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event. notwithstanding the general rule that factual findings by the trial court. and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.It then recommended that “to avoid any further loss and damage to lives. was. When the effect is found to be partly the result of the participation of man – whether it be from active intervention. Southeastern College. vs.000. it is necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned. thus. In order to be exempt from liability arising from any adverse consequence engendered thereby. merely relied on the aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of petitioner’s school building after the typhoon. were inevitable. is not always reflective of the real cause to their house rendered the same uninhabitable. Except in cases expressly specified by the law. . the person seeking exoneration from liability must not be guilty of negligence.”iii[9] Escriche elaborates it as “an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted.. the general formation of the buildings becomes a big funnel-like structure. The Resolution under attack denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. for damages based on culpa aquiliana. would do. there should have been no human participation amounting to a negligent act. those located on both ends of the building. in establishing the culpability of petitioner. Thus. that it has not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that said school building. faculty members. . the damage caused to private respondents’ house could have been avoided? . within legal contemplation. such as earthquakes.torts & damages PURISIMA. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence.00. as actual damages. as moral damages. floods. Buffeted by very strong winds. P1.000. though foreseen. as follows: “5. such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event.” .000. de Dimaano.In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability. which provides: “Art 1174. Still.000. private respondents alleged that the damage A2010 . 1996 of the Court of Appeals in “Juanita de Jesus vda. plus costs. no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen. those trusses are not anchored at all to the roof beams. or which. without its roofing or any portion thereof giving way. forcing them to stay temporarily in others’ houses. Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason for the dislodging of the roofings structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the said trusses to the roof beams.000. attack by bandits. this Court believes otherwise.” . a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of foresight. are binding and conclusive upon this Court. From these premises. as exemplary damages and P100. guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. After a careful scrutiny of the records and the pleadings submitted by the parties. landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents’ house. 1989 stated. the roof of petitioner’s building was partly ripped off and blown away. After the typhoon had passed. Thus. especially when affirmed by the appellate court. diligence or care.The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the ocular inspection made by the city engineer. robbery.In their Complaintii[6] before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. limbs and property of persons living in the vicinity. which houses school children. and Resolution dated September 12. ISSUES WON the damage on the roof of the building of private respondents resulting from the impact of the falling portions of the school building’s roof ripped off by the strong winds of typhoon “Saling”. an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or viewing. due to fortuitous event HELD YES . 1996. Private respondents. July 10.The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the Partidas which defines it as “an event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. is conduct which naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. When a person’s negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to another. and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. it bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence causative of his injury or loss. there are portions of the roofing.000. or failure to act – the whole occurrence is hereby humanized. Tolentino adds that “[f]ortuitous events may be produced by two general causes: (1) by nature.” the fourth floor of subject school building be declared as a “structural hazard. which reduced the moral damages awarded below from P1. The 1/2” diameter steel bars embedded on the concrete roof beams which serve as truss anchorage are not bolted nor nailed to the trusses. P300. for and as attorney’s fees. and employees.At the outset. On October 11. which remained intact after the storm. Inc. This conclusion finds support in Article 1174 of the Civil Code. absent any negligence on its part.50 - prof. or neglect.00.00. 1998 NATURE Petition for review seeking to set aside the Decision promulgated on July 31.000. the one situated along College Road. Situated in the peripheral lot is an almost U-shaped formation of 4-storey building.In its Answer. Hence. Negligence.After a thorough study and evaluation of the evidence on record. a powerful typhoon “Saling” hit Metro Manila. and (2) by the act of man. an ocular inspection of the destroyed buildings was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official. such as an armed invasion. In other words. .vii[20] What is visual to the eye though. epidemics. Branch 117.”. 6. governmental prohibitions.00 to P200. Pertinent aspects of the latter’s Reporti[5] dated October 18. or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk.00.Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road. fires.” Civilist Arturo M. while petitioner owns a fourstorey school building along the same College Road. FACTS . etc. or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation. as commonly understood. 1989. this appeal.116.

and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable of fault under article 1902 only if he had been negligent or at the same code. plaintiff contends that art. . 1967.” The action was filed by the sister of Loreto. the owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger. and contended that the mishap was due neither to Loreto’s own fault nor to force majeure. Hence. But the complaint contains no allegation on those points. . 1905 does not distinguish between damage caused to a stranger and damage caused to the caretaker and makes the owner liable whether or not he has been negligent or at fault. November 29. .The lower court took the view that under the abovequoted provision of the CC. Power Plant Engineer of NPC at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant. The present action.In a decision of the Spanish SC. casis voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences. 1989 FACTS . Nor did they conclusively establish that the construction of such building was basically flawed. “This liability shall cease only in case the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it.” . (Nana Belen) went to her store. Neither did they prove any substantial deviation from the approved plans and specifications. noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or shortcircuited lines. 1967. In the afternoon. We thus hold that petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon “Saling” was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents’ house. two girls (sales girlls) attempted to help. the death of an employee who was bitten by a feline which his master had asked him to take to his establishment was by said tribunal declared to be “a veritable accident of labor” which should come under the labor laws rather than under article 1905. For the statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for “any damages it may cause” and this for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage. the animal was in the custody and under the control of the caretaker. it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone. Reasoning .1905. Obviously. NO Ratio It was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone. the appeal. he could not see any INELCO lineman.6AM June 29.Moreover. even if such animal should escape from him or stray away. . he was “gored by one of them and later died as consequence of his injuries. is not brought under labor laws in effect.Spouses moved for dismissal for lack of cause of action. Yabes. 1902. While tending the animals. there was a hollow wound. . Wading in waist-deep flood. other than the said ocular inspection. Private respondents did not even show that the plans. if action is to be based on Art. 1967 . we find no clear and convincing evidence to sustain the judgment of the appellate court. Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the ground.Claiming that the lower court was in error. however. Rigor mortis was setting in. Five Sisters Emporium.Engineer Juan. obviously. it could not have withstood long years and several typhoons even stronger than “Saling. If subject school building’s roofing was not firmly anchored to its trusses. who was paid for his work as such. including himself. is liable for any damages it may cause.In the present case. one who hears a gunshot and then sees a wounded person. to look after the merchandise to see if they were damaged.This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an animal.2183 ) as ground for the liability: “The possessor of an animal. including himself.She uses Art. When he went to INELCO office. 2183. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had 5 ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY V CA (LUIS ET AL) 179 SCRA 5 PARAS. although it may escape or be lost. For instance. no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of petitioner’s school building. Her companions.In light of the foregoing. Loreto Afialda was the caretaker of the carabaos of spouses Hisole.4AM June 29. CC. the dangling wire was no longer there. On the left palm of the deceased. who has been in the city government service since 1974.The distinction (between stranger and caretaker) is important. .51 5 prof. specifications and design of said school building were deficient and defective.1905. which the CFI granted. Art. . CC (now Art. ISSUE WON the owner of the animal is liable when the damage is caused to its caretaker (as opposed to a stranger) HELD 1. It could have been self-inflicted or caused accidentally by a stray bullet. The body was recovered about two meters from an electric post. or the one who uses the same. it is essential that there be fault or negligence on the part of the defendants as owners of the animal that caused the damage. but under Art. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause. The relationship of cause and effect must be clearly shown. . This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.In the present case. 1949 NATURE Appeal from judgment of CFI Iloilo FACTS . AFIALDA V HISOLE 85 Phil 67 REYES. admitted in open court that no complaint regarding any defect on the same structure has ever been lodged before his office prior to the institution of the case at bench. Juan attempted to resuscitate Nana Belen but his efforts proved futile. Isabel Lao Juan. .he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection and saw grounded and disconnected lines. It is a matter of judicial notice that typhoons are common occurrences in this country.torts & damages behind. November 6. . A2010 . . And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.6-6:30AM June 29. .5. Juan suddenly screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water.” . cannot always definitely conclude that a third person shot the victim. cited by Manresa.On the other hand. but were afraid because they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. the son-in law. upon hearing the electrocution of his mother-in-law. passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current.strong typhoon "Gening" in Ilocos Norte brought floods and heavy rain. the city building official. Disposition Judgment AFFIRMED.Engr.

shall We punish her for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions. Furthermore. the doctor found an "electrically charged wound" or a first degree burn. There was. is AFFIRMED. 1967 . Castro examined the body and noted that the skin was grayish or cyanotic. On the contrary. P50.000 in exemplary damages.The petiton for appeal questioned the testimony of one Anasco with regard the process and procedures followed by Pepsi in the hiring and supervision of its drivers. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place.52 - prof. typhoons. and 6 the salesgirls. however. which indicated death by electrocution.The Court ruled that based on the evidence and testimonies presented during the trial.In defense and exculpation. .'circulatory shock electrocution" . Art. 1967 the electric service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area did not suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life and property.45 in actual damages (i. was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to INELCO’s consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril. at the time the fatal incident occurred. the Company is relieved of any responsibility from the accident.229. was faced with an impending loss. safety devices were installed to prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural calamities such as floods. ISSUE WON Pepsi Cola is liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability HELD NO .torts & damages . This being the case. Pepsi Cola exercised the due diligence of a good father in the hiring and supervision of its drivers. For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury. thus. except for the slight modification that actual damages be increased to P48. which sought to prove that (1) on and even before June 29. P12. Reasoning . … Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.45. The SC ruled that the issue brought before it with regard the credibility of Anasco is one of fact and not of law. private respondents." As such. a finding that Bonifacio was in fact negligent.CFI: awarded P25. as heirs. As testified by A2010 .Dr. or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property. it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. fire and others. the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission" Disposition CA decision. . … The responsibility treated of this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. the deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and not to INELCO because of the installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting.INELCO was negligent in seeing that no harm is done to the general public". P10.e. (4) 12 linesmen are charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the areas respectively assigned to them. the deceased. an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property. or in the supervision over him after the selection..229.000 attorney's fees ISSUE WON the legal principle of "assumption of risk" bars private respondents from collecting damages from INELCO HELD NO Ratio The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. Clearly.In its ruling..000 moral damages.229. may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by INELCO’s negligence Reasoning . but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. subtle and deadly. (5) They also presented own medical expert and said that cyanosis could not have been the noted 3 hours after the death because it is only manifest in live persons. the deceased went to the Five Star Emporium "to see to it that the goods were not flooded.. P45. nor even manning its office. 1967. 2180. (2) The service lines and devices had been newly-installed prior to the date in question.000 in compensatory damages. Hence.000 attys fees . While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible.The facts with regard the accident that Andres Bonifacio caused is not in the case.CA: P30. casis RAMOS V PEPSI COLA 19 SCRA 289 1967 NATURE Appeal from a CA decision FACTS . it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. . hence. or both. On the left palm. causing the deceased's electrocution when she tried to open her gate that early morning of June 29. considering that electricity is an agency. It went on to stay that the CA is a better judge of the facts. The switch must have been left on. The evidence does not show that defendant did that. evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area. P3. About the base of the thumb on the left hand was a burned wound.000 as average annual income of the deceased. The Court limited its ruling on the decision of the CA to absolve defendant Pepsi Cola from liability under Article 21806 of the Civil Code. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be" The negligence of petitioner having been shown.000 for the victim's death and P18. charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on. a source of her livelihood. (3) Also.45 for funeral expenses). . computed in accordance with the formula set in the Villa-Rey Transit case (31 SCRA 511) with the base of P15.In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag City on the night of June 28 until the early hours of June 29.INELCO can be exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. INELCO presented the testimonies of its officers and employees. The cause of' death was . (6) Lastly. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. the court citing its ruling on Bahia as follows: “ From this article (2180) two things are apparent: (1) that when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arise a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the employer or master either n the selection of the servant or employee.

. contrarily averred in its answer with cross-claim and counterclaim that the MMTC bus was driven in a prudent and careful manner by driver Leonardo and that it was the passenger jeepney which was driven recklessly considering that it hit the left middle portion of the MMTC bus. and medical records. in relation to Article 2180. Leonardo was negotiating Honeydew Road. previous experience. .Petitioner's attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of employees . through the testimonies of Milagros Garbo. who failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees and should thus be held solidarily liable for damages caused to the MMTC bus through the fault and negligence of its employees.torts & damages (2) that they presumption is juris tantum ( so much or so little of law) and not juris et de jure (of law and from law). WON the oral testimonies of witnesses even without the presentation documentary evidence.The case at bar is clearly within the coverage of Article 2176 and 2177. consonant with the theory of the case it or he seeks to advance and subject to such procedural strategy followed thereby.It was shown in this case that Pesi Cola did not merely satisfy itself that Bonifacio possessed a driver’s license. tests and examinations preparatory to actual employment. . to present all available evidence at its or his disposal in the manner which may be deemed necessary and beneficial to prove its or his position. and that said positive testimonies spell out the rigid procedure for screening of job applicants and the supervision of its employees in the field 2. . where she then worked as a machine operator earning P16.25 a day. .As both vehicles approached the intersection of DBP Avenue and Honeydew Road they failed to slow down and slacken their speed. ISSUES 1.Petitioner attempted to essay in detail the company's procedure for screening job applicants and supervising its employees in the field. 1979. Godofredo Leonardo. Disposition Decision of the CA is affirmed.Said defendants denied all the material allegations in the complaint and pointed an accusing finger at each other as being the party at fault. because the latter's negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the accident and that MMTC failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. couched in generalities and shorn of any supporting evidence to boost their verity. falling onto the pavement unconscious with serious physical injuries. we cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there was observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. Bicutan. whether plaintiff or defendant. the proof called for under Article 2180 to show diligence of a good father of a family has been met. the petitioners raised no questions. which for an employer doctrinally translates into its observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees but which mandate. herein petitioner MMTC.Whether or not the diligence of a good father of a family has been observed by petitioner is a matter of proof which under the circumstances in the case at bar has not been clearly established. He was also made to undergo both theoretical and practical driving tests prior to being hired as driver. The party. both of whom naturally and expectedly testified for MMTC. then driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his codefendant Victorino Lamayo. Bicutan. As a consequence. Taguig. a government-owned corporation and one of the defendants in the court a quo. and Christian Bautista. we do not find the evidence presented by petitioner sufficiently convincing to prove the diligence of a good father of a family. In any event. (MMTC) bus driven by defendant Godofredo C. of the Civil Code provisions on quasi-delicts as all the elements thereof are present. which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony. and for failure to submit all evidence within its control. provided only that the same shall measure up to the quantum of evidence required by law. A2010 . .It is procedurally required for each party in a case to prove his own affirmative assertion by the degree of evidence required by law. she was confined for twenty-four (24) days. Taguig. casis through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence. to hold sway. prove that driver Leonardo had complied with all the hiring and clearance requirements and had undergone all trainings. A background check was done and he was required to submit various clearances. bound for her work. . as its transport supervisor. the passenger jeepney ramming the left side portion of the MMTC bus. . Given this. 1993 FACTS .A complaint for damages was filed by herein private respondent. .While the jeepney was travelling at a fast clip along DBP Avenue. . or even subject evidence for that matter.At about six o'clock in the morning of August 28. June 21. . inasmuch as the witnesses' testimonies dwelt on mere generalities. the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. Godofredo Leonardo. to wit: (1) damages suffered by the plaintiff. must be corroborated by documentary evidence. Metro Manila bound for its terminal at Bicutan. The collision impact caused plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio to hit the front windshield of the passenger jeepney and (she) was thrown out therefrom. as its training officer. object or documentary. who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of presenting at the trial such amount of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable judgment. who being then a minor was assisted by her parents. While there is no rule which requires that testimonial evidence. .She was brought to the Medical City Hospital where she regained consciousness only after one (1) week.53 - prof. and consequently may be rebutted . 2. another fast moving vehicle. neither did they blow their horns to warn approaching vehicles.Their statements strike us as both presumptuous and in the nature of petitio principii. she was unable to work for three and one half months (31/2). to use an oft-quoted phrase. and as a consequence. assuming the putative existence thereof. WON petitioner exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees HELD 1. the owner of the jeepney and employer of driver Calebag. . In making proof in its or his case. In terms of the aspect of supervision. Thereat. along with its driver. Further.It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family. it is paramount that the best and most complete evidence be formally entered. It is not felt by the Court that there is enough evidence on record as would overturn the presumption of negligence. a Metro Manila Transit Corp. a collision between them occurred. is more often honored in the breach than in the observance.Defendant Victorino Lamayo alleged that the damages suffered by therein plaintiff should be borne by defendants MMTC and its driver. . It is entirely within each of the parties discretion. and that it was defendant Lamayo. petitioner MMTC must suffer the consequences of its own inaction and indifference. and (3) the connection of cause and effect between fault or negligence of the defendant and the METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORP V CA (CUSTODIA) 223 SCRA 521 REGALADO. against all of therein named defendants following their refusal to pay the expenses incurred by the former as a result of the collision. plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio boarded as a paying passenger a public utility jeepney. (2) fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond.

it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place. that is. 1976. Petitioner’s claim: . Jr. i. the basis of the liability being the relationship of pater familias or on the employer's own negligence.. From the foregoing ruling. and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff .Due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer.In Espanol vs.The F/B Marjolea. . 1982. Chairman.. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action accrued. Once this is done. the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff. the M/V Asia Philippines owned byTrans-Asia Shipping Lines. to hold the employer liable. it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. Employer is liable for torts committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned tasks. . especially since private respondent did not specifically pray therefor in her complaint. the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years. the Complaint filed on May 30. . there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent. It is to be noted that petitioner was originally sued as employer of driver Leonardo under Article 2180. 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period. this Court ruled that in an action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks. 1976 when the maritime collision took place. 1989 FACTS .that maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with special skill. For failure to rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of employees. But. the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry.that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued only on April 29. 1989 . The collision occurred on April 8. The Kramers instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent before Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City. and that accordingly. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners.Finally. from April 8.Article 2180 applicable only where there is an employer-employee relationship.With the allegation and subsequent proof of negligence against the defendant driver and of an employer-employee relation between him and his codefendant MMTC in this instance. the case in undoubtedly based on a quasi-delict under Article 2180. although it is not necessary that the employer be engaged in business or industry. interest as a part of the damages may be awarded in the discretion of the court. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen. It is only then that the defendant. . training and experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve . October 13. as employer. ISSUE WON a Complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by presciption HELD YES . Sarabia. As a consequence of the collision. The diligence of a good father of a family required to be observed by employers to prevent damages under Article 2180 refers to due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees in order to protect the public. was beyond the 4 year prescriptive period. KRAMER VS CA (TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES) 178 SCRA 289 GANCAYCO. without requiring the payment of interest thereon as an item of damages just because of delay in the determination thereof. the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. which is the time when the cause of action arises. The complaint for damages was filed in court only on May 30. Inc. and Marta Kramer. which consists of 3 elements. a fishing boat owned by Ernesto Kramer. In Paulan vs. and not as a matter of right. the employer is likewise responsible for damages. . He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code. When the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties. this Court held: The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action.. Trans-Asia filed a motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription. casis four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the said date. an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. taking with it its fish catch. agents or personnel of the other vessel. Philippine Veterans Administration. and that the ALLIED BANKING V CA (YUJUICO) 178 SCRA 526 GANCAYCO. the action being based on a quasidelict. October 13. the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel.e. the plaintiff must show. Thus.The Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was due to the negligence of the employees of Trans-Asia. was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.Under A1146 CC.54 - prof. the latter has the burden of proving that it has been A2010 . that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages. the F/B Marjolea sank. Article 2211 of the Civil Code provides that in quasi-delicts. diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. . the date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final. Disposition petition is dismissed.torts & damages damages incurred by plaintiff.In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible. . The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago. It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of 2 vessels the 4 year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. 1 985. rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. we believe that respondent court acted in the exercise of sound discretion when it affirmed the trial court's award. it is necessary first to establish the employment relationship. b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right. namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created.

.The tests to determine whether the claim for indemnity in a third-party claim is "in respect of plaintiff 's claim" are: (a) whether it arises out of the same transaction on which the plaintiff's claim is based. private respondent herein. consequently. . 2. since the cause of action accrued on March 25. (Español vs. The third party complaint is independent of. Panis. . The RTC judge was found to be in grave abuse of discretion and was ordered to admit the third-party complaint. or may have against plaintiffs claim. by the defendant. (Capayas v CFI Albay) The claim of third-party plaintiff.Second and current proceeding (1987) – Yujuico filed a motion to admit Ammended/Supplemental Answer and a Third Party Complaint to impead the Central Bank and Aurellano as third-party defendants. it was the claim of third-party plaintiff for other damages in addition to any amount which he may be called upon to pay under the original complaint. FACTS . The complaint alleged that by reason of the tortuous interference by the CB with the affairs of GENBANK. (b) whether the third-party defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant. On the other hand. . It was followed by another resolution ordering the liquidation of GENBANK. 1977 . can be accommodated under tests (a) and (b) abovementioned.First case: CA affirmed RTC decision in a special proceeding finding that the liquidation of GENBANK was made in bad faith. which were both denied. The decision of CA denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner are hereby reversed and set aside and declared null and void.Yujuico failed to comply with his obligation prompting Allied to file a complaint for the collection of a sum of money before the CFI Manila (now RTC). Both parties filed for motions of partial reconsideration. It was then that Yujuico filed the third party complaint to transfer liability for the default imputed against him by the petitioner to the proposed third-party7 defendants because of their tortious acts which prevented him from performing his obligations. . subrogation or any other relief. private respondent relies on the "Doctrine of Relations" or "Relations Back Doctrine" to support his claim that the cause of action as against the proposed third-party defendant accrued only on December 12.55 - prof. YES . who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such thirdparty defendant a right for contribution. the action has prescribed. casis complaint may cause delay in the disposition of the main suit. Allied acquired all the assets and assumed the liabilityies of GENBANK. although arising out of another or different contract or transaction. rendered a decision nullifying the RTC order. in respect of the plaintiffs claim. It is contended that while the third party complaint was filed only on June 17. October 22. The case was reraffled where presiding Judge Panis reiterated the order 7 A2010 . The third party complaint should not be admitted. On the theory that the cause of action accrued on March 25. If there was any confusion at all on the ground/s alleged in the thirdparty complaint. Being founded on what was termed as "tortious interference. While these allegations in the proposed third-party CAUSATION BATACLAN V MEDINA 102 PHIL 181 MONTEMAYOR. YES ."1 and the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said decision. it cannot be outrightly asserted that it would not serve any purpose. RTC Judge Mintu denied the third-party complaint but admitted the amended/supplemental answer.While the third party complaint in this case may be admitted as above discussed. by means of the third-party complaint.It is from the date of the act or omission violative of the right of a party when the cause of action arises and it is from this date that the prescriptive period must be reckoned. 1981.In the Memorandum of Agreement between Allied Banking Corp (Allied) and Amulfo Aurellano as liquidator of GENBANK.1987. . or (c) whether the third-party defendant may assert any defense which the third-party plaintiff has.CA. or whether the third-party's claim. . obtained a loan from the said institution in the amount of 500K. indemnity. petitioner maintains that the claim should have been filed at the latest on March 25. although the third-party defendant's liability arises out of another transaction.The action for damages instituted by private respondent arising from the quasidelict or alleged "tortious interference" should be filed within four 4 years from the day the cause of action accrued. Chairman.The judgment of the CA in its first decision is the substantive basis of private respondent's proposed third-party complaint. ISSUE 1. and another judgment is hereby rendered sustaining the orders of the RTC denying the admission of the third party complaint made by Judge Mintu. . separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint. including the receivable due from Yujuico. . to transfer unto the third-party defendants liability on the note by reason of the illegal liquidation of GENBANK which was the basis for the assignment of the promissory note. in a petition for certiorari questioning the denied motions. Hon.March 25. may be brought into the case with leave of court. .The first instance is allowable and should be allowed if it will help in clarifying in a single proceeding the multifarious issues involved arising from a single transaction. There is merit in private respondent's position that if held liable on the promissory note. . WON the cause of action under the third-party complaint prescribed HELD 1. Domingo D.1986 when the decision in CA (first case)became final and executory." petitioner asserts that under the CC on quasi-delict" the action against third-party defendants should have been filed within four (4) years from the date the cause of action accrued. they are seeking. 1977.Respondent Yujuico. is connected with the plaintiffs claim. Private respondent issued a promissory note in favor of GENBANK. it must be deemed to have been instituted on February 7.. the date when the Monetary Board ordered GENBANK to desist from doing business in the Philippines. 1957 FACTS A third-party complaint is a procedural device whereby a "third-party" who is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff. RTC Judge of Manila and Allied Banking Corp. he was prevented from performing his obligation such that he should not be held liable thereon. WON there was ground to admit the third-party complaint 2. 1987. 1980 when the Monetary Board ordered the GENBANK to desist from doing business in the Philippines while the third party complaint was filed only on June 17. 1979 when the complaint in the case was filed. 1977 – the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued a resolution forbidding GENBANK from doing business in the Phil. a ranking officer in General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) and a member of the family owning control of the said bank. This decision declared as null and void the liquidation of GENBANK.Mar 25.torts & damages NATURE Petition seeking the reversal of the decision of CA in "Joselito Z.Petitioner claims that the cause of action alleged in the third-party complaint has already prescribed. Philippine Veterans Admistration) . Yujuico vs. Disposition petition is GRANTED.

including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it. NO . Four passengers could not get out.Both parties filed their separate MFRs. It appeared that gasoline began to leak from the overturned bus. though he must have suffered physical injuries. granting the families of the deceased men P30k each in . the most handy and available. Public respondent lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet the situation. found that the men entered without clearance or consent of the market master. While the bus was running very fast on a highway. the rescuers had to carry a light with them. Upon learning from the market master about the need to clean said tank. A2010 . through its driver and its conductor. but most probably. ISSUES 1. the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected. including Bataclan. not for his death. gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus. unexpected and extraordinary. and the passenger is burned to death.Juan Bataclan rode Bus No. and four other companions including an Alberto Fernando were found dead inside the septic tank. To be entitled to damages. that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help. casis compensatory damages. The City Engineer’s office. *Di nakalagay sa case. merely causing him physical injuries. the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. if not for the overturning of the bus… then the leak and the fire wouldn’t have happened) FERNANDO V CA (City of Davao) 208 SCRA 714 MEDIALDEA. by lightning. we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus. What is more. the public toilet connected to it was used several times daily all those years.Upon dismissal of the case by the TC. such negligence was not a continuing one. can be smelt and detected -even from a distance. it immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service. but rather. say. one of the front tires burst. Bataclan. perhaps serious. there was nothing to supervise. and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning). They apparently did the re-emptying as the tank was nearly empty. and so damages were awarded. the overturned bus is set on fire. one of the bidders. market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property for the re-emptying of the septic tank of Agdao. WON such negligence is the proximate cause of the deaths of the victims HELD 1. and pins down a passenger. or at least. 2.torts & damages . WON Davao City is guilty of negligence 2. and even then no reports of casualties from gas poising emerged. The only indication that the tank was full was when water began to leak. -(I guess this case says. In fact. shortly after midnight. They. and all those people have remained unscathed which is ironically evidenced by the petitioner’s witnesses. pero mukhang kinasuhan ni Sofia Fernando yung Davao City for negligence in a previous case dahil namatay yung asawa nya .It may be that ordinarily. specially over a large area. One of them carried a torch and when he approached the bus. ISSUES What is the proximate cause of death of the four passengers? HELD The proximate cause of death is the overturning of the bus. by the driver and the conductor themselves. Neither did they present competent evidence to corroborate their testimonies and rebut the city government engineer Alindada’s testimony that safety requirements for the tank had been complied with. petitioners appealed to then IAC (now CA) which set aside the judgment and rendered a new one. they are not nuisances per se which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public.Proximate cause is defined as that cause which in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on 'Its side but completely on its back. P20k each as moral damages and P10k for attorney’s fees. when a passenger bus overturns. which was won by Bascon.Petitioner’s contention that the market master should have been supervising the area of the tank is also untenable. or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire. and without which the result would not have occurred. 30 of the Medina Transportation. public respondent’s failure to empty the tank had not caused any sanitary accidents despite its proximity to several homes and the public market as it was covered in lead and was air-tight. the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier.56 - prof. the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. . and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. but for the physical injuries suffered by him. was still alive. the CA rendered an amended decision granting Davao City’s MFR. burning the four passengers trapped inside. .Petitioners in fussing over the lack of ventilation in the tanks backfired as their witnesses were no experts. Their lungs had burst due to their intake of toxic sulfide gas produced from the waste matter in said tank. The bus fell into a canal and turned turtle. produces the injury. Invitations to bid for cleaning out the tanks were issued. before the date they were to work. a fierce fire started. . According to the witnesses. the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was. May 8. one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. 1992 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . driven by Saylon. and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available. "If through some event. Bertulano. this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled. . upon investigation. Ten men came to help.Although public respondent had been remiss in its duty to re-empty the tank annually (for almost 20 years). the fire that burned the bus. Also.see definition of proximate cause under A1 . NO . However. they had to use a torch. As defined in Art 694 of the NCC. . one must prove under Art 2179 of the NCC that the defendant’s negligence was the the coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus. that at the time the fire started. .The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus.Bibiano Morta. dismissing the case. Work on the tank was still forthcoming since the awarding to the winning bidder was yet to be made by the Committee on Awards—hence. But in the present case and under the circumstances obtaining in the same. In other words. made not only by the passengers. The autopsy showed that the victims died of asphyxia caused by lack of oxygen supply in the body.The Court also does not agree with petitioner’s contention that warning signs of noxious gas should be placed around the area of the toilets and septic tank. and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Hence this petition.

e. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. He was sentenced accordingly..torts & damages proximate cause of the injury. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus. as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record. 1981. . the victims would not have died.57 - prof. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. On November 15. The victims’ failure to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident. A short incubation period indicates severe disease.A toxic gas leakage could only have happened by opening the tank’s cover. but contributing to his own proper hurt. and headache are encountered occasionally. In a small proportion of patients. . and those acts of the victim not entering into it.The record is clear that . . but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Marcelo Javier was hacked by the Filomeno Urbano using a bolo.In an information. independent of it. . the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms. As in the case of the incubation period. They find it illogical that the septic tank which had been around since the 50’s would be the proximate cause of an accident which occurred only 20 years later. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury. casis probable result of the cause which first acted. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation URBANO V IAC 157 SCRA 1 GUTIERREZ JR. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. 1980. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill required in what he attempts to do. Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm.. "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury." . only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. i. Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City. 1980. irritability.The then IAC affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal. produces the injury. . Trismus is usually present.The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. which states that a distinction must be made between the accident and the injury. Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days.The incubation period of tetanus. and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. As the progresses. The evidence merely confirms that the wound. between the event itself.Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom. which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment. without which there could have been no accident. an interval referred to as the onset time. and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent. Bertulano. Dr." . . A test for such a relationship is given in Taylor v Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. especially since no other deaths or injuries related to the tank had ever occurred. and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death. trismus is marked. As the CA observed. However. In fact. The lower courts held that Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. stiffness gives way to rigidity. which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists. . As the disease progresses. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.PROXIMATE CAUSE "that cause. dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present. most muscles are involved to some degree. The accident is thus of the victims’ own doing—an ordinarily prudent person should be aware of the attended risks of cleaning out the tank.Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness. somehow got infected with tetanus However. rigidity becomes generalized. When admitted to the hospital. As a result of which. . January 7.Appellant alleges that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed. or back and difficulty swallowing. Disposition amended decision of the CA is AFFIRMED A2010 . . . which was the 22nd day after the incident. but ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. On November 14.When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. and that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November. but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw.The trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. since he was an old hand to septic services and is expected to know the hazards of the job. As more muscles are involved." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person. that Dr. minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency. in natural and continuous sequence. either immediately or by setting other events in motion. ranges from 2 to 56 days. Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition. however. This was especially true for the victim."And more comprehensively. and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs. a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. He states that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence. 1980.The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended . ISSUE WON there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death HELD YES. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time. which. 23. abdomen. and without which the result would not have occurred. the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and . trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery. Javier died in the hospital. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. had they not opened the tank which they were not authorized to open in the first place. 1988 NATURE Petition to review the decision of the then IAC FACTS ON oct. In the vast majority..

There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection. He had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Sts. if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked. reduced the damages awarded ISSUES Factual issues: (court discussed this to administer substantial justice without remanding the case to the lower court – since both TC and IAC did not consider defenses set by petitioners) 1. Makati) from cocktails/dinner meeting with his boss where he had taken “a shot or two” of liquor. (It is important to determine if he had a curfew pass to shed light to the 2nd and 3rd factual issues) -Testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who had taken DIONISIO to Makati Med testified that none was found with Dionisio. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine. Consequently. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck. like lockjaw and muscle spasms. DIONISIO suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars. generalized convulsive spasms. 3. should hold Dionisio alone responsible for his accident 6. he died. 1987 NATURE Petition for review INC.A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction. WON private respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful night 2. WON the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked a. the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease. without his headlights on and . partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning. if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct. He was not able to produce any curfew pass during the trial. however. Carbonel (CARBONEL). Makati (not far from his home) and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street without headlights when he hit a dump truck owned by Phoenix Construction Inc. none was found with Dionisio. the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. WON Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights before contact with the dump truck 4. for failure to take necessary precautions. Although Dionisio offered a certification attesting that he did have a valid curfew pass. (PHOENIX). or less. Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. 1004-1005. The following day. Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. . such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause DISPOSITION :. he suffered the symptoms of tetanus. The dump truck was parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the street. therefore.torts & damages time. The medical findings. with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. pp. casis without a curfew pass. Substantial Issues: 5. WON the amount of damages awarded should be modified HELD FACTUAL 1. died on the second day from the onset time. 1983 Edition. Javier. the onset time should have been more than six days. dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged. its regular driver. 1980. 1980. with the permission of his employer PHOENIX. medically speaking. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death. November 15. Emphasis supplied) Therefore. front or rear. . unrelated." and that consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel b. WON Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before the collision with the dump truck. WON Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident. based on the “last clear chance” doctrine. As a result of the collision. successive.In the case at bar. therefore. efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. TC: in favor of Dionisio. that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening. the happened but for such condition or occasion. or on November 14. awarded damages in favor of Dionisio IAC: in favor of Dionisio. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause. After 22 days. IAC (DIONISIO) 148 SCRA 353 FELICIANO. while under the influence of liquor. The infection was.58 - prof. and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. such condition was not the proximate cause. the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. (CARBONEL) VS. At Bangkal. MARCH 10. FACTS -About 1:30 am. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant. even though such injury would not have A2010 . And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition. a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. which was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (DIONISIO’s lane). the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time. DIONISIO claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. Therefore. distinct and foreign to the crime. 1980. his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. NO. natural. . The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. This incident took place on October 23. and an onset time of 72 hrs. lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. WON Phoenix has successfully proven that they exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver 7. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION. however. If. DIONISIO’s claim: the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix PHOENIX + CARBONEL’s claim: the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident.. WON the court.Doubts are present. severe trismus. WON the driver’s negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause. and efficient cause of the injury. Leonardo Dionisio (DIONISIO) was driving home (he lived in Bangkal.

YES. Dionisio's negligence. The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of others. it is difficult to see what role. the common law last clear chance . this argument had no validity under our jurisdiction and even in the United States. SUBSTANTIAL 5. the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark. substantial weight should have been ascribed to such testimony. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut. x x x In all of these cases there is an intervening cause combining with the defendant's conduct to produce the result and in each case the defendant's negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned. NO. usual and customary wind arising later will spread it beyond the defendant's own property. and not the result of reflective thought. The petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created. Testimonial evidence under this exception to the hearsay rule consists of excited utterances made on the occasion of an occurrence or event sufficiently startling in nature so as to render inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of the observer and hence made as a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event. -Dionisio claimed that he was traveling at 30kph and had just crossed the intersection of General Santos and General Lacuna Streets and had started to accelerate when his headlights failed just before the collision took place. Phoenix’s theory more credible than Dionisio’s. reactions from observers who happened to be around at that time. x x x [T]he standard of reasonable conduct may require the defendant to protect the plaintiff against 'that occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life. Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to anticipate the usual weather of the vicinity. if any. and therefore to be anticipated. particularly since. Private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory. but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited So far as it has any validity at all. or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances. it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important. DIONISIO’S CLAIM: he had his headlights on but that. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of the original risk.the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE ANYTHING. 3. x x x. Besides. A2010 . the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident. or to what extent. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created. 2. have purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at which Dionisio was travelling just before impact with the Phoenix dump truck. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible. to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. that one who leaves an obstruction on the road or a railroad track should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into it. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition. because of failure to guard against it. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions. one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who falls b. and some new force intervenes. or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason Thus one who sets a fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary. But even in such cases. the distinctions between" cause" and "condition" have already been "almost entirely discredited. the defendant is said not to be liable. NO. although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident. and hence of the defendant's negligence. including all ordinary forces of nature such as usual wind or rain. FROM PROF. at the crucial moment. it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety. or snow or frost or fog or even lightning. He also asserts that Patrolman Cuyno’s testimony was hearsay and did not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule since the facts he testified to were not acquired by him through official information and had not been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated. "One shot or two" of hard liquor may affect different people differently. although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck PHOENIX’s CLAIM: Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection (less than 200m away). as it could not. The person who leaves the combustible or explosive material exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of fire from some independent source. the defendant will not escape responsibility. . YES. as is invariably the case the latter am the result of other active forces which have gone before. a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as part of the res gestae and should have been considered by the trial court. -BUT: an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a stationary object in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous.not enough evidence to show how much liquor Dionisio had in fact taken and the effects of that upon his physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. 4. Ratio. Accordingly. casis into it a month afterward. even though it did not. it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines.' Thus." "Foreseeable Intervening Causes. rather than reflective. in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result. among other reasons. was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. Clearly.59 - prof. Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk. and therefore to take precautions to prevent that event. these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off." that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts a. it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump track was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. the defendant may be negligent. YES. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. PROSSER AND KEETON: "Cause and condition." but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. Smith but it is a matter for debate whether. When a spark ignites the gasoline. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno is admissible not under the official records exception to the hearsay rule but rather as part of the res gestae.torts & damages certification did not specify any serial number or date or period of effectivity of the supposed curfew pass. even though the car is negligently driven. Testimony of Patrolman Cuyno attesting that people gathered at the scene of the accident told him that Dionisio’s Car was MOVING FAST and that he DID NOT have its HEADLIGTS ON. and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it --" EVIDENCE PRESENTED: Patrolman Cuyno attested that Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken to Makati med + Dionisio admitted he had taken “a shot or two” . as it were.

fell into the diggings was precisely . As to the other awards of damages.00 as attorney's fees and costs. sustain. the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care. Quezon City. -Indemnification was sought from the city government. but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court. -Fulgencio P. Costs against the petitioners. ON LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE: The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule-that of contributory negligence.12. Definition of Proximate Cause: "any cause which. 7. Dacara. 2179.The bank employee is deemed to have failed to exercise the degree of care required in the performance of his duties.60 - prof.10. That was only when they noticed the error. is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix. .43. ISSUE WON Art. . as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines." Reasoning The proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of petitioner's employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit of private respondent in the name of another depositor who had a similar first name. 2005 NATURE Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS -On February 28. The same thing happened to the Oct. which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. shall be home by private respondent Dionisio. . PILIPINAS BANK V CA (REYES) 234 SCRA 435 PUNO. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community.It was redeposited but was again dishonored.M.PILIPINAS BANK’S Current Account Bookkeeper made an error in depositing the amount: he thought it was for a certain FLORENCIO AMADOR.4T due Oct. the plaintiff may recover damages. The payee then demanded a cash payment of the check’s face value which REYES did if only to save his name. Jr.00 as exemplary damages and P4. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. WHEREFORE. 1979 and for Vicente TUI in amount of P11. as well as costs of suit. 1994 NATURE . ..torts & damages doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff. when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises.FLORENCIO REYES issued two postdated checks. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its track driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning. while driving the said vehicle.. .On Oct. thus. he cannot recover damages. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel.To cover the face value of the checks. except the award of P10. it must be established that private respondent's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. and that the reason why Fulgencio Dacara. is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account.Furious. casis NO .12 check. which however. the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by reducing the A2010 . P100T moral damages. Fulgencio Dacara. would result therefrom as a natural and probable consequence. NO.000. P25T attorney’s fees. QUEZON CITY V DACARA PANGANIBAN. filed a Complaint for damages against Quezon City and Engr. Jr. -Defendants admitted the occurrence of the incident but alleged that the subject diggings was provided with a mound of soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or after it which was visible during the incident. posted the deposit in the latter's account not noticing that the depositor's surname in the deposit slip was REYES. even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. in natural and continuous sequence.For it to apply. in amount of P21T due Oct. SO ORDERED. JUNE 15. But if his negligence was only contributory. Disposition. CA: modified amount to just P50T moral damages and P25T attorney’s fees and costs of suit. he requested PCIB Money Shop's manager to effect the withdrawal of P32T from his savings account and have it deposited with his current account with PILIPINAS BANK. rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St. -In short. 6. Dacara. loss of expected income and moral damages private respondent Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount. YES.078. Since the ledger of Florencio REYES indicated that his account had only a balance of P4. it was dishonored and the payee was advised to try it for next clearing. Dispositive Petition denied. defendants claimed that they exercised due care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident.21798 of NCC is applicable HELD 8 Art. aggregate amount of compensatory damages. The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent. he immediately proceeded to the bank and urged an immediate verification of his account.Petition for review of CA decision FACTS .10 check in favor of WINNER INDUSTRIAL was presented for payment. 1988 at about 1:00 A. He. These are for WINNER INDUSTRIAL CORP. the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio.. -As a result.11. the Oct. owner of ’87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan. Taking into account the comparative negligence ot DIONISIO and the petitioners. Jr. -The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions. July 25. RTC: ordered petitioner to pay P200T compensatory damages. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. yielded negative results. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be home exclusively by the petitioners. only the balance of 800% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarily liable therefor to the former. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.500. has itself been rejected. . produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury complained of or some similar injury. for and in behalf of his minor son. Ramir Tiamzon.

they can be awarded only after claimants have shown their entitlement to moral. how then could it be explained that according to the report even of the policeman.000. having violated a traffic regulation. -Indeed. -Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. none was ever presented to stress the point that A2010 . when his car turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth from a digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an adequate warning to motorists especially during the thick of the night where darkness is pervasive. exemplary damages may be recovered if the defendant acted with gross negligence. No adequate reason has been given to overturn this factual conclusion. . (3) a wrongful act or omission of the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant. Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs. ordering the defendants to indemnify the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand pesos as actual/compensatory damages. P10. mental anguish.00 as attorney’s fees and other costs of suit. Yes. -These matters were. and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219. The negligence must amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property. provided that the act or omission caused physical injuries. besmirched reputation. -To award moral damages. (2) a culpable act or omission factually established. none was found at the scene of the accident. CA agreed with the RTC’s finding that petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by respondent. There can be no recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted in physical injury. public buildings. both the trial and the appellate courts’ findings. common sense. -It is too late in the day for them to raise this new issue. such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. petitioners assert that Fulgencio Jr. serious anxiety. clearly point to petitioners’ negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered by respondent’s car. P5. -In the case before us. The award of these sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed. -Such a circumstance obtains in the instant case. or psychological--clearly sustained by the claimant.61 - prof. -Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. respondent sufficiently proved before the courts a quo that petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the incident. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. mental anguish. bridges. social humiliation.00 as moral damages. casis -In the present case. To consider their belatedly raised arguments at this stage of the proceedings would trample on the basic principles of fair play. wounded feelings. 2. -The facts of the case show a complete disregard by petitioners of any adverse consequence of their failure to install even a single warning device at the area under renovation. and other public works under their control or supervision. -The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the accident bars us from supplanting their findings and substituting these with our own. social humiliation. there was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral damages based on Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code. mental. -RTC ruled in favor of Dacara. cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of. or injuries suffered by. -Moral damages are not punitive in nature.000. or similar injury. not raised by petitioners at any time during the trial. should be presumed negligent pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code. and due process.. 1988 which caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara. 3. The award of moral damages must be solidly anchored on a definite showing that respondent actually experienced emotional and mental sufferings. justice. If indeed signs were placed thereat. Provinces. a court must be satisfied with proof of the following requisites: (1) an injury-whether physical. absent any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment by the lower courts or an ample showing that they lacked any basis for their conclusions.torts & damages because of the latter’s negligence and failure to exercise due care. WON petitioner’s negligence is the proximate cause of the incident 2. fright.” as provided under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code Thus. -Hence. fright. upon a combined consideration of logic. but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering. WON exemplary damages and attorney’s fees are recoverable HELD 1. -Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts. It is evident from the records that they brought up for the first time in their Motion for Reconsideration. -Well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be awarded in the absence of proof of physical suffering. and that they must have nevertheless been indifferent (or worse) to the danger of injury to the person or property of others. moral shock. Jr. besmirched reputation. gasera which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade. 9 . -Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence. Thus. He has adduced adequate proof to justify his claim for the damages caused his car. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case. -What really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is a factual issue that this Court cannot pass upon. WON moral damages are recoverable 3. any person by reason of the defective condition of roads. and similar injury unjustly inflicted on a person. serious anxiety. -It is apparent from the Decisions of the trial and the appellate courts. This speed was allegedly well above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on “city streets with light traffic. P10. that no other evidence (such as a medical certificate or proof of medical expenses) was presented to prove Fulgencio Jr. -“The provisions of Article 21899 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same.000. this Petition ISSUES 1.00 as exemplary damages. Yes. thereby establishing his right to actual or compensatory damages. -That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the accident was aptly discussed in the lower court’s finding: “Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of February 28. moral shock. was driving at the speed of 60 kilometers per hour (kph) when he met the accident. sustained physical injuries. which are amply substantiated by the evidence on record. -Upon appeal. -Gross negligence means such utter want of care as to raise a presumption that the persons at fault must have been conscious of the probable consequences of their carelessness. temperate or compensatory damages. however. however. wounded feelings. No.’s bare assertion of physical injury. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision is tantamount to negligence which renders the City government liable -Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. the Complaint alleged that respondent’s son Fulgencio Jr. -Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for quasi-delicts. policy and precedent. streets.

1980 Javier died in the hospital. A quarrel between them ensued. by one or the other — it makes no difference which — and Pagnaya tried to fix the bridle. after alighting. led the horse over to the curb. 4. and after the runaway horse had proceeded up the street to a point in front of the Mission Hospital. became disturbed and moved forward. 1980 . 1921 Street Facts: Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata near Plaza Gay. produces the injury. v. in the City of Iloilo. de Bataclan. Conchita Gayetano. et al. and Julio. one Julio Pagnaya. and it became necessary for the driver to get out. The horse was then pulled over to near the curb. 1181). The infection was. The driver. the bit came out of the horse's mouth. -The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November. therefore. as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record. however. in her own right as widow of Proceso Gayetano. at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called this carromata first. pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence. distinct and foreign to the crime. Reasoning: -The case involves the application of Article 410 of the Revised Penal Code. with a view to going to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma in the same City. to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which it was made.Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs. to wit. Agaton Araneta.torts & damages damages is meant to be a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. stepped out into the street. upon which the box came down with a crash and frightened the horse to such an extent that he set out at full speed up the street. January 7. Proceso Gayetano. and in so doing received injuries from which he soon died. When the driver of the carromata had turned his horse and started in the direction indicated. Urbano hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand . It is as follows: "x x x 'that cause. and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. and laying his hands on the reins. Owing. Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dispositive The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. and Fermin Gayetano. The evidence merely confirms that the wound. URBANO V IAC (PEOPLE PHILIPPINES) 157 SCRA 1 GUTIERREZ. This action was brought by Consolacion Gabeto. in order to fix the bridle. Medina (102 Phil.62 - prof. had unfortunately retained his seat. causing a swelling on said leg. -In Vda. and as guardian ad litem of the three children. Meanwhile one of the passengers. 1988 OF THE Nature : This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court Facts:When Filomeno Urbano found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed he went to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier admitted that he was the one responsible for what happened. somehow got infected with tetanus However. replied to the effect that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta. in natural and continuous sequence. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. Rosita Gayetano. which he did. October 17. While he was thus engaged. supposedly caused by the wrongful act of the defendant Agaton Araneta.1980. but the other. At or about the same time Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Agaton Araneta. Issue: WON the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof Held: NO. Disposition: Judgment is REVERSED. Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended x x x. in doing which he pulled one of the wheels of the carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed Julio Pagnaya over. which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment. Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. Appellant’s claim: -there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death -the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed. The medical findings lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. which. we adopted the following definition of proximate cause: "x x x A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38. The evidence indicates that the bridle was old. Basilio Ilano. casis wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus. being free from the control of the bit. ISSUE: WON there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death HELD: Yes. On November 14. On November 15. and lately. He noticed the presence of a healing Art. the defendant. Judge awarded damages to the widow to which decision Araneta appealed. A2010 . Dr. and proceeded to fix the bridle." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom . started to go away. with the modification that the award of moral damages is deleted. had alighted while the carromata was as yet alongside the sidewalk. After going a few yards further the side of the carromata struck a police telephone box which was fixed to a post on the sidewalk. stopped the horse. ARANETA 42 Phil 252. the said Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig. and without which the result would 10 GABETO V. and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off. feeling himself free from control. in order that the vehicle might pass on. it was Julio who jerked the rein. the horse. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo. when the horse. cited by plaintiffsappellants in their brief. thereby causing the bit to come out of the horse's mouth. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. and that he had taken up the two passengers then in the carromata as the first who had offered employment. for the purpose of recovering damages incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the death of the said Proceso Gayetano. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay.

it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port. who was then on the pier apron noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. . (99 Phil. 118). he suffered the symptoms of tetanus. were dropped. Gavino ordered the engine stopped. . 1980. which result in injury because of the prior defective condition. Javier. When the vessel was already about 2. even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. The infection was. . the onset time should have been more than six days. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. The speed of . Cardenas.the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time. the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. beside him. Remaquillo. Victor Kavankov.On June 20. however. or on November 14. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. This incident took place on October 23. pp.After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold.' And more comprehensively. such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted. 8. or shifting from one berth or another.torts & damages not have occurred. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant. like lockjaw and muscle spasms. A2010 . Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it. Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Gavino submitted his report to the Chief Pilot who referred the report to the Philippine Ports Authority. the anchor did not take hold as expected. Kavankov filed his sea protest. owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC). 1980.' (at pp. the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease. Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel. 1998 NATURE Review on certiorari the CA decision affirming TC decision holding FESC and Gavino solidarily liable FACTS . arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver. October 1.Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge. he died. The following day. . unrelated. PERTINENT RULES on PILOTAGE . British Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning. A brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew members. casis the vessel did not slacken.The rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the Philippine Ports Authority the amount of P1. et al. Article III of Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. v. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause.J.126. -Therefore. the respective duties and responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the master have been specified by the same regulation: SEC. the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said Master Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined by competent "'A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. (People v. The vessel sustained damage too. 4. — On compulsory pilotage grounds. the M/V PAVLODAR. the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his negligence or fault. 1980. with the master of the vessel. '(45 C. The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on board. — For entering a harbor and anchoring thereat. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. therefore. as well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf.132.Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. 931932). as its berthing space. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death. The left anchor. 185-186) -The court looked into the nature of tetanus to determine the cause -Medically speaking. he ordered the engines half-astern. supra) As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. natural. such condition was not the proximate cause. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped. 03-85: SEC. with 2 shackles. . 125) FAR EAST SHIPPING CO V CA (PPA) 297 SCRA 30 REGALADO. Consequently. successive. as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person. distinct and foreign to the crime. After 22 days. or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage district. A commotion ensued between the crew members. Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Abellana likewise submitted his report of the incident. 1980. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events.The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is under compulsory pilotage pursuant to Section 8. the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. .000 feet from the pier. When Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about. every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage. died on the second day from the onset time. In such event. and efficient cause of the injury.When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier.63 - prof. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances. He can only be absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize damage. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo.25.therefore. Control of vessels and liability for damage. However. 11. If. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. The medical findings lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death.In case of compulsory pilotage. either immediately or by setting other events in motion. flying under the flagship of the USSR. and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. Abellana. November 15." (at p. the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. Compulsory Pilotage Service.

Despite the presence of a shallow canal on the right side of the road which he could pass over with ease. That his responsibility shall cease at the moment the master neglects or refuses to carry out his instructions. Driver Lagunda admitted that three passengers rode on the running board of the bus when his vehicle was still at a distance of 5 or 7 meters from the bus. testified that the 6 x 6 truck was running fast when it met the LTB Bus.A pilot. Provided. It then went on to determine who between the pilot and the master was negligent.64 - prof. By simply swerving to the right side of the road. where several causes combine to produce injuries. the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case. however may intervene or countermand the pilot if he A2010 . XXXIX. that a master of a ship may not know because the pilot is familiar with the port. and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. . . The court found that his reaction time (4 minutes) to the anchor not holding ground and the vessel still going too fast was too slow. Gavino and FESC are solidarily liable. it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent. 1955 when the LTB bus with full load to passengers was negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and sliding downward a slope. MASTER . and the other driven by Lagunda and owned by Prospero Sabido. that his responsibility shall cease at the moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry out his order. Lagunda did not avert the accident simply because to use his own language the canal "is not a passage of trucks. Gavino was found to be negligent. The master. it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. there is a presumption of fault against the moving object (based on common sense and logic). As a result. LTB bus passenger who was riding on the running board as truck was full of passengers. in maritime law. casis Disposition Petition denied. Kavankov’s testimony.In compulsory pilotage. Lagunda and Sabido throw all the blame on Mudales.Customs Administrative Order No. person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them. Capt. 15-65 issued twenty years earlier likewise provided in Chapter I thereof for the responsibilities of pilots: Par. CONCURRENT TORTFEASORS . He blindly trusted the pilot.As a general rule.The SC started by saying that in a collision between a stationary object and a moving object. deems there is danger to the vessel because of the incompetence of the pilot or if the pilot is drunk. 308-309. He is an expert who’s supposed to know the seabed.Capt. . without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. . Custodia. It is sufficient that his negligence. two trucks. so he could see and hear everything that the pilot was seeing and hearing. one driven by Mudales and belonging to Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company. the pilot momentarily becomes the master of the vessel. owner Sabido and driver Lagunda (tsn. the 6 x 6 truck could have avoided hitting Custodio. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone. Custodio was injured and died. — A Pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes control thereof until he leaves it anchored free from shoal. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots' Association. Provided. and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. whereas the six by six truck was climbing up with no cargoes or passengers on board but for three helpers. XLIV. it may appear that one of them was more culpable. He was right beside the pilot during the docking. and in turn means negligence on the part of FESC. 32. Based upon these facts. that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party. . going in opposite directions met each other in a road curve. ISSUE WON both the pilot and the master were negligent HELD YES. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. is a person duly qualified. Mendoza). To avoid any liability. — Pilots shall properly and safely secure or anchor vessels under their control when requested to do so by the master of such vessels. although acting independently. they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. Accordingly. are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person. he never sensed the any danger even when the anchor didn’t hold and they were approaching the dock too fast.There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. was sideswiped by the truck driven by Lagunda.Based on Capt. . and licensed. The sideswiping of the deceased and his two fellow passengers took place on broad daylight at about 9:30 in the morning of June 9. — The duties and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows: xxx xxx xxx f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed safely. August 31.torts & damages authority in appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. xxx xxx xxx Par. Makabuhay. SABIDO AND LAGUNDA V CUSTODIO. the Court of First Instance of Laguna and the Court of Appeals concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. LTB passengers had testified to the effect that the 6 x 6 cargo truck was running at a fast rate of speed. The master’s negligence translates to unseaworthiness of the vessel. PILOT . to conduct a vessel into or out of ports. etc. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons. concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's. 1966 NATURE Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS In Barrio Halang. or in certain waters. ET AL 17 SCRA 1088 CONCEPCION. is the proximate cause of the injury. SEC. However. He is charged to perform his duties with extraordinary care because the safety of people and property on the vessel and on the dock are at stake. CA affirmed. This is negligence on his part. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened. — hereinafter referred to as the carrier — and its driver Mudales (none of whom has . however. widoy of Custodio. As an expert he should’ve been reacting quickly to any such happenings. And Lagunda had time and opportunity to avoid the mishap if he had been sufficiently careful and cautious because the two trucks never collided with each other.

whereas that of the other springs from a quasi-delict. burning and all but consuming the bus. . . His widow. either is responsible for the whole injury.torts & damages appealed). evidently fueled with petroleum. WON the the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus. one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. There were about 18 passengers.That same day. NO. In fact. either immediately or by setting other events in motion. and.150. even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury. YES. 2. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. although the liability of one arises from a breach of contract.At about 2am. Calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood. had violated the contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio. the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were removed and duly identified that of Bataclan. thus making him liable. YES Ratio Tthe proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. and where the driver of the other vehicle was also guilty of contributory negligence. including the 4 passengers trapped inside it. casis ISSUES 1. YES. but rather.000 plus P600 as attorney's fee. there was a distance of about 150 meters. instead of being close to its right side of the road. but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running. came about ten men. It would appear that as the bus overturned. the negligence of the first two would not have produced this result without the negligence of petitioners' herein. gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank. whereas petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict. by reason of which all of them were held solidarity liable. petitioners' truck had the last clear chance.Shortly after midnight. such as the one at bar. The chauffeur. and almost immediately. we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus. . must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus. a fierce fire started. in this sense. WON there was negligence on the part of the defendant. Where the carrier bus and its driver were clearly guilty of contributory negligence for having allowed a passenger to ride on the running board of the bus. so that. its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle. 1759 ART. the rescuers had to carry a light with them. the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted. . including the driver and conductor. one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end. for Custodio was on the running board of the carrier's bus sometime before petitioners' truck came from the opposite direction. Salud Villanueva brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory. after the blow-out. the A2010 . 2. moral. that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help. the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected. WON petitioners were guilty of negligence 2. the owners of the two vehicles are liable solidarily for the death of the passenger. . while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus. left the town of Amadeo. 1755 ART.Some of the passengers. After half an hour. 1733 ART. but most probably. the distance between the two vehicles was such that he could have avoided sideswiping said passengers if his truck were not running at a great speed. Reasoning Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and their goods. October 22. HELD 1. VDA. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. These men presumably approach the overturned bus. as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person. Cavite. the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan .65 - prof.the three passengers Bataclan. 1957 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Cavite FACTS . heard groans and moans from inside the bus. a bus of the Medina Transportation. because that vehicle was running at a considerable speed despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve. this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back. and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses. after they had clambered up to the road. as testified to by one of the passengers. At any rate. the driver Saylon. and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning). Ratio There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out. 1763 direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person.the CFI awarded P1. although acting independently of each other. petitioners' negligence was the last.11 2. in combination. driven by its regular chauffeur. both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio. Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons. Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva. in point of time. the bus was speeding. MEDINA 102 PHIL 181 MONTEMAYOR. WON petitioners should be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its driver HELD 1. and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury. or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. made not only by the passengers. are. plus P100. The views of the Court of Appeals on the speed of the truck and its location at the time of the accident are in the nature of findings of fact. and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87. operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience. from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging. Dispositive Judgment affirmed. on its way to Pasay City. could not get out of the overturned bus. including that of the defense. and coming as they did from a rural 11 ART. Indeed. the fire that burned the bus. of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner. the correctness of said findings is borne out by the very testimony of petitioner Lagunda to the effect that he saw the passengers riding on the running board of the bus while the same was still five or seven meters away from the truck driven by him. through his agent. which we cannot disturb in a petition for review by certiorari. What is more. it was driven on its middle portion thereof and so near the passenger bus coming from the opposite as to sideswipe a passenger on its running board. Conrado Saylon. Reasoning under the circumstances obtaining in the case. in its execution. ISSUES 1. by the driver and the conductor themselves. DE BATACLAN VS. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. Cavite.

Manalo was eventually convicted and was imprisoned. but that the driver did not follow his instructions. IAC & CASIANO PASCUA. and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. .TC: found the couple and Manalo to be NEGLIGENT and held that there was a breach of the contract of carriage with their passengers. Neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. for exemplary damages.Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses Mangune and Carreon and Manalo on their contractual liability. neither were there oncoming vehicles except the bus. I don’t know if the italicized phrases are pertinent. the jeepney’s right rear wheel detached which caused it to run in an unbalanced position. 753 of Rabbit . The case against delos Reyes was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. INC v. 189 SCRA 158 MEDIALDEA/August 30. was hospitalized. and so damages were awarded. and in the course of his visit. If this be true. and his commitment to prison and service of his sentence (5) The application of the doctrine of res-ipsa loquitar attesting to the circumstance that the collision occured on the right of way of the Phil. Inc. .The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus. . but for the promotion of the safety of passengers on public utility buses. was still alive. though he must have suffered physical injuries. after its wheel was removed. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES. spouses Mangune and Carreon filed a cross-claim for the repair of the jeepney and for its non-use during the period of repairs. (2) the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence. Rabbit and (Rabbit’s driver)delos Reyes were all impleaded as defendants. or after stopping for a couple of minutes. she was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina. Filriters was jointly and severally liable as it was the jeepney’s insurer. with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are increased to P6.A criminal complaint against the two drivers for Multiple Homicide. invading and eventually stopping on the western lane of the road in such a manner that the jeepney's front faced the south (from where it came) and its rear faced the north (towards where it was going).Rabbit filed a cross-claim for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. (3) The observation of witness Police Corporal Cacalda also of the San Manuel Police that the path of the jeepney they found on the road \was shown by skid marks which he described as "scratches on the road caused by the iron of the jeep.On the other hand. . telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus changed immediately because they were already old. ordered to pay jointly and severally with Rabbit the plaintiffs. as a result of which. REASONING: TC WAS CORRECT IN APPRECIATING THE FF FACTS CONCERNING MANALO’S NEGLIGENCE. Applied primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear chance." (4) His conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious Physical Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence by the CFI of Tarlac.000 and P800. which is the right of way of vehicles coming from the north.In the public interest the prosecution of said erring driver should be pursued. respectively. . and while in the hospital. casis . Rabbit was to be paid by the jeepney party for actual damages. but these were the only ones that contained “but for”. ISSUE: WON THE JEEPNEY OWNERS AND ITS DRIVER ARE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES AND DEATH SUFFERED BY THE PASSENGERS OF THE JEEPNEY HELD: YES.According to the evidence.Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation. not only as a matter of justice. Bataclan. and (3) the substantial factor test to conclude that delos Reyes was negligent. BUT ONLY THE SPOUSES AND FILRITERS ARE LIABLE. crossing the Eastern lane and the (imaginary) center line and encroaching fully into the western lane where the collision took place as evidenced by the point of impact.66 - prof. plaintiffs based their suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict.Other passengers of the jeepney sustained physical injuries.This case is for recovery of damages for the 3 jeepney passengers who died as a result of the collision between the Phil. . including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it. The weather condition of that day was fair.As against Rabbit and delos Reyes. the bus bumped from behind the right rear portion of the jeepney which resulted in the said deaths and injuries. this.It was said that upon reaching a certain barrio. it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers . but for the physical injuries suffered by him. burial expenses. . A2010 . . ordered them to pay the damages. SC: . Note: This case was under the heading “but for”. not for his death. (jeepney driver)Manalo. . . (1) That the unrebutted testimony of his passenger Caridad Pascua that the Mangune jeepney was "running fast" that his passengers cautioned driver Manalo to slow down but did not heed the warning (2) The likewise unrebutted testimony of Police Investigator Tacpal of the San Manuel (Tarlac) Police who found that the tracks of the jeepney ran on the Eastern shoulder (outside the concrete paved road) until it returned to the concrete road at a sharp angle.IAC reversed this ruling in the sense that it found delos Reyes to be negligent. one of the passengers who.. 1990 NATURE: CERTIORARI FACTS: . -The jeepney practically occupied and blocked the greater portion of the western lane. and that as a matter of fact. for the death of Bataclan and for the attorney's fees. . Rabbit’s bus driven by Tomas delos Reyes and the jeepney driven by Tranquilino Manalo.At the time and in the vicinity of the accident. ***As regards the damages. that at the time the fire started.Three cases were filed and in all 3 the spouses (owners of the jeepney) Mangune and Carreon. he had been telling the driver to change the said tires. ET AL. -Manalo stepped on the brake. . as a result of the collision. Rabbit Bus.Damages sought to be claimed in the 3 cases were for medical expenses. moral damages and attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. among which was Bus No.Almost at the time when the jeepney made a sudden U-turn and encroached on the western lane of the highway. perhaps serious. . the fire that burned the bus. the jeepney which was then running on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn. she overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors. there were no vehicles following the jeepney. (the insurer of the jeepney) was also impleaded as additional defendant in the civil case filed by the Pascuas. DISPOSITION In view of the foregoing. loss of wages.torts & damages area where lanterns and flashlights were not available. but rather. . . because of the injuries suffered by her.

1966. et al. in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning. he would run the greater risk of running smack in the Mangune jeepney either head on or broadside as the jeepney then was abruptly making a U-turn. Here. He switched his headlights on "bright" and saw a Ford dump truck about 21/2meters away from his car. on the right hand side of a person facing in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding). It was shown by the pictures that driver delos Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to the right attempt to avoid hitting the Mangune's jeepney.To escape liability. 1987 INC v IAC Nature: Petition to review the decision of the IAC Facts: - at about 1:30 am on November 15 1975. v. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely pro hac vice. Necesito.24 seconds. etc. ("Phoenix").The IAC held that “. defendants Mangune and Carreon offered to show thru their witness Natalio Navarro. . much less establish.” -The speed of the bus was even calculated by the IAC. with the permission of his employer Phoenix. front or rear. . Aside from the time element involved. facing the oncoming traffic.e. 75). The bus driver's conduct is thus a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passengers of the jeepney. . it to be one caused by a caso fortuito. INC WERE LIABLE. 94 Phil. 657. the last on Dec. et al. 2d).. AFFIRMED TOO THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BUT MODIFIED THE INDEMNITY FOR LOSS OF LIFE FROM 3K (AS PER A1746 TO A2206 NCC) TO 30K. delos Reyes covered the distance of 45 meters in 3. is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways.torts & damages -The principle about "the last clear" chance would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. . .Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more or less 50 kph at the time of the accident.The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. an alleged mechanic. the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger. Smith. and in the event of contractual liability. measured from the time its right rear wheel was detached up to the point of collision. the moment a passenger dies or is injured. . CA. . If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour. he had little time to react to the situation. -In any event.To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too much from him. Verily.In culpa contractual. 16 SCRA 742). . Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-anddinner meeting with his boss. the day before the collision. the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable (Restatement. Cebu Autobus Company.That delos Reyes of the Rabbit bus could also have swerved to its left (eastern lane) to avoid bumping the Mangune jeepney which was then on the western lane: Under such a situation. et al. not only because he was driving fast and did not even attempt to avoid the mishap but also because it was the bus which was the physical force which brought about the injury and death to the passengers of the jeepney. Torts.The dump truck. partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. Buño et al. ***With regard to the substantial factor test: . Paras. . . was parked on the right hand side of the street (i. We find defendant bus running at a fast speed when the accident occurred and did not even make the slightest effort to avoid the accident. April 29.Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed an intersection when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. . 23. . It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. There were no lights or any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck. distance in only 2. 45 Phil. Using this speed. 892 citing Lasam. Delos Reyes could not have anticipated the sudden U-turn executed by Manalo. contradictory to the explicit provision of A 2181 of the NCC.. . which included the tightening of the bolts. This notwithstanding the right rear wheel of the vehicle was detached while in transit. Carbonel. assuming such calculation to be correct. . there were no options available to him. its regular driver. delos Reyes would have covered that A2010 .) -On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour. that would make the carrier's liability personal.. Said defendant did not even attempt to explain. and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733. It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another. v.67 - prof. an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver. It was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street. et al. -SC: The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon. that he periodically checks and maintains the jeepney of said defendants.if the driver is to be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier. . That it was not successful in fully clearing the Mangune jeepney as its (Rabbit's) left front hit said jeepney must have been due to limitations of space and time.. is not a caso fortuito which would avoid the carriers liability for damages (Son v. Smith.Also. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. DISPOSITION: TC’ S DECISION WAS REINSTATED and AFFIRMED BUT MODIFICATION THAT ONLY THE COUPLE AND THE FILRITERS GUARANTY ASSURANCE CORP. . unless contradicted by other evidence: would have been correct were it not for the undisputed fact that the U-turn made by the jeepney was abrupt. ***On the sole liability of the Jeepney Owners (excluding Manalo) PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION (DIONISIO) 148 SCRA 353 FELICIANO. As to the cause thereof no evidence was offered. owned by and registered in the name of Phoenix Construction Inc. even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver (Viluan v. 45 Phil. . . . the jeepney left a skid mark of about 45 meters.025 seconds. v. . But the SC was not convinced. Jr.Delos Reyes cannot be faulted for not having avoided the collision because as was shown. 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code 2 or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event 3 (Lasam v. . Jr.. the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. Mar 10. "[i]n an action for damages against the carrier for his failure to safely carry his passenger to his destination. casis -the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger. 657). 104 Phil. (Anuran.

particularly since. the defendant is said not to be liable. Even in the United States. that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening. 1956 . page 5 of outline) - concerned. in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result. the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark. without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. What the petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was only a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the truck driver’s negligence MANILA ELECTRIC v REMOQUILLO 99 PHIL 117 MONTEMAYOR. such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet.the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix Issue: WON the proximate cause of the accident was Dionisio’s negligence (driving faster than he should have. far from being a "passive and static condition". . and without headlights) or the negligence of the driver in parking the truck. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions. When a spark ignites the gasoline.5 ft parallel to the edge of the media agua.ON CAUSE v CONDITION (under IV A 3c. and some new force intervenes." Professors Prosser and Keeton make this quite clear: “Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. as is invariably the case the latter (is) the result of other active forces which have gone before.68 - prof. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition.” (downspout). do not have any validity in this jurisdiction. The collision would not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices.His widow and children filed a suit to recover damages from the company and the TC rendered judgment in their favor. successive." but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire.Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. was an indispensable and efficient cause. while under the influence of liquor. Petitioners’comments . such condition was not the proximate cause.the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident. (NOTE: this was the contention of petitioners which SC noted in is decision) Private respondent’s comments . If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause. but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause. Held: . was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. . The Company appealed to the CA. considering the latter's length of 6 feet. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition. ." - petitioners' arguments are drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United States. May 18. When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the media agua - if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked.Trial court ruled in favor of Dionisio. (see previous digest) . These arguments. the distinctions between" cause" and "condition" have already been "almost entirely discredited. he turned around and a portion of the iron sheet he was holding came into contact with an electric wire of Manila Electric Company (the Company) strung 2. the defendant will not escape responsibility. it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important. which affirmed the judgment.As a result of the collision. evidently a remote cause. Reasoning We fail to see how the Company could be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence. the truck driver must be held responsible.Efren Magno went to his stepbrother’s 3-story house to fix a leaking “media agua. Dionisio's negligence. It is this CA decision the Company now seeks to appeal. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down that street and for having so created this risk. however. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible. Ratio A prior and remote cause (which furnishes the condition or gives rise to the occasion by which an injury was made possible) cannot be the basis of an action if a distinct. He climbed up to the media agua which was just below the 3 rd floor window and stood on it to receive a galvanized iron sheet through the said window. one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who falls into it a month afterward. But so far as the fact of causation is the truck driver's negligence. casis NATURE Review by certiorari of a CA decision FACTS . Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars. electrocuting him and killing him. and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created. . ISSUE WON the Company’s negligence in the installation and maintenance of its wires was the proximate cause of the death HELD No.torts & damages .The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. unrelated and efficient cause of the injury intervenes between such prior and remote cause and the injury. To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire. such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. It merely provided the condition from which the cause arose (it set the stage for the cause of the injury to occur). After grabbing hold of the sheet. But even in such cases. it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations. So far as it has any validity at all. although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident. with modification on award of damages. IAC affirmed the lower court’s ruling. A2010 . it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety. a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution.it is the driver’s negligence.

Petitioners appealed to IAC. in the instant case. swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck. 1992 NATURE Appeal from decision of the IAC FACTS .There was no proof that Rodrigueza unlawfully intruded upon company’s property. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh. All of these houses were of light construction. his car collided with the truck. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the southern end of the bridge.Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man. Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc. . company had no right to negligently destroy it. he then switched on the headlights of the car. and driven by Ruben Galang. it was further asserted that these defendants did not allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising the said employee. So. . Disposition CA decision reversed.Using the test. this indicates contributory negligence on his part. TAYAG 211 SCRA 517 DAVIDE.In an MFR. IAC affirmed decision. July 16. would do.Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals may be set aside when such findings are not supported by the evidence or when the trial court failed to consider the material facts which would have led to a conclusion different from what was stated in its judgment. no negligence can be imputed to Jose Koh. then he is guilty of negligence.Judge Castaneda dismissed the 2 civil cases and awarded private respondents moral damages and exemplary damages.69 - prof. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had had training and experience for the job. November 19.The PROXIMATE AND ONLY CAUSE of the damage was the negligent act of the company. holding the 6-ft iron sheet with both hands and at arms length. casis Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused the accident. They also say that the sparks were produced by an inferior fuel used by the company – Bataan coal. That Rodrigueza’s house was near was an ANTECEDENT CONDITION but that can’t be imputed to him as CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE because that condition was not created by himself and because his house remained by the toleration and consent of company and because even if the house was improperly there. . an Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was filed with the trial court. ISSUES WON respondent Court's findings in its challenged resolution are supported by evidence or are based on mere speculations. on the said bridge. But unfortunately. and attorney’s fee. conjectures and presumptions. Hence this petition. 1921 NATURE Appeal from judgment of CFI RAILROAD MCKEE v IAC. . His house was there before the railroad company’s property. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck.Judge Capulong found Galang guilty of the criminal charge and ordered him to pay damages. He may be at risk for fire. which was the opposite lane. Plaintiffs say that the company failed to supervise their employees properly and was negligent in allowing locomotive to operate without smokestack protection for arresting sparks. it is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so. applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. ISSUE WON damage was caused by Rodrigueza’s contributory negligence HELD Yes. On the basis of this presumed negligence. evidently without looking. except that of Rodrigueza which was of strong materials.When the northbound Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge. . Jose Koh blew the horn of the car. Rodrigueza didn’t mind the warnings from the company. The decision is anchored principally on the findings that it was FACTS Rodrigueza et al seek damages fr fire kindled by sparks fr a locomotive engine. The company could have removed the house through its power of eminent domain. two boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car. His house’s materials included nipa and cogon. MANILA COMPANY STREET. which appealed.A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck owned by private respondents. his training and experience failed him.torts & damages just below the third story window. all passengers of the Ford Escort. 1977. In its consolidated decision of the civil cases. . Galang appealed to IAC. . as employers of Galang. the decision for the consolidated civil cases was reversed. . resulted from the company’s negligence. . two boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. he turned around swinging his arms with the motion of his body. HELD YES . . and physical injuries to George Koh McKee. The appellate court further said that the law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do . Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. he could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. but should not bear loss if the fire .Two civil cases were filed on Jan 31. was negligent. and forgetting where he was standing.The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. RODRIGUEZA V.On 1 March 1977. IAC immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh's negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. and throwing all prudence and discretion to the winds. Defense said Rodigueza’s house stood partly within limits of land owned by company. Jose Koh. Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee. in the selection and supervision of the latter. Trial judge decided against Manila Railroad. Before he could do so. . it reversed the ruling of the trial court and ordered the defendants to pay damages.Manila Railroad’s defense is not a bar to recovery by the other plaintiffs. Complaint against company dismissed A2010 .The respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that the driver of the car. and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. thereby causing his own electrocution. . The fire was communicated to four houses nearby.

if no ludicrous.As employers of the truck driver. the same facts differently. however. together with the registrar. and the presence of each of the fire exits was indicated on the wall. and although it had only one stairway. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. . "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger. across the street. or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril. and thereafter rendering conflicting decisions. Proximate cause has been defined as: that cause. . the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car. They told the students not to rush out but just to go down the stairway two by two.The Realistic Institute.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee . Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code.Last clear chance: The doctrine is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant. June 4. arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent. the result of the criminal case. In the case of independent civil actions under the new Civil Code. if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method. a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters away from the institute. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might.Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh. not juris et de jure. directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof. of about 1. the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted. is only juris tantum. A2010 . it had eight windows.Assuming.In the afternoon of October 24. subject to the modification that the indemnity for death is increased from P12. a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap. by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence. should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care.The civil cases. and without which the result would not have occurred. it cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. FERNANDEZ 51 SCRA 181 MAKALINTAL. semi-concrete edifice located at the comer of Quezon Boulevard and Soler Street. Assailed decision set aside while its original is REINSTATED. which. in natural and continuous sequence. The records do not indicate any attempt on the part of the parties. The doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril. however. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. . Upon seeing the fire. or in short. by exercising reasonable care and prudence. . attain justice with the least expense to the parties litigants. casis preventing the unseeming. could not .Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent. have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party.000. The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff.The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. Teague. according to their respective orientation. if at all negligent. .Moreover. or according to some authorities. Dispositive Petition granted. he was violating any traffic regulation. would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action. either immediately or by setting other events in motion. Neither did they attempt to prove it. spectacle of two judges appreciating. What remains to be the most important consideration as to why the decision in the criminal case should not be considered in this appeal is the fact that private respondents were not parties therein. who numbered about 180 at the time. produces the injury. which seeks to avoid a multiplicity of suits. prevent delays. had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. 1973 FACTS . were filed ahead of criminal case. was the initial act in the chain of events. and an injury results. the injured person is entitled to recovery. some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter. telling them not to be afraid because the Gil-Armi Building would not get burned as it is made of concrete. a panic ensued. That presumption. . The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. perception and perhaps even prejudice. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. The second floor was unpartitioned. Soler Street lay between that store and the institute.Section 1. the negligent act of the truck driver. the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. is not guilty of negligence. which were for the recovery of civil liability arising from a quasi-delict under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. had a total area of about 400 square meters. Such was what happened in this case. thereby TEAGUE VS. The panic. each of which was provided with two fire-escape ladders. the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here.torts & damages . whether acquittal or conviction.000. under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Four instructresses and six assistant instructresses of the institute were present and they. as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person. might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. Quiapo. Manila. if he. and it may therefore be reasonably concluded that none was made.70 - prof.The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. a two-storey. On the separate civil and criminal actions . the private respondents are. tried to calm down the students. to consolidate criminal case with the civil cases. owned and operated by Mercedes M. aware of the plaintiff's peril. 1955. would have easily sustained a consolidation. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road. was a vocational school for hair and beauty culture situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building. and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger. and that the fire was anyway. They were eventually consolidated for joint trial. guard against oppression and abuse. The answers of the private respondents in the civil cases did not interpose this defense. under what is known as the emergency rule.50 meters in width. unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. which was the actual cause of the tragedy. notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. In such cases. which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances. He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 km) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kph. . clear congested dockets to simplify the work of the trial court. or vice-versa.00 to P50. a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident. or to use the fire-escapes. Rule 31 of the Rules of Court. .

Dispositive Decision appealed from is affirmed. in case of large buildings more than two stairways shall likewise be provided when required by the chief of the fire department. and cannot be the basis of liability since there intervened a number of independent causes which produced the injury complained of. it is argued. Reasoning Thus the same may be privately owned. unrelated. ISSUES 1.then the building is within the coverage of the ordinance. But. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. It is true that in this particular case there would have been no overcrowding in the single stairway if there had not been a fire in the neighborhood which caused the students to panic and rush headlong for the stairs in order to go down. . Ratio it is not ownership which determines the character of buildings subject to its requirements. It is true that the petitioner's noncompliance with the ordinance in question was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of time.The petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death of Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of ordinance. This finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with in connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building. 1. thereby causing stampede. including Lourdes Fernandez. sister of plaintiffs. Fireproof partitions. NO.To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does not portray the situation in its true perspective. Fire!".The CFI of Manila found for the defendant and dismissed the case. [Citing Bataclan v Medina] . But it was precisely such contingencies or events that the authors of the ordinance had in mind. Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the respondents.A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible. was bound to happen under emergency conditions if there was only one stairway available. WON the ordinance devolved upon the owners of the building and therefore it is they and not the petitioner. in the manner in which it happened." The weakness in the argument springs from a faulty juxtaposition of the events which formed a chain and resulted in the injury. for under normal conditions one stairway would be adequate for the occupants of the building. 491. such condition was not the proximate cause. was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent. four students. schools." The alleged violation of the ordinance consisted is that the second storey of the building had only one stairway. but rather the use or the purpose for which a particular building. NO. March 15. is utilized. 1918 . although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had a second stairway under construction. which. said stairways shall be placed as far apart as possible. as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person. Reasoning It was the use of the building for school purposes which brought the same within the coverage of the ordinance. and it was the petitioner and not the owners who were responsible for such use. No part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. (5) stampede. restaurants or panciterias. the final event in the chain immediately affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted. Reasoning The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. (2) fire at a neighboring place. . 3. 2. casis .The CA declared that Teague was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. it would be more accurate to say that the overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one. assembly halls. and efficient cause of the injury. having one or more persons domiciled therein either temporarily or permanently. were found dead and several others injured on account of the stampede. [Citing MERALCO v Remoquillo] . after the panic was over. which by a divided vote of 3 to 2 (a special division of five members having been constituted) rendered a judgment of reversal and sentenced the defendant to pay damages to the plaintiffs in the sum of P11. WON Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila refers only to public buildings and hence did not apply to the Gil-Armi building which was of private ownership 2. even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. but does have such relation to the use or purpose for which the building is devoted. sanitarium. exits and stairways . since the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the building. This provision reads as follows: "Sec.000. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. but if it is devoted to any one of the purposes mentioned in the ordinance .2 meters each. (3) shouts of "Fire!. either immediately or by settling other events in motion.torts & damages be subdued and the students kept on rushing and pushing their way through the stairs. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become necessary to evacuate the building. if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct. it could be reasonably foreseen. the principle of proximate cause applies to such violation. who should be liable for the violation A2010 . Ratio The violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition. Indeed the requirement that such a building should have two (2) separate stairways instead of only one (1) has no relevance or reasonable relation to the fact of ownership. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result there from. But the violation was a continuing one. (4) panic in the Institute. was only a remote cause. and the like. and (6) injuries and death.All buildings and separate sections of buildings or buildings otherwise known as accessorias having less than three stories.According to the petitioner "the events of fire. panic and stampede were independent causes with no causal connection at all with the violation of the ordinance. reformatories. places of human detention. and all public or quasipublic buildings having less than three stories. such as hospitals. such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. The plaintiffs appealed to the CA. WON the failure to comply with the requirement of the ordinance was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez HELD 1. 3. which the Realistic Institute precisely was .71 - prof. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause.5 meters wide. YES. clubs.for instance as a school. The violation of the ordinance. . successive. who is a mere lessee. in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the building. PICART V SMITH STREET. shall be provided with at least two unobstructed stairways of not less than one meter and twenty centimeters in width and an inclination of not less than forty degrees from the perpendicular. instead of two of at least 1. plus interest at the legal rate from the date the complaint was filed. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events.

continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down. blameworthy. La Union.  In so doing. for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile.  Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet.  However. going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. he might get excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him.  The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. HELD Yes.  As the defendant started across the bridge.  The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. then he is guilty of negligence.  The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. without reference to the prior negligence of the other part. the court thinks.  When he had gotten quite near.  The plaintiff himself was not free from fault. would have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk. Reasonable foresight of harm.  The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him.  The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant. the defendant guided it toward his left. A prudent man. to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. that being the proper side of the road for the machine.  As the defendant neared the bridge he saw the plaintiff and blew his horn to give warning of his approach.  He did this because he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. the appeal ISSUE WON the defendant. he was. and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. 1912.  Stated in these terms.  As the automobile approached.  The pony had not as yet exhibited fright. he gave two more successive blasts. negligence is clearly established.  Before he had gotten half way across. but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course.72 - prof. but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done. casis  When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger. and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or. followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision. given the novelty of the apparition and the rapidity of the approach. there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side.  The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. and from this moment it was no longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing.  In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm. placed in the position of the defendant. as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.  The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not.torts & damages NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of La Union FACTS  On December 12.  He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge. if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles.  Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case.  As a result of its injuries the horse died. the defendant. The law considers what would be reckless. negligent in the eye of the law. It will be noted however.  CFI absolved defendant from liability  Hence. in the case under consideration. Could a prudent man. is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. in our opinion.  But in view of the known nature of horses. plaintiff was riding on his pony over the Carlatan Bridge.  In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. He was. was guilty of negligence that would give rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done Ratio: The person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences.  The defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side. there was an appreciable risk that. in maneuvering his car in the manner above described.  The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. A2010 . that the negligent acts of . he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. at San Fernando. foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so. it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge.

Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars. stated broadly. going very fast and the front wheels wiggling. aware of the plaintiff's peril. This is the way the collision happened: The bus. absolving the defendants based on the doctrine of last clear chance. Obiter . Civil Code of the Philippines). was traversing an inclined road when the driver saw from 30 meters away an approaching truck (driven by Montesiano). causing the deaths of the passengers of the bus. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he . driven by Susulin. the two vehicles sideswiped each other at each other's left side. owned and registered by Phoenix Construction Inc. Not minding this circumstance due to his belief that the truck driver was merely joking. without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. As against 3rd persons. in order to overtake a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the highway. ISSUES: 1. casis saw a Ford dump truck looming some 21/2meters away from his car. It does not apply in a case wherein a victim (who is an outsider to the cause of the accident) demands liability from the negligent parties.130AM 15 November 1975 . There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck. without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. Crossing the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal. 1991 NATURE: petition for certiorari to review decision of CA FACTS: a truck and a passenger bus sideswept each other. The dump truck. is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant.73 - prof. private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries. saying that the bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver. A2010 .We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory. while under the influence of liquor. Reasoning: The doctrine of last clear chance. a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. As a result of the collision.Dionisio commenced an action for damages claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck. The RTC awarded damages. not far from his home. the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril. WON the CA was correct in absolving the driver and owner of the truck (answered by WON CA correctly applied the doctrine of last clear chance) HELD: 1. might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence. when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. NO Ratio: The doctrine of last clear chance applies only between the negligent parties. if he. Phoenix and Carbonel countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident. Defendants Del Pilar and Montesiano ordered to pay damages with other defendants PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION (DIONISIO) 148 SCRA 353 FELICIANO. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by Carbonel. driving his Volkswagen car. or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril. The heirs of the victims filed for damages. The historical function of that doctrine in BUSTAMANTE V CA (DEL PILAR AND MONTESIANO) 193 SCRA 603 MEDIALDEA.torts & damages the two parties were not contemporaneous. was on his way home to Makati from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss where had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. a negligent actor can’t defend by saying that another had negligently failed to take action which would have avoided injury. Disposition: Petition GRANTED. . which was ascending the inclined part of the road. notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident (Sangco). should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due case. and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the same. The bus driver also observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. its regular driver. Susulin shifted from 4th to 3rd gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus.Leonardo Dionisio.CFI: in favor of Dionisio . by exercising reasonable care and prudence. or according to some authorities. March 10. 1987 INC V IAC NATURE PETITION for review of the decision of the IAC FACTS . and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone. and an injury results. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs.IAC: affirmed TC but modified amounts ISSUE (obiter) WON last clear chance doctrine should be applied therefore exculpating Phoenix from paying any damages HELD NO . As the doctrine is usually stated. had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (Am. Smith but it is a matter for debate whether. was parked askew (partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic) on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming traffic. it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. A negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff. The theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent. While the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing the hand tractor and the truck was approaching the bus. Makati. but was granted on MFR. Jur). Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. saying that the negligent acts of both drivers were the cause of the accident. or to what extent. since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. In other words. February 6. .Phoenix and Carbonel also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. thus their liability must be solidary. Dispositive: Appealed decision is reversed. a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. the injured person is entitled to recovery. which was denied at first." that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179. The driver and owner of the truck appealed to the CA.

as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate. P304. even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. filed a complaint to recover from the former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC). validate and stamp both the original and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip. (b) fault or negligence of the defendant. in technical terms. casis respondent RMC together with the validated duplicate slips with the latter's name and account number. . and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff." The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions. loss of expected income and moral damages Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount A2010 . plus damages.979. Held: It was the negligence of Ms. as it has been in A2179 CC . Unfortunately. Yabut and submitted to private . That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. the task of a court. Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number written thereon. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. in truth and in fact. Disposition CA decision is modified by reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory damages. petitioner bank had been regularly furnishing private respondent with monthly statements showing its current accounts balances. an original and a duplicate. . were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to Account No. is to determine whose negligence-the plaintiff's or the defendant's-was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. The law considers what would be reckless. . The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. if any.From May 5. .Picart v. . Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. however. would. After validation. has itself been rejected. which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent. now absorbed by the Philippine Commercial International Bank. is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account.Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC). Irene Yabut.Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man.74. petitioner Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalling P304. for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC with PBC. it had never been the practice of Romeo Lipana to check these monthly statements of account reposing complete trust and confidence on petitioner bank. RMC demanded from petitioner bank the return of its money. 1997 Nature: Petition to review decision of CA Facts: . The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. which is that of her husband's. however. it is difficult to see what role.CA affirmed. -Irene Yabut would accomplish two copies of the deposit slip. . The original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number. or some other person for whose acts he must respond.There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff. suffered by the private respondent RMC is petitioner bank's negligence or that of private respondent's. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. it filed a collection suit before RTC Pasig. 1976.74 to his secretary. which found petitioner bank negligent and ordered the bank and Mabayad to pay RMC jointly and severally P304. The second copy was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record purposes. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE v CA (LIPANA) 269 SCRA 695 HERMOSISIMA. With the daily remittance records also prepared by Ms.Upon discovery of the loss of its funds.74 representing various deposits RMC made in its current account with said bank. Azucena Mabayad. Bienvenido Cotas who likewise maintains an account with the same bank. to the tune of P304. Issue: Whether the proximate cause of the loss. 1975 to July 16. attornet’s fees and costs of suit. On the duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank. March 14. Smith.RMC maintained two separate current accounts with the Pasig Branch of PBC in connection with its business of selling appliances. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do.979. It turned out. she made her company believe that all the while the amounts she deposited were being credited to its account when. Under A2179. blameworthy. they were being deposited by her and credited by the petitioner bank in the account of Cotas. but as its demand went unheeded. 979.72. . Azucena Mabayad. on all occasions. and make it appear to be RMC's account number.979. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband. Accordingly. PBC's teller. To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. To accept the petitioners' proposition must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so.During this period. coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller. that these deposits. represented by its President and General Manager Romeo Lipana. the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff.74 - prof. The amount was not credited to RMC’s account but was instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society.torts & damages the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule-that of contributory negligence. then he is guilty of negligence. would do. but modified the award of damages. . The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent. or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.

1989 NATURE Petition for certiorari praying for a reversal of the judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court which.Engineer Orlando T. at least. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip. was extensively damaged. or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident.the doctrine of "last clear chance" assumes that the negligence of the defendant was subsequent to the negligence of the plaintiff and the same must be the proximate cause of the injury." In this case. thru its teller. At about that time. . however. The award of attorney's fees shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. This doctrine. assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. as advanced by the petitioner. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Zacarias was unhurt.00 attorney's fees. PADILLA [dissent] . GI sheets. As a result of the impact. the instant case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the late Engineer Calibo who are residents of Tagbilaran City against the driver and owners of the cargo truck.Furthermore. or bar a defense against liability sought by another. who had the last fair chance. .it cannot be denied that private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. It was private respondent who had the last and clear chance to prevent any further misappropriation by Yabut had it only reviewed the status of its current accounts on the bank statement sent to it monthly or regularly." 2. private respondent should. Ms. loaded with cement bags. but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other. . Since a GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER AND HARDWARE V IAC (VDA.000. Ms. such cannot be used by the petitioners to escape liability.70493 NARVASA. the jeep of the deceased Calibo was "zigzagging. coming from the opposite direction of Davao City and bound for Glan. Thus. incomplete duplicate deposit slips presented by Ms. . the loss would not have occurred. officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. . This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code Disposition CA decision modified. in essence.On November 27. Had it done so. the cargo track. the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of. plywood. and Maximo Patos were on the jeep owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries. shall be borne by private respondent RMC.1979. the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the truck. the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. and without which the result would not have occurred. is not contributory but the immediate and proximate cause of its injury. Calibo.Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic. original or duplicate. . . 1979. including its fender and hood. casis sizable amount of cash was entrusted to Yabut. It must have been a chance as would have enabled a reasonably prudent man in like position to have acted effectively to avoid the injury and the resulting damage to himself. have taken care of its concerns. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. to avoid the accident or injury. .75 - prof. if the latter.torts & damages . the latter would have discovered the loss early on. Private respondent failed to examine these bank statements not because it was prevented by some cause in not doing so. Moments before its collission with the truck being operated by Zacarias. under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to. had just crossed said bridge. In short. yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank. At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge. as it approached from the South Lizada Bridge going towards the direction of Davao City at about 1:45 in the afternoon of July 4. absent the act of Ms.. ignored or ran counter to the established facts. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC. Irene Yabut. had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. the left side of the truck was slightly damaged while the left side of the jeep. in natural and continuous sequence. ." The circumstances leading to the conclusion just mentioned: 1. DE CALIBO and kids) GR No. common human experience dictates that the same would not have been possible without any form of collusion between Ms. Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity.Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. not a last possible chance. Mabayad.While it is true that had private respondent checked the monthly statements of account sent by the petitioner bank to RMC. Considering. states that where both parties are negligent. Ms. thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company. only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the petitioners.the bank's teller. could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. Agripino Roranes. despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the selfimposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips. as what the law presumes. Azucena Mabayad. . common sense.the bank was not remiss in its duty of sending monthly bank statements to private respondent RMC so that any error or discrepancy in the entries therein could be brought to the bank's attention at the earliest opportunity. Proximate cause is "that cause. the company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. Yabut and bank teller Mabayad. Mabayad was negligent in the performance of her duties as bank teller nonetheless. therefore. but because it was purposely negligent as it admitted that it does not normally check bank statements given by banks. policy and precedent. FACTS . Stated differently. with Calibo at the wheel. produces the injury. while the truck stopped on its wheels on the road. it is claimed. which. May 18. After the impact. The demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio. Here. This omission on the part of the private respondent does not change the fact that were it not for the wanton and reckless negligence of the petitioners' employee in validating the A2010 . except the award of P25. that the fraud was committed in a span of more than one (1) year covering various deposits. driven by defendant Paul Zacarias y Infants. 40% of the damage awarded by the respondent appellate court. South Cotabato. at times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"). had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client.Trial Court dismissed the complaint (and defendants' counterclaim) "for insufficiency of evidence. simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure. Yabut. Inc. Calibo's companions who suffered injuries on account of the collision. there must be a last and a clear chance. Unlike Zacarias who readily submitted himself to investigation by the police. Its negligence. . was negligent in validating. refused to . particularly Romeo Lipana.

Reasoning Both drivers. In those circumstances. -PANTRANCO. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. JJ. under the law. The jeepney was extensively damaged. it was the driver of the passenger jeepney who had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and was therefore negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the harm. boarded a car and proceeded to Santiago. Both vehicles were travelling at a speed of approximately thirty kilometers per hour. This. ." 3. on the latter's demand. -Pantranco appealed the decision. . . He then turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse that the latter being frightened. to wit: 1) "the truck driven by defendant Zacarias occupied the lane of the jeep when the collision occurred. HELD: YES -Petitioner claims that under the circumstances of the case. and the complaint against herein petitioners in Civil Case No. Ratio The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a defense to accident liability. either of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous. Appeal dismissed for lack of merit ISSUE: WON PANTRANCO is liable for damages. together with spouses David Ico and Fe O. on its regular route to Manila. Bascos and Fe O. Dispositive WHEREFORE. filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO. the spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children Harold Jim. the defendant was also negligent. to celebrate the fifth wedding anniversary of Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa. however guided his car toward the plaintiff without diminution of speed until he was only few feet away. 5. The driver of the automobile. Even if it be considered that there was some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias shortly before the collision. concur. had had a full view of each other's vehicle from a distance of one hundred fifty meters.David Ico. jumped around and was killed by the passing car." 3) the waiver of the right to file criminal charges against Zacarias should not be taken against "plaintiffs" Roranes and Patos who had the right. they would have passed "along side each other safely. Other victims settled with Bus Company. encroached on the jeepney's lane while negotiating a curve. Isabela. since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. 1981." and was "uncertain and even contradicted by the physical facts and the police investigators Dimaano and Esparcia. what he handed to Pfc. were "telling indications that they did not attribute the happening to defendant Zacarias' negligence or fault. while still at that distance of thirty meters from the truck. Calibo had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident because he still had ample room in his own lane to steer clear of the truck. invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver. died while the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. Ilagan. was the 'driver's license of his co-driver Leonardo Baricuatro. Ambrosio Ramirez. 3283 of the Court of First Instance of Bohol. Upon reaching the highway. to opt merely to bring a civil suit.Maricar Baesa through her guardian Francisca O. Voting Cruz. the collision would never have occurred. While they were proceeding towards Malalam River. After the accident the driver of the PANTRANCO Bus. and none by the jeep.. Ico with their son Erwin Ico and seven other persons. It found Zacarias to be negligent on the basis of the following circumstances. INC v CAR BASCOS BAESA 179 SCRA 384 CORTES J. Engr. . not merely rely on a supposed right to expect. Ramirez has never been seen and has apparently remained in hiding. aside from pointing to the late David Ico's alleged negligence as the proximate cause of the accident. "the truck driver suddenly applied his brakes even as he knew that he was still within the lane of the jeep. demonstrates that the driver of the truck had applied the brakes and the jeep's driver had not. . But as we have already stated. From that time on up to the present. the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby REVERSED. and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. he "did not drive his truck back to his lane in order to avoid collision with the oncoming jeep .76 - prof. Branch IV. That there were skid marks left by the truck's tires at the scene. his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance. And they have not seen fit to deny or impugn petitioners' imputation that they also admitted the truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away. (Picart v Smith) A2010 . a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri. given in plaintiffs' behalf." had both vehicles stayed in their respective lanes. and that the jeep had on impact fallen on its right side is indication that it was running at high speed. . Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa. or he could simply have braked to a full stop. Gancayco. Isabela.' and although Zacarias saw the jeep from a distance of about 150 meters. is DISMISSED. River at a speed of about 20 kph. Esparcia. was "not as clear and detailed as that of Zacarias. No pronouncement as to costs." 4. Ambrosio Ramirez -TC ruled against PANTRANCO and ordered them to pay damages. . HELD NO. . Griño-Aquino and Medialdea. Roranes' testimony.IAC reversed TC. ISSUES WON respondent court is correct in reversing the decision of trial court. ." what is worse. Marceline and Maricar. the jeepney turned right and proceeded to MaIalam.. . without reference to the prior negligence of the other party." 2) Zacarias had no license at the time. casis PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS. From these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident. and the fact that indeed no criminal case was ever instituted in Court against Zacarias.: November 1989 FACTS: At about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of June 12. spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa and their children. as the Appellate Court would have it.torts & damages be so investigated or give statements to the police officers. Ico for herself and for her minor children. plus Roranes' waiver of the right to institute criminal proceedings against Zacarias. Seeing an automobile ahead he improperly pulled his horse over to the railing on the right. and collided with it. as the Appellate Court found. -Picart v Smith: The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge. It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault. in that he had caused his truck to run some 25 centimeters to the left of the center of the road. by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck. were aboard a passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at Malalam River. the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path. The private respondents have admitted that the truck was already at a full stop when the jeep plowed into it.

At the time David Ico must have realized that the bus was not returning to its own lane.00 of which payable within one week. May 20. might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. At the time of the accident. as a company driver is far from sufficient ANURAN V BUÑO 17 SCRA 224 BENGZON. he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction. Buño. on the right shoulder of the said road. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.The above contention of petitioner is manifestly devoid of merit. have been aware of it . When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane. Osmundo S. both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at the time of the accident the Pantranco bus was speeding towards Manila. there instantly arises a presumption that the employer has been negligent either in the selection of his employees or in the supervision over their acts. 1958. February 28. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.torts & damages -petitioner claims that the original negligence of its driver was not the proximate cause of the accident and that the sole proximate cause was the supervening negligence of the jeepney driver David Ico in failing to avoid the accident . each lot with semi-concrete residential house in the name of the SPS Canlas. Batangas. Thus. it was already too late to swerve the jeepney to his right to prevent an accident. who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so. But he parked his jeepney in such a way that ½ of its width (the left wheels) was on the asphalted pavement of the road and the other half.000. Osmundo Canlas delivered to Vicente Mañosca the transfer certificates of title of the parcels of land involved. A2010 . 1966 NATURE: Petition for Review by certiorari of CA decision. Vicente Mañosca was able to mortgage the same parcels of land for P100.CFI Batangas absolved the driver of the jeepney and its owners. It must follow that the driver – and the owners – of the jeepney must answer for injuries to its passengers. a passenger jeepney was parked on the road to Taal.In this case. Osmundo Canlas agreed to sell the said parcels of land to Vicente Mañosca. 1982.000.Contrary to the petitioner's contention. for and in consideration of P850. -On September 3. Although this presumption is only a disputable presumption which could be overcome by proof of diligence of a good father of a family. CA Purisima. 2000 Nature Petition for Review on Certiorari Facts -Sometime in August. It must be remembered that the obligation of the carrier to transport its passengers safely is such that the New Civil Code requires “utmost diligence” from the carriers (Art. P500.000. FACTS .The doctrine of the last clear chance simply. The former then executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing the latter to mortgage two parcels of land situated in San Dionisio. negligently bumped it from behind.00. driver of said jeepney stopped his vehicle in order to allow one of his passengers to alight. and the balance of P350. the jeepney had already crossed the intersection and was on its way to Malalam River -On the issue of its liability as an employer. means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter. Obiter on Application of Principle of Last Clear Chance: The principle about the “last clear chance” applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. which such violence that three of its passengers died. HELD CANLAS V. For the doctrine to be applicable. the doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case. This principle does not apply in this case. as his part of the transaction. and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered" . it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should. 1755) who are “presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. A motor truck speeding along. unless they prove that they have observed extraordinary diligence” (Art. there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. this legal presumption of negligence is confirmed by the CA’s finding that jeepney driver in question was at fault in parking the vehicle improperly. 4136** which provides that the driver of a vehicle entering a through highway or a stop intersection shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching in either direction on such through highway. but it turned out that the check covering the bigger amount was not sufficiently funded. Contrary to the petitioner's contention. In this instance. . and Vicente Mañosca.000.This Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine "can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously.00 and P460.00 to a . . casis YES.Petitioner likewise insists that David Ico was negligent in failing to observe Section 43 (c). . ISSUE WON the driver and owners of the jeepney should also be made liable. Plaintiffs appealed to the CA insisting that the driver and the owners of the jeepney should also be made liable for damages. with exercise of due care. 1982. The cited law itself provides that it applies only to vehicles entering a through highway or a stop intersection.77 - prof. -The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant.Suits were instituted by the representatives of the dead and the injured. this Court believes that the evidence submitted by the defendant to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family iti the case of Ramirez. . DISPOSITION: Judgment modified.00. Vicente Mañosca. An error of law was committed in releasing the jeepney from liability. 1756).00 to serve as his (Osmundo's) investment in the business. even as 2 other passengers suffered injuries that required their confinement at the Provincial Hospital for many days.000. Canlas. (BF Homes) Paranaque. conformably to the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code -When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee.On January 12. issued two postdated checks in favor of Osmundo Canlas in the amounts of P40. -Petitioner's misplaced reliance on the aforesaid law is readily apparent in this case. decided to venture in business and to raise the capital needed therefor. by exercising reasonable care and prudence.Moreover. respectively. to recover consequently damages against the drivers and the owners of the trucks and also against the driver and the owners of the jeepney. is made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff . the doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case . Article III Chapter IV of Republic Act No. petitioner claims that it had observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. but it required the truck driver and the owners o make compensation. Metro Manila.000.

LC Diaz is a professional partnership engaged in accounting. casis notwithstanding. Stated differently. -On January 15. respondent Asian Savings Bank has to bear the loss sued upon. respondent bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage.C. 1983. When the loan it extended was not paid. No pronouncement as to costs. The negligence of respondent bank was magnified by the fact that the previous deed of mortgage (which was used as the basis for checking the genuineness of the signatures of the supposed Canlas spouses) did not bear the tax account number of the spouses.R. whose business is impressed with public interest. Contreras and Asian Savings Bank refused to heed petitioner Canlas' stance and proceeded with the scheduled auction sale.nêt Yes. SO ORDERED. covering the same parcels of land in question. The Decision of Branch 59 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil Case No. LC Diaz demanded SolidBank the return of their money. On September 29. WON ASB must incur the resulting loss A2010 . M-028 is hereby REINSTATED. Vicente Mañosca was declared in default. 2003 NATURE Review of the decision of the CA FACTS . Calapre. as well as the Community Tax Certificate of Angelina Canlas. Diaz with Allied Bank. it was learned that 300k was withdrawn from the account. thru its cashier. On January 18. Issue/s and Held WON CA erred in holding that the mortgage is valid Settled is the rule that a contract of mortgage must be constituted only by the absolute owner on the property mortgaged.” Also.78 - prof. 1982. But respondents Maximo C. the teller told him that somebody else got the passbook. The doctrine of last clear chance is applicable.) GR No.000. petitioner Osmundo Canlas also wrote the office of Sheriff Maximo O. the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so. their act was not the proximate cause of the loss. the bank acted on their representations simply on the basis of the residence certificates bearing signatures which tended to match the signatures affixed on a previous deed of mortgage to a certain Atty.1âwphi1. accorded only to purchasers or mortgagees for value and in good faith. and yet. 25242 SET ASIDE. on February 3. they applied the rule that the holder of the passport is presumed the owner. with the help of impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses. For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking institutions. which bank deposits the bank should guard against loss due to negligence or bad faith. by reason of which the bank would be denied the protective mantle of the land registration law. The business of a bank is affected with public interest. On 14 August 1991. a mortgage. 138569 CARPIO. The latter refused and a case for recovery of a sum of money was filed against them . asking that the auction sale scheduled on February 3. The proximate cause was LC Diaz’ negligence.TC applied rules on savings account written on the passbook. or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident. 1983 the herein petitioners instituted the present case for annulment of deed of real estate mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. September 11. he left the passbook with Solidbank. the bank did not require the impostors to submit additional proof of their true identity. Contreras. Magno. The next day.An information for estafa was filed against one of their messengers (Ilagan) and one Roscoe Verdazola. When he came back. the efforts exerted by the bank to verify the identity of the couple posing as Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas fell short of the responsibility of the bank to observe more than the diligence of a good father of a family. the doctrine of last clear chance is to the effect that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other. 1983 be cancelled or held in abeyance. in CA-G. instructed their messenger. is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom.torts & damages certain Attorney Manuel Magno. The rules state that “possession of this book shall raise the presumption of ownership and any payment or payments made by the bank upon the production of the said book and entry therein of the withdrawal shall have the same effect as if made to the depositor personally. the Petition is GRANTED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Asian Savings Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals and CA reversed the lower court decision. 1993. and on May 23. . Evidently. Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas.DIAZ AND CO. CV No. and request that steps be taken to annul and/or revoke the questioned mortgage. despite several motions for extension of time for the filing thereof. Considering that it was established indubitably that the contract of mortgage sued upon was entered into and signed by impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. It was also held that Solidbank did not have any participation in the custody and care of the passbook and as such. with the use of subject parcels of land as security.00. Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L. 1983. to deposit money in Solidbank. -Consequently. 1983.C. But such fact CONSOLIDATED BANK V CA (L. It is worthy to note that not even a single identification card was exhibited by the said impostors to show their true identity. dated September 30. LC diaz. private respondent Vicente Mañosca was granted a loan by the respondent Asian Savings Bank (ASB) in the amount of P500. Applying Art. In the case under consideration. from the evidence on hand it can be gleaned unerringly that respondent bank did not observe the requisite diligence in ascertaining or verifying the real identity of the couple who introduced themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. and with the involvement of the same impostors who again introduced themselves as the Canlas spouses. the respondent bank must suffer the resulting loss. Disposition WHEREFORE. 1173 It could be said that the degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family in keeping with their responsibility to exercise the necessary care and prudence in dealing even on a registered or titled property. Calapre then deposited in Solidbank.For failure to file his answer. the trial court issued an Order restraining the respondent sheriff from issuing the corresponding Certificate of Sheriff's Sale. constituted by an impostor is void. Osmundo Canlas wrote a letter informing the respondent bank that the execution of subject mortgage over the two parcels of land in question was without their (Canlas spouses) authority. the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter. . the Court is of the ineluctible conclusion and finding that subject contract of mortgage is a complete nullity. In essence. holding in trust the money of the depositors. who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Lower court a quo came out with a decision annulling subject deed of mortgage and disposing.

But what has been shown is the presence of an emergency and the proper application of the emergency rule. This is a case of culpa contractual.When the passbook is in the possession of Solidbank’s tellers during withdrawals.” Solidbank could have averted the injury suffered by L. 1989 NATURE Petition to reinstate the decision of the Appellate Court. Its total loss was computed at P80. Reasoning The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident.C. Diaz was also negligent in entrusting its deposits to its messenger and its messenger in leaving the passbook with the teller. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital.We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case.: June 20. which was already on a head to head position going against Iran’s Tamaraw jeepney immediately before the vehicles collided. 2003 NATURE Petition for review seeking the reversal of the decision of the CA which affirmed with modification the judgment of the RTC of Iloilo City FACTS . on August 15. the law imposes on Solidbank and its tellers an even higher degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook. the child died. 1975. ISSUES 1.The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other. there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent. notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent. A2010 . modification only to damages ENGADA V CA QUISUMBING. the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant.C.” She was discharged after nine days but was re-admitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva. or culpa contractual. Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney bound for Iloilo City. 1975: Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda. It applied the provision on the CC on quasi delicts and found that the requisite elements were present. encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw and headed towards a head-on collision course with it. the authorized representative of L. Seyan incurred P130." The following day. . Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the impostor. For failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on drivers of vehicles abandoning their lane. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up. WON petitioner’s negligence was the proximate cause of the accident HELD 1.C. ISSUES WON Solidbank was liable HELD .July 29. .CA revered. The Tamaraw passengers allegedly saw from the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pick-up. Ratio It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of STRICT LIABILITY VESTIL V IAC (UY) 179 SCRA 47 CRUZ. After completion of the transaction.79 - prof. The appellate court ruled that while L. They found that the teller made no inquiry upon the withdrawal of 300k. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the performance of its contractual obligation to L.C. J. would exonerate the defendant from liability. December 6. Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract. the registered owner of the Tamaraw. the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so.L.000 in medical expenses.On November 29. Iran could not be faulted when in his attempt to avoid the pick-up. SolidBank’s negligence in returning the passbook was the proximate cause. at about 1:30 in the afternoon. at the same time. The teller could have called up LC Diaz since the amount being drawn was significant. Diaz. Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. Thus. On board was Sheila Seyan. petitioner must be held liable. 1989.C. it swerved to its left. (they could have presented the teller to whom the passbook was left. unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. Solidbank had the contractual obligation to return the passbook only to Calapre. where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss. YES.C. Solidbank was in possession of the passbook while it was processing the deposit. the father of Purita Vestil. The impact caused the head and chassis of the Tamaraw to separate from its body.In culpa contractual. the bank is liable to its depositor. he swerved to his left. Diaz had it called up L. who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent. . .For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence. casis overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot do so in safety. An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger. FACTS . There was no clear chance to speak of. once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract. The Toyota Tamaraw jeepney ended up in the junk heap. the pick-up collided with the Tamaraw. or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss. Solidbank failed to discharge this burden. where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead. but they didn’t) . is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution. No convincing proof was adduced by petitioner that Iran could have avoided a head-on collision. the Isuzu pick-up’s right signal light flashed. Iran swerved to the left only to avoid petitioner’s pickup.torts & damages . is chargeable with the loss. hitting the latter at its right front passenger side. Diaz. Petitioner’s acts had put Iran in an emergency situation which forced him to act quickly. is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. Dispositive The appealed decision is AFFIRMED. Solidbank could not escape liability because of the doctrine of “last clear chance. When it was just a few meters away from the Tamaraw. driven by petitioner Rogelio Engada. DISPOSITIVE Decision affirmed. Iran swerved to his left but the pick-up also swerved to its right. Likewise. Diaz to verify the withdrawal. It ruled that Solidbank’s negligence was the proximate cause. Stated differently. Solidbank’s tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative .000.

representing the establishment "American Bazaar. if collectors made collections on Sunday they were required to deliver the amount collected to the company the next morning. DISPOSITION The Court approves the time. the pipes of the hotel were under repair. 10 of said hotel. and second. A2010 . the hotel guest. that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia.80 - prof. -The Kanaans (Halim. casis -CFI held Francisco Echevarria liable. that it was a tame animal. as a result of the dog bites. That time. ISSUE WON Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria are liable for damages HELD YES. that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia. . April 25.Judge Jose R.While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house. Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed. and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. L-47033 AVANCEÑA. -Jose Dingcong. in Manila without notifying the company. which ultimately caused her death. KANAAN 72 Phil. a symptom of rabies. -Around 11pm of 19 September 1933. and occupying room no. The Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. despite his power and authority to cause the repair of the pipes. 1941 NATURE Petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA FACTS -The brothers Loreto and Jose Dingcong rented the house of Emilia Saenz (in Jose Ma. Kanaan.It appears that Madlangbayan had moved to Teodora Alonso St. Reasoning ART.According to the practice of the company. and that at the time of his death he was returning home after making some collections in San Francisco del Monte. when retiring to bed. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria. was a complication of rabies . and acquitted Jose Dingcong." the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. ISSUE WON the Vestils are liable for the damage caused by the dog. AFABLE V SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY 58 PHIL 14 VICKERS. although it may escape or be lost. He failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent these damages. G. 2183. caused the water to spill to the ground and wet the articles and merchandise of the plaintiffs. as a result of the dog bites. March 6. As for the alleged provocation. pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. HELD Ratio The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. . . . a symptom of rabies. Leopoldo Madlangbayan while riding a bicycle was run over and fatally injured at the corner of O'Donnel and Zurbaran streets in the City of Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay.torts & damages The cause of death was certified as bronchopneumonia. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants. wetting the articles and merchandise of the "American Bazaar." causing a loss which the CFI sets at P1. there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. . must also be responsible for the damages caused. occupies the ground floor of the hotel and established his "American Bazaar" dedicated to the purchase and sale of articles and merchandise.It does not matter that the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause. 1933 NATURE Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila FACTS . paying P30 a month. . sentencing him to pay the plaintiffs damages. and he was supposed to be residing in his district according to the records of the company. alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy. Petitioners’ Claim The Vestils are liable for the death of Theness. No.R. on the other hand. . once or twice weekly. is liable for being the one who directly. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. CA reversed and declared Jose Dingcong responsible. . the water run off the pipes and spilled to the ground. with complete possession of the house. since they own the dog that bit her. the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.On the strength of the foregoing testimony.61. .There is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house. 14. the Uys sued for damages. -Francisco Echevarria. by his negligence in leaving open the faucet.One Sunday afternoon. with the costs against apellant. . which ultimately caused her death. Respondents’ Comments The dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda. outside of the limits of the City of Manila. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility. DINGCONG vs.Obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. Nasri and Michael).Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine Company in the district of San Francisco del Monte.Theness developed hydrophobia. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility.089. Basa Street of the City of Iloilo) and established the Central Hotel. being a co-renter and manager of the hotel. . and second. Among the hotel's guests is Francisco Echevarria." thereafter filed this complaint for damages against Loreto Dingcong. carelessly left the faucet open that with only an ordinary basin without drainage. IAC found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog.Theness developed hydrophobia.The widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan brought an action to recover from the defendant . the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. was a complication of rabies. Echevarria.Seven months later. .

.torts & damages corporation under Act No. and XXXIV of the Civil Code Procedure and related articles of the Civil Code. 3428.Geronimo alleges that her complaint is one for damages which does not involve an administrative action.12 plus P100 for burial expenses. 3428. 3812. casis DAVIDE.78 for 208 weeks of P1. place. She brought the bottles to the Department of Health office in their region and was informed that the soda samples she sent were adulterated. .The trial court however annulled the questioned orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further proceedings in the civil case.745. 1930. . as the defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to use one. 3428.The trial court ruled in favor of Coca-Cola. it is apparent that the law which is applicable is Act No. A2010 . . and as a general rule an employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment. or furnish or require its agents to use bicycles.Plaintiffs' complaint was subsequently amended. .As the deceased Leopoldo Madlangbayan was killed on November 16. vs. Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the particular employment are excluded.These are additional reasons for holding that the accident was not due to and pursuance of the employment of the deceased.Coca-Cola moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and prescription.In the case at bar the deceased was going from work in his own conveyance. Geronimo examined her stock of softdrinks and found that there were indeed fibrous materials in the unopened soda bottles. .She demanded payment of damages from plaintiff Coca-Cola but the latter did not accede to her demands. 1930 and Act No.81 - prof. but was on his way home after he had finished his work for the day and had left the territory where he was authorized to take collections for the defendant. is unconstitutional and void because it denies the defendant the equal protection of the law. and circumstances under which the accident takes place. because such an accident does no arise out of and in the course of his employment. Her losses amounted to P200 to P300 a day which later on forced her to close down her business on December 12. Thus the complaint should have been filed within 6 months from the delivery of the thing sold.A group of parents complained that they found fibrous material in the bottles of Coke and Sprite that their children bought from Geronimo’s store. he did so at his own risk.The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and in pursuance of his employment. October 18. section 23 of which reads as follows: When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident due to in the pursuance of the employment. and they sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No. 3812 was not approved until December 8. . his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified. 3428 was changed in Act No. 3812 to "arising out of and in the course of". it should have been brought within 6 months from the delivery of the goods. If the deceased saw fit to change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make use a bicycle in going back and forth. .12 for compensation. Petitioners’ Claim: . . P100 for burial expenses and P1. as amended by Act. as amended. and his employer is not liable for any injury sustained by him. and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by reason of such employment. the plaintiffs would undoubtedly have the right. . and are descriptive of its character. 1993 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . According to the CA: “the allegations in the complaint plainly show that it is an action for damages arising from respondent’s act of recklessly and negligently manufacturing adulterated food items intended to be sol for public consumption.If the deceased had been killed while going from house to house in San Francisco del Monte in the pursuance of his employment.Since the complaint is for breach of warranty (under A1561.Defendant as special defenses alleged that Leopoldo Madlangbayan at the time that he sustained the injuries resulting in his death was violating an ordinance of the City of Manila which prohibits work on Sunday. stating that the complaint was based on a contract and not a quasidelict because of pre-existing relation between the parties. it appears that the deceased had never notified the defendant corporation of his removal from San Francisco del Monte of Manila.The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in section 2 of Act No. Respondents’ Comments: .August 12. he did not do so in pursuance of his employment. . the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Mueller Construction Co. . XXXIII. DISPOSITION The decision appealed from was affirmed. . Discussing this phrase. 3428 fifty per cent of P16. 1989. 1989 .At the time that he was over by the truck Leopoldo Madlangbayan was not in the pursuance of his employment with the defendant corporation. JR. while the words "in the course of" refer to the time. RULING NO. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS (GERONIMO) 227 SCRA 292 PHILS V CA . said: The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident. . Geronimo’s sales plummeted with her regular sales of 10 cases day dwindling to about 2 or 3 cases. No. . By the use of these words it was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment. that the defendant company did not require its employees to work on Sunday. and deprives the Courts of First Instance of their probate jurisdiction over the estate of deceased persons and nullifies Chapters XXIX. XXX. or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment or the result of the nature of such employment. with the costs against the appellants. and that Act No. XXXI. and that the company did not know that he was living in Manila on the day of the accident.Furthermore. but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's employment of incidental to such employment..” It also noted that the availability of an action for breach of warranty does not bar an action for torts in a sale of defective goods. . Industrial Board. CC). and if he made collections on Sunday.745. and impairs the obligation of the contract between the defendant and Leopoldo Madlangbayan. prima facie. ISSUE WON the employer is liable to pay the employee’s heirs.The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment".Because of this. . XXXII. to recover.Lydia Geronimo was engaged in the business of selling food and drinks to children in the Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen located in Dagupan.

DC Chuan sent a letter to Tek Hua advising it of a 25% increase in rent effective September 1. .Tek Hua filed an injunction and an action for nullification of the contracts between Trendsetter and DC Chuan. Espejo and Zaldarriaga. Chuan covering four stalls in Binondo. the same were not rescinded.Damage is the loss.torts & damages .The vendee’s remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in A1567. CC. GILCHRIST v CUDDY 29 Phil 542 TRENT.Yes. 1990 was implemented.Since there were existing lease contracts between Tek Hua and DC Chuan. Tek Hua in fact had property rights over the leased stalls. . the action prescribes in 4 years HELD YES Reasoning . the liabilities of the manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on negligence. they continued on a month to month basis. So was able to secure lease agreements from DC Chuan. casis . They entered into a contract whereby Cuddy leased to Gilchrist the Zigomar” for exhibition in his theatre for a week for P125. tort or other grounds. upheld the trial court. 120554 Quisumbing. the elemts of tort interference are a) existence of a valid contract b) knowledge on the part of the third party of its existence c) interference of the third party is without legal justification or excuse .WON So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference of contract HELD. Enclosed in both letters were new lease contracts for signing.Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against Cuddy. Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to execute lease contracts in its favor. Reasoning. d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under the general negligence rules. Trendsetter Marketing.C.Cuddy returned the money already paid by Gilchrist days before the delivery date so that he can lease the film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga instead and receive P350 for the film for the same period. DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed SON PING BUN vs CA (Tek Hua) GR No.Appellants have the legal liability for interfering with the contract and causing its breach. A2010 . the lessor. ISSUE . 1989. Tiong wrote a letter to So Ping Bun asking him to vacate the four stalls as the same were going to be used by them. In 1976. HELD YES . and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one party of the enjoyment of the other of his private property. or harm which results from injury. Gilchrist was the owner of a theatre in Iloilo. CC). He also prayed for damages against Espejo and Zaldarriaga for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy. entered into a lease agreement with D.On the other hand. petitioner. Both the trial court and the CA awarded legal fees only. . by act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence. shall be obliged to pay for the damage done. ISSUE WON the complaint is founded on a quasi-delict and pursuant to A1146(12). One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with. Instead of vacating the stalls. b) the invasion is substantial.In 1991. hurt.In 1963. . c) the defendant’s conduct is a legal cause of the invasion. and damges are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. 1915 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the CFI FACTS -Cuddy was the owner of the film “Zigomar”. No such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover for the damages suffered. In the case at bar.82 - prof. . The CA. While the letters contained a statement that the leases will be terminated if the contracts were not signed. The lower Court ruled in favor of Tek Hua. . The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud in which case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable. through its Managing Director So Pek Giok. The action of Trendsetter in asking DC Chuan to execute the contracts in their favor was unlawful interference.So Ping Bun. and as a result petitioner deprived respondent of the latter’s property right. on appeal. ISSUE WON Espejo and Zaldarriaga is liable for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy. Tek Hua Enterprises with Manuel Tiong as one of the incorporators. 1999 NATURE Appeal on certiorari for review of CA decision FACTS . This liability arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. February 18. occupied the same stalls under the business name.Under American law. September 21. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of the tortfeasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damage. Tek hua Trading. So Pek Giok. on the death of his grandfather.Her cause of action is based on an injury to plaintiff’s right which can be brought within 4 years (based on A1146. . The contracts were initially for one year but after expiry of the same. Tek Hua was dissolved with the original members forming a new corporation.In 1989. breach of warranty.Article 1902 of the Civil Code provides that a person who. A duty which the law on torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others. . they not knowing at the time the identity of the parties . A further rent increase of 30% effective January 1. DISPOSITION The instant petition is denied for lack of merit.

Reyes. . 1912 NATURE Appeal from judgment of CFI FACTS . Her right leg was fractured. and the job is specifically done by his subordinates.83 - prof. are also owned by the National Government. Florentina Guilatco. bridges. Moreover.000 as well as P25. directors.City Engineer of Dagupan Alfredo Tangco admitted that the manhole is owned by the National Government and the sidewalk on which they are found along Perez Blvd.P3000 as attorney’s fees remain the same Disposition Petition granted. CA reversed the lower court’s ruling on the ground that no evidence was presented to prove that City of Dagupan had control or supervision over Perez Blvd. and she is no longer her former jovial self. The said editorial alluded to him as an eagle that surprises and devours. CA decision affirmed subject to the modified award of attorney’s fees. He said that he supervises the maintenance of said manholes and sees to it that they are properly covered.” On Damages awarded . conjecture or guess work as to the amount. and other activities which she used to do prior to the incident. Liquete. streets. and that she has difficulty in locomotion. She has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter (at the time of filing of complaint) and thus lost income. she has been unable to perform her religious. The court can not rely on “speculation. Lichauco. a court interpreter. plus attorney’s fees. due to which she was hospitalized. CA decision reversed and set aside. Aguilar. . no liability should attach to the city. casis . Provinces. Santos. 1978. . article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from “defective streets.Award of P7420 as lost income for one year. GUILATCO v CITY OF DAGUPAN 171 SCRA 382 SARMIENTO. .Trial court ordered the city to pay Guilatco actual. in effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with article 2189 CC. 1989 Nature: Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of CA Facts: .000. and a vampire that sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless. member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior of the Insular Government commenced an action against defendants Ocampo. found the award exorbitant.In this case. the judge of the CFI rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. The trial court should not have rounded off the amount. public buildings.The editorial “Birds of Prey” was alleged to have incited the Filipino people into believing that plaintiff was a vile despot and a corrupt person.She averred that she suffered mental and physical pain. Held YES . The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. social. A2010 . . Feb. editors and administrators of a certain newspaper known as “El Renacimiento” or “Muling Pagsilang”) for the purpose of recovering damages resulting from an alleged libelous publication. decision of trial court reinstated with modification. any person by reason of the defective condition of roads. Kalaw. plaintiff was forced to seek relief through the Court snd thereby incur expenses to protect his interests.00 Disposition – Petition denied.Exemplary damages of P50000 reduced to P10000. . . public buildings and other public works. an owl that affects a petulant omniscience. Hence. and confined. It was reduced to Pesos 100.After hearing the evidence adduced during trial. . Guilatco’s handicap was not permanent and disabled her only during her treatment which lasted for one year.torts & damages . a vulture that gorges himself on dead and rotten meat. . .Moral damages of P150000 is excessive and is reduced to P20000. Mar 21. control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer. Palma. PERSONS LIABLE WORCESTER v OCAMPO 22 PHIL 42 Johnson. In this casse.65. Issue WON control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists.Plaintiff Dean Worcester. unworthy of the position which he held. . or injuries suffered by. city or municipality for liability to attach.on July 25. however. Jose.The liability of private corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows: Article 2189. due to defendant’s action of interference. and other public works under their control or supervision.It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province. mental suffering and injuries to his standing and reputation in the sum of P35. Barretto and Cansipit (owners. holding all the defendants (except for Reyes.City contends that Perez Blvd is a national road that is not under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. On the other hand. plus P450 bonus remain the same . . Arellano. The Court. writers. It stated that it is sufficient that the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives to conclude that So was not a malicious interferer.The provision in the Civil Code with regard tortuous interference is Article 1314 which states that “ any third party who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party”. . Hence the lack of malice precludes the award of damages. - The charter only lays down general rules regulating that liability of the city. The Court ratiocinated that the recovery of legal fees is in the concept of actual or compensatory damages as provided in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.000 as punitive damages. operated on.The SC handled the question of whether the interference may be justified considering that So acted solely for the purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest.Police confirmed existence of the manhole. Nothing on the record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on the part of So. She also lost weight. accidentally fell into a manhole while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk at Perez Blvd.Actual damages of P10000 reduced to proven expenses of P8053. Aguilar and Liquete who were found to be editors but in a subordinate position and found to have merely acted under the direction of their superiors) liable jointly and severally for sustained damages on account of petitioner’s wounded feelings. 27. cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of. moral and exemplary damages. which was partially covered by a concrete flower pot by leaving a gaping hole about 2 ft long by 1 ½ feet wide or 42 cm wide by 75 cm long by 150 cm deep.

**note: Ponente used examples of torts as held under common law** (In a case of assault and battery committed by various persons. or proprietor * * * is chargeable with the publication of any words in any part * * * or number of each newspaper. Barretto. As recognized by Section 6 of Act 277 of the Philippine Commission: “Every author. an unrestricted liability to the extent of all his property. 1914 NATURE Appeal from the judgment of trial court finding for the defendant FACTS . HELD NO. They might have sued jointly and severally. Ocampo. and without not liable. and altogether jointly liable for the whole damage. A street car bound from Manila to Sta. Arellano. The car which the plaintiff intended to board was on the main line and bound in an opposite direction to that in which the defendant was going. but is also jointly liable with his tortfeasors. It is not necessary that the cooperation should be a direct. corporeal act. or assists in any way the commission of a wrong. may be held jointly and severally liable as joint tortfeasors HELD YES. assisted or counseled. encourage. promote. They are each liable as principals. TORRES [dissenting in part] . defendant's driver suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the plaintiff. Being told by his friend that the car was approaching. after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom. Ana being immediately in front of him. . Jose. the plaintiff or person injured. and MAPA. Chapman. Barretto. becomes himself responsible for such acts. or any number less than all. editing. nor were they owners or proprietors of the newspaper. Ratio An owner who sits in his automobile or other vehicle. Under the common law. Reasoning Defendants fail to recognize that the basis of the present action is a tort. and somewhat hurriedly. jointly and severally with the director and manager. he immediately. editor. [concurring] . as though he were a regular general partner when he was not such. with occasional switches to allow cars to meet and pass each other).Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. It is incomprehensible how one could claim the right or title to share the earnings or profits of a company when he had put no capital into it. Just before reaching the scene of the accident the street car which was following took the switch (there was a single-track street-car line running along Calle Herran. advise. that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants. They were donors who merely contributed a sum of money. the lower court. aid or abet the commission of a tort. and still less incur liability for damages on account of some act of the said company. Lichauco. went off the main line to the left upon the switch lying alongside of the main track. So also is the person who counsels. was as much a principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual tort. Plaintiff attempted to board the front platform but. neither is it comprehensible how one could share in the losses thereof. The person injured may sue all of them. the entrance being from the front or the rear platform. ARELLANO. J. Ana and bound for Manila. aids. 000 with interest at 6%. seeing that he could not reach it without extra exertion. it is improper to deduce that the contributors formed a company of either a civil or commercial nature. While in this position he was struck from behind and run over by the defendant's (Underwood) automobile. stopped beside the car. except with reference to the liability imposed upon Lichauco. . he followed along behind it. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort. Therefore they can not incur. explicitly stated that the other so-called founders subscribed and paid sums of money to aid the paper but as to Lichauco. casis MORELAND. facing toward the rear platform. regardless of their participation in the commission of the actual tort.This judgment prompted defendants to appeal to the SC. as a genuine gift. It is no defense for one sued alone. and Cansipit for they had neither direct nor indirect participation in the act that gave rise to the present suit for damages. Ratio Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command. Lichauco. . and Cansipit held jointly and severally liable for the sum of P25. if done for their benefit. Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. March 28. However. as they were.84 - prof. The real owner and founder. ISSUE WON Underwood is responsible for the negligence of his driver. and issuing the said newspaper. CHAPMAN V UNDERWOOD 27 Phil 374 . Kalaw. C. or one of them separately. . ISSUE WON the defendants.The courts during the trial may find that some of the alleged joint tortfeasors are liable and that others are A2010 . ***If several persons jointly commit a tort.We concur. Arellano. Ocampo. The defendants might have been sued separately for the commission of the tort.After Ocampo had accepted the various amounts proffered. cooperate in. claiming that the CFI committed several errors in rendering said judgment among which was that the lower court committed an error in rendering a judgment jointly and severally against the defendants. Disposition Judgment of the lower court modified. . but dissent as regards Palma. Palma. he offered to contribute. its press or other equipment. passed into the street for the purpose of signaling and boarding the car.torts & damages .The defendant entered Calle Herran at Calle Peñafrancia in his automobile driven by his chauffeur. countenance. and waited for it to come abreast of him in order to board. because tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual. Thereupon the defendant either kept straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to the right. nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as compared with that of the others.The judgment of the trial court was for defendant. as fully as if he were the author of the same.J. for the purpose of founding. to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. all are principals).I concur in regard to the defendants Ocampo and Kalaw. On the other hand. but did not carry out his offer and in fact paid nothing. committed no error in rendering a joint and several judgment against the defendants. has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly. instigate. desired to board a certain "San Marcelino" car coming from Sta. The car was a closed one.that is. or who approve of it after it is done. the donors ceased to be the owners of and surrendered all right to the money donated and to the objects that were acquired therewith. a competent driver. Each is liable for the whole damage caused by all. he who aided. When the front of the "San Marcelino" car was almost in front of the defendant's automobile. in this case. under the common law. Jose. And this is true even though they are charged jointly and severally. in any way the commission of a crime. and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts. Santos absolved from any liability. if the driver. by a sudden act of negligence.The plaintiff-appellant. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tortfeasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates.

When he approached the carritela. within the meaning of Article 2184. was a caretella owned by a certain Pedro Bautista. On his part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane.Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of him..The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. only eight meters away. the driver does not fall within the list of persons in Art. YU KHE THAI GR No. makes his driver’s act his own. is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident.Bernardo had no record of any traffic violation. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai. Bernardo. . . .Negligence on the employer’s part.1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant would be responsible. He was with his family. There was no reason for Yu to be specially alert. one on each side. in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. The test of his intelligence. with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel. David. 1968 FACTS . that is. He had reason to rely on the skill of his driver. No negligence of having employed him maybe imputed to his master. 1968 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CFI of Iloilo FACTS . instead of slowing down or stopping altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear. . taking the owner from his Parañaque home to Wack Wack. therefore. Ahead of the Cadillac. December 18. decided to take a gamble — beat the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with the carretela. he slackened his speed. DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is affirmed. as they were the only ones under the law permitted to pass upon that side of the street car. considering the condition of the road and the absence of traffic — the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour. although present herein at5 the time the act was committed. a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another DISPOSITIVE . Bernardo did not see the carretela from afar.in the case of Johnson vs. judged the distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the Cadillac would wait behind. And even if he did not notice the lights.In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the opposite direction. Caedo was driving his Mercury car.The Caedos were injured. And as far as perception is concerned. The car was running at a reasonable speed.The plaintiff needed only to watch for cars coming from his right. Caedo and three daughters. as he claimed later on at the trial.The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds. going in the same direction. the owner of the automobile. . The act complained of must be continued in the presence or the owner for such a length of time that the owner by his acquiescence. where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. L-20392 MAKALINTAL. With them in the car were Mrs. the same rule applies where the owner is present. A2010 . injures a person or violates the criminal law. L-20392 MAKALINTAL. . They filed a suit for recovery of damages against Bernardo and Yu Khe Thai. . wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane.torts & damages the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance. This is the first clear indication of his negligence. Bernardo. On the other side of the road.A carretela was in front of the Cadillac. as it must have been in the beam of his headlights for a considerable while. and they should have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary precautions. Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane. veered to the left in order to pass. where his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro. He was driving the latter’s Cadillac along highway 54.Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from his home in Quezon City to the airport. absent a minimum level imposed by law. . or else squeeze in between them in any case.Bernardo is the driver of Yu Khe Thai.it appears with fair clearness that the interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver. . Julian Bautista. . He was passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side. . ISSUES WON Yu Khe Thai should be held solidarily liable as Bernardo’s employer HELD CAEDO V YU KHE THAI GR NO. casis Decision modified. . is not responsible. must be sought in the immediate setting. December 18. and the risk should have been quite obvious. The road was wide and open. CAEDO v. either civilly or criminally.No negligence can be imputed. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel. unless the negligent act of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. and the Cadillac at approximately 48 to 56 kilometers. The CFI ruled in favor of the Caedos and held Bernardo and Yu solidarily liable. if any. however. The carretela was provided with two lights. Yu Khe Thai is free from liability car of the Caedos’ approaching from the opposite lane. It was a risky maneuver either way. he decided to overtake it even though he had already seen the No. where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro's son. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel.85 - prof. Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not present at the time the alleged negligent acts were committed by the driver. Reasoning Defendant's driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and over the plaintiff. the carretela should anyway have been visible to him from afar if he had been careful.

caught the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose. Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperiña. must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident. And so. died as a consequence. and so he had to swerve to the left in spite of the presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane. And as far as perception is concerned. Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness. The father. within the meaning of Article 2184. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers. During the trial. . The road was wide and open. confronted with the unexpected situation. The photographs taken at the scene show that the right wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at the moment of impact. have real need of drivers' services. 1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Its rear bumper.Rafael Bernardo had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperiña. he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. This . as already stated. After trial. WON his employer. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. No. would be effectively proscribed. with other students. was accused of double homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperiña and Amado Ticzon on March 31. The test of his intelligence. father of Dante. and.959. and is otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo.12 12 The case involves an interpretation of Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code. Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged and. but was unsuccessful. he was a minor and was then living with his father. DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO G. the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperiña. are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them. Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of P2. in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. YES. defendant Yu Khe Thai. Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question jointly and severally with his son Dante because at the time the latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim. in case of his death or incapacity. if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him. supervision and custody of the latter.The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals but the case was certified to the Supreme Court on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of law. he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. Sabina Exconde. If the causative factor was the driver's negligence. and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed. is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident.It was already too late to apply the brakes when Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front of him. absent a minimum level imposed by law.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperiña. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver.86 - prof. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant. it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the complaint. 1957 BAUTISTA ANGELO. J. Negligence on the part of the latter. In line with her reservation. . tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to the right. The car was not running at an unreasonable speed. From the school Dante. if any. is solidarily liable with him. that is. the mother. Dante Capuno was only fifteen (15) years old when he committed the crime. nor did he know that his son was going to attend a parade. No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master." car owners who. The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions.The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno. (school’s liability versus parental liability) which provides: "ART. on appeal. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed.R. xxx xxx xxx Finally. as a consequence. necessarily subjective. . . ISSUE 1. 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna. paragraph 1 and 5. plaintiff contends. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. by -their very inadequacies. son of Delfin Capuno. From this decision. It further appears that Delfin Capuno. 1903. NO. the lower court erred in relieving the father from liability. reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages against the accused. teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.: FACTS Dante Capuno. but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible. 2.The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is. 2. jointly and severally with his son Dante. As it was.torts & damages . There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that he must be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from liability. reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage. the former was not under the control. L-10068-70 June 29. was not with his son at the time of the accident. ISSUE Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable. Caedo. the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. SABINA EXCONDE vs. the civil liability of the father is evident. It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the Balintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31. RULING YES. casis defense was sustained by the lower court and. the clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side was insufficient. to a great degree. If YES. HELD 1. with costs against the latter. boarded a jeep and when the same started to run. He only came to know it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher. and devoid of traffic that early morning. employment of professional drivers by A2010 . WON defendant Rafael Bernardo is liable for the accident.

but deliberate intent.. and the costs of action.. COURT OF APPEALS) REASONING The provision “Teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody". is obvious. in case of his death or incapacity. What substantial difference is there between them in so far as concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons.959. Facts: Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas. And it was in connection with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it. Spanish Civil Code). this tribunal gave the following reasons for the rule: — The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and. and. he attended the parade in honor of Dr. in case of his death or incapacity. etc. Wherefore. that according to the last article. 2 of Art. keeping them in their company. In the circumstances. should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody. BALCE FUELLAS V. as conceded by all commentators. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them. the children were under the direct control or supervision of an academic institution. while on the other hand. keeping them in their company. Issue: WON the father is liable civilly for the criminal act of his son? Held: Yes. the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. there can be no responsibility. The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms "preceptores y artesanos" used in the Italian and French Civil Codes. This defendants failed to prove. last paragraph. Capuno. This.87 - prof. Spanish Civil Code). L-10132.. last paragraph. No. arising from the criminal act committed by the latter. also a minor.00 as damages. liable under Art. REYES. the petitioner-appellant was ordered to pay damages for the deliberate injury caused by his son. now appellant Agapito Fuellas. I believe we should affirm the judgment relieving the father of liability. the mother. educating them in proportion to their means". June 29. while. for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them. Having proved that he entrusted his child to the custody of school authorities that were competent to exercise vigilance over him. the latter. on the other hand. were both 13 years old. the father has rebutted the presumption of Art. G. could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an institution of arts and trades as provided for by law.L. Padilla and Reyes. 1957). son of defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents. 1954. and that there being no fault or negligence on the part of petitioner-appellant's minor son. Dansalan City. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority. the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff. jointly and severally. 2180 of the Civil Code. WHICH WAS LATER MODIFIED BY J CRUZ IN AMADORA VS. 134 and 135. JJ. The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article 1903. the act of the minor must be one wherein "fault or negligence" is present. gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Arts. for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. In an earlier case (Exconde vs. that the said court held the petitioner liable pursuant to par. nor the city school's supervisor. submits that the appellate Court erred in holding him liable for damages for the deliberate criminal act of his minor son. SALEN V. therefore. et al. the sum of P2.torts & damages RATIO Parents shall be liable for the tortious conduct of their minor children living with them although at the time of the tort. the mother. defendants failed to prove. concur. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. 1903 and the burden of proof shifted to the claimant to show actual negligence on the part of the parent in order to render him liable. gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155. is obvious. Appellant. it would seem clear that where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher.R. in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades" used in Art. only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution.B. for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them. the accident occurred.. dissenting: A2010 .. Spanish Civil Code). casis to Pepito Cadano. the words "arts and trades" does not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of establishments". the father of the minor who caused the injuries . The civil liability which the law impose upon the father. it is clear that neither the head of that school. Spanish Civil Code). and not the parent. 1903. If. And if there is no authority. J. The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Art. J. I submit that the father should not be held liable for a tort that he was in no way able to prevent. his right arm was broken after Rico pushed him on the ground. educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means". on September 16. I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 2176 of the same Code. the above mentioned articles are not applicable. in connection with Art. prom. In my opinion. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them. 1903 of the old Civil Code. (THIS IS A LANDMARK DOCTRINE. Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular activity. They were classmates at St. 1903 of the old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. Mary's High School. for the existence of deliberate intent in the commission of an act negatives the presence of fault or negligence in its commission. holding the defendants jointly and severally liable with his minor son Dante for damages. 2180 of the new Civil Code for damages. and which he had every right to assume the school authorities would avoid. CADANO Nature: Appeal from the Decision of the Trial Court making defendant therein. It is contended that in the decision of the Court of Appeals. They had a quarrel that lead to Pepito’s injury. so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and supervision over the pupil. teachers. A.

the defendant Balce was the father of a minor Gumersindo Balce. The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180. whom he designates or permits to run it. stating that the civil liability of the minor son of defendant arising from his criminal liability must be determined under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and not under Art. where the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the owner's family than the child driving it. This is because a son who commits the act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12. It was conceded that the collision was caused by negligence pure and simple. jointly and severally. namely. or over 9 but under 15 years of age. with neither being willing to slow up and give the right of way to the other. the case is one of two drivers approaching a narrow bridge from opposite directions. And responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the action in the present case was instituted. Revised Penal Code). pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code. that of contract. any discussion as to the minor's criminal responsibility is of no moment. the decision appealed from is affirmed GUTIERREZ VS GUTIERREZ MALCOLM. In its broader aspects. Narcisso Gutierrez blames both the bus and the car while the truck blames the car and the car in turn blames the truck. to recover damages in the amount of P10. Verily. The reason for this conclusion reaches to the findings of the trial court concerning the position of the truck on the bridge. Gumersindo was found guilty of homicide for having killed Carlos Salen. The automobile was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez. February 28. for physical injuries suffered as a result of an automobile accident. and of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on a different basis. under 9 years of age. But. were accommodated therein. the void apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code. so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and servant. who maintains it for the general use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children." To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses. are responsible for damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of the evidence submitted therein by both parties. The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his son. 2. the mother. together will several other members of the Gutierrez family. the youth Bonifacio was in incompetent chauffeur. an insane. Disposition In consonance with the foregoing rulings. The liability of Saturnino Cortez. and Mrs. 1931 Nature: an action brought by the plaintiff in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the five defendants. the speed in operating the machine. would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son. that he was driving at an excessive rate of speed. and the plaintiff will have judgment in his favor against the defendants Manuel Gutierrez. the father was not in the car. Based on these facts. WON the owner of the truck is liable. independently of the criminal case. seven in all. But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability. with the inevitable result of a collision and an accident decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical cases. the 2. RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA) 135 SCRA 242 ABAD SANTOS. for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted. a businessman. WON the father of Bonifacio (car) is liable. in case of his death or incapacity. the judgment appealed from will be modified. who acts without discernment. and was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother. and that. but the mother.000. a lad 18 years of age. Mr. In the United States. Jose Balce. In reversing the decision. Abelardo Velasco. Yes. September 23. as may be gleaned from some recent A2010 . Salen and Salbanera vs. on approaching the bridge and the truck. At the time of the collision. the owner of the truck. 2177). In that case. minor son of plaintiffs. resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil Code. The theory of the law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of the owner's business. and was owned by Saturnino Cortez. the petition is dismissed. the pertinent portion of which provides: "The father and. Facts: A passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the municipality of Las Piñas. IN VIEW HEREOF. Province of Rizal. it is uniformly held that the head of a house. 2180 of the new Civil Code. driving a gokart. Yes. and . for the sum of P5. no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. below 18 years of age who was living with him.000. and the lack of care employed by the chauffeur. this tribunal held: — It is true that under Art. Held: 1. The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority or control. was killed in a vehicular collision (between Luna. 1985 NATURE: Petition to review a decision of CA FACTS: Roberto Luna. Manuel Gutierrez. Issue: 1. and the costs of both instances. 2 and 3. Moreover. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case. The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco. the owner of an automobile.torts & damages In another case. Narcisso Gutierrez was a passenger of the bus. and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore stated. casis father alone and not the minor or the mother. and Saturnino Cortez. a father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile. He had a fracture on his right leg. is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault of negligence under the Penal Code (Art. he lost his head and so contributed by his negligence to the accident.88 - prof. unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. subdivisions 1. 101 of the Revised Penal Code. would be liable for the damages caused by the minor.

A2010 . father of Wendell . Luis is already of age. low powered vehicles. Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December.000. thus is void. driving a Toyota car without a license) at a gokart practice area. in the interest of justice (since the death took place in 1970. Hill became merely subsidiarily to that of his son. P12. To this contention.000 personal expenses).000. which the CFI ruled in favor of the Lunas. he has no property in the Phils or elsewhere.” Disposition: resolution of CA SET ASIDE. was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos. It was error on the part of the CA to have disturbed the determination of the RTC which it had previously affirmed.) Obiter: The Dela Rosas invoke the ruling in Elcano v Hilll. and atty’s fees of P50. the court is “unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law because to do so will not serve the ends of justice. saying that they had no cash money. 13 years old. it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would also increase considering the manifold sources thereof” 2. the SC came out with a resolution ordering the Dela Rosas. contending that the CA erred in reducing the award for unearned income. Petition of the Dela Rosas was denied for lack of merit. The writ of execution produced only a nominal amount.000 compensatory damages. it was an error to increase the expenses without increasing the gross income.Julie and Wendell died from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm licensed under Cresencio Libi. and the trend of his earnings over the span of his last few years. reinstating the earlier decision with slight modification regarding the award of atty’s fees. In the meantime. P12. only slightly larger than foot-pedaled four wheeled conveyances. “That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low slung.000 gross income less P20.IAC: CFI decision set aside and found Libis subsidiarily liable ISSUE WON A2180 CC is applicable in making Libi’s liable for vicarious liability . all with legal interest.000 compensatory damages. RTC considered the various positions the deceased held at the time of his death. and attorney’s fees of P50. and 15 years after the process of litigation is still not over). the CA modified this by factoring in the “engagement of Luna in car racing. (The atty’s fees should accrue interest from the date of filing of the compliant. In a MFR filed by the Dela Rosas. In coming out with the life expectancy. Malou Alfonso . Also. Reasoning: the RTC based its computation of the net unearned earnings on 2 factors: life expectancy of the deceased of another 30 years. thus lowering the net annual unearned income to P45. at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from which she died on January 14.CFI Cebu: Gotiongs filed civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter's vicarious liability under A2180 CC. Both parties filed separate petitions for review in the SC. while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi. and that the award for atty’s fees should include legal interest. He has no assets of his own as yet”).000 (P75. due to the escalating gasoline expenses.000 for loss of companionship. RTC considered the age and health of the deceased. Heirs of Luna brought a suit for damages against Luis and his father. P50. WON the award for atty’s fees should have legal interest HELD: 1.000. with 2 kids. WON the CA erred in reducing the unearned income 2. September 18. . (Note: father and son solidarily liable for damages. awarding P1. Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend.” thus lowering the life expectancy to only 10 years.000. the liability of Atty. and an annual net income of P55. Luna's social standing’ [a statement which lacks complete basis]. and living in Spain but only causally employed (“His compensation is hardly enough to support his family. Hill nothwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of his son. ISSUES: 1.January 14. and who also died in the same event on the same date. the CA modified the decision. where the court held that A2180 applied to Atty. However. must have caused Wendell's death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification .000 as unearned net earnings of Luna.More than 2 years before their deaths. decision of the then WRT to the gross income. Pending the decision. but since the son had attained majority. . then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents. interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the court.1992 NATURE Petition for review of the Intermediate Appellate Court. married. within 30 days.both set of parents came up with versions of the story Gotiongs: > Wendell caused her death by shooting her and thereafter turning the gun on himself to commit suicide Libis: > an unknown third party.650.torts & damages Luis dela Rosa.89 - prof. YES Ratio: The reduction of the award of net unearned earnings had no basis.000.” Also. 1979 . thus coming up with a potential gross income of P75. whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU).1979 . In order to avoid him.) The Dela Rosas appealed in the CA. Luis is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine Courts. FACTS . 1978 when Julie Ann broke up with Wendell after she found him to be sadistic and irresponsible.000 for loss of his companionship (come on!!). and P50. “It stands to reason that if his annual personal expenses should increase because of the ‘escalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R. which affirmed in toto the RTC.January. the CA increased the annual personal expenses to P30.respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who.000 for unearned net earnings. CA erred in ruling that the engagement with car racing reduced the life expectancy. The instant petition is the one filed by Lunas. prompting him to resort to threats against her. Cebu City. The Dela Rosas failed to pay the amounts. . YES Ratio: The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and under the circumstances. The Dela Rosas now invoke that the father should also be held only subsidiarily. casis LIBI V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SPS GOTIONG) 214 SCRA 16 REGALADO. However. this time reducing the unearned income to P450.000 (no interest mentioned). with legal interest from date of the decision. to pay the Lunas P450.1979. CFI dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of the evidence. as a matter of equity. There is nothing on record that supports the claim that the car racing was a dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy.Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the Julie refused.

Decision set aside. appellants are liable under A2180 CC.BUT Liability is not subsidiary BUT primary > if the liability of the parents for crimes and QDs of their minor children is subsidiary. Wendell. Reasoning . Cresencio Libi. the diligence would constitute a valid substantial defense. they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. + for civil liability from crimes committed by minors under the legal authority and control or who live in the company of the parents: PRIMARY = premised on A101 RPC fot damages ex delicto by kids 9 or under or 9-15 but without discernment = premised on A2180 CC for kids 9-15 with discernment or 15-21 (now 18) + liability effected against father or mother? BOTH PARENTS AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE PARENTAL AUHTORITY OVER THE MINOR = youth welfare code = FC: responsibility of parents + for civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors: same rules in A2180 and A2182 Disposition Instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED TAMARGO vs CA (Rubio. under this doctrine. LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR QDS OF THEIR MINOR KIDS AS CONTEMPLATED IN A2180 ID PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY > applying A2194 (solidary liability of joint tortfeasors) the parent is also solidarily liable with the child. Jr. 1960 NATURE This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . mother of Wendell. because of his minority.The parents of Adelberto claimed that they are not the indispensable party in the action as their son adopted by the spouses Rapisura on November 18. 1992 NATURE Appeal for review of CA decision FACTS . then aged ten. Mercado. The trial Court agreed with the respondents and dismissed the complaint. sufficient proof can be presented to overcome this presumption.Amelita Libi. J. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their son. Bundoc) 209 SCRA 518 Feliciano. The presumption under law is that when a child under their care commits a tortuous act the parents were negligent in the performance of these duties and responsibilities. and in keeping said gun from his reach.undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It should be emphasized. Article 2180 reads “ the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions. a person is not only liable for torts committed by him also torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsibility. Thus parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of the parents which include the instructing. cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. . is the son of his co-plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita's key is always in her bag. testified that her husband. They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. Quisumbing. Disposition – Petition granted. Manuel . THE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR FELONIES IS LIKEWISE PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY. Reasoning.On October 20. controlling.A2180': The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by A2180 CC covers obligations wising from both quasidelicts and criminal offenses. We. Thus. that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not as the body was cleaned already in the funeral parlor . ISSUE . they they can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damages. of the instruction and supervision of the child. however. the provision of Article 2180 would be applicable. however. The adopting and natural parents of Jennifer filed a civil complaint for damages against the parents of Bundoc.Yes. all of which facts were known to Wendell. But if the liability id direct and primary. to a large extent.The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him under Article 2176. Therefore. However. To do so and hold them liable for the tortious act when be unfair and unconscionable.Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing. The Court held that parental authority did not retroactively transfer to and vested in the adopting MERCADO v. accordingly.The principle of parental liability is designated as vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed liability under the Anglo-American tort law. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible… The father and. and disciplining of the child. As stated.90 - prof. .The case contained procedural questions which were raised in the appeal. He was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide but was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability ob the ground that he had acted without discernment. HELD. Adelberto Bundoc. that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. 1982 via an adoption decree granted by the CFI of Ilocos Sur.WON the spouses Bundoc were indispensable party to the tort action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. A101 RPC SAYS SO > RULES: A2010 . The SC however decided to hear the appeal based on substantial justice.torts & damages HELD YES Ratio The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists. the mother are responsible for the damages caused by the children who live in their company… The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The adopting parents had no actual or physical custody of Adelberto at the time of the incident as they were then in the US were they live. while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L. 1982. HENCE. . She admitted.' . shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. . casis parents at the time the shooting incident occurred. COURT OF APPEALS AND QUISUMBING L-14342 LABRADOR. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was. May 30. owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. incase of his death or incapacity.

in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. . Jr. . FACTS . Daffon. Lastly. gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face.It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody. Teodosio Valenton. Brillantes. . (Art. Jr. but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. to a certain extent. NO. Valenton and Quibulue. Jr. The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows. such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. casis the class to which the deceased belonged. Quezon City.. direction and influence.The clause "so long as they remain in their custody" contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher." In the law of torts. . . 2179. Court of Appeals. we find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. was shown to have existed. such that the control. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. . quarrelled over a "pitogo". so long as they remain in their custody. and a student in automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute filed the action below for damages arising from the death of their son at the hands of a fellow student. however. this article(art.A "pitogo".the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.” ISSUE WON the school officials are jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors with Daffon. Civil Code. He never regained consciousness. absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute. . WON the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the of the father since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time) 2. respectively) Ratio The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students. YES. Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them." contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher." It is.torts & damages Quisumbing. is as follows: ART. upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should be made liable. it was duly incorporated. at the laboratory room of the said Institute. direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents.Palisoc spouses as parents of their 16-year old son.There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the school. Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing. was A2010 . It is true that occasioned by the fact that Manuel. On February 22. . that "(I)t would seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody. may be described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank.the deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates. they.The trial court. the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents. instructor of . which motivated the assault. .. yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augusto's resentment. Santiago M. it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school. so he was immediately taken to a hospital. since this contemplates the situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parents. YES (head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute. so long as they remain in their custody. 2180. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. and hence. of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived.Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar. Daffon. .The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's dictum in Mercado vs." contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher.000 are excessive. Consequently. therefore.Defendants were: Antonio C. which figures prominently in this case. WON the moral damages fixed at P2. which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. in retaliation. in this wise: “In the opinion of the Court. Dominador Palisoc. defendant Virgilio L. Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages. which authorizes the grant of moral damages. such that the control. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L.At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship. finally he died.) After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals. the president thereof. Jr.91 - prof. together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. HELD a. PALISOC VS. including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students. Quibulue. as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated. a fellow student of the deceased.2180) of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar. BRILLANTES 41 SCRA 548 TEEHANKEE. the grant of moral damages is not justified. within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219. Reasoning . including recess time. ISSUES 1. the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over. It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty. 1956. HELD 1. which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach. nor does paragraph 2 of said article. and Virgilio L. Augusto wounded Manuel. and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. As a result. is that they stand.. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. 2.. as to their pupils and students. and one afternoon. and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon. on the right cheek with a piece of razor. . Daffon. 1971 NATURE An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the CFI Manila. but lately. at the time when the incident occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute. had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get "his pitogo from Renato. apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy. October 4. At that time the classes were in recess. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply. Palisoc became pale and fainted.

damages. it would have expressly so stated. and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer minors. the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability. principal.L.. Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools. I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results. Thus. considering the size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions.00 for actual and compensatory expenses. teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. (b) P3. x x x “ The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises. NO (Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of directors and the school) itself cannot be held similarly liable. plus the costs of this action in both instances. Court of Appeals.00 for moral.00 for loss of earning power and (e) P2. dissenting: . Basis of teacher’s vicarious liability is.one other factor constrains me to dissent.Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority. REYES. Such defense they had taken necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of and thus be exonerated from liability imposed by Art 2180. However . said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. academic and non-academic. as well as the temper. so should teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category..At any rate. “x x x x The distinction no longer obtains at present. dismissing defendants' counterclaims. in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180. defendant Daffon. absolving defendant Antonio C. A2010 . The teacher in charge is the one designated by the dean. Further. should have been brought in as party defendant. Held: Yes. and the dicta in Mercado on which it relied. that while in the case of parents and guardians. rendering teachers and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control. b. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the student under their control and supervision. by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage...B. concurring: -I would like to clarify that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect that the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils who are minors is not in accord with the plain text of the law. Sentencing the Daffon." Note that for parental responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their company.I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v. the teacher is physically present and in a position to prevent it. J. the parents of the student at fault. AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLLETOS) 160 SCRA 315 CRUZ. as thus incorporated. The opinion of the majority states: "Here.000. since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant . Brillantes from the complaint. or has ended or has not yet begun. as in the case of the parents and of the guardians.000. DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows: . attitudes and often destructive activism of the students. . .00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc. including recess time. . Valenton and Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P12. their authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age. The fact that it has not done so indicates an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age.it stands to reason that (1) the clause "so long as they remain in their custody" as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase "who live in their company" as used in reference to parents. Alfredo went to the school to submit his “Report in Physic”.000.It would demand responsibility without commensurate authority..phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school.torts & damages under the law abovequoted. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury. J. must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision. April 15. 1988 Facts: . the article expressly so provides. whether the semester has not ended. academic or non-academic. the school may be held to answer for the acts of its teacher or the head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior. the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him." In the light of the factual findings of the lower court's decision. In any event. ISSUE: WON Art 2180 is applicable.finally. J.000. they acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents). it is not without significance that . 1. but it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. (c) P5.92 - prof. 2. to hold their teachers and/or the administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts committed by them. are not involved. the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter.the school had been incorporated since and therefore the school itself. casis It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to graduate at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes. While they were in the auditorium of their school. “There is really no substantial difference distinction between the academic and non-academic schools in so far as torts committed by their students are concerned. (d) P10. for injuries caused by the student. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school.375. It is natural to expect that if the law had intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of persons enumerated in the article. . Civil Code. since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident. and 3.00 for attorney's fee. whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching”. as such. hewas shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon. The term “custody” signifies that the student is within the control and influence of the school authorities. or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils or students in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution" . as erroneously held by the lower court. Teachers are liable for acts of their student except where the school is technical in nature (arts and trade establishment) in which case the head thereof shall be answerable. MAKALINTAL.

private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils. . filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano. Guttierez. YLARDE vs. As a result thereof." On the other hand. Being their teacher-in-charge. . also after classes. These four pupils ---. and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence. The work was left unfinished. Ylarde's parents. As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent nor the school remised in the discharged of their duties. playfully jumped into the pit. The answer is no since the provision speaks of “teachers or heads” Dispositive WHEREFORE. ISSUE WON the Art 2180 CC13 applies to academic institutions HELD It is unnecessary to answer the issue. However the court can suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed. which they did FACTS Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School and private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. private respondent Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging.Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng and Arante University based on Art 2190 CC . they were exonerated of liability. 1988 NATURE Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order dismissing the complaint as against the respondent school and denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal. 1988 July 29 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari AQUINO PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY) 160 SCRA 785 PARAS. not commit. Fransico Alcantara. in or out of the school premises – J. Alonso. It seems most unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship. pinning him to the wall in a standing position.Reynaldo Alonso. . if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education. the concrete block caught him before he could get out. Since it was a civil case. Petitioner (Reynaldo) was subsequently stabbed by Teng requiring him to be hospitalized and to undergo surgery.A group of students walking inside Araneta University were accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karin Madidis alias “Teng”.Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the provision only applies to vocational schools and not to academic institutions. At this point. Ylarde sustained injuries and died three (3) days later. the applicable provision of Article 2180 states: "Art.93 - prof. The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has outlived its purpose. dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep. .torts & damages teachers are not expected to have the same measure of responsibility as that imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree. three of the four kids. They also claim that the civil liability in this case arose from a crime. petitioners in this case. another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez stated burying them all by himself. ISSUE WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code. April 25. it can only apply the law with its imperfections. 2176. The court cannot make law. . What the petitioner wants to know is WON the school or the university itself is liable. Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope. 2180. Jr concurringly said many student x x x view some teachers as part of the bourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice on behavior deportment and other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively rejected. private respondent Aquino alone 13 "Lastly. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde. without any warning at all. GANCAYCO. private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. A2010 . so long as they remain in their custody. Then. Deciding to help his colleague. When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block." A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left. (Note – the court view on increasing students activism likely causing violence resulting to injuries. The following day. MTD was granted by the CA. the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone. (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person." . aged ten to eleven. casis continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging. FACTS . said private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away. there being fault or negligence. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides: "Art. he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. Such fault or negligence.Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of Dismissal. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. respondent school claims that a demand should have been made by the plaintiff rendering it premature to bring an action for damages against respondent school. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. the school was littered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II. Alcantara and Ylarde. Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde. Then. Motion was denied due to insufficient justification to disturb ruling. Before leaving. is obliged to pay for the damage done. both private respondents can be held liable for damages. x x x The parent can instill more lasting discipline more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or the head for the tort committed by the child. At that time.

Abon. capacity.: Feb. or the area within which the school activity is conducted. We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence. but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit. impleading Jimmy B. HELD NO. The standard of conduct to which a child A2010 . "the phrase used in [Art. knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area. and (5) left the children close to the excavation. and (3) dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit. an obviously attractive nuisance. is liable." as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult. as contemplated in the law. IAC (CASTRO) 166 SCRA 274 PADILLA. Ratio: Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-incharge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher. so long as they remain in their custody. Reasoning: This is in line with the Court’s ruling in Amadora vs. Jimmy B. (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling." or in the custody of BCF." HELD Only Aquino. as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience. (6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. including recess time. Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc. This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school. knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. supra. Court of Appeals. (2) absolving the other defendants. petitioners cannot under Art. must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age. According to the CA. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Jimmy B. at around 8:00 p. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. 2180 — 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school. the teacher. DISPOSITION Granted. BCF is both an academic and arts and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP. The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the CA. Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF). as heirs of Napoleon Castro. Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF). it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity. Subsequently. Ratio: ST. J. it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. the Trial Court rendered a decision." contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises. The time interval is safely within the "recess time" that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case. a student of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977. therefore. 2180 of the Civil Code. the ROTC Commandant.. Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior. casis Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. while it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident. (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging. The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. to a certain extent. ISSUE WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. when he shot Napoleon Castro. FRANCIS HIGH CA(Castillo/Cadiz) 194 SCRA 340 Paras. 25. Inc. J. a commerce student of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro. as party defendants. Abon for damages resulting from his acts. it is only the head of the school who can be held liable.torts & damages xxx xxx xxx "Lastly. he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the children's safety. 17 a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. so long as they remain in their custody. when he shot Napoleon Castro.m. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. Ratio: As regards the principal. the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages. This should not be the case. Reasoning: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task. Logically. Roberto C. Abon. 1991 SCHOOL v NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS . Likewise. to pay private respondents. SALVOSA v. in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student]. jointly and severally. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation. which was at about 8 o'clock in the evening. Bearing this in mind. in the parking space of BCF. 1988 FACTS Jimmy Abon. discretion. After hearing. We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde. In line with the case of Palisoc." Reasoning: a.94 - prof.. (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B. the latter "stands. Abon. A "recess. the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school. Libertad D." Likewise. he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. b.: October 5.

the male teachers who were to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking. ISSUES (1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180 HELD (1) NO. Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the parties. -his parents filed a complaint against St. it was shown that the principal had known of the picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the event. For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his employee. -Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroad:”… the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. there was SOLIMAN. In the case at bar. However. the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st. a school cannot be an insurer for its students against all risks. and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180. enrolled in the 3rd year commerce course of PSBA. 1992 FACTS -Carlitos Bautista. it should be noted that the victim’s parents allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination. he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher. The TC found against the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim. PREMISES CONSIDERED. the questioned decision is SET ASIDE PSBA v CA (BENITEZ/BAUTISTA) 205 SCRA 729 Padilla. -When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment. teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim. They cannot escape liability simply because it wasn’t an “extra-curricular activity of the HS”. In fact.E. recklessness and lack of security precautions.: Feb. Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them. time and place. particularly par 4. any finding of negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual obligation only. alleging negligence. (1) NO. . and several teachers for damages incurred from the death of their son. 2180. Hence this petition. At this stage. -A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by the TC. Petitioners contend that the victim’s parents failed to prove by evidence that they didn’t give their son consent to join the picnic. resulting in a bilateral obligation. 2 P. no moral or exemplary damages under Art. employers will be forever exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the performance of their duties. His parents didn’t allow him to go due to short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home. casis no cause of action since academic institutions are not subject to the said provision. -PSBA sought to dismiss the case. but the court has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a contract.torts & damages -Ferdinand Castillo. (3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence required of them. From the evidence. contending that it occurred due to petitioners’ failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family. teachers were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming.95 - prof. However. and as the latter had her own class to supervise then and was not actually invited. yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA. the petition is DENIED. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extracontractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties” -Using the test in Cangco.In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was breached due to PSBA’s negligence in providing proper security measures. In turn. the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task. Illumin. the student abides by the school’s academic requirements and observes its rules and regulations. then a freshman student at St. The CA erred in applying Art. alleging that since they were presumably sued under Art 2180. the teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity. Francis HS. a contract is established between them. Hence this petition. If the CA’s findings are to be upheld. (2) NO. Also. Costs against the petitioners. Also. represented by its principal. The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which was not school sanctioned. WHEREFORE. both are jointly and severally liable w/ the teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the owner/manager (St. Life savers were brought in the event of such an accident. The Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence of their liability. hence. during and after the attack of the victim. The records also show that the 2 P. JR. means and methods before. along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge. was stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants who were from outside the school’s academic community. The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. 2 of the teachers who arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers. J. the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondent’s complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC can determine.E. in relation to 2176 is applicable (3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper HELD A2010 . -Both parties appealed to the CA. under Article 2180. As such. At the outset. On the issue of the liability of St. 4th. The school is obliged to provide the student with an education. Francis HS and the Illumin. V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 . 4. a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBA’s liability. 2177 may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses. -No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised diligence of a good father of the family. 2180. This prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w/ Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers. Quezon. Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach. one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons. ISSUE (1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants (2) WON Art. Francis and the principal). -Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it. the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern.

. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student. contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it. that negligence xxx xxx xxx Lastly. shot the plaintiff on the abdomen. which contract results in obligations for both parties. Security Agency. Hence. xxx xxx xxx Art. The relations between teacher and pupil. the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen. filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC. 350 and 352 of the Civil Code 2. this appeal. The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority: xxx xxx xxx (2) Teachers and professors.L. The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. Jimmy Solomon. for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1. on the one hand. another student of the Institute. quoted above.In Palisoc v. Petitioner. YES . In fact. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils. the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon. casis paragraph of Article 2180. It held: When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment. . the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc. Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency. Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th . Certainly. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible. At the same time. resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with.L. RCC was not the employer of Solomon. RL Security Agency and Solomon. and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon.L. as well as those of Articles 349. and not to the clients of such agency. while the school was the client of the latter.. .The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows: Art. however.. Security Agency Inc. without any provocation. 350. while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil. who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant R." . NO Under Art. . Jr. J. he being in fact an employee of the R.Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority.. It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon. Security Agency Inc. a student of that Institute. For its part. their students or apprentices. student or apprentice of the school. Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner. as yet. . Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following: xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper. Inc. xxx xxx xxx Art. 349. Brillantes. It is settled that where the security agency. petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon. In the instant case. There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC and Solomon. as here. so long as they remain in their custody. acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.. while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman. WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180. WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law. supra. of the Civil Code did not apply.On August 13. Necessarily. the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment. 1982. he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months. This would be for the trial court to determine. the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision. . and the students who are enrolled.RCC filed a motion to dismiss. 7th paragraph. It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v. May 18. And.torts & damages FELICIANO. and as per doctor's opinion. there is established a contract between them. It further argued that Article 2180. hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards. since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case. The employer of Solomon was the R. In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced. the defendant. was not a pupil.It was also pointed out in said case that: "In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. On the other hand.Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCC’s motion to dismiss. Jr. the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon. the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon. there is. however. Petitioner’s MFR was denied. professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution. 2. Using the test of Cangco. represented by his guardian.Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or 'built-in' obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. The plaintiff was confined in a hospital. A2010 . . the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for one's own act or omission. student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges. 352. even if there be a finding of negligence. a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC). on the other hand. 1992 NATURE Civil complaint for damages FACTS .In the case of PSBA v CA. 2180. was in the campus premises thereof. no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. ISSUES 1.96 - prof. the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. xxx xxx xxx (4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices.The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman. recruits.Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges. the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only.

March 25. and Vivencio Villanueva.In the appeal. WHEREFORE. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. 2180 NCC (Art. But this was not alleged in their complaint.This case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings. -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days. the bus company also argued that PhilAm is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41. finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them.It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK. February 6. liable for damages HELD NO. petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle. Inc. SO ORDERED. or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded. MARY’S ACADEMY VS. whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision FACTS . allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC. and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS. only on Art. Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T. Ratio. together with James Daniel II (then 15. . . states. acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation. . . and therefore. The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan. -Liability for the accident.In the PSBA case. however. The negligence of petitioner St. This deprived the company of earnings of about P8. It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached. Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition. In other words. the trial court had denied the school's motion to dismiss the complaint against it. Mary’s Academy) WON St. along the nat’l highway at Sto. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him. the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events.Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St.200. James Daniel II. Carpitanos sued the school. a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. its manager BALINGIT and the driver. Reasoning. casis case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants. As PSBA. The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim. -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities. and could have been based.. It was Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep. Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva . owned by Phil Rabbit.PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines. Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have. there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pineda's employer.[19] The Court remands the PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO. Disposition.2180 uses the term ST. No costs. A2010 . Between the remote cause and the injury. 2002 NATURE Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos. held parents and school liable -CA: school liable under A218 and 219.* ISSUE WON the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise" used in Art.97 - prof. excluding petitioner St. there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Dipolog City. ISSUE (regarding liability of St.torts & damages becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista.2180 CC. Inc. Pampanga. must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. -TC: absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II. to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer.1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue!) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments: Art. In the case at bar. unbroken by intervening efficient causes. Mary’s Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos. 2180 of the Civil Code. and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the case. owned by Phil-Am. upon the assumption that petitioner's cause of action was based. and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep. but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract. This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that PhilAm and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality. -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva.600. The negligence of petitioner St. Tomas. driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep. . CARPITANOS PARDO. Between the remote cause and the injury. the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC. it must be shown that the ‘injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done. the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court. in the interest of justice. Mary’s Academy had no control. Mary’s Academy. . Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. and which was the proximate cause of the accident. and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial court's order. . PINEDA. FC.It is not the school. his parents. unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code. For the school to be liable.

and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondents’ Version -In the early morning of March 24. and denied MFR -Hence. The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses. Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus. A2010 . (with regard to this issue) PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE. Such fault or negligence. like petitioner Philtranco.  Petitioner’s Version -Manilhig. petitioner Philtranco.. xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. -The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn. in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City. recklessness. Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital.Hence. (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No. 2176. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 15 Art. including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired.torts & damages "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) to mean "employer. In the process.. June 17. the victim Ramon A. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions. defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises. in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer. Inc. or to Belvic St. this appeal ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes. direct and solidary. no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders. for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary. is obliged to pay for the damage done. runs perpendicular to Gomez St.98 - prof. direct. Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd. (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. He was traveling counterclockwise. 21. was run over by the said bus. thereafter. -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly. without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear. Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog. 1990. -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. the victim. about 6:00 o’clock. its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine. Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence. -Civil Case No. Dispositive Lower court’s order of dismissal is AFFIRMED. -The Magsaysay Blvd. Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed. violation of traffic rules and regulations. 2180. Article 2194 expressly provides: the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles. Inc. registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No. was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation. and joint and several or solidary with the driver. 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine. As to solidarity. and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street. Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides: Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.” . 1999. VASQUEZ Dec. xxxxxxxxx The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage . On the same date and time. Phil-American Forwarders. He was also only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time. the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. under the allegations of the complaint. * This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now. Art. -Since the employer's liability is primary. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills. GBW794. Acuesta who. Upon the other hand. its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus. Romeo So Vasquez. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. Davide Facts: At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning. casis Code against petitioner Manilhig and his employer. as a result thereof fell and. -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle. -As the bus was pushed. its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A. xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. respectively. professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur. which caused the death of the victim **Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents -Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Inc. suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road. there being fault or negligence. abandonment of victim. thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A. who was biking towards the same direction as the bus. 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 217614 and 218015 of the Civil (limited to that involved in the outline) 14 ∗ CASTILEX V.

Evidence that by using the employer's vehicle to go to and from meals. whether or not engaged in any business or industry. The Court of Appeals cannot. Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry. Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours within the call of duty. So. testified that at the time of the incident. so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employee's action or inaction. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included. be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employer's vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and. a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. III. registered under the name of petitioner. ABAD. 14 cda The employer may. Operation of Employer's Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer. spending more time at his actual duties. subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations. The phrase "even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task. Jr. Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. Issue: WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle. under which it can be found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home. to employers in general. an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle. employees oftentimes wear different hats. even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employer's vehicle. which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative. presumably. he was driving a company-issued vehicle. They perform functions which are beyond their office. title or designation but which. A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable. be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case.99 - prof. but rather. Operation of Employer's Vehicle in Going to or from Work In the same vein. are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task. The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance. Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect. As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact. It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment.This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks. who was presented as a hostile witness. However. the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employer's motor vehicle. and the fifth paragraph. and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work. Cebu Doctor's Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions. an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. once this is done. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship. nevertheless. On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks. This rule is. surmises. Such exception obtain in the present case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioner's vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager. The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances.torts & damages After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident. whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry. parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez. Held: Castilez is absolved from any liability. the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own. It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employer's motor vehicle: I. whether or not engaged in any business or industry. In the same action. Hence. admittedly. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to . while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task. however. Where the employee's duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work. in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed. The SC does not agree. an employee is engaged in his employer's business in the operation of a motor vehicle. the plaintiff must show. Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD. however. to hold the employer liable. II. the result varies with each state of facts. the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez. to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise. are still A2010 . Negligent acts of employees. against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. therefore. casis charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work. and Luisa So Vasquez. Instead. traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee. and not a part of his services to his employer. the fourth paragraph should apply. or conjectures. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. For. that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner. even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph. Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180. and even finality at times. the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident. the courts have frequently applied what has been called the "special errand" or "roving commission" rule.

SC reversed. .TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan. the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee.m. The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. However. it has been held that he has not resumed his employment. or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours. even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. includes any act done by an employee. It was then about 2:00 a.Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI. August 17. way beyond the normal working hours. He need not have an official appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act. Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept. then go home in the school jeep. There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver.Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR. his overtime work had already been completed. In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees. The president of FCI is Agustin Masa. Allan's job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day. or in the supervision over him. under Article 2180. ABAD's working day had ended. Hence.In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house. enroute to its destination. Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights.The petitioner. casis of the infliction of the injury or damage. the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees. then go back to the school. and seeing that the road was clear. pimps. The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw.It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home. . The liability of the employer is. .) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO. NPC v CA (PHESCO INC. Even if somehow. 1998 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . . using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position. . the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's business. His being at a place which. as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers. Rather. Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence. The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip.torts & damages An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use. who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver. A2010 . The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer. 1979. Funtecha wanted to drive home. not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. as petitioner put it. Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians). ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. 1992 NATURE Motion for Reconsideration FACTS .. it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employer's business or within the scope of his assigned task. Allan lives with his dad. . After a dangerous curb.On July 22. Funtecha also lives in the president’s house free of charge while a student at FCI. has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning he’s supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school. Agustin has a son. the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff." had no connection to petitioner's business. a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City. it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan. neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. . the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act.100 - prof. and drug pushers and addicts. Funtecha definitely was not. Moreover. thus. He has a student license.One night. He is also employed as a janitor.It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose. ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD YES . August 14. Allan let Funtecha drive. saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable. was known as a "haven for prostitutes. primary and solidary. having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately.Funtecha is a scholar of FCI. Allan. Unfortunately. it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtecha's possession of a student driver's license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms. for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan. The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night. There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep. .

3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50.Marjorie Navidad (Nicanor’s widow). in its answer.torts & damages .00.13 of the Civil Code. along with their children.No evidence.A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter. . d) P50.00 as actual damages. then drunk. the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad.TC: dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit. Navidads Contention: . entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman. the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage. instead of presenting evidence. which reversed the trial court's judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages. and Prudent for the death of her husband.00. but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks).The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latter's projects.At the exact moment that Navidad fell. including the latter's workers. if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it. instead. denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards. we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in "labor only" contracting. casis from liability. an LRT train. and e) P20.00. 2) Compensatory damages of P443.000. 2003 397 SCRA 75 NATURE: APPEAL from CA’s DECISION .000. which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES .LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. the Metro Transit Organization. driver of the dump truck.000. . Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY VITUG. .CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000.The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability. (Metro Transit).830.SC) LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD.000. Junelito Escartin.PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions. c) Attorney’s fees of P20. NPC's liability is direct. and he was killed instantaneously.00 as and for attorney’s fees.The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin." . . was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who.00.00 as nominal damages.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased. between the two.000. Nicanor Navidad. Finding that a contractor was a "labor-only" contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the "labor-only" contractor.In the provisions of the "Memorandum of Understanding" entered into by PHESCO and NPC.TC: Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following: "a) 1) Actual damages of P44. Of course. the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad. . Rodolfo Roman. b) Moral damages of P50. d) Costs of suit.830. J/February 6. c) P50. PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals. . a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task.CA: exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and.520. . shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action. . filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin. Navidad was struck by the moving train. The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier. entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare).Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides: "Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.In this regard. . The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train. operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman. the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him.14 Oct 1993. .A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. was coming in. NO. was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented. however. Inc. A2010 . . In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers. -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train. JR. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. about 730pm. in conjunction with Article 2180. ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba. WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTA’s CLAIMS: -Escartin’s assault upon Navidad. the LRTA. DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed. Prudent. holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts: a) P44. HELD: 1. b) P50.NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.000. which caused the latter to fall on the tracks. primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver.000. . In a "labor only" contract.While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks. In either case. . . NPC. In exempting Prudent . delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks.101 - prof. (But there wasn’t any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case. . ISSUES: WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD.00 as moral damages. filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task.

Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage . There is no showing that Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission. 13 Art. both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy. . Needless to say. using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons. Such fault or negligence. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.On January 8. a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck. for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. ______________ 12 Art. the contract can be said to have been breached by tort. Jr. Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence. No costs. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. 2176. and by simple proof of injury. "Article 1756. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions. a factual matter that has not been shown. . July 16.A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred. 2194. was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga. a liability for tort may arise even under a contract. according to the CA. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh.The Civil Code. .Once such fault is established. A2010 . there being fault or negligence. the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman. MCKEE V IAC (TAYAG & MANALO) 221 SCRA 517 Davide. In case of death of or injuries to passengers. DISPOSITION: CA’S DECISION AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. in case of his death or incapacity. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. REASONING: . in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. and driven by Ruben Galang. owned by private respondents. "This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees. and physical injuries to George McKee.. however. Christopher McKee and Araceli McKee." "Article 1763.Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier. all passengers of the Ford Escort. 1977. provides: "Article 1755.102 - prof. one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana. when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties. in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway. with a due regard for all the circumstances. . Lastly. . the presumption would be that it has been at fault. thus. if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent. Stated differently.Immediately before the collision.000 kilos. the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. Article 219414 of the Civil Code can well apply. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees. The Ford Escort. 14 Art. casis The father and. Jaime Tayag and Rosalina Manalo. and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. . which was loaded with 200 cavans of rice weighing about 10. Kim McKee and Loida Bondoc. the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved. is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. . he must also be absolved from liability as Prudent is. so long as they remain in their custody. thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.In fine. but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains. the mother.In case of such death or injury. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices." -The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers. is obliged to pay for the damage done. which LRTA and Roman. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent. 2180. where tort is that which breaches the contract. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.Petition to review the resolution of the CA FACTS . if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. 2. Pampanga. on the other hand. unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. have failed to show. Loadstar. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.torts & damages The premise. 1992 NATURE . ." "Article 1759. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers. and was bound for Manila. the cargo truck.The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. YES. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

103 - prof. casis every driver should be to those conditions. exhaustion. The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. . ISSUE WON the owners of the cargo truck (Tayag and Manalo) are liable for the resulting damages HELD YES The Court rules that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was. but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. It is the failure to observe that degree of care. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her. 3. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. alcohol. and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol. unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. put on her emergency lights. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. the visibility of the street. She parked along the sidewalk of Aurora Blvd. he then switched on the headlights of the car. an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger. under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 1996 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . which was the opposite lane. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered. precaution. A2010 . whereby such other person suffers injury. therefore. directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. Before he could do so. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. She was pulled out from under defendant's car.While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought or the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent. Physiological "fight or flight" mechanisms are at work. is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution. and then fell to the ground.Li was. alleging that plaintiff was the one who was reckless or negligent. He instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle. . Jose Koh blew the horn of the car. . Li would have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were alert as VALENZUELA v CA (LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL.torts & damages When the northbound car was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge. Inc. the provision for the unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the 253 SCRA 303 KAPUNAN. ISSUE 1. Defendants counterclaimed for damages. xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. YES . YES . drowsiness. and bumped plaintiff's car.) . even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party. in law. Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. 2 boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a car driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial. which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color. and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand.Li’s alibi was that he was driving at 55kph when he was suddenly confronted with a speeding car coming from the opposite direction.. CA absolved Alexander.Negligence. with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. however.The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense. and the area was poorly lighted. provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs. . alighted from the car. Given a light rainfall. Article 2180 reads as follows: The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions. Manalo and Tayag are. and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard. -RTC found Li and Alexander solidarily liable. his car collided with the truck. which was destroyed. and went to the rear to open the trunk. NO . . with no parking lights or early warning device.Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises. INC.Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant.Civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were filed as a result of a vehicular accident. swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck. on the said bridge.Ma. She filed a claim for damages against defendant. As employers of the truck driver. unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back.The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. Either factor working independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road conditions. as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others. February 7. . Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh. rather than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly apply his brakes. The boys were moving back and forth. is only juris tantum. She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. Court of Appeals. since normally he would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela's car. xxx xxx xxx The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. . the conduct which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoroughful care. Li's failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident could therefore have been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very fast" speed as testified by one of the witneses. Neither did they attempt to prove it. etc. WON Li was grossly negligent in driving the company issued car 2. applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. WON Alexander Commercial is liable as Li’s employer HELD 1. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving when she realized she had a flat tire. WON Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence 3. negligent in driving his companyissued Mitsubishi Lancer 2. . not juris et de jure. the proximate cause of the collision. That presumption.Please see first Mckee digest for details on the collision.

shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. which is the He could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. .Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: MERRITT v GOVERNMENT 34 Phil 311 TRENT. regulates the obligations which arise out of fault or negligence. He had to dissolve a partnership that he had with an engineer and give up a contract for the construction of a building. responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. As such. because. that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office. Partida 7. thus: By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It states that “E.Trial court held that the collision was due solely on the negligence of the chauffeur and awarded the plaintiff the sum of P14. are found. to defendant said Government at the same.Act No. 1916 NATURE Appeal from decision of the CFI FACTS . book 4. doubtless because and only in this case. the fault or negligence. 741.torts & damages business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car. Alexander Commercial. therefore.” ISSUES WON the government is liable for the damages resulting from a tort committed by an agent or employee of the government HELD NO Ratio The State is only liable for the acts of its agents. ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. said company.. A2010 . or create any cause of action in his favor. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li. . riding on a motorcycle. called upon to answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner. Merritt. Title 15. to our satisfaction. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. March 31. . difficulties and losses. except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. the following articles refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage. as held in the last paragraph of article 1903.The Civil Code in chap 2. by his own fault or negligence. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court.As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract. if any. to which Mr. on that the person obligated. It follows therefrom that the state. . but not always. 915. has not demonstrated. and whereas in the first article thereof. officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903. E. by virtue of such provisions of law. the managerial employee or company sales agent. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident. . on the contrary. based on the principle of bonus pater familias. He was one of the best contractors of wooden buildings.The obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or negligence is based. however. takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition. in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. This legal presumption gives way to proof. This latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor. 2457 was enacted. was hit by the General Hospital ambulance. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff. The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs. in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case. reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage.104 - prof. . title 16. the rule is stated in 36 Cyc. and among these persons. The patient apparently was slightly deaf.Plaintiff was so severely injured. which turned suddenly and unexpectedly to Taft Avenue without sounding any whistle or horn. Witnesses testified that plaintiff’s physical and mental condition before the accident was excellent. casis The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent. No. as is evidenced by the same Law 3. 1902. no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. which would be subversive of the public interest. Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li. except when it acts through the agency of a special agent. or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly. since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments. especially when he attempted to use his money for mathematical calculations. inc. where the general principle is laid down that where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence.In the United States the rule is that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs. subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. . because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. . to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital. DISPOSITION Judgment of RTC reinstated. in contravention of an ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act. guardians and owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise. Between these latter and the state. and the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands. and to determine the amount of the damages.E. His leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture. the state. in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of furthering the company's image. Reasoning . In fine. we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal an that of private persons interested in its operation.

it does not make any and all claims against the government allowable.The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903 On the computation of damages The two items which constitute a part of the P14.Art. duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim.torts & damages original basis of this kind of objections. the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. but not when the MENDOZA V. DE LEON FONTANILLA V MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINSITRATION 194 SCRA 486 PARAS. Dispositive Judgment appealed from reversed. acting in the exercise of his powers. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.Insular Auditor dismissed the claim hence this appeal. the court held the following: “ ’… The state is not responsible for the damage suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office… n relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a juridical person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor. in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of the property which they hold in sublease.741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a) P5. in the sense in which these words are employed.075.In the case of Merritt v. .666. . because the officers of the ECA did not act as special agents of the government within the above defined meaning of that wod in Article 1903 of the Civil Code in storing gasoline in the warehouse of ECA.000 per month. . August 31. which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. the government is not responsible for damages caused through such negligence. 327) authorizing the filing of claims against the government with the Insular Auditor. in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. .105 - prof. which ECA didn’t have). and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. xx “The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth. would not prevent recovery for the whole time. casis damage should have been caused by the official to whom it properly pertained to do the act performed. and the latter responsible for all claims. The court. 1948 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the Insular Auditor FACTS . This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. he executes the trust confided to him. and (b) the P2. thereby giving rise to this claim for damages against Panlilio for his negligence and the officers of ECA for storing gasoline in said warehouse contrary to the provisions of ordinances of the City of Manila (ordinance requires a license for storing flammable substances.The fire destroyed the building owned by the petitioner. must be presumed to lie with the state. . is one who receives a definite and fixed order by the commission. that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1. a government agency). The obligation imposed in the preceding article is enforceable not only for personal acts and omission but also for those persons for whom another is responsible. 1903. and the trial court so found.Although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in the name and representation of the state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers. DISPOSITION Decision appealed from is affirmed. and appeal by private persons or entities from the latter’s decision to the Supreme Court. he executes the trust confided to him.Although there is an act (Act No.The responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission. February 27. ROSETE v AUDITOR GENERAL 81 Phil 453 FERIA. In this we think there was error. which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees. was done by a special agent.Jose Panlilio ignited his lighter near a drum into which gasoline was being drained causing fire in the warehouse of Emergency Control Administration (ECA. yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official.” .There being no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to the ECA or its officers. 1991 . . for a period of 6 months. We. .’ xx “ ‘That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent. Government. .The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent.000. limited the time to 2months and 21 days. we are not called upon to determine. without any fault on his part. find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff. foreign to the exercise of duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof. because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated A2010 . ISSUE WON the government is liable for the damages HELD NO . therefore. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only 2 months and 21 days while the remainder of the 6 months was spent in his home. We find nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the first. foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof. 1903 of the Civil Code reads: “Art. the award awarded for permanent injuries. is P18. As to the second. however. the record shows.

. No. . thereby opening it up to the possibility that it may be held liable for the damages caused by its driver. thus is governed by the Corporation Law. where his injuries were treated. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions.R. 1990 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. . to recover funds or portions thereof expended for the construction and/or rehabilitation of communal irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a special fund for irrigation development under section 2 hereof. 1968 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals. 552 provides that: (b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water from all irrigation systems constructed by or under its administration. It also has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors. for the proper conduct of its business. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeep. he fell inside a manhole on P. Besides. DISSENTING: PADILLA: to say that NIA has opened itself to suit is one thing. such fees or administration charges as may be necessary to cover the cost of operation. waiting for a jeep. 1. exercised a governmental function because the nature of its powers and functions does not show that it was intended to “bring to the Government any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit”. his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid.R. . as are directly or indirectly necessary. CITY OF MANILA V TEOTICA 22 SCRA 267 CONCEPCION. upon the land benefited. . Burgos Avenue. and to transact such business. and in general. he had acquired the status of regular employee and could not be removed except for valid cause. it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent. improving. to say that it is liable for damages arising from tort committed by its employees. 1976. and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines. . maintenance and insurance. 61045 dated December 1. several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. - - Angat Case: Although the majority opinion declares that the Angat System. an accountant. o NIA believes this bases this on:  PD 552 – amended some provisions of RA 3601 (the law which created the NIA)  The case of Angat River Irrigation System v. As blood flowed therefrom. January 29. Burgos Avenue. which is the irrigation of lands. subsection b of P. the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders. 55963 and G. to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law. and his employment had lasted for five years. and then on the crops raised thereon. but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency. The decision of this Court in G. . subsection (f): (f) . Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be preferred liens first.106 - prof. including the power to establish and maintain subsidiaries. ACCORDINGLY. NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government. and to recover the cost of construction within a reasonable period of time to the extent consistent with government policy. is still another thing. Teotico. insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid. after which he was taken home. but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions. No. such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a "government-function" corporation. the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional. the Motion for Reconsideration dated January 26. Angat River Workers’ Union A2010 . and is therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its driver Garcia. was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P.D. The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court. 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED. which shall be organized immediately after the approval of this Act. Teotico - ISSUE WON the NIR is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. Section 2. The Angat dissenting opinion: Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. and such preferred liens shall not be removed until all fees or administration charges are paid or the property is levied upon and sold by the National Irrigation Administration for the satisfaction thereof. casis It has its own assets and liabilities. After waiting 5 mins. Due to the fall. which came into effect some 3 years after the perfection of the contract. who was not its special agent HELD YES Reasoning the functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. and took a few steps. It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces. . since his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer. The employment contract of 1971 was executed when the Labor Code of the Philippines had not yet been promulgated.torts & damages NATURE Resolution FACTS The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions. Name and Domicile — A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration.Genaro N. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital. a strong dissenting opinion held that Angat River system is a government entity exercising proprietary functions. including all communal and pump irrigation projects. DISPOSITION We conclude that the National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory. The National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local government. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing. like the NIA. who was not its special agent. rehabilitating. He argued that although his contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17. 3601 provides: Sec. impairing his vision. Therefore. which liens shall have preference over all other liens except for taxes on the land." Certainly. he hailed a jeep that came to a stop. Manila. (Emphasis for emphasis). While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare. . Section 1 of Republic Act No. incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above powers and objectives. The state or a government agency performing governmental functions may be held liable for tort committed by its employees only when it acts through a special agent. FACTS . Section 2.

the city government has changed the position and layout of catchbasins in the City by constructing them under the sidewalks with concrete cement covers and openings on the side of the gutter.Defense pointed out that because of the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing. respondent answered that these were not shouldered by the company and instead by other parties -while abroad.: May 24. to the damage of the firm of which he was an officer. or injuries suffered by. amended for damages against the City of Manila. and that in any event under the by-laws he had the discretion. the left upper arm.00. 1974 FACTS: -An employee of the Ace ADVERTISING Company was sent to the States to pursue studies in television.. Ratio RA 409. is a special law. what had happened was in truth and in fact a venture by them given their stamp of approval. . and it was these three without whose acts the same could not have happened. What said article requires is that the province. Sanchez.This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. demonstrate quite distinctly that the petitioner neglected to perform his duties properly. Then. again.sec. Voting Reyes. for which solidary liability should have been imposed upon all in the first place” ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict HELD: Yes . the determination of whether or not P. casis Advertising disbursed P5. subsequently. Angeles and Fernando. and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review. city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. “…were also privy to the unauthorized disbursement of the corporate moneys jointly with the appellant. or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions. a national highway. the petitioner remained passive. Dizon. concur. . bridges. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road. and as it was an unauthorized act of expenditure of corporate funds. applicable to the entire Philippines. as general manager. it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province. this appeal by the City of Manila. Hence. the juridical situation was a simple quasi-delict by them committed upon the corporation. stealing of iron catchbasin covers was rampant. or any other city officer. therefore.20. whereas the Civil Code is a general law. 3rd party complaint dismissed -CA affirmed however dismissal of 3rd party complaint was reversed stating that Taylor's trip had been neither authorized nor ratified by the company -CA noted that based on the facts. Upon the contrary. without costs." in particular. on account of Taylor's travel and studies -the Ace Advertising filed a complaint with the court of first instance of Manila against the respondent for recovery of the total sum disbursed to Taylor. under Republic Act 409. At any rate. to enforce the provisions of this chapter. Bengzon. . except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned. the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. alleging that the trip was made without its knowledge. cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of. regardless of the object thereof. in connection with the maintenance of said road. Municipal Board. all told. Zaldivar. CC governs liability due to "defective streets. to authorize the trip which was for the company's benefit -Joya also filed a 3rd party complaint against the two Aranetas proving that they were involved in sending Taylor abroad -trial court rendered judgment ordering the respondent to pay the Ace Advertising "the sum of P5. both petitioners knew and through their acts showed that they approved of the trip. or from negligence of said Mayor. ISSUES WON City of Manila should be held liable for the damages suffered by Teotica. denied the charge and claimed that the trip was nonetheless ratified by the company's board of directors. and that these changes had been undertaken by the city from time to time whenever funds were available. When asked about the expenses of the trip.Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter. in spite of his being a vice-president and director of the Ace Advertising. streets.Teotico filed with CFI Manila. city health officer. Castro. Dispositive WHEREFORE.043. . These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital. The Ace .20 with interest at the legal rate from August 23.The petitioner's assertion that he signed the questioned payroll checks in good faith has not been substantiated. intended exclusively for the City of Manila. he in particular not having testified or offered testimony to prove such claim. or any other law or ordinance. and other public works under their control or supervision. or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides: Provinces. required further medical treatment by a private practitioner. J.torts & damages suffered contusions on the left thigh. HELD YES. public buildings. The petitioner signed three of these checks. Makalintal..CFI Manila sustained the theory of the defendants and dismissed the amended complaint.P. the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed. Reasoning The assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made. in his answer. or Vicente Araneta (company treasurer) who put up part of the bill connected with Taylor's trip and also handed him letters for delivery in the United States. 1954 until full payment. because RA 409.043. that in order to prevent such thefts. which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6. the Municipal Board. city treasurer and chief of police. throughout the period of Taylor's stay abroad. for the first time.750. J. said Article 2189 is decisive thereon. The respondent. The others were signed by either the respondent. in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. . any person by reason of defective conditions of road. a complaint which was. . Burgos Avenue were. he continued to receive his salaries in the form of vouchers ordered and signed by respondent Joya. concerning the unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds for the latter. ARANETA v JOYA 57 SCRA 59 CASTRO J.L.. whereas Article 2189. A2010 . is one of fact. which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative. Even if P.The first issue raised by the Manila is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of RA 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading: The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor. city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. JJ. in general. under Article 2189 of the Civil Code. This plus the fact that he even approved thrice payroll checks for the payment of Taylor's salary.B. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence. this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila. its mayor. city engineer. that the Office of the City Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting from theft of said iron covers. with costs against the City of Manila. authority or ratification.4 refers to liability arising from negligence.107 - prof.

29. papers. Palawan. upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac. No. August 29." .June 15. that for some period after their arrest. WON defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure of the motor launch in question without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same was admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime 2.Pursuant to the foregoing provisions. known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communistterrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. moral damages of at least P150K each or a FACTS . WON defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful HELD 1. no public official has the right to enter the premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. In addition. . 28. that military men who interrogated them employed threats. that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts.00 moral damages. Jikil Taha through his counsel made representations with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return the . seized the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it. or any private individual. 1988 NATURE: Petition for certiorari FACTS This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs. Likewise. employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants. 34 and 36. harass and punish them. There can be no question that without the proper search warrant. exemplary damages may also be awarded. that he effected the seizure of the motor launch in the absence of and without the consent of Delfin Lim. April 15. constitutes no bar to the commission of a tort by one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages A2010 . And since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a warrant.R. 1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him. cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same. L-69866 YAP. xxx TORTS INDEPENDENT ACTION LIM v DE LEON G.Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch. defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela. Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon. on the ground that the same was the subject of a criminal offense.00 as actual damages. NO .108 - prof. 26. Palawan. Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon. elements of the TFM raided several places. seized property to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim but Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused. L-22554 MARTIN. Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages of P39. wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander in Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch.torts & damages -The fact that he was occupying a contractual position at the Ace Advertising is of no moment. P750. 32. who directly or indirectly obstructs. Detachment Commander of Balabac.Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: xxx "(6)Illegal search." Plaintiffs’ allegations: That complying with said order of Ver.030. defeats. filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha. No. in addition.Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their claim for damages on Articles 32 and 2219 of the New Civil Code which provide in part as follows: "ART. 1962. . 27. ISSUES 1. explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party. casis "(1)Acts and action referred to in Articles 21. The existence of a contract between the parties. plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim.000. tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them. said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants. . 2219. that during these raids.R.Plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". DISPOSITION Decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one entered declaring the seizure illegal and ordering defendant-appellee Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon to pay to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim the sum of P3. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan. 1975 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the CFI WITH CIVIL ABERCA V VER G. that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel. they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers. plus P1.Defendant-appellees admitted that when Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim and impounded the motor launch he was not armed with a search warrant. xxx "The indemnity shall include moral damages. a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. . A year later or on April 9. violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages. house. and. that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize.000.00 for attorney's fees." "ART. 2. xxx "(9)The rights to be secure in one's person. as has been repeatedly held by this Court. Upon order of the Provincial Commander. YES . they have violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search and seizure.After conducting a preliminary investigation.Plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim pleaded with Orlando Maddela to return the motor launch but the latter refused. 30. 32.Any public officer or employee.

Art. 2. Ratio: The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates. A superior have to answer for the transgressions of his subordinates against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. defeat. or members of the military or police force or private individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct. the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment. employer and employee) relationship. 32 of CC. 22 September 1994 Nature . which was never done in this case. And this must have been also the understanding of defendants' counsel himself for when he filed his comment on the motion. casis defendants. no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. But in this case. 2. including moral and exemplary. with his subordinates who committed such transgressions. it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the RPC or other penal statute. should be considered. 3. [b] By this provision.Aguinaldo and MSgt. Its message is clear. 32 of CC which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party Reasoning: [a] The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and acquires a larger dimension. It cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint. [d] Even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention. and no others. as well as indirectly. NO. owe obedience and allegiance at all times. unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party concerned. SEPARATE OPINION: TEEHANKEE. (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action. it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings. NO. under the above principles. concurring: . 32 governs. Thus. only the facts alleged in the complaint. . CA PUNO. 32. Respondents’ contentions: A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants. ISSUES 1.The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all persons. [d] So. For this purpose. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress. when the temptation is strongest to yield to the law of force rather than the force of law. violate or in any manner impede or impair the constitutional rights and civil liberties of another person. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. [c] Art. alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. high or low. it is difficult to justify the TC’s dismissal for lack of cause of action the complaint against all the MHP GARMENTS.. to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated.The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the civil action for damages filed in the court below by petitioners-plaintiffs for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of their constitutional rights and liberties. 32 of CC. Case remanded to the respondent court for further proceedings. Hence. Art. At the same time it rejects the automatic application of the principle of respondent superior or command responsibility that would hold a superior officer jointly and severally accountable for damages. INC. the judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer must not abdicate his duty to properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk of being held responsible for gross negligence and of being held under the cited provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with the tortfeasor. [b] The invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. 3. stand liable and may be sued in court for damages as provided in Art. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials. DISPOSITION: Petition granted. However. as contended by respondents. to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiff. would be sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action against all of them under Art. the decisive factor in this case is the language of Art. Reasoning: [a] The purpose Art.torts & damages total of P3M. through their counsel. civilian or military. defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties. 32 CC is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. WON trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to (dome of the) plaintiffs on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file MFR of the court's resolution granting the respondent's motion to dismiss HELD 1. 32 of CC makes the persons who are directly. NO Ratio: Although the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. except Maj.e. exemplary damages of at least P150K each or a total of P3M.109 - prof. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article.J. and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the defendants. but to all the lawyers of plaintiffs In filing the motion to set aside the resolution. if admitted hypothetically. it is not the actor alone (i. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Art. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. They needed no specific authority to do that. The complaint contained allegations against all the defendants which. WON a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages. vs. then SolGen. and attorney's fees not less than P200K. not just to the lawyers who signed the motion. [c] To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action. jointly and severally with his subordinates. A2010 . he furnished copies thereof.e. The body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs. be they public officers or employees. responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors. The authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be assumed. Estelito Mendoza. C. 32 CC. Balaba.

the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint for unfair competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods." -Sometime in October 1983. It will also serve as a stern reminder to all and sundry that the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a virile reality and not a mere burst of rhetoric. Disposition IN VIEW WHEREFORE. Private respondent then filed a Civil Case against the petitioners for sums of money and damages. on the said amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment thereof. The respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents. in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages. The items were then turned over by Captain Peñafiel to petitioner corporation for safekeeping. Again." These facts and circumstances were not in any way shown by the petitioners to justify their warrantless search and seizure. The evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private respondents' goods. After a preliminary investigation. We impose a SIX PERCENT (6%) interest from January 9. MHP received information that private respondents Agnes Villa Cruz. The all encompassing protection extends against intrusions directly done both by government and indirectly by private entities. The decision was appealed to the respondent court.000. De Guzman. Petitioner corporation received information that private respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia in October 1983. the appealed decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Letter of Instruction No. serious anxiety. De Guzman then made a surveillance of the stores of private respondents. they did not. op. Secondly. supplies. The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto. they should have filed a third-party MARCIA V CA (PAJE) 205 PHIL 147 RELOVA. Despite the sufficiency of time. upon proper application by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the Philippines for warrant of arrest and/or search warrant with a judge. and two (2) other constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market. the supposed illicit goods were seized. There was no probable cause for the seizure. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. Without any warrant. Private respondents' avowals of embarrassment and humiliation during the seizure of their merchandise were supported by their testimonies. and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. It is consistently ruled that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered..Paje is a driver of a Victory Liner Bus . 1299 already directs all law enforcement agencies of the Republic of the Philippines. and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition. in lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%). 1987 on the TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2. was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines. It affirmed the decision with modification MHP filed a petition for certiorari before the SC. Inc. they seized the boy and girl scouts pants. Mirasol Lugatiman. Conformably with our ruling in Lim vs. after a preliminary investigation. badges. moral damages can be awarded in the case at bench. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents. Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap . Issue/s and Held WON the search and seizure was legal No. Peñafiel. The progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant.Petition for Certiorari Facts -MHP Garments. The trial court ruled for the private respondents. Indeed. He also ordered the return of the seized items which was not immediately returned despite demands. dresses. they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. In their Memorandum Agreement. 1983. The search and seizure were clearly illegal. cit. to apprehend immediately unauthorized manufacturers and distributors of Scout paraphernalia. A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents. casis complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief. And thirdly. they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. So with the petitioner corporation which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman. The specific date and time are not established in the evidence adduced by the parties. The omission will not exculpate petitioners.. WON an award for moral damages should be awarded Yes. they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. Larry de Guzman who did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. January 27. the raid was made on the stores of private respondents and A2010 . not all the seized items were turned. Even then. and suits on display at respondents' stalls. the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms. 1983 NATURE FACTS Petition for certiorari . Firstly. and to impound the said paraphernalia to be used as evidence in court or other appropriate administrative body it orders the immediate and strict compliance with the Instructions which the petitioners miserably failed to do. Costs against petitioners. There can be no doubt that petitioners must have suffered sleepless nights. In doing so. and wounded feelings due the tortious raid caused by petitioners. he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. Private respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of business to recover their goods.00) for the unreturned twenty-six (26) pieces of girl scouts items and a TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest. causing the latter’s death and physical injuries to herein petitioners. or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law.His bus collided with the jeep driven by Clemente Marcia. was tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). petitioner corporation was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies. the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents. an employee of petitioner corporation. De Guzman. WON MHP Garments is liable Yes. Ponce de Leon.torts & damages . The wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies the award of exemplary damages. Probable cause for a search has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.110 - prof. They reported to the Philippine Constabulary and on October 25. The other items returned were of inferior quality. and insignias.

. Hence. he was not able to do so. the order dismissing Civil Case No. . 33. may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case. unless the act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be non-existent in the final judgment. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages. Ratio Section 2. Morales attempted to contact Arafiles but since the latter’s office was still closed at that time (past 12mn – he works for NIAS-PAGASA). . However." Obiter . 141 is SET ASIDE FACTS . but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. J. the injured individual is the one most concerned because it is he who has suffered directly. ISSUES 1. Ratio. The civil case was dismissed. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense."Art. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. . March 25. 2004 NATURE Petition for review of CA Deci FACTS (Consti II Case) -Respondent Morales wrote an article for People’s Journal Tonight based on the sworn statement in the police blotter and interview of Emelita Despuig where Despuig alleged that Arafiles raped her the month before then attempted to rape her the night she filed a complaint. Otherwise stated. . Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision. ARAFILES v PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS. a civil action for damages. the extinction of the criminal liability will not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability DISPOSITIVE Decision affirmed A2010 .Petitioner also relies on Art 33 CC. The respondent judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss which invoked Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads: "Sec. al. Madeja.The criminal case still pending.The defendants presented the copy of said criminal case to the court handling the civil case against them. fraud. based on doctrine of fair comment ISSUE WON the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages HELD NO.Paje was charged with homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. but we do not consider that the respondents. Other civil actions arising from offenses. namely: 1. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. 2. Japzon. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting. Carmen L. -About a year following the published article. In cases of defamation." 2. for the case was of pure accident. being the object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist. The two enactments are quoted hereinbelow: "Sec. ISSUES WON the acquittal in the criminal case would result to a dismissal in the civil case HELD YES . The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence. et.… an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. " .". Arafiles filed action for damages based on the alleged “grossly malicious and overly sensationalized” report by Morales which cast aspersions on his character. The information states that: "The offended party Carmen L. A civil case was also instituted against him by herein petitioners for reckless imprudence and negligence in driving the passenger bus. -RTC: in favor of Arafiles -CA: in favor of Morales. Independent civil action. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. and physical injuries. 3. The complaining witness is the widow of the deceased. INC CARPIO MORALES." Tolentino says: "While the State is the complainant in the criminal case.torts & damages . Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code.He was convicted in the criminal case in the RTC." . had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. This is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our MADEJA V CARO ABAD SANTOS.: December 21.In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately. Dispositive Petition is GRANTED.There are at least two things about Art. may be brought by the injured party..The acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Japzon is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. casis He should be permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him. no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith. However. under the circumstances of this case. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. fraud and physical injuries. 1983 NATURE Petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the defendant's motion to dismiss . Eva A. he was acquitted in the CA. they were not inflicted with malice. . Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation. Japzon for damages in the same court. J. The CA ruled that criminal negligence is wanting and that Paje was not even guilty of civil negligence. the said article speaks only of defamation.111 - prof. . YES. WON an independent civil action may be filed during the pendency of the criminal case HELD 1. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.Dr. Madeja sued Dr. frustrated and attempted homicide.

(c) causal connection between defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress. (d) the plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe. 19. RTC dismissed: plaintiffs failed to establish their cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically identified. a civil complaint for damages.” ISSUE 1. Ratio Action arising from an intentional tortuous act causing mental distress cannot be sustained in this SEPARATE OPINION VITUG [concur] . In the preparation of stories.The present controversy stems from a civil action for damages and not from a criminal complaint. In the preparation of stories. January 28. and consistently with good faith and reasonable care. CA reversed: it was "clear from the disputed article that the defamation was directed to all adherents of Islamic faith. to the effect that although it may not constitute a criminal offense. Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. a local federation of more than 70 Muslim religious orgs. (b) conduct was extreme and outrageous. but it is not per se illegal. but was about to happen) – so respondent’s article was not maliciously sensationalized.Complaint alleged that what was published in BULGAR was insulting and damaging to the Muslims. par. ill-natured. 21 NCC): Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. SO ORDERED A2010 .In the present case. and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious. the article relates to the entire Muslim population and not just to the IDCP or to any of the individual respondents. they should not be held to account.al. Reasoning Defamation means the offense of injuring a person's character. CARPIO [dissent] . but because it constitutes an . hence.MVRS claimed it was merely an expression of belief/opinion and was published without malice.112 - prof. as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm . . -then mentioned doctrine: The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines.I dissent not because the newspaper article in question is libelous. . The present case falls within the application of the relational harm principle of tort actions for defamation. There is no direct reference or allusion to the federation or any of its members. and. respondent was present when Emelita executed her sworn-statement where she reported an abduction with rape and an abduction incident (where no rape occurred. 135306 BELLOSILLO. No. that the narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had reported at the police headquarters. for such action is personal in nature. such cause of action cannot be sustained. were not entitled to damages. Respondents scarcely can claim having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in damages. and some individual Muslims filed in the RTC Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS.torts & damages democracy.The purported damage caused by the published article falls under principle of relational harm . and consistently with good faith and reasonable care. fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Phil but the entire Muslim world. CC recognizes the possibility of such a civil action either pursuant to Art 26. for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. . may be brought by the injured party. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal case. Disposition. Reasoning. do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. 2003 NATURE Petition to review decision of CA FACTS . NO. 2. or to Art. that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings. Torts with independent civil action: DEFAMATION An "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature. they should not be held to account. 33 which provides that in case of defamation. WHEREFORE. The presentation of the news item subject of petitioner’s complaint may have been in a sensational manner. whether written or spoken. it did not mention respondents as object of the article. MVRS V ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL G.To recover for this the plaintiff must show that: (a) conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of plaintiff. the petition is hereby DENIED. to a point of suppression. or anger. 4. casis case. . Decision reversed. “vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs xxx” can give rise to a cause of action for damages. however. it is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character. esp. for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.The ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHIL (IDCP). NO. The succeeding paragraphs (in which petitioner and complainant Emelita were eventually identified) sufficiently convey to the readers. WON elements of libel exist 2. press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines. and since no particular individual was identified in the disputed article. it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam.Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry. Also. .which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distress. Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se. The cause of action is libel. -then discussed how to determine if a published work is libelous: In actions for damages for libel. anxiety. et. WON the cause of action should rise from an intentional tortuous act causing mental distress HELD 1. embarrassment. First discussed applicable provisions (A33. or to any of the individual complainants.R. (AmJur) Disposition Petition granted.which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form of defamation. -then discussed the petitioner’s allegation that the news item as a “malicious sensationalization” failed: even though the police blotter only shows 1 count of abduction and rape. pendency or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom. . every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries. A civil action for libel under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely independent of the institution. to a point of suppression. or vexatious.

-At the back of the trust receipt is a printed form to be accomplished by two sureties who. a civil action for damages. Inc.JUSTICE JBL REYES: “…in the case of an independent civil actions under the Civil Code. FACTS -August 8. Chi. .. In cases of defamation. and upon securities not commensurate with the amount of the loans. the accused would not be liable.Both RTC and CA found the article insulting and humiliating to Muslims. . Salta indiscriminately granted certain loans mentioned in the complaints filed by PNB. Civil Case No. ISSUE . one of the kinds of crime mentioned in the aforecited provision. the latter granting it." Acquittal in the criminal case will not be an obstacle for the civil case to prosper unless in the criminal case the Court makes a finding that even civilly. This seems to be the spirit of the law when it decided to make these actions `entirely separate and distinct' from the criminal action. which affirmed in toto the decision of CFI Quezon City in a civil action instituted by the petitioner for the recovery of a sum of money representing the amount paid by it to the Nissho Company Ltd. 79583. To effect payment for said machineries. regardless of the result of the latter. for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. the Prudential Bank indorsed the shipping documents to the Phil Rayon which accepted delivery of the same.The offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature. . the Phil Rayon ceased business operation." DISPOSITION The decision of Justice De Veyra is affirmed. HELD NO. September 30. Ltd. by prior arrangement with the Prudential Bank. it is made clear that the civil action permitted therein to be filed separately from the criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings "regardless of the result of the latter. . 1982 FACTS . that the greatest sin in Islam is to worship things or persons other than Allah. Rayon applied for and was granted a commercial letter of credit with the Prudential Bank and Trust Company in favor of Nissho.113 - prof. Phil. I think Rule 107 Sec. unlike other offenses not mentioned. a trust receipt which was signed by Anacleto R. JR. the Bank of Tokyo. causing wounded feelings and mental anguish to believers of Islam. SALTA V DE VEYRA 202 Phil 527 DE CASTRO. of Japan for textile machinery imported by the Philippine Rayon Mills. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. that they may be made the subject of a separate civil action because of the distinct separability of their respective juridical cause or basis of action.Focal point of claim for damages: insult caused by the article that the Muslims worship the pig as their God which is absolutely contrary to their basic belief as Muslims that there is only one God. in manner characterized by negligence. PRUDENTIAL BANK V IAC (Philippine Rayon Mills & Anacleto Chi) 216 SCRA 257 DAVIDE. To enable the Phil Rayon to take delivery of the machineries. For a uniform ruling that would authoritatively settle this regrettable conflict of opinion. With this the bank filed a criminal action against Salta. were to be jointly and severally liable to the Prudential Bank should the Phil Rayon fail to pay the total amount or any portion of the drafts issued by Nissho and paid for by Prudential Bank. This is clearly illustrated in the case of swindling. This finding of fact establishes that petitioners have inflicted on private respondents an intentional wrongful act . Ltd. Inc.” AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ [dissent] . A2010 . depending on the amount of the loan applied for.Salta was an employee of the PNB assigned as Manager of the Malolos' branch. His duty was to grant loans. The criminal case is for the prosecution of an offense the main element of which is fraud.. .torts & damages intentional tortious act causing mental distress to those whom private respondent IDCP represents.The article is not only an imputation of irreligious conduct but also a downright misrepresentation of the religious beliefs of Muslims. 1(d) does not apply. . 1962: Philippine Rayon Mills. No.humiliating persons because of their religious beliefs. 1969.Salta was acquitted in the criminal case.PNB filed two civil actions to recover losses the bank suffered (Civil Case No. where the civil case may be filed separately and proceed independently of the criminal case. It is in the resolution of the motions to dismiss that Judges de Veyra and Purisima of the CFI of Manila took diametrically opposing views. As indicated on their faces. it executed. Anacleto R.. 74886 December 8. -Upon arrival of the machineries. Quezon City.It is significant to note that under Article 31 [11] of the New Civil Code. Hence in these cases.000. or only to recommend the granting of loans. Liability for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer. . . Phil Rayon's factory was leased by Yupangco Cotton Mills for an annual rental of P200. 1992 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of IAC. and. which fraud is positively and easily identifiable in the manner and scheme aforementioned. the result of the criminal case.R. which were all paid by the Prudential Bank through its correspondent in Japan. Based on the same acts for which the criminal action was filed. fraud. of Japan for the importation of textile machineries under a five-year deferred payment plan. but on the fact of defamation. the former denying the motion. The Phil Rayon was able to take delivery of the textile machineries and installed the same at its factory site at 69 Obudan Street. -Sometime in 1967. regulations and policies of the respondent bank. Against this letter of credit. while the others were not. two of these drafts were accepted by the Phil Rayon through its president. and filed Motions to Dismiss in each of the two civil cases. fraud and manifest partiality. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. may be brought by the injured party. On December 29. the civil actions very clearly alleged fraud and negligence as having given rise to the cause of action averred in the complaints. 88343). entered into a contract with Nissho Co. . casis . whether acquittal or conviction. by the very terms and conditions thereof. and physical injuries. would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action. G. .In disregard of the pertinent rules.Two cases involving the same issue disposed of by two judges in a manner directly in opposition of each other. WON a decision of acquittal in a criminal case operates to dismiss a separate civil action filed on the basis of the same facts as alleged in the criminal case (AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act). and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Reasoning ART 33. represented by co-defendant Anacleto R. Chi in his capacity as president of Phil Rayon. drafts were drawn and issued by Nissho. Ratio The civil action permitted therein to be filed separately from the criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings "regardless of the result of the latter. the two cases have been consolidated for a single decision. Chi.That there was fraud committed by the defendant in granting the aforesaid loans which rendered him liable for his acts.The filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is fully warranted under the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code.00. a specie of an offense committed by means of fraud.

While the acknowledgement of a surety before a notary public is required to make the same a public document. fraud and physical injuries. -The obligation of the Phil Rayon arising from the letter of credit and the trust receipt remained unpaid and unliquidated. And even if these were not sight drafts. As a matter of fact. he shall only be liable for those costs incurred after being judicially required to pay. 1974 against the Phil Rayon and Anacleto R. documents or instruments covered by a trust receipt to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appear in the trust receipt or to return said goods. their liability is not divisible as between them. however. declared liable on the 12 drafts in question and on the trust receipt.00.114 - prof. HELD: 1. NO. be in writing. payable on demand. Estafa falls under fraud. the failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods. The liability for the remaining ten (10) drafts did not arise because the same were not presented for acceptance. WON the case should have been dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of action as there was no prior exhaustion of Philippine Rayon's properties. . and the trial court explicitly ruled. in the CFI of Tarlac against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. -Any doubt as to the import. SC’s own reading of the questioned solidary guaranty clause yields the conclusion that the obligation of Chi is only that of a guarantor. the present action for the collection of the principal amount of P956. the law merely requires that it.Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence in the CFI of Pampanga. Private respondent Anacleto R. drafts are sight drafts which do not require presentment for acceptance.384. it would be the petitioner — and not Philippine Rayon — which had to accept the same for the latter was not the drawee. with respect to the latter. under Article 1358 of the Civil Code. shall run only from the date of the filing of the complaint. Defendant’s Defenses lack of cause of action. Chi declared secondarily liable on the trust receipt. . casis enforce the civil liability arising therefrom against Philippine Rayon. etc. April 30. Philippine Rayon Mills. If he is a guarantor. provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. 1973. documents or instruments if they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa. The parties herein agree. -Since that violation of a trust receipt constitutes fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code.Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. both courts concluded that acceptance of the drafts by Philippine Rayon was indispensable to make the latter liable thereon. partnership. Reasoning Last sentence of the clause speaks of waiver of exhaustion. however. .95 was filed on October 3. it is these corporations. it would be unenforceable unless ratified.The collision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers. associations. is ineffective in this case because the space therein for the party whose property may not be exhausted was not filled up. should also be paid.315. partnerships. -Reading Section 13 of PD No. also for damages. -Under Article 33 of the Civil Code. If not. YES. Ilagan. which is a promise to answer for the debt or default of another. which are made liable for the civil liability arising from the criminal offense. Contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into. Interest and damages. With respect to a guaranty. The attestation by witnesses and the acknowledgement before a notary public are not required by law to make a party liable on the instrument. NO. punishable under the provisions of Art.e. It is based on trial convenience and is designed to permit the joinder of plaintiffs or defendants whenever there is a common question of law or fact. Navarro and Attorneys Jose W. The information was subsequently amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of the three victims. ISSUES: 1. 1965 FACTS . employees or other officials or persons therein responsible for the offense. They are. 2. Under Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law. that the subject. -The clause "we jointly and severally agree and undertake" refers to the undertaking of the two (2) parties who are to sign it or to the liability existing between themselves. officers. the penalty of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the directors. -In the criminal case both the heirs of Capuno and the Estate of were represented by their respective counsel as private prosecutors: Attorney Ricardo Y.000. or some note or memorandum thereof. petitioner was acting well within its rights in filing an independent civil action to CAPUNO V PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES MAKALINTAL.While the criminal case was pending.torts & damages The lease was renewed on January 3. 1(b) of the RPC. being accessories of the principal obligation. Section 6. Presentment for acceptance is necessary only in the cases expressly provided for in Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL). NO. thereby necessitating acceptance. Whether private respondent Chi is jointly and severally liable with Philippine Rayon for the obligation sought to be enforced 3a. a civil action for damages.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs of Capuno under the Workmen's Compensation Act. -This is the equity rule relating to multifariousness. WON he may be considered a guarantor 3b. . . par. Chi became the sole guarantor. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. a contract of guaranty does not have to appear in a public document. the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civil action. together with the questioned solidary guaranty clause. it can be enforced to its full extent against any one of them. 2. 3. Private respondent Chi's signature in the dorsal portion of the trust receipt did not bind him solidarily with Philippine Rayon. Attorney's fees may even be allowed in appropriate cases. YES. the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras. trouble and expense.623. . Elsewise stated. -However.. all the textile machineries in the Phil Rayon's factory were sold to AIC Development Corporation for P300. On January 5. Repeated formal demands for the payment of the said trust receipt yielded no result Hence. these. Inc. that requirement is absolute and indispensable. or that it be proved in a certain way. which. association or other juridical entities. There was nothing procedurally objectionable in impleading private respondent Chi as a co-defendant in the civil case for the collection of a sum of money.Included in the complaint was a claim for indemnity in the sum of P2. Chi. 3b. or true intent of the solidary guaranty clause should be resolved against the petitioner since the trust receipt. no legal obstacle prevented it from enforcing the civil liability arising out of the trust. nevertheless. 3. In short. Chi's liability is limited to the principal obligation in the trust receipt plus all the accessories thereof including judicial costs. Disposition Petition granted. 1974. laches Lower Court’s Ruling Both the CFI and the IAC ruled that Philippine Rayon could be held liable for the two (2) drafts because only these appear to have been accepted by the latter after due presentment. may be brought by the injured party in cases of defamation.The case arose from a vehicular collision. prescription. when the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or enforceable. -And although it is true that the petitioner commenced a criminal action for the violation of the Trust Receipts Law. It does not refer to the undertaking between either one or both of them on the one hand and the petitioner on the other with respect to the liability described under the trust receipt. pursuant to Section 7 of the NIL. Otherwise. i. Diokno and Augusto M. receipt in a separate civil action. A2010 . 115: It is clear that if the violation or offense is committed by a corporation. It will save the parties unnecessary work. Excussion is not a condition sine qua non for the institution of an action against a guarantor. Whether Philippine Rayon is liable on the basis of the trust receipt. -By his signing. 3a. is a contract of adhesion which must be strictly construed against the party responsible for its preparation. Whether presentment for acceptance of the drafts was indispensable to make Philippine Rayon liable thereon. However. Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on permissive joinder of parties explicitly allows it.

1960. . and the plain inference from the foregoing is that a verdict of acquittal must carry with it exemption from civil responsibility. and consequently. it may be recalled. 1962 – Paje was acquitted by the appellate court. of the Revised Rules of Court which requires the reservation of the right to institute a separate and independent civil action in the cases provided for in Articles 31. 1956 – Felardo Paje was driving a Victory Liner bus.An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against Paje.And when they commenced the civil action on September 26. . Quoting Chantangco vs. 1960.This is the action which.But appellants' intervention was subsequently disallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's order to the effect. showing that appellants then chose to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code.115 - prof. 1958 the criminal case was still pending. ISSUE WON the action had already prescribed. and 2177 of the Civil Code affects the question of prescription. (1) that the action had already prescribed. the said rule does not apply in the present case. DISPOSTIION The order appealed from was affirmed." . Abaroai: “It is true that one of the plaintiffs in the present case reserved whatever right he may have had to bring a civil action. 1969 NATURE Direct appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal FACTS ." For P290. fraud. No appeal was taken from either of the two orders. . 1962 – Paje filed a motion to dismiss the civil action on the ground that his acquittal barred the said action but the motion was denied. Such reservation was not then necessary. the window and children of Marcia instituted the separate civil action for damages arising from the accident against Paje and Victory Liner. which read: ART.00 previously paid to the heirs of Capuno "under the Workmen's Compensation Act. casis 34. which action must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146.The grounds upon which appellees based their motion for dismissal and which the Court found to be "well taken" were. as held in Paulan v.The parties in the civil case entered into a "Compromise and Settlement. from which order the present appeal has been taken. In other words. ." . when they intervened in the criminal case against Jon A2010 . . and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. a civil action for damages. in turn. Marcia died while two other people were physically injured. judgment was rendered wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the charges against him. and (2) that on the part of the Estate of Buan its right to intervene in said case had been abated by the civil action.There can be no doubt that the present action is one for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict. July 31. In cases of defamation. 838 but finally settled by them in their compromise. that is. or after the lapse of more than five years. praying that the defendants be jointly and severally liable. including the claim for reimbursement of the sum of P2. 1961 – Pending Paje’s appeal.00 the Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages. . . . The information therein.The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants' contention that the four-year period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither waived the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately. for otherwise that action would have been premature and in any event would have been concluded by the subsequent judgment of acquittal in the criminal case. But the complaint here was filed only on September 26. Cipriano Capuno.In view of the filing of the civil action the accused Jon Elordi moved to strike out the appearances of these private prosecutors in the criminal case.December 23.As to whether or not Rule 111. Pampanga. Petitioners’ Claim > The petitioners claim that the Lower Court erred in acquitting Paje and that his acquittal was a bar to the civil action.At that time the criminal case was still pending. 33.November 21. Section 2. . "the institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict.00 by the Buan Estate under the Workmen's Compensation Act. As a result of the collision. Paje was later found guilty on November 7. This was obviously of no avail. saying that the collision was purely an accident. . 33. ART. . was sought to be recovered by the said Estate from appellees in Civil Case No. without having made it they could file — as in fact they did — a separate civil action even during the pendency of the criminal case. .December 29.The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing death.In filing the civil action as they did appellants correctly considered it as entirely independent of the criminal action. herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. the civil action for damages could have been commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent. . was dismissed by the Court a quo in its order of February 29.Appellants originally sought to enforce their claim exdelicto. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony. .The Court approved the compromise and accordingly dismissed the case. and physical injuries. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. and the same would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence. Grounds for the motion were (1) that as the Capuno heirs were concerned. under the provisions of the Penal Code. such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. which sum. Elordi. and (2) that appellees had been released from appellants' claim for damages by virtue of the payment to the latter of the sum of P2. may be brought by the injured party.000. It collided with a jeepney driven by Clemente Marcia in Lubao. 1958. they no longer had any interest to protect in the criminal case since they had already claimed and received compensation for the death of their decedent. CORPUS V PAJE 28 SCRA 1062 CAPISTRANO. the defendants asked the court to rule on their special defense that plaintiffs' cause of action based upon a quasi-delict had prescribed considering that the complaint was brought four years and eleven months after the collision and . Sarabia. Marcia’s heirs reserved their right to institute a separate civil action against Paje.November 9.623. 31.623. inasmuch as there resulted a judgment for the defendant. supra. Prior thereto. was amended precisely to include an allegation concerning damages suffered by the heirs of the victims of the accident for which Elordi was being prosecuted. without costs. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. upon appellees' motion. . 32.” Respondents’ Comments: > At the pre-trial of the civil case. -The appearance and intervention of Attorneys Diokno and Ilagan was disallowed by the Court and that of Attorney Navarro was disallowed in an amending order. Civil Code).torts & damages . RULING YES. pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code.

Paje.The criminal case still pending. (Civil Code. the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries. 141 is hereby set aside. because the terms used with the latter are general terms. for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article-some in their general and another in its technical sense. the Court ruled that the “offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that. and physical injuries. A .With regard to the issue of prescription. . may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case.” . Madeja reserved her right to file a separate civil action for damages . and not for homicide and physical injuries. Disposition Petition is granted. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. but in their generic sense. Of eleven justices only nine took part in the decision and four of them merely concurred in the result." 2. fraud. Other civil actions arising from offenses.116 - prof. would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act. (estafa) and physical injuries.In People vs.The defendant filed a motion to dismiss. casis 1. . it is evident that the terms 'physical injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. Carmen L. the Court ruled that the action had indeed prescribed because the prescription period was pegged at 4 years (A1146. fraud. 'fraud' and 'physical injuries. 1983 NATURE 16 Sec. Japzon for damages. or even death" **(end of obiter) . and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. 3.' Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.. The lower court ruled that the action had already prescribed. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting. which states that reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision. which shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderance of evidence. or attempted homicide. which the respondent judge granted on the basis of Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court16 ISSUE WON a civil action for damages may be instituted pending the resolution of a criminal case HELD YES . DULAY V CA (SAFEGUARD.Sec. Eva A. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery. CC) and began to run on the day the quasi-delict was committed. .torts & damages that according to Article 1144 of the Civil Code an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years. In cases of defamation.) . . Yatco this Court held that the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 of the Civil Code includes homicide. A2010 . 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. December 21. Madeja sued Dr. Buan. without special pronouncement as to costs. Disposition PREMISES CONSIDERED. Rules of Court." (Rule 111. Thearticle mentions only the crimes of defamation. Petition seeking to set aside the order of the CFI dismissing the civil case against Japzon FACTS . .Homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party reserved. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code.Art. that is. if intentionally done. 33. so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines. JAPZON was accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. 32. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.In the information. is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes the institution of an independent civil action. that is. EVA A. may be brought by the injured party.DR.There are at least two things about Art. frustrated and attempted homicide. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. it is to be borne in mind that the charge against Felardo Paje was for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. not the crime of physical injuries. not the result thereof.The Article in question uses the words 'defamation'. Reasoning . April 3. namely: MADEJA V CARO 211 PHIL 469 ABAD SANTOS. or frustrated homicide.Corpus vs. the offended party Carmen L.In other words. the term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury. but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. 33. 2. ISSUE WON the civil action against Paje can still prosper despite his acquittal HELD NO Ratio Criminal negligence. a civil action for damages. — In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately..Although in the case of Dyogi vs. of an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages. reckless imprudence. . provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. as the Code Commission states. the order dismissing Civil Case No.In any case the Code Commission recommended that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in American Law. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31. This is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution. With this in mind. Japzon. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. SUPERGUARD) 243 SCRA 220 BIDIN. and this recommendation must hove been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article intact as recommended. the order appealed from is affirmed.Section 2. 1995 .) Obiter . alleging that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. . It includes not only physical injuries but consummated. . Independent civil action.

Sec.. Then followed a discussion on the payment of claims of creditors and the preferences claimed for the accounts due to employees. Caro). When a criminal action is instituted. > that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability. citing Andamo v. Alfredo Velayo. management of CALI informally convened its principal creditors in a luncheon. and Atty.. which were to preserve the assets of CALI and to study the way of making a fair division of all the assets among the creditors. This was followed on Aug 10 by ISSUE WON civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action HELD YES .. Shell had reasons to believe that the financial condition of Shell was far from being satisfactory." and Atty.Benigno Torzuela. the civil liability is governed by Art 100 of the RPC. the accused in the case at bar. or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Inc. it must be noted however. and physical injuries. Agcaoili of National Airports Corp. Respondent: > that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties. Alexander Sycip were appointed to the working committee.Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: "Sec 1.There was a general understanding among all creditors present on the desirability of consummating the sale in favor of PAL. . 33. . (SUPERGUARD). In cases of defamation. a security guard on duty at the "Big Bang sa Alabang.The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v.58 in its favor for goods it sold and delivered to CALI. Shell’s Credit Manager was in charge of collecting payment. Atty. Carandang v. which was then in California. No understanding was reached on the matter of preference of payment and it was then generally agreed that the matter be further studied by a working committee to be formed. the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. a civil action for damages. 1948. Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Art 2176 > that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Art 3317 and Section 3. . Dulay. 33. it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence. Ltd.In the cases provided for in Articles 32. the independent civil-action which has been reserved may .Maria Benita Dulay. and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. 34. shall proceed independently of the criminal action. Inc’s (CALI) operations. working committee discussed methods of achieving objectives." . The balance sheet made mention of the Douglas C-54 plane. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution..Aug 9. fraud. . since the civil liability under Art 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Art 365 of the RPC. and the National Airports Corp.Although in the Marcia case. 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Torzuela shot and killed Atty. frustrated. 1956 NATURE Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila be brought by the offended party. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court18 17 A2010 . This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. may be brought by the injured party. > that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 > that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary. Torzuela's wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury. Inc. > that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed (Marcia v CA) Petitioner > the incident resulting in the death of Dulay was due to the concurring negligence of the defendants. . 1948. Thus. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence 18 Rule 111. reserves his right to institute it separately. Shell’s books showed a balance of P170. The other creditors disputed such contention of preference. Santiago). Secretary of the Board of Directors of CALI.. (Shell). negotiation on the division of assets was left pending. that Torzuela. . assigning its credit amounting to $79. October 31. and informed them that CALI was in a state of insolvency and had to stop operation. unless the offended party waives the civil action. Mr. 33. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Institution of criminal and civil actions. a civil action based on Article 33 lies. CALI”s President of Board of Directors. widow of Dulay. INTENTIONAL TORTS VELAYO V SHELL CO OF THE PHILS 100 PHIL 186 FELIX. . explained the memorandum agreement executed by CALI with Phil Air Lines Inc on Aug 4. Desmond Fitzgerald. Alfonso Sycip.Since the start of Commercial Air Line.440. Therefore. and attempted homicide (Madeja v. > that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Art 2176 (the one filed by petitioners) cannot lie.162. . However.It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation. Shell effected a telegraphic transfer of all its credit against CALI to the American Corporation Shell Oil Co. (SAFEGUARD) and/or Superguard Security Corp.Those present in the meeting were of the unanimous opinion that it would be advantageous not to present suits against CALI but to strive for a fair pro-rata division of its assets.On the same day (Aug 9). entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. had to be decided by Stephen Crawford and later by Wildred Wooding . Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. The management of CALI announced that in case of non-agreement of the creditors. When civil action may proceed independently . Alexander Sycip. IAC. casis FACTS .Aug 6. The offer was declined by Crawford. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated. 3. Any extensions of term of payment. while the negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury. the Government. . It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. however. and damages under Articles 32..As of August 1948. discussed the balance sheets of CALI. is charged with homicide. Napoleon Dulay had an altercation. its fuel needs were all supplied by Shell Company of the P. alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. regarding the proposed sale to PAL of the aviation equipment of CALI.117 - prof.torts & damages FACTS . Fitzgerald of Shell. and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed w/ deliberate intent (dolo). filed an action for damages against Torzuela and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co. offered to Fitzgerald CALI’s Douglas C-54 plane. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code. it would file insolvency proceedings. whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Art. not with reckless imprudence. in this case.I. Auditor of CALI.

National Airports Corp learned of Shell’s action in the US and hastened to file its own complaint with attachment against CALI in the CFI of Manila. 1948 approved the memorandum agreement of sale to PAL. 1950. Ltd. of the P. taking advantage of its knowledge of the existence of CALI’s airplane C-54 at California.Anent the argument that Civil Code provisions cannot be applicable as they came into effect only on Aug 30. Alfredo Velayo was appointed Assignee in the proceedings.Shell’s transfer of credit would have been justified only if Fitzgerald had declined to take part in the working committee and frankly and honestly informed the other creditors present that he had no authority to bind his principal and that the latter was to be left free to collect its credit from CALI by whatever means his principal deemed wise and were available to it. WON Shell Co.It is evident that Shell. or having reason to believe that insolvency proceedings are about to be commenced. . casis scheme. Shell acted in bad faith. entirely disregarded all moral inhibitory tenets. ISSUES 1.Plaintiff confined his action to the recovery of damages against Shell. to be received for the benefit of the insolvent estate.081. confidence and trust of other creditors of CALI present in said meeting by affecting a hasty telegraphic transfer of its credit to the American corporation Shell Oil Company. embezzles or disposes of ay money. may be achieved in applying the provisions of the Civil Code. CALI on Aug 12. An order of insolvency was issued by the court on the same day. without knowing the purpose for which it was called. . and noted that “the Board had been trying to reach an agreement with creditors… to prevent insolvency proceedings. having notice of the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency. (It) is a prudent earnest of justice in the face of the impossibility of enumerating. which is outside the jurisdiction of the Phils.29. act with justice. “no vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the right of others.29 and a supplemental attachment for a higher sum against the C-54 plane. Inc. Shell must answer for damages. such information would have dissolved all attempts to come to an amicable conciliation and would have precipitated the filing of CALI’s voluntary insolvency proceedings and nullified the intended transfer of Shell’s credit to American Shell. . WON by reason of said betrayal of confidence and trust.torts & damages a deed of assignment of credit amounting to $85. chattels.Dec 22. Inc. or its value. the amount of such damages HELD 1.081.. all wrongs which cause damage.440. and liable to an action by the assignee for double the value of the property sought to be embezzled or disposed of. that Shell be ordered to pay damages double the value of the plane if the case in the US will defeat the procurement of CALI of its plane.Oct 7.Unaware of Shell’s assignment of credit. goods. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals.If Article 23 of Civil Code goes as far as to provide that “Even if an act or event causing damage to another’s property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant.Velayo instituted case against Shell for the purpose of securing writ of injunction restraining Shell from prosecuting against CALI. July 30. USA. .First week of Sept 1948. . Mr. as to the applicability of this provision. he is chargeable therewith..”.. Art 2252 of Civil Code provides by implication that when new provisions of the Code does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The same result. Sept 17. which states Art 21.Section 37 of the Insolvency Law states Sec 37. and as an alternative. one by one.” Disposition Shell is liable to pay plaintiff. for the collection of assigned credit of $79. according to Art 2254 of Civil Code. . . and a writ of attachment was applied for and issued against a C-54 plane. they may be given retroactive effect. thus defeating the purpose of the informal meetings of CALI’s principal creditors and depriving the plaintiff of the means of obtaining the plane. Article 19 of the Civil Code provides Art 19. acted in bad faith and betrayed the A2010 . Shell did not have any vested or acquired right to betray confidence of CALI or of its creditors. YES. 1957 Defendant-appellee’s contentions . compensatory damages a sum equivalent to the value of the plane at the time Shell assigned its credit to American Shell.I. as it is contented that what Shell really disposed of was its own credit and not CALI’s property. but the Court of Justice (SC) cannot countenance such attitude at all.There are doubts. with much more reason that Shell should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of confidence. plus miscellaneous personal properties. 1948. the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited. such declaration is implemented by Article 21 of the Civil Code.Aug 12. . Court denied petition because whether the conveyance of Shell’s credit was fraudulent or not. But then. 1948 American Shell Oil Co filed a complaint against CALI in the Superior Court of the State of California. . however. 1948 CALI filed a petition for voluntary insolvency.118 - prof. or effects of the insolvent.The telegraphic transfer made without knowledge and at the back of other creditors of CALI may be a shrewd and surprise move that enabled Shell to collect almost all if not the entire amount of its credit. but so far no definite agreement had been reached. . for the benefit of CALI and its creditors. and if so. the Phil court would not be in a position to enforce its orders as against the American corporation Shell Oil Co. . Lower court dismissed the case. upon learning the precarious economic situation of CALI and that will all probability. . Shell may be made to answer for the damages. YES. and much less from a foreign corporation to the detriment of Philippine Government and local business. Any person must. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties. give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. ..” .Code Commission on Article 21: (it) would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. . 2. . before the assignment is made. Moreover. Defendant’s Comments > Assignment of credit in favor of American Shell was for valuable consideration and made in accordance with established commercial practices > It has no interest in the case instituted by American Shell. Fitzgerald could not have officially represented Shell because authority resides on Crawford. to the detriment and prejudice of other CALI creditors who were consequently deprived of their share in the distribution of said value 2. it could not get much of its outstanding credit because of the preferred claims of other creditors. > Fitzgerald was merely invited to the luncheonmeeting. and another equal sum as exemplary damages. If any person. 1948 an amended complaint was filed to recover assigned credit of $85.While Art 19 contains a mere declaration of principles. however. although this was practically the effect and result of the VELAYO V SHELL CO OF THE PHILS RESOLUTION 100 PHIL 207 FELIX. USA. as they are separate and distinct corporations.

torts & damages
- It is not guilty of bad faith, it having done nothing but to protect legitimately its own interest or credit against the bad faith of its debtor, the insolvent CALI, under the control of the latter’s president Alfonso Sycip - The transfer of credit to its sister corporation in the US did not prejudice the Government, because its claims were fully paid, not caused any loss or injury to other creditors, except the entities and groups controlled by Alfonso Sycip. It is not liable for exemplary damages because the provisions of the new Civil Code on the matter are not applicable to this case - Plaintiff-appellant has no cause of action against it and is not the real party in interest - Plaintiff’s right of action was based and prosecuted in the lower court under the provisions of the Insolvency Law and consequently he is stopped from pursuing another theory and is not entitled to damages under the provisions of the new Civil Code. HELD - The facts on which Court based its conclusion that Shell acted in bad faith are not and cannot be denied or contradicted by defendant. - There is no sensible reason for disturbing the finding that Shell is liable for exemplary damages. The amount of the award, however, may be modified. - According to the Civil Code, exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages, and that the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, for it is left to the sound discretion of the Court. - Majority of the Court is of the opinion that the value of the C-54 plane might result too high, and that exemplary damages should not be left to speculation but properly determined by a certain and fixed amount. The amount of exemplary damages is thus modified, and fixed at P25,000.

A2010

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she was terminated from the service by Saudia without being informed of the cause. - She then filed a complaint for damages against Saudia and Mr. Al-Balawi, its country manager. Saudia filed a motion to dismiss raising the issues of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss by Saudia, as well as the subsequent MFR. Saudia then filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO with the CA. The CA issued a TRO prohibiting respondent judge from conducting any proceeding unless otherwise directed. The CA, however, in another resolution, denied Saudia’s prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. Saudia then filed to the SC this instant petition. However, during the pendency of this petition, respondent CA rendered a decision that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the Amended Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is Art.21 CC, thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court. ISSUES 1. WON Morada had a cause of action 2. Which law should govern (Phil. Law or Saudi Law) HELD 1. YES - She aptly predicated her cause of action on Art.19 and Art.21 of the CC. As held in PNB v CA, “the aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold no. of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.” Although Art.19 merely declares a principle of law, Art.21 gives flesh to its provisions. Reasoning - After a careful study of the pleadings, We are convinced that there is reasonable basis for private respondent’s assertion that although she was already working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the two crew members for the attack on her person. As it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition. - There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that in “handing over” or “turning over” the person of private respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its duties as employer. Petitioner’s purported act contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V CA (MORADA) 297 SCRA 469 QUISUMBING; October 8, 1998
NATURE Petition for certiorari to annul and set aside CA resolution and decision FACTS - Private respondent Milagros Morada was a flight attendant of Petitioner Company. During a stop-over in Jakarta, she went to a disco with 2 of her fellow crew members Thamer and Allah (both surnamed Al-

Gazzawi) and had breakfast in their hotel room. While there, Allah left and Thamer attempted to rape her. She was saved by hotel security personnel who heard her cries for help. She later filed a case against them. The two were arrested and detained by Jakarta police. When Morada returned to Jeddah (the base of operations of petitioner), she was asked to go to Jakarta to arrange for the release of the two men. She proceeded to Jakarta but she refused to cooperate. She was eventually allowed to return to Jeddah but barred from Jakarta flights. The Indonesian authorities eventually deported the 2 men, through the intercession of the Saudi govt., after 2 weeks of detention. They were put back in service while respondent Morada was transferred to Manila. - 2 years later, she was asked by her superiors to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of Saudia, in Jeddah. When they met, he brought her to the police station where her passport was taken and she was questioned about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy merely stood as the police put pressure on her to drop the case against the two men. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch a later flight out of Jeddah. - A year and a half later, she was again asked to go to Jeddah to see Miniewy. When she did, a certain Khalid of Saudia brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. She was told that it was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, she signed a document to appear before the court a week later. When the date of appearance came, she complied but only after being assured by Saudia’s Manila manager that the investigation was routinary and posed no danger to her. She was brought before the court and was interrogated by a Saudi judge and let go, however, just as she was about to board a plane home, she was told that she had been forbidden to take flight. She was later told to remain in Jeddah and her passport was again confiscated. A few days later, she was again brought before the same court where the Saudi judge, to her astonishment and shock, sentenced her to 5 months imprisonment and 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah for what happened in Jakarta. The court found her guilty of adultery; going to a disco, dancing and listening to music in violation of Islamic laws; and socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition. - Facing conviction, she sought help from her employer, petitioner Saudia but she was denied assistance of any kind. She asked the Phil. Embassy to help her. Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila,

torts & damages
prosecution of private respondent under the guise of petitioner’s authority as employer, taking advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment of Morada was wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person and reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redress for the wrongs done, once duly proven. 2. Philippine Law Ratio Choice of law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing. Reasoning - Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the “connecting factor” or “point of contact” could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, “act with justice, give her due and observe honesty and good faith.” Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view, what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged according to the private respondent. All told, it is not without basis to identify the Phil. as the situs of the alleged tort. - In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, We find here an occasion to apply the “State of the most significant relationship” rule, which should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of the case. In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (A) the place where the injury occurred; (B) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (C) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and; (D) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

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anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime report reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results. - Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies petitioners filed a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial documents, later amended to just estafa. - Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four of which were for estafa while the fifth was for of Art.290 of' RPC (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence). - All of the 6 criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. - In the meantime, Tobias received a notice from petitioners that his employment has been terminated. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. - Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision and dismissed the complaint. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President. - Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company. However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. - Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. - Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during the hearings. - The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Tobias by ordering petitioners to pay him P80,000.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs. - CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. ISSUE WON petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent HELD YES Ratio Art.19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore,

- As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that the over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Phils. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged in international air carriage business here. Thus, the “relationship” between the parties was centered here. Disposition petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. Civil case entitled “Milagros Morada v Saudi Arabia Airlines” REMANDED to RTC

GLOBE MACKAY V CA 176 SCRA 778 CORTES; August 25, 1989
NATURE An appeal from the decision of CA FACTS - Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager. - GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos. According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive VP and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY. - one day after Tobias made the report, Hendry confronted him by stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys. - when Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, Hendry went up to him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies. - the Manila police investigators cleared Tobias of participation in the anomalies. - Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator who submitted a report finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be conducted. - Nevertheless, Hendry issued a memo suspending Tobias from work preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him. - the Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged

torts & damages
recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Reasoning - One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order." Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. - But while Art.19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. - Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that: Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. - However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that: Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. - In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. - the Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.

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malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias. - It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing several actionable tortious acts. Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the circumstances. - Petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of damnum absque injuria. It is argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage that private respondent could have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed from his employment, which was a valid and legal act of the defendants-appellants. According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable. This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners. - Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled that moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. - Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. The nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter. Disposition petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

- An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. - The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee. - Several other tortious acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from work: Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling him to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." - The threat unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity - The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code. - Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias. While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights, the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith. Considering the haste in which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by

ALBENSON V CA BIDIN; January 11, 1993
NATURE Petition assailing the decision of respondent CA which modified the judgment of the RTC and ordered petitioner to pay private respondent moral damages and attorney's fees. FACTS - Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. the mild steel plates

On 6 February 1973. respondents’ house had already been destroyed. ." . . that the defendants may have been dealing with . however. the check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed. shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. . (2) which is exercised in bad faith. AMONOY V GUTIERREZ 351 SCRA 731 PANGANIBAN. . Agnes Catolos.92.Thus. In filing said information. Woodworks. the said lots were foreclosed. Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda.L. Disposition petition is GRANTED and the decision of the CA is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.000 as actual damages. for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.Amonoy was the counsel of therein Francisca Catolos. the CFI on 25 July 1985 issued a Writ of Possession and pursuant to which a notice to vacate was made on 26 August 1985. plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez. Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given Eugenio S. private respondent has a namesake. Albenson was given a check in the amount of P2.From the records of the SEC. including the house of the Gutierrez spouses.L. In its January 27. on 21 January 1970 Amonoy filed for their foreclosure before the CFI of Pasig. his clients executed real estate mortgages on their lands and the house thereon. claiming ignorance of the complaint against him. Albenson was advised that the signature appearing on the subject check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao. upon verification with the drawee bank. ISSUE WON Amonoy may properly invoke damnum absque injuria in this case since at the time of the demolition he had color of authority over said properties HELD NO NO Ratio The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores. respondent Baltao filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises. Amonoy was ordered to return said properties to the rightful owners. and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal. his son Eugenio Baltao III. The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty. In addition.Petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. and Benjamin Mendiona. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration. its owner. Thus. However. The heirs opposed. Thereafter. the lower court observed that "the check is drawn against the account of "E. 1989. was one "Eugenio S.600. contending that the attorney’s fees charged were unconscionable and that the agreed sum was only P11. Woodworks. On appeal.L. But on 28 September 1972 judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay within 90 days the P27. He won the case for them and charged P27600 as attorney’s fees. causes damage to another. this recourse. was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao". good custom. and that is.The Gutierrez spouses sought a restraining order from the Supreme Court. was deemed to have waived his right. He found that the signature on the check is not the signature of Eugenio S. Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. . . which was granted by the same. the act must be intentional. 3) and it is done with intent to injure. E. Asuncion Pasamba died on 24 February 1969 while Alfonso Fornilda passed away on 2 July 1969. which received the goods in payment of which the bouncing check was issued is owned by respondent. Upon a judgment on merits later on. which was also denied. In its decision. . Jesse Yap. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith. whether willfully or negligently. Rizal. The presence of probable cause signifies. 2001 FACTS . . Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed. 1993 Decision.122 - prof. Albenson made an extrajudicial demand upon private respondent Eugenio S. public order. Baltao. Baltao to replace and/or make good the dishonored check. But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the above-mentioned Decision. Woodworks. The possibility is that it was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio Baltao III. casis pay. petitioner acted in good faith and probable cause in filing the complaint before the provincial fiscal. the two (2) lots would be sold at public auction.880. anyone who. What prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of BP 22 against private respondent was their failure to collect the amountdue on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private respondent. in the exercise of his legal right or duty.torts & damages which the latter ordered. a Complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their house was filed by respondents against petitioner before the RTC on December 15." Upon further inquiry.L. supposedly in accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction. resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law.00 and drawn against the account of E.They failed to pay. the RTC dismissed respondents’ suit. 2) but which is contrary to morals. depends on the circumstances of each case. Considering that Guaranteed. There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21. Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated respondent Baltao. When presented for payment. who manages a business establishment.Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S.00 as another round of attorney’s fees. its employee." not of Guaranteed Industries of which plaintiff used to be President. as a legal consequence. a single proprietorship business. . did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand." ISSUE WON private respondent's cause of action is not one based on malicious prosecution but one for abuse of rights under Article 21 of the CC HELD A2010 . with the very same business address as Guaranteed. or public policy. Albenson was informed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry that E. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting evidence. (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. The heirs sought the annulment of the auction sale. Baltao for Violation of BP 22. Woodworks. The case was dismissed by the CFI on 7 November 1977. Baltao. . Amonoy was the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale. Private respondent. but the latter failed to do so and therefore. P11. the absence of malice. the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates." After obtaining the foregoing information. immediately filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation. Hence. and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on 22 July 1981.695. Baltao. Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and had ceased to exist as a corporation since 1975. moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages. As they were not able to .645.00 secured by the mortgage. and P9. the CA set aside the lower court’s ruling and ordered petitioner to pay respondents P250.575. As part payment thereof. the Orders of 25 April 1986 and 6 May 1986 were issued for the demolition of structures in the said lots.Because his attorney’s fees thus secured by the two lots were not paid. a son of plaintiff. Failing in that.Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him. Reasoning .00 as value of the harvests. Among the heirs of the latter was his daughter. On Amonoy’s motion of 24 April 1986.

.Jader was enrolled in the UE College of Law from 1984 up to 1988.We reject this submission. . men must be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury – that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them. to give everyone his due.Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. Damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another.Petitioner invokes this legal precept in arguing that he is not liable for the demolition of respondents’ house. Indeed. the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed.123 - prof. Over and above the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice x x x.Petitioner. Thus. February 17. Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outset. a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible” UE V JADER 325 SCRA 804 YNARES-SANTIAGO. But the records show that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.A commentator on this topic explains: “The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears. known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights.Considering that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which is engaged in legal education. His name also appeared in the invitation for the graduation as one of the candidates for graduation. especially to the prejudice of others. that a copy of the TRO was served on petitioner himself on June 4. one must Reasoning . casis the latter arose out of his own negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned the result of his removal exam.UE elevated the case to this Court on a petition for review arguing that it has no liability to respondent Romeo A. Verily. For this reason. Every person who. He took a leave of absence without pay from his job and enrolled at the pre-bar review class.CA Affirmed and added an award of P50. contrary to law. 1986. Had he not insisted on completing the demolition. 20. his actions were tainted with bad faith. Indubitably. petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents’ house on May 30. wilfully or negligently causes damage to another. his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right. however. and it disappears when it is abused. is repugnant to the modern concept of social law. 1986. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties. was issued by the Supreme Court on June 2. . Jader attended the graduation and brought his family with him.He filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade but got a grade of five (5).UE denied liability arguing that it never led respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating students. 19. 1986 under the authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. his name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation with an annotation regarding his deficiencies.Article 19. 1986. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society. . The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life. shall indemnify the latter for the same. that their fellowmen. it is not permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others. and he who violates them violates the law. enjoining the demolition of respondents’ house. cannot be said to have acted in good faith. . respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the RTC. based on the Certificate of Service of the Supreme Court process server. ISSUE WON an educational institution may be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case HELD YES . Consequently. recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise. he sued UE for damages. more specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which states: Art. considering that the proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by .True. did not heed the TRO of this Court. .00 for moral damages . Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. in the availment of one’s rights.000. it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students. particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams. Jader later learned of the deficiency and he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examination. These standards are the following: to act with justice. The law. . He maintains that he was merely acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC.470. would render the transaction unconscientious. At the foot of the list of the names of the candidates there appeared however an annotation saying that it was a tentative list and that degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily complete requirements as stated in the University Bulletin . UE in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination. Every person must.00 . and to A2010 . their continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. He failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade . sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.In civilized society. but an invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when he received the TRO from this Court on June 4. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. . give everyone his due.He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student .UE had a contractual obligation to inform his students as to whether or not they have met all the requirements for the conferment of a degree. Art. he was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition. and observe honesty and good faith. . We agree with the CA that he unlawfully pursued the demolition of respondents’ house well until the middle of 1987. A right. even though the forms and technicalities of the law. The CA also found.torts & damages Ratio Damnum absque injuria may not be invoked by a person who claims to exercise a right but does so in an abusive manner violative of Article 19 of the Civil Code. act with justice. therefore.In the mean time. when they act affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that those with whom they deal in the general course of society will act in good faith.TC rendered judgment in favor of the Jader and ordered UE to pay Jader P35.” . By then. It cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another x x x. 2000 FACTS . together with the absence of all information or belief of facts. Schools and professors cannot just take observe honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another. Jader. though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such.

effective July 5. ISSUE WON the defendants prevented the petitioner from reporting to the school and thus making them liable for damages HELD NO . On January 13. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right. In the sales invoice. Barons paid P300k (thereby leaving an unpaid account of P3.B. 1982. as ordered by the school's Board of Directors. 1982. It failed to act seasonably. out of a membership of nine (9). Phelps sent several demands. .8m). but disputed the amt claimed by Phelps. A2010 . to terminate her services as a member of the teaching staff because of: (1) the absence of any written contract of employment between her and the school due to her refusal to sign one.Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to the delayed relay of information to respondent. did not make them liable to her for damages. secretary. plus 25% for atty’s fees and collection. 1982.Phelps Dodge appointed Barons Marketing as one of its dealers of electrical wires and cables. and some teachers allegedly threatened to resign en masse. The application was recommended for approval by the school principal. Joseph Wiertz. Upon her return from Austria in the later part of June. Labajo.On July 9. . . Their acts were not contrary to law. good customs or public policy. 1982. and prayed for atty’s fees of 25% of the amt. . the president. she applied for an indefinite leave of absence because her daughter was taking her to Austria where her daughter was employed. but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. petitioner filed a complaint for damages in the Regional Trial Court. with the exception of Fr. Wiertz disagreed with the Board's decision to retain her. but she did not comply with that order.torts & damages students for granted and be indifferent to them. and three members of the Board of Directors. he through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it. Barons purchased on credit wires and cables worth P4. Branch XI.The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner's discontinuance from teaching was her own choice. and (2) the difficulty of getting a substitute for her on a temporary basis as no one would accept the position without a written contract. Wiertz. graduate.Barons admitted the purchase of the wires and cables. 20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises only from unlawful.On June 1. It instead wrote Phelps requesting if it could pay the outstanding account in monthly installments of P500k plus 1% interest. instead of responding to the request of Barons. . and approved by the President of the school's Board of Directors. . 1982. They did not "illegally dismiss" her for the Board's decision to retain her prevailed. FACTS . signed a letter notifying her that she was "reinstated to report and do your usual duties as Classroom Teacher . Barons was given 60 days credit for its purchases of Phelp’s products. If mere fault or negligence in one’s acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby. Emerito O. on July 7. Esteria F. ordering Barons to pay the debt and interest of 12% and awarding 25% as atty’s fees. they actually did nothing to physically prevent her from reassuming her post. . that is. She made inquiries from the school about the matter and. 1982. good customs or public policy. . Joseph Wiertz. 1982. when he acts with prudence and in good faith. whatever loss she may have incurred in the form of lost earnings was self-inflicted. for without the latter. the members of the Board of Directors of the school. informing her of the decision of Fr. vice president. Garciano.The petitioner was hired to teach during the 1981-82 school year in the Immaculate Concepcion Institute in the Island of Camotes. concurred in by the president of the Parent-Teachers Association and the school faculty. willful or negligent acts that are contrary to law.124 - prof. it was stipulated that an interest of 12% would be imposed. .From Dec1986 to Aug1987. Volenti non fit injuria. That the school principal and Fr. she received the letter informing her that her services at the Immaculate Concepcion Institute had been terminated. filed a complaint for recovery of the P3. As such dealer. Emerito Labajo. and some members of the faculty of the school for discrimination and unjust and illegal dismissal.On September 3. On Sept1987.Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former." . Emerito Labajo addressed a letter to the petitioner through her husband. even when the act is not illicit. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. Consequently. August 10. Ratio Liability for damages under Articles 19. CA affirmed (with modification.8m plus interest." and that "any letter or notice of termination received by you before this date has no sanction or authority by the Board of Directors of this Institution. morals. has reacted acidly to the Board's deliberations for the reinstatement of Mrs. 1992 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint for damages filed by the petitioner against the private respondents. casis service terminated. the school's founder. therefore it is declared null and void. Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable. 1982. which it in turn supplied to MERALCO. Cebu. or morals. Sotero Garciano (for she was still abroad). thereby questioning the integrity of the Board's decision". The RTC rendered decision in favor of Phelps. GARCIANO V CA 212 SCRA 436 GRIÑO-AQUINO. against Fr. Petitioner cannot just give out its student’s grades at any time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking the bar. with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. While the respondents admittedly wanted her BARONS MARKETING V CA (PHELPS DODGE PHILS) 286 SCRA 96 KAPUNAN. or before the school year ended. resigned their positions from the Board "for the reason that the ICI Faculty. She was ordered to report for work on July 5. the former are useless. but Barons still did not pay. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL. 1998 NATURE Petition for review decision of CA FACTS .Phelps. and exemplary damages amounting to P100k. February 9. When one of two innocent parties must suffer. Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. even if true. They were simply exercising their right of free speech or their right to dissent from the Board's decision. The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right. Petitioner’s liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the course.1m. reducing .

One of his guests. making it harder for them to pay its own obligations. 1989 . by way of penal clause. including stipulated fees and charges.000.April 5. xxx The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established. WON there was creditors’ abuse of rights in this case 2.TC: ruled for MARASIGAN finding that BPI abused its right in contravention of A19 CC ordering BPI to pay P 100. More importantly. the inclusion of Art. .MARASIGAN was a complimentary member of BECC from February 1988 to February 1989 and was issued Credit Card with a credit limit of P3.March 21.00 as exemplary damages.May 7. and for an explanation within five (5) days from receipt thereof why his card was dishonored on December 8. there must be no intention to injure another. September 25. Mary Ellen Ringler.000. this should be reduced to 10% for being manifestly exorbitant.CA: AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION P50. WON BPI abused its right to suspend the credit card 2. and observe honesty and good faith.torts & damages atty’s fees to 5%) Barons now assail the CA decision. .00. the illicit act cannot be concealed under the guise of exercising a right. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate. and was threatening to suspend his credit card. Roberto Maniquiz. . . paid the bill by using her own credit card a Unibankard .00 by way of attorney's fees. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties. 1989. give everyone his due. bad faith on the part of Phelps was not proved.000. “Clearly. 1989 by Tess Lorenzo. .000.March 12. Ricardo J. 1990 .00. 1990 – MARASIGAN demanded BPI compliance with his request in his first letter dated March 12. 1998 FACTS . It is plain to see that what we have here is a mere exercise of rights. his membership will be permanently cancelled .00 as moral damages.00 which would include his future bills.November 28.000. there must be bad faith or intent to prejudice the plaintiff. P 50. Reasoning . Phelps was driven by legitimate reasons for rejecting Barons offer.December 12. alleging that Phelps should have been held guilty of “creditor’s abuse of rights”. and P10. a co-employee who handles the account of the plaintiff. within 5 days from receipt thereof or face court action and also to replace the postdated check with cash within the same period or face criminal suit for violation of Bouncing Check Law . and Barons should not be liable for atty’s fees. 1989 despite assurance to the contrary by defendant's personnel-in-charge. .MARASIGAN filed a complaint for damages against petitioner before the RTC Makati . postdated December 15. He was also told to refrain from further use of his credit card to avoid any inconvenience/embarrassment and . Marasigan’s credit card was dishonored.000.BPI served MARASIGAN a letter by ordinary mail informing him of the temporary suspension of the privileges of his credit card and the inclusion of his account number in their Caution List.00 by way of attorney's fees. head of the collection department of defendant was formally informed of the postdated check about a week later.84 was not paid in due time. 1989. 2989 . 1989 – MARASIGAN requested that he be sent the exact billing due him as of December 15.December 16. 1990 within three (3) days from receipt.October 1989 – statement amounting to P8. NO Ratio there is no abuse of rights when there is no bad faith nor intent to prejudice another.32. Citing Tolentino: There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. .MARASIGAN issued Far East Bank Check of P15. the bill amounting to P735. It merely wanted to avoid a situation wherein its cash position would be compromised. MARASIGAN admitted having failed to pay his account because he was in Quezon attending to some professional and personal commitments. YES Ratio the penal clause included in the contract should be complied with in the event of breach.000. this (the request of Barons) would be inimical to the interests of any enterprise. and must not be excessive or unduly harsh. 1989 which was received on November 23.00 as moral damages: P25. 1990 – MARASIGAN sent another letter reminding the manager of FEBTC that he had long rescinded and cancelled whatever arrangement he entered into with BPI and requesting for his correct billing.December 8.00 as exemplary damages.000.125 - prof. casis that unless he settles his outstanding account with the defendant within 5 days from receipt of the letter. otherwise the plaintiff will file a case against them . WON Barons should be liable for interest and atty’s fees HELD 1. 1989 – MARASIGAN sent letter to the manager of FEBTC requesting the bank to stop the payment of the check . .There is no showing that the plaintiff received this letter before December 8.In this case.To constitute abuse of rights.987. NO collection.the contract expressly provided for the imposition of the 12% interest plus 25% for attorney’s fees and A2010 . Mr. by Café Adriatico when the he entertained some guests. He was informed that bpi was demanding immediate payment of his outstanding account.Atty. otherwise the necessary court action shall be filed to hold defendant responsible for the humiliation and embarrassment suffered by him . Also. an employee of the defendant who in turn gave to Jeng Angeles.000.the law prescribes a "primordial limitation on all rights" by setting certain standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof. Thus. atty’s fees should be reduced to 10% Disposition CA decision modified WRT atty’s fees but AFFIRMED in other respects BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION V CA (MARASIGAN) 296 SCRA 260 KAPUNAN.000. act with justice.However. WON MARASIGAN can recover moral damages arising from the cancellation of his credit card by BPI HELD 1.19 in the CC: Every person must.” 2. less the improper charges and penalties. *note: Barons contends that Phelps abused its rights when it rejected Barons’ offer to settle the debt in installments **right involved: right of a creditor to refuse partial fulfillment of a prestation due to him ISSUES 1. 1990 . The check remained in the custody of Jeng Angeles. Thus. was requiring him to issue a check for P15.84 on the condition that BPI will not suspend the effectivity of the card .987. to withhold the deposit of his postdated check and that said check be returned to him because he had already instructed his bank to stop the payment because BPI violated their agreement that when MARASIGAN issued the check to cover his account amounting to only P8.00 and with a monthly billing every 27th of the month His membership was renewed for another year or until February 1990 and the credit limit was increased to P5. ISSUES 1. Reasoning . since 25% if P4. Barons is bound to pay the said amounts.1m is almost P2m. not an abuse thereof. Thus. the mere exercise of a right cannot be said to be an abuse of right. .final demand by BPI requiring him to pay in full his overdue account.MARASIGAN oftentimes exceeded his credit limits but this was never taken against him by BPI and even his mode of paying his monthly bills in check was tolerated. and P 20. especially a profit-oriented one like Phelps.

The Court then proceeded with the other cause of action which was deemed to be the controversy between Ruiz and Panlilio over the said 15%.126 - prof.Albenson made an extrajudicial demand but Balbao denied issuing the check. “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. BPI could have suspended MARASIGAN’S card outright.While the word “injury” may also refer to honor or credit.Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed was one Eugenio S. BPI was therefore justified in suspending his credit card. NO . BPI did not capriciously and arbitrarily canceled the use of the card. casis ISSUE WON the lower court erred in dismissing the case HELD NO . hurt or harm which results from the injury.Under the terms and conditions of the credit card. and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Consequently as early as 28 October 1989 thirty days from the non-payment of his billing dated 27 September 1989. they claim that even if the retention fund was in act released. Ratio To find the existence of an abuse of right A19 the following elements must be present (1) There is a legal right or duty. 2. Woodworks was registered in the name Eugenio Baltao. RUIZ V SECRETARY PAREDES. BPI allowed him to use his card for several weeks. BPI could automatically suspend his credit card.Albenson Enterprises Corp. the article envisions a situation where a person has a legal right which was violated by another in a manner contrary to morals. . Thus. the application contained the stipulation that the petitioner could automatically suspend a card whose billing has not been paid for more than thirty days. one cannot sustain the contention that the failure or refusal to extend recognition was an act contrary to morals. good custom. together with Panlilio. Baltao and that E. Article 21. Instead. Ruiz and Herrera want to be recognized as architects of the building also citing Article 21 of the Civil Code as their base for he cause of action. The pleadings in this case do not show damages were ever asked or alleged. good custom.By his own admission MARASIGAN made no payment within 30 days for his billing/statement dated 27 September 1989. A check is not considered as cash especially when it is postdated sent to BPI. Woodworks. there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the results of a violation of a legal duty. (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. The signature on the subject check belonged to Eugenio Baltao.The sole object of the appellants was to secure for themselves recognition that they were co-architects of the Veterans Hospital. their pleas for recognition as architects should have been heard by the lower court.Enrique Ruiz and Jose Herrera.And under the facts and circumstances obtaining. . January 11. any card with outstanding balances after thirty (30) days from original billing/statement shall automatically be suspended. Nowhere is it stated in the terms and conditions of the application that there is a need of notice before suspension may be affected as private respondent claims.L. (2) which is exercised in bad faith.” . On the other hand no amount of declaration will help an incompetent person achieve prestige and recognition. the named architect was only Panlilio. damage is the loss. Reasoning . ALBENSON V CA (BALTAO) 217 SCRA 16 BIDIN. states. he modified award of attorney’s fees. Inc. Neither did he make payment for his original billing/statement dated 27 October 1989. the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not A2010 . Thus. Disposition Petition denied. If this is so. The award of damages by the CA is clearly unjustified. amount to a legal injury or wrong. . Thus.Good faith is presumed and the burden of proving bad faith is on the party alleging it.L. .MARASIGAN’S own negligence was the proximate cause of his embarrassing and humiliating experience in not reading the letter of notice of cancellation. Order appealed from is affirmed. 1966 NATURE Appeal from an order of the Manila CFI FACTS . the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. or public policy. Hence. there is no need or necessity for a judicial declaration. He can not now pass the blame to the petitioner for not notifying him of the suspension of his card.Check was dishonored for the reason “Account closed. the mild steel plates which the latter ordered. . Ratio The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Any CARD with outstanding balances unpaid after thirty (30) days from original billing/statement date shall automatically be suspended and those with accounts unpaid after sixty (60) days from said original billing/statement date shall automatically be cancelled without prejudice to BECC's right to suspend or cancel any CARD any time and for whatever reason. and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury. or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. Reasoning . filed an action against the Secretary of National Defense and also against their own company (together with Pablo Panlilio who is also a shareholder of the company) in connection with the 15% retention fund withheld by the DND relating to the construction of the Veterans Hospital. Albenson filed a . or public policy.” . which was used as basis of the action. so as to enhance their standing and prestige. Prestige and recognition are bestowed on the deserving even if there is no judicial declaration.The amended complaint of appellants claimed that the non inclusion of their names as architects resulted in their professional prestige and standing being seriously impaired. As early as 28 October 1989.torts & damages Ratio The agreement was for the immediate payment of the outstanding account. . Hence it presupposes losses or injuries which are suffered as a result of said violation.As it turned out. Albenson was given a check drawn against the account of E. In such cases.Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right. there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded.It was petitioner's failure to settle his obligation which caused the suspension of his credit card and subsequent dishonor at Café Adriatico. good customs. both shareholders of Allied Technilogists. 1993 NATURE Appeal from decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . signed by MARASIGAN. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria . Under the contract and all other documents relating to the construction of the Veterans Hospital. Thus. delivered to Guaranteed Industries Inc. the real issue was the credit as to the architects of the building were. the issuance of the postdated check was not effective payment. As quoted earlier. As part payment. Reasoning . It turned out that said retention was already released by the DND to the Company.

Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. . Due to her pregnant condition. was bought. ISSUE WON Velez is liable for the preparations spent by Wassmer cost of wedding TANJANCO V SANTOS REYES.CA modified by reducing the moral damages and the attorney's fees awarded.Where there is no evidence of the other party having acted in wanton." P15.Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos. . A2010 . But Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. ISSUES WON Baltao should be awarded damages (based on malicious prosecution) HELD NO . to wit: (1) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor.Francisco X.000 as moral and exemplary damages.000. 1964 FACTS . (2) That in bringing the action. . or malevolent manner. for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate .L. its owner. Concededly.While mere breach of contract is not an actionable wrong. otherwise. attorney's fees and costs.127 - prof. casis is the abuse of right which can be a cause for moral and material damages. . that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. .Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. he sent a telegram assuring Wassmer that nothing has changed and he will return soon. it is damnum absque injuria. who manages E. To formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity. that he expressed and professed his undying love and affection for her who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings". Article 21 of the Civil Code says that when the person willfully causes loss or injury contrary to good custom. .000 as actual damages. his son Eugenio Baltao III. neither may exemplary damages be awarded Disposition Petition granted. December 24. oppressive. as a result of which she conceived a child. . only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized. job or occupation — and the same must be proved. reckless [and] oppressive manner. .Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief. 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage. no damages will be given . moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. with accessories. . and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights. Baltao for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Velez and Beatriz P.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award. profession. acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor. The bride-to-be's trousseau. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner Judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2. the prosecutor acted without probable cause. . that in consideration of his promise of marriage Araceli consented and acceded to Tanjanco’s pleas for carnal knowledge. Araceli had to resign her job as secretary in HELD YES . .Asst. Bridal showers were given and gifts received. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives.An award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. . Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated respondent Baltao. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid. if the proof is flimsy and unsubstantiated.This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. 1966 NATURE Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals revoking an order of the CFI dismissing appellant's action for support and damages. Woodworks.500 as attorney's fees. decided to get married and set September 4. fraudulent. and the costs. may file a case for damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights. . As to exemplary damages.A party injured by the filing of a court case against him.But the next day. (3) The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice . A matrimonial bed. he shall compensate the latter for damages. December 17. or on malicious prosecution.Baltao filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against Albenson Enterprises. It appears that private respondent has a namesake. P25. P2. CA decision reversed and set aside WASSMER V VELEZ 12 SCRA 648 BENGZON. In order that such a case can prosper. and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. even if he is later on absolved. property. Regularly until December 1959.torts & damages complaint against Eugenio S. which was subsequently issued. defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton.Trial court granted Baltao’s claim for actual or compensatory.Sued by Beatriz for damages. On September 2. is quite different.Baltao filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation. following their mutual promise of love. 1954 as the big day. in a reasonable mind. Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S. friends and acquaintances. to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation. It .Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss — in business. . Proof and motive that the institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to damages . there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person. and one employee.. the following three (3) elements must be present.. Baltao for violation of BP 22. fraudulent or reckless. trade. Wassmer. moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages. moral and exemplary damages. Velez left a note for Wassmer saying that he has to postpone the wedding because his mother opposes it. Tanjanco succeeded in having carnal access to Araceli. reckless. Their wedding was set. party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased. through his protestations of love and promises of marriage. FACTS .In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton .Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code.To constitute malicious prosecution. or oppressive manner.The record reveals that on August 23. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. however. both being of adult age.

But under the proposed article. and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover. even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury. sometime in 20 August 1987. he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses. she sustained injuries. attorney's fees and costs. CFI dismissed the complaint. Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. she would not have again yielded to his embraces. Over and above the partisan allegations. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire. reimbursement for actual expenses. for had Araceli been deceived. with repeated acts of intercourse. A promise of marriage either has not been made.In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages. . single. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. they therefore argued to get married after the end of the school semester. the latter courted and proposed to marry her. Araceli Santos. which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless. Insisting. petitioner's attitude towards her started to change. enticement.000. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.00 a month for her support and that of her baby. she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages.000. “but the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. that in law it is more than mere sexual intercourse. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing. a week before the filing of the complaint. petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and. BAKSH V CA 219 SCRA 115 DAVIDE JR. though the grievous moral wrong has been committed. and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation. February 19. . which are calculated to have and do have that effect. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages. the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission where it stated.00 attorney's fees. as a result of such maltreatment. Bugallon. plus P100. and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. persuasions and wiles. moral shock. petitioner. in an action by the woman. superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments. to pay her not less than P430." They gave an example  "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". wounded feelings. Under the present laws. Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the female. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion. Dagupan City. he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment. the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments. besmirched reputation. he prayed for an award for miscellaneous expenses and moral damages. persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury. without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage. or can not be proved. without the assistance of counsel. there is no seduction. Disposition the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City. a woman of adult age. it connotes essentially the idea of deceit. from 1958 to 1959. the facts stand out that for one whole year. and social humiliation. or a breach of a promise of marriage. and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer. much less for one year. he did not maltreat her. under Article 21. as the girl is above eighteen years of age. filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. plus P10. in his Counterclaim.128 - prof. She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts. She alleges in said complaint that: she is 22 years old. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes. maintained intimate sexual relations with Tanjanco. The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. before 20 August 1987. Inc. The girl becomes pregnant. let us examine the complaint. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex. entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of origin to proceed with the case. the Commission has deemed it necessary.torts & damages IBM Philippines. she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. 23.. during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint. and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. She became unable to support herself and her baby and duer to Tanjanco's refusal to marry her as promised. there is no crime. that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof. he maltreated and threatened to kill her. Hence. and though the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage. the enticement. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent.In his Answer with Counterclaim. the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. she suffered mental anguish. and no other cause of action being alleged. we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code. which was in October of that year. Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage. petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses.And in American Jurisprudence: On the other hand. she and her parents would have such a right of action. 1993 NATURE Appeal by certioriari to review and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS .00 in moral and exemplary damages.Bearing these principles in mind. and finally. artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant. ISSUE WON CS erred in reversing the CFI decision HELD YES . she was a virgin before she began living with him. had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit. The essential feature is seduction. casis Private respondent. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. . no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule: ART. To constitute seduction there must A2010 . on the other hand. The Court of Appeals. Guilig. and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit. in the interest of justice. but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport. petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga. in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. Therefore.

proof that he had.torts & damages .It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy. applying Article 21 of the Civil Code. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because. traditions and culture.Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals. the lower court. and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner. . ISSUE WON Art. have offended our sense of morality. and he has never maltreated her. . good customs or public policy. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees. who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality. (c) petitioner. . they proceeded to Bunag’s grandmother’s house. The Court a quo adopted her evidence. Cirilo was ashamed when she went home and could not sleep and eat because of the deception done against her by Bunag. and P10K for atty’s fees. As an Iranian Moslem. Later that evening. Jr brought Zenaida Cirilo to a hotel where they had sex. could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. Cirilo contends that she was abducted by Bunag Jr along with unidentified man and brought her to the motel where she was raped. Finally. inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors. and so holds. (e) by reason of that deceitful promise. he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent. Bunag Jr withdrew his application. 21 is applicable to the case at bar HELD YES . Unfazed by his second defeat. When she noticed they were going the wrong way. and Cirilo applied for their respective Marriage Licenses.In light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21. . petitioner filed the instant petition. they lived as husband and wife for 21 days.The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers." BUNAG V CA (CIRILO) 211 SCRA 441 REGALADO.Conrado Bunag. Bunag.After filing for the ML. . he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four wives and concludes that on the basis thereof. It is essential.129 - prof. They never got to the restaurant where they were supposed to eat. The RTC upon finding that she was forcibly abducted and raped Bunag Jr was ordered to pay for P80K for moral damages. she allowed herself to be deflowered by him. the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. culture and traditions. no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act. good customs. . That night. Jr. that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals. Respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto the trial court's ruling. . such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case.The Court found that Cirilo and Bunag Jr were sweethearts but for 2eeks before the alleged rape. so much so that she promised not to make any scandal and to marry him. the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing. the trial court erred in ruling that he does not possess good moral character. . he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways.The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens. P20K by way of temperate damage. casis Disposition Petition denied been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. July 10.After trial on the merits. (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs. petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her. promised to marry private respondent. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent. in reality. the said Code contains a provision. but after leaving. In the instant case. Cirilo protested but Bunag threatened her that he would bump the car against the post if she made any noise. Cirilo rode in the passenger’s seat while Bunag Jr was driving. . This notwithstanding. inter alia. During that time.She was then dragged by the 2 men in the hotel where Bunag Jr deflowered her against her will and consent. he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. Article 21. deceit and false pretenses. Bunag Sr was absolved from liability. rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision 5 favoring the private respondent. respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry. The Court is of the opinion. he is not conversant with such Filipino customs. petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship. . Bunag brough her to his grandmother’s house in Las Pinas where they liver together as husband and wife for 21 days.A complaint fro breach of promise to marry was filed against Bunag Sr and Bunag Jr.Bunag initially allowed her to go home but later refused to consent and stated that he would only let her go after they were married. which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Jr. his controversial "common law wife" is now his legal wife as their marriage had A2010 . (d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her. they had a quarrel. Bunag then left and never returned. that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress. P20K for exemplary damage. however. through machinations. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. Bunag Sr arrived and assured them that they would apply for the ML the next day. Moreover. Bunag Jr came riding in a car with an unidentified man. On the day of the said rape. she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. Bunag jr invited her for merienda to talk things over. 1992 NATURE Petition for review from the decision of CA FACTS . (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. traditions and culture.

in relation to Art 2219.Appellant. except where the plaintiff incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents therrof. she could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual contact sometime in August.00. While the Bunag’s assigned several errors in the TC decision. Reasoning . that the day following their first meeting. Disposition petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.000. 1970 NATURE Appeal on points of law from an order of the CFI FACTS .000 to P8. Amelita was forced to leave her work as a waitress. rape or other lascivious acts. any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. Manila. A2010 . She became pregnant and despite efforts and drugs (abortion pills?) supplied by defendant. 21. particularly Icao (Art. and the assailedjudgment and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED. Hence. even if such child should be born after the death of the testator (Art. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damage.Although TC granted damages on the basis of the forcible abduction and rape even after the criminal complaint’s dismissal.Cirilo appealed on the disculpation of Bunag Sr’s liability. . moral and exemplary damages. that at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening. the extinction of the criminal liability does not extinguish civil liability unless there is a declaration of a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case may arise did not exist. that Amelita asked for time to think about Ivan's proposal. 1974. ISSUE WON lower courts erred in granting damages for the breach of promise to marry HELD Ratio A breach of promise to marry is not actionable per se. Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. as a result of which Amelita got pregnant.130 - prof. and Art 2229 and 2234 CC. attorney's fees plus costs. the payment of actual. Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to which the latter agreed. 2219 which provides compensation in cases of seduction. Had she been induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage. . YES .Bunag filed for the petition for review claiming that CA failed to consider vital exhibits and testimonies and error in the proper application of the law. Amelita prayed for the recognition of the unborn child. that her pleas for help and support fell on deaf ears. Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married man. Plaintiff amended the complaint but the TC ruled such was not allowable as the original complaint averred no cause of action.Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action as the complaint did not allege the child had been born— the motion was sustained. that Amelita had no sexual relations with any other man except Ivan who is the father of the child yet to be born at the time of the filing of the complaint.Hence. that on the pretext of getting something. Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . casis and not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan. only the fiscal made such dismissal of the criminal complaint. where she worked as a waitress.Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her womanhood. the award for moral damages is allowed in cases specified and analogous to those provided in Art 2219 CC. succeeded in having sex with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation and without her consent. The latter. 854) 2.Petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for acknowledgment. YES . . support and damages against private respondent Ivan Mendez. Art 2219. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which warrant and justify the award of moral and exemplary damages. assisted by her parents. 1992 NATURE . “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. CONSTANTINO V MENDEZ BIDIN. However. May 14.For a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damages caused. that because of her pregnancy. apart from the right to recover for money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. .A breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law. Its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir. although married. that they repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and November. she surrendered her virginity HELD NO Ratio Mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. As stated in Art. Quimiguing. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. sued her neighbor Icao with whom she had close and confidential relations. 1974. the petitioner’s promising to marry Cirilo to evade criminal liability constitutes acts contrary to morals and good customs. In the case. she had to stop studying. Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the latter. Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted.” This is furthered by Art. . that while dining. unborn child is given a provisional personality by law and therefore has a right to support from its progenitors. plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages. Amelita Constantino alleges that she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant located at Sta. WON Quimiguing had a right to the support of the child 2. As relief. WON Quimiguing is entitled to damages HELD 1. she claimed support of P120/mo.torts & damages .A conceived. ISSUE WON Amelita can claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 3 & 21 4 of the Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage. Repeated sexual intercourse only indicates that passion QUIMIGUING V ICAO 34 SCRA 132 REYES. 742). that he was a married man. . Cruz.In her complaint. 40) and may receive donations (Art.Under the circumstances in the case at bar. pursuant to Art 21 in relation to par 3 and 10. whenever Ivan is in Manila. CA dismissed the petitions and affirmed judgment of RTC in toto. that after the sexual contact. Ivan professed his love and courted Amelita. independent of the right to support of the child. thus the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error. Reasoning . that Ivan is a prosperous businessman of Davao City with a monthly income of P5. par10. . July 31. Under Art 21 CC.The court is constrained with the factual findings of the lower courts. ISSUES 1. abduction.

The affair continued just the same. 1984. there was no intent to accuse falsely. when Nicolas ordered strollers from Que. QUE V IAC (NICOLAS) 169 SCRA 137 CRUZ. He allegedly ordered that payment be stopped because the goods delivered to him by Que were defective and that Que allegedly refused to replace them. . but through a clever strategy. no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that the defendant not only deliberately. the circumstances presented the possibility that Nicolas might cheat him. They fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts. The panel assigned to conduct prelim investigation found that there was probable cause to hold them for trial for the crime of REBELLION WITH MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER. If the charge. through an ingenious scheme or trickery. from Que’s point of view.This was then referred for preliminary inquiry to the Special Composite Team of Prosecutors who issued a subpoena to the said individuals after finding sufficient basis to continue the inquiry. as a matter of fact. was made with an honest belief in its truth and justice. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter’s family who allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of the family. although. the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs. there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. although false. Defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. The present action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. brothers and sisters of Lolita PE. PE V PE 5 SCRA 200 1962 FACTS . Information was filed before RTC QC.It is evident that the petitioner was not motivated by ill feeling but only by an anxiety to protect his his rights when he filed the criminal complaint for estafa with the fiscal's office. 1989 NATURE Petition for review FACTS . willful and malicious experimentation by filing against him a charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder when petitioners were . a married man.Nicolas then filed a case against Que for malicious prosecution. the element of probable cause was not treated separately from that of malice. frequently visited Lolita’s house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the rosary. and there were reasonable grounds on which such a belief could DRILON V CA (ADAZA) 270 SCRA 211 HERMOSISIMA JR. Instead. they prohibited defendant from going to their house. he has committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals. On april 14. When a complaint was laid and there was probable cause to believe that the person charged had committed the acts complained of.Gen Renato DE VILLA. the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution (Manila Gas Corporation v. casis be founded. with no recommendation as to bail. Therefore. He just stopped payment. the goods which were allegedly defective were not yet returned to Que before the filing of the estafa case. which were delivered. The checks were dishonored. this appeal by the plaintiffs ISSUE WON the defendant can be held liable under Article 21 HELD YES . he had not. Concededly. Que on his part alleged that the said defective products were only returned after he filed an estafa case. without Que knowing that there were defects in the goods he delivered. seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. requested the DOJ (headed by Sec Franklin DRILON) to order the investigation of several individuals. good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code. 'Under the Spanish Law. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found inside Lolita’s aparador. 1997 NATURE Petition to reverse CA’s Resolutions FACTS . This decision is immediately executory. Reasoning -. The wrong he had caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. but not so much on the theory of probable cause as on the ground that. an unmarried woman 24 years of age. The two had an amicable business relation until 1975. Also. Disposition decision of the respondent court dated March 12. . Chief of Staff of the AFP. . Que filed an estafa case against Nicolas. 100 SCRA 602) . 1979. Indeed. ISSUE WON Que had instituted a malicious prosecution of the private respondent (WON the reversal made by IAC was correct) HELD NO . The case was dismissed for lack of merit. did not demand for its repair. as under the American Law.Nicolas issued 5 checks which Que cannot encash. ADAZA filed a complaint for damages and charged petitioners with engaging in a deliberate.torts & damages Disposition the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside A2010 . Nicolas kept the goods. March 20. succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. .131 - prof. TC ruled in favor of Que.Magtanggol Que is a dealer of canvass strollers while Antonio Nicolas orders from him. under such circumstances. is REINSTATED as above modified.The circumstances under which the defendant tried to win Lolita’s affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who. After making demands for payment. The lower court dismissed the action. 1957. Verily. and then issued 5 postdated checks in favor of Que. is SET ASIDE and the amended decision of the trial court dated February 21.Feeling aggrieved by the institution of these proceedings against him. Ratio. in accordance with Nicolas’ order to stop payment. Hence. which Nicolas allegedly ignored. IAC reversed. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Court of Appeals. When the parents learned about this. January 13.To constitute malicious prosecution. One cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. the complainant was fully protected. the accusation could not be held to have been false in the legal sense. including private respondent ADAZA for their alleged participation in the failed Dec 1989 coup d’etat.Plaintiffs are parents. Lolita disappeared from her brother’s house where she was living. inspite of demands by the latter. Defendant.

” . called the action of malicious prosecution. August 25. P200. and abusive acts of petitioners. that is by improper or sinister motive. 35.132 - prof. Reasoning . it has been defined as“An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution. 29.RTC: rendered judgment in favor of Tobias by ordering petitioners to pay him P80. . The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results. WON complaint was a suit for damages for malicious prosecution 2. . Reasoning . or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause. . regularly. (b) That in bringing the action.000.This led Tobias to file a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful.Judging from the face of the complaint itself filed by Adaza.00 as moral damages.” Reasoning . 21.[ 2 SCRA 337]: the Court held that the right to file criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay HELD 1. 2217 and 2219 (8)]. thus rendering the complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.) ISSUES 1. without being asked by RETELCO. (c) Suffice it to state that the presence of probable cause signifies.During the pendency of the appeal with said office.Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal upon receiving the notice of his termination. NLRC. Such a change of theory cannot be allowed. NO Ratio In order for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper. Hendry’s threat of more suits against Tobias. denied Globe’s MR. . . and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of -Tobias.The results of the investigations said that the handwritings.00 as attorney's fees.CA also dismissed petition for certiorari and ordered RTC judge to proceed with the trial of civil case filed by ADAZA. the prosecutor acted without probable cause. GLOBE MACKAY V CA CORTES.] . and which terminates in favor of the person prosecuted. what appears clear from the records only is that respondent has been discharged on a writ of habeas corpus and granted bail. signatures. malicious. petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the latter's complaint for illegal dismissal. to which Tobias was the number one suspect though he claimed he was the one who reported it.LA: dismissed the complaint. The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force.In Philippine jurisdiction.Both parties appealed.Globe Mackay found out an anomaly that has been causing them to lose money.000. complaints for estafa were filed against Tobias. All of the six criminal complaints were . MFR for Order of Denial was also denied. after the termination of such prosecution.reversed.000. There was malicious intent manifested through the filing of the criminal cases as the case for illegal dismissal was pending. and the eventual dismissal of the cases.Despite being cleared. he maintained that his claim before the trial court was merely a suit for damages based on tort and NOT a suit for malicious prosecution. . as a legal consequence. civil suit. YES Definition of Malicious Prosecution: .However. . it has been defined as“One begun in malice without probable cause to believe the charges can be sustained. suit.00 as exemplary damages. CA: affirmed the RTC decision in toto. or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. NONE of these requisites have been alleged.torts & damages fully aware of the non-existence of such crime in the statute books. the absence of malice. . This is not considered the termination of the action contemplated under Philippine jurisdiction to warrant the institution of a malicious prosecution suit against those responsible for the filing of the information against him. . Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to take no further action on civil case except to DISMISS it.RTC denied MD. ISSUE WON there was malicious prosecution HELD YES . WON petitioners are liable for malicious prosecution A2010 . 33. . the Secretary of Labor: reinstated the LA's decision which Tobias appealed to the Office of the President. 1989 NATURE Certiorari FACTS .Yutuk V. (In Adaza’s latest Comment. oppressive.Nowhere in his complaint filed with the trial court did respondent Adaza allege that his action is one based on tort. “the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith” [Ventura v. . 20.In American jurisdiction. Hendry.00 as actual damages. and costs. for the mere purpose of vexation or injury. For this injury an action on the case lies. 26. The filing of the cases despite the police reports exculpating Tobias. 32.Although Globe claims that they must not be penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints against an employee who was their principal suspect in the commission of forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded them of substantial sums of money. the plaintiff must prove these elements: (a) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal.Petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias.Petitioners filed MD since there was no valid cause of action for this complaint for damages.000. Bernabe.. casis dismissed by the fiscal and MRs of Globe were denied too. Instituted with intention of injuring defendant and without probable cause. SC anchored its findings on TC’s finding (re bad faith of Globe Mackay in filing the criminal complaints against Tobias). The petitioners were of the honest conviction that there was probable cause to hold Adaza for trial. . . wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. (b) It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. (Sec 3e of RA 3019) An examination of the records would show that this latest posture as to the nature of his cause of action is only being raised for the first time on appeal.Unemployed. 2. P30. and (c) That the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice. P20. Manila Electric Co. 38 SCRA 5871. Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). (a) Insofar as Adaza’s Criminal Case is concerned. .The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in the provisions of the NCC [Art 19. Disposition Petition is GRANTED.

casis may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. "Indeed. He replied by denying and telling them to check the veracity of their claim. Disposition CA’s decision AFFIRMED.L. the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. It is now difficult to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not be checked by the application of these articles" (Tolentino. filed at least six criminal complaints against respondent. He told the trial fiscal to move for dismissal. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith [Sison v. known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights. depends on the circumstances of each case. . with one of the investigating fiscals.Albenson Enterprises delivered mild steel plates to 3267 V." Globe Mackay hastily filed 6 criminal cases with the city Fiscal's Office of Manila. Said check was signed by a Eugenio Baltao. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another. These standards are the following: to act with justice. To do so would be a clear perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice. and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal. Baltao denied that it was his signature on the check. Mesa. moral (P1M) and exemplary damages (P200k). Baltao appealed to the Provincial Prosecutor. . Investigating fiscal found probable cause and filed info with the RTC. . Asst. . and cited the same as the bases for the award of damages. Baltao filed a complaint for damages against Albenson because the latter had unjustly filed a criminal case against him. . and atty’s fees (P100k). public order.133 - prof.ACTS CONTRA BONUS MORES Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores. ELW was owned by Baltao’s son. 2 cases were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office of the AFP to railroad Tobias’ arrest and detention in the military stockade. 176 SCRA 778 [1989]). with persistence. all of which were dismissed. They believed Baltao was really the one who issued the check because it was his company who ordered and received the delivery. 2) but which is contrary to morals. and cause damage to plaintiff.There is however.Thus. ALBENSON V CA (BALTAO) BIDIN. an act which causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of damages. these three articles are all related to each other. The trial court as well as the respondent appellate court mistakenly lumped these three articles together. Concededly.The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty. *Findings of bad faith (as per the TC): > After the dismissal of the 4 cases and denial of the MR by the Ministry of Justice. David. He didn’t tell them that his son was his namesake and that the latter NATURE Appeal from CA judgment modifying RTC’s decision as regards amount to be paid FACTS . to give everyone his due.L. therefore. the filing of a suit by itself. or public policy. no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. The delivery was received by Guaranteed Industries. though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such. Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully". The second and third elements are not present. January 11. A2010 . . commenting in one case that. it is damnum absque injuria.575 was given as payment. Fiscal de Guia. The law. oppress. (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. Mapa Street. However. A right. (2) which is exercised in bad faith.IT TURNS OUT that E. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated. Woodworks’ business address was the same as Guaranteed Industries.After the criminal case was dismissed. ISSUE WON Baltao is entitled to damages HELD NO .An award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. 3) and it is done with intent to injure. Court of Appeals. good custom. Ratio To constitute malicious prosecution.Hawpia CA. Evident likewise is the flurry and haste in the filing of this case against respondent Tobias. CA. They wrote to him. Woodworks. CA. the haphazard way this case was investigated is evident. . Albenson filed case for violation of BP22. All they wanted was to collect what is owed them. .torts & damages an indebtedness. and although the police investigation was "still under follow-up and a supplementary report will be submitted after all the evidence has been gathered. a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. . drawn against the account of E. recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise. sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. of which Eugeneio Baltao was president. 1 SCRA 60]. Although the requirements of each provision is different. combined with articles 19 and 20. . 1993 . The provincial prosecutor found out that something was amiss during the investigation and upon reinvestigation. 100 SCRA 602]. the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly broadened.[20 SCRA 536]: the Court upheld the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and attorney's fees after making a finding that petitioner. or "negligently". "With this article (Article 21).ABUSE OF RIGHTS Article 19. Albenson extrajudicially demanded payment from Baltao. Sta. 122 SCRA 576]. a check in the amount of P2.There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights. despite the negative results of the lie detector tests which Globe Mackay compelled him to undergo.Albenson did not abuse its rights. 1 Civil Code of the Philippines 72). does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v.The check bounced. who is his namesake. the act must be intentional. and that is. but this was frustrated by a presidential decree transferring criminal cases involving civilians to the civil courts. resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law. > Despite the clearing Tobias of participation or involvement in the fraudulent transactions complained of. found no probable cause. . 5 for estafa thru falsification of commercial document and 1 for violation of A290 of the RPC (all of which were dismissed). . under any of these three provisions of law. CA modified by awarding only half of original moral damages and atty’s fees." there can be no mistaking that defendants would not but be motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass. Manila. and to observe honesty and good faith.RTC granted actual (P133k).

In the instant case.Subsequently. Private respondent was then taking a nap. .CA affirmed the lower court’s decision in toto.00 as exemplary damages in the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. 1967. oppressive and malevolent filing of the criminal complaint. Delfin Custodio. Plaintiff was sleeping.00. by way of example or correction for the public good. Ongsip inquired from Coronel why they were taking pictures but the latter simply gave him a calling card with instructions to go to his office. . . secondly: the illegal closure of respondent Ongsip's gas service connection without court order and without notice of warning. Besides. The circumstance was familiar to that of catching a thief in flagrante delicto. there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. .. besmirched reputation. When Plaintiff woke up at four o'clock in the afternoon.00 as exemplary damages in the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. 1965. -Thereafter.On May 20. the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.. and similar injury. .A burner gas was installed by petitioner's employees in respondent's kitchen at his residence. and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless." . 1967.000. petitioner disconnected respondent's gas service for alleged failure and/or refusal to pay his gas consumptions from July. petitioner's employees returned with a photographer who took pictures of the premises.Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals . casis are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.torts & damages operated a business in the same building. moral damages may be recovered if they . moral shock.. social humiliation. (8) malicious prosecution. To prove his innocence. .134 - prof. respondent Ongsip applied for gas service connection with petitioner Manila Gas Corporation.00 as attorney's fees. respectively. respondent Ongsip filed a complaint for moral and exemplary damages against petitioner Manila Gas Corporation based on two causes of action.By the end of August.00 as moral damages in the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. . . This. To constitute malicious prosecution.On August 17.000. There. temperate.On July 14. he was informed about the existence of a by-pass valve or "jumper" in the gas connection and that unless he gave P3. ." .To constitute malicious prosecution. October 30. a reading was made on the new meter and expectedly. Coronel and his men had already made the changes and had already gone. . pending investigation of the criminal complaint. mental anguish.On May 2. in October. 1980 NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA (treated as a special civil action) FACTS . it registered a sudden increase in gas consumption. even brutally. in addition. .00. CA reversed and set aside. wounded feelings. the trial court rendered its decision ordering defendant to pay plaintiff:(1) P50. petitioner's employees went to Ongsip's place. respondent Ongsip did not show any sign of fear or remorse and did not yield to the threatening demand of Coronel—this is the attitude of someone who knows how to take a firm stand where his principles and rights are concerned.000. Right then and there Coronel should have told Plaintiff that he was using a by-pass valve and in effect stealing gas from Defendant. 1967. 1965 to January. a complaint for qualified theft was filed by petitioner against respondent Ongsip .000. Though incapable of pecuniary computation.00 and P10.Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. But the truth is that when Coronel and his men entered Plaintiff's compound and made changes therein. . firstly: the malicious.000. hence. . . . .The first cause of action.Without notifying or informing respondent Ongsip.On February. 1964. Disposition Petition granted.There was no malicious prosecution. prompting petitioner to issue a 'meter order' with instructions to change the gas meter in respondent's residence.The installations and connections were all done solely by petitioner's employees. is predicated on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which states that "moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: . . he would be deported. This was the time when Plaintiff met Coronel.It bears noting that when he was informed as to the existence of a 'jumper' in his gas connection.000. fright. and on May and June 1966. 1966. serious anxiety. respondent Ongsip requested petitioner to install additional appliances as well as additional gas service connections in his 46-door Reyno Apartment: petitioner installed two 20-gallon capacity water storage heaters and two heavy-duty gas burners and replaced the original gas meter with a bigger 50light capacity gas meter.On July 27. (4) P5. A2010 . and. following the dismissal by the investigating fiscal of the complaint for qualified theft and the disconnection by petitioner of his gas service. (5) P10. this petition ISSUE WON the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of appeals is excessive HELD YES .Respondent Ongsip refused to give the money .As correctly observed by the trial court in its decision —A significant fact brought about by the testimony of Coronel himself is the total absence of immediate accusation against Plaintiff right at the very moment when the by-pass valve was allegedly discovered. They returned however at five o'clock. .On that same afternoon. but it was denied . . Coronel did not do. and (6) the costs of the suit. . 1966. but he was informed afterwards of what had taken place by his houseboy. testified that the second gas meter was replaced as MANILA GAS CORPORATION V CA (ONGSIP) MAKASIAR. there is reason to believe that there was malicious intent in the filing of the complaint for qualified theft. Albenson acted in good faith and had probable cause in filing their complaint against Baltao. this time with a photographer. Article 2229 provides that "exemplary or corrective damages are imposed. to the moral. 1972. however. .There was no significant change in the meter reading despite additional installations." On the other hand.000. the complaint was dismissed .. liquidated or compensatory damages. he was even willing to have his place excavated but petitioner would not dare take the consequences. (2) P10.Article 2217 of the Civil Code states that "moral damages include physical suffering. there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person. The presence of probable cause means the absence of malice. for which respondent Ongsip was awarded moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P50.00 as moral damages in the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. they changed the gas meter and installed new tube connections. petitioner's own mechanical engineer. Here was then the opportunity for Coronel to confront Plaintiff with the allegedly discovered 'by-pass valve' and bluntly.000. (3) P30. . tell him that there was thievery of gas. no gas consumption was registered in the meter.Concededly.

29. Qualified theft is a serious offense indicating moral depravity in an individual. "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest. respectively.. struck a bottle of beer on the table causing an injury on his hand which started to bleed. he and his wife and their two daughters went to shop at South Supermarket (owned . moral shock and social humiliation caused by private respondent's act of hitting petitioner on the face in public. the profit motive being merely secondary. We reduce the amount of moral damages to P15.Rafael Patricio. December 28. without provocation. Department of Foreign Affairs at the Philippine Embassy. As a consequence. Necessarily. the award of moral and exemplary damages should be reduced to P25. private respondent. This is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code.000. To be accused of such crime without basis is shocking and libelous.In addition to the award of moral damages. indemnification had to be made. The prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to cause additional mental and moral suffering to private respondent.Evidently. Washington. In consequence thereof. honorably discharged from the Philippine Army in 1946. (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries.00 as exemplary damages. slander or any other form of defamation. April 26. who was in a state of drunkenness and standing near the same gate together with his companions. member of the Philippine Veterans Legion.135 - prof. 2219. ISSUE WON Patricio is entitled to damages for the humiliation he experienced during the town fiesta HELD YES . The damage had been done. retired Minister. Council No. Pursuant to Art. The fact that the complaint for qualified theft was dismissed by the Pasay City fiscal is no consolation. an ordained Catholic priest.000. such damages are justly due. the court ruled in favor of herein petitioner (as complainant). where he is residing. under the circumstances.. holding private respondent liable to the former for moral damages as a result of the physical suffering.000." . 3713. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.000. and 35. 26.As to moral damages. It was actually intended to vex and humiliate private respondent and to blacken his reputation not only as a businessman but also as a person. casis (8) Malicious prosecution. and actively engaged in social and civic affairs in Pilar. . temperate or compensatory damages Disposition Decision in favor of Patricio. (6) Illegal search. employed as an executive of Proctor & Gamble Phils. Capiz. Then.Petitioner's act in disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas service without prior notice constitutes breach of contract amounting to an independent tort. 2219 of the same Code.P. 30 32.Respondent Ongsip's default in payment cannot be utilized by petitioner to defeat or nullify the claim for damages.The Court gives due consideration to respondent Ongsip's social and financial status as a businessman and the mental anguish he suffered as a result of the false imputation. hit petitioner's face with his bloodied hand. petitioner Manila Gas Corporation. 27.00 The award of P5.One morning in 1970.The act of private respondent in hitting petitioner on the face is contrary to morals and good customs and caused the petitioner mental anguish. An award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.Private respondent's contention that there was no bad faith on his part in slapping petitioner on the face and that the incident was merely accidental is not tenable. . (7) Libel. to wit: "ART. rape. President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Pilar. Class 1950. Petitioner is a public utility corporation whose primary concern is service to the people. member of the Knights of Columbus. son of the late Jose Maria Espino. Capiz. Patricio filed a complaint for Slander by Deed. 21 of the Civil Code in relation to par. wounded feelings and social humiliation. was appointed Director General of the 1976 Religious and Municipal Town Fiesta of Pilar. abduction. (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21. . FACTS . is sustained. being similarly warranted by Article 2234 of the Civil Code as complemented by Article 2220. While a benefit dance was ongoing in connection with the celebration of the town fiesta.The award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which provides that "willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that. Inc. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith" . As a result. 1979 NATURE Certiorari from CA’s decision to grant P75k. The amount of exemplary damages need not be proved where it is shown that plaintiff is entitled to either moral. 34. sought to vindicate its financial loss by filing the complaint for qualified theft against respondent Ongsip knowing it to be false. . (9) Acts mentioned in article 309.torts & damages being defective because "some of its parts were worn out and that it was not properly registering. Capiz and a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. exemplary damages and atty’s fees.00. Disposition Decision of CA modified as regards the amount of damages. exemplary or corrective damages may be imposed upon herein private respondent by way of example or correction for the public good. on the other hand. moral shock. a corporate manager incharge of motoring and warehousing therein. and before petitioner could respond.00 and P5. he approached petitioner in a hostile manner and asked the latter if he had seen his wounded hand. author of articles published in the Manila Sunday Times and Philippines Free Press. petitioner together with two (2) policemen were posted near the gate of the public auditorium to check on the assigned watchers of the gate. 1989 FACTS . GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET INC V ESPINO GUERRERO. a Philippine government pensionado of the United States for six months. It stigmatized private respondent causing him emotional depression and social degradation. (3) Seduction. in failing to recover its lost revenue caused by the gas meter's incorrect recording. or other lascivious acts. . A2010 . petitioner's financial capability must also be considered.Espino is a graduate Mechanical Engineer from U. At most." . P25k and P5k to Espino for moral damages. Private respondent Bienvenido Bacalocos. It was established before the court a quo that there was an existing feud between the families of both petitioner and private respondent and that private respondent slapped the petitioner without provocation in the presence of several persons. . However. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. a commotion ensued and private respondent was brought by the policemen to the municipal building. this circumstance can be considered as a mitigating factor in ascertaining the amount of damages to which respondent Ongsip is entitled. PATRICIO V LEVISTE PADILLA. (10) of Art. 28. (4) Adultery or concubinage. Under the circumstances.

In her complaint. 2214. threatening to call the police and in the presence and hearing of many people at the Supermarket which brought and caused him humiliation and embarrassment. There. a report was made. several persons were already there including the bride. The bags and personal belongings of all the people inside the room were searched. embarrass and degrade the dignity of a person. New Civil Code). . Civil Code). The whole incident that befell respondent had arisen in such a manner that was created unwittingly by his own act of forgetting to pay for the file. the official photographers. Branch 268. Valmonte noticed the people staring at her. he went around the store and found a cylindrical “rat-tail” file that he had wanted to buy for his hobby. shouting at him. Valmonte prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay actual.” Valmonte's car which was parked at the hotel premises was also searched but the search yielded nothing. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the reception was to be held. wounded feelings and serious anxiety.torts & damages by Grand Union) in Makati. He was totally embarrassed.After reporting to the bride. He instead held it in his hand. thereby causing him mental anguish. good customs and public policy to humiliate. good customs or public policy. CA awarded him damages. with a good part of the merchandise exposed. Because it was small. but decided to file a case. and went back to the suite. near the cashiers to a Mrs.A few days after the incident. It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties. It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: “Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto.He paid for the items in his wife’s cart. the guard stopped him and told him he hadn’t paid for the file. He apologized and said he had forgotten. . On their way out. imposing upon him a fine. personality. the bride's parents and relatives. no exemplary damages. that many people were present and they saw and heard the ensuing interrogation and altercation appears to be simply a matter of coincidence in a supermarket which is a public place and the crowd of onlookers. nominal. . The CFI dismissed. Fandino.Fandino read the report and remarked: “Ano. except liquidated ones. casis . give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith (Article 19.The false accusation charged against the private respondent after detaining and interrogating him by the uniformed guards and the mode and manner in which he was subjected. an aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress up for the occasion. Civil Code).After paying he and his wife walked out quickly. It was around 9am and the many people were at the store. moral and exemplary damages. private respondent's act of omission contributed to the occurrence of his injury or loss and such contributory negligence is a factor which may reduce the damages that private respondent may recover (Art. September 9. Thus. She paid the suppliers. While they were talking he stuck the file in his breast pocket. Fandino replied: “That is all they say. He started towards the cashier to pay. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched.” Espino objected. on that day. . CA modified: moral damages = P5k. but he forgot about the file in his pocket. Later. . . but the guard stopped him and said they were to go to the back of the supermarket.” Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search Valmonte's bag. Fandino said it was a reward for guards who apprehend pilferers. Yet. Del Rosario and Sierra engaged her services for their church wedding on 10 October 1996. liquidated or exemplary damages may be adjudicated. He thought about going back that night to throw stones at the supermarket. ikaw ang kumuha.Responding to the complaint. Among those present was petitioner Carpio.85 file. While his wife was shopping for groceries. petitioner denied having uttered words or done any act to confront or single out Valmonte during the investigation and claimed that liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. He was directed to get in line at the cashier to pay for the file. When she arrived at Suite 326-A. He was then brought to the front of the grocery. the assessment of such damages. Upon entering the suite. . New Civil Code). It is against morals. the make-up artist and his assistant. atty’s fees = P2k. All the time the people were staring at him. People started milling around and stared at Espino. Valmonte filed a suit for damages against her before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.Respondent Valmonte is a wedding coordinator.nakaw na naman ito. Espino and wife objected and said that he was not a common criminal. according to the circumstances of each case (Art. hearers or bystanders was not deliberately sought or called by management to witness private respondent's predicament. . It was his forgetfulness in checking out the item and paying for it that started the chain of events which led to his embarrassment and humiliation. Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the items needed for the wedding rites and the gifts from the principal sponsors. saying he was a regular customer of the supermarket. he and his wife ran into his aunt’s maid. 2216. the people whom we cause not paying for the goods say . The hotel security was called in to help in the search. police officers arrived and interviewed all persons who had access to the suite and fingerprinted them including Valmonte. is left to the discretion of the court. ISSUE WON Espino is entitled to damages for the humiliation he experienced at the supermarket HELD YES .136 - prof. Fandino reached over and took the P5 bill and said it was a fine. . as well as attorney's fees. gave the meal allowance to the band. Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were billeted. interrogated and trailed by a security guard throughout the evening. he didn’t put it in the grocery cart because it might fall and get lost. where Espino said that he just forgot that he placed it in his pocket while talking to the maid and his wife. Petitioner did not respond to the letter. And one must act with justice. Espino took out a P5 bill to pay for the P3. CARPIO V VALMONTE 438 SCRA 38 TINGA. Petitioners wilfully caused loss or injury to private respondent in a manner that was contrary to morals. During all the time Valmonte was being interrogated by the police officers. The Court does not believe that private respondent was intentionally paraded in order to humiliate or embarrass him because petitioner's business depended for its success and patronage the good will of the buying public which can only be preserved and promoted by good public relations. and the fashion designer.m. petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag were lost. Moreover. While still shopping.” Espino said he was going to pay for it. petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of apology which she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds' relatives and guests to redeem her smeared reputation as a result of petitioner's imputations against her. temperate. privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons (Article 26. sufficiently rendered the petitioners A2010 . nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto.While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral. Disposition Petition denied. petitioner kept on saying the words “Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto. Everyone must respect the dignity. They all intended to pay for the things that are found to them. At about 4:30 p. 2004 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS .

affect her future dealings with her clients.00 as moral QUISABA V STA. wounded feelings. . termination pay and attorney's fees. besmirched reputation.That on the following day Hyde informed him of his temporary relief as internal auditor so that he could carry out immediately the instructions thus given. it is damnum absque injuria. the court found no sufficient evidence to justify the award of actual damages.the NLRC's authorized representative in Davao City opined that the NLRC no power to award damages . asserting that the proper forum is the NLRC established by Presidential Decree No. Disposition Petition denied reasonable .Petitioner's verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone.Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court erred in finding that petitioner did not slander her good name and reputation and in disregarding the evidence she presented.That Robert Hyde instructed him to purchase logs for the company's plant to which he refused on the ground that the work of purchasing logs is inconsistent with his position as internal auditor . However. This being the case. and the fact that her profession is based primarily on trust reposed in her by her clients. . casis damages appears to be a fair and assessment of respondent's damages. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for the court to adjudge Valmonte liable on her counterclaim. but to enable the latter to obtain means. . She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently. courts are mandated to take into account all the circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages according to their discretion. that is when he acts with prudence and good faith. exemplary damages. petitioner virtually branded respondent as the thief.000. petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable. Worthy of note is that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant. August 30. INES CASTRO. True. ISSUE WON petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner that is contrary to morals and good customs HELD YES A2010 . serious anxiety.137 - prof. or to enrich a complainant. She adds that even on the assumption that she uttered the words complained of. wounded feelings.Quisaba opposed the motion.000. he was in the employ of the defendant corporation. It added that no proof was presented by Valmonte to show that petitioner acted maliciously and in bad faith in pointing to her as the culprit. Petitioner contends that the appellate court's conclusion that she publicly humiliated respondent does not conform to the evidence presented. 1974 NATURE Special civil action for certiorari FACTS . Certainly.Quisaba avers in his complaint that for 18 yrs prior to his dismissal. she was merely exercising her right and if damage results from a person exercising his legal right.torts & damages everything that transpired after the theft incident was purely a police matter in which she had no participation. Her firmness and resolve to find her missing jewelry cannot justify her acts toward respondent. the award of P100.Respondent is clearly entitled to an award of moral damages. petitioner had the right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor. . by any standard or principle of law is impermissible. social humiliation. It ruled that when petitioner sought investigation for the loss of her jewelry. and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. In any case.He pleaded for fairness but was instead demoted from a position of dignity to a servile and menial job. it was not shown that she did so with malice and in bad faith. fright. by reason of defendant's culpable action. but to malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewelry is an act which. . mental anguish. The complaint does not pray for reinstatement or payment of backwages. It categorized petitioner's utterance defamatory considering that it imputed upon Valmonte the crime of theft. The court said that Valmonte failed to show that she suffered serious anxiety." and that because of the said acts of the defendants.CFI granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint basically involves an employee-employer relationship.The trial court rendered its Decision dismissing Valmonte's complaint for damages.Hence. he suffered mental anguish. By openly accusing respondent as the only person who went out of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests therein. The Court of Appeals ruled differently. but not when he acts with negligence and abuse. social humiliation. that the defendants did not reconsider their "clever and subterfugial dismissal" of him which for all purposes constituted a "constructive discharge. besmirched reputation. and embarrassed. the seriousness of the imputations made by petitioner has greatly tarnished her reputation and will in one way or the other.Sta Ines et al moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Davao CFI.00 for she was publicly humiliated. ISSUE WON a complaint for moral damages. award of moral damages must be proportionate to the sufferings inflicted. deeply insulted. arising from an employer's constructive dismissal of an employee. The court concluded that petitioner's verbal assault upon Valmonte was done with malice and in bad faith since it was made in the presence of many people without any solid proof except petitioner's suspicion. and he was warned that his failure to comply would be considered a ground for his dismissal . or that her reputation was besmirched due to petitioner's wrongful act. Considering respondent's social standing. is exclusively cognizable by the regular courts of justice or by the NLRC HELD . and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched. moral shock and social humiliate on. 21. . moral shock. this petition. Such unfounded accusation entitles Valmonte to an award of moral damages in the amount of P100. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent. moral shock. Though no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be adjudicated. It opined that Valmonte has clearly established that she was singled out by petitioner as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. The appellate court held that Valmonte's claim for damages is not predicated on the fact that she was subjected to body search and interrogation by the police but rather petitioner's act of publicly accusing her of taking the missing jewelry. serious anxiety. she had no right to attack respondent with her innuendos which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly accusatory. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant's wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's physical suffering. .

The Commission shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the following. September 11. . HELD NO .Although the acts complained of seemingly appear to constitute "matters involving employee-employer relations" as Quisaba's dismissal was the severance of a pre-existing employee-employer relation. "went to the office of the defendant but instead of obtaining assistance to their complaint they were harassed and terrorized" -In view thereof. and (3) All pending cases in the Bureau of Labor Relations. 1962 NATURE Appeal from decision of CFI FACTS . De Aboitiz shouted at plaintiffs in the presence of the plaintiffs’ subordinates. that exist between members of a society for the protection of private interests. Deputy Minister of Justice issued resolution sustaining complaint. casis ISSUE WON Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs MEDINA V CASTRO-BARTOLOME ABAD SANTOS. as the complaint alleges. now under courts’ jurisdiction. . . 21(AKA LC) which reads: SEC.R.Without provocation. 3 . 10. ordering them thru his police to appear in his office when he is absent.Defendants filed second motion to dismiss because of amendments to the Labor Code and PD No 1691. but on the manner of his dismissal and the consequent effects of such dismissal. OTHER TORTS AMARO V SUMANGUIT G.Medina and Ong should not split their cause of action against Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola. .It was alleged that the defendants dismissed the plaintiffs because of an alleged delay in the use of promotional crowns when such delay was true with respect to the other plants.In my opinion the dismissal of the civil action for damages is correct because the claims of Medina and Ong were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Governing statute is Civil Code and not Labor Code.Civil law consists of that "mass of precepts that determine or regulate the relations . which under PD No 1691. (1) All matters involving employee employer relations including all disputes and grievances which may otherwise lead to strikes and lockouts under Republic Act No. five days before Christmas and on the day when the employees' Christmas party was held in the Muntinlupa Plant. 875. A2010 . they didn't know what to do and so they cried. .The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with the manner in which the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. his complaint is grounded not on his dismissal per se as in fact he does not ask for reinstatement or backwages.The case at bar is intrinsically concerned with a civil (not a labor) dispute. no longer holds. De Aboitiz is President and CEO of Pepsi-cola Bottling.. 1958: Jose Amaro was assaulted and shot at near the city government building of Silay . and does not involve an existing EE-ER relation within the meaning of section 2(1) of LC. YOU SHUT UP! FUCK YOU! YOU ARE