Papers in International Studies Southeast Asia Series No. 54


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Analyses of Knowledge, Approaches, and Prospects in Anthropology, Art History, Economics, History, and Political Science








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Edited by Eliezer B. Ayal

Ohio University Center for International Studies Southeast Asia Program, 1978 Athens, Ohio I.S.B.N. No. 0-89680-079-2


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Gifford B. Doxsee Department of History Ohio University

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e 1978 by the Center for International Studies, Ohio University

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THE STUpY OF THAILAND: Analyses of Knowledge, Approaches, and Prospects in Anthropology, Art History, Economics, History, and Political Science

Edited Eliezer

by B. Ayal

Ohio University Center for International Studies Southeast Asia Series No. 54 1978





"What damn good is this country--you can't compare it with anything!" attributed to David WilsonI

The world of English-language writing about Thai politics is a strange one. Consider only the following oddities: (1) No country in Southeast Asia, except perhaps the Philippines, has been more continuously open to Western scholars, yet there are only half a dozen serious published monographs about modern Thai political life--Coast (1953), Darling (1965), Riggs (1966), Siffin (1966), Skinner (1958), and Wilson (1962a). (2) All the major studies were done in the 1950s. We have nothing satisfactory in English on the Sarit dictatorship, except an unpublished dissertation by a Thai (Chaloemtiarana 1974); nothing on the Praphat-Than9m era; and nothing on the "democracy" of 1973-76. (3) While the military and the monarchy have quite clearly been the two most important political institutions in 20th-century Thai politics, few in-depth studies exist of either.2 There are no substantial works on political parties, on legislative behavior, on leftwing movements, or--aside from Skinner's outstanding work on the Chinese--on the political experience of the country's minorities. 3

All works referred to in the text and footnotes of this paper ate cited in full in the bibliography at the end. lIn Phillips 1976, p. 452.

2With regard to the monarchy, two significant unpublished studies exist: Greene 1971 and Batson 1977. (Vella 1978 reached me too late for inclusion in the present discussion.) On the military, Wilson 1962b, von der Mehden 1970, and Lissak 1976 are skimpy and do not compare in depth of knowledge or sophistication of analysis with the work on the Indonesian military by scholars such as Crouch, Feith, Lev, McVey, and Sundhaussen. 3Skinner 1957, 1958. Coughlin 1960 is less satisfactory. Poole 1970, on the Vietnamese in Thailand, is a counter-insurgency tract whose weaknesses are clearly demonstrated in Flood 1977. 193



Indeed, the list of topic areas not studied could be expanded indefinitely. (4) I cannot think of a single political biography to put alongside the very useful books available to Southeast Asianists on, for ~xample, Ho Chi Minh (Lacouture 1968) r U Nu (Butwell 1963), Sukarno (Legge 1972), or Magsaysay (Starner 1961). (5) In Neher's helpful recent compilation Modern Thai Politics, published in 1976, half the texts were written over a decade ago and only a third were authored by political scientists.4 (6) Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, with the exception of Phillips's "Some Premises of American Scholarship on Thailand," written in 1973, there is, to my knowledge, no self-conscious or se~f __ r i.tical Tit:er,~ft\fre o abo-ut the largerprobfem-so-f-approachor method--not to say paradigm--in Western (or American) writing als-ou-t ---modern Tna-rlll.story and politics. One has no sense~that Phillips's text, interesting as it is, aroused any significant response or discussion among Thai specialists; indeed, I think it is fair to say that the piece itself was a response less to theoretical problems within his own or parallel fields than to the general politico-moral crisis produced among Southeast Asianists by the Vietnam War. various explanations for this strange situation present themselves; I would like to offer some of them for consideration, in ascending order of their interest for the purposes of this essay (and also of their intrinsic complexity).
(1) The small number of Western Thai specialists, and \ -their )10mQgeneoUs -c__u_1__:t_ur.aL-an__d____c_laa§_ have certainly b.::l~kgrQlln..q, -/\ \ been 1mportant factors. Most of the relevant work has been done - in America, and by middle-class white male Americans. Thai political studies have not benefited as, say, Indonesian political studies have done, from a world-wide proliferation of alternative study '~enters. In the field of Indonesian politics, for instance, American scholars ~y~Q~reful ~~tention to work being done V in Australia, England, France, H~lland~~and-Japan. Indonesian studies in America have also been cross-fertilized by a sizable number of non-Americans (to name only some of the better known: Feith, Van der Kroef, Holt, Pauker, and Benda) who, however parochial their particular perspectives, nonetheless, coming from ~ {'I different "parishes, of_ten forced_~erig§.r:t~ _i._llt_9_J3_gl_:f_-_awareness __ _ I: by posing non-Arneri.can que st Lons . It is instructive, for example, that thEf-frrst:.hots in the oont i.nu s i.nq theoretical debate about approaches to understanding Indonesia were fired between a JewishAustrian-Australian political scientist _and a Jewish-CzechAmerican historian (see Feith's 1962 book, Benda's 1964 review of
" I

4Contributing political scientists were: Thawatt Mokarapong, Donald Hindley (visiting Indonesianist), David-Wilson, James Scott (visiting Malayanist), Clark Neher, William Siffin, Fred Riggs, and Vicharat vichit-Vadakan.



. and worked in the total (if soporific) calm of late colonial domination.) /u «. Indonesia.-ures. did it not rest on the magisterial work of colonial civil-servant scholars like Hall.". but they have been jealously guarded by the Thai rulers and ruling class. useful as these works are. in . they are not in the same class as the products of the colonial authors mentioned above.95 it. But the¥ did. and so forth.r Les tbey studied . cui i.· had_ (3) An important corollary of this condition is that in London. and the Philippines would be like today. Landon 1939. (2) If it is true--and it may not be entire1y. Luce..or eighteen~month grants. Modern Thai studies had to start largely from scratch.' ? (4) Much of the more valuable post-World War II scholarship on the newly-independent states of Southeast Asia was informed or stimulated by anti-colonial sympathies. voluminous archival materials on the inner workings of politics in the colonial territories lie accumulated--on the whole well-organized and well-catalogued. Henry.I'~eg:_A.1. mostly written in Western languages. Hayden. That· the Thai escaped direct colonia1ization has meant that nothing comparable exists ___9_~_studentsof earlY"lllodern Thai histOl:"Y. Van Leur. and various places in the United states. The Hague. G .~1l9_~ciges -and exce-Ilent bureaucra-t-icaccess. as opposed to travel reports. . Paris. Furnivall. They lived for years in the count. Not f only are most of-the es-s'e'nt:1ai comparable materials written in Thai. and Thompson 1941. Gourou.usu9-l1y a_c. referring to scholarly works. not only in terms of data and analSsis but even--as will be noted be10w--of fundamental perspectives. Vietnam. Western scholars have been seriously disadvantaged. ~n~der-o~ their ~ appearance: Wales 1931. Such scholars were not limited by twelve. and many others. It is difficult to imagine what modern scholarship on Burma. memoirs. Snouck Hurgronje.so--that the Thai were advantaged in not being directly colonized by a western power. . j " . Leiden. of course.'1 51 am. fragmentary data. -were able to us-et-he-coloiiiai administration to gather data. and so forth.' '. Nee~less to say. . and increasingly open to the interested scholar.and Feith's 1965 reply to~Benda)._ _ _g:e§P_ ]{nowreage-~of the :l. Stutterheim. politically turbulent field conditions.::qU!. these sympathies did not in the least of themselves \ guarantee work of any interest or stature. The most important pre-World War II scholarly works on Siam are. But (and this suggests an ironical perspective on the relation between good Western scholars and the fate of the peoples they study) this scholarship was made possible only by the colonial dictatorship itself. Pigeaud. Schrieke. Mus.

Because Indonesia. Since much of the best wiTting oil: the colonial countries was done by colonial officials and much of the best data came from colonial sources._. Thai governments.s • . however. something) more interesting happened. if the Truman AdminisJtration hurried t~abandon Pridi for Phibun. all these processes worked in contrary motion for the Thai specialists. or Rizal--rather than I v M.( to the idea t~at J:_olicy and scho~~':fj~~~migh~~_?~v:edifferent \\\")' values and ob j ectl.\~j' ~(.studY of /.___ ':~~O~!l~:~_~~~~_~c~~~~~~:~r~~~~~~~~il~~P~ ~e_-!~9:h:s~~me of \ ~~~l t. On the political level.e-~e_. 11. 'oj M. . study. -' --_. This compulsion) operated on two distinct levels. "Precisely because the Thai were not directly cOlon(zed. many scholars had to distance ' themselves from U. Thai specialists were not confronted by a formidable body of colonial s~ng Of"Cfge·-at---a-Erme-wnenall "Ehelr Southeast Aslanlst----eolleagues were imbued with pro-indigenous sympathies. reinforced a timid--not to say \conformist--outlook among the Thai spec La. I ~ __ .:' \J~:' . though in differing degrees for different territories.-.. --------~ 'I.i.-~----.196 pombination with the actually existing political situation.l. Burma. liberal post-war scholars were automatically put in a beneficial adversary relationship with the intellectualconceptual milieu in which they started working. they approached Thai. \.. insofar as the /c U. policy right from the start.ves. . government at various times and to varying -defgreesaided or supported dying colonial regimes.cri tical con~rontation wj__:t. however..--.inh. they fitted ~ly ~~to a general 1 . !the rest of Southeast Asia. - There is one further involution of this paradox that may be worth emphasizing. Vietnam. They had to think out their positions vis-~-vis the colonial giants. and the Philippines were ex-colonies. . . the implications of choosing between the two Thai leaders were far less serious than those of choosing between Sukarno and Van Mook. if they were to chall~nge them successfully.the Thai/West relationship that precisely the same forces that ~. . Phan Boi Chau.e9. On the political level.i_bj_t. and to get used ( )\. Sukarno." '<. One might be critical of Truman's policy.S... 'force "modern scholars into a critical posture. I tended to create a critical scholarly atmosphere in the . or d'Argenlieu and Ho Chi Minh. s.'but one continued to' J have cordial relations with the Phibun government in a way that it was difficult to have them with Van Mook's or d'Argenlieu's.Jl obj_ects/ w r-om t. On the intellectual level. and Thai history in the same tender spirit • Rama VI and Phibunsongkhram were placed wi thin the same conceptual cSttegory as Ba Maw.st. they had to interrogate colonial materials in an inquisitorial mood if they were to penetrate to native reality through white documentation.It is only one of the ironies of . ~. ---.he f __-_Dd mate-rials of their 9 Much more importantly.as / many of the senior Thai specialists were.

..ne ' themselves to be. H. in 1. McVey's superb The Rise of Indonesian Communism (1965) was intended to demonstrate the autonomy and . or examples. In that era. or Vietnamese uniqueness" Thai specialists cou1d--and did--proudly assume Thai uniqueness. '(1)'. the general ---mflliej'icre-of--Southeast As Land smwe s de Le Eez Lou s to Thai studies. Eisenstadt.r s m." They were seen as instances.. Again. Much of the best work on ex-colonial Southeast Asia after World War II was done in this vein. and Samir Amin into play. however.n. in fact for most serious purposes they were similar to one another and had similar relations with the industrial West. liw JM rather than s~udied or concretely demonstrated. of a general problem or situation. [I.-( Siam. i."t. 'I. exceptions such as Jacobs and Flood) on a . Only the events since October 6.se. was taken as iI2_so fac'to.' placid co" J nsensus-'UllQng-scho1 ars (with rare "but.confron-f:. a.6 \'.e.j 'Aha this~-ilunIqueii-ess as-typiC-aIry celebrated. however."~niqu. while many fruitful new ones became imaginable... draw an analogy between Thai studies and the development of astronomy in the late 15th century.t. \ which I aha'LL ske cch out .'iI l'! \\. to allow a penetrating assessment of what was really unique in the Thai \experience..eC! -wiflj) the disciplinary prestige of this comparativism. I think.qht.i. ofaxiQm!L~J::14Q1." idiosyncracy of early Indonesian conununism against the "comparative" stereotype of Third World conununist parties as faithful replicas and tools of the Kremlin.'/ 1976 have begun to shake the unconscious hold these axioms have maintained over the Thai specialists. a critical stance would have raised the comparative question and brought Barrington Moore. not being ex-colonial. astronomers discovered growing discrepancies between what they observed and the axioms of Ptolemaic cosmolog~ and were led to increasingly strained and involved extrapolations from those axioms to "save the phenomena." But once the essential simplification and axial twist was made-that the earth revolved around the sun--it turned out that many conventional astronomical questions no longer needed to be asked. . I \ The end product of these four constraints was. a IH).haLov . . ort" . One could. who were facing very different perspectival and methodological problems.) It would have rejected the alibi offered by the general stance of other Southeast Asianists. I 6In parallel vein. had to struggle--for good intellectual (and often bad personal) reasons--to validate and explicate the uniqueness of their country of study. lPrecisely in the case of Siam.!t~ItlQd~rn Siam. and what was not. mp.e arnaq i. Southeast Asia specialists . Similarly.que ex-ico Lon La L count. Where everyone else was struggling to represent Burmese. Indonesian.197 conceptual category--that of -"new states. A great many superficial (and a few intelligent) works were written in the 1950s an~l960s~rom ~ global c~mpar~tive"per~pective1 to show that however una.:.

It is explicit in the following sentence in the book's conclusion: "The king's task was. as it were. Siam was in effect modern nation-state in Southeast Asia.li ty" . let me outline what I believe some of these axioms were--at the same time noting that they were actually constructed (so incapable are we of imaging the unique) on a set of implicit comparisons: (1) Non-colonization was an unqualified blessing." But before proceeding further. (2) Accordingly.r----_---' 198 Thai studies. to seize power from his father's generation.8 J C3This perception clearly underlies the best book so far on Chulalongkorn's reign. emphasis added).. astute monarchical regimes made the necessary flexible adaptations to Western expansionism to escape colonization and to modernize "traditional" society.~ :) (4) Siam' s suc~es5_ was~<:l~el1!ai~JY_!:Q the basic_~s_tabj. the Jakri we re. within the framework of the old axioms..he rest __ ()~ S~:t-I!-hE::as~_ starting wi th/_1 Asia.and early 20th-century Southeast Asian history." historical the first independent role was "modernizing" 1''1 _~I/! . n_C!:!..Iof Thai society and to the famous "flexibility" of _its patriotic \1/ leaders. That -is. Wyatt's The Politics of Reform in Thailand (1969).v-The (':.ul/ fi) 1 analogy. and then so to use it as to bring the nation to a point-at which it could accept his dreams and make them lts own" (p. first.iml?-list patri_9ts.. let me suggest two types of largely implicit comparisons that make them plausible. 378. only by elaborating qualifications and theoretical "subletting. If these are the central axioms.. I think.f-~second sort--which underlies Axioms~---2~. in both cases. which marked Siam as unique in 19th. (3) The Jakri dynasty's and "national. 8Even the generally iconoclastic Jacobs accepted this In Modernization without Development (1971). tbe Filipinos of Rizal's generation. research done in the late 1960s and early 1970s was producing concrete data that could be explained. whether they understood it or not. One sort--which underlies Axioms 3 and 4--is that the Jakri dynasty's historical role is to be understood as analogous to that of ~he J nationalist leaAe:rs in t. O:Pr!....:rs--t1rat history the of modern Siam is to be seen as fundamentally comparable to Japan's. he wrote: The Siamese or Thai case is of particular interest for a study of development because of the great similarity between Siam and .

if modernizing._(a-t lea_st si. Both societies were independent. both were realistic about foreigners' (particularly Europeans') intentions and power and sensed the need for social innovation rather than verbalization to meet the threat. (II) In certain important respects Siam w~s almost the last. to use as the means by which to implement productive change--to mention only some of the key factors often discussed as crucial to successfully achieving modern development.nce." let us consider the following doubtlessly scandalous hypotheses: 50 /. (pp. to become an independent national state 1n Southeast Asia.K (I) much In certain important respects Siam was unfortunate. both were largely homogeneous in culture.iv:ely i_nfl~~:i. Japan developed but Siam did not •••./ It hardly needs to be~said that the facts that scholars are uncovering make both of these analogies more and more difficult to defend.oa. an exemp~a.i. No less than their antecedents. Brunei. both had creative and often brilliant elites· who were strategically located in decisionmaking positions from which they could innovate constructively. as in being indirectlx colonized. ~ _<?! colonial gove~gors_w~r~~ode~~izing. (III) The role of the Jakri dynasty.ble.!n.. cash crops. .lve iI!__ fact~_!:?e~n_~~Qmpa_rat.199 .J'iIYles . both had a strong sense of national identity. with the indirectly-ruled principalities of Southeast Asia (e. (IV) Siam's "success/failure" is to be understood primarily as a result of the European imperialist pacification of Southeast Asia.g. 1.re<.J. and both had the key. and the unfederated Malay states) and with the "modernizing" regimes Japan during the mid-nineteenth century at the time that the challenge of modern development first presented itself to both societies. in different ways.i ty~. the Javanese Vorstenlanden. -Thai l~a~er~ ~'. __ the 1930s.fe hasbeE. both had bureaucratic staffs able and willing to implement elite decisions. was modernizing only in the special sense that . not in being colonized.~~ . 3f. Rather than finding further qualifications and elaborations to "save the phenomena. Yet. these hypotheses rest on a comparative basis. emphasis added).-x=_~~s~:6f'instabi1... But the relevant comparisons now are not with Sukarno and Ho Chi Minh or with the Meiji reformers but rather. and Thai po Ld t..

and the Thai official sent from Bangkok to supervise \\/ the a&ninistration in Chiengmai or Ubon was only somewhat less -. and expansion of central government control to areas remote from the center. emphasis added). "behind" its directly-colonized neighbors. retarded the development of the Siamese -na t. "There was both enticement and instruction in these colonies which throve on order maintained by small but efficient military establishments" (p. makes the latter analogy with great lucidity. The remainder of this essay will be devoted to an elaboration of this argument. it is tempting to argue that it has been the identification of the two that has.fforeign than the British district officer in Malaya or the French PBsident in Indochina" (p. on the political level. still more important.9 (Simply from the point of view of world-historical time. Burma.) It will immediately be apparent that these hypotheses Icall into question the accepted view of the modern Thai monarchy and. they suggest contradictions between them. 118). the relationship between that monarchy and the modern Siamese nation. was in many respects similar to colonial regimes in neighboring countries. generally admiring of the Jakri. v . 120. 18. Later on. in some important respects.I illuminates the role of the Thai monarchy in the and early 20th century better than a consideration ~ V ~atson (1977). in Chulalongkorn's own words. "selecting what may be safe_models" (p. rationalization of the administration.Lon-v-Leav i. and Vietnam. Rather than assuming a harmonious lineal descent from one to the other.nq it. England).. It is instructive that the young sovereign never made a comparable trip to Japan. As Battye wryly notes. 19th century * * . "The late nineteenth century Thai government. systematically distorted understanding of 20th-century Thai politics and. with its goals of technological development. i" * Nothing [ ~\. on the scholarly level. In fact. . these comparisons seem rather more plausible: Chulalongkorn's reforms correspond temporally with the "new" colonial policies of the Netherlands Indies and British Burma rather than with the Meiji reforms.IO All of them precede by a generation the nationalist movements of Indonesia. emphasis added) IOBattye (1974) shows that the purpose of the young Chulalongkorn's visits to colonial Singapore and Batavia in 1870 and British India in 1872 was. For I believe that it may help supply a sort of "axial twist" that will both simplify and clarify some of the "problems" of the contemporary political historiography of Siam. in a pattern followed by many of the more advanced Southeast Asian "protected" rulers.200 of colonial Southeast Asia. he sent his heir to be educated in the metropo1e (in this case.

and a national pyramid of secondary and tertiary educational institutions run by Japanese was in good working order. II li I jo . advanced nationsll (1971:133. As late as 1974. one can not. 1968:161). and munitions.56._h~ _resto:p:~_9_mona!"~~'~Resid·uaieudal -. If this discrepancy between Siamese and Japanese progress escaped the eye of the Thai monarchs. Otherwise.II IIBy the beginning of this century. tactics. Siam would "continue to fall behind the rest of the world and continue to receive the disrespect of all the . emphasis added)~ . a Thai Ministry of War was no_tfiet up till 1894. Taking advantage of Western-style military organization.201 of the modernization of the_Thai armed forces. and within a generation they had proved their capacities in successful wars with China and Imperial Russia • By contrast. Furthermore. while Chula1ongkorn came to the throne in the year of the Meiji oligarchs' coup. cuts in government expenditures in certain fields. The army (and navy) were basically intended for external use. four decades after the Imperial University in Tokyo.) Nothing shows more clearly the non-parallelism of the Chulalongkorn regime with that of the Meiji oligarchs and the parallelism with the indirectly-ruled states of 19th-century Southeast Asia. the average number of years spent in school by Thai nationals was 5. a program of mass education had been initiated in order to provide the popular basis for a large standing army and a national polity. ItUntil World War II. Already in 1872. they defeated the obsolete levies of the Bakufu and proceeded immediately to establis~hAt was essentially a mi1itary \ dictatorsh_ip_ in_~-t:. the Thai government was happy to announce in 1957 that in 14 of 71 provinces more than half the population had completed primary education (Smith et al./ na~~_ f M military forces were-Jriquidated--not only on the basis of borrowed technical instrumentalities but by nationally conceived and administered conscription (1873). a whole generation later than in Japan (see Battye 1974:429). Greene notes that the ringleaders of the 1912 attempted coup against Rama VI cited Japan as their model in demanding changes in the state educational system._~~ __QLj:. and university deans were often Europeansll (1962a:62). modern primary education was not even made formally compulsory till the reign of Rama VI. only slightly more than a lower primary education stretch (see Mabry 1977:11). (In addition. By contrast. And as Wilson observes. the best secondary schools were administered by Europeans. The first full-fledged university (Chulalongkorn University) was set up in 1917. it was evidently obvious to some of their subjects. and democratization.' The Meiji oligarchs came to power in 1868 by coup d'~tat. the year prior-to the~--Sltfo~Japane-se war. they felt. no attempt was made to tie educational development to military requirements: indeed. virtually all Japanese children were in primary school. comprehend the modern political role of the Thai military without clearly understanding its historical origins. I think. Conscription was not introduced until 1905.

" It should perhaps be added that the term "Thai military" is essentially anachronistic. or immigrant adventurers who offered their services to the king. "Under Rama III and IV non-Siamese--who had long since manned the Second and Third Foot Guards--bore the brunt of calls for new military formations. Most of these units were manned by Vetnamese.~-~. one has to hope that the Vietnamese will not easily --\ escape from the power of the French.)-AS long as French rule continues in Vietnam it is a 'safeguard' for Siam. Skinner (1957:30) observes: "Rama Ill's successors were able to avoid 'shooting' wars altogether. Non-Siamese were especially overrepresented in "the more technical and up-to-date" units.12 Long before the French and British annexations (which occurred between 1885 and 1909).. and then unsuccessfully" (1974:66). Aside I from the necessity of maintaining good relations with the French. . and ~~were=dem-il. No matter how much we sympathize with the Vietnamese. I believe it is the direct interest of Siam not to give protection to Vietnamese rebels or in any way to aid the Vietnamese in freeing themselves from French Lrule. Battye (1974:20-2l) shows that the armed units serving the Jakri rulers in the 19th century were anything but Thai (just as the 18th-century Prussian army was anything but Prussian). Vietnamese were recruited for training as "sepoy" artillery. Mon and LaQ. -~~ ~. Khmer.--~~.. .. the year of the Nghe An and Ha Tinh peasant insurrections and the Yen Bay military uprising in Vietnam. As late 'as 1930." Under Rama III. All of the Thai rulers' traditional rivals--Burmese. all the -----. Mon for "sepoy" infantry. . the real external security of the Thai monarchical state had been guaranteed by the European imperial powers. it is hard to imagine such thoughts occurring to Ho Chi Minh. when one thinks of the danger that might arise. 13The Thai rulers were fully conscious of the advantages they derived in this respect from European imperialism.ltari-zed-by -bei~g subjected to .entire evolution of the Thai monarchy and the Thai military--is that between roughly 1840 and 1940 the state ceased not only to engage in warfare but even to seriously contemplate doing so. Rama VII observed: . Sukarno. "Mongkut [Rama IV] was the first Chakri king who never led an army into battle and [Sisuryawong] the Great Minister had campaigned only once.:-either descendants of war captives. Khmer... Khmer and Bangkok Lao were formed into new units of King's Guards. '- lLAs Battye notes. .} Needless to say.~ I ! 202 The key fact--which provides the framework for understanding the... _ 13 (In p£ecisery the same way. or Aung San at that time.. The crews of the "Thaill navy were predominantly Cham and Malay. j. Eu~ancoI6nialism. {See Batson 1977:l83.ao. In 1852.

.er.icli._. the "modern Thai" army (and navy_)___h_a_d__nQ serious ext. this point is thoroughly demonstrated by ~a-ftye's (1974) dafii)v'(All references in this footnote are from that work~elnofes that at the beginning of Mongkut's reign the royal armies had been outgunned by the Lord of Keng Tung.146).rn were "reactions to the extension and intensification of Siamese government into former tributary states ••. which uformed a most important base of support for the king's 'party' or faction in the lively politics of his first regnal year" (p.c:t. milTEary· was mainly a mean s for internal royaiisI-·-consolidation. which in tu. was prompted by the so-called Holy Man and Shan rebellions of 19'02. in his Birthday J Speech of 1886. Battye shows that military conscription. But this situation soon changed as "Bangkok began to gather new strength. nal defense f\lP.. Vi.•Confidence in internal security lSi) was shaken . for new weapons could be speedily dispatched by western sail and steam (p. 429-30.~l. emphasis added) ..•.J:apan!).He wanted an adequate force 'to put down unlawful persons within the country ••• III (p. When the young Chulalongkorn came of political age. 133)..nce s" (p.») In the late l880s and early 1890s. an emblem of modernity .The argument for a national conscript army as an essential instrument of internal governance •••unexpectedly -gathered strength.._!argely over Looks it.r @hough he himself. ~hulalongkorn for the first time. liThe king had not forgotten the link between the armies of the [British] Raj and the [Dutch] Kumpeni and effective government and prosperity •••.!"ld indeed .. 226). Battye adds "There is no reason to disbelieve the report of the British Consul that the· ["modernll] army.. was created for r internal political rather than external military purposes '·11 .. 14 it was.. one of the first IIreforms he undertook was the formation of a special royal bodyguard. made possible by imported land-mines (whose novelty terrified the local opposition). and he duly sent a royal commissioner to Chiengmai accompanied by a military garrison (p. _~.ua). emphasis added). IIbefore he turned to major reform of his government. He wrote to the Governor-General of India in [<larch 1874 that "we must make an effort to constrain the provinces". 268). 25lf. 76. began to speak of his Lao "prov i. rt.: ll ll / . !e>I!. decreed in 1905. 132). in addition. King Chulalongkorn carried out a series of military reforms which bear all the marks of internal political safeguards" (p.t .203 surviving monarchs of Southeast IIpacified" by one or another~of Asia had their external the colonial powers.. forces _ (corripCir~~. After a military success in Isan in 1885. Tfial. Finally. But the young king's ambitions soon expanded.. y__ n~~yer I6Ught ·-excepf·agaTnst~"domest. II (pp. -TEe -. __ (p. a novelty on the Siamese scene.. relations M As a result.

wrote acidly in 1906 that Siam should IIstop playing soldiers" (Battye 1974:463).y_cg. He suggests that.•• 11 Such views cannot be written off as colonial-minded prejudice... Financial Adviser to the royal government.204 for the outside world. this panic would 'certainly never have arisen. the Thai military nonetheless (or rather. 326) these words of Henry Norman in the ContempoY'ary Review (1893): nA couple of hostile British and French gunboats.. he comments that the Thai fleet "was more familiar with picknicking and the logistics of royal vacations than with combat maneuvers (p.. precisely because it had no external function) e". the Netherlands. etc. Once again. I think.1Ia proportion higher than in the budgets of Japan. Sir Edward Cook.Many Thai. He also cites (p. And an expert French military observer noted calmly in 1908 that "cette fOY'ce navale est. Spain. 325). however. As Siam's only territorial neighbors were British or French colonial possessions.•. Ramar~I was doing exactly what his father Rama V had done in 1873/74:~reating a loyal military force to consolidate a Jshaky politlca1 position and to challenge an entrenched political lIold guard. it was not clear what enemy the Thai military was designed to fight . That the Wild Tigers were basically "toy soldiersll is. Wholly ineffective as f~r as defense was concerned. noted in 1925 that 23. With regard to the Franco-Siamese crisis of 1893. Rama V's Finance Minister. widely accepted: but the term may seem inappropriate when applied to the Thai armed forces. felt that a substantial military establishment was necessary for national prestige ••• 11 (Batson 1977:51).me to_dominate the domestic tfn 15nMost foreigners saw Siam's armed forces as too large for purposes of maintaining internal order and yet far too small in the event of a conflict with a major European power. poup ainsi diY'e.ming this corps.~ptualJ.3% of the budget was spent on IIdefense. (Batson 1977:29). (An 'linstructi ve early example of dangerous overspending on "prestige . and the whole structure of Siam would fall like a house of cards . which in any case now [1920s] seemed an extremely remote possibility. rival toy soldiery in the Wild Tigers. ll . see Greene 1971:103-13 in particular. material in Battye (1974) is illuminating. Prince Mahit. nulle" (Battye 1974:533). 15 this li9l1t-' may better understand we J \the status panic of the Thai Int1~at Rama VI's creation of a !second.16 Had th~ Thai Imilitary had a credible external role to play. and a thousand soldiers on shore. in for.)11 16For useful material on the Wild Tigers.

Faisal. p the rulers who created it.1I adding that IIActually. 43ff.000 American troops alone. ' I . Rama VII said that the military cadet school was in such bad shape that at one time he believed the only thing to do was to close it down and"~et the bad examples be forgotten and start afresh. help to explain the less-than-glorious role of the military since. esp.)./ 205 p()!_!. . Burdened with its ancestry. ". Siam's defense continued to be guaranteed by foreigners (in this case. Haile Selassie. and Sihanouk. within this perspective. (For the 1968 figure. rigidly maintained (Thai IIflexibility" notwithstanding).c (' . 'in Libya. . the coup of 1932 assumes.' r . '"1. and Laos was little more than economic. / Ethiopia." f I . and if left may even become a source of danger. and the rest. In this memorandum.( . ). status-conscious. on Thai soil--almost three times the number of colonial troops in the Netherlands Indies in the 1930s. In the 1950-76 era. Farouk.'/ --) . criticized Thai officers for their "slackness and general apathy." In reply. South Vietnam. it remains today--like its half-forgotten cousin. . Burmese. a meaning that shows precisely the superficiality v ~ [ 17Two vignettes iilustrative of the Thai military and its domestic political role are offered by Battye and Batson. Egypt. see New York Times.( .---------------------------~1 '---. .' . Indeed. Battye (1974:263f.nq bent.1I 18In 1968.) At the same time. present in numbers never before seen on Thai soil. and habits of the Thai military (see Jacobs 1971. and Cambodia. " . 14 April 1968.17 in a -patterrfth-crr-hasbeen more recently replicated. II lIintriguing mentality -" and "moriey+maki. Batson (1977:202) brings to our attention a memorandum written in 1928 by Prince B9w9radet to Rama VII. ~.(It is instructive in this lightV to reflect on the parallels between R~ma VII and Idrus.) . Iraq..' . American and Chinese troops).the century of European imperialist pacification came to an end and the Thai found themselves once again up against Khmer. the Prince. (We need only compare the intra-Southeast Asian prowess of the IIThaili armies of pre-1840 with those of post-194D. the wild Tigers--a cluster of self-absorbed. then Minister of War.) remarks that in the mid-188Ds.• '.. for it must be recollected that we live in times in which subversive propaganda is likely to become prevalent.('.. outlook. vietnamese./ ( . these habits.18 The Thai military's external role in Korea. the spirit of the officers is deplorable. ". turning on . young reformers with European education--while dismissing any hope of external defense against the West--still strongly supported modernizing the military in order to push through domestic reforms against conservative opposition and the provinces.ticalrocess.. privileged bureaucratic factions. there were at least 46.' Yet in many basic respects the coup of 1932 did nothing to change the basic role.

In1906. The ruler remained the lIobject. the oligarchs abolished the samurai as a politico-military caste ." To an important extent. the rules for entry into the Military Academy were changed: henceforth.20 v " v I -<\(. "Merit" versus "blood" accordingly became a-political issue in a way that was inconceivable in Japan. In 1909. In addition. For example. ional.and engaged in fierce political competition among themselves as. and sons of military officers. arid the Ja~anese military in modern times never turned against the Japanese monarchy. i)1i 19It is almost with a sense of time-warp that one reads in Wyatt (1969:61) that Rama V.Lce role. While the able. from which comes all the material in this note) shows conclusively how Chulalongkorn's military policies ran flatly against profess.i." Is it possible that these men were the firstlJ Southeast Asian political figures to take out this kind of political life insurance? It is difficult to imagine the Emperor Meiji doing the same thing. 454-56). meritocratic standards. "citizens. candidates had to be children of "reputable" parents and to be sponsored and guaranteed by a commissioned government official (p. real power in Meiji Japan lay in "commoner" hands and flowed in "meritocratic" channels. entrance to the three preparatory grades of the Military Academy was limited exclusively to scions of the royal family.206 of (?nycomparison_between Meiji Japan and Jakri Siam. lower samurai "oligarchs" claimed to be restoring the centrality of the monarchy against Bakufu usurpation. the maternal family of Bang Chang. regardless of heir military talents and . qualifications (pp. Battyels work (1974. However. that he had no intention of being pushed aside "like the Mikado in Japan" (see Ba t. The reason is simple but instructive.. For a "1932" never occurred in Japan. when conscription was 'finally enacted.son 1977: 30) • 20It is sometimes thought that this became a real problem only in the reign of Rama VII.1Inot the "subject. in fact they never permitted the monarch to play an active po lLt. bought "property abroad for use in the event that abdication and exile became necessary. In Siam. in some sense. L Drawing popular legitimacy from the monarch and exploiting his sacral prestige. like his father before him. a special class was created for sons of 10 . civil servants were conscripted were given military ranks equivalent to tho e they had previously held in the civil service.!! of politics. the Jakri dynasty--like other 19th-century Southeast Asian royalties--continued till very late in the day to play "subject" rather than "ob j ec t 19 The pool of available political and military talent remained arbitrarily narrow for precisely this reason. 494). How aware the Siamese royalty were of the difference between their own role and that of the Japanese emperors is revealed by Rama VIiS remark. to his cabinet in 1925.

---~ 1 I 207 We may note one further fact of decisive comparative significance. . but this made absolutely no difference to the conduct of Japanese government. the year of Chulalongkorn's death. were also royalty--most of them very young indeed. pecause the monarchy served Q~ly sym_?olic funqtions. 22This trend started very early. 495). Riggs (1966) notes that Rama IV already created "secular" royal ceremonies on the English model. precisely because the Thai military did no serious fighting in which such talent could manifest itself. In 1887. things had become "civilized" to the point that Western and other foreign royalty-including princes or dukes from Britain.). the controlling presence of the Europeans and the prestige of European ideas about monarchical S-U. in spite of the combination of inbreeding and the modern etiquette of monogamy. as in other parts of indirectly-ruled Southeast Asia. In 1910.21 In Siam. The upper echelons of the War Ministry were more heavily royal than those of any other department. Hence the packing of the War Ministry with royal adolescents must have seemed particularly egregious and unprofessional favoritism. and nephews in other fieid~-6t government.9~~~~l. sons. By the time Rama VI ascended the throne." The ending of royal polygyny began to drastically reduce the pool of capable royalty with the rank of Serene Highness and above. Rama V made his nine-year-old son the legal heir to the throne. Sweden. Greece. "Twenty-year old generals were common. 105). Denmark and Japan--attended the public coronation ceremonies (Greene 1971:92). and sons of military officers with commissioned or warrant rank: no examinations were required for this class (p. If some of the-Japanese royal children happened to be feeble-minded or homosexual. the traditional office of Upparat was abolished. the Taisho Emperor (father of Hirohito) was insane for prolonged periods. rather than Upparat ("Second King" or Ruler of the Front Palace). 5 of the 9 Divisional Commanders. including the commanders of the First Division (Bangkok) and the Second (Nakh9n Chaisi). II 21In fact. jp. there is no convincing evidence that any were militarily competent.Ulc"t:~o~s 22 had a signally deleterious impact just because the monarchy remained a political "subject. indeed. however. it was not a matter of political importance. 6 out of 13 MajorGenerals were also of royal birth. such as for the King's Birthday and his Coronation Anniversary (p. only members of the royal family held the ranks of General and Lieutenant-General. By this "the king brought Siam into line with the 'civilized' monarchies of Europe" (Battye 1974:270f. 519). Such a situation is unimaginable in modern Siam. / Whatever the gIfts-of Chulalongkorn's brothers. Russia. Royal succession in Japan was able to continue calmly in the old vein.

Needless to say. v~'The revolution of 1932 might well have led to the establishment of a republic. as it seemed determined to do in the first flush of victory" (Riggs. in this discretion he follows virtually all published work on modern Siamese history and politics).rrtmen . A culmination of this process can be seen in the recent marriage of Crown Prince Vajralongkorn to his own first cousin (on his mother's side) . royal marriages necessarily became more and more endogamous. As principalities with which Thai rulers had earlier had marital links declined or disappeared. 1966:94).) The 1932 coup was thus the product of a failure either to maintain the pool of royal talent or to remove royalty from active politics. When rulers spent time and money on female sexual partners. style. the coup leaders came close to abolishing the monarchy. In addition. these women--however powerful they might become behind the scenes--were nonetheless barred from holding public office and thus offered no political competition to the usual princely and noble candidates. Yet even the coup did not achieve a real resolution of this contradiction. mistakes. he would be replaced by a relative or a republic would be established. Batson (1977:283) describes how the coup leaders told Rarna VII that if he did not accept a constitution. For a short time. (Yet it is striking that Greene's dissertation on Rama VI's reign.1 1 208 royalty in the younger generation and to incr€ase the likelihood of dangerous inbreeding within the royal circle. 24The policies. ts One is reminded that the English rulers Richard II and Edward II both were overthrown and murdered in part because of the political consequences of their homosexual inclinations.25 23Royal monogamy rather spectacularly reduced the total production of royal children in anyone generation. on the other hand. her social rank had to be of "unblemished" quality. who--whatever their personal merits--would surely have been barred from succession a century earlier on grounds of political incapacity or sexual orientation. since only one royal consort was now permitted.24 (Such "ossification" of traditional leaderships as a result of European pacification. but in the end they lost their nerve. and problems of Rama VI's reign cannot be understood without acknowledging the ruler's homosexuality. Iv .23 Succession determined in European-style legal-genealogical terms permitted the accession of monarchs like Rama VI and VII. Male sexual partners. completed as recently as 1971. European etiquette of succession. tiptoes silently around this fact. and European prejudiCes against polygyny is characteristic of most colonial zones. were eligible for public office. and Rama VI aroused great enmity ~i thin the Bangkok establisrunent by making such appo i.

27Note that. and as Rama VllI--the present king's elder brother--died of a mysterious gunshot wound while still a minor. on the eve of the 1932 coup.26 ' If the external pacification of Siam's borders and the "Europeanization" of Thai monarchical etiquette strongly indicate that some of the relevant comparisons are not with Meiji Japan but with the indirectly-ruled principalities of Southeast Asia.27 Whether or not a multiplicity of Western lIinterests" really made that much of a difference is.1I As neither Rama VI nor Rama VII had male heirs. 11:227): lilt was clear that my success involved a total revolution in all the financial machinery of the government [. Wilson (1962a:18) nonetheless/v correctly notes that it was not until 1938 that "Thailand's long M 26This is all the odder since the present ruler's accession to the throne was a product pu+ely of formal lineage and accident and should therefore have made him an ideal political "object. a moot point--if we remember that seventy-five years later. but there was a significant political difference--the nation was not brought completely within the sphere of interest of any single Western nation" (emphasis added) . The Bowring "treaty" of 1855 essentially deprived the Thai sovereigns of a key element of their sovereignty (i. it seems to me. 95% of the Thai export economy remained in the hands of foreigners and Chinese (Darling 1965:29).1I Siffin (1966:48) comments that liThe Thai role in this economic relationship [with the imperial v west] somewhat resembled that of a colony..1I v . everything recalls Johor or Kelantan.209 Unlike the monarchies of Libya and Ethiopia. On the juridical level.. the role of political "subjectll--persists in a curiously antique form in contemporary Siam. As Bowring himself observed (1857. control over foreign trade) as weLl as of the traditional royal commercial monopolies. the Thai monarchy has survived: but it has never made the full modern transition!v to the Japanese or European 20th-century monarchical style.] . for Siffin.e. such comparisons seem all the more pertinent when we turn to." in the sense of an active quest for real power in the political system by the royal family--Le. as Rama VII abdicated while in self-imposed exile. Nothing in all this reminds us of Japan. Without perceiving this connection. it should s~e to note that extraterritoriality is in essence simply another term for the privileged supra-legal status that white colonials enjoyed elsewhere in indirectly-ruled Asia under different nomenclature.. the element of accident is apparent: Rama IX ascended the throne as a politically untutored adolescent simply because of his close blood tie to his predecessor.the economic and juridical spheres.•that it took a large proportion of the existing sources of revenue. the Siam of 1855 is a IInation. "Royalism.

()~ t_he . and most of which were born in resistance to the Habsburgs. indirectly-ruled condition wholly incompatible with the "national"--not to say "nationalist"--terminology typically applied in most Western scholarship on Siam. for Wilson. the rationalization and centralization of the Austro-Hungarian Empire under the later Habsburgs was precisely discontinuous and non-identical with the formation of the modern nations of Hungary.t~.28 The material presented thus far plainly points to a semicolonial. __ he opportunl. 30 The role of Dutch colonial bur7aucratic ! cenfraIlzatlon In creatlng the embryo of the modern Indoneslan state is quite clear--this state is surely unimaginable in its present form without it--but who would identify the colonial bureaucratic state -with the modern Indonesian nation? I • 28Note that. in the words of Siffin (1966:48). analogous centralizations of state bureaucracies were being carried out both in neighboring indirectly-ruled territories by "native rulers" and in directly-ruled zones by white administrators. __ l. rywhere. is an eternal Thailand. Rumania. Czechoslovakia. 30The idea of "opportunities" is important." and "Thailand [gained] control over all legal ~nd fiscal aspects of its administration" (emphasis added) .29 (1)/:.r 210 struggle for complete autonomy~ [sic) was finally achieved.. not in succession to them.the expand i. which reads the internal consolidation of the dynastic state as identical with the development of the nation. It helps to explain why. the provisions of the Bowring treaty obtained "willing enforcement over the years by King Mongkut and his successor. t \__/\~l~ba}-?_~t_~ali~tsyste~. the "subject" of this long struggle 29Compare Kelantan in the 1838-86 reign of Sultan Muhammad ("Mulut Merah") II (see Kessler 1978:41-44) and Johor in the 186295 ~eign of Abubakar (see"Trocki 1978: chaps~ 5-6).1:leS derlved~_frqm.. . For example. cent. Austria. Yet the most elementary comparisons reveal the dubiousness of such a reading.§l.u.nq _ano. What then has made such terminology plausible? I would suggest that the answer is a myopic interpretation of the rationalization and centralization policies of Rama IV.r.. and Rama VI.ai:Z. l. .. and so forth--all of which are republics._ was ac::~_~erClt~n~ a res. 1:-~i?_n. Rama V. . It is important to remember that while the later Jakri were carrying out their reforms (under strong foreign guidance).\II· Eve." Siffin is less successful in explaining why a national patriot should have willingly enforced the provisions. as . ~ j d~_!Tland_g_ID~~l?Y_.

to be sure. something called British Burma or Colonial Burma. It is rather that because the construction of the centralizing "co:l_onj_allT-style late I9th-century state was -effected~Y __ JJ1e monarch}. 211 If Rama V should be understood as performing much the same historical role as Muhammad II of Kelantan and the European pro-consuls of late 19th-century colonial administrations.--_- -. i ThIs perspective itself mirrors the outlook of the Bangkok elite. was stunted. indeed in ever really comprehending the problems posed by these groups. v' M JE -. groupo' s1." terms that b iilaifferent times and different places denoted ethnic group and national community. the modern Siamese state in some sense does territorially correspond to a "pre-colonial" kingdom based on a wet-rice agricultural core area dominated by a single ethnic group. Karens.eBi'i-E::. "Hill Tribes. or Filipino "minorities. or for any particular minority beyond the Chinese. Khmer. and so forth--little in-depth work has been done on their political history and experience (with the exception of Skinner's rewarding texts on the Chinese). this role does not obviously identify him with the development of the modern Siamese nationL Indeed." My suspicion is that this_comparative neglect reflects an axiomatic view of Siam as '-("Thai-:"Tana~n direct succession to the Old Thai kingdoms." This relative lack of concern compares sharply with scholarly interest in. The historical movement from the kingdom of Burma to the nation of Burma might perhaps have followed a Siamese path had not the monarchy been liquidated by the British who interposed. say. at tirnes--alsO~-cOI1fusion)etween "Burmese" and "Burmans. has been the_ 9SlJltt9-1 reason for the failure to achieve modern nafIonal poTltical_ lntegration of ITminOiTtiesIT -and-to -c_f~sIe_~a___ilible. for about sixty years. and unlike Indonesia and the Philippines. an outlook that does much to account for their historic failures in dealing with the ITminorities" (especially "indigenous minorities").1T Vietnamese.iF ! - _ _ -- . Riggs's Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity (1966) has a single reference (to two pages) for "minorities.. Chinese. but by no means ruled by Burmans._--Jggltima.:. the argument runs in a diametrically contrary direction. X JrMinol'ities and National Integration. Precisely this development necessitated a clear politico-cultural distinction between nation and ethnocuituraT. A state emerged--named Burma.__E_Q1i tical order~--TFurthermoie ._ he _g_rowi:h_o~_~n ~ut.the--conceptual identification of monarchy and nation has no less seriously stunted Western scholarly investigation of these problems.---------~ Like Burma. _gn<L_thi~ sm in turn. . Burmese.t_e . Siffin's The Thai Bureaucracy (1966)..gna1ed-Tn' th. Nothing illustrates this neglect more strikingly than the fact that the indices to Wilson's Politics in Thailand (1962).liE:!Ilt:_jJS--]:iQE~_I:~_r _t __ f?~~!!l~se na tiona 11. Although Siam comprises considerable numbers of non-Thai peoples--Malays.ish--period arid afterwards'l:iy the semantic distinction (and. and Neher's Modern Thai ~ Politics (1976) contain no single entry for lT~inoritieslTin general. Indonesian.

There are good reasons for thinking that Jacobs (1971) is nearer the mark when he observes that "True to patrimonial principles ." At independence. one chamber of which was called the Chamber of Nationalities. when the liberal and nationalist Pridi regime was in power. 120). 75). Ifn. has still. continues on p. the Rangoon military leaders talk and think about national identity and national integration with an energy and anxiety wholly missing from the preoccupations of their opposite numbers in Bangkok. anti-Chinese political actions were not regularized but appear to be immediate responses to the arbitrary and capricious personal predilections of whoever was in power" "(p. for all the "extreme " nationalism" of the first Phibun era. I believe) to regard this formulation as expressing Thai nationalism.J . 19)." the term for the contemporary state ruled from Bangkok--product of the opportunist chauvinism of the Phibunsongkhram-Luang Wichit ideological duumvirate of the late 1930s--is"symptomatic. a federal republic composed of a number of ethnicallydefined (sub-) states. "Thailand.212 In this sense. in my view. nothing was done to limit the influx of golden-egg-laying geese. Given this view. ~10dern Burmese nationalism has been deeply conscious of and concerned by the whole complex question of "national identity" and "national integration. it is not surprising that he characterizes the "first Phibun era from 1938 to 1943" as one of "extreme nationalism" (p. Western scholars have tended (mistakenly. 213. The new state was formally entitled the Union of Burma. . a Burma-style evolution of political consciousness. In spite of the potential advantage to the Thai of having as the name of the Old Monarchy's realm (Siam) an appellation quite distinct from the name of any ethnic group. not been fully achieved. 31 Even today. In other words. the ethn~c Burmans were forced to confront their own "minority-ness" within the Burmese nation. clearly differentiating ethnic group from modern nation.•. 32 31The 1948 Constitution established a two-chamber parliament. Coughlin points out (1960: 24-25) that no administrative corrt Ls were placed on ro Chinese immigration-until May 1947. 32It is perhaps symptomatic that Wilson (1962a) refers to Phibunsongkhram's repression of the Chinese minority in the late 1930s and early 1940s as an "intensely nationalist policy" (p. for some of which the option of secession was constitutionally guaranteed. 54-59. There is no word for the Thai that prevents them from semantically monopolizing the nation. In other words. See Silverstein 1977: esp. elaborate constitutional mechanisms were worked out to handle the problem. the anti-Chinese repression was a matter more of extortibn than of nationalism.

or Malays to be loyal to the monarch. Luang Wichit (then Director of the Fine Arts Department) "gave an address in which he compared the Jewish problem in Germany to the Chinese problem in Thailand and. militant economic nationalism has resulted not in the defeat of the [Chinese] enemy.trol was exercised over the vassal states and over the distant provinces with hereditary governorships. the pattern is clearly reminiscent of. Chinese. 1I 1I measure of con. say. Per'sians. after all. In Old Siam.boundaries er Its ::'='not by its populations. they were.cerrt .. however. the state wa-s~aef-ine-d-by its.QY its. ! --- ---- ~ 213 It is striking that the progressive and genuinely nationalist regime of Pridi Phanomyong (1945-47) restored the old name Siam--not out of nostalgia for a monarchical past. that the thrust of the late Jit Phumisak's last work (1976) was precisely to combat ethnic Thai chauvinism by showing the heterogeneous ethnic origins of the "Thai" themselves and their close interaction with non-"Thai" groups (also see Flood 1977) . it has been the Thai left which has worked hardest at this redefinition of the state. noj:~-~y. These women formed a permanent bond between the Bangkok government and the leaders of vassal states and provinces. In subsequent generatIOns. but because the name symbolically marked the possibility for a new nation that would not be the monopoly of the ethnic Thai. But we must be clear about the basic historical reason for the prevailing "minoritie-s-!!_crisis: the conceptual conflation of monarchy and nation.rul~r." (Vella 1955:327) 3311Some . but in cooperation between the antagonists.. For this reason. including "Thai" monarchs. through a system of marriage alliances. It was the policy of the Thai kings to acquire the daughters of heads of dependencies to fill the royal harem. for example. 33 In a paradoxical formation--which may remind us that there has not been an ethnically English king of England since the Skinner is sufficiently a victim of conventional thinking that he can write (1957:360). it was relatively easy for Mon.implied that the Nazi solution might be applicable~1 (Skinner 1957:261). 'us -i. Traditional monarchs. We should perhaps not be surprised that in July 1938. in which racist propaganda and periodic pogroms combined with close economic ties built on extortion and corruption-policies few would claim to be in any sense IInationalist. Their ethnic identity in no way de~ermined the degree of their access to him..nd d in all traditional ae kingdoms. Czarist policies towards the Jews. but. In fact. We may note. in common his subjects. Lao. This episode is ignored in Wilson's text. in reference to the post-l948 era: "In one of the most intriguing paradoxes of Thai history. usually worked hard at integrating their kingdoms--and indeed expanding them--by multi-ethnic polygyny.

though a Malay chieftain could be loyal to a ruler in Ayutthaya or even in early Bangkok. Study of the physiognomies of the Thai ruling family (as of royalty elsewhere in Southeast Asia) shows clear atypicality produced by complex inter-ethnic mixes. the Hungarians of one generation could be loyal to the Habsburgs ~ Habsburgs.cThai monopoly of a new would-be nation-state. respectively. he is clear that the people of Isan are a Lao minority." 35Keyes (1967) makes instructive reading in this respect. he is sympathetic to the difficulties these Lao have thereby suffered." One can agree with Riggs. Assuming that the mothers of Rama II and III were "pure. Rama V's mother was a granddaughter of Rama II (and thus at least one-sixteenth Chinese). mother of Rama VI and VII.ulers are mixed-bloods." these rulers would have been. while the next 34We can illustrate this point with one important component of the Jakri ethnic mix: Chinese ancestry. He begins by reminding us that "We have King Mongkut's word for it that the bride of his great-grandfather was a beautiful daughter of one of the richest Chinese families in Ayutthayajll in other words. at least they love the monarch. there is no reason to suppose that this loyalty could or would be sustained towards rulers who. i . Queen Saowapha. was the daughter of a "pure Chinese" concubine of Mongkuti thus. he gives an excellent description of long-standing attempts by Bangkok rulers to incorporate them into a Bangkokcontrolled state. But the thrust of his argument is that Lao loyalty to the Jakri is proving to be the mediating mechanism for the development of loyalty to the modern nation-state. On the whole. if they dislike the government. It is curious. this "love" has very little to do with the nation-state and is in fact retrogressive.eansomething stunted and archaic. in modern times. However. were gradually transformed ideologically irito Thai monarchs. 3'+ All th~sar. for mixed blood was once a political advantage. that the strongly anti-Chinese Wachirawut should have had more Chinese than Thai "blood. so Chulalongkorn was more than one-quarter Chinese.hn i. preventing a modern incorporation into an authentic national polity. Rama IV would have been half Chinese. provided one understands "this sense of nationhood" to rn. onequarter and one-eighth Chinese. but not altogether surprising. Since his mother was the daughter of Rama I's sister and a rich Chinese. symbols of the et.-·-~ I 214 eleventh century--traditional rulers were the least "ethnicnational" people in their realms. Skinner's genealogical analysis (1957:19 & 26) is illuminating. Thai. This weakness is unconsciously stressed by Riggs' formulation (1966:106): "For the perpetuation of this [Thai] sense of nationhood the survival of the monarchy would appear to be necessary. As will be clear from my own argument to this point. Rama I was half Chinese. these two sovereigns were over half Chinese in ancestry. 35 In just the same way.

who manages to. 1962a:97-112i or Siffin 1966:51-63. e. 1966: 380n the Civil Service Act cf 1928. New methods have not been used. 37This is a commonplace in the literature. new products have not been developed. 372). them as Lac.) Yet here is the censervative Wil'sonI s j udqmerrt.. Moreover.. If neglect cf the prcblem of minorities and nationalism is cne tell-tale sign of this~~~~ic_ation.. pf3. rather than as mixed-breeds). and l'\!Qd_§!_:t::!J. this backwardness eriginates in and'depends cn a fundamental mystificaticn abcut the nature and crigins of the mcdern Thai state and the rele and meaning cf the monarchy within it.g. ccndescension. The later Jakri mcnarchs are regularly described in the literature as ~d. labcr. ~~ic. 215 generation rejected them because they had come to. ccmprehend the real crisis cf the minerities and the need for a radical redefinitien of the modern state.triotic. Precisely because much of the Bangkok ("Thai") elite--and many Western scholars--have never really thought about this transfcrmation36 and have assumed a centinuity that in fact does nct exist ("Thai" rulers as Ur-Thai.recver. His fieldwerk site is blissfully entitled "our remote and humble Thai village" (p.- ---- - - ----- -- . as it was a century ago._.(1976 :333 . Let me effer two. and residually feudal sccially. spend 375 pages on the pecple of Isan without cnce referring to.:ng __ y:lers. Policies have thus varied among indifference. See. the intellectual ccnfusien ever the much-discussea iss"lles of-it stabili ty" and "instability" is ancther. see Siffin .Lz_i. Wilson 211-13. and has neither imprcved techniques ncr increased the properticn of capital to. I would like to quote here from Ingram's Economic Change in Thailand (1955) in reference to the past century of world histcry: The Thai populaticn has largely remained in agriculture. well-known instances fer consideration. X ~stabil{ty and Instability.Lve examinations fer government posts were instituted enly four years before the cverthrow of the "absolute monarchy.. emphases in criginal) of the Siam he studied in the 1950s: "The society ef Thailand tcday is. be seen as Germans or Austrians. No product of any importance 36A splendid example is Tambiah (1970). they have been unable to.u38 long after the neighbcring colonial regimes had instituted such systems for their populations.much because of the malice of governments as because of their politice-cultural backwardness. Mo. most changes in the eccnomy as a whole have been in vclume rather than kind. predominantly _PI___£j_r!§lls:trial-almest pre-ccnunercial--ecencmicallYi mcre er less'neolithic technologically.t.. and repression--net so.37 (Writers in this vein t---enat:c E everlcok the fact that compet i.

~i.3 years per person.. (See Jackson 1978. only two presidents in 33 years. which I have termed a 'bureaucratic polity. ' .' is in a sense a nameless system." a polity descr ibed as inunensely stable.. Indonesia in the pos t+Lndependenoe period has had .e.. if we compare the years 1782-1932 (in which seven monarchs and one regent held power-roughly 18. or legislative bodies outside the state apparatus" (p. 323) I . It is nameless because no one dares to ascribe to it a basis of political legitimacy which corresponds to the facts of effective control.---. ::1 I>! 'Iii I'.' :i.) .ious to appeals or pressures from outside or below. political parties. . Why was it that. it seems to me. 216 (besides rubber) is exported exported in 1850 . would have called Indonesia a bureaucratic polity. 39 Yet. a "uniquely independent" Southeast Asian state remained so backward? Why did its export economy look like a retrograde version of the neighboring colonial economies (indeed. .. If 0 P /1 By contrast. closely resemble the economies especially of indirectly-ruled colonial territories)? Our second instance is the image of Thai politics made popular by the work of Riggs--i.." (p. imperv. today which was not . Of the 1930s he wrote: "Both the People's Party and the parliamentary system proved unable to control the dynamism of intrabureaucratic conflict which broke out as the monarchical control system was dislodged" (1966:178). :! IfORiggs recognized this obliquely. an average of 3.8 years per power-holder) with the years 1932-73 (heyday of the "bureaucratic polity"--with twelve different men .. /and no less than eight successful and many more unsuccessful \.j I draw attention to both longitudinal and latitudinal comparisons precisely to focus attention on the peculiarity of modern Thai political instability and to explore the reasons for its scholarly devaluation. 312). a picture 0. though no one." \I"l/( coups carried out). "The resultant system of government. till very recently. Here. Thailand in very substantial ways remained very much the same." One naturally asks where all that modernizing dynamism went. the "bureaucratic polity.:: in the Prime Ministership.' :I i I.E great instability emerges. the original-for their time--speculations of Hanks may have played an important 39" ••• cabinet politicians have shown themselves more responsive to the interests and demands of their bureaucratic subordinates than to the concerns of interest groups. . after a century of modernizing rulers.. This quotation illustrates the truly striking fact that between 1850 and 1950.. a century of revolutionary upheaval in the world.

and hypostasize it as "uniquely Thai. (See his seminal 1962 text.. See fn. . to mean IIThai":.wer"and his p model of the "entourage" have been especially attractiv. I suspect. though it refers to the period from the beginning of the 19th century to the present.). emphasis added).~4 V ~'I emphasize persons moving in their fixed setting. Indeed. \~~ I would argue.. it was tempting to perceive the bureaucratic polity as both "natural" in its instability (i. it was "uniquely Thaill). and historically rooted. 4~Here lies the central weakne~s of Jacob's stimulating work (1971). \. ---- . in a stunted and incomplete transition from kingdom ~ to modern nation-state--a transition whose problematic nature is glossed over by the axiom that IIThailandllstarted IImodernizing" in the l850s under Mongkut and has continued to do so ever since. in addition. 40.~3 J::l1f)~a1?ili~y thus __ ~a_~ frequently read. culturally rooted) and as national (after all.e because they incorporated instability within stability: a ceaseless M v "karmic" quest for patrons and followers.indicator of the crisis of the Thai state. important. comfortingly." Riggs evidently saw no inconsistency between acceptance of this gem ~nQ his own description of the bureaucratic polity as a "nameless~ political system without legitimacy. The roots lie.-. that the instability was (and is) real.style stabilityll-rather than as an. which never cryst~llized into stable institutions but at the same time never turned into anything new or different.. He attacked Phillips's and Wilson's 1964 Memorandum . he reverted to a "cul tural" explanation of the Thai population's acceptance of the bureaucratic ·polity. 43It is interesting that Riggs initially tried to disassociate his "bureaucratic polity" model from any "Thai cultural" explanation. It should be clear. this is to them one of the major pleasures of being a citizen.." Yet he has on occasion ignored his own warnings.for trying to account for the bureaucratic polity by lIalleged traits of the Siamese 'race'" (Riggs 1966:320ff. ~2Hanks (1962:107) warned his readers that "This paper treats the scene ahistorically. 324) Phillips's and Wilson's conclusion that "villagers actually enjoy making known to those in power their willingness to be ruled. But in the end...42 With history abandoned. even to the point of uncritically accepting (on p. He is so determined to unuermine the conventional myths about the "developmentll of Siam that he finds it difficult .e.. 217 role. elaborated in his 1975 article.~l . M { like players with their rules and tactics on a football fieldll (Hanks 1962:107..) His discussion of the dialectic of "meritand __Q. It was easy to take the model for a timeless reality... that there are irremediable intellectual problems with all ahistorical models that "refer to" specific historical periods.__ . 1 think.

The first reign is thus classically a period of unusual social mobility. . A new dynasty then arises. "absolutizingll tendencies have nothing intrinsically to do with modernization and everything to do with the inherent dynamics of a certain type of state system. however. Precisely because this figure emerges at a time of crisis. In other words--and this is important--centralizing. This very rough sketch of Akin's model does not do justice to the subtlety and learning with which it is elaborated. in which the central tension is between the monarch's natural drive to centralization and the localizing. noblemen. and the cycle begins allover.J 218 This conceptual framework is strikingly evidenced in Akin Rabibhadana's 1969 work. but it can not be used to e~plain everything. the new sovereign is able to subject most of society directly to his command. who come to power by descent rather than by coup or conquest. he is able to summon the most able men in the kingdom to his side. arguably the most brilliant Englishlanguage text on modern Siam by a Thai. We should thus already be warned to be cautious about interpreting to admit that any substantial changes have taken place at all in modern Thai history. The hero's successors. Above all. The services required by princes and nobles are so much less onerous than those demanded by the state that there is a steady leakage from phrai luang to phrai som--slowly draining the sovereign's manpower resources until the dynasty is too weak to survive a major challenge. and royal princelings. but it perhaps suffices for raising some interesting questions of perspective. Akin proposes the following general model of the dynamics of dynastic rule in Old Siam: A dynasty typically begins after some major calamity-energetic. Mongkut's Siam and Sarit's Thailand-everything is a timeless "patrimonialism. whom they have to IItake care ofll by 1 assigning them phrai sam (liprivate" corvee laborers). the numbers of phrai luang (commoners liable to state corvee) are at their height. prominent \ nobles. Taking advantage of his savior role. and it is a model for analyzing historical reality. and so forth. find themselves increasingly entangled in complex rivalries with and dependencies on fellow-members of the established royal family.1I it is clear that Akin's model closely approximates the general Weber ian model of patrimonialism. not that reality itself. when existing structures are in disintegration. fissiparous tendencies represented by provincial notables. First of all. the "patrimonial modelll can be very useful for the study of Thai political history." In fact. as I shall argue below. reintegrative leadership being provided by a parvenu statesman-general. in which exceptional homines novi can make their mark. if we ignore for the moment "Thai uniqueness.

82). 88. Comparable tendencies are observable in the Netherlands Indies and in British Malaya in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. the policy of encouraging in-migration of Chinese (especially Chinese as mobile. "Thailand" is great only when these state corv~es are working optimally. terms both of the policy itself. but emphasize that they involved conflicts of interest (not only between sovereign and nobility. On the other hand. then. Two small but important points should be made before turning to the basic questions raised by this policy.53.Jakri centralization in modernizing of the patrimonial model. 219 .116-23).ltS second. we can proceed to the next step in analyzing modern Thai political instability: theoretical reconsideration of Jakri policy towards the Chinese. ItSSkinner (1957) writes: "It may seem strange that the Chinese outnumbered the Thai in the Thai capital city. rather than in terms Secondly. took on a Chinese cast during the latter half of the nineteenth century" (p. and all the other obligations that citizens of national republics properly owe their state.. Exactly the same phenomenon of alien immigrants demographically dominating urban areas occurred in British Burma--and for exactly the same reasons (see Furnivall 1956:44. II More and more towns in the interior of Thailand. emphasis added). In a sense. terms. and of petty Malay sultanates like Johor and Perak--in .. too. Akin appears to face an uncomfortable paradox. In his view. it is the Thai people who undermine their own chances for national glory. military conscription. Avoiding royal corv~e then appears as heinous as dodging the draft! If we accept Akin's argument that there were basic' instabilities built into the Thai patrimonial state.-. but also between ruler and subject).. male manual laborers) precisely parallels the policies of the British and Dutch colonial regimes. .. it was a policy that absolutely cannot be made to fit with the Thai-monarchs-as-national-heroes trope. the silent migration of the population from phrai luang to phrai som status shows clearly that the Thai people much preferred service under anyone but the sovereign. single. For one thing. This paradox is tenable only if one sees the sovereign--as Akin tends to do--not so much as a dynastic powerpolitician following patrimonial imperatives but as Ur-Thai national hero: then the suffering and sacrifices imposed on Thai commoners can be glossed as analogous to tax-paying. He posits as the "great men" of Thai History those dynasts who are most capable of cornering the manpower market--implicitly belittling those latterday sovereigns who seem incapable of organizing the peasantry for state corv~e. ---~-'-- . but most nineteenth century observers attest the fact" (p. and of the world-historical epoch in which it was enacted. First.

Greene (1971:125) comments that Wachirawut decided that many' of the leaders of the abortive 1912 coup were of IImixed ThaiChinese stock" and believed this to be "highly relevant in th~ light of the recent political unrest in China. also pp.. it generated long-term instabilities and contradictions in Thai society--just as the immigration policies of the British and Dutch and of the Sultans of Perak and Johor did for contemporary Indonesia and Malaysia. 1I . 160..47) It is thus clear that the Chinese immigration p_c:>_l~_cY __ 1"!9-§_to understood be in terms o f dynastiq" rather ffian-nat-ional. in fact. for example." ll .. He wrote a number of articles in the press under various pen names which expounded the subject of love of nation and also attacked the developing sepqrateness of the Chinese community in the countrytl (Wilson 1962a:9-l0).. "The first two Jakkri kings developed state trading and royal monopolies to an unprecedented degree. In addition. successive Thai military regimes provided a further splendid example of "uniquely Thai realism and flexibility by maintaining diplomatic relations with Taipei for the next quarter of a century.. needs. negotiated in the brief interregnum of civilian rule between the two Phi bunsongkhram dictatorships.. ll 48But. 248-49). In order to increase tile production of Siam's exports and provide crews for their royal ships.s is this sentiment. ll li element Systematic importation of Chinese of state policy under'Rama 111.. entitled The Jews of the East (see Purcell 1951:l55)~/ There is. they encouraged Chinese immigration." 46 (Soser"iOti. by the way.was in effect the founder of intellectual nationalism among the educated Thai. _it is anti-Chinese sentiment that Western scholars see as one of the first -sighs of "Thainatiorialisrn. For another.. 220 it is inconceivable that a nat-ionalist leadership would pursue such a policy. It took the ~ivilian Kukrit Pramote government to open relations with Peking in 1976. after the overthrow of the Manchus in 1911. Wilson's readers are not informed that this tlvivacious founder of Thai intellectual nationalism was the pseudonymous author of a celebrated near-racist pamphlet attacking the Chinese. 47Purce11 (1951:192-94) describes the Siamese-Chinese Amity Agreement of 1946.48 labcr first became a major But it was "the expansion 46"Rama V1 ••. For if it helpe-d~n the---snortrun to IIstabilize dynastic power (as it clearly did). stresses that Wachirawut's anti-Chinese sentiments were largely derivative of the prevailing racist prejudices of the British whom he so deeply admired (see p." After Mao's victory in 1949. as Skinner (1957:24f. good reason to argue that the antiSinicism of Rama VI (himself more Chinese than Thai by ancestry) had little to do with any putative nationalism. that--in a remarkable manifestation of "uniquely Thai flexibility--Thai rulers from 1911 right through to 1946 consistently refused to entertain official relations with any Chinese national leadership. Skinner (1957).--"--~---- -_ .. Thai rulers feared that Chinese immigrants could bring with them republican ideas that might infect the Thai (Batson 1977: 89).) observes.

IIwould. as did the British colonial authorities in Malaya (and.. and what was the structural relationship between the immigrant labor force and Jakri absolutism? The answer is two-fold: (1) Manifesting themselves as .•• [they1 were charged a head tax large enough to be a sizable source of~evenue. 49rn exactly comparable vein. in relation to the rulers' manpower needs._____ . since the Chinese were so essential to royal plans.. rice-milling.. the Chinese immigrants presented the 'I'hai rulers with a directly exploitable labor force outside the Siamese political system--i. ll ll ll Nonetheless.' that] greatly increased the demand for manual workers and eventually led to the recruitment of Chinese peasants for 'coolie labor' in Siam and to the mass migration which began in the l880s" (Skinner 1957:109). to a lesser degree. from all accounts.49 IIInstead of corv~e .l. Let us look briefly at each part of the answer in turn.. and on Chinese commercial plantations (Mabry 1977:43)..l.e.~. Furthermore. British and Dutch colonial regimes in other parts of Southeast Asia gave immigrant Chinese (or Indians) IIfreedom unthinkable for the [local indigenous 1 masses. Chinese coolie labor was thus lIused extensively in canal and railroad building. youthful. that this labor force could be managed in such a way as to pay not only for its own exploitation but--for the-general expansion of-the state itself . stevedoring and other port work.. . have been impossible without Chinese labor. Skinner {1957:1l4} indeed suggests that the construction of Siam's railroad system. saw-milling." . Skinner is also correct in p6inting out that. tin-mining. the Dutch in the Netherlands Indies).----~ 221 of the Thai economy after l85? [the Bowring 'Treaty. they could be used for a far greater variety of tasks than could the Thai peasantry. Provided funds coUIaoe'··found to pay them wages. single. laborers looking for work (rather than as.-~-"-.l_oerab_. which began in 1892 and was essential to the maturation of Rama V's centralization policies. not subject to the classical slippage from phrai luang to phrai som. "wage labor came to be recognized as more efficient than conscripted labor (Skinner 1957:114). -.. and mobile.." And Chinese deaths: lilt is no exaggeration to say that thousands of Chinese lost their lives prior to 1910 on railway construction in Siam (1957:115).e. What were the reasons for this policy... (2) The Thai rulers quickly discovered. "they had to be given freedom unthinkable for the Thai masses of the time" (1957:97: emphasis added) . The enormous advantage of the Chinese immigrants. ignorant. Thai peasants seeking to evade work). was that they wer<~ Vl.

by far the greater part of the money income of the Chinese remained in Thailand.222 but not so large as to discourag~ immigration" (1957:97) . In the third reign. emphasis added) 52Skinner (1957:125) explicitly makes this case. 54 50This head tax amounted to 4.. as for the Thai. but not one out of fifty among them was an opium smoker" before arrival in Siam." . He concluded that practically the entire industry of Siam had [~ then] passed into Chinese hands" (1957:117. on whom they showered honors51) astutely established the following highly utilitarian structure: (aJ head taxes were kept very low to encourage Chinese immigrants to stay in Siam. but Thompson (1941:609) reports a League of Nations survey in the 1920s which found that in Siam "the average Chinese coolie spent fifty percent of his earnings on opium. With regard to the financing not only of this system of state-paid wage-labor but also of the absolutizing state itself. 54The policy was extremely successful. Werner attempted an exhaustive list of the commercial crafts in which any Thai were to be found ••. 53This may seem harsh. the simple explanation for the discrepancy is that the tax on Chinese had to be kept fairly low not to discourage them from immigrating. Is it superfluous to reiterate that such policies are absolutely irreconcilable with the conventional IIfar-sighted patriot" images of the 19th. Skinner was rather puzzled by this lIinequity.52 (bJ opium addiction. Skinner demonstrates that the Jakri rulers (with the assistance of a few extremely wealthy Chinese leaders. The opium farmer was also given noble rank ••• " (Skinner 1957:153. by the fifth reign the rank had been raised to Luang.53 to ensure that the Chinese laborers stayed put and spent their wages locally rather than remitting them to their familiea in China.and early 20th~century monarchs? . gambling.) 51"It was also government policy to give titles to most of the Chinese holding revenue monopolies. why not impose a stiff tax.5 baht paid once every three years. Skinner (1957: 227) concludes that "in all probability. see Skinner 1957:162. When compulsory male corv~e labor was finally abolished for the Thai in'1899." Needless to say. prostitution and alcoholism were encouraged within the immigrant community. It did not change from 1828 to 1909. both the lottery and gambling farmers were automatically given the title Khun.50 Furthermore. "In the 1860's. 97. it was replaced by a head tax amounting to 4-6 baht every year. emphasis added)." but viewed it as part of "the favoritism [sic] shown the Chinese by the Thai government in the nineteenth century. 123. since they had nowhere to escape to? (On all this.

To a lesser extent." (Skinner 1957:120. for which a free-floating. until 1905. 57In fact. the head tax never produced even 1. the measure did not emancipate those already burdened with the status of slave.000. it is cornmon sense.900. it merely forbade the creation of new slaves. Skinner (1957:226) tells us that in the period 1910-38. almost half of the government's revenues was derived directly or indirectly from the comparatively small Chinese minority. formal abolition of all slavery had to wait a generation.000 baht. about l5-20~ of government revenue. 55Skinner 1957:121." and yet have found this conclusion "anoma Lous . (Mabry 1977:42) .) It is revelatory of "late ptolemaic" thinking that Skinner should have observed (1957:125) that "for a period of at least fifty years.700. the lottery 2. (By contrast.200.5S In 1903/04. government· revenue from opium varied from 8 to 23 million baht a year. and alcohol 4.000 baht. the gambling farm produced 5. In precisely the same way. the same is true of the Dutch colonial government in the Indies. 56Battye (1974:22) says that Chinese were exempted from military conscription--a rather insubstantial privilege after the l840s. lottery.000. 56 the sovereign could essentially forget about defending the state militarily against external enemies and could devote himself fulltime to internal aggrandizement ("centralization"). It is in this light that one is to understand the abolition of slavery in l87457--an act that today is often glossed as an enlightened. under conditions of externally imposed peace. emphasis added) In 1905/06. the British colonial government in Malaya avoided taxing British enterprises by growing fat on drug-peddling to the immigrant Chinese community. see Skinner 1957:123. The opium-farm system was abolished in 1908/09 but then became a state-controlled monopoly. during which Siam achieved a modern government. and spirit farms. Final. These were the opiumf gambling. averaging 14.000 baht. In effect.000. revenue from the opium farm netted Rama V over 10.II In fact.--~ 223 The facts speak for themselves: "It is significant that four of the most lucrative [revenue] farms--together providing between 40 percent and 50 percent of the total state revenues during most of the second half of the nineteenth century--were based on Chinese consumption. liberating move but that should really be understood as a logical extension of the policies outlined above.000 baht a year at any time. and entered the world economy and family of nations. politically impotent alien population was decidedly advantageous.100.-.000 baht. provided one abandons conventional mythologies. a thriving economy.

he says both that these advisers "were not to have final control over major policies of the nation" and that "foreign advisers did not formally control major policy. 3. and others. and 69 "foreigners engaged in administrative work at the level immediately below departmental management. by freeing the slaves. It is well known that these policies involved (a) the sizeable employment of foreign advisers. Siffin (pp. Keyes 1967: chap. this number had doubled: by 1905. the English. . 23 assistant-director-generals or equivalent. "It became apparent to the-reforming kings that. He notes (p. II13 director-generals of departments or equivalent." (We are a long way from late Meiji Japan. We can now proceed to reconsider. and the tax base of the government would simultaneously be enlarge~I (Qiggs 1966:58). Keyes.OOO) exceeded the total salaried bureaucracy of pre-1892. Moreover. They were represented in every department which in some way exploited the natural resources of the nation in addition to being in every financial department. By 1910. and the south59_-considerably aided. in this light. Siffin.•England had a tremendous amount of influence within the Thai government in the form of her many foreign advisors. 133 of them were English. more than any other nationality. Siffin 1966 is. were spread throughout the bureaucracy. and Siffin 1966: chap. the supply of peasant farmers would be increased. 58 (b) the extension of Bangkok administration over Isan. 96) we learn that these advisers' "contribution to the central values of the new bureaucracy defies description. By 1899.g. more than 300 foreigners were employed by the government. the number in the Ministry of the Interior alone (15." (l) Elsewhere (p." S9E. was about 12. towards the end." Greene's description (1971:261. just prior to the "radical reforms" of Rama V. the general thrust of Jakri policies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries--policies that have been studied in different ways by scholars such as Wyatt..000. 94 and 80) suggests that the total number of salaried bureaucrats in 1892.224 The important thing to remember is that slaves were traditionally exempt from state corv~e and were thus outside the reach of the sovereign's grasp. 4. ptolemaic as to interpretation. Chiengmai. but their influence sometimes verged on control. 97) that in 1909. emphasis added) of the situation under Rama VI is less SChizophrenic: " •. as usual. by the expansion of imported rails. Wilson. S80n this. it had doubled again. They included a dozen Ugeneral advisers. the last year of Rama V's reign.) On the next page. illuminating as to the facts. Out of a total number of approximately 208 foreign advisors. and very close to late Abubakar Johor. however.

also Reynolds 1972: esp.e. continues on p. In Siam. 226. 7-9. "rational" from the perspective of the moi-state. Yet there is a difference. emphasis added): elsewhere in the region the period [of early 20th century] was characterized by the growth of disparate nationalist movements whose one common aim was the achievement of political independence. The European moi-states were profoundly unstable and destabilizing precisely because they were so strong. Actually. Romanov. this process may go back to Mongkut himself. [Fn.cal point was absent •••• " That the seeds for such popular" nationalism in fact existed is suggested by the "Ai Kan uprising in Saraburi in 1925. they are/were. this does not sound quite like Nongkut talking. (Siffin 1966:122) G1See Wyatt 1969: chaps. Bourbon. In important respects. motorized transportation. the functionalized bureaucracy. however. admitted that one of the motives he had in introducing the dharma reform movement was to compete with and thwart mil1enium movements which might arise during the dislocation accompanying his forthcoming modernization program.GO and (c) attempted direct subordination of the ecclesiastical hierarchy to the state. if Jacobs is to be believed. mystified revolt.) 62Batson puts it gently thus (1977:18.. Siam had more than 7. 3-5 and 7. telephones.-. GOBy 1907." (Somehow. said he would take care of it himself if the king did not do something about it in seven days (1977:174). G2 . in the short run. It is likely in any case that the stunted form of 20thcentury Thai nationalism is not wholly unique in Southeast Asia. of absolutism's own engine. The real political problem in Siam was--and is--precisely this: that there was DO decisive popular break with "absolutism. in a frank moment. and Stuart absolutism all collapsed before massive popular revolutions generated in reaction to the transforming policies of entrenched absolutism itself. attacking foreign oppression. and its manipulation for state-purposes (i. About 550 miles of railway were in operation. ultimately.] n ••• rl f I . signaled by the coup of 1932. He writes (1971:260): rtRama IV. many of these policies follow--on a small scale--the patterns of European absolutism symbolized by the immortal words of Louis XIV. 225 telegraphs." Indeed. its leader." fueled by social radicalism and -In-aeecrmass nationalism. this fo. chaps. the depth and duration 6f absolutism were insufficient to precipitate such a social upheaval. and. what emerged instead was the partial. In the Thai case.000 miles of telegraph lines linking 67 administrative and commercial centers. on the whole. the post-Mongkut role of the Dhammayut sect under strong royal patronage--notably the appointment of Chulalongkorn1s brother Prince Wachirayan as Supreme Patriarch and his function in harnessing the Sangha to the sovereign's overall administrative and educational policiesG1). "L' ~tat crest moi.

It will be apparent that much of the criticism of existing studies of Thai politics sketched out thus far is. Moore (1966:483-87) has warned students of politics against "culturalist" explanations precisely because. . at bottom. 6'-+ ~Cu[ture and Politics.63 The suspension began to come to an end only in the early 1960s--and then largely by inadvertence. the most significant feature of the contemporary scene." anachronisms such as [19th-century] "Thai nationalism. by its heterogeneity and functional spec_ialization. manifested in anti-Chinese racism and slavish admiration for the imperial British." but because it contained within itself no real foundation of or criteria for internal or external legitimation. ahistorical. in fact." like that of the Jakri. yet. criticism of a certain reification of Thai culture. 21ff. Out of these changes. where till very recently there has also been only a stunted and mystified nationalism. esp.+ 226 The bureaucratic engine of absolutism was incapable by itself of breaking with the perspectives and traditions of absolutism. which the bureaucracy itself was incapable of imagining--let alone generating--for all its "modernizing" protocol. when American military power and giant corporate capitalism imposed themselves on a stagnant political order. clinging with pride to their sultans. was made possible only by external pacification and external support. the absolutist moi-state manqu~." and que_stionable axioms such as "The monarchy is essential to the Thai national identity" encourage us to base our thinking on a wholly imaginary eternal Thai essence.) This massive penetration generated extremely rapid social changes (planned and unplanned) in Thai society. along with the British. I think that his argument is. it was also incapable of generating the temporal legitimacy that monarchical absolutism had previously had. primarily responsible for bringing the hated Chinese into Malaya in the first place. (Sarit's "absolutism. I believe. they are intrinsically conservative. 6'-+See my 1977 article. totally ignore the fact that these very sultans (or their immediate ancestors) were. the modern "bureaucratic polity" was both deeply conservative and highly unstable--not because it was "uniquely Thai. in his view. developed the popular Thai nationalism that is. Ambiguous rubrics like "uniquely Thai values. Suspended between royalist absolutism and popular nationalism. Large numbers of "nationalist" Malays. 63Riggs himself recognized this: see note 40 above. Riggs's "bureaucratic polity" was. and uncritical. in A comparable case is Malaya. pp. in turn.

that the whole "loosely structured societyll debate--aside from a certain basic triviality--concerned a supposed lIinherent. in search of a lIuniquely Thai" cultural matrix. The irony is that for all the importance attached.66 Once again. IIOld Siam" manifests itself as a typical blend of comfort and exoticism. a stable currency.its dynamic relation to Thai social and political life concretely explored. fundamental reality of Thai society. Needless to say. and a "relaxed" attitude on sexual matters.1I this culture has very rarely been studied in a critical and dispassionate spirit. in whole or in part. this IIOld Siamll does not date further back than about 1900.--~ I 227 general. since most of the political scientists have unconsciously been committed to the modernizing-monarchs= patriotic-national-heroes axiom. (Note . Nothing strikes one more vividly than the lack of visual distinction in the plastic arts of the Jakri period. pften unfair. to the idea of "uniquely Thai culture. Let me suggest two sorts of reasons for this undesirable situation. Nor is. there has been a tendency among political scientists who pride themselves on being area-specialists to defend that title by indiscriminate raids on the work of anthropologists (especially those influenced by the IIculture and personalityll school). For in talk and texts. . exaggerated--indeed. wholly divorced from history. it has been easy to assume (especially for those not much interested in culture in any case) that late Jakri "high culturell represented Thai national culture. plentiful servants. and easy communications with the Western world combine with colorful ceremonies.1I IIgiven essence of Thai society. The anthropologists' experimental models and hypotheses have too easily been reified by nonanthropologists as the axiomatic. cheap antiques. it is comparison--Iongitudinal and latitudinal-that is required. We can start by comparisons with an earlier Siam. modern tropical medicine. 65 Second. It is significant that the IIloosely structured societyll model continued to be used by political scientists long after most anthropologists had abandoned it. piquant cooking. But in the case of Thai studies.) li 66Hence a mythologizing of late Jakri upper-class life as IIOld Siam. picturesque sights and sounds. there is a good deal to be said for it." The cynic might offer more personal reasons for this nostalgic identif~cation. First. in analyses of Thai politics. The Buddha images are lifeless imitations of the strikingly individual 65This tendency may have been encouraged by the predominance of anthropologists among the first generation of post-World War II Thai-ologists and their general IIculture and personality" orientation. Steam-powered river transport.

By 1868 traditional Thai sculpture. While this view is intrinsically implausible.••. 1968:182-83): .68 Handbook's It is my strong impression that the lively arts have suffered much the same fate. as cited in Skinner 1957:117) of the 19th-century collapse of Thai craft industries at the hands of Jakri-imported Chinese. G8For . It is perhaps of more than symbolic significance that the dating of this stagnation is the year that Chulalongkorn ascended the throne.67 The royal complex at Bang Pe In expresses this melancholy process perfectly. dance. one hears the view expressed that the decline in court arts is to be blamed on the leaders of the 1932 coup. in which the decadence of the late Ayutthaya era continued . Similarly. the Ratanakosin [Jakri].. The Fifth and Sixth reigns show the final disintegration of any real idea of Thai architecture. parallels a steady decline in "classical" music. It was a period of little accomplishment. An almost unbroken succession of conservative regimes. a comparative discussion of the political meaning of such miniaturization and replication. painting.228 imagery of Sukhothai and early Ayutthaya. 690n occasion. with reference to Indonesia and Cambodia. This is not just my personal view. The establishment of B~ngkok in 1782 marked the beginning of the fifth-school of traditional Thai art. Traditional Thai sculpture had almost disappeared. fussy air about it. architecture. An incoherent jumble of miniature replicas of IItypically Thain palaces and garish "overseas Chinese"-style dwellings. thanks to the policies of the Jakri rulers? Skinner (l957:1J3-l4) records that Chinese built the structures for the cremat~on of Rama II in 1824 and that they had long been accustomed to erecting Thai-style temples. much of the religious and secular architecture of the 19th and 20th centuries has an exhausted. We may also recall Werner's description (mentioned above. ostensibly committed to Thai culture and values. it is _ pleasant to find Wachirawut starting a kh9n (dance drama) school around 1908 because he was worried that IIthis most highly developed of all Thai art forms was withering away due to lack of supportll (Greene 1971:30).69 Old teachers die 67May part of the reason be that these monuments and buildings were more and more constructed by immigrant Chinese rather than by native Thai craftsmen. it prefigures nothing so much as the suburban villas of postindependence elites in other parts of Southeast Asia. Here is the jUdgment of the Area Handbook for ThaiZand (Smith et al.. and drama to the point of near-extinction. see my 1978 article. music. ornamentation and handicrafts were stagnant •.

269. but in s an academic context. raises serious questions about the character of modern Thai history and politics. Surely this widely acknowledged cultural decline.. Similarly in literature: it seems of more than symbolic significance that the fall from favor of the last classical Thai poet of consequence. coincided with the accession to the throne of the Chinese-importing Rama III. II (Greene 1971 :261) (iii) In reference to the reign of Rama VI: liOnmost international questions. and they breed no children.---~-~ 229 without successors.c are occasionally revived.become museum pieces. ~.. 71This point brings to mind one of the most obvious gaps in the study of the modern history of Siam: a synoptic analysis of Anglo-Thai relations. cramped ideal of gentility everywhere smothering vitality? A museumized culture which found its institutionalization in the Siam Society of former times? Not until the 1960s--and then removed from court and Siam Society --did Thai literary culture regain a creative ~lan. What figures of comparable stature grace the reigns of the later Jakri? What vigorous literary styles were created? Is there not simply a kind of Victorianization?7o A narrow. But part of the answer may be found if we remember that Jakri absolutism was a dependent absolutism. at bottom a byproduct of European pacification and penetration. The c La ssi. considered in juxtaposition to the modernization of the realm.. The solution to the paradox cannot be found in the nature of absolutism itself. In 1884.. 71 70Phillips (1975:332) reports an informant telling him that the clas~ical erotic literature written at the court during the 17th-19th (early 19th?) centuries was "Thailand's only original contribution to the great literature of the world. emphasis added). Here are a few items for consideration: (i) Battye (1974) reminds us that England strongly supported Rama V's attempt to develop an army. All these arts tend to . the Prince [Devavong] usually adhered to . more for the entertainme~t of foreign tourists who have never seen them before than for living Thai society itself. Not only could England close her two entre pot ports of Singapore and Hong Kong.. which handled the bulk of Thailand's export trade. (ii) IIEngland exercised a virtual stranglehold on the Thai economy. II Such literature re-emerged from the underground only ln the last fifteen years or so. but she could also blockade the nation's primary port. the English Minister Resident wrote to London that he was IIconvinced that in strengthening the king and the throne lies the only hope for the future of Siam and for its possible utility to ourselves" (p. Sunth9n Phu. the royal absolutists of Europe--Louis XIV par excellence--presided over brilliant efflorescences in literature and the arts.

" . usurping the power of the American hired for that post. the policy line established by Great Britain. indirectly-ruled principalities in the vic~nity. Coming from the study of neighboring Southeast Asian countries. By so closely identifying the monarchy with nationalism and by maintaining a virtual monopoly on the leadership of the movement. was on exceptionally friendly terms with Devavong. six times as many Thai students were studying in England as in any other country (Batson 1977:72) • 72Greene's (1971:426) analysis of Rama VI's stance is very apt: "Whenever opposition arose he sought to surmount it by intensifying his call for loyalty to the king and nation. Indonesian. It is clear that the growth of a creative modern literature in the other countries mentioned. in part. 72 Finally. England's diplomatic representative in Bangkok. In fact. Wachirawut impaired its effectiveness. starting with the extraordinary novels of Jos~ Rizal.-~ I 230 In this sense. His concept of nationalism was suspect because it was the King. whole generations after its regional companions. such traditional Thai rulers were subject to Buddhism no less than. one cannot but be struck with the relative narrowness of 20th-century Siamese (in comparison with modern Vietnamese. Latitudinal comparisons are no less illuminating. and probably two. It is certainly likely that from early times Thai rulers "used" Buddhism to cement their legitimacy and increase their manpower resource base. we turn briefly to the largest and most complex cultural institution of all: the Sangha. Buddhist missionary activities were certainly encouraged. The "springtime" of this literature also manifested itself at least one. the Ministry's Foreign Advisor. himself. symptomatic precisely of the incomplete transition from absolutist kingdom to nation-state. he conferred with Devavong so often that in many Thai's eyes he was. is intimately connected with the nationalist movement.to the absolutism of neighboring colonial regimes and the would-be absolutism of semi-independent." (Greene 1971:264) (iv) As late as the mid-1920s. who so ardently preached loyalty to the monarchy. and even the most cynical. Nonetheless. or Filipino) literature. in effect. few of which produced anything significant in the realm of art. The crampedness of Thai literature is. Sir Herbert Dering. Macchiavellian rulers could not stand outside it. it was parallel . for raisons d'etat. These comparisons are made not with the intention of disparaging Thai achievements but to remind ourselves of the inescapable interrelation between cultural and political life. One function of traditional Buddhist monument construction was certainly to "attract" followers. one must remember--as when studying the politics of the Middle Ages in Europe--that only one cosmology was then available. I would suggest.

7~ (There are clear analogies here with the. 1977:22. Each of the elements of these pairs (and many others) has been the subject of useful study--by anthropologists. See my article. of Islam in contemporary Malaysia and Indonesia. the act was perfunctory. political. dynamic rule/unchanging society. and increasingly.--~ though in different ways from. manipulation. when they did. historians. as it were--of lay Buddhist activism? . Buddhist activism/decline of the Sangha. economists. Does this help to explain the contemporary paradox of a Sangha hierarchy in obvious decay (despite official affirmations to the contrary). such "faiths" rapidly petrify in their official institutional manifestations. . and others.. let me try here to offer a brief synthesis. one is struck by the many apparently contradictor~ motifs: loose structure/rigid bureaucratic hierarchy. and conceptual reasons for those weaknesses.) Under conditions where rulers no longer really believe in the ideology/religion they propagate to th~ ruled. Fewer and fewer boys from these milieus entered the monkhood at all (let alone for good) . and the wide lateral spread--to left and right.. by certain power-groups. 73 Thus. In all cases. to the extent that it was possible to stand outside it. 231 ----. Reflecting on the corpus of available writing on modern Thai society. Rather than repeating or even recapitulating what has been said so far. students of religion. stability/instability. political scientists. i' I " 73Batson (1977:79) records that the magazine of the Thai students in England in the 1930s contained numerous articles on the growing indifference to religion among the younger generation of Thai.. conservatism/decay. 7~This process reached an apogee of sorts in the brutal manipulations of the Sangha by the late dictator Sarit Thanarat. and to suggest some of the material. Conclusion I have tried to indicate what seem to me the weaknesses of English-language writing about modern Thai political life. their subjects. 29-30. the policies are reflections of cosmological separations between ruler and ruled. it beca~e possible to "u~e" Buddhism for political purposes in a more drastic and cold-blooded way. and of Buddhism in Burma. What seems to have happened in the late 19th century was the onset of a slow secularization of the Thai ruling class.

. it strikes me that the responses of the area-specialists. or the preponderant onei or (b) insisting. (On the whole. the important. the fancied boundaries of the discipline.country as an area or! as I put it earlier. What is badly needed is a perspective that seriously studies the interrelations. it is very important to assess dispassionately the situation of the "Thai specialistsll in the American (Western) academic marketplace. Thl. and culture as a totality. How easy it can be to snuggle down wi thin the limits 0"'£ both discipline and country. It seems to me that being an area-specialist is actually nothing to be ashamed of.) Yet how often the defiant country-~pecialist in fact submits him/herself to. data difficulties. on the whole. but we must have the energy and selfconfidence to undertake the task implicit in that to-be-honored title: in other words. All are both area-specialists and members of formal disciplines. that such lIdualities" are simply "natural givens" of a complex and uniquely Thai society. (IIHmnanistic studiesll can often be a useful shield for this maneuver. not only within each dualism but also of the general configuration that contains them all. history.s means not only readl. propose as our task the study of that area or.ng the work of fellow area-specl. as a tota~it~. often reflect a kind of failure of nerve. and engaging in the study of ever more narrowly defined and esoteric topics. The other consists in defiantly crawling deeper into an lIarea-istllshell. The prestige and plausibility of area studies--perhaps never very high. In this regard. political difficulties. in the hope of making respectableshowings at the discipline's annual conventions. It means precisely not raiding these works for I. ideological way--on the uniqueness and incomparability of the area of specialization. etc.232 Yet awareness of these ~pparent contradictions has not. as well as the theoretical and methodological. insisting--in a defensive. . In· other words.) Nonetheless.all. Two polar types of response seem only too frequent.sts in disciplines other than our own but allowing these works to interrogate our s. cultural difficulties. encouraged scholars to go beyond either (a) insisting that one element in the pair is the real. we need to dare to think care~ully about Thai society. and nationally significant only in the context of American expansion into the Third World after World War II--has been on the decline for a decade. difficulties facing their members working in places like Siam: language difficulties. access difficulties. One consists of mindlessly trying to IIcatch Upll with the discipline's latest methodological or theoretical fads--applying them randomly and without reflection to the data. Many areaspecialists feel vulnerable to the charge of being methodologically backward and theoretically unsophisticated in terms of their disciplines. these disciplines have only a modest appreciation of the concrete. with a certain complaisance.

II ~I . is meant to contribute to what I conceive to be the of this conference--to give some genuine meaning to nThai Studies'..--.------------------------------------------------~--~ 233 evidence to support existing conceptions them simply to add a cross-disciplinary. our writings. with this survey real purpose the idea of or hypotheses. or citing IIhumanistic" patina to all its obvious shortcomings and probable errors.

Benedict R. *1977 "The End of the Absolute thesis. *1974 liThe Military. 1974 Benjamin Siam's Political.." Mil. Future: Documents the Absolute Monarchy. theoretically a bit diffuse.etin of Concerned JAS PA CDP = = = Ithaca: Journal of Asian Studies Pacific Affairs Cornell Southeast Asian Scholars Asia Program Data Paper Alpern. pp." Ph. Battye. 282-321.D." In Jackson and pye. The only full-length study of relations between the crown and the military in modern Thai history. 10-77. Note use of the following abbreviations: AS = Asian Survey BCAS = BuZl. pp. Batson. O'G. IX.D. Anderson. LV. 1975 "Insurgency in Thailand: An Analysis of the Government Response. *1977 "Withdrawal Symptoms: Social and Cultural Aspects of the October 6 Coup. pp. Politics and Military Reform during the Reign of King Chulalongkorn. Stephen I. Monarchy A. 234 . e1978 "Cartoons and Monuments: The Evolution of political Communication under the New Order. Government and Society in Siam. from the End of in Siam. Noel A. thesis. Very rich data. general and/or comparative works mentioned in the article - ( Works cited in shortened form within items are cited in full under the name(s) of the editor(s). Valuable." Ph. clear-eyed account of Rama VII's reign. 13-30." BCAS.BIBLIOGRAPHY *= e= Siam/Thailand-specific works mentioned in the above article .itary Review. Cornell. A sophisticated revisionist rehabilitation of this monarch at the expense of the 1932 coup leadership. 1868-1910. CDP 96. Cornell. 3.

1976 "The Evolution of the Monarchy and Govermnent: Institutional Conflicts and Change. -. London: *1857 Son. Stanford Univ. pp.. ------------------------------------------ ----~ 235 ( Benda. Supplement No. 1963 "British and American Influence in Post-War Thailand.1I JAS. Saneh "Thai Politics and the October Revolution. Far and away the best treatment of the Sarit regime./ Thailand. Press. Darling. pp. Includes innovative analysis of Thai ideologies and of the politics of the Thai monarchy in +he postWorld War II period. 1957-1963: The Formative Years of Modern Thai Politics." Journ~Z of Southeast Asian History. Thak \ *1974 "The Sarit Regime. New Haven: Human Relations Bowring. Richard ~l963 U Nu of Burma.D... Trans. Tej 1976 The Provincial Administration London: oxford Univ. ThaiZand. ('Chaloemtiarana. Stanford: of Siam. . 449-56. *1960 Double Identity: The Chinese in Modern Hong Kong: Hong Kong Univ.. 1-41." Ph. John The Kingdom and People of Siam. Richard J. pp. John *1953 Some Aspects of Siamese Politics. 1. Parker and Wendell et a1. Area File. New York: Coughlin. Caldwell. Press. Alexander 1974 American Economic Aid to Thailand. thesis.---. 1892-191&. I. XXIII. Press." 1976 from Thai.. e1964 "nemoc racy ~ Blanchard. Butwel1. JournaZ of Social Science Review (Thammasat University).1I Asia. 1957 in In-donesia. 1. pp. Cornell.2. Mass. Bunnag. Institute of Pacific Relations. Frank C. Harry J.: Lexington Books. 88-102. coast. Lexington. 44-56. J. IV. Chanunarik.

Flood.-Thai relations. "Student Protest and Political Change in Thailand. /Evers. Feith. but now dated. Bureaucratization. contemporaine. Washington.S. Herbert e1962 The Decline of Constitutional Ithaca: Cornell Univ. IX. JAS. 2. 1969 Sous-d~veloppement et utopie au Siam. Context. 1973 PA. E. D. Hans-Dieter 1976 "The Formation of aSocial Class Structure: tirbanization. Paris: 'j' ! book on modern Thai politics. Bangkok: Thai Wattana Panich." likely to be a classic. 56-67. Press. XVII. Pierre 1967 .C. Theory.S. pp. States.. The best European Politics. *1977 . The United States and the Military Coup in ThaiZand. pp. 5-19. XLVII. L'EvoZution de la Thailande Armand Colin. backing for ThaL militarism. Washington.: Indochina Resource Center." v Fistie. Thadeus 1975 "The Thai Left Wing VII.: Best available account of U.C. 116-32. pp. pp. 1974 /' 1977 Dhiravegin. Likhit PoliticaZ Attitudes of the Bureaucratic Elite and Modernization in Thailand. pp. Democracy in Indonesia. 192-207." "Thailand in 1976: Another Defeat for Constitutional Democracy. D. BeAS. Paris: Mouton." AS. I' BCAS.1236 (con I t) *1965 Thailand and the-United Public Affairs Press. in Historical . 31-47. e1965 "History." In Neher. Pioneering 1976 analysis. pp. "The Vietnamese Refugees in Thailand: Minority Manipulation in Counterinsurgency. 3. 305-12.. and Social Mobility in Thailand. Traditional liberal critique of U. and Indonesian XXIV.

(see also nom de plume D. 355-71: reprinted in Neher 1976. University of Queensland. thesis. Ruth-Inge 1974 IITen Days in october--Students AS. University of Indiana. 346-59. Greene. John fate of Furnivall. 491-508. and Power in the Thai Social Order. Influential article politics. 387-405." PA. pp.237 (con't) Much the best discussion of the political the Vietnamese minority in modern times. Pr icha 1974 "The Role of the Military in Thai Political Development. XIV. Horrigan. pp. 1247-61: reprinted in Neher 1976. thesis." L. PA. Conventional but careful account under the controversial monarch. XLI." Anthropologist. Frederick J.L. XLII." PA. thesis. Lucien *1962 American "Merit. the Military. pp. pp.D. of Thai *1975 "The Thai Social Order as Entourage In Skinner and Kirsch. 107-23. pp. Insor) 1969 "Thailand's New cour se . Gir1ing.D." Hindley.S.D. and Circle. New York: New York Univ. stressing on the "anthropology" patron-client ties. 197-218. ph. pp. pp. Donald 1968 "Thailand: The Politics of Passivity. e1956 CoLonial Policy and Practice. 172-91. Stephen *1971 IIThai Government and Administration in the Reign of Rama VI (1910-1925). v Hongskrai1ers." Ph. 1I ." Ph. the royal favorites. University of London. 1977 "Thailand: The Coup and Its Implications. 1959 "Local Government and Administration in Thailand: A Study of Institutions and their cultural Setting. LXIV. Press. J. vs." Heinze. pp. of court politics Good material on V Hanks.

Poignant reflections on a generation of rapid social change in a Thai village. and Tokyo: Tuttle.) 1963 ThaiZand: A Political. Views Thai IIrnodernization as a superficial adaptation to external pressures. 1-6. Berkeley: Univ. In Jackson and Pye. Thailand Asian Case Study. Norman *1971 Modernization without Development. pp. Press. 1850-j970~ same press. pp. 3-22. updated version published 1971. III. James C. Press. 1955 Economic Change in. as an 1I Iconoclastic study of Thai society and politics in terms of a neO-Weberian patrimonial model. KeZantan 1969.238 Ingram. VIII. Kaufman. Ishii. Clive S. Unusually valuable anthropological study in that the author returns to his old fieldwork site after 20 years. Study in Thailand. q. Girling. Jumbala. Jacobs. (ed. John J. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. AS. el978 Islam and Politics in a Malay State. Yoneo 1968 "Church and State in Thailand. Social. as Economic Change in Thailand. New York: Praeger.Thailand since 1850. 1838- . Stanford: Stanford Univ. Kessler.S. pp. leaving traditional powerstructures essentially unchanged. and Lucian w. and Economic New York: Praeger. Press. of California Press. D. 1973-1976. ED1978 "Bureaucratic Polity: A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Power and Conununications in Indonesia. 864-71. 3. Jackson. Karl D. Karl D. (nom de plume of J. Howard 1976 Bangkhuad: A Community Vt. Countries. Prudhisan 1977 liThe Democratic Experiment in Thailand. Insor. 1I J Analysis.L. pye (eds. Rutland.11 Dyason House Papers (Melbourne). ll jJOhnson.v.) 1978 Political Power and Communications in Indonesia.) 1962 The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Princeton: Princeton Univ. Jackson.

Monograph Series of World Affairs. Pa. XXX. politically work on the still mysterious. Lobe. Biography. Chicago: Univ. XLIV. London: Cassell. $1968 Jean Ho Chi Minh: A Political Random House." PA./ Discus. pp. 425-42. pp. Thomas 1977 Civil-Military Beverly Hills: United States National Security Policy and Aid to the Thailand Police. *19-76 Relations in Thailand and Burma. and Lin. and Laos. Kenneth P. V Legge. especially useful historical overview of Isan's incorporation the contemporary Thai state. *1967 Isan: Regionalism ~n Northeastern Thailand. death of Rama VIII in 1946. Sage publications. for its into Still-valuable monograph. Possibly the earliest American account of 20thcentury Thai politics. e1972 Sukarno: A Politi~al Biography. Sein and Bruce Esposito 1976 "Agrarian Reform in Thailand: Problems Prospects. New York: Landon. Chambersburg. 551-67. Lacouture. Buddhist extremism Kruger. CDP 65. *1939 Siam in Transition. Denver: University of Denver.239 Keyes.)." In Bordwell smith (ed.: Wilson. John D. still well worth reading. Moshe Milita~y Roles in Mode~nization. Rayne 1964 The Devil's Detective momentous . Incisive study of right-wing in contemporary Siam. Charles F. Integration in Thailand. of Chicago Press. . 1971 1978 "Buddhism and National JAS. Burma." "Politica1Crisis and Militant Buddhism in contemporary Thailand. J Lissak. New York: Praeger. Religion and Legitimation of Power in Thailand.

Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. 1973 liThe Meo Hill Tribe Problem pp. 1972 "Legislative Intervention in Thailand's Development Process: A Case study. Bevars *1977 Marks. Michael L. pp. That Is ~ The War That Wi i l Be.D~ thesis. pp. Minorities and Nations Prlnceton: Princeton Univ. 929-44. James N. and Democracy. Barrington e1966 The Sooial Origins of Dictatorship Boston: Beacon Press. Princeton. Funny and horrible at the same time. New York: Random House.-240 (conlt) Splendid brief study of one important part of u.! Communism. Louis 1967 Mabry. Mokarapong. in Thailand. ." Lomax." In Peter Kunstadter (ed. e1965 The Rise of Indonesian Univ.s. Press. 1974 "Power and Parliament in Thailand: The Futile Challenge. II Ph. to be published 1978 as CDP. .). 144-228. pp." AS. Ruth T." In Lucian Pye (ed. Mich~el 1967 "A Minority and Its Government: The Thai-Lue of Northern Thailand.. Mosel. Moerman. XII-. Ithaca: Cornell Mezey.. pp. 306-17.). Bangkok: Chalermnit. Press. Southeast Asian Tribes. Moore. 401-24. Thai land: The va». Thomas A. Communications and Political Development. ~n Thailand. 1963 "Conununications Patterns and Political Socialization in Transitional Thailand. McVey." AS. Morell. 197~ liThe 1971 Coup in Thailand. 1972 Thawatt History of the Thai. XIII. Jr. liThe Development of Labor Institutions Ms. counter-insurgency activities in Siam in tbe1950s and 1960s. David L. D. XIII." AS. Revolution. 627-46.

. II 1976 "Political Legitimacy in Thailand: Problems and Prospects. Studies. "Stability and Instability AS. disabused account agrarian --. Thailand and the Struggle Cornell Univ. 1966 International Aid to Thailand: New Haven: Yale Univ. Nairn. 240-57.. Thailand. Ronald C.D. pp." V Neher.D. in Contemporary Cambridge. Kyoto: Kyoto Univ. thesis. The Dynamics of Politics and Administration in Rural Thailand. 1." 1975 *1976 Thai Politics. 241 Motooka. the volume lags well behind the realities of modern Thai politics. Entertaining. Clark D. 1965 Donald E.. 1097-113. in Siam. 42-121. Athens: Ohio University Center for Intll.Students.: Useful compilation of articles by leading Thai specialists in a variety of fields. activities I I I I' Nakata. Ph. Ithaca: . XV. XLIII. in Northern Thailand. thesis. Center for Southeast Asian Studies. Much of the data comes from the 1950s and early 19605. Takeshi 1971 Agricultural Development in Thailand.) Modern Schenkman. 1970 1974 "Constitutionalism and Elections PA. I. 1969 lIDistrict Level Politics Ph. Amusing period piece. Press. Nuechter1ein. University Angeles." of California at Los in Thailand.. consequently. pp. (ed.N. Vanderbilt. pp. Useful early study of Siam's growing problems. for Southeast Asia. SE Asia Series 10." Journal of Social Science Review (Thammasat University).- ~ The New Colonialism? of U. Mass. Thinapan 1972 liThe Problems of Democracy in Thailand: A Study of Political Culture and Socialization of College . Press. however.

Thai Information (Australia). iconoclastic Thai history. Herbert P. Berkeley: University of California Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies. II Phumisak. Ross and Narong Sinsawadi 1974 Thailand: Student Activism Bangkok: DK Books. 1I Inte1lectua1s. victor *1951 The Chinese Press. Thai. Foreign Values and Southeast Asian Scholarship. the only serious published American scholarship on Siam. 324-57. . Jit 1975 Chomna Sakdina Saeng Tawan. Peter A. in Joseph Fischer (ed.f I 242 Phillips. critique of Phillips. 1. Bangkok: Marxist Chomrom Nangs~ of Brilliant. Wilson *1964 "Certain Effects of Culture and Social Organization on Internal Security in Thailand.). *1970 The Vietnamese Press. pp. University of Queensland. Bangkok: Samakhom Sangkhomsat haeng Prathet Thai. publ. London: Oxford Dniv. Contains useful material on the Chinese community in Siam.A. Wisuth IIProblems in the Development of Democracy in Thailand. 34-37. Herbert P. Ithaca: Cornell Vniv. *1976 interpretation Khwampenma kh9ng kham sayam thai lao lae kh9m lae Zaksana thang sangkhom kh9ng ch~ chonchat. orig." In Skinner "Some Premises of American Scholarship on Thailand. pp. In Neher. 1975 ~n Thailand. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation. 1973. M. 1977 Resouree Poole. Pothithaen. 1I Pisalchai. A most pioneering 1976 study. 446~66. Research Monograph 11. II Prizzia. Asia. _ 1975 liThe Culture of Siamese and Kirsch. ~n Southeast and poZitieal Change. Memorandum RM-3786-ARPA. and David A. and its relations with Thai governments and China. pp. thesis. So far. Natee "Village Scouts. purcell.

thesis. II Reynolds. *1966 The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and Development.D. Polity. Honolulu: East-West Center Press. Studies. thesis. Ph. pp. William J. pp. Jeffrey 1974 1975 "The War in Northern Thailand.D. Race. as Supreme The Modernization of a Bureaucratic East-West Center Press. *1969 Akin The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period~ 1782-1873. XV.D. Herbert J. thesis. University Wisconsin. Patriarch. I Siffin.D. II Samuthvanit. Modern Asian AS. IIPo1itical Development and Modernization in the 1970 Non-Industrial State: The Experience of Thailand. 1972 "will and Awe: The Local Thai Official and Rural Development. Fred W. VIII.243 Rabibhadana. 85-112. Contains very useful data on the economic activities and interrelationships of the Thai military politicians of the 1950s. Ph. "The January 375-81. Paul R. Early attempt at developing a political science framework for understanding modern Siamese politics. . Cornell. American University. Rubin. Massachussetts Institute of Technology. CDP 74. 1971 Chaianan liThe Politics and Administration of the Thai Budgetary Process. II of Shirk. thesis. focusing on the reign Prince Wachirayan. *1966 Thailand: Honolulu: Century study. *1972 liThe Buddhist Monkhood in Nineteenth Thailand. Brilliant analysis of rule in the late Ayutthaya and early Bangkok periods. Craig J. II 1975 Thai Elections." Ph." Ph. Important pioneering of Rama V's brother. Riggs.

Harvey H. thesis. Press. *1968 Area Handbook for Thailand. Starner. Journal of Siam Society. e1977 Skinner. et al. Oxford Vniv. Khamsing 1973 The Politician and Other Stories. William and A." Srinawk. in honor of Lauriston Washington. of California Press. Somvichian. Thomas Kirsch (eds. Kamol liThe Thai Military in Politics: An Analytic Ph. II . of the best single book on modern Leadership Thailand. Silverstein. Siam. Skinner. Printing Office. 237-74. of Stagnation. William *1957 Chinese Society Ithaca: Cornell Arguably *1958 in Thailand: An Analytic Univ.D. G. LXIV. Press. G. Kuala Lumpur: stori€s Well-translated collection of satirical by one of Siam's best-known writers. Laurence D. pp. Study. Press. and Po~er in the Chines~ Community Ithaca: Cornell Vniv. Peasantry. Cornell Vniv. History.S. Gov't. Josef Burma: Military Ithaca: Cornell Rule and the Politics Univ. e196l Magsaysay and the Philippine Vniv.C. Berkeley: Stifel. Press.244 (con't) Discussion of bureaucratic change in Siam from the late 19th century to the 1950s from a straightforward "public administration" perspective.: U. 1969 D. Smith. Press. Frances L. University of London. Miscellany of essays Ithaca: Sharp.) 1975 Change and Persistence in Thai Society. 1976a "Patterns of Land Ownership in Central Thailand during the Twentieth Century. Systematic study of the power structure of the Chinese community in the 19508. and of its relations with the Thai political elite.

1I in Thailand. II IILoya1ists and Separatists: The Muslims in Southern Thailand. Virginia *1941 Thailand~ The New Siam. Embassy in Bangkok from 1968-1970. 1973 "Modernization and Counter-Revolution BCAS. 1976 "Technocrats and Modernization AS. pp.S. Thaxton. Valuable material the Thai Sangha.J. 187-203. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Astri 1975 1977 Suksamran. pp. 265-73. Somboon Political Buddhism St. 237-50. Symposium on the Northeast [of Siam]. VII. Martinis. 1I Case.). Buddhism and the Spirit Cults in North-east *1970 Thailand. politics (1966). . In Mark Selden (ed.--~-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ~. XVII. in Southeast Asia. New York: Pantheon. pp. Russak. VI. pp. New York: Crane. ~ 245 (con-t. II Thomas. Ladd Political Vi~lence in the Muslim Provinces of 1975 Southern Thailand. New York: of on the internal AS. 1I IIIrredentism contained: The Thai-Muslim Comparative Politics. XVI. 1974 Trial in Thailand. Press. V. New York: Macmillan. George K. 28-38. Remaking Asia. Tanham was Special Assistant for Counter-Insurgency at the U. Cambridge: Tanham. AS. Ralph 1971 IIModernization and Peasant Resistance in Thai1and. 1976 World Conqueror and World Renouncer. 4. Press. in Thai1and.) 1976b Suhrke. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 1184-96. M. Thompson. Tambiah. pp. Cambridge Univ. S. Occasional Paper 28.

57-110." International Studies. / Tunsiri. pp. The United Front in Thailand: A Documentary Analysis. 18511868: Thailand on the Eve of Modernization. University of Indiana. Affairs.D. Studies. *1970 "The Military and Development in Thailand. Wales. thesis. London: Shepperton. Venkataramani. 1784-1885.S. II Journal of Comparative Administration.D. in Thailand. and Thailand: The Anatomy of Super-Power Policymaking: 1948-1963. 1970 Albert 1970 Donald E. Looking Forward. C. Police and the Modernization Process: Thailand. Ungphakorn." Ph. Constance 1970 "State and Society in the reign of Mongkut. 1966 Jin "The Military in Politics: A Study of Military Leadership in Thailand. II. of California Press. Carl A. 1. Cornell. Singapore: Univ. Wilson. New York: Colombia Institute for Int'l. e1978 Prince of Pirates. 1977 Puey Thailand: Glancing Backward. Woodrow Wilson School of Public and Intll. vi Weed. University of Oregon • . M.D. pp.246 Trocki. H. /Vibhatakarasa." Ph.. Walter *1955 1978 F. / Weatherbee. 1973 "The U. Vella. Honolulu: Univ.S. Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the Development of Thai Nationalism. Fred R. The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore. Public Affairs Monograph 3. Princeton: Princeton University. 3. Quaritch *1931 Ancient London: Siamese Government Quaritch." Ph. 323-40./ Von der Mehden. . XII. and Administration. Press of Hawaii. The Impact of the West on Government Berkeley: Univ. of Singapore Press.G. Vichai 1971 "The Social Background and the Legislative Recruitment of the Thai Members of Parliament and theii Political Consequences. thesis. thesis.

Problems of Communism. Ithaca: cornell Univ. Wilson. pp. Singapore: Institute of southeast Asian Studies. IIInsurgency in Thailand.). Press. 3. pp. Yano.T 247 Wilson. New Haven: valuable study of changing educational policies in the broader context of politics during the reign of Rama V. IIPolitical Tradition and Political Thailand. V 1978 Reflections on the Collapse of Democracy in Thailand. and David A. hut still the best general political science book in English on Thai politics. Wyatt. Toru 1968 Zimmerman. 1960 "Thailand and Marxism. VIII. Robert F. II AS. In Frank N. 1I *1962a Politics in Thailand. 509-29. Herbert 1I In Johnson.) of Thailand. 18-39. in Thai Politics. Marxism in Southeast Asia. Press. pp. 331-43. Now badly out of date. stanford: Stanford Univ. *1962b *1964 1970 *1976 "The Military pp. David K. pp. (See under Phillips. XIV. David A." In Neher. Press." XXV. Change in The United States and the Future New York: Praeger. "Student 'Revolution' in Thailand: The End of the Thai Bureaucratic Polity?" AS. Trager (ed. in Thailand. *1969 The Politics of Reform Yale Univ. 1974 1976 IILand Tenure in Thailand. 58-101. 253-75. . 853-63. pp. P.

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