THE

SIX SYSTEMS
OF

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

OF

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

BY

THE RIGHT HON.

F.

MAX MULLER,

K.M.

FOREIGN MEMBER OF THE FRENCH INSTITUTE

NEW YORK

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND
LONDON AND BOMBAY
1899

CO.

PREFACE.
IT
is

not without serious misgivings that I venture
life

at this late hour of

workers and

all

who

to place before my felloware interested in the growth

of philosophical thought throughout the world, some of the notes on the Six Systems of Indian Philo-

sophy which have accumulated
for
It

in

my

note-books

as early as 1852 that I many years. published my first contributions to the study of

was

Indian philosophy in the Zeitsckrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft. My other occupahowever, and, more particularly, my preparations for a complete edition of the Rig- Veda, and
tions,

voluminous commentary, did not allow me at that time to continue these contributions, though my interest in Indian philosophy, as a most important part of the literature of India and of
its

same.
I

Universal Philosophy, has always This interest was kindled

remained the
afresh

when

had

to finish for the Sacred

Books of the East

(vols. I

and XV)

the

remote

my translation of the Upanishads. sources of Indian philosophy, and
Some

especially of the Vedanta-philosophy, a system in which human speculation seems to me to have

reached

of the other systems of Indian philosophy also have from time to time
its

very acme.

VI

PREFACE.

roused the curiosity of scholars and philosophers in Europe and America, and in India itself a revival of philosophic and theosophic studies, though not
leads to a

always well directed, has taken place, which, if it more active co-operation between Euro-

pean and Indian thinkers, rnture of most important

be productive in the results. Under these cir-

may

cumstances a general desire has arisen, and has repeatedly been expressed, for the publication of
a more general and comprehensive account of the six systems in which the philosophical thought of

India has found

its full

realisation.

More recentlv the excellent publications of Professors Deussen and Garbe in Germany, and of Dr. G. Thibaut in India, have given a new impulse to
these important studies, important not only in the eyes of Sanskrit scholars by profession, but of all

who wish to become acquainted with all the solutions which the most highly gifted races of mankind have These proposed for the eternal riddles of the world. studies, to quote the words of a high authority, have indeed ceased to be the hobby of a few individuals, and have become a subject of interest to the whole nation Professor Deussen's work on
'.

the Vedanta-philosophy (1883) an( l nis translation of the Vedanta-Sutras (1887), Professor Garbe's

Samkhya-Sutras (1889) followed work on the Su^khya-philosophy (1894), by and, last not least,, Dr. G. Thibaut's careful and
his

translation of the

most useful translation
vols.

of the Vedanta-Sutras in

XXXIV

of the East (1890

and XXXVIII of the Sacred Books and 1896), mark a new era in the
8,

Words

of the Viceroy of India, see Times, Nov.

1898.

PREFACE.

vii

study of the two most important philosophical systems of ancient India, and have deservedly placed the names of their authors in the front rank
of Sanskrit scholars in Europe. object in publishing the results of

My

my own

studies in Indian philosophy was not so much to restate the mere tenets of each system, so deliberately and so clearly put forward by the reputed authors
of the

a more

principal philosophies of India, as to give comprehensive account of the philosophical

activity of the Indian nation from the earliest times, and to show how intimately not only their religion,

but their philosophy
national

also,

was connected with the
inhabitants
of
so
India,

character

of the

a point

of view which has of late been
St.

ably

maintained by Professor Knight of University *.
*/

Andrews

It
its

was only
physical

a country like India, with all advantages and disadvantages, that
in.

such a rich development of philosophical thought as 'we can watch in the six systems of philosophy,
could

have taken

place.

In ancient India there
life.

could hardly have been a very severe struggle for

were abundantly provided by nature, and people with few tastes could live there like the birds in a forest, and soar like birds towards the fresh air of heaven and the eternal sources of light and truth. What was there to do

The

necessaries of

life

who, in order to escape from the heat of the tropical sun, had taken their abode in the shade of groves or in the caves of mountainous valleys except
for those

to meditate

on the world
See 'Mind,'

in

which they found them-

vol. v. no. 17.

Vlll

PREFACE.

placed, they did not know how or why ? There was hardly any political life in ancient India, such as we know it from the Vedas, and in consequence neither political strife nor municipal ambiNeither art nor science existed as yet, to tion.
selves
call forth

While

the energies of this highly gifted race. we, overwhelmed with newspapers, with

parliamentary reports, with daily discoveries and discussions, with new novels and time-killing social
functions,

have hardly any leisure left to dwell on metaphysical and religious problems, these problems formed almost the only subject on which the old
inhabitants of India could spend their intellectual Life in a forest was no impossibility in energies.

the Avarm climate of India, and in the absence of

the most ordinary means of communication, what was there to do for the members of the small
settlements dotted over the country, but to give expression to that wonder at the world which is

the beginning of all philosophy ? Literary ambition could hardly exist during a period when even tli^
art of writing was not yet known, and when there was no literature except what could be spread and handed down by memory, developed to an extra-

ordinary and almost incredible extent under a careBut at a time when fully elaborated discipline.
people could not yet think of public applause or private gain, they thought till the more of truth
;

and hence the perfectly independent and honest character of most of their philosophy.

my wish to bring the results Indian philosophy nearer to us. and, if possible, to rouse our sympathies for their honest efforts to throw some rays of li<rht on
of this
national

It has long been

PREFACE.

IX

the dark problems of existence, whether of the objective world at large, or of the subjective spirits,

whose knowledge of the world

constitutes, after

all,

the only proof of the existence of an objective world. The mere tenets of each of the six systems of Indian philosophy are by this time well known, or easily
accessible,

more

accessible, I should say,

than even

those of the leading philosophers of Greece or of modern Europe. Every one of the opinions at

which the originators of the

six principal schools of

Indian philosophy arrived, has been handed down to us in the form of short aphorisms or Sutras, so as to leave but little room for uncertainty as to
the exact position which each of these philosophers occupied on the great battlefield of thought.

We

know what an enormous amount

of labour had

to be spent and is still being spent in order to ascertain the exact views of Plato and Aristotle,

nay, even of

Kant and Hegel, on some

of the most

important questions of their systems of philosophy. There are even living philosophers whose words
often leave us in doubt as to what they mean, whether they are materialists or idealists, monists
or dualists, theists or atheists.

Hindu philosophers

seldom leave us in doubt on such important points, and they certainly never shrink from the consequences of their theories. They never equivocate or try to hide their opinions where they are Kapila, for instance, the likely to be unpopular.

author or hero eponymus of the Samkhya-philosophy, confesses openly that his system is atheistic, ani.svara, without an active Lord or God, but in spite of
that, his

system was treated as legitimate by his conit

temporaries, because

was reasoned out

consistently,

try even by any means to foist an active God into their philosophies. nay. required some transcendent and Without invisible power. shrink from calling themselves nay. free from all the if trammels of human activity and personality.X PREFACE. old Sa?/ikhya system reported to have been a worshipper of idols and to have seen in them. the not dishonesty. nor in any reality the lookers-on themselves. the most decided monist. despite of all their hideousness. and the upholder of Brahman. such as *Sa/kara. What is most curious is that a philosopher. but From yet endowed with wisdom. and hence the Sa?/zkhya-philosophy declares itself fearlessly as an-i.svara. the Yoga. to find in the some place for an Isvara or a personal God. and has often delayed recognition of a Godhead. Lord-less. nevertheless atheists. and will. This leads to philosophical ambiguity. in order to escape the damaging charge of atheism. Mere names have acquired with us such a power that the authors of systems in which there is clearly no room for an active God. as he thought. can provide any room for a creator or governor of the world. for the ignorant. no theory of evolution? whether ancient or modern (in Sanskrit Parmama). a philosophical point of view. no objective world. original matter. is Deity. power. even though they have no eyes as yet to see what is hidden behind the idols. and admitted. What I admire in Indian philosophers that . the so-called Purushas. leaving it to another philosophy. them there would be no evolution of Praknti. useful. and what was the true is meaning of them. the Purushas or spirits. symbols of the as the cause of all things. as a neuter.

he does not go so far as to say that he can prove the non-existence of such a Being. They are bona Jide idealists or materialists. they hold that the objective world requires though not necessarily a visible or tangible substratum. denies the reality of anything but the One Brahman. though likewise idealists and believers in an unseen Purusha (subject). on the contrary. that he cannot establish His existence by the In ordinary channels of evidential knowledge. any trace of intellectual cowardice. and. theists or atheists. because their reverence stronger than their reverence for anything else. for instance. they are never afraid to speak out. like Kant. monists or dualists. is a fearless idealist. as others have done. They do not allow themselves to be driven one inch beyond their self-chosen position. The followers of the Samkhya.PREFACE. is concerned. XI they never try to deceive us as to their principles and the consequences of their theories. as a monist. leave us in no doubt that they are and mean to be atheists. inference. the Universal Spirit. The Vedantist. As a careful reason er. they say so. neither of these statements can I discover. They first examine the instruments of knowledge which man possesses. These are sensuous perception. and a if real. If they are idealists. as a personal creator and ruler of the world. which is for truth is to account for the whole of the phenomenal world. so far as the existence of an active God. however. Kapila never refers to Him in his Sutras. a maker and ruler of the world. but he is satisfied with stating. and an unseen Prakriti (objective substance). even to the verge of nihilism. and as none of these can supply us with the knowledge of a Supreme Being. and verbal authority. but .

such as is granted to human beings. her evolution. simply a desire to abide within the strict limits of knowledge. nothing confined in space and time. and all the rest. though we should always remember that with him there is nothing phenomenal. such as >Siva. his aloneness. the Lord. We must distinguish however. he held that Prakriti. or subject. so as to stop her acting and to regain is presence of a magnet. spirit. Supreme Isvara. he simply treats them as 6ranyesvaras and temporal gods (Sutras and he does not allow. was by no means or Karyesvaras. however.Xll PREFACE. as postulated by other systems of philosophy or religion. Only through the presence of this Purusha and through his temporary interest in Prakriti could her movements. He does not argue against the possibility even of the gods of the vulgar. comm. literally man.). and his perfect bliss. just as the movements of iron have to be accounted for by the All this movement. He recognised in every man a soul which he called Purusha. motionless. Kapila. his indepen- dence. her changes and variety be accounted for. even to the III. philosophy is to make Purusha turn his eyes away from Prakr/ti. would for ever have remained dead. or primordial matter with its infinite potentialities. produced a nihilist or Nastika. and thoughtless. the creator and ruler of the world. because without such without such endless Purushas. more than a phenomenal existence. though he boldly confessed himself an atheist. or a power. that does not in the end rest on something real and eternal. Whatever we may think of such views of the . Visrmu. for himself his oneness. 57. and the highest object of Kapila's temporary only.

for some reason or other. it seems to me the very perfection for the treatment of philosophy. nature of philosophy that every philosopher must be a heretic. that throughout. that is. there is one thing which we cannot help admiring. but not argumentative. and that is the straightforwardness and freedom with which they are elaborated. How do we know ? the first place. Generally speaking. but we must remember that almost the first question which every one of the Hindu systems of philosophy tries to settle In thus giving the Noetics is. even if. It is in the bows before his self-chosen Veda as the seat of a revealed authority. and other systems of Indian philosophy. and downrightness with which each searcher after truth follows his track without ever looking right or left. the Vedanta. positive This may be true to a certain extent and particularly with regard to the Vedanta-philosophy. It never leaves us in any doubt as to the exact opinions held by each philoWe may miss the development and the sopher. dialectic eloquence with which Plato and Hegel propound their thoughts. but we can always appreciate the perfect freedom.PREFACE. Hindu philosophy it is but does not prove. like the Vedantists. a free chooser. It has sometimes been said that asserts. he. in the etymological sense of the word. the thinkers of the East seem to me again superior to most of the philosophers of the West. Xlii world as are put forward by the Sa?7ikhya. they admitted three legitimate channels by which knowledge can reach . However imperfect the style in which their theories perfect have been clothed may appear from a literary point of view. freshness.

telling us clearly what they take for granted. whether perception. would have been avoided. may nevertirely dependent theless accept some of the utterances of the Veda as they w ould accept the opinions of eminent men or <Sishfas. who profess themselves enon reasoning (Manana). and to have clearly seen this is. a very How much high distinction of Indian philosophy. and then advancing step by step from the The Vedantist. though always with the proviso that even the Veda could never make a false opinion true. to form the S&mkhya philosophers. or their various conceptions of the world. if a proper place had been assigned in limine to the question of what constitutes our legitimate or our only possible channels of knowledge. but authority In some systems rejected. that authority is revelation. inference. Such an examination of the authorities of human knowledge (Pramanas) ought. >Sruti. inference. freely chosen or freely and authority. The same relative authority is granted to Smrtti or tradition. revelation. paruseless controversy ticularly among Jewish.XIV PREFACE. and Christian philosophers. $abda. or anything else ! Supported by these inquiries into the evidences of truth. lation or the foundations to the highest pinnacles of their systems. Mohammedan. but there with the proviso that it must not be in contradiction with ^Sruti or revelation. after giving us his reasons why reve- Veda stands higher with him than . us. or the Veda. perception. as it seems to me. Hindu philosophers have built up their various systems of philosophy. in others it is the word of any recognised Thus it happens that the authority. of course. Apta-va&ana. r introduction to every system of philosophy.

nor from others. actually puts $ruti in the place of sensuous perception. because if the existence of anything besides the absolute One or the Supreme Being were admitted. All that exists is taken as One. that there should be multiplicity in the world. that it is not and cannot be real. not only of individual but of ignorance as inseparable from ignorance. But then came the question for Indian philosophers to solve. The conception of the world as deduced from the Veda. for it was perfect. and chiefly from the Upanishads. either from itself. and that there should be constant change in our experience. XV sensuous perception and inference.PREFACE. but presupposes a long preparation of metaphysical thought. how it was possible. whatever the Second by the side of the One might be. at least for the discovery of the highest truth (Paramartha). exists. could have received no impulse to change. That ignorance. namely. fold Then what is the philosopher to say to this maniand ever-changing world ? There is one thing only that he can say. but can be destroyed . and would have made the concept of the One self-contradictory. nescience human nature. It could hardly have been arrived at by a sudden intuition or inspiration. and allows to perception and inference no more than an authority restricted to the phenomenal (Vyavaharika) world. is indeed astounding. what they called Brahman. undisturbed by any foreign influences. for it was Second-less. if there was but the One. it would constitute a limit to what was postulated as limitless. They knew that the one absolute and unde- termined essence. but must be accepted as the result of or Avidya. though unreal it in the highest sense.

though deriving its its phenomenal character from the its real moon which remains unaffected in ness. The One Real Being is there. it follows that this cosmic ignorance also must be looked upon as not real. includes ourselves quite as much as what we call the objective world. with this difference. Only it must be remem- we perceive can never be the absolute Brahman. the latter never.XVI PREFACE. by Vidya. another is that of the Sa?khya. nor can it be said only. it should be remembered. just as the moon which we see manifold and tremulous in bered that what ever changing reflections on the waving surface of the ocean. i. Self nor what in our knowledge is not our Self. the Vedanta view. is not the real moon. the knowledge conveyed by the Vedanta. nothing that exists in our knowledge could exist. but temporary It cannot be said to exist. and as nothing that can at any time be annihilated has a right to be considered as real. e. though we suffer from it for a time. can never claim It is impossible to absolute reality and perpetuity. as little as it is possible to define Brahman. the Brahman. has its reality in Brahman alone. is called forth. like the mirage in a desert. which looks upon This is . just as our own ordinary ignorance. unapproachable remote- Whatever we may think of such a view of the cosmos. that the former can be annihilated. neither our it is not visible. according to the Vedanta. not to exist. only nor perceptible in its true character by any of the senses but without it. . knowledge. a cosmos which. it is clear that our name of nihilism would be by no means applicable to it. one view of the world. The phenomenal world which. however. define Avidya. but a perverted picture only.

why should an observer. of Prakrtti. constitute the real object of what was originally meant by philosophy. The itself is of no consequence.PREFACE. possible so to define the meaning of philosophy as to exclude men such as even Plato and Spinoza altogether. a collector and analyser. as put forward by the other systems of Indian philosophy. and Kant in the original. Hume. of Des It is in that Walhalla of real Cartes and Spinoza. Of course. b . and treats the individual perceiver as or separation produce final bliss or absoluteness. and to include on the contrary name self every botanist. of Locke. but its definition is. and by their discrimination individual. A President. which by their union or identification cause what we call the world. This determining idea has secured even to the guesses of Thales and Heraclitus their permanent place among the historical representatives of the development of philosophical thought by the side of Plato and Aristotle. I hope that the time will come when no one will claim that name who is not acquainted at least with the two prominent systems of ancient Indian philosophy. that I claim a place of honour for the philosophers representatives of the it is Vedanta and Samkhya. the Vedanta and the Samkhya. that is an explanation of the world. does not call himself His Majesty. with some other less important views of the world. however powerful. These two. eternally besides these two admitting nothing powers. XV11 our perceptions as perceptions of a substantial something. of Des Cartes and Spinoza. And if hitherto no one would have called hima philosopher who had not read and studied the works of Plato and Aristotle. the potentiality of all things. entomologist. or bacteriologist.

but we dwell on one or two of the strong points of their character. Even thus it could not well be avoided that in giving an account of each of the six systems. truth of the view taken by Vigwana-Bhikshu and cations others that there behind the variety of the sixsystems a common fund of what may be called is national or popular philosophy. and all the rest. contrary. if I can claim any thanks. as It professes to be no yet. a large Manasa lake of philosophical thought and language. if . full ? however of information. with but slight modifi- and the longer I have studied the various the more have I become impressed with the systems. while I should not be surprised. truly say in my conscious of the defects of this History of Indian It cannot be called a Philosophy as I myself. friends. and in the distant Past. from which each thinker was allowed to draw for his poses. Kapila. Badarayana. own purThus. to me less important and not calculated to appeal to European If we want our friends to love our sympathies. much in common. .XVlil PREFACE. history. claim the name of philosopher As a rule. far away in the distant North. for they all share so . no one knows so well the and I can own case that few people can be so more than a description of some of the salient points of each of the six recognised systems of Indian philoIt does not claim to be complete on the sophy. I believe that defects of his book as the author himself. because the chronological framework is. it is for having endeavoured to omit whatever seemed. almost entirely absent. This is what I have tried to do for my old friends. we do not give a full account of every one of their good qualities. there should be much repetition.

informs me that the only system that can now be its said to be living in India is the Vedanta with danta. but the works studied are generally the later controversial treatises. and if my own book were soon to be superseded by a more complete and more comprehensive examination of Indian philosophy. little as it may be. A friend of mine. such as the Paw&adasl Some and Yoga-Vasish^Aa. and numerous Pandits can be found to-day in all these sects who have learnt at least the principal works by heart and can expound them. although expensive much in other sacrifices are occasionally The Agnishfoma was performed. students of philosophy may think that there is really too much of the same subject.PEEFACE. especially in Bengal. a native of India. he writes. the MadhThe Vevas. and the Vallabhas. mixed with religion. discussed again and again in the six different schools. year performed last Of the other systems. such as the Upanishads. the BrahmaSutras. has become a living faith. the Nyaya only finds devotees. The Purva-Mlma msa / is still studied in Southern India. the Ramanu^as. Sanskrit scholars were to blame XIX having left out too much. being branches. not the earlier ones. but not parts. at Benares. the Advaitis. b2 . whom I consulted about the various degrees of popularity enjoyed I at the present in his day by different systems of philosophy own country. the great Commentaries of the A&aryas and the Bhagavad-gita. and my best reward will be if a new interest shall spring up for a long neglected mine of philosophical thought. of the less important treatises also are studied. me for have done my best.

enthusiasm of native students may seem to have carried them too far. is always dangerous. the Liyht of Truth. But such journals as the Pandit. Nor should the chronology of Indian philosophy. though it may show clear traces of Sanskrit . that and most degenerate even this small remnant of philosophical learning will vanish in one or two generations. In the their labour be restricted to Sanskrit texts. In some cases the France. Germany. even if belonging to orthodox Brahmanic families. except in its purely practical It is feared. Italy.XX PREFACE. and lately the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society. the Brahmavddin. What we want are texts and translaand any information that can throw light on tions. after studying the history of European philosophy. and England. do not take to these studies. South of India there exists a philosophical literature which. The Vaiseshika form. as the youths of the present day. we should welcome all the more a new class of native students who. have been doing most valuable service. inevitable I as it is said to be in India. have devoted themselves to the honorable task of making their own national philosophy better known to the world at large. and a mixing up of philosophical with religious and theosophic propaganda. Rome. hope that my book may prove useful to them by showing them in what direction they may best assist us in our attempts to secure a place to thinkers such as Kapila and Badarayana by the side of the leading philosophers of Greece. is neglected and so is the Yoga. however. But though we may regret that the ancient method of philosophical study is dying out in India. as there is no encouragement.

Gough.I. and he be allowed to appeal to younger men for such may help as he himself in his younger days has often and nor the gladly lent to his Gurus and fellow-labourers. M. complain that there is nothing left to do in Sanskrit literature. I believe. contains also original indigenous elements of great beauty and of great importance for historical Unfortunately few scholars only have taken up. the translator of the Vaiseshika-Sutras. and their friends. E. would.. How much may be done in another direction by students of Tibetan literature in furthering a study of Indian philosophy has lately been proved by the publications of Sarat Chandra and Satis Chandra Achaiya Vidyabhushana. .' for his extreme kindness in reading a revise of my proofA man of seventy-six has neither the eyes sheets. as yet. C. and the Das.PREFACE.A. A. XXi influence. M. May i. OXFORD. M. but young students who purposes. author of the 'Philosophy of the Upanishads.E. the study of the Dravidian languages and literature.. find their labours amply rewarded in that field. F. 1899. In conclusion I have to thank Mr. memory which he had at twenty-six.

.

. . . ... . . PAGE i 3 Upanishad-period.. . . . . .. .. . . .. .... . . . . . . 14 18 19 21 21 . 34 36 39 CHAPTEE TheVedas The Philosophical II... .. . . .. .. . .. . . .. from about 700 B... . 28 30 Greek Accounts . . . . ... . kanaka. .. . Period antecedent to the Upanishads Intellectual Life in ancient India 6 6 9 1 1 Kshatriyas and Brahmawas .. .. ...CONTENTS.. Hiouen-thsang King Harsha . Brahma-^ala-sutta Mahabharata Buddha . Prasena^it and Bimbisara .. . ...... INTEODUCTOEY CHAPTEE.. ... . . Buddhist Pilgrims. ... .. . .. The Evidence of the Upanishads.. 46 48 49 51 . . . A^atasatru A^atasatru Buddhist Period . . c. . .... .. 43 Basis of the Vedic Gods Three Classes of Vedic Gods Other Classifications of Gods The Visve or All-gods . Philosophy and Philosophers Sruti and Smnti . THE VEDAS.

. . . . . . .. .. . . . . .. Growth of Philosophical Ideas . . . . . . ... . .. .146 . 97 Prasthana Bheda .. . .... .... 2... . . . . Tad Nasadiya Ekam . ... 3.. 5.. . .. . . . Karman . . Atman . Visvakarman Tvashfri . ... . . . its various Meanings Br?h and Brahman. .143 . . .121 . Brahman. .113 .114 . .. .. . .118 . . . 98 1 1 1 1 1 1 Literary References in the Upanishads The Six Systems of Philosophy . . . .. . . among . .. .. . Search for a Supreme Deity Hymn to the Unknown God .137 . . Bnhaspati-Sutras Books of Reference .123 137 Common 1. Tendencies towards Unity Henotheism Monotheism and Monism Pra^apati .. . Mnemonic Literature The Brihaspati. .119 . . 52 53 53 55 57 57 . . . . . Infallibility of the Veda . . ... .116 . .... . . . . . PAGE the Gods . . THE SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY... . . . . . . . .. ... .XXIV CONTENTS. . . . Brahman. . . . . . Atman.. . . . . Immortality of the Soul . 4. Sawkhya-Sutras Vedanta-Sutras . .. . Pessimism . . 88 93 95 Pra^apati. CHAPTEE III.Philosophy . .. .. .. 59 60 63 64 68 72 77 .146 ... .. . . .. Hymn . .138 . Word East and West Mind and Speech . . .139 . . Brahman. Three Guwas . . . . .. . . . . Philosophical Ideas Metempsychosis Sawisara . . .. 6.. . . Atman . Dates of the Philosophical Sutras .

.. . . .229 .. . . . . 159 Translation of the Upanishads Character of the Upanishads . .. .. The Sthula.227 229 . . . . .... .. 203 204 209 215 .. . Ways Ramanuf/a Metaphors .179 . . . . . . . XXV CHAPTER IV. . ..188 188 Pratyaksha Anumana Sabda . Work-part and Knowledge-part of the Veda Vidya and Avidya Subject and Object . ... . . The Meaning of Veda .. . . . . . . .and Sukshma-sarira The Four States Eschatology . PAGE Vedanta or Uttara-Mimamsa . . . X 53 . . . . Appeals to the Veda .. . . . . .226 . . . .... .. . Pramawas Pramawas according .195 195 . . .187 . . . . 224 is Everything .189 .. . . Vedanta-Sutras . 239 243 255 . . . . Badarayawa Fundamental Doctrines of the Vedanta .236 . . . . of .190 . Philosophy and Religion Karman Brahman .. . . . . .. . .182 .220 . Authority of the Vedas .. The Phenomenal Cause and Effect Keality of the Creation or Causation Dreaming and Waking The Higher and the Lower Knowledge Is Virtue Essential to Moksha ? The Two Brahmans . . . . . .. .. . . . . Freedom Different in this Life .. . . . to the Samkhya . . . . .. ... . . .. . 198 199 199 202 . .184 . . .. . . . .186 . . Studying Philosophy . .148 . . .. .217 . . ... . . . . . . . . .CONTENTS.. ... .. VEDANTA OR UTTARA-MIMAA/SA.. .224 . World . . .. . .

. . 314 Bana's Harsha/oirita .. . . . .318 . ... . . . . . . Asvalayana's Gr/'hya-Sutras Did Buddha borrow from Kapila? .266 270 275 . .. Purva-Mimamsa a system of Philosophy? . .311 . Anteriority of Vedanta or Atheism and Orthodoxy Authority of the Veda Samkhya hostile to Priesthood . The Avyakta Buddhi. . . . Upanishads . . . . . . PAGH Purva-Mimawsa Contents of the Purva-Mimamsa 258 263 . . . Ahamkara Five Tanmatras . . ..... . .316 . . The Tattva-samasa . ... .294 . .. .292 . 328 . . Asvaghosha's Buddha-ftarita Buddhist Suttas . . . . ... Supposed Atheism of Purva-Mimamsa Is the ... . Samkhya-karikas Date of Gaudapada Tattva-samasa . . ...XXVI CONTENTS... . . . . . .286 288 .. . .281 . . SAMKHYA-PHILOSOPHY. . . . .. . . . Pramawas of (?aimini Sutra-style . . 279 CHAPTER VI. . . . . . . Samkhya-Philosophy Later Vedanta mixed with Samkhya Relative Age of Philosophies and Sutras . ... .320 . .... . .. 281 Age of the Kapila-Sutras . 309 . to . . . . .312 313 . . . . . .322 326 . . .. List of Twenty-five Tattvas . . . . . Has the Veda a Superhuman Origin ? .-500 Samkhya 303 305 306 307 Parallel development of Philosophical Systems Buddhism subsequent Lalita-vistara .. . . . PURVA-M!MAM8A. .. .. . .. . ... . . ..290 ... . . . ..321 .265 . CHAPTER V.310 . . .. . ....

Nescience Weakness Atushti and Tushft Asiddhis and Siddhis Tushfts and Siddhis . . . . .. .. . .. . -343 -345 ... Aviveka Atman and Purusha . . 346 348 348 350 35 1 351 (5) . . (5) Avidya.. of the .361 . . .. .. . . . . . . Nature of Pain Vedanta and Samkhya Vedanta. ........ . 358 358 359 The True Meaning .. . .. .. . .. .367 . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . .. . . 334 335 . . Adhyatma.. Bondage Dakshiwa-bondage. . .. Gifts to Priests Moksha Pramawas Du/ikha . -33 -33 .330 330 331 . . ... . . . ...-352 . . . . . .. .. .. . . . Avidya. . .. . . . . . . . Manas Five Mahabhutas Purusha Is Purusha an Agent ? Three Guwas Is Purusha one or many ? . Five Buddhindriyas Five Karmendriyas ... .. . 352 353 354 Mulikarthas ShasbJi-tantra . . .. . Adhibhuta.360 .. .369 -374 37^ 379 The Sastra .. .366 . . . 338 . ... -335 -33^ .. -355 .. .. . . . . .. Adhidaivata Abhibuddhis (5) Karmayonis Vayus (5) (5) Karmatmans Asakti. . .... . XXV11 PAGE Sixteen Vikaras . .. Sawkhya .... . ..331 .. . (28) . Bandha. . . Anugraha-sarga Bhuta-sarga . .. Origin of Avidya . ... . . . .. . .. ... . .-35 . . ... and Aviveka Sawkhya. ... . . .... Vedanta Sayings Early Eelation between Vedanta and Sawkhya Traiguwya San&ara and Pratisaw&ara . .CONTENTS. . .. . . ..356 356 357 35? . .. . .. . ..

. . Cosmic . Second Century B. . ..381 .450 . Dispassion. . . .412 415 The Yoga.. 447 . . .. Development of ..392 393 The Atheism of Kapila Immorality of the Samkhya 395 .. Prakn'ti. Sawkhya Parables . .. . Chronology of Thought . . . . . . -398 -399 CHAPTER Yoga and Sawkhya Meanings of the word Yoga .. . . . . . .. . 404 405 407 .411 . . . . VII.429 .410 . . . Yoga. . . . YOGA-PHILOSOPHY. . . . .454 Other Means of obtaining Samadhi . Retrospect Is Sawkhya Idealism ? .... .. . . What is Isvara ?. . . . . . . Meaning of Pain when Free Purusha Prakriti an Automaton Prakr/ti's Unselfishness Gross and Subtle Body . . . . . . ..442 . .432 438 The Four Books Jfitta True Object of Yoga . . ... but Disunion Yoga as Viveka Pata%ali. .418 . .4^1 . . of Yoga-Sutras .. . Kapila's Real Argument The Theory of Karman . .402 .. . . .. Misconceptions . . . . . not Union.. .. Vyasa ... . . .Philosophy Misconception of the Objects of Yoga Devotion to Jsvara. . 384 Purusha and Prakriti State of Purusha..421 . .... . . . ... ..444 ...C. .. . . PAGE 380 . .440 440 Functions of the Mind Exercises . . ? . ... . Samadhi Apnu//Vitii . Vairagya Meditation With or Without an Object. . .XXViu CONTENTS.. . . . . . . . . . . . ... . .. .. .. U'vara once more . . . . .416 .. . . .443 .391 ... . . ... 386 387 389 390 . . . .. .

. .501 . ... .. Padartha. ... . . Prayof/ana.. .491 . .. . ... .500 500 504 504 504 505 Prameya Samsaya . ... .. Freedom . . ... . . . Hetvabhasa. .. Objects of Knowledge . Vitawc?a. .493 493 496 Perception or Pratyaksha Inference or Anumana .. . . . . . Powers Sawyama and Siddhis . ..... .... .. ..481 489 . Pramawa . .. Gati. . . . . . . .. . . Nyaya and Vaiseshika . Vada. Miracles True Yoga The Three Gunas Samskaras and Vasanas Kaivalya Is Yoga Nihilism ? . . . Nigrahasthana .489 . . . . . . . . . . .. ...496 . . . .... Dn'shfanta. .. The Avayavas. . . ..496 .. . ... .. . . . 509 .458 ....459 462 466 468 .. .485 . . . . . Object Six Padarthas of Vaiseshika .. V. Word II. . Yogangas.. .. -455 ... . ... . ... 474 476 484 . . ... . . . . . .469 . .. Madhava's Account of Nyaya I. . .. . Nimaya X-XVI. . NYAYA AND VAISESHIKA. Comparison or Anumana or abda . .. ..492 . XXIX PAGE Kaivalya. . Helps to Yoga Vibhutis... or Members of a Syllogism Indian and Greek Logic VIII..CONTENTS. . . . Siddhanta IV. VII.. .. Dignaga Bibliography Nyaya-Philosophy Summum Bonum Means of Salvation The Sixteen Topics or Padarthas Means of Knowledge . . . . . .471 . ... . Tarka IX.490 ... .. VI.. . III. . . . .. . . 508 509 6ralpa. . . .471 CHAPTER Eelation between VIII. .456 ....

. . 539 542 543 .. .... .544 -545 545 .. . not of Things 560 562 Pramawas Anumana in different Philosophical Schools for Others . . . .. .. Body Manas. . . .. . . 520 527 Words express the Summum Genus Words expressive of Genera or Individuals? All Words mean TO ov . the . -565 CHAPTER IX. .... ... .. .. .. Kawada .. . PAGE Judgments on Indian Logic The Later Books of the Nyaya .. VAI. . Upamana. 515 . . Past. ... Objects of Knowledge . . . -552 553 555 . . . ... .... -553 -556 -557 559 ....XXX CONTENTS... . The Eight Pramawas Thoughts on Language Sphofa . Future . . Prameyas. ...510 513 Time Present.. . .. .. . 536 .. .516 516 518 Word .. . . . . 530 532 532 .. . Senses arira. . . .. . 546 549 549 552 . . . .. . .. .. Date of Sutras Dates from Tibetan Sources . .. . . .. . ....... . . . Comparison abda.-576 574 577 . .... .VESIIIKA PHILOSOPHY. Vedanta on Sphofa Yoga and Sawkhya on Sphofo Nyaya on Sphoa Vaiseshika on Sphofa Indriyas. .. Rewards Emancipation Knowledge Syllogism . .. . .. . . Atman Memory Knowledge not Eternal More Prameyas Life after Death Existence of Deity Cause and Effect Phala. . ... . .... .. Mind. of Ideas. .

..... Examined . ... . .. . .. ........ .. ...............581 ..... 586 587 589 ..... ... 583 584 586 586 Samanya "Vlsesha Sama>vaya Abhava The Six Systems .... 578 578 579 580 582 582 ..... Substances Qualities XXxi PAGE Actions Cause Qualities Time Space Manas Amis or Atoms .CONTENTS......... ...... ....

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INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. Their work has remained and continues to live to the present day. nay even popular sayings. We have some idea of who B . from the earliest times. in India we have indeed ample materials for watching the origin and growth of philosophical ideas. WHILE is in most countries a history of philosophy inseparable from a history of philosophers. In Greece. even though they contained nothing very original or personal. the simplest views of the world and of the destinies of man. Philosophy and Philosophers. Not even their dates can be ascertained with any amount of certainty. so as to have something like a historical background.INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. maxims of morality and worldly wisdom. but hardly any for studying the lives or characters of those who founded or supported the philosophical systems of that country. and wise saws of every kind. such as the Seven Sages. were generally quoted as the utterances of certain persons or at least ascribed to certain names. but of the philosophers themselves hardly anything remains to us beyond their names.

that no himself. whether some were the pupils and others the teachers. The Hindus seem to have He felt this indebtedness of the individuals to those before and around them who. they lived. lived at the all this is unknown our ever at to us. Whether any of these Indian philosophers same time and in the same place. whether they were friends or enemies. . but there is nothing to connect the names of the ancient Indian philosophers with any historical events. and that Anaxagoras was the friend of Pericles. they cannot find a human . of Pata/l^ali. presupposes an It is poem makes itself. We read that Thales warned King Croesus. where and when but of Kapila. and he breathes an intellectual atmosphere which is not of his own making. and what they did the supposed founder of the S&mkhya philosophy. of Badarayawa and 6raimini. with any political characters. we know next to nothing. and what we know hardly ever rests on contemporary and trustworthy evidence. or with dates before the time of Buddha. quite true that every literary composition. grows from a soil that is ready made for him. no poet makes at large. if far more strongly than the Greeks. nor do I see chance of knowing more about any them than we do present. and who was Plato. and no philosophical system is elaborated by the people But on the other hand.2 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. no philosopher owes everything to himself. whether in prose or in poetry. individual author. of Gotama and Ka?iada. the founder of the Yoga. Thales was. we know that Socrates drank poison. we are told that Empedocles finished his days by throwing himself into the flames of Aetna.

commonly Brahman. which really mean two periods. $rutam or /Sruti came afterwards to mean what has been revealed. exactly as we understand that word. What we call philoin its sophy systematic form. 3 have recourse even to mythological arid personages in order to have a pedestal. human or divine. and was not the work of men or any personal being. The Hindus have divided the whole of their ancient literature into two parts. Nor are even these fictitious poets supposed to have created or composed their poems. such as the hymns of the Rig-veda. however. and has always been treated as the work of an whether man or god. while Srmntam or Smriti comprised all that was individual. The Hindus are satisfied with giving us the thoughts. and an authority for every great thought divine and every great invention of antiquity. to observe how the revealed literature of the Hindus. have in later times been ascribed to certain families. It is curious. what was remembered.SRUTAM AND SMfl/TAM. what was heard. Snmti or tradition might at once be overruled by what was called $ruti or revelation. from an Indian B 2 . so that if there ever was a conflict between the two. author. or the Word. $rutam. though many of the names of these poets are clearly fictitious. a name. and leave us to find out their antecedents as best we can. recognized as possessing human authority only. $rutam and Smntam. but only to have seen them as they were revealed to called them by a higher power. is. and Smr^tam. nay even to individual poets.

period. /Srutam. imperfect as it is from a literary point of view. and followed by large commentaries or independent treatises which are supposed to contain the outcome of a continuous tradition going back to very ancient times. divergOne ing from and appealing to the same teacher. Brahmana There is no topic within the sphere of philosophy which does not find a clear or straightforward treatment in these short Sutras. in composed We short aphorisms or Sutras or in metrical Karikas. We should always know where we and we should never hear of a philosopher who declared on his deathbed that no one had are. that they represent the last result of a long continued study of philosophy. ascribed to authors of whom we hardly know anything. possess it in carefully and systematically elaborated manuals. nor of antagonistic schools. thing must be quite clear to every attentive reader of these Sutras. not revealed.4 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. such as Hegel's or Plato's. point of view. The Sutra style. carried on for centuries in the forests of India. . The ideas which are shared and hermitages by all the systems of Indian philosophy. would be invaluable to us in other systems of philosophy. understood him. can leave no doubt on this subject. nay even to the though in their present form they the work of medieval or modern are confessedly In the Sutras each system of philosophy writers. and elaborated in its minutest details. but belongs to Smriti or tradition. Nor can we doubt that what I for a long time the philosophical in embodied thoughts of India were call a Mnemonic Literature. the large number of technical terms possessed by them in common or peculiar to each system. to the Sutra. namely. is complete.

only.. c. e. and At this time also the A^Aakatha (commentary). but only of oral and even musical repetition. Nothing can be more explicit it than the statement that point ' : the chronicles of Ceylon on Before this time the wise monks had in handed down the texts of the Tipkaka orally. was unknown in India and even at the Bud- dhist Councils was when their Sacred Canon. carefully strict guarded by a peculiar and educational discipline. but an invitation was addressed to a member of the Samgha who knew the text by heart. and in order that the Law might endure for a long time. 5 Writing for literary purposes before the rise of Buddhism. the monks. under King Va^agamani. but of course the inevitable chances of oral tradifor philosophy exposed to all That Mnemonic Period existed as well as for everything else. assembled.C.. was not settled by an appeal to any MS. they caused it to be written down in books. rehearsed by certain individuals. and the different parts of the Canon were not consigned to writing. singing together. perceiving the decay of beings (not MSS. Whenever there arose a dispute as to the true teaching of Buddha. and settled.). The very name of a Council was Samgiti or Mahasawgiti. i. but reeds. the Tripkaka. ink. we must accustom ourselves to the idea that all that could be called literature then was mnemonic very tion. about 80 B. It is actually mentioned that the Southern Canon was not reduced to writing till the first century B. we hear nothing as yet of paper.' Such a state of things is difficult for us to imagine. still if we wish to form a true idea of the intellectual state of India in pre-Bud- dhistic times.MNEMONIC LITERATURE. and if we have to begin our study of Indian philosophy with the .

The Upanishads contain too many technical terms. nay there was. and that there will be a storm. and that there will be thunder and lightning to follow soon. this period is in fact the most valuable though of systematised philosophy. one period. previous to the Sutras. B.6 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the air. like For gaining an insight into the early growth of Indian philosophic thought. on reading the Upanishads. in Indian philosophy. Sutras. like life and strife. Yrata. and that is the last stage of the Vedic period. we feel. as yet. Even if the later systems of philosophy did not so often appeal themselves to the Upanishads . we are driven to admit a long familiarity with philosophic problems before the time that gave birth to the Upanishads which we possess. and many more. in our sense of the word. as represented to us in the Upanishads. Mimjimsa. Yoga. to allow us to suppose that they were the products of one day or of one generation. such as Brahman. mere guesses at truth. there must have been. Atman. during which we can watch something growth. I should even go a step further. Nay.C. In order to be able to account for what seem to us mere sparks of thought. that there is philosophy in As we can feel that there contains. TJpanishad-period. these Sutras themselves as the last activity carried on must be considered outcome of a long continued philosophical by memory only. Period antecedent to the Upanishads. it nothing. Dharma. ready made. little or is electricity in the Indian mind. . from about 700 But while the Sutras give us abstracts of the various systems of philosophy.

seems always to have been not only the first religion. not only by the Ganges and Indus.UPANISHAD-PERIOD. It is true that during that distant period which in the archives of we can watch religion. nothing would be more wel- come tribes to the historian of philosophy. J we could easily see for ourselves in though flowing very different directions. and language which reach back far beyond the Upanishads and even beyond the folklore of Khonds. these systems of philosophy can all be traced back to the same distant And as heights from which they took their rise. India. we can see the Indian mind also being nourished through ever so many channels. all pointing to the Snowy Mountains in the North. while the original springs are lost to us for ever. speakers of Aryan languages. as has been hastily thought. philosophy was not yet separated from religion but the earliest in the . that. of the at least among the races that of the best had taken possession of soil of Asia and Europe. among the savage tribes of to-day. For the present we must be satisfied with the germs of thought such as we find them in the Upanishads. as their authorities. If some of the seeds and germs of philosophy could be discovered. India was fertilised. as well as If it is the object of philosophy to discover the causes of things. rerum . like the Ganges and the Indus. all starting from a vast accumulation of religious and philosophic thought of which we seem to see the last remnants only in our Upanishads. but until these have been classified according to language. and Koles. we must leave these dangerous enterprises to others. but the first philosophy also. Upanishads. but by ever so many rivers and rivulets. Bhils.

the sky-god. that distant period to which we have to assign this earliest growth of language. Much formation may represent a chaos only. historical it so little to guide us in our is of great importance to remember that there was such a distant period of and that. of rain and thunder. first Of course. forgetting that there was an ancient reservoir of thought from which all could have drawn and drunk. the Asvins. dawn. monuments.8 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. but we w ant r . of fire. the Bright. law. has left us no Here and there we can dis- India. of dawn. morals. and calling them Dyaus or Agni. and philosophy. we should be careful not to conclude at once that they must have been borrowed by one system from the other. religion. the feeders of the idea of the Godhead. if at a later time we nascent thought meet with the same ideas and words turning up in different systems. is Considering how small our historical information as to the intellectual and social life of India at it is different times of its history. cognoscere causas. thought. we should carefully gather whatever there attempt to study Indian philosophy in tiated before^we of our in- its differen- and systematised systems. the gods ? Here are fire. . where we have researches. indicating the footBut in prints left by the strides of former giants. earliest what was the creation of the mythological gods but an attempt to explain the causes of light. whether of religion or philosophy. whatever tributaries it may have received afterwards. literary cover faint traces in language. or dii. by postulating agents for every one of them. Indra. of day and night. day and night. light or Ushas. and calling all of them Devas. essential that is.

that they wished to appear more ancient than more heroic. The picture which these sacred books give us of the seething thoughts of that country may at first sight seem fanciful and almost incredible . more marvellous. but because the men of ancient India. the scholars of The idea that the Europe. people seem to imagine. unless they contained a certain verisimilitude It is eyes of the people ? as some quite clear that they were not composed. is an absurd fancy. which seems fully to justify the saying that India has always been a nation of philosophers. 9 such a chaos in order to understand the kosmos that followed.INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN ANCIENT INDIA. provincial poet like Horace should have thought so much of ages to come. even think of us. if by tradition only. . ancient nations of the world wished to impose on us. more They did not enlightened. and even then we wonder rather how a local. or on anybody else. are different from Greeks and Romans and from ourselves. In certain chapters of the Brahmanas and in the Upanishads we see a picture of the social and intellectual life of India at that early time. as they are there represented to us. in order to impose after in the two thousands of years on us. Intellectual Life in ancient India. and had no word as yet for Such thoughts belong to much later posterity. not to say. it does not follow that we have not before us a faithful account of what really existed at one time in the land of the Five or Seven Rivers. We must not allow such ideas of fraud and forgery to spoil our they were. times. Why should these accounts have been invented.

we should always try before first of all to understand it we reject it as impossible and tional fraud. they did not so very farfetched a problem. and what they were intended for here on earth. finding themselves placed on this planet. have always been divided between practical and intellectual pursuits.10 faith INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and whither do we go ? O ye . should not a different kind of life have been possible in a country which. and our interest in ancients thought much of the nations of the distant future. conBut why siderably preponderating over the latter. times. which was protected on three sides by the silver streaks of the of its cultivators.s'vatara-upanishad ' : Whereby do we live. and on the fourth by almost impassable mountain barriers. ancient history. to ask who they were. as far back as we know anything about them. That in very early times kings as possible. what the ancients tell us about their own or about the past which could never have extended very far back. the so-called sons of the soil ? After all. without much effort on the part yielded in abundance all that was necessary for the support of life. The more of themselves than If. seems incredible to us. in ancient times. the former. to thoughtful people. was not they came. Thus we read at the beginning of the Whence are we born ? iS'veta. r termination directed against barbarous tribes. a country which for thousands of years was free from w ar except the war of exocean. whence it know how or why. particularly while there was as yet no struggle for life. however. because the energies of the people of Europe. as an inten- and nobles and sages in India should have been absorbed in philosophical questions seems no doubt strange to us.

the man. the Brahmans. S. To ask what caste means in India would be like asking what caste means in England. or He who is called Purusha. 311. originally in the sense of a pure or unmixed breed. In 1613 Purchas speaks of the thirty and odd several castes of the Banians (Vani</). such as we find from very early times to the present day in India. This term caste has proved most mischievous and misleading.KSHATRIYAS AND BRAHMANS. might be thought that all this was due to the elevating influence of an intellectual aristocracy. E. XX . The so-called Kshatriyas or It military nobility take nearly as active a part in the intellectual life of the country as the Brahmans themselves. or chance. a Portuguese word. or necessity. II who know Brahman. The fact is that we have to deal in the earlier period of ancient India with two rather than with four castes and their numerous subdivisions. of course. whether in pain or in pleasure ? Should time or nature. and the less we avail ourselves of it .. the better state we shall be able to understand the true ! of society in the ancient times of India. the Supreme Spirit ' l ? Kshatriyas and Brahmans. B. . or what fetish 1 See also Anugita. VIII. It had before been used in the sense of breed or stock. But this is by no means the case. p. or the elements be considered as the cause. and was applied from about the middle of the sixteenth century by rough Portuguese sailors to certain divisions of Indian society which had struck their fancy. that is. (tell us) at whose command we abide here. Caste is. chap.

The We former are named Aryas or Aryas.. or ruling aristocracy. goodness. qualities passion in the Kshatriya. p. >Sudras or Dasas. the Kshatriyas. are the . the Brahmans. Kshatriyas. if submissive to their conquerors. in the ' 1 Thus we : Brahmami. to say nothing of $&pindatya or Samanodakatva. read as early as the Mahabhanita The three abide in the three castes thus darkness in the S'udra. while the races of indigenous origin who remained hostile to the end. every stick a totem. and after- wards merchants and mechanics last To the very also. and the highest. Brahmans. B.VIII. 329. householders and cultivators of the soil. Pravara (lineage) otherwise we shall have once more the same confusion about the social organisation of ancient India as about African fetishism or North American totemism Each foreign word should (feiti9o) .12 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and a fighting society. E. ! always be kept to native meaning. have in India the Aryan settlers on one side. slaves. Gotra (race).' (Anugita.) . every idol a fetish. cultivators of the soil which they had conquered the latter. S. and the native inhabitants on the other. the three great divisions. 6rati (kith). its own distinction will be called caste. while the great bulk remained simply Vis or VaLvyas. What we really want to know is what was implied by such Indian words as Varaa (colour). if generalised for scientific purposes. Kula (family). means in Portugal. it should be most Otherwise every social carefully defined afresh. that is. were classed as altogether outside the pale of political ] The Aryas in India were naturally differentiated like other people into an intellectual or priestly aristocracy. or. that is.

Still even that rubbish heap deserves to be sifted. and air is prescribed for the three twice-born ' : (classes) . and not only allowed. as I believe it is now being sifted by scholars like Mr. under different forms to the present day. the order of householders S. Kshatriyas. Thus we read in the Mahabharata The order of Vanaprasthas. 316. of sages who dwell in forests and live 011 fruits. and Vaisyas seems for all. The lessons as described by Manu.' ^i I ^ have been due to occupation only. shared certain privileges and duties in common. in the ordinary occupations of The later subdivision civilisation.E. The Brahmans had to look after the originally to welfare of souls. division into Aryas and Dasas was due to descent. Originally they were all of them called twice-born. 13 and Vaisyas.) While the (Anugita. which seem to have occupied India far more than wars of defence or conquest. and the Vaisyas represented originally the undifterentiated mass of the people. and as preserved which the names of Varwa (colour) and G&ti (genus) teach us had long been forgotten even in Manu's time. but obliged to be educated in Vedic knowledge and to pass through the three or four Asramas or stages of life. Bisley and others.. the Kshatriyas after the welfare of the body politic. that into Brahmans. and are buried at present under a heavy heap of rubbish. Nay women also claimed a right to be . p. does not concern us for our present purpose. In ancient times neither Kshatriyas nor Vaisyas were excluded from taking part in those religious and philosophical struggles. roots. though it may soon have acquired an hereditary character. engaged an incipient of Indian society.CASTES. is prescribed B.VIII.

claimed by the Brahmans as their exclusive property. we fame read there of an ancient King kanaka. i i daughter. Sita. The Evidence If of the Upanishads. of view. we must not forget that Buddha also was a Kshatriya. Up.14 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. of the Videhas. and they occasionally asserted it with great force and dignity. the strong reaction in the discussions of the great for against priestly supremacy came at last from them. not as a general or conqueror. . a prince of Kapilavastu. successful We read of him as taking part in metaphysical discussions. is represented to us in later times as the famous wife of Rama (Ramapurvatap. from a social and political point and was against the privileges of teaching sacrificing. life we look back once more to the intellectual of India in the ancient Vedic times. Besides. He was a king ). Ar. one of the most famous philosophical teachers of . and his far . was Mithila. victorious in chivalrous tournaments. Up. as bestowing his patronage on the most eminent sages of his kingdom. IV. his capital and wide (Kaush. and that his chief opposition. II. not so much as a brave knight. or at least in the times represented to us in the Upanishads. A^atasatru. as presiding over philosophical councils. as the friend of Yagwavalkya. The Kshatriyas never surrendered their right to take part problems of life and death. and against the infallible and divine character ascribed by them to their Vedas. Ganaka. But in the Upanishads he is represented. i Brih.). heard in their philosophical assemblies. whose at the time when the Upanishads were composed had already spread Up.

his blood and seed the waters ? Whither did the descendants of King Parikshit go ? contains the worlds 1 yet is What is the soul ? What and from it Who rules everything ? different from everything Far be me to say that these and other questions were answered by Yagwavalkya in a manner that would seem satisfactory to ourselves. his mind the moon. the hair of his head the trees. such as Gargi. Up. such When Yagwavalkya. who is the deity that shall swallow death ? What becomes of the vital spirits when man dies ? What is it that does not forsake man in the hour of death ? What becomes of man after his speech at death has entered the a fire. Asvala. i . 15 1 performing a great this king sets apart a day for a Brahsacrifice. the daughter of VMaknu To (Brih. the hairs of his body the herbs. Ar. And so he does. Up.KING GANAKA. his eye the sun. the other Brahmans present propounded a number of questions which he was expected to answer in order to prove his superiority. i. . Ill. take an active part. Ar. and even women. i. his Atman his ear space. Then follow questions such as. While death swallows the whole world. Bhh. modyam. the victor in these disputations the king promised as a reward of a thousand cows with ten padas of gold fixed to their horns. a disputation in which philosophers. As Yagwavalkya claimed these cows on account of his superior knowledge. the Upanishad period. his breath the wind. IV. The first question is how a man who offers a sacrifice can be freed thereby from the fetters of death. Artabhaga. his body the earth. 5). What is important 1 Kaushitaki Up. the ether. Ill.

2. as not admit of being discussed one of any other country where at that time such religious congresses would have early been thought of. he turned round and said. neither Achilles nor Ulysses would have shone in them. Ya^/navalkya and Artabhaga. there king we have no reason to is one passage (Brih. Besides. his capital.. ' When is burnt. nothing that is mine to remain so.C. There is no other country in the world where in such ancient times such disputations would have been thought of. 13) where we are told expressly that the two disputants. Neither Menelaos nor Priam would have presided over them. Ar. Up. retired into a private place in order to come to an understanding about they thought. unless it were in Egypt. and that his answers should have satisfied his contemporaries. Mithila. and royal rewards bestowed on Do we know those who were ? victorious in these philosophical tournaments of the sayings of kanaka has remained One famous in Indian literature for ever. to us at in the fifth century B. and deserves was destroyed by a conflagration. did in public. Ill. While Mithila is burning. that. is that such questions should have been asked that they should have formed the staple of all. public discussion at that early time.' another feature. question which. That these disputations took place in public and in the presence of the doubt. but the vanquished was Very curious is .l6 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. namely. a time previous to the establishment of Buddha's religion in India. in these public assemblies not only was a royal reward bestowed on the victor.

26). it does not follow that the great gatherings of Indian sages find such as we presided over by their kings should be equally 1 I translate vipat by 'to fall off/ not i. l . and Narada. Besides these public disputations. 17 Nor sometimes threatened with losing his head was this a threat only. 4. i. It true we meet in the everywhere in ancient times. and Viro&ana. between Pra. the representative of the Brahmans.KING KANAKA. But though these are naturally mere inventions. Must we withhold our belief from such III. call all this call it We may exaggerated. but it actually happened. we also read of private conferences in which Ya^/lavalkya enlightens and after receiving every kind of present from him is told at last that the king gives him the whole of his kingdom. between Yama. in the case of $akalya (Brih.f/apati. the typical warrior deity. Indra. such as Kaush. is (Brih. statements. 9. because we have learnt to doubt the burnt hand of Mucius Scaevola and the suicide of Lucretia ? I believe not.) they had sounded as in- credible in India itself as they sound to us. we are told. Up. Upanishads with philosophical dialogues between gods and men also. the god of death. but we have no right to mere invention. Ar. between Indra and Pratardana. surrenders himself to him as his slave. between Sanatkumara. Up. for the cases are not quite parallel. nay his royal patron 6ranaka. to by 'to burst/ and not the causative by 'to make fall off/ 'to burst' have been vipaf? cut off.e. Would C . Ill. 2 3 . IV. for such stories would hardly if have been invented. and Na&iketas.

I relation do not mean. foundation in fact. Even imagination requires imaginary. 2. Up. for inthe case of King 6r4nasruti and the stance. Brahman Raikva. When he has convinced Balaki of the insufficiency of the information which this learned Brahman had volunteered to impart to him. however. i. and remained so to the time represented by Manu's Law-book. and must have been later than kanaka. VII. country of the Mahav?^'daughter.l8 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. IV. II. Ar. Up. i). a certain have a record of another disputation between a King Af/atasatru and the Brahman Balaki. See also the dialogue between Sanatkumara and Narada . and here again it is the king who has to teach the We Brahman. as he appeals to his fame as widely established. not vice versa. . till at last the India was that which king has to offer him not only gold and land (the Raikvapama villages in the shas) but his own amity and his instruction. the warrior class had evidently from a very early time produced a number of independent thinkers who were able to 1 2 Kaushitaki Up. 2 Brfli. who contemptuously rejects all offers of friendship from the king. Ar/atasatru was king of Kasi (Benares). the proud Brahman actually declares himself the pupil of the king 2 . (/tfmnd. to deny that originally the between the kings and the sages of ancient in we see represented. in order to secure his But though this may have been the original relation between Brahmans and Kshatriyas.

C. namely. as represented to us in the Sacred writings of the Buddhists. we know at all events that it was reduced to writing in the first century before our era. descendants in India. In the Maitra- King Br^hadratha who and kingdom. grapple with and to hold their 19 own against the to them particularly priests. we may therefore safely accept its descriptions as us a true picture of what took place in India giving c 2 . leave the period represented by the and turn our eyes to that which follows Upanishads. and which is marked by the rise and growth of Buddhism. and cited.BUDDHIST PERIOD. in their in one subject. Though there is every reason to suppose that their sacred When we the original text of the Tripifaka. the yawa-upanishad we read his Self. Such a royal pupil would become a sage 1 1 Again. who were superior as we are told. whose name may contain the first allusion to $akas and their of retires into the forest. The Kaikeya. we find no very sudden change in the intellectual life of the country. Up. belongs to the third century B. V. 1 1 i ) ? and this question the king was supposed to be able to answer better than any of the Brahmans. and was settled and recode. . naturally in the course of his studies and teacher himself. nay. Buddhist Period. in the TTAand.. gives up is instructed by the sage >Sakayanya. though not written down. What is our Self and what is Brahman (V. question which they discuss is. during the reign of Asoka. of eminent we see a number Brahmans approaching King Asvapati and making themselves his pupils. knowledge of the Atman.

soon as Buddhism arose Vedism disappeared from soil of India. however. even in its latest offshoots. if we consider that Buddha died about 477 B. Nay. including kings and nobles. may seem to us at first . was not satisfied with teaching a philosophy. It seems to me a fact of the the Upanishads.. India is a large country. new The description of the daily life of these Buddhist monks.soka had extended his We the patronage to the Buddhist fraternity. as represented originally by one of the many schools of thought which were springing up in India during the period of the Upanishads. when highest importance that the Buddhists at the time their Suttas were composed. were acquainted with the Upanishads and the Sutras. at all events with the very peculiar names of these literary com- must not. and even of the Buddhist laity. his ambition was to found His object was to induce people to withdraw from the world and to live a life of abstinence and meditation in hermitages or mona society. however. we are probably not far wrong if we look upon the doctrines which he gave form and life.20 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. while Buddhism was slowly but surely supplanting the religion of the Veda.C. who actually gave up his palace and made himself a beggar. for if we of may retain name the young prince Kapilavastu. asteries. We have no reason to doubt that some of the later Upanishads were composed long after King A. and Vedism may have continued to flourish in the West while Buddhism was gaining its wonderful triumphs in the East and the South. Buddha. suppose that as positions. and which became later on the to feeders of what are that called in India the six great systems of philosophy.

4). as we read in the Brahma(/ala-sutta that even among the disciples who 1 We Ehys time possess now an excellent translation of this Sutta by Davids. the read in the Tripkaka. supposed to have been preached by Buddha himself. showing the same respect and veneration to this poor monk We asking him any questions or making any Bante or Lord is the title by suggestions to him. the followers of Buddha. sight as incredible as 21 before in the what we saw Upanishads. We in the Veda and the followers of Buddha formed compact bodies. but have were very creditable for the now been superseded. and now forming part of the Buddhist l canon. likewise of King Bimbisara. before which the paramount sovereigns of India address these mendicants. blot (Sept Suttas Palis. If we want to get an idea of the immense wealth and variety of philosophic thought by which Buddha found himself surrounded on every side. drawing near to Buddha and sitting down respect- We fully 'at one side before venturing to ask him a read question (Samyutta Nikaya III. of Magadha.BRAHMA-GALA-SUTTA. hardly have been so. the Brahma-^ala-sutta are too apt to imagine that both the believers . The earlier translations by Gogerly. when they were made. i. for instance. of King Prasenagdt. Prasena#it and Bimbisara. of Kosala. . we cannot do better than consult one of the many Suttas or sermons. each being held together by generBut this can ally recognised articles of faith. the sacred code of Buddhists. Brahma-<7ala-sutta. such as. by Grim1876).

some. meaning either a member of the orone belonging to the three castes of the twice-born Aryas. try to get rid of the idea that Brahmans and Buddhists were always at daggers drawn. were but seldom inflamed against each i. such as Suppiya. often used in two senses which should be kept tinct. followed Buddha. particularly when philosophical questions are discussed. Buddha mentions no less than sixty-two of them. spoke openly against all the three. and Samanas or Buddhists. we can discover the faint traces of some of the schools of philosophy which we shall have to examine hereafter. Brahmawa is often used by him as a mere expression of high social rank. as far as their daily life and outward ceremonial were concerned. . such as Brahmadatta. and he who eminent in knowledge and virtue is even by is most Buddha dis- himself called is ' a true Brahma?*a. which all philosophical theories are supposed to have been caught like so many fishes. and claims to be acquainted with every one of them. in e. Their relation was not originally very different from that between different systems of philosophy. though standing himself above them all. the net of Brahma. though they differed.22 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. which. In the Brahma-iyala-sutta.' Brahman with us first caste. spoke in support of Buddha. who are under the spiritual sway of the Brahmans. such as the Vedanta and Samkhya. other by religious hatred. the two are constantly addressed together by Buddha. Though there was a clear line of demarcation between Brahmans his disciples. in support of his doctrines and while others. with many subdivisions. and We must divided the whole of India between themselves.

the Supreme. he became dissatisfied and longed for other from the World of Light. peak. there appeared (they say) the palace of Brahma. but not with regard to others. account of how people began to believe in one personal Supreme Being. According eternalists to will this world-system will pass away. When the world-system began to re-evolve. is The soul. giving birth to is steadfast as a mountain nothing new. But he who had come first began to think that he was Brahma. in all respects like him. including their names. we are are eternalists. eternal. They hold that the soul and the world are partly eternal. p. and who proclaim that both the soul and the world are eternal 2 They told 1 . Then a certain being fell from the World of Light and came to life in the palace of Brahma. and their former dwelling-places. There are some Samanas and Brahmans who are with regard to some things. After remaining there in perfect joy for a longperiod. or in the ordinary God. them radiating light. ever. the Ruler. 23 There are some Samanas and Brahmans. 26 seq. but it was empty. the Lord of all. and there then be beings reborn in the World of Light (Abhassara). and partly not. beings. traversing the air and continuing in Here follows a most peculiar glory for a long time. they and the world. . but they are for ever and declare. made of mind only. . This would be like the asvata-vada. feeding on joy. who profess to be able to remember an endless succession of former births. their lineage. translated by Khys Davids.BRAHMA-GALA-SUTTA. Living creatures transmigrate. And just then other beings fell 1 2 Brahma-#ala-sutta.

. immutable. masc. and therefore will remain for ever steadfast. while others who abstain from such indulgences remain steadfast. the that are and are to be. mutable. Lastly. nose. This Brahma reminds one of the Isvara of the Samkhya and other philosophies. and eternal. that there are certain gods so full of envy that their bodies become feeble and their mind imbecile. and limited in duration of life. Again. they had come.24 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the Ancient of days. Nay. must be distinguished from Brahma. The other beings he looked upon as created by himself. or lastly. infinite in height and depth.. They maintain Next follows either that the world or that it is is finite or that it is infinite. and body form an impermanent Self. these beings themselves also thought that he must be the Supreme Brahma. while those who came after him were impermanent. another class of speculators who are called Antanantikas. while others who are free from such failings remain steadfast. and it was thought that this Brahmcl must be eternal and remain for ever. and who set forth the infinity and finiteness of the world. which as Brahma. immutable. but is finite in lateral extension. and eternal. tongue. some Sam anas and Brahmans are led to the conclusion that eye. because he was there first and they came after him. neuter. because as soon as he had wished for them. the Maker and all Father of Creator. that it neither finite nor infinite. while heart or mind or consciousness form a permanent Self. ear. immutable. These fall from their divine state. and eternal. Then we are told that there are some gods who spend their lives in sexual pleasures and then fall from their divine state.

BRAHMA-GALA-SUTTA.. often taking refuge It that Buddha himself was in Agnosticism or the Ae/mlnavada 1 . that there is is chance in the world or that there not. Those who hold to this are called wriggling eels. are accidental and without a cause. is would seem. Some maintain that the conscious soul after death has form. there are Samanas and Brahmans who hold that everything. Natural . M. the founder of (rainism. others again Keligion. 25 The next description of the various theories held by either Samanas or Brahmanas seems to refer to what is known as the Sy4dv ada. They will not admit any difference between good and bad. according to some of the Suttas. that man continues after death or that he does not. and Mahavira. Next. others that ] it has no form. or a cause. who Furthermore. but they differ on several points regarding this conscious existence. there are Samanas and Brahmans hold and defend the doctrine of a conscious existence after death. He was often in fact an agnostic on points which he considered beyond the grasp of the human mind. 105. because they can remember that formerly they were not and now because they prove by means of logic that the soul and the whole world arose without they are. and they will not commit themselves to saying that there another world or that there is not. took the same view. the soul and the world. the theory that t everything may be or may not be. often disinclined to commit himself on some of the great questions of philosophy and religion. that anything has a result or reward or that it has not. p. M.

and others that it neither has nor has not form. and is thereKhys Davids. Dhyana. 1. that it is finite. . happiness in this salvation soul is is and maintain that complete here on earth. has and has not. there are some Samanas and Brahmans who teach the entire annihilation of all living beings. is however. others that it is infinite. it is held that the soul after death happy.26 that it INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. however. both Again.. that is. such as Alara Kalama. others who say that the soul after death has either unconscious. and that therefore the highest Nirvana consists in putting away all sensuous delights and entering into the first (VMna. has nor has not form or neither. said that sensuous delights transitory and always involve pain. that has various modes consciousness. again. or neither . There are. and while in that state form. infinite. is both or is neither. is miserable. a state of joy born of seclusion and followed by reflection and meditation. or no form. Their arguments are various. the senses. it is asserted that such happiness involves reasoning. i. others that it has unlimited consciousness. p. others that Lastly. Uddalaka and others They uphold the doctrine of l . Thus when the possible in perfect enjoyment of the five pleasures of life. has and has not. 48. is has limited. e. they call that Against this view. Some say that others it it it has one mode of conof sciousness. are the it is highest Nirvana. Against this view. Some say it is finite. that it is both and that it is neither. c. and have in their general outlines been traced back to some of the teachers of Buddha.

and to impart the truth that leads to true Nirvana. even this is outbidden. serene and thoughtful. a state of self-possession and complete equanimity. though well known by Buddha. true Buddhist. which produce desire. grief. and theories. because any sense ofjoy must be gross. a state of elevation and But even this does not satisfy the internal calm. and the final Nirvana is said to be reached in the fourth 6rMna only. reproduction. By division and subdivision there are said to be sixty-two theories. (/ala-sutta professes that all speculations about the past and the future are included in this Sutta of the net of Brahma. being always taken for granted. death. disease. are condemned by him as arising from the deceptive perceptions of the senses. misery. fore gross. born of all serenity without reasoning. The very dwelling of the mind on care and joy is declared to be gross. pain. arranged into two classes so far as they are concerned either with the past or with the future of the soul the soul. as it seems. while the highest 27 when Nirvana can only arise has been conquered and the soul reasoning has entered the second 6rAana. and therefore.BKAHMA-GALA-SUTTA. as if the philosophical of Buddha himself was so very different at teaching . sorrow. Lastly. This abstract may give an idea of the variety of philosophical opinions which were held in India at The Brahmaor even before the time of Buddha. a state of joy. birth. It does not seem. weeping. indeed. attachment. and true Nirvana can only consist in total absence of all longing after joy and thus entering into the third 6rMna. The extraordinary part is that in the end all these . while Buddha alone is able to cut off the root of all error and all misery. existence.

too. ' : shall be struck Thus we read in the Anugita. and others that it exists and does not exist. we by the great. Karikas and Sutras. is We piety remains after the body some say that it is not so. as has been so often supposed in the case particularly of Buddhism in its relation to the Sa??ikhya philosophy. and others. that it exists. containing descriptions of the philosophical then flourishing in India. Some say the permanent principle is impermanent. Some destroyed and others that there say everything is doubtful . and from each other on some very Mahabharata. we can . of philosophical schools it shows at differed all events be gathered from other how large a number how they was in existence then.28 first INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. similarity between their statements and those which we have just read in the Buddhist Brahma-r/ala-sutta. they run on irrigating the same expanse of country without proving in the least philosophy. which as known to us from the Though the Brahma-^ala-sutta does not enter may Suttas. essential points. chap. XXIV observe the various forms of piety to be as it were contradictory. Some is no doubt. often perceive clear traces of a distant relationship between Buddhism and the six orthodox systems of Like streams. all springing from the same summit. that one channel of thought was derived from another. almost verbal. from that of other schools which had flourished before and during his lifetime in India nay. Some say . If now we compare one sects in the of the numerous passages Mahabharata. . into full details.

say the Saugatas or Buddhists. and others that is mixed. Everything is impermanent. say the Uc/ulomas they are one. and others for indigence. thus say the YogaMras they are mixed. but . say other Mimamsakas.' This last can only refer to the followers of Buddha. it is thus say the Tarkikas permanent. say it it 29 is of one form or twofold. Everything is doubtful. sources. Some Brahmawas. . say the atomists time and space . that the Lokayatas or . after the ' Some hold. but only momentarily.TTarvakas. dins (] . believe that it is others that it is distinct and others again that it is manifold. Some have matted hair and skins and some are clean-shaven and . perceive the truth. too. Knowledge is one. Brahman as possessed of quali- they are distinct. . the view of the Satyavadins (Syadvanothing is doubtful. Some are for taking food others are intent on fasting. he says. whatever the date of our Mahabharata may be. Some say both time and space exist. such is the view of the . say the . without any covering. the ego and non-ego are two different principles. the great teachers. who know Brahman and one . . and others tranquillity.' The commentator Nilakan^Aa refers all these remarks to certain sects known to us from other ' . worshippers of the ties . . Some people are for bathing some for the omission of bathing. say the /Simyavadins something exists. ' that the Self exists is. . . Some people extol actions. Some extol final emancipation and various kinds of enjoyments some wish for riches. that of the Tairthikas. and others that it is not so. . body is is lost others. Mimamsakas nothing exists. r hold the contrary. who hold that special acts are the cause (of everything) manifold they are.MAHABHARATA.' .

30 IXDIAN PHILOSOPHY. they is not say the astrologers. that great influence on his contemporaries many generations after his death. are. a man who made a new epoch in the growth of Indian philosophy. the existence of a large number of religious and philosophical sects in the ancient days of India. 1 who say that it we see has no . and still more of Indian religion and ethics. at new not as the herald of any brand which he has to teach. far more than his doctrine. not a mere name. r Does not this refer to the solemn bathing which is the first step towards the stage of u Gr/hastha or independent householder ? 1 . And no if we consider that Buddha was a prince or nobleman who gave up whatever there w as of outward splendour pertaining to his rank. of the midst of this whirlpool of philosophical opinions there rises the form of Buddha. Those so. that is to say. as some have imagined. as preaching a new gospel to the poor. that what all. Buddha. but a real power in the history of India. first. wonder. but rather philosophy. I cannot that it was Buddha's marked personhelp thinking ality. calling for Out a hearing. gave him the and on so existed or not. is are the ancient philosophers the rule of the Naish^Aika BrahmaMrins bathing that of the householders. there must have been Whether he some one. He need not have been a powerful prince. His teaching must have acted like a weir across a swollen river.' Thus both from Buddhistic and Bran manic sources we learn the same fact. real existence at omission to bathe . such as he is described to us in the Suttas.

' should be taken. king of Kasi (or Benares). this is the same Agdtasatru. in order to consult without an according to others. i. not as a proper that may be. and the very fact making himself a popular teacher and religious reformer attracted attention as a social anomaly in the eyes of the people. of his Like several of the philosophers in the Upanishads. as we saw in the Upanishads. kings appear as friends and 1 we S. as a general ' However of royalty. sends two of his ministers. i. a name well known to us from the Upanishads. we find Buddha also not only patronised. 31 but he belonged to the royal class. but likewise the counsellors of princes. who. note. silenced the Brahman Balaki (Kaush. B. A(/ata. i). a Videha princess. by the kings of the son of Vaidehi. see in fact that one of the principal accusations brought against him. to him on what he ought Buddha It has been supposed by some scholars that to do.BUDDHA. 2. p. At all events. the coincidence title name is ' . XI. He. at a later time. a privilege that had always been recognised as belonging to those only who were Brahmans by birth. And as these Brahmans had always been not only the teachers of the people. as in the Upanishads. so in the see that. Tripkaka also. But.s'atru. e. was that he had arrogated to himself the privilege of being We a teacher. but consulted his own time.. IV. Up. E. like Devanam priya. cer- tainly striking. he was a Kshatriya. Curiously enough one of these kings has the name of A(/atasatru. who were Brahmans by birth. enemy. and it does not appear that he and his house had any suzerain over them. . and requires further explanation.

that of religion and philosophy. to beg. the nave of checked by the quality of goodness as its circumference. occurs in later Upanishads only. the turning of the wheel from the same source. enlightened. patrons of a philosopher. the spoke the understanding. and which is this wheel. could hardly be understood without the previous employments of the root Budh in the Veda nor Bhikshu. long before he had become recognised as the founder of a new they take a prominent part in public convened for discussing the great problems assemblies. but if this shows that they are post-Buddhistic. and Prasena^it. There is in this respect a clear continuity between the Upanishads and the earliest appearance of Buddhism and if some of the tenets and technical terms of the Buddhists also are the same as those of the Hindu schools of philosophy. such as Buddha. religion. and possibly 7\akrapraalso is taken vartana. XVII 'You : arc the one person to turn which is the Brahman. Buddha. without Bhiksh. Anugita. in the The name of . beggar. Nirvana.' . Ill. The best known are Bimbisara. as the awakened and 5). the highest goal. But though Buddhism and the Upanishads share 1 Cf. king of Magadha. it is true. is taken from the dictionary of the Upanishads. Para gati. and which does not turn hack. chap. or afterwards for settling the canon of their religious texts. king of Kosala. l .32 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. little difficulty in accounting for this as for the conThe Buddhist tinuity between Sanskrit and Pali. monk was clearly prefigured in the Parivra//aka or itinerant mendicant of the Upanishads (B?~ih. it suggests at the same time that the old Upanishads must have been pre-Buddhistic. there would be as . Upanishads.

in villages or towns. and the arrival of Buddha himself with his six hundred or more disciples was generally made the occasion of great sermon. Once a member of the Samgha. 33 things in common which point back to the same distant antiquity.BUDDHA. without reference to his birth. Though it did not abolish caste. and other entertainments of a less spiritual character. it led to a mixture of which had formerly been kept more carefully distinct. classes could jt>in the Buddhist fraternity. as we see in the case of the kings already mentioned. the old saying that the Indians are a nation of philosophers would seem to have never been so true as at the time of the great . they seem to have been re- ceived with splendid hospitality. they could become patrons and lay sympathisers (Upasakas). including a public cussion. He could then become an itinerant (Parivra^aka) friar. the India at the time of Buddha would seem D . we may judge from the Tripifcika. In fact. if only he was of good report and free from certain civil disabilities. Though kings and noblemen who had embraced the doctrines of Buddha were not obliged to become actual mendicants and join the fraternity. a public dis- rejoicings. without any of that previous discipline which was required from a Brahman. if whole of once more to have been absorbed in religion and philosophy nay. Buddhism in its practical working produced a complete social revolution in India. and of wealthy persons such as AnathaWhenever the Buddhist friars appeared pmcftka. as has many sometimes been supposed. he was free from all family ties and allowed to support himself by charitable gifts (Bhiksha). Anybody.

Pateliputra. but there was nothing in India corre- sponding to a Defender of the Faith. even that of Asoka. There never was such a thing as a state-religion in India. not yet by persecution. This Asoka.C. Greek Accounts. took the warmest It is interest in the proceedings of that Council. represented by schools and sects striving against each other. Mahabharata which. we are told. 242 B. at Vaisali. . are onesided and exaggerated but when we consult the . Nor have are the scant accounts which the Greeks left us of what they saw during and after the invasion of India by Alexander the Great at variance with what we learn from these native Nothing struck the Greeks so much as the philosophical spirit which seemed to pervade authorities. at all may we be assigned to the same Buddhistic meet get just the same picture. to the new brotherhood founded by Buddha. perhaps too much to say that he made Buddhism the state-religion of India. in its earlier elements.. period. We among the Brahmans as among the Buddhists with an immense variety of philosophical and religious thought. like kanaka of old. at and later on at the new residence of Asoka. held. Buddhist Councils. but by serious argumentation. Asoka certainly extended his patronage. that the authorities on which we have to rely for a description of the intellectual state of India at the time of these Councils. It might be objected. events.34 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. no doubt. formerly confined to Brahman s only.

c Crindle. he speaks of gymnosophists living on mountains or in the plains. They comwe are told.sized enclosures. 'in a simple style. and give themselves up to asceticism as if their and meditation. p. with kings. describes what he saw in India in the third century B. Nothing at least is said of any personal enmity between them. i. ambassador of Seleucus Nicator at the court of . their knowledge to such as will listen to them. Even we see described in the Upaniname did not tell us.' The so-called $armanas mentioned by Megasthenes.' having their abode in groves in front of moderate. 305. and spend their time in listening to serious discourse and in imparting of rushes or skins.. or in later Ancient India.GREEK ACCOUNTS. the members of the Buddhist brotherhood who then seemed to have lived most amicably with the Brahmans. Strom. cities live. the members of the third Asrama who had to live in the forest.C. They he writes. W. at a certain distance from their villages. and lie on beds within ' They abstain from animal food and sexual pleasures. adds that they neither live in cities nor even in houses. . we are distinctly informed that they lived in the forest. by J.. such shads. Prasena^/it and Bimbisara. have generally been accepted as representing the /Sramanas or Samanas. however much they may have differed in their philosophical His Hylobioi or forestand religious opinions. A(/atas'atru./Tandragupta (Sandrocottus). who. like 6ranaka municated. Clement Alex. 35 When Megasthenes 1 the that mysterious country. M p. 97 seq. subsisting on leaves and wild fruits. dwellers are probably meant for the Brah manic Vanaprasthas. 1877. D 2 . and wore garments made and 1 2 of the bark of trees (Valkala) -.

consulted them by messengers regarding the causes of things. Some pendent centuries later we have another and is inde- source of information on the intellectual state of India. described to us the state of the country such as they saw it. for no one else can have been meant by Clement. times King Harsha. as to their Holy Land. and by enduring pain. such as Fa-hian. The most important among them visited India from was Hiouen-thsang who 629 to . Chinese Buddhists who made their pilgrimages to India. Hiouen-thsang. whom they honour as a god on account of his extraordinary holiness. saw Buddhism century. at the time when what I call the Renaissance of Sanskrit literature and national independence began. Those who came early.36 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. adds at the end that there are also philosophers in India who follow the precepts of Butta. Buddhist Pilgrims. those who came of its flourishing in the fifth later in the sixth and / seventh centuries. and this also in perfect accordance with what we have hitherto learnt about India as the home of philosophers. We are also the first told that these philosophers practised fortitude. The name was never mentioned by Alexander's companions. which point to Greek influence. that is. Beginning with the fourth century of our era. and who through them worshipped and supplicated their gods. after repeating all this. both by undergoing active toil. remaining for whole days motionless in a fixed attitude. witnessed alreadv the evident simis c? decline. This is Greek mention of Buddha. with the figure and name of Boddo. Clement of Alexandria. though there are early coins.

and their public assemblies. each bringing with him both $ramanas and Brahmanas. and the king himself was present to judge of their learning and their good behaviour. who by this time had made himself a proficient Sanskrit scholar and Buddhist theologian.CHINESE ACCOUNTS. 645. was invited by the king to be present at one of these great assemblies. p. 1 Memoires sur les Contrees Occidentales. Hiouen-thsang. Stanislas Julien. commonly called $ri-Harsha of Kanyakub^a. . This travels and whose king. 251 seq. Twenty kings were gathered there. Each disputant had his chair. described as having conquered the five Indias. and whoever had killed He built a living thing was himself put to death many hospitals and monasteries. He describes the Buddhist monasteries scattered all over the country. Every year he '. and made them discuss in his presence the most important points of Buddha's doctrine. No one. is who though he bestowed his patronage and protection on all sects alike. the schools of the most illustrious teachers whose lectures he attended. was allowed to eat flesh in his dominions. we are told. No one can doubt the trustworthiness of this witness. and entertained many Buddhist friars at his own expense. i. 37 have been translated by my late friend. whether followers of the Vedas or of Buddha. assembled the >Srama^as from different kingdoms. Julien. though he may have been deceived in some of his observations. particularly those that took place at the court of /S'iladitya Harshavardhana 610-650. on the southern bank of the Ganges. having studied the Buddhist writings under some of the most illustrious teachers of the time. seems to have been in his heart a Buddhist.

the interest the great problems of humanity here on earth. they actually king. but exiled a large number of Brahmans from his kingdom. as celebrated in their in epic poetry on account of their acts of bravery or cunning. and I still believe it was he is mentioned by his Sanskrit name as Moksha' ' deva or as the all ' Master of the Tripiteka. This. and forgave the would-be assassin. most of them of a priestly rather than a warrior remained true to its character. Hiouen-thsang himself seems to have taken an active part in this who Congress of Religion. excited the anger of some Brahmans who were present. large A camp was constructed. however. India under the sway of its Vedic poets. escaped. as would seem. and every day rich it alms were bestowed on the $ramanas. one dominant interest pervaded the whole country. such as we should making make in the case of the descriptions of any enthusiastic witness. persecutions may have been exaggerated. enough seems to me to remain to show that from the time of the Upanishads to the time of Hiouen-thsang's sojourn in India.' After reasonable deductions. but they cannot be altogether denied. and the people at large developed and strengthened their old taste for origin. at This gives us the first idea of what that time religious persecution meant on the These part of Buddhists as well as of Brahmans. . They tried to set fire to the camp and the magnificent buildings erected by the And when they failed in this. Its kings surrounded themselves witli a court of sages rather than of warriors. hired an assassin to kill the monarch. The king. While in other countries the people at large cared more for their national heroes.38 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

enough for many phases of thought.KING HARSHA. and that in early days men and even women will place muscle higher than brain. But many even of these epic innate in the heroes have a tinge of philosophical sadness about them. speak of their Mahabharata as a Law-book. King Harsha. and Argoma. in the KHstma was of Kshatriya himself. as described Bhagavad-gita. the greatest among them. and is not extinct even at the Of course. 39 dured religious and philosophical problems that has enfor centuries. l . strange to say. Das Mahabharata. is at the same time the recipient of the highest wisdom communicated to him by KHshna. India a nation of philosophers. the poetical form of what we should call epic poems. The two great worship is epic poems are there to testify that hero- human heart. and was looked upon as r It is curious the very incarnation of the Deity. If the account spiritual state of India at the 1 given by Hiouen-thsang of the time of his visit See Dahlmann. . India is large We must not forget that even in the Vedic hymns Indra. if we call the people of present day. and the Hindus. the most popular of their gods. Dharmasastra and to a certain extent it may have fulfilled that purpose. class also had their and that their achievements also excited the interest of the people. origin. was a warrior. that the Sanskrit language has no w ord for epic Itihasa refers to the matter rather than to poetry. the hero of the Bhagavad-gita. this is not meant to deny that the warrior popular heroes.

as it would seem. the king leaves his ing suite behind arid proceeds on foot. but Bai^a also. incurring thereby the displeasure In the Harsha-/rarita' of the king or of his friends. . his stay at the court of and of Harsha should seem to be tinged too Buddhist priest. the friend and patron tolerated both Buddhism and realm. No doubt Hiouen-thsang looked at India with the eyes of a follower of Buddha. of Hiouen-thsang. We see him. much by the sentiments of the we have only to consult the history of Harsha as written in Sanskrit by Ba/ia. pay his respects to a sage of the name of Divakara. and obeying the orders of the same king. nothing. When approachthe abode of the sage. who had been by birth and education a Brahman. surrounded by his retinue. for instance. whether followers of Buddha or of the Veda. though not a Buddhist. as living together apparently in perfect peace. without. They would naturally discuss their differences and exchange opinions on points on which they were agreed or opposed to each other. p. attended by only a few of his vassals. translated by Cowull and Thomas. the king is represented to us as entering a large forest. While still at a distance from the holy man's abode. the king perceived a large Harsha-frarita. but of violent persecutions by one side or the other. but had been converted to Buddha's doctrine. or of excommunications and massacres. to feel convinced of the faithfulness of his account.40 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. represents to us the different schools and teachers. 235. we hear very little or The king in himself. and we feel doubtful sometimes which of the two he favoured most in Brahmanism his his own mind.

life from palaces. or squatting on the roots of trees. but in villages and forests. is there any other country world of which a similar account could be given. ascetics who pulled out their hair. adepts in sacrifices requiring seven priests. believers in God as a creator (Naiyayikas). Lokayatikas (atheists). and disputing. giving etymologies. followers of Kapila (Samkhyas). seated on rocks. adepts in grammar. raising doubts. . students of the Purcbias. from cities. nay. I a always the same from century to century ? Such life as here described may seem very strange to us. pondering.KING HARSH A. and all the rest. museums. all diligently following their own tenets. religious students (Brahma/iarins). followers of the Pa/l/taratras. because we forget the totally different conditions of in- tellectual life in India and elsewhere. and others beside. it would seem. followers of (Vaise- Kamda shikas). resolving them. urging objections. discussing and explaining moot points of doctrine. in perfect peace and harmony. 6rainas in white robes creepers. assayers of metals (?). students of legal institutes. and that the vast majority of universities. devotees dead to all passions. Now in the ask once more. towns. dwelling in bowers of lying in thickets or in the shadow of branches. followers of Krishna (Bhagavatas). followers of the Upanishads (Vedantins).with mendicants (Bhikshus orParivra#akas). ($vetambaras). 4! number of 'Buddhists from various provinces. 6rainas. even incredible. the real life of India was not lived in However. We cannot dissociate intellectual schools.' and all this. Even at present it should be remembered that towns are the exception in India. but that is our fault. perched on pillows.

An insight into this state of things seemed is nearest to the heart of man. meditate on the problems of life and on all that . and their Here the old sages were free to adjoining groves. and in the end the Upanishads themselves. people live in the country. let If they them be called necessary as a preliminary to a study of Indian philosophy as being throughout the work to me of the people rather than that of a few gifted individuals. a world of thinkers. the testimonies of the Greek invaders. a nation of philosophers. in villages. dreamers of dreams without which life would hardly be worth living. a society in which spiritual interests predominate and throw all material interests into the shade. and the hymns of the Veda. the minute accounts of the Buddhists in their Tripi^aka. As far back as we can trace the history of thought in India. but philosophers. .42 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. from the time of King Harsha and the Buddhist pilgrims back to the descriptions found in the Mahabharata. \ve are met everywhere by the same picture. / were not dreamers.

it one has ever doubted that in the Veda we have the earliest monument of and. and that we should God. in a certain sense. having nothing whatNo ever to do in its origin with any litera scripta. But seeing that the Veda was certainly more ancient than anything we possess of Aryan literature elsewhere. has been preserved to us. during the long night of centuries. IF after these preliminary remarks we look for the real beginnings of philosophy on the soil of India. II. and long before the fatal divorce between hardly differentiated religion and philosophy had been finally accomplished.CHAPTER The Vedas. if literature may be called. people it at the conclusion that very beginning of all find in the hymns of the Rig-veda the very songs of the morning stars and the shouts of the sons of ' jumped would bring us near to the things. There have been curious misunderstandings about this newly-discovered relic of ancient literature. an almost miraculous way.' many these expectations were disappointed. of these ancient hymns. that is in the Vedas. of in Aryan language and thought. chiefly by means of oral tradition. Aryan literature which. we shall is find them in a stratum as where philosophy yet from religion. turning out to be When .

very simple. and real. from our point of view. as a is minimum date for the Vedic hymns. the Brahmans or Pandits of India. but neither can they be proved. And . Whatever the Vedas may be called. natural. and the historian now sees that in the Vedas we have to deal. considering that we have no contemporaneous dates to attach them to. or even 5000 B. and with little of positive beauty. In the end. The Vedic hymns were looked on askance. as it always does after an excessive enthusiasm. but what gained by such bravery ? Such assertions are safe so far as they cannot be refuted. or novel truth. though we should not forget that this is a constructive date only. we are probably on safe ground. It may be very brave to postulate 2000 B. but with what is and has been not with what is beautiful. but with what is true and historically If the Vedic hymns are simple. they are to us unique and priceless guides in opening before our eyes tombs of thought richer in relics than the royal tombs of Egypt. however. and more ancient and primitive in thought than the oldest hymns of Babylonian or Accadian poets. very commonplace. and that such a date does not become positive by mere repetition.C. This 'too is a lesson worth learning. If we grant that they belonged to the second millennium before our era. the historical school has prevailed. nay sometimes very commonplace. and it was even hinted that they might be but forgeries of those very suspicious individuals. and often.44 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. they teach us that very useful lesson that the earliest religious aspirations of the Aryan conquerors of India were simple and natural. often commonplace. . a reaction set in.C. not with I what European philosophers thought ought to have been.

' may be very old as far as the progression of the equinoxes is concerned. faces.' my of turquoises and of crystal.' thy will in I fill heaven and the angels bow their hand with a mountain of diamonds. There are thoughts in those ancient Mesopotamian hymns which would have staggered the poets of tablets. We should look in vain in the ideas as ' ' Veda for such advanced ' deep/ is ' the holy writing of the mouth of the the god of the pure incantation. and public squares. ideas. Whatever may be the date of the Vedic hymns.' thou art as strong bronze. all that I mean and could mean is that they contain fewer traces of an advanced civilisation than the hymns deciphered from cuneiform which we find mention of such things as temples in stone and idols of gold. whatever their age. sceptres and crowns. such as their chief god being called the king of blessedness. these Babylonian hymns sense. but in the progress All this of human thought these ideas mark a point. are thought than the very latest hymns Rig-veda. the light of mankind. for do not speak here of philosophical we have learnt by this time that they are of no age and of any age.' of bronze and lead thou art the mingler. though I confess that it is that very fact.THE VEDAS.' ' ' made known or ' the wide heaven is the habitation of thy liver. the advanced civilisation at that time which they reflect. that makes the Babyearly in more modern of the lonian hymns I so interesting in the eyes of the historian. of altars. 45 when I say that the Vedic hymns are more ancient and primitive than the oldest Babylonian and Accadian hymns. &c. cities and libraries. not In that yet reached by the poets of the Veda. in the Veda. .

unless there was an possible to agent behind who controlled them. nor would it be easy even now to prove a negative One of these agents to this view of the world. but of a lighter and burner. a Dyaus (Zevs) and an Agni (ignis). they have their own unique place and stand by themselves in the literature of the world. the empire of the human mind. as established in India in the second mil- lennium B.C. and there is certainly little of poetical beauty in them. not only of fire and light as a fact. but they were natural thoughts. human mind we find Whatever aesthetic judge- ments may be pronounced on them.46 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. It seemed im- them that sun and moon should rise every day. whether 1500 or 15000 B. should grow strong and weak again every month or every year. What can be simpler than the simple conviction that the regularly recurring events of nature require certain Animated by this conviction the Vedic agents ? poets spoke not only of rain (Indu). The Philosophical Basis of the Vedic Gods. Let us begin with the simplest beginnings. or vtnos). is nay every word an authentic document in the history of the greatest empire. the enlivener. They tell us something of the of which early growth of the no trace anywhere else.C. We may smile at such thoughts. but of a rainer (Indra). they called Savitar as distinguished ('^L^TT/P. in the eyes of the historian and the psychologist they will always retain their peculiar value.. in them. far superior to the oldest chronicles. far superior to the most ancient inscriptions. the . an agent of fire and light. yet inseparable from Surya. for every verse.

' which originally all gods depended for their very existence. a plant known to Brahmans and Zoroastrians before the In this way both the reseparation of the two. same root Su. fire. but of Indian philoNo one. from a plant called Sorna or the enlivener. we cannot watch it with our own eyes. or the activity attributed to the great natural phenomena. the rain. p. of Prithivi. 1 requires neither hypothesis nor induction. of Vanma. ' ' should in future talk about these things who does not know the liig-veda 1 The process on or . and other such Vedic deities. and indirectly of all the Aryan people. Greek Helios. This was the beginning of philosophy. 47 Soma. . earth. e. The gods of the Vedic. and deserve our attention. while the creation of Dyaus.' as Deussen truly says. then the moon which was supposed to send dew and rain. dark sky. of Agni. light and sky. the personification of. ligion and the mythology of the Vedic sages have a philosophical basis. were the agents postulated behind the great phenomena of nature. was likewise at first what enlivens. 83. from the heavenly. the first law of causality. we can only guess at. can sophy also. the sun. and in it we have application of the to recognise the only true solution of Indo-European mythology. Deussen. takes place were in the full light of day. if we wish to understand the beginnings not only of Indian mythology and religion. used for sacrificial purposes and prepared i.PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF VEDIC GODS. while more or less obscured in in all it the Big-veda as other religions. and likewise of Aryan philosophy. Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophic. Whatever may have existed before these gods. and lastly the enlivening draught.

the agent of storm and lightning. the first attempt at . . There was the sky. the agents of the . apparently there must be an agent. the agent of fire other rivers. the agent of the sky Mitra. herself. the agent of the sun Savitn'. agent and as a masculine noun came first. Dyaus. and those of the earth. sphere in the giver its change between light and darkness. active. as rising from the earth as well as from the sky. . . To mid-air belong Indra. as a feminine. the storm-clouds . sometimes the Dawn also. We causes. the agent of the bright sky and day Varu??a. those of the sky. Dyaus. the agent of the enlivening or morning sun Asvinau. the maiden of the dawn. air Parr/anya. it Aryan Theogony was preceded by a period of is simply gratuitous. To the earth belong Prithivi as active . those of To the first belong mid-air. . Vayu and Vata. the agent of the atmo. called Dyaus. the earth i Saras vat and Agui. the agent of the rain-cloud Iludra. Three Classes of Vedic Gods. this hence To say that fetishism or totemism.40 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. that of the mere objective sky. events. These gods were the first philosophy. and divided of nature into three acts and the actors into three classes. second. . know now by what very satisfied simple process the Vedic Aryas how they the whole drama their earliest craving for created their gods. . the agents of . At all need not be refuted before it has been Possibly the naming of the sky as an proved. and several others connected with meteoric phenomena. of rain the Marutas. . the agent of the dark sky and evening Surya. the twin agents of morning and evening Ushas.

and different phenomena by the same agents. They were less interesting to the dwellers in India. Other Classifications of Gods. E . such as were connected with human affairs.. are triads clearly visible in nature. were noticed and named. the philosophy of the race. There in this pantheon. mirrored in ancient mythology in every part of the world. because they did not exercise the same influence on their daily life as they do in Europe. and sky. p. or the time for mowing (Krittikas). as gods of the sky. the return of calmer weather (Pleiades). and night. determining certain seasons. or again. but they never rose to the rank of the high gods. but human was suggested by nature herself. of the earth. noon. and therefore. of the stars only. and marking the time of rain (Hyades). 49 It is curious to explaining the wonders of nature. Earth. and of the clouds l . air. The gods. morning. summer. and winter. however. M. 475. Contributions to the Science of Mythology. had evidently been known before they were distributed into three classes. the system was of course no settled same phenomena being often represented by different agents.OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS OF GODS. we can clearly see that it was not artificial or the work of one individual only. These triads are very different from the later number assigned to the gods. observe the absence of anything like star-worship in A few India among the Aryan nations in general. If we call this creation and likewise first classification of the Devas or gods. under different names and forms. Though the Devas are known in the Kig-veda and the 1 M. spring.

p. the Asvins and Iludra. and Kig-veda X. 139. the Marutas. What we look for in vain in Veda are the names of seven Maruts or seven Hudras. and Tvash^rt. i. Adityas. Visve Devas. It seems rather due to a taste very common among uncivilised tribes of playing with numbers and multi2 We see the difficulty any extent experienced by the Brahmans themselves when they had to fill the number of thirty-three and give their Sometimes they are called three times names. in the sky. but only more or less systematising theories. Ushas. Br. all this is A??isa. 3 but the Rudras. we find no real tradition. we are told. The seven Adityas. the eleven Maruts. We can perhaps make out seven Vasus. 6. though possibly the as in a late verse. 3. too. eleven . number of seven veda VIII. 28. plying them to . 5. Bhaga. . Indra. Even this taken by some scholars in the general sense of many. I doubt whether there is any physical necessity for this number '. XII. . Daksha. 475. 122. and Maruts number of each of these classes of gods seems to have been originally seven rather than eleven. 1 1). I. times eleven replaced by the eight Vasus. We are told that they were the gods clouds (I. 205. meant for if. they are Agni. 2 3 Contributions. Mitra. to which two other We 1 Satap. p. like devanam bhuyishthsih but it is at all events recognised in the Higis '. and the twelve Adityas.50 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Vedanta-Sutras 28. Aryaman. on earth. and in the or again that they wr ere Vasus. i. the Adityas. but see in fact the three very uncertain. Avesta as thirty-three. may possibly be counted as Vanma. but when we ask who these three times eleven are.

in the sense of all the These Visve. from Sarva. 51 gods are added as leaders. Ill. E 2 . Sometimes. to bring their number up to the required thirty-three. though they belong to the class-gods (Gawas). so that even the other classes (Ganas). What is really important in these Visve is that they represent the first attempt at comprehending the various gods as forming a class. such as Adityas.THE VISVE OR ALL-GODS. Br. was raised to twelve. i. but there is hardly one of the Vedic gods who does not at times appear as one of them. all these attempts at a classification of the Vedic gods as due once more to the working of a philoIt is not so much sophical or systematising spirit. The first sented by different step in this direction seems to be reprethe Visve or the Visve Devas. It would be endless to give the names of all Maruts together. are different from other class-gods inasmuch as their number is hardly fixed. that interests the philosophical observer. the exact number or names of these gods. In still later times the number of the Adityas. Visva bhuvanani sarva. the two words can be used together. Gesammtgotter (cuncti). the gods who are praised in the hymns addressed to the Visve Devas. Indra often stands at their head (Indra^yesh^aA). Visva is all.' The Maruts are called Visve Mariita/^. not simply all the gods (omnes). therefore. It means the gods to- gether. 'all beings together. The Visve or All-gods. i. as Taitt. Vasus. as the fact that attempts had been made at so early a time to comprehend certain gods under the same name. having been taken for the solar light in each sucI look upon cessive month.

strides Aditi. as a class. Agiii-Shomau. was . important not only for mythological but for philosophical and religious purposes also. Hence arose a number of dual gods. were seen to perform the same acts. Tendencies towards Unity among the Gods. Vishnu with his three represented originally the same heavenly as rising in the morning. even in that rich treasure-house of Vedic Mythology. should have attracted so little attention hither- to. and hence a poet might well take upon himself to say direction. They are passed over. owing to their position in nature. It is all the more curious that this important class. the fifth volume of Muir's Original Sanskrit Texts. and setting in the evening. also the two Asvins. Mitra and Varu?za. such as Aryaman. Mitra-Varunau. but that in certain of his duties Agni was Indra and was Savit?^'. or Agni. culminating at noon. On other occasions three gods were praised as working together. that Agni not only acted with Indra or Savitn'. such as Indra-Agni. but they ought not to be ignored by those who are interested in the progress of the ancient mythological religions from given multiplicity to postulated unity. But while the first this conception of Visve Devas marks important approach from the many incoherent gods scattered through nature to a gradually more and more monotheistic phase of thought in the Veda. while from another point of view. being. Soma and Gandharva. was identified with the sky and the air. other movements also tended in the same Several gods. as an essential character of the godhead. Another god or goddess. Rudras may be comprehended under the wider concept of Visve.52 or INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

Agnim. This phase of religious thought has been well described in fifth the same see . 104. Weber has strangely he imagines that I designated this phase of religious thought as Henotheism. I. Rv. They thus arrived at the less distinctly more or conviction that above the great multitude of gods there must be one supreme personality. called 'mother. and it was this phase. worked together in one and made some of the Vedic poets see that the idea of god. p. 352 . is as for quite another . which I wished to mark definitely by a name of its own. I. was called the past son. syncretism to address either Indra or Agni or . Deussen. p. MONOTHEISM AND MONISM. To it is identify Indra. and. ways. Geschichte der Philosophie. Matarisvan. after a time. in The sages call that One Yama. . 53 and gods and the five races and the future. so fully developed in the hymns of the Yeda. Monotheism and Monism. calling it Henotheism l . they call it Yamam. and Vanma is one thing. All these tendencies direction. if once clearly conceived. included the ideas of being one and without an equal. 1 many Agni. Matarisvanam ahuh. Ekam sat vipra/i bahudha vadanti.also volume of Muir's Original Sanskrit Texts. they declared that there was behind all the gods that one (Tad Ekam) of which the gods were but various names. the time being the only god in existence with an entire forge tfulness of all other Vanma. father. 46. gods. if me Henotheism. Professor misunderstood was called all the of men. 164. Agni.HENOTHEISM.

In trying to trace religious the onward movement in the of and philosophical thought Veda. tasmat ha anyat na para/j kirn fcana asa. and represents the whole of Vedic mythology and religion even less than Homer represents the whole of Greek mythoIt is wonderful enough that logy and religion.54 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. more have no right to suppose But and this collection in was that we have even a hundredth part of the religious and popular poetry that existed during the Vedic We must therefore carefully guard against age. That One breathed breathlessly by itself. Tlie former thought led by itself to religion. Kv. the latter. . and I confess that there is some excuse for it. But we must never forget that is but a fragment. just as there was for looking upon Homer as the sole representative of the whole epic poetry of Greece. respects. was less widely worshipped This has been a very common mistake. we have taining about ten verses. made at different times systematically in some or less at random. We different places. Anit avatam svadhaya tat ekam. a monotheistic to a monistic philosophy. .o 1 collection of 7 in the Rig-veda a each on an average conhymns. 129. such conclusions as that. but in others. 2. therefore that god was considered as less important or than other gods. other than it there nothing since has been. and upon his mythology as the mythology of the the Ilig-veda whole of Greece. because we possess in our Rig-veda-samhita but one hymn addressed to a certain deity. Speaking as yet hymns i only. X. we should of the recognise once for all the great difficulties with which we have to contend. as ive shall see.

and we must be on our guard not limits assigned to us by to go beyond the the facts of the case. In all such matters. and says towards the end whether it should be. between what has been called tentative monotheism. writing being perfectly unknown. Pra#apati. which is philosophy. What has come down to us of Vedic hymns. which. ya/i deveshu adhi devaA eka/i . nay often chaotic form. and very likely at different periods. Here the poet hymn asks in every verse to whom. 121.PRAAPATI. there are differences also that cannot fail to strike the attentive reader. we are . we must be told. however. as much as possible. by an almost incredible. years ago. to what Deva. he should offer his sacrifice. but the art of mnemonics being studied all the more as a discipline essential to intellectual life. men. we can to the discover traces of the former in the famous the hymn X. which is religion. and abstain as much as possible from attempting to systematise and generalise what comes to us in an unsystematised. is to us a fragment only. when we keep in mind that the ancient literature of India was purely mnemonic. Distinguishing therefore. 55 such a collection should have escaped destruction or forgetfulness. Nor can the hymns which have come down to us have been composed by one man or by members of one family or one community only they reach us in the form of ten collections (Manc?alas) composed. yet well attested process. I called Unknown God. Though there is great similarity. nay even monotony running through them. by different careful not to go beyond the evidence before us. and tentative monism.

with an entire forgetfulness that one only can be so be above Semitic . V. it was he \vho had made the sun to shine. that the ground for this lies deeper. for instance. Aristotle already 1 remarked that. Here too. for a god above much more like the (narrjp av8pS>v re 6t5>v re). i. they imagined that the . 7 we 1 Arist. At first. Still all this would clans and tribes have the monistic craving for a time only. . but this is demand here made by the poet all very different from the distinct for a god that should gods (Exod. thou art the maker of all things. we can watch a slow and natural satisfied progress. each with their own limited supremacy. n). in the demand for and in the supply of a supreme deity. I believe. or for a father of gods and men. At the end the poet sums up by ' saying Visva-karma visvd-deva/i maha'n asi. VIII. as in Greece all demand It is other gods. when (Rv. as men have one king. 2. and where it might seem natural to imagine a number of supreme gods. S. he who alone was god above gods/ Many of the ordinary gods are constantly represented as supreme. (all-god). the all-powerful the conqueror. T. Politics. whether Rar/ah or Maharajah. Aristotle might no doubt have strengthened his argument by appealing to India where ever so many But had each their own king. must be governed by one king gods however. He was called iS'atakratu. thou art the great Visvadeva translate. p.56 ' INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.' The last word is difficult to if but its real purport becomes clear. O. 5. xviii. : and all-wise. or Abhibhu. 89) Indra was to be praised for his marvellous deeds. and also that the idea of oneness idea of is really involved in the God as a supreme and unlimited being. Muir. . &sit..

fact all that a Creator can such as Agni. It The maker should not be forgotten. i. 17).VISVAKARMAN. the maker of all things. re/crew. merely in consequence of that syncretism which identified Agni with ever so many (Rv. well known as the father of Saranyu and Visvarupa. as having begotten everything (visvam bhuvanam </a(/ana). and still more in Visvakarman. 89. as when he is addressed as having formed heaven and earth (X. that there was already another maker. 7 . the Hephaestos. In such adjectives as $atakratu. Indra. he is so here and there. 57 remember what we saw before with origin of the Visve Devas. we see the clear germs that were to grow into the one supreme As soon as Visvakarman was used as a subdeity. stantive. 23. i. in fact. TVASHTRI. Tvashtfn. too mythological a character for philosophical purposes. the had their Brahmans had what they wanted. nay. 9). 1 10. If Agni himself is called Tvash^H II. reference to the Visvakarman. called Tvashfrn. or creator of all things is the nearest approach to the one and only god of later times. X. only that he did not rise to the position of a real creator of all things. 5). He seems to have been too old. this is . however. He had all the requisites for becoming a supreme deity. being supposed to have created even some of the gods. god whose friendship the other gods were eager to secure (VIII. their god above all gods. of the Vedic gods.e. they All-maker. He is in be required to be. 2. and Brahmaviaspati (Rv. He remained the workman. II. the 3).

identical with Dyaus (Zeus) as has sometimes been supposed. like Prar/apati or Visvakarman. 1 Contributions. points in the same direction. a purely abstract 1 . This might also account for Indra's hostility to Tvashf?^'. Those who so confidently identify Yama and Yami with Adam and Eve seem to have entirely forgotten In that Yama never had any children of Yami. this does not necessarily imply his identity with the god SavitH. Tvash^r/ is sometimes but he never becomes. p. enlivener. and that we should take evil spirit. given to Tvash^ri and It is to his son Visvarupa. . his mythological character. and other ancient Devas.58 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. it. 19). but it is a mistake to suppose that as father of Yama and Yami he was ever father of Sara?iyu conceived as the progenitor of the whole human race. but the word should in that case be taken as a predicate. gods. meaning the why he did not. When Tvash^ri is called Savitrz. as a new god. considering that he (Indra). such as Dyaus. just as in other places he is praised as the nourisher or preserver of all One of the creatures. 55. become a supreme god and creator was his having belonged to a more ancient pre-Vedic stratum of causes gods. 560. had himself supplanted the older gods. but more particularly with Tvash^ri'. the simper of all things. Ill. Tvash^ri is best known as the and the grandfather therefore of the Asvins (day and night). also that the We possibilities. as the sun (Rv. not in the sense of an but in the sense of an ancient daimon in which it is applied in other hymns to Varmza. name possible of Asura. must be prepared for many such though I give them here as guesses only. II.

The work of Visvakarman is described in the following words. the support. Br. while producing heaven and earth l . O. 6 . p.' vague and uncertain the personal character of Visvakarman was in Vedic times. 4). 59 and in this we see the real difference between Tvash^H and Visvakarman. X. 355. meaning This blowing has reference to the forge on which the smith does his work. Wings were used instead of bellows. II. and no offspring. one supreme deity which led the Vedic priests to address their hymns to the Visve Devas or to Visvakarman as the maker for The same human yearning of all things.SEARCH FOR A SUPREME DEITY. as Visvakamma. mouths. has no antecedents. 2 Taitt. Muir. who is sent to act as hairdresser to Buddha. a merely subordinate spirit. like Tvashiri (Rv. 9. which have a slight mythological colouring What was the stand. blows (forges) with his two arms and with wings. the All-maker.. Visvakarman. induced them likewise to give a more personal character to Pra^/apati. 81. unless he is conceived as a bird. no parents. became with the Buddhists. we can see from the fact that the Taittiriya Brtihmana ascribes the very acts here ascribed to Visvakarman to How Brahman 2 . their fates ! The gods also have Search for a Supreme Deity.S. arms and feet. from whence the all-seeing Visvakarman : ' produced by his might the earth and stretched out the sky ? The one god who on every side has eyes. . Visvakarman. what and how was it. deity .T. This name. V. 1 and we must take care not to ascribe angels' wings to Tvash/rt or to any god of Vedic times. 8. and not as a man. At a later time. originally a mere predicate.

the sea and all that in them is. Savitri. But many first scholars take it as intended from the verse for the individualised god. . He who all gives who . like all that is omitted in the Pada-text of the Rig-veda. who had made heaven and earth. gives strength . lord of creatures. I considered and still consider this verse as a later addition. as I thought. In the beginning there arose the germ of golden light. Pra</apati. and I give therefore the translation of the hymn as I gave it in 1 ' 860. had left out in my Index one passage. such as Soma.S. for very good reasons. The whole hymn must have been. and though. He stablished the earth and this sky Who is the god to whom we should offer our sacrifice? life. index verborum is by no means infallible. Hirawyagarbha he was the one born lord of all that is. to the Unknown God. whose comimmortality mand the bright gods revere whose shadow is 1 Muir. is used in the Rig-veda as a predicate of several gods. in (p. O. and secondly our Samhita of the Rig-veda is but a segment. the expression of a yearning after one supreme deity. 121. my Ancient Sanskrit Literature translated I many times since. and His later origin has been inferred from the others. i o.60 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. These arithmetical statistics should. howFirst of all my ever. this was I probably no excuse for omitting it. fact that his name occurs but three times in the Rig-veda *. will be seen that History of It has been ' have had but little Hymn . but to alter. be used with great caution.. lie 2. it 568).T. probably a very small segment. 1. very I doubt this still. 390. X. V. of the mass of religious In the case of Pra^apati poetry that once existed.

he who also created the bright and mighty waters Who is the god to whom we should our sacrifice ? which I treated as a later addition. is my critics have evidently overlooked. poets have their own ways. if Pra^apati had been known by the poet as the god who did all this. or he. offer not destroy us. he whose two arms these regions are Who is the god to whom He who we should offer our sacrifice ? 5. whom the heaven was established. they say. GOD. However. the . sacrifice ? his might looked even over the waters. at the end of every verse. he would not have asked. thence he arose who is the sole life Who is the god to whom we should offer our 8. look up. the distant river. He who by May he the righteous. He through whose greatness these snowy mountains are. and the earth firm. because it seemed to me that. He to whom offer our When germ and generating of the bright gods the great waters went everywhere. man breathing and beast Who is the god to whom we should offer our sacrifice ? 4. and the sea. he who alone is god gave strength above all gods Who is the god to whom we should offer our sacrifice ? 9. holding the fire. He through he through heaven. Then follows the verse But the strongest argument against the which final verse. whom we should 6. 6l Who is the god to whom we through his power became the sole king of this and slumbering world he who governs all. with the Kasa. nay the highest light in the air sacrifice ? Who is the god heaven and earth (or. he. trembling in their minds. he over whom the rising sun shines forth Who is the god to whom we should offer our sacrifice ? 7. he who measured the to whom the sky is strong. which and produced the sacrifice. who the god was to whom sacrifice should be offered.HYMN TO THE UNKNOWN and mortality (gods and men) should offer our sacrifice ? 3. the two armies) standing firm by his help. the creator of the earth. who created the heaven.

fact that this verse has not Padakara. this conception of Pra</apati as the lord of created things and as the supreme deity.' . the . Prar/apati we find such names as Purusha.7). even though all With the existence of other gods was not denied. 81. exalted above all other gods. And what is curious is that we see the same attempt l Like Visvakarman and repeated again and again. name-giver of the gods. M. one god. spoils the It runs as follows : 10. may that be ours. maker VidhatH. arranger Namadha. may we be the lords of wealth. though not. no other but thou has held together all these things whatever we desire in sacrificing to thee. man . Pnma. But the deep which they made in the Indian mind has groove remained. that lame and weak. 1 Even the gods of modern times M. Hira?iyagarbha. Some meet us again during the Brahmana period and in the Atharvawa hymns. developed into These names have had different fates in later times. I still hold. breath. or rise to the surface in the more modern pantheon of India others have disappeared altogether after a short existence. Skambha. therefore. pp. all names for the Eka Deva.. . spirit . or have resumed their purely predicative character.62 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. '0 Pra^apati. and character of the hymn. and to the present day the religious wants of the great mass of the people in India seem satisfied . 244 seq. DhatH. whatever names may have been given to him. Theosophy. support (X. that it it is been divided by the was a later addition. the monotheistic yearning was satisfied. ovo^aToOerrjs and others. through the idea of the one supreme god. golden germ . like Pra^/apati. . fullgrown divine personalities.

where. Atman. the god above all gods.e. Durga. 1875) and more successfully by Deussen. originally was Brahman. first In the eyes of more thoughtful men every one of the gods. and thus we see that as early as the Yedic hymns it was spoken of as Tad Ekam. we see in India another powerful movement which postulated from the more than a god above. 63 such as /Siva and Vistmu. We come across it in the 1 hymn is of Dirghatamas (I. p.s-vakarman). Tad Ekam. In spite of their mythological disguises. and therefore not fit to fill the place which was to be filled by an unlimited and absolute power. with the male or female sex. By the side of the stream of thought which we have hitherto followed. It indeed full of obscure passages. 108. was considered as fit for such a being. as the primary cause of all created No name that expressed ideas connected things. as neither male nor female. ATMAN. yet among. the author of which is called Dirghatamas. as neuter. that One. This hymn. Parvati. . not even Pra^apati or Visvakarman. 164. are but new names for what embodied in the lord of created things (Prae/apati) and the maker of all things (Vi.BRAHMAN. We have now to take another step in advance. nay goddesses even. such as Kali. TAD EKAM. in his Allge- meine Geschichte der Philosophie. 6 x ). was limited ipso facto. but it still contains much that has to be cleared up. Long Darkness. called by a personal and proper name. has been explained by Haug (Vedische Rathselfragen und Riithselspriiche. that is. these modern gods have always retained in the eyes of the more enlightened of their worshippers traces of the character of omnipotence that was assigned even in Vedic times to the one supreme god. i. other gods.

is ' the Unborn. Agni then (comes) the heavenly bird Garutman that : . nor the heaven which is beyond. that walks is flies. 6. those or who the unmanifested. which One. says They keep apart all created things. abyss (in which it lay)? . Nasadiya Hymn. and established the whole world. Mitra and Varuwa. form or the unborn. the poet asks. there was no sky. they call it Agni. being differently born. 569. This One. though bearing the great gods . the and again between the One without is. in the shape of the Unborn (masc. but the meaning has on the whole remained much the same. 54. of which I likewise gave a translation in my History of Ancient Sanskrit It has been frequently Literature' (1859). the poets call in many ways. Was it perhaps the One (neuter).' Here we see the clear distinction between the is the One that is various gods. that is. the poet. who he was that established these six ' spaces of the world. Yama. 8. What covered ? Where was it.' The same postulated Being scribed in ' most fully de- hymn X. over or all that is unmoving and that moves. The One is placed in the nave of the unborn where all beings rested/ Again in a hymn ' to the Visve Devas. that named and the names. 82. and in whose shelter ? Was the water the deep i. i.)?' ' This should be read in connection with : the famous forty-sixth verse They call (it) Indra. and tremble the One rules not. translated since. III. where we read mentioned also in X. 129. p.64 after asking INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. There was then neither what is nor what is not. : when speaking of heaven and earth. Matarisvan.

NASADIYA HYMN. in 1859. 6. other than it there has been nothing. 4. Their ray which was stretched it is across. found by wisdom the bond of what 5. There was no death. There was no light (distinction) between night and day. . remain as obscure now as they were to me The poet himself is evidently not quite clear in his own mind. Darkness there was. in spite of much labour spent on them by eminent scholars. and he is constantly oscillating between a personal and impersonal or rather superpersonal cause from whence the universe emanated. 65 2. selfin it Who He then knows. where the Creator could have . 3. from a mythological Trpcoros to a metaphysical irpw-rov. who it has declared here. which was the seed springing from mind poets having searched in their heart . this creation arose. It is strange to meet with this bold guess in a collection of hymns the greater part of which consists of what must seem to us childish petitions addressed to the numerous Devas or gods of nature. and with it the decisive step from mythology to philosophy had been taken. and will above. hence was there nothing immortal. Even the question which in Europe was asked at a much later date. that One was born by the power of heat (Tapas). the Highest Seer in the highest heaven. had evidently been made at that early time. Love overcame it in the beginning. from whence was born this creation ? The gods came arose ? later than this creation. above? There were seed-bearers. then knows whence from whom . That One breathed by itself without breath. But the step from a sexual to a sexless god. he or does even he not know ? There are several passages in this hymn which. was it below or was there were powers. what is not. power below. in the beginning all this was a sea without light the germ that lay covered by the husk. it who 7. whether he made or did not forsooth make knows it.

had evidently passed through the minds of the Vedic seers when they asked. the poet says 'As a fool. from whence Visvakarman produced by his might . Soma. howcould have become possible. ever. what what and how was it. and afterwards addressed by such dark names as Brahman and Atman. 2 : must not. called simply Tad Ekam. as if inspired by a power not themselves. not necessary that the historical progress of thought. or It Varu/ja. proclaimed. a TTOV o-rco found for creating the world out of matter or out of nothing.66 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. when surrounded by millions who never got tired of celebrating the mighty deeds achieved by such Devas as Agni. measure every nation with the same measure. to declare that these gods were nothing but names of a higher power which was at first without any name at all. : ignorant in my own mind. whether religious or philosophical. nor forget that there always have been priin vileged individuals whose mind was untrammelled by the thoughts of the great mass of the people. The poets who utter these higher truths seem fully conscious of their own weakness in grasping them. 5 and 6. 167. I ask for the hidden . should It is We have been exactly the same must we every country. and who saw and fellow men. in I. truths far beyond the reach of their must have required considerable boldness. that One. Thus. 8 1 was the support. Rv. Savitr/. the all-seeing These startthe earth and stretched out the sky ?' outbursts of philosophic thought seem indeed ling to require the admission of a long continued effort of meditation and speculation before so complete a rupture with the old conception of physical gods and 4 'What was the stand. X. Indra.

347. the blood. Prar/apati is often identified with the year. F 2 . nay even by many Jews and Christians to their Jehovah or God. v. as the substance of all the gods. did not claim inspiration ab extra. to ask this ? ' 4 of the same hymn the firstborn. the self? who knows. then so far only as personality was necessary for will. entirely free from mythology. seasons see Galen. as they said. if endowed with personality at all. between the visible and the invisible. and. 1 covered. and hence also between the individual gods worshipped by the multitude. when he who had no bones him that has bones (form)? Where is the ver. All this represented an enormous progress. and in the seven we might see a distant recollection of a year of seven . : Who went to one In selves all this it is who proclaimed quite clear that the poets themthe great truth of the One. and that One Being which was .NASADlYA HYMN.free from the character of a mere Deva. between the phenomenal and the real.' Not having discovered I ask the sages who may have dis. in order to know six skies in the form of the unborn : he who supported the that was he perchance One?' ' And again in Who has seen (no form) bears breath of the earth. This was very different from the vulgar personality ascribed by the Greeks to their Zeus or Aphrodite. in order to weave. places of the gods ' 67 the sages. but strove to rise by their any own exertions out of the clouds of their foolishness towards the perception of a higher truth. The wise. stretched the seven strings over the newborn calf . and it is certainly difficult to imagine how 1 strings This calf seems meant for the year. not knowing. from parentage and sex. had perceived in their heart what was the bond between what is and what is not.

which afterwards became so important as the two main supports of Vedanta-philosophy. lord of creatures. many Such efforts had been made in the same direction. for chronology is very difficult to apply to the spontaneous intuitions of philosophical truths. Agni. One above Being. all is the the age when the collection was finished. a Being raised high all the conditions and limitations of per- sonality and of human nature. life without a long previous Brahman. could have been achieved at that early period and. the name of the transcendent soul as used in the Sawkhya system. if later on we meet with such questions as of . it may be. in the midst of prayers and sacrifices addressed to a crowd of such decidedly personal and as mythological Devas as Indra and Agni and Still it was achieved and whatever rest. it viction was had been formed that there of our Rig-veda-sawhita before that age that the conis but One. but which even at present is beyond the reach of many who call themselves Christians. even at the same time. and nevertheless the Being that was really meant by all such names as Indra. . or. we find Bnihman used as another name what before was called Tad Ekam. do not spring into incubation.68 it INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. nay even by the name of In fact the Vedic Prar/apati. or Purusha. names as Brahman and Atman. That One. If then its various Meanings. it were. Before that highest point of religious speculation was reached. poets had arrived at a conception of the Godhead which was reached once more by some of the Christian philosophers of Alexandria. Matarisvan. neither male nor female.

or is Purusha to be considered the source ?' We names fit naturally ask. Theosophy. whence came these ? What did Brdhman mean so as to become l to signify rb ovroos ov ? It is curious to observe how lightly this question has been answered Brali. however. repeated the same view. ' ITS VARIOUS MEANINGS. is the nature of things. 240. Here the first question seems to be how Brdhman Prof. have mostly thought. p. man. Lastly. Gemiiths auftretende und den Goiter n zustrebende Andacht. namely sacred songs. while with the ordinary change of accent Brahman means he who prays. M. is accident. 69 Was Brahman the first cause ? Whence are we Whither are we By what do we live hastening By whom constrained do we obtain born ? ? ? our lot in life whether of happiness or of misery. he assigned to Brahman the meaning of force as manifested in nature. to swell it was said or to grow. means prayer. by Dr.' words difficult to render into intelligible 1 M. Haug. ye knowers of Brahman ? Is time. first of all. and what meaning of growth and causes growth and welfare. ' force of will directed to the gods and he gave as the first meanDie als Drang und Fiille des ing of Brahman. no continuity in this string of Other scholars. Roth maincould have come to mean prayer. Muir starts from Brahman in the sense of prayer. and was derived from the root Barh or Bn'h. He then assigned to Brah- man the more abstract welfare.BRAHMAN. . and that of universal force as the Supreme Being. so that originally it would have meant what swells or grows. are the elements. Dr. 1 confess I can see tained that Brahman expressed the . is necessity..

but how are life . This evolution of thought must have taken place long .' lifting up of the will above one's own individuality of which we become conscious in religious I must confess that here too there meditation. and without any analogies in the Veda itself. there would be nothing to prevent its having originally grown out of Brdhman in the sense of word. is English. they to be derived one from the other I Prof. Though the idea of prayer as swelling or exalted thought may be true with us.JO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. lastly. When it is said that the hymns make the gods grow (Vndh). the absolute or impersonal god. c. of the heart. growing strong. 1. bursting forth. when we are trying to discover the almost imperceptible transitions by which a root which expresses the idea of growing forth (Vriddhau). Deussen (p. and all that has been said of the swelling little. as expressed by the word Brahman. then sacred and divine a sacred or magic formula words. The second meaning. decidedly modern. trace of such thoughts in the Veda. of the prayers there are very matter-of-fact Most petitions. p.this is little more seems to me than what we mean by saying that they magnify the gods (Deussen. the fervid impulse of the will. .. the elevation of the mind. i o) sees in Brahman the ' prayer. increasing. holy These are mighty strides of thought. according to him. seem to be several missing links in the chain of meanings. came to supply a name for prayer as well as for deity. Of course we cannot expect perfect certainty in a matter like this. . Even if a more profound intention were supposed to be necessary for the word Brahman in the sense of prayer. there is if any. opposed to ordinary language sacred wisdom. 245).

should note. 3. 2. long before the Aryan Separation. is synonymous with Ya/ias-pati. it would have been impossible to form such a name as Br/has-pati. however. lord of speech. ' ' Here we can see that speaking could originally have had the meaning of uttering. to break forth. or is uttered. strongest. I. tasya esha patih va&am brahma * ity upasate. to spread. The next step to consider is the name BrihasWe must start from the fact that Brzhaspati pati. and that word has been conceived as that which breaks forth. That Brahman means prayer is certain. fore. Unless Brih had once meant speech. BHh. that Vn'h or which I take to be a parallel form of VHdh. broad. vag ghi br/hati. Cf. We BHmhayati also w ere quoted by Indian gramr marians in the sense of speaking and shining.2. an utterance (Ausdruck). Hence Brihat means simply great (like great from I suppose. Br/h. 1 See /fAand. Up. What is equally certain. strong Barhish^a. u. . growing). as little as Brahma?^as-pati could have been possible without Brahman 1 . before ITS VARIOUS MEANINGS. 20. all. long before the final constitution of the Aryan language of India.BRAHMAN. I. though we cannot attribute much importance to the fact. and VII. to come forth. and that the root BHh meant to grow. meant to grow. 2. and we should never We can but guess there- forget this in trying to the faint traces which the earliest steps interpret of the human mind have left on the half-petrified sands of our language. and admitted by uncertain are the intermediate links is connecting the two. yo . 7! the Vedic period. and I can say no more. to grow. as we say. that BHmhati and .

the Latin vei'bum and the German Wort can be regularly derived from the same root. of a force that will manifests itself in audible become easy to understand how also. Bnh and Brahman. that is. . whether in speech or in nature now comes a much more perplexing question. 28). the absolute god. so far as it bursts forth. or shone forth. We may But It can hardly be doubted that Vrih or BHh is a parallel form of VHdh and it is a well-known fact that both . holy wisdom to the source of that wisspeech. But if I am Brdhman the it original meaning right in seeing of what breaks forth. from the very beginning though in a different direction. what broke forth. ^/aga/c A'a brahmavnwhanam 1 : ' (Vedantism.72 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. prayer lifting without any idea of swelling meditation or up of hearts. so alien to Vedic poets. corresponding In that to a possible Sanskrit Vw'h-a or Widh-a. p. they are known to in us. the word or speech. have been used as a name of that universal force which manifests itself in the creation of a visible universe. From this point once gained I make the next step and suppose that Brdh-nlan was formed to express what was uttered. we can easily understand how the general concept of word was specialised in the sense both of sacred utterance or formula and of . such as . Brahman could dom. We need not suppose that it had to ascend a scale first from holy word. If we have arrived at this. Divyadasa Datta quotes a passage from the YogavasishMa Brahmavn'wihaiva hi ^agarj. suppose therefore I say no more that Brdhman meant force or even germ. Word. l .

that was with God. p. but in the face of well-known facts he added Without wishing to give a de' : In the Rig-veda we have only va'/ca/i words. few Sanskrit scholars could help being reminded of the Logos or the Word that was in the beginning. . was 'the active power of Brahma. IX. or by the Indians from Greece. So far we on safe ground. published an article with the object of showing that the Logos-idea had no antecedents in Greece to account for it. brahma^as pate. This is a question the answer of which must lead to the most far-reaching consequences. as Colebrooke pointed out as speech. 2 After reading Colebrooke's proceeding from him early as 1805. &c. which.' IX. and brahman are still as the speaker. 3. was whether this idea of the creative Word was borrowed by the Greeks from India.Bfl/H AND BRAHMAN. 26. 73 case Brd.' This was certainly a startling assertion. the lord of This Va&. WORD. 23. The important question. Professor ' Weber in his 'Indische Studien. 166.' remarks on it. occurs frequently in Eig-veda. speech. and again patiw vaA'a/i. 2 1 pate. 28. as two Brahma^as i. I. 473. . and by whom all things were made. however. or whether it was an idea that sprang up independently in both countries. the utterer. gyeshtharag&m Miscellaneous Essays. and in the present state of our knowledge I should not venture to go much beyond. even after Colebrooke's remarks. But Colebrooke and other Vedic scholars have often pointed out the fact that in the Veda already we find a goddess Va&. 4. which we met in Va&as-pati and BHhas-pdti *. remained still undecided.h man also may be taken as a direct deriuttered vation in the sense of the word. pati/i as II. X. brahnia^am.

similarities. considering the close relations at that time existing this on between Alexandria and India. There are. VaA' is a a masculine.' He simply on account of the invigorating influence which the gods were believed to derive from the hymns. that the goddess of Speech was conceived as furnishing to Pra^/apati the strength of creation. being identified with the absolute Brahman. particularly in the shape of Om. but there are dissimilarities also which ought not I hope I to To say nothing else. did not enter on a discussion of the arguments which prove the absence of antecedents of the Alexandrian Logos idea in Greek to were intended philosophy. leaving classical and Sanskrit scholars to form their own conclusions.' that the facts of the case lead us to a very If I different. and that involves more feminine. . that the Alexandrian Logos idea had no antecedents in Greek philosophy. no doubt.. though at last. the surmise is obvious. Logos than a difference of grammatical gender. that the growth of this Neoplatonic idea was influenced by the like views of the philosophical systems of that it may have been says again. be ignored. I have tried to show in my ' Lectures on Theo- sophy. question. ' India. but was influenced by the Vedic VaA. nay to the very opposite opinion. While Professor Weber had asserted that the Logos appears in Alexandria without any preparatory steps.74 cision INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. she obtained the highest position.' Professor Weber's somewhat have thus given a correct account of vague yet startling assertion. it was because I thought it better to state the facts as they really are. without entering on any useless controversy.

when she has become the wife of Hephaestos. which are very well known to every up student of the early history of Greek philosophy If I have succeeded in this. we must here also admit that what was possible in India was possible in Greece likewise. 79). the red horses Dawn' (p. it in We the Upanishads. The two are as independent of each other as the Greek Charis. was concerned. 384. and that we have no evidence to support us any further conclusions. would fall to the ground of itself. was there at least a between Charis and the Haritas. and the Logos also ? Then the question arose. between Zeus and Dyaus. the presumption in 1 . even in that embryonic form in which of the ' ' we by find itself. p. 75 I did my best to point out these very steps leading to the Logos. Logos. that striking as are the coincidences between the Vedic Va& and the Greek Logos.' I had said before. Real Indian philosophy. between As there were no linVaA. stands completely cannot claim for it any historical relationship with the earliest Greek philosophy. distant relationship. In all this I thought It is that facts would speak far better than words.BtfTH AND BRAHMAN. The Historical Antecedents of the . of the Vedic is of the Haritas. as a potentia of the absolute Being. WORD. I arrived in the end at the conclusion. and the claims of India and Greece would be equal so far as the original idea Word. favour of any Indian influence having been exercised on the philosophers of Alexandria. true that Professor Weber was careful to add quite in 1 Theosophy. such as exists guistic indications whatever in support of such a view.

2 KAMaka 12. as the companion of Pra(/apati 2 . would not have been revived. in Prov. 30. for as Wisdom. Sophia. and the Sophia of the Old Testament 1 might have been adduced. 5 (27.' But with all this I cannot admit that there is any evidence of borrowing or of any kind of in- between Indian and Greek philosophy. rejoicing always before him. and I should have thought that after the historical antecedents of the Logos and the Logoi in Greece had been clearly laid open.or from the 0. the Purvapaksha and the Uttarapaksha. The Eternal possessed me in the beginning of his way. as one brought up with him . It is easy to state the pros and cons. viii. before his works of old. The historical consequences of such an admission would carry us very far indeed.. is made to say. had derived their information from him. I was by we read of Va& ' him. the conclusion. 381. i). we read ' in Prov.' While in the Kanaka we read of VaX* impregnated by Pra</apati. p. viii. the idea of the Greeks teraction having borrowed their Logos from Vedic VaA. and I was daily being his delight. If 1 M. . but the both are meant in the end to lead on to Even stronger Siddhanta. Theosophy. T.76 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. would require a far stronger lever to lift and to remove the weight of evidence on the other side than the arguments hitherto brought forward. M. and it . 22. ' the clause that he did not intend to give any opinion on this question/ hut after such a confession it is hardly becoming to hint that those who have given an opinion on this question. coincidences between VaA.

the difficulties of an interchange of thought. in India ? Modern missionaries. accredited by membership in the ruling race. nothing beyond mere possibilities of an exchange of religious or philosophical ideas between Greece and India has as yet been established. astronomical observations. or articles of trade whether jewels. wood. such as alphabetic writing. and even in the cases of two such men meeting. may. without a perfect knowlanguages. no doubt. It seems not to have been perceived that an exchange of philosophical thought is very different from an adoption of useful arts. is very different from what the position of a few Buddhist . 77 the Greeks had really borrowed their idea of the Logos from India. but the position of the Christian missionary in India. Has he left any trace of Chinese thought. can teach or influence a philosopher. particularly for ancient times. if unsuccessful in conversions. or It is only a philosopher that clothing materials. are far greater than we have an instance of a foreign philosoimagine. it ? This requires some fuller consideration. have left some imprint of Christianity and European philosophy on the native mind. but I feel bound to say that. coined money. whether derived from Confucius or Lao-tze.EAST AND WEST. why should they not have adopted any of the consequences that followed from East and West. has been carefully noted and strongly urged of late. Every indication of a possible intellectual intercourse between Greeks and Hindus in ancient as well as in more modern times. pher becoming a proficient in the philosophical ledge of the We language of India in the case of Hiouen-thsang.

Plato and Aristotle. even satisfied with names. no doubt. and seasons. but let him try to discuss metaphysical questions. Later expect contact between Indians and Greeks. with a name meaning atom and with the atomic theory. without our having to imagine that there was at that time any exchange of ideas we meet between the two countries on such points. ideas in common. and could not here. A courier may be very conversant with French or Italian. Pythagoras. priests. numbers. But long before that time both Greeks and Hindus had invented many tilings. for instance. assumed no importance till we come to the invasion of Asia Minor. we must be is marriages and funerals. to point out coincidences between Kapila and Zenon. and learnt to speak and converse on certain subjects in Greek or Egyptian. If then in India as well as in Greece with similar philosophic ideas. as. though. and it will be perceived what difference there is between an interpreter and a philosopher capable of discussing religious and metaphysical problems. Asia Minor or Greece. Persia. That there was a time when the ancestors of the Aryan speakers had the same language and held many of their mythological and religious names and no longer doubted. or Kanada his Anus from Epicurus ? It is interesting. common mythological speculations. such as kings. or even to translate a book of Vico's into English. and India by Alexander the Great.78 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. even monks could possibly have been in ancient if they had reached Alexandria. whether in Persia. should we suggest at once that Epicurus must have borrowed his atoms from Kanada. but it is even more interesting to point out the shades of difference in cases where . times.

First of all. there was a more real intercourse even between philosophers of Greek and Indian origin. virtue. elaborate an ideal Monism. love. 79 they seem most to agree. is best exhibited by the often attempted identification of the names of Pythagoras and Buddha-guru. Who would see to be found in Greek philosophy ? more than a very natural coincidence between the Atman Sanskrit triad of Dharma. word. and the Platonic TO. is very different from that of Pythagoras and other philosophers. in the and and kingdom. The real character of most of these coincidences between Greek and Hindu philosophy. after the establishment of a Bactrian . what is good. and TO. At first sight it is certainly startling. besides being borrowed from the Veda. The belief in transmigration among the Buddhists. well ? If the Vedanta could why not the Eleatics as And yet where is there a trace of such a philosophical theory as the absolute identity of (the Self). while ascetic practices were certainly not confined to either India or Greece. wealth. least of all as a name of the teacher Buddha. Pytha could never be the same as Buddha. but no one would venture to accuse either Greeks or Indians of borrowing or of theft on such evidence. o0eAi/ia 3 How is what is pleasant ? the triad of thought. It is quite true that after Alexander's conquests. -fjSea friend Professor Co well and others. Kama. and Brahman (the absolute being). TO. both civilised uncivilised. KaXd. or Goras as Guru. evaporates completely. Buddha-guru does not occur.EAST AND WEST. Artha. North of India. and whether as a common it Aryan name or as borrowed. but if traced back to its origin. and deed widely spread has been shown very clearly by my old is what useful.

The Hindus had a god of love in the Veda. Skanda. built and carved in stone. which With regard to require more convincing proofs. as early as the Veda. shows as clear surviving traces of as. noses and eyes. on coins. and if the images of Indian gods and even of Buddha on ancient may be supposed to have favoured idolatry in Indian gods. howIndia. heads. while some of the Indian architecture. >Siva. nor is there any reason to doubt that the idea of temples or monasteries or monuments. i. and Visakha. The later influence which Christianity is supposed . 3 99 provided that Visakha can refer to Kama and many of the 5 > shooting his arrows ? It cannot be doubted that the art of coining money was introduced into India by the Greeks. But even he brings forward coincidences. Indian coinage.e. were anthropomorphic. coins. V. came from Greece.8o INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the Lycian tombs. imaged on more modern coins as an archer sitting of sculptured idols. are the very gods found on the earliest Mauryan coins. facts bearing on this subject have been very carefully put together by Count Goblet d'Alviella in his Ce que I'lnde doit a la Grece. that too may be admitted. it should be observed that the three gods mentioned by Patafkjrali as used for commerce. even when a in stone. We earlier are now Greek in possession of specimens of workmanship in India. 1897. cf. on the back of a parrot. than this much Kama on the back of a parrot. but he was very different from the Kama. native wood-architecture for instance. and the absence of workable stone in many parts of India would naturally have been unfavourable to a development ever. Psm. had legs and arms.

It should not be forgotten j that as the Bhagavad-gita bears the title of Upanishad. and may.EAST AND WEST. and . can account for of those them. such but no one. does not help us much even as indicating the way by which the idea of the Creative Word could have reached Clement of Alexandria or Origen. to have exercised in 81 originating or in powerfully influencing the sectarian worship of K?'istma does not concern us here. That Clement of Alexandria knew the name of Butta is well known. p. Ever since the beginning of Sanskrit studies. one can deny the similarities. If Damascius tells us that there were Brahmans l we must not forget that this living at Alexandria refers to the end of the fifth century A. if it should be admitted at all.e. 167. and we are as far as ever from being able '^ point to any historical channel through which the legends of Christ or Kn'srma could have to travelled. Some who have been most anxious to gather coincidences between the Bhagavad-gitsi and the New Testament. that they should learn to translate both Sanskrit and Greek before they venture to compare. But iteration yields no strength to argument. it would have to be referred to a much later period than that which gave rise to the six systems of philosophy.. G . have been rightly warned by native scholars themselves. for. it may belong to the end of the Upanishadperiod. D. No as they are. as the late Professor Telang maintained. he even knew that he had 1 See Goblet d'Alviella. I believe. nay even before. be older even than the New Testament. I. these startling similarities between Krishna and Christos have been pointed out again and again..

such arguments as have been used to establish a real exchange of thought between India and Europe in ancient times. for the last time in my paper on Coincidences. which have been proved to be anything but real coincidences. without venturing to suggest any borrowing . Some of the coincidences between Buddhism and Christianity are certainly startling. are story of Buddha The repeated again and again. was one of the teachers But all this is far from proving that of Clement. who have pointed out coincidences quite as startling between the religious and philosophical folklore of uncivilised and civilised faces. been taken a god. or that their opinions were influenced by a few Indian travellers staying at Alexandria who cared for none of these things.82 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. No critical historian would listen for one moment to the similarities to startle New Testament. and the parable of the Prodigal Son scriptures in is in the surely very different in spirit Buddhist from that There remain quite sufficient and perplex us. had preached the Gospel in India. that Pantaenus who. but in several cases they exist on the surface only and are not calculated to carry conviction on one side or the other. without our dragging in what has no power of proving anything-. On this point we owe a great deal to students of ethnology.' but the same coincidences. I have treated of them on ' several occasions. Nor should it Clement or Origen was able to study the VedantaSutras or the Buddhist Abhidharmas. according to Eusebius. particularly by their number. for be forgotten. under an Indian fig-tree sitting (faux religiosa) has nothing whatever in with Nathaniel sitting under a Palestinian common fig-tree.

and shows that the way between Alexandria and Benares was wide open in the first century A. All this is true. among so low a race Klamaths 3 but no one has ventured to say that the two accounts had a common origin or were as the borrowed one from the other. and possibly. is mentioned in the legend of St. p. 3 Theosophy. as I pointed out. I. likewise the 1 Contributions to the Science of Mythology.. No doubt. barriers. p. S. 168. D.C. very characteristically from the Persian bridge. p. according to M. Alexandria was known by name. Levi. Again. has been authenticated on Indo-Parthian coins as Gondoof name King Gondaphoros. 2 4 Theosophy.EAST AND WEST. such channels were there neither mountains nor seas would have formed impassable . This should serve as a useful warning to those who are so fond of suggesting channels through which Indian thought might have influenced Palestine or Greece.e. and vice versa. was certainly a missionary religion quite as much as Christianity was at a later time. for it differs also. Le Comte d'Alviella. bridge.. for instance. On the other hand. community of origin. as early as the third B. Buddhism. to century the author of the the Mahavamsa 4 . or 83 any historical bridge. Besides. The which seems so peculiar to the Persians. G 2 . had its antecedents as far back as the and is matched by a similar bridge among Veda. Thomas' travels to India. 383. as Alasando. who name of his nephew Abdayases. the North American Indians 2 I say. 177. a similar . it is well known that the creation of the world by the Word has been discovered . Nor should phares. that of Vasu Deva as Misdeos.

Gorres.S'akya the Scythian. but we could not expect any bond jide historian to accept any one of them as a proof of a real influence having been exercised by Greece on India or by India on Greece. All this is possible. but no more. at a time when Greek philosophy and religion might Eastern guides. unless ment of India is once more to be revolutionised. Though the no trustworthy chronology. in spite of for all his mysti- cism. have been forgotten that in the Dialogues between Milinda and Nagasena we have a well authenticated case of a Greek king (Menandros). nay even probabilities. the whole structure of the literary developstill. or that of Terebinthos the the very founder of the pupil of Scythianos l . All this is true. and Terebinthos may contain traces of Thera (elder). They may point out Manichaean sect in whence these heresiarchs derived their wisdom. . discussing together problems of philosophy and religion. was right when he looked 1 a similarity It has been suggested that Scythianos may have been an adaptation of . and of a Buddhist some of the highest philosopher. would help us to discover the secret springs of the wisdom of Kapila or Buddha /SVikya Muni. or still have been amenable to Indian schools of thought might have gratefully received fresh impulses from the West. a name of Buddha.84 it INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. literature of India has we can hardly imagine names as that the occurrence of such (Zoroaster) among the followers of Mani. and yet we are as far as ever from having discovered a Greek or Indian go-between in flagrante delicto. but they leave the question which concerns us here totally untouched. We have before us ever so many possibilities. Bodda and Zarades Babylon.

The eternal word which is called Spho^a and does not consist of parts. though he philosophy. we could not admit it without admitting at the same time a community of thought. with verbum and Word may be. similarities between two mythologies.EAST AND WEST. Vivartate*rthabhavena prakriya gag&to yatha. Is changed into the form of things. Sphotekhyo niravayavo nitya/i sabdo brahmaiveti. they might as well the discovery of one coin with the name of Augustus on it is a more convincing proof of Roman influence in India than the discovery of pieces of uncoined gold. which is the eternal essence of speech. applied it wrongly. belief in spirits and visions in sleep or dreams. such as changes of men and women into animals or plants.. and of deep philosophical thought. 1 140: Anadinidhanam Ibrahma sabdatattvam yad aksharam. but one such equation as Dyaus = Zeus. To return to the origin of the word Brahman. Bibl. worship of trees and ancestors. p. is indeed ' Brahman.' . at a period There is a curious passage in Bhartnhari's BrahmakawcZa which seems to identify Speech and Brahman. like the evolution of the world. or end. l Tempting as the distant relationship between Bra'h- ever so many man and ~Brih. It is the same as in ComThere may be ever so many parative Mythology. is more convincing than all of them taken together. Brahman without beginning Equally strong is the statement of Madhava himself. Ind. See Sarvadarsana-sangraha. in the sense of speech. in technical terms in order to establish 85 an Indian influence on Greek or a Greek influence on Indian His principle was right. ask why If people ask why.

he who breathes. what whomsoever this. is introduced in hymn X. lie By me it is that he who sees. 30. they rest on me. 125. thee what believe. who never required any prayers at all. gods have thus established me in many places. I support the swelling (?) 3. the Brahma?ias and Upanishads Va. the gatherer of riches. and also for men . staying with many. speech. eats food without . prayer. say gods. and that Brahis man. 2. (?) even I myself. one and is all ! tell 5. as a name of the TrpvTov KIVOVV. could not have assumed the meaning of the object of prayers. also in Atharva-veda IV. I Hear. first the queen.86 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. from a consideration of the facts hitherto examined that in India itself Brahman. I support Mitra and Varima both. In order to show what direction the thoughts connected with Veda. knowing 1 it. I. good love. I bestow wealth on the zealous offerer. I wander with the Adityas and the Visve Devas. . I shall first of all subjoin here a few passages from the hymns. the Universal Spirit. I support Agni and the two Asvins i. entering into many. that is. the of those who merit worship the 4. I am knowing. : Va& took in the as saying ' : wander with the Vasus and the Kudras. speaking in her own name. on the sacrificer who presses Soma. need not have passed through a stage when Brdhman meant prayer only. who hears what is spoken. previous to the Aryan Separation and we certainly have no evidence sufficiently strong to support so What we may carry away bold a hypothesis. I support Tvashfr't and Pushan and Bhaga. Soma. for I him . I . .

This is. G. him I make him a Rishi. 6. 71) which is very obscure and has for the first time been rendered more intelligible by Professor Deussen (A. I have entered both heaven father (Dyaus) on the is earth. I hold earth I 011 . meet with such observations as that words We were made in the beginning in order to reveal what before had been hidden. showing that those who uttered it had not yet ceased. p. an important thought. . beyond the sky. I bend the bow for Rudra (the storm-god) that his arrow may strike the hater of Brahman I make . all from thence spread over beings. make formidable. to wonder at The struggle for life that is going on among words is alluded to by saying that the wise made speech by mind (Manas). P. to lay all things. my height. I 87 a Brahman. . him a sage. (my ?) summit of in the sea my I origin in the waters. war and 7. like ourselves. indeed spread forth like the wind. I bring forth the this world. here also there is nothing. and touch yonder heaven with 8. sifting as by a sieve the coarsely ground flour. The power of speech is greatly extolled. where we meet with some important remarks showing that language formed an But object of thought even at that early time. no doubt.. approaching to the conception of the Word as a creative power. and eloquence is celebrated as a precious the existence of such a thing as language. for the people.' is there any trace in these utterances of the thoughts that led in the end to the conception of the Greek Logos? There is another hymn (X. beyond the ask such have I become through my greatness. as yet. 148).EAST AND WEST.

All shout when the eloquent man apthe assembly subdued or spellbound pears. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. in this But although we can discover hymn an appreciation of the mysterious nature of speech. rests. I.e. and names by Aoyof. after having thought all forms.' Here we have only to translate forms by e'i'Sr). when on the verge of darkness. in various parts of the Brahmanas. The knowledge of all things or. . the wise. and having made their names. 12. p. nor do we find more than slight anticipations of the Neo-platonist dogma that the creation of the universe was in reality an utterance of the hidden thoughts and words of the Deity. is We meet with passages of a very similar character.17). 290.88 gift. and we shall not be very far from the world of thought in which Plato and Aristotle 1 moved.as given ' in the Taittiriya-aranyaka (III. holding men by his words (Sabhasaha). taught by the Brahman. nay he is supposed to remove all sin and to procure sustenance for his friends. The following passages will give some idea of what was thought in India about mind and language and their mutual relation. the knowledge of the origin of things. as Deussen says. addressing I know them. he.. One of the most startling is found in a verse inserted in the Purusha- hymn. that great sun -coloured Punish a. They may be Sec Deussen. which can be so clearly read in the Greek word Logos. Mind and Speech. both word and thought. we look in vain for the clear and definite idea that language and thought are one.

speech the gods. alone and lonely. Up. ancestors. i. let a second body be born of me. neut. 4. breath the Sama-veda. 17 'This world in the beginning : was Atman (Self). speech the Eig-veda.' Bn'h. speech is : 'The Atman consists of There are also the three worlds .' And ibid. 24 : 'He desired. for Va& was his. and he (death or hunger) embraced speech with his mind. 5.. created the : waters out of Va& (speech). Va& as the He thought. 21 and from Va& Visvakarman (the all-maker) begat ' : living beings. for she will go and become all this. 89 vague and mystical. 2. Ar. and men. this world. and Va& was his own. That was created (sent forth). : Paft&avimsa Brahmana XX. Let me create (send forth) second. the threefold Veda. that is. the three' Pra(/apati alone was this. I. Ar. and breath. i. after having created the Veda (Brahman.' The unborn is Va/j. He desired. mind the ancestors. The same are gods.MIND AND SPEECH. Then from the egg there arose fold Veda. . neut. mind the air. 5. &c.).' ~Brih. 14. Brahmana VI. 3 mind. breath the sky. VII. speech. Up. i 'Pra^apati. I. I. i. mind the Ya^/ur-veda.' first Brahman.e. He then entered the waters with Brahman. the nature of speech and the relation between speech and thought. $atap. $atap. and there arose from the water an egg which he touched and commanded to multiply. Brahm. breath men. 2 this Va&. but they show at all events that a good deal of thought must have been expended by the early thinkers of India on this problem. The same are the three Vedas.

Manas (mind) child. more correctly. 2. 1. of the Manavas. to which many more might be added. was uttered by Svayambhu. . 1 Vod. Sutras I. eternal. works. because they sprang from different minds without any prearranged system but tbey seem to me to show at all events that thought and language must have occupied the philosophers of . quotes from the He with his mind united himself with speech. breath the or very similar and often contradictory Thus we read in ideas occur in later works also. ' : of all beings and the procedure of of all acti\'ties. without beginning or end. Ar. The same I. Sophia) end. and often contradictory. the divine Va& (speech) of the Vedas. of which : 8533 'In the r 1 have to treat further on.svara shaped from the words of the Veda the names and forms . I May have a wife . the several names. These utterances. speech the wife.' And to quote but one passage from the /Santi-parva. 4 ' ' : : ' activities proceeded And again In the beginning Mahe.90 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. are certainly vague. Up. Manu 2 1 : 'In the beginning he (Brahma) fashioned from the words of the Veda. w as sent forth by Svayambhu.' >Sa??ikara. and conditions of all things. Maha- bharata. but they often contain old thoughts. from which all shall we Br/h. .' is the Self. . consisting of Veda. or. the self-existent. beginning without beginning or Vidya (knowledge. 3. Speech.' and he adds an important verse from some Snu'iti In the beginning divine Va&. 28. are no doubt later than the Brahma?(as. and chaotic. the clan of Manu. when treating of Sphofa (word).' The Laws Manu.

II. Vag vai Brahma). just as every thought- Greek must have known that there was a reason why Logos meant both word and thought. Br. 10. verily. but tried hard to discover whence it and what was we read in the true relation to thought. this also serves to show that at all events these early guessers did not accept language simply as a matter of course. I communicate. 'A dispute once /S'atap. and Pra</apati decided in favour of Mind. that trary lord of speech looks up to the mind. i. But that ancient chapter of thought which lies beyond . "I am excellent. I." Surely I am better than thou. and even in later times those of modern Europe. as most of our modern philosophers are so apt to do. ' : are words produced. and since thou art only an imitator of what is done by me and a follower in my wake. took place between Mind and Speech as to which was Both said." : They went to appeal to Pra^apati for his decision. I am Mind said " : " Speech said Surely I am better than thou. and the co-existence of Brthaspati and Brahma/zas-pati could hardly have failed to suggest to them the identity of Brahman and BHh ful in the sense of speech. and the mind runs after them. 4. First. 262) we read on the conihen the lord of speech was produced. for what thou knowest I make known. for thou dost not speak anything that is not understood by me. Br. And if some of them assigned the first place to thought and others to speech. 4.MIND AND SPEECH.' Some of the Brahmanic thinkers say in so many words that Speech is Brahman ($atap. 5. &c. 9! India far more than they did the philosophers of Greece.' ' In the Anugita (p." surely better than thou. 8 its : came Thus the better of the two.

He calls given currency. we may often fail to discover the right footsteps of 1 Tuitt. meaning word or speech. and then rising to the object of prayer. but which certainly requires a fuller Instead of beginning with the spejustification. which. meaning that which utters or drives forth (Pra/t-yavayati) or manifests or creates. though they produce conviction in some minds. for more popular purposes. Brahma \ No doubt in those dark fore passages through which words passed silently bethey emerged into the full light of literature. 17. the Urgrund der it der zum Heiligen. I prefer to begin with Brahman as a synonym of B?vh in Br/haspdti. . Br. that which is the universal support (Skambha) or force (Daksha). 7. which is much emporstrebende the same idea to which Roth and others have Welt. and from prayer came to mean he who is prayed to. II. the childhood of all philosophy is for ever lost to us and can be reconstructed by conjectures only. had a ritualistic origin (p.Q2 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Gottlichen Wille des Menschen. and to admit by the side of it another Brahman. cialised meaning of prayer. reluctant to differ on such a point from Professor Professor Deussen holds that Brahman Deussen. Brahman. whether as a neuter. I all these scattered indica- cannot bring myself to accept the evolution of the various meanings of the word Brahman as I am particularly elaborated by former scholars. such as we find it afterwards. i. 239). in fact the Brdhman. as a masculine. whether ritualistic or unpremeditated. in all. or. cannot be expected to produce the same Taking into account tions.

II. : at the end of the Vedic period. 8. As early as the time that 23. who does not become bewildered when pondering (on it). more particularly of the Vedanta and Samkhya systems. 23. is. as clearly as possible.ATMAN. the prevalence of Vedantic ideas l at the time of the author of this Sutra ' : He who is intelligence itself and subtler than pervades the in the the thread of the lotus-fibre. ' of the Apastamba-S&tras. also are mentioned by name 13. Atman. every (created) thing. and who recognises the Atman in . . that on which all scholars agree. 5 . The next word we have It is to examine is Atman. Apastamba-Sutras. as the cause of the world. 2. 23. 8. and we must be prepared for differBut the really important point is ences of opinion. i The Brahmam who is wise and recognises all things to be in the Atman. by assigning to Bnihman the rb TrpcoTov final meaning of TO 6V. 8. as not one corresponds fully and exactly to the character of Brahman as developed in the history of the Indian mind. we find a Brahman. I. even of those terms. he shines . which presupposes. 1 He who Yoga and Mimamsa Cf. and the two together may be called the two pillars on which rests nearly the whole of the edifice of Indian philosophy. we shall see. KLVOVV. 8. I. 4. I. bnt not yet as definite systems of philosophy.' indeed in heaven And in the definition of same Sutras. though. TO 6Vro>y 6V. 93 their progress. next in importance to Brahman only. . we read.

In some passages it is difficult to say vital breath.' Again we read. bahim dddhana/i atnuini.94 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Rv. life. i 13. grandfather. the breath (Atma) to the wind. spring all (objective) He is the primary cause. mother. wife. (form of absolute knowledge). unchangeable and larger than the He who is different earth. words addressed to a dead person. whoever upon them. the Atharva-veda IX.' instead of 'I magnify the Lord. However. va'tam atma. IX. ' we have are dear.' In the end Atman became the regular . contains this universe . as ' in to and. and that often grammatical rather than real. eternal and unof changeable. 3. was frequently used in the sense of what we call soul.' But Self may here be translated by soul or person also. Kv. I call Myself. 'putting strength into oneself. from the knowledge of this world which is obtained by the senses and is identical with its objects. ' to translate in English. still means breath. 30 we read : Atmanam G'ayam pitiiram put ram paiitram pitamahiim. From step soul there is but a small step to Self.' in several places. divides himself. mean whether we should translate it by life or by spirit.' The etymology At man it scure. son. father. 1 6. grandson. possesses the highest From him who bodies. like the spirit or breath. is though Aryan stratum of Indian speech. r/iinitrim miitaram ye priyas tan upa hvaye. X. just as we may say. My soul doth magnify the Lord. probably because again extremely obbelongs to a pre-Sanskritic. su'ryam MkshuA gaMatu. universe and who. May the eye go to the It then came sun. there can be little doubt that in the Veda Atman. i. If in is 5.

sarvesham bhutanam rac/a. There are passages such as Rv. pp. Atman philosophers would have called the quiddity. BRAHMAN. the soul of the world (Paramatman). ' or Indian philosophers the Idant& of things. and Atman. . Deusseii's Gescliichte Philosophic. Thus we read at first atmanam atmana pasya. This transition of meaning a curious parallel to that of As. pp. and we read (/S'atap.5. Prar/apati. see thy Self by thy Self. 'Where was the breath. XIV. the Here Atm may be blood. 1 We See Anthropological Keligion. each of which by itself represents in nuce a whole philosophy or a view of the world. Brahman. 200 seq. evidence which tionary its . 5. 247 seq. end it means much the same as what medieval rendered by spirit or life.' all beings. 4. Brahman. 'Self is the Self.' witness of atmaiva hy atmana/i sakshi. have thus seen three words growing up in the hymns and Brahmanas of the Yeda.PRA0APATI. Theosophy. he is the king of all Pra^apati. 'That Atman is the sovereign of beings. 95 pronoun 1 self.. in Asu and Asti. . ATMAN. which we examined before. I. or more recentl}-. 164. Br. Atman. so that in the thing. not go through all the be seen in any Sanskrit dicmay but we have still to see at what stage in I need development Atman became the definite name of the soul or Self within. 324 seq. bhumyaA asu/< in offers Atman asn'k a'tma kva svit.' In this sense Atman is afterwards used as the name of the highest person. der pp. the spirit of the world ? ' But in other passages the inmost nature of anysignifies simply and more particularly of man.15)^ sa va ayam atma sarvesham bhutanam adhipatiA.

pp. . to animate. He created the primeval waters and rose from them as Hiranyagarbha. material cause of the world may seem doubtful. In Pragdpati we have the admission of a personal and supreme being.M. while the recognition of Brahman and Atman. and to rule all Whether this Pra^rapati was himself the things. constituted the foundation of all the monistic philosophy of that country. in order to send forth. 134. or that a tortoise supported it belief in that Pra(/apati. X. however. . there was water over which Pra^apati breathed as We wind and produced the earth. There occur even in the Brahmanas allusions to the legend well known from the Puranas. India. 7). Many times it is said that he was everything and that he desired to become many. that a boar brought forth (Udbabarha or Udvavarha from V?^h) the l earth. the creator of gods and men. the primeval waters seem to have been admitted as existing by themselves and apart from Prat/apati also read that in the beginning (Rv. 287. in which case matter also \vould have come out of him.. In other places. a creator and ruler of the world. A was the beginning of monotheistic religion in India.96 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 1 M. as one. or that the waters themselves produced a golden egg from whence arose Pra^/apati. as a personal god. and thus created the world. 121. a god above all gods.

and without any preconceived system. munication. even the simplest means of comneither control. we should find so at much unity preserved to in the numerous guesses truth us among these Vedic ruins. to the to those who handed down the saved of it. WE all have thus learnt the important lesson that these ideas. Growth of Philosophical Ideas. metaphysical. It H . being often wanting. or even Atman. The wonder is that. burst forth in India in great profusion and confusion. We must remember that philosophy existed for a long time without being fixed by writing. must not suppose that these ideas follow each other in chronological succession.CHAPTER III.e. such as high-roads or rivers. and otherwise. tradition i. much more than the Nacheinander. Here once more the Nebeneinander gives us the true key. Every Asrama or settlement was a world by itself. we are told. and at last collected whatever could be It would be a mistake to imagine that there was a continuous development in the various meanings assumed by or assigned to such pregnant terms as Praf/apati. authority. Parampara. that there was this earliest We nor public opinion to protect it. Brahman. This was due. cosmological. in spite of all this. THE SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.

But if the period of Upanishads we have to find our way through religious and philosophical thoughts. while meaning what bursts or drives forth. each distinct from the other. the Brahmans themselves thought of their philosophical literature we may learn even from such treatises as the Prasthana-bheda. but life. the outlook becomes brighter as soon as we approach the next period. they are rather the last summing up of what had been growing up during many generations of isolated thinkers. as well as creative power and creator. to admit an infinite number of intellectual centres of thought. essence. Prasth&na Bheda. possess of the six systems of philosophy. in which either the one or the other view should then underfound influential advocates.98 is INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and why Atman meant soul. We must not imagine that even then we can always discover in the various systems of philosophy a regular hisThe Sutras or aphorisms which we torical growth. We stand better how Brahman. of all things. spirit. came to signify speech and prayer. cannot possibly claim to represent the very first attempts at a systematic treatment . much more in accordance with what we learn from the Brahmawas and Upanishads of the intellectual life of India. scattered all over the country. as through clusters of thickly tangled creepers. das in Selbst. which is characterised by persistent attempts at clear and systematic thought. or what not only breath. I have ventured to render by the BrahmaTias and the Self. from which some extracts by way of introduction to some gave papers of mine on one of the systems of Indian I What modern .

time by Professor was published in the and death mean- Weber in his Indische Studien. used sometimes as synonymous with Mimawsa. It is but fair to state that the credit of having discovered that tract of its Madhusudana Sarasvati. published as long ago as 1852 in the Journal of the German Oriental Society. who had prepared a illness critical edition of but was prevented by It from publishing it. example. 2 Nyaya is derived from ni 'into. i. p.' The fourth ' member of 3 a syllogism is called Upanaya. As the MSS.PRASTHANA BHEDA. leading towards 'induction. &c. 99 philosophy. vary between Gotama and Gautama. it. I have kept the former for the Nyaya..' the latter for Buddha. No one could understand why such things as doubt. 'and i 'to go. and it is no wonder that Ritter and others should have spoken of the 1 Nyaya with open A new lished by Prof. I myself came to be acquainted with it through my old friend.' he writes. 1894. and I think it may be useful to give once more some extracts from it ] . H 2 . 'philosopher. occurs also in Gautama's Dharmasastra II. ' or Anvikshikl as an old name of philosophy. Deussen translation of the Prasthana-bheda has been pubas an Introduction to his Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie. could possibly be called categories or praedicabilia. 1849. .e$o8os. definition. . wrangling. 44. and perceived importance. vol. 3 knowledge of the nature of the sixteen Padarthas by means of name.' Ballantyne translates Nyaya by yu. 'is logic Gotama 4 in five Adhyayas as promulgated by Its object is (lessons). Trithen. Dr. 3. belonged really to Colebrooke. more particularly It is of logic. and is more comprehensive than 4 logic. 'Nyaya 2 . and examination/ These Padarthas are the important or essential topics of the Nyaya philosophy but it has proved very misleading to see Padartha here translated by categories.

Karman. what predicated by. for they represent what can be predicated. from an Indian is view. is 4. doubtful even in 1 Bartliolemy p. Guwa. in general. what Thus it point of the highest has come to pass that Padartha. 'There is also the Vaiseshika philosophy in ten promulgated by Kawada. 5. &c. was used in Sanskrit in the sense of things in It is rightly translated by general. coinme Aristote. at least 1-5. Dravya.' 8 seq. : 2. &c. may indeed be called categories. what object. en 6mnnerant 1'a comine fait le Stagirite. Abhava. * the six Padarthas. the differentia or eternal atoms. quality. contempt. literally the meaning of a word. 1. The highest Samanya general and found in more than one is Satta or being.' These Padarthas of the Vaiseshikas. inseparable inherence. activity. . remarks. parts and the whole. To which may be added 7. leurs rapports et leurs But this is exactly what he has done. negation.100 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Visesha. or objects. is called Nyaya. of the objects This philosophy also of our experience. Sutras I. Samanya. 3. category when applied to the five Padarthas of Ka/tada. viz. is or. St. differences. what is special. leurs propriety's. cherche a distinguer 356. or sense (Artha) of words (Pada). le in his work on Indian Logic. cf. if such things were represented to them as the categories of Indian logic. substance. 'Mais les philosophe Vaiseshika n'a point categories entre elles. 6. but such a translation. as between cause and effect. residing in Samavaya. II n'a point montro. as they have done. Its object is to establish by their similarities and dissimilarities lessons. Hilaire.

in Gotama's system. chiefly sacrificial. and co-ordinate effect in the twelfth that 1 . Miscellaneous Essays. and the members. The second. (work-philosophy) ' : and the $ariraka-Mima???sa (philosophy of the embodied spirit). and fourth chapters treat of the differences and Dharma. Concurrent efficacy is considered in the eleventh chapter.' The objects of these twelve chapters are then indi- cated very shortly. find their place mostly under Prameya. and bars or exceptions in the tenth. IOI the case of the sixth or seventh Padartha of the Vaiseshikas. would of course be quite misleading when applied to the Padarthas of Gotama. is explained as consisting of acts of duty. vol. 1 third. meaning not so much what has to be proved or established. and so as to be hardly intelligible without a reference to the original Sutras. i. Dharma. its is varieties of opened in the seventh chapter and carried on more any was Inferrible changes. p. adapting to variation or copy of certain sacrificial acts what designed for the types or models of them. 330 seq. The fifth chapter tries to settle the order of all sacrificial performances. the object of this philosophy. the Karma-Mimawsa twofold. fully in the eighth. as what forms the object of our knowledge. TheKarma-Mima??isa has been brought out by the venerable (raimini in twelve chapters.PRASTHANA BHEDA. is. Madhusudana continues The Mimamsa also is viz. are discussed in the ninth. principal purpose of each sacrificial performance. and the sixth the qualifications of The subject of indirect precepts performers. the co-operation of several acts for a single I give this more intelligible description from Colebrooke. its parts (or appendent contrasted with the main act). The real categories would. .

' It is in fact much more what we call a system of philosophy than the PurvaMlmamsa. because it teaches the act called Upasana or worship. directly or indirectly. In the first section are considered Vedic passages which have clear indications of Brahman in the second.102 result is INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. according ' to .' for Read Adya Akhya in the Prasthana bheda. Sutras V. such as Uttara-Mimamsij Brahma-Mima/Jisa. somewhat different version of these titles. Next follows the $ariraka-Mima??isa. in the third. i. an object of worship. fiftli He gives. There is is also the Samkarsha^a-kcuicZa. but to judge from Mini. &c. &c. . second-less Brahman. Thus the consideration of the Vedanta refer to 1 Professor Deussen has given a. so far as he or it is an object of knowledge. known by the belongs to the Karma-Mima??isa. and refer to Brahman so far as he . consisting of four chapters. of which the chief purpose is different. and the incidental effect of an act. name of Devata-kanc/a. subject-matter. for instance. and this. Vedanta. and to exhibit the rules which teach the investigation (of it) by means of Vedic study. ' In the first lecture is shown the agreement with which all Vedanta passages refer. and it is quoted by different names. i. composed which by (raimini. as the subject of the chapter the successive order of recitation. and mostly is Brahman. the subject of the one. Its object is to make clear the one' ness of Brahman and Atman (Self). recitation. to the inward. the right meaning seems to be the settling of the order of performance. is discussed in the other ' l . &c. undivided.S'ruti. passages which have obscure indications of Brahman. passages which have obscure indications of Brahman. consisting of four chapters. as enjoined by S'ruti.

' by nature. the Kanadas. T because every examination should consist of tw o parts. and by the arguments employed by the Samkhyas. of which it can be doubtful whether they may not refer adapted and formulated by the Samkhya philosophers. &c. Agd. such as Pradhana. 103 texts has been finished. the establishment of our own doctrine and the refutation of the doctrine of our opponents. though quite wrongly. all In the fourth section are considered apparent contradictions between Vedic passages referring to the senses and their objects. undertakes their refutation.PKASTHANA BHEDA. and tries to establish the incontrovertible validity of his own arguments in the second lecture. second-less The convergence of all Vedanta texts on the Brahman having thus been established. PrakHti. In the third section the contradictions between the passages of the Veda. which is to ideas. the objections to the convergence of the Vedanta passages on Brahman. and in the fourth section such words as Avyakta. of the views of the followers of the Samkhya. are disposed In the second section is shown the faultiness of. Here. generally. as stated by the Snmtis of the Samkhya-yoga. in the first section. Vyasa or Badarayawa.. translated as independent of Brahman or Purusha. are considered. In the third chapter follows the examination of ' the means (of salvation). are removed in the first part. Here in the first section. fearing an opposition by means of arguments such as have been produced by acknowledged Smntis and various other systems. and in the second those referring to individual souls. while considering the going to and returning from . referring to the creation of the elements and other subjects.

all as recorded in different . and afterwards the meaning of the word That. the Vedanta. after he has realised the unqualified Brahman &c. and the internal. is indeed the principal of all doctrines. In the second section the meaning of the word Thou is made clear. In the fourth section the means of obtaining a knowledge of the unqualified Brahman. and meditation. promised to all who know the qualified a (or lower) man who knows Brahman. such as sacrifices and observing the four stations in life. such as quietness. 'This. In the fourth chapter follows an inquiry into the special rewards or fruits of a knowledge of the ' In the first qualified and unqualified Brahman. any other doctrine is but a complement . both the external. when free from the influence of good or bad acts. a collection of words. another world dispassionateness has to be examined. (transmigration). the further (northern) who died with a full knowledge of the unqualified Brahman is explained. if not purely referring to the unqualified Brahman. In the second section the mode of departure of a dying man by means of repeated study of the Veda. are investigated. road of a man In the third. is considered.104 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and afterwards the abode in the world of Brahman. In the third section there is tautological. control. section is described salvation of a man even in this life. In the fourth section the obtainment of disembodied aloneness by the unqualified Brahman is first described. may be taken together or not. $akhas or branches of the Veda and at the same time the question is discussed whether certain attributes recorded by other $akhas in teaching a qualified or unqualified Brahman.

like the Laws of Manu. still as the best of all Here we He made an important distinction also between the four. the distinction itself should not be passed over. According Madhusudana. of it. l Of course these systems of philosophy cannot be called Smriti in the ordinary sense of but. the other. Though it may be difficult to are understand the exact reason of this distinction. which together represented as the eighteen branches of the Trayi (the Veda). 1896. to It is curious indeed that this distinction little has been hitherto so remarked. 105 it alone is to be reverenced by wish for liberation. and Uttara. and the other recognised branches of knowledge belonged. Purva. nay like the Mah&bharata of Vyasa.Mimamsa on one side. as they are Snm'ti or tradition. the Nyaya. if not as the only true one. or revelation. and this according to all who the interpretation of the venerable $amkara this is and therefore the secret ' ! see clearly that Madhusudana considered the Vedanta-philosophy as interpreted by Sawikara. at least in the moral sense of that word. Dharmasastra and not >Stuti . Das Mahabharata als Epos und Eechts- buch. . 1 See Dahlmann. the philosophies of Gotama and Kanada are treated simply as Smritis or Dharmasastras.PRASTHANA BHEDA. nay even Nyaya and Vaiseshika. and the Ramayana of Yalmiki. Vaiseshika. the Samkhya and Yoga-philosophies on philosophies. Anyhow it is clear that Samkhya and Yoga were looked upon as belonging to a class different from that to which the two Mimamsas. if not in the legal. and the remaining two. they may be said to teach Dharma.

The Arambha-vada. 1 1). in six was Adhyayas. such as (II. in the fourth alonethird. Pradhana. whose thoughts are distracted. in the devotion. it should be clear that there are after all but three roads. and then a recapitulation which is of interest. &c. 1 8).' Madhusudana brought out by the venerable Kapila In the first . of opposite opinions in the sixth a resume of the whole. dispassionate persons. regulation of breath. the supernatural powers ness. Here Madhusudana says. posture. The chief object of the Sa??ikhya-philosophy is to teach the difference between Praknti and the . . the in the fifth there is refutation ttetcher (IV. as a means ' are discussed repeated practice and dispassionateness in the second the eight accessories which serve to produce deep meditation even in one towards it. which stops the activity and distraction of the mind.'aratra-systems. ' The Samkhya.' After this follows a short account of the Pa. . and. consisting of four parts. Here in the first part meditation. Adhyaya the considered objects for discussion are in the second the effects or products of . the theory of atomic agglomeration. 29) restraint. . Purushas. 'that after the various systems have been explained. observances. i. such as Pingal (IV. and meditation .supata and Pii/V. Then follows the Yoga-philosophy as taught by the venerable Pata%yali. The chief object of this philosophy is to achieve . concentration by means of stopping all wandering thoughts. or original matter in the third aloofness from sensuous objects in the fourth stories about .106 ' INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. contemplation. continues.

ending in the theory of illusion (Vivarta). is patan^alas.PKASTHANA BHEDA. The first theory holds that the four kinds of atoms (A. that of the Tarkikas (Nyaya Vaiseshika) and the Mimamsakas. and Pasupatas. sometimes called Prakriti or original matter. &c.nu). of the From this point of view the objective) world. But in have put reality all the Munis who forward these theories agree in wishing to prove the existence of the one Supreme Lord without a second. by becoming successively double atoms. while the Vaishnavas (Ramanu^a. and air. as it is.) hold that the world is an actual and true evolution of Brahman. This and an effect which was not theory. teaches that first produced the activity of causes which are.. as the world. the theory of illusion. and was rendered manifest through the activity of a cause. the theory of evolution. effected world existed before as real. The Vivarta-vada. those of earth. through its own power of Maya. though in a subtile (invisible) form. These Munis cannot be in error. that of the Samkhyas. 13. Yoga(the world). that of the BrahmavMins (Vedanta). is evolved through the stages of Mahat (perceiving) and Ahamkara (subjectivity) into the shape of the (subjective and posed. appears by The third mistake. com- Gunas of Sattva (good). says that Pradhana alone. considering that they are omniscient . llamas (moderate). through The second theory. IOJ The Parmama-vada. and these different views have . and Tamas (bad). theory. 2. says that the self-luminous and perfectly blissful Brahman which has no second. water. begin the world which culminates in the egg of Brahman. fire. &c.

in order to keep off all nihilistic theories.I08 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. who are bent on part of Madhusudana and others. but truth is one. only been propounded by them. nor is it at all certain that his view of the development of Indian philo- sophy is historically tenable. could not be expected at But all comes once to know the true goal of man. . it is our duty. though it gives a general survey. though differently expressed that philosophies. and thus. and Nyaya one and the same truth. But it shows at all events a certain freedom of thought. men. and the fact that to the present day these six different systems of philosophy have held their own in the . have become followers of various paths. a>s historians of philosophy. to study the different paths by which different philosophers. in fact. with their inclinations towards the objects of the world. but will become more intelligible hereafter when we come to examine each of the six philosophies by itself. have striven to discover the truth. Sa??ikhya.' Much of what has here been translated from Madhusudana's Prasthana-bheda. right when we understand their that object. is obscure. It is the very multiplicity and variety of these paths that form the chief interest of the history of philosophy. accepting their opinions. which we see now and then in other writers also. whether by the light of revelation or by that of their own unfettered reason. from not imagined that understanding true these Munis would have propounded what is contrary to the Veda. But however we may admire this insight on the bhikshu. and because they were afraid that human beings. may be many. such as Vi<7/iana- showing that there is behind the diversity of Vedanta.

first of all These philosophers are 1. 6raimini. other philosophers. if they speak of Arms or . called also Uttara-Mimamsa-Sutras. 3. Kanabhakshaka. It is easy to see that the philosophers to whom our Sutras are ascribed. Unfortunately such references hardly ever give us the title of a book. also called /Stesha or Phamn. Kanada. propounded by the thinkers of India. Gotama. 2. who therefore must have existed before the time when the Sutras Nor could the fact that received their final form. 4. also called Ka7iabhu<7.PEASTHANA BHEDA. often refer to some of the Sutras quote and refute the opinions of other Sutras. Kapila. to eliminate their distinctive features. or its author. the author of the Vaiseshika-Sutras. the author of or UMka. 6. the author of the Purva-Mimamsa- Sutras. Badarayawa. When they refer to such we know that they topics as Purusha and Prakn'ti refer to the Samkhya. 5. the Nyaya-Sutras. still less the ipsissima verla. also called Akshapada. the reputed author of the Brahma-Sutras. the author of the Samkhya-Sutras. the author of the Yoga-Sutras. called also Vyasa Dvaipayana or Krishna Dvaipayana. be accounted for without admitting a growing up of different philosophical schools side by side during a period which preceded their last arrangement. cannot be considered as the These Sutras first originators of Indian philosophy. 109 midst of a great multitude of philosophic theories. or Vyasa-Sutras. shows that we must try to appreciate their characteristic before attempting with Madhusudana peculiarities. Pataw/ali.

A.110 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. these Sutras should be looked upon as a mere rifaccimento. have been proved by Dr.C. sixth cent. seem incredible. Hall's dis- In this case. Die Suwkhya. are so modern that they could not possibly Sawkhya be quoted by ancient philosophers. Hall or against those by which Professor Garbe l has supported Dr. the place of earlier Sutras. we know Vaiseshikas. we know that even in our time there find learned Pandits ancient who no difficulty in imitating this down and The Sutra-period. his Council in 242 B. for instance.. atoms. which as early as the had probably been already superseded by the popular Sawkhya-karikas and then forThis late date of our Sawkhya-Sutras may gotten. claims not only the famous Sutras of Pamni. there is certainly nothing to be said against the arguments of Dr. and they may be even later. F.Philosophic. Startling as this discovery was. Some of these. D. but though a still I still hold that the for Sutra-style literary arose in period when writing are purposes was in its tentative stage. therefore. as has been proved. to take covery. 71. it would seem. reaching Sutra-style. and afterwards of religion. an activity called forth. Our SawkhyaSutras. but has also been fixed upon as the period of the greatest philosophical activity in India. by the strong commotion roused by the rise of the Buddhist school of philosophy. p. refer to the that their remarks are pointed at the But it by no means follows that they or Vaiseshika-Sutras exactly as we now possess them.. Hall to be not earlier than about 1380 A. D. . ' Curbo. as far as Asoka's reign in the third century.

would seem. it sonalities. where it is said that 'those parts of the Arawyakas which are not Upanishads are called Vedantas. Nyaya and Vaiseshika are altogether absent. namely Samkhya and Yoga or Samkhya-yoga. except those of the two Mimamsas. should seem too late a date for the introduction of writing for literary purposes that even inscriptions have not yet been found more ancient than those of Asoka. The Southern not claim to have reduced their A curious distinction is made in a commentary on the Gautama. danta does not occur. If the third century B. Literary References in the TTpanishads. Ill of considerable importance to remember that of the technical names of the six systems of phiIt is two only occur in the classical Upanishads. or Anvikshiki. while the names of Kapila and Gotama. when they occur. Badarayana and 6raimini. . The names of Pata/lr/ali. to quite different per- The Six Systems of Philosophy.C. nor with the names of the reputed founders of the six systems. refer. nor do we meet with such words as Hetuvidya. Munc/aka and some of the later Upanishads 1 Mima?ftsa occurs in the general sense of investigation. one can suppose that those whose names are mentioned as the authors of these six philosophical systems. were more than the final editors or redactors of the Sutras as No we now possess them. in India. and there is a wide difference between inscriptions we should remember and do Buddhists 1 literary compositions.Sutras XIX. or Ka7^ada. except in the $vetasvatara. 12.' . Velosophy.THE SIX SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. are absent altogether.

Sawkhya or Yoga. and lastly that tilled name of Suttas.. nay even in some of the Vedic hymns.. therefore. must be later than that of the earliest Brahmanic Sutras. as representing the whole outcome of the philosophical activity of the whole of India through so All we can say is that phigenerations. Sacred Canon to writing before the first century B. We need not wonder that much of that literature. is recognised in the Buddhist Canon. between 477 and 77 B. considering that it could be mnemonic only. though it is well known that they kept up close with their Northern co-religionists who were acquainted with writing During all that relations 1 . and we must take care also not to look upon what has been left to us in the old racter. nay even of a Buddhist chahave sprung up and have been reduced mnemonic form in various Asramas. because in the meantime the meaning of the word had been changed from short mnemonic sentences to fully developed the discourses. we are told. to ferment in India during the period losophy began many by Brahmanas and Upanishads. though not necessarily our own. that the existence of Upanishads. as a component part of the Buddhist Canon. the to be called The sac rod Bo-tree in the was grown. Possibly Sutra was originally meant for the text to be elucidated in a sermon. could to a Dar^anas. ever so many theories of the world. time. 1 city of Anuradhapura in Ceylon a branch of the tree at Buddha . so that long Buddhistic sermons came Suttas in consequence. c.112 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.C. should have been irretrievably lost. partaking of a Vedanta. from Gay a.

for yet for Buddhistic mendicants. India still possesses scholars who can imitate Kalidasa. is yatikas or /farvakas. who deny the existence of what is given by the senses. and that even these may be. in We the general decay of Sanskrit scholarship. to say nothing of such poems so and Ramayawa. IV. That some of the earlier philosophical Sutras were shown in the case of the B?^'haspati-Sutras. as in the case of the Sa?^khya-Sutras. i. everything beyond They are referred to by BhaskaraMrya at BrahmaSutras III. 2 They were identified . no. These are said to have contained the doctrines of the out and out materialists. vol. and Mahabharata successfully that few as the It is scholars could tell the difference. 3. and intended. and the Bhikshu-Sutras 2 quoted by Panini. it would seem. not long ago that I received a Sanskrit treatise written in Sutras with a commentary. possibly intended for the Vanaprasthas. 113 Brihaspati-Stitras. or sensualists. the Laukalost. 592. mere reproductions of lost originals. and we should not forget that even at present. it is likely that they still existed in his time. Vedanta-Siitras see by Taranatha TarkavJi/aispati with the Siddhanta Kaumudi. the work of a living 1 2 Colebrooke. Essays' . know now that such Sutras could have been produced at any time. . p. 3. in some cases. Misc. 53 \ and as he gives an extract. that of the old pre-Buddhistic literature we have but scanty fragments. and not It is a sad truth which we have to learn more and more. I . of them has been found as yet in India. though no MS.Btf/HASPATI-SUTRAS. I. Brahmanic. The same applies to such Sutras as the VaikhanasaSutras. 429.

both were composed by me. ii. He makes no secret that Sutraw vrittis /robhayam api mayaiva vyaraA'i. 1887. we for should not imagine that we possess all. Deussen's translation of the same work. The titles of the more important of the original Sanskrit texts may be found in Colebrooke's Miscellaneous Essavs. p. should not the same have taken place during the period of the Renaissance in India. B. particularly those ignorant of Sanskrit. and in the Catalogues. and preserved in what may seem to us an almost miraculous manner. 'the Sutra and the commentary. xxxiv and xxxviii. as in the case of the KapilaSutras.' is ' It called Katantra/. nay even At all events. Books of Reference. . may gain by themselves a knowledge of the six recognised svstems of Indian Philosophy. vol. from which students of philosophy. published since his time. E. I shall mention here some of the most important works only. preceded as it was by his in Of books written by -A'andrakanta and gives additional Sutras to the Katantra on Vedic Grammar.7. For the Vedanta-philosophy of Badarayawa the most useful book is Thibaut's English translation of the text of the Sutras and /Sa?kara's commentary in j the S. or that we possess what we possess in its original form. in Europe and India. . scholar in India..7mnda//prakriva Tarkalarikara. if. 1896. which might have deceived many a European scholar of Sanskrit literature \ If that is possible now. it was possible in the fourteenth century. though grateful at an earlier time ? why what has been preserved.114 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. German. vols. of the various collections of Sanskrit MSS. 259 seq.

Hindu Philosophy. can be thoroughly recommended. also the Bhashya or commentary by Gaurapada translated and illustrated by an original comment by H. Of the Samkhya-system we have the Sutras translated by Ballantyne in 1882-1885. 1894. is also a very useful work. German we have the Samkhya-Prava&anaBhashya. H. ' Garbe. commentary published as yet no book be studied. the Aphorisms of the Samkhya Philosophy of Kapila. Wilson. 1865. T. Vigwana-bhikshu's Commentar zu den In Samkhya-Sutras. 1889. which deals chiefly with the nature and authority of the Veda with special reference to sacrificial and other duties. The Samkhya Karika by Iswarakrishna. Garbe. . we have the Sutras with $abarasvamin's . 1892. 1885. 1852. with illustrative extracts from the Commentaries. Die Samkhya-Philosophie. Garbe. Oxford. London. von H. Colebrooke. 1881. . iibersetzt von II. Samkhya-Sutras. translated from the Sanscrit by H. iibersetzt von K. Of the Purva-Mimamsa or simply Mimamsa. Also Aniruddha's Commentary and the original parts of Vedcantin Mahadeva's commentary on the Richard Garbe. by Der Mondschein der Samkhya Wahrheit. 1837. nach den Quellen. The Sankhya Karika of Iswarakrishna.BOOKS OF REFERENCE. Va&aspatimis'ra's Sa7?ikhya-tattva-kaumudi. except Professor Thibaut's translation of I in the original but there is in English in which that system may 2 . advantage. may : still be consulted with Other useful w^orks are John Davies. 1892. 115 'System des Vedanta/ 1883.

the fourth. and not simply to their philosophical tenets. this social chiefly due to the political importance which they acquired the fifth. E. Allahabad. The Vaiseshika system by Roer. we cannot wonder that all attempts at fixing the dates of the six recognised systems of philosophy. It is true that Buddhism and (-rainism were likewise but two philosophical systems out of many. and We know also that there were many teachers. The Nyaya-Sutras of Gotama have been translated. should hitherto have failed. 1873 also in a Gertnan trans. and afterwards the canonical books of the Buddhists. by Ballantyne. 491. 1850-57. vols. Indica. The Yoga-Sutras are accessible in an English translation by Rajendraldla Mitra. 21 and 22. 478. published in the Benares of philosophy may be studied in an English translation of its Sutras by A.. and 492. with the exception of the last book. con- . and in some articles of mine in the same Journal of the German lation Oriental Society. consider the state of philosophical thought India such as it is represented to us in the in we Brahma^as and Upanishads. Laugakshi Bhaskara's Arthasawgraha. and the third centuries during B.Il6 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 462. No. 4. and that it has been But if in possible to fix their dates. Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenliindischen Gesellschaft.C. a short abstract of that philosophy. Gough. their case we know something about O is their dates and their historical development. 482. nay even their mutual relationship. Dates of the Philosophical If in Sfttras. 1849. Benares. in the Bibliotheca Nos. Sanskrit Series.

developed into a powerful sect. but they have left no traces in the literary history of India. literature. Bucldhismus. the Nirgrantha or gymnosophist. disappeared 6r/mtiputra or was actually the senior of Buddha. it is by no means clear that any which gave of these systems. originally an A^ivaka. like the brotherhood founded by Buddha. are mentioned by the side of 6rainism. Kakuda Gautama. the Nirgrantha. 117 temporaries of Buddha. are presupposed by Buddhism. Sam^aya Vaira^i-putra. Purana Kasyapa. in their literary form. then a follower of Mahavira. though the date of the Buddhist Canon may be fixed. 1 Kern. the founder of Katyayana. Nor should we forget that. 6r7iatiputra. the prince of the clan of the Sakyas. One of these only became known in history. which. the contents of a book may have become 182. the Maskarin. belonged to the same period of philosophical and religious fermentation rise to the first spreading of Buddha's doctrines in India. In the Buddhist annals themselves other teachers such as 6rfiatiputra. . Another. p. This is owing to the vague- ness of the quotations which are hardly ever given In India. however. though not the authors of . Gosali with the bamboo stick. Nataputta Though it seems likely that the founders of the six systems of philosophy. I. has now l the Sutras which we possess. the (rainas. Agita Kesakambali. the date of many of the texts which canonical is we now possess and accept as by no means beyond the reach of doubt.DATES OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SUTRAS. because the society founded by him. Gosaliputra. became likewise the founder of a sect of his own. during the mnemonic period of verbatim.

when they examine the six categories of the former (V. is . we know that they have the Vai. (V. Sm/'/ti once (V. are very chary of references. Whenever they refer to the Anus or atoms. and Vaiseshika Darsanas. .Il8 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Sawzkhya-Stltras. and Vamadeva. Sawkhya. Even at a much later time. it is We must therefore be very probable. when we see Bharb'/hari (died 650 A. The Sa??ikhya-Sutras. or rather allusions other systems of philosophy.possible.-a.-firya (VI. which the Sa?/<khyas were supposed to disregard. 86). /SYuti. 32. we have no right to conclude that he knew these Darsanas exactly as we know them.vikha philosophy in their minds . whose name occurs in both iSVuti and Snm'ti. considerably modified.veshika- and once the Vaiseshikas are actually mentioned by name (I. when he quotes no means follows that he knew Naiyayikas. careful not to rely too to. But of individual philosophers we meet only with Sanandana A/. while the teachers. by our Gotama-Sutras. while the title remained the same. though he may well have known these philosophies after they had assumed their Again. as well as others. 25). much on quotations from. is mentioned as one who had obtained spiritual freedom. D. They clearly refer to Vaiseshika and Nyaya. nor have we any right to say that our Gotama-Sutras existed in his time. 69) andPawX. It systematic it form.) referring to the Mima?/isaka. but it is not certain. are explained as com- prehending Kapila himself. 68). 123). the A&aryas. 85) and the sixteen Padarthas of the latter (V. when VI. mentioned in general. is very frequently appealed to. as we possess them.

Samkhya. he seems to avoid almost intentionally the recognised names of refers. Karslmagdni. nay to a Badaraya>ia also. all of whom he is endeavouring to refute. they quote each other mutually. Bhandarkar. Badarayana refers refer- ences.VEDANTA-SUTRAS. the Yoga. Audfalomi. and Vaiseshika were in his mind when he composed his Sutras. and Pa/iAaratras. to any literary work. 3. but they too do not help us much for chrono- more or less clearly to the Buddhists. Still Purva-Mlmamsa. Asmarathya. Samkhya. because. and Yoga a long previous development reaching back through Upanishads and BrahmaTias to the very hymns of the Kig-veda. though we have to admit. . He never however. nay even their technical terms. We cannot be far wrong therefore if we assign the gradual forma- from Buddha tion of the six systems of philosophy to the period (fifth century) to Asoka (third century). and Atreya. Vedanta-Stltras. Pasupatas. With regard to the relation of Buddhism to the six great of the orthodox systems it seems to me that all we can down honestly say is that schools of philosophy handing doctrines very similar to those of our six or classical 1 orthodox systems. the 6rainas. and among Mimamsic their authors. Samkhya Philosophy (1871). Kasakn/tsna. It is equally difficult to fix the relative position *- systems of philosophy. 1 19 The Vedanta-Sutras contain more frequent logical purposes. as I explained before. are presupposed by p. and even when he refers to other philosophical systems. Badari. particularly in the cases of Vedaiita. is it clear that the systems of the authorities he refers by name to (raimini.

must keep all this in mind if we wish to gain a correct idea of the historical origin and growth of what we are accustomed to call the six philosophical have seen already that philosophical discussions were not confined to the Brahmans. there as yet great latitude and want of system. it is quite clear that what we now possess of in India. Self. which was common property this floating that the regular systems slowly emerged. could not have been written down during the time when writing for any practical purposes except inscrip- . without on the parallel dates. Though we do not know in what form this took place. Even in the hymns we meet with great independence and individuality of thought. in the form of Sutras. though there common note running through them all. and a variety of opinions supported by different teachers and different schools. We We It is out of and religious mass of philosophical opinion. But this is very different from the opinion held by certain scholars that Buddha or his disciples actually borrowed from our Sutras. could we. prove any actual borrowing of Buddha or his disciples at that early time ? part earlier samasa was an work. how is is a In the Upanishads and Brahma?? as. but that the Kshatriyas also took a very active and prominent part in the elaboration of such fundamental philosophical concepts as that of Atman or systems of India. We know nothing of Samkhya-literature before the Sca??ikhya-karikas. philosophical manuals. which belong to the sixth century Even if we admit that the Tattvaafter Christ.120 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the Buddhist Suttas. which occasionally seems to amount* to downright scepticism and atheism.

that whenever writing has once become popular. Letters at that this time were as yet monumental only. the written letters are still called unreal (AnHta) in It has now been comparison with the audible sounds. tions on 121 monuments and coins was still unknown in India. as classified in the Pratisakhyas. that Smr/ti. 14. the Brahmanas and Upaniif shads . if there had been manuscripts in existence at the same time ? When that mnemonic literature. purposes. never forget that there was in India during many centuries a purely mnemonic literature. but to the writers of our texts. or at all events for literary had not yet been employed so far as we know. came for the first time to be reduced to writing. The very helplessness of the Sutra-style would thus become intelligible. p. Sutras II. probably took place in something like the form of Sutras. very few. it is next to impossible that there should be no allusion to it in the poetical or prose compositions of the people. which are represented by them (Ved. any. generally admitted. that elaborate system. I. not to the original We must authors. 451).MNEMONIC LITERATURE. I believe. in the Sutras. on the date which we can assign. There is no allusion historical to writing in the hymns. for in India also . and which was handed down from generation to generation according to a system which is fully described in the What would have been the use of Pratisakhyas. which continued down to the Sutra-period. of course. The value of these allusions to writing which occur in the literature of the Buddhists depends. Mnemonic Literature. Even as late as the time of $amkara.

nor even the Samkhya-karikas which seem to have superseded the ancient Sutras early in the sixth century. unless it was reduced to Often the name may writing at the proper time. monumental writing is anterior to literary writing. Writing material was scarce in India. while the body of a work was enHence when we see the Sa?nkhya tirely changed. if not to prove. It to might be possible. XVII). which had so far answered all purposes and was not easy to supplant. by a reference to the more name real assigned to his mother. invested with a kind of sacred character. Much of that mnemonic literature has naturally been lost.122 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. And so this could only . At the same time there existed the old mnemonic literature. such as the Visuddhi-magga (chap. at all events render probable the position assigned here to Buddha's teaching as subsequent to the early growth of philosophical ideas in their systematic and or less technical form. mentioned by name in the Buddhist texts. while our present Sutras date from the fourteenth. and to the adoption of a cursive alphabet. She called Maya or Mayadevi. whether to her it was her name was or a name assigned by tradition. and that if it was given not without a purpose. It is clear at all events that it could not have been our Sa//<khya-Sutras. Considering that in Buddha's eyes the world was Maya or illusion. it seems more likely that the name was given to his mother by early tradition. have survived. part and parcel of the ancient system of education. it is impossible to tell whether even at that time there existed a work on the Sawkhya-philosophy in the form of Sutras. and the number of those who could read must have been very small.

is known that. we read. as represented in the early Buddha's mother. 72. is for ever lost to us. and even in the Sutras of these two prominent schools. X. no doubt. and of PrakHti in the Samkhya-philosophy had been replaced by the technical term of Maya. in the old classical Upanishads. 71. a distinction being made . 10.THE BB7HASPATI-PHILOSOPHY. 123 have been after the name of Avidya (nescience) in the Vedanta. as the meaning it might name of not likely to have found a place in the Buddhistic legend during the early period of Indian philosophy. and before the systematic arrangement of the philosophical Sutras. Brihaspati His name is no doubt a very perplexing character. it would seem. Vedic given as that of the author of two is hymns. and therefore be argued that May&. ' In the I. equally significant that less it does occur in the later and more or apocryphal Upanishads. Let him know that Prakrit i is Maya or May4 PrakHt This refers. for instance. Maya in its technical belongs certainly to a secondary period. a certain amount of philosophical mnemonic composition after the period represented by the old Upanishads. can see this clearly in the case of the We Bn'haspati-philosophy. But whether in Samkhya or Vedanta.' to the Samkhya system in which Prakriti acts the part of Maya and fascinates the Purusha. i. is Upanishads. The Bnhaspati-Philosophy. X. the name of May& never occurs and it It is well . till he turns away from her and she ceases to exist. at all events as far as he is concerned. /SVetasvatara. There was. Maya?)i tu Prakntim vidyat. but whatever may have existed in it.

which upsets the Veda and the books. 96. the Let no man demons). for it is wrong Its reward lasts only as long . It seems strange. knowledge. and of the preceptor or Purohita of the gods. brought forth that false knowledge. 15. between a Bn'haspati Angirasa and a Brihaspati Laukya (Laukayatika ?). we read that Indra. Up. but for Thus we read. (but the demons only) study that false . as with one who has fallen from his station (caste). with B?*?'haspati as his ally. 9 : Bn'haspati. that of the preceptor of the gods. He is afterwards quoted as the author of a law-book. barren. atheistical. B?^'hasdecidedly modern. as it were. good other is evil that this By it they show that and that evil is good. . it is. and sensualistic system of philosophy in India. which we still possess. sacred should be studied (by the Asuras. so that Brihaspati-purohita has become a recognised name pati is besides the of Indra.>s the pleasure lasts. not for their benefit. therefore. that the same name. in which Bn'haspati is represented as teaching the demons his pernicious doctrines. His name is well known In Rv. for the safety of Indra and for the destruction of the Asuras (demons). Maitrdyami their own destruction. and they say new law. should have been chosen as the name of the representative of the most unorthodox. That being so. name of the planet Jupiter. it is said. ' 7.124 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. VIII. having become or having assumed the shape of ukra. as having BHhaspati for his Purohita or chief priest and helper. We may possibly account for this by referring to the Brahma?ias and Upanishads. also as one of the Vedic deities. overcame the godless people (adevi/i vis&h).

and. VIII. 5. after considering. II. There- Kai/?a Upanishad KaM. like jugglery. the other as (Yama) believe Na&iketas to be . these to deluded demons take their stand. wander about floundering and deceived. II. : ! he thought. even many same time both the imperfect knowledge (of ritual) and the perfect knowledge (of Self). Up. do thou tell us Thus. 125 false doctrine 1 : not be attempted. knowledge Those who are wrapt up . went once into the presence of Brahman 4 Having bowed before (their father Pra^apati ). as false knowledge. Up. the one known I knowledge. true. : 4 Va#. what is said in the Vedas. 4. Let that it is 1. Up. What is said in the Vedas. But in reality. for thus said Widely divergent and opposed are these two. like they the blind led by a man who is himself blind V ledge fancy themselves And ' again : The gods and the demons. we wish to know " the Self. the him. II. clinging it. 8. and therefore a very On that Self different Self was taught to them. and obtains immortality by means of the at the He who knows perfect 3. crosses death by means of the imperfect. possessed of a desire for knowledge pleasures do not tempt him away. that is true. wishing to know Self. . and What is untrue they see as praising untruth. these demons believe in a difference of the Atman (from themselves). on that the wise take their stand. 2. they said "0 blessed one. 2 in imperfect know- alone wise and learned. A7. destroying the true boat of salvation.THE B#/ HASP ATI-PHILOSOPHY.

or in the image in a looking-glass. in the possibility that the Atman could / be in some place different from themselves.126 fore let INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. while in the Maitrayana Upanishad Bn'haspati takes his place. we may possibly be able to under- stand how his name came to cling to sensualistic . Secondly w e see an alteration which was evidently made inis r tentionally. and as this would be the individual man. refer to a visible body goes on to say that the about full of pleasures in Atman Then Prar/apati moves is what a dream. were told to look for it in the person seen in the pupil of the eye.' First This passage is curious in several respects. still If thon in the Upanishads already Bn'haspati was introduced for the purpose of teaching wrong and unorthodox opinions. namely to the . even the demons. In the A'Mndogya Upanishad it is the Pra^tipati himself who imparts false knowledge of Atman to the Asuras. be wrong that this highest deity should ever have misled anybody. in which this episode of Bn'haspati giving false instruction to the demons more fully detailed. that to sav. of all it is a clear reference of one Upanishad to another. All this would. ever. or in the shadow in the water. he declares at last that Atman is what remains in deep sleep. unlikely that Brihaspati was introduced Upanishad because it It is not in the later in order to w as r felt to take the place of Pra^apati. howonly. without however losing its own identity. no Brahman study what is not in the Vedas. In the A7mndogya the demons who believed in the is i/ Anyata (otherness) of the Atman./TMndogya. or this will be the result (as in the case of the demons).

. unbelievers. to a scholion of Bhaskara on the Brahma-Sutras. the son of Parasara. '. were contained. however. the Brahma . it has been supposed that Pamni meant by Bhikshu.Sutras L sometimes ascribed to Vyasa. p. opinions. some of the hymns come to mean an infidel in general.Sutras. we can see in in which many years ago I out these curious traces of an incipient pointed In later Sanskrit. 127 and how at last. and has been readily accepted therefore by all who wish to claim the still possess. no) the author of the former as As Parasarya Parasarya. but whether composed in follower of BHhaspati. But although such we have no means of fixing their date as either anterior or posterior to the other philosophic Sutras. That such opinions time. e. Among the works mentioned in the Lalita-vistara as studied by Buddha a Barhaspatyam is mentioned. held responsible for existed even at an earlier however unfairly. Sutras may have existed. is it rather a broken reed to rest upon for chronological purposes. has is Sutras or in metre does not appear. in quoting Bhikshu-Sutras and Na^a-Sutras. menlost to us. i. tions (IV. 113. . some Sutras ascribed to BHhaspati in which the doctrines of the ^arvakas 1 . is a name of Vyasa. well known that the Lalita-vistara Besides. 429. or a scepticism. If we may trust. 1 Colebrooke. a Barhaspatya. II. even at that late time.THE Bfl/HASPATI-PHILOSOPHY. which we about the That would fix their date fifth century B. he was them. he seems to have known. z See before. of the latter as /Silalin. Pamni knew of Sutras which are and some of them may be He also safely referred to the time of Buddha. 3.C.

possible antiquity for the But Parasarya of India. sensualistic opinions crop treatises up among them. they are expressed in verse. There are some tenets of the followers of Bn'haspati which seem to indicate the existence of other schools of philosophy by their side. nay even earlier.C. which sidered as the possess a peculiar interest to us. The Barhasif being inter jxtrcs. When we meet elsewhere w ith the heterodox doctrines of Bri'haspati. Of course the doctrines of Buddha would be called certain sceptical and atheistic by the vaka as well as Nastika are to the Buddhists.128 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and mav be said to be hostile to all religious feelO ings. go far beyond Buddhism. But though it is difficult to say philosophers. because they is generally con- and istic home of all that is most spiritual was by no means devoid of sensualidealistic. though the lines that separate philosophy and religion in India are very faint. while Buddha's teaching was both religious and philosophical.. greatest literature philosophical have been chosen as the titular would hardly name of Vyasa and . old such theories how is may have been in India it that. patyas speak as they differ from others as others differed from them. authority do the same hesitate to assign to the Vedanta a place in the fifth century we cannot on such T slender for the Sutras themselves. as if taken from a Karika rather than from Sutras. Brahmans. as soon as we get any coherent on philosophy. They would show us that India. opposition against the religion of the Traces of an Vedas (Kautsa) . and /iar- as far as / names freely applied But the doctrines of Brihaspati. we know them. though we should not doctrines of the B.

because in arguing against other philosophies. particularly to the evidence of the Vedas. (Lokayatikas). they prove. even towards a qualified atheism. As viewed from a Brahmanic point of view. and the them would give us an entirely false idea of the religious and philosophical battles and battle-fields of ancient India. like sense-perception.THE B. appear in 129 hymns. and to ignore cept the evidence of the senses. that is. the opposition represented by Bn'haspati and others may seem insignificant. begins with K . and we have no other. but to out and out nihilists only. self- evident. and it is for that very reason. is given to them as saying No to everything exthe Sutras. Sarvadarsana-samgraha or the philosophical systems. ipso facto. that it seemed to me right that their philosophy should not be entirely passed over by the side of the six Vedic or orthodox systems. schools of Indian philosophy could tolerate much they were tolerant. curiously enough. that of Nastika. He looks upon it as the lowest of all. but nevertheless. which. as we shall see. but the very name given to these heretics would seem to imply that their doctrines had met with a world-wide acceptance Another name. and on account of the strong feelings of aversion which they excited.K/HASP ATI-PHILOSOPHY. are interesting to us from a historical point of view. like that of the Samkhya. Madhava. was called by the Vedantists Pratyaksha. . the existence of orthodox philo- The recognised sophical systems before their time. But they had nothing but hatred and contempt for the Nastikas. the Brahmaftas. a name not applicable to mere dissenters. These Nastikas. in his Epitome of all an account of the Nastika or TTarvaka system.

The statement that the Lokayatus admitted but one Pramana. affirmation (Aptavakya) .' This name Lokayata occurs already in Pamni's Ga>ia Ukthadi. He is account of this system fcandrodaya 27. perception (Pratyaksha) and inference (Anuthe Sa?/ikhya three. and he is is given treated as a historical individual to pati whom Brt'has- or ViU-aspati delivered his doctrines. and wind (not Akasa or ether). adding . by Bala. other We shall philosophical systems already in existence. though he does not tell us which he considers the exact points on which the two are supposed to have differed. as not to be ignored in a catalogue of the philoAarvaka (not Aarvaka) sophical forces of India. the Nyaya four. in the water. A short Kasika (p. and death It is the end of all things. and Aarvaka or Lokayatika. 18. in which the elements think.130 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. fire.s'astrin in the Preface to his edition of the of name represented as a teacher of the Lokayata or world-wide system. authority of knowledge. should be noted however. see that the Vaiseshika acknowledged two. e. in which wealth and enjoyment form the ideals of man. as the name of a Rakshasa. The Aarvaka is clearly connected with that of and this is given as a synonym of Buddha Aarva. that Hema&andra distinguishes between Barhaspatya or Nastika. shows clearly that there must have been i. in which the elements are earth. is given in the Prabodha- following words: 'The Lokayata system in which the senses alone form an authority. The Buddhists use Lokayata for philosophy in general. 2). the other world is denied. namely sensuous perception. if that is the meaning originally intended by that word. adding trustworthy mana) .

The /Tarvakas only denied this. 131 six. They held that what was called soul was not a thing by itself. they admitted four only. was the body that felt. earth. that remembered and thought. required some time to develop. as if it had been. While other systems water. e. appealing to the intoxicating power that can be developed by mixing certain ingrediflesh. and yet such an idea was evidently quite familiar to the . probably because it was invisible. for the evolution of consciousness arid intellect out of mere We except that they took refuge simile. as we see in the history of the Greek a-To^ia. air. In the Upanishads we see traces of an even earlier triad of elements. By such opinions they naturally in conflict with religion even more than every never came with do not know how they accounted philosophy. that saw and heard. with a K 2 . Not only philosophers. an idea as that of the four or five elements. though they saw it day rotting away and decomposing. comparison (Upamana) . the two Mimamsas and adding presumption (Arthapatti) privation Of these and others we shall have to Even what seems to us so natural hereafter. than as adding ideas of their own. admitted five. excluding ether.THE Bfl/HASPATI-PHILOSOPHY. fire. All this shows the philosophical activity of the Hindus from the earliest times./Tarvakas. but every Arya in India had a word So it is and never doubted that there was something in man different from the visible body. and ether. but was for soul. They held that it simply the body over again. and exhibits to us the K&xvakas as denying rather what had been more or less settled before their time. speak (Abhava). i. any new again with regard to the soul.

l)e relinquished as accompanied by painthe warning of fools berries of paddy. rich with the finest white . mixed together . And it alone since fatness. What man. fire. Holding this opinion. is the soul and no other. and therefore supposed to perish with the body.' In this way the soul seems to have been to them the body qualified by the attribute of intelligence. . earth.. which by themselves are not intoxicating. 4. Thus we read There are four elements. " Since in I am " fat. would fiing them away. as an analogy to the production of soul from body. water.132 ents. resides only in the body.should quoted The pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects. because covered with husks and dust ' ] '( 1 See for those vorsos Cowell and Gough's translation of the p. : ' A verse is Is to such is The grains. to consist ." these attributes abide in the same subject. &c. &c." I am lean. Sarvadarsana-sawgraha. And from these four elements alone is intelligence : ' produced Just like the intoxicating power from Kinwa. it is no wonder that they should have considered the highest end of man in sensual enjoyment. seeking his true interest. and air. and that they have accepted pain simply as an inevitable concomitant of pleasure. And such phrases as " " my body are only signi- ficant metaphorically. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY..

133 From all this we see that. the three Vedas. water cold. or nature. instead of Svabhava. no deliverance. can here be used ironically only.' Bnhaspati himself following invective ' : is held responsible for the no paradise. though fundamental philosophical principles are involved. If a victim slain at the 6ryotishoma will go to heaven. as they would probably have allowed us a deeper insight into the early history of Indian philosophy than the ready-made manuals of the chiefly to rely. therefore it must have come from their own : ' . rather than metaphysical. They are the mode of life made by their creator ' for those who are devoid of sense and manliness. Why sacrificer 1 is ? not his own father killed there by the Dhatri. Madhava in his six Darsanas on which we have The following verses preserved by Epitome are nearly all we possess of the teaching of Brihaspati and his followers Fire is hot. nature (Svabhava). the three staves (carried by ascetics) and smearing oneself with ashes. teaching utilitarianism and crude hedonism in the most outspoken way. . productive of rewards. the chief character of the j^arvaka system was practical. and certainly no Self in another world. creator. It is a pity that all authoritative books of these materialistic philosophers should be lost. and the air feels cool By whom was this variety made ? (we do not know). The Agnihotra. Nor are the acts of the Asramas (stations in life) There is or the castes.THE Bfl/HASPATI-PHILOSOPHY.

Then why not give food here are standing on the roof? As long as he lives let a to people while they live happily man . and demons. as strong that has ever been used by ancient or materialists. Then to give a viaticum to people who travel here on earth. ? Why does he not come back again perturbed by love of his relations Therefore funeral ceremonies for the dead were ordered by the Brahmans.134 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.IK The of flesh was likewise ordered by is any modern certainly very strong language. and likewise other things to be taken in hand. for without we should hardly . let him drink Ghee. The obscene act there (at the horse sacrifice) to be performed by the queen has been Proclaimed by knaves. knaves. after borrowing money. It is well that we should this know how old and how widely it spread materialism was. As a means of livelihood. eating demons. like ^r'arphari Turphari. The speech of the Pandits is (unintelligible). nothing else is known anywhere. If the *Sraddha-offering gives pleasure to beings that are dead. The three makers of the Vedas were buffoons.' Tliis . would be useless. How can there be a return of the body after once been reduced to ashes If he ? it has who has left the body goes to another world. If those who are in heaven derive pleasure from offerings.

however incon- Buddha brought with orthodox Brahmanism and differs from the Buddhists. in the eyes of the Brahmans. it would be far easier to prove that Buddha derived his ideas from Brihaspati than from Kapila. is in India from what it has been shall elsewhere. It is this denial philosophers in India of a personal god or nevertheless. Barhaspatyas against the Brahmans who followed the Veda are the same which the followers of from him. orthodox as long as they recognised the authority of the Veda. seems altogether out of place in India. If we are right in the description we have given sistently. however. arid drove him to found a new religion or brother- hood.THE B5IHASPATI-PHILOSOPHY. so natural to us. and who. essential both for religion and for very different The idea of orthodoxy. wild mass of guesses at truth idea of A . of the unrestrained and abundant growth of philosophical ideas in ancient India. stamped Buddha at once as a heretic. the Pramanas. that on the vital question of the authority fore. while those who followed the Sa??ikhya. the borrowing. and who on many important points did not differ much secure within the pale of of the charges brought by the orthodoxy. and tried to bring their doctrines into harmony with Vedic texts. the reputed founder of the Samkhya. and other fundamental truths which were considered philosophy. of the Veda the Sa??ikhya agrees. We the who deny existence Isvara. understand the efforts 135 that were made on the other side to counteract it by establishing the true sources or measures of knowledge. were tolerated as find of the authority of the Veda which. remained Some Considering thereagainst them.

because similar opinions prevail in Buddhism and in the Sawkhya-philosophy of Kapila. such as the names of Ya^Havalkya. much less doctrines than of any other school of philosophy. Raikva. or.136 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. therefore the former must have borrowed from the latter. maintain that Buddha borrowed from Kapila as No one would that Kapila borrowed from Buddha. imagine what the spirit of the philosophy of the ancient Indian heretics. such . In India we move in a world different from that which we are accusships tomed to in Greece. that the Hindus borrowed the idea of building say was from the Phenicians. Rome. as far as we know. well Though we can may have of their been. any binding public opinion to produce anything like Hence we have as little right to order in it. \ve know. or Modern Europe. the latter from the former. whether they are called TTarvakas or Barhaspatyas. floating in the air. and we need not rush at once to the conclusion that. but of the processes by which they arrived at them we know next to nothing. and credited there with certain know a few of the conclusions at utterances. or reducing it to writing. or any other ancient leaders of Indian thought mentioned the Upanishads. in We which they arrived. not even. They are to us no more than names. What we may learn from these utterances is that a large mass of philosophical thought must have at existed in India long before there was any attempt dividing it into six well-defined channels of systematic philosophy. Even when the names of certain individuals. unfortunately. or that of building Stupas from the Egyptians. and there was no controlling authority whatever. as some hold.

and is rendered in German by Seelenwanderung. but without any literary authority in Greek. Thus only can a number of ideas in Metempsychosis Sawsara. 137 as 6raimini. strongly that there existed in India a large common fund of philosophical thought which.METEMPSYCHOSIS SAJJfSARA. like Metensomatosis. but was like the air breathed cannot be urged too by every it living and thinking man. It corresponds in meaning to the Sanskrit Sa?7isara. The best known of these that which ideas. into new We with any attempt at proving or disproving it among the prominent writers of ancient or modern times. even of plants. To a Hindu the idea that the souls of men migrated after death bodies of living beings. we must not imagine that they were the original creators of a philosophy in the sense in which Plato and Aristotle seem to have been so. As early as the period of the Upanishads we hear of human souls being reborn both in animal and . This is a Greek word. 1. is is known under the name of Metempsy- chosis. is so self-evident that it was never meet hardly ever questioned. of animals. like language. be explained that we find all. and others. and which belong to no one school in particular. or nearly all. the systems of Indian philosophy which all philosophers seem to take simply for granted. belonged to no one in particular. nay. Common It Philosophical Ideas. which belong to India rather than to any individual philosopher. are given us as the authors of certain systems of philosophy. Kapila.

taken for granted that we look in vain for any elaborate arguments in support of it. do not admit what understand by Seeleuwanderung. howlinguistic ever.sarira. and its highest purpose is this recognition that it is above and apart from . idea from the Egyptians. ? In and if developed spontaneously this was so in India. bodies. but the Sukshma- Sawkhya Purusha by Soul the subtile body. Mortality . the is we commonly If we translate instead of Self. anything that has sprung from Prakr/ti or nature. particularly the Sa/wkhyaparticularly philosophy. Africa. The idea of the immortality of the soul also should be included in what was the common property of all This idea was so completely Indian philosophers. The Self remains always intact. Among the Aryan races. India certainly among races belonging to the same stock ? It should be remembered. Celtic. was held by Empedocles this In Greece the same opinion but whether he borrowed . it not the Purusha that migrates. a mere looker on. To me it seems that such a theory was so natural that it might is perfectly well have arisen independently among different races. as is commonly supposed to have been the case.138 in vegetable INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. And why not . and Scythic or Hyperborean tribes are mentioned as having entertained a faith in Metempsychosis. traces of it have lately been discovered even among the uncivilised inhabitants of America. nay. that some systems. Immortality of the Soul. why not in other countries. or whether Pythagoras and his teacher Pherecydes learnt it in India. 2. a question still hotly discussed. Italian. and Eastern it Asia.

decays and decomposes before our that such an expression as Atmano Self. People who name for good from a word which meant nothing but being or real. it does not thereby acquire any right to our consideration. but not derived their in all. . Sat. There are scholars so surprised at this unwavering belief in a future and an eternal life among the people of India. that posed to be universal among savages who thought that man left a ghost behind who might assume the body of an animal or even the shape of a tree. All Indian philosophers have been charged with pessimism. Pessimism. and need not have forgotten the so-called wisdom of savages as little as the >Sudras themselves from it ? whom they are supposed to have learnt 3. originally are not likely to have looked upon what is as what ought not to be. a longcontinued metempsychosis and as to a final annihila. would deny a future life. Indian philosophers are by no means dwelling for ever on the miseries of life. sounds almost No doubt. and in some cases such a charge may seem well founded. that they have actually tried to trace it back to a belief suption of the true Self.PESSIMISM. immortality of the would sound to Indian ears as a contradiction in itself. This is a mere fancy. 139 to with the Hindus is so entirely restricted the body which very eyes. Besides. *mHtatvam. as they at one time were no doubt savages themselves. why should the Aryas have had to learn lessons from savages. but all the other Bn'haspati schools rather fear than doubt a future life. and though it cannot of course be disproved. the followers of tautological in Sanskrit.

They simply state that they received the first impulse to philosophical reflection from the fact that there They evidently that in a perfect world suffering had no thought place. If we begin with Cr'aimini. Indian philosophy contains no outcry against divine injustice. That is not their pessimism. They would. we cannot expect much real philosophy from his Purva-MimamsA. may well have caused the question why it existed. the same troubles and the same problems would have to be faced again and again in another life. and in no way encourages suicidal expedients. and that this counted for and removed. because. something suffering is in the world. however. that it is something anomalous. be of no avail. if Pain. overcome. we should have more right to call it eudsemonistic than pessimistic. not the principal impulse to philosophical thought in India. which is chieHy . seems to be possible.140 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and the attainment of the highest happiness. and. and. are not always whining They life is and protesting that not worth living. imity with which the principal systems of philosophy nay some of their religious systems also. certainly. in fact. is full start from the conviction that the world suffering. we are accustomed to call pessimism. according to Indian views. to observe the unan- in India. an imperfection. as such. which was caused by nescience. of suffering should be acThis seems to have been if one of the principal impulses. that ought at all events to be accounted for. which was produced by knowledge. It is interesting. Considering that the aim of all Indian philosophy was the removal of suffering. and how it could be But this is not the disposition which annihilated.

of reaching KaiThe Vaiseshika promises valya or perfect freedom. i).philosophy. concerned with ceremonial questions. all the other philosophies take much higher Badarayana teaches that the cause of all evil is Avidy4 or nescience. 2). they were never supposed to secure the highest beatitude for which all the other and The Uttara-Mima?nsa philosophers were striving. but is it too well known to should be remeni- . begins ground. Up. at least such as we know it from the Karikas and the Sutras. arid so far as serving to diminish or extinguish the ordinary afflictions of men. at once with the recognition of the existence of the three kinds of suffering. and. which all obtained by the complete destruction of pain by means of logic. meditative absorption (Samadhi). and that it is the object of his philosophy to remove that nescience by means of science (Vidya). and proclaims as its highest object the complete cessation of all pain while the Yoga philosophers. which is also the highest bliss (Taitt. and through it cessation of all pain and even Gotama's philo. and had the same object. after pointing out the way to . sophy of logic holds out blessedness (Apavarga) as is in its first its Sutra complete highest reward. such as &c. II. But though these sacrifices are represented as being the means of a certain kind of beatitude. to its followers final knowledge of truth. in the end. declare that this is the best means of escaping from all earthly troubles (II. the annihilation of DuAkha or suffering (Nirva/ia) require further elucidation.PESSIMISM. a clear perception of human suffering and its causes. not however the Tattva-samasa. That Buddha's religion had the same origin. The Samkhya. and thus to bring about that true knowledge of Brahman. 141 sacrifices.

ceases to affect the soul. no doubt. whether Nirvana or DuAkhanta. Besides this conviction that all suffering can be removed by an insight into its nature and origin. mental pain. Mithyiu/ftana. in our works and thoughts. Thus. when quired they all under different names. and a systems. as soon as the Self has fully realised its aloofness from the body. we suffer what done. end of DuAkha. for.142 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. whether in this or in a previous existence. being traced back to our worldly attachments. We is are we have what we have made ourselves. Even physical pain. Aviveka. though it cannot be removed from the body. e. we reap what we have sown. the Sar/vkhya. though without any hope of a rich harvest. there are some other ideas which must be traced back to that rich treasury of thought which was open to These common ideas every thinking man in India. non-discrimination. false know- . Indian philosophy professes its ability to remove pain. The Vedanta gives Avidya. different guises in different but this ought not to deceive us. nescience. would vanish by freeing ourselves from the desires which cause these attachwhile all ments. and it the sowing of good seed. it can hardly be called pessimistic in the ordinary sense of the word. name bered that other systems also have one and the same for the state to which they aspire. that is represented as the chief purpose of a philosopher's life on earth. though the cause of suffering is inhave but one answer to give. all clamour against divine injustice is silenced at once. The cause of all suffering having been discovered in ourselves. If therefore all i. pain. source. the Nyaya. little reflection allows us to perceive their common assumed.

only And with this difference. or bad. the continuous working of every thought. is nothing in the eyes of Hindu like proofs of immortality. If by 'to be' is meant Samsara or the world. Karman. .KARM AN. deed. Length of time. is. all must bear and do bear fruit/ is a sentiment never doubted by any Hindu. 4. and never will be. revealed by a Brahmin Yogee. The next idea that seems ingrained in the Indian mind and therefore finds expression in all the systems of philosophy is a belief in Karman. and deed through all ages. however long it may last. however enormous.' the philosophy. 1898. the soul itself continues after the obtainment of freedom or final beatitude. It never was. whether to-day that ' or thousands of years ago l . ledge. then Hindu philosophers would never look upon it as real. good word. Allahabad. to be broken again by means of that true knowledge which is supplied bythevarious systems of philosophy. the same eternity which is claimed for works and their results is claimed for the soul also. The idea of the soul ever coming to an end is so strange to the Indian mind that there seemed to be no necessity for anything European meant by to be. The Mysteries of Karma. All works. so common in Knowing what ' ' is ' ' 5 Cf. 143 and these various aberrations from knowledge are generally represented as Bandha or bondage. idea that 'to be could ever become not to be seems to have been impossible to the mind of the Hindus. that while works will cease to work when real freedom has been obtained. it never is.

e. 1 Thibaut. the very popular idea of Pralayas. and all this according to their previous merits and demerits. and Brahman is then its reduced to (Karariavastha).144 philosophers. Brahman has then assumed its new Karyavastha or effective state which lasts for another But all this refers to the world of change Kalpa. It is the world of Karman. matter becomes gross and visible once more. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. To reckon a thousand years as one day would not satisfy them. p. I. By the time he has completely wiped them out by this process the world or Sawsara may indeed come to an end. 2 Sawkhya-Sutras VI. eternity. solution occurs at the end of each According to the Vedanta there Kalpa a Pralaya or disof the universe. Brahman creates or lets out of himself causal condition a world. In the Sa?>ikhyathese Pralayas take place whenever the philosophy three Gimas of Prakrit i recover their equipoise 2 . V. the temporary produce Maya. is not poise between them. but even then eternity and reality lie In order to get an easier hold of this far beyond. S. and souls become active and re-embodied. containing both soul and matter in an Avyakta At the end of this Pralaya. . (undeveloped) state \ however. and unreality only. 42. such as when a man once in every thousand years passes his silken kerchief over the chain of the Himalayan mountains. while creation results from the upsetting of the equiWhat is truly eternal. of Avidya. destructions or absorptions of the whole world. i. new though with a higher enlightenment (Vikasa). They represent length of time by much bolder similes. it is not yet of Nescience. or real reality. xxviii. has been invented.

than that they should each have invented the same theory under slightly varying aspects. they were brought up and from all whom they learnt their language and with it the materials of their thoughts. as and as adopted may be so. The exact nature of the Pralayas differs so much. that it is far more they may common those source. p. does not occur as yet in the old Upanishads. what we call creation. are already quite familiar to the poets. It in more recent. that is. and their beginning (Kalpakshaye and Kalpadau). If they are separated.K ARM AN. of their end the Bhagavad-git& IX. but 7. its self-being. and may recover at any moment its selfknowledge. absorptions. The idea of the reabsorption of the world end of a Kalpa (aeon) and its emergence again there follows at the in the next Kalpa. creation According to the Vaiseshikas this process of and dissolution depends on the atoms. nay even the name of Samsara is absent from them . if motion springs up in them and they are united. that among whom have borrowed it from a from the popular belief of is. 221. from it by the other systems *. according to different poets likely that and philosophers. and of Kalpas or ages. the idea of Pralayas. and Professor Garbe is inclined therefore to claim the idea of Pralaya as peculiar to the Samkhya-philosophy. there ensues dissolution (Pralaya). and its freedom from all conditions and fetters. or at least is so for a time only. affected 145 by the cosmic illusion. . 1 Sawkhya-Philosophie.

The theory of the three Gunas also. The impulse to everything in nature. 6. Infallibility of the Veda. idea. but it cerI. warm. and something between the two. as yet in the old Upanishads. tainly speaks of /Sruti (Sutras it As long as we know the Samkhya. One more common element presupposed by Indian of the supreme authority acter ascribed to the Veda. revelation and tradition. ' m>od. and neither cold nor warm . but rather as something it substantial by itself. calling it /Sabda. in ancient times. In the most general sense they represent no more than thesis. occurs in philosophy. recognises the authority of the Veda. when ordinary fact the sense. so that the Gumis become in component constituents of nature. the cause of all and variety. 5). and appeals to it even in matters of minor importance. in the of quality. antithesis. is is philosophy might be pointed out in the recognition and the revealed charThis. such as cold. 5. so well is known in the later phases of philosophy. which has been claimed as originally peculiar to the Sawkhyaphilosophy. not to be found Three Guwas.. O . familiar as it may The Sa?>ikhya-philosophy in supposed to have been originally without a belief the revealed character of the Vedas. certainly a startling sound to us at present. seems in its unscientific form to have been quite familiar to most Hindu philosophers. is ascribed to the three Gu^as. Gunn means quality.146 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. It is important to observe that the distinction between $ruti and Smn'ti. but we are warned expressly life not to take it.

Moved by the Highest. caused by a preponderance of one of the sion is three.' Here we have clearly the names of the three Gunas. Tension between these qualities produces activity and struggle: equilibrium This mutual tenleads to temporary or final rest. became uneven. That llamas. was Ra^as (obscurity). in the 2 ' : Maitrayana This world was in the beginning Tamas (darkness) indeed. 147 and neither good nor bad bright. Upanishad V. when moved. when moved. and this is the form of Sattva (goodness). and neither bright nor dark. than the later Upanishads or the Bhagavad-gita. That Tamas stood in the Highest. for instance. . at all events. ran forth as essence (Rasa). it became uneven.THREE bad. in order to establish the general acceptance of the theory of the Gunas. GU7VAS. dark. and it might therefore be argued that it does not In that form it count for much. unevenness. sometimes represented as Vishamatvam. That Sattva. L 2 . and so on through every part of physical and moral nature. in which the three Gunas are fully recognised. but the Maitrarecognised yana Upanishad shows several Samkhya influences. as we read. not for more.

and begin with the Vedanta. *Samkara. But though he calls him the author of the Mahabharata.. nor should we gain much by that identification.CHAPTEE IF IV. This Vyasa is said by /Samkara. In India he has been identified with Vy.e. now we pass on to a consideration of the six orthodox systems of philosophy. the collector of the Mahabharata. and this judg- . Vedanta or Uttara-Mimawisa. the re- puted author of our Sutras. though he mentions This convinced Windischmann Badarayana as such. II. 3. Of course when we possess commentaries on any Sutras. that ASamkara himself did not consider these two Vyasas as one and the same person. we know that the Sutras must have existed before their commentaries. I. in the whole of his commentary on the Vedanta-Sutras. 33. III. as Vyasa of the Mahabharata also is hardly more than a name to us. 3. and to have had intercourse with the gods. but without sufficient evidence. their commentator.isa. and the commentary of *Sa. we have to take as our chief guides the Sutras of Badarayana. c. never mentions that the Vyasa of the epic was the author of the book on which he is commenting. 32.mkara. to have lived at the end of the Dvapara and the beginning of the Kali age. We know little of Biidaraya?ia. 1.. 3. 47. I. that the Sutras of Badaraya?ia were older therefore than Samkara.

VEDANTA OR UTTARA-MIMA/VSA.

149

ment ought not to have been lightly disturbed. It was excusable in Colebrooke, but not after what had been said byWindischmann, particularly when no new argument could be produced. All we can say is that, whatever the date of the Bhagavad-git4 is, and it is
a part of the Mahabharata, the age of the VedantaStitras and of Badarayana must have been earlier.

We

may

also say that

Badarayana himself never

any work which could be assigned with any amount of certainty to any time after our era. Even when Badarayana quotes the Snm'ti, it does not follow that /Samkara is always right when
refers to

suggesting passages from the Mahabharata (Bhagavad-gita), or from Manu, for it is not too much to
say that similar passages may have occurred in other and more ancient Srnnti works also. Badarayarai
certainly most provoking in never quoting his If we could follow $amkara. authorities by name.
is

Badaraya^ia would have referred in his Sutras to

Bauddhas, 6rainas, Pasupatas and Paft&aratras, to Yogins, Vaiseshikas, though not to Naiyayikas, to By the Sawkhyas, and to the doctrines of (j'aimini
1
.

name of Sruti Badarayana, according to $amkara, meant the following Upanishads, BHhad-aranyaka, /^Aandogya, Kanaka, Kaushitaki, Aitareya, Taittiriya,

Munc^aka, Prasna, /Svetasvatara, and 6rabala. This must suffice to indicate the intellectual sphere in which Badarayana moved, or was supposed to have
far

moved, and so

may
as

be said to determine his
far

chronological position

anterior

to

that

of

another Vyasa, who was the father of $uka, the teacher of Gauc?apada, the teacher of Govinda, the
1

Deussen, System des Vedanta,

p. 24,

150

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

teacher of $a?kara, and who, if $a?>ikara belonged to the eighth century, might have lived in about

the sixth century of our era

l
.

literary works to which >Sa??ikara refers commentary are, according to Deussen (System,

The

in his
p. 34),

among the

Sa??ihitas,

that of the Big-veda, of the

Va^asaneyins, Maitrayamyas and Taittiriyas, and Ka^as, (nothing from the Sama and Atharvasamhitas)
;

among the Brahmanas, the
;

Aitareya,

Arsheya, Shac^viwisa, /S'atapatha, Taittiriya, Ta/^c/ya, TTMndogya among the Arawyakas, Aitareya and
Taittiriya
;

and among the Upanishads, Aitareya,
L>a,

Br&had-ararayaka,

Ka^Aa, Kaushitaki-brahmana,

Kena, jfiTAandogya, Maitrayaniya, Munc/aka, Prasna, jSvetasvatara, Taittiriya. These are sometimes called the old or classical Upanishads, as being quoted by

though Paiwgi, Agnirahasya, Narayawlya and G'abala may have to be added. As belonging to Smn'ti$amkara quotes Mahabharata (Bhagavad-gita),
$a?>ikara,

Ramayana, Marka/ic/eya-purana, Manu,Yaska, Pa?iini, Paribhashas, Samkhya-karika, and he refers to Sa??ikliya-Sutras (though it is important to observe that he
gives no ipsissima verba from our Samkhya-Sutras), to Yoga-Sutras, Nyaya-Sutras, Vai.veshika-Sutras, and to Mlmamsa-Sfrfcras. When he alludes to Sugata
or

Buddha he

refers once to a passage

which has been

traced in the Abhidharma-KosAa-vyakhya. He also knew the Bhagavatas and the Svapiuidhyayavids.
old Upanishads,
1

Though the name of Vedanta does not occur in the we can hardly doubt that it was the

Another sternum of Vyasa, given by native writers, is Naraya/w, VasishMa, (Padmabhava), *S'akti, Parasara, Vyasa,
.S'uka,

Gauf/apacla,

Hastamalaka

(*S'ishya),

Tro^aka,

Varttika-

kara, &c.

VEDANTA OR UTTARA-MIMAMSA.

151

Vedantic thoughts, contained in the Upanishads, which gave the first impulse to more systematic
philosophical speculations in India. Several scholars have tried to prove that Samkhya ideas prevailed
in India at

an

earlier

time than, the Vedantic ideas.

But though there
theories in

germs of Samkhya the Upanishads, they are but few and

certainly are

the strictly Vedantic concepts meet us at every step in the hymns, the Brahma/ias, the Aranyakas, and in the Sutras. Vedanta is clearly
far between, while

the native philosophy of India. It is true that this philosophy is not yet treated systematically in the

Upanishads, but neither

is

the Samkhya.
of

To us

who

care

only

for

the

growth
soil

thought on the ancient
;

philosophical of India, Vedanta is

and the question whether clearly the first growth lived before Badarayana, or whether the Kapila
systematic treatment of the
I

Samkhya took

place

before that of the Vedanta, can hardly arise.

only wonder that those who maintain the priority of the Samkhya, have not appealed to the Lalita-vistara, twelfth chapter, where, among the subjects known to Buddha, are mentioned not
likewise

only Nirghar^u, X/^andas, Yagraakalpa, 6ryotisha, but Samkhya, Yoga, Vaiseshika, Vesika (Vaid-

yaka

Arthavidya, Barhaspatya, AsA'arya, Asura, There Mri'gapakshiruta, and Hetuvidya (Nyaya).
?),

are several

names which are

difficult to identify,

but

there can be no doubt that the five philosophical systems here mentioned were intended for Samkhya,

The Yoga, Vaiseshika, Nyaya, and Barhaspatya. two Mimamsas are absent, but their absence does
not prove that they did not exist, but only that they were considered too orthodox to form a proper

152

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

This shows the real subject of study for Buddha. character of the antagonism between Buddhism and

Brahmanism, now so often denied or minimised
is

1

,

and

confirmed by similar references, as when Hema&andra in his Abhidhana mentions indeed such names
as Arhatas or (9ainas, Saugatas or Buddhists, NaiyaBarhasyikas, Yoga, Samkhya or Kapila, Vaiseshika,

Nastika, AUrvaka or Lokayatika, but omits the two really dangerous systems, carefully the Mimamsa of Badarayana and that of 6raimini. It should also be remembered that considerable

patya

or

doubt has recently been thrown on the age of the Chinese translation of the Lalita-vistara, which seemed to enable us to assign the original to a date

The case is not at all events anterior to 70 A. D. quite clear yet, but we must learn to be more
cautious with Chinese dates.
It has been the custom to give the name of Vedanta- philosophy to the Uttara-Mimams4 of

Badarayam, nor
should not
be

is

there any reason
If

why

that

name

Vedanta is used as synonymous with Upanishad, the Uttara-Mimawsa
retained.

certainly the Vedanta-philosophy, or a systematic treatment of the philosophical teaching of the
is

no doubt, that Vasish^a as well as Gautama distinguishes between Upanishads and Vedantas (XXII, 9), and the commentator to
Upanishads.
It
is

true,

Gautama XIX,

7 states distinctly that those parts of the Arawyakas which are not Upanishads only are to be called Vedantas. But there is no real harm

in the received

name, and we see that the followers of the Vedanta were often called Aupanislmdas.
1

See Brahmavadin, Feb., 1898,

p. 454.

V* BADARAYANA.

V

153

Badarayawa.

Badarayana, the reputed author of the Vedanta-Sutras, we had to confess before that we know nothing about him. He is to us a name
to

As

and an

know

intellectual power, but nothing else. the date of his great commentator, /Samkara, in the eighth century A.D., and we know that another
earlier.

We
We

commentator, Bodhayana, was even
also

know that Bodhayana' s commentary was followed

by Kamanu^a. It is quite possible that Bodhayana, like Ramanu^a, represented a more ancient and more faithful interpretation of Badarayana's Sutras, and
that $amkara's philosophy in its unflinching monism, is his own rather than Badarayana's. But no MS.

Bodhayana has yet been discovered. still more ancient commentator, Upavarsha by name, is mentioned, and /S'amkara (III, 3, 53) calls him Bhagavad or Saint. But it must remain doubtful again whether he can be identified with the
of

A

Upavarsha, who, according to the Katha-sarit-sagara,

was the teacher of Panini. It must not be forgotten

that, according to Indian

tradition, Badarayana, as the author of the VedantaSutras, is called Vyasa or Vedavyasa, Dvaipayana

or

Krishna Dvaipayana. Here we are once more in a labyrinth from which it is difficult to find an exit. Vyasa or Krishna Dvaipayana is the name given to the author of the Mahabharata, and no two the styles can well be more different than that of Vyasa of the Mahabharata and that of Vyasa, the
supposed author of the so-called Vyasa-Sutras. I think we should remember that Vyasa, as a noun,

meant no more than compilation

or arrangement,

154

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.
;

as opposed to Samasa, conciseness or abbreviation so that the same story might be recited Samasena,
in

an

abbreviated,

and Vyasena,

in

a complete

form.

should remember next that Vyasa is called Parasarya, the son of Parasara and Satyavati
(truthful),

We

and that Pawini mentions one Parasarya

as the author of the Bhikshu-Sutras, while Va/raspati Misra declares that the Bhikshu-Sutras are

the same

as

the Vedanta-Sutras, and

that

the

followers of Parasarya Parasarins. (Pan. IV,
This, if

were
3,

in

consequence called

we

could

no.) rely on
c.

it,

would prove the

existence of our Sutras before the time of Pamni,
or in the fifth century B.

This would be a most
collected

important
sophy.

gain for the
if,

chronology of Indian philoare
told,

But

as

we

Vyasa

(Vivyasa) not only the Vedas, the Mahabharata, the Puranas, but also the Vyasa-Sutras, nay even a prose commentary on Pataf^ali's Yoga-Sutras,

that the work ascribed to him must be taken as the work of several people or of a literary period rather than of one man. I formerly thought that Vyasa might have represented the period in which the first attempts were made to reduce the ancient mnemonic literature
to

we can hardly doubt

of India to writing, but there is nothing in tradition support such a view, unless we thought that

Vyasa had some connection

witli

Nyasa

(writing).

Indian tradition places the great Vyasa between the third and fourth ages of the present world, whatever that may mean, if translated into our
If Vyasa had language. really anything to do witli our Vedanta-Sutras, it

modern

chronological

BADARAYAJVA.

155

would hardly have been more than that he arranged
or edited them.

His name does not occur

in

the

Sutras themselves, while that of Badarayawa does, and likewise that of Badari, a name mentioned by (raimini also in his Purva-Mimawisa l In the Bhaga.

vad-gita, which might well be placed as contemporary with the Vedanta-Sutras, or somewhat later, Vyasa is mentioned as one of the Devarshis with Asita and Devala (X, 13), and he is called the greatest of Rishis (X, 37). But all becomes confusion again,
if we remember that tradition makes Vyasa the author of the Mahabharata, and therefore of the Bhagavad-gita itself, which is even called an Upani-

shad.

The only passage which seems
the relative
,

to

me

to settle

age of the Vedanta-Sutras and the 2 Bhagavad-gita is in XIII, 3 'Hear and learn from me the Supreme Soul (Kshetrar/ria) that has been
celebrated in

many ways by Rishis

in various metres,

and by

words of the Brahma-Sutras, which are and furnished with reasons.' Here the words Brahma-sutra-padai/?,' the words of the seem to me to refer clearly to Brahma-Sutras,' the recognised title of the Vedanta or Brahmathe
definite
'

'

Sutras.
'

Whatever native
'

authorities

may

say to

the contrary, the words definite and argumentacan refer to Sutras only. And if it is said, on the other side, that these Brahma-Sutras, when they
tive
refer to Snm'ti, refer clearly to passages

taken from

the Bhagavad-gita
I

doubt

it.

and must therefore be later, They never mention the name of the
also,

Colebrooke, M. E., II, p. 354. Prof. T. E. Amalnerkar, Priority of the Vedanta-Sutras, 1895.

156

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

Bhagavad-gita, nor do they give any ipsissima verba from it, and as every Smrzti presupposes a $ruti.
these
references

may have been meant

for

pas-

sages which

may

the Bhagavad-gita had adapted, and Brahmahave shared with other Snmtis.
is

Sutra, on the contrary,

a distinct

title,

all

the

more significant where it occurs, because neither the word Sutra nor Brahma-Sutra occurs ao;ain in ~

any other passage of the Gita. However, even admitting that the Brahma-Sutras quoted from the
Bhagavad-gita, as the Gita certainly appeals to the Brahma-Sutras, this reciprocal quotation might

be accounted for by their being contemporaneous, as in the case of other Sutras which, as there can
be no doubt, quote one from the other, and sometimes verbatim.

As to the commentary on Pataf^ali's Yoga-Sutras being the work of the same Vyasa, this seems to

me

altogether

out

of

the question.

There are

hundreds of people in India

who have the name

of Vyasa. Nor has it ever been positively proved that Pataf/r/ali, the reputed author of the YogaSutras, was the same person as Pata/l^ali, the author
of

Mahabhashya, the great commentary on Pa?iini's grammar, and on Katyayana's Varttikas. Some scholars have rushed at this conclusion,
the

chiefly in order to fix the date of the Yoga-Sutras, but this also would force us to ascribe the most

heterogeneous works to one and the same author Even the age of Pata^r/ali, the grammarian and
'.

author of the Mahabhashya, seems to
1

me by

no

Botli Lassen

seem inclined

to accept the identity of the

and Garbe, Die Sawkhya-Philosophie, p. two Puta%alis.

46.

BADARAYA.VA.

157

I gladly admit the settled. plauof Goldstiicker's arguments that if Pataft^ali sibility presupposed the existence of the Maurya-dynasty he

means positively

might be placed in the third century B.C. I look upon the Ar&aA, which he mentions in the famous Maurya-passage, as having been devised by the Mauryas for the sake of trade, as the first coins with
images of the
gods, introduced

by the Maurya-

Such coins, when they contain images dynasty. of the gods, should not, according to the grammarian, be called simply by the names of the gods,
but by a derivative name, not >Siva, but $ivaka, just as we distinguish between an Angel and an Angelot. And I pointed out before, the very gods

mentioned here by Pataf^/ali are the gods the images of which do occur on the oldest Indian coins which we possess, viz. Siva,, Skanda, and Visakha, the last, if taken for Kama. As a constructive date
therefore, that assigned

by Goldstlicker to Pata%ali

might stand, but that
tive date.

is very different from a posithe name of Maurya in the MahaBesides, bhashya is doubtful and does not occur again in it. saw before that Badarayana refers in his

We

Sutras to 6raimini, the author of the Purva-MimamsaSutras, and that (7aimini returns the compliment

by referring to Badarayawa by name.
is

Badaraya?ia

likewise acquainted with the atheistical doctrines of Kapila and the atomistic theories of Kanada,

and
far

tries

to

refute

them.

But

in

India this

is

from

proving the later date of Badarayawa.

We

must learn to look on Badarayana, 6raimini, Kapila, and similar names, as simply eponymous
;

so that at whatheroes of different philosophies ever time these systems were reduced to the form

158

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

of Sutras, certain opinions could be called

by

their

names.

scholiast to

Colebrooke states, on the authority of a Manu and Ya^fiavalkya, that the instruc-

were often reduced to writing by his pupils, and that this would account for the fact that the author of a system is often quoted in the third person in his own book. It would be interesting if this could be established with reference to
tions of a teacher

ancient texts, but I remember nothing of the kind. All this is very discouraging to students accustomed to chronological accuracy, but it has always seemed
to

me

far better to

acknowledge our poverty and the

utter absence of historical dates in the literary history of India, than to build up systems after systems which
collapse at the first breath of criticism or scepticism.

When
I

I

mean

is

that there

speak of a chronology of thought, what is a chronology which enables

us to distinguish a period of Yedic thought, subdivided into three periods of Mantras, Brahmanas, and Upanishads. No one would doubt the succession of these three periods of language, but if some scholars wish to extend each period to thousands of

them success. I confess I do not share the idea that we should claim for Indian literature as remote an antiquity as possible. The same attempts were made before, but nothing was gained by them, and much was lost as soon as more
years, I can only wish

After the sober and critical ideas began to prevail. would follow that of Buddhism, Upanishad-period marked, on the Buddhist side, by the Suttas, on

the Brahmanic

and possibly somewhat earlier, by the large mass of Sutra literature. To that period seem to me to belong, by similarity of thought,
side,
if

not of style, the six systems of philosophy.

I

FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA.

159

should have said by style also, because the earliest form in which we possess these systems is that of Sutras. Unfortunately we know now how easily even that very peculiar style can be, and in case of the Samkhya and some of the legal Smritis, has been

must not therefore ascribe too much weight to this. The next period would be what
imitated.

We

have called that of the Renaissance, beginning at a time when Sanskrit had ceased to be the language spoken by the people, though it continued, as it has
I

to the present day, to be cultivated by the learned. Such are the difficulties that meet us when we

attempt to introduce anything like chronological order into the literature of India, and it seems to

me

far better to state

them honestly than
its

to disguise

them.
is

After

all,

the importance of that literature,

philosophical portion, It has something to quite independent of age. teach us quite apart from the names and dates of its authors and grateful as we should feel for any real
;

and more particularly of

light that can be thrown on these chronological mazes, we must not forget that the highest interest of the

Vedanta and the other philosophies
but their truth.

is

not their age,

Fundamental Doctrines of the Vedanta.

fundamental doctrines of the Vedanta, the Hindus themselves have helped us and given us in a few words what they themselves
If
for the

we ask

consider
'

as the

my thought. Three Lectures on the Vedanta' (1894) In one half verse I shall tell you what has been
:

quintessence of that system I quoted these words at the end of

of

'

taught in thousands of volumes

:

Brahman

is

true,

l6o

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.
is false,

the world
else
1
.'

the soul

is

Brahman and nothing

And
'

again

:

There is nothing worth gaining, there is nothing worth enjoying, there is nothing worth knowing but Brahman alone, for he who knows Brahman, is
Brahman.'
This resume of the Vedanta
is

very true, and
in
its

very helpful as a resume of that system of philosophy.
details.

After
its

philosophy

distinguish fundamental doctrines and

all

we must

every

minute

We

can never carry

all

these details in

our memory, but we may always have present before our mind the general structure of a great system of thought and its salient points, whether it be the
philosophy of Kant or of Plato or of Badaraya?ia. It would be quite impossible in a historical sketch of
the six Indian philosophical systems to give all their details. They are often unimportant, and may
easily be gathered from the texts themselves, such as we have them in the original or in translations but they must not be allowed to crowd and to

;

obscure that general view of the six systems which alone is meant to be given in these pages. have another and still shorter abstract of the

We

Vedanta

Arum

the famous words addressed by Uddalaka to his son vetaketu (AMnd. Up. VI, 8),
in
' '

namely, Tat tvam asi,' Thou art That.' These words, however, convey little meaning without the context in which they occur, that is to say, unless we know

what
thou.

is

meant by the Tat, that, and by the Tvam, The Tat is what we saw shadowed forth in
1

See also Theosophy,

p. 3

1

7.

FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA.

l6l

the Upanishads as the Brahman, as the cause of the world, the Tvam is the Atman, the Self in
various meanings, from the ordinary I to the divine Soul or Self, recognised in man and it is
its
;

the highest aim of the Vedanta to show that these two are in reality one 1 This fearless synthesis,
.

embodied
to

in the simple

words Tat tvam

asi,

seems

me

the boldest and truest synthesis in the whole

history of philosophy. recognised the Tat or

Even Kant, who clearly it, that is the Ding an sich

behind the objective world, never went far enough to recognise the identity of the Tat, the objective

Ding an

sich,

and the Tvam, the Ding an

sich

on

the subjective side of the world. Among ourselves such a synthesis of the subjective with the objective

would even now rouse the strongest theological, not philosophical, protests, whereas the theologians of India discuss it with perfect equanimity, and see in it the truest solution of the riddle of the world.
Self
if

In order fully to understand it, we must try to place ourselves firmly on the standpoint of the

Vedanta philosophers, forgetting all our own inherited theological misgivings. Their idea of the Supreme Cause of the universe went far beyond

what

meant by God, the creator and ruler of the world (Prar/apati). That being was to them a manifestation only of the Supreme Cause or Brahman, it was Brahman as phenomenal, and it followed that, as Brahman, as they held, was indeed the cause of
is

everything, the All in All, man also could be nothing but a phenomenon of Brahman. The idea therefore that it would be blasphemy to make the creature
1

Mawdukya Up.

II,

Ayam Atma Brahma.

M

Even their god beyond gods (Deveshu adhi ekaA) did not satisfy them any longer. and that we can never go beyond. this lifting up of the Tvam into the Tat might prove the equivalent of the idea of divine sonship. but from the Vedanta point of view it means real identity. they saw Rig-veda . for we ought never to forget that we and the absolute Cause of w hen taken have always to be satisfied with what we take God to be ( Vidyamatra). nothing but truth in the doctrine that man in his true nature was the same with Brahman. including gods all and men. the absolute Cause of the universe. the lord of all creatures. They saw. manifested in a subjective and personal creator. never presented itself to their minds. that God is hardly a name that can be used for that Supreme Brahman. the Godhead. and all its consequences. equal to the creator so far as their substance was concerned. it was the absolute divine essence. or ignorance. in fact. With us unfortunately such questions can hardly be discussed in a calm philosophical spirit.1 62 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Translated into the language of the early Christian philosophers of Alexandria. just as the Jews declared it blasphemy in Christ to teach that He was . Their Tat was something behind or above the purely personal creator. as it did in the hymns of the and though they might have shrunk from identifying gods and men with that personal divine being. because theology steps in and protests against them as irreligious and blasphemous. and present likewise in all its phenomenal manifestations. that he shares in the nature of Brahman. r Pra<yapati I say when as the creative god. taken as such. also. or in the spirit of God. Prar/cipati. real recognition of the original divine nature of man. however much hidden and disfigured for a time by Avidya.

and in their stiff and algebraic Sutras they were working out these mighty problems with unfaltering love of truth. and in an unimpassioned and truly philosophic spirit. though under a strange form. though it was recognised as the early fathers of the Church. however. equal to God. The first is taken from the JTMndogya Upanishad w hich belongs to the Sama-veda and is generally regarded as one of the earlier Upanishads *. If properly understood. 92 M 2 . of man and God. The teachers of the Vedanta. but we get the grapes from which the juice was extracted and made into wine. while resuscitate in striving to man the consciousness of the identity of the Tat and the Tvam. nay. It is as difficult to give an idea of the form of the Upanishads as of the spirit that pervades the Upanishads. We do not indeed get there the pure wine of the Vedanta.FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. To maintain the eternal identity of the human and the divine is very different from arrogating divinity for humanity and on this point even our philosophy may have something to learn which has often been forgotten . arid. I. may help to show us the early Vedantists as they were. Tat tvam asi. nay that 163 He and the Father were one. seem to be moving in the most serene atmosphere of thought. bring us very near to the earliest Christian philosophy. groping their way in the dark. B. as it was understood by the great thinkers of Alexandria. these Vedanta teachings may. A few extracts. p. E.. of the Father and in vital all modern His sons. T 1 Translated in S. I Christianity. the unity by of the Father and the Son. though indirectly. and help us to understand it.

/Svetaketu returned to his father. by which ' that instruction. . go to school for there none belonging to our race. ' being only the name. His father said to him are so conceited. ' conceited. rny dear son.' 7. arising from thus. not having studied (the Veda). of Arima. the son $vetaketu. who. but the truth being that all is gold Arid as. the difference .e. ' all that is made of steel (Karsrmayasam) is known. ' we perceive what is not by which we know what is not known ? heard. have you ever asked by which we hear what is not perceived. as it were. and stubborn. four. arising from speech.' Having begun his apprenticeship (with a teacher) when he was twelve years of age. /Svetaketu was the son of Arum. by one nugget of gold 5. by one pair of nail-scissors 6. as you 3. To him ' : of Arima) said is his father (Uddalaka. considering yourself well-read. is ' : What ' of clay all that known. the grandson . speech. is that instruction. having then studied all the Vedas. i. but is made of clay is the truth being that all is clay And as. Sir ? he asked.164 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the difference being only the name. a Brahma?ia by birth only. $vetaketu. when he was twenty2. The father replied My dear son. a Brahmabandhu. arising from speech. FIRST KHANDA. my dear son. my dear son. : and so stubborn. all that is made of gold is known. The son said ' : Surely those venerable men . as by one clod 4. but the truth being that all is steel. the difference being only the name. 1. is. my for that instruction dear son. darling. considering himself well-read.

that which is. How not could that which ? is. 165 (my teachers) did not it. be born of that which that which is. but parts. without a second. 'It thought. in the beginning there was that only which is not (TO 6V). there was that only which is (TO 6V). consists of sixteen Abstain from food for fifteen days. only was in the beginning. one only. No.FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. water fire alone. is From water alone eatable SEVENTH KHAJVTDA. Man (Purusha). 3. therefore tell me that. ' It sent forth water. drink as much water as you like. ' It sent forth earth (food). my dear son. But how could ' it be so. one only. For if they had should they not have told it me ? Do you. may I 4. 'In the beginning. without a second and from that which is not. ^ born. know that. my dear son. my dear son ' ? the father continued. SECOND 1. ' i . Water thought.' ' Be it so. known why Sir. most food is then produced.' said the father. without is a second. Therefore whenever it rains anywhere. may I grow forth. ' 2. was . And therefore whenever is hot and perspires. one only. ' It sent forth fire. That thought. I be may I grow forth. food produced. fire may I be many. ' anybody anywhere is produced on him from many. Others say. for breath comes . my son. may many. may I be grow forth.

fire. which would not burn much more than this (i.ANDA. if you drink /SVetaketu abstained from food for fifteen days. be cut off.' After that. very little). my son. of a firefly. he understood NINTH KB. Ya^us. 'As the bees. my dear son. he understood what his father meant when he said Mind. lighted up with food.1 66 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. thus. Sir. burnt up. e. he knew it all ! ' by heart.' 3. will not from water. one part only of the sixteen parts (of you) is left. understood what he yea. and reduce the juice into one form. And whatever his father asked him.' He it. ' Then his father said to fire him : 5.' 2. breath from water. and by it you remember now the Vedas. As of a great lighted if left. there was one part of the sixteen parts left to you. and therefore with that one part you do not remember the Vedas. Thus. my son. and that. and afterwards approached his father. may ' 6. and water. ' . my dear son. The father said to him fire : one coal only of the size 'As of a great lighted of a firefly may be left. speech from said.' Then Sve4. He replied and Saman verses. make honey by col- lecting the juices of distant trees. Go and eat Then wilt thou understand me. And as these juices have no discrimination. one coal of the size be made to blaze up again by putting grass upon it. 2. taketu ate. 1. ' : What shall Then he came to his father and said The father said I say ? Repeat the Rile.' They do not ' ' : ' : occur to me. comes from ' : food. and will thus burn more than this.

or a worm. or a midge. Sir. it. ' 4. Be it so. run. ' as those rivers. They become indeed 1. my son. in the that they are merged in the True. Sir. ' Be my child. the eastern (like the Ganga) toward the east. I am the juice of this tree same manner. ' 2. or a wolf. in Self. my son. >Svetaketu.' said the son. ' or a gnat. That which is that subtile essence. ' that exists has Self. my child. Whatever these creatures are here. it so. that they become again and again.' the father replied. all these creatures. It is it. It is the True. a lion.' it is the ' ' and thou. or a musquito. when they have become merged in the True (either in deep sleep or in death).FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. in it all 3. And In the same manner. TENTH These rivers. Now that which its all that exists has Self. know not that they have come back from the True. ' its Self. the western (like the Sindhu) toward the west. or a boar. They go from sea to sea (i. I am this or that river.' It is the and thou. sea. inform me still more. that they become again and again. whether 3. when they have come back from the True. my son. or a gnat. do not know. /SVetaketu.' the father replied. . or a worm. or a boar. or a musquito. whether a lion. inform me still more. the clouds lift up the water from the sea to the sky. e. when they are in the sea. art Please. or a wolf. and send it back as rain to the sea). art Please. or a midge. all these creatures. Whatever these creatures are here. that subtile essence.' said the son. It is the True. so that they 167 might say. know not or that.

' Please.' ' know dies when the living (Self) has ' the living (Self) dies not. Sir. that branch withers if it leaves a third. Sir.' thence a fruit of the Nyagrodha tree. in it all that exists has its Self. TWELFTH KHA#Z>A. the whole tree withers. If he were tree here. Fetch me from Sir. It is the True.' said the son. but it would live. ' if it leaves branches. In exactly the same manner. Pervaded by the living Self that tree stands firm. to strike at its stem. This (body) indeed withers and 3. almost infinitesimal. That which is that subtile essence.' It is ' broken.' the father replied. but it would live. ' If one it . inform me still more. that branch withers a second. . Sir. that branch withers. this. ' i . ' Be it so.' ' What It is broken. ' art it. but it would live. : Thus he spoke my son. . it would bleed. of its .' Break one of them. Break it. it would bleed.' ' ' ' do you see there ? 'These seeds. my child. It is the Self.' ' ' What do you see there Sir. If it leaves the whole tree. drinking in its nourishment and rejoicing But if the life (the living Self) leaves one 2. If he were to strike at its top. ELEVENTH were to strike at the root of this large would bleed.' ? ' Not anything.1 68 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and thou. left it .' ' ' Here is one. $vetaketu. i .

Sir. for. which water last night/ it. it was melted. in it all that It is the True. my child/ the father replied. and thou. its Self. The father said to him Bring me the you placed in the salt. That which is the subtile 3. son . essence. The son did as he was commanded. Please. 2. but the salt continued to exist. It is the True. you do not perceive the True (Sat). which you do not perceive ' of that very essence this great Nyagrodha tree exists. art it/ ' It the and thou. my son. 2. That which is the subtile essence. ' Be it so. How replied ' is it ? ' : The son ' It is salt/ Taste Taste it from the middle. 169 The father said: 'My son. The father said Taste ' : found it not. and then wait on me in the morning/ ' . ' : Then the indeed. father said Here also. THIRTEENTH ' 1.FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. in this body. my but there indeed it is. of it from the surface of the water. ' : How it ' is it ? The son replied The father said on me/ It is salt/ ' : Throw away and then wait He did so . It is the Self. The son having looked for course. Believe it. it/ exists has its Self. art . ' How ' is it ? The son ' replied : It is salt/ it from the bottom. ' 3. still O /Svetaketu. that subtile essence there. inform me more/ said the son. $vetaketu. in it all is that exists has Self. Place this salt in water.

I have been brought left here with my eyes covered." 3. his mind in breath. 'And as thereupon some one might loose his " bandage and say to him. village to village arrive at last at the Gandharas. FIFTEENTH ' KHAA /)A. Sir. he would by asking his way from 1. It is the True. ' it all its Self. ' Be my man child. and leave him then in a place where there are no human beings and as that person would turn towards the east. who meets with a teacher to inform him. my child/ the father replied. it " and as is the Gandharas.' It is the and thou. it. here with my eyes covered. it so. his relatives assemble ? him and ask " : Dost thou know me round Dost thou know me merged heat ? in his (fire). Then.' said the son. or the west. in that exists has Self. If a is ill. art Please.' the father replied. inform me still more. inform me still more. having been informed and being able to judge for himself. and shout.170 ' INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. as long as his speech is not mind. 'As one might lead a person with his eyes away from the Gandharas. 'That which is the subtile essence. FOURTEENTH KHA^Z>A. ' Be it so. Go in that direction. learn that there is " delay so long only as I am not delivered (from this body). or " I have been the north. .' said the son. and then I shall be perfect. go in that direction thereupon." 2. . Please. Sir. in exactly the same manner does a man. covered . he " knows them. O /Svetaketu. T i . breath in heat in the Highest Being (Devata).

had to be true to his word and to I go as the 5. mind in breath.' .' It is the Self. art Please. inform me still more. surrendered (at a sacrifice) i. look forward how come A it will be with those who mortal ripens like corn. in it all that 2. then he knows them not. it. Va^asravasa. ' What will be the dying). that he possessed.) first. The son said of many (who have still to die) .' the father replied. having once said ' : though in haste. FIRST VALLI. and has by many scholars been classed as of later date. sacrifice his son. ruler of the departed) which (the to-day he has to do unto me ? of many (who are now Look back how hereafter. It is the True. and thou. desirous all (of heavenly rewards).FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA.' said the son. at the head in the I go midst work of Yama 6. That which is the subtile essence. it was with those who came before. and therefore his son also) said to his father Dear ' : father.' so. He (knowing that his father had promised to give up at a sacrifice all that he possessed. The next extract is from the Ka^Aa Upanishad of the Ya^ur-veda. breath in heat (fire). to whom it He ' said wilt thou give me ? a second and a third time. ' Be it so. my child. (The father. Sir. ' /Svetaketu. like corn he springs up again. He had a son of the name of Na&iketas. ' 171 But when his speech is merged in his mind. 4. his * exists has its Self. heat in the Highest Being. ' : Then the father replied (angrily) I shall give thee unto Death.

' 12. . as thou. destroys his his expectations. know thee. He shall sleep peacefully through the night. when a Brahmana That fire is quenched by this enters as a guest. as the of the three boons I choose that Gautama. and no one account of old age.' : have been dismissed by 1 1. Yama said thy father. ! ' A foolish man without receiving food to eat. my father. ' Hail to thee first ! and welfare 10. be that he may from anger towards me and know me and greet me. during which time Na&iketas had received no hospitality from him. returning to his house after an absence of three nights. and free from anger. peace-offering Brahmana that dwells in the house of a 8. all his sons and cattle/ hopes and and (Yama. ' therefore choose now !' : three boons. both hunger and all and out of the reach of sorrow. pacified. Vaivasvata bring water. 9.' . his possessions. will With my leave. Auddalaki Arum. Death. says :) Brahma?ia. and there is no one to receive him. and be again towards ' thee as he was before. rejoice in the world of heaven. a venerable guest. to me Na&iketas said kind. his sacred and his good deeds. (Na&iketas then enters into the abode of Yama Vaivasvata. after having seen thee freed from the jaws of death. and Death.172 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. righteousness. hast dwelt in my house three nights without eating. when I shall free thee. . is is Naiketas . said: 'In the heaven-world there no fear afraid on thou art not there. Thereupon one of the attendants of Yama is sup- posed to say ' :) Fire enters into the houses. 7. Leaving behind thirst.

Na&iketas said There is that doubt. Choose anunderstand. and what bricks are required for the altar. Choose now. that it is the attainment of the eternal worlds. do not press me. is thy fire which leads to heaven. That fire all men will proclaim as thine. and another teacher like thee is not to be found : surely no other boon is like unto this/ 'Choose sons and grandsons who 23. when a man is dead. and how they . Yama then told him that fire-sacrifice. the fire-sacrifice which leads us to heaven tell it to me. being pleased with him. Death said : . Death said ' : .' 15. this I ask as my second boon/ reach immortality. for I am Those who live in the heaven-world full of faith. learn it from 14. know. Then M?^'tyu. should like to know. he is others. hast declared it to be not easy to understand. hidden in darkness. NaAiketas said ' : On this point even the gods have been in doubt indeed. some saying. he is not. ' : . and which thou hast chosen as thy second boon. Death. thy third boon/ 20.. Yama said and when thou understandest that fire-sacrifice me. and their firm support. And Na&iketas repeated all as it had been told to him. which leads to heaven. and thou. and let me off that boon/ 22. and how many. this is On this point even the gods it is not easy to have been in doubt formerly That subject is subtle. other boon. 'Thou knowest. This. Na&iketas. said again : Na&iketas. Na&iketas. O Death. in the beginning of the worlds.FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. taught by thee This the third of my boons/ I 2 1 . I will tell it thee. O Na/dketas. 173 IT. ' 1 9. . ' : are to be placed.

thou thy horses. elephants. but do not ask 26. me about dying. as as thou is (which I have chosen) 28.174 shall live a INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. men. after having approached them. wear out the present vigour of all the Even the whole of life is short. the freedom from decay enjoyed by the immortals. desires. pleasures which arise from beauty and love?' Death. Na&i- ketas does not choose another boon but that which enters into what is hidden. ask for them according to thy wish fair maidens with their chariots and musical instru' 25. earth. that on which there is this doubt. Be (king). would delight in a long life.' . ments. Na&iketas. such are indeed not to be obtained by be waited on by them whom I give to thee. choose wealth.' Whatever desires are difficult to attain among these mortals. .' If thou canst think of any boon equal to that. tell us what there is in that great Hereafter. ' Only that boon to be chosen by me. herds of cattle. when we see thee 1 ' 27. Choose the wide abode of the gold. 29. and live thyself as many harvests as thou desirest. Death.' rulest ? What mortal. after he has pondered on the and knowing. Let us Shall we have wealth. and long life. on the wide earth. keep dance and song for Keep thyself/ can be made happy through wealth.' NaMketas said: 'Thoughts of to-morrow. and horses. slowly decaying here below. senses of man. 'No. No man long live. I make thee the enjoyer of all ' 24. hundred years.

after pondering all plea3. when found. ." thus he falls again and again under my sway. in which many men 'Wide apart and leading to different points are these two. "This is the world. hast dismissed ' them 4. wise in their own conceit. 175 SECOND VALLI. the wise goes round about them and distinguishes 1. I believe Na&iketas to be one who desires knowledge.' Thou. "there is no other. the wise prefers the good to the pleasant. . even when they hear of him. to hear. chain a man. greed and avarice.' Fools dwelling in darkness. like blind men led ' rises before the eyes of 6.' ' by the blind. but the fool chooses the pleasant through them. He (the Self) of whom many are not even able whom many.FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OP THE VEDANTA.' The Hereafter never 7. go ' 5. do not comprehend wonderful is a man. the careless child. deluded by the delusion of wealth. misses his end. Thou hast not gone into the road that perish.' leadeth to wealth.' . round and round. staggering to and fro. the pleasant another these two." he thinks. It is well with him who clings to the good he who chooses the pleasant. all. Death said: 'The . and what is known as wisdom. who is able to teach this (the Self) wonderful is he who comprehends this. . and puffed up with vain knowledge. ignorance.' The good and the pleasant approach man 2. good is one thing. O Na&iketas. ' : Yea. having different objects. for even many pleasures did not tear thee away. sures that are or seem delightful. when taught by an able teacher.

: the fulfilment of all desires.' 12. by means of transient things. Ancient is unborn. is killed. who has entered into darkness. who dwells in the abyss. I have obtained what . the foundation of the world. thinks that he this one does not kill. yet being wise thou hast with firm resolve dismissed it all.' for . nothing sprang from it. it is easy to understand. because he has obtained what is a cause for rejoicing. O dearest. it dies not. for the eternal not obtained by things which are not eternal. by means of meditation on his recognises the Ancient. I believe. The house (of Brahman) is open. 'The knowing Self is not born. O Na/dketas. and has thus reached that subtle Being. but when is . ' though the body is killed. that which is magnified by praise.' 19. eternal.176 ' INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. not to be obtained by argudeclared by another. they do not understand nor is that one killed. if the killed .' Yama said 1 1 Though thou hadst seen ' . killed.' 1 8. the rest. Self. who is hidden in the cave. who has removed from it all qualities.' 13. 'A mortal who has heard this and embraced it. Thou hast obtained thou art truly a man of true resolve. rejoices. everlasting he is not . the wide abode. the shore where there is no fear. If the killer thinks that he kills. Hence the Na&iketa fire-sacrifice has been laid by me first then. who is difficult to be seen. we have always an i o. the endless rewards of good deeds. May it now 9. is not transient (the teaching of Yama). he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind. inquirer like thee Na&iketas said I know that ' ' ! : what is is called treasure is transient. then. as God. The it sprang from nothing. is That doctrine it ment. ' The wise who.

sees the majesty of the Self by the grace of the Creator (or through the serenity of the elements). Know the Self to be sitting in the chariot. know that God. rite which a bridge for sacrificers which is the highest. nor by much learning. Who.' . he can never obtain is the Self (even) by knowledge. though lying myself. Self. There are the two.FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. 'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda. ' 177 The is is great.' ' who wish 3. ' Though down. 'May we is be able to master that Na/t'iketa . save who rejoices and rejoices not ? 22. dwelling on the highest summit (the ether in the heart). as unchanging among changing things. he walks far .' 21. as great and omnipresent. 20. own them shade and who perform the 2. He whom the Self chooses.' THIRD VALLI. by him the Self can be gained. entered into the cave (of the heart).' ' The Self chooses him But he who has not first (his body) as his 24. is sitting still. turned away from his wickedness. nor by understanding. smaller than small. imperishable Brahman for those to cross over to the fearless shore. not at rest. A man who free from desires and free from grief. Those who know Brahman call likewise. 'The wise who knows the Self as bodiless within the bodies. and subdued. those householders light Tri?ia/dketa sacrifice. ' 1 . he never grieves. greater than hidden in the heart of the creature. own. he ' goes to able everywhere. drinking their reward O in the world of their works.' 23. x . who is or whose mind not tranquil.

the Great Self is beyond the intellect. 'Beyond the senses there are the objects. 'But he who has understanding and whose mind (the reins) always firmly held.' That Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth. ful and always impure. who is unmind7.' But he who has understanding for his cha9. who is mindful and always pure. like good horses of a charioteer. and the mind. from whence he is not born again. his senses (horses) are unmanageable. the furthest road.' He who has no understanding. the objects of When he (the Highest Self) union with the body. reaches indeed that place.' O 6. intellect. But he who has understanding. The senses they call the senses their roads. he reaches the end of his journey.' 10.' Beyond the Great there is the Undeveloped.' ii. beyond the mind there is the intellect. ' Beyond the Person there is nothing the goal. is the horses.178 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. never reaches that place. his senses are under control. beyond the objects there is the mind. this i is 2. then wise people call him the Enjoyer. and that is the ' highest place (step) of Vishmi. the senses. but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and subtle.' 13. like vicious horses of a charioteer. He who has no understanding and whose mind is ' never firmly held. rioteer. beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person (Purusha). 'A wise man should keep down speech and . the body to be the chariot. and who holds the reins of the mind. but is ' enters into the round of births.' ' 8. and the mind the reins.' in ' 5.' ' 4. the intellect (buddhi) the charioteer.

without taste. nay. instead of intro- N 2 . as in our case. and unchangefreed from the jaws of death. know how far we are still from a perfect understanding of the Upanishads. I undertook a translation the more important Upanishads. . difficult is the path (to the He who has perceived that which is without without touch. such as it is presupposed by the commentaries of /Samkara. 179 mind is he should keep them within the Self which knowledge he should keep knowledge within the . my my But I do not wish it to be understood that I consider my translation even scholars Our best now as quite free from doubt. without end.' . Self which is the Great . Those who know regard to lation of the Upanishads. pass over the wise tell it. sound. eternal. published in 1879 and 1884. will easily see that I have altered it in several places. wrong in following a text. . When therefore. is beyond the Great. at guessing and deciphering an ancient Nor have I been at all convinced that I was text. Though I was well aware of the of all difficulties of such an undertaking. and he should keep that the Quiet/ 14. May I be allowed to say here a few words with transtranslation. all I could hope for was to give a better translation than what we had before. in 1879. without decay. without smell.' Translation of the Upanishads. understand them The sharp edge of a razor is is I ! (the Great) within the Self w hich T difficult to Self) 15.TRANSLATION OF THE UPANISHADS. I knew that I could count on the same indulgence which is always granted to a first attempt at translating. often. 'Rise. without form. awake having obtained your boons. without begin' ning. able.

to with /Sawkara's interpretations. in 1897. the more difficult it becomes to account for the introduction of such palpable corruptions into an ancient text. however obvious they seem to be. I have hardly ever referred to the mistakes made by earlier translators of the Upanishads. B. Though time. But the work of the children that glean some ears is very different from that of the mower who has to mow a whole field alone. but have simply corrected them. giving what they could give at the without waiting for the ninth year. ducing conjectural emendations. My determination discover also. has placed at the disposal of all Vedantic students what may almost be called a mowing machine in place of a sickle and . Such a work as Colonel Jacob's Concordance of the Principal Upanishads and the Bhagavad-gita. published in 1891. had to make that. shows what an immense advance has been made with have adopted many emendations in the extracts given above. whenever it was impossible to be satisfied a satisfactory meaning. as those who come after me a will field no doubt glean many a stray ear even in which so many mowers have mowed. I work. the careful and brilliant translation of the Sixty Upanishads published by Professor Deussen. who after all lived a thousand years ago. from Professor Deussen's its help. and when my translations diller from his. all the translators of the S. Scholars should learn that the more obvious their emendations are. may be criticised. .l8o INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and I never Besides represented it as more than a pis aller. such as it was at the time of $a??ikara. anybody who will take the a sacrifice in trouble to compare them with my own will find a good harvest of them. E.

suspect Vedantic influences. 1 7 might indicate that the Upanishad originally ended there. The technical repetition of certain words in IV. outside the Vedantic horizon. for instance. But on the other shall prove that it was not so ? hand.TRANSLATION OF THE UPANISHADS. Anybody can see also that the second Adhyaya differs in spirit from the first. for instance. that Purusha must always be taken in the technical Samkhya sense. our task would be much lightened. If we could always at what time each Upanishad was finally settled and reduced to writing. nor is Purusha entirely To say. is is go still going too far. or 17. whether before or after the time when the Vedarita and Samkhyaphilosophy assumed each its own independent and systematic form. and who three Vallis only. what do we know of the compilers of the Upanishads to enable us to speak so positively on such a subject ? Everybody can see that there was a division at III. all I l8l can say is that I always differ most reluctantly from one who has devoted so many years to Vedantic studies. is never mentioned in the second chapter. or 16. with regard to the Ka^Aa Upanishad. and Atman in that of the Vedanta. and that V. at least at present. 13. further out of our depth if we maintain. . whereas Purusha and PrakHti at once remind us of Sawkhya by no means unknown to early Samkhya philosophers. that there But Atman We was a time when it consisted of one chapter and It may have been so. 1 8 is later. Whenever we come across such words as Atman and know Brahman we doctrines. and whose mind is so thoroughly imbued with Vedantic ideas. The name of Naiketas. therefore. except last and probably spurious or additional in the verse.

for those who after us. can we consecutive treatises. the age of pbilosophy. Character of the Upanishads. for with all that has been achieved are on the threshold only of a truly historical study of Indian philosophy and literature. appears as NaAiketa. is fact. we are still like children playing on the sea-shore and finding now and then a pebble or a shell. and then We In as compared with the there come. half poetical. may easily discover a different spirit in the third. as derived from Na&iketa. we Here. properly so called. except in India. have here quoted from the seem worthy of the name of hardly Upanishads It would have been almost impossible philosophy. not from the old form NaHketas. watch that period of chaotic thought. Possibly.1 82 it INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. however. What is quite clear. which preceded. to describe them so as to give a clear idea of what Such utterances as will I us philosophy always means something systematic. whilst the great ocean of that ancient literature lies before us undiscovered and unexplored. in India at least. they might likeness to the outpourings of the authors of the Upanishads. still and second plenty of work left first Valli. is that the systematic philosophy of India would be perfectly unintelligible without the previous chapter of the Upanishads. With But that is the very reason the Upanishads are so interesting to the hiswhy torical student. half religious. And however unsystematic . Nowhere. also. while what we find here are philosophic rhapsodies rather than the Upanishads really are. if we knew more of the utterances of such men as Heraclitus show some or Epimenides in Greece.

these relics of the 183 childhood of philosophy may more system in them than at first sight. schools If /SVetaketu is is recorded to us in the Upanirepresented as attending the till twenty-four years of age. as salt pervades the sea. often mixed up with what seems to us childish and absurd.' Thou art that. cannot be doubted that they represent the soil which contained the seeds of philosophy which sprang up and had their full growth in the great it Whatever we may think systems of philosophy of a later age. art not different from that divine nature which ' ' pervades the whole world. You cannot see it. They contain a number even appears of technical terms which show that the Upanishads did not spring up in one day. in this unreal or phenomenal world. and that there must have been a good deal of philosophical controversy seem. no fruit. That divine essence. you cannot handle it. we see that that highest wisdom had already been fully elaborated in the of famous teachers he is formula of Tattvam asi. that which is alone true and real it and know that. . is present likewise.' that is. and without it there would be no seed. there is really during the age that shads. thou. and is then only learning from his father the highest wisdom. no tree. but you can taste though invisible. though invisible. Upanishads. is as true as it is difficult to explain.CHARACTER OF THE UPANISHADS. but to we must remember tradition that a long continued oral must naturally leave a wide door open of these additions of every kind. man. as the germ of life in the smallest seed. as without God there would be no That this ancient wisdom should be so world. it is there.

and which occur again and again at the beginning of Sanskrit works. as . Ve cUinta. such as Upanayana. We read there in the ' first Sutra and as a kind of title. and Ata/z. Now then a desire to know Brahman. to the philosophy elaborated by Badaraya/ia. 'Now then research of Brahman. or what is called Dharma. also.S fttras If .' The two words Atha and AtaA which. If we must assign to them any special meaning. reception by a teacher. would there arise a desire to know Brahman. including the Upanishads. and that only after having gained a virtue. it seems to me best to take Atha in the sense of Now. but a carefully reasoned system. learning by heart the text of the Veda. In that case the Mimamsd might be looked upon first.in the sense of Then or Therefore. always give rise and most fanciful interpretations. and we should have to consider the practice of virtue and the performance of sacrificial acts as a necessary . It may some commentators maintain. the so-called Vedanta-Sutras. now we turn to these. the Purva-Mimawsa forming the the Uttara-Miinib/isa the second part. particularly of the sacrificial Dharma.184 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and that he is therefore likely to feel a desire to understand the be true Veda and to know Brahman. were originally no more than introductory. we find no longer rhapsodies. knowledge of Dharma. contained in 555 short paragraphs. as one body. implying to endless thereby that the student has fulfilled certain preliminary conditions. law.' or as Deussen translates Giyn&sh. I believe. Vedadhyayana. that in real life the first step would have been to study the Purva-Mimamsa. &c. and first of all.

because in the true sense Brahman cannot be defined or known. to all these questions That from which is that given in the next Sutra. that food -.. 12. Up. . 6. research or discussion. Up. . Khaud. . we should have to consider works as essential for producing that purity and serenity of the mind without which a knowledge of Brahman all this is whether raya?ia. by being defined and So. . i. 2. . 3 JOand. according to the commentator. ' is : That JDmnd. instead of ViMra. 2 Brih. it can be explained negatively as Not so and Not so. i. Up. When we read. 19. 6 The words which actually occur in the Sutra are printed in italics. and their utter uselessness without a commentary. 18. 7. VII. 3. 2. 9. VII. II. to Badarayana and his predecessors. 5 Mahanar. however. i VII. 4 J^and. present to the mind of Biida- Gign&sa. 2 Brill. Ar. Ill. how- Brahman that Manas is Brahman that Vi^fiana is Brahman 3 that the sun is Brahman 4 nay that Narayana is Brahman 5 there ever. wish to know. like all be known as So But although Brahman cannot other things. subsistence. Up.VEDANTA-S^TRAS. i Brill. . XI. 1 2 . (origin. 4. He was may have used I confess I doubt impossible. 7. and dissolution) 6 of this world proceed . is surely room enough Brahman really is. IV. as it is generally expressed. Up. 185 preliminary to a study of the Vedanta-philosophy. Up. or. to give an idea of the enigmatical style of the Sutras. on purpose. ' for trying to determine what or at least what he or it was the origin &c. is l . and can thus be cleared from many doubts which arise from the various utterances about it in the Upanishads. .' The full sense of this Sutra. The best answer. i. Ar. V. Ill.

such intuition also presupposes a previous working of the organs of sensuous perception. intended to give a general idea of Brahman. that is Brahman. passages of which have been collected and properly arranged some places he admits as a second source of knowledge Sakshatkara. omnipotent cause from which proceed the origin. Ill.' Appeals to the Veda. a passage is quoted from the Taitt. Brahman. Up. where Varu^a explains to his son that ' that from which these beings are born. how this is known. can at first be supplied by the Veda In support therefore of our Sutra which is only. and the nature of whose arrangement cannot be conceived by the mind that cause is Brahman. If in but. in the Sutras. Though the Vedanta appeals to the Veda. looking back to it . times and causes. or manifestation. and is the abode of fruits or effects. the commenwhich world is differentiated tator insists very strongly that such knowledge is not to be gained by sense perception or by inference. when born. but simply by the Veda (Upanishads). i. that into which at their death they re-enter. these fruits having their definite places. that by which. that can only be meant for intuition. e. it appeals to it. while the object of such Sakshatkara. strictly speaking. not as having itself grown out of it or as belonging to it. contains many agents and enjoyers. If it be asked. subsistence and dissolution of the world. omniscient. by names and forms. i. they live. caused by former actions.1 86 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. but rather as an independent witness. try to know that. And here we should mark a curious feature of orthodox Indian philosophy.

because we do not possess How those Sutras. we cannot tell. We saw how the all . they seem to come back to get the approval of the Veda. after they had done so. as it were. to their original home. and. to The same applies. But it is characteristic of the Vedanta-Sutras. for sanction 187 and confirmation. Pramawas. of their offspring. This shows that a certain time must have elapsed after the final redaction of the Upanishads and the return.Sfarvakas admitted but one senses. How tial do we know ? a question which forms an essen- preliminary to all philosophy in India. or to establish their conformity with the Veda. because we have no historical documents. Veda as the highest authority was justified by the most elaborate arguments. the Sutras. than the other systems. that they pay much smaller attention to the Prama/ias. source of knowledge. a less degree. How this came about. These questions of Pramawa are often referred to in the . we do not know.PRAMAJVAS. the sources and authorities of knowledge. they defended that excluding sensuous knowledge against the uncertainties inherent in it. though in other systems They all speak as if they had for several generations elaborated their doctrines independently. the evidence of the others. but that there had been something very important intervening between the old Upanishads and the first attempts at systematising Vedanta and Samkhya doctrines in the form of Sutras is very clear by the manner in which the Sutras This constant appeal to the appeal to the Veda. as the recognised highest authority. as part of the question. also.

It is explained (Sawkhya-Sutra 89) as cognition which arises from contact (with objects) and represents their form. produces Pramiti. and survives in the modern Persian Ferman. though it is also used in the sense of what can be perceived by the senses.e. mind. . standard. and union of Manas. It may be translated by measure. Pratyaksha. accurate knowledge. with doubt and without doubt. forth. and Pra. Self. There is a distinction made between two kinds of Pratyaksha. with Atman. Pramaia is originally the instrument of measuring. and /Sabda. from Ma. and perhaps the oldest Pram&nas. contact of the sense-organ with its object. The former seems to consist in our seeing an object. description Anumana.l88 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. The first PraPratyaksha. ma?ia. is what we mean by sensuous shall find there a we very full of the three essential perception. The Pramana which serves as a means (Sadhana) of determining. just as a Sadhana (means) produces Siddhi. and is said to involve really three stages. i. commentaries. Pratyaksha. the Dn'shte. what is seen. viz. Pramanas according to the Sawikhya. an authoritative order. truth or certainty. It is generally explained by Indriyartha-sa?miikarsha. mind. but not so much in the text. and then declaring that it is this or that the latter in simply accepting . I. authority. contact of the senses and their respective objects. to measure. and at the same time union of the sense with Manas. called Savikalpa and Nirvikalpa. When we come to the Sawikhya.

Anumana. is heard by the ear only. so that it brought into is transmitted we are told. always supposing that fire but it suffices for has been proved to be the Vyapaka or the sine qua non of smoke. The next Prama^a is is Anumana or inference. c. w hich will be more fully explained hereAnumana. the ear. or as knowledge of something that but is known with is not perceptible. rawakararia. Each sense working by and at once run away. and on its own objects only. i. and that we know the absence of smoke when we see no fire. that we know the presence of fire when we see smoke. 100) as knowledge of the connected on the part of one who knows the connection.ANUMANA. as waves (ViAita). I.. Sound. But not every sound . for instance. as when we perceive fire (Vyapaka) from perceiving smoke This is a very imperfect description of (Vyapta). which explained (1. 189 a thing such as it is. is immediate contact with the ear through the ether. as being invariably connected (Vyapya) something else that is perceived. such as when we awake from sleep. without any previous idea of it. e. and is conveyed by Akasa or ether. As we have the common illustration illustration. one wave propelling the other across the vast ocean of ether. the special or exclusive instrument of the knowledge conveyed by it. by means of we may perceive the beating of a distant drum. till it strikes the shore. is the Asadhaitself. an our present purpose. T after. . see a tiger.

3. nay. is. 1 tion Samkhya-Philosophie. . Anin. another word. p. whether this $abda. and that it may have been intended at first for Brahman. plant. is explained to be instruction given by one that can be trusted (Aptopadesa) this one that can be trusted (I. nay.INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. can have been established by sensuous experience only and the trustworthiness of go Pratyaksha. $abda being for the Vedantists the Veda. but only by the The same applies to Aptava&ana. we Sutra V. as words such as greatness. convey knowledge that cannot be gained either by perception or by inference alone. for believing the Word. 101) or word. even dog or cow. or for verbal knowledge as is conveyed The Hindus knew quite well that by a word. was taken to signify the Veda such as we originally I have elsewhere given my reasons possess it T . The question that /S'abda had really a far more general and more philosophical meaning. It might as trustworthy. metal. on which the Anumana rests. any other person also endowed with authority and therefore considered back to one. Sabda. and therefore the authority see from of words by themselves. but for the Samkhya and other systems. or on acquaintance with the person who is or is not to be trusted. . because the invariable . word. 37. also such animal. goodness. That the connecbetween sound and meaning. another Pramana. 154. the concomitance between smoke and fire and the like. . occupied the Sawkhyas. these three Pramanas all easily be shown that any knowledge conveyed by word must equally depend on experience.

It seems strange at first sight. should apparently have attached so little importance to what may be called their Critique of Pure Reason. word. However. we must be satisfied with what the Sa?7ikhya philoand there can be no doubt that sophers tell us . used in the Samkhya-philosophy. the other systems of philosophy are well acquainted with them. has been obtained or received. or even of a book believed in by the world at large. at first sight makes the case still worse is . considering that they admitted a divine. which is explained by Yogya. Apta. This would seem indeed to lower the Vedanta-philo- sophy to the level of but a in all Pre-Kantian philosophy.SABDA. it is difficult to understand how they could afterwards take it in the general sense of the word of one that can be of philosophy have trusted. though was explained afterwards as meaning the word of a person worthy of confidence. little reflection will show us that there was What the Vedanta a sufficient excuse for this neglect. and they are even referred to by the commentators of the Vedanta all The Sutras of also. forms the founda- tion of every true system of philosophy. considering that the question of the possibility of knowing or of the instruments of knowledge. can It means what hardly be translated by aptus. and Aptavakya or for term Aptava&ana need than it originally have meant no more our traditional language such as it is. $abda. though not the later Vedanta works. question for us to consider is The important what other systems made of these three Pranuwas. that the Brahma-Sutras. not a human origin of the Veda. Samkhya understood /Sabda in the sense of Veda though. the followers of the orthodox .

become invalid. are ignored. perception. and Anumana. though it acknowledge their importance for all the ordinary Thus /Sawkara continues 'So transactions of life. namely Brahman. acquiesce in the doctrine of absolute unity (Brahman). : support of truth may and does readily in long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the unity of the Self.' prove that the manifold world. But we must remember that it is the highest object of the Vedanta to prove that there is only one true reality. could not well appeal at the same time to the evidence of the senses. presented to us by the senses. the ordinary means of right knowledge. perception. witli objects of right knowledge and its its instruments and results of actions. as we saw. inference. and one that could never claim more than a subordinate place. To most philosophers revelation would seem a very weak instrument of knowledge. a doctrine which undertakes to objects. the only evidence invoked by Badarayafta is $ruti or revelation.. that while Pratyaksha. was often invoked by the modern orthodox Samkhyas under the name of $abda or word. and that the manifoldness of the visible world is but the result of that nescience which the Vedanta is meant to destroy.192 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. even if treated as a subdivision of Anumana or inference. which. nor to inference which is founded on it. &c. is unreal. or right knowledge. It will then become intelligible why an appeal to the evidence of the senses or to inference would have been out of place and almost self-contradictory in the Vedanta. The commentator admits this when he says. because the If ' we absence of manifoldness deprives them of their Hence. it does not enter his mind that the world bf effects. .

has no proper foundation. says ' : In matters to be is mere reasoning o 1 not to known from $ruti be relied on. i . II. every kind of Tarka or speculation. and how the arguments of the latter are refuted in their turn by other men so that on account of the diversity of men's opinions. are true in so far only as they are not in opposition to the Veda. while other works. both Pratyaksha and Anumttna.' How well B4darayawa must have been acquainted with the ordinary evidences of knowledge. nay even the Sawkhya and Yoga systems (IV. 2. . But everything else. are shown by people still more ingenious to be fallacious. it is impossible to accept mere reason. 28) Pratyaksha to Srut'i (revelation) and Anumana to Snm'ti (tradition). as long as true knowledge does not present itself. such as Kapila. 193 is untrue and hence. such as the Law-books of Manu. 3. over this difficulty by accepting as well founded the reasoning of some person of recognised eminence. which disregards the holy texts and rests on individual opinion only.21). the Veda being to him self-evident. the Mahabharata (Bhagavad-gita). One sees how arguments which some clever men had excogitated with great pains. and other founders that even o . applying (I. there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity should not go on undisturbed. Kamida. whether Kapila or any one else. is best shown by the new meaning which he assigns to them. reasoning. Thus /Samkara. Nor can we get ing as having a sure foundation.SABDA. n. being Snmti. since we observe men of the most undoubted intellectual eminence. is excluded when the fundamental truths of the Vedanta are at stake. As the thoughts of man are altogether unfettered.

to an end.' they using reason against reasoning. say. with regard to the matter in hand there will be no escape. the whole course of practical human life But even is this does not frighten ' would have to come $amkara. cannot lend and other means of right knowledge.' if all reasoning were unfounded. form and the like. to some things reasoning admittedly founded on perception that although with regard is known to be well founded. that it is self-luminous like the sun for the its but .' schools. on account of its excessive abstruse- even be thought of without the help of the for it cannot become the object of perception because it does not possess qualities such as ness. and have possibly to admit a weak link in the strong chain armour of both Badardyana and awkara. the supreme authority of the established against those who doubt it ? is How Veda It to be may be is : orthodox to say that the Veda enough own proof. reasoning cannot there escape from the charge of being ill-founded. seems certainly strange in a philosopher and it is not unnatural that $amkara should have been taunted by his adversaries with . on reasoning only. he replies. holy texts . have contradicted each This rejection of reason and reasoning. as it it is devoid of characteristic itself to inference signs or qualities.INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. You cannot.e. As all reasoning and inference. maintain that no reasoning whatever is wellfounded. of philosophical other. and. though not unfamiliar to ourselves. i. ' ' Moreover.' Here we approach a very difficult question. The true nature of the cause of the world on which final emancipation depends cannot. for you yourself can found your assertion that reasoning has no foundation.

that its very language required to be interpreted by competent All this might have helped to invest the persons. (pram4?iyam. Veda. to which we referred before. that its authority requires no support from elsewhere how are objections to be silenced . 195 ? The Vedanta have no superstitions on any other philosophers points. The Meaning of Veda. Veda with some kind of mysterious character but . I hold. i. and at the same time the direct means of our knowledge of form and colour Authority of the Vedas. and are perfectly fearless in the treatment of all other problems they can enter into the most subtle controversies. just as the light of the sun is its own evi- dence of light. i). and yet they are satisfied with the mere assertion that the Veda wants no proof. It is hardly But who says so ? Who but a fallible mortal ? enough if we were to say that the Veda was the oldest document which the Brahmans possessed. that it may even have been brought into India from another country. nirapeksham). and in such passages Brahman is now generally taken in the sense of the Samhitas But and Brahmanas such as we possess them. that it is direct evidence of truth. have meant originally knowledge or wisdom o 2 . (II. and Brahman is Veda. my impression has always been that this would be taking too low a view of the Indian intellect. We often read that Veda is Brahman. like Aptava&ana. was not merely the name of a text or of texts.THE MEANING OF VEDA. but was originally conceived in a far deeper sense. might it not.

and not hymns and Brahma/ias. would naturally. 4. and men [. Upari. and Bf'ih. Veda means to originally knowledge. the All I should venture to suggest is that the idea of Word or the Logos being the first revelation. Ar. and as such a Sophia was impossible without words. i. manifestation or creation of a Divine Power is by no means so strange. 28 ' : We . the creation of divine thought.196 or Sophia . whether in Greece or in India. 3. as it seems to us. not a mere thought sign or a means of communication. give it to my mind simply as an idea that has presented itself as a way out of many difficulties. People who have at all about what a word is. Nay he speaks still all know from more distinctly in I. so far as to declare that the Veda >Sawkara goes is the cause of the distinction of all the different classes and ( conditions (species) of gods. and as such would come very near Wisdom or Sophia. or had been matured during the as yet undivided Aryan period. might we not here also have a faint recollection of Brahman as the Word. first After all. but an first act em- bodying for the time a definite idea which came by being uttered. I do not venture to speak little I positively on such a subject. recognise in every word an act of a Divine Thinker. and afterwards thrown forth and realised in our objective world. even in a very early period of thought. 10). INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. To prevent all misunderstandings I say at once that I do not entertain the idea that such thoughts were borrowed from Greece and Alexandria. animals. 3. just as in every species they have to recoginto existence nise the will of a Divine Creator. II. because there is so of real evidence left to which we could appeal.

' he says. not to sensuous experience nor to inference. has first to be created ? therefore conclude that. but to the Word full itself. It might then be said quite truly that the $abda. not mystical.' shows that the worlds. and in support of which there is but one appeal. the Vedic that is. We words became manifest in the mind of Pragrapati the creator. was Two such words as Brahman and Atman would by themselves convey that eternal said to be. for imagining that they could establish the highest truths which are within the reach of the . and that after that he created the things corresponding to these words. or Brah- man is eternal. i.THE MEANING OF VEDA. as they seem to me the only way in which we can free our Vedanta philosophers from the charge of childishness. if I know well how entirely hypothetical. thinkers of Brahman In that case the recognition by Indian as the Word or the Divine Thought.' What should he do when there is as yet no word to remember. which had become manifest in the mind (of Pra^apati). but could not entirely suppress these thoughts. and after that sets to work. from the word Bhur. self-luminous.. The Sruti also. ' 197 that any one. were created. to Brahman. &c. became manifest. &c. e. or as Veda. i. the idea.. would by no means be so surprising as it sounds to us at first. such as the earth. first remembers the word denoting the thing. before the creation. this I may sound to many Sanskrit scholars. in fact all that the Veda or Va/v or *BHh = word. sound. self-evident. e. when setting about something which he wishes to accomplish. truth for which the Vedanta-philosophy is fighting. absolute. when it says 'uttering Bhur He created the earth. but the word. observation. or the Veda.

Of course a distinction has to be made. Work-part and Knowledge-part of the Veda. Sam- kara is is useless to a bold enough to declare that the whole Veda man who has obtained knowledge. the 6r?lana-karica. however.' Mukti. the hymns and Brahman as. except in order to be discarded as soon as he has understood the knowledge-part. or rather in the oral tradition of the Veda. human mind. 36).198 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. such as we know it from the Sutras. may still be allowed to study the Vedanta as the fountain of true knowledge. Returning to the Vedanta. of good works and refer in fact to the . revela- exist for the true philosopher. or freedom. we must be satisfied with the expressed view of Badaraya?ia that the evidence for what the Vedanta teaches is neither perception nor inference. but the Word ($abda) alone. are more useful to one who has obtained he says. the Work-part. or ' ' Not all the Vedas together.sramas. true knowledge than is a small tank of water in a country flooded with water/ man who has neglected the Vedas and disregarded the rules of the four A. chiefly the Upanishads. the Brahmanas and even some of the Upanishads. and yet the work-part does not /Stuti. such as we find it in our manuscripts. Both are called Veda or tion. on such authorities as the hymns. 4. in fact. and the Karma-kanc/a. of an suppose enjoyer of what is to be enjoyed. and thus become The hymns and Bralmia/ias liberated (III. and has been made by Badarayawa between the Knowledgepart. a man who has lost caste. all A phenomenal world. as we possess them now. they prethe existence of a manifold creation.

are their very essence opposed to each other. but phenomenal. Thou.' he says. that object and subject. p.bject of the Vedanta-philosophy to expel view of the world cannot be It can therefore be due called Avidya. of the Ego and Non-Ego). many individuals. and replace it by VidyL Subject and Object. like darkness and light. art it Paramatman or Brahman). such as essential in leading it is. It is to be observed in as a lower stage. How then the are we to account for the manifold Thou's. Nescience.SUBJECT AND OBJECT. ? and the If the immense variety of the objective world Veda is true. the Vedanta philosopher is at once met by the question. the world. our true at the same time. and if. is well known. This Avidy^ is the next point that has to be /Sawkara. and vanishes as soon as true wisdom or Vidya has been obtained. and it is this and annihilate Avidya. 62. as we shall see. not real. it belongs to the realm of Avidya. there is but one Brahman and nothing beside it. their fruit. only to what is the very o. 199 is But all this. and You (or which fall under the concepts of ' We in say. has some important remarks on it discussed. as we told. but as on to a higher stage. . in the introduction to his comAs it mentary. Nescience. and If then the highest truth contained in the is Veda are the Tat (the Tvam Asi. the 6rivatman. ] ' . 1 it follows further that Three Lectures on the Vedanta. that is. and that the one can never therefore as we should take the place of the other.

200 their INDIAN . which consists of thought. we may conclude is that to transfer what that what is perceived as You or Non-ego with its qualities.' or I am blind. or vice ve*rsa to transfer what is subjective to what is objective. ' adds.' ' A subject can never be anything but a subject. has slowly to be over- . of subject a habit. the Nevertheless." this is mine. caused by a false apprehension and predicate. for conceived as subject. must be altogether wrong.' he object always remains the object. I am this.' Such statements therefore as ' am strong. This means that are you. Therefore. though it is inseparable from human thought. verb has a totally different character from what it has is ' in ' thou art T ' or ' he ' is. : We for objective ' ' qualities.' the organs. that is what perceives as We. so that what is conceived as object can never in the same act of thought be We can. it is a habit in human nature (a necessity of thought. in fact the Self." &c. such as it is.' arise from a false apprehension which.' It is clear that $amkara here uses subject and object not only in their simple logical sense.' he is continues. and vice versa. and by not distinguishing one from the other. but transferring the essence and is This the qualities of the one upon the other. or You instance. to say. to what is subjective. and the whole visible world. but that by subject he means what is real and true. the Ego. never say or think nor ought we ever to substitute subjective are we. while object means with him what unreal and phenomenal.' object and subject mutually exclude each other. objective.PHILOSOPHY. combining what " " is true and what is false. as we might call it). attributes also can never be interchanged. such as the body with its In I am.

and as underlying the Human Self and the phenomenal world. and stamps the whole of the Vedanta-philosophy with its own peculiar character.SUBJECT AND OBJECT. . is simply our own supposed. as darkness is with So far as in true reality we are light. from an Indian point of view. individual ignorance. for many of our own fallacies arise from the same Avidya. or what is real and subjective of what is phenomenal and objective. inevitable for a time. This distinction between subject and object in the sense of what is real and what is phenomenal very important. It must not be however. our being unacquainted with the truths of the Vedanta. Brahman. is It follows in fact from this fundamental distincpredicate tion that we should never what is pheno- menal or objective of what is real and subjective. our Nescience might indeed be called forth. and are due in the end to the attribution of phenomenal and objective qualities to the subjective realities which we should recognise in the Divine only. It the Nescience of Brahman. if for a time only and if we remember that it can be annihilated. It should rather be looked upon as inborn in human nature. 2O1 come and at last to be destroyed by the Vedanta- philosophy. and it is in causing this mistake that the chief power of Avidy& or Nescience consists. as the result of accumulated thoughts and deeds before the mountains were brought has truly been called a general cosmical Nescience. I should even go so far as to say that this warning might be taken to heart by our own philosophers also. or. we can . that the Avidya or Nescience which makes the world what we make it and take it to be.

'The entire complex of phenomenal considered as true so long as the knowledge of Brahman and the Self of all has not arisen. . 3. just as the phantoms of a dream are considered to existence is l)e as true true until the sleeper wakes. understand why according to The Phenomenal Reality of the World. nothing that is real can ever be annihilated. All we may predicate of that Highest Brahman is that it is one. Brahman. for.' Hence. as the subject. religious activity should not more particularly. should not be obeyed. the fundamental doctrine of There is $amkara remains always the same. why all go on undisturbed. so that nothing that is liable to annihilation has a right to be called real. and the commands of the Veda. i. as long does not present itself. Brahman the simple reason that there is nothing but Brahman. . and phenomenal. but Brahman is not the individual soul. no doubt. never in contact with anything. it was said to be nought. eternally anything To ascribe intelligent and free. Brahman and nothing else and to this . Thus w e r read (II. a general principle of the Vedanta. for 19). never changing. devoid of all form. But it is very curious to find that though $a??ikara looks upon the whole objective world as the result of Nescience. The individual soul is. . 14). nothing must be ascribed that is peculiar to the individual living soul (I. even of the work-part. which in its present state is personal. that is conditioned. he nevertheless allows it to be real for all practical purposes (Vyavaharartham). to that Brahman or Atman phenomenal pure.202 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. there is knowledge no reason why the ordinary course of secular and . But apart from this concession.

and yet Brahman is again and again represented as the cause of the Vedantist. a living Vedantist. we approach the problem of what we call the creation or the making of the world.CREATION OR CAUSATION. and nothing exists besides Brahman. all its sins Lectures on the Vedanta. and the effect is always selves. cause and effect are really the same thing looked at from two points of view. but as the material cause as well. seem to be the same as those which we use ourand yet they are not. so far as such foreign terms can be applied to the reasoning of the Vedanta. Hence. seems therefore to draw a quite legitimate inference when he l says 1 that the universe with p. that the created world is the effect. 203 would be the same error as to ascribe blue colour to the colourless ether of the sky. But the Vedantists have elaborated their own According to them theory of cause and effect. the substance of the world can be nothing but Brahman. and that Brahman is the cause. the world. it does not exist for Badaraya?ia only so far as it is a calling forth out of nothing does it approach the ideas of Creation with Badaraya?^a would be nothing but the result of Nescience. Creation or Causation. 24. As long . Here lies our great difficulty in rendering Hindu- The terms used by them philosophy intelligible. Divyadasa. It is easy to say that Karana is cause and Karya effect. . it is clear that creation in our sense cannot exist for the Vedantist. taken as granted. If with these ideas. and not only as the efficient. if Brahman is everything. supposed to be latent in the cause. as creation is con- ceived as a making or fashioning of matter.

are not other. an aggregate of threads. and crossways. cause and effect. The . The non-difference of the two (cause and effect) in is perceived. but he appeals likewise to observation. they. the non-difference or substantial identity of cause and and the Sarakhya philosophers agree with them up to a certain point. 'Only when a cause exists is an effect observed to exist. 14. Nor does /Sa?/ikara support this principle by passages from the Veda only. 15.' On this. i.204 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. ' different from each principle. Vedantists stand up for Karya-kara?iabheda. II. and in these again still finer threads. just as steam existed latent in water before it was heated. Tadananyatvam. we read in so many words. though it does not become evident as vapour till fire is brought near Cause and to- water. rests identity of their dogma of Brahman and the phenomenal as a general the substantial world. but merely threads running lengthways. On this ground we conclude that the . when we do not perceive the thing which we call cloth in addition to the threads. and miseries mijst have existed latent in Brahman. other. Effect. not when it does not exist. for instance. In the threads again we perceive finer threads. are not effect. it is not surprising that the Hindus also should have arrived at very different results. Thus he continues. and so on. This question of cause and effect and their mutual relation has occupied most of the philosophical systems of India and when we remember what different views of cause and effect have been held by some of the most eminent philosophers of Europe. In the Vedanta. II. that is. i.

CAUSE AND EFFECT. these again with and. the ether with world. e. when we see through its leaves and fruits. the effect. previous to its And actual beginning. as. viz. and ask again what it is. being. The Veda has declared that what is posterior in ' time. and black. 205 very finest parts which we can perceive are ultimately identical with their causes. can never become the object of perception. as it were.' Is not this pure Vedanta ? only that the Vedantists hold that a cause. . in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which spring sprouts and new trees. we Almighty cannot see Him. as applied to the sprout. at last. even in cases where the coni. viz. white. the term birth. for instance. in the nature of the cause. the sun and the skies. are the in fact.' A^amkara adds that. a distorted shadow. that it would not be at all but for Brahman. while what Tennyson calls the distorted shadow would come very near to the Avidya of $amkara. This is the real Pantheism of the Vedanta and strange as it may sound to us. its bark and wood. but we see His shadow. Even so recent a poet as Tennyson is reported to have said. the seed.' air. cataracts. has its tinued existence of the cause (in the effect) is not perceived. Or again. it would be nothing if it through Brahman. red. by its very nature. that it exists through Brahman. such is our petty nature. that it lives : from our own philosophers or our poets. Brahman which the air with ether. means only that the causal substance. it would not be difficult to match it whether the answer comes that were not Brahman. is with- out a second and the ultimate cause of the whole when we look at a tree and ask what it is. ' Perhaps this earth and : all that is in it storms. mountains.

becomes visible by becoming a sprout through the continued accretion of similar particles. from all this is the Omniscient Lord. $amkara Belonging to the Self. This problem of cause and effect in connection with the problem of Brahman and the world was no doubt beset with difficulties in the eyes of the Vedantists. sustentation. or nature (Prakrtti). while in other passages the same Brahman is called the Creator. as the Samkhyas hold. there are names and forms (NamaThese correspond very closely to the Logoi rupa). If they turned to the Veda. forms' (AV/tind. called Prak?*iti. of the omniscient Lord. instead of being the ideas of a Divine Mind. They are the germs of the entire expanse of the phenomenal world. from a second non-intelligent power. however. there were ever so many passages declaring that Brahman is one and unchangeable. VIII. Up. such as He who is called Ether is the revealer of all forms and names that wherein these forms and names are contained. that is. ' . it. 2) . the cause passes again beyond the sphere of visibility. Different. and not. the wise one. they are the figments of or as different from Nescience. as it were. . i) what in >S'ruti ' . and from him. of and Smrzti is called illusion (Maya). power (*S'akti). VI. ' 3. and in support of this a number of Vedic passages may be quoted. while the term death means no more than that through the secession of these particles. and reabsorption If it of the world are said to proceed. except that. the creation.' of Greek philosophy. 14. that is Brahman' Let me evolve names and ('A7*and.206 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Up. not to be defined as either real (Brahman). particularly to the Upanishads. lie. be asked how two such answers ' : opinions can be reconciled.

While the Vedantist breakers. sits speaking/ i. and informed or enlightened man the whole phenomenal world is really non-existent. 12. The Lord as creator. all conditions. nay the world. according to the Vedanta. Self. The Karya-kara?iabheda. threatened by is all these the Samkhya He imperilled. a power far generally. PrakHti itself being its material cause. Though dif- . creations of a Divine Wisdom. while effect are held to same time cause and is be identical in substance. no real effect would be possible without the continuance of its cause. 12). as Lord or Isvara. is considered as unreal. 7) . Otherwise Kapila takes much the same view of the relation between cause and effect as the Vedantist. 'He who makes the one seed manifold' (Svel. of the cause. as the material cause of the world. on taking (Purusha) notice. VI. though very imperfectly. less philosopher starts with a PrakHti. 207 having defined all forms and having made their names. To steer between all these rocks is no easy matter. Up. may therefore be called the efficient cause of man and the world.CAUSE AND EFFECT. it is taken notice of by he. as far as man is concerned. not like the The true Logoi. de- pends upon the limiting conditions or the Upadhis of name and form. and these. the Purusha. is called the material cause (Upadana) which he at the is himself immaterial. Ill. even in the Lord. is valid as much for S&mkhya as for Vedanta. free is all the time free from from names and forms. PrakHti exists. the identity of cause and effect. different from Brahman. creating (Taitt. though of the world. Ar. for the truly Brahman. only so far as . translated by Nature. are represented as products of Nescience. According to both.e.

the identity of For he says (II.' curious that Kapila seems. which might be compared with ' Hume's view of If it 1 Samkhya -Philosophic. i. almost in so many words. there would be no says. i. 'Thus the non-difference of is to be conceived. the doctrine that every effect pre-exists. it is a is not something new manifestation only. 4. This is so characteristic a dogma of the Sawkhya that this philosophy is often spoken of as the Sat-karyavada. Professor Garbe first l . . to guard against what is known to us as For in Sutra I. but rendered invisible only. 232. both are the same newly An effect substantially. may be right in supposing that would be a more natural theorem for a follower it for of the Sawikhya than of the Vedtinta. 20).208 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and is the effect of something real. is And whole world an effect of Brahman. as the and afterwards its religious Brahman and the world. ferent in appearance or phenomenally.' The Sat-karyavada. claims it Kapila. the promise is fulfilled. produced or created. p. Whether this doctrine of the identity of cause and effect was proclaimed by Kapila or by Badarayana is who almost impossible to settle. while the Asat-karyavada is peculiar to Nyaya and Vaiseshika. application. law or hold (Niyama) between cause and effect. and non-different from It is it. lie causality. the effect from the cause therefore. but this could never be used as an argument that the Sft???khyaphilosophy is older in its entirety than the Vedanta. were only priority. the cause being never destroyed. fSawkara himself certainly gives us the impression that with him the recognition of the identity of cause and effect came first. and strongly supported by the Buddhists.

therefore. would have denied all reality in the highest sense to everything except Brahman. in fact our sense of the word. who look upon everything as the result of Avidy& or Nescience. we shall also see that Nescience Brahman. If. which is Brahman. when perceived as the world. If we once see this may quite as well be called the material cause of the world as clearly. strictly speaking. so Brahman no idea of claiming for the rope a real change into a snake. with the Vedaiitists no matter at all. There first is more is is in this often- quoted simile than at sight meant to show that as the rope It is appears. the there is being that. and in the same way no real change can be claimed for is to the world. a certain ambiguity many as to what is meant by material and real. One There would have thought that philosophers. but which. Even the apparent and illusory existence of a material world requires a real substratum. has the very real effect of frightening those who step on it. Dreaming and Waking. to the snake. 209 Herbart's Selbsterhaltung des Realen. however. There Brahman. And so in a certain p . Brahman this is is called the material cause of the world. in the Vedanta. even in its mistaken character.DREAMING AND WAKING. and apart from Brahman the world would be simply nothing. Brahman presents itself as the world. just as the appearance of the snake in the simile requires the real substratum of a rope. is. is often illustrated by the very popular simile of the rope which is mistaken for a snake. not meant in the sense in which the clay is the material cause of a jar. as well as in other systems of philosophy.

Dreams at night are contradicted by full daylight. He holds. says $a??ikara. and not our perceptions. /Samkara himself argues most strongly against this extreme idealism. but perceive someHe thing not ourselves. whatever we may think of them in our heart of hearts. not only perceive our perceptions. He dreams is and that the admission of the existence of external No. It is clearly directed against Buddhist philosophers who. which even Berkeley and Kant would readily have allowed. Although some Vedantists have been credited with holding the same opinion. But besides the concession to which sense they do. carrying the Vedanta principle to its extreme consequences. that for practical purposes (Vyavaharartham) things may be treated as real. This is called the $ilnyavada (doctrine of emptiness or vanity) or Vidyamatra (knowledge only). and that all we have and know are our perceptions only. that dreams on awaking are dreaming found to be unreal. a concession. but he enters on a full argument against the nihilism of the Buddhists. not only allows the reality of the objective world for practical purposes (Vyavaharartham). we alluded before. . there is a difference between perceiving viands and perceiving the satisfaction arising from eating them. therefore.210 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. also points out that there is this difference between and waking. by-the-by. there is another important argument. that in perceiving anything we These maintain that perception in of the same kind as all other perception. and have actually been called Cryptobuddhists in consequence. held that everything is empty and unreal. but perceptions in full day-* When the light are not contradicted by dreams. things is therefore unnecessary.

211 Buddhist replies that. but it is real in so far as it is phenomenal. and just as when we speak This must suffice to show what the Vedantists thought of the difference between the real and the phenomenal. for nothing can be phenomenal except as the phenomenon of something that is real.' to which all things perceived by us are referred ? If our perceptions conform to anything without is the existence of such perceived objects No one would say that peripso facto admitted. in spite of that. us. And if the Buddhists answer that these perceptions are illusive only. and that European scholars also should have failed to form a clear idea of that creative Nescience of which we can neither say that it is or that it is not. and what was the meaning they attached to Avidya by which not only the individual Egos. . ception and what is perceived are identical they stand to each other in the relation of instrument of an impression. that they are perceptions of things as if they were without us. Avidya. Creation is not real in the highest sense in which Brahman is real. the Vedantist asks What is meant by that 'without us. In the Upanishads p 2 . No wonder that. though we perceive perceptions only. we admit something that impresses as well as something that is impressed. with all these ambiguities about the phenomenally real and the really real. different schools even in India should have differed in their views about Avidya. the Ved4ntist answers that. but the whole phenomenal world exists or seems to exist. like all other words. these perceptions are always perceived as perceptions of something. has had a history. we never can be said to perceive anything but perceptions.DREAMING AND WAKING. effect.

sense simply subjective. and the Though this great Lord as the Mayin (magician). when dying. more efficacious. I. 3. at all events. 10: 'Both perform the sacrificial act. when awake. a man. It is then no longer the Nescience of the individual. viz. Maya. 3. with faith. who knows and he who does not know. is said to shake off his body and his Avidya. 10 call : Prakn'ti (nature) as Maya (magic). We are right therefore. Vidya. it shows us. he Up. knowledge. IV. and Both are in that opposed to Vidya. 20 then. this Nescience or Ignorance In some of the later Upanishads assumes a more inde- pendent character and even a new name. but the result of that universal Nescience. he takes that to be real whatever he fears. Kh&nd. often used in the simple sense of ignorance. and with the Upanishad. IV. just as we saw that the higher concept of the Self. I believe. But there between Vidy (knowledge) and For what is performed with Avidy& (nescience).' If he feels in a dream as if he were murdered. Thus we read.' Here we see that it is ignorance alone which imparts a false character In the same of reality to the visions of a dream. Up. is a difference ' : Upanishad.' is not pure Vedanta. IV.212 it is INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. that is Or again. 4. in his ignorance. ' we should Thus we read the phenomenal in the /SVet. arose from that of the individual personal Self. if historically we trace the concept of Avidya back to the subjective ignorance of the individual. Brz'h. Up. which is the cause of what world. i. Know the ignorance of the individual became the cause of what we call objective reality. though in the end identical with Brahman. Ar. the way by which . when as yet not free from the limits of the Ego.

both afferent and efferent. perceives. . as we say. the central organ of perception. : The Mukhyaprana. itself. The five afferent (Upalabdhi) senses are the senses of hearing. the personal Brahm or Isvara how Avidya in fact became a $akti or led. going. or pure or was covered up (Upahita) or blinded. feels. sight. the material organic body. . senses. conditioned by the so-called Upadhis. the Manas. at . and potentia. 1 Adhyavasayo buddhi/A. the Indriyas. ditions or impositions. in both There is here again a certain ambiguity. to the admission of an active and creative Lord. Avidy& being caused in the individual soul ((rivatman) by the Upadhis. somehow or other related to Brahman But before there arises this it May& of objective nature. belonging as were to Brahman himself. Maya of the internal or subjective This was originally the only Maya. from another point of view. 13. taste. evacuating and generating 4. the . These Upadhis are 1. and to react on them by will. the Atman.DREAMING AND WAKING. and. 3. five efferent The ) or acting senses (Adhyavasaya l are the senses of speaking. Sawkhya-Sufcras II. and. if we may say so. thinks and wills . touch. the five senses. there was the world. ready to receive what is conveyed to it by the separate senses. grasping. deceived by that Maya or Avidya. vital spirit (uncon- scious) 2. the conSelf. scent. 213 the same time. the Upadhis being caused by primeval Avidya. Manas being that which.

as the phenomenal was considered .214 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. I (I ' am not ' I or what is there real behind the I. yet closely united views of the world. comprehending the phenomena of our inward as well as of our outward experience. We can understand how it this startling idealism or monism for it is not nihilism. by our objective environment. though our philosophy has no better name for call led to two distinct. a growth. for he who would say so. the senses and the whole body. are to be treated as Not-self. arid if it be asked why they should ever have been treated as Self. would himself be not. The question then is What is really can say. To these is sometimes added 5. but universal. meanings of the senses (Artha). was unreal . All that we should phenomenal. but. What in our is common language we call the Ego or Aha?nkara but a product of the Manas and quite as un- substantial in reality as the Manas itself. or would not be. and therefore an end. called the Upadhis. but through a Nescience that is not only casual or individual. for all these have a beginning. for perishable it cannot be the Indriyas or these. It cannot be the body as influenced that body is the Manas or the Mukhyaprima. The objective environment. and it is only through Avidya that the Atman has become identified with them. All . but if a proof were wanted it would be found in the fact that no one being the disguised Atman). is in That there man something that can be called Atman or Self requires no proof. All these are not the or the objects or Atman. conditions. the only possible answer is that it was through Nescience or Avidya.

happiness on earth and in heaven. behind And this led to the admission The higher knowledge consists in the distinction and thereby the freedom of the Self (Atman) from all its Upadhis. or even under the name of any its This worship (Upasana) being enjoined in many parts of the Veda. These are even allowed the highest knowledge. with Brahman by the strict Advaitists or Monists of two kinds of knowledge. is recognised as obligatory on all who have not yet reached the individual deity. that is. but chiefly on its work-portion (Karmakant/a). as a personal Lord and Creator. 215 impossible without the noumenal. and can only exist. the higher knowledge. the lower.THE HIGHER AND THE LOWER KNOWLEDGE. The Higher and the Lower Knowledge. it it. nay by way of preparation. well known under the names of Apara-. in worshipping a personal god. though phenomenal aspect only. and they are promised. not how Brahman is to be known. that is. but for all eternity. that is. The lower knowledge is likewise founded on the Veda. as a reward of their worship. the true Godhead. and teaches. without the real Brahman. and deliverance from birth and rebirth in the constant evolution (Sa??isara) of the world. a slow advance (Kramamukti) towards complete in its Moksha or freedom. exists. it In this sense has been truly said that $a??ikara . This is the true Moksha or freedom which implies knowledge of the identity of the Atman with Brahman. and this not for this life only. comfort that. it was in that sense real also. and Para. but how it or he is to be worshipped in or his phenomenal state. they are really worshipping Brahman.

and . . he tried to ' ' introduce the right spirit of idolatry. and though he did not cut off all connection with idolatry. . symbols are either given up. and that is all the difference things between them.2l6 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. idolatry. why should religion ? not also the other ? To my mind. idolatry is a necessity of our The tender seed of a religious spirit requires to be carefully preserved in a soft coating of symbols. some appealing to among $amkara's contempt of all ritualism and Karman. p. whether to in words Verbal the ear. is a religious algebra. or suffered to remain from their harmlessness. in his Lecture on Vedantism. this point others to his defence of a worship of the popular gods. apart from And not attendant corruptions. formal symbols. [but are they its if and to the same extent. and the symbols of symbols appeal to the eye. there must be. It is certain. Who would object to the use of language in But if the one is allowed. which has given rise to much controversy the Hindus themselves. . . did not attack or destroy idolatry. Verbal symbolism is language. Divyadds Datta. At one ?] so. verbal symbols. or stocks and stones also are unobjectionable. without the spirit or in a corrupted spirit. Idolatry in the sense of religious symbolism and I believe the most orthodox Hindus would take no other view cannot be open to objection. . that $a??ikara was opposed to the abuse of ritualism. 12. religious spirit is mature. till it has acquired the strength to resist the nipping frost of worldliness When the scepticism. I may quote the words of a living Vedantist. Symbolism or things. are not objectionable. stage of nature. its growth. though with him On it was always symbolism rather than idolatry.' he says. .

If I..' If $amkara did not claim full freedom or Moksha for himself. knowledge alone can . &c. This also was in the beginning the result and the reward of moral virtue. as he says. they are still. Indra. 28) he says: 'The gods (or deities) must be admitted to be corporeal. 3. in whom he believed. Vishmi. had not walked without remission in the path of works. part 4. Yama. . and subject to creation and dissolution as much as /Samkara himself expresses this opinion very clearly when (I. he did so. or whether it l Though. . Journal of the R.. requires a fulfilment of moral duties also as far as I understand $amkara.' he says. Brahma. . end lead to Moksha. at one and the same time. like ourselves. sometimes as symbols of lower orders of beings in whom he believed.IS VIRTUE ESSENTIAL TO MOKSHA ? 21 7 $amkara did bow to idols. for the sake of others. virtue is certainly preIt is the same question which meets us supposed. lower orders of divine beings. of the restraint of passions and of perfect in the tranquillity of soul. are phenomenal. and ourselves. A. with regard to the Buddhist Nirva/ia. partake of oblations offered at numerous sacrifices. These . O Lord ' ' ' ! Is Virtue Essential to Moksha? Another question which has been hotly contested both in India and in Europe is whether Moksha can be the result of knowledge only. others would not have followed my steps. by Divyadas Datta. for See Moksha or the Vedantic Release. xx. subject to birth and death. such as 1 we find it described. vol.' though by their divine powers they can. S. sometimes as symbols of the great Infinite.

The good and the pleasant approach the wise goes round about them and distin- guishes them. ' : the Ka#7ia Upanishad II. a man .' But even in this passage we are not told that virtue or self-denial by itself could or perfect freedom read a few lines further. ' nay. Yea.2l8 instance. and less not tempted away from it by pleasure. G'uniimi \\lnc\i has been somewhat freely translated ' : For . All of them. Dhammapada . in the INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. convincing are passages taken from the is Bhagavad-gita. G'anamy adharmam. showing that virtue was conIn essential preliminary of Moksha. amounting to a denial of all reality in subjective in world. and likewise in the There are a few traces left sidered an the Upanishads. na /ra me mvritti/t. presuppose high morality on the part of the candidate. if we only : Wide apart and leading to different points are those two. clings to the good but he . i. for that purpose. is misses his end. but the fool chooses the pleasant through greed and avarice. but it soon assumed a different character. ignorance (Avidya) and what is known as wisdom (Vidya). no doubt. we see secure Moksha . the objective. na //a me pravn'ttiA. as representing freedom from all bondage and illusion. so that Ar</una is made to say for himself: dharmam.' And Still Na/tiketas is praised because he desires know- ledge. well with him. It objects chain a man. the wise prefers the good to the pleasant. a work which was meant to present different views of Moksha. if he who chooses the pleasant. though they do not explicitly say so. we read these two having different the pleasant another . which is generally quoted The good is one thing.

Up. should lay great stress on the religious and moral side of Moksha is quite compatible with what has been maintained before.IS VIRTUE ESSENTIAL TO MOKSHA I ? 2 19 what I would that later do not. may well be uttered 2 &)1 ! Lead me from the unreal to the real Lead me from darkness to light Lead me from death to ! ' immortality its ! lower knowledge only. 3. ceremonial works. 22). but in the end by knowledge only. sacrifices. but what I hate that such as do I/ That treatises. that Moksha cannot be achieved by sacrifices or by moral conduct. and has for reward another world. May such unchanging love as foolish people feel ' for earthly pleasures I call upon Thee ' ! never cease in my heart when by worshippers of Brahma or Isvara. no doubt. It would not be difficult. by charitable . by gifts' (Bnh. Hence a prayer such as. if performed from pure motives and without any hope of rewards. 4. but that is very different from saying that Moksha can be obtained by mere Good works. the Pan/t-adasi. who is yearning for Brahman and true Moksha. even merely abstaining from sin. that is. the heaven world. And thus we read ' : Brahmanas seek to know Him by the study of the Veda. but not by the true Mumukshu. which will also pass away. Even the prayer from the BHhad-aranyaka (I. IV. form an excellent refers to the preparation for reaching that highest knowledge which it is the final aim of the Vedanta to impart. to produce passages which declare that a sinful man cannot obtain Moksha.

properly understood. that whosoever evil.220 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. The Two Brahmans. of St. 8). was even in this life above the distinction of good and could do nothing that he considered good and nothing that he considered evil. . so far as we are concerned. 68). remains always Nirgunam or unqualified. to be conceived and to be is the same thing. inherent in sentient nature. Sagu/iam and Ni rgu n am. 2. doubts are solved. heart is away. of the highest But when the knowledge has once been reached or is Brahman all within reach. to imagine that true Moksha can be obtained by moral conduct alone is a mistake. with to be produced regard to Brahman. extinguished are all his works. but this would again apply to a state of Nescience or Avidya only and it is in It . whether good or bad. II. John (Ep. this sense alone that Brahman also may be said to be affected by Avidya. v. but by an Avidya. while passages in the Upanishads to show that some Vedantists taught that a man who had there are reached Brahman and the highest knowledge. knows Brahman cannot if is hardly more than the saying dangerous. however. with or without qualities. and as. The true Brahman. w hen He has been beheld who is both high and low (Muwd Up. ' works. it God. I. not by the Avidya of single individuals. sometimes seems as if *S'a??ikara and Badarayawa had actually admitted not only two kinds of knowledge. but two Brahmans also. so likewise. nay by Avidya. broken. all T ' fall The fetter of the Hence. sinneth not. whatever we may think about him. that is. that whosoever is born of sin. Dangerous as this principle seems to be.

It will be seen how small a step it was from this view to another which looked upon Brahman itself as affected by Avidya. perceiving.THE TWO BRAHMANS. but the result of Avidya and of man while under her sway. perfect. active. we can and more than everything In that sense Brahman may be called both being. creative and personal through the deception of the same universal and inevitable Avidya. is Brahman In the same way the creation of the world and of man not the work of Brahman.' then these three predicates are in reality but one. we. to the character of an active creator. as different from all that the world calls being or true. at least according to the interpretation of /Samkara. but the same Nescience which clouds us for a time. not raising him. Only we must (6rivatnian) never forget that all this is illusion. In full reality Brahman is as little affected by qualities as our true Self is by Upadhis (conditions). make Brahman. so that in truth na. is. the qualified Atman. This is ambiguity runs through the whole of the Vedanta. being in the highest sense. no is all he is not say. as our maker. being and not shads Brahman being. not being. 221 conceived by us and becomes to us qualified. If in the later Upani- Sat and Asat. unaffected and untrammelled by . we can i. If the qualified Brahman makes us. nay which changed this Avidy& into a $akti or potentia of Brahman. He that else. predicate nothing of . No. Atman and Brahman being substantially one. Brahman but Na. for he or it could not be is called Sa-id-ananda. this. he is not that. thus lowering him. is e. and he could not perceive himself or itself except as independent. clouds ipso facto Brahman also. ' without perceiving or it itself (esse est percipere). and blessed.

Even Yoga. a return. the convictions of the people of India. this Brahman cannot It is known by any pre- subjective. TO oWcoy 6V. . accom- plishment) as an approach of the individual soul towards God. and even though. shall thus understand the distinction which We the Vedaritists and other Indian philosophers also make between the Brahman. Having no of course be qualities. but Yoga is effort towards Nirodha or suppression of A'itta (the activity of thought) (see Yoga-Sutras I. of Brahman as our own that an ecstatic perception of as Brahman was allowed now and then modern times. and not it liable to objec- can only know itself. preserver. where there is There can be no such approach identity. as phenomenally only. If it knows. practised in ancient. a revival of its true nature. 2). like the sun that is not lighted. as creator. else (Advitiya). nor Yogin a man united with God. anything highest dicates. a becoming of the soul of it always has been.uid the Brahman under as I. this perception also could only be a perception of the Atman as identical with Brahman. Our knowledge of Brahman also can only be consciousness subjective Atman or Self. not dissolver of the universe.222 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. but lights itself. or let us say. The fatal mistake which interpreters of the Vedanta-philosophy both in India and Europe have made is to represent this absorption or recovery (Samradhanam. worshipped different names. tive attributes.svara. did not mean technically union. the personal God. just as everything else exists. and This Isvara exists. It seems only a concession to the prejudices. . there can only be recovery what or restitution. as we shall see. such as the Yogins in possible in a state of trance. strictly speaking.

rewards and punishments. that there is really but little room in it for nay even for ethics. It on the tremendous synthesis of subject object. If we have once grasped that synthesis. as I have here tried to explain it. character of the Vedanta. 223 as absolutely real. they contain no thoughts. and determines. it is of Avidy& a phenomenal world. of the I and This constitutes the unique It. though he does not cause. so entirely new at the time when they were uttered. he rules the world. These personified by the power or Nescience. from this one fundamental doctrine and though its . complete . though this Mukti involves by necessity the are produced directly disappearance of Isvara as a merely phenomenal god. and whatever he may appear to be. though When by the acts themselves. as this identity of subject and absorption of the object object. psychology or kosmology. we know the All its other teaching flows naturally Vedanta. carefully thought out and worked out details are full of interest. and man at last obtains true knowledge and Mukti. directly or indirectly. the identification of cause and and effect. Most important acts are ascribed to him. or this by this subject. The soul and the world both belong to the realm of things which are not real. It must be clear to any one who has once mastered the framework of the true Vedanta-philosophy. But it is He through whose grace deeds are followed by rewards.THE TWO BKAHMANS. This consists in the complete surrender of all we are and know. and have little if anything to do with the true Vedanta in its highest rests chiefly and truest form. he is always Brahman. unique as compared with the every other philosophy of the world which has not been influenced by it.

so far as they can claim any are told. sophy It is its but encouraged and patronised by religion and by recognised representatives. The individual souls. again at the beginning of every new Kalpa. acts. as a philosophy interfere with popular religion on the contrary. The individual souls also were supposed. from the day of their birth on earth. interesting to see how this very bold philoof the Vedanta was always not only tolerated. and not reality. and recommended a number of sacrificial and ceremonial hymns and were even considered as a necesThey sary preliminary to higher knowledge. to break forth again and acts as resting on the authority of these Brahmawas. . to be followed in great periods by a taking back of it into Brahman. Here we perceive the so principal moral element in the ancient Vedanta.224 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. we though long-forgotten. but. The creation of the world. though not the making of it. date. whether it was under the The whole sway of Brahmans or of Buddhists. and this doctrine far as it is meant for practical life of Karman or deed. it accepted all that is taught about the gods in the hymns and in the Brahma^as. Philosophy and Religion. unless entirely liberated. to which we alluded before. Nor did the Vedanta . at the end of each Kalpa. was accepted as an emanation from Brahman. . to be drawn back into Brahman. and lias leavened the whole of India. has remained to the present day. from all eternity. Karman. They are clothed in their Upadhis (conditions) according to the merit or demerit which they have acquired by their former.

though for a time only. 225 the world. which is answerable for the whole of this phenomenal world. healthy. man we A who enjoys health and wealth is made to feel that he is spending more than he has earned. this primeval Avidy& is unexplained. by a Divine caprice that one man is born deaf or dumb or blind.KARMAN. another strong and It can be the result of former acts only. whether. Like it has to be accepted as existent but it from Brahman in so far as it can be destroyed by Vidya. But this is never clearly the doer of them of them or not. It is not stated. as say. in this life. it is not to be accounted for as as On little Brahman can be accounted for. possibly also of the with them the solution of what we venture to call the injustice of God. it may be a reward in disguise. unjustly. which is the eternal life-spring of Brahman. is aware even necessarily a punishment. life. is the result of acts character and fate of each man are the result of his acts in this or in a former acts of others. and that he has therefore to It cannot be make up his debt by new efforts. such as it is. Q . except of Brahman . . A man who suffers and suffers. It might seem sometimes as if Avidya too. . for at the end of a Kalpa even gods like Indra and the rest have to begin their career afresh. seems to them but paying off a debt or laying up capital for another life. left the contrary. In fact it might be said with some truth that Avidya is the cause of but that the cause everything. The merit which can be acquired by man even in Brahman differs this state of Avidya is such that he may rise even to the status of a god. had to be taken as the result of acts far back before the beginning of all things. It This is is their Theodicee.

or as a modification of Brahman but no. there is them. In this sense the Vedarita is more sceptical or critical than even Kant's critical philosophy. cording to the Vedanta this kind of creation is due And strange as it may sound to apply to Avidya. This might become we took Brahman for the Kantian Ding Atman sich. According to $a?/<kara the world is. according to the Kantian philosophy. These powers of conception are real indeed for all practical purposes. are accepted as true. while the Vedanta treats them also an as the result of Nescience. Avidy4 is beyond our powers of Brahman is Everything. understanding. though the two agree with each other again when we remember that Kant also denies the validity of these forms of perception and purposes in this thought when applied to transcendent subjects. remembering only that. name and form . though subjective. behind them.226 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. as . though hidden under It would be natural to suppose within that Atman had been taken as a : part of Brahman. but in the highest sense they too are phenomenal only. the Brahman clearer if that receives them. that name of Avidya to Kant's intuitions of sense and a his categories of the in common element this different names. the forms of intuition and the categories of thought. the Rupa. tical though true for all pracphenomenal life. of that primeval conception. According to Kant it is man who creates the world r as far as its form (Namarupa) is concerned ac. They too are but Namaand the reality that lies rupa. is and nothing else.

AND SUKSHMA-SARIRA. If the Atman within seems. owing to Avidya.THE STHULA. It would represent perception as uniting and arranging the great mass of sensations. but it includes besides Upalabdhi. and the $arira. to be though we know but very far from omniscient. Adhyavasaya. said to see by the mind (Manas. as determined by the outward world. but it seems to have been more or less the common property of all Indian philosophers. Pranas. senses. so far as it depends but he on a is previous interaction of percepts. vital spirits. omnipresent. 1 Hence a man vovs). may Theosophy. mind. Brahman ought . and not a part only only. Here we have in fact the Holenmerian l . receiving and arranging what has been conveyed to it by the have no separate organs of sense. and omnipotent too well that in ourselves it is The Sthftla- and Stikshma-sarlra. mind. Indriyas. all this. These are the conditions or Upadhis which consist of Manas. body. anticipated in India. Henry More. and supplied by the common language of the people. Q 2 . p. perception. wrongly conceived and individualised. the whole of Brahman in all its integrity. What is the admission of a central organ. peculiar in it is We word corresponding tations we may though with proper limicontinue to translate it by mens or to it. show theory of Plotinus and of Dr. also. 280. I tried to 227 on a former occasion. determination. this is once more due to Avidya. limited like the Brahman when seen in the objective world. This Vedantic arrangement of our organic structure and our mental organisation is curious.

though transparent or nevertheless accepted as material and . Vyana. through-. a subject so carefully elaboAll this rated by modern philosophers. but afterwards defined differently and without much reference to any This also is a doctrine common physiological data. and consisting of Mukhya Prtuza. the Manas. This body is supposed to remain after death. and> Indriyas. unapproached and unexplained. the Mukhya Prana. though it is difficult it to see by what physiological observations could have been suggested. latter invisible spirit. off-. also be said to decide and act by the mind (Manas). for the most part. we find a fivefold division into Pra/ia. but. . and Udana. while the outer body is dissolved into its material elements. vital Manas. to most systems of Indian philosophy. The thin it or invisible. and of percepts into Here the concepts. Upana. leaving particularly the question of the change of mere sensations into percepts (Vorstellungeri). in an unconscious state. subtle this Sukshma-. the coarse and the fine body. being opposed to the admission of various mental faculties. the former the visible outward body the . and out-breathing. meaning originally forth-. mind.228 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. is satisfied tries to explain all with one. organs of sense. It is not like a human body with arms and legs.and Sukshma-sarira. By the side of the vital spirit. philosophy of Herbart would supply what is wanted. with-. Samana. What is more interesting is the distinction between the Sthula. may seem very crude. is is body. and psychical phenomena whatever as the result of the action and interaction of elemen- tary Vorstellungen (ideas or presentations).sarira which is supposed to migrate after death from world to world. He too.

but to return unchanged at the time of In the fourth or disembodied state awakening. which sions (Vasanas). the state of dreaming.ESCHATOLOGY. different Eschatology. It is taken over from the Upanishads. and knowledge. in fact. and then to take. moves through the veins of the body and sees dreams made out of the remnants of former impresThe third state arises from a complete separation of Atman from Manas and Indriyas. the circumstances attending the departure of the soul. the Atman in the heart is supposed to have for a time become one with Brahman. a complete Eschatology. While these are absorbed in the vital spirit. Here again we come across an original idea of Indian philosophy. . simply on the authority of the Veda. second the Indriyas cease to act. the state of deep and dreamless sleep. nition of the limits of human knowledge. with the full recog. but the Manas remains active. joined to the Manas. the state of being awake. to which is added as the fourth. remains in full activity. the doctrine of the four states. The Four States. In the first state the Atman is supposed to be perceiving and acting In the by means of the Manas and the Indriyas. according to merit paths into the next life. Such sophy fancies like seem strange in systems of philothe Vedanta and. we can hardly understand how Vedantists accepted this account of the Sukshma-sarira. and the Atman. the Atman with the Sukshma-sarira is supposed to escape from the heart through a vein in the head or through the hundred veins of the body. the state of death.

They cannot even be treated as Naisargika. as a means of subduing the passions in the l . a great portion of the sacred traditions of the Vedic age. and cannot be helped. They are simply Mithyagwana. a self-contradictory state- ment any that kind at least which is unsupported by This is evidence. as a preparation. really a weakness that runs through the whole of the Vedanta. Vedantists had once for all bound themselves to accept the Upanishads as revealed truth. or the highest knowledge. nay the very conception of a sacrifice.230 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. because they involved an actor and an enjoyer of the fruits of such acts. or inevitable. had no place Para Vidya. incorporated as they are in the hymns. and the Upanishads. . while much may be taken over from the Veda as due to Avidya. 1 See (Sawkara's Introduction to the Aitareyu Upanishad. After the supreme and superhuman authority of the Word or of the Veda had once been recognised. or the wisdom of the world. had to be accepted with the rest. the Brahmanas. under its wellunderstood limitations. such as the horn of a hare. though accepted as part of the Apara Vidya. But these dreams about the details of a future life are a mere phantasmagoria. All the sacrificial rules. But we should see clearly that. For practical purposes Avidya may often be called common sense. the lower knowledge only. if not that which is commonly illustrated by the son of a barren woman that is. fanciful or false knowledge. we are here really moving in an Avidya within that Avidya. and the truly enlightened man cannot be either an actor or an enjoyer However. and that may be the excuse for it. and the usual result followed.

carried along by the and have Udana through vein. the waning year. might perhaps have been tolerBut when we come to a full description of ated. if good people. the waning moon. they had to be mentioned life though they are better studied of the Upanishads. As these eschatological dreams have been included in the Vedanta system. together with the promises of rewards vouchsafed to them. but have not yet reached the highest knowledge. the ether. and supported by the remnant of . 23! and purifying the mind by drawing it away from the low and vulgar interests of life. here. the capital following path of the fathers (PitHyana) or the path of the gods (Devayana). the subtle body in which the Atman is clothed migrates. In the moon the departed lastly the moon.ESCHATOLOGY. the stations on the road by which the subtle body is supposed to travel from the veins of this body to the very steps of the golden throne of the Lower Brahman. company with the Pit?^'s. night. either The former lower. in then descend again. the world of the fathers. all such commandments. souls remain for a time enjoying the rewards of and their good deeds. in the pages We who are told there that. the Murdhanya the Nac?i. The former leads on to smoke. in the case of persons have fulfilled their religious or sacrificial duties lived a good life. the latter for those who are good and have already reached the is meant for not the highest knowledge. we wonder at the long suffering of the true philosopher who has learnt that the true and highest knowledge of the Vedanta removes in the twinkling of an eye (Apatata^) the veil that in this seems to separate Atman from Brahman.

. ' works their and then redescend with a remainder of good works. to the From ether. it may be of interest to see in what sense $arakara 1. place what is Otherwise there would take i. &c. having become a cloud he falls down as rain.. Thus the following words also. the earliest allusion to metempsychosis or Seelenwanderung. On this point the Veda makes the following statement " They return again the way they came to the ether.' he says. unrewarded merit due to their good works. smoke. Anlage. cloud.. as far as I know. Thibuut's translation. "Having become air ! S. becomes smoke. begins a new life on earth in such a station as the rest of his former deeds (Anusaya). ." Here a doubt arises whether the descending souls the pass over into a state of identity (Sabhavyam) with ether. having become mist he becomes a cloud. the plants springs seed which. from the ether to the Then the sacrificer having become air air (wind). the state is one of identity. that the souls of those who perform sacrifices. and plants. &c. secondary application of a word).B. vol. called indication only (Lakshana.E.232 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and whenever the doubt lies between a directly expressed and a merely indicated meaning. : mode of that descent.22 took it It has been explained. after having reached the moon. e. because this is directly stated by the text. dwell there as long as their in his ' commentary on Sutra * III. the former is to be preferred. xxxvii. wind. when matured in the womb.. or into a state of similarity (Samyam) The Purvapakshin (opponent) maintains that only. may warrant. rain. As this is. having become smoke he becomes mist. We now have to inquire into last.

This is the meaning of the " clauses. &c. then becomes subtle and then gets mixed with smoke. Hence it follows that the souls (of the departed) become really identical with ether. from the ether to the air. he violently between the departed . Sukshma-sarira) and the ether. They return as they came to the ether. in doing so. In cases where it is another in the literal sense of the word. For these reasons the souls' be- coming ether. and rain and it is important to observe how. consisting of water which the soul had assumed in the sphere of the moon it for the purpose of enjoyment. &c. And as conis. not possible that one thing should become 1 If. moreover.' We see from this that similarity only." &c. is quite proper to assume the meaning which is merely indicated. to an end. souls) with it can here be meant. are appropriate only if the soul be understood to identify itself with them. eternal. and so on. $amkara believed in a an outward and temporary similarity (in its . To this we ($awkara) reply that they only pass into a state of similarity to ether.. 5 233 he becomes smoke. on account of its allno other connection (of the pervadingness. &c. they could no longer descend through the air. has to be taken in the secondary sense of their passing into a state of similarity to ether. cloud. but their entering into a state of similarity to it. When the body. mist. the souls became identified with ether. nection with the ether it impossible to accept the literal meaning of the text." &c.ESCHATOLOGY. How is this known thereupon into the power of the to be the meaning For it is Because thus only is it possible. passes air. air. dissolves at the time when that enjoyment comes like ether.

though the Vedantists may be bound by *S'a?kara's interpretation. the word used in the Sutras. actually becomes a plant. cloud. rather than altering a word of the Sutra. A similar difficulty arises again when it has to be determined whether the departed. be- comes a progenitor. with them. &c. when eaten. the is child when begotten is the soul that had ascended to and descended from the moon. denies this with reference to the departed who. Lastly. of the departed in their subtle body 1 . though the temporary habitat only. mist. though here again the actual words of the Sutra have certainly to be twisted by him . For the progenitor must exist long before he eats the rice or the beans. plants as the habitat. Anyhow. can only mean that it is joined with a progenitor. have already reached the moon. nay. 1 See Vishwu Dh. beans. and are after that redescending upon earth. twisted the natural meaning of Sabhavya. on account of their pious works. XLIII. it seems to me as if the author of the Sutras himself had taken a different view. 45. arid had looked throughout on ether.. on account of their bad He only deeds. air. sesamum. sink so low as to become plants.234 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and replacing Sabhavyam by Samyara. such as rice. according to $amkara. this also. though other people amkara himself has to admit that may really. S. if it is said that the plant. and is able to beget a child. I must confess that. . in his further descent. and born again according to his former works. or becomes merely connected /Samkara decides strongly in favour of the latter view. corn. rain.

hand him over to a person who is said to be not-a-man. and while pious people are fully rewarded in the moon and then return again to the earth. hardly to be called philosophy. and then lightning but all these. 8. that knowledge which. we are told. the waxing year (northern pre- world of the Devas. to the world of Varuna. they enter the flame. Upanishads of those who. air. the moon. 4. share in all the powers of Brahman except those of creating and ruling the universe. different After leaving the body. neither t:ie . They are not supposed ever to retura to All this is world of Samsara (IV. i.ESCHATOLOGY. those pious and have also reached at knowledge of Brahman follow a who have been least the lower road. if obtained on earth. when fully released. the waxing moon. 17). This person conducts him cession). but guides only who. they knowledge or the Samyagdarsana. the . lastly to that of Pra^apati or the qualified Here the souls are supposed to remain till realise true and Brahma. then to that of Indra. when the departed has reached the lightning. Upanishad V. are not abodes for the soul. Theirs is the third place alluded to in the jKMnd. which does not mean universal. at once frees a man from all illusion. the world of Vayu. the year. 10. But while evil doers are thus punished in different hells. Finally the souls. as mentioned in the Puranas. Little is 235 said in the But Badaraya?ia tries to that the Upanishads know of a third make it clear class of beings (III. deeds. the sun. the day. 12) who reap the fruits of their evil actions in owing to their evil moon and descend again. do not even rise to the Samyamana (abode of Yama) and then ascend to earth again. but thorough and com- plete knowledge.

of past and present. to become once more what the Atman always has been. But much towards a it real insight would have been unfair to leave out what. and cannot do anything. is even in this life so free from the body that it feels no longer any pain. 28. This is indeed the real object of the Vedanta-philosophy. which. which is above the distinctions of subject and object. and which naturally vary according to different schools. and no doubt it may be both misunderstood and misapplied. namely Brahman. This never was intended as freedom in the sense of licence. but as freedom that can 1 Vedanta-Sutras III. . This has been always laid hold of as the most dangerous doctrine of Vedantism. is a characteristic feature of the Vedanta-philosophy. and must be judged from a purely historical point of view. though they fetter the mind no longer. Freedom in of importance to remember in these ancient fancies is that the enlightened man may become free or obtain Mukti even in this life (6rivanis What mukti 1 ). The Atman. to overcome all Nescience.236 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. this Life. having recovered its Brahmahood. is also by necessity above the distinction of good and evil. remain like broken chains hanging heavy on the mortal body. and then to wait till death removes the last Upadhis or fetters. though childish. help us into the Vedanta. do the different descriptions of the road on which the souls of the pious are supposed to wander towards Brahma. 3. of cause and effect. But in the beginning it meant no more than that the Atman. whether good or bad.

is for a moment the only boat for crossing this ocean of the world. Leaving all this Do which of illusion. being at rest and blessed in itself and in Brahman. it may hastha). Life is tremulous like a water-drop on a lotus-leaf. or youth. banish all Let thy mind be satisfied desires from thy heart. leave quickly and enter into the place of Brahman. whether as a student (Brahma&arin) or as a householder (Qri- In order to make this quite clear. it may serve at Though not least to show is the state of mind in which the true Vedantist meant to maintain himself. No one can even approach it who has not previously passed through a course of discipline. with what is gained by thy Karman. of friends. ' ! Who are is thy wife and who is thy son ? Curious " the ways of this world. is full The company of the good. Time takes all away in a moment. strictly philosophical. .FREEDOM IN THIS LIFE. though only. 237 neither lapse into sinful acts nor claim any merit for good acts. even in its popular form. O Brother." not be proud of wealth. be useful to add a few verses from one of the many popular works intended to teach Vedanta to the masses. It is hardly necessary to say or to prove that the Vedtlnta-philosophy. It is called the Mohamudgara. holds Far from it. the Hammer of Folly. Who art thou ? Whence didst thou come ? Ponder on this. It was carefully edited with Bengali. and published at Darjeeling in 1888. Fool give up thy thirst for wealth. and is ascribed to $amkara. out no encouragement to vice. Hindi and English translations by Durga Das Ray.

the mouth has become toothless. the seven oceans. I and the whole world are nothing why then is there always. no one clings to the Highest Brahman. Thus is the dwelling manifest the misery of the world. So long as a man can earn money. this is . son. Time is playing. Indra. to yet man abandon all worldly enjoyment surrender not make happy ? . The eight great mountains. any sorrow ? In thee. Brahma. the stick in the hand shakes. when does such Do tion. is As in birth so is death. friend. to sleep on the earth. whether not trouble about enemy. the hair grey. Preserve equanimity if you desire soon to reach the place of Vishnu (Vistmupada). and give up all of difference. leaves not the anchor of hope. there is truly no particle The rich are afraid even of their of happiness in it. it is useless to be angry with me and imSee every self in Self.238 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. O Man How ! can there be satisfaction Day and night. the youth delights in a beautiful damsel. an old man is absorbed in cares patient. thou. The body is wrinkled. in me. the rule established everywhere. morning and evening. and so is the mother's womb. to put on a goat-skin. or relafor war or peace. life is waning yet the breath of hope never ceases. Consider wealth as useless. To live under a tree of the house of the gods. the Sun and the Rudras. here for thee. But when his body becomes infirm son. and in others there dwells Vishnu alone. thought The child is given to play. . his family is kind to him. winter and spring come and go.

DIFFERENT WAYS OF STUDYING PHILOSOPHY.

239

through old age, no
him.

man

in the house asks after

Having given up

lust, anger, avarice,

and

dis-

Fools traction, meditate on thyself, who thou art. without a knowledge of Self are hidden in hell and
boiled.

In these sixteen verses the whole teaching of the disciples has been told. Those in whom this
does not produce understanding,
for

who can do more

them

'

?

Different

Ways

of Studying Philosophy.

This

may

not be exactly moral teaching as

we

understand
philosophy.

it.

But there
The

are

two ways of studying
it

We

may study
critic

in

a

critical or in

would no doubt fasten, spirit. at once on the supersession of morality in the Vedanta as an unpardonable flaw. One of the corner-stones, without which the grandest pyramid of thought must necessarily collapse, would seem to be missing in it. The historian on the other hand will be
a historical
satisfied

with simply measuring the pyramid or
to
scale
it

trying

step

by

step,

as

far

as

his

thoughts the labour

will carry him.

He would thus understand

it has required in building up, and discover some counteracting forces that possibly render the absence even of a corner-stone intelligible,

It is surely aspardonable, and free from danger. tounding that such a system as the Yed^nta should

have been slowly elaborated by the indefatigable and intrepid thinkers of India thousands of years ago, a system that even now makes us feel giddy, as in mounting the last steps of the swaying spire of an
ancient Gothic cathedral.
of our philosophers, not excepting Heraclitus, Plato, Kant, or Hegel, has

None

240

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

ventured to erect such a
storms or lightnings.

never frightened by Stone follows on stone in
spire,

regular succession after once the first step has been made, after once it has been clearly seen that

the beginning there can have been but One, as there will be but One in the end, whether we
in
call
it

Atman

or

Brahman.

We may

prefer to

look upon the expansion of the world in names and forms as the work of Sophia or as the realised

Logos, but we cannot but admire the boldness with which the Hindu metaphysician, impressed with the miseries and evanescence of this world, could bring

himself to declare even the Logos to be but the result of Avidy:! or Nescience, so that in the destruction of

that Avidya could be recognised the highest object, and the summum bonum (PurusMrtha) of man.

We

need not praise or try to imitate a Colosseum, but if we have any heart for the builders of former days we cannot help feeling that it was a colossal and stupendous effort. And this is the feeling which I cannot resist in examining the ancient Vedanta.

Other philosophers have denied the reality of the
world as perceived by us, but no one has ventured to deny at the same time the reality of what we call
the Ego, the senses and the mind, and their inherent forms. And yet after lifting the Self above body and
soul, after uniting

heaven and earth, God and man,
these Vedanta philosophers

Brahman and Atman,

have destroyed nothing in the life of the phenomenal beings who have to act and to fulfil their duties in
the contrary, they have shown that there can be nothing phenomenal withthis

phenomenal world.

On

out something that is real, and that goodness and virtue, faith and works, are necessary as a prepara-

DIFFERENT
tion,

WAYS OF STUDYING PHILOSOPHY.

241

nay as a sine qud non, for the attainment of that highest knowledge which brings the soul back to its source and to its home, and restores it to its true nature, to its true Selfhood in Brahman. And let us think how keenly and deeply Indian thinkers must have felt the eternal riddles of this
world before they could propose so desperate a solution as that of the Vedanta; how desperate they must have thought the malady of mankind to be before they could think of so radical a cure. A student
of the history of philosophy must brace himself to follow those whom he wants to reach and to under-

has to climb like a mountaineer, undismayed by avalanches and precipices. He must be able to breathe in the thinnest air, never disstand.

He

couraged even

if

snow and

ice

bar his access to the

highest point ever reached by the boldest explorers. Even if he has sometimes to descend again, dis-

events strengthened his lungs and his muscles for further work. He has done his athletic exercise, and he has seen views
all

appointed, he

has at

such as are never seen in the valleys below. I am myself not a mountaineer, nor am I altogether a

Vedantist
scaling

;

but

if I

can admire the bold climbers
I

Mount Gauri-Samkar,
thinkers
toiling

can also admire
heights of the to us in clouds

the

bold

up

to

Vedanta where they seem lost and sky. Do we imagine that these ascents were undertaken from mere recklessness, from mere love
of danger? It is easy for us to call those ancient explorers reckless adventurers, or dispose of them with the help of other names, such as mystic or
pantheist, often but half understood by those who The Vedaritists have often been employ them.
R,

242

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

called Atheists, but as the gods which they denied were only Devas, or what we call false gods, they might thus far have been forgiven. They have been called Pantheists, though their theos, or their theoi, were not the Pan, but the Pan was their theos. They have been called Nihilists, but they themselves have drawn a sharp line between the up-

the emptiness-doctrine, and their own teaching, which, on the contrary, insists throughout on the reality that underlies all
,

holders of the $unya-vada

l

phenomenal things, namely Brahman, and inculcates
the duties which even this world of seeming imposes on all who are not yet in possession of the highest truth. That this phenomenal world has no exclusive
is surely implied by its whatever perishes can never Besides, If heaven and earth shall pass real. if we see our away body, our senses, and all that has been built up on them, decaying and perishing every

right to the

name

of real

very name. have been
;

day before our very eyes
is

the very Ego, the Aham, dissolved into the elements from which it sprang,
;

if

why

should not the Vedantist also have held to his

alone is really real, and everydream and that even the Nama-rupas, thing the words and things, will vanish with each Kalpa? To sum up, the Vedanta teaches that in the highest sense Creation is but Self-forgetful ness, and Eternal Life remembrance or Self-consciousness. And while to us such high abstractions may seem useless for the many, it is all the more surprising
belief that
else a
;

Brahman

that, with the Hindus, the
1

fundamental ideas of the
between Buddhists and Vethe Sat or

An

important
is

distinction

dantists

that the former hold the world to have arisen from

what

is not,

the latter from

what

is,

Brahman.

RAMANUOA.

243

Vedanta have pervaded the whole of their literature, have leavened the whole of their language, and form

day the common property of the people ideas assume in the streets a different garment from what they wear among the learned in the Asramas or the forests of the country.
to the present
at large.

No doubt these

K-Jffay even

among the learned few stand up for the complete Advajfca or Monism as represented by
jSamkara.

The danger with /Samkara's Vedantism was that what to him was simply phenomenal, should be
taken for purely fictitious. There is, however, as a difference between the two as there is great between Avidy^ and Mithyagwana. May4 is the
1

cause of a phenomenal, not of a fictitious, world; and if $amkara adopts the Vivarta (turning away)
instead of the Parinama (evolution) doctrine, there is always something on which the Vivarta or illusion
is

at work,

and which cannot be deprived of

its

reality.

There are schools of Vedantists who try to explain the Sutras of Badarayana in a far more human spirit.

The best known

the school of Ramanur/a, who lived in the twelfth century A. D. 2 If we place $a???kara's
is
3 the claim literary activity about the eighth century of priority and of prior authority would belong to
,

iSamkara.

But we must never
else,

forget that in India

more than anywhere
1

philosophy was not the
(III,

2,

3\
2 8

In the only passage where the Sutras speak of Maya it need not mean more than a dream.
Wilson, Works,
I-tsing,
I, p.

35.
p.

Introduction,

xv,

788-820 A.D.

;

Kumarila,

750 A.D.

R

2

244

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

property of individuals, but that, as in the period of the Upanishads, so in later times also, everybody was free to contribute his share. As we find a

number of teachers mentioned in the Upanishads, and as they give us long lists of names, pupil succeeding teacher through more than fifty spiritual
generations, the commentators also quote ever so many authorities in support of the v^ews which they
either accept or reject.

Hence we cannot accept

/Samkara as the only infallible interpreter of the Vedanta-Sutras, but have to recognise in his com-

mentary one only of the many traditional interpretations of the Sutras which prevailed at different times in different parts of India, and in different schools. A most important passage in this respect is that in which ASa??"tkara has to confess that others (apare tu vadina//) differ from him, and some, as he adds, even
of our

own (asmadiyas a

l

ke&it)

.

This allows us

which

a fresh insight into the philosophical life of India is worth a great deal, particularly as the

difference of opinion refers to a

fundamental doctrine,

namely the absolute identity of the individual soul with Brahman. iSamkara, as we saw, was uncompromising on that point. With him and, as he thinks,
soul

with Badaraya?za also, no reality is allowed to the (Atman) as an individual (Criva), or to the world

as presented to
soul's reality is

and by the senses. With him the Brahman, and Brahman is one only.

But

souls also.

others, he adds, allow reality to the individual this is the very opinion on which

Now

another philosopher, Ilamfmur/a, has based his own interpretation of Bddarayana's Sutras, and has
1

S.B.E.,

XXXIV,

p. xx,

Thibaut.

RAMANU&A.

245

founded a large and influential sect. But it does not follow that this, whether heretical or orthodox
opinion, was really first propounded by Ramanu^a, for Ramanucfa declares himself dependent on former

teachers (Pur vaMry aA), and appeals particularly to a somewhat prolix Sutra- vritti by Bodhayana as his
authority.

Ramanu^a
after

l

himself quotes not

only

Bodhayana, but
Dravic/a),

him Tanka, Dramic?a (or Guhadeva, Kapardin, BharuH. One of
is

them, Dravicfa,
to $aikara,

expressly said to have been anterior

he

is

and so must Bodhayana have been, if meant by the Vrittikara whom $amkara him-.

self criticises

ought, therefore, to look on Ramanu^a as a perfect equal of /Samkara, so far as his right of interpreting Badarayana's Sutras, according to his own It is the same here as everyopinion, is concerned.

We

where
sopher

in
is

The individual philophilosophy. but the mouthpiece of tradition, and that

Hindu

tradition goes back further and further, the more we try to fix it chronologically. While $a/?ikara's

system

is

RamamK/a

Advaita, i.e. absolute Monism, that of has been called Visish^a- Advaita, the

doctrine of unity with attributes or Monism with a difference. Of course with Ramanur/a also Brahman

the highest reality, omnipotent, omniscient, but this Brahman is at the same time full of compassion
is

or love.

This

is

a

new and very important
as

feature

Brahman, compared with the icy self-sufficiency ascribed to Brahman by $amkara.
in Ramanuir/a's

Even more important and more humanising
3

is

the

S.B.E.,
2

XXXIV,

p. xxi.
p. 31.

Deussen,

The Vedanta-Philosophy,

246

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

recognition that souls as individuals possess reality,
A/lit, what perceives and what does not soul and matter, form, as it were, the body perceive, of Brahman l are in fact modes (Prakara) of Brahman.

that Kit and

,

Sometimes Kit

is

taken

a conscious cause, AHt matter but there is always Isvara as a third, the Lord and this, originally Brahma, is later on iden;
;

the Supreme Spirit as for the unconscious effect or
for

Vislmu, so that Raman w/a's sect is actually called $ri-Vaistmava. It assumed no doubt the greatest importance as a
tified

without much

ado with

religious sect, as teaching people how to live rather than how to think. But to us its chief interest is
its

philosophical character, and more particularly its relation to the Badarayana-Sutras and $arakara's

explanation of them.

Brahman, whether under the name of Isvara, Vishnu or Vasudeva, or Bhagavat, is with Ramanuf/a as with $a??ikara both the efficient and the material cause of all that exists, and he is likewise the lord and ruler of the world. But here mythology comes in
at once.

according to Ramanu^a, the individual soul ((7iva), from spring Samkarshana,

From this Brahman,

Samkarshana Pradyumna, mind (Manas), and from Pradyumna Aniruddha or the Ego (Aharikara).
Brahma, masc., here called Vasudeva,
is

not without

qualities, as >Samkara holds, but possesses (7/kina

(knowledge), $akti (energy), Bala (strength), Aisvarya

(supreme power), Virya (vigour), and Te^as (energy), as his Gu?tas or qualities. Much more of the same

kind

may

be found in Colebrooke

2
.

1

Colebrooke, Misc. Essays,
Ibid., I, p. 439.

I,

439

n.

2

RAMANUGA.

247

The

Vedantism has

real philosophical character of Ramanw/a's for the first time been placed in its

true light by Professor Thibaut, from whom we may soon expect a complete translation of Ramanw/a's own commentary on the Vedanta-Sutras, the Sri-

As, according to Ramanugra, Brahman is bhashya. not Nirguna, without qualities, such qualities as intelligence, power, and mercy are ascribed to him, while with /Samkara even intelligence was not a
quality of Brahman, but

Brahman was

intelligence,

these being. to possess, as conqualities, supposed stituent elements, the material world and the indi-

pure

thought, and

pure

Besides

Brahman

is

vidual souls, and to act as the inward ruler (Antaryamin) of them. Hence, neither the world nor the
individual souls will ever cease to exist.

All that

Ramanu</a admits
stages as

is

that they pass through different

Avyakta and Vyakta. As Vyakta, developed, they are what we know them to be on earth as Avyakta they are enveloped (SamkoHta). This involution takes place at the end of each Kalpa,
;

when Brahman assumes its causal state (Karanavastha), and when individual souls and individual
things lose for a time their distinct and independent character. Then follows, by the mere will of Brahma,

new creation of gross and visible and an assumption by the individual souls matter,
the evolution, or the
of new material bodies, according to the merit or demerit of their former existence. The important
point
is

that the individual souls,

according to

Ramanuf/a, retain their individuality even when they have reached the blissful abode of Brahman. The
not considered by him as merely the result of Avidya, but is real, while Brahman is to be looked

world

is

248

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

upon and worshipped as a personal god, the creator and ruler of a real world. Thus Isvara, the Lord, is not to be taken as a phenomenal god and the difference between Brahman and Isvara vanishes, as much as the difference between a qualified and an unqualified Brahman, between a higher and a lower knowledge. Here we perceive the influence exercised on philosophy by the common sense or the common sentiment of the people. In other countries in which
;

philosophy is, as it were, the private property of individual thinkers, that influence is far less perBut extreme views like those propounded ceptible.

by /Samkara were, as might be expected, too much for the great mass of the people, who might be willing to accept the doctrines of the Upanishads in their vagueness, but who would naturally shrink

from the conclusions drawn from them with
exorable consistency by >Sa??ikara.
'

in-

If

it is

impossible

to say, as >Samkara says, I am not,' it is difficult at least to say, 'I am not I,' but 'I am Brahman.' It may

be possible to say that Isvara or the Lord is Brahman but to worship Isvara, and to be told at the same

;

but phenomenal, must be trying even to the most ardent of worshippers. If theretime that Isvara
fore
is

Ramanur/a, while professing his faith in the Upanishads and his allegiance to Badaraya^a, could

give back to his followers not only their own souls, but a] so a personal god, no wonder that his success should have been so great as it was.
it

In the absence of any definite historical materials is quite impossible for us to say whether, in the

historical

at the time of

development of the Vedanta-philosophy Badarayana and afterwards, it was

the absolute

Monism

as represented

by

/S'a??ikara

RAMANUGA.

249

that took the lead, or whether the more temperate Monism, as we see it in Ramanur/a's commentary, There are certainly some exercised an earlier sway.

Sutras which, as Dr. Thibaut has shown, lend them-

more readily to Ramanur/a's than to Ssunkara's interpretation. The question as to the nature of individual souls seems decided by the author of the Sutras in favour of Ramanw/a rather than of $amkara. We read in Sutra II, 3, 43, The soul is a part of Brahman.' Here the soul is clearly declared to be a part of Brahman, and this is the
selves far
'

by a as it were,' since Brahman, being not composed part, of parts, cannot have parts in the literal sense of
;

view of Ramanur/a

but /Samkara explains

it

'

the word.

This seems a bold proceeding of /Samkara's and, though he tries to justify it by very ingenious
;

arguments, Ramanu^a naturally takes his stand on the very words of the Sutra. Similar cases have

been pointed out by Dr. Thibaut

;

and

this very

diversity of opinion confirms what I remarked before, that the Vedanta philosophers of India, though they

look both on Upanishads and the Sutras as their highest authorities, often present a body of doctrine

independent of them
that had

grown

were, of thought to be independent of the mother;

colonies, as

it

country, but are anxious nevertheless to prove that their own doctrines can be reconciled with the old
authorities.

This was

the position

assumed by

Badarayana towards the Upanishads, so much so that nearly the whole of the first book of his Sutras had to be devoted to showing that his own views of Brahman were not in conflict with certain passages in the Upanishads.

Some

of

them may

refer

250

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

to the lower Brahman, some to the individual soul as one with Brahman and it is on these points that, at a later time, $amkara and Ramanuf/a would
;

What was important for naturally have differed. Bcidarayawa to show was that no passages from the
be quoted in support of other philosophies, such as the Sa??ikhya, of which both /Sawkara and RamanuT/a would disapprove.
fairly

Upanishads could

are anxious to

In the same manner both /Samkara and Ramanuc/a show that they themselves are in

perfect agreement with Badarayana. Both, however, approach the Sutras as if they had some opinions of their own to defend and to bring into harmony

with the Sutras.

can only suppose that schools in different parts of India had been growing up fast in the hermitages of certain teachers and their
pupils, and that all were anxious to show that they had not deviated from such paramount and infallible authorities as the Sutras and the Upanishads. This was done by means of what is called Mimawsa, or a critical discussion of passages which seemed to be ambiguous or had actually been twisted into an

We

unnatural meaning by important teachers. Dr. Thibaut therefore seems to me quite right when he says that both $amkara and Ramanm/a

pay often less regard to the literal sense of the words and to tradition than to their desire of forcing

Badarayana

own

to bear testimony to the truth of their philosophical theories. This only confirms what
in

I said before

thought
shads,

about the rich growth of philosophical India, independent of Sutras and Upani-

though influenced by both.
1

Even

if

we

S.B.E.,

XXXIV,

p. xcvi.

RAMANUtfA.

251

admit that Badarayam wished to teach in his Sutras nothing but what he found in the Upariishads, it must not be forgotten that the Upanishads contain
ever so many conflicting guesses at truth, freely uttered by thinkers who had no personal relations with each other, and had no idea of propounding

a uniform system of religious philosophy. If these conflicting utterances of the Upanishads had to be

reduced to a system,

we can hardly blame $amkara

for his taking refuge in the theory of a higher and a lower Brahman, the former being the Brahman of philosophy, the other that of religion, and both, as

he thought, to be found in different parts of the Veda. By doing that he avoided the necessity of arguing

away a number

of purely anthropomorphic features, incongruous, if applied to the highest Brahman, and dragging down even the Brahman of the lower Vidya
to a lower stage than philosophers
of.

Ramanugra's Brahman
according to
is

is

would approve always one and the
the knowledge of but his Brahman is

same, and,

him,
;

Brahman

likewise but one

more than an exalted Isvara. He is able to perform the work of creation without any help from Maya or Avidya and the souls of the departed, if only their life has been pure and holy, are able to approach this Brahma, sitting on his throne, and to enjoy their rewards in a heavenly The higher conception of Brahman exparadise.
in consequence hardly
;

cluded of course not only everything mythological, but everything like activity or workmanship, so that creation could only be conceived as caused by Maya
l

Ved. Sutras II, 2, 2, sub fine: Avidyapratyupasthapitanamarupamayavesavasena, Through being possessed of the Maya of names and forms brought near by Avidya.'
'

1

am well aware that the view of the world. was incompatible with the fundamental tenet that the two were. a personal god. and an eternal soul that yearns for an approach to or a reunion with that Being. and of the soul. trying hard to reconcile their Monism with the demands of the human heart that re. and unworthy of the name of philosophy.252 . whether in the Upanishads or in the Sutras and their commentaries. I have nothing to say against this criticism. however prominent it may be in the Upanishads and in the system of Ilamanur/a. and always will require. as the last cause of all that is. as explained by $a?'/ikara. as propounded by the Vedantists. It must be admitted therefore that in India. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. of God. never separated except by Nescience. runs counter to the conception of Brahman. The idea of an approach of the soul to Brahman. least of all in . nor have I ever tried to make propaganda for Vedantism. and always remain. whatever have been its value in the East. while the very idea of an approach of or Avidya the souls of the departed to the throne of Brahman. supported by an unwavering faith in Monism. we have really two. even of the individual soul being a separate part of Brahman. nay. quired. instead of one Vedanta-philosophy. has often been declared strange and fanciful. that of RamanuT/a. or of their souls being merged in Brahman. to be again joined to Brahman after death. that of $awkara being kept for unflinching reasoners who. one and the same. do not shrink from any of its consequences another. I at all may events utterly unsuited to the West. springing from the same root but extending its branches in two very different directions.

And I am neither afraid nor ashamed to say that I share his enthusiasm for the Vedanta. and quite understand what he meant when he said. and that it might raise the human mind to a height from which the most essential virtues of social and might dwindle away into mere phantoms. or to allow himself to go into ecstasies over so-called mystic and inarticulate thought. and feel indebted to it for much that has been helpful to me in my passage through life. that it would fail to call out and strengthen the manly qualities required for the practical side of life. and which in no country can be studied to greater advantage than in India. 253 England. It has been the solace of my life. At the same time I make no secret that all my life I have been very fond of the Vedanta. In the whole world there is no study. I know no better and A man may be a Christian. But I maintain that it represents a phase of philosophic thought which no student of philosophy can afford to ignore. I can fully agree with Schopenhauer. or stones . I quite admit that. Platonist. who is called in de- upon to take an active part in breaking whether fending or ruling a country. for fitting men to lead 7 quiet lives. and yet a good citizen and I should say the same of a Vedantist.' my Schopenhauer was the last man to write at random. the Vedanta would have its dangers. except that of the original (of the Upanishads). in amassing wealth. and an honest . so beneficial and so political life ' elevating as that of the Oupnekhat (Persian trans- lation of the Upanishads). as a popular philosophy. Nay. And I go even a step further. contemplative and preparation than the Vedanta.RAMANUffA. After all it is not everybody in life. it will be the solace of death.

if clothed in softer language. nay. and have our shrink from adopting the plain and simple language of the Upanishads that the Self of God and man is the same. and of the voice of God within us nay. St. it is curious to observe of the Vedanta. we repeat with This is We . if not self own blasphemous. are in full harmony with our intimate convictions. may often seem very startling to us. God's Presence and His very And Essence all-divine ! also speak without pure Vedanta. both mental and physical. being in God. while the that our in and the Divine Self are nature might seem irreverent. they do not jar at on our ears. the very type of manliness and strength. called useless They may be by the busy and toiling portion of humanity.254 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. among which we move : . our own favourite hymns And Should that a higher gift than grace flesh and blood refine. the unreality of the material world. yet we Again.' then may we not hope that even the quiet in the land are not so entirely useless as they appear to be ? And while some of the most important doctrines before us in the plain and direct language of the Vedanta-Sutras. hesitation of our body as the temple of God. but if it is true that 'those also serve who only stand and wait. speaks like a Vedantist of the shadows . when placed all how. and move. seems to many a pure fancy and yet one of our most popular poets. though proved point by point by Berkeley. Self. own most idea identical Thus. Paul that we live. one of contains the prayer.

All we can do is to strive to approximate as near as possible. into the Nameless. Indian It thought will never quite square with English thoughts. when the Vedarita has to Tennyson. and that most of them. Goethe. as a cloud passed Melts into Heaven. however unwilling we may be to confess it. There is one more point that requires a few differences to remarks. ' 255 of the Self was loosed. though differently expressed. is often meant for the same. no doubt . but It has often deals too much cannot prove. not mine utter clearness. I touched limbs the limbs The word that is The mortal limit revolving in myself the symbol of myself. This is true. And my Were But The gain of such large life as matched with ours Were Sun to spark unshadowable in words. Thus. The Ancient Sage. and yet no shade of doubt. Themselves but shadows of a shadow-world. . and others. and thro' loss of Self would be easy to add similar passages from Wordsworth. but in philo- sophy illustration also by means of metaphors has its value. strange. because they can only illustrate. to show that after all there is some of the Indian leaven left in us.METAPHORS. been said that the Yedanta-philosophy in metaphors. leave us in the end unsatisfied. and not to allow these inevitable prejudice us against what. Metaphors. For more than once when I Sat all alone. though fascinating at first sight. and the English words which we have to adopt in rendering Indian ideas are never quite adequate. and I doubt whether they were ever meant for more than that.

256

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

explain how the Sat, the Real or Brahman, dwells within us, though we cannot distinguish it, the author
of the jfTMndogya Up. VI, 13, introduces a father telling his son to throw a lump of salt into water, and

some time to take it out again. Of course he cannot do it, but whenever he tastes the water it is In the same way, the father says, the Sat, the salt.
after

Divine,

is

within us, though

we cannot

perceive

it

by Another application of the same simile (Brihad. Ar. Up. II, 4, 12) seems intended to show that the Sat or Brahman, in permeating the whole elementary
world, vanishes, so that there is no distinction left between the individual Self and the Highest Self 1
.

itself.

that the manifold beings are produced from the Eternal as sparks spring from a burning fire, we should remember that this
illustrates the idea that all created beings share in the substance of the Supreme Being, that for a time they seem to be independent, but that

Again, when we read

2

metaphor

they vanish again without causing any diminution in the Power from whence they sprang. The idea of a creating as a making of the world
is

most repugnant to the Vedantist, and he tries in every way to find another simile by which to illus-

trate the springing of the world from Brahman as In order to avoid seen in this world of Nescience.

the necessity of admitting something extraneous, some kind of matter out of which the world was
shaped, the Upanishads point to the spider spinning web out of itself; and, in order to show that

its

things can spring into existence spontaneously, they
1

2

See Deussen, Upanishads, Bnh. Ar. Up. II, i, 20.

p. 416,

fora different explanation.

METAPHORS.

257

use the simile of the hairs springing from a man's head without any special wish of the man himself.

Now

it

may be

quite true that none of these

were they intended as arguments in support of the Upanishadphilosophy, but they are at all events very useful in reminding us by means of striking similes of certain doctrines arrived at by the Vedanta philosophers
illustrations can be considered, nor
in their search after truth.

CHAPTER

V.

IT would be interesting to trace at once the same or very similar tendencies as those of the Vedanta in

the development of other Indian philosophies, and particularly of the Sarakhya and Yoga, and to see

what they have
of

to say on the existence

and the

true nature of a Supreme Being, and the relation human beings to that Divine Being, as shadowed
in

forth

certain

passages

of

the

Veda, though

differently interpreted by different schools of philoBut it seems better on the whole to adhere sophy.

to the order adopted by the students of philosophy in India, and treat of the other Mima?sa, the Purva-

the Former Mimamsa, as it is called, in connection with the one we have examined. The Hindus admit a Purva-Mima?rtsa and an UttaraMima?HS'i, that
is

Mimawsa.

They look upon the Vedanta

as

the

Uttara- or later Mima?^sa, and on that of G'aimini as the Purva-, or prior. These names, however, were

not meant to imply, as Colebrooke seems to have supposed, that the Purva-Mimfvwsa was prior in
l

time, though
Pra/,'i
-,

it

is

true that
It

previous.

sometimes called really meant no more than that
it
is

1

of Philosophy, vol.
2

Colebrooke, Misc. Essays, vol. i, p. 239. Kilter, History iv, p. 376, in Morrison's translation.
p. 122,
1.

Sarvadarsana-sawgraha,

3.

PURVA-MfMAA/SA.

259

the Purva-Mimamsa, having to do with the KarmakancZa, the first or work-part of the Veda, comes first, and the Uttara-Mimarasa, being concerned with
the Grfl&nak&nda,, comes second, just as an orthodox Hindu at one time was required to be a Grihastha or

householder
forest

first,

and then only to

retire into the
life

and lead the contemplative

of a Vana-

prastha or a Samnyasin.

We

shall see, however,

that this prior Mima??isa, if it can be called a philosophy at all, is very inferior in interest to the Vedanta, and could hardly be understood without

the previous existence of such a system as that of Badarayana. I should not like, however, to commit

myself so far as to claim priority in time for the Vedanta. It has a decided priority in importance, and in its relation to the (r/lana- portion of the

Veda.

We

saw why the

fact

that

Badaraya^a

cannot be used for chronological quotes purposes, for (7aimini returns the compliment and quotes Badarayana. How this is to be accounted
6raimini
for, I

tried to explain before. Badarayana endeavoured to

It

is

clear that while

introduce

order into

the Upanishads, and to reduce their various guesses to something like a system, 6raimini undertook to do the same for the rest of the Veda, the so-called Karmakaijc/a or work-portion, that is, all that had

regard to sacrifice, as described chiefly in the Brahmanas. Sacrifice was so much the daily life of the

Brahmans that the recognised name for sacrifice was simply Karman, i.e. work. That work grew up in different parts of India, just as we saw philosophy springing up, full of variety, not free even from contradictions. Every day had its sacrifice, and in some respects these regular sacrifices may be
s 2

260

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

They depended on the seasons or regulated the seasons and marked the different divisions of the year. There were some rites that lasted the whole year or even several
years.

called the first calendar of India.

And as philosophy existed, independent of the Upanishads, and through BMarayana attempted to make peace with the Upanishads, we must conexisted for a long time without the Brahmar/.as, such as we possess them, that they grew up without being restrained by
sider that sacrifices also

generally binding authorities of any kind, and that at a later time only, after the Brahmanas had

been composed and had acquired some kind of authority, the necessity began to be felt of reconciling variant opinions and customs, as embodied in the Brahmanas and elsewhere, giving general as well as special rules for the performance of every

kind of ceremony. We can hardly imagine that there ever was a time in India when the so-called priests,

know how to perform their own sacrificial duties, for who were the authors of them, if not the priests? But when the Brahmanas once existed, a new problem had to be solved how to bring the Brahmanas into harsettled in distant localities, did not
:

mony with themselves and with local customs, and also how to

existing family and discover in them a

meaning that should satisfy every new generation. This was achieved by means of what is called

Mlm^msa,
There

is little

investigation, examination, consideration. room for real philosophy in all this, but

there are questions such as that of
sacrificial duties,

Dharma

or duty,

which offer an opportunity including for discussing the origin of duty and the nature of its rewards while in accounting for seeming contradic;

PURVA-MfMAMSA.
tions, in
sacrificial

261

arriving at general principles concerning
acts,

problems would naturally turn up which, though often in themselves valueless, are In generally treated with considerable ingenuity.
this

way

the work of 6raimini secured for

itself

works ascribed to Badarayafta, Kapila and others, and was actually raised to the rank of one of the six classical philoa place

by the

side

of

the

sophies of India. It cannot therefore be passed over in a survey of Indian philosophy.

While Badaraya^a begins
'

his Sutras

with Athato

Brahmagdc/nasa,

Now

therefore the desire of
'

know-

ing Brahman,' 6raimini, apparently in imitation of

begins with Athato Dharmaf/ig^asa, Now therefore the desire of knowing Dharma or duty.' The two words Now therefore offer as usual a large
it,
' '

number of interpreters, but they mean no more in the end than that now, after the Veda has been read, and because it has been read, there arises a desire for knowing the full meaning of either Dharma, duty, or of Brahman, the Absolute the former treated in the Uttara-, the latter in the Purva-Mimamsa. In fact, whatever native commenscope to a
;

tators

not

may say to the much more than a

contrary, this first Sutra is title, as if we were to say,

Now

begins the philosophy of duty, or the philosophy of (raimini.

Dharma, here translated by duty, refers to acts of prescriptive observance, chiefly sacrifices. It is said to be a neuter, if used in the latter sense,
a very natural distinction, though there is little evidence to that eifect in the Sutras or in the literature

known to us. This Dharma or duty

is

enjoined in the Brah-

262

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

and these together with the Mantras are held to constitute the whole of the Veda, so that whatever is not Mantra is Brahmana, whatever is not Brahma/ia is Mantra. The Brahmarias are said to consist of Vidhis, injunctions, and Arthavadas, The injunctions are meant either to make glosses. us do a thing that had not been done before, or to make us know a thing that had not been known
before
l
.

Subsequently the

Vidhis

2

are

divided

into Utpatti-vidhis, original or general injunctions, such as Agnihotram guhoti, he performs the Agnihotra, and Viniyoga-vidhi, showing the manner in

which a
comprises

sacrifice

to be performed. The latter injunctions as to the details, such as
is

Dadhn&

(/uhoti,

he performs the

sacrifice

with sour

milk, &c.

Then
is

settle the exact

and there
determine

follow the Prayoga-vidhis which order of sacrificial performances, lastly a class of injunctions which
is
fit

who

to perform a sacrificial act.

They are called Adhikara-vidhis. The hymns or formulas which
a

are to be used at

sacrifice, though they are held to possess also a transcendental or mysterious effect, the Apurva, are by 6raimini conceived as mainly intended to remind

the sacrificer of the gods
sacrificial gifts.

who

are to receive his

likewise lays stress on what he calls Namadheya or the technical name of each sacrifice,

He

such as Agnihotra, Darsapurttamasa, Udbhid, &c. These names are found in the Brahmawas and they
are considered important, as no doubt they are, in The Nishedhas defining the nature of a sacrifice.
1

Rigvedabhashya,
2

vol.

i,

p. 5. p. viii.

Thibaut, Arthasawigraha,

CONTENTS OF THE PT>RVA-MIMAMSA.

263

or prohibitions require no explanation. They simply state what ought not to be done at a sacrifice.

Lastly, the Arthavadas are passages in the Brahmanas which explain certain things they vary in character, being either glosses, comments, or ex;

planatory statements.
Contents of the Purva-Mlmaws..
I cannot do better than give the princontents of (raimini's Sutras, as detailed by cipal

Perhaps

Madhava in his Nyaya-mala-vistara \ The Mima/wsa consists of twelve books. In the first book
is

discussed the authoritativeness of those collec-

tions of

words which are severally meant by the

terms injunction (Vidhi), explanatory passage (Artha(Mantra), tradition (Snm'ti), and name (Namadheya). In the second we find certain subvada),

hymn

sidiary discussions, as e. g. on Apurva, relative to the difference of various rites, refutation of erro-

neously alleged proofs, and difference of performIn ance, as in obligatory and voluntary offerings.

the third are considered revelation ($ruti), sign or sense of a passage (Linga), context ( Vakya), &c.,
'
'

'

'

and

respective weight, when in apparent then the cerarnonies opposition to one another called Pratipathi-Karmam, things mentioned by the
their
;

way, Anarabhyadhita, things accessory to several main objects, as Praya^as, &c., and the duties of the sacrificer. In the fourth the chief subject is
the influence of the principal and subordinate rites on other rites, the fruit produced by the (ruhA

1

See Cowell and Gough in their translation of the Sarvadarp. 178.

sana-samgraha,

264

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.
of the

when made
sacrifice.

dice-playing, &c.,

Butea frondosa, &c., and the which forms part of the Ka^/asuyafifth

the subjects are the relative order of different passages of the /Sruti, &c., the order
of different parts of a sacrifice, as the seventeen animals at the Va(/apeya, the multiplication and
non-multiplication of rites, and the respective force of the words of the /Sruti, the order of mention, &c., as

In the

determining the order of performance. In the sixth we read of the persons qualified to offer sacrifices, then: obligations, the substitutes for prescribed matesupplies for lost or injured offerings, expiatory rites, the Sattra-offerings, things proper to be given,
rials,

and the
is

different sacrificial fines.

In the seventh

treated the

mode

of transference of the cere-

monies of one
'

sacrifice to

another by direct

in the Vaidic text, others as inferred
sign.'

command by name or
' '

In the eighth, transference by virtue of the
'
'

clearly expressed or obscurely expressed by the predominant sign,' and cases also
'

sign

or

where no

transference takes place. In the ninth, the discussion begins with the adaptation (Uha) of hymns,

when quoted in a new connection, the adaptation of Samans and Mantras, and collateral questions
connected therewith.

In the tenth the occasions are discussed where the non-performance of the and nonprimary rite involves the preclusion performance of the dependent rites, and occasions
'
'

when
duce

rites are precluded,

because other rites pro-

their special results, also Graha-offerings, certain Samans, and various other things, as well In the eleventh we as different kinds of negation.
find the incidental
fuller

mention and subsequently the discussion of Tantra, where several acts are

PRAMA^AS OF

GAIMINI.

265

combined into one, and Avapa, or the performing an act more than once. In the twelfth there is the discussion on Prasaiiga, when the rite is performed with one chief purpose, but with an incidental further reference, on Tantra, cumulation of concurrent rites (Samu&Maya), and option. It is easy to see from this table of contents that

Kant would have felt much the But we must take philosophies as they are given us and we should spoil the picture
neither Plato nor

wiser for them.

;

of the philosophical life of India, if we left out of consideration their speculations about sacrifice as con-

There are passages, however, which appeal to philosophers, such as, for instance, the chapter on the Pramanas or the authoritative sources of knowledge, on the relation between word and thought, and similar subjects.
tained in the Purva-Mima/msa.
It is true that in

most of these questions are treated the other philosophies also, but they have a peculiar interest as treated by the ritualistic Purva-

Mimamsa.
Pramawas of
Craimini.
first

Thus

if

we turn our

attention

to the Pra-

manas, the measures of knowledge, or the authorities to which we can appeal as the legitimate means
of knowledge, as explained by the Purva-Mlma??isa, we saw before that the Vedantists did riot pay

much

attention

to

quainted with the

them, though they were acthree fundamental Pramawas

and revelation. The on the contrary, devoted considerPurva-Mimamsa, able attention to this subject, and admitted five,
sense-perception, inference,
(i)

Sense-perception, Pratyaksha,

when the organs

266

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.
;

are actually in contiguity with an object (2) Inference (Anumana), i. e. the apprehension of an

unseen member of a known association (Vyapti) (3) by the perception of another seen member Comparison (Upamana), knowledge arising from
;

(4) Presumption (Arthapatti), such as can be derived of a thing not itself knowledge perceived, but implied by another (5) >S'abda, verbal

resemblance

;

;

information derived from authoritative sources.
sect of Mima?nsakas,

One

those who follow Kumarila admitted besides, (6) Abhava, not-being, Bha^a, which seems but a subdivision of inference, as if we infer dryness of the soil from the not-being or

absence of clouds and rain.
All

these

sources
it is

of information

are

carefully

examined, but
nition,
for

curious that

Mimamsakas should

admit this large array of sources of valid cogconsidering that for their own purposes, establishing the nature of Dharma or duty,

they practically admit but one, namely scripture or /S'abda. Duty, they hold, cannot rest on human
authority,

which underlies ought all duty, can only be supplied by an authority that is more than human or more than fallible, and such an authority is nowhere to be found except in the
because
the
'

'

Veda. This leaves, of course, the task of proving the superhuman origin of the Veda on the shoulders of 6 aimini and we shall see hereafter how he per?

;

forms

it.

Stltra-style.

Before, however,

we

enter on a consideration of
in

any of the problems treated
a few remarks have to be

the Purva-Mimamsa,
peculiarity in

made on a

SUTKA-STYLE.

267

the structure of the Sutras.
subject fully,

In order to discuss a

and

to arrive in the

end at a

definite

opinion, the authors of the Sutras are encouraged to begin with stating first every possible objection

that can reasonably be urged against what is their own opinion. As long as the objections are not
perfectly absurd, they have a right to be stated, and this is called the Purvapaksha, the first part. Then follow answers to all these objections, and this
is called the Uttarapaksha, the latter part and then only are we led on to the final conclusion, the This system is exhaustive and has many Siddhanta. but it has also the disadvantage, as far advantages,
;

as the reader

is

concerned, that, without a com-

mentary, he often feels doubtful where the cons end and the pros begin. The commentators themselves differ sometimes on that point. Sometimes again, instead of three, a case or Adhikarana is

stated in five members, namely 1. The subject to be explained (Vishaya).
:

2. 3.

4.
5.

The doubt (Samsaya). The first side or prima facie view (Purvapaksha). The demonstrated conclusion (Siddhanta) and The connection (Samgati).
;
l ,

is illustrated in the commentary on the first and second Sutras of the Mimamsa which declare that a desire to know duty is to be entertained, and

This

then define duty (Dharma) as that which recognised by an instigatory passage, that

is
is

to be

by a

Here the question to be passage from the Veda. discussed (Vishaya) is, whether the study of Duty in
Sarvadarsana-sawgraha, p. 122; translation by Cowell and Gough, p. 180; Siddhanta Dipika, 1898, p. 194.
1

268
(raimini's

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

Mimams^

is

taken.

The Purvapaksha says
it is

really necessary to be underof course, No, for

when

said that the

Veda should be

learnt (Vedo

*dhyetavyaA), that clearly means either that it should be understood, like any other book which we read, or

should be learnt by heart without any attempt, as yet, on the part of the pupil to understand it, simply as a work good in itself, which has its reward in
that
it

heaven.
ancient

This

is

a very
;

common view among

the

Brahmans for, as they had no written books, they had a very perfect system for imprinting texts on the memory of young persons, by making them learn every day a certain number of verses or lines
by heart, without any attempt, at first, of making them understand what they learnt and afterwards
;

only supplying the key to the meaning. This acquisition of the mere sound of the Veda was considered
highly meritorious
;

nay, some held that the
if

Veda
if

was

more

efficacious,

not understood than

understood.

This was in fact their printing or rather their writing, and without it their mnemonic
literature

would have been simply impossible.

As

we warn

our compositors against trying to understand what they are printing, Indian pupils were cautioned against the same danger and they succeeded
;

in learning the longest texts by heart, without even attempting at first to fathom their meaning. To us

such a system seems almost incredible, but no other system was possible in ancient times, and there is

no excuse
witnessed

for being incredulous, for it in India to the present day.

may

still

be

Only after the text had thus been imprinted on the memory, there came the necessity of interAnd here the more pretation or understanding.

the its commands. After that he bathes. such as is given in the Mima??isa. proper performance of are besides several points in the course of this dis- . after to his house is having finished his apprenticeship. considering that it rests on no definite sacred command. to be learnt stood. cannot be considered superfluous. though miraculous rewards may be held out for that.SUTRA-STYLE. the Purvapakshin. But if so. marries and sets up his own house. a more minute study of the sacrificial precepts of . so that it is argued there would actually be no time for any intervening study of the MimamsEi. 269 enlightened of the Indian theologians argue that the Vedic command Vedo-dhyetavyaA/ the Veda ' ' is to be gone over. that is. though his learning of diately bathe the text of the Veda is useful in every respect. is Therefore the imaginary opponent. and learns to understand it in the house of his teacher.' implies that it is also to be underpreferable this intelligible purpose is to the purely mechanical one. by and that heart. it is what can be the use of the Mima?nsEi? The pupil learns the Veda by heart. as a means towards the highest object of the study of the Veda. though I must confess There that its meaning is not quite clear to me. connection. asked. viz. the Veda. But here the Siddhantin forward and says that the Snm'ti passage enjoining a pupil's bathing (graduating) on returning steps not violated by an intervening study of the Mima??isa. is to be acquired. These considerations in support of the Siddhanta or final conclusion would probably fall under the name of Samgati. objects that the study of the Mimamsa not necessary at all. because it is not said that. he should immeand because.

The Jews. it promise any rewards as a motive for the performance of any duty least of all. to those therefore who perform Vedic* sacrifices. it could not establish a duty. no doubt. were riot represented as having been the work of Jehovah. The subject is interesting even though the arguments may not be convincing to us. a reward in heaven. such as. then. or whether it is what we should If it were the work of a person. though sacred. the so-called is four Kriyaphalas. but these books. arid it is interest- ing to see how they try to escape from all the diffi- culties arising out of their postulate that the Veda must be the work of a superhuman or divine author. on which more information to be desired. or that it cannot be the work of a personal or human author. They were acknowledged to literature of . It is clear that O */ even to start such a claim as being revealed for any book requires a considerable advance in religious and philosophical thought. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. for instance. or of some authority. and I doubt whether such a problem could have arisen in the ancient any country besides India.270 cussion. It follows either that the Veda has no binding authority at all. inspired person. had their sacred books. important like any other work. much Has the Veda a Superhuman Origin? This discussion leads on to another and more one. call revealed. whether the Veda has supreme whether it is the work of man. such as the Yeda promises again and again nor could . This is a dilemma arising from convictions firmly planted in the minds of the ancient theologians of India.

so that we mistake mother-of-pearl for then may we misapprehend the meaning of revealed words However. or St. John. the human recipient would always be a possible source of error. tried to maintain a superhuman authorship in favour of the silver . e. theologians have not been very far from taking the same view. the non-human origin of the Vedas. as in the case of Moses. can deceive us. i. The Mimamsa philosopher would probably have argued that as no writer could relate his own death. even though they maintain at the same time that they are historical documents written by illiterate people. the first thing is to see how the Brahmans. when given. therefore Deuteronomy must be considered the work of a superhuman writer and some of our modern . To the Brahmans. message. much as the Gospels are in the eyes of certain Christian theologians. Let us see therefore how the down Mark Mimamsa deals with this problem of the Apaurusheyatva. 1 quote from Madhava's introduction to his com- . Inspiration in satisfied these the ordinary sense of the word would not have Indian orthodox philosophers. or by apostles such as St. as they point out. by historical persons. even if. eternal and infallible. however true the message might be. they actually related the death of their reputed author.HAS THE VEDA A SUPERHUMAN ORIGIN? 27! have been composed. for. how much more easily ! Veda. any part of the Veda. as being liable to misapprehend and misinterpret such a Even the senses. if not written down. even if it bore a human or historical name. and particularly the Mimamsakas. this would exclude the possibility of error. because. was superhuman. as not they truly remark.

that the Vedas must be of 1 new objection. with 6raimini's Sutras. by showing that they were He perfectly intelligible. i. Kauthuma. The Vedas. if it &c. are known to be their human authors.. in accordance. 10. . And Ka^Aa. and other sections of the &c. case of Vyasa's Mahabharata and Valraiki's Rama- ya?ia. vol.' ' they hold that as the Raghuvamsa of Kalidasa and other poems are recent. Taittiriya.. See my Second Edition. human origin. are not without a beginsay. were suggested that such names as were meant for men who did no more like teachers. them ning or eternal.. then proceeds to establish the Apaurusheyatva. and hence we find men quoted in As in the as the authors of the Vedas. the recognised objectors. Vyasa. than hand down the oral tradition. as he says. In his introduction he establishes first the authority of the Mantras and of the Brahmanas. both Vidhis (rules) and Arthavadas (glosses). follows that the Vedas were the works of human authors. . l . p. uphold approximation towards the Vedas. a very comprehensive treatise on the subject. &c. thus in the case of the Kanaka. the non-human authorship of the Veda. he says. which had been denied.272 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. having written the Nyaya-mala-vistara. the Purvapakshin is ready witli a namely.' that is to 'Some people. Ka^Aa. they continue. and he means of course the Purvapakshins. mentary on the Rig-veda in He is a great authority matters connected with the Purva-Mimarasa. Valrniki. so also are the Yedas. are given us as the names of the authors of these branches of the Veda and hence it Veda.

can understand therefore why in the next Sutra. (raimini should appeal to a former Sutra in which he established that even the relation of words to their meanings is eternal. but only handed down a certain portion of the Veda.' as it were pro-vehens.HAS THE VEDA A SUPERHUMAN ORIGIN? because 273 we see in the Vedas themselves the mention Thus we read of a Babara of temporal matters. 6raimini. in answer to the inevitable Objector-general. or Babara Pravaham. This subject had been discussed before. which is the We Siddhanta or final conclusion. therefore. who had maintained that the relation between words and their meanings was conventional (6eo-ei). Babara imitating the sound. not as the name of a man. we may surely mistake the meaning of words. but existence from all eternity. done by showing that Ka^/ia did not compose. and hence the meaning of words of the Veda also. and that Babara Pravcaham was meant. Pravaham. or eternal. in this place. For as we may mistake mother-of-pearl for silver. It is seen from this that what is claimed for the not only revelation. and is Veda before the beginning of all time. the Purvapakshin. and Pravahana meaning 'carrying along. pre-temporal. therefore. established by men. &c. and hence cannot be prehistoric. but as a name of the wind. communicated to historical persons. could not have existed in times anterior to these persons mentioned in them. wishes us first of all to keep in mind that the words of the Vedas themselves are superhuman or supernatural. and thus fortified he next proceeds to answer the objections derived from such names as Kanaka. The Vedas. that sound itself is eternal. and therefore liable to error quite as much as the evidence of our senses. This is T . of a Kusuruvinda Auddalaki. nay.

274

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

Then follows a new objection taken from the fact that impossible or even absurd things occur in the Veda for instance, we read that trees or serpents
;

performed a
songs
fit

that an old ox sang foolish 1 Hence it is argued once for the Madras.
sacrifice, or

more that the Veda must have been made by human But the orthodox (raimini answers, No beings. for if it had been made by man, there could be no
;

injunction for the performance of sacrifices like the (ryotish toma, as a means of attaining Svarga or paradise, because no man could possibly know either the

means, or their effect and yet there is this injunction in the case of the 6ryotishoma, and other sacrifices
;

are not different from

it.

Such injunctions as Let a
'

man who
foma
'

desires paradise, sacrifice with the 6ryotishon the are not like a speech of a madman
;

contrary, they are most rational in pointing out the
object (paradise), in suggesting the

means (Soma,

c.),

and

mentioning (Dikshamya, &c.).

in

all

We

the necessary subsidiary acts see, therefore, that the com-

of the Veda are not unintelligible or absurd. we meet with such passages as that the trees and serpents performed certain sacrifices, we must recognise in them Arthavadas or glosses, conveying

mands

And

if

in our case indirect laudations of certain sacrifices,

as

even trees and serpents perform them, how much more should intelligent beings do
if

to say,
' !

'

if

the same

As, therefore,
(raitnini

human workmanship can
origin and

no flaws that might arise from be detected in the Veda,

concludes triumphantly that its superhuman its authority cannot be doubted.
Miidruku, see Muir, Sansk. Texts, II,

On

p.

482.

SUPPOSED ATHEISM OF PURVA-MIMAJUSA.

275

This must suffice to give a general idea of the character of the Purva-Mimamsa. may wonder

We

why

it

should ever have been raised to the rank of

a philosophical system by the side of the UttaraMim&msa or the Vedanta, but it is its method
rather than the matter to which

seems to have invested
This

it

applied, that with a certain importance.
it is

of discussing questions has been adopted in other branches of learning also, for instance, by the highest legal authorities in trying
it

Mimamsa method

to settle contested questions of law. meet with in other systems of philosophy also as the recog-

We

nised

method

of discussing various opinions before

arriving at a final conclusion. There are some curious subjects discussed by (raimini, such as what authority can be claimed for

from revelation, how far the recognised customs of certain countries should be followed or rejected, what words are to be contradition, as different

sidered as correct or incorrect
or

;

or again,

how a good

bad

act,

after

it

has been performed can, in

spite of the lapse of time, produce good or bad results for the performer. All this is certainly of

interest to the

student of Indian literature, but

hardly to the student of philosophy, as such.
Supposed Atheism of Purva-Mim&wsa.
point seems to require our attention, namely, the charge of atheism that has been brought This sounds a very against (raimini's Mimamsa.

One more

strange charge after what we have seen of the character of this philosophy, of its regard for the Veda, and the defence of its revealed character,
nay,
its insistence

on the conscientious observance
T 2

276
of
all

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

ceremonial injunctions. Still, it has been both in ancient and in modern times. So brought
early a philosopher as Kumarila Bha^a tells us that the Mima/nsa had been treated in the world
as a Lokayata
l
,

i.

e.

an atheistic system, but that
re-establish
it

he was

anxious

to

as

orthodox.

Professor Banerjea- tells us that Prabhakara also, the other commentator of the Mima/msa, had openly
treated this system as atheistic, and we shall meet with a passage from the Padma-Pura?ia supporting the same view. However, there seems to be a mis-

understanding here. Atheistic has always meant a great many things, so much so that even the most
could be imagined, the Vedanta, has, like that of Spinoza, been accused of The reason is this. The author of the atheism.
pantheistic

system

that

Vedanta-Sutras,Bcidaraya?ia, after having established the omnipresence of Brahman (III, 2, 36-37) by quoting a number of passages from the Veda, such
as

'Brahman
is all

is all
'

this' (Mu^cZ.

Up.

II, 2,

1

1),

'the

Self

this

show

(III, 2,

(A"Mnd. Up. VII, 25, 2), proceeds to 38) that the rewards also of all works

proceed directly or indirectly from Brahman. There were, however, two opinions on this point, one, that

the works themselves produce their fruit without any divine interference, and in cases where the fruit
does not appear at once, that there
is

eensuous

principle, direct result of a deed,

called

Apiirva, which
actions

a superis the

and produces
all

fruit at a later

time
1

;

the other, that

are directly or

Lokayata is explained by Childers, s.v., as controversy on fabulous or absurd points, but in the Amba/Ma-Suttu, I. ,3, it is mentioned as forming part ot the studies proper for a Brahman.
2

Muir, III, 95.

SUPPOSED ATHEISM OF PURVA-MIMAMSA.
indirectly requited

277

by the Lord. The latter opinion, which is adopted by Badarayana, is supported by a quotation from Bn'h. Up. IV, 4, 24, This is indeed the great, unborn Self, the giver of food, the giver of
'

we are informed by next Sutra, accepted the former Badaraya^a The command that he who is desirous of opinion. the heavenly world should sacrifice,' implies, as he holds, a reward of the sacrificer by means of the
wealth.'
(jaimini, however, as

in the

'

and not by any other agent. But how a sacrifice, when it had been performed and was ended, could produce any reward, is difficult
sacrifice itself,

to understand. In order to explain this, 6raimini assumes that there was a result, viz. an invisible something, a kind of after-state of a deed or an invisible antecedent state of the result, something Apurva or miraculous, which represented the reward inherent in good works. And he adds, that if we supposed that the Lord himself caused rewards

men, we should often have to accuse him of cruelty and partiality

and punishments and that
it

for the acts of

;

is

better therefore to allow that

all

works, good or bad, produce their own results, or, in other words, that for the moral government of the

world no Lord
Here, then,

is

wanted.
see the real state of the case as

we

between (7aimini and Badarayana. Graimini would not make the Lord responsible for the injustice that seems to prevail in the world, and hence reduced everything to cause and effect, and saw in the inequalities of the world the natural result of the
continued action of good or evil acts. This surely was not atheism, rather was it an attempt to clear the Lord from those charges of cruelty or undue

278

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

partiality which have so often been brought against him. It was but another attempt at justifying the

wisdom of God, an ancient Theodicee,
ever

that,

what-

the

we may think of name of atheism.

it,

certainly did not deserve

however, thought otherwise, and quoting himself, he says, Badarayana thinks the Lord to be the cause of the fruits of action/ and

Badarayana,

'

even the cause of these actions themselves, as we may learn from a well-known Vedic passage (Kaush. Up. Ill, 8) He makes whomsoever he wishes to lead up from these worlds,
is
'
:

he adds that he

do good deeds and makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do bad deeds.'
;

Atheism
those

is

a charge very freely brought against

who deny certain characteristics predicated of the Deity, but do not mean thereby to deny its If the Mimamsakas were called atheists, existence.
it

meant no more than that they
/

tried to iustify the J
*J

But, once having ways were accused of ever so been called atheists, they many things. In a passage quoted by Professor
of
in their

God

own way.

Banerjea from a modern work, the Vidvan-modatararigmi, we read They say there is no God, or world nor has the world any sustainer maker of the
'
:

;

or destroyer

;

for

every

man

conformity with his maker of the Veda, for

own

obtains a recompense in works. Neither is there any

its

words are
Its
it

eternal,

and

their
is

arrangement
from
all

is

eternal.

authoritativeness

self-demonstrated, for since
eternity

has been established
be dependent upon

how can
'

it

This shows how the Mimamanything but itself ? sakas have been misunderstood by the Vedantists,

and how much $awkara

is

at cross-purposes with

IS

THE PURVA-MIMAMSA A PHILOSOPHY

?

279

(raimini.

What

has happened in this case in India

is what always happens when people resort to names of abuse rather than to an exchange of ideas. Surely a Deity, though it does not cause us to act, and

does not itself reward or punish us, is not thereby a non-existent Deity. Modern Vedantists also are
so
is,

enamoured of their own conception of Deity, that of Brahman or Atman, that they do not hesitate,

Vivekananda, for instance, in his recent address on Practical Vedanta, 1896, to charge those who He is the atheist,' differ from himself with atheism.
like
'

he writes,

'

who

does not believe in himself.

believing in the glory of

your own

soul

is

Not what the

Vedanta
Is the

calls atheism.'

Pftrva-Mimawsa a system of Philosophy?

Let me say once more that, in allowing a place to the Purva-Mimamsa among the six systems of Indian
Philosophy, I was chiefly influenced by the fact that from an Indian point of view it always held such

a place, and that by omitting it a gap would have been left in the general outline of the philosophic thought of India. Some native philosophers go so

both systems, that of (raimini and Badarayana, by the same name of Mimamsa, but to look upon them as forming one whole. They actually take the words in the first Sutra of the
far as not only to call
'

Vedanta-philosophy,

Now

then a desire to know

Brahman,' as pointing back to (raimini's Sutras and
as thereby implying that the

be studied

first,

Purva-Mimamsa should and should be followed by a study
Besides, the
his

of the Uttara-MimamsEi afterwards.

authors of the other five systems frequently refer to
(raimini as

an independent thinker, and though

280

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

sacrificial system of the Veda would seem to us to deserve the name of a system hardly

treatment of the

of philosophy, he has nevertheless touched on

many

a problem which
thought.
different

falls clearly

within that sphere of

Our idea of a system of philosophy is from the Indian conception of a Darsana.

meaning philosophy, as a love of comes nearest to the Sanskrit 6ri(//iasa, wisdom, a desire to know, if not a desire to be wise. If we take philosophy in the sense of an examination of our means of knowledge (Epistemology), or with Kant as an inquiry into the limits of human knowledge, there would be nothing corresponding to it in
In
its

original

based, not on independent reasoning, but on the authority of the /Sruti, would lose \vith us its claim to the title
India.

Even the Vedanta,

so far as

it is

of philosophy. But we have only to waive the claim of infallibility put forward by Badarayana in favour of the utterances of the sages of the Upanishads,

and treat them as simple human witnesses to the truth, and we should then find in the systematic
arrangement of these utterances by Badarayarza, a real philosophy, a complete view of the Kosmos in which we live, like those that have been put forward

by the great thinkers of the philosophical countries of the world, Greece, Italy, Germany, France, and
England.

CHAPTER

VI.

Samkhya-Philosophy.

HAVING- explored two of the recognised systems of Indian philosophy, so far as it seemed necessary in a general survey of the work done by the ancient thinkers of India, we must now return and enter
once more into the densely entangled and almost impervious growth of thought from which all the

high roads leading towards real and definite systems of philosophy have emerged, branching off in different directions.

seems to me, by far the most important for the whole intellectual development of India, the Vedanta, has been mapped out by us at least in its broad
of these and, as
it

One

outlines.

It seemed to me undesirable to enter here on an examination of what has been called the later Vedanta which can be studied in such works as the Pan&adasi or the Vedanta-Sara, and in many

popular treatises both in prose and in verse.
Later Vedanta mixed with Sawkhya.
It

would be unfair and

unhistorical, however, to

look upon this later development of the Vedanta as simply a deterioration of the old philosophy. Though
it is

certainly rather confused, if compared with the system as laid down in the old Vedanta-Sfttras,

282
it

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

represents to us what in the course of time became of the Vedanta, when taught and discussed in the different schools of philosophy in medieval

and modern

India.

What

strikes us

most

in it is

the mixture of Vedanta ideas with ideas borrowed
also

as it would seem, from Samkhya, but from Yoga, and Nyaya sources. But here again it is difficult to decide whether such ideas were actually borrowed from these systems in their
chiefly,

mon

whether they were originally comwhich in later times only had become property restricted to one or the other of the six systems of
finished state, or

In the Pa?U*adasi, for instance, we meet with the idea of Praknti, nature, which we
philosophy.
are accustomed to consider as the peculiar property of the Sa/mkhya-system. This Prakrit! is said there
to be the reflection, or, as we should say, the shadow of Brahman, and to be possessed of the three Gunas or elements of goodness, passion, and darkness, or, as they are sometimes explained, of good, indifferent, and bad. This theory of the three Gu?;as, however,
is

altogether absent from the original Vedanta at least, it is not to be met with in the purely Veduntic
;

Upanishads,

occurring for the

first

time

in

the

/SVetasvatara Upanishad. Again in the later Vedanta works Avidya and Maya are used synonymously,
or, if

distinguished from one another, they are supposed to arise respectively from the more or less The omniscient, pure character of their substance
1
.

but personal tsvara is there explained as a reflection of Maya, but as having subdued her, while the

1

I

translate

Sattva

hero

by substance,
take
it

for

the

context

hardly allows that

we should

for the

Guna

of goodness.

LATER VEDANTA MIXED WITH SAJIfKHYA.
individual soul, Pragma or 6riva,
is

283

represented as

having been subdued by Avidya, and to be multiform, owing to the variety of Avidya. The individual
being endowed with a causal or subtle body, body to be its own, and hence error and suffering in all their variety. As to the desoul,

believes that

velopment of the world, we are told that it was by the command of Isvara that PrakHti, when dominated by darkness, produced the elements of ether, a,ir, fire, water and earth, all meant to be
enjoyed, that
souls.
is,

to be experienced

by the individual

this we can hardly be mistaken if we the influence of Samkhya ideas, obscuring recognise and vitiating the monism of the Vedanta, pure and

In

all

In that philosophy there is no room for a Second, or for a Prakn'ti, nor for the three Gums, nor for anything real by the side of Brahman.
simple.

How

that influence was exercised

we cannot

discover, possible that in ancient times already there existed this influence of one philosophical system upon the other, for we see even
it is

and

some of the Upanishads a certain mixture of what we should afterwards have to call the disin

tinctive teaching of Vedanta,

philosophy. idea of private property in any philosophic truth did hardly exist. The individual, as we saw before,

We

Samkhya, or Yogamust remember that in India the

was of little consequence, and could never exercise the same influence which such thinkers as Socrates
or Plato exercised in Greece.

If the descriptions of

life emanating from the Indians themselves, and from other nations they came in contact with, whether Greek conquerors or Chinese pilgrims, can

Indian

284

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

be trusted,
or as private,

we may

well understand that
to be truth,

truth,

what was taken

was treated not but as common property. If there was

an exchange of ideas among the Indian seekers after truth, it was far more in the nature of cooperation towards a common end, than in the
assertion

any claims of originality or priority That one man should write by and publish his philosophical views in a book and that another should read and criticise that book or carry on the work where it had been left, was
of

individual teachers.

;

If never thought of in India in ancient times. A. referred to B. often, as they say, from mere civility, Pm/artham, B. would refer to A., but no

one would ever say, as so often happens with us, that he had anticipated the discovery of another,

some one else had stolen his ideas. Truth was not an article that, according to Hindu ideas, could ever be stolen. All that could happen and did happen was that certain opinions which had been discussed, sifted, and generally received in
or that

one Asrama, hermitage, Arama, garden, or Parishad, religious settlement, would in time be collected

by

its

members and reduced
form.

to

a more or less

systematic times we may

that form was in early see from the Brahmanas, and more

What

particularly from the Upanishads, i. e. Seances, gatherings of pupils round their teachers, or later on

from the Sutras.

It cannot be

doubted that these

Sutras presuppose, by their systematic form, a long continued intellectual labour, nay it seems to me difficult to account for their peculiar literary form except on the ground that they were meant to be
learnt by heart

and to be accompanied from the very

LATER VEDANTA MIXED WITH SA3/KHYA.

285

beginning by a running commentary, without which they would have been perfectly unintelligible. I suggested once before that this very peculiar style of the Sutras would receive the best historical explanation, if
it

could be proved that they represent

the
in

first

India.

attempts at writing for literary purposes Whatever the exact date may be of

the introduction of a sinistrorsum and dextrorsum

alphabet for epigraphic purposes in India (and in spite of all efforts not a single inscription has as yet been
discovered that can be referred with certainty to the period before Asoka, third century B. c.), every classical

knows that there always is a long interval between an epigraphic and a literary employment of the alphabet. People forget that a period marked
scholar

by written and a large
there
is

literary compositions requires a public, public, which is able to read, for where
is

no supply. Nor must we forget that the old system of a mnemonic literature, the Parampara, w as invested with a kind of sacred character, and would not have been easily
r

no demand there

surrendered.

The

old

mnemonic system was upheld

strict discipline which formed the principal of the established system of education in India, part as has been fully described in the Prati.sakhyas. They explain to us by what process, whatever

by a

existed at that time of literature, chiefly sacred,

was firmly imprinted on the memory of the young. These young pupils were in fact the books, the scribes were the Gurus, the tablet was the brain.

We
life

can hardly imagine such a state of literature,

and the transition from it to a written literature must have marked a new start in the intellectual
of the people at large, or at least of the educated

286
classes.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

Anybody who has come
feats

in contact

with

the Pandits of India has been able to observe the

wonderful

that

can

be

achieved by that

mnemonic
books,
texts.
.

discipline even at present, though it is dying out before our eyes at the approach of printed

nay of printed editions of
I

their

own
if

sacred

need hardly say that even

Biihler's

idea of the introduction of a Semitic alphabet into India by means of commercial travellers about 800
or 1000 B.C.

were more than a hypothesis,

it

would

not prove the existence of a written literature at The adaptation of a Semitic alphabet that time.
to the phonetic system as elaborated in the Prati-

sakhyas may date from the third, possibly from the fourth century B.C., but the use of that alphabet for inscriptions begins in the middle of the third
century only
;

and though we cannot deny the

possibility of its having been used for literary purposes at the same time, such possibilities would

form very dangerous landmarks in the chronology of Indian literature.

But whatever the
literature

may have

origin of the peculiar Sutrabeen and I give my hypothesis

as a

hypothesis only all scholars will probably agree that these Sutras could not be the work of one individual philosopher, but that we have in them the

outcome of previous centuries of thought, and the labours of numerous thinkers whose names are forgotten and will never be
last

the

final result of

recovered.
Relative

Age

of Philosophies and Sfttras.

If

we keep

this in mind,

we

shall see that the

question whether any of the texts of the

six philo-

I. while Gotama attacks in turn certain doctrines of Kapila and Bada- He does the same for the Yoga-Sutras in II. applicable to European literature. cised by Kapila. to whom .e. . 24 in the Sawkhya-Sutras which we possess. IV. I. relative ages of literary works. who is acquainted with Kapila. taking the one who is quoted or the predecessor who quotes. rayawa five and Badarayafta and because right to their systems show an acquaintance with the other systems of philosophy. which would be perfectly legitimate in Greek and Latin literature. Ka^ada was clearly acquainted with Gotama. 3. is really a question im- The tests for settling the possible to answer. It has ignores all anterior to all of been supposed. IV. are not applicable to Indian literature. because during its mnemonic period anything could be added and anything left out. actually adopts one of Badarayana's Sutras. arrange them in chronological succession. which occur rayana. and VI. because Patan^ali other systems. xviii. at Kapila.RELATIVE AGE OF PHILOSOPHIES AND SUTRAS. 33. Thus. III. i i and inserts it totidem verbis in his own work. if we as feel justified in one Greek author quotes another. that therefore he was them l . 46. 287 sophies which we now possess should be considered as older than any other. 1 Kajendralal Mitra. But all such conclusions. 5 and II.. before each system reached the form in which we possess it. . we have no Kanada. p. have no weight whatever in the literary history of India. is clearly critileast in our Kapila-Sutras. 34. contemporary of the one But because G'aimini quotes Bada6raimini. the S&mkhya-Sutras are ascribed.

and the Sutras which embody their teachings and have been handed down to us as the earliest documents within our reach. was the same as what we possess in Pata/lr/ali's Sutras of the Yoga-philosophy. . The Sutras of Kapila. It should be first observed that Vedanta also occurs for the in time the same SVetasvatara VI. i 3 and in several of the minor Upanishads. 22. classical We for look in vain in the so-called Upanishads the names of either Samkhya or Vedanta. are so little the work of the founder of that system. Yoga. with Yogins. known in those early times. that it would be far safer to treat them as the last arrangement of doctrines accumulated in one philosophical school during centuries of Parampanl It is easy to see that the Yogaor tradition. but Sa/wkhya occurs in the compound Samkhya-Yoga in the /SVetasvatara Up. But it by no means follows that the Yoga. which have come down to us. but while Pata%ali.Sutras cannot be earlier than the fourteenth century A. VI. and afterwards in All such indications may the smaller Upanishads. it is now generally admitted that our Sawkhya. Age of Kapila-Sfttras. It is necessary to distinguish carefully between the six philosophies as so many channels of thought. as a technical term. the reputed author of Yoga-Sutras has been referred to the second century B. occurs earlier than the name of any other system of philosophy. Up.C.D. 10 we meet even Sutras. and is mentioned in as early an authority as the Asvalayana-Gn'hyaIn the Maitray. It occurs in the Taittiriya and Ka^Aa Upanishads. philosophy presupposes a Sa?7ikhya-philosophy.. VI.288 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

who evidently knew the Sutras of the other systems. with individuals. if they had been in existence in his time ? . In the Bhagavad-git IJ. who. as. 5.. and the Even Madhava about 1350 A. quotes not a single Sutra from our Samkhya-Sutras... and the composition of which is assigned by Balasastrin to so far. never quotes from our Samkhya-Sutras and not. 39 we meet with the Samkhya as the name of a system of philosophy and likewise as a name of its adherents. as was then the fashion. Va&aspati Misra. It is quite possible that our Samkhya-Sutras may only be what of the old Sutras. to our Samkhya-Sutras their antiquity was first shaken by Dr. wrote also a commentary on them. for instance. such as PaMasikha. is of that modern date. whether from scattered MSS. FitzEdward Hall. the As author of the Samkhya-tattva-Kaumudi. He declares that they were all com- posed by the well-known Vi^/nana-Bhikshu who. V. Ra^avcartika. as we know.AGE OF KAPILA-SUTKAS. or from the recollection of less forgetful or forgotten If that was the case. Varshaganya. but appeals to older authorities only. why by no means follows that every one of the Sutras which we possess in the body of the Samkhya-Sutras. why should not certain portions of the Samkhya-Sutras have been preserved here and there. we should call the latest recension We know that in India the oral tradition of certain texts. was interrupted for a time and then restored again. according to Professor Garbe. can be safely referred to about 1150 A. so voluminous a work as the Mahabhashya . But we must not go too It late a period as the sixteenth century. and have been TJ . become valuable hereafter 289 for chronological purposes. the Sutras of Panini. D. D.

Karikas Alberuni. we are fortunate in being able to assign a much earlier and much more settled date if But we must to another work which for centuries seems to have formed the recognised authority for the followers of the Sa?7ikhya in India.is more than possible that our Sutras of the Samkhyaphilosophy contain some of the most ancient as well as the most modern Sutras.290 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. who wrote his account of India in the 1 See Hall. 361. Vedanta. Samkhya-Sara. 12 . as well as those of Lsvara-KHshfta and even of VigwanaBhikshu. p. PafU-asikha and Varshaga?iya. till they meet us at 'last in their final form. the so-called Sawkhyakarikas or the sixty. accept so very modern a date for our Kapila-Sutras. it . Asuri. Deusscn. at least in that final But if we literary form in which it has reached us. at so late a date as the fourteenth or even the sixteenth century ? It was no doubt a great shock to those who stood up for the great antiquity of Indian philosophy. That these Karikas are older than our Sutras could easily be proved by passages occurring among the Sutras which are almost literally taken from the 1 . the utterances of Kapila. may not be older than the time of Des Cartes. consider the circumstances of the case.nine or seventy Versus memoriales of Isvara-Krtshna (with three supple- mentary ones. equally ascribed to that author). Sawkhya-karikfts. added to or remodelled from time to time. p. . to have to confess that a work for which a most remote date had always been claimed.

told. another step backward. assigns his Native tradition. TTan-ti was not considered a good Chinese scholar.' the number supposed to refer to of verses in the Karika. a Tripkaka (lit. A. But though we are thus enabled Samkhya-karika to the sixth century A. Sawkhya und Yoga. it by no means follows that this work itself did not exist before that time. was well ac- quainted not only with Lsvara-K?^'shna's work. U 2 . as has been shown.Kan-ti true truth). Nanjio's Catalogue). made by . The name given is to it in Chinese. and his translation of the Abhidharma-Kosha-sastra. first 29! half of the eleventh century. 7. existence. For the Samkhya-karikas exist in a Chinese translation also. and was followed by the Kh&n He lived till 582 A.D.D. for instance.300 in B. in the reign of the . 1. with Gauc/apada's Nay. law-teacher of the Kh&\\ dynasty. ' the Golden Seventy Discourse.D. See Mayer's Chinese Header's Manual. less than twenty-eight of his translations now in (not 583)..C. had in consequence to be replaced by a new transto assign the lation by Hiouen-thsang. we can even make commentary on it 1 . and there are no dynasty.D. . possibly Paramartha. that of the Suvama-Saptati-sastra being the twenty-seventh (No.D. we are to the first century B. work 1 2 Garbe. which gives the exact dates. but likewise.SAMKHYA-KARIKAS. p. 547 A. 557 to 589 Paramartha came to China in about Emperor Wu-ti of the Lian dynasty which ruled in Southern China from 2 502 to 557 A.

the late Mr. places /Samkara much earlier. to translate portions of the Chinese commentary for me . 1887.D. informed Chinese translation of the commentary me was that the not. Date of Gatif/apada. but the specimens he sent me did not suffice to settle the question whether it was really a translation of Gauc?apada's commentary. with regard to the age of Gauc?apada. a translation of So much trouble may Gauc/apada's commentary. and could not in any sense be called. Beal could no longer be consulted I asked one of my Chinese pupils.. the author of the commentary on the Karikas. so difficulties arise But even here new we were informed by Beal. XIII. This commentary also. after carefully collating the Chinese translation with the Sanskrit commentary of Gauc/apiida. 95.. had been translated into but how is that possible Chinese before 582 A. Dr.292 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. D. and son or pupil of Govinda ? As Mr. in 590 A. without upsetting the little we know of Gauc/apada's $a?7ikara is represented as the pupil of date ? Govinda who was the pupil of Gauc^apada. and actually to have given the name of $a?ftkaradeva to his son in honour of the philosopher. . as is generally How then could he have supposed. and that Fleet. Takakusu.D. In order to escape from all these uncertainties I wrote once more to Japan to another pupil of mine. It but right to state here that Telang in the Indian Antiquary. $arakara's literary But career began. been the literary grandson of Gauc/apada. in the Indian Antiquary. assigns 630 to 655 as the latest date to King Vrishadeva of Nepal who is said to have re- ceived $a7ftkara at his court. is Jan. Kasawara. about 788 A. . and he.

the Sixty-doctrine. and. proclaimed by the greatest sage. it reached even Isvara-Kri'shria 2 He calls it the . The author of the Karikas informs us at the end of his work that this philothis difficulty sophy. and Asuri admitted that he was He then satisfied with the state of a GHhastha. and /Samkara's date need not be disturbed. had been communicated by him to Asuri. by an uninterrupted series of teachers. came a third time Paramartha. ! 293 be caused by one unguarded expression Anyhow is now removed. dutifulness (Dharma). Kipila (Kapila)/ he says.DATE OF GAUDAPADA. art thou satisfied with the state of a or householder ? GHhastha After a thousand years he came again. by Asuri to Pa?iA. . wisdom (Pragma). from Pan&asikha to Patan^ali l and had been widely taught until. whereupon Asuri quitted the state of a householder and became a pupil of These may be mere additions made by Kapila. 71. Kapila. that to him also Kapila and Asuri were persons of a distant past. and freedom (Moksha). separation from desires (Vairagya). e. as the Tattva-samasa adds. i. at all events. He saw a Brahman of the name of O-shu-li (Asuri) who had been worshipping heaven or the Devas for a thousand years. but they show. was a jRishi ' ' descended from the sky and was endowed with the four virtues. vv. Shashd-tantra.' to Asuri. 2 See Karika.asikha. and said to him ' : Asuri. . A similar account is given by Paramartha in his comment on the first verse. 1 This would seem to place the Tattva-samasa later than 70. Pata%ali.

such as were handed down for other branches of learning by oral tradition.294 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Tattva-samasa. in the form of Sutras. if 650 . what could have become of the real Samkhya-Sutras. But however far the Karikas of may go work rise back. but neither Karikas nor in stories in the the Tattva-samasa. an age that gave to other Karikas like BhartHhari's (about A. they did not. if they ever existed or. never to originate what we should call new and original thoughts. Everybody has wondered. a metrical in the style of a later age. There is clearly a great gap between the end of the Upanishad period and the literary period that was able to give rise to the metrical w. In what form could the Samkhya-philosophy have existed in that interval ? To judge from analogy we should certainly say. this cannot prove their posteriority to the Sutras as we have them but it shows that . at Isvara-Knshna's time there existed a body of as Samkhya-philosophy which contained such we find in our modern Sutras.svarathings comprehended under the name of Para- . D.) Karikas on grammar. why there should never have been such Sutras for so important a system of philosophy as the Samkhya. The Karikas themselves presuppose such a tradition quite as much as the much later Sutras which we possess. were omitted by I. also Besides these stories other K/'i'shna. they are what they are. therefore.ork of Isvara-Kristma. the illustrative stories contained in the fourth book of our Sutras. They are both meant to recapitulate what existed. When we see the Karikas declare that they leave out on purpose the Akhayikas.

and why was the proper text-book of the Samkhya-philosophy. and probably is so. sucb as those on the necessity of an Isvara. Sawkhya-prava&ana-bhashya. to Kapila.TATTVA-SAMASA. I ascribed to the same author. . When it agrees with the Karikas. could ' ' the scholiast of Kapila 2 may be should he not ? the Tattva-samasa Whether that Tattva-samasa not find a copy of it. 7. 295 v4da. as if what is new to us must be new chronologically also. trusted. Sutras of Paw&asikha be ' : so. On in it of its being the contrary there are several indications an earlier form of the Samkhya- philosophy than what we possess in the Karikas or in the Sutras.' he wrote. 2 I. and i. p. but that we are in actual possession of it. Under these circumstances I venture to say that such a work in Sutras not only existed.' And It appears from the Preface of again he wrote the Kapila-bhashya that a more compendious tract in the form of Sutras or aphorisms. namely in the much neglected Tattva-samasa. it has been put down at once as modern. but I find no other marks of a modern date in the body of the work. admit that the introductory portion of this tract sounds modern. Because it contains a number of new technical terms. if to justify Colebrooke told us Samkhya l long ago that. or whether the of Kapila be extant. bears the is title of Tattva-samasa. pp. 244. We know text of the far too little of the history of the so confident a conclusion. sometimes almost verbatim. e. probably controversies. Colebrooke. is not certain. it is the metrical text 1 Essays. no. It was a mere accident that he.

not the we prose the metrical version. and which are still absent from the Samkhya-karikas also. and why should he have found no excuse for the existence of the Kapila-Sutras except that they are short and complete. This is the way in which certain 1 Sawkhya-prava&ana-bhashya. and even supposed by some to have been himself the author of our modern Samkhya-Sutras. no mean authority on such matters. . It should also be mentioned that Vi^wana-Bhikshu. of the ancient Samkhya. while the Tattva-samasa is short and compact 1 ? able to find a MS. For why should he defend Kapila. The so-called Aisvaryas or superhuman powers. against the charge of Punarukti or giving us a mere useless repetition. Not being and thus it came to pass that most scholars have been under the impression that in India also this metrical version was considered as the most authoritative and most popular manual of the Samkhya-philosophy.296 that seems to INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and not the it for author of the Tattva-samasa. In the Sutras themselves find no allusion as yet to the atheistic or non- which distinguish the later texts of the Samkhya. might seem to presuppose the recognition of an Isvara. which are recognised in the Tattva-samasa. of the Tattva-samasa Colebrooke decided to translate instead the Sa?khyakarikas. takes granted that the Tattva-samasa was certainly prior to the Kapila-Sutras which we possess. Introduction. me to presuppose the prose. though this is very doubtful but the direct identification of Purusha with Brahman in the Tattva-samasa points certainly to an earlier and less pronounced Nirisvara or Lord-less character theistic doctrines .

the Samkhya is spoken of as Kala-vipluta. nor have I We several had access to any other MSS. Professor Wilson told me that. p. complains that it has been swallowed up by the sun of the time. p. if we consider the number of commentaries written on it 2 and the frequency of allusions to it which occur in other commentaries. and that but a small part of the moon of knowledge remained . 33. quotes one com- mentary by Kshemananda. but it is not quite clear to me whether this is the same as the one published by Ballantyne. Nor Karikas were hardly who had can we doubt that it in the part of India best known really an important and popular work.e. 3. 2 Five are mentioned by Hall in his Preface. while in the Bhagavata Purana I.. in his commentary on the Samkhya-Sutras (v. him rightly. during the whole of his intercourse with learned natives. 297 have learnt since from prepossessions arise. p. he met with one Brahman only who professed to be acquainted with the 1 Drift of the Sawkhya. where he resided. I.. 5). The comif I understand mentary published by Ballantyne is. It gives first what it calls the S&mkhya-Sutrara. these Ballantyne We known at all except to those seen Professor Wilson's English edition of them. l that at Benares. 10. while the Tattva-samasa was well known to all the native assistants whom he employed. called Samkhya-krama- dipika. . destroyed by time. must not forget that in modern times the in Samkhya-philosophy has ceased to be popular parts of India. i.TATTVA-SAMASA. 13. and then the Samasakhyastitra-vritti/z. anonymous. Hall. to Ballantyne was . Even in the sixteenth century Vi^nana-Bhikshu.

Bhikshu at least. c. and. may have been eclipsed by But if and what. which means no more than enumeration. Hall. it seems to me just the book that was wanted to fill the gap to which I referred before. it was considered to be in India. By itself it would fill a few pages only. as such. definitions without Some of them are mere any attempt at etymology.s-vara. exposition of the Samkhya. 1856. Both are called therefore Sa?>ikhyaas prava&ana. it would agree very well with the somewhat puzzling name of Samkhya. fesses to be. both the Samkhya-Sutras and the YogaSutras are really mere developments of the Tattvasamasa-Sutras. It is possible also that the very smallness of the Tattva-samasa it may have lowered in the eyes of native scholars. which is called An-i. According to Vi^/lanaBhikshu in his commentary on the Sutras (pp. name of Shashh-tantra. p. writings of this philosophical school. ed. and thereopposition to the Sawkhya.298 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. All other derivations of this title seem far-fetched commentaries. 1 10). . Hence we may well understand that Sawkhya MSS. 1 and that in time it more voluminous we accept it as what it proits compared with this. In fact it is a mere enumeration of topics. the Doctrine of the They are mentioned in the Preface to Hall's edition of tho Samkhya-pravaA'ana-bhashya. up to the time of Vign&na. or Lord-less. in Supreme Lord.. and Professor Bhandarkar (1. are scarce in India. 6. the latter adding the peculiar arguments in support of the existence of an Lsvara or fore called Sesvara. it is And the 1 here important to remark also that Sixty. and entirely absent in certain localities. 3) states that the very name of Sawkhya-prava&ana was unknown on his side of India.

in matters 1 These Anukramas have been very carefully published in the Anecdota Oxoniensia by Professor Macdonell. the Sarvanukrama and other Anukramanis described in my History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature 1 . and there is no other work in existence of which it could be called an abstract. to whom I had handed over my materials. which generally form the . 299 is given by Isvara-Krtstwa. starting-point of the whole system.philosophy. At first sight. which as containing the 17 (enumerated in 64 and 65). yet old Sutra-works. The smallness of the Tattva-samasa can hardly be used as an argument against its ever having been an important work. certainly not either of the Karikas or of the modern Sutras. no doubt. The three kinds of pain. more modern Samkhya works. relegated meet with technical subjects and technical terms which are 'not to be found at all in other and. for instance. or at all events the author of the 72nd of his Karikas. should by occur and be accounted for in the Tattva-samasa. the Tattva-samasa we find the straightforward detogether would claration ' : Iti tattva-samasakhya-samkhya-sutrani/ Here end the Samkhya-Sutras called Tattva-samasa. previously exhibited in 62 and 63. for instance. such as we possess them. as it We would seem. for we find similar short. Samasa seems to mean a mere abstract but Samasa may be used also in opposition to BHhat. However. .TATTVA-SAMASA. The whole arrangement is different from the other and more recent treatments of Samkhya . and the 33. are to the very end as a separate topic. together with the 10 Mulikarthas or fundamental facts which make up the sixty topics of the At the end of the 25 great topics of Shashri-tantra.

We there could arise in time the systematic arrangement and final representation of systems such as have been handed down to us in the Sutras of the Vedanta. with the limited means at our disposal. What weighs with me is the fact that Indian Pandits evidently considered the Tattva-samasa-Sutras as the original outlines of the Samkhya-philosophy. and as distinguished from the Sutras in which we possess them. I think we can enter the misgivings and fears of those who felt . while the idea that they are a later spurious pro- duction rests. we must avoid being too positive either or asserting the age and authenticity denying of Sanskrit texts. Anteriority of Vedanta or Sawkhya. though the commentary is. and the other schools. to attempt to prove the anteriority either of the would Vedanta or of the Samkhya. External or historical evidence we have none. on no real argument whatever. out positive proof. of the seeds scattered about in the Upanishads. of a later date. the Satkhya.300 of this kind in INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. All I can say is that there is no mark of modern age in their language. and internal evidence. can but seldom amount to can understand how. as systems of philosophy. as far as I can see at present. and admit that the Sawikhya-philosophy may have of the into been a kind of toning down of the extreme Monism Advaita Vedanta. It cannot be denied that in the Upanishad period Vedantic ideas are certainly more prevalent than I go even a step further those of the Sa/mkhya. though it may support a suggestion. It must be clear from all this how useless it be. no doubt.

that is. have caused difficulty or and the required surrender of all individuality on the part of the subject. of ourselves. would seem to have been the total denial of what is meant by the reality of the objective world. there are utterances that come very near to what we rather than Vedanta doctrines. at least as interpreted by the school which was represented rather than founded by $amkara. the two points which are most likely to given offence to ordinary consciences. Ksithsi Upanishads. and . though sacrificing the Isvara in order to save the reality of each Purusha. Maitray. know as Samkhya ideas Vedanta preponderate. of the soul. had an advantage over the Vedantists in admitting only. so decidedly in the Upani- shad literature.ANTERIORITY OF VEDANTA OR SAMKHYA. however. . Now. such as we find in the Samkhya. and it is quite possible that they may have given rise to another system free from these startling doctrines. such as Bodhayana and other Purv4Mryas. These are the points which seem most startling even to ourselves. for instance. These conflicting views of the world. They certainly formed the chief stumbling-block to Ramanm/a and those who had come before him. emerge already in the Upanishads and in a few of them. that we can well understand that in the oral tradition of the schools the Samkhya doctrines should have exercised a limited influence whatever favour they may have found with those who were repelled by the extreme views of The followers of Kapila the monistic Vedanta. and of God. the $vetasvatara. startled 30! by the unflinching Monism of the Vedanta. and led them to propound their own more human interpretation of the Vedanta.

302 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and when it allowed to the individual souls or (rivas also an independent character. and the illusory character of all that is objective. while the Sawkhya allowed at events the temporary reality of the objective world and the multiplicity of individual all . It should be of an Isvara or remembered that the denial personal Lord did not probably form part of the original Samkhya. or a something objective. To the people at large it would naturally seem as if the Vedanta taught the oneness of all individual souls or subjects in Brahman. the Vedanta unflinchingly following its straight course. and the Sa??ikhya was clearly dualistic when postulated nature. as presented to us in the Tattva-samasa. but as something real in the it ordinary sense of that word. independent of Brahman or Purusha. and disless appearing when that look ceased. and though far from proving that it was therefore to the Vedanta in its severest form. It would seem therefore that on these very important points the Samkhya was more conciliatory and less defiant to the common sense of this is posterior mankind than the Vedanta. though called into life and activity by the look of Purusha only. it might well be accepted as an indication that these two streams of thought followed parallel courses. a Prakriti. Dualism is always more popular than rigorous Monism. not only as the result of Avidya or Maya. starting from a common fund of ancient Vedic thoughts. avoiding certain whirlpools of thought which seemed dangerous to the ordinary swimmer. the other. the Sa/ttikhya. but diverging afterwards. They were also opposed to the common consciousness of man- kind in admitting the reality of individual souls.

such as the Vedaiitists. us so vital a point in every philosophy as theism or atheism. whatever we may think of its Yedic character. and so far it might seem to indicate . by means of this diplomacy. for the present Hamanu^a.impossible but the fact is that orthodoxy has a very different meaning in India from what it has with us. souls. Whether in its origin the is Samkhya was quite independent of the Veda.ATHEISM AND ORTHODOXY. But if so. difficult to scholars think that the recognition of the supreme authority of the $ruti was an after- Some thought with Kapila. like Of course. or whether. also could claim the authority of If that his interpretation of Badarayana's were so. he PurvaMryas in Sutras. This seems to us. to be raised to the same position which others. The Samkhya. Indian philosophers to' Even on what seems seem to have been able to come to an understanding and a compromise. the difference between the two systems would certainly seem to be irreconcilable. while minor differences between them would ment. say. never denies the authority of the Veda in so many words. we should be forced to admit philosophers wished. in India at least admit of a friendly adjust- Atheism and Orthodoxy. by orthodoxy was with them not much more than a recognition of the supreme authority of the Veda. We must remember that in the eyes of the Brahmans the Samkhya is atheistic and yet orthodox. a mere stroke of theological diplomacy. What we mean . though it may express a less decided submission to it. had occupied that the Samkhya before them . 303 we must leave it an open question whether the extreme monistic view of the Veda was due to $amkara.

This does not affect the authority of the . like Bnhaspati or It is It is quite another question whether it really carried out the spirit of the Veda. but it would show at the same time that Kapila. To judge from a passage in the beginning of the Samkhya-karikas it might seem indeed that Kapila placed his own philosophy above the Veda. the posteriority of the Samkhya. compared with philosophy or We must not forget that after all it is >Sruti or O revelation itself which declares that all remedies are palliative only. that is. particularly Buddha. and that other remedies enjoined by philosophy are likewise good but that of the two the latter are better. adopted by Kapila. and that real freedom (Moksha) suffering can be derived from philosophical knowledge only. v. 2). That *Sa??ikara. proves after all no more than that a difference of opinion existed between the two. as well as $awkara. from all than sacrifices or I. and that this is incomparably higher Veda as a whole. had tried to represent his philosophy as supported by passages from the Veda. important here to remember that the Sawnot only declared for the authority of the Veda. other meritorious acts (Sawkhya- pravaana 5). should deny the correctness of the interpretation of the Veda. more efficacious (Tattva Kaumudi. the great defender of Vedantism. enjoined by the Veda. as human knowledge. are good. of the Upanishads. . as a system of philosophy. khya but had never openly rejected it. But he really says no more there than that certain remedies for the removal of pain.304 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

perception. it possible sources of knowledge. inference. which clearly means received revelation or revelation from a trustworthy source. Nyaya. 36 he appeals to both Sicuti and revelation. while perception and inference are not. but in many places he appeals to $ruti/ alone. but is placed by him on an even higher pedestal. 5 by Aptasruti. I cannot bring myself to believe that this concession on the part of Kapila was a mere stance. artifice to escape the fate which. pramawam. 305 Authority of the Veda. or true may be. correct. no doubt. 147. where we read There is no denial of what is established ' x . Svata^- but are admitted to be confirmation. or. that with the true Samkhya philosopher the Veda does not possess that superhuman authority which is ascribed to it by Badarayana. $ruti can here the Veda and only considered as equal to sensuous perception inference. therefore. What authority Kapila assigns to the Veda may be gathered from what he says about the three and Aptava&ana. the word of a trustworthy explains Aptava&ana in v. though. the Veda as interpreted by Kapila. There are many passages where Kapila appeals quite naturally to $ruti or In I. that word. is shown by the fact that Kapila (Sutras V. And that the Veda is not the commentators may differ. person.AUTHORITY OP THE VEDA. That revelation is to be looked upon as superior to experience or sensuous perception is stated by him in so many words in I. 51) declares it to be self-evident. for in- befell Buddha. However He mean only. liable to error and to require Though it is true. reasoning. is the received.

80. ' They cannot be says so formed. because $ruti that they are formed of Ahamkara. the Sa??i- khya. 154. was simply one out of many attempts to solve the riddle of the world. like the Vedanta-philosophy. Kapila squashes the whole argument by a simple appeal to $ruti. and even the fact that it did not appeal to a personal Lord or creator. when the Nyaya philosophy tries to establish by reasoning that the organs of sense are formed of the elements. 22. and it seems There is full of meaning. or supposed to be so by the commentator. be condemned as superstitious and mischievous 2 As springing from the great mass of philosophic thought accumulated first in the Upanishads. was evidently at first riot considered sufficient to anathematise it as unorthodox or un-Vedic. III. $ruti. 147. 83. &c. IV. self-consciousness (II. 36. bondage arising from having to offer gifts to priests. 77. 20. 22.' he ' says. is which men are liable. 20) V Other passages where the authority of /Sruti is invoked as paramount by Kapila. but ought not to one called Dakshma-bandha. Sflwkhya hostile to Priesthood. II.306 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. one passage only in which a decidedly hostile feeling towards the Brahmanic priesthood may be discovered in Kapila's Sutras. 15. which seems to . mere Vikaras of Ahawkani? 2 See Tattva-samiisa 22 Sawjkliya-karikas 44. It was probably 1 But are not the elements .' by Again. may be found in SamkhyaSutras I. . Among the different kinds of bondage to be. It was probably at considered as neither orthodox nor unorthodox.

has often proved most mischievous. at a 307 later time when the Vedanta and other had already entrenched themselves behind systems revelation. in the present state of our knowledge. authoritative tradition as human. was safe under the shadow of the Veda.DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS. may We admit that the Samkhya has no need of the Veda. while the Vedanta. unless our conva&ana. or the Veda. as we catch glimpses of it now and then in the course of centuries. It is possible that there may have been originally a difference between $ruti. in the form in which it has reached us. Scholars of recognised authority have arrived at and given expression to convictions. riot only widely X 2 . not even essential part of the quite honest. that other systems. nay. to call one channel of philosophic thought. as its very name implied. ception of the development of Indian philosophy. revelation as not human. and that with Kapila the Veda was treated at first as coming under AptaBut however this may be. The result of this desire to fix dates. other. came to be considered as objectionable or unorthodox. but why should it appeal to it even on indifferent questions. having been proved un-Vedic. would be mere playing Parallel development of Philosophical Systems. it must be clear that. I know that other scholars maintain that with the Samkhya any appeal only. is entirely wrong. more ancient than the with words. where dates are impossible. as the highest authority much even on philosophical questions. whether Samkhya or Vedanta. to the Veda was an afterthought and not an original system. if the Veda had not been considered by it as of supreme authority. and Apta-va&ana.

Instead that early period already by the Vedanta. instead of being satisfied with taking things as Nebenein- ander. to the ascendency gained at owing. Both branched off. as a language. The chief cause of this confusion has been that. Brahmawas and they meet us again in some of the Upanishads. religion. parallel and formed under similar conditions. We meet with philosophical ideas of a Vedantic character. A reference to the history of language may make my meaning clearer. learn how.308 different. by a very natural tendency. though as yet in a very undecided form. time than productions in nor would any Sanskrit scholar deny that the Sutras of Badarayana are older than the Sa?nkhyaSutras. It is true that we know earlier literary productions in Greek at a literary much Latin. but diametrically opposed to each other. philosophy also formed at first beyond the we may of kind common property. springing from a common source and flowing on side by side in the same direction. . would seem. while the it Samkhya ideas stand out less prominently. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Greek. as far back as the hymns the of the Ilig-veda in . like language. cannot be a than Latin. far India and a In limits of any chronology. as we now possess the two. In their embryonic form they both go back to some indefinite date. we always wish to arrange things Nacheinander or in causal connection. mythology. No one would say that Greek was older than Latini Greek has some forms more primitive than Latin. from the time when the Aryan separation took place. but Latin also has some forms more primitive than Greek. But it for all that. slowly day older may be and almost imperceptibly at first.

The recognition of mendicant friars also. has begged through in the (Bhikshitva) begging (V). as a social institution. What remains of the chronological framework of Indian philosophy is in the end not much more than that both Vedanta and S&mkhya ideas existed before the rise of historical Buddhism.BUDDHISM SUBSEQUENT TO UPANISHADS. 5. the first or the third of the Asramas or Vanaprastha). a BrahmaA-arin is mentioned who has begged. 5. that passages in support of Sa/n-khya ideas occurring in certain of the older Upanishads were foisted in at a later time. it seems far more probable to me that they were survivals of an earlier period of as yet undifferentiated philosophical thought. 3. is so peculiar that occurrence in ancient Buddhist texts proves once for all the existence of some of these works before the rise of Buddhism. Ar. Manu and 2 afterwards. i. is fully recognised. The technical term for this . for instance. In the Kaush. but the right of begging. applied to the members of the Buddhist fraternity. Buddhism subsequent to Upanishads. seems to me simply taken over from the Brahmans. 309 of supposing. Ill and exactly the same compound. is BhikshaMry in the B-rih. Bhikkha- . that the name of Bhikshu does not occur in the classical whether in Upanishads. that the third and fourth Asramas are not only so clearly distinguished in early times as they are (BrahmaMrin in II. no doubt. The very name of Bhikkhu. however. we read of a man who a village and got nothing JTMnd. Up. The very name its of Upanishad. IV. comes from the same source. It is true. Up. Up.

The institution of the Vasso l . and taken over by the Buddhists from the Vedic Brahmans. . 3. Bhikkhu) were known before the rise of Buddhism. .) could have come from the same source only. name does not occur in the classical Upanishads but. and so is the quinquennial celebration is of the Pan&avarsha-parishad. we can hardly doubt that the three or four stages (Brahma&ari. Socially. I less have explained before why at present I attribute importance than I did formerly to the occurrence 1 S. That many of the technical terms of the Buddhists (Uposhadha. we find Asramin in the Maitray. so much so that it has been rightly said. Lalita-vistara. so that the fact that the substantive Bhikshu does not occur in the classical Upanishads can hardly be used as an argument to prove that the status of the mendicant friar ing of Buddhism. E. 2. Gaha^Ao. p. for instance. Up.310 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the retreat during the rainy season. the only Asramas that remained among the Buddhists were two. Mrya. the rainy season. and many other customs adopted by the Buddhists. n. as kept by the Brahmans. clearly taken over from the Varshas. Without Brahmanism no Buddhism. occurs in the Dhammapada 392 BhaikshaHry occurs also in the Mwic/aka I. Vanapa^Ao. that of the Grihins and that of the Bhikkhus. ing Asrama. 13. the as was not known before the spreadIt is true that in its social meanof the three or four stages. has long been known. &c. IV. 213. VIII. .

Samkhya. of a 31! number of Vaiseshika. and Vaiseshika. Yoga. ?) composed. but. while Hetuvidya can hardly be anything but Nyaya. we must abstain from using them for assigning any dates to their Sanskrit originals. Khan(Kalpa). Yoga. what would be most important for us. But until the dates of the various Chinese translations of the Life of meant for Buddha have been re-examined. possibly including Samkhya. He mentions Vyasa. the well. /Siksha. the author of the Ramayana. the passage so often quoted from the twelfth chapter would be of considerable value to us in forming an idea of Indian literature as it existed at the time when the Lalita-vistara here the names not (Nigha^u das. We find only of the Vedic glossary the Nigamas (part of Nirukta). Nirukta. Nyaya. known most king. here already called Bodhisattva . and titles. the names of Itihasas. astronomy (6ryotisha). in the Lalita- vistara. though not of the Vedanta-Sutras he knows Valmiki. has been ascribed to the first century A. Asvaghosha's Buddha-&arita. Atreya as a teacher of medicine.JTARITA. as a teacher of Yoga. By far the important passage in it for our present purpose is the conversation between Arac/a and the future Buddha. as the compiler We may of the Veda. the son of Sarasvati.D. which. with great probability. ritual three systems of philosophy also. perhaps place more reliance on Asvaghosha's Buddha-A-arita. and kanaka. Puranas. Vedas. If the date assigned by Stanislas Julien and others to certain Chinese translations of this work could be re-established. was originally grammar.ASVAGHOSHAS BUDDHA.

though the name of Samkhya does not occur. Vastu became Vattliu in Pali. This Arac/a it in the twelfth book.C. and we have actually the name of Kapila. and even a disciple of his is mentioned.vastu l also occurs. and was then probably retranslated into Sanskrit as Vastu.312 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. to the Vedanta has been met with in Asvaghosha's Buddha-arita. though the substitution of the Vedantic of name of Brahman for the Sawkhya name Purusha deserves attention. the name of Kapila does (XII. earlier state . because that alone means dwelling-place. were at all events reduced to writing in the century B. we find there also first views ascribed to the Brahmans of Buddha's time which clearly breathe the spirit of the Sa??ikhyaBut it would be very unsafe to say philosophy. the reputed author of that system. as the birthplace of Buddha and as the No reference dwelling of the famous sage Kapila. while Vastu means thing. ascribed to the first century A. more. D. . 2 1 ). If we consult the Buddhist Suttas. All we can fully 1 I write Vastu.. a clear reference to that philosophical system which is known to us under the name of Samkhya.. whatever the date of their original composition may have been. which. of Samkhya-philosophy. may clearly a teacher be of Sa??ikhya in an is and. The name of Kapila. Here then we have in a poem. and to maintain that such passages prove in any way the existence of developed systems of philosophy. or of anything very different from what we find already in certain Upanishads. Buddhist Suttas. and may be safely used therefore as historical evidence for that time.

Akshapada. Nigan^o Nataputta. Here. Buddha Purana are mentioned. Brthaspati are met with. works belonging to the age of Vedic literature. . Akshobhya. But we hear nothing of any literary compositions ascribed to B4daraya?ia. Another help for determining the existence of ancient Sutras and Bhashyas may be found in the GHhya-Sutras of Asvalayana and /S'amkhayana. We should remember that in the Buddhist Canon we find constant mention of Titthiyas or Tirthakas and their heretical systems of philosophy. Atman. Agita. Samkhya and Yoga-philosophies. Six con/Sa-svata. (raimini. Parmama. but again not a single specimen or extract from their compositions. Gotama of these names occur in the Buddhist Sanskrit texts also. but. as I pointed out in 1859 in 1 my History Samar5f?a-Phala-Sutta 3. and many more far as I know. Nitya (? Anitya). and from nowhere else. the names of the reputed authors of the six systems of Brahmanicphilosophy absent from the Tripi^aka. being the well-known founder Kassapa. 313 say is that there are a number of terms in the Suttas which are the very terms used in the Vedanta. such as the Lankavatara where the names of Kanada. . one of them. Pakudha and Sa^k/aya Nor are Makkhali. Asvalayana's Gnhya-Stltras. or Kanada. though it may be to the very end of what I call the Sutraperiod. there is not one of which we could say that it could have been taken from the Sutras only. Brahman. 1 . so tsvara.ASVALAYANA'S GS/HYA-S^TEAS. Dharma. such as temporaries of of (jrainism. Pataf^/ali. Some Kapila. Kapila.

Did Buddha borrow from Kapila I ? may seem very sceptical in all this. Paimgya. 4. we must . or even possible. it seems to me. without which. Mahabharata and Dharmaftaryas are out altogether. not only to the existence of Sutras. Suyagwa Audavahi. Su^atavaktra. as known to us in its Sutra form. Bhashyas. that instead of Bharata and Mahabharata. give the same list. Vadav& Pratitheyi. Mahapai?gya. neither the philosophical. 10. Vaisampayana. Sau^ami. nor the grammatical. . of the law. though leaving out a few names and adding others. (raimini. nor any other Sutras would ever have been intelligible. Aitareya. had as much we may learn from the fact How careful be. the Sakala (text). Siitras IV. ^Sakalya. but of Bhashyas or commentaries also. 10. left . Mahakaushitaka. Bharata (ninanti. Mancfavya. in the sense which we ourselves assign to borrowing. Paila. but such names as Sumantu. Mahaitareya. Gautama. as I said before. $a??ikhayana. Babhravya. of Ancient Sanskrit Literature. The most valuable part in both sets of Grihya-Sutras is their testifying at that early and probably pre-Buddhistic time. Bahavi. Manc/ukeya. 1 Buddha.314 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Mahaudavahi. Bharata. other MSS. Sulabh4 Maitreyi. 1 Sutras. the Bashkala (text). but I cannot even now bring myself to believe that the author of Buddhism borrowed from the Samkhya or any other definite final system of philosophy. read Bharatadharma/raryas while in the Samkhayana Gn'hya-Sutras IV. Gargi Va&aknavi. Mahabharata. The ^S^ikhayana G?^'hya/Saunaka. Asvalayana. teachers Gargya. Kahola Kaushitaka. we find not only the Rig-veda with all its subdivisions.

and (10) Devadhammikos. the latter belonging to the Digambara sects. while Munc/asavakos. Gotamakos. the tradition. But not one of these names helps us to a real chronological date. the Buddha. which could hardly have been established long before Buddha's appearance. (5) Paribba^akos.even when the names of the principal systems of philosophy and the names of their reputed authors are mentioned. or simply the general Parampara. (3) Muw<iasavakos. that his belief in Samsara or migration Who of souls It was borrowed from Badarayawa or Kapila ? belonged to everybody in India as much as a belief in Karman or the continuous working of deeds.e. such as (i) Agdvakos. for . how do we know that they anything written that we possess ? Unless we meet with verbatim quotations.DID BUDDHA BORROW FROM KAPILA ? 315 right to many of the so-called Sa?>ikhya or Yedanta ideas as Kapila or anybody else. (6) (9) Magandikos. i. Our difficulties are very great. would say. two things which should be It is carefully distinguished. Agdvakos and Nig&nthos are the names of (7aina ascetics. for instance. were told that in Professor Hardy's most valuable translation of We the Anguttara a number of philosophical sects were mentioned which existed at the time of Buddha's appearance. as handed down in various Asramas. if we lay hold of any- thing to save us from drowning while exploring the chronology of Indian literature. strange to see how often our hopes have been roused and disappointed. pupils of the shaveling. may In the great dearth of historical dates it no doubt be excusable. (7) Tedancfrkos. we can never know whether a certain book of a certain author is refer to intended. (2) Nigan^Aos. (4) 6ratilakos. and Gota- . that is. (8) Aviruddhakos.

Kapilas. by any desires. Jan. (ratilakos. with each other Of the six recognised systems of philosophy. Varaha-Mihira also. of their eponymous heroes or their written works. J. may again. . people of Magadha. makos would seem to be schools which owed their The other names existence to Buddha himself. if schools they were. in his Life of King Harslia. a name not clear to me. and and possibly Vedic. seventh. Ehys Davids. which have been referred to the sixth. 197. and eighth centuries A. while Devadhammikos are clearly worshippers of the ancient therefore Brahmanic. Not even Bana. but by no commonly supposed. knows indeed of Aupanishadas. S. All they teach is that at the time Brahmanic and Buddhist existing side means. ascetics. in constant con1 . Magandikos. Sawmyasins carrying the three staves. We get dates from the names of any of these schools. no historical national Devas. Buna's Harshafcarita.. Paribba^rakos. the Aupanishadas can hardly be meant for anybody . religious mendi- cants. as is flict sects were by side in large numbers.316 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. do we meet with actual quotations from our Sutras of in later works.. we do not hear a single word. would be Buddhists Aviruddhakos.e. 1898. but the Vedantins. Teda>ic/ikos. Ka^adas and if the Kapilas are the followers of the Sawkhya. have been intended for ascetics no longer impeded i. would be applicable both to Brahmanic and Buddhist sects. in the sixth Cf.D. Ka^adas the followers of the Vaiseshika school. A. the six Darsanas. K. if meant for Magadhikos.. p.

was the Yoga-philosophy. informs us that these Karikas contain the words of Kapila or of Pan&asikha. a strong argument in support of their non-existence in his time. the more. And here again. Hiouen-thsang likewise mentions a number of Nyaya works. for the unreserved acceptance of a purely conjectural date is very apt to inter- with the discovery of a real date. as is well known.. the pupil of Asuri. as I pointed out before. is no doubt. Does that prove that Gotama's Sutras were unknown in the seventh century of the 1 It may or may not.000 We Gathas. who was the pupil of Kapila. mentions The Chinese translator of the Karikas. but fere not Gotama's Nyaya-Sutras. He relates that Gimamati defeated a famous Samkhya philosopher name of Madhava. and all that Is vara. . We cannot be too careful in such matters. and not the Vaiseshika-Sutras by Kanada. he says not a word of the most important of them all. should not have mentioned those of the Samkhya. that therefore these Sutras did not exist in his time.). though he speaks of a number of Yoga works. while mentioning the Sutras of the other systems. D. century A. but again he tells us no His own special study. are told even that there were originally 60. as little as But it is no we may conclude from the fact that Hiouen-thsang translated the Vaiseshika-nikayadasapadartha-sastra by 6rrtana&andra.Krishna did was to select seventy of them two Karikas. D. likewise in the sixth century. proof. That MMhava (1350 for his seventy or seventy- A.BANAS HARSHAJTARITA. 317 Kapila and Kanabhu^ (Vaiseshika). but even this does not help us to the dates of any Sutras composed by them.

particularly the Karikas. but that would only show once more that they presuppose the existence of a commentary from the very first. as may be seen in the excellent editions and translations which we owe to Professor Garbe. M. they would always retain their value as showing us in how . and if I prefer to follow them count I give of that philosophy. India. I am quite aware that many scholars will object. as I believe. give us certainly better arranged accounts of that philosophy. are hardly more than a table of contents. p. the Tattva-samasaSutras are older than our Samkhya-Sutras. of Pata/i^ali J . What we possess in the shape of commentaries may not be very old. If. for commentaries may come and go 1 in different schools. it is true. 362. The Tattva-samasa. and will prefer the description of the Samkhya as given in the Karikas and in the Sutras.. their account of the Samkhya-philosophy would always possess its peculiar interest from a historical point of view while even if their priority with regard to the Karikas and Sutras be doubted. while the M. These Samasa-Sutras. Both of them. great a variety the systems of philosophy really existed in so large a country as India. Yet I doubt whether we may conclude from this that these Sutras did not exist at his time. If then I venture to call the Tattva-samasa the oldest record that has reached us of the Samkhyain the ac- philosophy.318 Sfttras INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. a mere S4mkhyam or Parisamkhya. . 1898. and I may now add to Satish Chandra Banerji.

now lost to us ? lication of The commentary on the Tattva-samasa. no doubt. u. the pubwhich we owe to Ballantyne. have revived the Sawkhya (Sawikhya-Sara. earth the highest (the summum bonum) do to be saved in ' ? What is truth ? What must I ? Kapila said. engraved on the memory of teachers and pupils. like a late tradition. for though absent in the Tattva-samasa and in the Karikas. though it may sound like a late tradition.' topics which are twenty-five Then number : follow the 1 In the Bhagavata-purawa I. certain A Brahman. ed. he said Reverend Sir. Where were they during the interval if not in Sutras or Karikas. his name. 319 Sutras which they intend to explain. 'I shall tell thee. What is here on nator) of the Samkhya ' : l . the Karikas. it would be very difficult to prove that it was so. but reminds us in some respects of the dialogue at the beginning of the Chinese translation But of the commentary on the Samkhya-karikas. begins witli an introduction which sounds. 3. Chronology is not a matter of taste that can be settled by mere impressions. would remain unchanged. p. . though left out in. How tenacious that philosophical ParampaKi was we can see from the pregnant fact that the Akhyayikas or stories. note). they reappear in our Samkhya-Sutras. Hall. the teacher (not necessarily the origi- and having declared his family. we are told. Kapila is said to 7. overcome by the three kinds of pain.THE TATTVA-SAMASA. took refuge with the great Tfo'shi Kapila. and his clan in order to become his pupil. must surely have existed both before and after the time of Isvara-Kn'srma.

The five Karmatmans.320 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. to bud- TV X. of eight kinds . II. The five Tanmatras (essences) of sound. . winds or vital spirits. The Prakriti as Avyakta (the non-dif. Manas (central organ or mind) 20-24. List of Twenty-five Tattvas. A1 .. / a 0> 9-13. of three . touch. V. The Adhibhtita instruments. ferentiated or undeveloped principle) The Buddhi (intellect). i. i VII. (active organs) 19. The sixteen ViMras (modifications). 14-18. i of The five Abhibuddhis (apprehensions). The five Buddhindriyas (perceptive organs) . kinds (Vaikarika. The Aha?nkara (the subject). and odour. I. five Karmendriyas . . The Traigunya (triad of forces). XII. . . The five Vilyus. kinds of Ahamkara. The eight Prakritis (primary and produc1. The Adhyatma / \ A referring to the thirteen VIII. Ihe Adhiuaivata v rin 11-1 tlln.' . XIII. five acts Buddhi or the Indriyas. . The Sahara (evolution). savour. The PratisafJiara (dissolution). { The . Tai^asa. The five Karmayonis (sources of activity). 2.e. The Mahabhutas (material ments) III. IX. colour. Bhutadi) 4-8. and the ten T Indnyas. IV. ele- 25. XT. VI. Ahamkara. The Purusha (Spirit or Self). tive elements). . 3. Manas.

Here then the Avyakta. XVIII. and 4-8. Bandha (bondage). and have given these titles or headings in Sanskrit. ninefold. Siddhi (perfection). which follows immediately on the Sutra. threefold. XXIV. XX. Moksha (freedom). with sixty-two XV. 2. shall often have to use these Sanskrit terms. (Nescience). Anugrahasarga (benevolent creation). is meant to elucidate their meaning. XIX. explained. because their English equivalents. Pramana (authorities).' The Avyakta. again in technical terms which will have to be explained ' ' : I. eightfold. XVI. As in the . XXIII. 3. He then continues ' : i . XVII. are too often unintelligible or misThis commentary leading without a commentary. threefold. five Tanmatras (transcendental elements). Now what are the eight PrakHtis V and he answers. XXI. Avidya subdivisions. and it does so on the whole satisfactorily. Mulikarthas (cardinal facts). Buddhi (light or perception). threefold. The commentator begins by asking. but the English word seems never to square the Sanskrit terms quite accurately. threefold. (creation of material elements). even when they can be found. 321 XIV. fivefold. Asakti (weakness). eight.THE AVYAKTA. Du/ikha I (pain). XXII. Bhutasarga fourteen. is neuter (the undeveloped). twenty-eightfold (nine Atushds and eight Asiddhis). The Avyakta (chaos). Ahamkara (subjectivity). Tushd (contentment). the i.

inaudible. without attributes. is a cow. Brahman 2 Pura (abode). are It is manifest. is And what is is called Buddhi (intellect) ? Buddhi through Adhyava'saya (ascertainment). intangible. such And why ? Because it has neither manifest. world various objects such as water-jars. in It is that which there regard to a cow.. nor has It is it any parts. but of an immaterial world. vases. Prasuta (productive). under certain circumstances Pradhana (principal). &c. nor end. indestructible. 2 Brahman seems out of place here. and to be synonymous with Purusha or Atman rather than with the Avyakta. Mahat in the sense of mind. And these are its synonyms. this (Pratipatti). Akshara (indestructible). &c. the conviction " This is so and so.' Buddhi. &c. cloth. the Avyakta not apprehended by the senses. pre-eminent. invisible. . unchanging. fall to Brahman as being what is called the substantial cause of the world." . words applicable to the Avyakta. this Avyakta is subtle. middle. but alone of all the eight PrakHtis unproduced (Aprasuta). from a Vedantic point of view. The learned eternal. but strictly 1 speaking Prakn'ti also would. not a horse this is a post. to be beyond what is great *. not otherwise. (darkness). Tamas : . as it would seem. declare it to be without beginning and middle.. ' 2. without beginning or end. Pradhanaka (chief). without savour and odour. Kshetra (field. and Pradhana in the sense of nature. is not so beginning.322 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. object). without parts. producing (Prasuta). And again. not a man. that is to say. It is given as a synonym of Purusha further on. Dhruva (unchanging). one only. seem hardly to be appropriate here. beds. but common to all. as the ear.

it would clearly presuppose the later phases. but likewise something that is knowable and determinable. even in its widest sense. it is impossible that this should have been its original meaning in the mind of Kapila. we can hardly help taking this Great Principle. and rendered capable of becoming at a later time the germ of Aha?7ikara (distinction of subject and object). it If taken in a psychological sense.BUDDHI. Manas. the Mahat. like Prakriti in the beginning. mind. apprehensive senses. If Buddhi meant only determi- nation (Adhyavasaya). or at least Tanmatras. in a cosmic sense. and as yet senseless Prakriti. But originally it must have been meant as Prak?^'ti illuminated and intellectualised.' is Buddhi. Only after PrakHti has become lighted up or perceptive. no doubt. as rendered capable of perception. such as Mahabhutas. only after mere material contact has become conscious- Y 2 . and no longer as dull matter. and the senses and the other organs of the soul. and Indriyas. as subjective. can only be PrakHti as lighted up. not only Ahamkara. yet The Buddhi or the Mahat must here be a phase tation of growth of the universe. the undeveloped. or of the determination of this and that. the possibility supplies. Manas. of individual perception also. this psychological acceptation is the Though accep- common Buddhi among native writers on Samkhya. but whatever native and Euro- Buddhi pean authorities may have to say. Now the first step after Avyakta. sense is more important than commentaries. and however violent our proceeding may in the cosmic seem. dull. in a later stage. the most wonderful phase of Prais generally taken here in its subjective or psychological sense. 323 Such kn'ti. Indriyas.

What may ' native interpreters have all - made on of Buddhi 23 be seen in their commentaries. and even the Tanmatras. whether general between subject and object (Aha??ikara). Banerji on p. dispassionateness. ' ' ' ' ' a complete forsaking of native guidance. can distinction. there seems no escape from it. human and is and tradition. knowledge. it is in . by contrasting them with their opposites. for instance. nay. (3) Vairagya. it cannot possibly be right as representing the first evolution of PrakHti from its chaotic state towards light and the possibility of perception.' This may considers external senses. then he Manas). (2) 6r/lana. vice. There are eight manifestations of this Buddhi (intellect). is the opposite of Adharma. revelation It is not opposed to. (i) Dharma. virtue. and we imagine the or individual. super- power. if it were no more than the act of fixing this or that in thought. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. As each of these requires explanation. as I on one side and this and that on the other. and their new relation as perceiver and perceived. It could not be the antecedent of Ahamkara. and saying that (i) Dharma. virtue. but unless a more reasonable and intelligible account can be given of Buddhi.324 ness. then he refers the be quite right in a later phase of the development of PrakHti. VaA'aspati Misra's commentary first his Karika : Every man uses (with the various objects to his Ego (Aha?wkara). (4) Aisvarya. namely. This may seem a very bold interpretation. I am glad to find that Mr. Manas. enjoined by >S'ruti and Smn'ti. and lastly he decides with his Buddhi what to do. C. 146 of his work arrives at much the same conclusion. he explains them by a very favourite process. S.

is the opposite of passion. Tamasa. Synonyms of Buddhi . upward. 2 1 give their This also seems out of place here. the (3) Vairagya. being able to assume the smallest form and weight. the great. the practice of the best people. These four kinds of intellect (Buddhi) are classed ' as Sattvika. i. and the elements (Bhuta). dark or Through going liberation. and consists in not being dependent on or influenced by external objects. discrimination. taken collectively. These Aisvaryas are believed in by Sawkhya and Yoga. the opposite of Agwana or ignorance. and are acquired by Yogins by means of long and painful practices. 2 Mahat. thought. and consists of the eight qualities such as Amman. &c. extreme minuteness. in its eight forms been de- are. the states of thought (Bhava). through superhuman power there comes unfettered movement. as a means.. through there takes place knowledge there arises through dispassionateness men are absorbed in Praknti (Prakrit ilaya?). knowledge. mind. . its and has happiness for 6r/iana or is outward mark. unless the Sawkhyas own meaning both to Brahman and Brahma. virtue. Pragma. Khyati. (4) Aisvarya. Brahma masc. e. dispassionateness. becomes the Upadhi or mental limitation of Brahma or Hirawyagarbha. such as sound. Thus has Buddhi scribed. is the opposite of powerlessness. $ruti.BUDDHI. Their opposites are classed as bad. &c. Manas. Mati. explained as the understanding of twenty-five subjects (Tattvas). superhuman power. 325 harmony (2) with. wisdom. In later times Buddhi. inspiration.

It is quite clear that in all these explanations continuity of meditation. Pragwanasantati. Srrm'ti. the other in the minuscule letters of a much later age. ' What is is called Aha??ikara ? And I he answers. Buddhi is only can we account for the statement that this Buddhi. because his wife and children are unhappy. is said to assume the form (Rupa) of virtue. and this consists in the belief that i.' >S'a?yikara in his commentary on the VedaritaSutras gives. it takes the four opposite forms of vice. in fact. I enjoy. rich. as it were. &c. assumption or misconception. and superhuman powers. in the old uncial writing that shows forth here We and there. to perception (Buddhindriya?ii) ? read the Samkhya-philosophy in two texts. thought. It Abhimana. though from a different point of view.326 Dhn'ti. giving the cosmic process. dominated by Tamas (Gu?ia of darkness). firmness. by powerful enemies. e. imagines that he . as when a man. he asks. knowledge. and as personal and that the idea of a cosmic stage of intellect. I taste. dispassionateness. memory. interpreted in a psychological or epistemological sense. I am lord and am Isvara. am in the sound. Now. Ahamkara. Thus intellectuality has been entirely forgotten. I and I I I smell. I see. shall be slain am some more instances. taken as intellect. I feel. How could this be possible before the distinction between subject and object has been realised by Aha??ikara. and DM. 3. devoted to virtue. if while. I hear. and before Buddhi has assumed the character of sense- have. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. one. if dominated by Sattva (Gu?za of purity). by me a man was slain. &c.

without the introduction of the Ego or I. are Vaikarika. Thus we are told that there are three or four . dependent on inference. whereas all these things do not pertain to him at all. Niranumana. after that matter has passed through Buddhi. deaf. sense. Sanumana. Buddhi cannot really act without a distinction of the universe into subject and object. that jumps. Ahamkara was so familiar in the sense of Egoism that. is stout. that he has desires. that he is dumb. walks. is in the Samkhya something developed out of primordial matter. I cannot see. and Ahamkara as a condition presupposed in any mental act of an individual thinker. luminous. like Buddhi. it was taken in its ordinary rather than in its technical Samkhya I quite admit that this is a somewhat bold how to get without it at a proper of the ancient Samkhya. thin. or fears. whatever it may mean in later times. impotent.' Here we must distinguish again between Ahamkara. Bhutadi. blind. its psychological interpretation is far more easy. objectively the creation of what is subjective and objective is ment of what the only possible meaning of the cosmic Ahamkara. or fair. as a cosmic power. must remember proceeding.AHAMKARA. or that he stands. but to Prak?^'ti only. modifying. the first of elements. is 327 unhappy. doubts. After that only do we watch the develop- is objective in general into what is But while this or that (the Tanmatras). Tair/asa. or ' he Synonyms of Ahamkara. not dependent on in- ference. but We that Ahamkara. or rather modifications of it. the rival understanding of the Vedanta. or something objective. which again is impossible without a Non-Ego.

e. Five Tanmatras. contact odour. dominated by the Ra^as(3) the Bhutadi. grave. (i) modifications of the Ahamk4ra. helps to do hidden works (4) the Sanumana Ahamkara is responsible . /foshabha. the very essence of our acts. such as Shac/r/a. F. Dliaivata. A. for unintentional evil works. rather confused. Madhyama. helps to do good works (2) the Tai^asa. savour. yet should be taken as an act of the production of Ego involves that of the Non-Ego. such as acute. matras the essence of sound. . while in another place the Tattva-samasa itself explains that Ahamkara Buddhi directed towards the perception of the nature of what is Self (subjective) or Not-Self (objective). Gandhara. C. G. are . ? What are the five Tan- he answers. circumfiexed. and the notes of the gamut. Pa/U'ama. and The essences of sound are perceived only. dominated by the Gunas. These five modes of Ahamkara are spoken of as Karmatmans also. . and thus divides the whole world into what is subjective and objective. E. but no longer as a cosmic potentia. i. 4-8. colour. The five sub(substances) stances or essences as emanating from Ahamkara. though at all events that the Aha?nkara is here treated as simply a moral agent. If it is asked. helps to do evil works dominated by the Tamas-gima. 1). Nishada. B. for unintentional good .328 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. dominated by the Sattva-gu?ia. in sounds Differences of sound. guwa. (5) the Niranumana. Though Ahamkara means only the production of Ego. shows This division. the Vaikarika.

these eight Prakritis only. astringent. Ami. . The essences of savour only. only. the answer is because they alone Prakurvanti. but no difference in the essence of colour. Differences of are perceived in savoursavour. from Avyakta to the Tanmatras. salt. . Asanta. not-pleasurable. Mahabhutas (?). offensive. .FIVE TANMATRAS. three being negations of the qualities of the Mahabhutas. according to the three Gunas preAnd if it is asked why ponderating in each. but there is no difference in the essence of savour. is colour are perceived in colourof colour. touch soft. such as and hot. sweet. Aghora. purple. black. and the great elements PrakHtis. are called Prakritis. are perceived. corrosive. acid. not-terrible. are perceived. but rough. and their synonyms. are said to be Avisesha. or evolve. not differentiated. Differences of touch. Amuc/Aa. perceived of sound. there is no difference in the essence of touch. The essences of only . slippery. such as pungent. perceived in odour such as sweet and odour. riot-stupid the last therefore not perceptible. such as white. Differences green. not to be experienced. bitter. cold. there yellow. are perceived. atomic. are perceived. but there is no difference in the essence of odour. Abhogya. natures. they alone bring forth. 329 but there is no difference in the essence in The essences of touch are perceived only. hard. though sometimes very inaccurate ones. red. are Differences The essences of odour of Thus have the essences been indicated : . .

the organ of excretion evacuation. the eleven sense five elements. the tongue' savour. Vaika' . the ear. a view of considerable antiquity. or perceptive organs. Their synonyms are. are represented as being of the same nature as the objects perceived. voice. if we only remember its ' 1 9. The ear perceives odour. the nose Being produced from the Tanmatras. Manas. and at the same time active like the Karmendriyas. 'The five Karmendriyas or organs of feet. and the Five Buddhindriyas. and the organ of generation. as perceptive. action. instruments. the organ of generation pleasure. the eye colour.' as its object sound. perform each its own work. the eyes. constitute the five Buddhindriyas. like the other organs.' Central organ of the senses or KOLVOV ala-OriTripiov might be the nearest approach to the meaning of Manas but mind may do. II. hands. as perceiving. If it be asked ' ' Which are the sixteen Vikaras ' or evolutions ? the answer is. Sixteen Vikaras.33 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. performs its acts of doubting and ascertaining. the skin touch. both perceptive and active. 14-18. The voice utters words.' organs (including Manas). the tongue. Sa??ikhya definition.' Manas. 'Now the organs are set forth. the skin. Five Karmendriyas. the hands work. Kara/ta. Thus have the eleven organs been explained. mind. . the organ of excretion. and the nose. the senses. 9-13. the feet perform movement.

not an agent. are the five Ether has one quality. and ether. pleasurable. imperishable ? .PURUSHA. sound. touch. touch. because rests in the body (Puri say ate). /Santa. not producing. rika. experiencer. scribed. modifications. fearful. appliances \ . Purusha objects. elements. omnipresent. 20-24. III. sound. shapes. Earth is possessed of five qualities. and savour. Air is possessed of two qualities. light. changing. sound. 25. Or Akshara. Niyata. perceptive. atomic. touch. 'The Mahabhutas.' are told. it subtle. 257. Light helps the other four by Here the we Air helps the other four by drying. AvadhHtani. and odour. helps the other four. special elements. without qualities. Siunkhya-Philosophie. species. colour. by being their support. : Thus Their synonyms are Bhutas. 2 p. are earth. seer.' (?). earth. kept under organ. Muc/Aa. spotless. 331 Padani. Water is possessed of colour. savour. and colour. sound. 'What is is the Purusha ' ? and the answer is without beginning. and because it serves I Because of its 1 Garbe. or gross elements. sound is and touch. Thus have the sixteen Vikaras been destupid. Why is it called Purusha it being old (Pura?iat). 2 Anu. air. Mahabhutas explained.' Purusha. special. Ghora. Aksha Five Mahabhfttas. Now it is ' asked. ripening. Vikaras. eternal. Water helps the other four by moistening. Tanu. ' Light possessed of three qualities. knower of is. Akritis. water. Bhutaviseshas. four qualities. Vigraha. Ether helps the other four by giving space. skin (or body ?).

one of the many names of the supreme deity. and no end of it. or end of it. Why Because it perceives ? the modifications of Prakrtti. and trouble. like the sky. by the side of Prat/apati.332 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. fanciful etymologies and we can hardly doubt that we have. Purusha also was probably used both for the divine and for the human side of the same power. a recollection of the Vedic Purusha. Visvakarman. not made. Why it is indifferent and without the qualities (Gimas). Why spot- Because neither good nor evil acts belong to the Purusha. And why but it is probably meant for no more than that we never perceive a beginning.' This is not a very satisfactory answer. omnipresent ? Because. in the name of Purusha. as Purohita (Director). no middle. and it was seer ? cannot be made. without qualities ? Because the qualities of is. middle. it reaches everything. pain. is the Purusha without beginning ? Because there is no beginning. It is the multiplicity only of the Purusha which ' is peculiar to the Sa??ikhya-philosophy. a time) pleasure. Why Why for perceptive ? Because it perceives (that Why good. Why cause eternal ? Because and bad are not found in it. Hira?iyagarbha. &c. being perceptive it Why enjoy er Be- perceives (for awhile) not an agent ? Because pain. These are. it can produce nothing. . and its extent is endless. Thus has the Purusha of the Sawkhya been described. of course. indifferent. the knower of body or of objects ? Because it Why pleasure and knows the less ? qualities of objective bodies.' . Like Brahman when conceived as Atman. Why not-producing? Because it has no seed. that is. Why is it subtle ? Because it is without parts and supersensuous.

i. there is no doubt. and Purusha. in the three divisions of Prakn'tis. and Manas). Akshara. smelling in nose. 4. indestructible. 2. Odour. Prakrit! (object). Tanmatras. He who knows these twenty-five substances. 3. 4. seeing in eye. Evacuating in Payu. Thus have the twenty-five substances been described. Kshetragwa. Brahman. poet. organs (Ragasa) (5 + i Manas (mind) Buddhindriyas. Mahabhutas (Tamasa). whatever stage of life he may be in. He. Vikaras. i. water (sabda + sparsa + rupa + rasa). Savour. 2. 1 . Buddhindriyas. or Buddhi (light 5 Tanmatras (Sattvika) (subtle elements). the eight Prakn'tis. Avyakta 2. not yet individualised). Nara. Karmendriyas. i. Touch. Te</as. first Purusha I (subject). viz. 5. ether (sabda). Moving in feet. Rupa. 1. a topknot. 3. 3. 2. the part of the Tattva-samasa is ended. and the Purusha. Sabda. I supposed it the relative pronoun could hardly be used as a might be meant for the indefinite pronoun is ya/ika/j. Self. name. and intelligence as Samashii. TvaA touch in skin. Ghraxa. 4. A'akshus. 4. Vayu. Here. Puman. Ahawzkara (subjectivation). 5 Karmendriyas. anybody. This verse is it often quoted by Samkhya philosophers. 1 As ya/i. 5. Colour. Pumgu^a^antugivaA. spirit. and whether he wear matted hair. Sound. 5. 3. Speaking in tongue. r. 5. 2. air (sabda + sparsa). he is liberated. Sa. Kavi. Generating in Upasth. hearing in ear. the sixteen Vikaras. Srotra.PURUSHA. Mahat | 3. 5 1. 10 Indriyas. a male living creature. Sparsa. Atmari. earth (sabda + sparsa + rupa + rasa + gandha). but this doubtful. or be shaven. Pi-ana. Pn'thivi. knower of objects or of the body. containing a list of the twenty-five Tattvas. Ap. Gihva. fire (sabda + sparsa + rupa). Grasping in hands. man. Akasa. . YaAkaA ] . Rasa. Gandha. seems. 333 The synonyms of Purusha are. tasting in tongue. male.

anger. . impurity. They are here taken as purely moral qualities. . these are called bad conduct. seems to me. these are called indifferent conduct. rudeness. sloth. would render the original conception of the Samkhya-philosophy quite unmeaning. he would do good actions only. of cosmical ideas which in the case of it We see here the same narrowing we had to point out before Buddhi and Ahamkara. dim and dark light. violence. mobile. never to Purusha apart from Prakriti. The three kinds of action But passion. displaying of supernatural powers. see here once more that the three Gmias We must have had originally a much wider meaning than is here described. de- votion to women. fault-finding. whereas originally they must have had a much larger cosmic sense. greed. and which. drowsiness. Is Purusha an Agent? Now follow a number of special questions. shown by change of coun(2) tenance. these qualities belong to nature as seen by the Purusha. freedom from hatred. (3) Madness. even when the Suwkhya We speaks of moral qualities. Is the Purusha an agent. which consists in kindness. lassitude. bad bright. indifferent. and there would not be the three different kinds of action. . which seemed to require fuller treatment. reflection. nihilism. control and restraint (of the organs). or is he not ? If Purusha were an agent. heavy. must never forget that. contrary ingredients of Prakrit! in its differentiation of good. They are not they are on the qualities or mere attributes at all . discontent. are (i) Good conduct. worthlessness. intoxication. The first is. called virtue (Dharma).334 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

29 :sees (aright) who by all respects performed looks upon actions as in Prakn'ti alone. and follows that Purusha is not the agent.' Ibid.' And then it is said (in the Bhagavad-gita III. and taking a wrong view of these Gimas which belong to Prakriti. neither acts nor suffers. because of the variety in the acts of pleasure. foolish and intoxicated by vain imagination and saying. a fool imagines that he the agent.' ' And He ' XIII. he becomes an agent. and upon the Self as never an agent. deluded by the conceit of the I (Ahawikara). health. imagines that the I : is the agent. Nay. pain. 31:This imperishable supreme Self. All this was made by me himself is ' and belongs to me.IS PURUSHA ONE OR MANY? 335 Three Guwas. confusion and purifying (of race). not to himself. trouble. Is that Purusha one or many? The answer to this question divides the Samkhya from the Vedanta-philosophy. XIII. though in reality he is unable by himself to bend even a straw. . even while staying in the body.' Is Purusha one or many? Now comes the important question. 2 7) 'Acts are effected by the qualities (Gunas) of PrakHti in every way. perceived in the world is clear that agency belongs to the Gunas. as it were. this triad is Whenever it it Deceived by passion and darkness. but the Self (Atman). The Sa?nkhya answer is that the Purusha is clearly many. from being without beginning and devoid of qualities.

I. occurs also Taitt. and other Sawikhya teachers describe Purusha as many. and so on in the . But teachers who follow the Vedanta. abode. 12. he is lord of that immortality which springs food. on account of the manifoldness indicated by form. all would be happy if one were unhappy. Hence purity of race. but many. such as Harihara. If there were but one Purusha.336 birth INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. all Pan&asikha and Pata/l^ali. liberation. Ill. The first from . 7 . Ar. health. immortality of the ordinary immortal gods 2. where we should I. that it is is water and Prar/apati ~. Yat annenadhirohati. Vedanta Sayings. that is Surya. 90. and in the Eig-veda X.S'vet. read. And why so ? Because (as the Vedanta says). that is Brahman. cf. Up. Up. birth. and they are mostly taken from the Upanishads. and death also on account of the stages in life (Asrama) and the difference of caste ( Vama). that is immortal. Thus Kapila. Purusha 1. Geschichte. Asuri. describe Purusha as one. . that is Vayu. there is fortune. 152. Ill. That is Agni. 1 These verses arc meant to represent the views of the Vedanta. Mahanar. 2. Vyasa and others. That is true. Hiranyagarbha. case of people affected by trouble. Sawih. i. Va#. i. 32. see Deussen. confusion of race. birth and death. is to be. not one Purusha. as the Vedantins hold. 2 p. 3. . society or loneliness. then if one were happy. that is /ifandramas. ' is all this. what has been and what is. all would be unhappy. that is pure. 15. that up by (sacrificial) he is beyond the l .

the master 6. ] . in the dog and the elephant. He is all substances everywhere. Gita V. in all whom all this 10. 13. 18. . (because knowledge 11. 4 string passes 1 vet. 337 it is it is indestructible. the source of all . glory of the sun it is . because of the existence of knowledge. 3 8. Up. that the sages know as Brahman. Brahmabindu Up. Up. and nothing greater. Shining through the qualities (Guna) of all the senses. For there is but one Self of beings. This Self of the world ? is one by whom was Self as made manifold Some speak is of the several. 12. cows. . Ill. whether moving or motionless. having mouth. 20. the Higher than which there is nothing else. z . settled in everybody. it stands covering everything 4. in the outcast. it was spread out. Ill. all. he by 9. Gita XIII. 2 3 Svet. in beasts. 9 . Up. gadflies. Bhag. and gnats. like the moon in the water. head and eyes everywhere. hearing everywhere in this world. that in which everything is absorbed. different in different people). 12.VEDANTA SAYINGS. all this is filled 5. nothing smaller. 17 . Cf. X. it is seen as one and as many. cf. dwells beings. Bhag. For he alone. and yet free from all the senses. in worms and insects. Wise 4 people see the same (Atman) in the Brahman. the great refuge of all 7. Having hands and feet everywhere. the Lord. As one and the same Mahanar. the Self of . 14. 2 of all. the great Self. the One stands like a tree planted in the sky by him and by the Purusha. &c. the highest point.

. in elephants. through gold. men. deer.. Brahman. gropings in the dark but the idea that if the one was right the other must be wrong. . All these views were at first no more than guesses at truth. and pearls. and silver. to that of systematised arid controversial philosophy. corals. Maya. and We see in these extracts a mixture of . Gunas. and were not felt to be altogether incompatible. and others. and the Purusha being many. Early Relation between Vedanta and Samkhya.' &c. &c. thus is one and the same Self to be known as dwelling everywhere in cows. but may also represent to us a period when these two views of the world were not yet finally differentiated. such as Purusha. such as Atman. belongs decidedly to a later period. the Samkhya philosophers are not altogether wrong when they maintain that their view also can be supported by Yedic authority. Though there is in the Upanishads which w e possess a of philosophic thought r decided preponderance of a Vedantic interpretation of the world. which remind us at once of the Vedanta-philosophy but even these terms are used far more freely in the Brahmawas and Upanishads than in the Darsanas. which are looked upon as the peculiar Samkhya. &c. Avidya. porcelain. . The Most relation between Samkhya and Vedanta is during the Upanishad-period scholars it by no means clear. There are certain technical terms. are given in the same breath.338 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Buddhi. property of the . seem to regard it as a kind of syn- cretism. jewels. Vedanta and Samkhya terms and ideas and in verse 10 the two views of Brahman being one.

Manas. is not in strict accordance with the systematic but still less does it represent to us Samkhya. as here described.' In the same Upanishad. beyond the mind is nothing. 5. Avyakta. that is : the highest being (Sattvam Uttamam). 8.' the Purusha. and obtains immortality. Avyakta. Beyond the Undeveloped all-pervading and that knows him is liberated. III. 7. 2. Thus we read in the Kanaka Up. vary slightly. beyond the mind is intellect (Buddhi). Arthas. 10. 7. Indriyas. 10. the Every creature imperceptible. Purusha. Z 2 MaMn Atma. successive The Even the two accounts. ii. VI. in the during the Upanishad-period. Ill. 339 nor are they always used in the same sense or in the same order by earlier and later authorities. 4. Purusha. 8. 6. Mahan Atma. beyond the undeveloped there is the Purusha. we read Beyond the senses is the mind. We get 7. showing to us how little of technical accuracy there was as yet Vedantic ideas. Beyond the Purusha is there ' the goal. . beyond this great (Self) is the highest. the Undeveloped. as given same Upanishad. VI. 1 1 : 'Beyond the senses are the objects (Artha).RELATION BETWEEN VEDANTA AND SAMKHYA. Buddhi. the highest point. is development. 1. Sattvam Uttamam. 3. the Great Self (Mahan Atma) there is beyond the intellect. higher than that being is the great Self (Mahan Atma). Indriyas. Manas. beyond the objects is the mind (Manas). Beyond the Great the Undeveloped (Avyakta).

lent of the Phenician certainly not an equivaMot. knowing the body. 5. they are implied by the Indriyas or senses. but even then it would only occupy the place of (rivatma. intangible. 61. the individualised Self. which is entirely intelligent. that is the live Buddhindriyas. present a in every single man. generally the first emanation of PrakHti in its undeveloped (Avyakta) state. xcvii. II. Mahfm Atm& looks conjectured many years ago like a Vedantic term. be replaced by Sattvam The omission Uttamam. And this part. But why should Buddhi. in his Introduction. II. As to 3. but difficult why It it is should be called Great is to say. the Highest Being ? The word may be meant for Buddhi.. and the Manas bhashya. and how could this be said to emanate from the Avyakta ? Another passage which reminds us of Sa?khya rather than of Vedanta-philosophy occurs in the He who has the Maitray. the Great. dwells of his own will here in part ' : . willing (Buddhi). called 1 See Samkhya-Sutras cf. the idea of parts (Awsa). as Professor Wilson l . 43. 71 . of the Arthas as objects would not signify. The Anubhuti-praka. 2 see Garbe. and belief in subject and object (Ahawk.340 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. I. the Ekadasakam is Sattvi- kam. as Indriyarthas. Up. and Thibaut's remarks .ira) is Pra/yapati. Sawkhya-pravafcana- p. attested by conceiving (Manas). and is very small. i8H. the five Kar.s'a roads Buddhipurvam. for Buddhi is often called Mahat. because. mendriyas. Deussen translates 3 Abuddhipurvam. where we read name of Purusha. man who is fast asleep awakes of his own will. see Vedanta-Sutras II. 1 8. p. 2 3 as invisible.

The whole passage. lotus-leaf. powered about. This passage does not contain much of Samkhya By and he the words Purusha and possibly Buddhipiirvam seem to allude to Kapila's ideas Other words rather than to those of Badarayana. like a drop of water on a but he. he sees not the creator. 341 him. taste. however.EELATION BETWEEN VEDANTA AND SAA/KHYA. called the elemental Self (Bhutatma) who. (Self) remains untainted. he becomes bewildered. touch. i. thus overpowered. . called Visva or Vaisvanara (Vedanta-sara. is obscure. 2.Upanishad. yet may here doctrines. III. the Bhutatman. Then this And the explanation. is in the power of the Gunas of Prakn'ti. Tau/asa and Pragma. abiding within him. so that his and that overis upward or downward. enters on a good or evil birth. Carried along by the Gimas. darkened. Then. and the five Mahabhutas (gross elements) also are called Bhuta. in the sense of Aha?nkara. by the pairs is (the opposites) he roams The five Tanmatras (of sound. and because thus bewildered. the holy Lord. Visva. such as Samkalpa. is the body made is the driver thereof. overcome by the bright and dark fruits course of action. be mentioned. e. Adhyavasaya and Abhimana. light. $ 138). body. point to the same source. and he who dwells in that body is called Bhutatman (the True. his immortal Atman elementary Atman).' intelligent. also. as reminding us of S&mkhya There we read There is indeed that ' : other different one. unless he is right in recognising here the germs of the later Vedantic ideas of a Pra^/apati. the aggregate of all these is called /Sarira. the intelligent. thought. and smell) are called Bhuta (elements). nor does the commentator help us much. One more passage of the Maitray.

upward in his course. fickle." &c. which is a compound of Tanmatras. this is mine. quoted sometimes as a synonym of Purusha. If. he enters into Abhimana (conceit of subject and He object). Upanishad. the Vedanta such terms as Atman and possibly Bhutatman. though likewise called Atman. unstable. though system. he enters on a good or evil birth. Up. as a bird is bound by a net. Nor could any be said to be purely objective. strictly speaking. In fact. however. like many other things in the Maitray. this Bhutatman fits neither into . full of devices. as Atman as Prakriti springs from him. This Bhutatman. It would therefore correspond to the Vedaritic (rivatman. $arira.' Here we see again a mixture of Samkhya and Vedanta ideas. it could not possibly stand for the Purusha of the Sawkhyas. and Mahabhutas. But if this Bhutatman is said to spring from Prak? viti. and that he dwells in the body. believing "I am he. or downward pairs. i itself says that the Atman of Bhutatman is another. binds himself by himself. and. pound to be looked as belonging to the The Maitray. and seems to have been borrowed from it when it occurs in some of the later Upanishads. cannot be supposed to stand here for Purusha. and. because their little Purusha does not spring from Prak?v'ti. Upanishad. crippled. overcome by the he roams about. Ill. It is a term peculiar to the Maitray. vacillating. it is upon Samkhyawe must remember that Atman. Bhutas. A comsuch as Bhuta-Purusha would be impossible. is by no means so clear as has sometimes been imagined. overcome afterwards by the fruits of what he has done. the Samkhya claiming such terms as Prakriti and Gums.342 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

in i. Upanishad is Niratman (selbstlos]. nor into the Samkhya-philosophy. In this all this we may possibly get a glimpse of a state of Indian philosophy which was. all we meet about 1 of with some more remarks Sattva. A similar mixture of philosophical terms meets us in the $vetasvatara Upanishad. Traiguwya. which is Vedanta. and on their philosophy as the result of a later syncretism. But though Upanishad Samkhya ideas would seem to Vedanta ideas are not excluded. where it Praknti. the three Gunas. and Maya. we have Pradhana. 10 Maya is directly identified with Purusha occurs in III. The very prevail. 13). Sawkhya should be here taken as the title of the two Samkhya and Yoga. but the name of Vedanta also is not absent. VI. difficult and rather obscure expression the Maitray. as yet. . which Samkhya. explained as systems. IV. at least the later Vedanta. or better still as one word. 12. evidently stands for Brahman. neither pure Samkhya nor pure Vedanta. Samkhyayoga.TRAIGU^YA. 10. name of Samkhya 1 and Yoga occurs (VI. and would rather seem to belong to a philosophy in which these two views of the world were not yet finally separated. an expression which would be impossible in the Vedanta- Another in philosophy. while in IV. 22. 343 the Vedanta. and is certainly perplexing even in the Samkhya. If now we first return to the Tattva-samasa. unless we look on these Upanishads as of a far more modern date. IV. In verse is I. It cannot well mean Priifung. for instance.

but is for the present it nor word herited best to retain Guna.. qualities. as Colebrooke had already warned us ignorance. attainment of what is it Passion evil. drowsiness. there being neither thought in English corresponding to Gu?ia. such as grief. ignorance. &c. In short it consists of trouble or madness. asks. intoxication. These three qualities. attainment of what In is wished for.' he says. complacency. and enter into its composition like different rivers forming one stream. In short is it consists of pain. but even with us We a definition of inherent qualities is by no means easy. and Tamas. contentment. goodness against taking the Gunas of the Smkhya in the sense of qualities. . Darkness . as defined in the Samkhya. though for a time retainConstituent parts ing their different colours. itc. nor our qualities without subOur commentary continues : He now the answer sion. ourselves have inour ideas of substance and quality from Greek and medieval philosophers. such as covering. mist. ' are not mere accidents of nature. separation. misery. is Goodness (Sattva) short consists of happiness. joy. is of endless variety. but are of its essence. &c. excitement. is. virtue. movement. patience. passion. Ra^as. of endless variety. disgust. such as calmness. of endless variety. What is the triad of Gu?ias ? and and Darkness.' ' ' ' might be a better rendering. considering that our substances never exist without stances. explained as dust. PasThe triad of Gu?^as means the three Guwas. the triad consists of Goodness.344 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. heaviness. sloth. lightness. darkness. purity. distress.

tain objects as meaning that ness in us. This is what is named Trai- Let it gunya. and mist by good. of the 345 ex- Thus plained. or as Hegel's thesis. we should remember that we also call sugar sweet. matter quality and what is qualified . being considered in the Samkhya as inseparable. passion all that excites. These Gunas act a very prominent part in Indian philosophy. These Gimas have been again and again explained as Dravyam. is far has the triad Gunas been be known that goodness is all that bright. &c.. Saw/iara cause of movement and and Pratisawytara. would be called its Gmias as much as the blue of the sky. light. in fact the beginning of creation. manifested in in morals nature by darkness. and indifferent.SAjYA'ARA AND PEATISA^A'ARA. with many applications and modifications. bad. Pratisafl&ara dissolution or re-involution. The four sides of a cube. What is San&ara and what is Pratisa?I&ara ? The answer is. see in the preponderance of any one of first and they them the activity in Prakriti or nature. V. antithesis and synthesis. and have quite entered into the sphere of popular thought. . these being . and darkness all that is not bright. We can best explain them by the general idea of two opposites and the middle term between them. VI. Evolution is as follows : From the Avyakta (undeveloped Praknti) before explained. it calls forth the sensation of sweet- The Hindus look upon the state of equilibrium of the three Gmias as perfect. for instance. Then comes the question. If the Samkhyas look on cer- happy instead of happifying. San&ara is evolution.

Buddhi into Avyakta (the undeveloped). the Buddhindriyas and Bhutadi (first of elements). as under the influence of llamas producing luminous. sub- of three kinds. modified of Sattva Tau/asa. Thus has dissolution been explained. From the modified or Vaikarika Aha??ikara. because it was never evolved out of anyKnow both Prakrit! and Purusha as having thing. (Spirit). 236. Tair/asa. Intellect is subjective. (essences) . ' Ahawkara .346 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. . what is to be received and perceived by p. essences. modified. From the Tanmatras. are produced the material This is the development or Sa/U'ara. Buddhi (intellect) arises. which under the influence of Tamas produces the gross material elements. that is. Aha??ikara into Buddhi (intellect). What is Adhibhuta ceived is objective. the Tanmatras .Philosophic. jectivity). Adhibhtlta. . Adhidaivata (pertaining to deity) ? To this it is answered. and Adhyatma (subjective). of Prak?'tti. Vaikarika. Bhutadi. Brahma is deity. and Adhidaivata. 1 Gurbe. Tanmatras. all being different forms The Undeveloped is nowhere dissolved. when superintended by the high and omnipresent Purusha intellect. what is to be perVII-IX. Pratisa?7/:ara or dissolution is as follows : The material elements are dissolved into the essences. Samkhya. no beginning. the essences and senses into Aha?kara. spring the gods and the senses from the first of elements. arises From this Buddhi. meant by (objective). and or this of eight kinds. it is Now asked. from the luminous. Ahamkara is subjective. Adhyatma. both. the substance of (conceit Aha??ikara is of I. elements.

is what is to be touched The eye is the deity. the properly what is qualities (Gu?^asvarupa^i). is the deity. Mitra is the deity. is subjective. the case of each of the thirteen instruments is there what is subjective. is the deity. Earth jective. Here ends (Gu?ias). ether. to be tasted is objective. The voice is subto be uttered is objective. -/Tandra. The ear is subjective. The two hands are subjective. what is to be grasped is objective. is what is to be smelled objective. The feet are subjective. objective. The organ of is excretion subjective. is the The skin is subjective. I I ought to say that in this and the subsequent paragraphs had often to be satisfied with giving the words such as they stand. AND ADHIDAIVATA. what is to be enjoyed is objective. learnt the substances. subjective. Agni. Whoever has forms of the objective. but 2 while they may be safely passed over by philosophical readers.ADHYATMA. is is the deity. the discussion of the Tattvas (substances) 2 . is is moon. Indra is the deity. Akasa. is to be conceived objective. Vayu. wind. what deity. fire. 1 Evidently taken already as god of the waters. is Vishnu is the deity. Varuna is the is ! The nose what is is subjective. Aditya. and the deity. . but is not united to them. ADHIBHUTA. without being myself able to connect any definite ideas with them. the sun. Manas. to be heard is objective. the deity. and the deity (Adhidaivatam) is freed from evil and released from all his sins he experiences the qualities . The tongue is subjective. I did not like to leave them out altogether. is the deity. what has to be gone over is objective. mind. tion is subjective. what is to be seen is objective. what is to be excreted The organ of generaobjective. Thus in Pragdpati. what deity. lord of creatures. it 347 is objective. Rudra what is is the deity.

an act conceit. desire of knowledge. desire. pertaining to the Karmendriyas.348 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. is The apprehension that this has to be done by me ascertainment an act of the intellect. Kriya. is wish. Abhibuddhis (5). such as speaking. The answer are the five Abhibuddhis (appreis. &c. X. Abhimana. an act of the intellect. Karmayonis (5). the act of the intellect. $raddha. Lkkhh. is said to consist in study of the Veda they may. At present most of them seem to me to consist of useless distinctions and hair-splitting definitions of words. desire. Now what ? hensions) ascertainment. conceit. Avividisha. Kartavyata. is action '. Kartavyata. Thus have five Abhibuddhis (apprehendhindriyas. is an act of the intellect pertaining to the BudKriya. They are Vyavasaya. an idea of the mind. action. I hope. /Sraddha. sions) been explained. energy.. 1 The text is somewhat doubtful.. determination to act or will.. the will of doing such acts as hearing. ? XL What is are the five Karmayonis The answer that they are Dhr/ti. . Abhimana. elicit from Sanskrit scholars some better elucidation than I am ablo to #ivo. for their objects. it is Ahamkara. O resolves or The character of Dhr/ti or energy is when a man and carries out his resolution. Vividisha. carelessness. is of the intellect. I/t&Aa. performed by the senses that have sound. &c. faith faithfulness. directed towards the perception of the nature of Self and not-Self. bliss. Sukha. . &c. faith or faithfulness.

referring to each of the subjects with which Vividisha. What has to be known is the oneness (belonging to Prakn'ti). AvividisM or carelessness consists in the heart's being absorbed in the sweetness of sensual pleasures. and penance. Satkaryavada. 6rneyam. the separateness (ofPurushaandPraknti). subtle. in order sacrifices to obtain blessedness. and not-percipient. the desire of knowledge.KARMAYONIS. .. But Sukha or bliss arises when a man. sacrificing and causing sacrifices to be performed. . &c. but this is a mere guess. It a state belonging to Prakriti cause and effect.. I have taken Grneyft. Vividisha or desire of knowledge is the source of knowledge of thoughtful people. penance. and making Homa-oblations. devotes himself to knowledge. dishti is a state belonging to Prakriti which helps to destroy cause and effect by showing that they are one and the same. but may be excused in what is after all no more than an index. with real and this is products. is and probably corrupt. giving and receiving- proper gifts.. and Ballantyne has very properly left it It may mean that Vivialtogether untranslated. Thus have the five destroying is Karmayonis been explained (?). and not to be disturbed . Satkaryam refers to the cerned. (Prakr/ti) being eternal. I separate Sukshmam and take it in the sense of Sukshmatvam. being always engaged in penitential acts. 349 religious studentship. Vividisha. is conThe construction is very imperfect. Some the text for portions of these verses are obscure. The third line is quite unintelligible to me.

e. Samana. though springing from the Tanmatras. Vayus XII. Karmatmans XIII. The Vaikarika. 1 . Apana. The Bhutadi first of is the doer of bad works. the winds in the bodies of those who have bodies. What are the five Karmatmans. Sanuand Niranumana. They may have been intended to account for the vital processes which make the discovered. is action of the senses (Indriyas) and of other organs of the body also. of these winds has never been they are rendered by vital spirits. but their special functions organism are often stated differently by different authors. the (Ego as ? They are Vaikarika. because the Bhutas. The Tauyasa. Bhutadi. luminous. wind called Udana is superintended by the throat. are due to it. The wind nose. is Praa superintended by mouth and because it leads out or called moves by the navel. Bhutadi is used in the sense of Manas. '. nothing gained except explaining obscurum per obscurius. active) (5). (5). and Apana is superintended Apana because it leads away and moves downward. r Vyana is the all-pervader.350 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. possible. i. Udana. Tair/asa. It is called Udana because it goes upward and is The wind called moves out. modifying. called Prana called is and out. The wind called Samana is superintended by the heart. They form a kind of physical or AntaAkara^a. and Vyana. mana. What are the Vayus (winds) ? They are Prana. Thus have the five w inds been meaning If The real explained. is the doer of good works. but their original intention escapes us altogether. and is called Samana The because it leads equally and moves equally.

Ahamkara. namely with PrakHti. Here darkness and illusion are again each eightfold. Gloom unrestrained hatred. darkness. &c. utter gloom. &c. and the tenfold world of sense has been conquered. five Karmatmans been explained. great is XIV. colour. 351 If associated elements. XV. &c. great illusion. illusion. WEAKNESS. Avidya. darkness. whether heard or seen. What The is called the twenty-eightfold weakness ( faults of the eleven organs of sense and the seventeen faults of the intellect. Buddhi. gloom. is when one supposes oneself to be liberated in the ten states with regard to the objects of sound. Andhatamisra. illusion. Mahamoha..ASAKTT. is the misconception eighteenfold. Weakness (28). What Tamisra. such as minuteness and the rest. First. is the fivefold Avidya (Nescience) ? It Tamas. Moha. gloom and utter gloom are Tamas. is the misconception arising from the obtaimnent of supernatural powers. with inference (Sanumana). such as minuteness. directed against the eightfold superhuman powers. Moha. Nescience (5). Utter gloom is that distress which arises at the time of death after the eightfold human power has been acquired. is the doer of hidden works. Mahamoha. r Asakti. that Self is identical with things which are not Self. the Aha?ttkara is the doer if not associated of what is good and reasonable . with inference (Niranumana) it is the doer of what Thus have the is not good and not reasonable. with regard . and against the tenfold w^orld of sense causing is threefold pain. Thus has ignorance w ith sixty-two subdivisions been explained.. great illusion is tenfold. and the five Tanmatras. illusion. Avyakta.

. . perfections. been explained. Atushfa and Tushft. Asupara. The seventeen in . which are also called Asiddhis. addiction to en. perfection. the conviction . diversity is mistaken for phenomenal unity Sutara. . XVI. madness in the mind these are defects of the eleven organs. dumbness in the voice. (Prakrit!) in recognising the Atman in the Mahat consisting (Buddhi. the denial that the . there deafness in the ear. the contentments. leprosy in the skin. XVII. lameness in the feet. after hearing words only. when . Thus have the nine opposites of Tushd. is no Pradhana Tamasalina. the non-recognition of the Ego (Ahamkara) Avrish^i. contentment. joyment Anuttamambhasika. impotence the organ of generation. loss of smell in the nose. Asiddhis and Siddhis. crippledness in the hands. as. is to the organs of sense. are the causes of the elements Asutara. for instance. occupation in their preservation Asunetra. dullness in the tongue. Tanmatras. when. when after hearing that a man who knows the various principles . without seeing the evil of injury (to living beings). occupation in acquiring the objects of the senses . defects of the intellect are the opposites of the Tushds. contentments. intellect) Avidya. that there First then the opposites of the Tushfis or They are Ananta.352 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. without seeing that it is liable to be lost AsumarUika. the is opposite understood. blindness in the eye. Next follow the opposites of Siddhi. occupation for wealth. essences. and of the Siddhis. engaging in enjoyment . non-perfections: Atara. constipation in the organ of excretion.

Ignorance of a man of undecided mind even with regard to what has been taught him by a friend is But failure of an unfortunate man in obArasya. SuniariAika. If a man. though overcome by mental suffering. Pramodarnana. the opposite plained. are : Ogha. Sutara. though devoted and studying. either because of bad instruction or disregard on the part of the teacher. been ex- and the twenty-eightfold A^akti (weakness) finished. taining knowledge. Tarayanti. is Asatpramuditam. owing either to his obtuseness or to his intellect being impaired by false doctrines. does not succeed in knowing the twenty-five principles. this is Apramoda. posite. A a . that such a man is not liberated Ataratara. and Siddhis themselves. Vr/shfi. Sattviki. Prainoda. Tushfts and Siddhis. Siddhis are : 1 of the nine Salila. Thus the next pair also of Apramudita (mutually not delighted) and Apramodamana so that (mutually not delighting) should be considered. when a man. is not anxious to know. Thus have the eight Asiddhis. netra. but . Kainyaka. water. l I am afraid they are of very small importance that even what I have given of these long lists. Satpramudita. Some of these technical terms vary in different texts. being careless as to transmigration. Tushfis or contentments Sutara. Uttama The names Supara. but as their opposites have already been examined follow the Tushris Xext we may dispense with their enumeration here. to hearing ignorance. a man understands the op. Suof the eight Tara. Pramudita. is of the Siddhis or perfections. knowledge is no pleasure to him. (tattvas) is 353 liberated.TUSHTIS AND SIDDHIS. The names Ambhas.

an See Samkhya-tattva-kaumudl. and not very closely connected with the great problems of philosophy. SuA:i. of the sources of activity. Pada.. are not mentioned either in the Karikas or in the Sutras. seems to me. and this. 1 are with regard to its reality its having an (Astitva). surprising. for instance. which has been taken for a sign of their more recent date. If these technical terms were modern would occur more frequently modern works on the Sawkhya-philosophy. . as. Avadharita. inventions. in as XVIII. they do not. of Nescience with its sixty-two subdiviI though certainly meaningless to my mind. &c. to speak in favour of an early and independent origin of the Tattva-samasa and its commentary. which are so characteristic of the Sa??ikhya-philosophy. may have proved very tedious. but thought that they were of some importance historically. that is. may possibly serve to show how long and how minutely these philosophical questions must have been discussed in order to leave such spoils behind. I confess that in several cases many of these subdivisions seemed to me entirely meaningless. the most important subjects established by the Sa<khya They PrakHti or Pradhana. We have still to examine. and for a right appreciation of the methods of Indian philosophy. on the contrary. its oneness (Ekatva). they Mftlikarthas. 59. object or p.. as possible. the Mulikarthas or eight cardinal facts. This large number of technical terms is certainly sions. &c. but far as I know. though as briefly '. The long lists of the instruments and the acts of intellect.354 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Some of them.

however. Garbe also. intention (Arthavattva). reality. while Sthiti.SHASim-TANTRA. Mulikarthas. but it is meant as the reality of PrakHti only. which the with establishing as against the Vedantins who deny it with regard to Samkhya that is chiefly concerned objective. might seem to belong to both PrakHti and Purusha. all is Astitva with Purusha as well as with PrakHti. keeping it for the subject The only. whether he is called Purusha or Atman. probably with reference to the original number of verses in the Karika. his not being an agent (Akartritva). 355 and some one else (Pararthya). but that is more than mere Astitva. Shashft-tantra. and his being intended for They are with regard its They are with regard to being many (Bahutva). not 8. of little consequence. but this time by adding 17 Tushes and Siddhis. is The matter Atman khya or has of course never been doubted by SamVedanta philosophers. Astitva. is said to refer to the Sukshma. and thus The Chinese name presuparriving at 60 topics. unless Astitva is taken in the sense of phenomenal or perceptible The highest reality of the Purusha or the reality. both Prakriti and Purusha. durability. the 33 (Avidya 5 + Asakti 28) and 10. to Purusha his being different from Prakn'ti (Anyatva). Aa 2 . their temporary union and separation. the Sixty-doctrine. the poses a Saptati-sastra. or Seventy-treatise. It should be added that the commentator in this place accounts once more for the name of Shashdtantra. the gross and the subtle bodies. and Prof. connect commentator.and Sthula-sarira.

such as Pi. the animals. and immovable things consists of one. But even here the Tattva-samasa finished. shaped from the Tanmatras \ Bhtita-sarga. forming again 1 five classes. Indra. men. domestic animals. the creation of benevolence. Brahma. from immovable Sesha (world-serpent) down to worms things from the Pari^ata-tree (in paradise) down to grass. living is beings. i. consisting of good and evil spirits and gods. Tliis passage is very doubtful. only. Domestic animals are from cows down birds from to mice . Yakshas. unless we connect Man a with Tanmatra. creation conreptiles. XX. This gods. wild animals from lions down to jackals reptiles . Anugraha-sarga. so that the creation would be represented as made for man. Rakshas. the threefold creation. XIX. Garur/a down to gnats . created for them the so-called benevolent creation. and take measuring in the sense of perceiving. lit. After this divisions. Pragrapati. e. sists of and Brahma. follows the Bhuta-sarga in fourteen The divine creation has eight divisions.9aas. . . but as yet without a sphere in which their measuring or perceiving power could find scope. of man The human creation from Brahmans down to K&ndiil&s.356 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Gandharvas. for it goes is not yet on to explain the Anugrahasarga. after seeing these (the organs of sense ?) produced. consisting of and animals. wild animals. birds. The animated or plants. which is explained as the production of external objects from the five Tanmatras or subtle essences for the sake of the Purusha.

but they are thrown to the jackals.DAKSHItfA-BONDAGE. l . 329) and as long as a man considers . one to be fee'd ? In the Aitareya-Brahmana already we said to have been 1 readofYatis who condemned sacrifices. students. these as the highest. if if The bondage of the sixteen both to ascetics and to men of the they are subdued by the senses. GIFTS TO PRIESTS. 357 XXI. as before (pp. which are Vikaras.' to me very important. Dakshiwa-bondage. Karika 44. and who from misconception bestow sacrificial gifts on priests. bondage applies to those. Vikaras applies world. If it (Bandha) consists be asked what the threefold bondage in. That this See. they are devoted to objects of sense. if they are ignorant and deluded by passions. it is replied. whether householders. mendicants or anchorets. and it is strange that it should never have been pointed out as marking the unecclesiastical and unorthodox character of the What would have become Samkhya-philosophy of the Brahmans without their Dakshmas or fees. Gifts to Priests. whose minds are overcome by passions and delusions. is spoken of by the name of Prakriti- and thirdly bondage Vikara-bondage. . Bondage. 321. if their organs of sense are not in subjection. however. There are eight Prakritis. he is absorbed in PrakHti and bound by Prakn'ti. Bandha. In the eight Pra- kritis.in the sixteen Vikaras. and in Dakshma (gifts to often described priests). This last bondage seems through priestly gifts. the very name of a Brahman being Dakshimya. A verse is quoted here in support priestly : The * Bondage bondage.

and looked upon sacrifice and priestcraft as hindrances rather than as helps to true freedom and the spirit. as a preThis distinguishes Indian philosophy very favourably from other philoAll systems of philosophy in India admit sophies. the highest aim of Kapila's again of three kinds. importance of this question. and in concentration of the Purusha in himself. Pramawas. is of the passions of the senses. and from the destruction of merit and demerit there arises final beatitude consisting in complete detachment from the world. The Vedanta. Still each system of philosophy takes its is own view less of them. and . This Moksha. feeing of a priest should have been considered one of the three bondages shows at all events that the followers of Kapila were above superstition. as they have been fully examined before. according as it arises from increase of knowledge.35^ INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. looks upon the Veda as the only source of true knowledge. Moksha of XXII. and the character of determined by the view taken of the real nature of knowledge. Moksha. however. What is most creditable is that each system should have recogeach nised more or the liminary to every philosophy. or lastly from the destruction of the whole. from the quieting philosophy. Pratyaksha or perception of the senses as the first of Prama/^as. XXIII. From increase of know- ledge and quieting of the passions of the senses there arises the destruction of all that is commonly considered as merit and demerit . The three Pramanas which follow next require little explanation here.

and sandal wood. inference of fire from the rising of smoke. the principles. or nymphs of Svarga. right affirmation. the Tattvas also. learned. The Pramanas of the Mimamsa would apply to the world of Avidya or nescience See only. the king of the gods. XXIV. inference of water from the appearance of cranes. is illustrated by the usual examples. things. free from hatred Apta is arid passion. 14. and who can therefore be These three Prama?ias. is sometimes called Drish^am.DUJ7KHA. and endowed with relied upon. and AnuApta-va&ana (Samkhya). or measures. i.. word. the existence of Iridra. &c. What- ever cannot be proved by either sense or inference has to be accepted as Apta-va&ana. actually applies to ordinary three or it 359 the six name of Pratyaksha. the golden mountain. as. DuAkha. never to the true world of Brahman. We saw in the beginning how . mana. weighed by a balance. for instance. Munis such as Vasish^a must be accepted as authorities. Meru. inference. the Northern Kurus. the Bhavas (their modifications). is meant . times. for Sensuous what is perceived. all virtues. are measured or proved by the Prama?ias. The last paragraph in the Tattva-samasa points back to the first. the For all these Apsaras. such as. elemental substances. what is seen and instead of Veda we meet with >Sabda. man who is explained as a name for a assiduous in his work. but the meaning if it is the same. are so called because in the same way as in common life grains are measured by measures such as a Prastha. The names vary someVedanta-Sutras II. perception. and the Bhutas. inference of rain from the rising of clouds. &c.

envy. bile. whether produced by wind. anger. that the Tattva-samasa is older than either. &c. greed. separation from what is liked. without mixing it up with the Karikas or Sutras. &c. Adhidaivika caused by divine agents. is not born again. as a desire for water arises in a thirsty man. The True Meaning of the Sawkhya. thunderbolts. took refuge with the great Jfo'shi Kapila. Adhibhautika is pain that arises from other living is it is that beings. and thus is finished the commentary on the Sutras of the Tattva-samasa. a desire to know (the reason) arises in him. all under the direction of the Vedic pain that Devas. three- a Brahman was introduced who. But if I am right. is to be gained. Freedom from pain. I was cpiite aware that the Karikas or the Sutras might have supplied us with a clearer and better -arranged account of that philosophy. Adhibhautika.360 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and from the mind (Manas). or final beatitude.. If a Brahman is affected by this threefold pain. wind. &c. If we ask what was meant by that threefold pain. I have followed entirely the Tattva-samasa. folly. overcome by fold pain.. from a study of the Tattva-samasa. &c. heat. such as is thieves. such as is due to desire. wild beasts. the doctrine of the great sage Kapila. and Adhidaivika. rain. is cattle. it seemed to me more important that we should know what . the answer Adhyatmika. Adhyatmika is pain arising from the body. union with what is disliked. or phlegm. Whoever knows the philosophy which is contained This is in the Tattva-samasa. as we are told. as pain arising from cold. In giving an account of the Samkhya.

believing that he could procure for him entire freedom from all his troubles. If we were asked why such a system should ever have been imagined and elaborated. All we can learn is that a man crushed by the burden of what is called the threefold misery. no doubt. Nature of Pain. and it is world in which he found himself. should seek advice from a philosopher. we should indeed have little to answer. and . should have opened man's eyes to the fact that there was something wrong in the or limited in his nature. or what kind of comfort. all that is essential can be found in the Samasa. nor in the Tattva-samasa. and seeing no hope of relief either by means of good actions or of sacrifices. But though the Karikas and Sutras give us a more systematic account of the Sawkhya. do we find what we most value in every philosophy. which can promise no more than a temporary happiness on earth or in Heaven. an insight into the mind and heart of the founder of that philosophical system. By comparing the Tattva-samasa with the Karikas and Sutras. the Karikas. whether intellectual or moral. if only we try to arrange the dry facts for ourselves. the 361 Samkhya really was in its original form. we can easily see how this dry system was developed in later times. something like a really human sentiment. not only as actual suffering. such as Kapila.NATURE OF PAIN. It must be confessed. it could have afforded to any human being. We can well understand why pain. but as an appaacross Here we come rent anomaly or imperfection in the universe. that neither in the Sutras.

however low an opinion they may otherwise have formed of Indra and Agni. or deaf. How then could : they be the authors of suffering.' This seems 1 human by the ancient Indian philosophers. nay was first brought to life. were generally supposed to be good and just. quite intelligible that this consciousness of his limitation should have acted as the first impulse to an inquiry for the cause of it. great. was that all that seemed wrong in the world must have been the effect of causes. who shrink from charging any divine power with injustice or cruelty towards men. if not in this.362 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. small or life. This was the fundamental principle of their ethics. Jt was but another version of what we mean by eternal punishment. Visvakarman or Brahma. or mad. and it certainly did so in India. and an excellent principle it was. The gods or god. of deeds done. even in their imperfect conception. such as being born blind. nay even of Prar/apati. could ever be without its effect. for which the individual was clearly not responsible. in a wider sense. Here then it was that philosophy was called in. bodily or mental. for it has rightly been observed that . without which the world would it fall to pieces . particularly of that suffering. its reward or punishment. the origin of evil. then in a former No deed (Karman) good or bad. or dumb. must have existed already before this question of the origin of suffering could well have been mooted but religion seems rather to have increased the difficulty of the questioner than solved it. and the answer which to felt have been keenly gave as to the origin of suffering or. This would naturally lead on either to a religious or to a philosophical A religion solution.

there arose question which could not well be suppressed. eternal punishment for eternal love. off In order to achieve this deliverance from all suffering. Yes. however. a personal God. But this is again denied. it presupposes an eternal lover. or what was called Samsara. though allowing deeds to have their effects. as independent actors. from all the bondage of the He must world. they went so far as to admit at least the superintending care of a Divine Being.NATURE OF PAIN. and could not have been otherwise. because through an in- . namely. from all limitation. and with it all bodily sufferings might seem to end. though the seeds themselves were the deeds performed by men. because man himself had made it what it was. man must learn what he really is. But though this ought to have sufficed to convince men that the world was exactly as it ought to be. In some cases. just as the giver of rain enables seeds to grow. Whether it was beyond the power of man ever to put an end to the unbroken and irresistible sequence of the effects of the deeds of himself and a new the cycle of life and death. would go on for ever. in fact. and therefore liable to take all their consequences upon themselves. man's former of his fellow creatures . whether as an individual or as a member of a class. and annihilated. cannot hang in the air. but by one by means of knowledge or philosophy. learn that he is not the body. a creator and ruler of the world but even this idea Indian philosophers would : not have taken for granted. whether. And here the bold answer was. for the body decays and dies. the Samsara can be stopped. whether good or evil. is 363 in reality but another name This idea of eternal love. acts can be shaken means only.

agency (Adnshtfa or Apurva) a new Ego would its spring up. as we saw. namely. the view of the Vedanta. Both may have had the same roots. and that Self is to be recognised either as identical with what was in earlier times conceived and called the Divine. undetermined by any qualities. the Unconditioned. but they differ The view which the Vedanta took of man has sometimes been mistaken for human apotheosis. and what they wanted was reconciliation between the Divine within and the Divine without. in their later growth. . the Eternal. in fact. whether as recovery of the Divine as Brahman. Their Moksha or Nirvana was not meant for Vergotterung. self. the Self. Then what remains ? There remains behind the body. Ego formed by surroundings or cumstances. A man must is former acts. liable to suffer for it was is in this life. or as Purusha. The former was. just as learn therefore that for the cir- he not even what also has been meant by the Ego. and whose eminence they could have reached. or as something beyond all names that had ever been given to the Divine. The Divine which they meant was the Divine in man. blissful in its independence and in the complete aloofness from everything else. sophers there were no theoi left But people forget that for these philo- whose company man could have joined. perfect. and absolute in itself. clom. and behind the Ego. and will vanish again like everything else. as the eternal Subject. the latter is the view of the Samkhya-philosophy. independent. Brahman. or as Atman. freedom from all conditions and limitations. not even for the Vergottung of Eckhart it was meant for complete freedom. or the individual person. what is called the Purusha or the Atman.364 visible INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

The most curious thing is that such views could be held by the philosophers of India without bringing them into conflict with the representatives of the ancient religion of the country. solutions Whatever we may think of these two of the world's great riddle. satisfied 365 in his and blissful in his own being and own thinking. but they are visions which. Such views cannot be and rising criticised as we criticise ordinary systems of religion or morality. and hence was carefully distinguished in India from the atheism of the Nastikas or nihilists. . a world that must exist. To and the Vedanta not. of admitting an active or limited personal god. They are visions. and it does call the Samkhya atheistic. of anything beyond our bodily senses. None of them seems to me to have so completely realised what may be called the idea of the soul as the Phoenix. of anything divine.NATUKE OF PAIN. particularly if we compare them with the solutions proposed by other philosophers. would be philosophically most unfair. we cannot but admire their originality and their daring. to have seen is like having been admitted to the vision of another world of . if you like. but that atheism was very different from what we mean by It was the negation of the necessity it. whether of ancient or modern times. however different in its eternal silence from what we and from what the ancient seers of India imagined it to be. consumed by the fire of thought from his own ashes. soaring towards which are more real than anything that can regions be called real in this life. It is true that the Samkhya-philosophy was accused of atheism. who denied the existence of anything transcendent.

we may see by an extraordinary defence set up for the so-called atheism of the It seems to us perfectly Samkhya-philosophy. Vedanta and Samkhya. nay. including animate and inanimate nature. It was a common belief in India that man could. raise himself to the status of a god. There are ever so many legends to that or Deva.366 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. absurd. At first sight no two philosophies would seem to be so different from each other. explanations. provided always that the students had. How different the world of thought in India was from our own. but it was by no means so. acquired the strength and fitness necessary for so arduous a task. the Indian priesthood great credit that they treated both systems as orthodox. by a previous severe discipline. by severe penance. and yet in India they seem quite 'bond fide. as a phenomenal manifestation of an unknown power which he There is nothing beside it. We have thus finished our account of the Vedanta and of the Sa?>ikhya-philosophy. including the small gods and the still smaller men. if we consider the popular superstitions of the Hindus at the time. or at all events as not prohibited. This might no doubt be called apotheosis effect. to start from such opposite points of view as the Vedanta and the Samkhya. nothing calls Brahman. The Vedantist of the school of /Sa?>zkara looks upon the whole world. was expressly stated that it was in order to put an end to such vain desires of becoming and it personal gods that Kapila ignored or left out of question the existence of such theomorphic or anthropomorphic beings as could ever excite the We are hardly prepared for such rivalry of men. . .

but one answer is possible. two facts that the world is changing and unreal. is as we see it and live in changeful. is the world. This ignorance or Avidya. but also as its material cause. who But explain the world as an evolution (Pari/iama). not only as its efficient. and consequently never. to our individual ignorance. Hence nothing remains but ful phenomenal to ascribe the changecharacter of the world to something else. Vedanta. to ignorance. AND AVIVEKA. He accepts the this was not $amkara's theory. but so far only. such it. however. and. How could that eternal Brahman ever give rise to the world. and that the Brahman. but to some primeval ignorance directed towards Brahman as manifested and seen. incapable of change. Brahman.VEDANTA. But whence Brahman. as it really is. That Brahman it world. until real. not. . as he starts with the idea of there being but one real being from eternity to eternity. and it was clearly that of Ramanu^a and his followers. could ever change or be changed. Avidya. AVIDYA. ever passing away. We we have become Ved^ntists. this phenomenal world ? or rather. in the Vedantic sense of that word. is is The phenomenal world. never see it or know it. so far as real. 367 that can be called real except this one invisible Then came the question. It is universe as a development of Brahman was possibly the original view taken by Badaraya?ia. and yet that the is real cause of it. impossible to think that this eternal Being. if indeed there is any- thing material in the objects known to the Vedantist? Under the circumstances thus given. according to the Vedanta. and Aviveka. whatever name be given to This view of the it. that is.

i. and it be anything. neuter. can be in full reality nothing but Brahman. again. or as Maya. must not be called something The great difficulty how Brahman could ever be affected by Avidya. as for to us by Vidya or knowledge. illusive power. All such views are excluded by the postulate that Brahman is free. as not there. Therefore it is. e. should of course ask at We Whence comes is it ? what How can that Avidy& or that Maya. or is answerable for call creation. may become the creator and ruler of the world. which what we once. in fact performs. which is a weakness or a defect. nothing therefore that could ever have dominion over Brahman. the time under a cloud or forgetful of itself. which satisfied his mind. it is nothing by the side of Brahman. is one and all though here again. but we see also know through it. while affected by Avidya or seen through Avidya. other Vedantists differ from $a?kara. While that state of Avidya lasts the true Brahman. and represent Avidy& as an actual . and. that is the never really unreal. is avoided by looking upon Brahman. was that we know as a fact that Avidy4 or Nescience that it is is there. as soon as we soon as we are able to annihilate is it given Vedantist holds that nothing that can be annihilated can claim true reality for itself. power (/Siakti) of Brahman. if not the minds of other Vedantists. We individual souls. is not to be called real. but ourselves also. though real. the only thing that exists ? The answer given by $amkara. because forgetful of Brahman through Avidya. Brahma.368 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. such as by the Vedanta-philosophy. in fact. masculine. The Avidya. as may become to us . though O 7 for a while we are divided from it. if not again Brahman.

because the idea which it of every philosophy. And it develops not only into an objective or material world. PrakHti things. Aviveka. It accepts the the Samkhya is decidedly dualistic. that is Brahman. it Bb . . supplying the instruments of perception and thought. it simply grows or develops into consciousness when seen by Purusha. But in order to account for the world of experience. or Lord. It is. Avidya is lifted. but at the same time. into what we should the subjective or intellectual world. Sawkhya. this creator also recedes and is restored at once to his true state and He. The Samkhya takes what seems a very different These attitude towards the problem of the world. receive worship from his creatures. as little as could ask that question with regard to Brahman. but only as having been blinded for a while by Avidy& so as to forget ourselves. and thereby recover our true Brahmahood. 369 But as such. whole objective universe as real. a word often translated by Nature. or Selfhood. and calls it Praknti. may be called the undeveloped matter or Urstoff. If call we represents has never arisen in our philosophy. not as if we had ever been divided from it. Creator. The call we question whence it came is never asked. the so-called Isvara. or becomes what he is and always has been.SAMKHYA. containing in itself the possibilities of all By itself it has no consciousness. soon as the cloud of. our true Self. both what perceives and what is perceived. attitudes towards the world form indeed the kernel the Vedanta monistic. the whole Brahman and we ourselves also remember dignity. AVIVEKA. and it has had no beginning. but in reality untranslatable. it has been.

under the eye of a Purusha. dull.' the creation of . let Up. inert matter alone would not account for the world. and always passing through a process of evolution. such as ' (/fAand. VI. What. possibly importance in the great development of the universe. 63) remarks As. the great. the Samkhya philosopher saw clearly enough that dead.' In this stage Praknti in order to called indicate its Mahat. and as applied to each individual it goes by the name of Vyash^i. so long as Praknti is at work so long only as it is perceived by a Purusha or a true Self. according to passages of Sruti and : Smriti. commonly translated by perception. 3) Let me multiply myself. This would come very near to the recognition of the subjectivity of all our knowledge. tellect (rouy).370 is INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and also perceptible. is supposed that this undeveloped PrakHti it is always noticed or perceived by a Purusha (Self). but really a kind of perception that involves something like what we should call inPrak?-iti. so as to render it perceptive. operative. is really meant by Buddhi in this place. In the cosmical sense the development of the world is often spoken of as Samashfi. and to the recognition that the world exists for us in the form of knowledge only. This is an important condition. It cannot be taken here in an exclusively psychological sense. as far as I can see. Therefore If call Prak?^'ti we he makes develop into Buddhi. the possibility of the intelligence of the individual also. though it supplies. in the psychological sense. It is the Indian is ' Let there be light. is the lighting up of Praknti or dull matter by intelligence. me procreate. no doubt. matter. 2. Thus Vu//lfma-Bhikshu (Sa?>tkhya-Sutras I.

is But as a cosmic Buddhi that essential condition of all which gives light as the knowledge. Buddhi exists in human nature as the power of perception. is preceded by Abhimana it e. perceiving or perception. though not quite correctly. and thus becomes Buddhi. AVIVEKA. really the cause of the creation of the as preceded by an activity of Buddhi. is here conceived as a development of Prakriti. This Buddhi. Perception. and it is then. which combines and regulates the impressions of the senses. however. i. 371 (i. according to the S4mkhya. and as. literally I-making or Egoism. the mental activity going on within us. the powers of light and thought. and is after- wards developed into the senses. it is sometimes said that Abhimana in the or Ahamkara is the cause of creation. requires a new development before it can serve for conscious intellectual work. but begins to perceive as root Budh. as force. two ideas often comprehended by the or to perceive. as we must always remember. follows that this when part of the individual or psychological development. &c. to awaken soon as he is awake. but philosophically used with a much larger meaning. world. the cosmical Buddhi. for end all the Vikaras or evolutes serve one and the same purpose.SAA/KHYA.e.. For shortness sake. cannot work without Ahamkara. namely. as yet. and inert to the world. as Buddhi is generally explained is Ahamkara Abhimana or subjectivity). and not simply the personal organ of deciding. we shall see hereafter. the elements. neither subjective nor objective. if I am B b 2 . identified with Manas or Anta^karana. which. Budh means And as a sleeping person is dull literally to awake. Prakriti also is inert till it is awakened (Pra-buddha).

but there is much that Does Kapila really look upon requires fuller light. as subjective and objective. all this development remains without real consciousness. only viewed from different points of view. Subjectivation. and the objective world on the other. even after it has reached the stage of Buddhi. such as sight and light. All these. till it attracts or Self. After this development of Prakrit! into Buddhi. smelling and odour. that before is. hearing and sound. its the attention of some Purusha. whole world. and therefore in one sense the same thing. Spirit who by becoming conscious of Prakrit! and all works. tasting and savour. as we should say. feeling and touch. as that which produces the sense of subject.372 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. ] . and as changed at last into the material reality of the sentient powers on one side. in spite of being lighted up or rendered capable of perceiving and being perceived. therefore. approach. right. the division of the of itself. produces what is the only reality of which we have any conception. the elements of the senses as well as of the sense-objects. the next step is that it produces the Tanmatras. requires. Nature. but a self-conscious soul. Lastly. ready made by Prakrit! for the use of the Purusha. perception and thought as an instrument. though naturally there can be no subjectivation without simultaneous objectivation. and in consequence of object also. the faculties as well as the corresponding qualities of sense-perception. into subject and object. would seem to be the nearest any real perception can take place. and its differentiation as subjective and objective. are modifications of the same Prakrit!. the phenomenal reality of hope I have understood this train of thought rightly.

we may well ask. but in the end both Vedanta and Sa?7ikhya look upon what we call reality as the result of a temporary error. call it nescience. S.SAJfKHYA. Thus the creation of the phenomenal world and our position in the phenomenal world are due to nescience (Avidya) with the Vedantist. it is hardly fair to . nay. and his freedom from PrakHti (Karika 66). do not competent to pronounce so decided an opinion as others have done on this subject. Where then. This union is said to arise from a want of discrimination (Aviveka). generally ascribed to the working Gunas feel ? Much may be said for either view. the Samkhya explains it by the temporary union bet ween Purusha and Prak?^'ti. no doubt. and this want of discrimination is actually called by the Vedantic term of Avidya in the Yoga-Sutras II. 24. If. 373 till remaining inert. illusion. or is it the first glance of Purusha at Prakn'ti in its state of Avyakta or chaos. 5 5). but to a want of discrimination (Aviveka) with the Samkhya philosopher (S. that gives the of the I first is which impulse impulse to the activity of PrakHti. it is actually said to have the one object only of evoking at last in the Purusha a revulsion. like a telescope. is ? the difference between the two views of the universe There is a difference in the mode of representation. and it is not in the highest sense a real union. and in the end a clear recognition of his complete independence. philosophers like Vi^wana-Bhikshu recognised this original similarity in the tendencies both of the Vedanta and the Samkhya. it is looked through by the Purusha. AVIVEKA. therefore. If the Vedantist explains what we call Creation as the result of Avidya or Nescience. or anything else. 1. because it vanishes again by dis- criminating knowledge (Viveka). want of discrimination.

and they advanced for a time in the same direction. If the Vedantists desired to arrive at what discrimination is called Atma-anatma-viveka. the difference between and want of discrimination. one sun reflected in the countless waves of the world-ocean according to the latter there are many Purushas. Greater.374 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. accurate reasoning on the part of the Sii^khyas. as it seems to me. according to Vedanta and Sa??ikhya. between Atman and Anatman. AviNescience. to a want of . No doubt these two philosophies diverged in their later development. Such a peculiarity must not be slurred over in an . not as phenomenal only. as many as there are divine. and vegetal souls. the Sa??ikhyas looked forward to Prakr/ti-purusha-viveka. Atman and Purusha. discrimination between Purusha and Prak?'/ti. . there is a radical difference and this is due. than according to Kapila they are. Avidya. as it were. human. however. it was but right that those who could interest see deeper. therefore. is that between the Brahman of the Vedanta. According to $awkara the individual souls are not. On this point. blame them as having mixed and confounded the two. but they started with the same object in view. and their plurality is conceived as eternal. as the causes of the world. veka. Where then their is the difference ? If their later defenders forgot and laid greater stress on the points of difference than on the points of similarity between them. should bring to light whatever features there were left of the original family likeness between common the two philosophies. animal. According to the former there is in reality but one Atman or Self. and the many Purushas of the Sawkhya.

and being Purusha they would by necessity cease to be many. the absolute subject. call him Adam or Manu or any other name. In this way Vi^?7ana-Bhikshu was right that Kapila did not differ so much from Badarayana as it would seem. many Purushas. and would render the character of it lute. because. but it is fair to point out what the reason of this aberration may From a higher point of view the Purusha of Kapila is really the same as the Brahman or the Atman of the Vedanta. from a metaphysical point of view. just as the many gods had to be recognised as in reality the One God without a second. of course. It have been. it ought have been clear to Kapila that the plurality of such a Purusha would involve its being limited. while Brahman differs was. at all events. though. necessary.ATMAN AND PURUSHA. if the Purushas were supposed to be many. but he has forgotten support of the that every plurality presupposes an original unity. 375 account of the Samkhya-philosophy. Apart from that. but surely a right to do so. and that as trees in the last resort presuppose the tree. only in that the Purusha was never conceived as the material cause of the universe. It may last as and at be said that this we have It is is going beyond Kapila. mere mistakes of Brahman. just as Vi^nana-Bhikshu and other . Kapila has certainly brought in for- ward every possible argument plurality of individual Purushas. as men are descended from man. and unconditioned. as eternal. that we should see all this clearly. if the Purusha was meant as absoimmortal. to self-contradictory. with the important proviso that everything material was due to Nescience. necessitate the admission of one Purusha. determined or conditioned. they would not be Purushas.

where the two follow different roads. but that they must have passed through many . If this is seen and accepted in a historical spirit. in fact. c. are but the last outcome of the philosophical activity of a whole country. whether of the fourteenth century A. changes for better or for worse. philosophers saw it clearly. Nor should we ever forget that our philosophical Sutras. it can do . if he could only see that. in order to perceive the unity that underlies the apparent diversity in the philosophy of India. We have no such remnants of an earlier period of philosophy anterior to the Sutras. D. or the fifth century B. though not without a firm conviction that such perfect systems as we find in the Sutras cannot have sprung up in a day. the final outcome of ages of inquiry and discussion.376 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. It would seem then to follow from Vi^nanaBhikshu's remarks that in India a philosopher might at one and the same time have been a follower of the Vedanta as well as of the Sa?>*khya. and that we are entirely ignorant of their historical antecedents. Sutras are. and possibly of some of the more ancient parts of the Mahabharata but in other respects we are left without any earlier facts. still less from one brain. they started nevertheless from the same point and were proceeding towards the same goal.. before they could assume that final and permanent form in which The they are now presented to us in literature. with the exception of the as yet unsystematised Upanishads. whatever their age. We should remember that the grammatical Sutras of Pa?nni are contradicted again and again by grammatical forms which have fortunately been preserved to us in the earlier Brahmarcas and Mantras of the Vedic period.

succeeded in discover- of both of them. Hence his natural desire to show that they did not on any essential points contradict each other. whether true or false. to mention him only. whenever Vedanta and Samkhya shared the same should always remember that there must have been a period of unrestricted growth of ideas. as they represent the Self as ing the common background endowed with qualities. We thought in ancient India. all To him not only Vedanta and Samkhya. In one respect Vi</Mna-Bhikshu. though no doubt there is danger of the distinctive features of each system becoming blurred. though not $ruti. 377 no harm. might seem to be contradicted by the Vedanta and Samkhya which show that the Self.ATMAN AND PURUSHA. but the six Darsanas or systems of philosophy were orthodox. as he says. he attempted to do the same for the Nyaya and Vaiseshika. in the Sutras that these schools It was became sterilised and far. they were all Snm'ti. has certainly seen more rightly by not resorting at once to the idea that actual borrowing must have taken place. at least to my mind. if we dwell too much on what they share in common or on what they may have shared in common at an earlier period of their growth. or the Purusha. On one point Vi^nana-Bhikshu may have gone too yielding to a temptation which does not exist for us. Nyaya and Vaise- . but this is not so. were common property and could be freely philosophical adopted by different schools of philosophy. and had certainly. cannot be endowed with qualities . and that during that period philosophical ideas. After he had reconciled to his own satisfaction the conflicting tenets of Vedanta and Samkhya. petrified. These two.

The full light. the Absolute. and also. of the hence. they teach that the Self is at all events different from the body. To the followers of the Nyaya-philosophy Brahman. is AnirvaA'aniya. however. quite as nor do I remember where Gotama and Ka/<ada themselves any passage represent their teaching as a mere step leading to the higher knowledge of Vedanta or Sawkhya.378 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 1 1 truth. as he thinks. standing but as unaffected by pain and joy. They present themselves as independent philosophies. however. as neither suffer- what marks the ing nor enjoying.. to the effect The question which the Sawkhya may seem have left to unanswered. undefinable or inexpressible.seshika were intended as a preparation only. as neither thinking nor acting in any way. This is first advance toward a right underof the Self. but the other systems are never represented as merely preparations for it. but which is really unanswer- . shika are intended. There does not. 1. 98) of India. not only as different from the body. as slowly preparing him for the acceptance of the highest truth. to be qualified by pain and joy. the usefulness Nyaya and Vaiseshika. nor as the other Darxanas : much any utterance of P>adarayaa or Kapila that such preparation was required. according to Vi^ftana-Bhikshu. as a first step only towards the truth and though they admit the Self . that the Nyaya and Vai. Origin of Avidyfi. seem to be any ancient evidence to support this view of Vu/mma-Bhikshu's. still less that they existed as systems before the doctrines of the Samkhya began to in- fluence the thinkers indeed mentioned in as the highest The Sawkhya is the Mahabharata (XII. of the Sa?>ikhya-doctrine might dazzle the beginner.

asked how Kapila came to know anything about Prakriti or Urstoff which. these discussions Badarayana had only to appeal to the Veda in support of any one of his statements. nay on Buddhi or intellect. and from Ahamkara to the Tanmatras or subtle substances. 6) that there was nothing but the $astra itself to depend on in support of what may . and going on from Buddhi to Ahamkara. or. able. the making of the I or Ego. as belonging to him. as he calls it. on the Manas (central sense). as his own ? What Kapila wishes to teach is that nothing is in reality his own or belongs to him except his Self. beginning with Buddhi or intellect. on the Aham or ego. in fact. and how we ourselves can know anything about its various developments.. Kapila. could ever have arisen. 379 How this Aviveka. and how and by what stages the development of Prakr&ti may be supposed to have taken place which led in the end to the delusion of Purusha and made him look on the senses.THE SASTRA. Hence the Sutras of Kapila received the name of Manana-sastra. had evidently meant to reason out his system by himself. &c. within his experience. a real difference And while in all Here we can observe between Sawkhya and Vedanta. though without any declared antagonism to the Vedas. the Purusha. institute of reasoned truth. this failure of Purusha to recognise himself as distinct from PrakHti. is. as superintended by Purusha. we have to 1 confess with the author of the Samkhya-sara (p. with all his regard for Aptava&ana. is said to stand for the whole of creation. on everything. The If then it is Sastra. or subjectivity as inseparable from objectivity.

called Avyakta. When is. no doubt. as handed down from time immemorial in various schools in India. the Avyakta. or from Avyakta. and of the Mnh. such as the Sa?ftkhya-karika or the original text of the to Samkhya. felt to l . the S'dstrn alone. or the whole body of Samkhyaphilosophy. nature. In place of this one Prakriti we often read of eight Prakrttis. those beginning with Buddhi or the distinguished as produced as well as while the first. but not produced. &c. undeveloped. be very crude and startling assertions $astra sometimes stands for Veda. Mahat being than that the seven modifications (Vikaras) and For the actual succession in the evolution of AhawkAra from the Mahat. it is at first. and that produces every- thing without being itself produced.380 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. It seems rather be to point the existence of a treatise. the undeBut we must remember that all these veloped. and not infer1 ence..it from Prakr/ti. English renderings are very imperfect. it At first sight. seems strange to us to derive Buddhi or Intellect from PrakHti. can be our authority. Cosmic. because inference can only lead us to the conclusion that all effects must have a cause. or that beginning with the mind in the way in which the Sawkhya-philosophy teaches. This need not mean more only. that means that it chaotic. Then what is meant by 6astra here ? . is producing producing. In the Samkhya-philosophy Prakriti is a postulated something that exists. Prak?"iti very different from nature or 0i/o-i?. and invisible. but it cannot well be taken in that sense here. we are told.Sutras. while there is no inference to prove either the succession beginning with the elements. Development of Prakriti. though there is is hardly a more convenient term to render it by.

or with the end. or potential perception. it may be well to try to give a more general view of Kapila's system. in this so-called Mahat or Buddhi. and hence. Retrospect. 381 forms of Prakn'ti are all effects. described as Prakasa. Whether we begin with the beginning. the chief condition of all per- After Praknti has thus been lighted up ception. it is but natural that Kapila should have asked himself the question how what was postulated as the beginning. but serves as cause only for all the other forms of PrakHti. another distinction was necessary in this luminous and perceiving mass. a ir^rov K. while the Avyakta itself. the differentiation between perceiver and what is perceived. namely. and serve again as causes. so long as it is confined to PrakHti. This . the lighting up. or how all that did follow could be traced back to this postu- could account for all lated Prakriti. to its physical and intellectual activity. Given the undeveloped PrakHti. or light. This first step in the development of Prak?"iti. the phenomenal world as reflected by the Indriyas and the Manas. Some such impulse required by all metaphysicians. he imagined that it was due to the disturbance of the equilibrium of first was is three constituents (Gunas) that it awakened to life and light or thought. this first awakening of the inert substance. the undeveloped Prakriti. that was to follow. the postulated PrakHti. and become Buddhi.IVOVV.BETEOSPECT. the undeveloped PrakHti. has no antecedent cause. After going through the long list of topics which form the elements of the Samkhya-philosophy. is conceived by Kapila as Buddhi. between subject and object.

odour. Tanmatras the potentiality of both. the answer of Kapila is that there must be Tanmatras (This-only). I believe. seeing. is perdpi. sight. If we begin with the objective side. smelling. nor what actually hears and sees. how perception is possible subjec- tively.. Garbe) rather than by Ego or Egoism. was the work assigned.382 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. In their final form the taste. and differentiated into subject and object. potential perceptilnlia. the five Tanis But there in the matras are realised as the five subjective powers of perception. to Aha?ttkara. Hindu Philosophy. These five potentialities are Sound. touch. which are not the potentialities of everything in general. Light. ergo cogito. but of this and this only(Tan-matra). and tasting. They are not yet what is actually heard. This step from Buddhi to Ahamkara has been compared to Des Cartes' Cogito ergo sum\ but is it not rather Sum. but they contain the possibilities of both. the evolution of the Avyakta has gone so the question arises. &c. neither is there any sound without hearing. Hence. and Taste. which by subjectivation (Snbjectivirung. and corresponding to them as the five five objects of sense. potential Tanmatras stand before us in their 1 Duvies. p. . how it is possible objectively. seen. touching. the Sawkhyas seem to have argued. and the objects of sound. Odour. in fact. according to the division produced by Ahamkara into subject and object. as showing that being itself would be impossible unless it were first lighted up. As there is no hearing without sound. that esse. Touch. 18. how this process of perception could take place. the powers of hearing. or even percipere ? I should prefer to translate When far.

which is but really a kind of central organ of perception. into concepts also. and is for a time misled into believing in his identity with the workings of Prakriti. It should be account for remembered. The Purusha watches the clockwork. a full insight into the problems which troubled Kapila. as we should say. meant to prevent the crowding in of perceptions. Only we must guard against taking this Manas. nose. might also be called the point of attention and apperception. called Manas. whether it is called Atman or Purusha. as yet. objectively as ether. quite different from the highest Self.RETKOSPECT. in addition to the five. light. that in order to perception such as it really is. another. or into the solutions which he proposed. however. This is but a poor attempt to make the Samkhya view of being and knowing intelligible. and all the rest. and. They all are necessary for the work of perception. but even this would hardly help us to a clear view of what Kapila really meant by Manas. for the true Self. or mind. eyes. subjectively as ear. to arrange them into percepts. 383 material shape. These five supply all possible and real forms under which perception can and does take place. being in fact the conditio sine qud non of all well- necessary. . water. is a sixth sense. generally translated by mind. and earth (the five Mahabhutas). air. conception. acting as a door-keeper. Manas is as much a mere instrument of knowledge and a product of PrakHti as the five senses. and tongue. clined to translate One might feel in- Manas by term brain. ordered and rational thought. skin. if brain had not It become so unscientific a in our days. as a kind of clockwork. and I am far from maintaining that \ve have gained.

to make them. to the Buddhi. could have been admitted by one and the Ahawikara . who again remits them to the treasurer.' they from the householders and hand 'As the seniors of a the governor of the district. or the outside or objective world. and the treasurer to the king. hand it on to the inner sense. and try to follow the ancient thinkers along the few footsteps which they left behind. to is after appropriating it. We are . our own. an illustration in the Sawkhya-tattva36. and deserves to be taken There is Kaumudi into consideration ' : say.' Here Buddhi. supreme. but that that it What is we must at least make an attempt to bring those ancient problems near to us. thus do the outer senses. I feel is. collect taxes village. which may be called Avidya. which suggests a very different view of the process of knowing. whether the Hindus fully realised the a clear We are asked fact that we are conscious of our sensations only. and that all we call bodies. and the Ahawkara. the supreme Lord. the organ which determines what there is and then hands it over to Aha??ikara.384 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. though decidedly different from the cosmic Buddhi that springs from the Avyakta and leads easy to see how these two Buddhis. which are easily accessible in the Sutras. Is Sa?nkhya Idealism ? There to is another point on which it is difficult to come understanding. the Manas. not enough simply to repeat the watchwords of any ancient philosophy. when them over to they have perceived anything. or rather that one Buddhi in its two functions. is no more than the result of an irresistible inference of our mind. nor is it same philosopher.

is PrakHti as looked at by Purusha. really take the place of what we call creation. own bodies. the . and all that remains. but the whole world. he actually identifies himself with those images. determine not only ourselves. our Buddhi. the primary and secondary qualities. our Tanmatras. the fundamental error by which. the Ego. our senses. and that what we call the real. is our growth.IS SAAfKHYA IDEALISM? 385 no doubt. but that it is given us. from this point of view. the consciousness which he assumes of it. takes place within us. is no Saft&ara. But beyond that. the sensuously perceiving and perceived world. This identifying process would. or under our sway. the Non-Ego. and the Tvam. after deducting both . more than the development of thoughtless nature as reflected through the senses on our enchanted The riddle of the world which the SamkhyaSelf? philosophy has to solve would then be no more than to account for the mistaken interest which the Self takes in that reflex. our creation blue. It is within us. it is. our Ahamkara. though not our work. is the light within us that has the power of perceiving by its light that both the Aham. our world is only an inductive world. not excluding sich. as we should say. The closing of the mental eyelids would be the dropping of the curtain and the c c close . that this PrakHti has grown to all that it is. that we do not make conscious. for a time at least. the sky. our Manas. that the light which. so to we make the sky concave or say. Was this the view taken by the Samkhyas ? Did they see that the our development of the world. as Buddhi emerges from Prakriti. das Ding an which we can never know directly. or. that we are not ourselves the cause of our sensations.

and the belief in the reality of things. both objective and subjective. with such . and the Purusha only as subjective.386 of the INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the absence of discrimination between the It would become Self and the imagery of nature. whether Kapila or Asuri or Parl/rasikha. . freedom from all cosmic being. w hile interested in the world. conscious and thinking why in its solitude Purusha was conceived as not active. and yet with a constant longing after a higher and truer her part so long only as it . but Prakn'ti as always active why Purusha should sometimes mean the eternal Self. freedom from pain. It sometimes seems to me as if such views had been at the bottom of all Hindu philosophy. though forgotten again or obscured by a belief in that reality which determines our practical life (Vyavahara). believing in the world. r state. much in the Sa??ikhya-philosophy would cease to be obscure. objective. the Buddhi of the world and the Buddhi of ourselves would indeed become one. and put an end to that suffering which is the result of bondage or finiteness. and sometimes man such as he is or imagines himself to be. drama of the world . intelligible why Prakn'ti should be supposed to play was noticed by Purusha it would explain why Prakn'ti. was taken as A&etana. and this final recogni- tion of our cosmic misconception would lead the Self back from the stage of the world to himself. freedom as alone with himself. freedom from the world. would undo all creation. might truly be explained as due to Aviveka. by itself. Purusha and Prakr/ti. . By admitting this blending of cosmic and psychological views. thoughtless. But if we may credit the founders of the Samkhya.

not to the to the Manas. But this is a question c c 2 . because there will always be new Purushas to be enchanted and enchained for awhile. if clear to themselves that they really had made it quite human beings cannot have anything but their own knowledge. in consequence. to suffer. she She may altogether ceases to try to please him. and breathes the fresh air of a bright The Samkhya uses this very simile. but at last to be set it may be said that she is free by her. but who in the end dries his tears and stops his sighs. when he seems to see. 387 advanced views. hension only. as belongPurusha or the Self. all joy and pain. after the spell of Prakriti has been broken. we can understand why they should have represented the whole process of perception and combination. ing. in all her disguises. and to will. it is said. and so far never annihilated. State of Purusha. Often has the question been asked. while the Purusha. What then becomes of the Purusha. WHEN FREE. takes place only when Purusha is looking on the dancer. like a spectator does so by misappre- who is carried away by his sympathies for Hecuba. If he does not look.STATE OF PURUSHA. on Prakrfti. to combine. to rejoice. and indirectly to Prak?"iti. please others who are still looking at her. she does not dance for him. whole development of PrakHti. all willing also. leaves the theatre of the world. and. and as soon as he turns his eyes entirely away from her. that is. and he has ceased to take any interest in the phantasmagoria of the world. but to a stranger. The night. thrown on him by the Manas and all the products of PrakHti that support the Manas. when Free.

Buddhismus von Joseph Dahlmann. in the air in India. I cannot believe that it was borrowed by the Buddhists from either of those Nirvana was one of the ideas that were systems. but by each in his own fashion. in the simple sense of but was developed higher and higher. unrestricted. such as the oneness with Brahman.388 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.J. The name itself. till first. Dahlmann that the Buddhist idea of Nirvana was the same. and bliss This ineffable state of the Nirvana of the Buddhists. would remain himself. 1 in the Nirvana. perfect and happy in himself. All that can be said is that Purusha. absent at in It occurs in the Vedanta. Berlin. 1896. free and independent. this unfathomable bliss assumed naturally the character of paradisiacal happiness painted in the most brilliant and even sensuous colours. freed from all PrakHtic bonds. it repreself- sented tranquillity satisfaction. not interfered with. and it was worked out by Bud dim as well as by Kapila and Badaniyana. joy or sorrow. like many technical terms of Buddha's teaching. eine Studio zur Vorgeschichto dos S. would be what he alone can be. which no philosophy can be expected to answer. in the highest sense of the word. it We see in the Buddhist Suttas how was used by the Buddhists. . as that of the higher bliss of the Brahmanic. perfect rest. In the eyes of less advanced thinkers. and hence. has naturally shared the fate of similar conceptions. whether ignorance or knowledge. and l agree with Dr. While I Vedanta and Sar/ikhya-philosophy. the NiAsreyasa or Non plus ultra. while to the truly enlightened (/Santi). though it is the Sa?/ikhya-Sutras. was no doubt originally. freedom from passion.

Kapila does not enter into a minute analysis of see his Nirvana. it would betray end it spring up as naturally in Buddha's philosophy as in that of Badarayawa and They all took their materials from the Kapila. while we see it into systems. or. 389 became altogether negative. But in spite of Dr. If it had been simply taken over by Buddha from some individual teacher of an established philosophy. and elaborated them its origin. aloneness. as peculiar Brahman. he does not attempt to explain what kind of happiness he means and some Vedanta philosophers have actually objected to to the highest . as he calls it. or happiness as a positive predicate of the Negatively. same stratum of thought. secured by the Samkhya just as much as by the Vedanta and the Buddhist-philosophy. if Kapila had had eyes for the ordinary sufferings only which are entailed on . but though the Vedantist admits happiness (Ananda) by the side of existence and perception (Sa&-/. however. Ananda highest Brahman. that happiness can be can be absolutely removed. Kaivalya. and therefore perfect bliss. Meaning of Pain.MEANING OF PAIN. Dahlmann's very learned and very able pleading.it). and wholly unworthy of a great philosopher. this happi- ness may surely be defined as freedom from pain. I must say once more that I cannot yet any evidence for supposing that either Buddha borrowed direct from Kapila or that Kapila borrowed from Buddha. probably about the same time. His object was to show how pain arose and how pain If freedom from limitation and pain is happiness. It would seem extraordinary. freedom from all limits or fetters.

he may have meant. limited. our Like the whole evolution of PrakHti. or fettered. perception. must wait for further light. and Manas to the height or the deptli of individual existence. not to the Purushas. this suffering. All imagine. Both Purusha and Atman. It is true he is after as well as before his release. In order to explain the world. that sadness cleaves to all finite life. are absent in Buddha's teaching. but likewise another quite independent being. . rising in the form of Buddhi. Kapila evidently meant by Du/^kha or pain something more than physical or even mental suffering. the real or the better and truer Self. and therefore very much the same as the Atman of the Vedanta. With Kapila the Purusha or Self always remains. He must have known that there happiness also for them. we have to admit not only Prakriti. He seems to have felt what Schelling felt.390 all is INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the method suggested by him for its removal is certainly bold and decided. as we Purusha. namely the consciousness of being conditioned. and action. Kapila meant something else by pain. the even tenour of a man's life. also belongs to PrakHti and not to oursuffering selves. this suffering. but that is very different from always being intent on getting rid of the sufferings inherent in life on earth. the Purusha. he tells us. and by their removal the idea of Nirvana has become But on this point also we almost meaningless. it should be remembered. the sons of men. is not. which is But whatever suffering inseparable from this life. Ahawkara. and something between suffering and happiness.

Professor Huxley who showed that. Nay Prakriti even. if we saw in Prakriti an automaton. nay his mind and his and if he can individuality. In the same way all the changes of PrakHti. above all suffering.PRAK. from mere sensation to con- . that he really possessing all that the world offers to him. Prakrit! an Automaton? might possibly help us to understand the relabetween Purusha and Praknti better. nor his ever. as the chose It was pensante.R/TI AN AUTOMATON? all 39! only the looker on of Prakrtti. o always one of and many Purushas. ceases her jugglery as soon as Purusha turns away. superadded to the automaton. organs of sense. whether in life or in death. only learn the wisdom of Kapila. his . above all sensation. are neither he. which has no soul. performing all the functions which we consider our own and which are common to man and animals. such as Des Cartes described. he is for ever above the body. that he himself suffers and rejoices. all our mental conditions might be regarded as simply the symbols (Pratibimba) in consciousness of the changes which take place automatically in the organism. as in fact a mere mechanism. and unwilling to give it up again. that takes place through were into a glass in which all For a time by this Purusha. looking as it the doings of Prakn'ti are mirrored. the Purusha. as a consequence of this assumption. forgets his true nature identifies himself with this image of PrakHti. how- He himself is an I. some strange want of discernment. imagines therefore that he himself sees and hears. and if we It tion took the rational soul. but acts only as impelled by her nature when looked at by Purusha. His very body.

than Prakriti. read in the Karikas 59-62 As a dancer having exhibited herself on the stage ceases to dance. ing and beguiling Purusha. but who is here represented not only as intent on pleasfor him. in enchanting or binding Purusha. does lie become free. wanders dependent is . or wander as she is on different Purushas. has no object in view except that Purusha should in the end perceive his fetters. so does Nature (PrakHti) cease. when she has made ' : We herself manifest to Purusha. . therefore really chained. although that looker on in his enchanted state imagines that he is himself doing what in reality Prak?^'ti is doing This is beautifully illustrated by the simile of the dancing-girl to which we referred before. the working of PrakHti. a new application of the simile mentioned Prakr/ti's Unselfishness. but as trying herself to open his eyes and make him free from her charms and fetters. 60. after she knows that she has been 6 1. ceptual thought. at. who does not expose herself again to the gaze of Purusha. In many ways PrakHti serves Purusha. and by discrimination become free from them (Kurika 59). independent of the looker on. who she is noble yet does nothing for her in return minded and cares only for the welfare of him who is so ungrateful to her. might be taken as including pain and joy and consequent action. and is freed/ In fact it would seem that Praknti. There is gazed 62. is bound. No Purusha from birth to birth.392 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. We thus get before. nothing more modest. . I think. nor Praknti alone.

and so long as we do this. But the exact nature of that subtle body and its relation to the grosser body is wish it to be. transmigration continues. liberation is achieved at once. and the dance of life is ended for ever. The idea of a subtle body by the side of our and we know that gross body is very natural . In the Vedanta the name of that body. that kills and is killed. Until that final liberation has been accomplished and everything like body has been completely removed. we imagine that we ourselves do and suffer As soon as this insight has been gained. Whatever we may think of the truth of such a system we canis not help admiring its consistency throughout. that suffers. among the Greeks also Pythagoras claimed a subtle its grosser clothing when united with the body. and its boldness and heroism in cutting the Gordian knot. till our eyes are learn that it is Prak?^'ti that sees all acts. 393 Here is indeed the Gordian knot of the whole Samkhya-philosophy. . and the Purusha is supposed to be clothed in what called the Liriga-sarira. while all this.GROSS AND SUBTLE BODY. We are and exposed to opened and we kinds of pain. or vehicle. We believe for a time in our own physical nature and in the nature by which we are surrounded. Gross and Subtle Body. as soon as Purusha has distinguished between himself and what is not himself. at least so far as the liberated Self is concerned. we suffer. or subtle body. ethereal clothing for the soul apart from by no means as clear as we could Both Samkhyas and Vedantists agreed in admitting the necessity of a subtle body in order to make the process of migration after death intelligible.

and the individual soul recovers its true being in Brahman. both perceptive (Buddhindriyas) and active (Karmendriyas). &c. seems to me useless to attempt to reduce clear in their views and their various guesses to one uniform theory. which at death leaves the coarse subtle material body.. by no means consistent in their views on these two bodies. from body arises. This subtle and invisible body or Suksh ma-sarira remains. according the so-called Upadhis (conditions).md it on the subject. this in the (7iva. consistent . the Manas In the Mukhya Prami. This to the Vedanta. Its physical life is dependent on the Mukhya Prana.394 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and consists of the senses of the body (Dehendriyas). . Vedana (sensation). or on the process by which the one affects or controls the other. eyes. without being injured itself. the individual. or Asraya for the journey of the soul from existence to existence is Sukshma-sarira. objects required for sensation and presupposed already by Manas. The Vedantists look upon or this thin and transparent vehicle of the soul as a seminal or potential (Vigra akti) body. the vital spirit. however. and but neither the Upanishads nor the Vedanta-Sutras are always quite this in the subtle body . the Its Indriyas or senses are not specialised spirits. and on the five Pra/ias. but as their functions only (Vritti). of Buddhi (intellect). dissolution of the coarse At the final body we are told that the Indriyas are absorbed in the Manas. The Vedantists are. the subtle and the coarse body (Sukshmaw and Sthulam $ariraw). according to the Vedanta. the subtle body. such as ears. implying beyond itself the Vishayas. till true knowledge arises. to be taken as the external organs of sense. and of Manas (mind).

who also is reabsorbed in Prakrit i. till final freedom is obtained by the Purusha and not only the gross body. and it likewise determines by means of its acquired dispositions the gross bodies into which it has to enter from life to life. of the five or four coarse elements (Bhutas). is formed of eighteen elements of (i) Buddhi. have still to say a few words about the charge of atheism brought against the Samkhyas. sometimes called the vehicle. accord- ing to some Samkhya teachers.THE ATHEISM OF KAPILA. according to others of the element of the earth only. Manas. and Suwkhya-Sutras III. The subtle or inner body. and (9-18) the ten senses. and is made up of six coverings. being itself what it has been made to be by former works. All fitness for reward and punishment attaches to it. is difficult to say. unless Eka is taken for the Purusha who. but without it the coarse body would be useless. flesh. (4-8) the five Tanmatras or Sukshma(3) This body is of bhutas. hair. not to the Purushas 1 . or the Ativahika-sarira. bones and marrow. identifies himself with the subtle body. blood. The Atheism of Kapila. course invisible. . 395 In the Samkhya-philosophy this Sukshma-sarira appears as Linga-sarira. and unchanging. The Sthula-sarira or coarse material body consists. or the sign-body. It seems certainly strange that at this early time Karika 40. sinews. and causes the difference in the characters of individuals. but the subtle body are all alike . (2) Ahamkara. for the time being. sarira should be said to consist of seventeen 1 We Why the Linga- and one (Sapta- dasaikam) elements. 9. It forms what we should call our personality.

put nearly everything that belonged to God into Prakriti. him in but there is simply no place left for the system of the world. are mentioned in the Tattva-samasa- bhashya. and as working without a conscious purpose. Both Pra^apati and Visvakarman. as we are told. selves. in fact. the lame one mounting on the shoulders of the blind one. We was the blind. we are told. and then working. though blind. but there is none for God. because the Sawkhya-philosophy looks upon every thing that is. unless when looked at by Purusha. This has sometimes been illustrated by what must have been a very old fable.396 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. whether Pra^apati. as elaborated by the old philosopher. Prakr/ti. viz. or Brahman. that traveller. as proceeding out of something that is real (Sat- . before his time. Prakriti. for his benefit only. however. the different BrahmS. should have been said by Kapila either for nothing or against these beings. Most likely at his time and hymns addressed Devas of the popular had already been eclipsed in the minds of religion thoughtful people by one Deity. only that this Prakriti is taken as purely objective. is always conceived as real. There is a place in his system for any number of subordinate Devas. whether as the creator or as the ruler of all things. no out-spoken atheism in that sense. But even such a supreme Deva or Adhideva is never asserted or denied by Kapila. He had. that of a cripple who could not see. Purusha the lame must remember. could not walk. There is no direct denial of such a being. meeting another cripple who As they could not live by them- they lived together. sacrifices and surrounded as he no doubt was by and to the innumerable Vedic Devas.

and ending with the last of the twenty-four Tattvas.THE ATHEISM OF KAPILA. are first in a state of equipoise. know that Kant. there is tension. beginning with the emanation of Buddhi. . difference 397 Arid here we see again. denies distinctly the existence even of the purely mythological gods. but as soon as one of the three preponderates. Sawkhya-Philosophie. the fundamental between the Sa?nkhya and the other philoas Va&aspati-Misra has pointed out in his sophies. such proofs for denying it. Kapila has an answer ready. . The Buddhist takes the real world as the result of nothing. honest thinker as he was. but neither does he offer any something real. and in that respect he does not differ much says from Kant that there are no logical proofs to establish that existence. while the Samkhyas derive what is from what is l If it be asked how the unconscious Prakr&ti began to work and attract the attention of Purusha. such as Indra. and based the arguments for his belief in 1 We God on purely Garbe. the Vedantist takes the unreal world as proceeding from Naiyayika and Vaiseshika derive what does not yet exist from what does exist. he says. There is this difference also between the atheism of Kapila and that of other atheistic systems of philosophy. 202. that Kapila nowhere puts himself into a hostile He nowhere attitude towards the Divine idea. rejected all the logical proofs of the existence of Deity as insufficient. karyavada). . The Gu?ms. which is strange nor does he enter on any arguments to indeed He simply disprove the existence of one only God. p. and Prakrit! enters on the course of her unceasing labours. commentary on the Samkhya-karikd 9.

right to assume anything of the kind with regard to Kapila. when brought face to face with this great religious Though we have no and moral problem. only God. were unconsciously approaching We should not forget that with the true Purusha. we should say. strong moral sentiment in the belief in (deed) Kapila also holds that deeds. generally called Isvara. atheism meant. Purusha in his perfect state is noning moral. Immorality of the Sawkhya. the existence of a supreme God. virtue nor vice. neither merit nor demerit. we ought to mark his impartiality and the entire absence. the Vedanta implies systems of Indian philosophy. could hardly have seriously believed in. of anything The Devas he like animus against a belief in God. The Sawkhya. grounds. accordmorality. and means. when once done. can never cease. existing any longer arid other for him. This whole question. exist. . the Lord. and in support of the admission of a Supreme Being. a denial of many people Devas rather than the denial of the one. but produce effect Karman and transmigration. It has also been said that Kapila's only without a God. the First Cause of the world. except at the time of Moksha. possibly however. but likewise system is not without any But though it is quite true that. he is certainly not like allowed to be immoral. in the whole of his philosophy. and yet he spares them and allows them to with the reservation that people. will be better discussed when we reach the Yoga-philosophy and have to examine the argu- ments produced by Pata%ali against Kapila.398 ethical INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. in worshipping them. to Kapila.

after effect. would serve as reduced to a strong incentive to morality.' The story which follows is that a young prince who was born . still less that it encourages vice. 'As in the case of the son of a king. Samkhya There is Parables. deserves to be mentioned. so that virtue. but one more feature of the Samkhya that it is not found in may be supposed to have suggested to the Buddhists their method of whole chapter of the teaching by parables. which is only another name for reasoning. one of the unalterable convictions in the Hindu mind. the dispraise of passion and the praise of disThese are represented as forms of Buddhi. as a preliminary. It is really in- dispensable to final liberation. stories. Nay. Anyhow there is no ground for saying that Kapila's system ignores ordinary morality.SAMKHYA PAKABLES. as Rupas or Bhavas. because the other Indian philosophies. forms or states. may be true that mere calculation in this way morality is of consequences. and they can be appealed to by one word. Some teach. The first is meant to illustrate the complete change that comes over a man when he has been taught his true nature by means of the Samkhya. and therefore following the Liiiga-sarira from birth to birth. the fourth. inhering in Buddhi. going downward to vice. each of which is meant to illustrate some are very much to the point. besides the admission of virtue and vice. is assigned to a collection of Sutras. There is. but even such a calculation. both in this 399 This is life and in the lives to come. so as to recall the whole lesson which they were meant to A doctrine of Kapila's. passion. it is distinctly added that going upward is due to virtue.

believed that he was a prince. The .' The commentator adds : an extract from the Garuc/a-Purana which must have been from a Sa?7^khya source borrowed 'As everything that is made of gold is known as gold.' as no one takes his hand a^ain after it has once been cut off. is 'like a cut-off hand. and not a Sahara. I am a Brahman. and says. surrenders the idea that he is a material and mortal being. went to him secretly and told him that he was the son of the king. and recovers his true nature. thus the soul. But a minister. and assumed a truly royal bearing. a kind of wild man of the woods. was taken out of his capital and brought up by a $abara. who had found out that the prince was alive. saying As a son of Brahman I am nothing but Brahman. after once having surrendered the illusion of the objective. and not a being different from him in this phenomenal ' world.400 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. As a Brahman possessed by an evil spirit. When he grew up he naturally thought that he himself was a iSabara. but. is the body. and lived accordingly. in the same way God the whole world becomes known. posfrom knowing after sessed by Maya. no one should o identify himself witli anything objective. In the same manner a man who has been told his true character by his teacher. when the possession is over. under an unlucky star. At once the prince gave up the idea that he was a savage. imagines that he is a /Sudra. knows that he is a Brahman. if even from one small piece of gold one has learnt to know what gold is.' The seventh illustration and is meant to teach that. but it knows its own true being again. imagines that it Maya has come to an end.

Like the Sutras referring to these stories. though they do not occur in the Karikas and all in the Tattva-samasa. I have called attention already to the fact that these illustrative parables. She became his wife see water. and will never return. is meant to teach that even an accidental negligence may be fatal to our reaching the highest goal. on condition that he should never let her He gave the promise. but were omitted in the Karikas and even in the Tattva-samasa. must have existed the time in the Parampara of the Brah- mans.' ' The story is that of a king who. Neither nets nor anything else was of any avail for bringThus ing her back. to which I called attention many years ago as connected with old Aryan folklore. tired after playing. and disappeared in the lake. he forgot his promise. and brought her some. because they appear in the modern Sutras. This system of teaching by parables was very popular with the Buddhists. other Sutras also may occur in our modern collection of Samkhya-Siitras. who are so often called Kryptobuddhists or Pra&Manna-Bauddhas. as handed down by tradition. as in the case of the frog-wife. while hunting. which existed for centuries. and it is just possible that the first impulse may have come from the followers of Kapila. DC! .SAMKHYA PARABLES. that is in the sixteenth century. had seen a beautiful girl in a forest. whereupon the daughter of the frog-king became a frog (Bheki). true knowledge also will disappear by one act of negligence. 4<DI sixteenth. asked him for some water. but once when the queen. the king had lost her for ever.

Up. or possibly as Yoga Yoga belonging to the Sa?nkhya. distinguish between Samkhya and Yoga at all. not learned people. understands aright. representing and Samkhya together as one..ime of one person Kapya Fataf/A'ala. Sawkhyaably long been given up by him. that he we read again in who understands Sa//<khya and Yoga to be one. but the Bhagavad-gita V. find the S4mkhya and Yoga represented. lias probSee also Garbe. ' Philosophie. p. authors. 67) but we one philosophy.CHAPTER VII. which are ascribed to different 1 . Yoga. Thus the Bhagavad-gita V. XII. II. once proposed by Professor Weber. goes so far as to say that children only. 104. who is mentioned in the Siitnpatha-brahmawa. 4. also find a philosophy called Sa?>?khya-yoga (Svetasv. as it were. Yoga and Sawkhya. THE is relation of the Yoga to theSam-khya-philosophy not easy to determine. . but as . may no doubt have existed in India in very The identification of these two names with tho n. Kapila and Pataf^ali and they are spoken of in the dual as the two old systems (Mahabh. 26. in the sense of ascetic practices and meditations. and this not as a Dvandva. each We in its own Sutras. Sawkhya and Yoga. as a neuter sing. 5. 13). as it were between faith (knowledge) and works.

But the deplorable scarcity of any historical documents does not enable us to go beyond mere conjectures and . of a origin while the two Mimamsas. It is much the same with the other philosophies. and we are left in doubt as to whether the three (III. Manu to Ikshvaku. 15). the suspicion of their former unity. Thus royal sages came through tradition know it. called Puratana G. which in character are more remote from one another than . when he made : I declared this imperishable it Yoga to Vivasvat. A according to $awkara) is mentioned already in the JjfMndogya Upam'shad VIII. to . IV. . even Purva. because their divergence with regard to the existence of an Isvara. Nyaya and Vaiseshika. were amalnay gamations of systems which had originally an independent existence. and from Manu to the people (to Ikshvaku. common the other systems.. by their names at least. tions of former systems. or Lord. ancient times.YOGA AND SAMKHYA. was not so essential a point to them as it seems to us. the Bhagavad-gita (IV.' similar oral tradition descending from Pra^apati to Manu. Vivasvat told to Manu. . seem to sanction. (B. 3). It is 403 (old). D d 2 . n Samkhya and Yoga. Those who wanted an Isvara have formed one might have him as a first and super-eminent Purusha while those who had gone beyond this want. having received it but this Yoga was lost here by long lapse of time. need not have quarrelled with those who still The Nyaya and Vaiseshika show clear traces felt it.and Uttara-Mimamsa. easily Samkhya and Yoga might comprehensive system. i) the Bhagavat say to Ar^una ' and this is probably what the author of meant. or whether they were differentiacouples.

and Kanada. for the simple reason that there was nothing for him that he could have wished to join. and Gotama may seem to have an older air than those of Pataftr/ali. even though it does not know it. meant originally Even native joining the deity. for hard work. or union with it.404 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. again that Yoga. moment's consideration. would have shown that such an idea could never have entered the mind of a Sawkhya. from Yu</. 3. and it only requires the removal of ignorance for the soul to recover its Brahmahood. came. to harness oneself for some Thus Yu^/ assumed the sense of preparing work. . (raimini. such as we possess them. In the Bhagavad-gitft Yoga is defined as Samatva. to mean to join oneself to something. Sutras. 48). by means of a very old metaphor. from meaning to join. Etena YogaA pratyuktaA. we must not in such matters allow ourselves to be guided by mere impressions. to join. It has been repeated again and equability (II. The often-cited passage from the Vedanta-Sutras II. The soul is always Brahman. however. a though movement of the soul towards Brahman is distinctly guarded against as impossible.isa. Meanings of the word Yoga. a very common misconception nay. Yu^/. i. though the names of Kapila. 'By this the Yoga is refuted/ proves of course no more than the existence of a Yoga-philosophy at the time of Badarayana it cannot be used to prove the existence of the Yoga. as previous to the composition of the Vedanta-Sutras. or to become what it always has been. whether preparing others or getting . A Even the Vedantist does not this is really join Brahman. authors occasionally favour that view. Vy.

to prepare for work. e./Tittam. as the Yoga-Sutras tell us at the very beginning. to get ready for hard work.. or the effort of concentrating our thoughts on a definite object. came to mean to exert oneself. often used with such words as Manas. in his ' " misrepresented the case. the effort of restraining the activities or distractions of our thoughts (TTitta-vHtti-nirodha). though the usual explanation is that it was so by a metaphor taken from the In Sanskrit this Yu# is stretching of the bow. p. particularly in the Atmanepada. in the sense of concentrating or exerting one's mind and it is in this sense only that our word Yoga could have sprung from it. Atman. e. A false interpretation of the term Yoga as union has led to a total misrepresentation of Patark/ali's philosophy. " into the supreme Godhead forms no part of the Yoga theory. i. like Kapila. satisfied with the isolation of the soul. Yoga. BUT DISUNION. 238-9). whereby this absorption into the supreme Godhead is sought to be attained. that is. He says. such as penances. not Union. ." rests Pata%rali. . One very peculiarside of the Yoga doctrine and one which was more and more developed as time went on is the Yoga practice. and the like. 405 ready oneself.YOGA." " The idea of absorption. quite right History of Indian Literature (pp. NOT UNION. and does not " " . has entirely : when he wrote Rajendralal Mitra. i. And as people with us use the expression to go into harness. Possibly the German Angespannt and Anspannung may have been suggested by the same metaphor. mortifications. I." he continues rightly. 208. was therefore Professor Weber. or to buckle-to. 2. meaning. Yw/. but Disunion. the outward means." he adds. &c.

yogaA karmasu kausalam. Yoga. Yoga might mean union. By which (teaching of Pata/i^ali) Yoga (union) : ' is said to be Viyoga (separation) of Purusha and Prakn'ti. Even the best historian of Sanskrit literature. that it is small blame to a man who writes a complete history of Indian literature. means really Viyoga. pulling oneself together. but the proper term would have been Sa?/iyoga. separation. did not mean union with God. or anything but effort (Udyoga.406 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.' Yoga. self and nature. Thus we read in the Bhagavad-gita II. from his own experience. joining. not Sa?nyoga). exertion. Yoga (all) That native scholars were well aware of the double is success in meaning of Yoga.' . if he has not read every book on which he has to pronounce an German literature can hardly have read every German author of any eminence. much less can the first historian of opinion. where he states that. 50 Buddhiyukto (/ahatiha ubhe sukn'tadushkrite. or Viveka. ' He who is good and evil devoted to knowledge leaves behind both deeds therefore devote yourself to . actions. Rajendralal Mitra. : Tasmad yogiya yu(/yasva. with a true Yogi n. pry into the how and where the soul abides after separation." But when he charges the professor with ' not having read the Yoga he goes a little too far. we may see from a verse in the beginning of Bho<yadeva's commentary on the YogaSutras. such as it is taught in the Samkhya Pumprakr/tyor viyogo'pi yoga ityudito vaya. however. in the philosophy of Pataf/ali and Kapila. is quite right so far that Yoga. and he ought to have known. concentration. discrimination between PurushaandPrakr/ti. subject and object.

.YOGA AS VIVEKA. is often used by Pata%ali himself for Purusha. Yoga as Viveka. by ascetic exercises delivering the Self from the fetters of the body and the bodily senses. bodily as well as mental. by which the senses should be kept in subjection so as not to interfere again with the concentration of all thoughts on the Self or the Purusha l . Self. render Purusha by Self rather than by man. Besides. is the highest object of philosophy. because in English man cannot be used in the sense of simply subject or soul. cf. a number of exercises. 1 But originally their to I prefer. breathings. even in the Sawkhya-philosophy. how how is . reached. Everything can become absurd by exaggeration. Yoga-Sutras III. 21 II. . the case with the self-imposed discipline and tortures of the Yogins. this subduing and drawing away of the Self from all that is not Self. (rfianayoga) and even when it to be maintained ? By knowwould be the answer of Kapila (by is it to be reached. we ought first of all to try to understand their original intention. he presupposes it useful support. . ledge chiefly. On the he only adds. 41. 407 We saw that this Viyoga or Viveka was indeed the highest point to which the whole of the SamkhyaBut granted that this disphilosophy leads up. Patan^ali by no (by Karmayoga) adds Patawr/ali. no doubt. In that sense he tells us in the second is the effort of restraining the or distractions of our thoughts. Atman. as a contrary. and this has been. and other means of mental concentration. means ignores the (rftanayoga of Kapila. Before we activity begin to scoff at the Yoga and its minute treatment Sutra that Yoga of postures. crimination.

Teresa as downright impositions. as little as we should treat the visions of St. in that sense This was the simple beginning of Yoga. inroads his upon by Karmayoga e. They . might at first have been quite harmless. because even a convinced Samkhya philosopher who had obtained 6rfianayoga or know- ledge-yoga would inevitably suffer from the disturbances caused by external circumstances and the continual i. Francis or St. and it was meant to be a useful addition to the Sa??ikhya. and their experiences. of the outer world upon him. The real relation of the soul to the body and of the senses to the soul is still as great a mystery to us as it was to the ancient Yogins of India.408 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. if only honestly related. Manas. object seems to have been no other than to counteract all consider the the distractions of the senses. the attempts to reduce these sensuous affections to some kind of quietude or equability (Samatva) need not surprise us. so utterly foolish and useless. More minute directions as to how this desired concentration and abstraction could be achieved and maintained. unless strengthened to resist or work-yoga the ever present enemy of his peace of mind. nor need we be altogether incredulous as to the marvellous results obtained by means of ascetic exercises by Yogins in India. But if we ourselves must admit that our senses and all that they imply are real obstacles to quiet meditation. but if carried too far they would inevitably produce those torturing exercises which seemed to Buddha. We closing of the eyelids and the stopping of the ears against disturbing noises useful for serious meditation. deserve certainly the same careful attention as the stigmata of lloman Catholic saints. as they do to most people.

409 is may be or they may not be true. this point of view it seems to me that the Yoga-philosophy deserves some attention on the part of philosophers. but there no reason From why they should be treated as a priori untrue. the Samkhya as such. to mention no other and more painful reports. 117 seq. became civilised have passed through such a phase. and is always presupposed by the Yoga. true that. and I did not feel justified therefore in passing over this system altogether. We must never forget that. . a few words with reference to the sources on which we Before we have useful. which we see among savage tribes The Hindus also. and the sweating processes of the American Indians in their steambooths. to depend for our information may be . after we have once understood the position of the Samkhya-philosophy though it may be quite towards the great problem of the world. enter upon an examination of the peculiar teaching of the Yoga-philosophy. 1892-3. is not. by J. more particularly of the physical school of psychologists. p. prepared by cultivation.YOGA AS VIVEKA. W.. we shall not glean many new metaphysical or psychological ideas from a study of the Yoga. and has but carefully orgiastic ecstasies It has its roots in a soil centuries little in of philosophical common with the of the present day. Powell. although our Samkhya-Sutras are very modern. p. may easily be seen from the excellent Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology. 823 seq. before they and philosophers. may or may not But how little of true similarity there really exists between the Yoga and Tapas of the Hindus.

It has actually been asserted that Vyasa. we . the author of a late commentary on Pata/l^ali's Yoga-Sutras.C. are ascribed The Sutras of the Yoga-philosophy to Patari^ali. garbha.410 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Ilarihara. and no solid argument could posliving sibly be derived from the mere recurrence of such There are works ascribed to Hira/jyaa name. Vyasa. little about the history of Sanskrit proper names to be able to say whether the same name implies the same person. Vedanta-Sutras. &c. as proper names. Pata?I#ali. It may be so. the grammarian and author of the Mahabhashya. the divine serpent. as to prove that they were but if style of language and style of thought are any safe guides in such matters. but we should say no more. is the same person as Vyasa. the reputed author of the Mahabharata and of the But there are ever so many Vyasas even now. course uncertain. Vislmu. with great assurance. Even the commonly received identification of the philosopher Patan^ali with Pata/1(/ali. assigned him to the second century B. should be know too treated as yet as a hypothesis only. That is not the case in any other country. and can hardly be true in India considering how freely the names of the gods or of great Rishis We were taken. then why not to of course as impossible to prove Pata/Vyali that Pata/V/ali the philosopher and Pata?Vyali the It is grammarian were not the same person. the collector of the Vedas. . who is also called Phamn or $esha. and are still taken. ? . though some scholars have. He may have been the author or the representative of the Yoga-philosophy without being His date is of necessarily the author of the Sutras.

but that is no excuse for saying that the Yoga-philosophy was reduced to the form of Sutras in that century. and should do so any other literature. even the date assigned to the grammarian Patafk/ali is a constructive date only.C. The fact that these Yoga-Sutras do not enter on any controversy might certainly seem to speak in .SECOND CENTURY B. and should not for the present be considered as more than a working hypothesis. but on that point also it seems to me better to wait till we get some more tangible proof. 411 in ought certainly to hesitate. fied I think we must be satiswith the broad fact that Buddha was later .C.C. duty of every scholar to abstain from premature assertions which only encumber and obstruct the way to further discoveries. the second century B. The second welcome as a date century would certainly be most for any of our extant philoso- phical Sutras.. It of the present state of knowledge. Besides. because the grammarian Patan^ali has been referred to it. Second Century B. before taking the grammarian and the philosopher Patafk/ali as one and the same per- would no doubt be a great help if we could transfer the date of the grammarian. In son. or rather ignorance. favour of their being anterior to the other Sutras but we saw already why we could no more build any chronological conclusions on this than we should think of proving the anteriority of our Sa?nkbya-Sutras by the attacks on its atheistical doctrines which occur in the Sutras of the other philosophical systems. all dates to be assigned to the philosophical it is the Sutras. to the author of our YogaSutras.

it is no doubt of little than the value. . As to popular tradition.though not to his name. and S&m* have been a portion of Sarikarsha?ia or Anarita. Pata7l(/ali is said to and Vyasa. but of the chronology of thought and taking the Yoga. eye on the one or the other. we can best understand the prominence which it gives both to the exercises which are to help toward overcoming the distracting influences of the outer world. Patan^ali. particularly in India still I doubt whether tradition could have gone so completely wrong as . as post-Buddhistic.412 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and to the arguments in support of the existence of an Ixvara or Divine This marked opposition became intelligible and necessary as directed against Kapila as well as against Buddha and in reading the Yoga-Sutras it is often difficult to say whether the author had his Lord.. if they had lived before the great heresy of Buddha. not of the chronology of years. to prophesy in the Saiikshepa-^amkara-Vir/aya elsewhere that (raimini. This is the kind of useless information which tradition gives us. Ixvi. and it may be for the same reason that he is sometimes called Pha?iin (Phambhartn). . in the Pataf^ali-Siitras. Iii India we must learn to be satisfied with the little we know. kara would appear on earth to uproot all heresies. . p. the hooded serpent /Sesha. because they evidently refer to his doctrines. in its systematic form. encircling the world. e. classical Upanishads. Chronology of Thought. i. and that our philosophical Sutras are later than Buddha. 1 Jf we took away these Yoga Aphorisms.

His own experience at the beginning of his career had convinced him of their uselessness. are often mentioned. and to teach the means of restraining the affections and passions of the soul. though arranged and described in different Then we read again (Anugita XXV) That ways. namely. moderated than encouraged the extravagant exercises of Buddha himself Brahmanic ascetics. the objects of sense are stated to be a development. Pradhana kara (egoism). 413 two establish characteristic features of the Yoga. a kind of via media.CHRONOLOGY OF THOUGHT. is void of smell. and from the elements respectively. little would seem to remain that is for true peculiar to Patafw/ali. which sages by their understanding meditate upon. ' : which sound. and rather time. unperceived a development of this unperceived power is the Mahat and a development of the Pradhana (when it has) become Mahat. But a moderately ascetic life. That is . nay. with Purusha as the twenty-fifth. of their danger. there can be no doubt that not only the general outlines But though the Sutras Samkhya. the great elements. we find that the twenty-four principia. touch or that is called Pradhana (Prak?Tti). are post-Buddhistic. remained throughout . as a preparation knowledge. such as taught by the Sawikhyaphilosophy. is Aham.' As to the Yoga-practices or tortures that. Thus. of colour. of taste. but likewise all that belongs to the Karmayoga or work-yoga was known before the rise of Buddhism. the wish to the existence of an Isvara against all comers. after practising the we know for a most severe Tapas declared against it. From Ahamkara is produced the development. if we turn to the of the Mahabharata.

denial of an Atman and Brahman. had given its sanction to Buddha's asceticism. according to Patan^ali at least. or Lord. if it came more boldly forward. that in its be decidedly That systematic form it was post -Buddhistic. would become intelligible that way Buddhism. not so of thought.by admitting Purusha. in trying to hold their own against the Buddhists. though sprung from a soil saturated with Sfiwkhya ideas. admitted a belief in something transcendent. after the rise of Buddhism. the one deemed as elements. the ideal of Buddhism. and thus to satisfy the ingrained theistlc tendencies of the people at large. In that sense it might truly be said that the Yoga-philosophy would have been timely and opportune. . which for a time had been as a much new system thrown In by the Buddhist apostasy.Buddhistic as in its final . and we can well understand that the Brahmans. by showing that the Samkhya. the existence side by side of two such systems as those of Kapila and Buddha. it would have seemed all the more necessary to protest decidedly against such denial. condemn a belief even in an Isvara. which was far more serious than the denial of an Isvara. should have tried to place before the people an even more perfect system of And. which was considered as orthodox or Vedic. which we know in the Sutras of Kapila into the shade it this or in the Karikas or even in the Tattva-samasa in fact. should have been anterior to that new and systematic development of Samkhyaphilosophy. and did by no means. Lord. lest it should be supposed that the Sa??ikhya-philosophy. but as a re-invigorated and determined assertion of ancient Samkhya doctrines. the Sa/mkhya should pre.414 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

gave matter for reflection to the people in India we see best by a well-known verse which ago (p. It is true that this apparent irregularity might be removed by a reference to another rule of Pawini (II. but it is curious that such a compound rules (II. or the Yoganusasana called also by the same name which was given to the Samkhya1 . The Yoga-Sutras. 'Now begins the teaching of the Yoga. considering that Word-teaching might be taken in the sense of teaching coming from words as well as teaching having words for its object. reminds us of the title which the grammarian Pataf^ali gives to his Mahabhashya. 'Now begins the teaching of Words or of the Word. viz. the other unorthodox. really offend against one of Panini's According to Pamni there ought to be no such compound. yet it is curious that the only apparent.' to the This title . a translation 1 It is not much of an argument. how could ? ' there be difference of opinion between the two ? The Yoga-Philosophy. does not belong to Pamni's Sutras. Atha $abdanusasanam. If both were omniscient. may have been contained originally in some such text-book The Sutras were published as the Tattva-samasa. 415 orthodox. but title it may deserve to be mentioned. in my ' : I quoted many years of Ancient Sanskrit Literature History 102) is If what truth Buddha knew the law and Kapila not. and though he does not give us the reason why he objects to this and other such-like compounds.THE YOGA-PHILOSOPHY. both being considered as expositions of the old Samkhya. 1852.' and not Atha Yogar/i<7asa. 3. easily see that Sanskrit did not sanction compounds which might be ambiguous. irregularity should occur both in the Mahabhashya and in the Yoga-Sutras. Atha Yoganusasanam. that the given by Pata%ali to the Yoga-Sutras. if . both being ascribed to same. Samkhya-prava&ana. and translated by Ballantyne. we can and as /Sabdanusasanam would Mahabhashya 2. Sutras. 66). 14).

The Prasnopanishad-aloka. I have not been able to obtain. Garbe speaks well of a dissertation by P. It as 1 was almost impossible that the Yoga-philosophy. Die Yoga-philosophie nacli clem Itdjamdrtanda daryestellt.416 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 1894. however. 28-68. an abstract of the Yoga. 1883. A more useful edition. the Yoga-varttika. Ill. which. but Nos. 2). vol. The Yoga-vfirttika. An explanation of Prasastapada's commentary on the Vaiseshika-Sutras. p. ascribed to him. represented by European scholars. 'Yoga Aphorisms of Patafk/ali. called Vaiseshika-varttika. . with the commentary of Bho^a Ra(/a. like all his essays. and may be consulted with advantage by students of philosophy. The Isvara-gita-bhashya. continued by Govindadeva-sastrin in the Pandit. was given by Rajendralal Mitra in the Bibliotheca Indica. which has been edited and translated by Ganganatha Jha. should not Other works ascribed to the same author are The Brahma-mimawsa-bhashya. There are printed editions of the Samkhya-prava&anabhashya. . Colebrooke's essay on the Yoga. called Vi</nananmta. Markus. The Sawkhya-karika-bhashya. Bombay. is the author also of the Yoga-sara-sam- graha. not always quite correct translation. from the Kurma-purawa. Misconception of the Objects of Yoga. but really : composed by GaueZapada (see Ganganatha. is still most useful and trustworthy and there are in German the excellent papers on the Samkhya and Yoga by Professor Garbe in Biihler's Grundriss. and the Samkhya-sara. whose commentary on Kapila's Sawkhya-Sutras was mentioned before \ and who is chiefly known by his Yogavarttika.' Vi^lana-Bhikshu.

but whether Pata/l^ali may be fairly accused of having yielded to the brutal force of numbers. as is generally supposed. Whether this was done. particularly in one point. from mere theological diplomacy is a question we should find difficult to answer. Yoga is indeed. namely. There is an entire absence of animosity on his part. display any animosity against the Divine idea and its defenders. All its metaphysical antecedents were there. in its attempt to develop and systematise an ascetic discipline by which con- centration of thought could be attained. certainly extraordinary to see the perfect calmness with which. Nor does Kapila. Kapila's atheism is discussed. if they represent as the creator and ruler of the world. Samkhya. only modified. like other atheistic philosophers. 417 have suffered from its close association with the Samkhya. He criticises theists Him indeed the usual arguments by which their God. and how little there is of the adpopulum advocacy in support of a belief in God and a personal God. as the Brahmans say. and by admitting devotion to the Lord God as part of that discipline. properly so called. elaborated his theistic and a majority in favour of a theistic philosophy of the universe as against an atheistic. such as our own philosophers would certainly have displayed in accusing another philosopher of atheism in trying to amend his system in a theistic No doubt there must always have been direction. and curried favour with the quite another question. considering how little we know of the personal character of Pata?k/ali or of the circumstances under which he Samkbya-philosophy.MISCONCEPTION OF THE OBJECTS OF YOGA. and make and unmake E e . with very few ex- many It against the few is is ceptions.

placing oneself forward and into) . and in later times was applied even to such gods as Vistmu and /Siva. though it occurs as a name of Rudra. Instead of which we find Pataw/ali. 23. I. Devotion to isvara.' Devotion or Pranidhdna (lit. If it either by Kapila or by we remember how the two philo- sophies were in popular parlance distinguished from each other as Sawikhya with and Sa?khya without a Lord. or the name of any special god. at the end of the first chapter. after they had been divested of much of their old mythological trappings. mentioning simply as one of many expedients. it is useful to see how little heat was expended on Pataw/ali. nor does in answering he anywhere defend himself against any possible suspicion that in showing the necessity of a personal God.' or. making But all this is done by Kapila in a calm and what one might almost call a businesslike manner and . Misconceptions. Pata?l^ali also He the same Samatva or even temper. we should have expected to see this ques- tion treated in the most prominent place. after having described the different practices by which a man may hope to become free from worldly fetters. charge him at Kapila's arguments. by him responsible for the origin of evil also. In this respect also we have something to learn from Hindu philosophers. as it all is generally translated 'devotion to God. Considering the importance of the subject. he was defending the interests of the Brahman priesthood. an Isvara. preserves imputes no motives to his antagonist. After all. Isvara was not even a popular name for God. the same time with cruelty. 'Devotion to the Lord.418 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

and the fruit thereof. and this prevalence of goodness arises from His eminent knowledge.' The commentary adds . that. 24 I-svara. or mixed rewards are the ripened fruits of actions life. is a Patark/ali goes on to say never been touched by Purusha (Self) that has ' : sufferings. Avidya. . MISCONCEPTIONS. the order of His worship. knowledge and power. or tions. the Lord. actions. the name of Him. who has no beginning. forbidden. that means that He and able different from all other Purushas (Selves).DEVOTION TO ISVARA. Lord is is called a Purusha. Anlage) are so-called because they lie in the soil of the mind till the fruit has ripened. by His work alone to liberate Such power is due to the con- stant prevalence of goodness (a Guna) in Him. for they are eternally abiding in the very substance of Isvara. if He is called Lord. &c. then goes on. the proof. without wishing for any rewards consisting in worldly enjoyments. is the nature of that Lord. Pata>1<7ali we ' are told. are not dependent on each other. they are instincts (Samskara) or impresIf the sions (Vasana). it is Pramdhana. actions are either enjoined. and as the surrender of all one's actions to Him. His very relation to that goodness is without beginning. manifested in birth (genus. that means that He is the whole world. makes over all his cares to Isvara as the highest guide. But the two. ' : consequent disposiSufferings are such as Nescience. As has been said that Samadhi or complete absorption can be obtained through devotion to the Lord. is 419 explained by Bho^a as one of the forms of resignation. as worship of Him. caste) and while dispositions (Asaya. rewards. If a man.' In I. the majesty. because the union E e 2 . the next that has to be explained in order.

the creation would. and. The emancipated implies bondage. a return of sufferings. and delusion. that is.. is possible. in enjoyment through Isvara. The Patafyyala-bhashya dwells very strongly on between the liberated soul and the Lord for 'the liberated or isolated souls. Altta or mind in remaining without blemish. and full of virtue. less.' . he alone having reached the final goal of lordship. have been impossible without the will of such an Lsvara. Purushas. &c. eternal union with Therefore he alone eminent above all other Purushas. as he is always such as he is.420 of Prakrit! INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. alone. many such Isvaras. and has to be guarded against by such means as are inculcated in the Yoga but he. yet as their aims such a view would be impossible. is not like a man who has gained freedom. Again. becomes conscious of the incidence of the if pictures mirrored on the mind. unhappiness. even for one who has gained freedom.' it says.' this difference . the Isvara. good. While the ordinary Purushas or Selves undergoes. while in the body. are And though there be a possibility of more or yet the most eminent would always be the Isvara or the Lord. and Purusha. but this can never be predicated of the Lord. different. nature be of free. 'attain their isolation by rending asunder the three bonds. modifications tending towards happiness. it His highest modification Isvara. from a Yoga point of view. whereas in regard to Isvara there never was and never can be such bondage. Nor should one say that there may Though there be equality qud Purushas. but he is by . is is not so with of goodness is and he remains steadfast it.

is more than a god. and all that therefore there must be for of them a point beyond which it is impossible to go. though he does not go quite as far as the pares. as compared with other Purushas. and the purely relative character of the greatness and separateness claimed for the Isvara. but it We may be well to try to compare our own ideas of God. hardly be considered as a convincing argument of the existence of a Being endowed with all such transcendent excellences as Though this could . such as omnisci- ence. but as one of the Purushas. greatness. smallness. Pata?l^ali proceeds in the next SCitra to offer what he It calls his proofs. This Niratisaya point. ' by saying : In Him the seed of omniscience) attains infinity.' discover in this anything like a proof or a tenable appeal to any Prama/ia. His Isvara may be primus inter God. he is but one among but he his peers. Pataf^ali seems to me to come very near to the Homoiousia of man with Vedantin who claims for the Atman perfect Homoousia with Brahman. is He a little What is Isvara? As Kapila had declared that the existence of such a being as Isvara did not admit of proof. But Bho^/a without the help of the commentary.WHAT IS ISVARA? 42! need not point out here the weak points of this argument. with the ideas here propounded. is what is claimed for Isvara or the Lord. this non plus ultra of excellence. and other Aisvaryas. when put into clear and simple language. certainly not what we mean by God. (or the omniscient would be difficult to explains that what is meant here is that there are different degrees of all excellences.

there must also be a greatest. such as Brahma and guide. it shows at all events an honest intention on the part of Patafi^ali. without any inducement. could have caused that union and separation of himself and Prakn'ti which. as we are told. there must be best. This. 27 : His name Pra?^ava. the first creators.' Pranava might etymologically mean breathing forth or glory.' By the former ones are meant. of course. his determination being to save all living beings at the time of the Kalpapralayas and Mahapralayas. It sacred syllable Cm. I. Nor does he flinch in trying to answer the The question is supposed questions which follow. is only another name for creation. and this is Isvara. is He the ancients. Next ' Pata/lgrali proceeds to explain the majesty in I. how this Isvara. What he means that where there is a great and greater. of Isvara by saying. assigned as a name to the possibly a relic of a time beyond is . and that where there is good and better. the superior (Guru) even of the former ones. The answer is that the inducement was his love of beings. as we saw. the great destructions and reconstructions of the world.422 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. are here postulated. arising from his mercifulness. to have been asked. being himself not limited by time. 26. so and by superior is meant instructor and that it would seem difficult to assign a higher position to any divine being than by placing him thus above Brahma and other accepted builders of the world. ' Next is follows his name. others. would not have been admitted by Kapila. Patafw/ali's argu- ment reminds us is to a certain extent of the theistic argument of Cleanthes and Boethius.

and if it has any historical or etymological justification. But however that may be. certainly much as hoc illud was used in French when conthat. called PraTiava. And this. and to attain to Samadhi. used in the sense of Yes. IS LS'VARA? 423 It is said to have been the name of all eternity. and cannot It is be explained any further etymologically. their sacred syllable. who sees in it an Indianised form of the Hebrew Amen First of all.' nominal stem Avam. Amen does not mean God. as a means to concentrate our thoughts. us. it is praise or breathing forth. stopped by the labial nasal. Still we ! cannot go quite so far as Rajendralal Mitra. But why it is so we cannot tell. that repetition of the syllable and reflection Om on meaning are incumbent on the student of Yoga. or it may ' be the contraction of a pro- corresponding to Ayam. there is not one in the least satisfactory syllable Om to the scholar. a name. and how should such a word have reached India during the Brahmana period ? Pataw/ali continues by telling us in Sutra I. just as the name of father This may old However be true. but it does not satisfy the name Pranava and the may have been. its . 38. which has to be repeated a hundred or a thousand times in order to draw the mind away from all disturbing is Om impressions and to concentrate it on the Supreme Being. but in spite of all the theories of the Brahmans. It may be a mere imitation of the involuntary outbreathing of the deep vowel o. they must have had a beginning. and it is tracted to oui. and then drawn in ' . I9vara from or son. riot made by anybody. as Bho^a adds. as Bho^a says.WHAT our reach. this is at all events not known to us.' this.

distress. worldliness. languor. as 'Disease. Thus does the mind become serene and capable of Samadhi.' is Inward-turned thought (Pratyaketana) plained as a turning exall away of our senses from outward objects. I.424 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and disturbance of the regular inbreathing and outbreathing. fixing of the I. there arises serenity of mind. complacency. and indifference towards objects of happiness. In that sense he adds. and turning them back upon the mind. one should think how it could be removed if one sees virtuous people. and show neither approval nor aversion. pity. unhappiness. I.' The commentator ' adds. not having a settled standpoint. : and absence of obstacles. carelessness. 33. tremor of limbs. 32. I.3i. the chief end of the whole Yoga-philosophy. 'To prevent all this. doubt. . idleness. one should not envy them if one sees unhappiness. unsteadiness of mind/ 'With them arise pain.' 'And likewise from a reviving friendliness. and of thus in time obtaining Samadhi. people. there is constant mind on one subject (Tattva). one should rejoice and not say. Are they really virtuous ? if one sees vicious people.' I have given this extract in order to show how subordinate a position is occupied in Patafi^ali's . virtue and vice. If one sees happy . and not keeping it these are the obstacles causing . But all these are only outward helps towards fixing the mind on one subject. 29 'Thence also obtainment of inward-turned thought. The obstacles to Samadhi are mentioned in the next Sutra.' I. error. one should preserve indifference. 30.

would seem to speak in his favour. are first. lii) he represented this belief in one Supreme God as the first and most important tenet of Pataf^ali's philo- The leading tenets of the Yogins.' Rajendralal Mitra does not stand alone in this . and He rewards those who are ardently devoted to of liberation Nor directly grant it. and are eternal. is Om. and thus realising that Viveka or discrimination between the true man (Purusha) and the objective world This remains in the Yoga as it was (Prakrit!). in stating the tenet. and assume . Rajendralal Mitra is right. But we have only to look opinion.WHAT IS ISVARA? 425 mind by the devotion to Isvara. Samkhya. to have been that there are countless individual souls or Purushas which animate living beings. that there is a Supreme Godhead who is ' ' purely spiritual. the father. do not think. creator. works. deserts. that Rajendralal Mitra in his abstract of the was right when Yoga (p. They are pure and immutable but by their association with the universe they become indirectly the experiencers of joys and sorrows. therefore. however. theistic at this the Sutras themselves to see that originally a personal God was by no means looked upon as the most characteristic feature of belief in Patafk/ali's system. second in importance. Him by facilitating but He does not their attainment is He and the very name of Sesvara-Samkhya. sophy.' he says. and desires. or all soul. in the Sa?nkhya. perfectly free from His symbol afflictions. It is but one of the many means for steadying the mind. with which He is absolutely unconnected. given to the Yoga. . the I summum bonum of mankind. or protector of the universe.

and not even as the most popular atmosphere of In the in India this belief one Supreme Being may have been a strong point in favour of Patavk/ali's system. but again as one only out of many means. with the Yogins. devotion to the Isvara is mentioned. supreme in every sense.426 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. but from a philosophical point of view. or self-centred- As one it of the that freedom. but one that has never been associated with or implicated in metempsychosis. or liberating means of obtaining of quieting the mind previous to useful altogether. in the highest sense of the word. this I-svara being synonymous with God. Pataw/ali's so-called proofs of the existence of God would hardly stand against They are mere vrapepya. We possible to prove the existence of Lvvara. The Isvara. yet of the same kind as all other Purushas. or rather Selves or Purushas. aloofness. Such a confession not of an inability to prove the existence of an Isvara does not amount to atheism. According to him. but restricted to a personal creator and ruler of the world. the highest object of the Yogin was freedom. or side must remember that Kapila had committed himself to no more than that it is imany criticism. The idea of other Purushas obtaining union with him could therefore never have entered Pata?1(7ali's head. aloneness. and thus only can we explain the fact that Kapila himself was considered orthodox by friends In the Vedanta-philosophy the question of the real existence of a personal Isvara foes. innumerable embodied forms in the course of an ever-recurring metempsychosis. in the current sense of that word. efficacious of all. issues. ness. was originally no more than one of the many souls. and .

we should have to apply the same name to Newton's system of the world and Darwin's theory of evolution. but it therefore atheistic.. and. when animated by Purusha. such as both in its subjective and objective character. it was this natural craving rather than any vulgar wish to curry favour with satisfied the human the orthodox party in India that led to Patan^ali's partial separation from Kapila. though we know that both Newton and Darwin were Darwin himself went thoroughly religious men. His supreme Purusha. and this is very much what Pataf^/ali actually did in his Yoga-Sutras. We certainly need . so far as I can see. neuter. has no need to call in the assistance of a personal Lsvara. so far as to maintain most distinctly that his system of nature required a Creator who breathed life into it in the beginning. it is. the absolute Divine Essence of which the active or personal Isvara or the Lord is but a passing manifestation. the work or outcome of Prakrit i. a mere phase of Brahman. Brahman. The masc. in attempting to explain the universe. creator His system is therefore without a if we called or personal maker of the world. craving after a First Cause. would strongly object to be called irreligious or atheists. Kapila might easily have used the very words of Darwin.WHAT never arises. not is. presented by Brahma. What we mean by the objective world of according to Kapila. Samkhya. IS ISVAKA? 427 though we know how saturated that philosophy is with a belief in the existence of Brahman. and even those Darwinians who look upon this admission of Darwin's as a mere weakness of the moment. or First Being. afterwards raised into an Adi-Purusha.

oldest representatives of the Samkhya-philosophy. and that these defenders of the faith were satisfied with an sincere in- the Vedas. of atheism became more popular in seems to me an so that in the is Padma-purana the charge of atheism not against the Sa??ikhya only. not suppose that the recognition of Kapila's orthodoxy was a mere contrivance of theological diplomacy on the part of the Brahmans.428 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. of the of the recognition of the supreme authority of I confess that with what we know life religious of India and the character at all times. as good earnest. to the Veda in when it supports his own to such passages as $vetasvatara Upanishad IV. Two systems brought only escape this charge. but the Vaiseshika and Nyaya-philosophies also. do not even allude to the difficulty arising from the Isvara question. when he wants to prove 'that the world arises from primitive matter/ and appeals to the Veda. and Intro- . . Brahmans Besides. Hall. that is. and BHhad. we saw. it seems to me very difficult to admit the idea of such a compromise. 4. Preface to Sawkhya-sara. note. Kapila appeals. the Tattva-samasa and the Karikas '. which teach the identity of the 1 individual soul p. which ment important arguThe charge favour of their antiquity. The two that can be made to support his view. the Uttara-Mimamsa and the Yoga and in the case of the Uttara-Mimawzsa. 7. 5. with the highest 39. its explanation by $amkara is stigmatised as no better than Buddhism. particularly views. because it perverts the meaning of passages of the Veda. against nay even against the Purva-Mima??isa. 1 2. Ar. I. as in V. Up. in later times. duction to Sawkhya-pravafcana.

but "V i(//ianaBhikshu remarks with a great deal of truth. is He had stopped by the inevitable opponent who demurs to this definition of perception. because it would not include. as it is pretended. soul 429 (Brahman without qualities). But it is but fair that we should hear what Kapila himself has to say. Kapila's Heal Arguments. as he says. perceptible Isvara. while engaged the nature of sensuous perception been explaining perception as from actual contact between the cognition arising senses and their respective objects. It is then that Kapila turns round on his opponent. as it in discussing (I. And here it is important again to observe that Kapila does not make a point of vehemently denying the existence of an Isvara. Yogins. This may seem to us to amount to a denial of an Isvara. and complete indifference towards this world and the next. but seems likewise to have been brought to discuss the subject. and that. were by the way only.KAPILAS REAL ARGUMENTS. has never been proved to exist at all. and says that this Isvara. or at all events not wide enough because it does not include the perception of the Isvara or Lord. he is dealing with the perceptions of ordinary mortals only. But the Another opponent controversy does not end here. the perceptions of the Kapila replies that these visions of the do not refer to external objects. And here he 89). has never been established of by any of the three legitimate instruments knowledge or Prama/ias. starts up and maintains that Kapila's definition of perception is faulty. that . and recommends the surrender of good works. Yogins without denying their reality. this.

a Sat-kara. 95). because Isvara has not been proved to exist. it could have no desire. that is. sopher follows Anyhow this is not the tone of a philowho wants to preach atheism. free. For if he were supposed to be above all variance and free. have a different purpose. and therefore he must Kapila does not spurn that argument. Kapila had wished to deny the existence of God. though not altogether.' Then . he would have said Isvarabhavat. he could not have willed to create the world if he were not so. as he says. nor even the desire of creation . because if altogether free. or of one who by devotion has attained supernatural power (I. or to a Yogin who by devotion has obtained super- . would break down. he says that ' every proof in support of an Isvara as a maker or Lord. but. because desire. because Isvara does not exist. based on the Veda speaks of an Isvara or Lord. follows fact that the a more powerful objection. and not IsvarasiddheA. and in what we shall see that it is the manner rather than the matter of the proof of an Isvara which is challenged by Kapila and defended by his antagonist. namely the glorification of a liberated Self or Purusha. exist. and not. he endeavours to prove that the Vedic passages relied on in support of the existence of a maker of the world. some kind of which every activity presupposes is of evil. Taking his stand on the ground that the highest blessedness or freedom consists in having renounced all activity.43 if INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. he would be distracted and deluded and unfit for the supreme task of an fsvara. This is explained by Aniruddha as is referring either to a Self which almost. as he has recognised once for all the Veda as a legitimate source of information.

if it is meant to prove the existence of an active creator. or being created is PrakHti. to the Adi-purusha. the First Self. have been the origin of the later Purushottama. because the superintendence of the Purusha of the Samkhyas over PrakHti is not an active one. as in the case of a crystal (I. What he means is that in the Samkhya the Purusha is never a real maker or an He simply agent. unintelligent Prakn'ti would never have acted.KAPILAS REAL ARGUMENTS. and who may. free and has remained from eternity. Vigwana-Bhikshu goes a step further. changing. while what is really moving. and declares that it refers either to a Self that has obtained freedom from or to the Self that all is all variance and disturbance. but arises simply from proximity. though it remains all the time quite unmoved. . as if exercising an active influence over PrakHti. wrongly imagining all the time that he is himself the creator or ruler of the world. In support of this Aniruddha quotes a passage from the Bhagavad-gita (III. 96). or the products of PrakHti are reflected on him and as anything reflected in a crystal or a mirror seems to move when the mirror is moved. reflects on Prakr^ti. Aniruddha thereupon continues that it might be said that without the superintendence of some such intelligent being. The Purusha therefore cannot be called superintendent. 431 natural powers. and the Purusha does no more than witness all this. . that is. thus the Purusha also seems to move and to be an agent. But this also he rejects. 27): 'All emanations of Prakriti are operated by the Gunas . who in the theistic Yoga-philosophy takes the place of the Creator. for all we know. but Prakriti is evolved up to the point of Manas under the eyes of Purusha.

namely that. a dead body also might be supposed to perform the act of eating. in that case. A last of attempt is made to disprove the neutrality or non-activity of the Atman. while in reality he does no more than witness the appreis. he says. 56). while the Atman or Purusha remains for ever unchanged. Thus when he it is said. In another place where the existence of an Ls-vara. But no. It is the individual Purusha (6riva) that performs such acts. The Theory of Karman.' is (in spite of the PrakHti. as developed into gender) and not for the Purusha who in reality is Manas. The Atman reflects hension of the Manas. meant deluded. and Manas). such acts are performed not by a dead or inactive Atman. ' He is omniscient and omnipotent. yet the teaching anything. Manas on the Manas. the subject is again treated not so much for its own sake. the impossibility of his being a creator. Ahamkara. as little as a dead body eats. when under the influence of Prakn'ti (Buddhi. by Prak?^ti. for a time. as in order to settle the old question of the continuous effectiveness of . namely the uselessness supposing the Self to be without cognition. or active ruler of the world.432 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. To this the answer altogether is that though the Atman is not cognitive. and hence the illusion that he himself cognises. that is. a mere witness of such omniscience and omnipotence for (III. is once more discussed in the Sa??/khya-Sutras. but the Self deluded by Ahamkara imagines that he is the operator/ Another objection is urged against the Samkhya view that the Purusha is not a doer or creator.

' And others. whether working for Himself or for would ipso facto cease to be free from deThis argument is examined from different points of view. and on the other hand that He compassionated it after He had created it. ception of the status of the popular Hindu deities. is . you hand you will be reasoning in a circle. does not depend on any ruler the works themselves are working on for evermore. pf . to the conviction that the highest state of perfection and freedom from all conditions is really far higher than the ordinary con. but always leads to the same result in the end that is to say.THE THEORY OF KARMAN. If you say before. the Lord. for any desire to free living beings from pain (which is the main characteristic of compassion) and if you adopt the second alternative. sires. &c. as long as there before no creation.. again. we or after creation ? that as pain cannot arise in the absence of reply bodies. to a Lord who is nevertheless supposed to be loving and gracious. p. since the hypothesis fails to meet either For does He act thus of the two alternatives. 433 works (Karman). as on the one will hold that God created the world through compassion. in his Sarva-darsana-samgraha (transCowell and Gough. as every activity presupposes desire. we should have to ascribe the creation of the world. 228) uses the same by As for the doctrine of " a argument. The reward of every work done. Kapila. there will be no need. saying Supreme Being who acts from compassion. this has wellnigh passed away out of hearing. with all its suffering. If it were otherwise. according to of the world ." what has Madhava lated ' : been proclaimed by beat of drum by the advocates of His existence.

of the liberated Purusha or conceived as This concept has in fact Atman superseded the concept of the Isvara. by far the most effective defence against the charge of atheism. on the part of Kapila. if higher even than that of an Isvara. It is easy to understand why almost every philosophy. which was a later expedient. which was supposed to imply a denial of God nor did the Nyaya and Vai. without claiming even the aid of an Adi-purusha. as because it . though based on the belief that the Veda is of superhuman origin. or of being without a belief in the God of the vulgar. a maker and ruler of the universe. but there is certainly. whether Indian or European. so far as I can . can hardly avoid the suspicion of denying the old gods. to dehumanise. Nor must it also besides the be forgotten that other philosophies Sa?7ikhya have been suspected or openly accused of atheism for the same reason. a first Purusha. we It may be saw. that the recognition of the authority of the Veda was considered sufficient to quiet the theological conscience . Even and though entirely devoted to the interpretation of the Vedic sacrifice. and to exalt the idea of the Godhead.seshika systems. admitted the independent evolution of works. if it endeavours to purify. has been charged with atheism. 6raimini's Purva-Mima/msa. The conscience of Kapila and of the ancient Samkhyas was evidently satisfied with a belief in a Purusha in which the old concepts of the divine and the human had been welded into one. and to have made this quite clear would have been.434 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. escape the same suspicion. It is well known that on that ground even the early Christians did not escape the suspicion of atheism.

is There meant to be or to do. by later what the Isvara is philosophers such as Madhava in his Sarva-darsanasamgraha. Sutras 19-21. namely Book V. as met by the Nyaya philosophers. may be looked upon as purely academic. as should say. shows that they at all events took them seriously. because they possess the we nature of being effects. see. that eternal.Sutras where an tsvara is clearly denied or postulated. on the other side. for instance. because the Deity. we established by proof. either as the author or as the controller of the infinitesimally small elements or atoms of which the world is by them supposed one passage in the Nyaya-Sutras in which the question of a divine Lord is discussed in the usual way. These attacks. The Veda cannot. must be beyond the senses.THE THEORY OF KARMAN. but the tone in which they are met. admit that a Supreme Isvara cannot be is. a watch) And that they are effects can easily be proved by the fact that they possess "? parts. Inference cannot. 435 no passage in the Nyaya and Vaiseshika. that none of the three Prama^as can prove ' a Supreme Being. must have had a maker. 171): 'It is quite true/ he says. As specimens of Indian casuistry some extracts from Madhava's chapter on the Nyaya may here be of interest. being devoid of form. because we Naiyayikas have ourselves proved it to be nonAll this we admit to be quite true. But is there not. Perception cannot. quite as much as a jar (or. bethe existence of cause there is no universal proposition or middle term that could apply. seas. I quote from the translation by Cowell and Gough (p. &c. F f 2 and . the old argument that the mountains. these parts existing in intimate relation. but otherwise we hear nothing of to consist..

eyes. not by themselves alone.436 again INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the objector asks next. he had any. that is. a knowledge of proper means. but by concurrent causes. since this militates all him to and not laden with Hence he concludes that against his compassion. produced. but Aristotelian KIVOVV CLKLV^TOV)' (the But though yielding to this argument. by the fact that they possess a limited magnitude half-way between what is infinitely great and infinitesimally small. Hereupon the Nyiiya philosopher ' : be- comes very wroth and exclaims thou crest-jewel of the atheistic school. A feeling of compassion. for you have not even shown that what you say about the eternal ether is a real fact. and to His action in consider . Nor has any proof ever been produced on the opposite side to show that the mountains had no maker. We therefore abide by our old argument that the mountains have the nature of effects. they could not be effects. and if they had no maker. should surely have create living beings happy. For if any one should argue that the mountains cannot have had a maker because they were not produced by a body. what object this maker or Isvara could moved by none have had induced in view if in creating the world. creating but the idea is indeed caused by compassion only. desire to act. misery. setting in motion itself all other causes. be pleased to close for a moment thy envy-dimmed the following suggestions. one of them A maker is a being possessed of a being a maker. it would not be fitting to admit that God created the world. combination of volition. just as the eternal ether this pretended inference would no more stand examination than the young fawn could stand the attack of the full-grown lion.

. Do you suspect this "reciprocal " of each which you call " reasoning in dependence a circle.). and then again God's existence by the Veda]. the desired end. how will you remedy your deadly sick- ness of reasoning in a circle [for you have to prove the Veda by the authority of God. source nor. the atheistic opponent returns once more to the authority of the Veda and says ' : But then. ledge the non-eternity of the Veda. Therefore. for even if our knowledge of God were dependent on the the Veda might be learned from some other Veda. is obtained.' But the Nyaya is theistic interpreter and defender of the not silenced so easily. when God has been rendered propitious by the performance of duties which produce His favour.' In answer to this. liberation. 437 of a creation which shall consist of nothing but happiness is inconsistent with the nature of things. since there cannot but arise eventual differences from the different results which will ripen from the good and evil actions (Karman) of the beings who are to be created. thus everything is clear. there is no possibility of His being produced nor can it be in regard to their being known. again can it be in regard to the know." in regard to their being produced or in regard to their being known ? It cannot be the former. for the non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived by any Yogin endowed with transcendent faculties of (Tivra.' . still as God Himself is eternal.THE THEOEY OF KAKMAN. and replies ' : We defy you to point out any reasoning in a circle in our argument. &c. for though the production of the Veda is dependent on God.

an Isvara. gives an account of the supernatural . or any one else. The Four Books of If Yoga-Stltras. knowledge). though the non-existence of Nyaya does not teach Isvara. and secured by devotion to Him. the Kaivalyapada. is devoted to an explanation of the form and aim of Yoga. . meditation. that is. the Sadhana-pada. Brahman. and of Samadhi. and of deep absorption and ecstasy. Everything the Indian may be clear way of arguing to one accustomed to . That this is the riofht O view of the case is confirmed by the remarks made by Vi^nana-Bhikshu in his Here we are told that Yoga-sara-sa?y/graha. meditation or absorption of thought the second. an not very successful in proving by its logic the necessity of admitting a maker or ruler of the world. p. the means of arriving at this absorption the third. 18. alone. even when there is some imperfection in the employment of the above means (faith. and not to any other being. the Samadhi-pada. of concentration of thought. the two results (absorption and liberation) can be brought very near by the grace of the Parama-Isvara. the Highest Lord. now we turn to the Yoga-Sutras of Pataw/ali we find that the first book. view it would certainly seem the it is but from our point of that. energy. Vibhuti-pada. from Kevala. memory.438 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Kaivalya. absorbing and . means the isolation of the soul from the universe and its return to itself. explains Kaivalya to be the highest object of all these exercises. whether Isvara. explains . powers that can be obtained by absorption and ascetic exercises while the fourth.

deceived. Devotion to Him Hara. is quoted from the Smn'ti. Vishnu. as he says. ' all (I. nor by virtue or vice and their various developments. nescience and the rest. because it leads to greater nearness to the final goal. however different the roads followed by the Vedantins and Samkhyais yogins may be. the Divine idea of both schools is much the same. He only adds that the powers and omniscience of the Isvara are equalled or excelled by none. evidently quite convinced that. 439 is By Parama-lWara meant that or the Highest Lord here particular Purusha (Self) who was never touched by the five troubles. i.' . such as illness. because. and a passage the impediments. put an end to &c. and that he is the inner guide. that he is the spiritual chief and father of all the that gods. he said to consist in contemplation and to end in Steadfastness with regard to direct perception. and imparts spiritual vision (6r/lana&akshus) through the Vedas. thinking only with the mind. steadiness Isvara is with regard to the human self being secondary This devotion to Isvara is also declared to only. he has treated of this Being very fully in his remarks on the Brahma-Sutras I. saying much more on the Vi^nana-Bhikshu abstains from Lord.THE FOUR BOOKS OF YOGA-SUTRAS. and called Pranava. such as Brahma. or by any residue (results of former deeds) in general. For one desiring liberation the most comfortable path is clinging to or resting on Vishnu otherwise. 30) . He probably refers to his commentary on the Vedanta and he . a man is sure to be . is represented as the principal factor in abstract meditation and in liberation.

that is. the impressions of the senses and all the cares and troubles of every-day life would return. this 7fltta. though fully to its true nature. It curious that the Yoga should have employed is a word which. rendered by movement or function which T give as thought. Now We Yoga saw that as the second Sutra he explained Altta-vn'tti-nirodha. for the attainment of liberation. But it is not that highest goal itself. this what Pata/^ali is chiefly concerned with. lated by mind or the thinking principle. Yoga. would soon be torrent away again by the of life . however true the Samkhya-philosophy may be. nor could it be accepted as the most important feature of the Yoga. was not a recogterm of the Sawkhya. It is clear throughout the Isvara that devotion to him whole of this chapter on is no more than one of the means. the highest goal of the Yoga. is steadying of the mind. Vritti. but as far as technical . a very important one. which I translate by action. though. if there were no means of making the mind as firm as a rock. it may he. The character of the Yoga consists in really important teaching that. but only a means towards it. has also been while A"itta. restraining in or steadying the actions and distractions of thought. In the Sa?ftkhya the term would be Manas.440 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. helps which the Yoga-philosophy enlightened as carried The human mind. mind. True Object of Yoga. it fails to accomplish its end without its those practical alone supplies. has often been trans. nised I know.

Of course Manas is always different from Buddhi. it would be difficult to find a better rendering for thought. concentration only. But for practical purposes. provided always that we remember being a technical term of the Yogaphilosophy. it must be remembered that the real self-conscious absorption. as It has a development of Ahamkara and Buddhi. though it leads in the end to something like utter vacuity or selfentire suppression of all first but at the functions of the Manas. which itself has passed through Ahamkara or the differentiation of far as it is a modification of subjectivity and objectivity. 441 Manas in a state of activity.OTTA. Nirodha. as a name on in real life. has been defined philosophers. and indirectly As I had to only of the instrument of thought. It is he who is temporarily interested in what going on. is simply our thought or our thinking. and. to be taken here as a psychological term. restraint. and is very differently by different used most promiscuously in common parlance. what is meant by Kitta. though not absorbed in it except by a delusion only. and though mind. as carried word when used by Yoga philosophers. all In seer or perceiver is. use mind for Manas in the Samkhya-philosophy. ocean of Praknti.. its etymological relationship with Manas pointed it out as the most convenient rendering of Manas. of course. in so of the Buddhi. the Purusha or Self. for the time being. does not its mean movements of thought. but in reality it is . the Self appears as moving is in the waves which break against O it from the vast not moving. Like the moon reflected in the ripples of the waters. with us also. as we have to do whenever we render Prakrtti by nature.

We The sleep. and thus would establish once for all what is called the orthodox character of the Yoga. inference. but. the monster that is that has a head. was supposed in Hindu philosophy to assume for the time being the actual form of the object perceived. but that the Self is altogether intelligence. for Agama means distinctly the Veda. Right notions are brought about by the three Prama^as. notions require no explanation. saw that the mind. just as llahu. A state of doubt are uncertain whether also when we is what we is see at a distance a man or the trunk of tree. fancy. .44s INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. so well known from different systems of Indian philosophy. principal acts and functions of the mind are described as right notion. and they may be either painful or not. It is significant that Pata?l^ali should have used Agama instead of the Aptava&ana of the S4??ikhya. as sensuous perception. They illustrated by our mistaking mother-of-pearl a rope for a snake. &c. or of the head of llahu. Functions of the Mind. Wrong are for silver. and remembering. the fact being o 1 that there is no in- telligence belonging to Self. . Fancy is explained as chiefly due to words and a curious instance of fancy is given when we speak of the intelligence of the Self or Purusha. when receiving impressions from the outer world. it perceives nothing but itself. wrong notion. classed among wrong notions. Vedic or otherwise. is not a being is a head and nothing else. when once perfect in Yoga. but supposed to swallow the moon. and testimony.

however. and this by exercises (Abhyasa) and freedom from passions (Vairagya). 12. we could not say that we had slept well or badly. because. Patafk/ali asks at once is ' : What ' is Abhyasa or exercise ? Abhyasa generally used in the sense of repetition. Indian philosophers have the excellent habit of always explaining the meaning of their technical terms. ception. which is a perception of vivid impressions. 443 Sleep is defined as that state (Vritti) of the mind which has nothing for its object. it remains in effort its own character. free from all activity (V ritti). and in the said to be effected end to be suppressed. Having introduced for the first time the terms exercise and freedom from passion. when. he declares that it means that state of the mind. explains that in sleep also a kind of perception must take place. . unchanged. Remembering may depend on true or false perceptions. takes place in sleep. but he answers that he means hereafter to use this term in the sense of effort towards steadiness (Sthiti) of thought. on fancy. Exercises. Now is all these actions or functions have to be restrained. false perception. implied by the term Abhyasa 13). otherwise. itself the not wiping out of an object While true perperceived. Remembering is that has once been a waking state.EXERCISES. as Such must be continuous (I. and even on dreams. I. repeated. And if it be asked what is meant by steadiness or Sthiti. and fancy take place in a dream. The commentator. that or is. while sleep has no perceptible object.

(DHshte) stands for perceptible or sensuous objects. intermittingly Dispassion. Perhaps Anusrava is more general than Veda.444 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. D. a long time thoroughly and un14). that.). and that is the highest point which the student of Yoga-philosophy hopes to reach. we are told. &c. while Anusravika may be translated by revealed. as it is derived from Anusrava. as the consciousness of having overcome (the world) on the part of one who has no longer any desire for any a. and this is identical with /S'ruti or Veda. such as the stories about the happiness of the gods in paradise (Devaloka). is Vairagya or dispassionateness. mean much more than what we mean by the even and subdued temper of the true gentleman. is This Abhyasa if practised for (I. but it signifies also the highest unworldliness and a complete surrender of all selfish desires. It is interesting to see how deeply this idea of Vairagya or dispassionateness must have entered into the daily life of the Hindus. visible whether visible or revealed is). but for everybody. including all that has been handed down. Next follows the definition of dispassion( Vairagya). said to become firmly grounded. very good of what Vairagya is or ought to be is description A preserved to us in the hundred verses ascribed to Bhartnhari (650 A. Vairagya. which are preceded by two . It is constantly mentioned as the highest excellence not for ascetics It sometimes does not only. objects whatsoever. Here The consciousness of having subdued or overcome all such desires and being no longer the slave of them.

445 other centuries of verses. and it is very doubtful whether BhartHhari was really the original author of them all." it. you do nothing good work 1 His is actually called Subhashita-trisati. should not be subservient to ' it. VAIRAGYA. and pursues him like an enemy perform.. p.' If. after Bhartn'hari. and it is the only means taught by of liberating yourself from the world.DISPASSION. or whether he only collected them as Subhashitas \ Anyhow they show how the philosophy of Vairagya had leavened the popular mind of India at that distant time. is the precept our old Bishis. therefore. so that you may reap a blessing hereafter. and Tamil MSS. Self is imperishable and everlasting it is connected it with the body only by the link of Karman . one on worldly wisdom and the other on love. Pity it is that you have not tried the ' ' " Know ' Yourself. good deeds.' ' Live in the world but be not of The body is perishable and transitory. But as the Vairagyasataka of (rainaMrya seems in more recent times to have acquired considerable popularity in India.' ' . Frequent enjoyment of earthly prosperity has led to your sufferings. It was perhaps bold. 7. Death follows man like a shadow. 1896-97. see Eeport of Sanskrit astri. while the . through sheer negligence. a few extracts from it may serve to show that the old teaching of Pataw/ali and Bhartn'hari has not yet been forgotten in their native country. Many of these verses occur again and again in other works. to undertake a similar collection of verses on the same subject. by Seshagiri . nor has it ceased to do so to the present day.

and good deeds. for your fellow creatures.' Better to do less good. malice. p. to undergo austerities. . but good and loving work. involving O c* 1 Garbe. silent or inactive. or pithy advice. you will be your own enemy. than to do more with jealousy. the essence of a drug. and engage in ' deep contemplation.' Dispassionateness. Patu/i/yali 1 . instead of thinking what is untruth. to devote yourself to the worship of " Permanent God. speech.' 'To control your mind. 49. thoughts. reaches its highest point in the eyes of the Yoga-philosopher. all desire for the three is Gimas This c"> This at least what (I. Little. says in a somewhat obscure to Sutra ii) Sutra seems intended describe the highest 1 state within reach of the true VairiUnn. pride. to carry out your secular affairs with calmness." bearing universe. as here taught for practical purposes chiefly. and body. does not mean to be thoughtless. is always valuable. after he has attained to the knowledge of Purusha. when a man. like but. speech.44^ INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. has freed himself entirely from (or their products).' If you are unable to subject yourself physically to penances. and doing harm to others. the proper course to liberate your soul from the hard fetters of Karman would be to keep the passions of your heart under control. and body should be applied to good beasts or trees. to check your desires. good words. evil. Grundriss. or fraud. ' like a pure gem. with purity of heart. and become a victim to the miseries of this world. and to realise in yourself the in mind the transitory nature of the Truth. speaking mind.

where we meant for (i) Visesha. The knowJ . 19. 1 7) to explain an important distinction between the two kinds of meditative absorption (Samadhi). the gross elements and the organs (2) Avisesha. i. Pataw/ali next proceeds (1. the subtle essences and the senses : Aliwga. Visishfaliwga. the gross elements AvisisbJalimga. but such a translation would Sutra misleading here. particularly as the 23. which he calls Sampra^nata 1 These Guwas are more fully described in II. a (Bhutani) name . (3) the Liwgamatra.e. i.' From may a purely philosophical point of view Purusha be translated by God. Buddhi .' Meditation With or Without an Object. the Pradhana. ' : It the sense. 447 indifference not only to visible and revealed objects. e. that is. the same classes of Gvmas are described as of Pradhana. follows so soon after.e. the twenty-four Tattvas. read that the four Guwas or Guwaparvam are .e. Praknti as Avyakta. i. on the devotion to the Lord. the Self. Liwgamatra. It would have been better also to translate ' be arising from. i. i. that is. ledge of the Purusha implies the distinction between what is Purusha.e. . here called Guwas because determined by them.' than ' conducive to. however. the subtle elements and the mind. 45. In the comI. and Aliwga. e. i. and there- between Purusha and the Gunas of Prakr^ti. (4) mentary to the Aliwga. but likewise towards the Gimas. from realising the difference between what is Self and what is not Self. and fore also not as a possessive compound remaining much the same. if I am not mistaken. Buddhi. that is curious Rajendralal Mitra should have rendered Purushakhyate^ by conducive to a knowledge of God. Vigrnana-Bhikshu explains it by Atmanatmavivekasakshatkarat.MEDITATION WITH OR WITHOUT AN OBJECT. and what is not.

The twenty-four Tattvas are called unconscious. yet. Native com- known mentators. the twenty-fifth or Purusha is conscious. This again is . meditation called Avi(/a. but only existence. Here the spirit of minute distinction shows itself there is once more. and the former be considered preliminary to the latter. which I am inclined to take in the sense of having it can fix. are called Videhas. This seems to and Asampra<7?iata. are called Prakwtilayas. Those who in their Samadhi do not go beyond the twenty-four Tattvas. for though these two kinds of meditation may well be kept apart. is mean that there one kind of meditation when our thoughts are directed and fixed on a definite object. others who do not see the Purusha bodyless . When meditation (Bhavana) has something definite for its object it is called not only Pra^/iata. not having a seed object. and another when no definite object of meditation left. The without a Asampra^rtata-samadhi. but it is hardly necessary that we should enter into all the intricate subdivisions of the two kinds of meditation. without seeing the twentyfifth. as referred to the subject. but at all events identify themselves no longer with the body. the Purusha. the numerous divisions of each hardly deserve our notice. from which to spring or to expand.448 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. take a different view. literally with a seed. looked upon as one of the Purushas. but also Savi^a. absorbed in Prakf'iti. however. or. and from which or is it some seed on which can develop. as sub- We are told that what is called conscious meditation may have for its object either one or the other of the twenty-four Tattvas or the Isvara. not quite clear to me. known. knowing.

or that there is but a small residue of them. Pata?"k/ali says (I. argumentative. Sutra has been differently explained by It different European and native commentators. that there is may mean which are I a is residue not. Savi&ara. or general disposition. joyous. 1 9) once more that in the case of the Videhas and Prakviti- 3 Asmita is different from Ahawkara. They may become important in a more minute l . is explained as being preceded by a repetition of negative perception. or meditation with- out a known object. or that there The Sawskaras. 18. such as Prakn'ti. Manas. its its have rendered by previous impressions. and as the end of all This I. The Asamprae^ata-samadhi. and means the mis- (Asmi) what I Buddhi. character. and Sasmitil ceit. previous impressions. but they can hardly be of interest to speculative philosophers except so far as they furnish another proof of a long continued study of the Yoga-philosophy in India before the actual composition of the Sutras. it may be. Ahamkara. Gg . &c. deliberawith false contive.' est imbuta recens servabit odorem It all may be intended that these Sawiskaras are either wiped out. of previous impressions. 449 such as Savitarka. Sananda. conception that I am am not. or. In summing up what has been said about the different kinds of Samadhi. its everything that has given to the mind flavour. peculiar so to say. 'Quo semel Testa diu. manifested in the final act of the stopping all functions of the mind.MEDITATION WITH OR WITHOUT AN OBJECT. unconscious meditation. study of the Yoga.

the proof of the existence of a Deity. 21). be near or within reach when the zeal or the will is strong. and I shall in future dispense with them. or excessive. concentration. or with excessive zeal and those who employ excessive means with mild. and knowledge succeeding each other. the cause of Samadhi is the real world (Bhava). the name of Samkhya. memory. follows at last the 23. with moderate.and Yoga-philosophies extremely tedious. with mild. layas (as explained before. an alternative. those who employ mild means. though they may contain now and then some interesting observations. make both the Samkhya. After an enumeration of to be employed all these means of Yoga by the student.' The commentator calls Nor is it simply an easy expedient. it right. which has always been supposed answer to Kapila. and some more helps are mentioned in the next Sutra (I. if you like. or with excessive zeal. with moderate. but that for other Yogins there are preliminary conditions or steps to Samadhi. . with liajendralal Mitra. Such divisions and subdivisions which fully justify . These strong-willed or determined aspirants are again divided (I. Thus we get nine classes of Yogins.45 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Every one of these Samadhis is again carefully defined. namely. 448) the object or. energy. with mild. or with excessive zeal those who employ moderate means. moderate. tsvara Once More. enumeration. to translate this famous Sutra I. with moderate. where we read that Samadhi may be said to faith. and which I translated before by Devotion to the Lord. 22) according as the means employed by them are mild. p. to contain. in ' .

that the orthodox Yogins derived great comfort from this Sutra as shielding Patan^ali against the charge of atheism. but always one of many Purushas and though he was looked upon as holy (I. a subject certainly far more important than has generally We Gg 2 . Though it is true. is not God in the sense in which Brahm^ might be called so. or as more than a somewhat forced confession of faith. But this opens far generally one of the Tattvas. follow next. which we can well believe. he never seems to have risen to the rank of a Creator. too large a subject for our purpose in this place. such as the expulsion and retention of the breath. it would be impossible to look upon it as which there is really a real proof in support of the existence of God. the highest God. ' 451 Sutra at once by Devotion to God. 25) and omniscient. the so-called Pranayamas. as may be seen from Sutras I. 29 Nor is this devotion to I. even the last or the highest Upaya. no doubt.OTHER MEANS OF OBTAINING SAMADHI. no room in the Samkhya system.' Isvara. Expedients. 33 translated before. contrivances to subjects may have been really useful as all draw away the thoughts from except the one chosen for meditation. the so-called Ha^a or Kriya-yoga. Other Means of Obtaining Samadhi. for . approach here to the pathological portion of the Yoga. The benefits arising from this devotion to the Lord are not essentially different from those that are to be obtained from other Upayas or means of attaining Samadhi. He is a God. as we saw. for Patark/ali goes on immediately after to mention other means equally conducive to concentrated meditation or absorption in the thought of one object.

452 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. as is now include the so-called physico-psychological experiments under the name of philosophy. their illusions do not seem to me to have been mere frauds. Next to the moderation or restraint of the breaththe mind. such as the moon without. they are honest in their statements as to the discipline that can be applied to the mind through the body. and to such . been supposed. All these are means towards an end. that even objects seen in dreams or in sleep are supposed to answer the same purpose. but a subject for students of pathology rather than of philosophy. that is. provided always that these objects do not appeal to our passions. In fact any object may be chosen for steady meditation. and the same with all the other senses. to fix the attention. . follow descriptions of how tion towards objects. we . and even if they could be proved to have been mistaken in their observations. having everything they want in themselves. outward which produces a steadiness and contentedness of the mind when directed towards objects which no No wonder longer appeal to the passions (I. as so often happens. 37). though it is far from my purpose to undertake a defence of all the doings and sayings of modern Yogins or Mahatmans. We are next told of the perception of an inward luminous and blessed state. and there can be no doubt that they have proved efficacious only. unless. One thing may certainly be claimed for our Sutras the fashion. cognises a heavenly odour. at least in the days of Pata?l(/ali. the means have evidently encroached in this case also. or our heart within. by being directed to the tip of the nose. which therefore are supposed to have no longer any inclinaing. on the aims.

we are told at other times that any step may be useful. and which was to lead on to Kaivalya or spiritual separateness and freedom. if we ask what is the result of all this. supposing that our meditation was centred on a cow. . obtains with regard to formation grounded in all them objects of his senses con(sic). the question would be whether we should meditate on the sound it is called Savitarka.OTHER MEANS OF OBTAINING SAMADHI. Now. As a crystal. 453 an extent that Yoga has often been understood to consist in these outward efforts rather than in that concentration of thought which they were meant to produce. 41). Though some of these bodily exercises are represented as serving as a kind Kriya-yoga or worksometimes called HaAa-yoga. 42) that when meditation is mixed with uncertainties as to word. or knowledge. This impression remains true as grounded in the object. becomes really red to our eyes. or steadiness and consubstantiation. which is though it is not clear why. in the same way the mind is supposed to become tinged by the objects perceived. he now explains (I. when placed near a red flower. and our mind should always be centred on one object of meditation. and that some may be skipped or taken for of staircase on which the passed. called mind ascends step by step. the idea being that the mind is actually modified or changed by the objects perceived (I. Having mentioned in a former Sutra that Samadhi (here called Samapatti) may be either Savitarka or SaviMra. Thus. meaning. This true Yoga is often distinguished as Ra^a-yoga or royal Yoga from the other ing Yoga. we are told in Sutra 41 that a man who has put an end to all the motions and emotions of his mind.

that is. quite different from the knowledge which is acquired by inference or by revelation. Its though not much more clearly. and that is what was called before Apragr/iat& Samadhi. there is highest goal of the true Yogin . Savitarka. then there would follow on the completion of that meditation contentment or peace of the Self (Atman). If we look upon the NirviMra Samadhi as the highest of the Samadhis. the Savitarka Samadhi. and thus we learn that the former. 44). After Samadhi. the next division is into Savi&ara and NirviMra. Go. And from this know- ledge springs a disposition which overcomes all former dispositions and renders them superfluous. tinged with the form of its object. as it were. forgets its own subjective form of knowing. without any form. Subtle objects include Prak-riti also. is Knowledge in this state called Tfo'tambhara. remains. right or truth-bearing. when the knowing mind (Pragma). They are defined as having reference to subtle objects essences. one in form with the object. meditation . (I. and becomes. and there is nothing subtle beyond it. to the Tanmatras. still something beyond knowledge. or on the meaning of it (Begriff).454 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Sk.subtle. This knowledge therefore would seem to be the but no. that is the genus cow. or. Such a meditation would be called opposite is Nirvitarka when all memory vanishes and the meaning alone. for the Purusha is neither subtle nor non. as the commentator puts it. has been described. or the idea or picture (Vorstellung) conveyed by it. material objects only. both Savitarka and Nirvitarka. had to deal with and the senses. cow. Samadhi Aprar/uatft.

KAIVALYA. namely. i. and in its simplest form. FREEDOM. It shows us the whole drift of the Yoga in with the means of and concentrating the mind on certain steadying things. such as the Pranayama. but that is almost the only allusion to what in later times came to be the most prominent part of the practical or Kriyayoga. Yoga carried on by thought or by the will alone. are just alluded to. supposed to prepare the mind . the postures and other ascetic per- formances (Yogahgas). Kaivalya. the in- and out-breathing. as taken over from the Samkhya. This short account of what first is contained in the all chapter of the Yoga-Sutras contains almost that can be of interest to European philosophers the system of Patan^ali. the Purusha to his delivered from all 455 This restores own nature. which is tantamount to a meditation which does not dwell on anything that can be offered by an ideal representation of what is called the real world. Freedom. without any object. and it may well be called the highest achievement of 6rfiana-yoga. and it is not impossible that it may have originally formed a book complete in itself. e. beginning leading on to a description of meditation. after he has been life. or pure ecstasy. the outside disturbances of and particularly from the ignorance that caused him to identify himself for awhile with any of the works of Prakrit i (Asmita). no longer restricted to any of the Tattvas. as distinct from all the is Tattvas of Praknti. and more particularly on the twenty-four Tattvas. Outward helps. each Purusha on It is really meditation of himself only. This Kaivalya or the highest bliss in the eyes of the true Yogin.

(II. or members of Yoga. translated by Shrinivas Jyangar. Devotion to the Lord/ is classed here as simply one of the Yogangas or accessories of Yoga. Walter. 1893. better still .456 for its INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. it is a kind of worship (Bhaktibut that is all the visesha) addressed to Bhagavat . The above-mentioned Isvara-pramdh4na. the Ha^aprayoga. commentator has to say in recommendation of it. by Sabhapati Svami. the existence or non-existence of an individual Creator or Ruler of the world. Yogangas. Mimchen. Helps to Yoga. contentment. There is also a very useful German translation by H. 1880. Svatmarama's Ha^Aa' yoga-pradipika. Bombay. own higher ' efforts. Lahore. It is quite possible that some of my readers will. and . meditation. together with purification. Bombay. and several more. There is nothing to show that Patafi^/ali imagined he had thereby given a full and satisfactory answer to the most momentous of all questions. 1895. penance. edited by Siris Chandra Basu. It is . such as the second and third books of the Yoga-Sutras. 32). the Ghera/<c/a-samhita. but it seems to me that they really have nothing to do with philosophy in the true sense of the word and those who take an interest in them may easily consult texts of which there exist English translations. be disappointed by my having suppressed fuller details about these matters. 1893 On the Vedantic Haj-Yoga. and mumbling of prayers showing how little of it real philosophical ascribed to by Patafk/ali. true that considerable antiquity is claimed for some of these Yogangas. importance was It helps towards Sa- madhi.

and names such as Vasish^Aa and Ya^navalkya are quoted as having described and sanctioned eightyfour postures. cross-seat. 2. Place each foot under the thigh its of side. while Gorakshanatha reckoned their I take a few specimens true number as 8. : ' . be considered enough and more than enough. HELPS TO YOGA. of the Bandhas or bindings. Place the hands in the form of a tortoise in front of the scrotum. The right foot should be placed on the left thigh. Danc/asana. Bhadrasana. stick-seat. . It is called Padmasana. Siva. Sitting straight with the feet is placed under the (opposite) thighs sana. . Virasana. 102. and there Bhadrasana. Svastikasana. 103 i Padmasana. sex. Yoga Aphorisms. and the two thigh J . lotus-seat. food and dwelling of the performer of Yoga. I believe. caste. is called Svastika- Seated with the fingers grasping the ankles brought together and with feet placed 5. p. p. himself is reported to 457 have been their author. and the left foot on the right the hands should be crossed. and under the feet. 3. fortunate-seat. To most people these 1 See Eajendralal Mitra. and of the rules regarding the age. and it will produce the heroic posture Virasana. and is highly beneficial in overcoming all diseases. and I shall abstain from giving descriptions of the Mudras (dispositions of upper limbs). great toes should be firmly held thereby the chin should be bent down on the chest.400. extended on the legs.000 from Eajendralal Mitra's Yoga Aphorisms. and in this .YOGANGAS. posture the eyes should be directed to the tip of the nose. 4.' This will.

and PrakHti. hunger and thirst This is what is meant the complete subjugation of by the senses (Param& vasyatS. I do not go quite so far. N. Pata/lr/ali's The third chapter of are called Vibhutis. Powers. MahaHere also we are siddhis. Yoga-Philosophy. Jfo'ddhis. and a complete indifference of the Yogin towards pain and and heat. or Aisvaryas. Vibhdtis. which to a reader without physiological knowledge seem simply absurd and incredible. the same tendency nings which led from intellectual to practical Yoga. C. for some of these facts have. presented to Purusha through the agency of the Manas pleasure. as developed from Prakriti. Yoga-Sutras is devoted to a description of certain powers which were supposed to be obtainable by the Yogin. indriy4?^im. II. if properly practised.458 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the seer. They able to watch the transition from rational beginto irrational exaggerations. in a general way. cold ] . That transition is clearly indicated in the Yogangas or Cf. 55) which it is the highest desire of the Yogin to realise. but as an essential condition of perceiving the difference between the Purusha. Paul. or simply Bhutis. the spectacle. are helpful in producing complete abstraction (Pratya- hara) of the senses from their objects. . been recorded and verified so often that we can hardly doubt that these postures and restraints of breathing. and this not for its own sake. Professional students for of hypnotism would probably be able to account many statements of the followers of Kriya-yoga. minute regulations will seem utterly absurd.

The Samyama. arises when while the third. real the mind. abstraction (Praty4hara). the other five being treated as merely outward helps. In II. the navel. regulation of breathing (Pranayama). Siddhis. 3). contemplation (Dhyana). restraints (Yama). is thoroughly collected and fixed on one point without any disturbing causes (III.SAM YAM A AND accessories SIDDHIS. which leads on to the Siddhis. the sky or some other place. is in i) as the this and said to be the tip of the nose. 8). its absorption. however. is explained etymologically as that by which the mind. firmness holding. confinement of the Manas to one place. arid Samadhi. of which absorption or meditation is a very madhi. firmness (Dharana). firm grasp being no more than an approximative rendering. but. viz. which comprises the three highest is called internal (III. . 4 three only are chosen as constituting Samyama. By this all other VHttis or motions of the Manas are stopped. It is this Sawiyama. Sawyama and helps to Yoga. firmness. DharaTia. is contemplation of the one object to the exclusion of all others . 29 we subduing (Niyama). place the ether. namely Dhyana. Samyag adhiyate. it is still but an outside help of the so-called objectless It is difficult to find a (Nirvi^a) state (III. 7) in contra- distinction from the other helps. 459 find eight of these accessories mentioned. poor rendering. lost in This Sawork. The next. word for Samyama. postures (Asana). Dharawa. is explained (III. and the mind can be kept fixed on one object. but in III. Samadhi. or perfections. in itself. Dhyana. and absorption (Samadhi). illuminates one object only. of Yoga.

and as no more. and certainly became in higher degree to the achievements by means of Sawyama claimed by the Yogins in the following Svltras. to this gift. the future may present and the present accounted for by the past. have how- . it is said. before explaining these Siddhis. when it more. by no means without parallels In fact we countries. gift of prophecy. it is now. This is expressed by So far all is clear but Pataf^ali in Sutra III. and how it is to be applied to what called Knowledge of the past from the present. is supposed to be able to understand the language of birds and get more and more into in other superstitions. Thus a jar it is is not yet. as has often been supposed both by Indian and by European scholars. and that it is possible from knowing one to know the other states. when So in all things. Here (III. it sounds very much like a claim of the so time. is hardly miraculous yet though. These are at first by no means miraculous. as now.460 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. or of the future from the present. and it is no has been broken up and reduced to it . as not yet. exists only as clay the visible jar. 16. that a Yogin by means of Sa??iyama knows what to is come and what in is past. but for all that. i 7) because a man has learned to understand applies The same a still the meanings and percepts indicated by words. when dust again. known from the it is difficult to see why Samyama is required for is this. endeavours show that every thing exists in three forms. be . a Yogin by applying Sawyama other animals. the threefold modification. to Patafw/ali. nor are they the last and highest goal of Yoga-philosophy. though they become so afterwards. when we are told . superstitions which little claim on the attention of the philosopher.

461 ever interesting they may appear to the pathologist. a man may is himself beloved by everybody. as we know. a fore-knowledge of one's death. &c. by meditating on the a knowledge of geography. lightness like that of cotton. though omniscience. our senses and our thinking organ are liable. More of these Siddhis are mentioned from IV. whether we accept trivial. by meditating on the Polar star. ascension to the sky.SAMYAMA AND SIDDHIS. we are landed once more in when we are told that he may may see things may. conquest of all elements. if only he can bring his will or his Sawyama to bear on the things which produce such effects. sometimes indicated by portents. or whether we try to account for them in any other way. in fact know everything. Then follow other miraculous gifts all ascribed to as a knowledge of former existences. and by meditating on the navel. 38 to 49. Samyama. such as the soul entering another body. even from a . but soon after the supernatural. invisible to ordinary eyes. by meditating sun. a knowledge of anatomy. or thought-reading. could not be passed over. see heavenly visions. such a power of making oneself invisible. them as mere hallucinations to which. a knowledge of another's mind. They form an essential part of the Yoga-philo- sophy. acquire the strength of an elephant. a knowledge of astronomy. he may acquire firmness. By Samyama with make respect to kindness. These matters. effulgence. conquest of the organs. This again natural. acquire on the moon. conquest of time. though not of the merely casual objects of his thoughts. and it is certainly noteworthy. a knowledge of the movements of the heavenly bodies. He may actually suppress the feelings of hunger and thirst. unlimited hearing.

relates not only which the young student had these might but miracles in the presence of many people. that we find such vague and incredible statements side by side with specimens of the most exact reasoning and careful observation. and bid you rise and go to the Agastya A. because I see that : you are holy and sincere. Lcct. pati. that I who said to him in ' : Know. born in Madras in 1840. and all the are You not separate from me. had a vision of the Infinite Spirit. are told that it was in the twenty-ninth year be accounted for like other visions which he performed We of his age that Sabhapati. in all creations. thirsting for Brahma^/Mna or knowledge of Brahman. Miracles. xiii.sTama. Sabhapati Svamy. where you will find me in the shape of Rishis and 1 M. .. M. neither is any soul distinct from me I reveal this directly to you. Sabhaare the Infinite Spirit creations am me. the author of a short visions life of his teacher. In reading the accounts of the miracles performed by Yogins in India we have in fact the same feeling of wonderment which we have in reading of the miracles performed by the Neo-platonists in Alexandria. The same writer who can enter into the most abstruse questions of philosophy 1 with perfect good faith how he saw sitting in the air so feet will tell us his master above the ground. philosophical point of view. many One instance of the miracles supposed to have been wrought by a Yogin in India must suffice. I accept you as my disciple.462 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. A writer with whom I have been in correspondence. Theosophy.

in the dead of the night. The Yogin had been expecting him ever since Mahadeva had commanded him Agastya Asrama. and was again commanded Asrama. acquired Brahmagwana and practised Samadhi till he could sit several days without any food. in a vision to proceed to the Agastya After many perils he at last reached that Asrama and found there. But though he himself declined to perform any of the ordinary miracles. seven miles from Madras.' it 463 After that.' Sabhapati seems after- wards to have taught in some of the principal cities and to have published several books. Sabhapati left his wife and two sons. Yogins. a great Yogin. There he sat for three days and three nights immured in deep contemplation. went out of his house and travelled all the night till he reached the temple of Mahadeva. also called Vedasrem-Svayambhu-sthalam. still living at Lahore. for was one o'clock in the morning when he saw the divine vision. Be liberal in imparting the truths that should benefit the GHhasthas (householders). declining. his face benign and shining with divinity.MIRACLES. But beware lest thy vanity or the importunity of the world lead thee to perform miracles and show wonders to the profane. After seven years his Guru dismissed him with words that sound strange in the mouth of a miracleGo my son. he has left us an account of a miracle performed by one of the former members of his own Asrama. two hundred years old. to perform any miracles. About i So years ago a Yogin passed through Mysore and visited . in a large cave. and try to do good to the monger world by revealing the truths which thou hast to proceed to the ' : learned from me. He became his pupil. howIn 1880 he was ever.

'Yes. we know that such things as the miracle here related are impos- Om. He willed. asked ' : What power ' ' . and what have A you that you call yourselves divine persons ? Yogin answered. and the sky was as serene and calm as ever I V do not say that the evidence here adduced would All that strikes pass muster in a Court of Law. in it is the simplicity with which everything is me told. Destruction was impending ' . and the tempest and the thunder. 1880. . thunder began to roar in the air. a treatise on Vedantic Raj Yoga Philosophy. Of course. a deep dark- man. Government College. by the Mahatma Giana Guroo Yogi Sabhapati Sovarni. the world will be in ruins. and lightning began to flash. and cut down the branches of the fruit trees to pieces. and the unhesitating conviction on the part of those who relate all this. and they all went with the Yogin to his Asrama. clouds overcast the sky.' The people implored the Yogin to calm this universal havoc. being a Mussulreceived Rj ah who have you that you arrogate to yourself divine honour. Student. The Nabob. and the rain and the wind. it The stick was transformed into millions of arrows. and the fire and all were stopped. the voice of the Yogin was heard to say If I give more power. and rain began to fall in torrents.464 the INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. ness spread over the land. edited by Siris 1 Chandra Basu. we possess the full divine and the Yogin power to do all that God can do took a stick. and in the midst of this conflict of the : elements. gave divine power to it. Meanwhile the Nabob of Arcot paid a visit to Mysore. Lahore. and threw in the sky. him with great reverence and hospitality.

we must also remember that the influence of the mind on the body and of the body on the mind is as yet but half explored and in India and among the Yogins we certainly meet. with many . and it was only in order to guard against ordinary being supposed to be unwilling even to listen to the statements of those who believe in Kriyayoga that I have given so much space to what I cannot help considering as self-deception. and the chief object it had in view was to realise the dis- Hh . and should still continue to be beThis belief in miracles evidently began with lieved. feared. there events also. is Prophets would soon begin to outbid prophets. leading in many cases to a systematic deception of others. particularly in more modern times. and the small ball of superstition would roll on rapidly till it became the avalanche which we know it to be. soon be accepted as the work of the prophet who foretold it. with what Pata^ali describes as a foretelling of the future by a knowledge of the What could be foretold might present or the past. but a step to prophesying other whether wished for. and from prophecy even of recurrent events. It was truly philosophical. Yoga. But all this is beyond our province. and to have been at all times and in all countries. or expected. however. Apart from that. however interesting it may be to modern psychologists. sible. in its early stages.MIRACLES. it but human nature small beginnings. knew little or nothing of all this. indications artificial that hypnotic states are produced by ference means and interpreted as due to an interof supernatural powers in the events of life. 465 seems almost as great a miracle in that such things should ever have been believed.

in truth. Moksha. freedom. 37) in the career of the true aspirant after Viveka.466 tinction INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. or perceiver of pain or pleasure. we ought reject to remember that only by practical experiments could we possibly gain the right to them altogether. aloneness. and Yoga. True Yoga. his. and Kaivalya. though false. distinction. experience arises from our not distinguishing between these two heterogeneous factors of our consciousness. We are told again and again that our ordinary. the ever objective. In enumerating the means by which this distinction can be realised. between the experiencer and the experienced. But though Patam/ali allows all these postures and tortures as steps towards reaching complete abstraction and concentration of thought. One sometimes doubts whether all the mind. repre- sented the achievement of this distinction. but simply the working of Prakn'ti. he never forgets his highest object. or as we should call it. but can only see them as being reflected on the Manas or mind. the separation or deliverance of the subject from all that is was objective in him the truth being that the Purusha never can be the immediate experiencer or ever . the Purusha's. If he does not discard the latter altogether. are useless and may even become hindrances (III. when perfect. nay he allows that all the Siddhis. Sutras can really be the work of one and the same Thus while in the course of Patangrali's . claimed by the Yogins. this mind not being. Patafw/ali always gives the preference to efforts of thought over those of the flesh. between subject and object. or miraculous powers.

so that the Yogin shrinks from contact with his own. or in something like the pineal gland. 55) : mind and the Kaivalya (aloneness) Self have obtained the same achieved when both the purity. 54). the general drift of the Yoga remains always the same. which the commentator renders by A'ittasattva. much more from contact with other denly told colour. took Sattva as the Guna. 467 we could not but give him credit for never trying to locate the mind or the act of perceiving and conceiving in the brain. last Sutra of the third book. Pata%/ali says simply Sattva. after the removal of the misconception of This seems not quite exact. 34. it is to serve as a discipline for subduing all the . may as a ferry. for if we activity. strength and adamantine firm- ness be gained for the body. However. by Samyama or restraint. and is to be reabsorbed into its cause . (III. we are sud- 46) that loveliness. Sattva. across the ocean of the world. or causes (Ahamkara. as a light by which to recognise the true independence of the subject from any object and as a preparation for this. bodies. claiming the muscle of the heart as the seat of the consciousness of thought (HHdaye While the human body as such is 7ifittasa?nvit). This requires some explanation. while the Manas has a cause. Bnddhi.TRUE YOGA. Prakrit!) as soon as Hh 2 . and defines as the entering of thought (Jiitta) into its own causal form. speculations. In the passions arising from worldly surroundings.' Instead of Mind. we should be told that a Guna cannot have a cause. Patan^ali sums up what he has ' said by a pregnant sentence is (III. always regarded as dark and as unclean. it is to serve as a Taraka (III. we find him suddenly in III.

perfections. but something substantial (Dravyam). We are I always told that the three Guas are not qualities. 1 and to heat Yatharthas trigunas tatha A'ittam api triguwam. 'As the is The mind in threefold. 15) l Sattva of the mind is goodstriving for mastery and its purification means its not ness. meditation in its various forms. . and therefore in the there are these three Gu?ias (IV. holding the Self. 47). first as having thorn or being them.468 its INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. natural or miraculous. In everything that springs from nature. Guna. fitness for bethis Ekagrata. light. but also to birth. darkness (II. which Kaivalya. subjugation of the organs of sense. to Indian philosophers they seem to be so clear as to require no explanation at all. aloneness. unfortunately. joy. the thought also is threefold. the case of the Purusha. Manas being overcome by the other two Gu^as of Ra^as. to drugs. From this passion. and tells us that they may be due not only to Samadhi. but I am bound to confess that their nature is by no means clear to me. and from this at last Atmadar-sanayogyata. to incantations. also. have tried to explain the meaning of the three Gu?ias before. . fitis the same as In the fourth and last chapter Patafw/ali recurs once more to the Siddhis. from concentration. serenity. here the Sattva. or Tamas. has become perfectly *Santa or quieted. then as being tinged once more by the Gunas of object fact is the objects perceived (IV. while. from this Indriyar/aya. The Three Gums.' doubly affected by the Gimas. or in ness for beholding himself. 16). purification springs first Saumanasya.

because it is performed without any desire. the act of a Yogin. their support. became by penance a Brahman. became a Deva. Impressions are caused by from desire. . desire all is from nescience. in the locality when a man is born.SAMSKARAS AND VASANAS. it produces no fruit. Sawskaras and Vasanas. perceptions. or Samskaras. or . whether good or bad. cow. This is accounted for as being simply a removal of hindrances. or when Visvamitra. a Brahman. often dormant. as a Brahman or /Sudra. &c. but break out again when he enters on a canine birth. dispositions. Though. bird. These rethe mainders never cease. impressions. and is then called memory l or in the peculiar genus. They show themselves either in what remains. whatever a man does has its results. They are not said to be without beginning. is neither black nor white. their them the body with habitat the mind. 469 By birth is meant not only birth in this or in a future life. As the results of actions we have Vasanas. we are told. so that pensities animal pro- may lie dormant for a time in a Brahman. near to what we call instinct. (Tapas) or ardour of asceticism. propensity. from being a Kshatriya. of man. as a rule. such as when Nandisvara. wishing to irrigate his field. or that on which they lean. perceptions spring The result of its instincts. as when a husbandman. pierces the balk of earth that kept the water from flowing in. 1 This kind of memory comes very untaught ability. but also rebirth. because desires and fears can only arise when there are objects to be feared or desired (IV. 10). and in the time Brahman or /Sudra.

or affect the mind. the universalia in re. though . is i. the mind. e. definition of consciousness (con-scientia) as well as of the Sanskrit Saw-vid. knowing along with the impressions of the apprehending i. But though Altta the work of the Manas. In what anything can ever be completely destroyed. the Hence it is said that they sprout. IV. the ideas or types. connexion with this the question is discussed. the concepts in our minds. exists can be made not to exist. who is pure intelligence. 12) when he discovers here something like the theory of ideas or logoi in the mind of Patafi<?ali. The Manas only receives the consciousness of perception which conies in reality from the Purusha.470 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. self-illuminated. objective world. as past. I confess I hardly understand his meaning. correspond to the admission ofuniversalia ante rem. i. though somewhat fanciful. like seeds. and how what does not exist can be how how made to exist. side when seen by the seer (Purusha) on one and tinged with what is seen on the other. present and future. It should never be forgotten that the mind is taken by Patafl(/ali as by itself unconscious (not as Svilbhasa. so that here we should have the etymological. how(III. ever. and holds that the three ways or Adhvans in which objects present themselves to the mind. when roasted. 1 8) and as becoming conscious and intelligent for a time only by the union between it and the Purusha. IV. not directly of the Buddhi. but that by Knowledge and Yoga they can be annihilated also like seeds. the essence. the same as the support of perception. I doubt. e. mind (Svabuddhi-Sawvedanam).e. this A'itta. whether Rajendralal Mitra can be right 9. may be spoken of as the thought of the Purusha. and the universalia post rem.

undisturbed. cease troubling Purusha becomes himself. and blessed. of bringing him back to a final recognition of his true Self (IV. Is Yoga Nihilism? This is wonder that the end of the Yoga-philosophy. turns more and more inward and away from the world. having done their work. the Purusha.e. the term. perfect discrimination is rewarded by what is called by a strange tion. (Vasana). have now ceased. and as such it serves no purpose of its own. and no it should have been mistaken for . Then at last. may whom it binds and fascinates for a time with the are told. when beginning to feel the approach of Kaivalya. obtainment of the highest bliss of the Purusha. the very Gunas. knowledge and virtue being inseparable like cause and effect. once achieved. even what is to be known becomes smaller and smaller. but works really for another./Litta by a temporary misconception only. free. is independent. neither knower nor If that is and the Manas or active mind. All works and all sufferings . Dharmamegha. i. 24). unless the old Yoga-remedies are used again and again to remove all impediments. we Kaivalya. the cloud of virtue. the Purusha knows that he himself is not experiencer. sole purpose. and mind may lose its steadiness.IS YOGA NIHILISM ? 47! it is so . Prakriti. This again is coloured by many former impressions It be called the highest form of PrakHti. so as not to actor . Yet there is always danger of a relapse in unguarded moments or in the intervals of meditainterfere with the Old impressions may reassert themselves.

complete nihilism by Cousin and others. unchanged himself in this ever- changing Samsara. But first of all. and those who attempt to do so are apt to reduce it to that it is . apart it is not distinctly stated. the play of Prak?^'ti. However. that the Purusha in his from illusion. what has not entered into the mind of man. Secondly. I know from my own experience how . other innumerable Purushas and is not thereby annihilated. to supply silence. though freed . or what to us seems fanciful or r irrational. though it has ceased for our Purusha. but nothing can be It is what no eye has seen and predicated of it. He is from nature. is supposed to be going on for ever for the benefit of as long as there are any spectators. and it is possible. like the 6rivan- nmkta of the Vedanta. always defies description. Though I hope that the foregoing sketch may give a correct idea of the general tendency of the Yoga-philosophy. who has gained true knowledge. I know but too well that there are several points which require further elucidation. the spectacle of Prakrit! will never cease. a mere phantasmagoria or to a nothing. though himself. we need not attempt what Pata?~^ali himself has passed over in The final goal whether of the Yoga. aloneness may continue his life. without any fear or hope among of another life. studies is rejecting as absurd whatever we cannot understand at once.472 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. maintaining his freedom a crowd of slaves. the Purusha.' We ' know but no one can say what it is. nay even of the Vedanta and of Buddhism. and on which even native expositors hold different What w e must guard against in all these opinions. or of the Samkhya. Nirvana in its highest sense is a name and a thought.

The great multitude of technical terms. to reduce them to systematic order. but they are not decepti deceptores. letter Indian philosophers l Patark/ali (II. they do not deceive or persuade themselves. because it helps to show through how long and continuous a development these Indian it may systems of thought must have passed. and I can only hope that if others follow in my footsteps. remains with philosophers me are a strong conviction that Indian honest in their reasonings. they shrink from no consequences if they follow This is the inevitably from their own premisses. 36) says in so is . could not be entirely suppressed. . though often for what seemed me absurd. a time a far deeper nay meaning than I should ever have expected. 1 Satyapratish^ayam kriyaphalasrayatvat. as Plato has erred and even Kant. in contradistinction to Kapila who denies that there are any arguments in continents of thought. before any attempt was made. But there remains much to be done. and we be afraid to follow in their track. nor do they try to deceive others.IS YOGA NIHILISM? to 473 a long time unmeaning. reason why I doubt whether the admission of an Isvara or lord by Pataf^ali. they will in time make these old bones to live again. as it was by Patafw/ali and There others. disclosed after be bewildering to us. and never use empty words. These ancient sages should become fellow-workers and fellow-explorers with ourselves in unknown ought not to They always have the courage of their convictions. should be put down as a mere economy or as an accommodation to popular opinion. support of such a being. and words that truth many are than sacrifice They may err. truthful.

CHAPTER VIII. It WHILE in the now come and Yoga. have long been accepted as the original sources We whence these two streams of the ancient But we know now philosophy of India proceeded. the period to which the first attempts at a written in place of a purely . Gotama and Kanada. and the objects which they present to us. of our faculties or powers of perceiving. NYAYA AND VALSESHIKA. which are very dry and unimaginative. and much more like what we mean by scholastic systems of philosophy. conceiving. Samkhya. we to two systems. there runs a strong religious and even poetical vein. on the other. Nyaya and Vaiseshika. businesslike expositions of what can be known. and these with their reputed authors. or reasoning on one side. either of the world which surrounds us or of the world within. that is. and should be remembered that. particularly in the Vedanta. possess indeed a separate body of Nyaya-Sutras and another of Vai. that the literary style which sprang up naturally in what I called the Sutra-period. systems hitherto examined. Eelation between Nyaya and Vaiseshika.veshika-Sutras. the Nyaya and Vaiseshika also have by the Hindus themselves been treated as forming but one discipline. and Yoga. like the Samkhya to a certain extent like the Purva and Uttara-Mimawisa.

in the present state of our mere conjectures know- . old system of Anvikshikl. in the Bhasha-PariM'Aeda.e. 475 mnemonic literature may have to be ascribed. with its commentary the Muktavali. and instead of regarding the two as two independent streams. may have been an and may have to remain always. omne scibile. was by no means restricted to that ancient period.). the two systems of Vaise- shika and shared of course Nyaya branched off. and on the means of acquiring such knowledge. the TarkamHta. very like our Tarthe one before the bifurcation of the kasamgraha. so that. the other after the confluence of the two. i.RELATION BETWEEN NYAYA AND VAISESHIKA. the Padarthas.D.D. These two systems many things in common. It should always be borne in mind that the Sutras ascribed to Gotama and Ka^ada presuppose a long previous development of philosophical thought. &c. in the Tarkasamgraha. But these are as yet conjectures only. well understand that at a later time they as should have been drawn together again and treated we see in >Sivaditya's Saptapadarthi (about 1400 A. which are later than Madhava find it (1350 A. the Tarkakaumudi.). but in more modern compositions also. but continued to be so well imitated in later times that we used with great success not only in the Samkhya-Sutras. according to the preponderance of either the one or the other subject. bearing on things that can be known. For practical purposes it is certainly preferable that we should follow their example and thus avoid the necessity of discussing the same subjects twice over. There old Tarka. and hence we can as one. from which at a later time. it seems far more likely that there existed at first an as yet undifferentiated body of half philosophical half popular thought.

and I may refer my readers to him for the best information on the subject. D. Bodas.476 ledge. for the simple reason that nothing is known of Nyaya before Gotama. should be welcome. Was not Kalidasa himself assigned to a period long before the beginning of our era ? It seems now generally accepted that Kalidasa really belonged to the sixth century A. nay even the Samkhya. would have seemed downright heresy. and. B. former years to assign the Kapila-Sutras to the fourteenth or even fifteenth century A. however. however late. and this . we must not attempt a historical and depending. as we have to treatment. has indeed promised to give us A some kind of history of the Nyaya-philosophy in India. in the Introduction to his edition of the Tarkasa??igraha. without however adducing any new or certain belief that the Vaiseshika. in the present state of our studies. have been extremely well treated by Mr. Dignaga. proofs. But unfortunately that period in the historical development of the Nyaya which is of greatest interest to ourselves. namely that which preceded the composition of the Nyaya-Sutras. Mahadeo Rajaram Bodas. but treat each system by itself in spite of unavoidable repetitions. had by him also to be left a blank. Bodas places the Sutras of Gotama and Kanada in the fifth or fourth cent. very zealous native scholar. Dates are the weak points in the literary history of India. do. and he expresses a . In any date. The later periods.. as systems of thought.. D. chiefly on the existing Sutras as the authorities recognised in India itself.C. Mr. were anterior to Buddha. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

pp. We may suppose therefore that Dignaga was con- Now Dignaga sidered a contemporary of Kalidasa. is said by Ya&aspati Misra. 307 seq. 307. may be fixed by means of that of Dignaga as I tried to show in the passage quoted above (India. 16. So late a date may not seem worth having. and assign the same or rather an earlier date to the svamin. valuable to us. p. traditions of the Brahmans. IV. as explained by him and other Nyaya philosophers. . we should be allowed to place Dignaga in the sixth century. to have interpreted the Nyaya aphorisms of Gotama in a heterodox or Buddhist sense. date of Kalidasa 477 help us to a date for the Sutras of Gotama. p.). with the literary It is quite intelligible 1 2 India. Sutras of Gotama. according to native interpreters. Kalidasa alluded to the logician Dignaga in a verse of his Meghaduta 2 . I think it is Several other dates chronology of the later literature of the Brahmans. as has generally been supposed. if I am right in supposing that in the beginning the followers of Buddha broke by no means so entirely. A more comprehensive study of Buddhist literature may possibly shed some more light on the still to be worth much. while Uddyotakara wrote his commentary to refute his interpretation and to restore that of PakshilaIf Va&aspati Misra is right. and iv. I have pointed out l that. in his Nyaya-varttikatatparya-ika.DIGNAGA. parts Chandra Vidyablmshana in Journal iii. Satis of Buddhist Text Society. though it may be despised by those who imagine that the value may of Sanskrit literature depends chiefly on its sup- posed remote antiquity. See also Prof.

a Brahman. D. though making their reserves on certain points. dhist. but denied by Buddha. a commentary by Pakshila-svamin or Vatsyayana on the Nyaya-Sfitras. 16. For we possess. . But there was no reason why the Buddhists should forswear the study of either the Nyaya or Vaiseshika systems. while of the in the beginning 1 seventh century Dharmakirtti. 1896. the Buddhist. We know that at the court of Harsha. and we know that the same Sutras were explained afterwards by Dignaga. such as the existence of an Lsvara. Therefore in Vasubandha's time all the six systems of Indian philosophy must have been in existence. This Yasubaridha. was actuallv the teacher of Hiouen-thsang. in the form of Sutras or Karikas. See also Journal of Buddhist Text Society. before he became a Buddhist. various systems of Hindu philosophy the Buddhists should have paid little attention to the two Mimawsas. This Buddhist commentary was attacked by Uddyotakara.). concerned as they both were why among the with the Veda. p. Brahmans. who travelled in India from 629 to 648 A. which was admitted by the Nyayas. We know from Chinese travellers such as Hiouen-thsang that Vasubandha. the same as those which we possess. or even the Sawkhya system. meant but also the six Tirthya philosophies. as a very old man. in one case at least.INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. had read with his 1 not only master. for instance. pp. 307 seq. Vinayabhadra or Samghabhadra the books of the eighteen schools which were Bud. and 6rainas were equally welcome (India. of the sixth century. clearly for the six Brahmanic systems of philosophy. Bauddhas. an authority which the Buddhists had rejected.

Yogalura. In the ninth century Dharmottara. which are full of interest. to is 479 said to have defended Dignaga l and have criticised Uddyotakara's Nyayavarttika. and every hope that other philosophical treatises for instance. Thanks to the labours of Sarat Chandra Das and Satis Chandra Vidyabhusharta. we have lately gained access to some of the Sutras of the Buddhist schools of philosophy. and Vaibhashika. and it was not till re-established the in the tenth century that Va&aspati Misra finally Brahmanic view of the Nyaya Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-ika. Sri Sarat Chandra states that there is in the library of the Grand Lama a Tibetan translation of his Nyaya-samuft&aya (Journal of Buddhist Text Society. the Nyaya-samuM'aya. the Madhyamika.DIGNAGA. The Sutras or rather Karikas of the Madhyamika school must. a Buddhist. his This would coincide with the period of the Brahmanic reaction and the general collapse of Buddhism in India. made accessible to us by the labours of these inde- fatigable scholars. may be is there also. be distinguished from the system of thought which they are meant to explain. while the revival of the Nyaya dates from Gamgesa Upadhyaya who lived in the fourteenth century at Mithila. and thus place before us an intelligible progress in the study of the Nyaya both by Brahmans and Buddhists from the sixth to the tenth century. Of the four great schools of the Buddhists. the first or in Madhyamika now lies before us the Madhyamika 'Vritti by A^andra-Kirtti. of course. p. defended Dharmakirtti's and indirectly Dignaga's interpretation of the Nyaya-Sutras. Though none of Dignaga's writings have as yet been discovered. Sautrantika. a Buddhist. 3 1896. 17). part iii. .

veiled. for instance. 28. 37 to 40. in Kapila's Samkhya-Sutras I. perceptions of them. and if it teaches the Pratityatva of everything. in Badarayana's Yedanta-Sutras II. 2. is a son. 44. the oldest document of systematic philosophy in India. which will require very careful examination. pure and simple. or nihilism. where $a??ikara distinctly refers the doctrine that we know no objects. this after all is not very different from the Vedantic Avidya. Madhyamikas between what is Paramarthika. and a father 1 A is impossible without a son. Though it is different. characteristic feature The of that system is the unya-vada. In the same way everything is dependent on something . else. no doubt. Pitaram Pratitya. As such it is referred to and refuted in Gotama's Nyaya- Sutras IV. and Samvntika. 43. and we should have in his Karikcas. dependent on a father. but only our to Sugata or Buddha. that terms. D.480 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and the Sa?>ikhya Aviveka. as explained by A'andra-Kirtti. son. The author of the Parl&adasi quotes the Madhyamikas by name as the teachers of universal nihilism (Sarvam iSunyam). from . they would carry us back to about the first century A. is much the same as the distinction of the later Vedanta between what is really real (ParamarthaPratitya in Pratitya-samutpada and similar words may best he rendered by dependent or conditioned. possess them. we now all the six systems. If Nagar^una was really the author as of the Madhyamika-Sutras. real in the highest sense. on something else need be no more than the dependence of everything The distinction made by the 1 . it nevertheless shares in common with them many of the ideas and even technical If it teaches the /Sunyatva or emptiness of the world.

more Sri Satis Chandra Das and particularly for retranslations from Tibetan. and sound. taste. Many of the technical terms used by the Madhyamikas are the same as those with which we are acquainted in the other systems. Bibliography. 481 Vyavaharika. divine or supernatural. forms the sixth sense. fundamental position of the Samkhya. and ether. Adhibhautika. mind. touch.BIBLIOGRAPHY. and with their five causes. however. phenomenal or the result of Maya. water. pain. earth. air. ta/i). for instance. and we look forward to many valuable contributions from their pen. light. It was in 1852 that published my first contributions to a study of Indian philosophy in the Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandisclien Gesellschaft. These papers did not extend. which again is not very different from what the Buddhists is and what meant originally by /Sunya. We that to them neither the objects of sense nor the sensations point to an underlying substance or reality. intrinsic. i i . owe a great debt of gratitude to both Sarat We Chandra Vidyabhushana for their labours in Tibet. empty. meet with the five perceptions of colour. and Adhidaivika. Du/ikha. the veil that covers the Nirgwia Brahman or the Tad. as Satkaryavada. Whether Buddhist philosophy shares more in common with the Samkhya than with Vaiseshika seems to me as doubtful the Nyaya and The as ever. is divided into Adhyatmika. is the very opposite of the Buddhist view of the world. and we also have the well-known idea that Manas. sometimes called Samvn'ti. for they hold that even the $unya is not altogether nothing. What is peculiar to the Buddhists is extrinsic. smell.

so that there can be little doubt as to what Ka?iada or Gotama thought about the nature of the soul. and the relation between God or the Supreme Being and man. particularly through the publications of the Vaiseshika-Sutras the Bibliotlieca Indica. Though. may still be recommended to who want trustworthy information on Indian philosophy. Gough.veshika and the other systems even papers published so long ago Colebrooke's papers on the Nyaya of Indian all philosophy. and in my paper on Indian Logic contributed to the late Archbishop Thomson's Laws much of Thought. 1873. through the complete translation of them by A. the reality of human knowledge. but there is a great difference between what is old and what is antiquated. E. of course. and Vai. beyond the Vaiseshika and Nyaya-philosophy as treated in the Tarkasa?ttgraha. I found that there was not to alter in my old account of Gotama's and Kanada's philosophies. such as J. such as Professors Deussen and Garbe. These essays have sometimes been called antiquated. the relation between cause and effect. and more urgent occupations connected with the edition of the Rigveda prevented me at the time from finishing what I had prepared for publication on the other systems of Indian philosophy. much new and important material has come to light in the meantime.482 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. as given in the German Oriental Journal. and through the comprehensive rein searches of European scholars. the meaning of creation. Indian philosophy has this great adthat each tenet is laid down in the Sutras vantage with the utmost precision. The difficulty in giving an account of these systems for the benefit of European . Thus it may be understood why as 1824.

with the author's Dipika and Govardhana's Nyaya-bodhini. (Gautama is the same as Gotama. The Tarka-Kaumudi. The Vaiseshika Aphorisms of Kanada. Manilal Nabubhai Dvivedi. on the Nyaya and Vaiseshika were written. pp. Bombay. Gough. The Tarkasamgraha of Annambha^a. 1850. 1 in the Pundit. but not too late to enable me I i to profit 2 by several of . This book reached me after these chapters 1897. than in recapitulating all their tenets. The Aphorisms of the Nyaya-Philo- sophy by Gautama.) A. 60. s. 483 readers consists far more in deciding what may be safely omitted.363 (incomplete) see also Bibliotheca Indica. besides the papers of Colebrooke Ballantyne. 1877. it would seem. Sanskrit and English. Gautama as that of Buddha. . 1873. 09. only that a tacit agreement Gotama has generally been by used as the name of the philosopher. Mahadeo Kajaram Bodas. Bombay. The Nyaya-darsana with the com- mentary of Vatsyayana. so as to bring out the salient points of each system. a. E. Benares. being an introduction to the principles of the Yaiseshika arid Nyaya-philosophies by Laugakshi This is the same author Bhaskara. the MSS. prepared by the late Kao Bahadur Yasavanta Vasadeo Athalya.BIBLIOGRAPHY. Uber das Nyaya-bhashya. varying with regard to the vowel. to whom we owe a valuable edition of the Yogasara- sawgraha. Allahabad. both belonging. Leipzig. Books in which the Nyaya and Vaiseshika-systems may be studied by those who are unacquainted with : Sanskrit are. to the family of the Gautamas or Gotamas. translated. Windisch. Kesava $astri. 1886. 311. and published with critical and explanatory notes.

by knowledge. or indifference to any rewards in the to come fear. published by Goldstlicker. and in the nonis acceptance life of. can. Nor is logic the sole or chief end of Gotama's philosophy. we must not imagine that the Nyaya-Sutras are anything like our treatises on formal logic. which is actually called Nyaya in such works. the Purva-Mimamsa. which is to follow by Thin perfect itself. There is. Ny ay a-P hilosophy Though Nyaya has always been translated by logic. . or resignation. without as being in fact what Brahman is. no doubt. Even this Brahmahood must not be an object of desire. and prevent that perfect freedom from all fear or hope. . be realised in one way only. printed. without decay. a greater amount of space allowed to logical questions in these than in any of the other but originally the systems of Indian philosophy name of Nyaya would have been quite as applicable . according to the ancient commentator Vatsyayana. Its chief end. literally that which has nothing better. This blessedness. without desire. the all. according to Gotama. and in this case.484 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. for instance. like that of the other Darsanas. his explanations and criticisms. the non plus ultra of blessedness. is salvation. by a knowledge of the sixteen great topics of the Nyaya-philosophy. for such desire would at once produce a kind of bondage. before they were . described as consisting in renunciation with regard to all the pleasures of this life. and without death. namely. but should never be yearned for. state of freedom. This summum bonum which is promised to summum bonum is called by Gotama Ni/zsreyasa. as Sayana's to Nyaya-mala-vistara.

as the Upanishads already declare. the true means of destroying all bondage recognises is and regaining perfect freedom of the spirit in our distinguishing clearly between spirit and matter. but for the promised . and the character also of the bliss is not always the same yet in each of the six systems philosophy is recommended not. 485 Summum Bonum. . highest purpose that man can strive after in this life. This Brahman or God is. Kapila.' every Vedantist is to learn in the end the same lesson. and as $vetaketu was taught Tat tvam asi/ Thou art it. In this respect all the six systems of philosophy are alike. which knowledge is tantamount to identity with Brahman. invisible. likewise the object of the Samkhya-philosophy. admits all suffering is The end of an objective substratum by the side of a subjective spirit or rather spirits. and he sees the cause of all suffering in the spirits' identifying themselves with what He therefore purely objective or material. saw that the Vedanta recognised true salvation or Moksha in the knowledge of Brahman. and to realise his identity with Brahman. learnt from revelation as contained in the Veda. though it is to be reached by a different road. and far beyond the reach of the But he can be ordinary faculties of our mind. and the surcease of all ' ' We suffering (Du^khanta). his own salvation. The approaches leading to that bliss vary. as with us. as the fulfilment of all desires. that is.SUMMUM BONUM. they always promise to their followers or their believers the attainment of the highest bliss that can be obtained by man. for the sake of knowledge. being a dualist.

The Yoga-philosophy holds much the same view of the soul recovering its freedom. or aloneness. (7aimini. the subjects. the right is name for that highest state of bliss which promised to us by the Samkhya-philosophy. as the only means of final beatitude. but the point distinction reached at last is much the same. that of diverges It lays its chief widely from that of Badarayami. which knowledge produces at once the recognition of oneself as in reality Brahman (Brahmavid Brahma eva bhavati. between Purusha and is Kaivalya. and Prakriti. ' He who knows Brahman is is Brahman curious to observe that. may best obtain and maintain peace and from the all quiet- and thus free sufferings of itself effectually life. according to Kapila. The roads are different. It indeed '). the Vedanta on the contrary postulates the surrendering of all between the Self and the world. supreme spirits. and holds that salvation may be obtained through the performance of such works. all that is objective. the Pramawas. if only . cannot be established by any of the recognised means of real knowledge. between subject and Prak?-iti. and between the Self and Brahman as the right means of Moksha. Of the two Mima??isas we have seen already that the Brahma-Mimawsa or the Vedanta recognises salvation as due to knowledge of the Brahman.486 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. The other Mima?usa. object. illusions and It also lays great stress on devotion to a Spirit. among the other whose very existence. while the Sa?7ikhya insists on a distinction between Purushas. stress on works (Karman) and their right performance. but it insists strongly on certain spiritual exercises by which the soul ness.

whether on earth or in heaven. which always reach us the soul is through the body. Nyaya and Vaiseshika systems.SUMMUM BONUM. They different are satisfied with teaching that from the body. or bliss. but is in a kind of paradise. but no details are added. Lastly. and they think that. 487 they are performed without any desire of rewards. agreeing as they do among themselves. These two philosophies. But while we can understand that each of the six systems of Indian philosophy may succeed in removing pain. the though they also aim at salvation. and as final. The bliss held out by the It Samkhyas also is very vague and indefinite. . that but the happiness resides in the highest Brahman to be enjoyed by the souls near the throne of Brahman. or the six or seven categories put forward by Kar^ada. seem to me to differ very characteristically from all the others in so far as they admit of nothing invisible or transcendent (Avyakta). our sufferings. it is very difficult to see in what that actual happiness was supposed to consist which remained after that removal. is not considered assigned to a lower class only. whether corresponding to Brahman or to Prak?^'ti. Their blissful knowledge is described as oneness with Brahman. . The Vedanta speaks of Ananda. are satisfied with pointing out the means of it as consisting in correct knowledge. if this belief in the body as our own is once surrendered. such as can only be obtained from a clear apprehension of the sixteen topics treated by Gotama. That paradise has no attraction. and would give no real satisfaction to those who have reached the know- ledge of the Highest Brahman. will cease by themselves.

plus Nor does the well-known Buddhist term delivery. can arise only from the Purusha himself. 61. . Amrita. Even the bliss names given to the supreme each system of philosophy tell promised by different little. in the shorter text of the Maitreya Nirvanam anusasanam occurs. the fire is gone out. however. 50) that the word dhistic and existed in his time.' We cannot prove. far from all the illusions and disturbances arising from objective nature. p. Upanishad where possibly meant for l Nirvananu. XV.488 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. if left entirely to himself. 1 Sacred Books of the East.sasanam. immortality. it was borrowed there from There is one passage only. and it does not seem to the all occur in the classical Upanishads. isolation or ultra. that Nirvana was used as the technical term for the summum bonum in Pa?dni's time. the Apavarga (bliss) of the Nyaya and Vaiseshika systems seems entirely negative. Apavarga. us very 7io?i Mukti and Moksha mean deliver- ance. Its occurring as title of one of the modern Upanishads makes it the more likely that Buddhistic sources. or the works of Pralm'ti. NiAsreyasa. detachment. Kaivalya. We know indeed from was pre-Budtells Pa?iini (VIII. the teaching of Nirvana. used in the sense of blown ' out. and produced simply by the removal of false knowledge. 'the wind has ceased to blow. 2. such as Nirvat'o vata/i. if He us that. What should be clearly understood is that in the early Buddhistic writings also.' the right form ' would be Nirvata/^. Nirvfwa does not yet mean a complete blowing out of the individual soul. Nirvana help us much.' but Nirvano *ghih. Lastly.

DHsh^anta. 22. instance (5) Prayo^ana. II. and no one certainly could form an idea of what that Nirvana was meant to tion be in the Buddhist Nihilistic or >Sunyata-philosophy. p. argumentation. wrangling. (12) Vitanc/a. (15) See a very learned article on Nirvawa by Professor Satis Chandra Vidyabhushawa. . sophistry. i) that all speech turns away from the bliss of Brahman. . Up. Turning now to the means by which the Nyayaphilosophy undertakes to secure the attainment of the summum bonum or Apavarga. (i) . (13) Hetvabhasa. reasoning . 1 quibbles. thought ' is not likely to fare better. con6ralpa. (n) (14) /f/^ala. . Means of Salvation. means of knowledge (2) Prameya. (9) Nirnaya. unable to reach it V an d when language fails.THE SIXTEEN TOPICS OR PADARTHAS. purpose established truth (7) Avayava. premisses clusion . . they confess themselves (Taitt. cavilling. (10) Vada. 489 but rather the blowing out and subsiding of all human passions and the peace and quietness which result from it. (8) Tarka. doubt (4) objects of knowledge (3) Samsaya. in the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society. . VI. . The meaning of complete annihila- was a later and purely philosophical meaning attached to Nirvana. fallacies. part i. Pramana. . 4. : we find them enumerated in the following list The Sixteen Topics or Padarthas. (6) Siddhanta. I doubt even whether the Upanishads could have given us a description of what they conceived their In fact highest Mukti or perfect freedom to be.

Perception comes begin to do its the way. has first been established. word. If the necessity have been avoided we must depend for all our knowledge. particularly by one title of that claims the Nyaya or logic. faculties. depends again. while the $abda or the word. particularly that of the Veda. How many if all misunderstandings might philosophers had recognised of such an introductory chapter. and Prameya. or whether it can claim an . (16) Nigrahasthana. and has supplied the material to which inference can be applied. analogies. that in reality the chapters on Prama?ia or means of knowledge. false INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. it seems to me highly creditable to Indian philosophers that they should have understood the necessity of such an analysis on the very threshold of any system of philosophy. Means of Knowledge. as we should say. Anumana. comparison. The four Pramanas. on a previous inference by which the authority of the word. first on our then on our combinatory and reasoning senses. are Pratyaksha. Comparison is no more because inference can only work after perception has prepared first.49 ^rati. Upamana. the question whether revelation falls under the one or the other. This may seem a very strange list of the topics It is clear to be treated by any philosophy. comprehend the whole of philosophy. than a subordinate kind of inference. according to Gotama. and >Sabda. objects of knowledge. inference. unfitness for arguing. sensuous perception. Imperfect as this analysis of our instru- ments of knowledge may seem. more particularly the revealed word.

mind. in fact. These death. whatever may be. such as body. the treatment of which led gradually to subject It is the elaboration all of general rules of its thought. quite clear that these sixteen topics should . as given by the Nyaya. but turn up casually whenever transcendental problems come to be treated. pain. Objects of Knowledge. objects of knowledge. towards philosophical discussion. false analogies. are afterwards discussed singly. and final freedom. comprehend omne scibile. w hile premisses and reasoning lead on to the concourse little to first do with mark the r clusion 10 to logic. and downright misstatements. qualities. fault. If from our point of view we deny the name of logic to such problems. steps instances and established truths supply materials. how to avoid or to resist sophistry. though a glance at the history of Greek philosophy would show us that. soul. how to defend truth against unfair antagonists. fallacies.OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE. 1 which disputants wish to reach. From Nos. quibbles. enjoyment. can far more easily be settled than if such questions are not asked in limine. before logic became an independent branch of philosophy it was likewise mixed up with dialectic and with questions of some more special interest. wrangling. applicable to reasoning. 49! independent authority. 6. will. but have of objects The of Doubt and purpose logic. we should be perfectly justified. we have rules for dialectic rather than for We are taught how to meet the artifices of our antagonists in a long argumentation. cognition. organs sense.

it could never have been so far extended as to include wrangling. of a word. things gnomina. Nothing shows so well the philosophical character of the Sanskrit language than this very word PadIt artha. quibbles and all the rest. Their language passed through an opposite process to that of Latin. thus showing that from the earliest times they understood that no thought was possible except in a word. means in ordinary Sanskrit simply a thing. i. and however much the meaning of this term may have been varied by European philosophers. that the six or seven Padarthas of the Vaiseshikas correspond far more nearly to the categories of the Aristotelian and afterwards of European philosophy in general. mere forgotten ynomina they became nomina. Pada. the meaning. as they mostly have been. names. We shall see fallacies. . Object. the object. their ynomina became nomina. and were then supposed to be something different from the old and e.492 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and after the initial y known had been dropped. as we drop it involuntarily in gnat. What we should call objects of thought. they called far more truly objects of words. but literally it meant Artha. on no account be rendered. and that the objects of our knowledge became possible only after they had been named. from y]nosco. which has been translated by category. or whatever can be predicated. by the sixteen categories. Padartha. . Categories are the praedicabilia. but after a time. Latin called every kind of knowledge or to know all .

it would seem.MADHAVAS ACCOUNT OF NYAYA. so as to correspond in fact to our activity or even to our becoming (Werden). more than mere local movement. and should be carefully distinguished from mere conjunction or succession. Six Padarthas of Vaiseshika. was added. The next two. are treated by the Vaiseshikas under this head. or negation. all things can be referred. to present or to subsequent non-existence. parts and the whole. 493 According to the Vaiseshikas. in the eyes of native scholars. e. stances things must be either subqualities (24). Abhava. All (9). at a later time. the general and the particular. Knowledge (Buddhi) is which here treated as one of the qualities of the soul. it may be useful to look at an account of given . the Not-withoutbeing. In order to see what. itself is one of the substances. however. i. such as cause and It comes effect. Madhava's Account of Nyaya. The seventh category. and the like. or motions. comprehend what is shared in common by many objects. the last known meaning. Samavaya or intimate connection is a very useful name for a connection between things which cannot exist one without the other. categories or predicates. and thus distinguishes it from all others. the it Nyaya-philosophy was meant to achieve. six general meanings. e. to which all words i. e. we have six Padarthas. very near to the Avinabhava. i. and can be applied to previous. so that many things which with us belong to psychology and logic. and what is peculiar to one. or even to absolute Abhava.

" and also the subject of "wholes" and "parts. .' After having held out in the promise of eternal salvation to all first Sutra the his who study philosophy properly. the compendium of all the systems of The Nyaya-sastra. or highest happiness. second." In the first daily portion fifth book he discusses the various kinds of the various kinds futility (Giiti). faults (Dosha). transmigration (Pretyabhava). fruit or reward (Phala). of five books.' he says. and refutes all objections that could be made against their being considered as instruments of right know- ledge tion " . "understanding (Buddhi) and mind (Manas). of the third book he examines the daily portion in the soul. and final liberation (Apavarga) . discusses the four kinds of proof. and each book contains two daily In the first Ahnika of the portions or Ahnikas. first daily portion of the second book he examines doubt (8). beginning with discussion (Vada). by the great Madhava/iarya in his Sarvadarsanasa?ttgraha. first book the venerable Gotama discusses the ' ' " definitions of nine subjects. consists philosophy. beginning with proof" (Pramana). and in the second those of the remaining In the seven. In the first daily portion of the fourth book he examines activity (Prav?"itti). in pain (Du/ikha). Gotama proceeds at once to a description of the steps by which the promised is to be attained. and in the second of the of objectionable proceedings (Nigrahasthana). the senses.494 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the body. and their objects . and in the second he shows that " presumpand other Pramanas are really included in the " four kinds of In the first proof" already given. Ni//. " the second he investigates the truth as to the " causes of the faults.vreyasa.

Avidya or that cosmic Nescience The which was the Samkharas these ] . but what- ever the age of our Sutras (the sixteen topics) 1 may Cf. but the general likeness can hardly be mistaken. none of which seems quite satisfacThe chain of Gotama is shorter than that of tory. and Upayasa. Samkhya-Philosopliie. Upadana. decay and death. and was meant generally translated by Chain to sum up the causes It of existence or of misery. sensation. 495 namely by the successive annihilation of false knowledge. This of successive proclaimed by Buddha has formed the subject of ever so many commentaries. desire. Gautama. the twelve Nidanas. some of the links in the PadM^a Samuppada of the or blessedness Buddhists. all the varieties of existence . . state of exis- tence. Vedana. on Vi(/?lana. THstma. Bhava. names and forms sion Sparsa. Du^kha. Daurmanasya. This is of Causation.v. chain grief. Cf. on this Namarupa. (^aramarana. of activity. p. really first means is step so fully elaborated in the Vedanta-philosophy. Gotama or Gautama. 6rati. 269 seq. literally abstersion or This process reminds us strongly of purification. s. despair states 2 . sorrow. the six organs of perception. on these the Shac/ayatana. Parideva. been annihilated there follows ipso facto freedom. in consequence. lamentation. of faults. 2 Garbe. sensation . Then follow in succes- contact. and. Childers. When (Apavarga).MADHAVAS ACCOUNT OP NYAYA. /S'oka. of the last or suffering has birth and suffering. . According to the Buddhists there follow on Avidya origin resting on something else. is still a contested question. fering. attachment. sufbirth. Who was the earlier of the two.

this object How a mere passive being supposed to be real. inference (3) Upamana. I. word. as 5). a consequent . parison. Perception or Pratyaksha. impression. preceded by perception.sra very acutely (Karika in attacking his antagonists for . (i) Pratyaksha. Anumana remarks or inference. i. i. proceeding from what is constantly seen together. Purvavat. topic or Padartha is Pramana. They are in the Nyaya as in the Vaiseshika. Vaaspati Mi. Though. from what was before. is a question not even asked by . described as of three kinds.e. the A7irvaka rejects every kind of he. and (4) /Sabda. to examine each of the Gotama proceeds next sixteen topics. as we saw. all being means or The first measures of knowledge. and Samanyato Dn'shYa. can be changed into a sensation or into a presentation (Vorstellung) or what used to be called a material idea. Pramawa. proceeding . Perception (Pratyaksha) is explained as knowledge produced by actual contact between an organ 1. sense-perception (2) Anumana. Anumana. com.496 be. . proceeding from what was after. e. which is said to consist of four kinds. an antecedent *Seshavat. rise of Nyaya-philosophy existed clearly before the Buddhism. Gotama. is Inference (Anumana). supposing the contiguity of the organs its of sense and of sense with outward objects had once been established. a INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. corresponding object. Inference or 2.

. It is generally explained that a Purvavat. (Nyaya is S. Thus the rising of a river may be due to its having been ants dammed up. II. that is. we infer as the $esha or posterior that it will rain. we infer as its Purva When we see that the ants carry their eggs. In that case the fault arises from the conditioned character of the Vyapti or the pervasion. without which he could not so much as surmise that his antagonists held erroneous opinions. 497 their mistaken faith in inference. refers to the mutual relation between a sign and what is signified by it. The however. When or prius we see a river rising that it has rained. the carrying off their eggs by the may have been caused by some accidental dishill. wander away. may what may prove too much or too little. Kk . such erroneous opinions being never brought into contact with his organs of sense. turbance of their peacocks may really and the screaming of the have been imitated by men. 37). is universally or is marked by This uncon- ditional association afterwards treated under the name of Vyapti. in such cases does not affect the of inference. preceded by or possessed of a prius. literally pervasion of one thing by another. or that the peacocks are screaming. OR ANUMANA.INFERENCE. but being sup- posed to exist on the strength of Anumana. but the Vyapti only and as process soon as the relation between the sign and the fault. The meaning of the three kinds of inference differs considerably according to different commentators. so that the observation of the sign leads to the observation or rather inference of associated with it what it. does really himself rely on inference. It is true that in all these cases the reason given for an inference called. 5. Examples will make this clearer.

nay to infer the existence of an organ of touch from our feeling any animated body. fire and smoke is conditioned by damp and there are other cases also where fire exists without smoke. It requires but a certain amount of experience to infer the presence of an ichneumon infertile existence of from seeing an excited snake. the truth of the conclusion quite another. is truth. as in a red-hot iron ball. is illustrated by our inferring that the sun is moving it is seen in different places.498 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. based on what is constantly seen together. the sign itself Vyapya. In all such cases the correctness of the inference one thing. consists of a sign (Lingin). Thus smoke is the sign (Linga. always present when there is smoke. on which the ancient moved. But everything depends on whether the two are either absolutely or only conditionally related. and fire is what pervades the smoke. is therefore Lingin or Vyapaka. rectified. Even a deaf man may sound if he sees a particular conjunction of a drumstick with a drum. everything seen in different places being known to have Here the Vyapti. thing signified has been the inference will is come right. the Samanyato Drishta. Vyapya). These conditions are called the Upadhis. The third kind of inference. Thus the rela- tion between firewood . because that is logicians depended. that of a each inductive sign (Linga). had to wait till it was corrected by Copernicus. or to infer fire from perceiving the heat of water. what is to be pervaded. is the sine qud non of smoke. is . the latter being always conditioned by the presence or absence of certain Upadhis. and the bearer The bearer of the sign is called Vyapaka or pervading. Each Vyapti.

the prius. but as a general concept the properties of which have been formerly comprehended as known. infer that smell does not belong to anything that is not earth. which are by themselves imperceptible (Indriya/a Atindriyani). should not be taken in the sense of antecedent cause. because it is Aprasakta. In the same manner we are told that Purva. but effect. inference. But this is wrong. by inferred from the fact that the element of earth possesses smell.. because sesses the quality of smell. as belonging to the genus fire. is by our inferring the existence of senses. except artificially. earth is being separated from all other elements One might have peculiar quality of smell. It would be no better than if we were to infer that smell must belong to other qualities and actions also. does not apply. its it alone posto say. according mean subsequent us to infer its invariable cause.INFERENCE. because we do perceive colour &c. and as no actions can take place without instruments illustrated we may infer the existence of senses as instruments Kk 2 . But as earth is different from all other substances. This is not supposed to illustrated by an example.e. or method of residues. that all elements possessed the same. as in scented articles. OR ANUMANA. such as is ' Earth is dif- ferent from all other elements. we may This is the residuary inference. or Sarnanyato Drishta. allowing is to be taken in the sense of what is left. i. falling under the general concept of fire The third. which would be simply absurd. 499 Different from this very natural explanation of the three kinds of to which >Sesha is Anumana is another.' that left over. Thus from smoke on a hill we should infer the presence of a particular fire on the hill.

Samanyato Dn'shte. shall have to deal again with Anumana We when we come to consider the seventh Padartha. effect. but not a cow. ($abda) is explained either as a preof one worthy to be trusted. &c. our action of seeing.500 for INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. or what call the members of a syllogism. a a Gavaya. It inference from the sensible to the supersensible. or as a right cept It refers. or not straightforward but this only if we adopt the . we should Comparison (Upamana) or recognition of likeness. thus becomes very like the seeing of a general concept. having been told that a Gavaya (bos gavaeus) is like a cow. invisible objects. the second Avita. man may infer that it is Word 4. explained as an instrument for ascertaining what has to be ascertained by means of similarity with something well known before. or Sabda. Comparison or Anumana. the Avayavas or Premisses. nay I find it difficult to understand why this view should have been given up by the modern Naiyayikas. both is ancient and modern. For instance. With all respect for native commentators. second explanation of the three kinds of Anumana. I must confess that I prefer the more natural explanation of the three kinds of inference being based on cause. we are told. and seeing an animal like 3. the first and last are called Vita or straightforward. Next follows a cow. It is Word curious to see that among the people to be trusted (Apta) the commentator . and association. either to visible or precept. Among these three inferences.

are the qualities of earth. (10) rewards of deeds. (12) final beatitude. by enumerating the characteristics peculiar to each. touch. (4) sense-objects. are supposed to arise from the elements. and knowing (Buddhi). and sound. come under II. the qualities of the objects of sense. and hearing. The characteristics of the Self are desire. savour. sight. (5) understanding. (u) suffering. the other six caused. touch. that is. that is. . . Twelve such objects are mentioned: (i) Self or soul. that can be established by the four Pramanas. taste. These elements (from which the senses draw their origin light. hatred. unless it can be proved to be AptavaA-ana. water. (3) senses..FRAME YA. (9) transmigration. and ether while the objects of the senses . provided they are well Strictly speaking the Veda would not abda. should mention not only Rishis and Aryas. (2) body. (7) activity (will). and what they intimate. such as odour. 501 MleMAas informed. The senses or organs of sense are defined as those of smell. their objects 1 3. &c. air. and according to the next Sutra. pleasure. (6) mind. of the senses. (8) faults. Gotama next proceeds to define each of these Prameyas. Prameya. member that 1 of the elements the first four are both According to the commentary the sensations. or topic is The second Padartha all Prameya. pain. or what we should call omne scibile. The first six of these are called causative. which alone can be perceived. 1. 4. will. They . and their perceptions) are earth. the word of one worthy to be trusted. but or barbarians also. It is essential to recolour. 2 Body is defined as the seat of action.

Little attention. mind is considered as A/m or an atom. and is explained as that which prevents more than one notion from arising at the same time. however. for the union of Atman and Manas. 5. with the Mimawsakas.502 eternal INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. notion. If. being A?m. is eternal only. The sense of scent perceives odour only. Even the distinction between percepts. Vorstellungen. or infinitely great. to Buddhi. which translate by ether. . it were admitted that the two could unite. organic. or sensitive. and remembrance. we and non-eternal. and so on. such as we know there is in sleep. prevents the rushing in of all sorts of sensuous impressions at once. is Mind (Manas) different say. would be indissoluble. Akasa. so that the sense of light perceives or sees light only. lias never been fully realised Manas or by Indian logicians. and of percepts into concepts. and hence not tangible. understanding. but always related to the sense. a subject little cultivated by Indian philosophers. would naturally fall to the Manas. it is by the Naiyayikas explained as being the same as apprehension or knowledge. Bcgriffe. while the fifth. The transformation of sensations into percepts. this subject. Smarana. if once effected. It is sometimes called the gatekeeper or controller of the senses. then there could never be any cessation of knowledge. which is Vibhu. is paid by Hindu logicians to which has assumed such large proportions with us. and regulates them in our conit sciousness. The non-eternal substances are either inorganic. that is to 6. and concepts. can be united with Atman. and the question has been fully discussed how Manas. and as being twofold. As from understanding. Anubhava.

of the understanding working through the mind (Manas). . eternal (Tarkakaumudi. Faults cause acts. however. and acts bear 1 . infinitely small. from Atman by being atomic in dimension. n. that the Manas is both Anu. p. Activity (will) is the effort of body. be Anitya. Pretyabhava is transmigration. nay we should be unable to account for a future life and the in- we should equalities of birth in any future life have to admit. like Atman. and as pleasure also involves pain. results produced by faults. and by actions consequent on them. and we should lose that which retains the impressions of acts done in the body. in the most general sense. voice. 24). Pravnttidosha<7anitartha/i phalam. 7. fruit. is Having thus examined 1 all that can form the See I. It is 503 held by the Naiyayikas that when Manas enters a particular region of the body called Puritat. in fact. the effect of the union of Atman and Manas is and sleep ensues. therefore. Entire deliverance from pain and pleasure 12. differing. If Manas were supto be co-extensive with the body it would posed neutralised. both pain and pleasure are here treated together under pain. 4. while Manas. . non-eternal.PRAMEYA. 20. Apavarga or final beatitude. and of the 8. . so that they are sometimes explained as 10. and be destroyed with the body. The Naiyayikas hold. and Nitya. 1 1 Pain is characterised by vexation . Rewards are consciousness of pleasure and pain. effects without a cause. good or bad 9. is eternal and numerous.

V. as when we recognise in a distant object the qualiof a post. that is. familiar case (VI) Siddhanta. neither of which has as yet been proved. unless we are inclined to admit either an influence of feel we hardly Greek on Indian. the coin- . from our recognition of various attributes opposed to one another in one and the same object. the Pramanas or measures of knowledge. The definition given of doubt shows that the ancient logicians of India ties of a man and had carefully thought about the different causes of doubt. so that they were led to the admission of three or even five kinds of IV. and the Prameyas. as well as those referring to (IV) Prayo^ana. or of Indian on Greek philosophy. example. contain nothing that is of peculiar interest to the historian of philosophy. the To us a syllogism and the next subject.504 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. purpose or motive (V) D?*ishanta. VI. Much more important so-called gism. we are told. tenets. we now enter on the third of the sixteen topics. object of our knowledge. Dnsh^anta. . . it. Siddhanta. III. or Members is of a Syllogism. the members of a sylloits structure are so surprised at meeting with it in the schools of logic in India. But these disquisitions. arises Sa?nsaya or doubt. familiar that members. The Avayavas. Yet. Prayo^rana. Doubt. VII. except so far as they offer once more the clearest evidence of a long continued previous study of logic in the ancient schools or settlements of India. Samsaya.

who died a voluntary death by allowing himself to be burnt before the eyes of the Macedonian army. my conviction. as we may gather from his desire to communicate with the gymnosophists of India. possible in one country. It was readily admitted. that we must here also admit the existence of undesigned coincidences to a much I keep to many larger extent than our predecessors were inclined must never forget that what has been to do. was deeply impressed with that idea. we are told. and particularly Indian Logic. is possible in another also. Alexander himself. and this even at a time when. and that the Greeks had borrowed the first elements of their philosophy from the Hindus. One of these gymnosophists or Digambaras seems to have been the famous Kalanos (Kalyana T). were more ancient than that of Aristotle. either on one side or on the other and though I am far from denying . cidences between the 505 to myself I feel evidence of any direct influence.INDIAN AND GREEK LOGIC. bound to confess that I see no its possibility. We At the time when the philosophy became different systems of Indian first known to the scholars of Europe everything that came from the East was looked upon as of extreme antiquity. as far as we know at present. Indian and Greek Logic. therefore. manuscripts in India were still . expressed years ago. There had been vague traditions of ancient Indian philosophy even before the time of Aristotle. by European scholars that the Hindu systems of philosophy. As two are certainly startling. The view that Alexander might actually have sent some Indian philosophical treatises to his tutor at home.

inconceivable as it now seems to us. there were many points of coincidence between Greek and Indian logic. quoted a passage from Aristotle in which he speaks of a fifth element and calls it dKa. but even that one coinNo doubt cidence has not yet been discovered. i. fire. without giving any reference. e. quotes Epicurus us to the HOU! being a mixture of three elements. on the other hand. Gorres undertook to prove that the Greeks had actually retained some For instance. . would have clinched the argument once all.. like for it. ether. O r/V UVTU> CUCT^TIKOV. Philos. but none in technical proper names in Comparative Mythology.T-ov6fj. if Niebuhr and others power stood up for the opposite view and tried to derive But does Indian philosophy from Greece ? Niebuhr is reported to have said in his Lectures on Ancient History. terms.506 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.aTov. look at Indian philosophy we discern traces of a great similarity with that of the Greeks. De Placit. and that Aristotle might have worked them up into a system. technical terms taken from Sanskrit. <Uld & fourth UKUTOVO/AaOTOV. Gorres. was taken up and warmly defended by men like Gorres and others. this being probIt ably an ingenious conjecture for aKarovo^aa-Tov \ is quite true that one such verbal coincidence would settle the whole question. Now ' If we as people have given up the hypothesis that Greek philosophy formed itself after Indian philosophy. we cannot explain this similarity except by the inter- 1 Plutarch. and water. show a higher of historical criticism. unknown. which. akds-nominatum. air. as Indian philosophers admit five elements. the fifth being called Akasa.

which can be watched from its first childhood. They. too. and civilisation. as certainly and Aristotle were Greeks and not to be surprised if Brahmans. religion. rise They can Brahmanas They can show how they gave and private. or until technical philosophical terms can be discovered in Sanskrit of Greek. . should have been of foreign origin. But they ought not scholars have just the Sanskrit same feeling with regard to Indian philosophy. art. trace their gradual development in the and Upanishads. What it then remains ? It seems to me that until can be proved historically that the Greeks could freely converse with Indians in Greek or in Sanskrit on metaphysical subjects or vice versa. or in Greek of Sanskrit origin. course which the Indians 507 had with the GraecoMacedonic kingdom of Bactra. as yet in a very vague and shadowy form.' To Niebuhr and to most Is that really so ? Greek scholars it would naturally seem next to impossible that Greek philosophy. a mere importation from India.INDIAN AND GREEK LOGIC. are as certain that philosophy was autochthonous in India as that Gotama and Ka?iada were Brahmans and not Greeks. show themselves in the hymns of the early poets of the Veda. public at last they were fixed in different schools in that form in which they have reached us. and how to discussions. They feel it to as Plato be a home-grown production. how its growth ran parallel with the progress of Grecian poetry. how they assumed a more and more definite form. They know how Greek philosophy grew up gradually. They also can show how in India the first philosophical ideas.

1896. and may be discovered by all nations if they search for it with honesty and perseverance. genus = Samanya. whenever we meet with coincidences of any kind. doubt there are the Vaiseshika categories = Padarthas. = the Avayavas there is inducnay. and is On Coincidences. substance. be best to accept facts and to regard both Greek and Indian philosophy as products of the intellectual soil of India and of Greece. we must wait and not hamper the progress of research by premature assertions. Having once learnt this lesson we shall feel less inclined. or reasoning from the fitness of the case.508 it will INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Society of Literature. to conclude at once that they cannot be explained except by admitting a historical contact and a borrowing on one side or the other 1 No . there is Dravya. Sanskrit and in Greek.. and deduction = Upanaya. . But why not ? If they could be developed naturally in Greece. that in philosophy also there is a wealth of truth which forms the common heirloom of all mankind. though seeing smoke does not see that there must be fire. even syllogism tion = Vyapti. M. which is explained as refutation. After the five members follows VIII. VIII. and species = Visesha. and derive from their striking similarities this simple conviction only. quality there is . why not in India ? Anyhow. Tarka. as on a 1 hill. But before we enter into the intricacies of the Indian syllogism. Guna. it will be best to finish first what remains of the sixteen topics of the Nyaya. Tarka. both in . when a person. a paper read before the Royal See M.

6rati. XIV. If this wrangling is devoid of really establishing any attempt it at an opposite opinion. Vitanc&i. and Kalatita. fraud in using words in a sense different from what is generally understood. We next come to XIII. that stand themselves in need of proof. mistimed. Hetvabhasas. however. they have been mentioned before. sophistical or attacking what has been established. These are SavyabbiMra. ati. . It is difficult to . Vada or argumentation. meant to be a reductio ad absurdum. (7ati. Nigrahasthana. caring for wrangling by means false of fraud analogies .. Khsila. Prakaranasama.. and not for truth. cavilling. futility arising from change of class. 509 thereupon made to see that if the hill were without It is fire. and XVI. both disputants. truth only next XI. Nimaya. ascertainment. Viruddha. Then follow the rhetoric or eristics paragraphs connected with rather than with logic. quibbling arising from . that is. Nirwaya. alpa. X-XVI. and XIV. is The next topic to be considered IX. Vada. consisting of and answers. arguments that prove too much. (ralpa. or specious arguments. that prove the reverse. . As to XV. IX. Vitawda. Nigra- hasthana. . Hetvabhasa. such as objections X. unfitness for discussion. is called XII. Kh&la. paralogisms and sophisms. futility.NIRA7 AYA. In the last five cases disputants are supposed to care for victory only. it would of necessity be without smoke. XV. ETC. that tell equally on both sides. Sadhyasama.

because he a soldier. yet continuing to talk. unfitness for diswhen a man by misunderstanding or not understanding. renders himself liable to reproof.. If we were topics. may be also too minute for our taste. as his table of the categories. mean a futile he has a fever. loose. e. European philosophers would no doubt be justified in saying what Hitter said in his History of Philosophy that the exposition of the It is tedious. Here the same soldiers man from is referred first to the class of those fever. list. as to look upon this list of the sixteen some have done. i. or with others. though in several cases there are subdivisions which have here been left out. &c. mixed up with subjects which have nothing certainly to do with pure logic. but it cannot be called loose at the same time. XVI.510 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. for instance. it should be answered that he is is able to travel. unfair to It all is charge the Nyaya and equally the other . birth or genus. is cussion. should unless it meant originally argument. but will have to be discussed hereafter. This may seem a long Judgments on Indian Logic. as when. in answer to an argument that a man is unable to travel. in the school of Zeno. but so was Greek logic in its Nyaya is It beginning. as an abstract of Gotama's whole philosophy. and unmethodical. which have been passed over by him. and yet at the end of the list Gotama actually apologises and says that there are many more sorts of futility. Nigrahasthana. The last. a transitio in alterum genus. and then to that of who suffer who are always supposed to be able to march. because understand why 6rati.

Instead of complaints about the injustice and cruelty of God. Philosophy at the same time held out a hope that in the end might be broken through. that is. We must remember that philosophy in India had very different antecedents from what it had with us. return to himself and be himself this net of consequences . and a firm conviction that nothing can ever be lost. and the Self. with and with entirely ignoring all of ethics. systems practical 5! I of Indian philosophy. return to whence it came. or on what is called Samaya. the agreement of good people. Whether such a belief is right or wrong is not the question. strongest support is a firm belief in the solidarity of life here and hereafter. according to . people were taught that what seemed undeserved misfortunes. were in fact the natural consequences of previous acts. and in one respect the safest means of paying off all debts.JUDGMENTS ON INDIAN LOGIC. free for ever from the chains and pains of this transient episode of life on earth. Morality with the Brahmans depends either on prescriptive sacra (Dharma). were fully deserved. We ourselves can hardly conceive a philosophy which in the end is not to be of practical usefulness. and that no one can ever escape from the consequences of his own acts and thoughts. That highest freedom and beatitude. but it produced at all events a deep sense of responsibility. enlightened by true knowledge. be again the Universal Self. sophers as they are. The popular mind of its being unthe problems But India seems never to have doubted the fact that every good or every evil thought or deed will grow and bear fruit. and which ignores all questions But we must learn to take philoof morality.

and the means of knowing. is at all events perfectly coherent. depended on philosophy or knowledge it could not be acquired by good works or good thoughts alone. this life on but an episode that may be very important in itself. as he holds. . Modern Nyaya is almost entirely confined to Pramana. which is the cause of activity. that Gotama just as Kant began to say. which. Prama?ia. but I can discover no looseness of reasoning in it. nor in Indian philosophy in general. if indirectly the whole Nyaya-philosophy is called the cause of final freedom or blessedness. are they so far wrong ? And what is true in the case of the Vedanta. the eternal life of the soul. nor does it betray any looseness of reasoning. seemed necessary to the limits of the two. from a Hindu point of view. This again may be right or wrong.512 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 2). that his sixteen headings. is the true cause of error or sin. But this being done in under Gotama too. like Badaraya?ia and Kapila. If they hold that a knowledge of the true relation between man and the world. is essential to true freedom and tine happiness. his philosophy is. Prameya. and between man and the Author of the world. . first of is it all. This. which is the cause of birth. which is the cause of suffering ' ' (I. is true in a certain sense It may be said that the fundaof the Nyaya also. mental points of this philosophy are contained in what can be known. We must not forget that. enters on an explanation of the process by which it was possible to destroy ignorance or Mithyar/mina. Indian views. the tracing of the limits of Pure Reason. but is a mere nothing compared with what earth is lies behind and before. to establish. with his Critique full detail of Pure Reason. whether right or wrong. the Samkhya and Yoga systems of philosophy.

The objector would cut away the ground under his Ll . they prove at all events the conscientiousness of the early Naiyayikas. the third and fourth of the Prameyas. namely. for though some of the objections raised may seem to us of little importance. Pratyaksha. starts the question. the Prama?ias. 513 The Later Books of the Nyftya. In this gives us way the first indeed a fair book of the Nyaya-Sutras outline of the whole of Gotama's philosophy. these books Some of the questions discussed in show quite clearly that they must have formed the subject of lively and long-continued controversy. while the following three books enter into a more minute examination of its Thus the second book treats more fully of details. might be said that the authority of the senses also requires to be established by another authority. or who the authority of its authority. on That sensuous perception should be a Pramarca seem to us to have re- Gotama or his opponent what ground the evidence of the is senses can claim such authority. This is an idea that anticipates an important element of modern As a balance may serve to weigh philosophy. there can be none on the side of the objector either. it and so on ad infinitum. that if there is no authority anywhere. the fifth treats of all that comes under the head of paralogisms.PBATYAKSHA. PEECEPTION. Perception. a thing. but must also be weighed or tested itself. or authority would hardly But quired further proof. In answer to this Gotama uses what seems to be an ad hominem argument.

Even such questions as to whether there is any interval of time between our hearing the sound of a word and our realising its meaning. yet we know that it can only be successive. because for real perception there must be contact not only with the organs of sense. does by no means exclude that between mind and Self. 13). feet. but likewise between the senses and the mind (Manas). again reminds us of modern philosophy. he only defends himself by saying that everything cannot be said at the same time. that which results from contact of sense with its object. and that his definition of perception. whether . But admitting that sensuous perception has authority just as a lamp has light to light up the things around it. own and thus would himself have no locus stanch for offering any objections (II. and the question whether several impressions can be taken in at the same time is negatived by a reference to the running of a pin through a number of sheets of a MS.514 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and between the mind and the Self (Atman). that in fact there may be sensation without perception. from want of attention. are alluded to by Gotama and his school. the next question is whether the definition of sensuous perception. He also admits that contact between sense and object does not invariably produce perception. on the contrary takes it here for granted. Another question also which has lately occupied our psycho-physiologists. Here the piercing seems simultaneous. This is not denied by Gotama. is not incomplete. though it dwells only on what is essential (the contact of sense and object). as when we are so absorbed in listening to music that we do not perceive the This objects around us.

while the rest has This leads to be supplied by memory or inference. for it is the opinion of the Buddhists. the it whole tree trembles. we see only that it has fallen or that it has still to fall. so-called childish Time Present. yet taking it as a whole. but never r it is falling. 31). a very real objector. but exactly in these simple and thoughts that the true interest of ancient philosophy seems to me to consist. has ever seen more than one side of the moon. denies that there is such a thing as present time. No one. Future. FUTURE. and in this case. Here the answer is that past and future themselves would be impossible. The objector. of which one side only can be seen at the time. may seem childish to us. and as a globe. particularly in cases where our senses can apprehend a part only of their object when perceiving. past. The next problem that occupies Gotama is that of time of present. Gotama remarks that in that case perception and all that springs from it that Ll2 .TIME PRESENT. The illustration given by Gotama to show that a tree is a whole. for instance. because the moment w e see a fruit falling from a tree. and future. by Gotama (II. he tries to account for the process by which we take a part for the whole. a tree. PAST. for instance. is 515 discussed perception does not involve inference. Past. if the present did not exist. namely. him on to another question whether there really is such a thing as a whole. and as we can in reality never see more than one side at a time. because is when we shake one branch of it. it seems. and on the objector's admitting such a possibility. we postulate and are convinced that there is another side also.

516 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. comparison. though an independent place among the Praschool . his next instrument of knowledge. inference. of at the all independent evidences. And here Gotama seems in conflict with Kawada who. we know that this question of the Pramanas had been discussed again and again in every school of Indian philosophy. as essentially different from Anumana. Upamana. would by no means a kind of Anumana. Comparison. we know that we have to deal with followers Nyaya but the Vaiseshika. declines to accept Upamana. can only said in this place about the validity of inference. because depend on what is present. Kanada's name is not mentioned here nor that of his system. analogy or comparison. reject it. namely Upamana. as we shall see. it would be altogether impossible. so that a mere reference to the subject cannot be used as deterthis that . authoritative as one or. Vaiseshika and secondly. might feel tempted to conclude from We Gotama must have been later in time than Kawada. We now come to the various kinds of verbal is testimony. if presented as Sabda. mining the seniority either of the opponent or of the defender. we find Gotama bent on establishing is Passing over what by the side of it. events. by the side of Anumana. All we can say is that. of the denying it manas. But first of all. the Word. whenever we see Upamana appealed to as a means of valid knowledge. because we shall have to return to it hereafter. Testimony said to be conveyed by .

517 words. it follows that every word of the Veda possesses the highest This. and by a sentence. and certainly do not enable us to admit more than the ' ' ' contemporaneous activity of the various schools of . a question which is intimately connected with the question of what authority is due to the Veda as the Word par Here we meet with a number of arguexcellence. satisfy the Mimamsakas.' between acceptance of the word of an authority (Aptopadesa) and reliance on an inference. and it is Brahman. Then. as we know. find again the same question started as before. is Though the meaning of words because admitted to be conventional. consisting of many words. however. does not authority. or whether it should not rather be treated as a kind of inference. THE WORD. must not be taken to prove the anteriority of 6raimini's Sutras to those of Gotama's. but as the highest authority is as the Veda is the word of chief authority for deterof a word is admitted to be the The argued that Brahman or God.SABDA. who assign eternity to the $abda itself. conveying the meaning of each word in its relation to the other words. though clearly referring to (raimini. he enters on new problems such as the association of sense with sound. but which again. mining the meaning usage of trustworthy persons. ments in defence of the supreme authority of the Veda with which we are familiar from the PurvaMima?nsa. we In the examination of the validity of /Sabda or word. the word or the sound of a word. while others take them to be non- eternal or human. after Gotama has shown the difference be- tween I know and I infer. yet opinions differ some consider such conventions to be eternal or divine. it whether deserves a place by itself.

or under Anumana. probability. and The Eight Pramaflas. was a zealous student of the Nyaya-philosophy. supposed to be lost. centuries intervening rise Hindu philosophy during the between the close of the Vedic age and the spread of Buddhism. tradition. assumption. the others to Anumana. 17) '.518 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. They include. He wrote a work. while /iesh^a. We which was. called Prama/ia-samuK'aya. Sambhava. till Sarat Chandra discovered a Tibetan version of it in the library of the Grand Lama at Lhassa (Journal of Buddhist Text Society. it is added. proceeds to criticise the four additional four Pramawas of the Mimamsakas. non-existence. and even Abhava. Aitihya. like written letters. 480. as when we conclude from the fact that Devadatta is not in his house. This would prove at the same time the study of the Nyaya philosophy in the first century of our era see p. as we saw. neither more nor less. and shows that their number is superabundant. parts iii and iv. whole of Nyaya. Having defended the teaching of the Nyaya. - . Arthapatti. as supplying knowledge. that there are Gotama Prama/ias. The Pramanas seem to have formed a subject of prominent interest to the Nyaya philoin modern times they have absorbed the sophers . or mere gesture. inference. not necessarily authoritative. may. 1 . are told that Nagaiv/una. p. IV. have gone out. that he must Of these four Prama/ias the first is referred by Gotama to $abda. however. Word. because they hold that there can be knowledge arising from not-being or from absence. be classed either under Word. before he became a Buddhist.

and I do not mean to deny that some of their remarks on philosophers. Though is the word eternal. the difference between sound (Dhvani) and words. and we the minds of Hindu philosophers they are connected with some of the greatest branch out very see far. The true problem of language has been almost entirely neglected by Greek philosophers and theii difference disciples in Europe. till we arrive again at the question whether and therefore a Pram&na by Similar questions occur in most of itself. such as the existence of a Creator and the relation between the cause and the effect of our created world. the more we shall feel the between Eastern and Western philosophy. language are really childish. as is origin of language touch only the very it presents itself to Indian The way in which the problem of handled by them will no doubt be dislanguage missed as childish by modern philosophers. the Indian philosophical systems. But we shall see that .THE EIGHT PRAMAA AS. for all the discussions (f>vo-L about the or Secret hem of the question. as whether a vowel such as they deal with such purely grammatical questions i can ever be changed into the semi-vowel y. where we meet with them again as worked out by Gotama. it will be necessary to examine them more fully in this place. and at last on the divine. T 519 Here follow long discussions as to the nature of words. The oftener we read these discussions on the eternal character of sound. and as I passed them over before. on words and their true nature. in fact whether any letter can ever become another letter. nay transcendental character of language. or not. these disquisitions shall be surprised to how intimately in problems of philosophy.

Thoughts on Language. the connection of the two ideas. speech. by the greatest thinkers Language has been to most of us so among familiar a subject that we have hardly perceived what is behind it. existed. as is shown both by perception and by inference. have now We to follow up these views as they are presented to us in a more systematic form in the Sfttra-period. Brahma??as. back to the same root as that of Brahman. long before the rise of philosophical systems. to which we must return for our present purpose. the whole question is treated by Hindu philosophers in a very serious and searching spirit. At all events the idea that Brahman was the Word.520 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. We as expressed in the philosophical hymns. more particularly in the Vedanta-Sutras. Word and Creator. but If I it received its full development in the Sutras only. and have scarcely asked the questions which it has cost so much effort to Indian have already on a former philosophers to answer. read in Sutra I. in Brihas-pati. and always try to keep their eye on what is important and has often been overlooked even us. would carry us back even beyond what we call the Vedic period. and Upanishads of the Vedic period. Students of philosophy should overlook what may seem strange to them in the manner of treatment. as we saw. was right in tracing the word B?*ih. scrip- . 3. It was shadowed forth in the very language of India. and that the world was created by the Word. occasion examined some of the views on language.' Perception is here taken in the sense of /S'ruti. 28 refute his objection on the ' : We We ground that (the world) originates from the Word.

and individual gods are allowed to have had an origin. I. were looked upon as non-eternal. not this or that cow or horse. are not capable of entering into that connection. and as even the gods. It is Brahman. ture. he adds. Word be supconstitutes the material cause it Nor must shown before. as accordance with their true origin in the they are rightly said to have Veda and in Brahman. 4 Then with SmHti. for these. nor this or that Deva. and as all individual things are created in this. that had their origin in the Word. but not the also. the fify (Akritis). This is afterwards confirmed by passages from /Stuti and such as BHh. 52! and inference in the sense of Smn'ti. ' : . it followed that the Veda. posed that the . must be admitted to have originated from the Word or the Veda. Hence genus to which they belong. and that this Word is Only. as containing their names. possibly be ante-temporal or eternal. the Devas. not with individuals. that is. Up. word of the Veda is simply the expression of what is permanent and eternal in all things (universalia in rebus). 2. An objection had been started that the Veda could not be considered as eternal. which was thought and uttered at of things first by Brahman. all individual things. it is not the individuals. though readily admitting the non-eternal character of the gods. having been proved to be subject to birth and rebirth. nay the whole world. the gods and other beings. as being infinite in number. if it contained names of non-eternal things. /Samkara argues. tradition. the Devas. but the genus to which they belong. could not Against this. with the genus that words are connected. lies in Brahman The only.THOUGHTS ON LANGUAGE. which is therefore more than the Word. Ar. that in spite of that. it.

8534: 'He who exists by himself let first stream forth the Word. without beginning or end. and there was Of course. 2): '"This as.' The Word therefore. could have created the is things corresponding to them. it to many readers.522 his INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. it is easy to see that Veda. was meant for more than what was afterwards called the Vedas. 2. existed before creation. necessary for the creation three of created things. Mahabh. Speech. or the ideas or logoi of the world. said. and the . read in the Burnt i and whence proceeded the evolution of the world 'God in the beginning again. : ' continuous process of their works. so full ()." he and created the earth. In order to show that there all is nothing strange $amkara remarks that even we ourselves. nay even to such thought as '(Jod spake. before he in this. g. when we mean to do anything. manner the words of the Veda had to be present to the mind of the Creator. Br. Let there be light. XII. e. the Divine Word which we read in the Veda. 8535 created the names and forms of things. the Mahabharata XII. which is identified with the words of creation. have first to think In the same of the word for what we mean to do.' I This will sound strange to confess. and Brahma^as. Pra^apati. as we mind he united himself with also. Veda stands here for Logos or Sophia. and comprehends all named concepts. thus it said in the is Veda (Taitt. first the earth.' If we read such passages carefully. me when I T.' ourselves to say that the Logos of the Alexandrian . And 4. if we can bring light. the Samhitas. the eternal. or Speech. II. sounded strange came across these thoughts. of Neo-platonic reminiscences.

if indeed it admits of will people not see that it is far more any. but it also means sound. Gescluclite der Logosidee. but it was admitted as an independent element by the other schools of thought. both religious and philosophical. the Barhaspatyas. however hesitatingly. and I have tried to show this on several occasions. and they therefore begin with asking what sound is. . requires a very different solution from that proposed by Professor Weber. and had fully perceived its intimate connection with some of the highest problems. and of sound only. which were nearest to their heart. because it is supersensible. 1896. They begin with the beginning and try first to make what /Sabda is. which we translate by ether. even by the Buddhists. and indoctrinated pagan and Christian philosophers with their ideas But as every Greek scholar of Va& or Speech. philosophers l 523 had no antecedents in early Greek there would be an end of the whole philosophy and we should simply have to admit that question. pp. which was meant to be the vehicle of sound and The existence of this fifth element was altogether denied by the materialists. scholarlike to confess our ignorance than to give an answer. We have it clear to themselves seen already that they actually postulated a fifth element Akasa. because 1 See Anathon Aall.THOUGHTS ON LANGUAGE. Brahmans came to Alexandria. knows that the very opposite is the case. the question . $abda means word. 218 seq. and thus to dis- Why courage further research ? Hindu philosophers have treated this whole question with so much care that we can see at least that they truly cared for it.

its substance. however.). to their honour that they allow ' full credit to the Purvapakshin who opposes the eternal character of sounds and words. All these arguments are clearly directed against the Mima/msakas who for reasons of their own re- quire >Sabda. sound cannot be eternal. not possibly be the vehicle Its loudness might depend on it. (5) that to Dadhy Atra). Sansk. is the number of those who make augmented by But to all these 1 Cf. The opinion that sound exists always and is only made manifest by each is held by the Mimamsakas. but a i.. which This is illustrated by the striking of a drum with a drumstick. . having Akasa or ether for and eternally. is rejected by Kanada. to be eternal. (2) that it passes away.' he says *. 2. and that it is only carried along by the air. whether sound or word. No. speaker. 21). where we can clearly see that sound is produced by a conjunction between a drum and a drumstick. Muir. pp. 6 com. explains sound as the object apprehended by the sense of hearing (II. neither substance nor action.). The Vaiseshika-philosophy. Ballantyne's Mimawm-Sutras. because we see (i) that it is a product. I. III. 8 . Orig. Ka-kara &c. ' (3) that it is made it is (the very letters being called A-kara. A-making. but not air could they held that of sound. 70 seq. Ka-making perceived by &c. p. We see (4) that different persons at once. Texts. It must be said.524 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. for instance. it changes (as Dadhi Atra changes (6) and that it it. It then declares that sound is quality (cf. its quality. which takes a special interest in the question of the elements. sounds and words being accepted as momentary manifestations only of eternal sound.

its traces it the mind of the hearer or learner . Besides. when the authorship of the Veda had to be discussed. if repeated. and when it was shown that the author of the Veda could not have been a personal being. we are on sound as eternal and as always present. only not always manifested on account of the absence of an utterer or an exciter. it is not the same letter modified. and that we have 110 right to suppose that it is ever annihilated. that everywhere at the same time that. difficulties 525 The word is the Mima/msaka has a ready answer. If it should be supposed that sound is a mere modification of air. now heard. there are the definite words of the Veda which tell us of an eternal Voice. it leaves . the answer is that the ear does not simply hear the air. If is heard. noise. to his Having thus established own satisfaction the eternity of sound. and as to the increase of due to the increase of the number of conjunctions and disjunctions of the air. (raimini proceeds to defend the sounds or words of the Veda against all possible These arguments were examined by us objections. . and though the per- is the same on both sides. eternal. though the sound in is may vanish. The letter ception of sound right in looking k. that is (raimini's reasons in support of the eternal char- acter of sound are that.THOUGHTS ON LANGUAGE. but is sensitive only to what is intangible in sound. but it is another letter in the place of a letter. it is the same. he says. before. the same sun. perceived at applies to the As to the modification of sound. it is said that sound the same which has always been is made. that only is means that it is employed. and if it the same time by many. the quality.

as it has been truly called. namely. They had evi- dently perceived that language is the only pheno- menal form of thought. philosophers Though these discussions are of a grammatical rather than of constitutes a word. they deserve our attention. among their representative philosophers. and Bcgriff (conand that true thought has to do with conceptual . as to what and what according to Indian character. when divested of its natural integuments. is its real a philosophical character. They understood what even modern philosophers have i'ailed to understand. not as made by them. and that. the words. that there is a difference between VorsteUurifj (presentation or percept) cept).526 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. We may therefore at once proceed to the next point. to the question. nay skinned thought. except in the form of words. How well the Hindus understood that the study of language forms an integral part of philosophy. because they show how keen an interest the ancient philosophers of India had taken in the Science of Language. it was the duty of a student of thought to inquire into the nature of words before he approached or analysed the nature of what we mean by thought. their greatest grammarian. but that the Veda could only have been seen by inspired Rishis as revealed to them. as human beings possess no means of perceiving the thoughts of others. and in consequence between the Science of Language and the Science of Thought or Philosophy. naked thought. nay even their own thoughts. and how clearly they had perceived the intimate relation between language and thought. we may gather from the fact that they actually admitted Panini.

Hindu philosophers have actually elaborated an idea which does not exist in any other philosophy. are M&dhava inseparable. Derived as it is from SphuZ. the material element of (7aimini's words. but the name grammarian whom he quotes (VI. or is really the ' he writes. Sphoa must have meant originIt has been translated by ally what bursts forth. The subject has been well treated by Madhava in his Sarva-darsana-sa??igraha. what we should call Other systems the grammatical system of Pamni. It is true that in Pamni's own that of Sphofa. also treat most fully of linguistic questions. for instance. expression. Sutras the word Sphoa does not occur. and he adds thereupon some lines from grammar. 123). and perish when separated. Here. word and thought. i. concept or idea. and is without ' . is the true cause of the world/ is in fact Brahman. but none of of a these renderings can be considered as successful. and as conveying a meaning. 527 words only. when examining the P4mni Darsana.SPHOTA. parts. notion. he shows first of all that the /Sabda or word which Pamni professes to teach in his $abdcanusasana. shows that this peculiar word Sphofci must have existed before Pawini's time. the Purva-Mimamsa when treating of the question whether sound. same as Brahman. It really means the sound of a word as a whole. apart from its component letters. is eternal or not. as. in his survey of all philosophies. The eternal word/ which is called Spho^a. Sphofo. nay that the two. assigns a place between Purva Mim4msi and Kapila's Samkhya to the Panini Darsana. Spho^ayana.

he says.' know it as distinct from the letters composing it. . arises from the separate letters of a word. whether in their single or their united form. distinct from the letters though Splio^a.D. the : in- Which developed destructible essence of language. vanishes. As therefore the letters. in support of And if it were said that cognition their opinion. without beginning or end. and I only wonder that those who believe in an ancient indigenous alphabet.528 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and whence springs the creation of the world. long before they became acquainted with the written letters of a Semitic alphabet. . nay even of vowels and consonants. cannot produce cognition. it is maintained that it is actually an object of perception. for all men. It cannot be in their collective form.) says Brahman. though ' vainly. we ask. to the discussions of Spho^a. on hearing the word cow. that the Hindus had elaborated the idea of letters. as we knew already from the Pratisakhyas. should never have appealed. where that grammarian (died ' 650 A. each as soon as pronounced. Bhartn'hari's BrahmakawcZa. and therefore cannot form a whole nor can it be in their separate form.' What more ? could be said of the Neo-platonic Logos In answer to some who deny the existence of such a Sphofa. whether these letters are supposed to produce cognition in their collective or in their separate form. because letter. in the form of things. there must be something else by means of which knowledge is produced. and that is the the sound. because no single letter has the power of producing cognition of the meaning of any word. This shows.

however. This shows that the conventional character Mm . as distinct from the letters. explains this more it is ' fully by saying : Grammarians maintain that the word. but if it requires festation. This dilemma is put forward by Bha^a in his Mima??isasloka-varttika The grammarian who holds that manifest or non-manifest. when pronounced. as are apprehended. and horns. hump. revealed by them. is not silenced at once. hoofs. ' : 529 He Now Mahabhashya is that by which.' Kaiyate. too. 4. when they are pronounced and thus the same difficulties which were pointed out before as to the collective or single action of letters. there duced then quotes from Patan^ali's what is the word Cow ? It is proin us the simultaneous cognition of dewlap.SPHOTA. . which expresses the meaning. 14) seems to have given the right solution.' severally On this point Panini (I. tail. He. this could be by its letters only. It is therefore some- thing distinct from the single letters which conveys the meaning. ' : Spho^a itself is manifested by the letters as they are pronounced and apprehended. while the letters. conveyed all that is wished). asks the question whether this Sphoa is If it required no maniwould always be there. does not thereby escape from a single difficulty. and that is what we call the Sphoa. it manifestation. by laying it down as a principle that letters can never form a word unless they have an affix at the end. would arise again. since. though one and indivisible. if the letters expressed there would be no use in pronouncing the second and following ones (as the first would already have it. simply help to convey the they meaning by means of a conventional association (0ecrei).' The objector.

that the admission of Spho^a is necessary. Nor is it enough that the letters should be the same. After having thus in his own way established the theory of a Spho^a for every word. Words express the Summum Genus. as explicit.. accept the revealing the invisible Sphote. whether that sound was called $abda or Spho^a. it is remarked that in one sense this is really so but that. our philosophical grammarian takes another step. case all . evanescent as soon as they have been probeing nounced. would carry the same meaning. because separate letters would never be a word. of the relation between sound and meaning was fully recognised in India. is coloured by its surroundings. otherwise Vasa and Sava. trying to prove that ultimately that summum genus (Satta). as little as flowers without a string would And as the letters cannot combine. namely. they must also follow each other in the same order. Nava and Yana. we are asked to admit a Sphoa. whereas the following letters serve only to make that Spho^a more and more manifest and first letters. no more than a catching at a straw by a drowning person. when con- . &c. and that all the objections are . Brahman. namely Brahman or being. and to be a wreath. All this was meant to show that the admission of a Spho^a was unnecessary but we now get the orthodox answer. namely pure existence. the characteristic of which is consciousness of the supreme the meaning of all words is And lest it should be thought that in that words would mean one and the same thing. which they do not. as a crystal reality.53 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

we must remember that.. and the meaning of the This is existence. rest ultimately on the summum genus.WORDS EXPRESS THE SUMMUM GENUS. expresses existence. and there(or fore all words. Brahman). Brahman thing. to which I added the amendment that they expressed either an action or a status. this is the great Atman root. expressed by affixes such as Tva. as found in cows. 53! nected with different things and severally identified with each.. This they call objects. as others say. the Pratipadika. expressive of definite meanings. If the stem-word. is called this or that species by means of its connection with different phenomenal world. horses. the root expresses Bhava. &c. a state. horse. Greek as well as medieval logicians and it is exactly what my late friend Noire tried to establish. For existence. is found in all things. &c. Tal. or. as found and then only what they are in this In support of this another of Bhartrihari's is quoted: 'Existence being passage divided. Kriya. and Satta. in cows.. in which it resides. the meaning of the stem. in individuals. as the summum genus. existence. and on it all words depend. these being first of all 'existence' (Satta) or the highest genus. action. stands afterwards for different species. If this true kernel of every word is by Hindu philosophers called the Great Atman (Mahan Atma). &c. cow-hood. differen- tiated by various thoughts or words. &c. which form abstract nouns. such as Go-tva.. such as cows. is the true substance of every: This is stated again by Bhartrihari Mm 2 . &c. that all words originally expressed action. such as cow. the summum genus. horses.. according to the Vedanta. &c.' This will remind us of of many of the speculations .

e. only so long as Devadatta is the possessor of reality named the house) . is Brahman' may mean when we say. like the house of so called for a vanishing reason (that Devadatta. the one of Va^apyayana. many Brahmans. was necessitated by the very character of the Vedanta-philosophy. he states that the plural and Rama. The Supreme Being is the thing words. is. that a Brahman 'a in another. 2. I. reality is known under its illusory words under untrue disguises. pure houseis hood 3 only expressed. we meet with two schools.532 ' INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Words mean TO words in the QV. he shows that as . i. the other. the true forms. I. of Vyat/i. the Paramatman and the 6rivatman. Ramas means always Kama. maintaining that our ordinary words mean a genus. for in one place. 2. the highest or universal. 58. who holds Pamni holds that they mean individual things. both views as true in grammar. Hence it is said denoted by all word but the relation of the two. but by the word house. and it is identical with the : ultimately identical. All The idea that all end mean Brah- man. while they are . by The true is (for a time). which admits of no duality except as the result of nescience.' of Genera or Individuals? Words Expressive But while the meaning of all words is thus admitted to be Brahman. and the living or individual 1 Read Gnhatvam instead of Grihitam? . Rama so many single Ramas. varies as it does in the case of the two Atmans. the one Supreme Being. to be honoured 64.

533 the difference between the two being due to Avidyd or temporary nescience. if OV. Though from our point of view the idea of such a Sphoa may seem unnecessary. not of Panini himself. there would have been no necessity for the admission of a Sphoa. such as Go. It was evidently not seen I by the inventors of this Spho^a that letters have no independent existence at all. As early as the Maitrayana Upanishad we meet with verses to the same effect.' conveying a meaning which does not depend ' on any single letter nor on any combination of them. and of an earlier date than itself. Sphoa is in fact the word before it had been analysed into letters. such as (VI. . and that words existed long before even the idea of letters had been formed. and the straight royal road among This if all the roads that lead to emancipation. is. 'Two Brahmans have to be meditated on. like every other system of philosophy. and can be considered only as the result of a scientific analysis. the purifier of all sciences. Letters. as ' it was called by Pata%ali ($abdanusasana).V ALL WORDS MEAN TO soul. and by the Word alone is the Non-word revealed. the means of final beatitude. the medicine of the diseases of language. at least of his followers and must say that if his explanation of a word as a number of letters ending in a suffix had been accepted. the breaking forth of a whole and undivided utterance. by themselves.' may be accepted as representing the views. have no raison d'etre. cow. we cannot help .' In this way the grammatical philosophers endeavoured to prove that grammar or exposition of words. the Word and the Non-word. leads up to final bliss. 22). the door of emancipation. the science of sciences it is the first rung on the ladder that .

and this may be raised to the status of a word by means of a grammatical suffix which. as creative types. casually ? rather see clearly here also how long and . I should add. and as genera they are eternal. as it were. we have not a combination of three letters v. required so till many evolutions of thought they reached the point which they reached in Alexandria. and. And can we suppose that ideas which. in Greece. much-despised Neo-platonic philosophy. have no reality and no power. should have sprung up in India Do we not suddenly or. as such.534 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. something undivided and indivisible. All this is true and recognised now by students of the Science of Language. logoi in the These logoi existed before the creation of the world. a welcome surprise. but always of classes or genera. the basis of the Christian theory of creation. expressive of its meaning in its undivided form only. and that we should find it so fully elaborated in the ancient world of India is surely a surprise. In such a word as Va&. rendered that creation possible. This is the nay. admiring the ingenuity of the ancient philosophers of India in inventing such a term. For it is perfectly true that the letters. but we have an indivisible explosion. makes an organised whole of it. Vox. and that every word is something different from its letters. Still more important is the idea that all words originally meant Brahman or TO 6V. which would be nothing. and in seeing difficulties which never attracted the attention of European philosophers. and receive their special meaning from their relation to the genera or all mind of Brahman. though never even suspected by the philosophers of other countries. as we should say. and afterwards in Palestine. a. Words are not names of individuals. k.

according to Indian philosophy. even we have to descend again frightened and giddy.' we can at least admire the struggle which led up to this view of the world. In the beginning was the Word. and tried to establish ' the truth that there is is Rhyme and Reason is full a Logos. which ended where Greek philosophy ended. thought. and where Christian philosophy began. nay even if we should put aside as unintelligible the beginning words of the fourth Gospel. in which it has its true Self or Atman. which Atman is Brahman. even in the lower spheres in which we have to move in our daily life and amidst our daily duties. that there in the world. Speaking for myself. I am bound to say that I have felt an acquaintance with the if general spirit of Indian philosophy as a blessing it from all against the antinomies of being and thinking. it 535 of thought must have taken place south of the Himalayas before such Would any Greek fruits could have ripened ? scholar dare to say that all this how continuous a development was borrowed from Greece ? Would any Sanskrit scholar be so intrepid as to hint that the Greeks might possibly have learnt their Logos from the Vedic V&k ? Even if we do not accept the last results of this Indian line of thought.all the encounters with the scepticism and ma- my very youth. To have mounted to such heights. must have strengthened the muscles of human reason. That mind.V ALL WORDS MEAN TO OV. and that the whole universe of Brahman. and will remain in our memory as a sight never to be forgotten. and nerved in . not visible to the human eye. in which it lives and moves. being strengthened by . the Eternal and the Divine. has its true being in the alone Divine Mind. though visible to the human mind.

Why not do the same for Indian philosophy ? Why not try to bring it near to from it we may seem at us. Is not that something to make us think. the brain philosophy. the vein of gold that runs through the quartz. to discover blemishes in the form easy. In other countries philosophy has railed at religion and reIn India alone the ligion has railed at philosophy. however far removed all first sight. and to cite expressions which at first sight seem absurd.536 terialism of our INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Humani nihil a me alienum puto ? rich kernel is often A covered by a rough skin. to try to understand the thoughts of great philosophers. two have always worked together harmoniously. even in the most modern. and style of Indian philosophy. then to winnow what is permanent from what is temporary. may be Vedanta on Sphote. and had its right place in it at the right What the historian of philosophy has to do time. Many people have smiled at the Platonic ideas. for it is quite We . own ephemeral philosophy. if is first of all possible. But there are such blemishes and such absurdities in all philosophies. and true wisdom hiding where we least expect it. or at the location of the soul in the pineal gland or in certain parts of yet all this belongs to the history of . philosophy gaining its spirituality from religion. and to sweep away the rubbish. It is no doubt. at the atoms of Democritus. and to discover. I mean chiefly the Vedanta. and to remind us religion deriving its of the often-repeated words of Terence. have now to see what the other systems of philosophy have to say on this subject. to keep the gold. freedom from philosophy.

because not even the last letter with the impression left by the preceding letter in our memory. because as soon as they are pronounced they perish. &c. was not accepted by all. because they differ according to the pronunciation of each speaker. 28. and which in conversation conveys to others what is in our own mind. entirely unnecessary. is entirely opposed He fully admits that to the admission of a Sphoa. and it is that Spho^a from which whatever is denoted by it was produced in creation. l favour of the admission of a Sphoa. however. to admission of a Sphoa this. different therefore from perishable and changeable letters. prove he goes back and 1 Ved. This is one of the cases where the Purvapaksha. the outburst of the whole word. that the letters cannot convey the meaning. because they possess neither singly nor collectively any significative power. presenting itself all at once as the object of our mental act of apprehension. the Sphotfa. how were these words Beginning as usual with the Purvapresent ? pakshin or opponent.VEDANTA ON SPHOTA. the opponent's view. That Sphoa is what is eternal. earth and all the rest were created according to the which were present to the mind of the Creator. as repre- senting the Vedanta-philosophy. but always clothed in sound. has been mistaken for 5amkara's own final opinion. Sutras I. would convey to us the sense of a word.. he produces as arguments in words earth. clear that the idea of a Spho^a. or for the Siddhanta. though known to $amkara. but he asks. Hence something different from the letters must be admitted. 3. /Samkara in order to himself. considers such calls an and. 537 them. .

Thus when the word cow is pronounced twice. and not to the intrinsic nature of the holds that the apprehension of difference on external factors.538 his INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 53) varsha argues that the letters by themselves constitute the word. viz. no doubt. if it And of a row. high or low. this is not so. Upavarsha. or a wood. which as long as they move one after another in amkara charges Sabarasvamin. because though they perish as fast refers to elsewhere also as they are pronounced. cannot form the object of one mental act. may. with having borrowed an from Badaraya/za. being several. aid an old Vedantist. show that things which comprise several unities can become objects And if it of one and the same act of cognition. we have only to look at a number of ants. 5. 1 . 3. strong or weak. but as actually the same. whom he This Upa(III. He letters. but the letters through all this are recognised as the may be said that the letters of a word. but that the same word has been And though two individuals pronounced twice. I. cuckoo and ape. i. we do not think that two words have been pronounced. the famous commenPurva-Mimamsa. The sound which enters the ear (Dhvani) be different. such differences are due to the organs of pronunciation. they are always recognised again as the same letters. pronounce the same word differently. or an army. be asked why groups of letters such as Pika and Kapi should convey different meanings. not only as belonging to the same class. because the ideas which we have same. argument 1 Here tator on the . but that their recogdepends nition is due only to the intrinsic nature of the letters.

originated. and horses. 1 1 1 Garbe. *Samkara end maintains that the admission of a Sphoa is unnecessary.YOGA AND SAMKHYA ON SPHOTA. the eternal character of the words is strenuously retained. and if the letters are supposed to manifest the Sphoa. not have without such as gods. We never perceive a Sphoa. by the eternal words from which all non-eternal things. and as such are eternal. The Yoga-philosophy accepted the theory of the Sphoa. he argues. n. . and that it is simpler to accept the letters of a word as having entered into a permanent connection with a definite sense. in order to maintain the identity of Brahman and the Word. 539 a certain order. after apprehending the several letters. It would even be preferable to admit that letters form a genus. Hence we see that. though the theory of the Spho^a is by the Vedanta. Without adducing further arguments. being considered essential. as it would seem. p. nay it has been supposed to have first originated 1 it 1 . Yoga and Sawkhya on Sphofa. for. the Sphoa in turn would have to manifest the sense. and the rejected creation of the world by Brahman in accordance with the eternal words. and as in the always presenting themselves in a definite order to our understanding. convey the idea of a row. which. finally comprehends the entire aggregate as conveying a definite sense. according to the commentary. cows. Samkhya-Philosophie. but cease to do so if they are scattered about at random. but in either case we should gain nothing by the Sphoa could that we admission of it.

is to Indian philosophy. so that even at the beginning of a new creation an . namely that existence cannot be proved. Nor are the letters. from Kapila's point of view. proves no more than their belonging to one and the same genus. rather than against the Mimarasa.54 it INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. but not their being eternal. 58). however. that Kapila's objections concerning the Sphoa were directed. then why not be satisfied with this. it is thinkers not merely a grammatical problem distantly connected with the question of the eternity . according to Kapila. thus heated. If Sphoa. of the Veda. eternal (V. what is in fact entirely gratuitous (V. It is curious to observe the elaborateness with which what seems to us a purely grammatical question is discussed in the various schools of Indian The Sphoa. and our being able to recognise them as the same. 57). we can witness their production . the three Vedas were produced. as is of much the same character what he had said about its Isvara. not that it does not exist. because. 46) because the Vedas speak of themselves as having been produced in such passages as : He became heated. was against the Yoga-philosophers. the Lord. as manifesting its sense ? Why invent something which has never been perceived. mean no more ' than unbeginning and unbroken continuity. and which exists as little apart from the letters as a forest exists apart from the trees. This eternity is denied by Kapila (Sa??ikhya V.' Eternity of the Veda can therefore. as Badarayana also re- marked. is meant for the group of letters forming a word. he says. and simply speak of a word (Pada). What Kapila says about Sphote. and from him.

because. Now a liberated Purusha. because we know of no possible personal author. in the same way as germs and sprouts. nor could an active. because he would not have this possessed the omniscience required for such a work. as Nyaya and Vaiseshika mainVeda was the work of a personal being. and their innate power is proved by the wonderful effects which are produced. as a tangible and irrefutable proof of the efficiency of the Vedas. a personal work. ancient or modern. like the notes of birds. such as tsvara. and this the Hindus. for instance. this 54! Veda remains the same But if. could not have composed enormous Veda. as he holds. non-liberated Purusha have been the author.YOGA AND SAJlfKHYA ON SPHO^A. For he holds that the Lord or Isvara could only have been either a liberated or an unliberated Purusha. the order of words in the as before. rise spontaneously like an exhalation from the Highest Being. therefore the Veda eternal. without any No. because he is free from all desires. as we read. not by any effort It must of will. What is called the wT ork of a personal being always is presupposes a corporeal person. This is the same argument which was used in the Nyaya-Sutras II. But we must not conclude that. such an Isvara has never been proved to exist. and it presupposes a will. 68. such as Vislmu for instance. would find . by medical formulas taken from the Ayur-veda. tain. Here all would depend on the experimental proof. should not call the mere breathing of We But the Vedas. not be supposed that the words of the Veda are manifested. a person in sleep. but by some miraculous virtue. they are the means of right knowledge. purpose or meaning. this is declared impossible by Kapila.

but if the Hindus were satisfied. 104). Biblioth. there being no known barrier between the ether and our ear (II. 0. but it si iows at all events the freedom Indian philosophers were allowed to handle the ancient Sacred Books of the country. both in the Manvantaras and Yugas which are past and those that are still to come. according to Gotama. ed. 3. whilst their authority depends on the authority of the most competent persons. Muir. it is argued. Indica. study. and hence it must be non-eternal. 86). and because it is known to be factitious. p. The true eternity of the Vedas of sound is. if sound were eternal. p.. and employment. consists. but it is nevertheless a something perceptible by one of our senses. This ethereal substratum to perceive no doubt. even before it is uttered. all with which 1 Vatsyayana's Commentary on the Nyaya. difficult to supply . because it is an object of senseperception. we have no reason to find fault. This is the same with secular words This last admission would of course be resisted and resented by Vedanta philostrongly '. now we turn to the Nyaya-philosophy we find Gotama also denies the eternity of sound. 91. that of hearing. in the unbroken continuity of their tradition. we can see that it has a that beginning or cause. Besides. T. because. Nyaya on If Sphola. . Ill. we should be able it always. sophers. S.542 it INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. intangible (II. 115. 3.

In answer to this sweeping condemnation the Vaiseshika points out VI. as pointed out by the native ' ' commentators. . and not of an author of limited intelligence. ' upon intelligence/ or as we should say. But though this Sutra to its given twice. X. 9. whether human or divine. e. it is doubted whether he can justly claim any authority. 543 Vaiseshika on Spho/a. should known in their . and whoever its author may have been. and the rest discovered by some critics in the text of the Vedas. such as self-contradictoriness.VAISESHIKA ON SPHOTA.' may also be translated by because it declare's it.ksha in the Vedanta and Mimamsaka-Sutras. the same as those ' i. there attaches some uncertainty meaning. is lastly do not differ much from as to whether the Veda is eternal own way authoritative or not. of the Veda is called in question. because no merely rational author could propound such a rule as sacrifice. the Veda must at least be admitted to be the work of a rational author. The very last Sutra of the ' Vaiseshika-Sastra. to which the is final Sutra refers. tautology. because. i i that at all events there is in the Veda a construction of sentences consequent . The Vaiseshikas the Naiyayikas or not. but they follow their of reasoning.' ' He who desires Such matters could not be paradise. the words because uttered by Him. says: It has been declared that authoritativeness belongs to the Amnaya (Veda) because is and this declaration uttered by Him found likewise in the third Sutra of the first book ' it is .' teaches duty (Dharma). because it with which we are familiar from the Purvapa.' But in either case there are objections. 2. Thereupon the eternal character. too.

we return to the Sutras of Gotama. at least as trustworthy safely be regarded. such as the rewards of sacrifices in another world. the eternity of the Veda meant no more than its uninterrupted tradition (Sampradaya). . besides being the work of a rational being. The Vaiseshikas admitted a personal author of the Veda. the instruments of objective knowledge. . but this by no means involved the eternity of the Veda. it had been accepted as the highest authority by a long line of the great or greatest men who themselves might infallible. They argued that. With the Vaiseshikas. Prameyas. but some further supports to its authority were found in the fact that. if not as and authoritative. or not.544 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. an Isvara. and other matters beyond the ken of experience. the ISelf. Objects of Knowledge. it shows at events the state of mind of the earliest defenders of revelation. causes and effects to ourselves. If now. he could not possibly have declared things that are beyond the knowledge of ordinary rational beings. as established by the Pramanas and the first question that meets us is. the Lord. we find that. in his third book. also. that the objects of knowledge. because the author must at least be admitted to have been a rational being. men Whatever we may think all of limited knowledge like of this argu- ment. in this case of Isvara. he is chiefly concerned with the Prameyas. is whether the senses or Indriyas. after an examination of the various opinions entertained by the Nyaya and other Hindu philosophers of the significative power of words. should be treated as different from the Atman.

there is no why. or. . A number of similar and answers follow. the eye colour. according to other systems. Body. the skin warmth. must be something different from the several senses. Senses. BODY. mere remembrance of an acid substance can make our mouth water. Indriyas. while other difficulties are such that even in our own time they have not ceased to perplex minute philosophers. the Manas or mind. Some of them suggest difficul- which betray a very low state of philosophical reasoning. that itself. holds that they are different from the and in order to prove this. /Sarira. if memory is supposed duality of perception to be a quality or mode of the Self. a question which would Next never occur to a Vedantist. 545 Gotama Atman if . namely the Atman. But Gotama asks it and solves it in his own way. It cannot be. the consequences of good and evil deeds would cease to pursue the Self through an endless when and rebirths. at to Gotama goes on show N n .SARIRA. the ear sound. he argues. We meet with the question why. and that therefore what perceives all these impressions together. &c. being burnt. the body has once been destroyed by because. least carefully considered. follows the question whether the body is the same as the Atman. he says. with the dual organ of vision. at the same time and in the same object. all showing how much objections this question had occupied the thoughts of the series of births Nyaya ties philosophers. if not solved. would perceive . After these questions have been. each sense could perceive by each sense its own object only.

is . The Self is The Self is eternal. be conceived as the Atman. desire in general. when this view has been silenced by the remark that a child does not consist of the five elements only. as maniappealed to as showing a child's previous existence. And here a curious argument is brought in. our Indian movements objector declares that such are to be considered as no more than And the opening and closing of a lotus-flower. is not in fact. as he says. And when. while the mind or Manas is only the instrument (Kara?ia) of knowledge by which attention is fixed on one thing at a time. in a former life. the body be not Atman. as a last resource. the smile of a new-born child can only arise from memory While our modern psychowould probably see in the smiles or physiologists the cries of a new-born child a reflex action of the of a previous experience. Gotama answers once more that a child cannot be treated like a piece of iron. the knower. arid when this also has once fested by a child. a new argument of the same character is adduced. mind. they say. different from the usual Indian arguments in support of our previous existence. not of this life only. a mere vegetable. towards a magnet. Manas. which can only be accounted for. because. neither can Manas. namely the child's readiness to suck. by the child having. because we see that iron also moves milk. as we should say.546 that if INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Mind. muscles. without beginning and therefore without end. to show that our Self does not begin with our birth on earth. acquired a desire for When this again has been rejected as no argument.

like every other substance. or of four. 547 more been answered by the remark that a child. water and fire. or of three elements. The consideration of the body and of the substances of which it consists. must be possessed of qualities. or of five. . Gotama finally dismisses all these objectors by maintaining that desires are not simply qualities. the difference between the two. and their relation to knowledge. whether of earth only. Here we should remember Nn 2 that. to the objects of perception are not very assigned different from what they are supposed to be in the really philosophic matter in other systems of philosophy. The final solution only deserves clearly shows that the Nyaya also recognised in some cases the authority of the Veda as supreme. earth. and they may be passed by here all the more because they will have to be considered more fully VaLs'eshika system. in so far as it is * made of earth. or many. the mind (Manas).MANAS. It is chiefly concerned More with the nature of Self (Atman). when we come to examine the interesting is the discussion which occupies the rest of the third book.' because scripture says so/ What follows. but there is little of what we mean may by The qualities it. is naturally of small interest in our time. because it displays the qualities of the five. by stating that the body our attention. MIND. contain curious suggestions for the psychophysiologist. water. earth. and the question whether we possess one general sense only. and why ' ? /Srutiprama^yat. but can arise from experience and previous im- pressions (Samkalpa) only. the discussion of sight or of the visual ray proceeding from the eye. fire and air.

and all the rest. which might often be rendered by light or the internal light that changes dark and dull impressions into clear and bright sensations. while the Buddhi of Gotama is distinctly declared to be non-eternal. or as Gotama explains it (1. 16). verbal testimony. doubt. understanding. imagination.' ' This is cases this declared to be due to attention. dreaming. feeling of pleasure. is Manas often called the doorkeeper. we are told. inference. is totally different from the Buddhi of the Sa7?<khyas. guessing. If therefore we translate Manas therefore by mind. is what we should call attention. and its being originally different from Buddhi. such as memory. It should also be remembered that is the same Sanskrit term has often very different meanings in different systems of philosophy. 15. Upalabdhi (apprehension). The Buddhi of the Nyaya philosophers. the preventing of knowledge arising altogether. for instance.548 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Though there are many manifestations of Manas. perceptions. Their Buddhi is eternal. and knowledge in general. we must always remember its technical meaning in Indian philosophy. and in many would be the best rendering of Manas. or by understanding. The difference between the philosophical nomenclatures in English and Sanskrit for the Manas and its various functions is so great that a translation almost impossible. Buddhi (understanding). cognition. at least so far as it enables us to transform and understand the dull impressions of the senses. according to I. and 6rn4na (knowledge) are used synonymously. sensations from rushing in promiscuously preventing and all at once. yet its distinguishing feature. . and I am by no means satisfied with my own. desire.

Snm'ti. 549 The Buddhi of the Sarakhya is a cosmic principle independent of the Self. or in the lighting up and appropriating of the inert impressions received This knowledge can come to by the senses. . and on the other side of Manas with Indriyas (senses). who remembers. can never be destroyed. Nor does knowledge belong to the Manas.MEMORY. which is but the instrument of knowledge. and meant to account for the existence of the light of reason in the whole universe while in the Nyaya-philosophy it signifies the sub. though it may be ignored. can only be the Self who in the end knows. like the wielder of an axe. which is either immediate or mediate. who desires and acts. an end and vanish by forgetfulness. jective activity of thought in the acquisition of knowledge. It suppressed. Memory. who feels . like the Buddhi of the Samkhyas. What is knowledge. but it arises from the conjunction of Atman (Self) with Manas (attention). because knowledge abides even when the senses and what they perceive have been soul. pain and pleasure. the Self or Gotama the cannot belong to the senses and their objects (Indriyartha). declares in this place quite clearly that real knowledge belongs to the Atman only. In answering the question. must be some one different from it this. Atman. has not received from Indian If it philosophers the attention which it deserves. it falls under Anubhava. is treated as a means of knowledge. while an eternal essence. according to the Nyaya. and the wielder of that instrument. Manas is the instrument. Memory.

2. Here we have Anubhava. . Relation. Likeness. mark. as Repetition. which is capable of being revived. or This is Devadatta. Possession. proof. when royal attendants remind us 9. Attention to an object perceived : . when a property reminds us of its owner 8. as . 113. or Smriti. as when on seeing a man we say. Connection. a revived Samskara. as of the king . Absence. A . what has to be proved learned a . There is and then another manifestation of memory in the act of remembering or recognising. The subject of memory is more fully treated in III. called Smn'ti. Succession. or kine of a bull 10. minds one of sprinkling 1 1. namely he or Devadatta. as when a thing recalls its sine qud A 'iion . 7. as when the word when one has Prama/ia. as when the pounding . knowledge of this. and the various associations which awaken memory are enumerated as follows 1. sign. as us of the co-disciples 12. recalls 3. impression. 5. . one calls up the other 4. as when one body recalls a similar body. Belonging.550 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. disciple reminds us of the of rice re- teacher. number of things together. as when a . as when a standard reminds one of its bearer 6. Every Amibhava is supto leave an impression or modification of the posed mind. . This is he. as of a wife Fellow-workers. Prameya. joined with something else. when one disciple reminds .

which make us reflect on 23. Pre-eminence. Merit and Demerit. as . as . Pleasure and pain. Affection.MEMOKY. . as . knowledge of the fundamental tenets of Indian philosophy. Such lists are very characteristic of Hindu philosophy. as when a shaking branch reminds us . tator himself. what is feared. chiefly in order to stir up the thoughts of the learners. . they show once more how much thought had been spent in the elaboration of mere details and this. joys and sorrows of a former life22. 1 551 3. reminding us of their . each of which recalls the it . when a gift reminds one of the giver 1 6. Covering. Opposition. when the ichneumon recalls the snake 14. &c. causes 19. occasioner of 1 8. . which makes us think of those who can . as when investiture with the sacred string recalls the principal agent. *Sishyavyutpadanaya. the Guru or teacher 15. as we are told in this case by the commen. when a sword reminds one of the sheath 1 7. reminding us of a son. to independent activity. and they show at the same time that it is a mistake to ascribe them exclusively to the SamkhyaThough they do not add much to our philosophy. of the wind . Want. reminding us of . such as death 20. supply our wants 21 Motion. Fear. Desire and aversion. Receiving.

which Gotama wishes to establish is this. mind. While the third book was occupied with the six of the first Prameyas. i) DuAkha (pain). body. (8)Dosha (faults). . that knowledge. More Prameyas. Knowledge not Eternal. or objects to be known and proved. however. the other. senses. atom. such as (7) Pravritti (activity). (9) Pretyabh&va (trans( i migration). Indriyas. understanding. one after Lastly. he states that the infinitely small. He also guards against the supposition that as we seem to take in more than one sensation at the same time. is not in itself eternal. and less attractive to the student of the problems of being and thinking. just as the fiery circle is when we whirl a firebrand with great rapidity. Self or soul. the fourth book which is devoted to the remaining six Prameyas. but of psychology also. and (12) Apavarga (final beatitude). however. as eating a cake full in of different kinds of sweets. as we should say. The important point. Some questions. and not in succession. and /Sarira. Manas. but vanishes like any other act.552 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. central sensorium. are treated in it which . and therefore gave rise to some important questions not only of metaphysics. Manas ari is Ami. Buddhi. though belonging to the eternal Self. or as we imagine that a number of palm-leaves are pierced by a pin at one blow. such as Atman. including the whole apparatus of knowledge. is naturally of a more practical character. we ought to admit more than one Manas and he ex- plains that this simultaneousness of perception is apparent only. or. (10) Phala (rewards).

Existence of Deity. Life after Death. It comes in when a problem of the Buddhists under discussion. we have already seen enough of it to know that it included almost every question within the sphere of philosophy and religion. strongly denies this. whether the world came out of nothing. and whether the manifestation of is anything presupposes the destruction of This is its cause. literally existence after having departed this life. and the practical bearing of the Nyaya-philosophy. and this is proved in a very short One of the seven Self has been proved to be eternal. if it is not passed treated by Gotama. Some of the objections way. namely salvation. and that its chief object was the same as that of all the other systems of Indian philosophy. I mean the existence of a Deity. as it was by Kapila. if we wish to give a full insight into the whole character. As the Gotama made is to this tenet are easily disposed of. says (IV. is that a human being born again in another world as either or as some other animal being.EXISTENCE OF DEITY. namely. is subject. and reminds the opponent that . Another important over altogether. 10) it follows that it will exist after what is called death. or even as a plant. 553 cannot well be passed over. illustrated by the fact that the seed has to But Gotama perish before the flower can appear. but nothing said to establish what is meant by transmigration. incidentally only. interesting subjects treated here is Pretyabhava. Though this philosophy is supposed to represent Indian logic only.

the world also cannot have sprung from nothingness. or of Nothing being the cause of the world. Nor could be said that the flower. if it had not existed previously. as its real cause. if work done continued to work entirely of men do by itself. however. is confirmed by what was evidently considered by Gotama as a firmly established truth. that is. though not by itself. who hold that all tilings. He holds. the flower would never appear. ' We then meet with a new argument. This is certainly a curious of proving the existence of God by the very argu- ment which has generally been employed by those who want to prove His non-existence. if it had. nor from an annihilated something. but requires the admission of an Isvara. he also differs from the Sawkhya philosophers. its existence to the simple destruction of Therefore. while. And as Gotama differs from Gautama in denying the origin of the world out of nothing. on the contrary. namely. but under the superintendence of some one. it would it have owed the seed. the seed were really destroyed by being pounded or burnt. destroyed the seed. the Lord. are real only so long as they are noticed by the Purusha. the fact that some good or evil deeds riot seem to receive their reward would remain unaccounted way for. of Lsvara. even though in the capacity of a governor rather than of a maker of the world. like a seed. namely that. And this admission of an Isvara. is to refute the Buddhist theory of vacuity (6'unya). as developed out of Prakriti. different from that of the Mimamsakas. as nothing can be produced from nothing. that every act of man invariably produces its result. Gotama's real object. he continues.554 if INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. . and afterwards to disprove the idea that effects can ever be fortuitous.

and to reappearance at the beginning of a new aeon. they hold that in the eyes of philosophers He would be but a phenomenal manifestation of the Godhead. and not entirely indifferent to the Securus judicat orbis terrarum. but others are not. This l is a novel kind of argument for an Indian philosopher to use. the denial of a supreme and absolute Being but we saw that even the so-called atheism of the is Samkhya-philosophy does not amount to that. be proved to exist by human arguments. because we actually see both their production and their destruction. If. 555 that some things are real and eternal. we should doubt what has been settled by the authority of all men. we should always remember that such terms as theistic and philosophy in the atheistic are hardly applicable to Indian sense in which they are used by Christian theologians. liable even to temporary disappearance at the end of each aeon. liable to change. Cause and Effect.CAUSE AND EFFECT. that is taken for granted by the It is this J Sarvalaukikapramatva. kind of a divine being. . and shows that with all the boldness of their speculations they were not so entirely different from ourselves. And even such a personal God is not altogether denied by the Samkhyas they only deny that He can . If we were to doubt this. With us atheistic implies . It simply the denial of an Isvara. as an active and personal creator and ruler of the world. and if He exists as such. and there would be an end of all truth and untruth. we call the Nyaya-philosophy theistic. a personal Isvara or Lord. however.

fully The argument which we met stated in Gotama's Sutras. stated that 'the Atman Self). the (rivatman (the (personal Highest Self). atman. while the (rivatman is separate for each individual body. and that can be Isvara only. but we require another power. an Lsvara. and that no effects would take place without the working of human with The actions of men. 19-21. Hindu Philosophy. do not IV. Hence there must be another power that modifies the continuous acting of acts. which is one only. and. 1 Bullantyne. for instance. It is not denied thereby that human actions are required. all-pervading and eternal.556 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. always produce an effect. 133. . philosophers. 0. Though Paramatman is Isvara. Phala. is ParamIt Paramatman before is only. and here the same subject is treated once to It is more. as they ought. now come the tenth of the Prameyas. p. it is distinctly Nyaya . the Vaiseshika philosophers also l by In the Tarka-Samgraha. to account for what would otherwise be irrational results of human actions.. Isvara is not Paramatman. that Lsvara. p. T. We Phala . agents. Rewards. or Self is twofold. if every act continued to act (Karman). 12 Muir. nor bad actions bad results. Christianity contrasted with . it is said. vol.' however. it may be added at once. but a phenomenal manifestation of and the Paramatman must not be supposed. only they are not the sole cause of what happens. Good actions do not always produce good results. the omniscient Lord. iii. S. though from a different point of view.

that certain last subject. that we actually see production and destruction before our very eyes. not to be frightened by this apparently Buddhistic argument. takes a bolder step. Gotama at last approaches the He begins emancipation (Apavarga). even pleasure. arid expressing his conviction that everything. And if it should be argued that the fruit produced by a tree is different from the fruit of our acts. would have ceased to is exist long before their fruit be gathered. asked. sible in another As both good and evil works are done in this the cause. there is a permanent receptacle. namely the Self. rewards or punishments. but appeals again to what we should call the common-sense view is Gotama of the matter. This objection is met by an illustration taken from a tree which bears fruit to long after jector it has ceased to be watered. 557 how are effects. or is or is not. The ob- is not. before it has been woven. After examining the meaning of pain. is Emancipation. for no weaver would say that the threads are the cloth. this is met by the declaration that. satisfied with this. no subject. such as that it is impossible in this life to pay all our moral debts. . namely these works. We can see every day that a cloth. or the cloth the threads. on the contrary. namely. as we should say. at the same time. is full of pain. and denies that any effect either is or is not. however. but. as usual with objections. does not exist. is no receptacle (Asraya) or.EMANCIPATION. which because there alone or in capable of perceiving pain or joy in this any other state of existence. in the case of good or bad acts. poslife ? life.

in fact there though even this would really have to be looked tion. of all upon as an obstacle to real emancipaNothing remains but -a complete extinction desires. good works will be paradise. to their very nature. apprehension can be eradicated. cannot be further according reduced or compressed out of being. we should in the end be landed in nihilism. There cannot be annihilation because the A?ius or (IV. If. tion of Ahamkara. and this can be effected by knowledge of the truth only. If wholes are constantly divided and subdivided. and that if it is said that a man is freed from these by old age. namely whether the objects of desire And this leads him on exist as wholes or as parts.558 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. namely the admission of Anus or atoms. and of the Nyaya-philosophy in The first step towards this is the cessaparticular. if in thought only. sacrificial duties are enjoined as incumbent on us to the end of our lives. eradicated and aversion also but before he explains . this does not imply that. Against this the smallest parts are realities view of the existence of what we should call . Therefore knowledge of the truth or removal of all false notions. and. continue. but this is not to be. such as desire for a beautiful and aversion Desire therefore has to be to a deformed object. Gotama is carried (Mithyagtfiana) back once more to a subject which had been discussed before. to how this desire. even when he is no longer able to perform his daily duties. which arises from false what is the distinguishing doctrine both of the Nyaya and of the Vaiseshika-philosophies. here used in the sense of personal feelings. he should not perform certain duties. 8-82). is the beginning and end of all philosophy. there will be rewards for them. therefore.

can exist for us. Knowledge of Ideas. one more question arises. because we saw that knowledge is not eternal. like it an appeal were made by a mirage. if And of things remembrances. must never be a regressio in infinitum. the usual arguments are then adduced. he says. presuppose previous perception and that even in mistaking we mistake . and therefore in an atom also. ether is said to be intangible. a Buddhist. it would be their non-existence. it is of necessity In reply. makes a still bolder sweep by denying the existence of any external things. if . is to be preserved. once gained. as there would be in attempting to divide an atom. . first of all because. if it were impossible to prove the existence of any external things. equally impossible to prove to dreams. not things nothing different from our knowledge. how that true knowledge. not of Things. it would seem. but vanishes. nor preventing and in the end an others from occupying space . again. divisible. appeal is made to a recognised maxim of Hindu philosophy. And now (Vidyamatra) doctrine. that neither occupying space against others. something. namely that ether (or space) is everywhere.KNOWLEDGE OF IDEAS. After granting that. is. NOT OF THINGS. neither resistant nor obstructing. or by should be remembered that dreams also. or independent of our knowGotama objects to this ledge. so that false knowledge can always be removed by true knowledge. All we have is knowledge. And here the Nyaya suddenly calls the Yoga to its aid. or visions produced jugglery. the opponent. that there. 559 atoms. and if an atom has figure or a without and a within.

No. But considering the activity of philosophical speculation. while the Nyayaphilosophy retains its own peculiar usefulness as of all employed in the defence of truth against all comers. of which we have had so many indications in the ancient as well as in the modern we can well understand that philoskilled in all the arts and artifices of reasonsophers. one subject. objectionable proceedings. Nigrahasthana. however. to No.560 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. point of view this syllogism or even logic in general 1 Cowell. may seem a very humble view to take with regard to a system of philosophy which at the very outset promised to its students final beatitude as the highest reward. would secure for their system that high position history of India. and teaches that Samadhi or intense meditation will prove a safe preservative of knowledge. which requires some more special consideration. Report on the Toles of Nuddea. XVI. ing. in which case even such arts as wrangling and cavilling This may prove of service. There is Five Members. treated as VII. the topics from ati. which are ' fully treated in the fifth book. which the Nyaya certainly held and still holds among the recognised systems of orthodox philoIt would be useless to go once more over sophy. XIV. in spite disturbances from without. namely the Syllogism. Syllogism. . This has always excited the special interest of European logicians on account of certain startling similarities or the which no doubt exist between it and the syllogism of But from a Hindu Aristotle and the schoolman. 1867. futility.

M. silver as silver. Prama. though in the larger sense of being the cause of every conception that has found expression in Knowledge. right again Right perception a thing such as it is. is language. following the Sutras. not. Anumana or inference. as we saw. O O . Appendix to Archbishop Thomson's Laws of Thought also Die Theorie des indischen Rationalisten von 1 . as we saw. l priate place here . den Erkenntnissmitteln. nor fully discussed in the Vedanta and chief object of the Nyaya-philoexclusive property. receives here a more special produced by perception. obliged. represents either is This is called truth. treatment. perception or remembrance. . Different systems of philosophy differed. it is Wrong perception represents a thing as silver. sensuous. Perception or wrong. mother-of-pearl as This right perception. according to the Nyaya. and by revealed authority. but among which one. brought back to the Prama/was again which were discussed in the beginning. von R. The Nyaya looks As we saw upon knowledge as inseparably connected with the Self. is 561 by no means the is it its sophy. and is by inference. by com- We are thus in See M. and once more in the Vaiseshika it but as it forms the pride of the Nyaya. according to the Nyayaphilosophy is.SYLLOGISM. inferential. of four kinds. and authoritative. 1888. twofold. It has been Samkhya systems. Garbe. to go over some of the ground again. comparative. we found knowledge put forward as the characteristic feature of Self.. Here we are parison. will find its most appro- colour mentioned as the distinguishing quality of light.

: Two. first of rivers and S4manyatodri'shZa. : One. Perception. . qualities. : equivalence. 37) called Purva vat. that there is fire which we cannot see in a mountain. Six. revelation. or as the cause. revelation. has been arises. Sambhava. tion) : Vaiseshikas and Perception. AeshZa. the question how can we know things which are not brought to us by the senses ? How do we know. according to what each considers the only trustworthy channels of knowledge. having the sign after or as the the effect. Four. Perception. examined.562 in the INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Others admit also Aitihya. inference. which takes cognisance substances. inference. revelation. or that a mountain is a volcano. for instance. In class the sign of past rain was the swelling in the second the sign of coming rain was . and actions. number of Prainanas which they admit. Three. comparison. $eshavat. gesture. the ants carrying off their eggs in the third the sign of the motion of the sun was its being seen . and not-being Mlmamsakas. Perception and inference Buddhists. presumption. keen together. and comparison Naiyayikas. inference. Perception AUrvakas. when all that we do see is merely that the mountain smokes ? We should remember that there were three kinds of Anumana (NyayaSutras II. inference. Perception. comparison. Five. arid word (revela- Sa?>ikhyas. Pramanas in different Philosophical Schools. tradition. having the sign before. : and presumption : Prabhakara (a Mimamsaka). of After sensuous knowledge.

fieriness. what pervades. there is fire. a Paksha or member of our Vyapti. it Thus sea-water is is always pervaded by it. for instance. in simply the sine qud non. The latter pervaded by fieriness. as we saw. there fire.' The as conclusion then follows that this mountain which ' shows smoke. viz. and in order to arrive at it. and in this sense what is to be pervaded. what must be pervaded Vyapaka. may sometimes be taken as a general rule. If we once are that the firewood should be moist. 563 in different places. inseparable or universal concomitance. or. was the most important word in an Indian syllogism. we only require what is called groping or consideration (Paramarsa) in order to make the smoke. which we see rising from the mountain. . we are told that we must be in possession of what is called a Vyapti. or invariable concomitance. inseparable from Vyapti. saltness. but not that wherever there is Vyapti in order to be true would require a condition or Upadhi. that smoke is pervaded by or invariably connected with fire. is used by logicians in the sense of invariable.PRAMAJVAS IN DIFFERENT PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS. that smokiness is pervaded by smokiness. however. Knowledge of things unseen. Literally it means pervasion. or even as a general law. is called inferential knowledge (Anumana). came to be used for Vyapya. in possession of a true Vyapti as smokiness being there is smoke. not. This. Vyapta means pervaded Vyapya. must have fire. what we should call the middle term in a syllogism. 002 . to pervade. acquired in these three ways. Vyapti that wherever there fire. . fieriness by We arrive by is induction at the is smoke. such wherever there is smoke. It is such a Vyapti. as the Hindus it is some cases say. This expression.

crov rb rpiTcp Seixvvo'ii'. terminus major e. but translate it We very clumsy to European would have been easy enough to into our own more technical language. e. by predicate or is to be pervaded. Vyapaka or Sadhya. the smoking mountain. might and make easily clothe Ka?iada in a Grecian garb him look almost like Aristotle. sed aliter. we might have said that our knowledge that S is P arises from discovering that of saying that discovering in S is M. Multa jiunt eadem. axpov rS> 6 o-yAXoytoyioy Sia fj. but what the Hindus describe as Paramarsa or groping or trying to find in an object something which can . and that the pervading predicate is predicable of all things of which the pervaded predicate is. by Vyapya. This is done by what we may call syllogism. or with Aristotle. Paksha. fieriness. g. that constitutes the principal charm of a comparative peculiar to Indian logic Even such terms as syllogism or conclusion are inconvenient here. what should we have gained by this ? All that is i. . because they study of philosophy. this aliter. terminus medius. might have been translated by subject or terminus minor what pervades. Kanada e. g. Wliat calls one member of the pervasion. may sound it logicians. But smokiness. and TOV M is P. and the remainder might have been taken for a clumsy imitation of Aristotle.564 All this INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and what would have evaporated. and it is this very thing. have with us an historical colouring and may throw a false light on the subject. The Sanskrit Anumana is not exactly the Greek o-u/zTrepacr/za. but it means measuring something by means of something else. . Instead inferential knowledge arises from an object something which is always pervaded by something else.

knowledge of the connected. that the So much for the inference the inference for ourselves. For the present we must remember that in the case before us the act of proving by means of Anumana consists in our knowing that there is in the mountain something always pervaded by. This corresponds in fact In Kapila's the principal object of inference is system (I. as fire is. Gotama therefore defines the result of inference (I. if it smokes. knowledge. the result Anumana. that is. will has of fire. Anumana for Others. transcends the horizon of our senses. smoke always pervaded by fire. Things which cannot be seen with our eyes. that is. the relation of what pervades and what JQI) as is pervaded call is very different from what we should the relative extension of two concepts. when what is seen is smoke only. is or inferential mountain for a volcano. The former is the means of arriving at knowledge for oneself. By repeated observation.ANUMANA FOR OTHERS.' he says. are known by inference. truth which to the looking for a terminus medius. and that therefore the mountain. in our case. But. as arising from the perception of a connection or a law. it being intended either for one's own benefit or for the benefit of others. By this process we arrive at Anumiti. 565 the be measured by something else or what can become member of a pervasion. as in . Next follows others. again. This become more evident as we proceed. ' twofold. 61) said to be transcendent truth. or inseparable from something else. and the process is this. What pendium. follows ' is The act of taken from Annambha^a's Comis concluding.

(4) Anusamdhana. Now you perceive that the mountain does smoke. (2) Apadesa. exposition. and Vaiseshika-Sutras IX. on a kitchen hearth and the like. as you may see. the case of kitchen hearths and the we are reminded of a rule (Vyapti). (3) of Nidarsana. and the mountain has . reason. 4. smoke (5) 1 Conclusion (Nigamana). Application (Upanaya). if reason for ourselves. Liwga. 3 Hetu are Apadesa. the case is then start with the assertion. therefore I. and the five members are severally called l . and remember the Vyapti between smoke and (4) fire . that all that smokes is fiery. we remember the rule. it has fire 3 . Prainawa. We know to be true. We now approach a mountain and wonder whether there smoke. different. Because it smokes. or the major premiss. (1) Assertion (Prati^fta). such as that wherever we have seen smoke. (3) Instance (Udaharana or Nidarsana). because it has smoke fire . for instance. .' Nyaya-Sutras 2 Synonyms The Karawa. We are asked. 32. The mountain is fiery. . and immediately perceive that the mountain itself is fiery. and hence you will admit that T was right when I said that the mountain is This is called the five-membered form of fiery. This is the process may or may not be fire in it.566 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. look at the kitchen hearth. Vaiseshika terms are (i) Prati^na. 2. we have seen fire. like. we have to convince somebody else of what by inference. the mountain has 2 (2) Reason (Hetu ). (5) Pratyamnaya. We see the when we But we. Why? and we We then give our answer.

ANUMANA FOR OTHERS. How it is that we know any thing which we do not. as they fall But the question which occupies Gotama is. and as this knowledge is not confined to sensuous perceptions. . justify inferential knowledge. corresponds totidem verbis to the first form of Aristotle's syllogism All that smokes is fiery. \vould be sufficient for him. The mountain smokes Therefore the mountain is fiery. however. useful in con- What is called by Annambha^a the conclusion : for oneself. that of describing knowledge as one of the qualities of the Self. more persuasive. but the second is supposed to be more rhetorical. if perceive by our senses. he collects. It is not so logic as it is noetic that interested Kamida. from the time of Aristotle to our own. has but one object with Gotama. he arranges and analyses the functions of our reasoning faculties. and therefore more troversy. Deductive reasoning may in itself be most useful forming Vyaptis. From this point of view we can easily see that neither induction nor deduction. in fact. it for may give a variety of . how we can taken by itself. 567 In both cases the process of inference is the same. tive and deductive reasoning. nay which we cannot under his observation. Gotama felt it incumbent on him to inferential kind of explain the nature and prove the legitimacy of the knowledge also. takes a much He was purely technical interest in the machinery of the human mind. that whatever of formal Logic in these short extracts. aware of the inseparability of inducclearly The formal logician. We there is must not forget.

The conclusion. &c. at which Aristotle arrives by way of induction. say. i. Gotama does not this.' bile. Ka?^ada would say that humanity all is pervaded by mortality. therefore all animals with differ bile are long-lived. we also see the attribute the much from of long life. because it teaches nothing new. but it can never add to it. but he would express himself in He would say. different aspects to our knowledge. horse. have little little bile (B) . Gotama. as for instance in men. and mule (C) (C) are long-lived (A) . He knew to as well as Aristotle that tirayayri in order to prove the oAo>y must be Sia TrdvTtov. He arrives at it by saying that man. mules. he cannot on the other rely entirely on induction. or that we have never seen men humanity without mortality . strictly speaking. horse. would say that kinghood is . and not what Gotama would call Prama. is absolute truth or Prama. and not for others. always e?n TO 77-6X1. and where Aristotle concludes that kings are mortal because they belong to the class of men. where Aristotle says that are mortal.568 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and mule man.. that animals with little bile are long-lived. and that this is impossible.. But there he would not stop. 'Now we know that the elephant has little therefore we know also that he is long-lived. wherever we see a different way. might be called a Vyapti. Knowledge gained by epagogic reasoning is. He would value this Vyapti merely as a means of establishing a new he would use it as a means of deduction and rule . And if on one side Gotama cannot use deduction. The only object of all knowledge. horses. f. according Gotama. attribute of little bile. because it cannot teach anything certain or unconditional. if he argued for himself only. Or to use another instance.

however. exceptions. it does not follow that it will be so in the hundredth case. instance where smoke was seen without fire. if. much less all The Hindu. case. the mutual inherence and inseparable connection of l 1 ' Satasah sahafcaritayor api vyabhiMropalabdhe/i. men. we approximate no doubt more and more to a general rule. One thing can be said in favour of the If we go on accumulating instances to form an induction. the other has been seen likewise. and we shall see that Indian philosophers themselves have not been slow in bringing them forward. and likewise in answering them. He states.' Anu- manakhawcZa of TattvaJtintaniani.' and by then giving a number of mere instances. and therefore kings are mortal. possible. as in the afore-mentioned Indian method. that because in ninety-nine cases a Vyapti or rule has happened to be true. we add horses. on the contrary. The Hindu knows the nature of induction quite well enough to say in the very words of European philosophers. Wherever we have seen the attribute by saying. that wherever the one has been.' or better We have never observed long life without the still. but we never eliminate all real. ' ' attribute of little bile. .ANUMANA FOR OTHERS. and the like. excludes the reality. though not the possibility. It would be easy to bring objections against this kind of reasoning. and these by way of illustration only. 569 pervaded by manhood and manhood by mortality. of little bile. and thus throws the onus probandi as to any case to the contrary upon the other side. mules. as a fact. of exceptions. If it can be that there never has been an proved. we have observed long life.

The conditions (Upadhis) under which it is allowable to form a Vyapti. every conceivable objection was started by them and carefully analysed and answered. 365. Hindu they furnish at all events a curious parallel to the endeavours of European philosophers in defence both of inductive and deductive thinking. of Kamda's argument of is are by the introduction an example in the vitiated. smoke and fire is more firmly established than it would be by any number of accumulated actual instances where the two have been seen together. the universality of the conclusion . Thus it has been pointed out by European philosophers that the proposition that wherever there is smoke there is fire.570 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. have greatly occupied the thoughts of Volumes after volumes have been written on the subject. History of Philosophy. says that 'two members while. It cise seems hardly time as yet to begin to critithe inductive and the deductive methods as elaborated by Hindu philosophers. In accordance Purvapaksha and Uttarapaksha. IV. as on the kitchen hearth. philosophers. p. and though they may not throw any new light on the origin of universals.' But the Hindu logicians also were perfectly aware of the fact that this character l ' not essential to a syllogism. We must first know them more Such objections as have fully. hitherto been started were certainly not unknown to Gotama and Ka?^ada themselves. to form a universal rule. would really lose its universal with their system of by the introduction of the instance. They look upon the instance simply as a helpful reminder for instance is 1 Ritter.' evidently superfluous. third. that is to say.

i. 35 is Gotama some The third member the to fact is or example says. and Kevala-vyatireki. trated by such a case as.' rhetoric therefore far is more than Indian responsible for the introduction logic that of this third . member which contains the objectionable instance and rhetoric. where it is impossible to bring forward anything that is not cognisable. It is Vy4pti between the smoke the fire which is implied. present only. character which through its having a invariably attended by that establishes (in which is be established. familiar case which. 57! controversial purposes. there is and where fire is not. not as an essential part of the process of the proof itself. is illustrated by a case such . Where there is smoke. as Whately says. the and absent. as Anvaya-vyatireki. pervasion. or Kevaldnvayi. present by such a case as. of In Sutra I. It is meant to remind us that we must look out which we see. Kevaldnvayi. than for the manner in which it may serve hereafter as the basis formation of of a syllogism. yet.ANUMANA FOR OTHERS. smoke is not. though it is not logic. The first. is illustrated Anvaya-vyatireki. second. The fire. but not for a rhetorical syllogisms or syllogisms for others only that the instance has therefore in its ' proper place. is an offshoot of logic. as an illustration to assist the memory. is e. and seen. Vyapti was considered as three- A fold in the school of Gotama. con- junction with the reason) the existence of that It is Indian character which is to be established. or Kevala-vyatireki. The fact is that Gotama cares far more for the a Vy4pti. is is illus- Whatever cognisable nameable. which must depend on the character of the Vyapti. The third case.

we have to say. i. from the other elements. e. : is to be established (Sadhya-vyapakatva) consists in the not being the counter-entity (Apratiyogitva) of any absolute non-existence (Atyantabhava) having the . Earth it is is different because odorous. as water (by itself). in the case of a red- hot iron ball. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. d. is not inodorous. founded chiefly on the Tarkasaragraha. far the Indian mind may go in these minutiae of reasoning may be seen from the following instance that there fire because there is given by Dr. e. or indispensable condition. Thus in the ordinary Vyapti that there is smoke in a mountain. because there is fire. This Upadhi pervades what is to be established (Sadhya-vyapaka). ' 59 To be the constant accompanier of what p. Ballantyne in his Lectures on the Nyaya-philosophy. and the other therefore not not-different from elements. q. what is not different from the other elements is But this earth it is is not odorous. fuel. as. not so. Much attention has also been paid by Hindu philosophers to the working of the Upadhis or assigned to a Vyapti. fire. but different from them. in this case. Here we could not go on different and say.572 as. but it does not pervade what establishes (Sadhana-vyapaka). because the only case But point (Udaharana) would again be earth. because fire is not pervaded by or invariably accompanied by wet smoke. for instance. the presence of wet fuel was conditions an Upadhi. all that is from the other in elements has odour. or that How there is no fire because there is no smoke. smoke. where we have really fire without Hence it would not follow by necessity is smoke.

but to the late Dr. 573 that which (Samanadhikara?ia) as to be established.ANUMANA FOR same subject is OTHERS.' The credit of this translation belongs not to me. Ballantyne. who was assisted in unravelling these cobwebs of Nyaya logic by the Nyaya-Pandits of the Sanskrit College at Benares. Such native aid would seem to be almost indispensable for such an achievement. To be not the of inhesion constant accompanier of the argument (Sadhanavyapakatva) consists in the being the counterentity (Pratiyogitva) of some absolute non-existence [not impossibly] resident in that which possesses [the character tendered as an] argument. .

would be worth having. even such a date.' in the Indische Studien. if only But we can make certain. Professor In the year 1885 his valuable re- Leumann. XVII. or rather with regard to the VaiseshikaSutras. another step backward. 6'inabhadra. 9 i-i 35. (7inaas mentioned by the author.CHAPTER IX. we are able to fix a date below which their composition cannot be placed. we are told. it by Professor Leumann and is certainly not later. if in the This. the sixth. was founded by the author of the Vaisesiya-sutta of the Chaulti race. originally a meant for Could this be Auluku ? . is the age of thirteenth century A.. pp. and hence called If there could be any doubt that this is Chauluga meant for the VaLseshika-Sutras it would at once be 1 . we consider our Samkhya-Sfttras.D. 121. 1 Haribhadra. Among the various heresies there mentioned. still. VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. p. dispersed by the 144 so-called points of that system. is true. The old reports on the schisms of the (rainas. Date of IT is Stltras. fortunate that with regard to the Vaiseshika philosophy.D. well known by searches in ' 6raina literature. bhadra's date is fixed eighth century A. referred now to the no great antiquity.. published an article.

though.DATE OF SUTRAS. of course. but converted to (rainism. and Sanskrit scholarship is greatly indebted to Professor C. Haribhadra. (4) traina. is not an Astika. which contains a short abstract of the six Darsanas in which the Vaiseshika-darsana is described as the sixth. This short but important text was published in the first volume of the Giornale della Societa Asiatica Italiana. and in that description likewise we meet with the most important technical terms of the Vaiseshika. he remarks. This would give i. if not earlier. but that in that case the number six could be completed by the Lokayita (sic] system which he proceeds to describe. 575 Brahman. but which.D.sanas was Vaiseshika. (5) from the Nyaya. already firmly For. (3) Dar.e. the Nyaya.