CATALINO P. ARAFILES, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC., ROMY MORALES, MAX BUAN, JR., and MANUEL C. VILLAREAL, JR.

, Respondents March 25, 2004 FACTS: Petitioner, Catalino P. Arafiles, seek a review of the July 31, 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing his complaint for damages against respondents Philippine Journalists, Inc., Romy Morales, Max Buan, Jr., Manuel C. Villareal, Jr. April 14, 1987, while respondent Morales, a reporter of People’s Journal Tonight, was at the Western Police District Headquarters along United Nations Avenue, Manila, Emelita Despuig, an employee of the National Institute of Atmospheric Sciences (NIA) lodge a complaint against petitioner, a NIAS director, for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape before the then on duty Patrolman Benito Chio at the General Assignments Section of the headquarters. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages. RULING: In case of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, the injured party may bring a civil action for damages, entirely separate and district from the criminal action. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, shall require only a preponderance of evidence. The pertinent provision of the Civil Code (Human Relations) namely Articles 19 and 21 provide: Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his duce, and observe honesty and good faith. Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter of the damages. A publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense in which the readers to whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it. The whole item, including display lines, should be read and construed together, and its meaning and signification thus determined. Petitioned denied.

INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL.), INC., petitioner, vs. MERLIN J. ARGOS and JAJA C. PINEDA, respondents, September 10, 2001 -364 S.C.R.A. 792FACTS: Respondents Merlin Argos and Jaja Pineda are the general manager and commercial director, respectively, of the Fragrances Division of the petitioner International Flavors and Fragrances, Inc. (IFFI). The general managers reported directly to Hernan Costa, the appointed managing director. Costa and respondents had serious differences. When the positions of the general managers became redundant, respondents agreed to the termination of their services. They signed a “Release Waiver and Quitclaim”. That same time, Costa issued a “Personnel Announcement” which described respondents as “persona non grata” and urged the employees not to have further dealings with them. Two Informations were filed against Costa for the criminal charge of libel. In addition, respondents filed a civil case for damages against Costa and Petitioner Corporation (IFFI), in its subsidiary capacity as employer. ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondents could sue petitioner for damages based on subsidiary liability in an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, during the pendency of the criminal libel cases against petitioner’s employee. RULING: Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of defamation, the injured party may bring a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. Such civil action proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a preponderance of evidence. In Joaquin vs. Aniceto, 12 SCRA 308 (1964), the Court held that Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. Any action brought against the employer based on its subsidiary liability before the conviction of its employee is premature.

MARCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS 120 SCRA 193 FACTS: On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a passenger bus owned and operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee, private respondent Felarde Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter’s death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon, information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Felarde Paje. On January 23, 1957, an action for damages was filed by petitioners against private respondents, alleging that the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus. While the civil case for damages was in progress, the criminal action proceeded. The accused Felarde Paje was convicted of the offense charged. However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, he was acquitted and the conclusion is that ‘CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is WANTING in this case, and that appellant was NOT even GUILTY of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE. Insofar as the appellant is concerned, it was a case of PURE ACCIDENT.” As a consequence, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the civil case for damages against them invoking the decision of the Court of Appeals in the criminal case (Corpus vs. Paje). The trial court dismissed the civil case for damages. On appeal the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court dismissing the civil case was affirmed. Petitioners averred that the civil action they filed was one of the nature of an Independent Civil Actions provided under Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and therefore, such action should proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. ISSUE: Is there a valid independent civil action for damages based on physical injuries in this case? RULING: Section 2 of Rule 111 merely refers to the institution of independent civil action without waiting for the filing or termination of the criminal action and requires only preponderance of evidence to prosper. However, acquittal based on the finding that the facts upon which civil liability did not exist, bars the filing of an independent civil action if it is based on the crime.

As held in the prior criminal case (Corpus vs. Paje), reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith. The charge against Felarde Paje was not for homicide or physical injuries but for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide (death of Clemente Maricia) and physical injuries suffered by petitioners. They are not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code; therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.

Jesus B. Ruiz, petitioner, vs. Encarnacion Ucol & the Court of Appeals, respondents. August 7, 1987 FACTS: The laundrywoman for plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz filed an administrative charge against defendant-appellee Encarnacion Ucol. Ucol, in her answer, alleged that Tagaca was merely used as a tool by Atty. Ruiz who wanted to get back at the Ucol's because of a case filed by respondent’s husband against Ruiz. She was also alleged to have made remarks that Atty. Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the charges. When the administrative case was dismissed, the petitioner filed his own criminal complaint for libel against Ucol based on the alleged libelous portion of Ucol's answer. The lower court acquitted Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court as to the civil liability of the accused made no pronouncement. Instead of appealing, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for damages based on the same facts upon which the libel case was founded. Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had prescribed and that the cause of action was barred by the decision in the criminal case for libel. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. On appeal, the appellate court certified the case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the civil action for damages was already barred by the criminal case of libel. RULING: The contentions of the petitioner have no merit. Art. 33 of the Civil Code, independently of a criminal action for defamation, a civil suit for the recovery of damages arising therefrom may be brought by the injured party. The civil liability arising from the crime charged may still be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged, or does not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant. The Supreme Court did not find any defamatory imputation, which causes dishonor, or discredit to the complainant. She was the victim of an unprovoked, unjustified and libelous attack against her honor, honesty, character and reputation; she has a right to self-defense, which she did in her answer, to protect her honesty and integrity and the very job upon which her family depend for their livelihood.

Suntay vs. Suntay GR No. 132524 Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabel’s Petition for Letters of Administration over the estate of Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The decedent is the wife

of Federico and the grandmother of Isabel. Isabel’s father Emilio, had predeceased his mother Cristina. The marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously been decalred by the CFI as “null and void.” Federico anchors his oppostion on this fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of representation as she is an illegitimate child. The trial court had denied Federico’s Motion to Dismiss, hence this petition for certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that the dispositive portion of the the decision declaring the marriage of Isabel’s parents “null and void” be upheld. Issue: In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispostive portion thereof, which should prevail? Related thereto, was the marriage of Isabel’s parents a case of a void or voidable marriage? Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child? Ruling: Petition dismissed Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This is also applicable and binding upon courts in relation to its judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states that the marriage be “declared null and void,” the body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art. 85 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time. Art. 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled. As such the conflict between the body and the dispositive portion of the decision may be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court. The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that: Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel would be covered by the second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides that “ children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate.” IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees, VS. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant January 31, 1963 FACTS: Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he had always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been declared acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile;

that therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the success ional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of California on the matter; that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and his will remain undisturbed. ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen? RULING: The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California; and the conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. The California conflict rule says: “If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile.” Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed. Where it is referred back to California, it will form a circular pattern referring to both country back and forth.

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLE’S BANK & TRUST COMPANY, executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, VS. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET. AL., heir-appellees June 6, 1967 FACTS: Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had 5 legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children. Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate should be divided in trust in the following order and manner: a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen; b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each; c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares. Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein. Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition” where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages. Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children. The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply. RULING: It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law. Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and that under the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis. PCIB VS. ESCOLIN 56 SCRA 266 FACTS: Linnie Jane Hodges died giving her testamentary provisions to her husband. At the time of her death, she was citizen of Texas but, was, however domiciled in the Philippines. To see whether the testamentary provisions are valid, it is apparent and necessary to know what law should be applied. ISSUE: Whether or not laws of Texas is applicable. RULING: It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it must be proven whether a renvoi will happen or whether Texas law makes the testamentary provisions valid. In line with Texas law, that which should be proven is the law enforced during the death of Hodges and not in any other time. The Supreme Court held that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters could be more than just stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper application of the principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of the record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and We, therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings and resolution in the first instance by the court o quo, as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending such further proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, Our considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole share of their conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus what, as explained earlier, have been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth

share would be her free disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of her husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code.

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No. 174689 October 22, 2007 CORONA, J.: When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2) Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. “Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!,” the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man “Malakas” (Strong) and the woman “Maganda” (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda) When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery? FACTS: On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, alleging that he is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female” and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a “woman” culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely,” and his sex from “male” to “female.” On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, stating that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity; that with his sexual re-assignment, petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him. Likewise, the court believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her fiancé and the realization of their dreams. On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic, and set aside the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the change of petitioner’s name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.

HELD: A PERSON’S FIRST NAME CANNOT BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed: SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases: (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or (3) The change will avoid confusion. Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local

civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned. NO LAW ALLOWS THE CHANGE OF ENTRY IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO SEX ON THE GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a “clerical or typographical error” is: “Clerical or typographical error” refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment. To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from” while to change means “to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.” The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly. “Status” refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession. A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws. But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause. Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides: SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child. In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words “sex,” “male” and “female” as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as “the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female” or “the distinction between male and female.” Female is “the sex that produces ova or bears young” and male is “the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.” Thus, the words “male” and “female” in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore,

“words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary.” Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term “sex” as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category “female.” For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. NEITHER MAY ENTRIES IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO FIRST NAME OR SEX BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF EQUITY The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong. The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted. It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law.” However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based. To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege. It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.

Petitioner pleads that “[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams.” No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Ballatan vs CA (G.R.No. 125683) Facts: This is a dispute over forty-two (42) square meters of residential land belonging to petitioners. Parties herein were owners of adjacent lots located at Block No. 3, Poinsettia Street, Araneta University Village, Malabon, Metro Manila. Eden Ballatan only discovered the said encroachment when she constructed her house and which was surveyed by Engineer Jose Quedding, the authorized surveyor of the Araneta Institute of Agriculture (AIA), the ownerdeveloper of the subdivision project. Petitioner Ballatan made a written demand on respondent to remove and dismantle their improvements on the said lot. Failing to agree amicably, petitioner Ballatan instituted against respondents Go Civil Case for recovery of possession before the Regional Trial Court. The Go’ s filed their “Answer with Third-Party Complaint” impleading as third-party defendants respondents Li Ching Yao, the AIA and Engineer Quedding. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs but the third-party complaint filed by third-party plaintiffs Go against third-party defendants Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Jose N. Quedding and Li Ching Yao was DISMISSED. Respondents Go appealed, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court. It affirmed the dismissal of the third-party complaint against the AIA but reinstated the complaint against Li Ching Yao and Jose Quedding. Petitioners question the admission by respondent Court of Appeals of the third-party complaint by respondents Go against the AIA, Jose Quedding and Li Ching Yao. Petitioners claim that the third-party complaint should not have been considered by the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction due to third-party plaintiffs’ failure to pay the docket and filing fees before the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent court of appeals erred on question of law and gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it did not dismiss the third –party complaint due to non-payment of any filing of docket fee.

Ruling: The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the third-party complaint against AIA. The claim that the discrepancy in the lot areas was due to AIA’s fault was not proved. The appellate court, however, found that it was the erroneous survey by Engineer Quedding that triggered these discrepancies. And it was this survey that respondent Winston Go relied upon in constructing his house on his father’s land. He built his house in the belief that it was entirely within the parameters of his father’s land. In short, respondents Go had no knowledge that they encroached petitioners’ lot. They are deemed builders in good faith until the time petitioner Ballatan informed them of their encroachment on her property. The rule in this jurisdiction is that when an action is filed in court, the complaint must be

accompanied the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees. In real actions, the docket and filing fees are based on the value of the property and the amount of damages claimed, if any If the complaint is filed but the fees are not paid at the time of filing, the court acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring prescription. The Supreme Court ruled that the decision of respondent Court of Appeals be modified as follows: The Decision of the Court of Appeals ordering Engineer Quedding, as third-party defendant, to pay attorney’s fees to respondents Go is affirmed. The additional filing fee on the damages constitutes a lien on this award. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing third-party complaint against Araneta Institute of Agriculture is affirmed.

Reyes vs.Lim, Harrison Lumber et al. GR 134241 Reyes as seller and Lim as buyer had entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land. Ten million (10,000,000.00) was initially paid by Lim upon the signing of the contract, the with a remaining balance of 18,000,000.00 to be paid when the present occupant of the property, Harrison Lumber, vacates the same and an Absolute Deed of Sale is executed. A penalty was to be paid by Reyes, to be taken against the remaining balance, if the property is not vacated within a designated period. Reyes would accuse Lim and Harrison Lumber, who had still not vacated the property, of connivance and files a civil case against them. An offer would be made by Lim of to pay the balance, and a subsequent offer would be made by Reyes to return the downpayment. Later, it was revealed that the property had already been sold to a third party. In a the original case, Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the 10,000,000.00 downpayment with the RTC cashier. The trial court grants this motion. Reyes Motion to set Aside the Order and MotforReconsideration would be denied by the trial court. Reyes petition for certiotrari was denied by the CA, hence this petition. Reyes avers that the trial court erred when it ordered the deposit of the downpayment, as said deposit is not among the provisional remedies provided for in the Rules of Court. Issue: Is the order to deposit the downpayment subject matter of the case proper considering that it is not among the provisional remedies provided for in the Rules of Court Ruling: While the matter of deposit is not provided for the in the Rule of Court, this is a case when there is a hiatus in the law. If left alone, such hiatus would result to the unjust enrichment of Reyes at the expense of Lim. This calls for application of equity which fills the open spaces of the law. Art. 9 of the Civil Code mandates the courts to make a ruling despite “the silence, obscurity or inefficiency of the laws. As the contract between the parties can no longer be enforced, a rescission of the contract creates the obligation to return the thing subject matter of the contract. UnderArt 22, the principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another applies to substantive rights and procedural remedies. As the aggrieved party has no other actions available based on any other provision of contract or law, courts can extend this condition to the hiatus in the Rules of Court.

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, VS. RODERICK A. RECIO, respondent October 2, 2001

FACTS: The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino”. Since October 1995, they lived separately; and in 1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondent’s former marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven. 2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia. RULING: The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry”. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient; and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of petitioner’s failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility. Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. However, there are two types of divorce, absolute divorce terminating the marriage and limited divorce merely suspending the marriage. In this case, it is not known which type of divorce the respondent procured. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree “a party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute commits the offense of bigamy”. This shows that the divorce obtained by the respondent might have been restricted. Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with other evidences submitted, they don’t absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to the alleged foreign law. Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage between the petitioner and respondent can not be declared null and void based on lack of evidence conclusively showing the respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. With the lack of such evidence, the court a quo may declare nullity of the parties’ marriage based on two existing marriage certificates.

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, VS. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents November 23, 2000 FACTS: Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through naturalization, he became a US Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife, he discovered that she was living with his brother and a child was born. The child was registered as legitimate but the name of the father was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California, which later on became final. He married Alicia and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and testament stating that all his properties will be given to his second marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorente’s estate. The trial granted the letter and denied the motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of whatever properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired during their 25 years of cohabitation. ISSUE: Whether or not the National Law shall apply. RULING: Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also the situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. As stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided that they are validly required in their National Law. Thus the divorce obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his National Law since the divorce was contracted after he became an American citizen. Furthermore, his National Law allowed divorce. The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, VS. HON. MANUEL ROMILLO JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON, respondents October 8, 1985 FACTS: Alice Reyes, the petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and they established residence in the Philippines. They had two children and they were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. The petitioner remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. The private responded filed against petitioner stating that the petitioner’s business is a conjugal property of the parties and that respondent is declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court, where respondent acknowledged that they had no community property as of June 11, 1982. ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent as petitioner’s husband is entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets? RULING: The petition is granted. Complaint is dismissed.

The policy against absolute divorce cover only Philippine nationals. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law. From the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves marriage, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage between them with the petitioner. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, petitioner, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS and DEMOCRITO MENDOZA, respondents March 9, 2000 FACTS: Plaintiff Mendoza filed an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for the alleged embarrassment and mental anguish he suffered at the Geneva airport when the American Airlines security officers prevented him from boarding the plane, detained him for about an hour and allowed him to board the plane only after all the other passengers have boarded. Petitioner American Airlines filed a motion to dismiss the action for damages filed by the private respondent for the lack of jurisdiction under section 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention. However, the motion was denied. The Court of Appeals later affirmed the trial court’s decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the contract of transportation between the private respondent and private respondent would be considered as a single operation and part of the contract of transportation entered into by the private respondent with Singapore Airlines in Manila? RULING: No, the contract of carriage between the private responded and Singapore Airlines although performed by different carriers under a series of airlines tickets, including that issued by the American Airlines constitutes a single operation. Members of the TATA are under a general pool partnership agreement wherein, they act as agent of each other in the issuance of tickets to contracted passengers to boost ticket sales worldwide which are inaccessible in some parts of the world. Petitioner’s acquiescence to take place of the original designated carrier binds it under the contract of carriage entered into by the private respondent and Singapore Airlines in Manila. Therefore, findings of the Court of Appeals are affirmed. Case was ordered to be remanded for more investigation for action against damages.

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner, VS. ROMEO A. JADER, respondent February 17, 2000 FACTS: Romeo Jader, a law student of the University of the East, failed to take his regular examination in Practice Court I in his first semester of his last school year. However, he was able to remove the incomplete mark when the Dean of his college approved his application to take a removal examination.

In the 2nd semester, his name appeared in the tentative list of candidates for graduation for the Decree of Bachelor of Laws and in the invitation for the 35th Investiture and Commencement Ceremonies, the plaintiff’s name appeared. Thus, he attended the investiture ceremonies and graduated. On April to September 1998, he took a leave of absence from his work and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. To his dismay upon knowing that he incurred a deficiency, he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examinations. He then filed a suit against UE praying for moral and exemplary damages arising from the latter’s negligence. The trial court ruled in his favor and was granted for actual damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification. The CA awarded moral damages. On account of suffering moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights and ultimately for not having to take the bar exam. ISSUE: Whether or not Romeo Jader can validly claim for moral damages. RULING: In view of the foregoing issue, the Supreme Court emphatically enunciated that moral damages cannot be awarded to Romeo Jader. It cannot believe that he suffered shock, trauma, and pain. Along this vein, the Supreme Court held Jader negligent. It opined that as a student, he should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, especially those appertaining to his academics, are in order. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements. While the Court held the University of the East negligent and therefore liable for actual damages in favor of Jader, the latter was also held liable for negligence thereby no moral damages can be awarded in his favor. The decision was affirmed with modification. _________________ CONCLUSION, LAW, APPLICABILITY TO SITUATION, JURISPRUDENCE Report this post Top Profile Send private message Reply with quote OzqC Post subject: PostPosted: Thu Jun 05, 2008 2:47 pm Offline Junior Member User avatar Joined: Tue Aug 07, 2007 5:10 pm Posts: 385 Location: Santiago City CRUZ VS. NLRC February 7, 2000 FACTS: The private respondent Norkis Distributors Inc., is a domestic corporation. It is engaged in the business of selling motorcycles and household appliances. It was operating in Mandaue City, Cebu; it had its branch in Valencia, Bukidnon where the petitioner Cruz was employed. On October 14, 1990, while petitioners and her co-employees were busy working, petitioner collapsed and was brought to the hospital. From then on, she was not able to report for work. On

December 28, 1990, she sent a letter to respondent Norkis to verify her status of employment but as an answer, she received a termination letter dated November 2, 1990 citing health reasons for the dismissal. On March 18, 1991, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the private respondent praying for payment of separation pay and other money claims before the NLRC Branch of Cayagan de Oro City. The Labor Arbitration Branch ruled in favor of the petitioner. From the said decision, both parties appealed to the NLRC where the decision was reversed and set aside. ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of petitioner is legal. RULING: Under Section 8, Rule 1 Book VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, for a disease to be a valid ground for the dismissal of the employee, the continued employment of such employee is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his coemployees and there must be a certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months even with proper medical treatment. There is merit in petitioner’s submission that the award of moral and exemplary damages in her favor is warranted by her unjustified dismissal. Award of moral and exemplary damages for an illegally dismissed employee is proper where the employee had been harassed and arbitrarily terminated by the employer. The Court has consistently accorded the working class a right to recover damages for unjust dismissals tainted with bad faith, where the motive of the employer in dismissing the employee is far from noble. The petition is granted. GLOBE MCKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP. VS BARRIOS 119 SCRA 461 FACTS: Petitioner failed to deliver to respondents a cablegram from Mercy Hospital, Buffalo, New York, admitting respondent wife for a rotating internship in said hospital. As a consequence of which, she was unable to signify her acceptance and the petition was given to someone else. Respondents sued for damages. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents for moral, exemplary and actual damages. ISSUE: Whether or not there was negligence on the part of petitioner as to entitle the respondents for damages. RULING: The telegraph company’s failure to deliver the cablegram constitutes gross negligence arising from a breach of contract because the service of the said company is to ensure that cablegrams will be sent to its recipients. The respondents never received the cablegram from the Mercy Hospital. In fact, they received the cable message from another cablegram company. The respondent couple is entitled to damages.

RCPI VS. COURT OF APPEALS 143 SCRA 657

FACTS: Petitioner was a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and transmitting messages. One of its employees had committed an error of sending libelous messages to a certain Loreto Dionela. As a consequence, a case was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, and the decision was in favor of Dionela. When it was appealed to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the RTC was affirmed. RCPI then went to the Supreme Court, praying that it was not liable to the respondent since the criminal act from which the civil liability arouses was an act of its employee; there was no sufficient publication of the libelous telegram; and that the liability of the petitioner arising from Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code was erroneous. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code was violated by RCPI, as claimed by the Court of Appeals. 2. Whether or not Dionela was entitled to have some indemnifation from the petitioner due to damages incurred by the latter. RULING: Respondent committed breach of contract through the negligence of its employees. It was still said to be liable since every time a person transmits a message through the facilities of the petitioner, a contract is entered into. In contracts, the negligence of the employee is the negligence of the employer. Libelous messages or matters were included in the message transmitted, without the knowledge or consent of the sender. Breach of contract was committed then. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees. Hence, the acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner. To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of petitioner’s business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective and adequate remedy. Res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself) was the doctrine applied by considering the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury. The Court affirmed the assailed decision.

CUSTODIO AND SANTOS VS. COURT OF APPEALS -253 SCRA 483FACTS: A Civil Case was filed for Pacifico Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida Custodio, Rosalina Morato, Lito Santos and Maria Cristina Santos filed the grant of an easement of right of way. Pacifico Mabasa owned a parcel of land. In order for him to enter the premises of his property, he had to use a portion of the land of the Santos’s as passageway. However, the defendants mentioned of some inconveniences of having a passageway in their property. A case was filed in the Regional Trial Court and the defendants were ordered to give plaintiff permanent access to the property and the plaintiff was ordered to pay indemnity for the use of the passageway. ISSUES: 1. Whether the grant of right of way to private respondent is proper; 2. Whether or not the award of damages is in order. RULING: With respect to the first issue, the petitioners are barred from raising the complaint because the decision of the trial court is final and executory. On the other hand, with respect to the second issue, the award of damages has no legal basis. One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted

may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter’s favor.

ANDRADE VS. COURT OF APPEALS -371 S.C.R.A. 555December 7, 2001 FACTS: Petitioner Virginia Andrade was appointed as a permanent English teacher at the Araullo High School. Two days before the regular classes, she inquired from Department Head Virginia Fermin of her teaching load but the latter instead referred her to Principal Dominador Wingsing. On the other hand, the principal referred her back to the department head. Because of this, the petitioner wrote to the Assistant Schools Division Superintendent Coronel requesting that she be given a teaching assignment. The superintendent informed the petitioner that she would be designated to a non-teaching position in the meantime that arrangements were being made for her eventual reassignment to other schools where her services may be needed. Petitioner made a request that she be transferred to another school, which was favorably acted upon by the superintendent. Petitioner started reporting for work, but in a letter she relayed that she is withdrawing her request for transfer and indicated her intention of remaining at the Araullo High School. Thereafter, petitioner discovered that her name has been deleted from the regular monthly payroll and transferred to a special voucher list, thus, filing an action for damages before the trial court, which in turn held the principal liable to her for actual and compensatory damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint of petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not awarding damages to plaintiff. RULING: While Article 19 of the New Civil Code may have been intended as a declaration of principle, the “cardinal law on human conduct” expressed in said article has given rise to certain rules, e.g., that where a person exercises his rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty and good faith, he opens himself to civil liability. The elements of abuse of one’s rights under Article 19 are the following: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. In this regard, it appeared that the complaint of petitioner Andrade failed to meet the second and third requirements. A careful review of the records reveals that the declaration of petitioner as an excess teacher was not motivated by any personal desire on the part of principal Wingsing to cause her undue misery or injury, but merely the result of the valid exercise of authority.

HERMOSISIMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS -109 PHIL. 629FACTS: The complainant Soledad Cagigas is thirty six years old, a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent. The petitioner Francisco Hermosisima is ten years younger than complainant, and an apprentice pilot. Intimacy developed between them and thus sometime 1953 after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin. In February 1954, the woman advised the man that she is pregnant whereupon the man promised to marry her. Their daughter Chris Hermosisima was born June 1954 in a private clinic. However, subsequently the man married one Romanita Perez. Hence, Soledad filed a complaint against Francisco for acknowledgement of her child as a natural child of the petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral

damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. The CFI declared the child a natural daughter of the defendant, ordered Francisco to support the child by giving a monthly alimony, awarded actual damages and moral damages. On appeal of the petitioner, the CA affirmed the assailed decision however increased the amount for actual and moral damages. ISSUE: Whether or not the award for moral damages is valid. RULING: The Supreme Court held that no moral damages can be had in the intant case because it was the woman who virtually seduced the man by surrendering herself to him because she a girl ten years older was overwhelmed by her love for him, she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

Galang vs. C.A. -4 SCRA 55FACTS: Plaintiff Beatriz Galang and Rodrigo Quinit were engaged, but Rodrigo’s parents were strongly opposed to their marriage. They lived as husband and wife in the house of one Adolfo Dagawan until Rodrigo left and never returned. The evidence on other pertinent facts is however conflicting. Plaintiff tried to prove that she and Rodrigo were engaged despite the opposition of the latter’s mother and that the father of Rodrigo agreed to give dowry and defray the expenses of the marriage. The father even took them to the house of Dagawan for them to stay as husband and wife. However when Rodrigo was not able to secure a marriage license for lack of a residence certificate, he went back to his hometown to get such certificate but never returned. On the other hand, the defendants sough to establish that he and plaintiff were engaged but his parents were opposed to the marriage. Rodrigo was agreeable to marry the plaintiff after his graduation but the latter was impatient and wanted the marriage to take place sooner. Because of continued relationships with the plaintiff, Rodrigo’s parents told him to leave the parental home. He later told this to plaintiff. The plaintiff convinced him to go to Dagawan’s house where she followed and stayed thereafter. Because of his continued refusal to marry the plaintiff, the latter’s relatives, accompanied by policemen and constabulary soldiers intimidated him. He was allowed to go home and was then placed under the custody of a town mayor by his parents. He refused to acknowledge the marriage application, which was provided by Dagawan for him to sign, when he did not appear before a notary public. Plaintiff filed an action against Rodrigo and his father Maximo Quinit to recover damages for breach of promise on the part of Rodrigo to marry her. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, which on appeal, was reversed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not plaintiff may recover damages for breach of promise to marry. RULING: It is urged by the plaintiff that said Court had erred in not awarding moral damages to her. She insists that moral damages for breach of promise to marry are collectible under our laws, but this question has already been settled adversely to plaintiff’s pretense in Hemosisima vs. Court of Appeals. Moral damages for breach of promise to marry are not collectible.

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents February 19, 1993

FACTS: Petitioner was a medicine student at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges at Dagupan City. He was an Iranian exchange student and was 29 years old. Respondent was a former waitress on a luncheonette, and was 22 years old. Petitioner was allegedly the lover of the respondent, and was said to promise marriage to the latter, which convinced her to live with him in his apartment. It was even alleged that the petitioner went to the house of the respondent to inform her family about the marriage on the end of the semester. However, the marriage did not materialize, with several beatings and maltreatment experienced by the respondent from the petitioner. The case was filed in the RTC of Pangasinan, and the decision was held in favor of the respondent. However, the petitioner claimed that the judgment of the RTC was an error, for the claims of the respondent are not true, and that he did not know about the custom of the Filipinos; his acts were in accordance of his custom. The decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent could claim payment for the damages incurred by the petitioner. RULING: Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law. However, since the respondent was proved to have a good moral character, and that she had just let her virginity be taken away by the petitioner since the latter offered a promise of marriage, then she could ask for payment for damages. Furthermore, since she let her lover, the petitioner, “deflowered” her since she believed that his promise to marry was true, and not due to her carnal desire, then she could have her claims against the petitioner. Moreover, the father of the respondent had already looked for pigs and chicken for the marriage reception and the sponsors for the marriage, and then damages were caused by the petitioner against the respondents, which qualified the claims of the respondent against the petitioner.

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff, vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant December 26, 1964 FACTS: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned to get married. However, Velez went away and Beatriz did not hear from him again. Beatriz sued Francisco and asked the latter to pay her moral damages. Velez contended that there is no provision of the law authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. However, the court did not find this defense meritorious because even though it is true that there is no law for breach of promise to marry, Wassmer still suffered frustration and public humiliation. ISSUE: Did the court err in ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff moral damages? RULING: The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry because it is not considered an actionable wrong. The mere fact the couple have already filed a marriage license and already spent for invitations, wedding apparels, gives the plaintiff reason to demand for payment of damages. The court affirmed the previous judgment and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages for the humiliation she suffered; actual damages for the expenses incurred and exemplary damages because the defendant acted fraudulently in making the plaintiff believe that he will come back and the wedding will push through.

GIL MIGUEL T. PUYAT, petitioner, vs. RON ZABARTE, respondent February 26, 2001 FACTS: The petitioner owed the respondent a money obligation that stemmed from a partnership interest in the State of California. The Superior Court of the State of California rendered a judgment ordering petitioner to pay respondent in consonance with a compromised agreement entered into by the parties. The respondent commenced an action for enforcement of the money judgment in the Philippine court. The petitioner filed an answer to the motion. The respondent then filed a motion for summary judgment since the former was not able to give a genuine issue. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the summary judgment, affirmed the foreign judgment and moved for the completion of the judgment’s execution. The Court of Appeals affirmed said ruling. Hence, the petitioner’s appeal to the Supreme Court gained ground. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the grant for summary judgment is not erroneous. 2. Whether or not there is unjust enrichment. RULING: The lower court did not err in resolving the matter through summary judgment because petitioner was not able to pose a genuine issue to any material fact. It is apparent that summary judgment is used for the prompt dispositions of actions regarding a legal issue. The Supreme Court upheld that there is no merit on the issue of unjust enrichment. The petitioner claimed that the foreign judge made him shoulder all the liabilities in the case even if there were two other defendants. The Supreme Court cannot exonerate petitioner for his obligation under the foreign judgment because the foreign judgment itself does not mention those other defendants, their participation or their liability to the respondent. It was proved that the petitioner was the one who chose to represent the other defendants; hence, he cannot be allowed to impugn a decision based on this ground. Unjust enrichment or solutio indebiti cannot be applied to his case. The doctrine contemplates payment where there is no duty to pay and the person who receives the payment has no right to receive it. The petitioner owed money and the judgment merely required him to pay it.

Concepcion vs. C.A. -324 S.C.R.A. 85FACTS: Respondent spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allen Nicolas resided in an apartment leased by owner, Bing Concepcion who also resided in the same compound where the apartment was. Nestor engaged in a business where Bing joined in the venture by contributing capital. Thereafter, petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the deceased- husband of Bing, angrily accosted Nestor at his apartment and accused him of having an adulterous relationship with Bing. To clarify matters, they went to see some relatives of the Concepcion Family, who allegedly knew about the relationship, however, the latter denied knowledge of such. The two confronted Bing on the matter and also denied the imputations of the petitioner. As a result, Nestor suffered extreme embarrassment and shame. His business venture declined and the husband and wife often had quarrels. Because of the refusal of the petitioner to apologize to the spouses, the latter filed a civil suit for damages against the former. The trial court rendered decision in favor of the respondents, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is legal basis in awarding the damages. RULING: It does not need further elucidation that the incident charged of petitioner was be less than an invasion of the right of respondent Nestor as a person. The philosophy behind Article 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man. Thus, under this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person’s dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. The violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive but are merely examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore are allowable for actions against a person’s dignity. Under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral chock, social humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary computation, may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.

SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner, vs. Spouses JOSE GUTIERREZ and ANGELA FORNILDA, respondents February 15, 2001 FACTS: Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda executed a deed of real estate mortgage for two lots in favor of petitioner Sergio Amonoy to secure him of his attorney’s fees in a case for the settlement of an estate involving six parcels of land. However, the two died before the taxes have been paid, claims settled and properties adjudicated and the estate was declared closed and terminated, thus, the attorney’s fees of petitioner, secured by the lots were left unpaid. Judgment, in petitioner’s action for foreclosure required the heirs to pay the attorney’s fees secured by the mortgage, and that failure to pay would subject the lots to sale at a public auction. The heirs failed to pay, consequently, the lots were foreclosed and an auction sale was held where petitioner was the highest bidder. Included in those sold was the lot on which the respondents Gutierrez spouses had their house. On Amonoy’s motion, an order was issued on the demolition of the structure. The respondents then filed an action against the trial court deputy sheriff and Amonoy. The Supreme Court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the demolition of the respondents’ houses and a copy was served to petitioner; however, he pursued the demolition of the respondents’ house. Thus a complaint for damages against petitioner Amonoy was filed. ISSUE: Whether or not liability for damages in favor of respondents was with merit. RULING: Although the acts of petitioner may have been justified at the outset, their continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted in bad faith. Had he not insisted on completing the demolition, respondents would not have suffered the loss that led the suit before the trial court. His acts constituted not only an abuse of right, but also an invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when he received the TRO from the Court. By then, he was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition. Obviously, petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle premised on the valid exercise of a right. Anything less or beyond such exercise will not give rise to the legal protection that the principle accords. And when damage or prejudice to another is occasioned thereby,

liability cannot be obscured, much less abated. In the ultimate analysis, petitioner’s liability is premised on the obligation to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of one’s act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.

HEIRS OF THE LATE TEODORO GUARING, JR. VS. COURT OF APPEALS 269 SCRA 283 FACTS: On November 7, 1987, the car driven by Teodoro Guaring Jr. collided with the Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by Angelo Cuevas and wth a Toyota Cressida Car driven by Eligio Enriquez, along the North Luzon Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico Pampanga.. As a consequence, Guaring died. The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioners, but lost in the Court of Appeals where the accused was acquitted based on reasonable doubt. This was because it was found out that the deceased was the one who acted negligently. The accused the claimed appealed in the court that the civil case filed against him be extinguished since the extinguishment of his criminal liability necessarily follows the extinguishment of his civil liability, since his civil liability aroused from his criminal liability. The petitioners disagreed on this ground, claiming that the civil case should pursue. This was then appealed to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the civil case must be terminated as a consequence of the termination of the criminal case based on reasonable doubt. RULING: The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable doubt, which means that the civil case for damages was not barred since the cause of action of the heirs was based on quasi delict. Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi delict, the acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was based not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held: The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability; and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted. Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings for the civil case of the said incident must continue for the recovery of damages of the victim’s heirs. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the civil liability of the accused. GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and MARIA NICOLAS, respondents January 29, 2001 FACTS: In the evening of September 25, 1982, at the National Highway of Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, George Manantan was driving a Toyota car going home. At that time, he was with Fiscal Ambrocio, Miguel Tabangin and Ruben Nicolas. Suddenly, a jeepney, coming from the opposite

direction hit the driver side of the car, driven by Manantan. Consequently, Manantan, Ambrocio and Tabangin were injured while Nicolas died. Trial followed. The lower court acquitted the accused of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. The respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the lower court’s judgment. Even if the accused was acquitted from his criminal liability, the Appellate Court held him civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify the aggrieved party for the death of Nicolas. ISSUE: Whether or not the acquittal of petitioner extinguished his civil liability? RULING: The acquittal was based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. Article 29 of the Civil Code provides that a civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases. Therefore, the accused cannot be exempted from paying civil damages which may only be proven by preponderance of evidence. Manantan claimed that he was placed on double jeopardy but the courts did not give merit to this contention. The following elements must be present for double jeopardy to exist: (1) A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) The first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the third jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first. In the case at bar, the initially put into jeopardy but he it was terminated by his discharge. When the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, the issue was about the civil aspect of the criminal case. Thus, there could be no double jeopardy.

BONITE VS. ZOSA -162 SCRA 173FACTS: At about 2:00 pm on September 24, 1968, Mr. Florencio Bonite was working as “caminero” of the Bureau of Public Highways at Barrio Vicente Alto, Orquita City when a vehicle being driven by Eligio Abamonga, which caused the death of Bonite, hit him. The heirs of Bonite then filed a criminal action against Abamonga but Hon. Mariano Zosa, the presiding judge for lack of evidence to prove the accused guilty of the crime charged, dismissed the same. Petitioners did not appeal but instead filed a civil case for damages. The same judge dismissed the instant case stating that the parties earlier reserve the right to file a civil case. The petitioners then raised this case for appeal Certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the courts erred in dismissing the case on the basis that the petitioners did not reserve their right to file a separate civil case. RULING: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court and stated that it is right of every party to be compensated for damages that they have incurred by way of the criminal action. The court further stated that a criminal action is distinct from that of a civil action. So upon this, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded the case back for the trial of the case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS Y CORDOVA,

accused-appellant September 2, 1994 FACTS: Rogelio Bayotas was charged with rape and eventually convicted on June 19, 1991. While the appeal was pending, Bayotas died. The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal; however, it required the Solicitor-General to comment with regard to Bayotas’ civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor-General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. This comment was opposed by the counsel of accused-appellant, arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of the conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both criminal and civil penalties, he cited in support and invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo, which was held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal responsibility and therefore civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered. ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability. RULING: Yes, the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability because tire liability is based solely on the criminal act committed. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated from another source of obligation other than delict, such as law, contract, quasi-contract or quasidelict. Where civil liability survives, an action for recovery may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1. Rule 11 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based.

MANSION BISCUITS V. CA -250 S.C.R.A. 195FACTS: Two informations were filed against Ty Teck Suan, president of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation, for having violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law for allegedly failing his obligation to pay or make good the value of the postdated checks he issued, which was dishonored by the bank due to insufficiency of funds, in payment of the nutri-wafer biscuits delivered by Mansion Biscuit Corporation to the latter. Ty Teck Suan was found not guilty of the said criminal charge by the trial court. Petitioner then filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals assailing the trial court’s ruling absolving defendant from civil liability in the criminal cases. Petitioner contended that the acquittal of the accused in the criminal cases did not necessarily extinguish their civil liability. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can enforce the civil liability for non-payment of the nutri-wafer biscuits in question against private respondent notwithstanding the fact that the latter contracted the agreement in behalf of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation. RULING: The civil liability for non-payment of the goods delivered by petitioner to the Edward Ty Brothers Corporation cannot be enforced against the private respondent because the said civil liability was not the personal liability of Ty Teck Suan to Mansion Biscuit Corporation, rather, it was the

contractual liability of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation, of which Ty Teck Suan was president, to Mansion Biscuit Corporation. The issue of the civil liability of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation to Mansion Biscuits Corporation arising from the contract of purchase and sale between them could not have been and was not litigated and resolved in the criminal case inasmuch as they were not parties therein. A separate civil action must be instituted by Mansion Biscuits Corporation against Edward Ty Brothers Corporation to enforce the contract between them. Necessarily, any claim for tortuous liability must be ventilated in a separate action against the proper party. EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO JR., petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE and FERNANDO O. CARRASCOSO JR., respondents July 23, 1999 FACTS: Herein petitioner was a businessman-sportsman owning several racehorses which he entered in the sweepstakes races between the periods covering March 6, 1986 to September 18, 1989. Several of his horses won the races on various dates, landing first, second, or third places, respectively. However, respondents PCSO and its chairman withheld the prizes of the petitioner, claiming that such was the order of the Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG). A case was filed regarding the said matter before the RTC of Manila. PCGG advises defendants that “it poses no more objection to the remittance of the prize winnings”, and this was communicated by Carrascoso, Jr., defendant, to the petitioner’s counsel, but was refused since the matter was brought to the court. RTC ruled in this case in favor of the petitioner. However, the awarding of moral damages, exemplary and attorney’s fees in favor of the petitioner and that they acted in bad faith was questioned by the respondents, and was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the rulings of the RTC. So, the petitioner appealed it to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the petitioner were violated. RULING: When the respondents withheld the prize winnings of the petitioner, the latter’s right to the use of his property was unduly impeded. There was no writ of sequestration on neither the racehorse winnings of petitioner, nor the racehorses for that matter. The issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing of a prima facie and due regard for the requirements of due process. The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law. The respondents are liable not because they have acted in bad faith or with malice, but because there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one’s duties. _________________ CONCLUSION, LAW, APPLICABILITY TO SITUATION, JURISPRUDENCE Report this post Top Profile Send private message Reply with quote OzqC Post subject:

PostPosted: Thu Jun 05, 2008 4:20 pm Offline Junior Member User avatar Joined: Tue Aug 07, 2007 5:10 pm Posts: 385 Location: Santiago City ALCUAZ VS. PSBA -161 SCRA 7FACTS: In 1986, some PSBA students, herein petitioners Alcuaz et. al. staged demonstrations in the premises of the school. In order for the demonstration to be settled, an agreement was entered into among others the regulations for the conduct of protest action. In spite of the agreement, it was alleged that the petitioners, committed tumultuous and anarchic acts within the premises of the school, fanned by the cooperation of the intervening professors, causing disruption of classes to the prejudice of the majority students. The school took administrative sanctions upon them in view of their participation in the demonstration. The students and the intervening professors were sanctioned. They were dismissed and terminated. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a deprivation of constitutional rights of expression and assembly and of due process of law of the students who have been barred from re-enrollment. HELD: The Supreme Court held that due process in disciplinary cases such as the case at bar does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in the courts of justice. The Court has already recognized the right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations. In the school’s administrative process, both students and professors were given three (3) days from receipt of letter to explain in writing why the school should not take administrative sanction against them. With respect to the academic activities of the students and the teaching loads of the teachers, the respondent school has created new class for the petitioners and the intervening professors during and when the investigation was going on. The Court then upheld that there is no denial of due process where all requirements of administrative due process were met by the school and the students were given the opportunity to be heard and that the right of expression and assembly are not absolute especially when parties are bound to certain rules under a contract.

Ariel Non,et. al, petitioners, vs. Hon. Sancho Dames II and Mabini Colleges, Inc., respondents, May 20, 1990 FACTS: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings. The trial court dismissed the petition referring to the ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA stating, that being a mere privilege and not a legal right for a student to be enrolled or re-enrolled, respondent Mabini College is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom enjoyed by the school.

The respondents, in justifying their action, stated that 8 of the petitioners have incurred failing grades. In response, the petitioners stated that: (a) three of them were graduating. (b) Their academic deficiencies do not warrant non-readmission. (c) The improper conduct attributed to them was during the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly. (d) There was no due investigation that could serve as basis for disciplinary action. (e) Respondent school is their choice institution near their places of residence, which they can afford to pay for tertiary education. ISSUE: Whether or not the school has the right not to re-admit the petitioners. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court cannot anchor the “Termination of Contract” theory the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions. It is intended merely to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on installment basis. It cannot be construed to mean that a student shall be enrolled for only one semester. The right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal protection. It provides that every student has the right to enroll in any school college or university upon meeting its specific requirements and reasonable regulations; . . . and that "the student is presumed to be qualified for enrollment for the entire period he is expected to complete the course, without prejudice to his right to transfer."

ARMANDO JOSE y PAZ and MANILA CENTRAL BUS LINES (MCL),petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ROMMEL ABRAHAM, represented by his father FELIXBERTO ABRAHAM, JOSE MACARUBO and MERCEDES MACARUBO, respondents January 18, 2000 FACTS: On February 22, 1985, a bus driven by petitioner Armando Jose, collided with a red Ford Escort driven by John Macarubo.As a result of the collision, the left side of the Ford Escort's hood was severely damaged while its driver and its lone passenger, private respondent Rommel Abraham, were seriously injuredMacarubo, despite being taken to hospital, died after he undergone a surgery. Abraham, on the other hand, became blind on the left eye which had to be removed. In addition, he sustained a fracture on the forehead and multiple lacerations on the face, which caused him to be hospitalized for a week. Consequently, respondent, represented by his father, Felixberto, instituted a civil case for damages against petitioners MCL and Armando Jose in the Regional Trial Court.On July 17, 1986, the spouses Jose and Mercedes Macarubo, parents of the deceased John Macarubo, filed their own suit for damages in the same trial court. On the other hand, MCL filed a third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo, registered owner of the Ford Escort on the theory that John Macarubo was negligent and that he was the "authorized driver" of Juanita Macarubo. The latter, in turn, filed a counterclaim for damages against MCL for the damage to her car. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing both civil cases against MCL and ruling favorably on its third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo, ordering the latter to pay MCL P54,232.12 as actual damages, P24,000.00 for lost income, and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not Armando Jose, the owner of Bus 203 is liable for a quasi-delict

RULING: It is such a firmly established principle, as to have virtually formed part of the law itself, that the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer. Before the presumption of the employer's negligence in the selection and supervision of its employees can arise, the negligence of the employee must first be established. While the allegations of negligence against the employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the complaint are enough to make out a case of quasi-delict under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, the failure to prove the employee's negligence during the trial is fatal to proving the employer's vicarious liability. In this case, private respondents failed to prove their allegation of negligence against driver Armando Jose who, in fact, was acquitted in the case for criminal negligence arising from the same incident. MCL failed to present any evidence to prove that Juanita Macarubo was the employer of John Macarubo or that she is in any way liable for John Macarubo's negligence under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. For failure to discharge its burden, MCL's third-party complaint should be dismissed. Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the complaints filed against MCL and Armando Jose, as well as the third-party complaint filed against Juanita Macarubo, are dismissed.

Alano vs. Court of Appeals October 15, 1997 FACTS: On or about June 10, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused defraud Roberto S. Carlos by pretending to be still the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 1,172 square meters, more or less, located at Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, covered by Tax Declaration No. 120-004-00398, well knowing that he had previously sold the same to the said Roberto S. Carlos for P30,000.00, sold the aforesaid property for the second time to one Erlinda B. Dandoy for P87,900.00, thereby depriving the said Roberto S. Carlos of his rightful ownership/possession of the said parcel of land, to the damage and prejudice of the said Roberto S. Carlos in the aforesaid amount of P30,000.00, Philippine currency. Petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that there was a prejudicial question pending resolution in another case being tried in the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Pasig, Branch 68. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 55103 and entitled "Roberto Carlos and Trinidad M. Carlos v. Arturo Alano, et. al.," concerns the nullity of the sale and recovery of possession and damages. In the aforementioned Civil Case, private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner seeking the annulment of the second sale of said parcel of land made by the petitioner to a certain Erlinda Dandoy on the premise that the said land was previously sold to them. In his answer, accused claimed that his sign was forged in the second contract, but this was said after the five years of filing of estafa against him in a criminal case. ISSUE: Whether or not the pendency of Civil Case No. 55103, is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-84933 filed against the petitioner. RULING: The Supreme Court held that there is no prejudicial question on this case. The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal action. In other words, if both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exists, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. In this case,

there was no prejudicial question since he admitted in the pre-trial that his signature is valid on the vouchers and on the second deed of sale. By admission of the validity of his signatures and the second deed of sale, his admission on the estafa case meant that he could no longer use or raise said defense to raise a prejudicial question in his case. Meynardo L. Beltran, petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines, and Hon. Judge Florentino Tuazon, Jr., respondents June 20, 2000 FACTS: The petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage. The petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage. RULING: The Supreme Court finds the contention of the petitioner without merit. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. CITY OF PASIG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, respondents September 10, 1999 FACTS: On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City Council of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City. Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for June 22, 1996. Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997. The Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the COMELEC its attention to a pending case for settlement of boundary dispute wherein areas of the proposed barangays are included. The COMELEC ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in abeyance until after the court has settled with finality the boundary dispute involving the two municipalities. Hence the filing of civil case by the City of Pasig. The COMELEC, however, dismissed the Petition for being moot in view of the holding of the plebiscite as scheduled on March 15, 1997 where the creation of Barangay Napico was ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast therein. Hence, the filing of civil case by the Municipality of Cainta.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the two local governments. RULING: The Court agrees with the position of the COMELEC that the Civil Case involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held. In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area are included in the boundary dispute case pending before the RTC. Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in futility. Neither does the Court agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the case of the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has already been rendered moot and academic. The issues raised by the Municipality of Cainta in its petition before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Napico are still pending determination before the RTC. Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. In the same vein, the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should be annulled and set aside.

Diaz v. Merced -109 Phil. 155FACTS: Abundio Merced filed a complaint for annulment of his second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar on the ground that latter’s relative’s force, threatened and intimidated him into signing the affidavit to the effect that he and defendant had been living together as husband and wife for five years. The immediately after then celebration of the marriage, plaintiff left defendant and never live with her. Elizabeth Ceasar denies the maternal allegations of the complaint and avers that neither she nor her relatives of plaintiff’s previous marriage to Eufrocina Tan but plaintiff showed her a letter which he wrote breaking off is engagement with Tan. After plaintiff had filed civil case, defendant Elizabeth Ceasar filed a criminal complaint for bigamy against plaintiff Abundio Merced. Abundio Merced filed a motion to hold the trial in Criminal Case because civil case involves prejudicial questions, which if resolved, will determine if criminal proceeding would prosper. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a prejudicial question. RULING: Prejudicial question is one that must be decided first before a criminal action maybe instituted or may proceed because a decision therein is vital to the judgment in the criminal case. There are two elements of prejudicial question: first, it must be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the spouse and second, the resolution of which must be lodged to different courts. In the case at bar, the issue on the validity of the second marriage can be determined or must

first be determined in the civil action before the criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The prejudicial question is, whether or not the second marriage is valid, because determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinative in the civil action must be precede the criminal action for bigamy.

DONATO, petitioners, vs. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XXXII; HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents, April 15, 1988 FACTS: On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado Cantor, filed information for bigamy against Leonila Donato with the Court of First Instance. The private respondent filed a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner. Respondent had no previous knowledge of petitioner’s existing marriage to Rosalinda Maluping. Donato interposed in her answer the defense that his second marriage was void and since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by respondent. Petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the criminal case contending that the civil case seeking the annulment of the second marriage raise a prejudicial question which must be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the issue raised in the civil case is a prejudicial question which must be determined before the criminal case can proceed; 2. Whether or not the petitioner lacked the legal capacity to contract the second marriage. RULING: Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial question because a case for annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question on the condition that it must be proven that the petitioner’s consent to the marriage was obtained through intimidation, violence and undue influence in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was done involuntarily. In the petitioner’s argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and void on the ground of force, intimidation and violence allegedly employed against him by respondent only sometime later cannot be considered relevant.

GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS 2 SCRA 801 FACTS: Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner Antonio Geluz. After her marriage, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by Geluz. Less than 2 years later, Nita incurred a third abortion of a two-month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her husband did not know of, nor consented to the abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo, private respondent, sued petitioner for damages based on the third and last abortion. The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 as attorney’s fee and the cost of the suit. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUE: Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs injury, his parents may recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn child? RULING: Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality. It is, of course, essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be considered as never having possessed legal personality. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality. It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of the Civil Code because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present case, the child was dead when separated from its mother’s womb. This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or violation of the rights of the deceased child.

Eugenio Domingo, Crispin Mangabat and Samuel capalungan, petitioners, vs. Court of Appeals, Felipe C. Rigonan and Concepcion R. Rigonan, respondents October 17, 2001 FACTS: Paulina Rigonan owned three (3) parcels of land including the house and warehouse on one parcel. She allegedly sold them to private respondents, the spouses Felipe and Concepcion Rigonan, who claim to be her relatives amounting to P850.00. The petitioners Eugenio Domingo, Crispin Mangabat and Samuel Capalungan, who claim to be her closest surviving relatives, allegedly took possession of the properties by means of stealth, force and intimidation, and refused to vacate the same. The respondent filed a complaint for reinvindicacion against petitioners. The petitioners stated that the sale was spurious and they are the legitimate owner of the land being the nearest kin of Paulina. The respondents shown a carbon copy of the deed of sale not bearing the signature of Paulina only allege thumb mark of the latter and the deed was tainted with alterations, defects and irregularities. The trial court found the deed “fake” and rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners. The appellate court, however, reversed the decision and declared the respondents the owner of the properties. On appeal, the petitioners asserted that there was abundant evidence at the time of the execution of the sale, the deceased was already senile. She could have not consented to the sale by merely imprinting her thumbmark on the deed. ISSUE: Whether or not the vendor has the capacity to act on the alleged sale of her property. RULING: The Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the trial court. There is a serious doubt that the seller consented to the sale of and the price for her parcels of land. The time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was already of advanced age and senile. She died an octogenarian barely over a year when the deed was allegedly executed but before copies of the

deed were entered in the registry. The general rule is that a person is not incompetent to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. However, when such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the person from properly, intelligently, and firmly protecting her property rights then she is undeniably incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony of Zosima Domingo shows that at the time of the alleged execution of the deed, Paulina was already incapacitated physically and mentally. She narrated that Paulina played with her waste and urinated in bed.

MARIO J. MENDEZONA ,et al,petitioners, vs. JULIO H. OZAMIZ,et al, respondents February 6, 2002 FACTS: Petitioners alleged that petitioner spouses Mario Mendezona and Teresita Mendezona own a parcel of land which they bought from Carmen Ozamiz. They initiated the suit to remove a cloud ontheir respective titles of ownership caused by the inscription thereonof the notice of lis pendens which came about as a result of an incident in a special proceeding for guardianshipover the person and properties of Carmen Ozamiz initiated by respondents Julio Ozamiz, Jose Ozamiz, Paz Montalvan, Ma. Terresa Zarraga, Carlos Fortich, Jose Roz, Paulita Rodriguez and Lourdes Lon. The respondents alleged that Carmen Ozamiz, then 86 yearsold, after an illness on July 1987, had become disoriented and could no longer take care of herself nor manage her properties by reason of her failing helath, weak mind and absent-mindedness. Both parties agreedthat Carmen needed a guardian over her person and her properties. Thus, as guardians, respondent Roberto Montalvan and Julio Ozamiz filed their “Inventories and Accounts” of Carmen’s properties and other assets including the parcel of land bought by the petitioners. Roberto and Julio caused the inscriptionon the titles of petitioners a notice of lis pendens thus giving rise to the suit for quieting of titles filed by petitioners. The RTC rendered its decidion in favor of the petitioners; however, the appellate court reversed it. ISSUE: Whether or notCarmen Ozamiz was of sound mind thus capacitated to contract with the petitioners regarding the sale of a certain parcel of land. RULING: A person is presumed to be of sound mind at any particular time and the condition is presumed to continue to exist, in the absence of proof to the contrary. Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to have existed in the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to continue until the contrary is shown. The respondents sought to impugn only one document, namely, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989, executed by Carmen Ozamiz. However, there are nine (9) other important documents that were, signed by Carmen Ozamiz either before or after April 28, 1989 which were not assailed by the respondents. Such is contrary to their assertion of complete incapacity of Carmen Ozamiz to handle her affairs since 1987. We agree with the trial court’s assessment that "it is unfair for the [respondents] to claim soundness of mind of Carmen Ozamiz when it benefits them and otherwise when it disadvantages them." Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.

PRIMA G. CARRILLO and LORENZO LICUP, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FRANCISCA SALAK DE PAZ and ERNESTO BAUTISTA, defendants-appellees October 28, 1966 FACTS: Prima Carillo and Lorenzo Licup were claiming portions of their inheritance from their deceased

mother. The property was currently on the name of the appellees. ISSUE: Whether or not the issue of survivorship can be applied in this case. RULING: Reserva troncal in this jurisdiction is treated in Article 891 of the new Civil Code and Article 811 of the old Civil Code, which state: "The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquitted by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came." The reserva troncal arose — as had been finally decided by the Court of Appeals in Special Proceeding No. 23 — when Agustina acquired by operation of law all the properties of her descendant Adolfo (grandson), who acquired them by gratuitous title from another ascendant, Isabel (Adolfo's mother). According to Manresa, the reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservista, as it then becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can bring a revindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right, if not exercised within the time for recovering real properties, can be lost by prescription. Plaintiffs-appellants herein, as reservatarios, had the right to claim the property — 2/3 of 1/2 of Lot No. 221 - from Francisca Salak de Paz, who has been possessing it in the concept of an owner, from April 24, 1950 when Agustina died. And the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the existence of reserva troncal, promulgated on June 8, 1950, rendered it all the more doubtless that such right had accrued in their favor from the time Agustina died. It is clear, therefore, that the right or cause of action accrued in favor of the plaintiffs-reservatarios herein on April 24, 1950.

Marcos vs. COMELEC -248 SCRA 300FACTS: Imelda Romualdez Marcos was born in a town in the first Congressional district of Leyte. She then migrated to Manila when her parents decided to live in the said place. She was married to the then President Ferdinand Marcos, and consequently, lived in Ilocos. After several years, and upon returning to her birth place, she ran as a congresswoman in the first district of Leyte. Her opponent in that position was Cirilo Roy Montejo. The case started when Montejo asked the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos for allegedly lacking the one-year residency requirement mandated by the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Montejo claimed the former First Lady placed her residency in the first district of the province at seven monthspreceeding the balloting, which entailed that she lacked five months of the required residency. Marcos argued that she has been a resident of the are since childhood and has not abandoned her residency. The poll body disqualified her, and as a consequence, she appealed it to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Imelda Marcos is a resident of the First District of Leyte, and could run for and could be elected to a Congressional seat. RULING: The Supreme Court held that Mrs. Imelda Marcos is a resident of the first District of Leyte and could run for and could be elected to a Congressional seat. This is based on the ground that Mrs. Marcos is still a resident of that place and did not actually lack the requirements of those persons who could run a Congressional seat. Mrs. Marcos lived in Manila and in Ilocos for a long time and

only went back to her town and lived there for only seven months prior to the election but she did not really intended to abandon her birth place. This was proved by the frequent visits that she had in that place. Mrs. Marcos is said to have her domicile of her choice and of origin in Leyte. Yes, she did left Leyte but had shown that her choice of residence was Leyte, as proved by her visits. Therefore, Mrs. Marcos could run for and could be elected to a Congressional seat on the First District of Leyte.

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA V. SOLEDAD ESCRITOR 22 June 2006 FACTS: In a sworn-letter complaint dated July 27, 2000, complainant Alejandro Estrada requested Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253, Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, for an investigation of respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, for living with a man not her husband, and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Consequently, respondent was charged with committing “disgraceful and immoral conduct” under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code. Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a son.] But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.” For Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Declaration allows members of the congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed. As laid out by the tenets of their faith, the Jehovah’s congregation requires that at the time the declarations are executed, the couple cannot secure the civil authorities’ approval of the marital relationship because of legal impediments. Only couples who have been baptized and in good standing may execute the Declaration, which requires the approval of the elders of the congregation. As a matter of practice, the marital status of the declarants and their respective spouses’ commission of adultery are investigated before the declarations are executed. ISSUE: By invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards of her congregation, in asserting that her conjugal arrangement does not constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct, may the respondent be held administratively liable? RULING: There has never been any question that the state has an interest in protecting the institutions of marriage and the family, or even in the sound administration of justice. Indeed, the provisions by which respondent’s relationship is said to have impinged, e.g., Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code, Articles 334 and 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and even the provisions on marriage and family in the Civil Code and Family Code, all clearly demonstrate the State’s need to protect these secular interests. Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental

rights in our Constitution. It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights — “the most inalienable and sacred of human rights,” in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to contend that the state’s interest is important, because our Constitution itself holds the right to religious freedom sacred. The State must articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to religious freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate the Free Exercise Clause as a source of right by itself. Thus, it is not the State’s broad interest in “protecting the institutions of marriage and the family,” or even “in the sound administration of justice” that must be weighed against respondent’s claim, but the State’s narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the cohabitation which respondent’s faith finds moral. In other words, the government must do more than assert the objectives at risk if exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted. This, the Solicitor General failed to do. To paraphrase Justice Blackmun’s application of the compelling interest test, the State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition, in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim, cannot be merely abstract or symbolic. The State cannot plausibly assert that unbending application of a criminal prohibition is essential to fulfill any compelling interest, if it does not, in fact, attempt to enforce that prohibition. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. The State has never sought to prosecute respondent nor her partner. The State’s asserted interest thus amounts only to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Incidentally, as echoes of the words of Messrs. J. Bellosillo and Vitug, in their concurring opinions in our Decision, dated August 4, 2003, to deny the exemption would effectively break up “an otherwise ideal union of two individuals who have managed to stay together as husband and wife [approximately twenty-five years]” and have the effect of defeating the very substance of marriage and the family. Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.

MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner, vs. RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent March 4, 2004 FACTS: The petitioner and the respondent were married on March 5, 1959. Eight children were born from their marriage. On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned the petitioner and their children. On January 25, 1994, petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition against the respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property with a plea for support and support pendente lite. On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement where some of the conjugal properties were adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children, including the parcel of land located at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite with the resort Munting Paraiso Training Center. The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise agreement. Conformably thereto, the respondent vacated the resort Munting Paraiso. The petitioner, with the knowledge of the respondent, thenceforth resided in the

said property. On June 5, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity. Although the respondent knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort Munting Paraiso, he, nevertheless, alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing Las Piñas, Metro Manila, “where she may be served with summons.” On June 21, 1995, the Court sheriff submitted a Return of Service to the court stating that the summons and a copy of the petition were served on the petitioner through her son Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III on June 6, 1995. The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. On June 22, 1995, the respondent filed an “Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendant as in Default”. The trial court granted the motion and declared the petitioner in default, and allowed the respondent to adduce evidence ex-parte. On July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order granting the petition and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio. On February 14, 1998, the respondent and Teresita H. Rodil were married in civil rights. On July 7, 2000, the petitioner filed a verified petition against the respondent with the Court of Appeals for the annulment of the order of the RTC of Cavite. The petitioner alleged that the respondent committed gross misrepresentations by making it appear in his petition that she was a resident of Las Piñas, Metro Manila, when in truth and in fact, the respondent knew very well that she was residing at Munting Paraiso. According to the petitioner, the respondent did so to deprive her of her right to be heard in the said case, and ultimately secure a favorable judgment without any opposition thereto. The petitioner also alleged that the respondent caused the service of the petition and summons on her by substituted service through her married son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III. According to the petitioner, the order of the trial court in favor of the respondent was null and void for lack of jurisdiction over her person and due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the respondent. She further contended that there was no factual basis for the trial court’s finding that she was suffering from psychological incapacity. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. 2) Whether or not a judgment based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment may be had in the instant case. 3) Whether or not the presumption of marriage can be appreciated in the case at bar. RULING: The Court ruled that the petition states a sufficient cause of action for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of the petitioner, notwithstanding the absence of any allegation therein that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration, or appeal are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked unless barred by laches. No judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. The actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code, which reads: Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of

Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides: Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation. If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exits, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. The Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. The family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone. Whether or not a marriage should continue to exist or a family should stay together must not depend on the whims and caprices of only one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological imbalance, incapacitating such party to fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIAS BORROMEO, defendantappellant October 31, 1984 FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the court finding accused Elias Borromeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in holding that he and Susana Taborada (the deceased) were legally and validly married because there was no marriage contact executed in their wedding, hence he could be liable only for homicide, not parricide. Other than the stand of appellants counsel against the existence of marriage in order to lessen or mitigate the penalty imposable upon his client, accused Elias Borromeo himself admitted that the deceased-victim was his legitimate wife. ISSUE: Was there a valid marriage between the accused-appellant and the deceased-victim? RULING: There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused of the existence of such marriage. (Tolentino vs. Paras). Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter

presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of the society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law. The presumption in favor of the matrimony is one of the strongest known in law. The reason for this presumption is well settled in Perido vs. Perido, thus: The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. CORPUS V. CORPUS 85 SCRA 567 FACTS: Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939. Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were: (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio, (3) Amelia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died in October, 1944. Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five (5) children with Tomas Corpus, two (2) of whom were the aforementioned Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus. On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover the supposed share in Yangco’ intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in Yangco’s will imposing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void and that the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent’s estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy. ISSUE: Whether or not Tomas Corpus has a cause of action for recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as legal heir in Yangco’s estate. RULING: It is disputably presumed that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage and that a child born in a lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate. Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, the Supreme Court held that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco’s estate. JOSE RIVERA, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ADELAIDO J. RIVERA, respondents February 15, 1990 FACTS: On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio Rivera died. On July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Venancio’s estate. Docketed as SP No. 1076, this petition was opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera. Who denied that Jose was the son of the decedent. Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father and did not die interstate but in fact left two holographic wills.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose Rivera was the legitimate son of the deceased Venancio Rivera. RULING: In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage the legitimacy of children. Even in the absence of any certificate of marriage or other documentary proof of the existence of marriage, the law presumes a man and woman cohabiting with each other as being married, in the absence of proof to the contrary. Based on this unrefuted legal presumption, Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr. who authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by their father, was sufficient. _________________ CONCLUSION, LAW, APPLICABILITY TO SITUATION, JURISPRUDENCE Report this post Top Profile Send private message Reply with quote OzqC Post subject: PostPosted: Thu Jun 05, 2008 4:36 pm Offline Junior Member User avatar Joined: Tue Aug 07, 2007 5:10 pm Posts: 385 Location: Santiago City MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR., Presiding Judge, 8th MCTC, Manukan and Jose Dalman, 9th Judicial Region, Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, respondent October 25, 1995 FACTS: Respondent had been scandalously and openly living with Priscilla Baybayan as early as 1970 and begot three children all surnamed Tabiliran even while respondent’s marriage to his first wife was still valid and subsisting. Respondent’s contention is that his first wife left the conjugal home in 1966. And since then and until the present her whereabouts is not known and respondent has had no news of her being alive. He further avers that 25 years had already elapsed since the disappearance of his first wife when he married Priscilla Baybayan in 1986. That he represented himself as “single” because that is what best fits to him since the words to choose from were widow, single and divorced. That besides both he and Priscilla executed a joint affidavit wherein in his former marriage to Banzuela was honestly divulged. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s marriage to Priscilla is valid. RULING: Article 390 of the Civil Code which provide that, after an absence of seven years, it being known whether or not the absentee is still lives, the absent shall be deemed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession, can not be invoked by respondent. By respondent’s own

allegation, his first wife left the conjugal home in 1966. From that time on up to the time that respondent started to cohabit with Priscilla in 1970, only 4 years had elapsed. The respondent had no right to presume therefore that his first was already dead for all-purposes. Thus, respondent’s actuation of cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970 when his marriage to his first wife was still valid and subsisting constitutes gross immortal conduct. The SC said, it makes mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution.

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, ET. AL., respondents May 17, 1990 FACTS: Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana Vargas, her full blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. Private respondents (Vargases) alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenio, who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interferring with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be considered as a spouse of Vitaliana Vargas. RULING: There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-à-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully wedded spouse, in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime. Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases).

PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant vs. JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent June 19, 1997 FACTS: On January 7, 1994, complainant got married to respondent in a civil wedding before Judge Myrna Lim Verano. On that night, respondent fetched complainant from her house and reached

the condominium unit of respondent two hours later at which time, she answered the phone. At the other end of the line was a woman offending her with insulting remarks. Consternated, complainant confronted respondent on the identity of such caller but respondent simply remarked "it would have been just a call at the wrong number". What followed was a heated exchange of harsh words, to a point when respondent called complainant a "nagger", he even said, “Get that marriage contract and have it burned." Complainant leaves in haste the place of their would-be honeymoon. Since then, they have been living separately because as complainant rationalized, contrary to her expectation respondent never got in touch with her and did not even bother to apologize for what happened Several months after that fateful encounter, the complainant learned from Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, that he solemnized the marriage between former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz and a certain Lydia Geraldez. Infuriated, complainant lost no time in gathering evidence against respondent, such that, on June 6, 1995 she filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment against him. On August 7, 1995, when she discovered another incriminatory document against respondent, the complainant executed against respondent her "Supplemental Complaint Affidavit for Falsification". The marriage contract of respondent and Lydia Geraldez, dated May 10, 1994, was offered by complainant to prove that respondent immorally and bigamously entered into a marriage, and to show that the respondent distorted the truth by stating his civil status as SINGLE, when he married Lydia Geraldez. ISSUE: Whether or not a sham marriage is a valid marriage. RULING: The Court finds itself in full accord with the findings and recommendation of Justice Purisima. Herein respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. He himself asserts that at the time of his marriage to herein complainant, the decision of the court annulling his marriage to his first wife, Librada Peña, had not yet attained finality. Worse, four months after his marriage to petitioner, respondent married another woman, Lydia Geraldez, in Cavite, after making a false statement in his application for marriage license that his previous marriage had been annulled. Respondent's subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a "sham" marriage will not justify his actuations. Even if the said marriage was just a caper of levity in bad taste, a defense which amazes and befuddles but does not convince, it does not speak well of respondent's sense of social propriety and moral values. This is aggravated by the fact that he is not a layman nor even just an ordinary lawyer, but a former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court and, thereafter, a Justice of the Court of Appeals who cannot but have been fully aware of the consequence of a marriage celebrated with all the necessary legal requisites.

Garcia Vda. De Chua vs. CA March 5, 1998 FACTS: Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita A. Vallejo and had two illegitimate sons with her. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City. Upon the death of Roberto, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for the guardianship and administration over the persons and properties of the two minors. Herein petitioner filed for its dismissal, claiming that she was the sole surviving heir of the decedent being his wife; and that the decedent was a resident of Davao City and not Cotabato City, which means that the said court was not the proper forum to settle said matters. The petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the marriage contract and the evidences that she used were: a photocopy of said marriage contract, Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the

name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married; passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City. The trial court ruled that she failed to establish the validity of marriage, and even denied her petition. This was latter appealed to the appellate court, but it decided in favor of herein respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on their ruling on the validity of marriage of Antonietta Garcia to Roberto Chua. RULING: The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the appellate court are correct in holding that petitioner herein failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the petitioner failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage. The lower court correctly disregarded the photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. A valid, original marriage contract would be the best evidence that the petitioner should have presented. Failure to present it as an evidence would make the marriage dubious.

DONATO v. LUNA 160 SCRA 14 FACTS: On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor, filed information for bigamy against herein petitioner, Leonila C. Donato with the Court of First Instance. The Information filed was based on the complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan. On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner’s arraignment, private respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. It was Donato’s second one. Respondent had no previous knowledge of petitioner’s existing marriage to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping. Petitioner Donato interposed in her answer in the civil case for nullity the defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent. Petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the criminal case contending that the civil case seeking the annulment of the second marriage raise a prejudicial question which must be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed. ISSUES: Whether or not the issue raised in the civil case is a prejudicial question which must be determined before the criminal case can proceed, and whether or not the petitioner lacked the legal capacity to contract the second marriage? RULING: Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho v. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial question since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner’s consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be

the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar. The argument of petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private respondent only sometime later when he was required to answer the civil action for annulment of the second marriage is totally irrelevant.

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents August 19, 1986 FACTS: In an action filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilia’s previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. lilia while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage void or was it merely voidable. RULING: There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID. There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her husband at the time they married each other, for them such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel), accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents August 19, 1986 FACTS: In an action filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilia’s previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. lilia while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage. ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage void or was it merely voidable. RULING: There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID. There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her husband at the time they married each other, for them such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel), accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila, respondent March 29, 1995 FACTS: Respondent Judge Francisco R. Brillantes, Jr. is charged by complainant with gross immortality and ignorance of impropriety for having been cohabiting with and subsequently married Yolanda De Castro, complainant’s live-in partner and of whom he has two children, despite of him being married twice with Ongkiko which alleges to be invalid for having been celebrated without a marriage license. His subsequent marriage with De Castro was celebrated without having obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage with Ongkiko. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge is legally capacitated to contact a subsequent marriage without having secured a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage. RULING: Under Article 40 of the Family Code of the Philippines, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Thus, respondent judge is not legally capacitated to contract his subsequent marriage with De Castro, his first marriage with Ongkiko not having been judicially declared null and void for lack of a marriage license.

BESO VS. DAGUMAN January 28, 2000 FACTS: Judge Juan Daguman solemnized the marriage of the complainant, Zenaida Beso, and her fiancé at the judge’s residence in Calbayog City, which was attended by three witnesses. After the wedding, the complainant’s husband abandoned her without reason and when the complainant went to the City Civil Registrar of Calbayog City to inquire about her marriage contract, she was informed that their marriage was not registered. She therefore wrote to the judge to inquire, and was told that all the copies of the contract were taken by her fiancé. Hence, the complainant filed charges against the judge for solemnizing their marriage outside of his jurisdiction and for negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering their marriage. ISSUE:

Whether or not the judge solemnized marriage outside of his jurisdiction. RULING: Judge Daguman solemnized the marriage of the complainant outside of his jurisdiction. Article 8 of the Family Code states that a marriage can be held outside the judge’s chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: at the point of death; in remote places in accordance with Article 29; or upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. In the case, none of the instances mentioned were present. In fact, the judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage of complainant to her fiancé because the complainant was an overseas worker, who, the judge realized deserved more than ordinary official attention under the present government policy. The judge further claimed that he believed he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married. Judges must not only apply the law but must also live and abide by it and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. Also, considering that the judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-TaranganPagsanjan, Samar only, he does not have the authority to solemnize a marriage in Calbayog City. Moreover, the judge, by his carelessness, lost the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate of the complainant and her fiancé. The judge therefore committed non-feasance in office. His claim that the complainant’s fiancé took all copies doesn’t deserve consideration for lack of proof. He should have exerted more effort to locate or reconstitute the documents. As a judge, he is expected to be conscientious in handling official documents. The judge was fined P5,000.00 and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

MARILOU NAMA MORENO, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE C. BERNABE, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondent July 14, 1995 FACTS: Marilou Moreno filed this complaint against Judge Jose C. Bernabe of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72, Metro Manila for grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law. Complaint alleged that she and Marcelo Moreno were married on October 4, 1993 before the respondent judge. The respondent assured her that the marriage contract will be released ten (10) days after the date of celebration. When she visited the office of the respondent, she found out that the local Civil Registrar failed to issue marriage license. Thus, she claimed that the respondent connived with the relatives of Marcelo to deceive her. But the respondent denied the allegations. The investigation then was referred to executive Judge Villarama Jr., who recommended the matter for dismissal for failure of the complainant to appear on hearings, and the memorandum he issued was referred to the court administrator office for evaluation. The office found out that respondent displayed his ignorance of the law, as affirmed by the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge may be held liable for misconduct for solemnizing without the marriage license. RULING: The Supreme Court recommended that Respondent be held liable for misconduct for solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and that the appropriate administrative sanctions be

imposed against him. Careful study of the records reveals that indeed respondent Judge displayed his ignorance of the law when he solemnized the marriage without a marriage license. As a judge, he is presumed to be aware of the existence of Article 3(2) of the Family Code of the Philippines (E.O. 209, as amended by E.O. 227), which provides of a marriage is a valid marriage license. Absence of said requisite will make the marriage void from the beginning (Article 35 [3], the Family Code of the Philippines). Judges are enjoined to show more than just a cursory acquaintance of the law and other established rules. On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not effect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. The Revised Penal Code provides that "priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law."

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent July 19, 1996 FACTS: Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed an administrative case against MCTC Judge Hernando Domagtoy. Complainant contended that Domagtoy displayed gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law when he solemnized the weddings of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife; and Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario, which was solemnized at the respondent’s residence which does not fall within his jurisdiction. ISSUES: 1. What are the effects of the irregularities in formal requisites of the two marriages? 2. Whether or not the respondent judge may be held liable for solemnizing marriages which did not comply with the requisites in the Family Code. RULING: The Court held that even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the present spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage. In this case, Tagadan was not able to present a summary proceeding for the declaration of the first wife’s presumptive death thus, he is still considered married to his first wife. A marriage can only be considered beyond the boundaries of the jurisdiction of the judge in the following instances: (1) at the point of death; (2) in remote places; or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. None of these were complied with therefore there is an irregularity. Wherefore, the Court suspended Judge Domagtoy for a period of six (6) months and was given a warning that once he repeats these offenses again, it will be dealt with severely.

RP V. IYOY 21 Sept. 2005 FACTS: After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hottempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines. ISSUE: Should the divorce obtained abroad by the Filipino wife be recognized as valid? RULING: Article 26 of the Family Code provides: "Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. "WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW." The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husband’s citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien. It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial court’s

declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar. As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent October 23, 2001 FACTS: The respondent, Rederick Recio, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.” Since October 1995, they lived separately; and in 1996 while in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondent’s former marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce a decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson were proven. 2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia. RULING: The Philippine law doesn’t provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.” A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient; and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of petitioner’s failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it

was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility. Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. However, there are two types of divorce, absolute divorce terminating the marriage and limited divorce merely suspending the marriage. In this case, it is not known which type of divorce the respondent procured. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree “a party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute commits the offense of bigamy.” This shows that the divorce obtained by the respondent might have been restricted. Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with other evidences submitted, they don’t absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to the alleged foreign law. Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage the petitioner and respondent can’t be declared null and void based on lack of evidence conclusively showing respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. With the lack of such evidence, the court a quo may declare nullity of the parties’ marriage based on two existing marriage certificates.

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City, and RICHARD UPTON, respondents October 8, 1985 FACTS: Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in Hongkong in 1972. They established residence in the Philippines and had two children. In 1982, the wife sued for divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on the ground of incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada. In 1983, Upton sued her asking that she be ordered to render an accounting of her business which Upton alleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed that he be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had acknowledged that the couple had no community property. From denial of that motion, she went to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari and prohibition. ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce decree granted by U.S. court, between Filipina wife and American husband, held binding upon the latter. RULING: It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents June 30, 1989 FACTS: On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila on January 23, 1983. On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." ISSUE: Whether the criminal cases filed by the German ex-spouse may prosper. RULING: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. Hence, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents April 20, 1998 FACTS: On August 10, 1978, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a complaint for partition and damages against Private Respondents Felix and Lourdes, both surnamed Trinidad, before the Court of First Instance, claiming that he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio Trinidad, who was the original owner of the parcels of land. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to his three (3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three (3) equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused. Defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before plaintiff's birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in the complaint had been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land. Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan. Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. On October 28, 1982, Felix died without issue, so he was not substituted as a party. On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Respondent Court reversed the trial court on the ground that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married to each other and that acquisitive prescription against him had set in. ISSUES: Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents' marriage and of his filiation? RULING: The partition of the late Patricio's real properties requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedent's estate. His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born during the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes). The Court held that such burden was successfully discharged by petitioner and, thus, the reversed the assailed decision and resolution. In Pugeda vs. Trias, it was ruled that when the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged

wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents. In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioner's case. Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital union, petitioner's failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place. In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren, who testified that she was present during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple deported themselves as husband and wife after the marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year old barangay captain of Tigayon and former board member of the local parent-teachers' association, used to visit Inocentes and Felicidad's house twice or thrice a week, as she lived only thirty meters away. On July 21, 1943, Gerardo dropped by Inocentes' house when Felicidad gave birth to petitioner. She also attended petitioner's baptismal party held at the same house. Her testimony constitutes evidence of common reputation respecting marriage. It further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate in which Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the child's father and mother. Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification that records relative to his birth were either destroyed during the last world war or burned when the old town hall was razed to the ground on June 17, 1956. To prove his filiation, he presented in evidence two family pictures, his baptismal certificate and Gerardo's testimony. Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of "the other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws" to show pedigree. The totality of petitioner's positive evidence clearly preponderates over private respondents' selfserving negations. Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the adverse party.

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila, respondent March 29, 1995 FACTS: This is a complaint for gross immorality and appearance of impropriety against the judgerespondent. The respondent was co-habiting with the complainant’s live-in partner (Yolanda De Castro), which the respondent claims to have married in Los Angeles on December 4, 1991. When respondent married De Castro, he believed that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license. Respondent denies having been married to Zenaida Ongkiko (first wife), although he admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of Ongkiko’s parents, they were again married in June of the same year and neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko allegedly abandoned him 17 years ago and left their children in his care. ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage entered into by the respondent and Zenaida Ongkiko was void ab initio RULING Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. The Family Code applies in the case although the respondent argues that his first marriage was made prior to the Code’s effectivity. Moreover, the retroactive application of the Code doesn’t impair any vested right of the respondent. Following the rule that all marriages are valid unless annulled by a competent court, the marriage between respond and Ongkiko is valid although they don’t have a marriage license. Furthermore, the respondent can’t invoke that their marriage was void ab initio because they have, in fact, been married twice. And without any a judicial decision annulling their marriage, it remains valid. The respondent is dismissed from the service.

MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent April 11, 1992 FACTS: Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law, via a sworn Letter-Complaint, for solemnizing the marriage between petitioner and her late groom (Ret.) Commodore Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license, among others. Since the marriage is a nullity (because the marriage was also celebrated outside the respondents territorial jurisdiction), petitioner’s right, upon Orobia’s death, to inherit the “vast properties” left by Orobia was not recognized. Petitioner was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia. Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations, which caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings. The case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to the Office of the Court Administrator, which required the respondent to comment on the complaint. Respondent averred, among others, that before starting the ceremony, he examined the documents submitted to him by the petitioner and he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license so he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of the provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. After the solemnization, respondent reiterated the need for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner assured and Orobia assured the respondent that they would give the license to him, but they never did. He attributed the hardships and embarrassment petitioner suffered as due to her own fault and negligence. The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation, found respondent guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and outside his territorial jurisdiction. ISSUE: Assuming that the marriage was conducted within the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent, will the subsequent issuance of a marriage license render a marriage solemnize without it valid? RULING:

Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, the Supreme Court held that a marriage, which preceded the issuance of the marriage license, is void, and that subsequent issuance of such license cannot render or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to conduct marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law. (Respondent is fined P5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely). ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents April 20, 1998 FACTS: On August 10, 1978, plaintiff and petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance and action for partition of four (4) parcels of land. He was claiming that he was the son of the deceased Inocentes Trinidad. Patricio Trinidad, the father of the deceased, owned four (4) parcels of land, which he left to his three children namely, Inocentes, Lourdes, and Felix. The refusal of the defendants, Lourdes and Felix, to the demand of Arturo to the partition of the land into three (3) equal parts caused Arturo to file a case which was decided in his favour. The Appellate court did not decide in favor of Arturo and reversed the ruling of the lower court on the ground that he was not able to present sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married to each other. ISSUE: Whether or not the failure to present a marriage contract would mean that there was no marriage that transpired. RULING: While it is true that a marriage contract is the primary evidence of a marriage, the failure to present it does not prove that no marriage took place because there are other evidences that could have the same bearing as a marriage contract. He failed to present the marriage contract due to the destruction of such records. His act of presenting witnesses who were present during the nuptial of his parents, his baptismal certificate and the affirmation of the cohabitation of his parents is enough evidence to prove the marriage of his parents.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents September 22, 1994 FACTS: On June 24, 1970, Angelia M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. the marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro’s parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.

The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro’s parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro’s brother, with the consent of Cardenas. ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonal evidences presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardena. RULING: At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance. The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not be found in a registrar. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage license, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of due search and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 1396182 to the contracting parties.

FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, respondents April 12, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to his father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15,1988, and from then on, lived with his father. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the grounds that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living separately for more than one year; and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. The trial court also granted custody of the children to Filipina. In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband. Filipina

testified that in the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with the family computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her son, and started spanking him. At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking her when she fell on the floor, and released her only when he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on different parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it was not the first time Fernando maltreated her. The Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent, on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick to respondent. On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest thereafter. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court in finding that the testimony of petitioner concerning respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the trial court that the couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years from the date of the celebration of their marriage. And prior to their separation in 1983, they were living together harmoniously. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and 2) Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity. RULING: The date of celebration of their marriage on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent. The pieces of evidence on record showed that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the

marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona. The marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code. those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, are void ab initio. This is clearly applicable in this case. The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain the Court. It is mooted by the conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized. SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent February 2, 2001 FACTS: SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969 without a license and without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage - he married Susan Yee on November 10, 1992. Carino died due to diabetes on November 23, 1992 under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both spouses of Carino claimed and collected monetary benefits and financial assistance from various government agencies as death benefits. Susan Yee filed a case to collect one half of the sum of the death benefits received by Susan Nicdao. At the time she married Carino, Susan Yee claimed that she had no knowledge of Carino’s marriage with Susan Nicdao. ISSUE: Whether or not the first marriage contracted by Carino is void ab initio. RULING: Yes. The first marriage contracted by Carino is void ab initio. The marriage of Carino and Susan Nicdao is void since it was solemnized without the required marriage license. Under the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage.

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