1 – Balt Chavez
Board of Optometry v. Colet a. Facts: 1995 – Congress enacted R.A. No. 8050 Revised Optometry Law. Private respondents prayed before RTC Manila a petition for declaratory relief and for prohibition and injunction of R.A. No. 8050. They claimed that R.A. 8050 was unconstitutional on the grounds of derogation in the legislative process and vitiation of legislative consent; undue delegation of legislative power and vitiation in the legislative process of the said act. RTC Manila granted the writ of preliminary injunction. In their efforts to seek annulment of the said order, petitioners Board of Optometry et al alleged that the respondents did not have any legal existence or capacity to sue except for Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. b. Issue: WON private respondents have locus standi to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8050. c. Ruling: No. Private respondents have no legal standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8050. SC cited Art. 44 of the Civil Code that an association is considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from its members. Otherwise, it cannot be a real party in interest in any civil action. When the private respondents failed to prove the juridical personality of their associations and chose to keep mum on that issue, they have grossly disregarded Sec. 4 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. Thus, without juridical entity demerits the private respondents to become real parties in interest. Petitioners’ prayer for the writ of preliminary injunction to be annulled and set aside was granted. Case 2 – Nove Oracion Melisande Joy Tan Executive Class JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents. FACTS: A petition for prohibition and declaratory relief against R.A. No. 7854, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati," was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr.,
Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854. ISSUES: Whether sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 are unconstitutional. RULING: The court finds no merit in the petition. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 clearly stated that the city's land area "shall comprise thepre sent territory of the municipality." Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. Hence, the territorial bounds need not be made in metes and bounds with technical description and does not violate sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code. Also, at the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. The contention on the constitutionality of section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 was not entertained by the court since it did not comply the requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law which are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events which this Court has no jurisdiction and nor are they proper parties to raise this abstract issue. On the constitutionality of section 51 of R.A. 7854, which declares the addition of another legislative district in Makati, the court refers to the case of Tobias vs. Abalos. In said case, the court ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a
general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). There is also no merit in the contention of the title of the bill that it should expressly state the addition of a legislative district. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details so as not to impede legislation. Hence, the court ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject." WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs. Case 4 – Herlen Obligacion La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Assn vs Ramos Case Digest G.R. No 127882 Facts : On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements. On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times, two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No.
7942 took effect. Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996. On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter. Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. They pray that the Court issue an order: (a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements; (b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as unconstitutional and null and void; (c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and void; and (d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western Mining Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void. Issue : Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 is unconstitutional. Ruling : The Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution and hereby declares unconstitutional and void: (1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines "qualified person," to wit: Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for purposes of granting an exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or mineral processing permit.
(2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration permittee, insofar as said section applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement, (3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a financial or technical assistance agreement; (4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for every financial or technical assistance agreement; (5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement to convert the same into a mineral production-sharing agreement; (6) Section 56, which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing permit to a contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement; The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they are dependent on the foregoing provisions and cannot stand on their own: (1) Section 3 (g), which defines the term "contractor," insofar as it applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement. Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract area in a financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 36, which allows negotiations for financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or technical assistance agreement proposals; Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA; The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which provide for the Government's share in a financial and technical assistance agreement; and Section 90, which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies to said contractors;
When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Case 5 – Cynthia Teruel City of Los Angeles vs. Lyons Facts: This case begun in February 7, 1997, when Adolph Lyons, filed a complaint for damages, injunction, and declaratory relief in the U.S District Court for the Central District of California. The defendants were the City of Los Angeles and four of its police officers. The complaint alleged that on October 6, 1976, Lyons was stopped by the defendant officers for traffic or vehicle code violation, and that although Lyons offered no resistance or threat whatsoever, the officers, without provocation or justification seized Lyons and applied a “chokehold”, rendering him unconscious and causing damage to his larynx. In addition to seeking damages, the complaint sought injunctive relief against the City of L.A, barring the use of chokeholds except in situations where the proposed victim reasonably appeared to be threatening the immediate use of deadly force. It was alleged, that pursuant to the city of L.A’s authorization, police officers routinely applied chokeholds in situations where they were not threatened by the use of any deadly force; that numerous persons had been injured as a result thereof; that Lyons justifiably feared that any future contact he might have with police officers might again result in his being choked without provocation; and that there was thus a threatened impairment of various rights protected by the Federal Constitution. Issues: Whether or not respondents Lyons satisfied the prerequisites for seeking injunctive relief in the federal district court. Whether or not the federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain respondents claim for injunctive relief.
Ratio Decidendi: The District Court, on the basis of the pleadings, ultimately entered a preliminary injunction against the use of chokeholds under circumstances that did not threaten death or serious bodily injury. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After a series of events, however, the Court of Appeals reversed for failure of the complaint to allege a case or controversy. Although it was claimed in that case that particular members of the plaintiff class had actually suffered from alleged unconstitutional practices, the court observed that “past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief, if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effect”. Case 6 – RB Parreno
policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, “execute its laws.” In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, including the Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior and Local Government. The specific portion of PP 1017 questioned is the enabling clause: “to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.” Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate “decrees”?
Prof. Randolf S. David vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006 • "Take Care" Power of the President • Powers of the Chief Executive • The power to promulgate decrees belongs to the Legislature FACTS: These 7 consolidated petitions question the validity of PP 1017 (declaring a state of national emergency) and General Order No. 5 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. While the cases are pending, President Arroyo issued PP 1021, declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist, thereby, in effect, lifting PP 1017. ISSUE:
The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chap. 2, Book III of E.O. 292. President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to those issuances mentioned in the foregoing provision. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution. This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec. 1, Art. VI categorically states that “the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. But can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military? As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to “laws,” she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence. Case 7 – RB Parreno
Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 arrogated upon the President the power to enact laws and decrees If so, whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional
“Take-Care” Power This refers to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, based on Sec. 17, Art. VII: “The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.” As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate
La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association vs. Ramos (GR 127882, 2 December 2004) Facts: The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the constitutionality of (1) Republic Act 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated 30 March 1995, executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP). On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision, granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service contracts, which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation. The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who had criticized service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive management and control of the enterprise, including operation of the field in the event petroleum was discovered; control of production, expansion and development; nearly unfettered control over the disposition and sale of the products discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at the point of extraction; and beneficial ownership of our economic resources. According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2 of Article XII) effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently, Victor O. Ramos (Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]), Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau [MGB-DENR]), Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary), and the WMC (Philippines) Inc. filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. Issue: Whether the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of control over the EDU of our natural resources Held: The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to “enter into agreements with foreign owned corporations.” On the other hand, Congress may review the action of the President once it is notified of “every contract entered into in accordance with this [constitutional] provision within thirty days from its execution.” In contrast to this express mandate of the President and Congress in the exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should the President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this regard, the courts may -- in a proper case -exercise their residual duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary
should not inordinately interfere in the exercise of this presidential power of control over the EDU of our natural resources. Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and coordinate branches of government, the Court must restrain itself from intruding into policy matters and must allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using the resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable employment opportunities in the country. “The judiciary is loath to interfere with the due exercise by coequal branches of government of their official functions.” As aptly spelled out seven decades ago by Justice George Malcolm, “Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act.” Let the development of the mining industry be the responsibility of the political branches of government. And let not the Court interfere inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution of the Philippines is the supreme law of the land. It is the repository of all the aspirations and hopes of all the people. The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be used to strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to grant the President and Congress sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to enable them to attract foreign investments and expertise, as well as to secure for our people and our posterity the blessings of prosperity and peace. The Court fully sympathize with the plight of La Bugal B’laan and other tribal groups, and commend their efforts to uplift their communities. However, the Court cannot justify the invalidation of an otherwise constitutional statute along with its implementing rules, or the nullification of an otherwise legal and binding FTAA contract. The Court believes that it is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of discretion to the Chief Executive, given the nature and complexity of such agreements, the humongous amounts of capital and financing required for large-scale mining operations, the complicated technology needed, and the intricacies of international trade, coupled with the State’s need to maintain flexibility in its dealings, in order to preserve and enhance our country’s competitiveness in world markets. On the basis of this control standard, the Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations -- insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements -- as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA). Case 7: Genevieve D. Penetrante La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Assn. v. DENR Secretaty
Facts: 25 July 1987 – EO 279 authorized DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for largescale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. In entering into such proposals, the President shall consider the real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country that will be realized, as well as the development and use of local scientific and technical resources that will be promoted by the proposed contract or agreement. Until Congress shall determine otherwise, large-scale mining, for purpose of this Section, shall mean those proposals for contracts or agreements for mineral resources exploration, development, and utilization involving a committed capital investment in a single mining unit project of at least Fifty Million Dollars in United States Currency (US $50,000,000. 00) • 3 March 1995 – RA 7942 signed into law • 30 March 1995 – Government entered FTAA with WMCP 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan • Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato . 9 April 1995 – 30 days after publication on 10 March 1995, RA 7942 took effect 20 December 1996 – DENR Secretary Victor Ramos issued DAO 96-40 • 10 January 1997 – counsels for petitioner sent letter to Ramos demanding DENR to stop implementing RA • 7942 and DAO 96-40. No response, thus this petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with prayer of TRO and preliminary injunction(denied) claiming that petitioner Ramos acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the assailedConstitutionality of RA 7942 , of DENR Administrative Order 9640 , and of the Financial and TechnicalAssistance Agreement entered into on 30 March 1995 between the Republic of the Philippines and WMC(Philippines) , Inc.. 23 January 2001 – Manifestation of respondents that WMCP isno longer foreign-owned as WMC has sold100% of its equity to Filipino company Sagittarius Mines, Inc. which is 60% owned by Filipinos or Filipino-owned corporations. WMCP is renamed as Tampakan Mineral Resources Corporation.
18 December 2001 – DENR approved the transfer and registration of FTAA to Sagittarius from WMCP. Supreme Court said that this manifestation and transfer does not render the issue moot since the question of validity of the FTAA will affect even that held by Sagittarius. Issue/s Preliminary Issue: Standing of Petitioners 1. WON EO 279 is an invalid law having been issued two days before President Aquino’s legislative powers expired with the convening of Regular Congress and having thus took effect after which.
2. WON RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 are unconstitutional and
consequently the FTAA entered pursuant to above stated laws is invalid Ratio Decidendi: Preliminary Issue: Petitioners have standing since they are residents of the land covered by the FTAA. Since the petition if for mandamus and prohibition and the issue is of constitutionality of a statute, the Supreme is no longer concerned whether or not petitioners are real parties of interest to the contract/agreement. 1. NO. EO 279 is valid and whether or not the law’s effectively date lies beyond the expiration of the President’s legislative power is irrelevant since it was still enacted when the president held such power. It does not run counter to EO 200 requiring laws to have 15 days after publication requirement before its effectivity since EO200 also provides “unless it is otherwise provided,” EO 279 having stated its own effectivity as “shall take effect immediately.” In addition, the 15-day post-publication requirement was for the information of the public and does not in any way affect the date of enactment and is not a ground for invalidation. EO 279 nonetheless was published on the Official Gazette on 3 August 1987. 2. Yes. The 1987 Constitution provides “The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, or utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.”
Source: http://www.scribd.com/doc/36157396/La-Bugal-Digest Case 8 – Genevieve D. Penetrante DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 94 S. Ct. 1704, 40 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1974). Facts: Petitioner DeFunis, a white applicant to the University of Washington law school, sued the Board of Regents of the University of Washington in state court after he was denied admission. DeFunis alleged that the law school discriminated against applicants of certain races and ethnicities, including whites, by admitting minority applicants with significantly lower undergraduate grades and LSAT scores. DeFunis maintained that his rejection was predicated on racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court granted DeFunis injunctive relief and ordered the law school to admit him. When DeFunis was in his second year of law school, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed, holding that the admissions policy was not unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of the United States granted DeFunis’ petition for a writ of certiorari and stayed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington pending final disposition of the case. The case came before the Supreme Court of the United States for a full hearing when DeFunis was in his final year of law school. Although the law school assured that it would allow DeFunis to graduate regardless of the Court’s decision, both parties contended that mootness did not exist to block formal adjudication of the matter. Issue
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. That a matter deemed moot leaves an important social issue unresolved is of no consequence. Dissent (Douglas) Due to the social significance of the issue involved in this case, this matter should be adjudicated despite its apparent mootness. Dissent (Brennan) Because of the social significance of the issue involved in this case, failure to adjudicate this matter now will only result in a future duplication of the court effort. Source: http://www.lawnix.com/cases/defunis-odegaard.html Case 10 – Mona Luisa De Guzman CRAIG VS. BOREN 429 US 190 December 20, 1976 Facts. Appellant Craig, a male then between 18 and 21 years old, and appellant Whitener, a licensed vendor of 3.2% beer, brought this action to the attention of US Supreme Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that an Oklahoma statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of “non-intoxicating” 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18 constituted a gender-based discrimination that denied to males 18-20 years of age the equal protection of the laws. A three-judge District Court held that appellees’ statistical evidence regarding young males’ drunk-driving arrests and traffic injuries demonstrated that the gender-based discrimination was substantially related to the achievement of traffic safety on Oklahoma roads. Issue(s) Do Craig and Whitener have standing to sue? Ratio Decidendi The US Supreme Court held that the controversy has been mooted as to Craig. Whitener on the other hand has standing to make the equal protection challenge. Craig, at the time that the US Supreme Court had noted probable jurisdiction, has turned 21 years old hence the decision that the controversy sought by Craig has been mooted. Furthermore, the court also held that there be no prudential objective thought to be served by limitations of jus tertii (third party standing) can be furthered here, especially as the District
• Can a case be adjudicated when subject matter jurisdiction is
lacking due to mootness, if adjudication of the suit would resolve an important social issue? Holding and Rule • No. When a federal court’s determination of a legal issue is no longer necessary to compel the result originally sought, the case is moot and federal courts lack the power to hear it. The constitutional basis of the mootness doctrine is found in Article III of the Constitution which requires the existence of a case or controversy. Thus, a real and live controversy must exist at every stage of review. The court held that when the original controversy has disappeared prior to development of the suit, it is deemed moot and a trial must not proceed for
Court has already entertained the constitutional challenge and the parties have sought resolution of the constitutional issue. Whitener, on the other hand, has established jus tertii or third party standing. She suffers “injury in fact” since the challenged statutory provisions are addressed to vendors like her, who either must obey the statutory provisions and incur economic injury or disobey the stature and suffer sanctions. As such, the US Supreme Court has determined that vendors, in similar circumstance as Whitener, may resist efforts to restrict their operations by advocating the rights of third parties seeking access to their market. Case 11 – Mona Luisa De Guzman FRANCISCO S. TATAD, et. al. vs. HON. JESUS B. GARCIA & EDSA LRT CORPORATION, LTD. G.R. No. 114222 April 6, 1995 Facts. EDSA LRT Consortium, a foreign corporation, was awarded with the construction of Light Rail Transit III (LRT III) as the only bidder who has qualified with the requirements provided by the PBAC. The said foreign corporation will construct the LRT III in a “Built-Lease-Transfer” agreement that such public utility will be leased by the government through the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and then it would be subsequently sold by the corporation to the government. An objection was raised by the petitioner stating that the awarding of the bid to the said corporation is against the Constitution. It was provided in the Constitution that only Filipinos are entitled to operate a public utility such as the LRT III. Issue(s) Is the EDSA LRT Consortium against the Constitution (pertaining to the concept of this issue as an issue of transcendental importance to the public)? Ratio Decidendi The Court held that EDSA LRT Consortium is not against the provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that “operation” of a public utility should be by Philippine Government. In this case the consortium pertains not to operation but rather on the ownership in the facilities and equipment to serve the public. The said corporation awarded the Consortium Contract will only own the facilities and equipment such as the train carts, the railings and the
booths. In addition, such ownership will then be subsequently transferred to the government under Built-Lease-Transfer agreement. Case 12 – Ferdinand Maquirang II KILOSBAYAN, INC., et. al. vs. GUINGONA, et. al. G. R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994 FACTS: This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the “Contract of Lease” executed by the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation in connection with the on-line lottery system, also know as “lotto.” Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. It submitted that said contract of lease violated Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as amended by B. P. Blg. 42. Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that the issues of “wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial reviews;” and that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant petition. 2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid. RULING: As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the procedural technicality in view of the importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted the liberal policy on locus standi to allow the ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to initiate and prosecute actions to question the validity or constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions, or rulings of various government agencies or instrumentalities. Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign.” The language of the section is clear that with respect
to its franchise or privilege “to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities,” the PCSO cannot exercise it “in collaboration, association or joint venture” with any other party. This is the unequivocal meaning and import of the phrase. By the exception explicitly made, the PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of the methods mentioned, nor can it transfer, assign or lease such franchise. Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged Contract of Lease is hereby declared contrary to law and invalid. Prepared by: Fernando H. Maquirang II Kilosbayan, Incorporated, et. al. vs. Teofisto Guingona, PCSO and PGMC 05 May 1994 G.R. No. 113375 Ponente: Davide, JR., J. FACTS: The PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating on an online lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, with its affiliate, the International Totalizator Systems, Inc. became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. Considering the citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40% by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors. An open letter was sent to President Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of an online lottery system due to ethical and moral concerns, however the project pushed through. ISSUES: Whether the petitioners have locus standi (legal standing); and Whether the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in light of Sec. 1 of R.A. 1169 as amended by B.P. Blg. 42. RULING: 1. The petitioners have locus standi due to the transcendental importance to the public that the case demands. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic and moral well-being of the people. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition, and in the exercise of its sound discretion, the Court brushes aside the procedural barrier. 1. 2.
Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign.” The language of the section is clear that with respect to its franchise or privilege “to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities,” the PCSO cannot exercise it “in collaboration, association or joint venture” with any other party. This is the unequivocal meaning and import of the phrase. By the exception explicitly made, the PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of the methods mentioned, nor can it transfer, assign or lease such franchise.
Case 12 – Jane Sudario Wednesday, April 20, 2011 Case Digest: Kilosbayan, Incorporated, et. al. vs. Teofisto Guingona, PCSO and PGMC 05 May 1994 G.R. No. 113375 Ponente: Davide, JR., J. Source: http://reenfab.blogspot.com/2011/04/case-digest-kilosbayanincorporated-et.html FACTS: The PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating on an online lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, with its affiliate, the International Totalizator Systems, Inc. became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. Considering the citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40% by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors. An open letter was sent to President Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of an online lottery system due to ethical and moral concerns, however the project pushed through. ISSUES: Whether the petitioners have locus standi (legal standing); and Whether the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in light of Sec. 1 of R.A. 1169 as amended by B.P. Blg. 42. RULING: The petitioners have locus standi due to the transcendental importance to the public that the case demands. The ramifications of such issues
immeasurably affect the social, economic and moral well-being of the people. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition, and in the exercise of its sound discretion, the Court brushes aside the procedural barrier. Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign.” The language of the section is clear that with respect to its franchise or privilege “to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities,” the PCSO cannot exercise it “in collaboration, association or joint venture” with any other party. This is the unequivocal meaning and import of the phrase. By the exception explicitly made, the PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of the methods mentioned, nor can it transfer, assign or lease such franchise. Case 13 – Rona Marzo KILOSBAYAN, et. al. vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, et. al. G. R. No. 118910 FACTS: This is a petition seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in G. R. No. 113373, 232 SCRA 110. Petitioners contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with and violative of PCSO’s charter and the decision of the Supreme Court of 5 May 1995, that it violated the law on public bidding of contracts as well as Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution in relation to the COA Circular No. 85-55-A. Respondents questioned the petitioners’ standing to bring this suit. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because some cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of the law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. And they do not have present substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit. Case 14 – Rona Marzo Philippine Constitution Association, petitioner vs. Enriquez, respondent Facts:
RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled “An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines from January 1 to December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes” was approved by the President and vetoed some of the provisions. Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court. PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994. 16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and the National Treasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt services. Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s, DPWH, and Nat’l Highway Authority. Issue: Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and valid? Held: Special Provision on Debt Ceiling – Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire item/appropriation. VETO VOID. Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCU’s – said provision allows for the use of income & creation of revolving fund for SCU’s. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCU’s enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Road Maintenance – Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID. Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. – AFP modernization, prior approval of Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto. Any prov. blocking an admin. action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be subj. of a separate law. VETO VALID. Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions – allows Chief of Staff to augment pension funds through the use of savings. According to the Constitution, only the Pres. may exercise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID. Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGU’s – use of special fund for the compensation of the said CAFGU’s. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID. Case 17 – Anthony Andaleza People vs. Vera [GR 45685, 16 November 1937] First Division, Laurel (J): 4 concur, 2 concur in result Facts: The People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al." (Criminal case 42649) of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila and GR 41200 of the Suprme Court. Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case. The information in the said criminal case was filed with the CFI on 15 October 1931, HSBC intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the testimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the CFI, on 8 January 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty
ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, HSBC. Upon appeal, the court, on 26 March 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from 5 years and 6 months of prision correccional to 7 years, 6 months and 27 days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on 17 December 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on 18 December 1935. Cu Unjieng thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in November, 1936. The Supreme Court, on 24 November 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu Unjieng for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment. Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation on 27 November 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The CFI of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same 18 June 1937. Thereafter, the CFI of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on 5 April 1937. On 2 April 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on 5 April 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act 4221. On 28 June 1937, Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution, concluding that Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by the Supreme court in GR 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation. On 3 July 1937, counsel for Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An
alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on 13 July 1937. This was supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on 14 July 1937. The aforesaid motions were set for hearing on 31 July 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel for Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court. On 6 August 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commit Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment. On 10 August 1937, Judge Vera issued an order requiring all parties including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on 14 August 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of both motions. The judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on 21 August 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on 19 August 1937. But at this juncture, HSBC and the People came to the Supreme Court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the CFI of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order by the Supreme Court on 21 August 1937. Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present case. Held: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the SolicitorGeneral and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an
invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. Case 18 – Amor Gutierrez Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000 FACTS : On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a military bases agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by the US military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the US entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels and aircraft. In 1991, with the expiration of RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military exercises between the two countries were held in abeyance. However, the defence and security relationship continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty. On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Negotiations by both panels on VFA led to a consolitdated draft text and a series of conferences. Eventually, President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA. On October 5, 1998 President Joseph E. Estrada ratified the VFA thru respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting thru Executive Secretary Zamora officially transmitted to the Senate, the Instrument of Ratification, letter of the President and the VFA for approval. It was approved by the Senate by a 2/3 vote of its members. On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an exchange of notes between Secretary Siazon and US Ambassador Hubbard. The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the constitutionality of the VFA and imputing grave abuse of discretion to respondents in ratifying the agreement. ISSUE : Whether or not the VFA is unconstitutional. RULING : Petition is dismissed. The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. Sec. 21 Art. VII, which respondent invokes, reads: “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the Members of the Senate. Sec. 25 Art. XVIII provides : “After the
expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the RP and the US concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in and when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the Senateby the other contracting state”. The first cited provision applies to any form of treaties and international agreements in general with a wide variety of subject matter. All treaties and international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage or particular designation requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective. In contrast, the second cited provision applies to treaties which involve presence of foreign military bases, troops and facilities in the Philippines. Both constitutional provisions share some common ground. The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Sec. 21 Art. VII, and that Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision is immaterial. Undoubtedly, Sec. 25 Art. XVIII which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases and troops should apply in the instant case. Hence, for VFA to be constitutional it must sufficiently meet the following requisites : a) it must be under a treaty b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate, and when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State There is no dispute in the presence of the first two requisites. The third requisite implies that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. They are equally binding obligations upon nations. Therefore, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the constitution. The court also finds that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the executive department as to their power to ratify the VFA. Case 18 – Benjie Arceta G. R. No. 138570 October 10, 2000 Bayan vs Zamora
Facts: The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it by (2/3) votes. Cause of Action: Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not Section 21, Article VII. Following the argument of the petitioner, under the provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities´ may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met: a) it must be a treaty, b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and c) recognized as such by the other contracting state. Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least twothirds of all the members of the senate. ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution? Ratio Decidendi: Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate. The Constitution makes no distinction between ³transient´ and permanent. We find nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines. It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty Case 19 – Benjie Arceta Gonzales v Narvasa
G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000 Facts: On December 9, 1999, a petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. In his capacity as citizen and as taxpayer, he seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Petitioner also prays that the Executive Secretary be compelled through a mandamus to furnish the petitioner with information requesting the names of executive officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacañang. Issue: Whether or not petitioner possesses the requisites of filing a suit as a citizen and as taxpayer. Ratio Decidendi: The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have standing to bring suit as citizen. Petitioner did not in fact show what particularized interest they have to bring the suit. As civic leaders, they still fall short of the requirements to maintain action. Their interest in assailing the EO does not present to be of a direct and personal character. Furthermore, they do not sustain or are in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement. As taxpayers, petitioners cannot attack the EO. There is no appropriation granted from Congress but only an authorization by the president. There being exercise by Congress of its taxing and spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the PCCR’s creation. The petitioner has failed to show that he is a real party in interest. With regards to the petitioner’s request of disclosure to public information, the Court upheld that citizens may invoke before the courts the right to information. When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition with the exception that respondent Executive Secretary is ordered to furnish petitioner with the information requested. Case 19 – Ryan Floyd Sorolla Case Digest on Gonzales v. Narvasa Right to Information G.R. No. 140835 (August 14, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner wrote a letter to the Executive Secretary requesting for information with respect to the names of executive officials holding multiple positions, copies of their appointments, and a list of recipients of luxury vehicles previously seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to the Office of the President. Petitioner filed this petition to compel the Executive Secretary to answer his letter. HELD: It is the duty of the Executive Secretary to answer the letter of the petitioner. The letter deals with matters of public concern, appointments to public offices and utilization of public property. The Executive Secretary is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of appointment papers