CASE DIGESTS LEGAL SEPARATION I A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001 (Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No.

99706-MTJ) HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent. RESOLUTION DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: Facts: Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children were born out of that marriage.2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.3 When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated." Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.4 According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.

Issue: WON the respondent Judge committed gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage. Held: Article 34 of the Family Code provides: No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage. For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur: 1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other; 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.6 Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated." Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage
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is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.7 The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar. Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application to judges,8 who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.9 And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10 II AIDA P. BAÑEZ, petitioner, vs. GABRIEL B. BAÑEZ, respondent GR 132592

Facts: The Regional Trial Court of Cebu decided Civil Case No. CEB-16765, decreeing among others the legal separation between petitioner Aida Bañez and respondent Gabriel Bañez on the ground of the latter’s sexual infidelity; the dissolution of their conjugal property relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of respondent’s one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children; the payment to petitioner’s counsel of the sum of P100,000 as attorney’s fees to be taken from petitioner’s share in the net assets; and the surrender by respondent of the use and possession of a Mazda motor vehicle and the smaller residential house located at Maria Luisa Estate Park Subdivision to petitioner and the common children within 15 days from receipt of the decision. Thereafter, petitioner filed an urgent exparte motion to modify said decision, while respondent filed a Notice of Appeal. The trial court granted petitioner Aida Banez’ urgent ex-parte motion to modify the decision on October 1, 1996 by approving the Commitment of Fees dated December 22, 1994; obliging petitioner to pay as attorney’s fees the equivalent of 5% of the total value of respondent’s ideal share in the net conjugal assets; and ordering the administrator to pay petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Adelino B. Sitoy, the sum of P100,000 as advance attorney’s fees chargeable against the aforecited 5%.[4] In another motion to modify the decision, petitioner Aida Bañez sought moral and exemplary damages, as well as litigation expenses. On October 9, 1996, she filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Respondent Gabriel Bañez filed a consolidated written opposition to the two motions, and also prayed for the reconsideration of the October 1, 1996 order. After several exchanges of petitions and motions, the CA rendered a decision setting aside the October 1, 1996 decision and further denying the motions
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for reconsideration by petitioner. Hence, she filed the instant case before the SC alleging that the CA erred in setting aside the questioned order. She further alleged that an action for legal separation is among the cases where multiple appeals may be taken. According to her, the filing of a record on appeal, pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,[13] is required in this case. However, since respondent failed to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period as provided under the Rules of court (Sec 1-b, Rule 50), the same should be dismissed Issue: WON multiple appeals may be allowed in an action for legal separation? Held: NO xxx Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with accounting, in actions for partition of property with accounting, in the special civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final. In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that may allegedly be the subject of multiple appeals arose from the same cause of action, and the subject matter pertains to the same lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in that case would only be violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals. The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The issues involved in the case will necessarily relate to the same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation.[19] They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by

the court and become final prior to or apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of legal separation.[20] Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals. Petitioner’s alternative prayers that in case we do not dismiss the appeal, we return the records to the trial court and require respondent to file a record on appeal, or we return the records to the trial court and retain only the pleadings and orders relevant to the appeal, are untenable. If we grant the first, we are effectively saying that the instant case is one involving multiple appeals, which it is not. If we allow the second, we are effectively applying by analogy, Section 6, Rule 44 and Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, without petitioner showing support therefor in law or jurisprudence. III PACETE vs. CARRIAGA G.R. No. 53880 March 17, 1994 FACTS: Concepcion Alanis and Enrico Pacete were married on April 30, 1938 and had a child. Enrico contracted a second marriage with Clarita dela Concepcion. Alanis learned of it on Aug 1, 1979. Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted
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misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. CFI granted legal separation, conjugal properties half-and-half. Thus, this certiorari. ISSUE: WON CFI gravely abused its discretion in decreeing the legal separation of Enrico Pacete (P) and PR, and held to be null and void ab initio the marriage of P and Clarita Concepcion HELD: Yes, The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.” The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in

actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no c collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. IV SABALONES vs CA GR 106169 Facts: Petitioner Samson Sabalones being a diplomat was assigned in different countries and left to his wife the administration of some of their conjugal properties for 15years. After his retirement he returned to the Philippines but not to his wife and children. After 4 years he filed an action for juridical authorization to sell their property in San Juan which belongs to the conjugal partnership and would use the proceeds of the sale for his hospital and medical treatments. Respondent (wife) opposed the authorization and filed an action for legal separation. Respondent alleges that that the house in San Juan was being occupied by her and their children and the lot in Forbes Park is being leased to Nobimichi Izumi, and that her husband never returned to them being the legitimate family and lived in a separate house in Fairview with Thelma Curameng and their children. Judge Umali found that petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage with Thelma Curameng. Court granted the decree of legal separation and the petitioner is not entitled to share in the conjugal properties and he is not entitled to support from his respondent wife. Decision of lower court was appealed and was granted the writ of preliminary injunction filed by the respondent to enjoin the petitioner from interfering in the administration of their properties.
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1996. and that Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna. contesting Rosanna’s claim for death benefits. In April 1997. AGUAS. Rosanna and Jeylnn file a claim/petition for the Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the Social Security Commission (SSC). Aguas. In an investigation. the CA rendered a decision in favor of Rosanna. now joined them as claimant. No. V Page 5 of 47 . it is necessary to protect the interest of the respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal assets.Petitioner argues that the law provides for joint administration of conjugal properties and no injunctive relief can be issued against the other because no right will be violated. Rosanna indicated in her claim that Pablo was likewise survived by his minor child. Injunction has not permanently installed the respondent as the administrator of the whole conjugal assets Presence of 2 requirements of valid injunction: ○ ○ Existence of rights of the respondents to a share of the conjugal estate There is evidence that entrusting the estate to the petitioner may result to the irresponsible disposition of assets that would cause injury to his wife and children ONG VS ONG VI SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM. it was reported that the deceased had no legal children with Rosanna and that Rosanna left the deceased six years before his death and lived with Romeo while she was still pregnant with Jenelyn. ROSANNA H. Rosanna was advised to refund to the SSS the amount representing the total death benefits released to her and Jenelyn. Primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the subject of the action of the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiffs respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit. filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits. Her claim for monthly pension was settled. Pablo’s sister. Pablo’s surviving spouse. Twin requirements of valid injunction: ○ Existence of a right ○ Actual or threatened violation ○ Article 61: after further petition for legal separation has been filed. 2006 Facts: Pablo Aguas died on December 8. Aguas. who also claimed to be the child of the deceased and Rosanna. AGUAS. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode approximately more than six years before.R. Respondents. represented by her Legal Guardian. and minor JEYLNN H. Petitioner. vs. The SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnn’s monthly pension. Rosanna H. SSC rendered a decision denying the claims for lack of merit and ordering Rosanna to immediately refund the SSS. Jeylnn. Janet H. ROSANNA H. AGUAS. the trial court shall in the absence of a written agreement between the couple would appoint either one of the spouses or a 3rd person to act as the administrator. the SSS received a sworn letter from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac. On Appeal. 165546 February 27. AGUAS. G. JANET H. and lived with another man. Issue: WON article124 is applicable as regards to joint administration of conjugal properties Held: Grant for preliminary injunction is valid.

Alice Page 6 of 47 . there is no showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime. she was still dependent on him for support even if they were already living separately. a Filipino citizen and Richard Upton. In 1983. were married in Hongkong in 1972. as it was established that she is his legitimate child. the parties were divorced in Nevada. He asks that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of that business. No. the Court cannot give said birth certificate the same probative weight as Jeylnn’s because it was not verified in any way by the civil register. it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the husband for support. Alice has remarried in Nevada. In 1982. Jeylnn’s status as a legitimate child can no longer be contested. Indeed. absent any showing to the contrary. Hence." The claimant-spouse must therefore establish two qualifying factors: (1) that she is the legitimate spouse. if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living together at the time of his death. 1985) Facts: Alice Van Dorn. the records show that Janet was merely "adopted" by the spouses. The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the husband. Such presumption may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis. On the other hand. she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death. a husband and wife are obliged to support each other. they resided in the Philippines and begot two children. Under Article 164 of the Family Code. and (2) that she is dependent upon the member for support. can not extend to Janet because her date of birth was not substantially proven. Finally. However. an American citizen. children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. while Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo. Manila is conjugal property of the parties. On the claims of Rosanna. Only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo. his heirs. L-68470 October 8. in exceptional cases. The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164. she cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUNSBAND AND WIFE VII VAN DORN vs ROMILLO JR (G. Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the signature of Pablo. unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself. hence. Rosanna presented a copy of their marriage certificate verified with the civil register. however. United States. But whether or not Rosanna has sufficiently established that she was still dependent on Pablo at the time of his death remains to be resolved. Held: The petition is partly meritorious. In this case. but there are no legal papers to prove it. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or. but whether one is actually dependent for support upon the other is something that has to be shown. Richard filed suit against Alice with the RTC stating that her business in Ermita.R. After the marriage. Respondents submitted a photocopy of Janet’s alleged birth certificate. she must prove that she was "the legitimate spouse dependent for support from the employee. and that Richard be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Conversely. it cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone. it bears stressing that for her to qualify as a primary beneficiary.Issue: Whether or not respondents are entitled to the pension benefit. this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. under our laws. 1980. or more than five months after the Page 7 of 47 . observe respect and fidelity. 1986. In this case. this petition. pursuant to his national law. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as her husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. provided they are valid according to their national law. aliens may obtain divorces abroad. which may be recognized in the Philippines. However. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code. were married in Germany.moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11. 1982. hence. and render support to Richard. Alice should not be obliged to live together with. However. and Private Respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling. On January 15. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court. Hence. Issue: Whether or not Richard still has the right over the alleged conjugal properties. Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. Alice has to be considered still married to Richard and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109 of the Civil Code cannot be just. barred by prior judgment. filed an action for legal separation. Alice contends that Richard is estopped from claiming on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. 1983. a German national. the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot. VIII PILAPIL vs IBAY SOMERA GR 80116 Facts: Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil. In her petition. divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction. on the other hand. Manila where their only child. was born on April 20. the divorce in Nevada released Richard from the marriage from the standards of American law. support and separation of property. The couple lived together for some time in Malate. Isabella Pilapil Geiling. 1986. on June 27. under which divorce dissolves the marriage. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. Richard avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy. Richard is no longer the husband of Alice. which validly exercised jurisdiction over him. a Filipino citizen. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss. To maintain that. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April. The decree is binding on Richard as an American citizen. and whose decision he does not repudiate. Petitioner. such disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January. After about three and a half years of marriage. Ruling: There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. 1982. Thus. especially if the same is contrary to public policy.

Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. 2006. 2006.issuance of the divorce decree. her husband. Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate residence from her husband. 2008 WON Norlaine is disqualified for running as mayor on the ground of failure to comply with one-year residence. IX LIMBONA vs COMELEC GR# 181097 / JUNE 25. does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint. However. Mohammad G. Issue: Whether or not the complainant. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. Art. Lanao del Norte for May 2007 National and Local Elections. The Comelec found that Mohammad. petitioner's husband. the court shall decide. as well as four other crimes against chastity. then it follows that petitioner effected the change of her domicile also on November 11. private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. the crime of adultery. Issue: Held: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. and that her domicile by operation of law (by virtue of marriage) is Rapasun. and as there is no evidence Page 8 of 47 . it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status. respect and fidelity. Facts: Petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona (Norlainie). Lanao del Norte. Lanao del Norte only on November 11. Ruling: We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioner's domicile of origin is Maguing. a foreigner. and render mutual help and support. Norlainie filed a new certificate of candidacy as substitute candidate for Mohammad. being no longer the husband of petitioner. and respondent Malik "Bobby" T. The husband and wife are obliged to live together. Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code provide: Art. capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. In case of disagreement. COMELEC disqualified Mohammad. such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. Limbona (Mohammad). private respondent. Consequently. Marawi City. adultery. which is also her place of birth. Malik filed a petition for disqualification against Mohammed on the ground that it failed to comply with the one-year residence rule. while still married to said respondent. 69. 68. Alingan (Malik) were mayoralty candidates in Pantar. effected the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar. Since it is presumed that the husband and wife live together in one legal residence. Thus. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action. observe mutual love.

R. ERLINDA I. we shall discuss the issues thus: First. 2000. Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his wife. 1999. how the Court will conduct the same. HON. ILUSORIO. Erlinda K. Erlinda K. ILUSORIO. G. for failure to comply with the residency requirement.14 She claimed that her two children were using their sick and frail father to sign away Potenciano and Erlinda's property to companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia. Ilusorio. at 10:00 a. Erlinda cannot now deny that she wanted Potenciano Ilusorio to live with her. However.. filed a petition with the Court of Appeals1 for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium. the very root cause of the entire petition is her desire to have her husband's custody. Ilusorio sought custody of her husband was that respondents Lin and Sylvia were illegally restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of property rights out of pure greed. respondents. reliance on these provisions of the Family Code is proper and is in consonance with human experience. No. Issue(s): The Court laid down the issues to be resolved. G. Second. ERLINDA K. and (c) If relevant.to prove otherwise.7 What is now before the Court is Erlinda's motion to reconsider the decision.2 This case was . vs.9 Held: Nevertheless. Ilusorio. On March 11. Ilusorio claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in consortium and that Potenciano's mental state was not an issue. Thus. Lanao del Norte. No. Erlinda K. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. without requiring the mandatory presence of the parties.8 On September 20. One reason why Erlinda K. Bildner and Sylvia K. (b) Whether the same is relevant. for emphasis. SYLVIA K. 139808 Facts: Once again we see the sad tale of a prominent family shattered by conflicts on expectancy in fabled fortune. Potenciano Ilusorio. vs. MA.R. we dismissed the petition for habeas corpus4 for lack of merit. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. 1999. m. ERLINDA K. 139789 x--------------------------------------------------------x POTENCIANO ILUSORIO. petitioners. we set the case for preliminary conference on October 11. However. 1999. Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to have custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio. petitioner is disqualified to run for the office of mayor of Pantar. on October 11. Thus. to wit: (a) To determine the propriety of a physical and medical examination of petitioner Potenciano Ilusorio. JOHN DOES and JANE DOES. ILUSORIO. She also argued that since Potenciano retired as director and officer of Baguio Country Club and Philippine Oversees Page 9 of 47 X IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF POTENCIANO ILUSORIO. 2000. On May 12. petitioner's disqualification would not result in Malik's proclamation who came in second during the special election. the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable from her husband some years ago. the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject. petitioner. On April 5. and granted the petition5 to nullify the Court of Appeals' ruling6 giving visitation rights to Erlinda K. Erlinda I. ILUSORIO-BILDNER.13 Clearly. respondents. ILUSORIO-YAP. asserting that he never refused to see her. 2000. consolidated with another case3 filed by Potenciano Ilusorio and his children.

2000 POTENCIANO ILUSORIO. Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from various ailments. there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano. May 12. Thus. We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose whether to see his wife or not. these are matters that may be threshed out in a separate proceeding. G. Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code support her position that as spouses. Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. 139789. respect and fidelity. Erlinda claimed that the facts mentioned in the decision were erroneous and incomplete.17 We emphasize.R. BILDNER. MA. vs. having separated from bed and board since 1972. As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the corporation. Hence. 1999.20 The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous.21 Obviously. G. she would logically assume his position and control.18 Although there are exceptions to the rule. Marital union is a two-way process. they separated from bed and board for Page 10 of 47 . mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.19 Erlinda failed to show that this is an exceptional instance. they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and care for each other. respondents. The hornbook doctrine states that findings of fact of the lower courts are conclusive on the Supreme Court. vs. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together. conscious of its value as a sublime social institution. In 1972. Petitioner failed to sufficiently convince the Court why we should not rely on the facts found by the Court of Appeals. Again.22 XI ERLINDA K. petitioners. We agree. Third. and SYLVIA ILUSORIO. No. respondents. ERLINDA I. lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. observe mutual love. this is a question of fact that has been decided in the Court of Appeals. Fourth.Telecommunications. Potenciano Ilusorio did not have the mental capacity to decide for himself. For many years. sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness.15 The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at the Court of Appeals on March 23. ILUSORIO. ILUSORIO. Yet. ERLINDA I. 139808.R. Erlinda argued that Potenciano be brought before the Supreme Court so that we could determine his mental state. We see no reason why the High Court of the land need go to such length. JOHN DOE and JANE DOE. irrelevant in habeas corpus. 1942. petitioner. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. We defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty (30) years. May 12. Lin and Sylvia were the ones controlling the corporations. No.16 Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented by his children from seeing anybody and that he had no objection to seeing his wife and other children whom he loved. 2000 Facts: The undisputed facts are as follows: Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. ILUSORIO. Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect. it is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over again. On July 11.

Potenciano’s health deteriorated. 1997.[13] or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. poor eyesight and impaired judgment. Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse. On the other hand. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions. namely: Ramon Ilusorio (age 55). Sylvia (age 49). Issue(s): May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss? The answer is no. On February 25. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus. The children. and absent any true restraint on his liberty. Ayala Ave. Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. Marietta (age 48). Makati. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. Held: As heretofore stated. after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City. Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court. upon Potenciano’s arrival from the United States. The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. She alleged that respondents[11] refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.. the spouses had six (6) children. To justify the grant of the petition. Being of sound mind. 1998. alleged that during this time. their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft. where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary. the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium. we have no Page 11 of 47 . Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin). In this case. Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52). frail health. an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in New York.[17] The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective. or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated.S. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age. not merely nominal or moral. and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention. as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms. U. and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.[14] It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium. Out of their marriage. Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. As a consequence. where there is denial of due process. With that declaration. Antipolo City a petition[10] for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latter’s advanced age. On May 31.A. 1999. the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. 1998. he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. and Shereen (age 39).undisclosed reasons. Maximo (age 50). On March 11. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. On December 30.

When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights. Held: NO. he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. and considering that the indebtedness was contracted by the wife only. Under such circumstances. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. "2-C. allegedly owned conjugally by the plaintiff and his former wife Teodora Ong. the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. By reason thereof. Ilusorio. Ong) was carried by Teodora in the aforesaid declaration. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice. The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right. Facts: Plaintiff Ramong Ong filed a complaint for the annulment of auction sale of a parcel of land. 139808. it is paraphernal. In G. 05378. the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it gives visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. coupled with a careful scrutiny of the records of the present Page 12 of 47 XII RAMONG ONG vs. No costs. CA . No costs. in the name of Teodora B. the levy of the subject property not owned exclusively by the wife owned jointly with the husband is improper. Ong and Teodora B. Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. that indicates that the subject property was acquired during the marriage. It is undisputed that the subject parcel was declared solely in the wife's name. in G. R. 139789. 06022 in the name of Ramon C. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subject’s sanity. the property in dispute is presumed to be owned jointly by both spouses. No. p. 4). "2-B". It was the contention of the plaintiff that since the surname "Ong" (which is the surname of the husband Ramon C. The auction sale was made due to failure of the wife to pay her loan obtained from Francisco Boix who lent her money in relation to her own logging business in Camarines Sur. we will deprive him of his right to privacy. but the house built thereon was declared in the name of the spouses. Such assertion of raw. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons. R. naked power is unnecessary. Needless to say. WHEREFORE.reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice. Otherwise. No. The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax declaration of the subject property is not sufficient proof that said property was acquired during the marriage and is therefore conjugal. Plaintiff argued that the subject property is really conjugal which the wife in the case at bar could not legally bind. this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. Issue: WON the property is conjugal. Ong while the house erected thereon was declared under Tax No. Plaintiff based his argument on the fact that the property was "declared. "4") (Decision. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other process. in favor of Francisco Boix. under Tax No. The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. it also emphasized that the same shall be enforced under penalty of contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Ong (Exhibits "B".

whatever profits are earned by the wife from her business go to the conjugal partnership. 203. and is therefore. 160. 1981 a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court. Furthermore. The presumption that property is conjugal (Art. When there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by a spouse. It would only be just and equitable that the obligations contracted by the wife in connection with her business may also be chargeable not only against her paraphernal property but also against the conjugal property of the spouses. Jose Ponce de Leon vs. the party who invokes the presumption that all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership (Art. shall be liable for the obligations incurred by the wife in the course of her business (Arts.C.. petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which. Vol. 140. the wife may engage in business although the husband may object (but subject to certain conditions). could no longer be delivered.650. 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. pp. the rule that should govern in that case is that the wife's paraphernal properties. 114791 FACTS: Private respondents spouses Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7. XIII GO vs CA G. Three times thereafter. According to Justice Ameurfina-Herrera (then Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) in her concurring opinion. Furious at its loss. they found out that the tape had been erased by petitioners and therefore. After a protracted trial. 36 SCRA 289). the court a quo rendered a decision declaring defendants Alex Go and Nancy Go jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs Hermogenes Ong and Jane C. New Civil Code) refers to property acquired during the marriage. Rehabilitation Finance Corp. We hold that the lot in question is paraphernal. on September 14. Martin. In the same manner. Art. et al.case. this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. private respondents filed on September 23. As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court. It is clear from the records that the wife was engaged in the logging business with the husband's knowledge and apparently without any objection on his part. Dumaguete City. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Civil Code.. The acts of the husband show that he gave his implied consent to the wife's engagement in business. When they return. 1981.R. 117 of the Civil Code. 160. which they planned to show to their relatives in the United States where they were to spend their honeymoon. New Civil Code) must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. and 236. Code of Commerce. liable for the personal debts of the wife. 10. in Dumaguete City. T. 7th Judicial District. et al. even assuming for the sake of argument that the property in dispute is conjugal. 1993. the newlyweds tried to claim the video tape of their wedding. Ong. 1970 Revised Edition. however. the recent case of PNB vs. as well as those of their conjugal partnership. Court of Appeals. the fact that the title is in the spouse's name is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. After all. The video coverage of the wedding was provided by petitioners at a contract price of P1. 117. (Cobb-Perez. No. Commercial Laws. 14-15). And this presumption under Art. cited in Commentaries on Phil. Branch 33. Lantin. 1. 172. Dissatisfied with the decision.00. Under Art. Page 13 of 47 . 23 SCRA 637. 153 SCRA 435 affirms that: When the property is registered in the name of the a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse. vs. and thrice they failed because the tape was apparently not yet processed. the same may still be held liable for the debts of the wife in this case.

00 on September 23. The RTC dismissed the case and ruled in favour of Agapay.Hence. In the instant case. pursuant to the principle that contracts produce effect only as between the parties who execute them. Miguel and Carlina’s only child. Palang. 1975 when she was only 22 years old. Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. the respondent court reversed the trial court’s decision and declared Carlina and Herminia Palang the owners of the properties in question. 1979. but this was disclaimed by the notary public saying that the money used to buy the property was given by Miguel. Two years later. this petition. Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda Agapay. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money Page 14 of 47 PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUNSBAND AND WIFE XIV AGAPAY VS PALANG Facts: Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage with Carlina (or Cornelia) on July 16. ISSUE: WON the husband. A few months after the wedding. Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a deed of donation as a form of compromise agreement. Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia filed an action for recovery of ownership and possession of the Riceland and house and lot both located at Binalonan. Kristopher A. Pangasinan was also purchased by Erlinda as sole vendee. On October 1975. 63 yr old Miguel contracted a second marriage with 19 yr old Erlinda Agapay. On July 11. Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe. The parties agreed to donate their conjugal property to their only child. Atty. Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20. was born on May 12. 1949. Consequently.dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial courts decision. 1950.000. Herminia Palang. In 1979. Zambales. On appeal. the wife may exercise any profession. Miguel died. On July 15. The trial court found that as early as 1957. Binalonan Pangasinan. 1973. occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. A house and lot in Binalonan. When he returned for good in 1972. SC is convinced that it was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the contract with private respondent. Miguel refused to stay with Carlina but stayed alone in a house in Pozorrubio. Pangasinan. petitioner Alex Go is jointly and severally liable with his wife Nancy Go regarding the pecuniary liabilities imposed HELD: No. in October 1949. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Petitioner Alex Go is absolved from any liability to private respondents and that petitioner Nancy Go is solely liable to said private respondents for the judgment award. he left for work in Hawaii. SC rules that she is solely liable to private respondents for the damages awarded below. During his visit in 1964 to the Philippines. Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the Family Code). Held: With respect to the house and lot. Herminia Palang. Miguel and Erlinda had a son. Two months earlier. he stayed with his brother in . Issue: WON the house and lot in Pangasinan is a valid donation by Miguel to Erlinda. Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint.

Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. 1944.Locquiao. When the donor died. the donees were gifted with four (4) parcels of land.C. in consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of the future spouses. 18383. 1973 wherein they distributed among only three (3) of them. that the donation did not observe the form required by law as there was no written acceptance on the document itself or in a separate public instrument. respondent Benito Locquiao (hereafter. They registered the Inventario Ti Sagut with the Office of the Register of Deeds on May 15. Petitioners Romana and Constancia filed a Complain for the annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title No. and. denominated as Inventario Ti Sagut in favor of their son. in consideration of the impending marriage of the donees.for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda's name alone be placed as the vendee.T. The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda. 84897 was issued in the name of the respondents Benito and Tomasa. respondents. Unlike ordinary donations. especially as regards the formal essential requisites. that the Inventario Ti Sagut is spurious. petitioners. the original title was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. Under the Old Civil Code. In due course. No. 1985.R. By the terms of the deed. Tomasa Mara and the Registrar of Deeds of Pangasinan. donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property don ated must be specifically Page 15 of 47 .Valencia and Constancia L. but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.” The distinction is crucial because the two classes of donations are not governed by exactly the same rules. 1970. the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union. including Respondent Benito. excluding the land in question and other lots disposed of by the Locquiao spouses earlier. Respondentsdonees took their marriage vows on June 4. the 6 heirs left . the twelve (12) parcels of land left by their common progenitors. Issue: Whether or not the donation propter nuptias is valid? Held: Yes the donation propter nuptias is valid. Disagreements arose among them. Valencia. G. Moreover. including the land in question. respondent Benito) and his prospective bride. respondent Tomasa Mara. that the notary public who notarized the document had no authority to do so. VS Benito A. 1944 and the fact of their marriage was inscribed at the back of O. executed a Deed of Partition with Recognition of Rights on March 18. No. 84897 against respondents Benito and Tomasa before the RTC of Pangasinan on December 23. 122134 Facts: On May 22. donations propter nuptias or donations by reason of marriage are those “made before its celebration. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of the transfer certificate of title was fraudulent. XV ARCABA VS BATOCAEL XVI Romana Locquiao. under Article 739 of the Civil Code. as well as a male cow and onethird (1/3) portion of the conjugal house of the donor parents. for otherwise. now deceased and substituted by Jimmy Locquiao. Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao(donor) executed a deed of donation propter nuptias which was written in the Ilocano dialect.

and found Cecilia and Sunga-Chan solidarily liable for any and all claims of Chua. 94. Absent any indication otherwise. Under the New Civil Code. the celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary couple. Cecilia Sunga. Shellite Gas Appliance Center (Shellite). RTC’s judgment was upheld by the CA. over which a building leased to PNB stood. Manila. Accounting. his widow. SYSTEMS OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY XVII SUNGA – CHAN vs CA GR 164401 Facts: In 1977. and married daughter. SungaChan questions the levy on execution of the subject property on the ground that it is an absolute community property with her husband Norberto Chan. implied acceptance is sufficient. Page 16 of 47 . it does not matter whether or not the donees had accepted the donation. As a consequence. which contains the Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder need be in writing only to be enforceable. express acceptance “is not necessary for the validity of these donations. Chua's subsequent repeated demands for accounting and winding up went unheeded. 1992 may reasonably be considered to have been used for her and her husband's benefit. Then the sheriff levied upon and sold at public auction Sunga-Chan’s property in Paco. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Chua. or by one spouse with the consent of the other. Withal. in tandem with compliance with the prescribed form. It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes. 94 of said Code pertinently provides: Art. or by both spouses. In other words. Article 1403. The records show that spouses SungaChan and Norberto were married after the effectivity of the Family Code. The absolute community of property shall be liable for: x x x (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community. Lamberto Chua and Jacinto Sunga formed a partnership. After Jacinto's death in 1989. Article 1330 of the same Code provides that “acceptance is not necessary to the validity of such gifts”. continued with the business without Chua's consent. The validity of the donation is unaffected in either case. Art. as provided in Article 129. paragraph 2. 1950. their absolute community property may be held liable for the obligations contracted by either spouse. (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited. it is the Old Civil Code which applies in this case since the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30. prompting him to file a Complaint for Winding Up of a Partnership Affairs. the rules are different. However.described.” Thus. the use and appropriation by petitioner SungaChan of the assets of Shellite even after the business was discontinued on May 30. Issue: Whether the absolute community of property of spouses Lilibeth Sunga Chan and Norberto Chan can be lawfully made to answer for the liability of Lilibeth Chan under the judgment. Specifically. Article 127 thereof provides that the form of donations propter nuptias are regulated by the Statute of Frauds. unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. petitioner Lilibeth Sunga-Chan. Held: Yes. Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment. applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code in the determination of the validity of the questioned donation. was enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias under the Old Civil Code. However. Consequently.

Nicolas suffered a stroke and cannot talk anymore. Procopio Villanueva. Spouses Retuya resided at Tipolo. 1926. vs. Angela. is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas Retuya. During their marriage they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City. Written demands were made by plaintiff. the said official issued a certification to file action. In 1945. has no occupation. Salome.R. defendant Nicolas Retuya no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with defendant. Nicolas. she had no properties of her own from which she could derive income. Cebu. Natividad. Witness Natividad Retuya went to Procopio to negotiate because at this time their father Nicolas was already senile and has a childlike mind. to the defendants. In 1985. Napoleon. is their illegitimate son. G. including the illegitimate family asking for settlement but no settlement was reached by the parties. Also. if the properties are acquired during the marriage. petitioners. it is defendant Procopio Villanueva. 1985 and until the present. ISSUE: Whether the conjugal. plaintiff’s witness. under the Family Code. then. having been married to the latter on October 7. The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of Family Code. which they claim is Pacita’s exclusive property. Natividad Retuya. they begot five (5) children. Further. Out of the lawful wedlock. namely. This issue is easily resolved. complained to the Barangay Captain for reconciliation/mediation but no settlement was reached. HELD: Petitioners claim that the subject properties are exclusive properties of Nicolas except for Lot No. The burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Petitioners argue subject properties are Page 17 of 47 . from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas. the presumption is that they are conjugal. Natividad Retuya knew of the physical condition of her father because they visited him at the hospital. is co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City. one of Nicolas’ illegitimate children who has been receiving the income of these properties. Plaintiff. was the only person who received the income of the above-mentioned properties Defendant. She told defendant. NICOLAS RETUYA and PACITA VILLANUEVA. respondents. and Consolacion. through her counsel. Nicolas Retuya. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal. Thus. defendant. 143286 Facts: Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya. then. Pacita Villanueva.COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF EUSEBIA NAPISA RETUYA. defendant Pacita Villanueva had no means of livelihood. Mandaue City. 152. hence. Pacita Villanueva. and Roberta. From the time defendant Nicolas Retuya suffered a stroke on January 27. Procopio that their father was already incapacitated and they had to talk things over and the latter replied that it was not yet the time to talk about the matter. No. testified that the parcel of land covered by tax declaration marked Exhibit "T" was the property bought by her father from Adriano Marababol for at the time of purchase of the property.CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS General Provisions XVIII PROCOPIO VILLANUEVA. wherein defendant.

were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. The presumption of equality of contribution arises only in the absence of proof of their proportionate contributions. proof of actual contribution by both parties is required. Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting in 1936. The cohabitation of a spouse with another person. and the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a 191. Petitioners failed to meet this standard. To this union were born Danilo and Vilma. 152 is conjugal or not. the answer came from petitioners themselves. Simply put. 1968. 152 with her own money. XIX De Leon v. 1965. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. on April 24. even for a long period. We disagree. especially when affirmed by the appellate court. Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Hence. The presumption in Article 116. are still presumed conjugal. Nueva Ecija. What petitioners fail to grasp is that Nicolas and Pacita’s cohabitation cannot work to the detriment of Eusebia. The date of acquisition of Lot No. the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia. the date of Eusebia’s death. including Lot No. the legal spouse. De Leon. The burden of proving that a property is exclusive property of a spouse rests on the party asserting it and the evidence required must be clear and convincing. De Leon GR# 185063 Facts: On July 20. The tax declarations covering the subject properties. all property acquired from 7 October 1926.30 square-meter lot situated in Fairview. on whether Lot No. along with the unrebutted testimony of Eusebia’s witnesses." stands as an obstacle to any claim the petitioners may have. does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Bonifacio O. We give due deference to factual findings of trial courts. 152. Petitioners failed to show proof of actual contribution by Pacita in the acquisition of Lot No.that Eusebia failed to prove this prerequisite. Both the trial and appellate courts agreed that the subject properties were in fact acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in a civil rite officiated by the Municipal Mayor of Zaragosa. the date of Nicolas and Eusebia’s marriage. Quezon City. Subsequently. The question of whether the subject properties were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia is a factual issue. then single. which subsists "unless the contrary is proved. petitioners failed to prove that Pacita bought Lot No. The marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia continued to exist regardless of the fact that Nicolas was already living with Pacita. or that she actually contributed her own money to acquire it. A reading of Article 148 readily shows that there must be proof of "actual joint contribution" by both the live-in partners before the property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their contribution. the law would be giving a stamp of approval to an act that is both illegal and immoral. The burden is on petitioners to prove that the subject properties are not conjugal. until 23 November 1996. Finally. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that any of the subject properties was acquired outside or beyond this period. In short. petitioners’ reliance on Article 148 of the Family Code is misplaced. Otherwise. 152. 152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. otherwise there is no co-ownership and no presumption of equal sharing. A reversal of this finding can only occur if petitioners show sufficient reason for us to doubt its correctness. Petitioners in the present case have not. subject to the condition that actual joint contribution is proven first. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. Following the full payment of the cost Page 18 of 47 . Since the subject properties. establish this fact. 152 was purchased on 4 October 1957. Moreover. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16 December 1996.

166 of the Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband may alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership. if not equivalent. as administrator. be with the wife’s consent. Lita. as we have explained. on June 22. Ruling: Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code. To a specific point. 1972 in the name of Bonifacio. Court of Appeals teaches. the sale of a conjugal piece of land by the husband. and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit before the RTC in Quezon City. On February 29. Else. to a contract to sell. provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. So it is that in several cases we ruled that the sale by the husband of property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife is void ab initio. a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property inasmuch as he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC. Issue: WON the property in question is part of the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita. it is not. 173677 was issued on February 24. unlike in a contract of sale where title passes upon delivery of the thing sold. in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor’s obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event. that fraud attended the execution of the Deed of Sale and that subsequent acts of Bonifacio would show that he was still the owner of the parcel of land. The Tarrosas. for PhP 19. In other words. even necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. In fact. as a rule. "single. and husband Felix Rio Tarrosa (Tarrosas). As further alleged. It cannot be over-emphasized that the 1950 Civil Code is very explicit on the consequence of the husband alienating or encumbering any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. must. the sale is not valid. and the properties will still be considered conjugal.000. Bonifacio. They secured the issuance in their names from the Quezon City Register of Deeds. the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed. under civil interdiction.price for the lot thus purchased. 1974 (Deed of Sale) did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. 166 of the Code. In both types of contract. the presumption will still apply. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the property is conjugal." Subsequently. Bonifacio died. they were not aware of the supposed marriage between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale. The nullity. Anita and her children alleged. Since Art. or like causes. petitioners herein. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. Three months later. It is well settled that a conditional sale is akin. PHHC executed. The conveying Deed of Sale dated January 12. among other things. it follows that the acts or transactions executed against this mandatory Page 19 of 47 . even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear. the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage. 1970. absent any showing that the latter is incapacitated. In the case at bar. 1996. in a contract to sell ownership is retained by the seller and is not passed to the buyer until full payment of the price. ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and covered by the PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. so that if the suspensive condition does not take place. RTC ruled in favor of Anita and her children. For the presumption to arise. CA held that the Tarrosas failed to overthrow the legal presumption that the parcel of land in dispute was conjugal. the Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale. proceeds from the fact that sale is in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Art. Danilo. sold the subject lot to her sister. usually the full payment of the purchase price. Accordingly. Anita. In their complaint. as Tan v.

HEIRS OF DOMINGO HERNANDEZ. executed by Hernandez. the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership. in 1958. Sr.R.. DOMINGO V. and from 1983 to 1995 (the time when the Heirs filed the original action) is a period of another 12 years. PLARIDEL MINGOA. in consideration of the amount of P6. The assailed Page 20 of 47 . Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. the sale of his ½ share in the conjugal property was valid. With regard to the consent of his wife.27 Thus. On the other hand. Said property was awarded to Domingo Hernandez. MELANIE MINGOA AND QUEZON CITY REGISTER OF DEEDS. The consent of Domingo Hernandez. From 1966 (the time when the [respondents] were able to possess the property) to 1983 (the time when the [petitioners] had knowledge that the TCT in the name of Hernandez. Sr. took possession of the said property. including a residential house where they presently reside..00. the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate. No. and have made considerable improvements thereon. Notably. DOLORES CAMISURA.provision are void except when the law itself authorized their validity. Sr.. in Camisura’s favor. namely: SERGIA V. hence null and void in accordance with Article 1409 of the Civil Code. Sr.. Petitioners contend that the lack of consent on the part of Sergia Hernandez (the spouse) rendered the SPAs and the deed of sale fictitious. Sergia’s lack of consent to the sale did not render the transfer of her share invalid. had already been cancelled by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City) covers almost a span of 17 years. the Court agrees with the CA that the sale of onehalf of the conjugal property without liquidation of the partnership is void. Title over the said property was issued in 1966 in the name of Hernandez. Sr. thus. Petitioners. and MARIA LEONORA WILMA HERNANDEZ. Sergia Hernandez. to the sale involving their conjugal property. to the contract is undisputed. JR. when it is finally determined that.500. transfers his rights over the subject property to the latter. 1963. after settlement of conjugal obligations. expressly states that the former. SR. 146548 FACTS: Domingo Hernandez. ISSUE: Whether or not the consent of the spouse is necessary for the validity of alienation of conjugal property? HELD: No. The Deed of Transfer of Rights. However. vs.. As a final consideration. G. Sr. was awarded a piece of real property in 1958 by the PHHC as part of the government’s housing program at the time. Sr. Respondents. and does not ripen into a title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. the trial court found that it was lacking because said wife’s signature on the SPA was falsified. a mere expectancy. HERNANDEZ (Surviving Spouse). such deed was simultaneously executed with the SPA on February 14. there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs. which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate. or after dissolution of the marriage. the [respondents] took possession of the said property in 1966 and are in actual and physical possession thereof up to the present. SR. HERNANDEZ. Neither [petitioners] nor Hernandez.26 The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. after full payment for the property was received by the PHHC. It bears stressing that the subject matter herein involves conjugal property.

she or her heirs. The sale of the property to Melanie Mingoa and the issuance of a new title in her name happened in 1978. Joselyn’s sister. 1966. when such consent is required. while their marriage was subsisting. Taylor (Joselyn). Taylor (Benjamin). XXI PHILIPS MATTHEWS vs BENJAMIN and JOSELYN TAYLOR GR 164584 Facts: On June 30. Joselyn and Benjamin.00. On July 20. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift. Joselyn bought from Diosa M. the court may compel her to grant the same. and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 9. 1989. Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin. a 17year old Filipina.000. x x x. Boracay Island. 1992. for and in consideration of P129. Malay. The wife may. the failure of Sergia Hernandez to file with the courts an action for annulment of the contract during the marriage and within ten (10) years from the transaction necessarily barred her from questioning the sale of the subject property to third persons. the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. Sr. Should the wife fail to exercise this right. On June 8. Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the disposition of conjugal property without the wife's consent is not void but merely voidable. Title in the name of Domingo Hernandez. entered into an Agreement of Lease (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years.00. during the marriage. a British subject. covering the subject property was issued on May 23. married Joselyn C. lease. However. In Sps.000. 165.41 we held that: The Family Code. Art. The agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public. All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino. Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee. or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Sps. 1992. or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium. the applicable law is the Civil Code. also using the latter’s funds. 1988. The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. Aklan. However. Petitioner thereafter took possession of Page 21 of 47 . Art. ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent. We quote the applicable provisions. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband. when the sale is made before the effectivity of the Family Code. 173. Borras. Since all these events occurred before the Family Code took effect in 1988. provides that any alienation or encumbrance made by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is void. authorizing the latter to maintain. the provisions of the New Civil Code govern these transactions. Alfredo v. Thus. to wit: Art. 166. and within ten years from the transaction questioned. with an annual rental of P12. and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property. sell.294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent.SPAs were executed in 1963 and 1964. constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. respondent Benjamin A. which took effect on 3 August 1988. Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out. after the dissolution of the marriage. Martin a 1.

To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. any transaction involving said property required his consent. the Agreement of Lease entered into between Joselyn and petitioner cannot be nullified on the grounds advanced by Benjamin. The honorable court of appeals failed to pass upon the counterclaim of petitioner despite the fact that it was not contested and despite the presentation of evidence establishing said claim. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal. he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. If the property were to be declared conjugal. Thus. she acquired sole ownership thereto. no. in the light of cheesman vs. • • Held: Page 22 of 47 . The courts a quo erroneously applied article 96 of the family code of the philippines which is a provision referring to the absolute community of property. The parcel of land subject of the agreement of lease is the exclusive property of jocelyn c. a filipino citizen. Taylor. Issue(s): • The marital consent of respondent benjamin taylor is not required in the agreement of lease dated 20 july 1992. Article 96 of the family code of the philippines finds no application in this case. Benjamin. is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. benjamin taylor is deemed to have given his consent when he affixed his signature in the agreement of lease as witness in the light of the ruling of the supreme court in the case of spouses pelayo vs. as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing. In any event. 1991. being an alien. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his (Benjamin’s) consent. The property regime governing the property relations of benjamin taylor and joselyn taylor is the conjugal partnership of gains because they were married on 30 june 1988 which is prior to the effectivity of the family code. no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed. g. no implied trust was created in his favor. Melki perez.r. june 8. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin’s claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. g. this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land. january 21. we uphold its validity. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have. In fine. 141323. The honorable court of appeals ignored the presumption of regularity in the execution of notarial documents. Granting arguendo that his consent is required. Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated “vendee” in the Deed of Sale of said property. 2005. • • We find and so hold that Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. no. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property. Iac. 74833.r.the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort. and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyn’s husband.

an Austrian. On the contrary. During the course of their relationship. a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued only in the name of respondent and the registration was refused on the part of Jambrich on the ground that he was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. GR 159310 Facts: Wilhelm Jambrich.29 Therefore. Petitioner then filed a complaint for recovery of the real property. In her Answer. would have been declared invalid if challenged. we find it unnecessary to address the other issues raised by the petitioner. being an alien. Page 23 of 47 . she claimed that she "solely and exclusively used her own personal funds to defray and pay for the purchase price of the subject lots in question. that Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of the properties. that the property was already transferred in the name of respondent and had already been mortgaged. has validly obtained the right over the subject property without violating the prohibition under the Constitution. was prohibited to acquire or own real property in the Philippines. DESCALLAR. Believing that his interest in his property with the Agro-Macro Subdivision still exist. who is a resident alien. the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich. HELD: YES. When the deed was presented before the Registry of Deeds for registration. Jambrich’s name was erased from the deed of sale. he discovered.With the foregoing disquisition. ISSUE: WON the petitioner as the successor-ininterest of Jambrich. Petitioner. and. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner." and that Jambrich. The decision was however reversed by CA on appeal.000 relative to the purchases he made from the latter which he was not able to pay. the fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands. he sold the same by way of Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment to petitioner. BORROMEO. in the instant case. that petitioner acquired absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment which Jambrich executed in his favor. had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. As the rule now stands. a Deed of Absolute Sale was issued in their favor by Agro-Macro Subdivision respecting a house and lot where they transferred and lived together. Jambrich met petitioner Camilo Borromeo with whom he was indebted in the amount of P150. with whom he had a live-in relationship with. except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen. When petitioner was about to register the deed. Jambrich adopted the sons of respondent. Sebastian. Consequently. vs. In the meantime. Petitioner alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale over the properties which identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true agreement of the parties since respondent did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price and was not in fact a buyer. respondent belied the allegation that she did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price. who is an Austrian. however.30 the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases31 that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino. ANTONIETTA O. not long after. XXII CAMILO F. In United Church Board for World Ministries v. Respondent. that it was Jambrich alone who paid for the properties using his exclusive funds. was assigned by his employer to work here in the Philippines where he met respondent Antonietta Descallar. the couple broke up and lived separately without settlement of their properties. However. a separated mother of two boys. While still in the Philippines.

1996. created a principal-agent relationship only between his wife. executed a Deed of Sale in favor of respondent. his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor. particularly. Cagayan.the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Catral (Catral). The rationale behind the Court’s ruling in United Church Board for World Ministries.: [W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation [were] void ab initio since [they were] contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines. 1996. the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. may validly redeem the property in question (2) WON the petitioner husband Isaac has a cause of action against his respondent wife Marilou HELD: 1. Applying United Church Board for World Ministries. the real estate mortgage he constituted over the property was foreclosed. as the HMDF was itself the highest bidder at such public auction. Gloria R. and Catral. the RTC dismissed the Complaint and on appeal. YES. as agent. By virtue of a power of attorney executed by Villegas ‘wife. Marilou Catral-Villegas (Marilou) as principal. that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. that he never authorized Catral to administer his properties. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved. as reiterated in subsequent cases. his motherin-law. the debtor. this petition for review. thereafter. Section 6 of Act No. and then only for the latter to administer the properties of the former. As the property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person. by virtue of the same power of attorney. a Filipino citizen. Exclusive Property of Each Spouse XXIII VILLEGAS vs LINGAN GR 153839 FACTS: Isaac Villegas was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Tuguegarao. Hence. herein subject property. 1996. a certificate of sheriffs sale was issued and. ISSUES: (1) WON the wife of the petitioner Isaac. In order to secure the payment of a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). the latter redeemed the property from the HMDF. since from the very wordings of the power of attorney. On December 19. On May 17. Isaac constituted a real estate mortgage over the said parcel of land in favor of DBP. viz. and that Catral had no authority to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the respondent. registered with the Register of Deeds on March 8. Isaac claims that the power of attorney executed in favor of Catral. the property was sold at public auction and. she had no special authority to sell or convey any specific real property.32 is this – since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nation’s land for future generations of Filipinos.When the Isaac failed to settle his loan. yet. Villegas in favor of Gloria Roa Catral. the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him. CA affirmed in toto the RTC Judgment. there would be no more public policy to be protected. 3135 provides that “in all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to. Marilou C. has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid. he being a foreigner. The said loan and mortgage was subsequently transferred by the DBP to the Home Mutual Development Fund (HMDF). as successor-in-interest. or any person having a lien on Page 24 of 47 .

Aquilino Villar entered into an oral partnership agreement for ten years with Agustin Navarra involving Page 25 of 47 . after the death of Petra Unating. she exercised the right of redemption in her own right as successor-in-interest of the petitioner. violates the right of the In the present case. with more reason. petitioner has no valid cause of action against the respondent. may be redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided. as a contract.There was no violation of a legal right of the petitioner. or his spouse or heirs. Under the above provision. then only the parties. A cause of action is an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right of the plaintiff. petitioners wife. Divested of all interest over the property. And where the redemption is made under a property regime governed by the conjugal partnership of gains. is binding only between the contracting parties. Section 27. may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of sale. Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “real property sold as provided in the last preceding section. and. as well as the third person who transacts with the parties themselves.the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold. by the following persons: xxxx a)The judgment obligor. Marilou acquired ownership of the subject property. no such obligation arises in behalf of the defendant. NO. since. there is no property right that exists in favor of the petitioner. It must be stressed that there is no allegation or proof that Marilou redeemed the property in behalf of the petitioner. All rights and title of the judgment obligor are transferred upon the expiration of the right of redemption. herein respondent. 2. Rather. However. as correctly held by the CA. or a person with a joint interest in the property. CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY XXIV PISUEÑA vs HEIRS OF PETRA UNATING GR 132803 Facts: Salvador Upod and Dolores Bautista are the heirs of Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar. They claimed that the land in dispute known as Lot 1201 was registered in the name of Petra Unating married to Aquilino Villar. the agency. the petitioner has ceased to be the proper party who may challenge the validity of the sale. as a rule. The property in question was the exclusive property of Marilou by virtue of her redemption. xxxxx Petition is denied. Under the circumstances. Article 109 of the Family Code provides that property acquired by right of redemption is the exclusive property of the spouses redeeming the property. This rule is a corollary of the foregoing doctrine on the rights of real parties in interest. Consequently. the aggrieved party is Marilou. may question the validity of the agency or the violation of the terms and conditions found therein. and (3) the act or omission of the defendant plaintiff. (2) an obligation of the defendant to respect such right. or any part thereof sold separately. of the Code of Civil Procedure. in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three essential elements:(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises. to respect such right. Moreover. Marilou did not act as agent of the petitioner. or his successor-in-interest in the whole or any part of the property. should there be any right violated. sometime in 1950. and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of section 464 to 466. inclusive. petitioner could have redeemed the property from Marilou after she had redeemed it. Thus. The successor-in-interest of the judgment debtor referred to in the above provision includes a person who succeeds to his property by operation of law. The pleadings filed and the records of this case do not show that petitioner exercised said right.

Felix and Catalina’s inchoate interest in it was actualized. Held: The Court ruled that the lot in dispute can properly be considered as a Ferrer vs Ferrer GR No. son-in-law of Agustin Navarra. When Aquilino Villar died in 1953 without disposing of his one-third share in the disputed property. On the other hand. consequently. and Agustin Navarra on the other hand. a half. Felix and Catalina effectively transferred to Agustin Navarra on February 4. Aquilino Villar was still alive. they had an inchoate interest in their father’s share. However. their title over their two-thirds share in the disputed lot. 1949. by virtue of the Deed of Sale they executed. XXV CHING vs CA GR 124642 XXVI Issue: W/N the lot in dispute is paraphernal property of Petra Unating hence would be covered by the CPG. pursuant to Article 1434 of the present Civil Code. paraphernal property of Petra Unating. and accounting with prayer for injunction and damages. which was already in force at the time of Aquilino’s death in 1953. they filed the instant action for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land against Jessie Pisueña. Concededly. the heirs of Petra Unating repossessed the land in question until the defendant Jessie Pisueña. the court a quo ruled that since the disputed lot was the conjugal property of Spouses Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar. 166496 Facts: Petitioner id the widow of Alfredo Ferrer. as they were not yet owners. And finally. to the entire lot. forcibly took physical possession of the said land from the heirs of Petra Unating. that title passed to Agustin Navarra. She alleged that before her Page 26 of 47 . After trial. reached in adversarial proceedings. She filed a Complaint for payment of conjugal improvements. including policemen. this validity pertained only to the share of the late Petra Unating considering that at the time of the sale. they could not have disposed of their father’s share in the same property at the time. At the most. because succession vested in them the title to their father’s share and. this prima facie presumption cannot prevail over the cadastral court’s specific finding. In 1958 when Agustin Navarra died.the swampy portion of the lot in question consisting of around four hectares which was converted into a fishpond with the investment capital of Agustin Navarra and the net income shall be divided equally between Aquilino Villar and his children Felix Villar and Catalina Villar on one hand. However. And he and his wife purchased the said land from the heirs of Agustin Navarra. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the said decision. as evidenced by Escritura de Venta Absoluta. Thus. sometime in 1982. properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal. that the lot was inherited by Petra Unating from her mother. Thus. being the only children.brother of Respondents. its purported sale by Felix and Catalina Villar. disturbed their possession sometime in 1974. to Agustin Navarra could be considered as valid. with the company of several men. the defendant. sum of money. However. defendant countered that the whole land in dispute was sold by Felix Villar and Catalina Villar to Agustin Navarra. Consequently.

Indeed. as well as the warehouse. however. the latter acquired a piece of lot. 2728 was issued and registered in the names of respondents. in September 1991. subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement. he stopped paying rentals thereon.000. are not petitioner’s spouse nor can they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner for her costs rested. including a residential house and a two-door apartment building. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property. Issue: Whether or not Petitioner has the right to be reimbursed for the cost of improvements under Article 120 of the Family Code? Held: No. Moreover. it was during their marriage that payment of the loan was made using the couple’s conjugal funds. 67927. Otherwise stated. otherwise. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership. that when Alfredo died on 29 September 1999. She alleged that the cost of the improvements amounted to P500. Thus. What is incontrovertible is that the respondents. hence. The Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) covering the purchased lot (Lot no. and TCT. the obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire property is vested. in case the property is sold by the ownerspouse. when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement. However. The subject property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of Article 120 of the Family Code.00. The right of the spouse as contemplated in Article 120 of the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements. 1985. XXVII MBTC vs PASCUAL GR 163744 Facts: Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on January 19. He applied for a loan with the SSS to build improvements thereon. she had the right to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements on Alfredo’s lot. as the case may be. said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse. they constructed a warehouse on the lot. respondents do not have the obligation to respect petitioner’s right to be reimbursed. Petitioner was not able to show that there is an obligation on the part of the respondents to respect or not to violate her right. one-half thereof should be reimbursed and paid by respondents as they are now the registered owners of Alfredo’s lot. alleging that he had acquired ownership over the property by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of respondents. petitioner posited. Manuel and Ismael and their spouses. likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located in Makati City. From their conjugal funds. or at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. 67927 was cancelled. It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts.marriage to Alfredo. TCT No. 156283) was issued in the name of Page 27 of 47 . despite the allegations contained in the Complaint that they are the buyers of the subject premises. No. During the union. According to petitioner. petitioner averred that respondent Manuel occupied one door of the apartment building.

The RTC rendered judgment finding for Nicholson.a. w/c the latter failed. it errs in its theory that. then the presumption of conjugal ownership applies. the RTC. was paraphernal. a Bureau of Internal Revenue employee. Proof of acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. before the Makati RTC a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property.k. in the name of Erlinda Ramirez. Page 28 of 47 . married to Eliseo Carlos (respondents). before conjugal ownership could be legally presumed. (Metrobank). unless it be prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. 1427. 160 of the Civil Code. The disputed property is conjugal. XXVIII MUÑOZ vs RAMIREZ GR 156125 FACTS: Subject of the present case is a seventyseven (77)-square meter residential house and lot located at 170 A. Due to the failure of Florencia and the sps Oliveros to pay their loan obligation. Held: The court ruled in favor of Nicholson. payable within twenty (20) years. 1989. to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to secure a P136. When there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by the spouse. Nicholson Pascual. alleging that the property. mortgaged TCT No. is the applicable legal provision since the property was acquired prior to the enactment of the Family Code. On April 6. not Art. w/c was granted by the Quezon City RTC in 1995. Mandaluyong City (subject property). together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros. 156283. Pascual In 1994. being registered in Florencia’s name.Florencia married to Nelson a. The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. The CA affirmed the RTC but deleted the award moral damages and attorney’s fees. MBTC alleged that the disputed lot.500. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. with Erlinda’s consent. inter alia. As Nicholson aptly points out. Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties. 7650 of the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City in the name of the petitioner. the fact that a title is in the name of the spouse is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. On April 30. This article does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. was mortgaged without his consent. 1427. In the same decision. Issue: Whether or not the subject property is conjugal partnership property under Article 116 of the Family Code. Florencia was declared in default. Art. 1997. including one lot no. obtained a P58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. Eliseo. 2000. Bonifacio Street. 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership. Nicholson filed on June 28. To secure the obligation. if proof obtains on the acquisition of the property during the existence of the marriage. The residential lot in the subject property was previously covered by TCT No. MBTC foreclosed the property.00 housing loan. 116 of the Family Code. there must be a showing that the property was acquired during marriage using conjugal funds. ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the exspouses conjugal partnership of gains. Florencia. While Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 FC. which is still conjugal property.

claiming that there was no sale but only a mortgage transaction. the respondents filed a complaint with the RTC for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale. pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code. two-story residential house on the lot.00 advance.445. and in 1993. 1427. and the documents transferring the title to the petitioner’s name were falsified. and made her sign a document purporting to be the mortgage contract.00 advance to cancel the GSIS mortgage.000.00 loan. and demanded that Erlinda return the P200. the petitioner kept the title. 1427. The petitioner countered that there was a valid contract of sale. for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Eliseo. 7650 had been issued in the petitioner’s name.000. Pursuant to Articles 92 and 109 of the Family Code. since Erlinda could not return the P200.66.00 balance and to cancel the mortgage. In the present case. unsigned. properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse. is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. the subject property. 1992. for a stated consideration of P602.000. clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership. whether the acquisition appears to have been made. 1427 with the GSIS mortgage cancelled. the title to the subject property was transferred to the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale. in May 1992. executed by Erlinda. and submits an affidavit signed by Eliseo stating that he waives all his rights to the subject property. Applying the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas v. The CA decided the appeal on June 25. 1993). they discovered that TCT No. 1427. contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses.687. when the respondents failed to repurchase the subject property within the one-year period despite notice. but returned Eliseo’s affidavit. since Eliseo’s affidavit was unsigned.000. The respondents then constructed a thirty-six (36)-square meter. Hon. shall be excluded from the Page 29 of 47 property is . the petitioner gave Erlinda a P200. It found that the subject property was Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property that was inherited from her father. 1997. the CA declared void the deed of absolute sale. all property acquired during the marriage. 1993.00 advance because it had been used to pay the GSIS loan.000. Erlinda paid GSIS P176. ISSUE: Whether the subject paraphernal or conjugal. 2002. 1992 to April 30.000. He alleged that the respondents sold the subject property to him after he refused their offer to mortgage the subject property because they lacked paying capacity and were unwilling to pay the incidental charges. became conjugal property when it was used as collateral for a housing loan that was paid through conjugal funds – Eliseo’s monthly salary deductions. HELD: As a general rule. Thus. to be secured by a first mortgage on TCT No.00 advance.00 balance when Erlinda surrenders TCT No. 1993. the RTC dismissed the complaint.00. he caused the transfer of title in his name on July 14. On September 24. Erlinda surrendered to the petitioner the clean TCT No. the CA held that the subject property. and set aside the RTC decision. the petitioner granted them a P600. originally Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property. cannot be validly sold or mortgaged without Eliseo’s consent. 1993.000. during the marriage. cancelling TCT No.through monthly salary deductions of P1.000. the sale was with the implied promise to repurchase within one year. The respondents alleged that in April 1992.1427 in their name. In a Decision dated January 23. during which period (from May 1. the petitioner promised to give the P402. dated April 30.00. therefore.27 to cancel the GSIS mortgage on TCT No. the respondents would lease the subject property for a monthly rental of P500. the petitioner refused to give the P402. Fortun. with the P200. On July 14.

XIX Imami v. including herein petitioner. The court held that they cannot subscribe to the CA’s misplaced reliance on Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas.825.76. with the enactment of the Family Code on August 3. Considering the P136. the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership.755.. but to no avail. except with respect to rights then already vested. Jr.community property and be the exclusive property of each spouse. said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse. when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement. including Article 158.00). Metrobank made several demands for payment upon CPDTI. and not the Civil Code. not the entire amount of the GSIS housing loan plus interest.00 and P63. Inc. otherwise. we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS loan through monthly salary deductions. likewise subject to reimbursement improvement. the Civil Code provisions on conjugal partnership of gains. Benedicto C. RTC ruled in favor of Page 30 of 47 . This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties.445. The residential lot.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan. Later. Under this provision. Cynthia C. is Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property. Article 120 of the Family Code. 1989. The NBI finding that Eliseo’s signatures in the special power of attorney and affidavit were forgeries was immaterial.45. From April 6.76 amount paid by Eliseo through monthly salary deductions. CPDTI obtained loans of P100. and Nicolas Ponce as her co-sureties. of the cost of the In the present case. subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement. However. 1981. Article 105 of the Family Code states: x x x x The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code. As the respondents were married during the effectivity of the Civil Code. The loans were evidenced by promissory notes signed by Cesar and Nieves Dazo. 1992. Doroteo Fundales. Thus. but not exceeding Six Million Pesos (P6.755. Dazo. have been superseded by those found in the Family Code (Articles 105 to 133). Thus.500. with Cesar P. As sureties. Dazo. which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code. (CPDTI) incurs. it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is considerably more than the P60. Evangeline D. the written consent of Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary.P. therefore. MBTC GR # 187023/Nov.27 paid by Erlinda to cancel the mortgage in 1992.000.000. since the petitioner advanced the P176. we refer to the provisions of the Family Code.000. provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses. Dazo. the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda at the time she contracted with the petitioner. in determining the nature of the subject property. they bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness C. without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. as provided in Article 256. Eliseo paid about P60. Dazo Tannery. its provisions on conjugal partnership of gains (Articles 142 to 189) should have governed their property relations. respectively. Nieves Dazo. Imani (petitioner) signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor of respondent Metrobank. 17. 2010 Facts: On August 28. CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its loans. at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. 1989 to April 30.

no actual benefit may be proved..If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract. EVP of PBM. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. Similarly. he directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession. 1999. i. . However. . It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and Alfredo Ching. the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. A writ of execution was issued against CPDTI and its co-defendants.300. Held: Yes. Pending appeal and upon motion of AIDC. the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. The sheriff levied on a property covering a lot registered in the name of petitioner.Metrobank.00 with interests.e. which was granted on December 7. petitioner prayed for the nullification of the levy on execution and the auction sale. Thus. as such. Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the conjugal partnership of gains of spouses Ching is not liable for the payment of the debts secured by the husband Alfredo Ching. Issue: WON or not the property in question is conjugal. Ruling: All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. As added security for the credit line extended to PBM. Spouses Ching filed a case of injunction to enjoin the auction sale alleging that the judgment cannot be enforced against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that. vs CA GR 118305 Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a loan from Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). From the very nature of the contract of loan or services. As aptly ruled by the CA. Petitioner argued that the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership. Neither can it be subject of levy on execution or public auction. for this presumption to apply. the fact that the land was registered in the name of Evangelina Dazo-Imani married to Sina Imani is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses’ coverture. the certificate of title could not support petitioner’s assertion. Metrobank then filed with the RTC a motion for execution. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or Page 31 of 47 . as well as the certificate of sale in favor of Metrobank. among others. Issue: Whether the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement entered into by the husband in favor of his employer. Thus. Alfredo Ching. obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. it cannot be held answerable for the liabilities incurred by CPDTI to Metrobank. that contract falls within the term ". executed security agreements making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM's indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan. CHARGES UPON AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP XXX AYALA INVEST AND DEV’T CORP. Hence. the lower court issued a writ of execution and the Deputy Sheriff caused the issuance and service upon spouses Ching of a notice of sheriff sale on three (3) of their conjugal properties. After trial.000." Here. the time when the property was acquired is material. the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of P50. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.

respondent and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and requested him to advance the amount of US$25.2Thereafter. in October 31. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION of herein plaintiff which suffered tremendous setback Page 32 of 47 .3 On August 24." Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership. To enable and assist the spouses conduct their married life independently and on their own. Maria Theresa CarlosAbelardo admitted securing a loan together with her husband. Branch 172. vs. respondent and his wife filed separate answers. CARLOS.L. its equivalent in Philippine currency plus legal interest from date of extra-judicial demand.8 In his separate Answer.4Thus. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the benefit of the family.00 for the purchase of a house and lot located at #19952 Chestnut Street. when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement. Here. if the money or services are given to another person or entity. petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages against respondent and his wife before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. ABELARDO. from petitioner. petitioner.7She claimed. of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except to the extent that they redounded to the benefit of the family. On the other hand.000. issued a check in the name of a certain Pura Vallejo. petitioner asked for the payment of the US$25. respondent admitted receiving the amount of US$25. 1994. XXXI HONORIO L.00 or P625.00 but the spouses failed to comply with their obligation.00 but claimed that: a. that said loan was payable on a staggered basis so she was surprised when petitioner demanded immediate payment of the full amount. 4490-V-94. seller of the property.1 The amount was in full payment of the property. attorney’s fees and costs of suit from respondent. Metro Manila. When petitioner inquired from the spouses in July 1991 as to the status of the amount he loaned to them. 1994 that in October 1989. by itself. Defendant (respondent) xxx revived that otherwise dormant construction firm H. it is "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. 1989. paragraph 3. In the complaint.000.5Petitioner likewise claimed moral and exemplary damages.services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband.6 As they were separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint. 1994. the latter acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they were not yet in a position to make a definite settlement of the same. petitioner. respondent. however." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. Article 121. who acknowledged receipt thereof. the property in dispute also involves the family home. docketed as Civil Case No. on October 13. Paranaque. GR 146504 Facts: Petitioner averred in his complaint filed on October 13.000. that contract cannot. respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioner’s inquiries on the amount to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner. MANUEL T.000. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal one. alone be categorized as falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.00.000. Executive Heights Village. petitioner made a formal demand for the payment of the amount of US$25. and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor. No presumption can be inferred that.

CARLOS CONSTRUCTION and the income derived therefrom were deposited in the name of such firm of plaintiff. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION. The plaintiff seeing the progress brought about by defendant xxx to his company proposed a profit sharing scheme to the effect that all projects amounting to more than P10 million shall be for the account of plaintiff.L.000. Page 33 of 47 . • • Held: Early in time. he asked for moral damages from petitioner for causing the alienation of his wife’s love and affection.10 On June 26.L. acknowledgment of the loan made by the defendant-wife binds the conjugal partnership since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family. out of which defendant derived his income. and that the filing of the complaint is a hoax. e. The court of appeals erred in nullifying the award of damages for lack of proof thereof. starting with small construction business. But.00 was never intended as loan of defendant.000. used all his business and personal connection to be able to revive the construction business of plaintiff. it must be noted that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. They do not deny that the same served as their conjugal home. It was his share of income on contracts obtained by defendant. That.00 was given as private respondent’s share in the profits of H.after the assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino. Carlos Construction. thus benefiting the family.00 to defendant to square off account and to start the arrangement in paragraph (e) supra. the said US$25. c. defendant devoted all his efforts and skill. g. The court of appeals erred in holding that the us$25.00 was used to purchase the subject house and lot. Little-by-little. lower amount shall be for defendant’s account but still using H. d. f.000. Inc.L. to clear account on previous construction contracts that brought income to H. defendant-husband and defendant-wife are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan. Issue: • The court of appeals erred in finding insufficient evidence to prove that the amount of us$25. The defendants never denied that the check of US$25.00 was a loan obtained by private respondent and his wife from petitioner. Respondent denied having made death threats to petitioner and by way of compulsory counterclaim. Working day and night and almost beyond human endurance. 1996. defendant was able to obtain various construction jobs using the name H.000. On the same principle. attorney’s fees and costs of suit. he was allowed to use the facilities of the plaintiff. plaintiff gave the amount of US$25. Hence.000. b.L.CARLOS CONSTRUCTION. the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Defendant xxx was made to believe that the earnings derived from such construction will be for him and his family since he was the one working to secure the contract and its completion.

GR 143382 Facts: Page 34 of 47 .000. the defendant is dealing with the corporation and not with the plaintiff in his personal capacity. compensation cannot take place. In the instant case. Firstly. Article 1278 of the Civil Code provides that compensation shall take place when two persons.000.Defendant-husband cannot allege as a defense that the amount of US $25. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: xxx (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. indeed. We also find sufficient basis for the award of damages to petitioner. In the same manner that as he is not an employee nor an agent of H. The Court of Appeals. If.00 he advanced to respondent and his wife was a loan. the amount advanced for the purchase of the house and lot came from the personal account of the plaintiff. the checks should come from the corporation’s account and not from the plaintiff’s personal account. notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent. under Art. he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife. H. compensation is a sort of balancing between two obligations. As its indicates. Secondly. Inc. instead of giving the amount of P3.00 is to be treated similarly. thus. The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 121 of the Family Code: Article 121.000.00 to them. defendanthusband does not appear to be a stockholder nor an employee nor an agent of the corporation. L. Inc. still compensation cannot extinguish his loan obligation to the plaintiff because under such assumption. Carlos Construction. This argument is untenable.. Even granting that the checks amount to US $3. the evidence adduced by petitioner sufficiently established his claim that the US$25. 21 of the Family Code.000. it was to be construed as defendant-husband’s share in the profits of the corporation. Hence. the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house and lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and his family. the latter could have applied their share in the proceeds or income of the corporation to the concurrent amount of the alleged loan. he has no right to participate in the income or profits thereof. contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is not entitled thereto. On the contrary.000. (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited. or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other. XXXII SBTC vs MAR TIERRA CORP. the plaintiff and the defendant-husband are not debtors and creditors of each other.000. considering that the corporation has a personality separate and distinct from that of its stockholders and officers. Carlos Construction. the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. L. If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities. Defendant-husband in invoking the defense of compensation argued that if indeed they were indebted to the plaintiff.000. Hence.00 was received as his share in the income or profits of the corporation and not as a loan. erred in finding that respondent’s liability was not proved by preponderance of evidence. Xxx While respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife. are debtors and creditors of each other. Since he is not a stockholder. still there is no sufficient evidence to establish that the US $25. undoubtedly. Even granting that the defendanthusband’s claim to the profits of the corporation is justified. he has no right to receive any salary or commission therefrom. in their own right.00 given by the plaintiff to the defendant-spouses was their share in the profits of the corporation.

the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party. the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Martinez. Hence." In other words. Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation. petitioner appealed to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision in toto. Petitioner sought reconsideration but it was denied. 8 the conjugal partnership is liable for "all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.000. No presumption is raised that. hence.NO. there is a legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to establish the benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.000 credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company (SBTC).. found that the obligation contracted by individual respondent Martinez did not redound to the benefit of his family. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan." But when are debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone considered for the benefit of and therefore chargeable against the conjugal partnership? Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the said provision? We ruled as early as 1969 in Luzon Surety Co. Wilfrido C. where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business. when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement. the direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own business or profession. the transaction falls within the term "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. however. Court of Appeals. [11] On the other hand. this petition. the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the Page 35 of 47 . it was able to pay about P4M while the remaining balance remained outstanding as the corporation suffered business reversals and eventually ceased operating. Dissatisfied with the RTC decision.. de Garcia 9 that. The respondent corporation finally availed of its credit line and received P9M. Miguel J. Martinez. Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit line agreement with respondent corporation. in acting as a guarantor or surety for another. it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. [12] It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. it ordered the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez. i. through its president. 10 we ruled that. Out of that amount. ISSUE: WON the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party? HELD: Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code. v. The RTC rendered a decision holding respondent corporation and individual respondent Martinez jointly and severally liable to petitioner for the remaining balance of the loan including interest and attorney’s fee. Inc. if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor. if the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract. It. petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against respondent corporation and individual respondents in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. [13] In the absence of any showing of benefit received by it. It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C. To enforce its claim against the corporation on the remaining balance of the loan. applied for a P12.e.

Issue: WON the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership Held: No. It became final and executory and later on issued a a writ of execution. notice of levy and notice of sheriff’s sale. writ of execution. In response. Hence. respondent claimed that his property which was valued at P500. [14] In this case. was solely for the benefit of the latter. Respondent. the principal contract. Almost a year later on 2 February 1994. a notice of sheriff’s sale was issued.000. Citing De Leon v.00 was only sold at a “very low price” of P51. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of petitioners. The case was assigned to Branch 21 of the RTC of Imus. [16] Hence.685. It failed to discharge that burden. the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on execution addressed to the Register of Deeds of Cavite. Salvador.husband to accommodate a third party. The auction sale proceeded with petitioners as the highest bidder. To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the husband alone defeats the objective of the Civil Code to protect the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by appellant. Cavite. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. Cavite. Furthermore. Eventually. the husband of Erlinda Nicol. Finding Erlinda Nicol’s personal properties insufficient to satisfy the judgment. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the latter’s benefit.000.00.00. the credit line agreement between petitioner and respondent corporation. petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and that they had acted on the basis of a valid writ of execution. On appeal. connived and directly levied upon and execute his real property without exhausting the personal properties of Erlinda Nicol. the instant petition attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. petitioners claimed that respondent should have filed the case with Branch 19 where the judgment originated and which issued the order of execution. Two (2) days before the public auction sale on 28 January 1993. an affidavit of third-party claim from one Arnulfo F. it limits the liability of the conjugal partnership only to debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. as plaintiff therein. RTC dismissed respondent’s complaint and ruled that Branch 19 has jurisdiction over the case. now petitioners. RTC rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages. XXXIII BUADO vs CA GR 145222 Facts: Spouses Buado filed a complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol with Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacoor.There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. [15] The underlying concern of the law is the conservation of the conjugal partnership. whereas the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol was only P40. which originated from Erlinda Nicol’s civil liability arising from the criminal offense of slander filed against her by petitioners. Fulo was received by the deputy sheriff prompting petitioners to put up a sheriff’s indemnity bond. Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly Page 36 of 47 . filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff. Respondent averred that there was no proper publication and posting of the notice of sale. Romulo Nicol. alleged that the defendants.

conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse. unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership. Held: Under the New Civil Code (NCC). or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium. If the conjugal partnership does not have enough assets. administration does not include acts of ownership. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. Contracts entered into by the husband in violation of this prohibition are voidable and subject to annulment at the instance of Page 37 of 47 . Melania found out that Antonio had entered into a contract of lease with defendant Antonio M. To reiterate. the husband can do so in certain cases allowed by law. He is not required by law to render an accounting. 165.provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. 166 of NCC "unless the wife has been declared a non-compos mentis or a spendthrift. Cayetano sometime on March 30." This rule prevents abuse on the part of the husband. not the paraphernal property. Issue: W/N a husband. or otherwise alienate the property being administered. may legally enter into a contract of lease involving conjugal real property without the knowledge and consent of the wife. sell. by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership." in view of the fact that the husband is principally responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family. Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property. Apparently. She then filed a complaint for annulment of the contract of lease entered into without her consent against Cayetano. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent. Responsibility should carry authority with it. Acts done under administration do not need the prior consent of the wife. ADMINISTRATION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY XXXIV ROXAS vs. much less her marital consent. For while the husband can administer the conjugal assets unhampered. the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. as the administrator of the conjugal partnership. CA GR 92245 Facts: Melania Roxa (Petitioner) is married to Antonio Roxas. she was to put up a flea market in the lot and has already filed for a Mayor’s permit but the same was denied on renewal because Cayetano also applied for the same permit and was earlier granted. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. The husband is not an ordinary administrator. the court may compel her to grant the same. but are living separately. 1987 covering a portion of their conjugal lot situated in Quezon City without her previous knowledge. who is partly responsible for the acquisition of the property. and guarantees the rights of the wife. However. Thus. Parenthetically. for while a mere administrator has no right to dispose of. it is the husband's capital that is responsible for such support. "Art. under Art. the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership the wife's consent. who filed a motion to dismiss the same on the ground of lack of cause of action. he cannot alienate or encumber the conjugal realty. in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse. particularly the real property.

When petitioner met again with respondent spouses for the formal affixing of Norma’s signature. Norma refused to sign the contracts prompting petitioner to file a complaint for specific performance and damages against respondent spouses before the Regional Trial Court. Such agreement was a handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties. After some bargaining. (Art. the disposition is void. During the meeting. Petitioner reminded respondent spouses that the contracts to sell had already been duly perfected and Norma’s refusal to sign the same would unduly prejudice petitioner. petitioner received a call from respondent Norma (wife). Still. Thus. The formal typewritten Contracts to Sell were thereafter prepared by petitioner.She and Edilberto met for the formal signing of the typewritten Contracts to Sell. 124. The following day. respondent Norma Camaisa . Edilberto assured her of his wife’s conformity and consent to the sale. subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy. Article 124 of the Family Code provides: Art. The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal. However. the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person. hence. In case of disagreement. The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife. the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by Page 38 of 47 . so they arranged to incorporate the notations and to meet again for the formal signing of the contracts. When petitioner pointed out the conjugal nature of the properties. which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. The contracts were given to Edilberto for the formal affixing of his wife’s signature. After Edilberto signed the contracts.the aggrieved wife. requesting a meeting to clarify some provisions of the contracts. petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price of the property to be paid on installment basis. the consent of both husband and wife must concur. Issue: Whether or not there is a perfected contract to sell of the conjugal property? Held: There is no perfected sale. 173 of the Civil Code) XXXV GUIANG vs CA GR 125172 XXXVI JADER – MANALO vs CAMAISA GR 147978 Facts: Petitioner made a definite offer to buy the properties to respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of his wife. she was surprised when respondent spouses informed her that they were backing out of the agreement because they needed “spot cash” for the full amount of the consideration. otherwise. for the contracts to sell to be effective. handwritten notations were made on the contracts to sell. petitioner delivered to him two checks. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. the husband’s decision shall prevail.

In this case. (Underscoring ours. void ab initio. Anent the second issue. 1986. the sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent is not. de Ramones v. Dipolog City. but merely voidable. and ordered petitioners to vacate the lot and remove all improvements therein. On July 19. annulled the deed of absolute sale dated May 13. payable in installments. Sometime in 1985. in its Joint Decision. and a house thereon. During their marriage. Issue: (1) Is the subject lot an exclusive property of Florentino or a conjugal property of respondents? (2) Was its sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent valid? Ruling: Anent the first issue. petitioners' contention that the lot belongs exclusively to Florentino because of his separation in fact from his wife. perfectly within ten years from the date of sale and execution of the deed. Villaranda. Fortunately. In Vda. Agbayani. Respondent Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties. the separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership.) Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. being merely aware of a transaction is not consent. Applying Article 166. we held that without the wife's consent.000. Shortly after their last installment payment on December 13. the contract entered by Florentino is annullable at Elisera's instance. Florentino allowed petitioners to occupy the lot and build a store. 1992. 4383 on July 5. XXXVII UY vs CA GR 10955 XXXVIII VILLANUEVA vs CHIONG GR 159889 Facts: Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married sometime in January 1960 but have been separated in fact since 1975. Accordingly. Florentino sold the one-half western portion of the lot to petitioners for P8. the husband's alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3. conformably with Article 173. the consent of both Elisera and Florentino is necessary for the sale of a conjugal property to be valid. Significantly. the requisite consent of Elisera was not obtained when Florentino verbally sold the lot in 1985 and executed the Deed of Absolute Sale on May 13. Respondents' separation in fact neither affected the conjugal nature of the lot nor prejudiced Elisera's interest over it. refused to sign a deed of sale. 2000.[5] petitioners demanded from respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their favor. during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned. however. Under Article 178 of the Civil Code. however. 1988 is not void. 1991. at the time of sale dissolved their property relations. Florentino executed the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners. On May 13. her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. which she denied. Even granting that respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties. The lot retains its conjugal nature. However. petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. Elisera. a shop. Elisera. Thereafter.the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. 1992. XXXIX DELA CRUZ vs SEGOVIA GR 149801 Page 39 of 47 . the RTC. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's decision. they acquired a Lot situated at Poblacion. 1992. is bereft of merit. citing Villaranda v. Elisera timely questioned the sale when she filed Civil Case No.

1965. the spouses acquired a 555square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7. Mary Ann. In 1991. T-26471. when no beneficiary was designated. in his lifetime married twice. beneficiary of one insurance is not automatically the beneficiary of the other. the retirement insurance policy likewise belong to them. 1957. Trial Court. as beneficiaries named in the life insurance policy. Consequently. T88674 in their names. Rosario on the other hand filed a claim over the retirement insurance policy proceeds claiming to be Jose’s only legal heir. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the NCC. located at Kamuning Street. In 1982. born of said wedlock. GSIS ruled that Rosario and Basilia are both Jose’s wives. Hence this case. Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). 1/2 portion each. Held: To both wives. When he died on Sept 26. including a poultry house and an annex. Basilia filed a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction to CFI praying that she and her children be declared as the exclusive beneficiaries of the said retirement insurance proceeds. The house was finished in the early 1980’s but the spouses continuously made improvements. VILLA ABRILLE GR 160708 Facts: Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. Basilia also filed a similar claim asserting that. while the 1st marriage was still subsisting. Basilia appealed. Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. They have four children. He fathered 2 children (both already dead) from Rosario and 7 from Basilia. Mary Ann was Page 40 of 47 .Facts: Jose Consuegra. GSIS intended that the life and retirement insurance be separate and distinct therefore. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity “the only just and equitable solution is to recognize the right of the 2nd wife to her share of ½ in the property acquired by her and her husband and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage. Matina. whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husband’s share in the property here in dispute” quoting Trial Court’s decision. Dissatisfied. they and their children. to Basilia Berdim. still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. she is entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Davao City. quoting Lao vs Dee held that “ When 2 women innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man. therefore the proceeds must be given to them. 1937 and on May 1. the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedro’s lot. the proceeds of his GSIS life insurance policy were paid to Basilia and their children being the beneficiaries stated in the policy. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely in his name under TCT No. “Since the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void. will be regarded as legitimate children and each family be entitled to ½ of the estate. this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting. Issue: To whom should this retirement insurance benefits be paid. the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. who are also parties to the instant case and are represented by their mother. and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. to Rosario Diaz on July 15. XL RAVINA vs. And with respect to the right of the second wife. Juna Subdivision.

saying that it was a family matter. the same being contrary to law and evidence. 1988. . acquired during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. 1991. but police authorities refused to intervene. Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein petitioners. which was an exclusive property of Pedro. unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. they were stopped from entering it. T-26471. but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Ann’s consent. They sought help from the Talomo Police Station. No evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was acquired through exchange or barter. Damages and Attorney’s Fees with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Pedro and herein petitioners (the Ravinas) in the RTC of Davao City. 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school. the lot covered by TCT No. 88674 in favor of spouses ravina. examined the titles when they bought the property. “All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. They waited outside the gate until evening under the rain. and that her husband. so much so that one flunked at school. respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale. or (b) in case of one spouse’s Page 41 of 47 • The court of appeals erred when it declared x x x the sale of lot covered by tct no. . By himself. T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. Thus. It appears on the said deed that Mary Ann did not sign on top of her name. as null and void since it is clearly contrary to law and evidence. Specific Performance.” There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. Pedro together with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting in connivance with petitioners began transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment. The court of appeals erred when it ruled that petitioners patrocin[i]a ravina and wilfredo ravina are liable for damages. who had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house.forced to sell or mortgage their movables to support the family and the studies of her children. On July 5. is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife. • Held: Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides. Petitioners’ bare assertion would not suffice to overcome the presumption that TCT No. the house built thereon is conjugal property. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear. Pedro declared that the house was built with his own money. is conjugal. tension and anxiety to her children. Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. During the trial. the same being contrary to law and evidence. having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann. Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina testified that they bought the house and lot from Pedro. together with the house thereon. When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home. Significantly. petitioner Wilfredo Ravina. having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses. However. a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3. Issue: • The court of appeals erred when it ruled that petitioners patrocin[i]a ravina and wilfredo ravina are not innocent purchasers for value. as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated June 21. Likewise. satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro. Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused stress. T-88674.

the authority of the court. such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by the husband without the consent of the wife is null and void. a purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to. the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. Accordingly. T26471. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife. or interest in. Mary Ann’s conformity did not appear in the deed. the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. is explicit: ART. petitioners contend that they are buyers in good faith. subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. On the second assignment of error. or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. The contention is bereft of merit. However. the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person. they were apprised by Mary Ann’s lawyer of her objection to the sale and yet they still proceeded to purchase the property without Mary Ann’s written consent. Pedro was married to Mary Ann. they need not inquire whether the lot was purchased by money exclusively belonging to Pedro or of the common fund of the spouses and may rely on the certificates of title. In the absence of such authority or consent. he must show that he inquired into the latter’s capacity to sell in order to establish himself as a buyer for value in good faith. a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely without Mary Ann’s consent. To establish his status as a buyer for value in good faith. In case of disagreement. the respondents were the Page 42 of 47 . her action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT No. 124. such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case. Mary Ann. However. and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.inability. the governing law at the time the assailed sale was contracted. such sale is void. thereby resulting in a disagreement. Hence. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties. without knowledge and consent of the wife.) The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. In the present case. But for a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell is restricted. sells conjugal property. Petitioners cannot deny knowledge that during the time of the sale in 1991. such as by Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code or Article 124 of the Family Code. respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the deed. if the husband. Moreover. the property is registered in the name of Pedro and his wife. a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller need only show that he relied on the face of the seller’s certificate of title. just like the rule in absolute community of property. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. Here. (Emphasis supplied. Even assuming that petitioners believed in good faith that the subject property is the exclusive property of Pedro. the husband’s decision shall prevail. Article 124 of the Family Code.

petitioners knew that Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the subject properties and yet they failed to obtain her conformity to the deed of sale. we sustain the appellate court’s order directing Pedro to return to petitioner spouses the value of the consideration for the lot covered by TCT No. despite the showing by the husband that his signature on the SPA had been forged and that the SPA had been executed during his absence from the country and while he and Ma.ones in actual. Thus. T-88674 and the house thereon. petitioners cannot now invoke the protection accorded to purchasers in good faith. Article 449 of the New Civil Code is applicable. Pedro Villa Abrille acting in connivance with the petitioners surreptitiously transferred all their personal belongings to another place. However. When Dionisio learned about the alleged sale. “(h)e who builds. The claim is erroneous to say the least. who allegedly acted in good faith and paid the full purchase price. petitioner Patrocinia Ravina made improvements and renovations on the house and lot at the time when the complaint against them was filed. On July 5.” When a right is exercised in a manner that does not conform with such norms and results in damages to another. Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: “Every person must. loses what is built. in consonance with justice and equity and the salutary principle of non-enrichment at another’s expense. The relationship between the parties in any contract even if subsequently annulled must always be characterized and punctuated by good faith and fair dealing. petitioners claim that the decision awarding damages to respondents is not supported by the evidence on record. The sale by Ma. the restoration of what has been given is proper. and observe honesty and good faith. any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. 1991. while respondent was out and her children were in school. planted or sown without right to indemnity. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages caused. this court rules that petitioners cannot claim reimbursements for improvements they introduced after their good faith had ceased. It is patent in this case that petitioners’ alleged acts fall short of these established civil law standards. The respondents then were not allowed to enter their rightful home or family abode despite their impassioned pleas. he filed for an action for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Page 43 of 47 . at the time of sale. The manner by which respondent and her children were removed from the family home deserves our condemnation. It provides that. Thus. act with justice. give everyone his due. a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrong doer must be held responsible. if a voidable contract is annulled. Elena was made in favor of the spouses vendees/petitioners. Hence. visible and public possession of the property at the time the transaction was being made. LI AGGABAO vs PARULAN GR 165803 Facts: Respondent Ma. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties. Elena allegedly made a sale of two parcels of land with their improvements considered as conjugal property by presenting a special power of attorney to sell (SPA) purportedly executed by respondent husband Dionisio in her favor. Now. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals. Similarly. Elena have been estranged from one another. Hence.” On the last issue. Ravina continued introducing improvements during the pendency of the action. plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another.

not Article 124 of the Family Code. In Tumlos v. and the cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties. while holding the Page 44 of 47 . therefore. according to Article 256[29] of the Family Code. Parulan’s counteroffer during the March 25. among them the entire Title VI in which the provisions on the property relations between husband and wife. 1988.Ma. However. Hence the present case filed by petitioners imputing error to the CA for not applying the “ordinary prudent man’s standard” in determining their status as buyers in good faith. the petitioners did not show any vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3.[30] the Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the Family Code did not apply because the acquisition of the contested property had occurred prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. ISSUE: WON Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should apply to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio. The petitioners submit that Article 173 of the Civil Code. are found. and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. The decision of the RTC was affirmed by the CA. The RTC ruled in his favor and declared that the SPA was forged. the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person. the provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired. for it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code. the sale was made on March 18. The proper law to apply is. Article 124 of the Family Code. the effectivity of the Family Code. Herein. Held: NO To start with. Elena. Dionisio ratified the sale through Atty. In the absence of such authority or consent. They argue that notwithstanding his absence from the country Dionisio still held the administration of the conjugal property by virtue of his execution of the SPA in favor of his brother. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. and pointed out that Article 256 provided that the Family Code could apply retroactively if the application would not prejudice vested or acquired rights existing before the effectivity of the Family Code. or after August 3. In case of disagreement. 1988 that exempted their situation from the retroactive application of the Family Code. however. Secondly. Fernandez. 1991 meeting. Fourthly. the petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio.[28] Article 124 of the Family Code provides: Article 124. and that even assuming that Article 124 of the Family Code properly applied. the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. Thirdly. Article 254[27] the Family Code has expressly repealed several titles under the Civil Code. the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. 1991. Article 173 included. governed the property relations of the respondents because they had been married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. the husband’s decision shall prevail. subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy. and that the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code should not apply because the other spouse held the administration over the conjugal property. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.

Parulan. and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or upon authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. Issue: WON the refusal of the husband to accept his wife constitutes abandonment which is a ground for the dissolution of their property regime.administration over the property. she may petition the court for a receivership. Elena that Dionisio had the option of accepting or rejecting before the offer was withdrawn by either or both Ma. for the two powers may only be exercised by an agent by following the provisions on agency of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878). we agree with Dionisio that the void sale was a continuing offer from the petitioners and Ma. stating that in the absence of the other spouse’s consent. The last sentence of the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code makes this clear. the transaction executed sans the written consent of Dionisio or the proper court order was void.[32] On the other hand. The petitioner contends that the respondent court has misinterpreted Articles 175. They never agreed to separate permanently. the petitioners’ insistence that Atty. Parulan the authority for the administration. She submits that the agreement between her and the private respondent was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval. 178 and 191 of the Civil Code. and vice versa. [31] Lastly. shall not affect the conjugal partnership. had delegated to his brother. Jose Jo. was limited to the sale of the property in question. which are acts of strict ownership. The first of these women. and did not include or extend to the power to administer the property. 178. this arrangement was repudiated and ended in 1942. the transaction should be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person. Prima filed a complaint against Jose for judicial separation of conjugal property. when she returned to him at Dumaguete City and he refused to accept her. And even if they did. the administration of the property. Prima PartosaJo. being a special agency. On appeal. except that: xxx xxx xxx (3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year. admits to having cohabited with three women and fathered fifteen children. Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership Regime LII PARTOSA – JO vs CA GR 82606 Facts: The herein private respondent. the apparent authority of Atty. Atty. As such. hence. The RTC rendered a decision and in the dispositive portion it stated support but not the separation of conjugal properties. Nonetheless. Monina Jo. Specifically. an authority to dispose cannot proceed from an authority to administer. The other women and their respective offspring are not parties of this case. we stress that the power of administration does not include acts of disposition or encumbrance. Parulan. ratification did not occur. In 1980. which reads: Art. 1991 meeting ratified the sale merits no consideration. claims to be his legal wife whom he begot a daughter. considering that they did not present in court the SPA granting to Atty. for a void contract could not be ratified. or administration by her Page 45 of 47 . Parulan’s making of a counter-offer during the March 25. Under Article 124 of the Family Code. Ruling: The petitioner invokes Article 178 (3) of the Civil Code. Elena and the petitioners.

Sec. and Agacoili vs.00 payable in 2 installments of P300k and P185. Siy Uy. There must be absolute cessation of marital relations. duties and rights. followed by prolonged absence without just cause. Lease was for 5 yrs ending on Sep. LIII ALIPIO vs CA GR 134100 Facts: Jaring (Romeo) was the lessee of a 14. 6 This idea is clearly expressed in the abovequoted provision. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. with the intention of perpetual separation. beginning 1968 until the determination by this Court of the action for support in 1988. leaving a balance of P50.of the conjugal partnership property or separation of property. 12. 20.Mabuco. the private respondent had already rejected the petitioner. The physical separation of the parties.00 w/c they failed to pay despite Alipio’s demands.00. Death of her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the case. the private respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. the CA dismissed the case and held that the rule invoked is not applicable. The action for recovery of a sum of money does not survive the death of the defendant. In June 19.600. 1990.5 hec fishpond in Barito.1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 1987 til the end of the lease period. The second installment due on June 30. whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. 21 of the 1964 Rules of Court claiming that such was applicable since her husband and co-sublessee passed away prior tothe filing of this action. Purita Alipio petitioned for the dismissal of the case invoking Rule 3. creditor may bring his action against any of the debtors obligated insolidum. sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. 1989. coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner. Sublessees failed to pay entire second installment. Vda de Agcaoili) Issue: W/N a creditor can sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in anordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of money chargeableagainst the conjugal partnership.(Climaco vs. Proper remedy would be to file aclaim in the settlement of the decedent’s estate or if none has beencommenced. Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return.600. Jaring subleased the fishpond to sps Alipio and sps Manuel. Imperial vs. thus the remaining defendants cannot avoid the action by claiming thatsuch death totally extinguished their obligation." The record shows that as early as 1942. Bataan. Moreover. Alipio’s liability is independent of & separate from her husband’s. depending on whether Page 46 of 47 . David. The Trial court denied Alipio’s petition because she was a party to the contract & should be independently impleaded together w/the Manuel sps. Held: NO. Said rule has been amended by Rule 3. he filed a case against said sublessees asking for payment of the balance or rescission of the contract should they fail to pay the balance.600. When the action is solidary. Petitioner & Manuels were ordered to pay balance and P10k atty’s fees and costs of suit. which states that "a spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning. and without in the meantime providing in the least for one's family although able to do so. On appeal. he can file a petition either for the issuance of letters of administration or for the allowance of will. Hermosa. Sec. Thus. The stipulated rent is P485.

& liquidated and debts thereof paid. This was affirmed in Ventura vs. At best.Tanedo the Court held that no complaint for collection of indebtedness chargeable to the CPG can be brought against the surviving spouse. obligations entered into by sps are chargeable against their CPG & the partnership is primarily bound for the repayments. Page 47 of 47 . CC Art. Creditor may apply for letters of admin in his capacity as a principal creditor. Militante where Court held that lack of liquidation proceedings does not mean that the CPG continues. administered. 161 (1) provides that the obligation of the Alipios is chargeable against their conjugal partnership since it was contracted by the spouses for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. They’ll be impleaded as representatives of the CPG and concept of joint/solidary liability does not apply. it will not be solidary but joint. Surviving spouse’s powers of administration ceases & is passed on to court-appointed administrator. When petitioner’s spouse died. Sec. No shortcut by lumping claim against Alipios with those against the Manuels. Note that for marriages governed by CPG.itstestate/intestate. Claim must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation & settlement of the CPG. In Calma vs.2 w/c provides that the community property will be inventoried. in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. their CPG was dissolved & debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement of estate proceedings in accordance w/ Rule 73.

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