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CASE DIGESTS LEGAL SEPARATION I A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001 (Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No.

99706-MTJ) HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent. RESOLUTION DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: Facts: Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children were born out of that marriage.2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.3 When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated." Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.4 According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.

Issue: WON the respondent Judge committed gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage. Held: Article 34 of the Family Code provides: No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage. For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur: 1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other; 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.6 Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated." Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage
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is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.7 The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar. Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application to judges,8 who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.9 And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10 II AIDA P. BAEZ, petitioner, vs. GABRIEL B. BAEZ, respondent GR 132592

Facts: The Regional Trial Court of Cebu decided Civil Case No. CEB-16765, decreeing among others the legal separation between petitioner Aida Baez and respondent Gabriel Baez on the ground of the latters sexual infidelity; the dissolution of their conjugal property relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of respondents one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children; the payment to petitioners counsel of the sum of P100,000 as attorneys fees to be taken from petitioners share in the net assets; and the surrender by respondent of the use and possession of a Mazda motor vehicle and the smaller residential house located at Maria Luisa Estate Park Subdivision to petitioner and the common children within 15 days from receipt of the decision. Thereafter, petitioner filed an urgent exparte motion to modify said decision, while respondent filed a Notice of Appeal. The trial court granted petitioner Aida Banez urgent ex-parte motion to modify the decision on October 1, 1996 by approving the Commitment of Fees dated December 22, 1994; obliging petitioner to pay as attorneys fees the equivalent of 5% of the total value of respondents ideal share in the net conjugal assets; and ordering the administrator to pay petitioners counsel, Atty. Adelino B. Sitoy, the sum of P100,000 as advance attorneys fees chargeable against the aforecited 5%.[4] In another motion to modify the decision, petitioner Aida Baez sought moral and exemplary damages, as well as litigation expenses. On October 9, 1996, she filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Respondent Gabriel Baez filed a consolidated written opposition to the two motions, and also prayed for the reconsideration of the October 1, 1996 order. After several exchanges of petitions and motions, the CA rendered a decision setting aside the October 1, 1996 decision and further denying the motions
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for reconsideration by petitioner. Hence, she filed the instant case before the SC alleging that the CA erred in setting aside the questioned order. She further alleged that an action for legal separation is among the cases where multiple appeals may be taken. According to her, the filing of a record on appeal, pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,[13] is required in this case. However, since respondent failed to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period as provided under the Rules of court (Sec 1-b, Rule 50), the same should be dismissed Issue: WON multiple appeals may be allowed in an action for legal separation? Held: NO xxx Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with accounting, in actions for partition of property with accounting, in the special civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final. In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that may allegedly be the subject of multiple appeals arose from the same cause of action, and the subject matter pertains to the same lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in that case would only be violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals. The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The issues involved in the case will necessarily relate to the same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation.[19] They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by

the court and become final prior to or apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of legal separation.[20] Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals. Petitioners alternative prayers that in case we do not dismiss the appeal, we return the records to the trial court and require respondent to file a record on appeal, or we return the records to the trial court and retain only the pleadings and orders relevant to the appeal, are untenable. If we grant the first, we are effectively saying that the instant case is one involving multiple appeals, which it is not. If we allow the second, we are effectively applying by analogy, Section 6, Rule 44 and Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, without petitioner showing support therefor in law or jurisprudence. III PACETE vs. CARRIAGA G.R. No. 53880 March 17, 1994 FACTS: Concepcion Alanis and Enrico Pacete were married on April 30, 1938 and had a child. Enrico contracted a second marriage with Clarita dela Concepcion. Alanis learned of it on Aug 1, 1979. Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted
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misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. CFI granted legal separation, conjugal properties half-and-half. Thus, this certiorari. ISSUE: WON CFI gravely abused its discretion in decreeing the legal separation of Enrico Pacete (P) and PR, and held to be null and void ab initio the marriage of P and Clarita Concepcion HELD: Yes, The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition, obviously in order to provide the parties a cooling-off period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in

actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no c collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. IV SABALONES vs CA GR 106169 Facts: Petitioner Samson Sabalones being a diplomat was assigned in different countries and left to his wife the administration of some of their conjugal properties for 15years. After his retirement he returned to the Philippines but not to his wife and children. After 4 years he filed an action for juridical authorization to sell their property in San Juan which belongs to the conjugal partnership and would use the proceeds of the sale for his hospital and medical treatments. Respondent (wife) opposed the authorization and filed an action for legal separation. Respondent alleges that that the house in San Juan was being occupied by her and their children and the lot in Forbes Park is being leased to Nobimichi Izumi, and that her husband never returned to them being the legitimate family and lived in a separate house in Fairview with Thelma Curameng and their children. Judge Umali found that petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage with Thelma Curameng. Court granted the decree of legal separation and the petitioner is not entitled to share in the conjugal properties and he is not entitled to support from his respondent wife. Decision of lower court was appealed and was granted the writ of preliminary injunction filed by the respondent to enjoin the petitioner from interfering in the administration of their properties.
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Petitioner argues that the law provides for joint administration of conjugal properties and no injunctive relief can be issued against the other because no right will be violated. Issue: WON article124 is applicable as regards to joint administration of conjugal properties Held: Grant for preliminary injunction is valid; it is necessary to protect the interest of the respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal assets. Injunction has not permanently installed the respondent as the administrator of the whole conjugal assets Presence of 2 requirements of valid injunction: Existence of rights of the respondents to a share of the conjugal estate There is evidence that entrusting the estate to the petitioner may result to the irresponsible disposition of assets that would cause injury to his wife and children

ONG VS ONG VI SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner, vs. ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H. AGUAS, represented by her Legal Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS, Respondents. G.R. No. 165546 February 27, 2006 Facts: Pablo Aguas died on December 8, 1996. Pablos surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits. Rosanna indicated in her claim that Pablo was likewise survived by his minor child, Jeylnn. Her claim for monthly pension was settled. In April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablos sister, contesting Rosannas claim for death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode approximately more than six years before, and lived with another man, and that Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna. The SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnns monthly pension. In an investigation, it was reported that the deceased had no legal children with Rosanna and that Rosanna left the deceased six years before his death and lived with Romeo while she was still pregnant with Jenelyn. Rosanna was advised to refund to the SSS the amount representing the total death benefits released to her and Jenelyn. Rosanna and Jeylnn file a claim/petition for the Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the Social Security Commission (SSC). Janet H. Aguas, who also claimed to be the child of the deceased and Rosanna, now joined them as claimant. SSC rendered a decision denying the claims for lack of merit and ordering Rosanna to immediately refund the SSS. On Appeal, the CA rendered a decision in favor of Rosanna.

Primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the subject of the action of the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiffs respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit. Twin requirements of valid injunction: Existence of a right Actual or threatened violation Article 61: after further petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall in the absence of a written agreement between the couple would appoint either one of the spouses or a 3rd person to act as the administrator. V

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Issue: Whether or not respondents are entitled to the pension benefit. Held: The petition is partly meritorious. Jeylnns claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the signature of Pablo. Under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. In this case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime. Hence, Jeylnns status as a legitimate child can no longer be contested. The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however, can not extend to Janet because her date of birth was not substantially proven. Such presumption may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis. Respondents submitted a photocopy of Janets alleged birth certificate. However, the Court cannot give said birth certificate the same probative weight as Jeylnns because it was not verified in any way by the civil register. On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must prove that she was "the legitimate spouse dependent for support from the employee." The claimant-spouse must therefore establish two qualifying factors: (1) that she is the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon the member for support. Rosanna presented a copy of their marriage certificate verified with the civil register. But whether or not Rosanna has sufficiently established that she was still dependent on Pablo at the time of his death remains to be resolved. Indeed, a husband and wife are obliged to support each other, but whether one is actually dependent for support upon the other is something that has to be shown; it

cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone. The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living together at the time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the husband for support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself. Only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo, as it was established that she is his legitimate child. On the other hand, the records show that Janet was merely "adopted" by the spouses, but there are no legal papers to prove it; hence, she cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary. Finally, while Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still dependent on him for support even if they were already living separately. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUNSBAND AND WIFE VII VAN DORN vs ROMILLO JR (G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985) Facts: Alice Van Dorn, a Filipino citizen and Richard Upton, an American citizen, were married in Hongkong in 1972. After the marriage, they resided in the Philippines and begot two children. In 1982, the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States. Alice has remarried in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice with the RTC stating that her business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the parties. He asks that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Richard be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Alice
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moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss. Hence, this petition. In her petition, Alice contends that Richard is estopped from claiming on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property; hence, barred by prior judgment. Richard avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not Richard still has the right over the alleged conjugal properties. Ruling: There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on Richard as an American citizen. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Richard from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, Richard is no longer the husband of Alice. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as her husband

entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. To maintain that, under our laws, Alice has to be considered still married to Richard and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109 of the Civil Code cannot be just. Alice should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Richard. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

VIII PILAPIL vs IBAY SOMERA GR 80116 Facts: Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and Private Respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany. The couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. After about three and a half years of marriage, such disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property. On January 15, 1986, Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. However, on June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the
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issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Issue: Whether or not the complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint.

Facts: Petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona (Norlainie), her husband, Mohammad G. Limbona (Mohammad), and respondent Malik "Bobby" T. Alingan (Malik) were mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao del Norte for May 2007 National and Local Elections. Malik filed a petition for disqualification against Mohammed on the ground that it failed to comply with the one-year residence rule. COMELEC disqualified Mohammad. Consequently, Norlainie filed a new certificate of candidacy as substitute candidate for Mohammad. Issue:

Held: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. Thus, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. IX LIMBONA vs COMELEC GR# 181097 / JUNE 25, 2008

WON Norlaine is disqualified for running as mayor on the ground of failure to comply with one-year residence. Ruling: We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioner's domicile of origin is Maguing, Lanao del Norte, which is also her place of birth; and that her domicile by operation of law (by virtue of marriage) is Rapasun, Marawi City. The Comelec found that Mohammad, petitioner's husband, effected the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on November 11, 2006. Since it is presumed that the husband and wife live together in one legal residence, then it follows that petitioner effected the change of her domicile also on November 11, 2006. Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code provide: Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate residence from her husband, and as there is no evidence
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to prove otherwise, reliance on these provisions of the Family Code is proper and is in consonance with human experience. Thus, for failure to comply with the residency requirement, petitioner is disqualified to run for the office of mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. However, petitioner's disqualification would not result in Malik's proclamation who came in second during the special election.

consolidated with another case3 filed by Potenciano Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he never refused to see her. On May 12, 2000, we dismissed the petition for habeas corpus4 for lack of merit, and granted the petition5 to nullify the Court of Appeals' ruling6 giving visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio.7 What is now before the Court is Erlinda's motion to reconsider the decision.8 On September 20, 2000, we set the case for preliminary conference on October 11, 2000, at 10:00 a. m., without requiring the mandatory presence of the parties. Issue(s): The Court laid down the issues to be resolved, to wit: (a) To determine the propriety of a physical and medical examination of petitioner Potenciano Ilusorio; (b) Whether the same is relevant; and (c) If relevant, how the Court will conduct the same.9 Held: Nevertheless, for emphasis, we shall discuss the issues thus: First. Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in consortium and that Potenciano's mental state was not an issue. However, the very root cause of the entire petition is her desire to have her husband's custody.13 Clearly, Erlinda cannot now deny that she wanted Potenciano Ilusorio to live with her. Second. One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her husband was that respondents Lin and Sylvia were illegally restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of property rights out of pure greed.14 She claimed that her two children were using their sick and frail father to sign away Potenciano and Erlinda's property to companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia. She also argued that since Potenciano retired as director and officer of Baguio Country Club and Philippine Oversees
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X IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, respondents. G.R. No. 139789 x--------------------------------------------------------x POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents. G.R. No. 139808 Facts: Once again we see the sad tale of a prominent family shattered by conflicts on expectancy in fabled fortune. On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable from her husband some years ago, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals1 for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium. On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio. Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to have custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio.2 This case was

Telecommunications, she would logically assume his position and control. Yet, Lin and Sylvia were the ones controlling the corporations.15 The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at the Court of Appeals on March 23, 1999.16 Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented by his children from seeing anybody and that he had no objection to seeing his wife and other children whom he loved. Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from various ailments. Thus, Potenciano Ilusorio did not have the mental capacity to decide for himself. Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano be brought before the Supreme Court so that we could determine his mental state. We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose whether to see his wife or not. Again, this is a question of fact that has been decided in the Court of Appeals. As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the corporation, these are matters that may be threshed out in a separate proceeding, irrelevant in habeas corpus. Third. Petitioner failed to sufficiently convince the Court why we should not rely on the facts found by the Court of Appeals. Erlinda claimed that the facts mentioned in the decision were erroneous and incomplete. We see no reason why the High Court of the land need go to such length. The hornbook doctrine states that findings of fact of the lower courts are conclusive on the Supreme Court.17 We emphasize, it is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over again.18 Although there are exceptions to the rule,19 Erlinda failed to show that this is an exceptional instance. Fourth. Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code support her position that as spouses, they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and care for each other. We agree. The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,

observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.20 The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.21 Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.22 XI ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, respondents. G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000 POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents. G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000 Facts: The undisputed facts are as follows: Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for
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undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely: Ramon Ilusorio (age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39). On December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a consequence, Potencianos health deteriorated. On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a petition[10] for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati. On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents[11] refused petitioners demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City. Issue(s): May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.

Held: As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention,[13] or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.[14] It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.[17] The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral. The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions. Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no

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reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subjects sanity. When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that the same shall be enforced under penalty of contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Such assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary. The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and womans free choice. WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. No costs. In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it gives visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs.

Facts: Plaintiff Ramong Ong filed a complaint for the annulment of auction sale of a parcel of land, allegedly owned conjugally by the plaintiff and his former wife Teodora Ong, in favor of Francisco Boix. The auction sale was made due to failure of the wife to pay her loan obtained from Francisco Boix who lent her money in relation to her own logging business in Camarines Sur. Plaintiff argued that the subject property is really conjugal which the wife in the case at bar could not legally bind, and considering that the indebtedness was contracted by the wife only, the levy of the subject property not owned exclusively by the wife owned jointly with the husband is improper. Plaintiff based his argument on the fact that the property was "declared, under Tax No. 05378, in the name of Teodora B. Ong while the house erected thereon was declared under Tax No. 06022 in the name of Ramon C. Ong and Teodora B. Ong (Exhibits "B", "2-B", "2-C, "4") (Decision, p. 4). It was the contention of the plaintiff that since the surname "Ong" (which is the surname of the husband Ramon C. Ong) was carried by Teodora in the aforesaid declaration, that indicates that the subject property was acquired during the marriage. By reason thereof, the property in dispute is presumed to be owned jointly by both spouses. Issue: WON the property is conjugal. Held: NO, it is paraphernal. The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax declaration of the subject property is not sufficient proof that said property was acquired during the marriage and is therefore conjugal. It is undisputed that the subject parcel was declared solely in the wife's name, but the house built thereon was declared in the name of the spouses. Under such circumstances, coupled with a careful scrutiny of the records of the present
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XII RAMONG ONG vs. CA

case, We hold that the lot in question is paraphernal, and is therefore, liable for the personal debts of the wife. The presumption that property is conjugal (Art. 160, New Civil Code) refers to property acquired during the marriage. When there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by a spouse, the fact that the title is in the spouse's name is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court, the party who invokes the presumption that all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership (Art. 160, New Civil Code) must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. (Cobb-Perez, et al. vs. Lantin, et al., 23 SCRA 637; Jose Ponce de Leon vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corp., 36 SCRA 289). In the same manner, the recent case of PNB vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 435 affirms that: When the property is registered in the name of the a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Art. 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. Furthermore, even assuming for the sake of argument that the property in dispute is conjugal, the same may still be held liable for the debts of the wife in this case. Under Art. 117 of the Civil Code, the wife may engage in business although the husband may object (but subject to certain conditions). It is clear from the records that the wife was engaged in the logging business with the husband's knowledge and apparently without any objection on his part. The acts of the husband show that he gave his implied consent to the wife's engagement in business. According to Justice Ameurfina-Herrera (then Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals)

in her concurring opinion, the rule that should govern in that case is that the wife's paraphernal properties, as well as those of their conjugal partnership, shall be liable for the obligations incurred by the wife in the course of her business (Arts. 117, 140, 172, 203, and 236, Civil Code; Art. 10, Code of Commerce, cited in Commentaries on Phil. Commercial Laws, Martin, T.C. Vol. 1, 1970 Revised Edition, pp. 14-15). After all, whatever profits are earned by the wife from her business go to the conjugal partnership. It would only be just and equitable that the obligations contracted by the wife in connection with her business may also be chargeable not only against her paraphernal property but also against the conjugal property of the spouses. XIII GO vs CA G.R. No. 114791 FACTS: Private respondents spouses Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1981, in Dumaguete City. The video coverage of the wedding was provided by petitioners at a contract price of P1,650.00. Three times thereafter, the newlyweds tried to claim the video tape of their wedding, which they planned to show to their relatives in the United States where they were to spend their honeymoon, and thrice they failed because the tape was apparently not yet processed. When they return, however, they found out that the tape had been erased by petitioners and therefore, could no longer be delivered. Furious at its loss, private respondents filed on September 23, 1981 a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial District, Branch 33, Dumaguete City. After a protracted trial, the court a quo rendered a decision declaring defendants Alex Go and Nancy Go jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs Hermogenes Ong and Jane C. Ong. Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which, on September 14, 1993,
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dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial courts decision.Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON the husband, petitioner Alex Go is jointly and severally liable with his wife Nancy Go regarding the pecuniary liabilities imposed HELD: No. Petitioner Alex Go is absolved from any liability to private respondents and that petitioner Nancy Go is solely liable to said private respondents for the judgment award. Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the Family Code), the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In the instant case, SC is convinced that it was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the contract with private respondent. Consequently, SC rules that she is solely liable to private respondents for the damages awarded below, pursuant to the principle that contracts produce effect only as between the parties who execute them.

Zambales. The trial court found that as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, Miguel refused to stay with Carlina but stayed alone in a house in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. On July 15, 1973, 63 yr old Miguel contracted a second marriage with 19 yr old Erlinda Agapay. Two months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was also purchased by Erlinda as sole vendee, but this was disclaimed by the notary public saying that the money used to buy the property was given by Miguel. On October 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a deed of donation as a form of compromise agreement. The parties agreed to donate their conjugal property to their only child, Herminia Palang. Miguel and Erlinda had a son, Kristopher A. Palang. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. Two years later, Miguel died. On July 11, 1979, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia filed an action for recovery of ownership and possession of the Riceland and house and lot both located at Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda Agapay. The RTC dismissed the case and ruled in favour of Agapay. On appeal, the respondent court reversed the trial courts decision and declared Carlina and Herminia Palang the owners of the properties in question. Issue: WON the house and lot in Pangasinan is a valid donation by Miguel to Erlinda. Held: With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money
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PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUNSBAND AND WIFE XIV AGAPAY VS PALANG Facts: Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage with Carlina (or Cornelia) on July 16, 1949. A few months after the wedding, in October 1949, he left for work in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlinas only child, Herminia Palang, was born on May 12, 1950. During his visit in 1964 to the Philippines, he stayed with his brother in

for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda's name alone be placed as the vendee. The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union. XV ARCABA VS BATOCAEL XVI Romana Locquiao- Valencia and Constancia L. Valencia, petitioners, VS Benito A.Locquiao, now deceased and substituted by Jimmy Locquiao, Tomasa Mara and the Registrar of Deeds of Pangasinan, respondents. G.R. No. 122134 Facts: On May 22, 1944, Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao(donor) executed a deed of donation propter nuptias which was written in the Ilocano dialect, denominated as Inventario Ti Sagut in favor of their son, respondent Benito Locquiao (hereafter, respondent Benito) and his prospective bride, respondent Tomasa Mara. By the terms of the deed, the donees were gifted with four (4) parcels of land, including the land in question, as well as a male cow and onethird (1/3) portion of the conjugal house of the donor parents, in consideration of the impending marriage of the donees. Respondentsdonees took their marriage vows on June 4, 1944 and the fact of their marriage was inscribed at the back of O.C.T. No. 18383. They registered the Inventario Ti Sagut with

the Office of the Register of Deeds on May 15, 1970. In due course, the original title was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84897 was issued in the name of the respondents Benito and Tomasa. When the donor died, the 6 heirs left , including Respondent Benito, executed a Deed of Partition with Recognition of Rights on March 18, 1973 wherein they distributed among only three (3) of them, the twelve (12) parcels of land left by their common progenitors, excluding the land in question and other lots disposed of by the Locquiao spouses earlier. Disagreements arose among them. Petitioners Romana and Constancia filed a Complain for the annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84897 against respondents Benito and Tomasa before the RTC of Pangasinan on December 23, 1985. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of the transfer certificate of title was fraudulent; that the Inventario Ti Sagut is spurious; that the notary public who notarized the document had no authority to do so, and; that the donation did not observe the form required by law as there was no written acceptance on the document itself or in a separate public instrument. Issue: Whether or not the donation propter nuptias is valid? Held: Yes the donation propter nuptias is valid. Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or donations by reason of marriage are those made before its celebration, in consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of the future spouses. The distinction is crucial because the two classes of donations are not governed by exactly the same rules, especially as regards the formal essential requisites. Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property don ated must be specifically
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described. However, Article 1330 of the same Code provides that acceptance is not necessary to the validity of such gifts. In other words, the celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance with the prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias under the Old Civil Code. Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides that the form of donations propter nuptias are regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2, which contains the Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder need be in writing only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance is not necessary for the validity of these donations. Thus, implied acceptance is sufficient. It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code which applies in this case since the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. As a consequence, applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code in the determination of the validity of the questioned donation, it does not matter whether or not the donees had accepted the donation. The validity of the donation is unaffected in either case. SYSTEMS OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY XVII SUNGA CHAN vs CA GR 164401 Facts: In 1977, Lamberto Chua and Jacinto Sunga formed a partnership, Shellite Gas Appliance Center (Shellite). After Jacinto's death in 1989, his widow, Cecilia Sunga, and married daughter, petitioner Lilibeth Sunga-Chan, continued with the business without Chua's consent. Chua's subsequent

repeated demands for accounting and winding up went unheeded, prompting him to file a Complaint for Winding Up of a Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Chua, and found Cecilia and Sunga-Chan solidarily liable for any and all claims of Chua. RTCs judgment was upheld by the CA. Then the sheriff levied upon and sold at public auction Sunga-Chans property in Paco, Manila, over which a building leased to PNB stood. SungaChan questions the levy on execution of the subject property on the ground that it is an absolute community property with her husband Norberto Chan. Issue: Whether the absolute community of property of spouses Lilibeth Sunga Chan and Norberto Chan can be lawfully made to answer for the liability of Lilibeth Chan under the judgment. Held: Yes. The records show that spouses SungaChan and Norberto were married after the effectivity of the Family Code. Withal, their absolute community property may be held liable for the obligations contracted by either spouse. Specifically, Art. 94 of said Code pertinently provides: Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for: x x x (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited. Absent any indication otherwise, the use and appropriation by petitioner SungaChan of the assets of Shellite even after the business was discontinued on May 30, 1992 may reasonably be considered to have been used for her and her husband's benefit.
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CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS General Provisions XVIII PROCOPIO VILLANUEVA, NICOLAS RETUYA and PACITA VILLANUEVA, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF EUSEBIA NAPISA RETUYA, respondents. G.R. No. 143286 Facts: Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas Retuya, having been married to the latter on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot five (5) children, namely, Natividad, Angela, Napoleon, Salome, and Roberta. Spouses Retuya resided at Tipolo, Mandaue City. During their marriage they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu. Also, defendant, Nicolas Retuya, is co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City. In 1945, defendant Nicolas Retuya no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein defendant, Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the income of the above-mentioned properties Defendant, Pacita Villanueva, from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation, she had no properties of her own from which she could derive income. In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke and cannot talk anymore. Natividad Retuya knew of the physical condition of her father because they visited him at the hospital. From the time defendant Nicolas Retuya suffered a stroke on January 27, 1985 and until the present, it is defendant Procopio Villanueva, one of Nicolas illegitimate children who has been receiving the income of these properties. Witness Natividad Retuya went to Procopio to negotiate because at this time their father Nicolas was already

senile and has a childlike mind. She told defendant, Procopio that their father was already incapacitated and they had to talk things over and the latter replied that it was not yet the time to talk about the matter. Plaintiff, then, complained to the Barangay Captain for reconciliation/mediation but no settlement was reached, hence, the said official issued a certification to file action. Written demands were made by plaintiff, through her counsel, to the defendants, including the illegitimate family asking for settlement but no settlement was reached by the parties. Further, plaintiffs witness, Natividad Retuya, testified that the parcel of land covered by tax declaration marked Exhibit "T" was the property bought by her father from Adriano Marababol for at the time of purchase of the property, defendant Pacita Villanueva had no means of livelihood. ISSUE: Whether the conjugal. HELD: Petitioners claim that the subject properties are exclusive properties of Nicolas except for Lot No. 152, which they claim is Pacitas exclusive property. This issue is easily resolved. The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of Family Code. Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal. Petitioners argue subject properties are

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that Eusebia failed to prove this prerequisite. We disagree. The question of whether the subject properties were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia is a factual issue. Both the trial and appellate courts agreed that the subject properties were in fact acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. The tax declarations covering the subject properties, along with the unrebutted testimony of Eusebias witnesses, establish this fact. We give due deference to factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the appellate court. A reversal of this finding can only occur if petitioners show sufficient reason for us to doubt its correctness. Petitioners in the present case have not. Moreover, on whether Lot No. 152 is conjugal or not, the answer came from petitioners themselves. Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16 December 1996. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October 1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia. The burden is on petitioners to prove that the subject properties are not conjugal. The presumption in Article 116, which subsists "unless the contrary is proved," stands as an obstacle to any claim the petitioners may have. The burden of proving that a property is exclusive property of a spouse rests on the party asserting it and the evidence required must be clear and convincing. Petitioners failed to meet this standard. The cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even for a long period, does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Otherwise, the law would be giving a stamp of approval to

an act that is both illegal and immoral. What petitioners fail to grasp is that Nicolas and Pacitas cohabitation cannot work to the detriment of Eusebia, the legal spouse. The marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia continued to exist regardless of the fact that Nicolas was already living with Pacita. Hence, all property acquired from 7 October 1926, the date of Nicolas and Eusebias marriage, until 23 November 1996, the date of Eusebias death, are still presumed conjugal. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that any of the subject properties was acquired outside or beyond this period. Finally, petitioners reliance on Article 148 of the Family Code is misplaced. A reading of Article 148 readily shows that there must be proof of "actual joint contribution" by both the live-in partners before the property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their contribution. The presumption of equality of contribution arises only in the absence of proof of their proportionate contributions, subject to the condition that actual joint contribution is proven first. Simply put, proof of actual contribution by both parties is required, otherwise there is no co-ownership and no presumption of equal sharing. Petitioners failed to show proof of actual contribution by Pacita in the acquisition of Lot No. 152. In short, petitioners failed to prove that Pacita bought Lot No. 152 with her own money, or that she actually contributed her own money to acquire it. XIX De Leon v. De Leon GR# 185063 Facts: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon, then single, and the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a 191.30 square-meter lot situated in Fairview, Quezon City. Subsequently, on April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in a civil rite officiated by the Municipal Mayor of Zaragosa, Nueva Ecija. To this union were born Danilo and Vilma. Following the full payment of the cost
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price for the lot thus purchased, PHHC executed, on June 22, 1970, a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 173677 was issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, "single." Subsequently, Bonifacio, for PhP 19,000, sold the subject lot to her sister, Lita, and husband Felix Rio Tarrosa (Tarrosas), petitioners herein. The conveying Deed of Sale dated January 12, 1974 (Deed of Sale) did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died. Three months later, the Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale. They secured the issuance in their names from the Quezon City Register of Deeds. Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit before the RTC in Quezon City. In their complaint, Anita and her children alleged, among other things, that fraud attended the execution of the Deed of Sale and that subsequent acts of Bonifacio would show that he was still the owner of the parcel of land. The Tarrosas, in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property inasmuch as he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC. As further alleged, they were not aware of the supposed marriage between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale. RTC ruled in favor of Anita and her children. CA held that the Tarrosas failed to overthrow the legal presumption that the parcel of land in dispute was conjugal. Issue: WON the property in question is part of the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita. Ruling: Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. For the presumption to arise, it is not, as Tan v. Court of Appeals teaches, even necessary to prove that the property

was acquired with funds of the partnership. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the property is conjugal. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal. In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and covered by the PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. It is well settled that a conditional sale is akin, if not equivalent, to a contract to sell. In both types of contract, the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendors obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, usually the full payment of the purchase price, so that if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed. In other words, in a contract to sell ownership is retained by the seller and is not passed to the buyer until full payment of the price, unlike in a contract of sale where title passes upon delivery of the thing sold. It cannot be over-emphasized that the 1950 Civil Code is very explicit on the consequence of the husband alienating or encumbering any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. To a specific point, the sale of a conjugal piece of land by the husband, as administrator, must, as a rule, be with the wifes consent. Else, the sale is not valid. So it is that in several cases we ruled that the sale by the husband of property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife is void ab initio, absent any showing that the latter is incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or like causes. The nullity, as we have explained, proceeds from the fact that sale is in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Art. 166 of the Code. Since Art. 166 of the Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband may alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that the acts or transactions executed against this mandatory
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provision are void except when the law itself authorized their validity. As a final consideration, the Court agrees with the CA that the sale of onehalf of the conjugal property without liquidation of the partnership is void. Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into a title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement.26 The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution.27 Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs. HEIRS OF DOMINGO HERNANDEZ, SR., namely: SERGIA V. HERNANDEZ (Surviving Spouse), DOMINGO V. HERNANDEZ, JR., and MARIA LEONORA WILMA HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, vs. PLARIDEL MINGOA, SR., DOLORES CAMISURA, MELANIE MINGOA AND QUEZON CITY REGISTER OF DEEDS, Respondents. G.R. No. 146548 FACTS: Domingo Hernandez, Sr. was awarded a piece of real property in 1958 by the PHHC as part of the governments housing program at the time. Title over the said property was issued in 1966 in the name of Hernandez, Sr., after full payment for the property was received by the PHHC. Neither [petitioners] nor Hernandez, Sr., took possession of the said property. On the other hand, the [respondents] took possession of the said property in 1966

and are in actual and physical possession thereof up to the present, and have made considerable improvements thereon, including a residential house where they presently reside. From 1966 (the time when the [respondents] were able to possess the property) to 1983 (the time when the [petitioners] had knowledge that the TCT in the name of Hernandez, Sr. had already been cancelled by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City) covers almost a span of 17 years; and from 1983 to 1995 (the time when the Heirs filed the original action) is a period of another 12 years. The Deed of Transfer of Rights, executed by Hernandez, Sr. in Camisuras favor, expressly states that the former, in consideration of the amount of P6,500.00, transfers his rights over the subject property to the latter. Notably, such deed was simultaneously executed with the SPA on February 14, 1963. Petitioners contend that the lack of consent on the part of Sergia Hernandez (the spouse) rendered the SPAs and the deed of sale fictitious, hence null and void in accordance with Article 1409 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the consent of the spouse is necessary for the validity of alienation of conjugal property? HELD: No. The consent of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. to the contract is undisputed, thus, the sale of his share in the conjugal property was valid. With regard to the consent of his wife, Sergia Hernandez, to the sale involving their conjugal property, the trial court found that it was lacking because said wifes signature on the SPA was falsified. However, Sergias lack of consent to the sale did not render the transfer of her share invalid. It bears stressing that the subject matter herein involves conjugal property. Said property was awarded to Domingo Hernandez, Sr. in 1958. The assailed
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SPAs were executed in 1963 and 1964. Title in the name of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. covering the subject property was issued on May 23, 1966. The sale of the property to Melanie Mingoa and the issuance of a new title in her name happened in 1978. Since all these events occurred before the Family Code took effect in 1988, the provisions of the New Civil Code govern these transactions. We quote the applicable provisions, to wit: Art. 165. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same. x x x. Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband. In Sps. Alfredo v. Sps. Borras,41 we held that: The Family Code, which took effect on 3 August 1988, provides that any alienation or encumbrance made by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is void. However, when the sale is made before the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code. Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the disposition of conjugal property without the wife's consent is not void but merely voidable. Thus, the failure of Sergia Hernandez to file with the courts an action for annulment of the contract during the marriage and within ten (10) years from

the transaction necessarily barred her from questioning the sale of the subject property to third persons.

XXI PHILIPS MATTHEWS vs BENJAMIN and JOSELYN TAYLOR GR 164584 Facts: On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of P129,000.00. The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyns sister. However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner thereafter took possession of

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the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort. Issue(s):

The marital consent of respondent benjamin taylor is not required in the agreement of lease dated 20 july 1992. Granting arguendo that his consent is required, benjamin taylor is deemed to have given his consent when he affixed his signature in the agreement of lease as witness in the light of the ruling of the supreme court in the case of spouses pelayo vs. Melki perez, g.r. no. 141323, june 8, 2005. The parcel of land subject of the agreement of lease is the exclusive property of jocelyn c. Taylor, a filipino citizen, in the light of cheesman vs. Iac, g.r. no. 74833, january 21, 1991. The courts a quo erroneously applied article 96 of the family code of the philippines which is a provision referring to the absolute community of property. The property regime governing the property relations of benjamin taylor and joselyn taylor is the conjugal partnership of gains because they were married on 30 june 1988 which is prior to the effectivity of the family code. Article 96 of the family code of the philippines finds no application in this case. The honorable court of appeals ignored the presumption of regularity in the execution of notarial documents. The honorable court of appeals failed to pass upon the counterclaim of petitioner despite the fact that it was not contested and despite the presentation of evidence establishing said claim.

We find and so hold that Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated vendee in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his (Benjamins) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyns husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent. In fine, the Agreement of Lease entered into between Joselyn and petitioner cannot be nullified on the grounds advanced by Benjamin. Thus, we uphold its validity.

Held:

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With the foregoing disquisition, we find it unnecessary to address the other issues raised by the petitioner.

XXII CAMILO F. BORROMEO, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, Respondent. GR 159310 Facts: Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, was assigned by his employer to work here in the Philippines where he met respondent Antonietta Descallar, a separated mother of two boys, with whom he had a live-in relationship with. During the course of their relationship, a Deed of Absolute Sale was issued in their favor by Agro-Macro Subdivision respecting a house and lot where they transferred and lived together. When the deed was presented before the Registry of Deeds for registration, a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued only in the name of respondent and the registration was refused on the part of Jambrich on the ground that he was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, Jambrichs name was erased from the deed of sale. In the meantime, Jambrich adopted the sons of respondent. However, not long after, the couple broke up and lived separately without settlement of their properties. While still in the Philippines, Jambrich met petitioner Camilo Borromeo with whom he was indebted in the amount of P150,000 relative to the purchases he made from the latter which he was not able to pay. Believing that his interest in his property with the Agro-Macro Subdivision still exist, he sold the same by way of Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment to petitioner. When petitioner was about to register the deed, he discovered, however, that the property was already transferred in the name of respondent and had already been mortgaged. Petitioner then filed a complaint for recovery of the real property. Petitioner alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale over the properties which identified both Jambrich

and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true agreement of the parties since respondent did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid for the properties using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of the properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment which Jambrich executed in his favor. In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation that she did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price. On the contrary, she claimed that she "solely and exclusively used her own personal funds to defray and pay for the purchase price of the subject lots in question," and that Jambrich, being an alien, was prohibited to acquire or own real property in the Philippines. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. The decision was however reversed by CA on appeal. ISSUE: WON the petitioner as the successor-ininterest of Jambrich, who is a resident alien, has validly obtained the right over the subject property without violating the prohibition under the Constitution. HELD: YES. As the rule now stands, the fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.29 Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian,30 the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases31 that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino,
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the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Applying United Church Board for World Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, viz.: [W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation [were] void ab initio since [they were] contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid. The rationale behind the Courts ruling in United Church Board for World Ministries, as reiterated in subsequent cases,32 is this since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nations land for future generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved. Exclusive Property of Each Spouse XXIII VILLEGAS vs LINGAN GR 153839 FACTS: Isaac Villegas was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. In order to secure the payment of a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), Isaac constituted a real estate mortgage over the said parcel of land in favor of DBP. The said loan and mortgage was subsequently transferred by the DBP to the Home Mutual Development Fund (HMDF).When the Isaac failed to settle his loan, the real estate mortgage he constituted over the property was foreclosed, the property was sold at public auction and, as the HMDF was itself the highest

bidder at such public auction, a certificate of sheriffs sale was issued and, thereafter, registered with the Register of Deeds on March 8, 1996. By virtue of a power of attorney executed by Villegas wife, Marilou C. Villegas in favor of Gloria Roa Catral, the latter redeemed the property from the HMDF. On May 17, 1996, Gloria R. Catral (Catral), by virtue of the same power of attorney, executed a Deed of Sale in favor of respondent. Isaac claims that the power of attorney executed in favor of Catral, his motherin-law, created a principal-agent relationship only between his wife, Marilou Catral-Villegas (Marilou) as principal, and Catral, as agent, and then only for the latter to administer the properties of the former; that he never authorized Catral to administer his properties, particularly, herein subject property; and that Catral had no authority to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the respondent, since from the very wordings of the power of attorney, she had no special authority to sell or convey any specific real property. On December 19, 1996, the RTC dismissed the Complaint and on appeal, CA affirmed in toto the RTC Judgment. Hence, this petition for review. ISSUES: (1) WON the wife of the petitioner Isaac, as successor-in-interest, may validly redeem the property in question (2) WON the petitioner husband Isaac has a cause of action against his respondent wife Marilou HELD:

1. YES. Section 6 of Act No. 3135 provides that in all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on
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the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of section 464 to 466, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. Section 27, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that real property sold as provided in the last preceding section, or any part thereof sold separately, may be redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided, by the following persons: xxxx a)The judgment obligor, or his successor-in-interest in the whole or any part of the property; The successor-in-interest of the judgment debtor referred to in the above provision includes a person who succeeds to his property by operation of law, or a person with a joint interest in the property, or his spouse or heirs. Under the above provision, petitioner could have redeemed the property from Marilou after she had redeemed it. The pleadings filed and the records of this case do not show that petitioner exercised said right. Consequently, as correctly held by the CA, Marilou acquired ownership of the subject property. All rights and title of the judgment obligor are transferred upon the expiration of the right of redemption. And where the redemption is made under a property regime governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, Article 109 of the Family Code provides that property acquired by right of redemption is the exclusive property of the spouses redeeming the property. 2. NO. A cause of action is an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right of the plaintiff. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three essential elements:(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the

defendant plaintiff.

violates

the

right

of

the

In the present case, there is no property right that exists in favor of the petitioner, and, with more reason, no such obligation arises in behalf of the defendant, herein respondent, to respect such right.There was no violation of a legal right of the petitioner. It must be stressed that there is no allegation or proof that Marilou redeemed the property in behalf of the petitioner. Marilou did not act as agent of the petitioner. Rather, she exercised the right of redemption in her own right as successor-in-interest of the petitioner. Under the circumstances, should there be any right violated, the aggrieved party is Marilou, petitioners wife. The property in question was the exclusive property of Marilou by virtue of her redemption. Thus, petitioner has no valid cause of action against the respondent. Divested of all interest over the property, the petitioner has ceased to be the proper party who may challenge the validity of the sale. Moreover, since, as a rule, the agency, as a contract, is binding only between the contracting parties, then only the parties, as well as the third person who transacts with the parties themselves, may question the validity of the agency or the violation of the terms and conditions found therein. This rule is a corollary of the foregoing doctrine on the rights of real parties in interest. xxxxx Petition is denied. CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY XXIV PISUEA vs HEIRS OF PETRA UNATING GR 132803 Facts: Salvador Upod and Dolores Bautista are the heirs of Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar. They claimed that the land in dispute known as Lot 1201 was registered in the name of Petra Unating married to Aquilino Villar. However, sometime in 1950, after the death of Petra Unating, Aquilino Villar entered into an oral partnership agreement for ten years with Agustin Navarra involving
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the swampy portion of the lot in question consisting of around four hectares which was converted into a fishpond with the investment capital of Agustin Navarra and the net income shall be divided equally between Aquilino Villar and his children Felix Villar and Catalina Villar on one hand, and Agustin Navarra on the other hand. In 1958 when Agustin Navarra died, the heirs of Petra Unating repossessed the land in question until the defendant Jessie Pisuea, son-in-law of Agustin Navarra, disturbed their possession sometime in 1974. And finally, sometime in 1982, the defendant, with the company of several men, including policemen, forcibly took physical possession of the said land from the heirs of Petra Unating. Thus, they filed the instant action for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land against Jessie Pisuea. On the other hand, defendant countered that the whole land in dispute was sold by Felix Villar and Catalina Villar to Agustin Navarra, as evidenced by Escritura de Venta Absoluta. And he and his wife purchased the said land from the heirs of Agustin Navarra. After trial, the court a quo ruled that since the disputed lot was the conjugal property of Spouses Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar, its purported sale by Felix and Catalina Villar, to Agustin Navarra could be considered as valid. However, this validity pertained only to the share of the late Petra Unating considering that at the time of the sale, Aquilino Villar was still alive. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the said decision.

paraphernal property of Petra Unating. Concededly, properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal. However, this prima facie presumption cannot prevail over the cadastral courts specific finding, reached in adversarial proceedings, that the lot was inherited by Petra Unating from her mother. Consequently, by virtue of the Deed of Sale they executed, Felix and Catalina effectively transferred to Agustin Navarra on February 4, 1949, their title over their two-thirds share in the disputed lot. However, they could not have disposed of their fathers share in the same property at the time, as they were not yet owners. At the most, being the only children, they had an inchoate interest in their fathers share. When Aquilino Villar died in 1953 without disposing of his one-third share in the disputed property, Felix and Catalinas inchoate interest in it was actualized, because succession vested in them the title to their fathers share and, consequently, to the entire lot. Thus, that title passed to Agustin Navarra, pursuant to Article 1434 of the present Civil Code, which was already in force at the time of Aquilinos death in 1953. XXV CHING vs CA GR 124642

XXVI Issue: W/N the lot in dispute is paraphernal property of Petra Unating hence would be covered by the CPG. Held: The Court ruled that the lot in dispute can properly be considered as a Ferrer vs Ferrer GR No. 166496 Facts: Petitioner id the widow of Alfredo Ferrer, a half- brother of Respondents. She filed a Complaint for payment of conjugal improvements, sum of money, and accounting with prayer for injunction and damages. She alleged that before her
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marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired a piece of lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 67927. He applied for a loan with the SSS to build improvements thereon, including a residential house and a two-door apartment building. However, it was during their marriage that payment of the loan was made using the couples conjugal funds. From their conjugal funds, petitioner posited, they constructed a warehouse on the lot. Moreover, petitioner averred that respondent Manuel occupied one door of the apartment building, as well as the warehouse; however, in September 1991, he stopped paying rentals thereon, alleging that he had acquired ownership over the property by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of respondents, Manuel and Ismael and their spouses. TCT No. 67927 was cancelled, and TCT. No. 2728 was issued and registered in the names of respondents. According to petitioner, that when Alfredo died on 29 September 1999, or at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, she had the right to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements on Alfredos lot. She alleged that the cost of the improvements amounted to P500,000.00; hence, one-half thereof should be reimbursed and paid by respondents as they are now the registered owners of Alfredos lot. Issue: Whether or not Petitioner has the right to be reimbursed for the cost of improvements under Article 120 of the Family Code? Held: No. Petitioner was not able to show that there is an obligation on the part of the respondents to respect or not to violate her right. The right of the spouse as contemplated in Article 120 of the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in

case the property is sold by the ownerspouse. Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. The subject property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of Article 120 of the Family Code. What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite the allegations contained in the Complaint that they are the buyers of the subject premises, are not petitioners spouse nor can they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner for her costs rested. It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise stated, respondents do not have the obligation to respect petitioners right to be reimbursed. XXVII MBTC vs PASCUAL GR 163744 Facts: Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on January 19, 1985. During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located in Makati City. The Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) covering the purchased lot (Lot no. 156283) was issued in the name of
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Florencia married to Nelson a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual.

Pascual

In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 FC, w/c was granted by the Quezon City RTC in 1995. In the same decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the exspouses conjugal partnership of gains, w/c the latter failed. On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a P58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties, including one lot no. 156283. Due to the failure of Florencia and the sps Oliveros to pay their loan obligation, MBTC foreclosed the property. Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before the Makati RTC a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property, alleging that the property, which is still conjugal property, was mortgaged without his consent. MBTC alleged that the disputed lot, being registered in Florencias name, was paraphernal. Florencia was declared in default. The RTC rendered judgment finding for Nicholson. The CA affirmed the RTC but deleted the award moral damages and attorneys fees. Issue: Whether or not the subject property is conjugal partnership property under Article 116 of the Family Code. Held: The court ruled in favor of Nicholson. The disputed property is conjugal. While Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160 of the Civil Code, not Art. 116 of the Family Code, is the applicable legal provision since the property was acquired prior to the enactment of the Family Code, it errs in its theory that, before conjugal ownership could be legally presumed, there must be a showing that the property was acquired during marriage using conjugal funds.

Art. 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This article does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. As Nicholson aptly points out, if proof obtains on the acquisition of the property during the existence of the marriage, then the presumption of conjugal ownership applies. Proof of acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. When there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by the spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the spouse is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.

XXVIII MUOZ vs RAMIREZ GR 156125 FACTS: Subject of the present case is a seventyseven (77)-square meter residential house and lot located at 170 A. Bonifacio Street, Mandaluyong City (subject property), covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7650 of the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City in the name of the petitioner. The residential lot in the subject property was previously covered by TCT No. 1427, in the name of Erlinda Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos (respondents). On April 6, 1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal Revenue employee, mortgaged TCT No. 1427, with Erlindas consent, to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to secure a P136,500.00 housing loan, payable within twenty (20) years,
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through monthly salary deductions of P1,687.66. The respondents then constructed a thirty-six (36)-square meter, two-story residential house on the lot. On July 14, 1993, the title to the subject property was transferred to the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 30, 1992, executed by Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Eliseo, for a stated consideration of P602,000.00. On September 24, 1993, the respondents filed a complaint with the RTC for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale, claiming that there was no sale but only a mortgage transaction, and the documents transferring the title to the petitioners name were falsified. The respondents alleged that in April 1992, the petitioner granted them a P600,000.00 loan, to be secured by a first mortgage on TCT No. 1427; the petitioner gave Erlinda a P200,000.00 advance to cancel the GSIS mortgage, and made her sign a document purporting to be the mortgage contract; the petitioner promised to give the P402,000.00 balance when Erlinda surrenders TCT No. 1427 with the GSIS mortgage cancelled, and submits an affidavit signed by Eliseo stating that he waives all his rights to the subject property; with the P200,000.00 advance, Erlinda paid GSIS P176,445.27 to cancel the GSIS mortgage on TCT No. 1427; in May 1992, Erlinda surrendered to the petitioner the clean TCT No. 1427, but returned Eliseos affidavit, unsigned; since Eliseos affidavit was unsigned, the petitioner refused to give the P402,000.00 balance and to cancel the mortgage, and demanded that Erlinda return the P200,000.00 advance; since Erlinda could not return the P200,000.00 advance because it had been used to pay the GSIS loan, the petitioner kept the title; and in 1993, they discovered that TCT No. 7650 had been issued in the petitioners name, cancelling TCT No.1427 in their name. The petitioner countered that there was a valid contract of sale. He alleged that the respondents sold the subject property to him after he refused their offer to mortgage the subject property

because they lacked paying capacity and were unwilling to pay the incidental charges; the sale was with the implied promise to repurchase within one year, during which period (from May 1, 1992 to April 30, 1993), the respondents would lease the subject property for a monthly rental of P500.00; when the respondents failed to repurchase the subject property within the one-year period despite notice, he caused the transfer of title in his name on July 14, 1993. In a Decision dated January 23, 1997, the RTC dismissed the complaint. It found that the subject property was Erlindas exclusive paraphernal property that was inherited from her father. The CA decided the appeal on June 25, 2002. Applying the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon. Fortun, the CA held that the subject property, originally Erlindas exclusive paraphernal property, became conjugal property when it was used as collateral for a housing loan that was paid through conjugal funds Eliseos monthly salary deductions; the subject property, therefore, cannot be validly sold or mortgaged without Eliseos consent, pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code. Thus, the CA declared void the deed of absolute sale, and set aside the RTC decision. ISSUE: Whether the subject paraphernal or conjugal. HELD: As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership. Pursuant to Articles 92 and 109 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse, during the marriage, shall be excluded from the
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property

is

community property and be the exclusive property of each spouse. The residential lot, therefore, is Erlindas exclusive paraphernal property. The court held that they cannot subscribe to the CAs misplaced reliance on Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas. As the respondents were married during the effectivity of the Civil Code, its provisions on conjugal partnership of gains (Articles 142 to 189) should have governed their property relations. However, with the enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1989, the Civil Code provisions on conjugal partnership of gains, including Article 158, have been superseded by those found in the Family Code (Articles 105 to 133). Article 105 of the Family Code states: x x x x The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. Thus, in determining the nature of the subject property, we refer to the provisions of the Family Code, and not the Civil Code, except with respect to rights then already vested. Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code, provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Under this provision, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to

reimbursement improvement.

of

the

cost

of

the

In the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS loan through monthly salary deductions. From April 6, 1989 to April 30, 1992, Eliseo paid about P60,755.76, not the entire amount of the GSIS housing loan plus interest, since the petitioner advanced the P176,445.27 paid by Erlinda to cancel the mortgage in 1992. Considering the P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is considerably more than the P60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo through monthly salary deductions. Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda at the time she contracted with the petitioner; the written consent of Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary. The NBI finding that Eliseos signatures in the special power of attorney and affidavit were forgeries was immaterial. XIX Imami v. MBTC GR # 187023/Nov. 17, 2010 Facts: On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani (petitioner) signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor of respondent Metrobank, with Cesar P. Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and Nicolas Ponce as her co-sureties. As sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00). Later, CPDTI obtained loans of P100,000.00 and P63,825.45, respectively. The loans were evidenced by promissory notes signed by Cesar and Nieves Dazo. CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its loans. Metrobank made several demands for payment upon CPDTI, but to no avail. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties, including herein petitioner. RTC ruled in favor of
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Metrobank. Metrobank then filed with the RTC a motion for execution, which was granted on December 7, 1999. A writ of execution was issued against CPDTI and its co-defendants. The sheriff levied on a property covering a lot registered in the name of petitioner. Petitioner argued that the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership; as such, it cannot be held answerable for the liabilities incurred by CPDTI to Metrobank. Neither can it be subject of levy on execution or public auction. Hence, petitioner prayed for the nullification of the levy on execution and the auction sale, as well as the certificate of sale in favor of Metrobank. Issue: WON or not the property in question is conjugal. Ruling: All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material. Similarly, the certificate of title could not support petitioners assertion. As aptly ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was registered in the name of Evangelina Dazo-Imani married to Sina Imani is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. CHARGES UPON AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP XXX AYALA INVEST AND DEVT CORP. vs CA GR 118305 Facts:

Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a loan from Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). As added security for the credit line extended to PBM, Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security agreements making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM's indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and Alfredo Ching. After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of P50,300,000.00 with interests. Pending appeal and upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of execution and the Deputy Sheriff caused the issuance and service upon spouses Ching of a notice of sheriff sale on three (3) of their conjugal properties. Spouses Ching filed a case of injunction to enjoin the auction sale alleging that the judgment cannot be enforced against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among others, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the conjugal partnership of gains of spouses Ching is not liable for the payment of the debts secured by the husband Alfredo Ching. Issue: Whether the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement entered into by the husband in favor of his employer. Held: Yes.If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term ". . . obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or
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services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership. Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except to the extent that they redounded to the benefit of the family. Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the benefit of the family. XXXI HONORIO L. CARLOS, petitioner, vs. MANUEL T. ABELARDO, respondent. GR 146504 Facts: Petitioner averred in his complaint filed on October 13, 1994 that in October 1989, respondent and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and requested him to advance the amount of US$25,000.00 for the purchase of a house and lot located at #19952 Chestnut Street, Executive Heights Village, Paranaque, Metro Manila. To enable and assist the spouses conduct their married life independently and on their own, petitioner, in October 31, 1989, issued a check in the name of a certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the

property, who acknowledged receipt thereof.1 The amount was in full payment of the property. When petitioner inquired from the spouses in July 1991 as to the status of the amount he loaned to them, the latter acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they were not yet in a position to make a definite settlement of the same.2Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioners inquiries on the amount to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner.3 On August 24, 1994, petitioner made a formal demand for the payment of the amount of US$25,000.00 but the spouses failed to comply with their obligation.4Thus, on October 13, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages against respondent and his wife before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, docketed as Civil Case No. 4490-V-94. In the complaint, petitioner asked for the payment of the US$25,000.00 or P625,000.00, its equivalent in Philippine currency plus legal interest from date of extra-judicial demand.5Petitioner likewise claimed moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit from respondent.6 As they were separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint, respondent and his wife filed separate answers. Maria Theresa CarlosAbelardo admitted securing a loan together with her husband, from petitioner.7She claimed, however, that said loan was payable on a staggered basis so she was surprised when petitioner demanded immediate payment of the full amount.8 In his separate Answer, respondent admitted receiving the amount of US$25,000.00 but claimed that: a. Defendant (respondent) xxx revived that otherwise dormant construction firm H.L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION of herein plaintiff which suffered tremendous setback

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after the assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino; b. Working day and night and almost beyond human endurance, defendant devoted all his efforts and skill, used all his business and personal connection to be able to revive the construction business of plaintiff; c. Little-by-little, starting with small construction business, defendant was able to obtain various construction jobs using the name H.L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION and the income derived therefrom were deposited in the name of such firm of plaintiff, d. Defendant xxx was made to believe that the earnings derived from such construction will be for him and his family since he was the one working to secure the contract and its completion, he was allowed to use the facilities of the plaintiff; e. The plaintiff seeing the progress brought about by defendant xxx to his company proposed a profit sharing scheme to the effect that all projects amounting to more than P10 million shall be for the account of plaintiff; lower amount shall be for defendants account but still using H.L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION. f. But, to clear account on previous construction contracts that brought income to H.L.CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, out of which defendant derived his income, plaintiff gave the amount of US$25,000.00 to defendant to square off account and to start the arrangement in paragraph (e) supra; g. That, the said US$25,000.00 was never intended as loan of defendant. It was his share of

income on contracts obtained by defendant; Respondent denied having made death threats to petitioner and by way of compulsory counterclaim, he asked for moral damages from petitioner for causing the alienation of his wifes love and affection, attorneys fees and costs of suit.10 On June 26, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Issue: The court of appeals erred in finding insufficient evidence to prove that the amount of us$25,000.00 was a loan obtained by private respondent and his wife from petitioner. The court of appeals erred in holding that the us$25,000.00 was given as private respondents share in the profits of H.L. Carlos Construction, Inc. and that the filing of the complaint is a hoax. The court of appeals erred in nullifying the award of damages for lack of proof thereof.

Held: Early in time, it must be noted that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. The defendants never denied that the check of US$25,000.00 was used to purchase the subject house and lot. They do not deny that the same served as their conjugal home, thus benefiting the family. On the same principle, acknowledgment of the loan made by the defendant-wife binds the conjugal partnership since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family. Hence, defendant-husband and defendant-wife are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan.

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Defendant-husband cannot allege as a defense that the amount of US $25,000.00 was received as his share in the income or profits of the corporation and not as a loan. Firstly, defendanthusband does not appear to be a stockholder nor an employee nor an agent of the corporation, H. L. Carlos Construction, Inc. Since he is not a stockholder, he has no right to participate in the income or profits thereof. In the same manner that as he is not an employee nor an agent of H. L. Carlos Construction, Inc., he has no right to receive any salary or commission therefrom. Secondly, the amount advanced for the purchase of the house and lot came from the personal account of the plaintiff. If, indeed, it was to be construed as defendant-husbands share in the profits of the corporation, the checks should come from the corporations account and not from the plaintiffs personal account, considering that the corporation has a personality separate and distinct from that of its stockholders and officers. Even granting that the checks amount to US $3,000.000.00 given by the plaintiff to the defendant-spouses was their share in the profits of the corporation, still there is no sufficient evidence to establish that the US $25,000.00 is to be treated similarly. Defendant-husband in invoking the defense of compensation argued that if indeed they were indebted to the plaintiff, the latter could have applied their share in the proceeds or income of the corporation to the concurrent amount of the alleged loan, instead of giving the amount of P3,000,000.00 to them. This argument is untenable. Article 1278 of the Civil Code provides that compensation shall take place when two persons, in their own right, are debtors and creditors of each other. As its indicates, compensation is a sort of balancing between two obligations. In the instant case, the plaintiff and the defendant-husband are not debtors and creditors of each other. Even granting that the defendanthusbands claim to the profits of the corporation is justified, still compensation cannot extinguish his loan obligation to the plaintiff because under such assumption, the defendant is dealing with the corporation and not with

the plaintiff in his personal capacity. Hence, compensation cannot take place. The Court of Appeals, thus, erred in finding that respondents liability was not proved by preponderance of evidence. On the contrary, the evidence adduced by petitioner sufficiently established his claim that the US$25,000.00 he advanced to respondent and his wife was a loan. The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 121 of the Family Code: Article 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: xxx (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. Xxx While respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house and lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Art. 21 of the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife. We also find sufficient basis for the award of damages to petitioner, contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is not entitled thereto. XXXII SBTC vs MAR TIERRA CORP. GR 143382 Facts:
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NO. Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company (SBTC). Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit line agreement with respondent corporation. It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan. The respondent corporation finally availed of its credit line and received P9M. Out of that amount, it was able to pay about P4M while the remaining balance remained outstanding as the corporation suffered business reversals and eventually ceased operating. To enforce its claim against the corporation on the remaining balance of the loan, petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against respondent corporation and individual respondents in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The RTC rendered a decision holding respondent corporation and individual respondent Martinez jointly and severally liable to petitioner for the remaining balance of the loan including interest and attorneys fee. It, however, found that the obligation contracted by individual respondent Martinez did not redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez. Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, petitioner appealed to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision in toto. Petitioner sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party? HELD: Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, 8 the conjugal partnership is liable for "all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." But when are debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone considered for the benefit of and therefore chargeable against the conjugal partnership? Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the said provision? We ruled as early as 1969 in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia 9 that, in acting as a guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party. In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 10 we ruled that, if the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own business or profession, the transaction falls within the term "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." In other words, where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. [11] On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. [12] It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption is raised that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to establish the benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership. [13] In the absence of any showing of benefit received by it, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the

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husband to accommodate a third party. [14] In this case, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the latters benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to discharge that burden. To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the husband alone defeats the objective of the Civil Code to protect the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. [15] The underlying concern of the law is the conservation of the conjugal partnership. [16] Hence, it limits the liability of the conjugal partnership only to debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. XXXIII BUADO vs CA GR 145222 Facts: Spouses Buado filed a complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol with Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite, which originated from Erlinda Nicols civil liability arising from the criminal offense of slander filed against her by petitioners. RTC rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages. It became final and executory and later on issued a a writ of execution. Finding Erlinda Nicols personal properties insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on execution addressed to the Register of Deeds of Cavite. Eventually, a notice of sheriffs sale was issued. Two (2) days before the public auction sale on 28 January 1993, an affidavit of third-party claim from one Arnulfo F. Fulo was received by the deputy sheriff prompting

petitioners to put up a sheriffs indemnity bond. The auction sale proceeded with petitioners as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of petitioners. Almost a year later on 2 February 1994, Romulo Nicol, the husband of Erlinda Nicol, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff. Respondent, as plaintiff therein, alleged that the defendants, now petitioners, connived and directly levied upon and execute his real property without exhausting the personal properties of Erlinda Nicol. Respondent averred that there was no proper publication and posting of the notice of sale. Furthermore, respondent claimed that his property which was valued at P500,000.00 was only sold at a very low price of P51,685.00, whereas the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol was only P40,000.00. The case was assigned to Branch 21 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite. In response, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and that they had acted on the basis of a valid writ of execution. Citing De Leon v. Salvador, petitioners claimed that respondent should have filed the case with Branch 19 where the judgment originated and which issued the order of execution, writ of execution, notice of levy and notice of sheriffs sale. RTC dismissed respondents complaint and ruled that Branch 19 has jurisdiction over the case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by appellant. Hence, the instant petition attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. Issue: WON the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership Held: No.There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly
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provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership. ADMINISTRATION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY XXXIV ROXAS vs. CA GR 92245 Facts: Melania Roxa (Petitioner) is married to Antonio Roxas, but are living separately. Melania found out that Antonio had entered into a contract of lease with defendant Antonio M. Cayetano sometime on March 30, 1987 covering a portion of their conjugal lot situated in Quezon City without her previous knowledge, much less her marital consent. Apparently, she was to put up a flea market in the lot and has already filed for a Mayors permit but the same was denied on renewal because Cayetano also applied for the same permit and was earlier granted. She then filed a complaint for annulment of the contract of lease entered into without her consent against Cayetano, who filed

a motion to dismiss the same on the ground of lack of cause of action. Issue: W/N a husband, as the administrator of the conjugal partnership, may legally enter into a contract of lease involving conjugal real property without the knowledge and consent of the wife. Held: Under the New Civil Code (NCC), "Art. 165. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership," in view of the fact that the husband is principally responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family. If the conjugal partnership does not have enough assets, it is the husband's capital that is responsible for such support, not the paraphernal property. Responsibility should carry authority with it. The husband is not an ordinary administrator, for while a mere administrator has no right to dispose of, sell, or otherwise alienate the property being administered, the husband can do so in certain cases allowed by law. He is not required by law to render an accounting. Acts done under administration do not need the prior consent of the wife. However, administration does not include acts of ownership. For while the husband can administer the conjugal assets unhampered, he cannot alienate or encumber the conjugal realty. Thus, under Art. 166 of NCC "unless the wife has been declared a non-compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership the wife's consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same." This rule prevents abuse on the part of the husband, and guarantees the rights of the wife, who is partly responsible for the acquisition of the property, particularly the real property. Contracts entered into by the husband in violation of this prohibition are voidable and subject to annulment at the instance of
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the aggrieved wife. (Art. 173 of the Civil Code) XXXV GUIANG vs CA GR 125172 XXXVI JADER MANALO vs CAMAISA GR 147978 Facts: Petitioner made a definite offer to buy the properties to respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of his wife, respondent Norma Camaisa . After some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price of the property to be paid on installment basis. Such agreement was a handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto. When petitioner pointed out the conjugal nature of the properties, Edilberto assured her of his wifes conformity and consent to the sale. The formal typewritten Contracts to Sell were thereafter prepared by petitioner.She and Edilberto met for the formal signing of the typewritten Contracts to Sell. After Edilberto signed the contracts, petitioner delivered to him two checks. The contracts were given to Edilberto for the formal affixing of his wifes signature. The following day, petitioner received a call from respondent Norma (wife), requesting a meeting to clarify some provisions of the contracts. During the meeting, handwritten notations were made on the contracts to sell, so they arranged to incorporate the notations and to meet again for the formal signing of the contracts. When petitioner met again with respondent spouses for the formal affixing of Normas signature, she was surprised when respondent spouses informed her that they were backing out of the agreement because they needed spot cash for the full amount of the consideration. Petitioner reminded

respondent spouses that the contracts to sell had already been duly perfected and Normas refusal to sign the same would unduly prejudice petitioner. Still, Norma refused to sign the contracts prompting petitioner to file a complaint for specific performance and damages against respondent spouses before the Regional Trial Court. Issue: Whether or not there is a perfected contract to sell of the conjugal property? Held: There is no perfected sale. The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus, Article 124 of the Family Code provides: Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by
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the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Underscoring ours.) Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties. However, being merely aware of a transaction is not consent. XXXVII UY vs CA GR 10955 XXXVIII VILLANUEVA vs CHIONG GR 159889 Facts: Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married sometime in January 1960 but have been separated in fact since 1975. During their marriage, they acquired a Lot situated at Poblacion, Dipolog City. Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold the one-half western portion of the lot to petitioners for P8,000, payable in installments. Thereafter, Florentino allowed petitioners to occupy the lot and build a store, a shop, and a house thereon. Shortly after their last installment payment on December 13, 1986,[5] petitioners demanded from respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their favor. Elisera, however, refused to sign a deed of sale. On May 13, 1992, Florentino executed the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners. On July 19, 2000, the RTC, in its Joint Decision, annulled the deed of absolute sale dated May 13, 1992, and ordered petitioners to vacate the lot and remove all improvements therein. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's decision.

Issue: (1) Is the subject lot an exclusive property of Florentino or a conjugal property of respondents? (2) Was its sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent valid? Ruling: Anent the first issue, petitioners' contention that the lot belongs exclusively to Florentino because of his separation in fact from his wife, Elisera, at the time of sale dissolved their property relations, is bereft of merit. Respondents' separation in fact neither affected the conjugal nature of the lot nor prejudiced Elisera's interest over it. Under Article 178 of the Civil Code, the separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature. Anent the second issue, the sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent is not, however, void ab initio. In Vda. de Ramones v. Agbayani, citing Villaranda v. Villaranda, we held that without the wife's consent, the husband's alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 is not void, but merely voidable. Applying Article 166, the consent of both Elisera and Florentino is necessary for the sale of a conjugal property to be valid. In this case, the requisite consent of Elisera was not obtained when Florentino verbally sold the lot in 1985 and executed the Deed of Absolute Sale on May 13, 1992. Accordingly, the contract entered by Florentino is annullable at Elisera's instance, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, conformably with Article 173. Fortunately, Elisera timely questioned the sale when she filed Civil Case No. 4383 on July 5, 1991, perfectly within ten years from the date of sale and execution of the deed. XXXIX DELA CRUZ vs SEGOVIA GR 149801

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Facts: Jose Consuegra, in his lifetime married twice, to Rosario Diaz on July 15, 1937 and on May 1, 1957, to Basilia Berdim, while the 1st marriage was still subsisting. He fathered 2 children (both already dead) from Rosario and 7 from Basilia. When he died on Sept 26,1965, the proceeds of his GSIS life insurance policy were paid to Basilia and their children being the beneficiaries stated in the policy. Rosario on the other hand filed a claim over the retirement insurance policy proceeds claiming to be Joses only legal heir. Basilia also filed a similar claim asserting that. as beneficiaries named in the life insurance policy, the retirement insurance policy likewise belong to them. GSIS ruled that Rosario and Basilia are both Joses wives, therefore the proceeds must be given to them, 1/2 portion each. Dissatisfied, Basilia filed a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction to CFI praying that she and her children be declared as the exclusive beneficiaries of the said retirement insurance proceeds. Trial Court, quoting Lao vs Dee held that When 2 women innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, they and their children, born of said wedlock, will be regarded as legitimate children and each family be entitled to of the estate. Basilia appealed. Hence this case. Issue: To whom should this retirement insurance benefits be paid, when no beneficiary was designated. Held: To both wives. GSIS intended that the life and retirement insurance be separate and distinct therefore, beneficiary of one insurance is not automatically the beneficiary of the other. Since the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void, the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the NCC, she is entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him.

Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husbands share in the property here in dispute quoting Trial Courts decision. And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity the only just and equitable solution is to recognize the right of the 2nd wife to her share of in the property acquired by her and her husband and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage. XL RAVINA vs. VILLA ABRILLE GR 160708 Facts: Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four children, who are also parties to the instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann. In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7, located at Kamuning Street, Juna Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T88674 in their names. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely in his name under TCT No. T-26471. Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedros lot. The house was finished in the early 1980s but the spouses continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and an annex. In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was
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forced to sell or mortgage their movables to support the family and the studies of her children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Anns consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated June 21, 1991. It appears on the said deed that Mary Ann did not sign on top of her name. On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school, Pedro together with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting in connivance with petitioners began transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment. When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from entering it. They waited outside the gate until evening under the rain. They sought help from the Talomo Police Station, but police authorities refused to intervene, saying that it was a family matter. Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused stress, tension and anxiety to her children, so much so that one flunked at school. Thus, respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance, Damages and Attorneys Fees with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Pedro and herein petitioners (the Ravinas) in the RTC of Davao City. During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his own money. Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina testified that they bought the house and lot from Pedro, and that her husband, petitioner Wilfredo Ravina, examined the titles when they bought the property. Issue:

The court of appeals erred when it ruled that petitioners patrocin[i]a ravina and wilfredo ravina are not innocent purchasers for value, the same being contrary to law and evidence. The court of appeals erred when it ruled that petitioners patrocin[i]a ravina and wilfredo ravina are liable for damages, the same being contrary to law and evidence.

Held: Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was an exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. No evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro. Petitioners bare assertion would not suffice to overcome the presumption that TCT No. T-88674, acquired during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is conjugal. Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house. Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouses
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The court of appeals erred when it declared x x x the sale of lot covered by tct no. 88674 in favor of spouses ravina, together with the house thereon, as null and void since it is clearly contrary to law and evidence. .

inability, the authority of the court. Article 124 of the Family Code, the governing law at the time the assailed sale was contracted, is explicit: ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied.) The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by the husband without the consent of the wife is null and void. Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case.

Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the deed. However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT No. T26471, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely without Mary Anns consent. On the second assignment of error, petitioners contend that they are buyers in good faith. Accordingly, they need not inquire whether the lot was purchased by money exclusively belonging to Pedro or of the common fund of the spouses and may rely on the certificates of title. The contention is bereft of merit. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, a purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. To establish his status as a buyer for value in good faith, a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller need only show that he relied on the face of the sellers certificate of title. But for a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell is restricted, such as by Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code or Article 124 of the Family Code, he must show that he inquired into the latters capacity to sell in order to establish himself as a buyer for value in good faith. In the present case, the property is registered in the name of Pedro and his wife, Mary Ann. Petitioners cannot deny knowledge that during the time of the sale in 1991, Pedro was married to Mary Ann. However, Mary Anns conformity did not appear in the deed. Even assuming that petitioners believed in good faith that the subject property is the exclusive property of Pedro, they were apprised by Mary Anns lawyer of her objection to the sale and yet they still proceeded to purchase the property without Mary Anns written consent. Moreover, the respondents were the
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ones in actual, visible and public possession of the property at the time the transaction was being made. Thus, at the time of sale, petitioners knew that Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the subject properties and yet they failed to obtain her conformity to the deed of sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now invoke the protection accorded to purchasers in good faith. Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is proper. The relationship between the parties in any contract even if subsequently annulled must always be characterized and punctuated by good faith and fair dealing. Hence, in consonance with justice and equity and the salutary principle of non-enrichment at anothers expense, we sustain the appellate courts order directing Pedro to return to petitioner spouses the value of the consideration for the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 and the house thereon. However, this court rules that petitioners cannot claim reimbursements for improvements they introduced after their good faith had ceased. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner Patrocinia Ravina made improvements and renovations on the house and lot at the time when the complaint against them was filed. Ravina continued introducing improvements during the pendency of the action. Thus, Article 449 of the New Civil Code is applicable. It provides that, (h)e who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity. On the last issue, petitioners claim that the decision awarding damages to respondents is not supported by the evidence on record. The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which respondent and her children were removed from the family home deserves our condemnation. On July 5, 1991, while respondent was out and her children were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille acting in connivance with the petitioners surreptitiously transferred all their personal belongings to another place.

The respondents then were not allowed to enter their rightful home or family abode despite their impassioned pleas. Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in a manner that does not conform with such norms and results in damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrong doer must be held responsible. Similarly, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages caused. It is patent in this case that petitioners alleged acts fall short of these established civil law standards.

LI AGGABAO vs PARULAN GR 165803 Facts: Respondent Ma. Elena allegedly made a sale of two parcels of land with their improvements considered as conjugal property by presenting a special power of attorney to sell (SPA) purportedly executed by respondent husband Dionisio in her favor. The sale by Ma. Elena was made in favor of the spouses vendees/petitioners, who allegedly acted in good faith and paid the full purchase price, despite the showing by the husband that his signature on the SPA had been forged and that the SPA had been executed during his absence from the country and while he and Ma. Elena have been estranged from one another. When Dionisio learned about the alleged sale, he filed for an action for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by
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Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof. The RTC ruled in his favor and declared that the SPA was forged. The decision of the RTC was affirmed by the CA. Hence the present case filed by petitioners imputing error to the CA for not applying the ordinary prudent mans standard in determining their status as buyers in good faith. The petitioners submit that Article 173 of the Civil Code, not Article 124 of the Family Code, governed the property relations of the respondents because they had been married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code; and that the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code should not apply because the other spouse held the administration over the conjugal property. They argue that notwithstanding his absence from the country Dionisio still held the administration of the conjugal property by virtue of his execution of the SPA in favor of his brother; and that even assuming that Article 124 of the Family Code properly applied, Dionisio ratified the sale through Atty. Parulans counteroffer during the March 25, 1991 meeting. ISSUE: WON Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should apply to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio. Held: NO To start with, Article 254[27] the Family Code has expressly repealed several titles under the Civil Code, among them the entire Title VI in which the provisions on the property relations between husband and wife, Article 173 included, are found. Secondly, the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.[28]

Article 124 of the Family Code provides: Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. Thirdly, according to Article 256[29] of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired. In Tumlos v. Fernandez,[30] the Court rejected the petitioners argument that the Family Code did not apply because the acquisition of the contested property had occurred prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, and pointed out that Article 256 provided that the Family Code could apply retroactively if the application would not prejudice vested or acquired rights existing before the effectivity of the Family Code. Herein, however, the petitioners did not show any vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation from the retroactive application of the Family Code. Fourthly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding the
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administration over the property, had delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of the property, considering that they did not present in court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan the authority for the administration. Nonetheless, we stress that the power of administration does not include acts of disposition or encumbrance, which are acts of strict ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed from an authority to administer, and vice versa, for the two powers may only be exercised by an agent by following the provisions on agency of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878). Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty. Parulan, being a special agency, was limited to the sale of the property in question, and did not include or extend to the power to administer the property. [31] Lastly, the petitioners insistence that Atty. Parulans making of a counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting ratified the sale merits no consideration. Under Article 124 of the Family Code, the transaction executed sans the written consent of Dionisio or the proper court order was void; hence, ratification did not occur, for a void contract could not be ratified.[32] On the other hand, we agree with Dionisio that the void sale was a continuing offer from the petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio had the option of accepting or rejecting before the offer was withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the petitioners. The last sentence of the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code makes this clear, stating that in the absence of the other spouses consent, the transaction should be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or upon authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership Regime LII PARTOSA JO vs CA GR 82606 Facts: The herein private respondent, Jose Jo, admits to having cohabited with three women and fathered fifteen children. The first of these women, Prima PartosaJo, claims to be his legal wife whom he begot a daughter, Monina Jo. The other women and their respective offspring are not parties of this case. In 1980, Prima filed a complaint against Jose for judicial separation of conjugal property. The RTC rendered a decision and in the dispositive portion it stated support but not the separation of conjugal properties. On appeal, The petitioner contends that the respondent court has misinterpreted Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code. She submits that the agreement between her and the private respondent was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to separate permanently. And even if they did, this arrangement was repudiated and ended in 1942, when she returned to him at Dumaguete City and he refused to accept her. Issue: WON the refusal of the husband to accept his wife constitutes abandonment which is a ground for the dissolution of their property regime. Ruling: The petitioner invokes Article 178 (3) of the Civil Code, which reads: Art. 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval, shall not affect the conjugal partnership, except that: xxx xxx xxx (3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she may petition the court for a receivership, or administration by her
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of the conjugal partnership property or separation of property. Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the meantime providing in the least for one's family although able to do so. There must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. 6 This idea is clearly expressed in the abovequoted provision, which states that "a spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning." The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning 1968 until the determination by this Court of the action for support in 1988, the private respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. LIII ALIPIO vs CA GR 134100 Facts: Jaring (Romeo) was the lessee of a 14.5 hec fishpond in Barito,Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. Lease was for 5 yrs ending on Sep. 12, 1990. In June 19, 1987 til the end of the lease period, Jaring subleased the fishpond to sps Alipio and sps Manuel. The stipulated rent is P485,600.00 payable in 2 installments of P300k and P185,600.00. The second installment due on June 30, 1989.

Sublessees failed to pay entire second installment, leaving a balance of P50,600.00 w/c they failed to pay despite Alipios demands. Thus, he filed a case against said sublessees asking for payment of the balance or rescission of the contract should they fail to pay the balance. Purita Alipio petitioned for the dismissal of the case invoking Rule 3, Sec. 21 of the 1964 Rules of Court claiming that such was applicable since her husband and co-sublessee passed away prior tothe filing of this action. Said rule has been amended by Rule 3, Sec. 20,1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Trial court denied Alipios petition because she was a party to the contract & should be independently impleaded together w/the Manuel sps. Death of her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the case. Petitioner & Manuels were ordered to pay balance and P10k attys fees and costs of suit. On appeal, the CA dismissed the case and held that the rule invoked is not applicable. The action for recovery of a sum of money does not survive the death of the defendant, thus the remaining defendants cannot avoid the action by claiming thatsuch death totally extinguished their obligation. When the action is solidary, creditor may bring his action against any of the debtors obligated insolidum. Alipios liability is independent of & separate from her husbands.(Climaco vs. Siy Uy, Imperial vs. David, and Agacoili vs. Vda de Agcaoili) Issue: W/N a creditor can sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in anordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of money chargeableagainst the conjugal partnership. Held: NO. Proper remedy would be to file aclaim in the settlement of the decedents estate or if none has beencommenced, he can file a petition either for the issuance of letters of administration or for the allowance of will, depending on whether
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itstestate/intestate. No shortcut by lumping claim against Alipios with those against the Manuels. CC Art. 161 (1) provides that the obligation of the Alipios is chargeable against their conjugal partnership since it was contracted by the spouses for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. When petitioners spouse died, their CPG was dissolved & debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement of estate proceedings in accordance w/ Rule 73, Sec.2 w/c provides that the community property will be inventoried, administered, & liquidated and debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. In Calma vs.Tanedo the Court held that no complaint for collection of indebtedness chargeable to the CPG can be brought against the surviving spouse. Claim must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation & settlement of the CPG. Surviving spouses powers of administration ceases & is passed on to court-appointed administrator. This was affirmed in Ventura vs. Militante where Court held that lack of liquidation proceedings does not mean that the CPG continues. Creditor may apply for letters of admin in his capacity as a principal creditor. Note that for marriages governed by CPG, obligations entered into by sps are chargeable against their CPG & the partnership is primarily bound for the repayments. Theyll be impleaded as representatives of the CPG and concept of joint/solidary liability does not apply. At best, it will not be solidary but joint.

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