SHELLS Security Shell.. Kitsch Shell.. Framework K LINKS Democracy Realism Civil society/cosmopolitanism Womil. Utilitarianism Defer Death IMPACTS Militarism Will to Truth ALTERNATIVES Aesthetics Amor fati Joy Refusal.
.42- 46 47 26

NEG ANSWERS TO ... '" 1-8 9-16 17-23 Permutation Nietzsche eats babies Framework- the ballot. Alternative theory Democracy Feminism Kitsch extensions
.53 56 59

60 61
63 64

27 28- 29 .30-31 32- 34

Alt. fails 65-66 67

Pragmatism .36-39

Democracy .......•...................... Institutions Preservation Draft Nietzsche= asshole

68- 72 73
74-75 76

77 78. 79

Nietzsche= Woman Hater ....•.••.•........ The Ketels Hammer, '"

48-49 .50

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji

UTNrF 21c6
Nietzsche JaleeBlohnson & Mick Niller We call our argument the Fox News Exclusive. The ?J-0de~ age is committed to a disavowal of tragedy. The triumph of Socratic reason marufest~ In our a~empts to order life and renounce suffering. This requires the construction of an ~deal real in opposition to the apparent world of chaos and violence . .Enter ~e Affirmatn~e. I~ the modem drive toward certainty and security and, in an .~ttempt~ng a~res~lvmg disorder and insecurity, the plan labors to mold the world to make It fit an idealized Image of order.


S~urette, Paul, Profe~sor of Political Theory at John Hopkins University 1996 ~~tr;;st ~l ~ystem~tizers and.Avoid Them'; Nietzsche, Arendt and the C~fthe Will P~.1~2:] In temational Relations Theory, Journal ofIntemational Studies, Vol. 25 No.1
The Will to Order andPolitics-as-Making Tbe Philosophical Foundation of the Will to Truth/Order


I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. A will to

a system

is a lack of

According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation ofa society is the set of ideas which give meaning to the phenomenon of human existence within a given cultural framework. As one manifestation of the Will to Power; this will to meaning fundamentally influences the social and political organisation of a particular community.' Anything less than a profound historical interrogation of the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the origins of values which we take to be intrinsic and natural. Nietzsche suggests.therefore, that to understand the development of our modern concep-tio!! of.society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence of the Platonic formulation of Socratic thougbt. Nietzsche claims that pre-Socratic Greece based iiS philosophical justification oflife on heroic myths which honoured trag~d competition; Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful. and order~ (Apollonian) a~d chaotic and suffering (Dionysian)~pects of life were aCGepted andaffinned as inescapable aspects ·ofhuman existence.6 However, this incarnation of the WIll to power as tragedy weakened, and became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer instilled the self-respect and. self-control that had upheld the pre-Socratic social order.vEverywhere the instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were. but five steps from excess: the ·---moi(istrum-in-animo-was-a-univer~al-danger'-!-No-1Dngerwi1lin-g:-tb-accepcthe--------·--. tragic hardness and self-mastery of pre-Socratic myth, Greek thought }delded to decadence, a search for a new social foundation which would soften the trage.d,y .E_flife, while still giving meaning to existence. In this context, Socrates' thought became paramount. In the words of Nietzsche, Socrates saw behind his aristocratic Athenians; he grasped that his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional, The same kind of degeneration was everywhere silently preparing itself: the old Athens was coming to an end-And Socrates understood that the world had need of him -his expedient, his cure and his personal art of self-preservation."


With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The At~J?ic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji --~------------


UTNIF 2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Mick Niller
Socrates realised that his search for art ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled the widespread yearning for assurance and stability within society. His expedient, his cure? An alternative will to power. An alternate foundation that promised mastery and control.tDot through acceptance of the tragic life, but through the disayowal of the instinctual, the contingent. and the problematic. In ;:;;sponse to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy by retreating/escaping into the Apollonian world yromised by Socratic reason. In Nietzsche's words, '[r]ationality was divined as a saviour... it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice:' either to perish, or be absurdly rational.. .. ,9 Thus, Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an intellectual framework. The Socratic Will to Truth is characterised by the attempt to understand and ord~r life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privil~ing an idealised Apollonian order. As life is inescapably comprised both order and disorder, however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is"";nly possible by creating a 'Real World' of eternal and meaningfuLforms,J.ll_ , opposition to an' Apparent World' oftransitoryp-hysical existence. Suffering and_ contingency is contained within the Apparent World, disparaged, devalued, and i~nored in relation to the ideal order of the Real World. Essential to the SocratiZ" Will to Truth, then, is the fundamental contradiction between the experience of Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and the idealised order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this dichotomised model led to the emergence of a uniquely 'modern']O understanding of life which could only view sufferiii"g the result of the h-riperfection of the Ap.p.arent..W.Qr.ld. his outlook created a T modem notion ofresp.0nsibility in which the Diany.sian elements of life could be u"iIderstood only as a phenomenon for which someone, or something, is to blame. Nietzsche terms tills p-hilo~..hi.cal1y;induced condition cessentimenb and argues that it signalled a potential crisis of theWil1 to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution. This contradiction, however, was resolved historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to Nietzsche" ascetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employil1g the







Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the Appare t '


or1dd, PA' Ncl~eljJOecause did not live up to God, the Truth and the Re:l e they
ietzsche wrote, be to blame for it' thI.'nks every" . kl I , .... . SIC Y sleep. But priest tells him' 'Quite so my h 1 . seep. someone must you: yourself are .this someone, you alone are to alone are to blame for yourself-This is b one thing is achieved by it the directi:naz~~ ,

"lsuffer: someone must hi 'I I .; IS s iep ierd, the ascetic b t bl' blame f arne for It: but or yourself,-you and . fa~se en.ough: but ressentiment IS altered.!'

Wit? contri~utions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt Fascist Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji


UTNIF 2k6 Nietzsche Jalee Blohnson & Mick Niller

Faced. with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the prospect of meaninglessness, once again, 'one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational.. .. ,12 The genius of the ascetic ideal was that .it preserved the meaning of the Socratic Will to Power as Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdium the Socratic division through the redirection of ressentiment against the Apparent World! Through this redirection, the Real World was transformed from atranscendental world of philosophical escape into a model towards which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blamingJ!!) contradictory experiences on itsQwn imperfect knowledge and action. '-This;s·ubtle transformation of the relationship between the dichotomised worlds creates the Will to Order asthe defining characteristic of the modern Will to Truth. Yriable to accept the Dionysian sufferingJuljerent in the Ap.parept World, .the .. ascetic ressentiment. des erately searches for 'the hypnotic sense of n_<2thingness,the repose of deepest sleep, in short absence a suffering' .13 .According to the ascetic model, however, this escape is j2Q.Ssibleonly when the A,Eparent"World perfectly duplicates the R~al World., The Will to Order, then, is 'the Mg_ressive need increasingly to order the Apparent World in line with the ~ceptsbfthe moral-Truthofthe Real World. The ressentiment of the Will to 'order, therefore, generates two interrelated reactions. First, ressentiment engenders a need act' vel to mould the Apparent World in accordan~ diCtates of the ideal,A]2olIoriianReal World. In order to ac leve t is, however, the ascetic ideal also asserts that a 'truer', more complete knowledge of the Real ('... . World must be established, creating an ever-increasing Willto Truth. This self: perpe.tuating movement creates an interpretative structure within which evei'}j:hing must be lloderstoad.aod..or.der.e.dJn..r.elation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World. As Nietzsche . suggests, or-"- .
. '.""-';> -' , ' .

{tjhe ascetic ideal has a goal-this goal is so universal that all other interests of human existence seem, when compared with it, petty and narrow; it

interprets epochs, nations, and men inexorably with a view to this one goal; it permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation." The very structure ofthe Will to Truth ensures that theoretical investigation must '-'he'increasingly-ordered;-C'(i1TI15telrelfSive, ore True, alfdCloser totlie-jJerfecfJOI1 m of the ideal. At the same time, this understanding of intellectual theory ensures that it creates practices which attempt to impose increasing order in the Apparent World. With this critical transformation, the Will to Order becomes .the fundamental philosophical principle of modernity.

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji



UTNIF2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Micle Niller The aff is only another breaking news story warning us'the chaos which surrounds us and compelling us toward resolving that chaos. Unfortunately, our attempts at securing the world are damned to fail. It is not a coincidence that breaking news occurs every fifteen minutes because international politics are unpredictable. Terrorism is an ever present threat, a SARS outbreak is just around the comer, killer bees are invading our neighborhoods and there just might be poison in the children's Halloween candy. The uncomfortable yet 'irresistible truth is that human life is dangerous. Rather than coming to terms with this condition, the aff encourages us to stay gluedto the television screen, stocking up on duct tape and water. At issue here is not just life but what makes life worth living. We encourage indifference and carelessness in a world inherently comprised of danger and insecurity in an attempt at reclaimingjoy from the affirmative's world of paranoid tiptoeing. James Der Derian. The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, Baudrillard. On Security. Ed. Ronnie Lipschultz. 1998.
Nietzschetransvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or va llle for security. but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to .affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. 33 Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a 1'esentment and, finally, a transcendence of this pa.1'adox. III brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others-who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying, into a fearful sameness. Since Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his reinterpretation of security will receive a .more extensive treatment here, One must begin with Nietzsche's idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all considerations of security. 1n Beyond Good and Evil, he emphatically establishes the primacy of tile will to power: "Physiologists should think before putting down the ~ ..--.---- ···-·--~;i~~t-~f·~~if-p~~;;;;;ti~~· cardi~~j~'~i~-~r~f being. f\





above all to discharge its strength--life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the most frequent results." M The will to power, then, should not be confused witha Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings--including selfpreservation--are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji


Nietzsche T~ke Blohnson & Mick Niller . . ion, mjury, .. tcrti'l"t6flttl1e-rearsenaemIC;to TIre, for "... 1'£'"itse If'IS essentia IIy appropna ti or 1e overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation--but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages. " :li Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war." 36 But the denial of this permanent condition, the. effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression offear. The desire for securIty is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally Imowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everytlling strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of/ear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" 11 The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear offate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short. the secl.itity imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature oftbis generative relationship in The TWilight of the Idols: The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling offear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving .... That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation-that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations. ~ .... __. __ ..A .safe.life reg'llires safe1:ruths.T]l~s1:rangean~ ~e alien remain unexam~.e~, tl~e.~o~. becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility--recycling the de~ire for security. The "influence of timidity, " as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to tlle "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences.":12. The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. "Trust," the "good,nand other common values come to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling of security such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected . ._._.

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji



io/'f J%lP.~mi9&~iMlfJh~Yfclburse,

only a ftilse sense of security can come from false gods:

"Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error: in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing something to be truc; or a state of consciousness is confused with its causes. " 11. Nietzsche's interpretation of the origins of religion can shed some light on this paradoxical origin and transvaluation of security. In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche sees religion arising from a sense of fear and indebtedness to one's ancestors: The conviction reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplishments of the ancestors that the tribe exists --and that one has to pay them back with sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognizes a debt that constantly grows greater, since these forebears never cease, in their continued existence as powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and new strength. ~ The ancestors of the most powerful tribes are bound eventually to grow to monstrous dimensions through the imagination of growing fear and to recede into the darkness of the divinely uncanny and unimaginable: in the end the ancestor must necessarily be transfigured into a god . ~ As the ancestor's debt becomes embedded in institutions, the community takes on the role of creditor. Nietzsche mocks this originary, Hobbesian moment: to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling One lives in a community, one enjoys the advantages of communality (oh what advantages! we sometimes underrate them toda~; one dwells protected, cared for, in peace and trustfulness, without fear of certain injuries and hostile acts to which the man outside, the "man without peace," is exposed ... since one has bound and pledged oneself to the community precisely with a view to injury and hostile acts. ~

The establishment of the community is dependent upon, indeed it feeds upon, this fear of being left outside. As the castle wall is replaced by written treaty, however, and distant gods by temporal sovereigns, the martial skills and spiritual virtues of the noble warrior are slowly debased and dissimulated. The subject of the individual will to power becomes the object of a collective resentment. The result? The fear of the external other is transvalued into the "love of the neighbor" quoted in the opening of this section, and the perpetuation of community is assured ---------~-~·--~tiUough fueliitemaHzationand legitimationof'a"feartliatlosf its'originafsource"16lig ago~"-:--'--'-'-"""'-'"''''''''''''---'-'''''-''---''''''''''''' This powerful nexus of fear, of external and internal otherness, generates the values which uphold the security imperative. Indeed, Nietzsche locates the genealogy of even individual rights, such as freedom, in the calculus of maintaining security: - My rights - are that part of my power which others not merely conceded me,"but which they wish me to preserve. How do these others arrive at that? First: through their prudence and fear and caution: whether in that they expect something similar from us in return (protection of their


With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji

Nietzsche .lake BlohnSQ11 & Mick Niller. a strugg 1 ..vith us WOU ld b e pen '1ous or to no purpose; or. m , flgmsJ; orTn-matThey consmer mat e WI . that they see in any diminution of our force a disadvantage to themselves, since we would then be unsuited to forming an alliance-with them in opposition to a hostile third power. Then: by donation and cession. ~ . The point of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show that the perilous conditions that created the security imperative--and the western metaphysics that perpetuate it=have diminished if not disappeared; yet. the fear oflife persists; "Our century denies this perilousness, and does so with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security, Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation." 1QNietzsche's worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger: the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man whicl} controls through confofmity and rules through passivity. The security of the sovereign, rational self and state comes atthe cost ofambiguity.. uncertainty, paradox--all that makes a free life worthwhile. Nietzsche's lament for this lost life is captured at the end of Daybreak in a series of rhetorical questions: Of future virtues-How comes it that the ·morc comprehensible the world has gtown·thc mote solemnities of every kind have decreased? Is it that fear was so much the basic element of that reverence which overcame us in the presence of everything .unknown and mysterious and taught us to fall down before the incomprehensible and plead for mercy? And has the world not lost some of its charm for us because we have grown less fearful? With the diminution of our fearfulness has our own dignity and solemnity, OUfownfearsomeness, not also diminished?12

It is of course in Nietzsche's lamelit, in his deepest pessimism for the last man, that one finds the
celebration of the overman as both symptom and harbinger of a more free-spirited yet fearsome age. Dismissive of utopian engineering, Nietzsche never suggests how he would restructure society; he looks forward only so far as to sight the emergence of "new philosophers" (such as himself?) who would restore a reverence for fear and reevaluate the security imperative. Nietzsche does, however, go back to a pre-Christian, pre-Socratic era to find the exemplars for a new kind of security. In The Genealogy of Morals, he holds up Pericles as an example, for lauding the Athenians for their "rhathymia "--a term that incorporates the notion of "indifference to and contempt for security." 48 .... . It__ i?__Q~~hap.E.l_~_g__!!!~ch !<:>...~:.xP~'?!_~!~~!~~~E:~'~_E?:~~~a.~~!<:>_!~~"()_l?:a.!_<:lin.late IIt.<:>~et:n t!_me~~.!()_~pec!~_. at the very time when conditions seem most uncertain and unpredictable? that people would treat fear as a stimulus for improvement rather than cause for retrenchment. Yet Nietzsche would clearly see these as opportune times, when fear could be willfully asserted as a force for the affirmation of difference, rather than canalized into a cautious identity constructed from the calculation of risks and benefits. " ._"_.,,. __

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UTNIF2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blolmson & Mick NiUer The alternative is to do nothing. This ontological disarmament in the face of dangerous others is the only means to real peace, which cannot exist physically but only in the mind. We would rather die than promote the affirmative's futile search for certainty, Living life is more important than deferring death. Your ballot is a remote control. You should turn off the news.


The anti-christ, Human, All too Human. Aphorism


The means to real peace.- No government admits rulYmore that it keeps rul ru'11W to satisfy occasionally the desire for conquest. Rather the army is supposed to serve for defense, ruld one invokes the morality that approves of self-defense. But this implies one's own morality ruld the neighbor's ilmnorality; for the neighbor must be thought of as eager to attack and conquer if our state must think of means of self-defense. Moreover, the reasons we give for requiring rul army imply that our neighbor, who denies the desire for conquest just as much as does our own state, and who, for his part, also keeps an army only for reasons of self-defense, is a hypocrite ruld a cmming criminal who would like nothing better thrul to overpower a hru'mless and awkwru'd victim without any fight. Thus all states are now rrulged against each other: they presuppose their neighbor's bad disposition and their own good disposition. This presupposition, however, is inhumane, as bad as wru' and worse. At bottom, indeed, it is itself the challenge and the cause of wars, because, as I have said, it attributes immorality to the neighbor and thus provokes a hostile disposition ruld act. We must abjure the doctrine of the rumy as a means of selfdefense just as completely as the desire for conquests. And perhaps the great day will come when people, distinguished by wru's and victories ruld by the highest development of a military order and intelligence, and accustomed to make the heaviest sacrifices for these things, will exclaim of its own free will, "We break the sword," and will smash its entire military establishment down to its lowest foundations. Rendering oneself unarmed when one had been the best-armed, out of a height of feeling-that is the meruls to real peace, which must always rest on a peace of mind; whereas the so-called armed peace, as it now exists in all countries, is the absence of peace of mind. One trusts neither oneself nor one's neighbor ruld, half from hatred, half from fear, does not lay down arms. Rather perish than hate and feru', ruld twice rather perish than make oneself hated and (earedthis must someday become the highest maxim for every single commonwealth. Our liberal representatives, as is well known, lack the time for reflecting on the nature of man: else they would know that they work in vain when they work for a "gradual decrease of the militruy burden." Rather, only when this kind of need has become greatest will the """-"---ldl1d-ofgod'belrearestwho"-alone"'crul helpilere:''fhe'iTeeof war-glory'can-only'be'-~"-~'-'---'--'-'---"-"""-'-""'''"'.0," destroyed all at once, by a'stroke of lightning: but lightning, as indeed you know, 'comes from a cloud-s-and fimn up high.

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji


.... _---



UTNIF2k6 Nietzsche lake Blolmson & Mick Niller The affirmative is an example of kitsch, a supposed categorical agreement with being that the world ought to be one way as opposed to another. In an effort at realizing this agreement the affirmative identifies the shitty parts of existence and labors to eliminate or correct them. Alan White. From Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth. 199!h http://www.williams.edu/philosophy /faculty / awhite/WNL%2 oweb/WNL%2ocontents. htm Nietzsche's "voice of beauty" is not the voice of "a thousand times already told," not, at least, to my ears. But even if Nietzsche; or my Nietzsche, is as free from this form of kitsch as from that of the Grand March, even then he may not escape kitsch altogether. Kitsch, Kundera tells us, "has its source in the categorical agreement with being" (Lightness, 256). He elaborates: The dispute between those who believe that the world was created by God and tJ:1osewho think it came into being of its own accord deals with phenomena that go beyond our reason and experience. Much more real is the line separating those who doubt being as it is granted to man (no matter how or by whom) from those who accept it without reservation. Behind all the European faiths, religious and political, we find the first chapter of Genesis, which tells us that the world was created properly, that human existence is good, and that we are therefore entitled to multiply. Let us call this basic faith a categorical agreement with being. The fact tllat until recently the word "shit" appeared in print as s--has nothing to do with moral considerations. You can't claim that shit is immoral, after all! The objection to shit is a metaphysical one. The daily defecation session is daily proof of tlle unacceptability of Creation. Either lor: either shit is acceptable (in which case don't lock yourself in the batluoomO or we are created in an unacceptable manner. It follows, then, that the aesthetic ideal of the categorical agreementwithbeing-isa world-inwhich shit is-denied.and-everyoneacts _ as though it did not exist. This aesthetic ideal is called kitsch. "Kitsch" is a German word born in the middle of the sentimental nineteenth century, and from German it entered all Western languages, Repeated use, however, has obliterated its original metaphysical meaning: kitsch is the absolute denial of shit, in bOtll the literal and the figurative senses of the word; ldtsch excludes everything from its purview which is essentially unacceptable in human existence. (247-48)
With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji

Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Mick Niller

This faith in the purpose of their path results in a "grand march" mentality wherein all are expected to fight for the cause. This denies life and values individua1lives only insofar as they contribute to a utilitarian greater good.
Alan White. From Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth. 19~ http://www.williams.edu/philosophy /faculty / awhite/WNL%2oweb /WNL%2ocontents. htm In this book, I have attended closely to some of Nietzsche's details. In at least to have undermined the suggestion that Nietzsche has no more than that of having humanity follow him, in lockstep, across the bridge overman. Whatever his flaws may be, my Nietzsche does not succumb calls the kitsch of the Grand March: so doing, I hope inspiring vision leading to the to what Kundera


The fantasy of the Grand March r...l is the politicalldtsch joining leftists of all times and tendencies. The Grand March is the splendid march on the road to brotherhood, equality, justice, happiness; it goes on and on, obstacles notwithstanding, for obstacles there must be if the march is to be the Grand March. The dictatorship of the proletariat or democracy? Rejection of the consumer society or demands for increased productivity? The guillotine or an end to the death penalty? It is all beside the point. What makes a leftist a leftist is not this or that theory but his ability to integrate any theory into the kitsch called the Grand March. (Lightness, 257)

The teaching of the overman is a form of Grand March ldtsch, but Nietzsche himself undermines that teaching shortly after introducing it. More generally, the Grand March in all its versions presents us with lives tllat appear worth living only because they contribute to the attainment of a human existence tllat would follow the healing of what The Birth of Tragedy calls "the wound of existence"; Nietzsche unmasks all such presentations as life-denying, as variants of the Socratic delusion.

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The At~:nic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji


UTNIF2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Mick Niller The affirmative carries on the tradition of the Socratic Delusion. The plan is an attempt at healing the wound of existence by identifying error in the world and seeking to correct it. This denigrates life and makes living worthwhile only for the sake of correcting it. Alan White. From Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth. 19.9!L. http://www. usilliams.edu/philosophu/facultu/. awhite/WNL%2oweb/WNL%2ocontent s.htm The first justificatory illusion listed by Nietzsche in the passage under consideration, the Socratic delusion, is historically the last; as I have indicated, Nietzsche attributes the death of tragedy to "the Socraticism ofinorality, dialectic, satisfaction [GeniigsmakeitJ, and the equanimity [HeiterkeitJ of the theoretical man" (BTSC:l). With the emergence of Socraticism, art and beauty are displaced within the hierarchy of cultural values, subordinated on the one hand to morality and goodness, on the other to theory (or science) and truth. In that this subordination remains in effect in Nietzsche's own time (as in ours), its examination is central to Nietzsche's non-antiquarian project:

what does all science signify, viewed as a symptom oflife? [...J Where is science going; worse yet, where did it come from? [...J Is the scientific spirit perhaps only a fear of, a fleeing from pessimism? A subtle last resort against -- the truth? And, in moral terms, something like cowardice and falsity? In non-moral terms, a ruse [SchlauheitJ? was that perhaps your secret? (BTSC:l) Socrates, Socrates,

What is the secret? Art is generally supposed to be concerned with beauty, science with truth, and morality with goodness, yet Nietzsche suggests, directly, that science may be a defense against truth, an attempt to disguise the truth; he also suggests, indirectly, ______ t:=;h:::;a;..:::t..:::m::;:,;o::.:r;,;::a;.::::li:.=.tygoodness, an attempt to avoid aclG.1owledging may be a defense against what true goodness would require. The mechanism that allows these defenses to work is a "new and unprecedented treasuring [Hochscha.tzung

J of knowledge

and insight." Clear

evidence for the novelty of this valuation is provided by Socrates's admission of his own ignorance, and his amazement that others -- great statesmen, orators, poets, and artists - are governed by instinct rather than by knowledge:

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f' ('


Nietzsche Jalee Blohnson & Mick Niller
"Only from instinct": with this expression, we touch the heart and midpoint of the Socratic tendency. With it, Socraticism condemns existing art as well as existing ethics: wherever he directs his examining glance, he sees the lack of insight and the power of delusion [Wahn]; from this lack. he concludes that what exists is internally perverse [verkehrt] and reprehensible [verwerflich]. (BT:13)

In condemning all that exists, including current art and ethics, Socrates condemns both what is and what has been; given this rejection of past and present. he can be "detained in life" only by the delusion that he can make the future radically different. He consequently views his own task as one of therapy; he is to "heal the wound of existence" by "correcting existence" (BT:13). This correction or healing is a practical project, but it requires a theoretical foundation: transformation the replacement of custom by morality presupposes a replacement of instinct with knowledge. The result of the two replacements is a of pessimism into optimism:

Socrates is the protozype [Urbild] of the theoretical optimist who, with his already characterized faith in the fathomability [Ergrundlichkeit] of the nature of things, ascribes to knowledge and cognition the force of a panacea, and conceives error as evil in itself. To penetrate into every ground [Grund] and to separate true cognition from semblance and from error strikes the Socratic man as the most noble human calling, indeed the only truly human calling. (BT: 1S)


The Socratic legacy -- hence, the functioning of the Socratic illusion -- is clearest in 2th~e_4;:p~a~ra~d~ig~m~_[IYpJ1.sJ existence unheard of before Socrates: that of the of a form of theoretical man, who embraces Socrates's project. "to make existence appear comprehensible and thereby as justified" (BT:16), and thereby also Socrates's "profound delusion [Wahnvorstellung]," the "unshakable faith that thinking, following the guideline of causality, reaches into the deepest abysses of being, and that thinking is in a position not merely to know being, but even to correct it" (BT:1S). The "essence of the spirit of science," then, combines "faith in the fathomability [Ergrundlichkeit] of nature and in knowledge as panacea [an die Uniuersalheilkraft des Wissens]" (BT:17). Life is worth living, for those possessed of this spirit. only because it is perfectible

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji

I rJ t--

Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Mick Niller The affirmative's attempts at correcting existence are futile. There is and will always be shit in the world which disgusts us. However, we must not hold our nose in its presence. That there is much shit in the world does not make the world itself a shitty place to be. Rather, we can take joy in life, shitty as it is, and accept it without reservation. Alan White. From Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth. 199.Q... http://www.williams.edu/philosophy /faculty / awhite/WNL%2 oweb /WNL%2 ocontents. htm . In a passage I have already cited more than once, Nietzsche accuses Christianity, grounded as it is in ressentiment against life, of "malting of sexuality something impure," thereby "throwing shit on the origin, on the presupposition Genealogy, he expands his accusation: On his way to becoming an "angel" (to employ no uglier word) man has evolved that queasy stomach and coated tongue through which not only the joy and innocence of the animal but life itself has become repugnant to him -- so that he sometimes holds his nose in his own presence and, with Pope Innocent the Third, disapprovingly catalogues his own repellent aspects ("impure begetting, disgusting means of nutrition in his mother's womb, baseness of the matter out of which man evolves, hideous stench, secretion of saliva, urine, and shit [Koth]"). (GMII:7) Within the Christian-moral tradition, life itself appears as soiled by the shit that is a part of it. Disgust with this soiling is connected with the despising of the body and with denigration of the earth: on earth, soil remains, no matter how much asphalt we may spread. Early on in Zarathustra, and the denigrators of the earth. Nietzsche speaks explicitly to the despisers of the body Much later, he relates earth and body to shit: of our life" (TJX:4). In The

"To tlle pure everything is pure [DemReinen istAlles rein]" -thus speak the people. But I say to you: to swine all things become swinish [den Schweinen wirdAlles Schwein]! That is why the swooners and head-hangers, whose hearts hang down as well, preach: "tlle world itself is a beshitted monster [kothiges Ungeheuer]."

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kaslunir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji





UTNIF2k6 Nietzsche Jalee Blohnson & Mick Niller For these are all of unclean spirit, particularly those who have neither rest nor peace [nicht Ruhe, noch Rast] except when they view the world from behind [von hinten] -- the hinterworldly! To these I say to their faces, even if it does not sound endearing: the world is like the human being in that it has a behind, -- this much is true! There is in the world much shit: this much is true! But that does not make the world itself a beshitted monster! There is wisdom in the fact that much in the world smells ill [libel]: disgust itself creates wings and forces that divine fresh waters [quellenahnende Kriifte]. Even in the best there is something disgusting; and the best is still something that must be overcome! -Oh my brothers, there is much wisdom in the fact that there is much shit in the world! (III:12.14, entire) That there is shit in the world -- in all worlds, on our earth -- does not make the world, the earth itself a beshitted monster; we see what we look for, or what is visible from the perspectives we take. In conversing with the revolutionary fire-dog, whose true concern is with power rather than with human betterment (II:18; 170.1-12), Zarathustra acknowledges that although the earth has its "skin diseases" -- including both the firedog and humanity (168.15-17) -- the "belly of things" (170.5) is not, as the volcanoes on the fire-dog's island lead it to believe, full of "ashes and smoke and hot mud" (170.19) that cause a "gurgling and spitting and griping of the bowels" (170.22-23) and that must, from time to time, be excreted or regurgitated, no matter how damaging the eruption. On the contrary, as another fire-dog -- a revolutionary of a different sort -- knows, "the

1-·, ,

heart of the earth is of gold" (170.25-26). Although "there is much shit in the world," there is wisdom in its presence. Its presence is, perhaps, among the features that make the world a "humanly good thing. " Although there is much shit in the world, Nietzsche insists, "the heart of the earth is of gold. " Does he thereby acknowledge a categorical agreement with being?

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji


UTNIF2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blolmson & Mick Niller The alternative is to do nothing. This is an act of complete nihilism which recognizes that our world does not correspond to the purpose or truth presumed by the affirmative. Completing nihilism means accepting our world, as it is and refusing our rightto a "better" one. Alan White. From Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth. 19.9Q..

http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%2oweb/WNL%2ocontent s.htm

All of this suggests that radical nihilism remains "something to be overcome." The questions arise: by whom, and how? A passage already introduced provides a hint concerning the first: what I have been calling radical nihilism results when "all one has left are the values that pass judgment." This suggests that one for whom those values have "devalued themselves" must be left with nothing at all. Etymologically, it would certainly make sense to call such a person a "nihilist." In addition, Nietzsche suggests that one who is left with nothing in this manner has gained rather than lost: in denying that the world requires "purpose," "unity," or "truth" of the sort posited by religious nihilists and despaired of by radical nihilists, one may regain the world of becoming in its original innocence: one cannot judge, measure, compare, or even deny the whole! Why not? -- For five reasons, all accessible even to modest intellects; for example, because there is nothing besides the whole [weil es nichts gibt ausser dem Ganzen]. [...] And, once again, this is a tremendous restorative, for herein lies the innocence of all existence. (N:1S[30]
/ WP:76S; cf. T1VI:8)

The Nietzschean term that suggests itself for the resulting position is "complete

[vollendeter] nihilism," but this term must be used with care. I take it from Nietzsche's
description of himself as "Europe's first complete nihilist, who, however, has himself _____ -=a::::lr:..::e;::ad;::y, lived nihilism through to its end, within himself -- who has it behind him, beneath him, outside of him" (N:ll[411] / WP:P). The wording of this passage indicates that Nietzsche, although Europe's first complete nihilist, is no longer a nihilist. I will nevertheless characterize this position as "complete nihilism" in the sense of completed nihilism, nihilism that has been lived through entirely, "the logic of our great values and ideals, thought through to its end" (N:ll[411]
/ WP:P).

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji

I t:


__ ---_-_---_

UTNIF2le6 Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Mick Niller My use of the term receives some justification from Nietzsche's claim of having brought nihilism to its end, albeit only within himself; its advent within the world at large, he tells us, is to dominate "the history of the next two centuries." Following those a .... two centuries, "in some future or other," there will be a countermovement, - -..----WP:P}-IfNietzschecannotaccomplishthistransvaluation,he-canatleastfor.eseeitrand thereby, within himself, bring nihilism to its end; but, again, he can be aware of doing so, can be aware that the end is end, only if he is beyond the end, only if he sees that what follows the end is no longer nihilism. One is a complete nihilist only when one has completed nihilism, thereby ceasing to be a nihilist. And indeed, in the continuation of the passage defining nihilism as the condition of one who has left only "the values that pass judgment -- nothing else," Nietzsche describes the "problem of strength and weakness" in terms that clearly place the strongest beyond the so-defined nihilism:
(1) (2)

transvaluation, that will "absolve [abla sen] this complete nihilism" (N:ll[411] /

the weak collapse the stronger destroy what does not collapse;

(3) the strongest overcome the values that pass judgment. (N: 9 [107] /

The religious nihilist, unlike the radical nihilist, denies being a nihilist; what about the complete nihilist? Certainly, the latter acknowledges that our world does not correspond to the traditional "highest values," and that we "have no right" to any other world; but this acknowledgment is paired with the denial that any other world "ought to be," and that our "world of becoming" ought not to be. For the complete nihilist, denigrating the world for its lack of purpose is as senseless as denigrating a philosophical treatise for its lack of plot. a symphony for its lack of text. or a painting for representing, rather than contammg, rii6tl5i1OfUepflf.ln non-Nietzscliean terms: the complete nihilist considers nihilism itself to be the result of a category mistake. The complete nihilist thus returns to a position abandoned with the step to religious nihilism: the complete nihilist "deifies becoming and the apparent world as the only world, and calls them good" (N:9[60]
/ liVP:S8S).

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji

UTNIF2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blolmson & Mick Niller


Their insistence upon the truth of their framework is contrived and ignores the historical contingency of debate. We should embrace this contingency rather than closely guarding the borders of our activity.
Ian Johnston. There's Nothing Nietzsche Couldn't Teach Ya About the Raising of the Wrist. http://www.mala.bc.ca/-johnstoi/introser/nietzs.htm

The al1alogyI want to put on the table is the comparison of human culture to a huge recreational complex in which a large number of different games are going on. Outside people are playing soccer on one field, rugby on another, American football on another, and Australian football on another, and so on. In the club house different groups of people are playing chess, dominoes, poker, and so on. There are coaches, spectators, trainers, and managers involved in each game. Surrounding the recreation complex is wilderness. These games we might use to characterize different cultural groups; French Catholics, German Protestants, scientists, Enlightenment rationalists, European socialists, liberal humanitarians, American democrats, free thinkers, or what have you. The variety represents the rich diversity of intellectual, ethnic, political, and other activities. The situation is not static of course. Some games have far fewer players and fans, and the popularity is shrinking; some are gaining popularity rapidly and increasingly taking over parts of the territory available. Thus, the traditional sport of Aboriginal lacrosse is but a small remnant of what it was before contact. However, the Democratic capitalist game of baseball is growing exponentially, as is the materialistic science game of archery, And they may well combine their efforts to create a new game or merge their leagues. When Nietzsche looks at Europe historically what he sees is that different games have been going on like this for centuries. He further sees that many of the participants in anyone game have been aggressively convinced that their game is the "true" game, that it corresponds with the essence of games or is a close match to the wider game they imagine going on in the natural world, in the wilderl1essbeyond tile playing fields. So tiley have spent a lot of time producing tileir lUle books and coaches' manuals and making claims about how tile principles of tileir game copy or reveal or approximate tile laws of nature. This has promoted and still promotes a good deal of bad feeling and fierce arguments. Hence, in addition anyone game itself, within tile group pursuing it tilere have always been all sorts of sub-games debating the nature of tile activity, refining tile rules, arguing over the correct version of the rule book or about how to educate the referees and coaches, and so on. Nietzsche's first goal is to attack tilis dogmatic claim about the trUtil of tile rules of any particular game. He does tilis, in part, by appealing to the tradition of historical scholarship which shows that tliese galneS are libTeferliill}Cfrue, hut have1ChistOl"j.Rugb)Cbegah-,vlrell a scrccefj?1ay'er15f6-ke th"'e;---------lUles and picked up tile ball and ran with it. American football developed out of lUgby and has changed and is still changing. Basketball had a precise origin which can be historically located. Rule books are written in languages which have a llistow by people witil a deep psychological point to prove: the games are an unconscious expressiol1 of the particular desires of 1twentive games people at a veW particular llistoricalmoment; these rule writers ate called Plato, Augustine, Socrates, Kant, Schopenhauer, Descartes, Galileo, and so 011.For various reasons they believe, or clahn to believe, that the rules they come up with reveal sometil1tlg about the world beyond tile playing field and are tilerefore "true" in a way that other rule books are not; they have, as it were, privileged access to reality and thus record, to use a favorite metaphor of Nietzsche's, tile text of the wilderness.
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Nietzsche J alee Blolmson & Mick Niller
In attacking such clatins, Nietzsche points out, the wilderness bears no relationship at all to any human invention like a rule book Olepoints out that nature is "wasteful beyond measure, without pU1-poses and consideration, without mercy and justice, fertile and desolate and uncertain at the same time; imagine indifference itself as a power--how could you live according to this indifference. Living--is that not precisely wanting to be other than this nature" (Epigram 9). Because there is no connectiol1with what nature a.-ulyis, such rule books are mere "foreground" pictures, fictions dreamed up, reinforced, altered, and discarded for contingent historical reasons. Moreover, the rule books often bear a suspicious resemblance to the rules of grammar of a culture (thus, for example, the notion of an ego as a thinking subject, Nietzsche points out, is closely tied to the rules of European languages which insist on a subject and verb construction as an essential part of any statement). So how do we know what we have is the truth? And why do we want dle trudl, anyway? People seem to need to believe dlat dleir games are true. But why? Might they not be better if dley accepted that dleir games were false, were fictions, having nodililg to do with dle reality of nature beyond the recreational complex? If they understood dle fact that evetything they believe in has a history and dlat, as he says in the Genealogy of Morals, "only dlat which has no histoty can be defined," they would understand that all dus proud lustoty of searclililg for dle truth is somedling quite different from what philosophers who have written rule books proclaim. Furthermore these lustorical changes and developments occur accidentally, for contingent reasons, and have nod1ing to do with the games, or anyone game, shaping itself in accordance with any ultimate game or any given rule book of games given by dle wilderness, wluch is indifferent to what is going on. And dlere is no basis for the belief dlat if we look at dle history of the development of dlese games, we discover some progressive evolution of games towards some lughet type. We may be able, like Darwin, to trace lustorical genealogies, to construct a narrative, but dnt narrative does not reveal any clear direction or any [mal goal or any progressive development. The genealogy of games indicates dlat histoty is a record of contingent change. The assertion dlat there is such a tlililg as progress is simply one more game, one more rule added by inve1ltive minds (who need to believe in progress); it bears no relationslup to nature beyond the sports complex. Ditto for science. So long as one is playing on a team, one follows the rules and thus has a sense of what constitutes right and wrong or good and evil conduct in dle game, and tlus awareness is shared by all those cati"yingout dle Saine endeavour. To pick up dle ball in soccer is evil (unless you are dle goalie); and to punt dle ball while lun1ung in American football is permissible but stupid; in Australian football both actions are esse1ltialand right. In odler words, different cultural communities have different standards of right and wrong conduct; These are determined by the artificial inventi01ls called rule books, one for each game. These rule books have developed dle rules lustorically; thus, dley have no permanent status and no claim to privileged access.

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji


Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Mick Niller Even their insistence upon a best way to play this particular game is belied by their inability to justify this "best."
Ian Johnston. There's Nothing Nietzsche Couldn't Teach Ya About the Raising of the Wrist http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/introser/nietzs.htm


Now, at this point you might be thinking about the other occasion in which I introduced a game analogy, namely, in the discussions of Aristotle's Ethics. For Aristotle also acknowledges tllat different political systems have different 1ules of conduct. But Aristotle believes tllat an examination of different political communities will enable one to derive certain principles common to tllem all~ bottom-up generalizations which will tllen provide tlle basis for reliable rational judgment on which game is beil1g played better~ on what constitutes good play in any particular game~on whetller or not a particular game is being conducted well or not. In otller words~ Aristotle maintains tllat tllere is a way of discovering and appealing to some autll0rity outside any particular game in order to adjudicate moral and knowledge claims which arise in particular games or in conflicts between different games. Plato, of course, also believed in the existence of such a standard, but proposed a different route to discovering it. Now Nietzsche emphatically denies tlus possibility. Anyone who tries to do what Aristotle recommends is simply inventing anotller game (we can call it Supersport) and is not discoveril1g anytlling true about tlle real nature of games because reality (tllat's tlle wilderness surroundi11g us) isn't organized as a game. In fact, he argues, that we have created tlus recreational complex and all tlle activities wluch go on in it to protect ourselves from nature (wluch is indifferent to what we do with our lives)~not to copy some recreational rule book which that wilde1ness reveals. Human culture exists as an affirmation of our opposition to or contrast with nature, .not as an extension of rules which include both human culture and nature. That's why falsehoods about nature might well be a lot more useful than truths, if they enable us to live more fully human lives. If we tllink of tlle wilderness as a text about reali~ as tlle trUtll about nature~ tllen~ Nietzsche claims~we have no access whatsoever to tllat text. What we do have is access to conflicting interpretations~ none of tllem based on privileged access to a "tiue" text. Thus~ tlle soccer players may tlunk tlley and tlleir game is superior to mgby and tlle 1ugby players~ because soccer more closely represents the surrounding wilderness~ but such statements about better and worse are irrelevant. There is notlling rule bound outside tlle games tllemselves. Hence~ all dogmatic claims about tlle tiutll of all games or any particular game are false.

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji
1__ .


q InO

1 :t-

UTNIF2le6 Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Mick Niller In reality, there is no true essence to debate. No one way to do it. All of their procedural arguments are contrived for the purpose of defending the rules of the game that they've come to depend on. Ian Johnston. There's Nothing Nietzsche Couldn't Teach Ya About the Raising of the Wrist. 1996. http://www.mala.bc.ca/.-jolmstoi/introser/nietzs.htm
Take, for example, the offside rule in soccer. Without that the game could not proceed in its traditional way. Hence, soccer players see the offside rule as an essential part of their reality, and as long as soccer is the only game in town and we have no idea of its histOIY (which might, for example, tell us about the invention of the off-side rule), then the offside rule is easy to interpret as a universal, a necessary requirement for social activity, and we will find and endorse scriptural texts which reinforce that belief, and our scientists will devote their time to linking the offside rule with the mysterious rumblings that come from the forest. And from this, one might be led to conclude that the offside rule is a Law of Nature, something which extends far beyond the realms of our particular game into all possible games and, beyond those, into the realm of the wilderness itself. Of course, there were powerful social and political forces (the coach and trainers and owners of the team) who made sure that people had lots of reasons for believing in the unchanging verity of present anangements. So it's not surprising that we find plenty of learned books, training manuals, and locker room exhortations urging everyone to remember the offside rule and to castigate as "bad" those who routinely forget about that part of the game. We will also worship those who died in defence ofthe offside rule. And naturally any new game that did not recognize the offside rule would be a bad game, all immoral way to conduct oneself. So if some group tried to start a game with a different offside rule, that group would be attacked because they had violated a rule of nature and were thus immoral. But for contingent historical reasons, Nietzsche argues, that situation of one game in town did not last. The recreational unity of the area split up, and the growth of historical scholarship into the past demonstrated all too clearly that there was overwhelming evidence that all the various attempts to show that one particular game was privileged over any of the others, that there was one true game, are false, dogmatic, trivial, deceiving, and so on. For science has revealed that the notion of a necessaty connection between the rules of any game and the wider purposes of the wilderness is simply an ungrounded assertion. There is no way in which we can make the connections between the historically derived fictions in the rule book and the mysterious and ultimately unknowable directions of inational nature. To play the game of science, we have to believe in causes and effects, but there is no way we can prove that this is a --------,trU'e-be-ltef-aiio-tltel'e-is-a-da:lrgerfor-usifwe'simplyignore-that-f'act. fhel'efol'e, we-ealmot"'p1'0ve... a link between the game and anything outside it. And history has shown us, just as Darwin's natural history has demonstrated, that all apparently eternal issues have a story, a line of development, a genealogy. Thus, concepts, like species, have no reality--they are temporary fictions imposed for the sake of defending a particular anangement. Hence, God is dead. There is no eternal truth any more, no rule book in the sky, no ultimate referee or international Olympic committee chairman. Nietzsche didn't kill God; history and the new science did. And Nietzsche is only the most passionate and irritating messenger, announcing over the PA system to anyone who will listen that someone like Kant or Descartes or Newton who thinks that what he or she is doing can be defended by an appeal to a system grounded in the truth of nature has simply been mistaken.
With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent ...Benji


UTNIF2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Mick Niller
The alternative is to refuse the affirmatives framework and to remake debate as your own game. This is to be a free spirit, not confined by anyone else's speculative "truths." Your ballot not only recognizes our attempt to break the aff's rules and make debate our own but signifies your reclamation of debate as you wish it to be.

Ian Johnston. There's Nothing Nietzsche Couldn't Teach Ya About the Raising of the Wrist. 1996. http://www.mala.bc.ca!~johnstoi/introser/l1ietzs.htm
First of all there is the ovelwhehning majority of people: the players atld the spectators, those caught up in their particular sport. These people are, for the most part. continuing on as before without reflecting or caring about what they do. They may be vaguely troubled about rumours they hear that their game is not the best, they may be bored with the endless repetition in the schedule, atld they have more or less reconciled themselves that they are not the only game going on, but they'd rather not think about it. Or else, stupidly confident that what they are doing is what really matters about human life, is true, they preoccupy themselves with tinkering with dIe lUles, using the new technology to get better balls, more comfortable seats, louder whistles, more brightly painted side lines, more trendy uniforms, tastier Gatorade--all in dIe name of progtess. Increasing numbers of people are moving into the stands or participating through the newspaper or the television sets. Most people are dms, in increasing numbers, losing touch with themselves and their potential as instinctual human beings. They are dIe herd, dIe last men, preoccupied widl dIe trivial. unreflectingly conformist because dley dlink. to dIe extent they dlink at all, that what they do will bring dIem sometlling called "happiness." But they are not happy; dley are in a permanent state of narcotized anxiety, seeking new ways to entertain therns elves with the steady stream of marketed distractions which the forces of the market produce: technological toys, popular entertainment, college education, Wagner's operas, academic jargon. TIlis group, of course, includes all dIe experts in the game, tlle cheerleaders whose job it is to keep us focused on tlle seriousness of ilie activity: dIe sports commentators and pundits, whose life is bound up witll interpreting, reporting, and classifying players and contests. These sportscasters are, in effect, the academics and government experts, the ] ohn Maddens and Larry Kings and Mike Wallaces of society, tllose demigods of tile herd, whose autllol'ity derives [mm tlle false notion that what dley are dealing witil is somedling other than a social fiction. TIlere's a second group of people, who have accepted dIe ultimate meaninglessness of the game dley were in. They have moved to dIe sideli11es,not as spectators or fans, but as critics, as cytlics or tlillilists, dismissing out of hand all dIe pretensions of tlle players and fans, but not affirming anytlling dlemselves. These are dIe souls who, having notlling to will (because iliey have seen dltough the fiction of tlle game and have dlerefore no motive to play any more), prefer to willnotlling in a state of paralyzed skepticism. Nietzsche has a certain admiration for these people, but maititains tlnt a life like dlis, the tlillilist on the sideli11es,is not a human life. For, Nietzsche insists, to live as a human being, is to playa game. Only in playing a game can one affirm one's identity, can one create values, can one tluly exist. Games are tlle expression of our instinctual human energies, our living dl'ives, what Nietzsche calls our "will to powel'." So tlle nillilistic stance, dlOUgh understandable and, in a sense, courageous, is sterile. For we are born to play, and if we don't, then we are not fulfilling a worthy liliinall fUifctiOtl.Knhe saitre titne:-however;"we-haveio-recognize"that-a:ll-games-are-eq,ually-fietionsdtwented human constructions widlOut any C01l11ections dIe reality of tllings. to Hence we arrive at dIe position of dIe need to affirm a belief (invent a lule book) wllich we know to have been invented, to be divorced from ilie tmdl of tllings. To play tlle best game is to live by lules wllich we invent for ourselves as an assertion of our instinctual d11vesand to accept dlat tlle lules are fictions: tlley matter, we accept tllem as binding, we judge ourselves and odlers by dIem, and yet we know tiley are artificial. And just as in real life a normal soccer player derives a sense of meaning during the game, affirms his or her value in the game, without ever once believing that the universe is organized by the rules of soccer or that those rules have any universal validity, so we must commit ourselves to epistemological and moral rules which enable us to live our lives as players, while at the same time recognizing that these rules have no universal validity. TIle nihilists have discovered half of this insight, but, because they are not capable of living the full awareness, they are vel)' limited human beings. With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantialIy lesser extent- Benji

UTNIF2le6 Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Miele Niller
The third group of people. that small minority which iricludes Nietzsche himself. are those who accept the games metaphor. see the fictive nature of all systems oflmowledge and morality. and accept the challenge that to be most fully human is to create a new game. to live a life that is governed by lules imposed by the dictates of one's own creative nature. To base one's life on the creative tensions of the artist engaged with creating a game that meets most eloquently and uncompromisingly tlle demands of one's own irrationalnature--one's \Vill--isto be most fully free. most fully human. Tllis call to live tlle self-created life. affirnling oneself in a game of one's own devising. necessallly condemns tlle llighest spirits to loneliness, doubt, insecurity, emotional suffering, (because most people will mock tlle new game or be actively hostile to it or refuse to notice it. and so on: alternatively. tlley will accept tlle challenge but nllsinterpret what it means and settle for some marketed easy game. like floating down the :Mississippi smoking a pipe), but a self-generated game also bdngs Witll it the most intense joy, tlle most playful and creative affirmation of what is most important in our human nature). It's important to note here that one's freedom to create one's own game is not unlimited. In that sense, Nietzsche is no existentialist maintaining that we have a duty and an unlimited freedom to be whatever we want to be. For tlle resources at our disposal--tlle parts of the field still available and tlle recreational matetiallying around in tlle club housenare deternlined by tlle present state of our culture. Furtllermore. tlle lules I devise and tlle language I frame them in will almost certainly owe a good deal to tlle present state of tlle lules of otller games and the state of tlle language in wllich those are expressed. Altllough I am changing the lules for my game. my starting point. or tlle lules I have available to change, are given to me by my moment inllist01:Y, So in moving fOlward, in creating sometlling tllat will transcend tlle past, I am using tlle matedals of tlle past. Existing games are tlle matedals out of wllich I fasllion my new game. Thus, tlle new plillosopher will transcend tlle limitations of tlle existing games and will extend the catalogue of games \Vim me invention of new ones, but that new creative spirit faces certain historical limitations. If this is relativistic, it is not totally so. The value of tllis endeavour is not to be measured by what other people tlllnk of me newly created game: nor does its value lie in fame, matedal rewards, or service to tlle group. Its value comes from tlle WflJT ellables tlle it individual to manifest certain human qualities, especially tlle will to power. But whetller or not tlle game attracts otller people and becomes a permanent fixture on tlle sparring calendar, sometlling later citizens can dedve enjoyment from 01' even remember. tllat is irrelevant. For only tlle accidents ofllistozy will deternline whetller tlle game I invent for myself attracts other people, tllat is, becomes a source of value for tllem. Nietzsche claims that tlle rime is dght for such a radically individualistic endeavour to create new games, new metaphors for my life. For, wrongheaded as many of tlle traditional games may have been, like Plato's metaphysical soccer or Kant's version of eight ball, or Marx's materialist chess tournament, or Christianity's stoical snakes and ladders, tlley have splendidly traUled us for tlle much more difficult work of creating values in a spirit of radical uncertaUl~" The exertions have trained our imaginations and intelligence in useful ways. Hence, although those dogmatists were fundamentally unsound, an immersion in their systems has done much to refine those capacities we most need to lise above the nihilists and the herd.

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji


UTNIF 21c6
Nietzsche JaleeBlohnson & Micle Niller

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The aff s promotion of democratic rights misplaces existential suffering. The impact is resentment of life.

Connolly, William E. Professor of Political Science at John Hopkins University 1991 [Identity/ Difference: democratic negotiations of political paradox]

.1_ In Twilight of the Idols,

Nietzsche attacks "Christian and anar.

When thT a~arch!st, as the. m~uth~iece o~ decliniug strata of society.,., d.ema?ds ~Ith nght~ous Indlgnatl.on 'hIS rights', 'justice', 'eg!!!!,l ,!;ghts, he IS only actIng under the Influence of his want of culture which prevents his understanding why he is really suffering-i~ w'hat respect he is impoverished in life. A cause-creating drive is" powerful within him: someone must be to blame for his feeling vile. . . . His '~i&:hteousindignation' itself already does him good; e~ery poor devil finds pleasure in scolding,....-it gives him a little of the intoxication of power. 21 .

N~etzsc~e ?im.self, of course, takes pleasure in scolding, though he picks distinctive targets. The respect in which the dissatisfied ones find life impoverished is the key:

Whether one attributes one's feeling vile to others or to oneself- the Socialist does the former, the Christiari does the lattet-'--m:lces no ess~ntial difference. What is common to botb,..aod..uJl~t.hJun both,

is that someone has to be to blame for the fact that one suffers-in short that the sufferer prescribes for himself the honey o{revenge as a medicine for his suffering.s?

: 1hese, clearly enough, are antidemocratic sentiments. ¢Nietz..:.1 l.scheis ridiculing anyone who demands e!;Jualrights and justice as a ! :~dicine for existential suffering~ He insist~ that these narcotics; I cover u more fundamental sources of sufferm and forestall con-I i frontation of them; he suggests that SUCl refusals take a heavy I cumulative toll on the life of oneself and 'others; and he implies that a 'collective identi,!y formed through these dispositions intensifies ~l. ) \o.lt·.-' . ..,

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster.Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji


tJ '"'"

UTNIF2le6 Nietzsche J aleeBlohnson & Mick Niller .. h t J hn Hopkins University 1996 [1 Saurette, Paul, Profe~sorof Pohtic~ T eory.~. ~zsche Arendt and the Crisis of the Will Mistrust all Systematizers and.AvOlThd j ie al offuternational Studies, Vol. 25 No.1 Them to Order in International Relations eory, oum pp.1-28] ,'lJle notion that Realism is a highly normative perspective is no longer a
contentious statement Morgenthau , postulates the existence of 'objective' laws of politics, this is only possible through a series of normative manoeuvres. which take the state as the ultimate realisation of political interaction. By accepting that human nature is characterised by a lust for power which creates danger for individual (and later state) survival, Morgenthau follows an essentially Hobbesian conception of the justification of domestic politics." The establishment of civil society through the rule of law and centralised state power is viewed as a necessary result of , human nature. As such, Morgenthau accepts the state as a self-evident goal, because only its hierarchical rule can tame 'natural' conflict and ensure survival and security. This normative bias is also betrayed in the work of Kenneth Waltz, his strenuous claim to objectivity notwithstanding. In fact, Waltz's claim to objectivity is conspicuous for the fact that it implicitly privileges the status quo (the state) by default. Waltz's theory of anarchy, however, also seems to suggest a more assertive mo~al framework. Insofar as he views anarchy as a uniform consequence of the existence of autonomous units," it seems clear that Waltz merely adopts his own reading of Rousseau's state of nature to justify the normative primacy of the state. In other words, Waltz justifies the moral legitimacy of the state simply by assuming that it is the only effective form of civil society that can mitigate the logic of anarchy by ensuring hierarchical l1troJ.lwaltzthus replaces Morgenthau' s embarrassing assumptions about power ith th9 sanitised notion of structural self-interest, while continuing to justify the s ate in terms of hierarchical security. In both cases, the domestic order is privileged because 'progress and perfection', or at least the mitigation of the state of nature, is assumed to be possible only through control and rule. This conception appears coherent only because non-order, understood as the lack of hierarchical rule, is a priori defined as a state of nature/conflict. It is only by a perfectly circular tautology, then, that realism 'manages to privilege the state. Once anarchy is defined as dangerous, politics can be conceptualised only as a process of fabrication through which a secure community is forged by rule and control. Moreover, once security/community is understood in these terms, the logic can only circulate back and reinforce the understanding of political action as mastery and control over human affairs through the authority or violence of rulership. When considering international relations, then, it is completely consistent for realism to label 'the international' as anarchic and thus dangerous because it is beyond in contemporary IR theory." Although



control. Yet, because realism has previously defined non-order as inherently dangerous to survival, the drive for state security compels the attempt to impose ..... ~-order-Ol1-the-intefnaHonal-realm:--ln-a"ense;-the-;ntemati'on1fl,nust seem botli---······ political (a space in need of hierarchical control) and apolitical (a space beyond hierarchical control). This dichotomy leads to the double strategy of realism as (1) the attempt to impose order on the international through 'reasoned foreign policy' and power, while (2) retreating into the normative value of the state, and its circular normative justification of domestic order and state survival. In this light, it is absolutely paradoxical and yet completely consistent for Morgenthau to decry the international as the realm of irrationality and emergency, while nostalgically yearning for objective scientific laws which would allow the statesman to impose theoretical order on international politics, and thus lead to the. actual control and mastery of the international realm." As such, realism manages to privilege the normative value of the domestic realm while simultaneously idealising the domestication of the international through an extensio? of c~l.ltrol·and order::l



With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The AtO.l?ic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji


UTNIF2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Mick Niller

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Saurette, Paul, Professor of Political Theory at John Hopkins University 1996 [I" Mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them': Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory, Journal of Intemational Studies, Vol. 25 No.1



:osmopolitan Idealism The influence of the tradition of p'0litics-as-making is no less evident in Realism' 1"esis': cosmo ohian Idealism. The term 'cosmopolitanism' is admittedly a vague and contested term Wit m the literature, assimilating a variety of approaches under the similarity of appeals to universality, progress, and humanity." However, since Kant is Martin Wight's paradigmatic revolutionary, Ian Clark's prototypical 'optimist', and is often cited as the central theorist of cosmopolitanism in contemporary literature, it is perhaps appro riate t . t as re resentative of the underl in fo;;iiation of cosmo]2olitanism.43 Despite his largely one-dimensional appropriation moe IR cannon, Kiint is a sophisticated theorist who recognises the considerable difficulties of his propositions. Thus, while not offering as.extreme a version of cosmopolitanism as some others, Kant suggests a more nuanced cosmopolitan understanding of international politics that makes it somewhat more difficult, but also more interesting, to unearth the influence of the tradition of politics-asmaking upon his thinking. For if the Hobbes ofrealism can be read as creating a renewed foundation/justification for the state without QlIestioning the tradjtionat categories of action that unde in the tradition of politics-as-making, the Kant cosmopolitanism offers a similar pattern. t iough often referred to as an optimist, Kant's definiti10nal use of the concept of the state of nature is virtually identical to earlier social contract theorists. Not surprisingly, Kant decrjes the anarchy of the state ofn~ture as an intolerable situation from which.cUtil..sool~ grows. Kant's distinctiveness lies in the fact that, unlike Hobbes, be creates a tejeOl'ogicalunderstanding of human progress in which the tension between man's reason and his unreasonable environment determines that human development does not end with the establishment of the sovereign state." Kant w:gues that ~jJ society is an imru>rtant stage in humanity's historical c;I~nt..because it secures, with minimum restriction, those conditions und~ .....• --.- ... -which-an-indi¥.idual-is_fr.ee,-equal,_ancLindep.endent~.t,..Kant.;;fiJ~n::::.d~SJlJ~1~J~s_;;;e~ra;:incomplete because interstate relations remain caught iri1l1eCoii1'hctuai state of illitu're'WhiCIntrremenstiiesTIl15l1ity aon~esbc Civil soci~tead of of retreatn1g into, and thereby reifying, the sovereign state, Kant argues that 'providence' has provided humanity with the impetus to extend the conditions of domestic order globally." Indeed, Kant's teleological understanding of the development of reason suggests that 'men are ,compelled to reinforce this law by introducing a





system of united power, hence a cosmopolitan system of general political security' .47 Thus, in Perpetual Peace, Kant outlines his well known view that . a cosmopolitan confederation of states will emerge due to the growtli of reason (as the influence of nature and providence) and the rationalIntervention of philosophers,"

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji

UTNIF 2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blobnson & Mick Niller
Consequently, Kant has been understood as a rationalist whose theories of political action are an outgrowth of his faith in reason and teleological nature. 1 would suggest; however, thatKant's use of teleology and rational faith is more a symptom than a cause. Kant's teleology functions primarily to reground the 'Ideal/Real World' dichotomy in an attempt to save the interpretation of politicalas-making. Where Hobbes resorts to human nature to replace the absolute.Truth of Christianity, Kant instead turns to reason and historical development to guarantee a new ideal towards which all action should be oriented .and judged. While Kant's writings harbour deep philosophical. doubts about. the epistemological difficulties of knowledge, he still argues that through reason and approximate knowledge, humanity can rationally recognise that 'the highest purpose of nature, a universal cosmopolitan existence, will at last be realised as the matrix within which all the original capacities of the human race may develop' ,49 The fguudflt;onaj jnDuence of the will-to-orderis eyjdent in the fact !@1....clesj3lt-e-K.auU severe metaphysical. doubts, he js still cO!1melledto diyjdlt. the world into two spheres, one ideal; and one experiential and ar ue that although .humani can onl approxjma!e the worlof' 'ire • 0 t IS agproximatjDlJ, so Rather t ian question the nature of politics and action, Kant ignores the nascent logic of his own scepticism and instead em races a ~..faith' to salvage a dichotomjsed world and to ensure guidance.throug 1




This meta h sical escape inevitably defines his unde st i Kantian politics' are mere y 'rational projects' which 'accelerate the coming 0 this period' of universal cosmopolitanism." Thus; although his oft-quoted motto i of the enlightenment, 'Sapere Aude: Have courage to use your OWI7 understanding';" is indicative of his recognition of the crisis of religious and traditionalauthority, the Kantian withdrawal into rational faith ensures that his motto for cosmopolitan politics is more accurately summarisedas something like 'have courage to follow the philosopher's truth, accessible .neither through religion norknowledge of human nature, but rather through historical reason' ,53 Like Plato, Kant understands olitic erely as the realisation of an ideal in o,ur, world: a man of knowledge must master the human rea m to create justice (Plato) .or freedom (Kant), jJijlili mterpret'l!five 1ramework Kant must conceptualise cos~tan...; litics as an universalised s ste under w 1Ich the rule of domestic hierarchy is guarantee y a 'law-governed extern a ~9Qjmonweal!!!:,54 ~Ra-iflt-eFHat.jGRal politicDecome Ide'iillClil;-1rot1r ~re conceived ideally as the rule of Iloumenal Truth and Reason through ,imperfect, yet approximate, phenomenal laws, T~..tkspite Kant's pbilosoghical sp.ti<:.ism,_hj,~-tw-e-Icey-p011ti~I...@liefs (Ii 'that peace and the individual development of human potential can be guaranteed only by hierarchical political rule, and (2)that the Apparent World must be an a . roximation of the Truth of the Real~r veal the foundatio al ' f.l~6HGe..Qf_tlWill 0 rder and politics-asmaking on


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With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, BOling Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji


Wendy BROWN, professor of poli sci at UC Berkley, States ofIniury 95 Here, Foucault's concern is less with disrupting the conventional modernist equation of power with speech on one side, and oppression with silence on the other, than with the ways in which insurrectionary discourse borne of exclu- sion and marginalization can be colonized by that which produced it much as counter-cultural fashion is routinely commodified by the corporate textile industry. While "disqualified" discourses are an effect of domination, they nevertheless potentially function as oppositional when they are deployed by those who inhabit them. However, when "annexed" by those "unitary" discourses which they ostensibly oppose, they become a particularly potent source of regulation, carrying as they do intimate and detailed knowledge of their subjects. Thus, Foucault's WOllY would appear to adhere not simply to the study of but to the overt political mobilization of oppositional discourses. Consider the way in which the discourse of multiculturalism has been annexed by mainstream institutions to generate new modalities of essentialized racial discourse; how "pre-menstrual syndrome" has been rendered a debilitating disease in medical and legal discourses; n17 how "battered women's syndrome" has been deployed in the courtroom to defend women who strike back at their assailants by casting them as sub-rational, ego less victims of male violence; n18 or how some women's response to some pornography was generalized by the Meese Commission on pornography as the violence done to all women by all pornography. n19 Consider, more generally, attempts at codifying feminist discourses of women's experience in the unitary and universal discourse of the law. What happens when legal universalism's silence about women, when its failure to recognize or remedy the material of women's subordination, is remedied with discourses specifying women's experience and codifying the category of women through this specification? In pursuing this question, I will focus briefly on Catharine MacKinnon's work, but the questions I am raising about this kind of feminist legal reform are not limited to her work. n20 ' MacKinnon expressly aims to write "women's experience into law," but as so many other feminists have remarked, this begs the question ofwmch women's experience(s), drawn from which historical moments, culture, race, and class strata. n2l Indeed, what does it mean to write historically and cultur- ally circumscribed experience into an ahistorical discourse, the universalist discourse oflaw? Is it possible to do this without rendering "experience" as ontology, "perspective" as Truth, and without encoding this ontology and tbis Truth in law as the basis of women IS rights? What if, for example, the identity of women as keyed to sexual violation is an expressly late twentieth __centyry and white middle-class construction of femininity, consequent to a radical deprivatization of sexuality on the one side, and the erosion of otlier-elements of compulsory-heterosexualIty ii22 --such as a severely gendered----tlivisinlftlho'Ci1[l1.lIbor=onllre~oth-er'?"Mo~doesade:fiIlltionof\v6fiieliTs-sexili1t-sn:bot1:1i=nattBn, andLh~~---· encoding of this definition in law, work to liberate women from sexual subordination, or does it, paradoxically, legally reinscribe female- ness as sexual violability? If the law produces the subjects it claims to protect or emancipate, how might installation of women's experience as "sexual vio-Iation" in the law reiterate rather than repeal this identity? And might this installation be particularly unemancipatory for women whose lived experience is not that of sexual subordination to men but, for example, that of sexual outlaw? [CONTINUES-1I2] . .



With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, D~ria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji




JakeBIOhnsdlMer :JiclZSche JaleeBlohnson
& MicleNiller


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These questions suggest that in legally codifying a fragment of an insurrec- tionary discourse as a timeless truth, interpellating women as unified in their victimization, and casting the "free speech" of men as that which "silences" and thus subordinates women, MacKimlon not only op-poses bourgeois liberty to substantive eguality, but potentially intensifies the regulation of gender and sexuality in the law, abetting rather than contesting the production of gender identity as sexual. In short, as a regulatory fiction of a particular identity is deployed to displace the hegemonic fiction' of universal personhood, the disc.ourse of rights converges insidiously '\\rith the discourse of disciplinarity to produce a spectacularly potent mode of juridical-regulatory domination

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji


UTNIF2le6 Nietzsche lake Blohnson & Mick Niller
Their utilitarian calculus demotes the individual to the status of equal and wrongly presumes that eradicating suffering promotes the good. In fact, suffering is an intrinsic and productive part of human existence.


TulaneUniversity, "Nietzsche's

Critique of Utilitarianism."

The Journal of Nietzsche Studies

29 (2005)

Nietzsche's preliminary account of the difference between master morality and slave morality in Beyond Good and Evil culminates with the conclusion that "[s]lave morality is essentially a morality of utility" (260). Although Nietzsche develops the notorious distinction between master and slave morality most fully in the Genealogy, he articulates the sense in which he considers utilitarianism a form of slave morality in a revealing passage in Beyond Good and Evil. Here he speculates that the noble, aristocratic man first identifies himself and those like him (powerful, proud, distinguished men) as good, and then contrasts himself with those he contemptuously , regards as "the cowardly, the timid, the petty" and, above all, "those who think only of narrow utility" (BGE 260). The noble's power consists not only in his ability to exploit others with his superior acumen or physical strength but also in exercising "power over himself," by refraining from acting on the inclination of pity that characterizes those whom he despises. The slave, conversely, identifies himself negatively; he is part of the group that resents those who unabashedly exercise their power. Nietzsche scorns slave morality because its proponents meekly resign themselves to whatever master morality is not, and yet consider their own moral principles universally binding rather than acknowledging them as narrowly useful for members of their own group. In the Christian tradition, "pity, the kind and helping hand, the warm heart, patience, industriousness, humility, friendliness come into honor-for these are the most useful qualities [for the slave]" (BGE 260). Although Nietzsche thinks utilitarians share these values, he does not consider their values coextensive with Christian morality, since hedonistic utilitarianism is concerned with maximizing the very sensation that Christian morality aims to suppress: pleasure (WP 35).9. The partial coincidence between Christian and utilitarian values results in part, Nietzsche thinks, from the fact that utilitarians [End Page 2] construe "utility" in exceedingly familiar terms. The pleasure they seek is not that of the voluptuary or conqueror, but that of the "herd animal"-the "boring" and "mediocre" enjoyment of people who have yet to awaken from the "soporific" spell of slave morality (BGE 228).§ What does it mean to espouse the values of a herd animal? We have already encountered some of the values Nietzsche associates with slave morality-humility, industriousness, pity, but in what sense are they "herd" values? If the fundamental goal of an animal within a herd is its own preservation, and if its own preservation depends upon the health of the herd of which it is a member, then, Nietzsche supposes, the moral principles of that group will tend to reflect the kind of egalitarianism embodiedfn--Serittiam's-dicfum;-"EverybOdy couhts for o-he, a-h'dMbb-dY-for more than one."l Nietzsche considers this the essence of herd mentality: ''[Ilt is the instinct of the herd that finds its formula in this rule-one is equal, one takes oneself for equal" (WP 925). According to Nietzsche, this egalitarian formula originates from the benefit that comes from reciprocal cooperation among equals in a group, but has been extended by Christian morality to apply to all people-including unequals. Nietzsche thus construes the golden rule as a precept of "prudence" or mutual advantaqe, observing that "John Stuart Mill believes in it"as the basis of morality, but that he fails to grasp its prudential origin (WP 925).~ Nietzsche also portrays egalitarian values as myopic, dangerous, and potentially self-subverting. This is because, Nietzsche thinks, the opposite of these values-pain, suffering, inequality; in short, "evil"-is equally indispensable for the survival and happiness of the very herd that seeks With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji


.J I-.


UTNIF2le6 Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Mick Niller
to eradicate it. Accordingly, Nietzsche sharply criticizes Bentham's hedonic calculus (which correlates happiness maximization with pain minimization) as inconsistent with utilitarian goals. In its place, Nietzsche stresses the necessity of physical suffering and intellectual struggle for the self-improvement of each and, by extension, the vitality and happiness of the group. He accordingly rebukes the proponent of any morality that makes the reduction of suffering its fundamental goal: "[I]f you experience suffering and displeasure as evil, worthy of annihilation and as a defect of existence, then it is clear that besides your religion of pity you also harbor another religion in your heart that is perhaps the mother of the religion of pity: the religion of comforiableness" (GS 338). This religion-or, more specifically, moralitv-of comfort thwarts its own goals by attempting to eliminate all suffering (BGE 44).Q In a passage that anticipates what we now call the "hedonic paradox," according to which pleasure is diminished when we pursue it directly, Nietzsche ridicules those who, like Bentham, seek to maximize individual or collective happiness by minimizing pain: "[Hlow little you know of human happiness, you comfortable and benevolent people, for happiness and unhappiness are sisters and even twins that either grow up together or, as in your case, remain small together" (GS 338).J.QHe goes on to underline the idiosyncratic nature of suffering and the simplemindedness of those who heedlessly strive to relieve the [End Page 3] suffering of others. "It never occurs to them," Nietzsche adds, "that ... the path to one's own heaven always leads through the voluptuousness of one's own hell" (GS 338

Wi~l contri~utions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy ~my, Kashmir, The At~:nic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- BenJI

11~ .::J

l 18f


UTNrp 2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blolmson & Mick Niller The aff's attempts at averting death are life denigrating. Accepting the world as it is requires accepting the mortality that accompanies it. Alan White. From Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth. 19~ http://www. williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/ awhite/WNL%2oweb/WNL%2ocontent s.htm The Apollinian veil, like Nietzschean amor fati, involves affirming existence rather than disguising or attempting to heal it; but it stops short of amor fati in that it does not involve the affirmation of all of existence, "without subtraction, exception, or selection." Returning to The Birth of Tragedy: "How is the world of the Olympian gods related to this folk wisdom [i.e., the wisdom of Silenus]? Even as the rapturous [entzilckungsreicheJ vision of the tortured martyr to his torments" (BT:3). The Apollinian, like the Christian martyr but unlike the Dionysian, turns away from this world and looks to another: "The Greek knew and felt the terror and horror of existence; in order to be able to live at all, he had to interpose between himself and life the radiant dream-birth of the Olympians." To the extent that the "terror and horror of existence" are affirmed, they are affirmed not "for themselves," but rather Iike the martyr's torments -- for sake of the visions they make possible. The "terrors and horrors" are revealed in the pre-Olympian myths that inspire the great tragedians; the Olympians provide the Apollinian veil that, "interposed" between the Greeks and life, shields them from the horrors:

That overwhelming dismay in the face of the titanic powers of nature, the Moira enthroned inexorably over all knowledge, the vulture of the great lover of mankind, Prometheus, the terrible fate of the wise Oedipus, the family curse of the Atridae, which drove Orestes to matricide: in short, that entire philosophy of the sylvan god [i.e., Silenus (see BT:7)], with its mythical exemplars, which caused the downfall of the melancholy Etruscans -- all this was again and again overcome by the Greeks with the aid of the Olympian middle world [Mittelwelt] of art; or at any rate it was veiled and withdrawn from sight. (BT:3) The gods justify human life by living it themselves -- the only satisfactory theodicy! Existence under the bright sunshine of such gods is perceived [empjimden] as desirable in itself, and the real pain of Homeric man is caused by parting from it. especially by early parting; so that now, reversing the wisdom of Silenus, we might say of the Greeks that "to die ~--------so-0-n-iswOrSfOfalH6Ftllem:l:11e next worsr=tO die a:Uflt"-CET:-Sj

Whereas life is the worst for the Silenian, death is the worst for the Apollinian. But as long as either life or death is condemned, human existence cannot be affirmed. The Apollinian affirms all that is present. but only as present, only as permanent. Mortality, the horror the Apollinian cannot affirm, must be disguised; it is concealed behind the Olympian veil.

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji


UTNIF 2k6 Nietzsche JaleeBloMson & Mick Niller



NfElYBGHg(XIN'n~'UI:,S IN lhp. ~,TheRidh.QtTX§g~·dy·r·ransl'lh·.dGolffiuif, i·956 p. 9-10· (In the preface I addressed to Hichard Wagner 1 claimed that are, rather than ethics, constituted the essential metaphysical activity of man, while in the body of the book I made several suggestive statements to the effect tllat existence could be justified only in esthetic terms. As ll: matter of:fac.t)thr,oughout tbe book I attrilmteda purely esthetic llwamng-whether implied or overt-to all process: a kind of divinity if you like~ God as the supreme artist, amoral, rec1clessly creating and destroying, reali7..ing himself indif£~ntly in whatever he does or undoes, ridding himself by hIS acts of the embarrassment of his riches and the strain of his Ineemafcontradictions, TIlus the world was made t?P:2J?$I_!t evenr.lnstank, asa sii7:ce.$~QIu.tfu;;of:God's __ '!y'~etisjo~.s:.~~~ver.:_~9y_vi.~~ln:1Tii.~ o !ll[~~ for whonl1lIUsio\l,is]he onlt.,M~iJ?le-mode .of~ !~~.el!lEtiop. hat whole esthetic metaphysics might be reT
jected 'out of band as so much prattle or rant. Ystin.,i~

~~e..lltialtraiJ!_it,alreadr E!.~6&ursdthatsJ;!irit ofd~eE.Eis• •~rust a.~, f!!:§!n.ce \vhich, later Oll,}'il3S to resist to the biller: end any' moral intemretatioD QLexist~ whatsoever. It .!§ h~rullat...Qne could fi'pd~per11apsfor t'b.;'6r;t timeIil ~istory-~essi~Eis!!! .,si2eJ~d.(fl)eyonq,S22.,d .an~yil'J; .a

perversity ,of stance" of the kind Sehopenhauer spent all his life fulminating against; .JlPllilosoRhy :,w.hich da~<:d 121aceethic,s among the phenomena (and so "demote" it) -OI, rather, place it noteven among the phenomena ill
.;:::t1=le:...:i=df=aH~tic ..... .....




sense.buymo]lg::the~~ioU~1-oraJit:=y~~------------~ On dus view, b~cam.cwwn.CI.e..ftb!ic.a.tion §rEurposes 00£ ~lI.inB: at lbe~1:t. al~£?11£Jirm;JIJ;~n;ol."ID;, •.all~miimg~Q!ls
~ ... ~, ....

The depth of this anti-moral bias rna}' best be gauged by noting the wary and hostile silence I observ,ed on the subject of Clnistianit}'~QJlm..l;ll1~ttx. .. e,il}g the mOst·&-~
~avas..ant.~et of..variationsJD!.I?!.Ero~~!Ol~x.::: of ethics. No doubt, the pur.ely. esthetic mterpretatlOnand justil1tation of tile_. world';~,...---'was pr(JpoUl)~i-I.:1~}n __ I t'l1,ose


... ,_.







With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy ~y, Kashmir:, The Ato!?ic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantIally lesser extent- Ben]!


UTNIF 2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blohnson &

Vi~~~~~~~ldth~opposite them at

pole from Christian

doctrine, ~ellr.u;.cly..lllOtalJllJllilP.Q!,t~}lS~.~J!Pso6

lute standards; God's absolute truth, fat example, which. re'ieg;tes all art. to the realm of falsehood an.d in.sodoi~lg condemns it. I had always sensed strongly t~fu..u:w.u,S,vlI~.dTctive(jlat~linmlkiW.Q that...e~;id~~ ~~d y;J..ues. and sensed, too, thatir;t ord,~r.to be consIstent ,w£th its premises ~stell1. ot.Jhiss!j1rt. \\FaS •forced to abominate art. For both art and life depend wholly on the laws of q;tics, on perspective and illusion; both) to be hhmtl.d:pend On the necessity of error. ~!l~

Lnity spelled life Ioa_thin_gjtseIf .•and that loathmg was sim-

Illy disguised, tricked9ut,.JYttl.~ l~.otiot.!.L9.tan...:£,ther'l.an.d ·~e. Uatre~;QLthe "wor!d," a ~~tEe a£fec~ve ur~sl a feat of beatllyJu.u:l.§ensuali~l!J.ransccndence ~e~.2!'..!~!~~n(I~n.~9~!,t.~L~xiste~e'..LJ~ming.for.ex~n, cessation ofall effort until the great "sabbath of sabhaths"'-this whole duster of distortions, together 'IjNith the intran~igent Chdstia"ii' assert~~ nothing counts

except moral values, h~!iaY.s: §tJ;!J£l{ me as"hcing. t};).e ulostdangerous, most sInister form the will to destruction ea.n ta~ at ail ~vents, as ~"§.igu...JI..Lru:..Otound ~'Less, moroseness, qxhaustiQDJ..hlcl,Qgi~{:ti~n, .~nce §&!-

cordi,ng to eJ;!lic~ (specifically Christian, absolute ethics) l_i~e\.'.tJ.i! lwaysbe in the w:rongJ.t.MlID.Y..ed quite naturally ~ ffi~t one must smother it ung~r a Joad.of contempt al}d ponstat.!,t;,~at.i~; ~USI: vie'~~i~ as.~.2E5::s:~.n9.UmlY...En,!:.rthy of ~Hrp~.e!~~,~l!~~J)solutl?!y',.~~!llcss in ~. for moralily, on the other hand,SQ.llla..ll be.• an}'th!~g ~l:!t!J:yill. tI? deny lif~;. a secret instinct of destruction, a


principle of calumny, a reductive agcnt..,..tll§ begirm.fng,.gf Q:eend?-.and, for that \'~ reasonJthe Sup.!~meDaI?-~er? Thus it happenea that in those days, with this problem book, my vital instincts turned against ethics and founded a radical counterdoctrine, slanted esthetically, to ,oppose
the Christian

i.ng a philologist, that is to say a man of tVOI'ds I christened it rather arbitrarily-for who can tell the real nume of the

libel on life. But it still wanted a name. Be-




An tic~rist?_:~~~ll t1~~;;~~e.~~,~~~~!~~>[)-!-OllYSOS.).'f'"'_. ----_---_ ~l~~,-: .: -

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, C~azy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji

UTNIF2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Mick Niller
The affirmatives moralizing results in guilt and an inner war against the self which outweighs an violence. Friedrich Nietzsche. Only slightly racist. On the Genealogy of Morals. 1887. 2.16 At this point, I can no longer avoid setting out, in an initial, provisional statement, my own hypothesis about the origin of "bad conscience." It is not easy to get people to attend to it, and it requires them to consider it at length, to guard it, and to sleep on it. I consider bad conscience the profound illness which human beings had to come down with, under the pressure of the most fundamental of all the changes which they experienced -- that change when they found themselves locked within the confines of society and peace. Just like the things water animals must have gone though when they were forced either to become land animals or to die off, so events must have played themselves out with this half-beast so happily adapted to the wilderness, war, wandering around, adventure -- suddenly all its instincts were devalued and "disengaged. " From this point on, these animals were to go on foot and "can), themselves"; whereas previously they had been supported by the water. A telTible heaviness weighed them down. In performing the simplest things they felt ungainly. In dealing with this new unknown world they no longer had their old leader, the ruling unconscious drives which guided them safely. These unfortunate creatures were reduced to thinking, infelTing, calculating, bringing together cause and effect. reduced to their "consciousness," their most impoverished and en'or-prone organ! I believe that on emth there has never been such a feeling of misery, such a leaden discomfort -- while at the same time those old instincts had not all at once stopped imposing their demands! Only it was difficult and seldom possible to do their bidding. For the most part they had to find new and, as it were, underground satisfactions for them. An instincts which are not discharged to the outside are turned back inside. This is what I can the internalization of man. From this first grows in man what people later call his "soul." The entire inner world, originally as thin as if stretched between two layers of skin, expanded and extended itself, acquired depth, width, and height to the extent that the discharge of human instinct out into the world was obstructed. Those frightening fortifications with which the organization of the state protected itself against the old instincts for freedom -- punishment belongs above all to these fortifications -- made an those instincts of the wild, free, roaming man tum backwards, against man himself. Enmity, cruelty, joy in pursuit, in attack, in change, in destruction -- all those turned themselves against the possessors of such instincts. That is the origin of "bad conscience."

people want to "tame," this impoverished creature, consumed with longing for the wild, had to create in itself an adventure, a tOlture chamber, an unceltain and dangerous wildemess, this fool, this yearning and puzzled prisoner, was the inventor of "bad conscience." With him was intToduced the greatest and weirdest illness, from which human beings today have not recovered, the suffering of man from his humalmess, from himself, a consequence of the forcible separation from his animal past, a leap and, so to speak, a fall into new situations and living conditions, a declaration of war against the old instincts, on which, up to that point. his-power, joy;-andability-t'o-inspire- fear had been-based; Let us at once add that, on the other hand, the fact that there was now an animal soul turned against itself, taking sides against itself, provided this earth with something so new, profound, unheard of, enigmatic, contradictory, and portentous [Zukunftsvolles], that the picture oftl1e earth was fundamentally changed. In fact, it required divine spectators to approve the dramatic performance which then began and whose conclusion is not yet in sight, a spectacle too fine, too wonderful, too paradoxical, to be allowed to play itself out senselessly and unobserved on some Iidiculous star or other. Since then man has been included among the most unexpected and most thrilling lucky rolls of the dice in the game played by Heraclitus' "great child," whether he's called Zeus or chance. In himself he arouses a celtain interest, tension, hope, almost a certainty, as if something is announcing itself in him, is preparing itself, as if the human being were not the goal but only the way, an episode, a great promise ... With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- BenjiU


UTNIF2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Mick Niller
Moral dogmatism motivates wars and clashes of civilization. .excellence to a narrow and oppressive morality. It also subjugates human

Ian Johnston. There's Nothing Nietzsche Couldn't Teach Ya About the Raising of the Wrist http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/introser/nietzs.htm


Why is this insight so worrying? Well, one point is that dogmatists get aggressive. Soccer players and lugby players who forget what Nietzsche is pointing out can start killing each other over questions which admit of no answer, namely, questions about which group has the true game, which group has privileged access to the truth. Nietzsche senses that dogmatisln is going to lead to warfare, and he predicts that the twentieth century will see an unparalleled extension of warfare in the name of cOlnpeting dogtnatic truths. Part of his project is to wake up the people who are intelligent enough to respond to what he's talking about so that they call recognize the stupidity of killing each other for an illusion which they ln1stake for some "truth. " In addition to that Nietzsche, like Mill (although in a vety different manner), is serious concerned about the possibilities for human excellence in a culture where the herd mentality is taking over, where Europe is developing into competing herds-sa situation which is either sweeping up the best and the bli.ghtest or is stifling theln entirely. Nietzsche, like Mill and the ancient preSocratic Greeks to whom he constantly refers, is an elitist. He wants tlle potential for individual human excellence to be liberated from tlle harnesses of conformity and group competition and conventionallnorality. Otllerwise. human beings are going to become destructive, lazy, conforming herd anhnals, using technology to divert tllem from tlle greatest joys in life, which come only from individual stri.ving and creativity, activities which require one to release one's instincts witllout keeping tllem eternally subjugated to an overpowering historical consciousness or a conventionallnorality of good and evil.

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji

UTNIF2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Mick Niller

A-\ k( I\:d ~




tv.s»:~\0 c~


fV\.:J V-L





~ \-




J,A..\.{j\,1l_ r~~


\l" \)\~tL.

Sanrette, Paul, Professor of Political Theory at John Hopkins University 1996 [I Mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them'; Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory, Journal of International Studies, Vol. 25 No.1 pp.1-28]
dan e to negation' negate. Even a



r,As Michael

secularised teleologies, cannot survjye t le scru my Haar notes,



[a]fter having killed God-i.e. after having recognized the nothingness of the 'true world'-and aFter havin laced himself where God once as Man

radi~al and untempered scepticism ~fscientific Will to Truth undermines the foundational meanings of the modem world and thus reaten / oder ife with the ros e u onditional m I Ism. The Will to Truth must become conscious of itself as a problem' if it is to avoid this fate." And with the historical stage of late modernity, we are able to explore the possibilities of this self-overcoming of the Will to Truth. As Nietzsche states, '[w]e finally come to a~ys op before a stilI more basic question. We ask ~t the value of this will. uppose we want.Irut~t ifiilieruhtruth? and uncertainty? even ignorancb?'66 In this question, Nietzsche at last sees the positive potential of the death of God. &>r while the danger of 11iliilislllis ever-present, Niet su ests that the fact that 'a new problem Jl'ises.· that offli!1lZltue-aftruth'67 allows us to question the previously nil ' belief that we must -ground philosophical foundations in the notion of a dichotomised world in which only ideal and 'true' values can structure and guide _~umaninteractio~,:_ Nietzsche forces the Will to Truth to 'draw its most,stri"lIJg



lrference, .its inference .E&ainst itself,. [and] pose the question "what is the meaning of all truth?,"68 In_~,()_iJlgo~blematises s the authority and the .' lue of a" dichotomised ~ction structured un uestioningly by Ii conception of normatlVe Truth. . Ie zsc le s paradoxical charge is t lUS to £vercomSJJiPlLiU-t9..:rJiU.tb and found a renewed philosophical will to power, while simultaneously avoidin the a s of modern nihilism. For us moderns, •exposed without t ie reassurance of God or Truth,' it is a rendezvous, it seems, of questions ancLquestjon marks'

J 2.O-zl

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Ato!:uc Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji

UTNrp 2le6 Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Mick Niller

A.t. ~k"'(~
,:;, A:i::::\

none at

'1 , ; see so 1983, lS1). InCluded among Nietzsche's "Ten Commandments for Free Spirits" is the
',wi . • of se1f.overooming: au a not have e courage to UInUp. and perish: and so you never know that which is new. What today are m'l ~,

sche intentionally made his published work politically obnoxious lest his sole public role as a writer constitute an infraction of his edict: "I write in such a way that neither the mob, nor the populi, nor the parties of any kind want to read me. •. • Neither usefully nor pleasantly-to the trio I have named" (1986, 327-28). To be antipolitica1, as Nietzsche considered himself (1967b, 225) is the mark of in-

proscription, You shall not pmctice politics (1920-29, 9:365). Indeed, Nietz-

ptLwer. clothes. and~lor. shall b!:..J!l.y ashes tomorrow" (Nietzsche 1920-29, 14:13). Jlje project to make of one's l.i& a work of art resounds with the imperative to 6e'COme a Phoenix. "4Uqtd~ Dring 8bOJ1t(,;."t1ieit,',13wn;aestriiction ffirOug1i an .act Of sen:-ovei'COliiIiig," his own destiny (1967c, 161). The hero has the fate of Tantalus whose reach is insufficient and whose efforts are unending. For the &uitol~e is_tm-


attainable: he Isa mortal who seeks' ::rtaJity, a socially constructed en~ t seeJ:s absolute independence, a man who desires to be a god. But as be reacbes for what he cannot grasp, be also grows in po~ and therefore welcomes the temp~ation to o~rstep his limits. That his fate lSeJd,teordained •• that he is doomed to p .~ugb his own excesses is a matonlYaSp4k$theti,tlhenomenon (1967a, let ~f m~c;e. Or rather, the Oppor52); .mat is to say. nne!s:Uk (and in partie~tydt°thperish In pursuit of a lofty goal -----___,uJar.a.u£e-devoted.to-the.pu.rsuit-of-know1 .. .___-----1 .r~n ...... e reach ..of ..JnortaLman-JS

The aiteria of aesthetic. The hero of knowledge ultimately must be evaluated using artistic. standards. His final words, Ecce homo {Behold the man) are both the proclamation of his heroic individuality and the advertising of a tragic masterpiece. Fot",;Ni~,existence isiustifiable

ms JuagmentSai'e primarily

:ro~~~~:~::ushi~ 1liiQiliG~.to'=

one's li£et!tomake ofOQ§elf.awork of art 1?i means of best ~ one's numer~IJ.!L~&ii1S';"'NetZSdie attaCked the

(1974, 164).

tion of a man wbo strives for a goal ~l)ich "reclc2nl!~L!Vitb,,~_he,~ n~ ~." ,,_ O~ i



Lt cJt·Jl1"


~ :i
With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kaslunir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji





UTNrF 2le6
Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Mick Niller

neither Man fill the void of nihilism li:!ft by the death of God. '1t was Nietzsche," said Foucault, "who burned for us/even before we were born, the intermingled promises of the dialectic and anl:hropol ..
nor Historv to

cham of History,'; allowing

• ogy" (1970, 203). From these ashes, Fou-

future thought: ''In~, Nietzsche, offer.. .. this £u.ture us as bOth roiriiSe

cault speculated, ~


grow the seeds of


longer comes into (X)nsideration. Heroism is the good will to self-destruction" (1.920-29, 14:52-5..3~~= . in Itself~it$" .". ._


ota2etoatfliiina:-~to~ O u!~~~ .•. . mtto1iii'Pabi Survival in the ~t
fU!ii) must jusHfy his existenceafter the fact brDhimse1.fa noble ~ matdIig o· SOlTIethiIi8 that life, nant. ely., an a.esthetic project. ; an.d by d

c;:rut¢ a it does not CciiiSiifiiii lacuna that must be filled. It 1s notbJng lnQre( and nothing Jess. tb&n t:he unfold-

•• again... ".For



. voi

can b~

oes not

ofan ideal:



rls1dn2.andoftenJQSing1rls1ifeasaresiilf. and mortal means ensure a .We fate. But he 8ladly eInbraces suCh a

DiVine endS

destiny. Nietzsche's words might serve as the hero's motto: "1know of no better aim of life than that of perishing animae magnae prodigus [careless of Ufe] in suit of the

knowledge" (197&, 73). The term will to knowledge, as well as the genealogical method used to track it, was taken directly from Nietzsche. In Foucault's "Nietzsche, . Genealogy, History," originally published in 197.L one finds amid the numerous :references to Nietzsche's corpus all the tools and Concepts later adopted by Foucault in Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality. AlI the trademarks

Foucault proposed that his subsequent studies be seen as attempts to "constitute the 'political economy' of the will to

. a the wretched spiritual game of goals and intentions and motives is only a foreground-seven though ~ak eyes may take them for the matter itself" (Nietzsche 1968b,518).6 ~e is the perpetual food of the midseventies Foucault had placed his own soul, and [the soul] knows well enough archaeological method in the service of h~w to exact the sweetness from it:' srenea]ORYJ_whose_pw:p_o.se_ _was_to--lest=sIilaltlb-~~-----------____:Niettseh-e-wn;te in hls noteboOkliSh'iahlStorica1 knowledge of struggles (1920-29, 1:1~). Foucault~ I contend, and to make use of this knowledge tactilaid claim to this same nounslunent· and . . the will to struggle-so promin~t in cally today (Poucault19BO, 83,85). Were Niet.zsche'sthought-was also Foucault's he willing to carry Nietzsche's banner actuation. It structures his theory and in(something he felt to be "pretentious"), forms his practice. HWe are to accept Foucault announced, "he would use 'the (perhaps with some irony) Edward Said's genealogy of morals' as the general title assessment of Foucault as lithe greatest of for what[hf was] doing" (p. 53). Ni!t%sche's odern disciples" (Said 1984, m With regard to his later work Foucault 1) It must be based on Foucau1t'sinherited was ready to admit that "it was'Nietzsche

, .a



Tee 1S

er to

e . to struggle, "and

of Foucault's methodology and concerns-the nature of genealogical studYi the violence of (the origins of) truth; the el mal d pass! of th will· eru ty ice, an .. on e to knowledge, and the sacrifice and selfsacrifice of the subject in the endless deployment of the will to truth-are documented as Nietzche's own. By the


.. . .



.~~~~~~~~~:;~~~i:::. __
4_._g_.": . _

Foucault paid much homage to Nietzsche and claiIned to be if not following in his footsteps, at least 'making use of the


th general form, shall We say, of philosophical discourse" (p. 53). It was also NietzW
0 $peCiru:u
.£::•. .]



e power r~atio?


as • .e

UTNrF 2le6 Nietzsche Cth\1jt\~~() ?( J aleeBlohnson & Mick Niller


i;~i§~~II~' ;I~ l
own position: "Sartre avoids the idea of the self as something which is given to us, but through the moral notion of authenticity, he turns back to the idea that we have to be ourselves-to be truly our true self. I think the only acceptable practical consequence of what Sartre has said is to link his theoretical insight to the practice of creativity-and not of authenticity. From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to aeate ourselves as a work of art .... My view is much closer to Nietzsche's than to Sartre's" 237; see also 19Mb, have

lies the hostile engagement of forces, Foucault called, for convenience's sake, -"Nietzsche's hypothesis" (p. 93). A final conjunction: Foucault's writings concerning sexuality circumscribe the notion of creating the self as a work of art. Thlsconeem preoccupied Foucault in his latest works and was an endorsement ·of the Nietzschean project. In part, Foucault had shifted emphasis from genealogy to the equally Nietzsch~ endeavor of exploting the recreation of the self whose deconstruction was the task.


Nietzsche's arsenal for his genealogical forays and exploratory reconstructions tempts one to search in Nietzsche for the answers to those questions Foucault seemed to evade. Yet such an investigation should not be couched in terms of Foucault's fidelity to Nietzsche. Foucault, it would seem, took to heart Zarathustra's words to his followers that "one repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupU. And why, then, should you not pluck at my Jaurels7" (Nietzsche 1969, 103). As Foucault himself said, "The only valid


borrowing from

cursory examination Nietzschean roots might best be concluded with what amounts to Foucault's most explicit pledge of allegiance. In an .interview conducted a few weeks before his death, Foucault responded to the question whether his link to Nietzsche did not ------constitute-the-sour.ce-O£ the miSlmder~-SU1Tounding his wOrk: "'DO.You formulatlon, He stated, "My problem is mean to say that my fundamental Nietzscheanism might be at the origin of differnot that everything is bad, butftt@!lYent misunderstandings7 .•• 1 can only respond by saying that I am simply N'retz~ schean, and I try to see, on a number of ons, then we always have somethiruz. to So my positionleadS not to apathy points, and to the extent that it is possible, with the aid of Nietzsche's texts-but also but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism. 1 with anti~Nietzschean theses (which are think that the ethico-political choice we nevertheless NietzscheanI)-whatcan be have to make 'every day is to determine done in this or that domain. I'm not lookwhich is the. main danger" (Foucault ing for anything else but I'm really search~".983b, 231-32). Unending action is ret ingJo_[Jhat" (1985a. 9~_... .. ........._.,..,: . -.

preciselytotothought to deform Nietzsche's is use it, such as it, to make it tribute groan and protest. And if commentators then say that I am being faithful or unfaithful to Nietzsche, that is of absolutely no interest" (1980, 53, 54).* To be a Nietzschean genealogist is, to use one of Nietzsche's terms, a contradictio in adjecto. For the genealogist has no constants, not even the master's discoveries and methods. Still, Foucault did place himself under Nietzsche's sun, and his work gives evidence of this stimulation. The aporias in which Foucault is said to find himself, namely. the seeming impossibility of justifying struggle Without transcendental standards in a faithless (some might add hopeless) age were already illuminated by his mentor. Nietzsche's solution, as we have seen, was an apolitical, tragic heroism, a phUosophica1 and aesthetic life of continual se1f-overcoming. Foucault formulated its political analogue. ' ..Eolitks, as generally described by Foucault/~!.tm of war and bAttle, tac-.pes !M~'§' Politics, stated, simply is war carried out by other means.' Yet despite his reversal of the Oausewitzian thesis, Foucault refused to draw any specific lines of battle or to define a specific enemy. Thus, his critics claim, we are left in a political no-man's-land, threatened from all sides but with no one in particular to fight and with the ensuing predilection for apathy rather than ac-




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With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji


Rather than 5peak1ng of an essential freedom. it would be better to speak of an "agonbm" -of • relationship which !sat the same time rec:iprocal incitation and struggle; less of a face-to-face (X]Oo.

front&tion which paralyzes both sides than.permanent provocation •••• For to say that there cannot be a society without power relatiOM is nQt to say either that those which are estabIlshed are necessary, or, in any case, that power c0nstitutes a fatality at the heart of societies, such that It cannot be undermined. -lMtead I would say that the analysis, elaboration, and bringing into 'question of power relations and the "agonism" between power relations and the intransitivity of freedom is a permanent political task inherent in all social existence. (1983b, 222-23)

With contributions ;from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, KasIunir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji

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UTNIF 2le6
Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Mick Niller The alternative is a romantic deification of life as we live it. Love of fate means that we want nothing other than what we have. Alan White. From Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth. 19~ http://www. williams.edu/philosophy/Jaculty/ awhite/VVNL%2oweb/WNL%2ocontent s.htm The present, condemned by Socrates, is deified by the Apollinian. This is perplexing,

however, in that the deification of the present is characteristic, according to the later Nietzsche, not of the Apollinian but of the Dionysian, and thus of the perspective he himself attempts to take. Consider: An experimental philosophy [Experimental-Philosophie] such as I

live anticipates experimentally [versuchsweise] even the possibilities of fundamental [grundsiitzlichen] nihilism; but this is not to say that it must halt at a no, a negation, a will to the no. It wants rather to continue on to the reverse of this [bis zum Umgekehrten hindurch] -- to a Dionysian affirmation of the world as it is, without subtraction, exception, or selection -- it wants the eternal circulation [Kreislauj], -- the same things, the same logic and illogic of entanglements - my formula for this is amor [ati. This requires conceiving the previously denied aspects of existence not only as necessary, but as desirable [wiinschenswert]: and not only as desirable in relation to the previously affirmed aspects (perhaps as their complements or preconditions), but for themselves [um ihrer selber willen], as the more powerful, more fruitful, truer aspects of existence, within which its will speaks out more distinctly. (VIII:16[32]; WP:l041) My formula for what is great in humanity is amor [ati: that one wants nothing otherwise, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely to bear what is necessary, still less to conceal it -- all idealism is mendacity in the face of what is necessary -- but rather to love it. (EffiI:lO) [Knoten]. The highest state a philosopher can attain: to stand in a Dionysian relationship to existence -

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji




UTNIF2le6 Nietzsche Jake Blolmson & Mick Niller The alternative takes joy in life rather than seeking constantly to correct it. We make no apologies for whom we are or the lives we lead but celebrate existence as it is. Alan White. From Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth. 19.9Q.. http://www.williams.edu/philosophy /faculty / awhite/WNL%20web /WNL%2ocontents. htm If we send metaphysics to the devil, then we send the Schopenhauerian and Silenian perspectives, with whatever consolation or justification they may provide, along with it: we reject the presupposition, on which both perspectives depend, that there is a "primordial will" "behind the appearances. " But if we reject this presupposition and thus these perspectives, to what are we to turn? Not to a forgetting of Silenian wisdom; that leads back to Schopenhauer's cheap, gaudy paint job. Nor to the Socratic delusion of individuality transformed, of life following the healing of the wound of existence; that is another form of metaphysical consolation. Nor, finally, to the Apollinian vision of individual immortality; we cannot affirm human life without also affirming death. What we must affirm is the existence of the world as it is rather than as we might wish it (Socrates), of an individuality neither destroyed (Silenus) nor made permanent (Apollo), but rather lived. This is the perspective, the life that, according to Schopenhauer, is impossible: "If one were to reveal to anyone the terrible pains and tortures to which his life is constantly exposed, this person would be overcome by horror" (WWRI:S8). The source of this horror is not the pains and tortures we actually suffer; many of us, much of the time, suffer few. But only life's gaudy paint job, or the Socratic delusion that the wound of existence is being healed, can blind us to the fact of our exposure to pains and tortures; suffering is occasionaL exposure to it constant. Constant exposure to suffering, accompanied by the constant possibility of joy, is shared by humans with Dionysus, the god of whom, according to Nietzsche, all preEuripidean Greek heroes are masks:
the one true, real Dionysus appears in a multiplicity of figures, in the mask of the struggling hero and, so to speak, enmeshed in the net of individual will [EinzelwillenJ. AB the appearing god now speaks and acts, he resembles an erring, striving, suffering individual. [...J In truth, however, the hero is the suffering Dionysus of the mysteries, the god experiencing in himself the agonies of individuation, of whom wonderful myths tell that as a boy he was torn to pieces by the Titans and now is worshiped in this state as Zagreus. (BT:lO)

And what is the perspective of Dionysus, the perspective from which such an existence is justified, such a life worth living? The Nietzsche of 1872 provides us with no more than a hint: In Dionysian art and in its tragic symbolism tlle same nature speaks to us in its true, undisguised voice: "Be as I am! Amid the ceaseless flux of appearances the eternally creative, primordial motller, eternally impelling to existence, eternally finding satisfaction in this change of phenomena." (BT:16)

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UTNIF 2k6 Nietzsche

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It is not clear that Nietzsche recognizes this as a position distinct from what I have called the Silenian; indeed, in the very next section (in a passage quoted above) he characterizes the Dionysian or tragic position in different, and contradictory, terms: "Dionysian art, too, wants to convince us of the eternal pleasure of existence; but we are to seek this pleasure not within the appearances, but rather behind the appearances" The "primordial one" seeks pleasure in the appearances rather than behind them, but the primordial one itself does not appear. The Silenian may seem to seek pleasure in appearances, but this pleasure presupposes an escape from appearance, a merging, behind appearances, with the one, a metaphysical absorption. The Dionysian position retains elements of both: like the one, the Dionysian attends to the appearances themselves rather than looking beyond or behind them; but unlike the one, and unlike the Silenian, the Dionysian remains among the appearances, existing as "an erring, striving, suffering individual." ABa human being, I can "impel to existence" only by existing, thus, only by appearing. "Be as I am," then, suggests something quite different from "be one with me." First, it suggests a position that makes no commitment to the actual existence of the primordial one - a non-metaphysical position. Moreover, the imperative "be as I am" demands that I live my own life, not the life of the real or imagined one, that I seek my satisfaction within appearances rather than behind appearances, but that the satisfaction I seek indeed be my own, that my artistic activity be not for the sake of the Divine Spectator (Schopenhauerian or Olympian), but rather for the sake of my self, and perhaps for others like me.

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UTNIF 2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blolmson & Mick Niller The alternative is an explicit refusal to lay down ones life for shit. Life is an experiment, and not a contract. The question asked by your ballot should not be is life how it should be, how can I make it better, but is life good enough, and should I live it. Alan White. From Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth. 19~ http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/'WNL%20web/'WNL%20contents. htm The move beyond viewing the world as created or uncreated is the move beyond what I have been terming metaphysics - this, it seems to me, is the move that Kundera, for all his agreement with Nietzsche and his amplification of him, does not fully make. earth is an argument against the earth. From the metaphysical perspective, and only from that perspective, the presence of shit on Kundera writes, "Amid the general idiocy of the world [Second World] war, the death of Stalin's son" - who "laid down his life for shit" "stands out as the sole metaphysical death" (Lightness, 245). A post-metaphysical would not be a world without shit. but it might be a world in which there would no longer be any reason to lay down one's life for shit. If God is dead, then we need not agree with him, categorically or otherwise: if we are aware of his death, we cannot agree with him. What remains after God's death is being, and with being there can be no agreement: being, unlike God, is not an eternal will worldng in and through all things. Like human society, life itself is an experiment, not a contract or agreement (see ZIII:12.25; 265.22). Being is not something I agree or disagree with, it is rather something I accept or reject. In deciding whether to accept or reject being, I do not ask. "is being good"; I ask instead, "is it good enough"? Hie Rhodos, hie saltus, here is the rose, with its thorns, here we must dance, if we are to dance at all.

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UTNIF 2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Mick Niller

The alternative does not make ethical reflection impossible, but more urgent. In the absence of universal moral codes of conduct, contemplation is made possible where it was previously discouraged. Alan White. From Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth. 19i1lh http://www.williams.edu/philosophY/faculty/ awhite/WNL%2oweb/VVNL%2ocontent s.htm Differently stated, is it not the case tllat, in the words ofIvan Karamazov, "If God is dead, then all is permitted," or, in Nietzsche's own words, "Everything is false! Everything is permitted!" (N:VII:2S[SOS] / WP:602; cf. N:VII:2S[304], N:26[2S], N:31[Sl], N:32[8(34)]). My answer -- introduced in the chapter devoted to Zarathustra, and developed in those that come thereafter -- is that everything is indeed permitted, but that universal permissibility does not make ethical reflection impossible or trivial; on the contrary, it makes such reflection the more pressing. Simply put: to say that everything is permitted is to say, at least that there is no one -- better, no One -- around to forbid or prohibit anything. It is not to say that we cannot make distinctions, that all acts are equally admirable. or honorable, or desirable. If we take our ethical bearings by what is permitted and what is forbidden, we may pay little attention to what is noble. Likewise, even if everything is permitted, that does not mean that all answers to the question, . "What should I do," are equally good. Instead, it makes the question more pressing, more difficult and more interesting. AB I attempt to decide what I am to do, how I am to live my life, it makes little difference whether "everything is permitted" or not. If some ways of living were prohibited. I would still have to decide which of the remaining ways to·adopt as my own; if no ways are prohibited, the question becomes the more pressing -- even if all ways are somehow open, I must still decide which I am to follow. Differently stated: just as acceptance of a universal moral code -- denial that "everything is permitted" -- does not entail decent or admirable behavior, neither does the denial of such codes entail indecent of despicable behavior. We have all, I suspect, encountered moral absolutists who, while adhering strictly to their accepted laws, allow themselves extraordinary latitude with respect to acts not specifically covered by the codes. Appropriately, Nietzsche insists explicitly that just as the identification of prohibitions does not guarantee moral behavior, the denial of prohibitions does not preclude it: . I deny morality as I deny alchemy, that is, I deny their premises: but I do not deny that there have been alchemists who believed in these premises and acted in accordance with them. -- I also deny immorality: not that countless people feel themselves to be immoral, but that there is any true reason so to feel. It goes without saying that I do not deny -- unless I am a fool -- that many actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, or that many called moral ought to be done and encouraged -- but I think the one should be encouraged and the other avoided for other reasons than hitherto. (D:l03)

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UTNIF2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Mick Niller The alternative is not belief in nothingness but a recognition of the nothingness which grounds all beliefs. We don't preclude value judgments but emphasize the contingency of any one.
Ian Johnston. There's Nothing Nietzsche Couldn't Teach Ya About the Raising of the Wrist. http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/introser/nietzs.htm


There's one important point to stress in this review of the critical powet of Nietzsche's project, It's essential to note that Nietzsche is not call.hlgus to task fot having beliefs. We have to have beliefs. Human life must be the affitmation of values; otlletwise it is not life. But Nietzsche is centrally concemed to mock us fot believing tl1at our belief systems are T1ue~are fixed~ are somehow etetnally tight by a grounded standard of knowledge. HU1TIanlife~ its highest f011.ns~ in must be lived in tlle full acceptance tllat tlle values we create for ourselves are fictions. We~ or tlle best of us~have to have tlle courage to face up to tlle fact tl1at tllere is no "Trutll" upon which to ground anytl1ing we believe in; we must in tlle full view of tllat harsh insight~ nevertlleless affirm ourselves witll joy. The Trutll is not accessible to our attempts at discovew; what thinking human beings characteristically do~in tlleir pursuit of tlle Trutll~ is create tlleir own UUtllS. The alternative is not an ethic of irresponsible hedonism but an individually cultivated, but disciplined, self-fashioning.
Ian Johnston. There's Nothing Nietzsche Couldn't Teach Ya About the Raising of the Wrist. http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/introser/nietzs.htm


It's vital to see that Nietzsche and tlle earlier Romantics are not simply saying we should do what we like. They all have a sense tllat selfcreation of tlle sort tlley recommend tequires hnmense spiritual and emotional disciplinetlle discipline of the artist shaping his most important original creation in accordance witll tlle stringent demands of his creative hnagination. These demands may not be rational~ but tlley are not pe11nissively telativistic in tllat 1960's sense ("If it feels good~ do it"). Pe11.nissivenessmay have often been attributed to tlus Romantic tradition~ a sort of 1960's "Boogie 'til you puke" etluc~but that is not what any of them had in 1TI111a. For NietZsa1e1l1at woulasirriplfbea11Cra response to a popillariZeO.anCl-------bastardized version of a much lugher call to a solitaty life lived witll tlle most intense but personal joy~suffetin& insight~ courage~ and hnaginative discipline.

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UTNIF2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blolmson & Mick Niller

A2 Permutation

1. The perm is impossible. Our Alternative is to do nothing. You cannot simultaneously do nothing and enact the plan. Furthermore, the spirit of our alternative lies in embracing and celebrating life as we experience it. This is incommensurate with the aff's attempts at ordering, changing, or otherwise forcing existence to fit our idealized model. 2. The alternative embraces life as is. This is exclusive of their attempt to add to or subtract from existence. Alan White. From Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth. 19~ http://www.williams.edu/philosophy /faculty / awhite/WNL%2 oweb lWNL%20contents. htm . Zarathustra affirms being. Immediately before describing his restoration to divinity of "Lord Chance," he announces: I have become one who blesses and one who affirms: this is why I wrestled long and was a wrestler, so that once my hand would be freed for blessing. And this is my blessing: to stand over every thing whatsoever as its own sky or heaven, as its rounded roof, its azure bell and eternal security: and blessed is hew-hothus blesses! For all things are baptized in the well of eternity and beyond good and evil. (III:4; 209.3-10) Nietzsche, too, affirms being. His "experimental philosophy" presses on to "tl1e reverse" of "a will to the No," on to "a Dionysian affirmation of the world as it is, without subtraction, exception,

selection" (16[32] / WP:1041). His am or {ati requires "that

one want nothing otherwise, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely to bear what is necessary, still less to conceal it [...] but ratl1er to love it

3. Even if the permutation were technically possible, it wouldn't be desirable. We've isolated several disads to the plan. Cross-apply our link arguments here. If we win any of these arguments, then they're reasons that the Alternative alone ..-···--~-··--·~-·---·-·~~w~.-ourd-be et-oenefiCiaITo-illiycombii1iitionofthe n AIt. ana1:liepla.n~ .-------.~.~-.-~--

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Nietzsche Jake Blolmson & Mick Niller






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,With. respect to the idea ~{f~~ed~m these three positions can. be located III the same frame. A matrix, in which the categories across the horizontal axis are mastery and attunement and those on the vertical ax~sare the individual and the collectivity, creates space for four ~heones of freedo~. 6 The r,ermutations can then expandjg~mtelJ::_~s compromIses are forged by theorists of mastery who' c~::te a little r~o~ for attunement, theorists of individuali!}': ~ g!~ more credIbIlIty to the state as a site of collective freedom ' i theorists of community who coneeoe a little more to the dictates of mastery, and so on. But these contending theories share certain affinities. . First, across the horizontal axis, the doctrines linkingireedom to ~ery and attunement share a Pattern of insistence: each d-; mands, through a set of presuppositions about se~nd nature provIding the measure against which all other assumptions and ~tand.ar~s are ~o be assessed, that the order of things be susceBti!?le I? pnncIple eIther to human mastery or to a harmonization that approaches the highest human essence. The world, at least in the fiiial instance, must be for us in one way or the other. Jl.-including external nature and the human material from which unified selves are constructed-must be either formed for us ot plastic enough to be mastered by us. . . .. bntological narcissism-as we might label views that demand ~fensations from within the world to replace. the loss per~ sonal, willful, and powerful Ggd located above It-a!!gws each of ~ontending_parties to domesticate the p-rotean idea of conti~- , incy: each of I that domesticatethese orientations invokes ontologicaltheassumptions contingency as the unexpected, dangerous I event, the obdurate condition that resists effective intervention, the ~inevltahle-0ute0me-aeeidefltal-0flly-ifi-its-timifig, the-resistance-to-' detailed design lodged in the human animal and nature. And perI . haps each masks the conversion of a world of microcontingencies into a world of global contingency by its insistence that the world itself must be predisposed to us in one way or the other. ~cond, along the vertical axis, each position tends to del2loy its idealism within the terms of the p-ro'blematic of.soyereignzy. Either the state is the highest embodiment of freedom and democracy, or it is the site of constitutional protections that guard space for individual freedom. None of the positions within !his frame strivg_tQ rethink the pro'blematic of..-soveieign;y itself, probably l?£'F~~ ,e~1iiiiks that,..any effort to do so wouldtake away the esseI)tJal pt;.e.ConJr.t;,io~~emocracy in the ~r.riJorial state:. •...




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UTNIF2le6 Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & MieleNiller


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It is not easy to think outside the frame of these debates, and I do not claim to be ready to do so in any finished or refined way. But it ..... may be im ortant toda to tr to push against these boundaries. ~thin the terms of these debates t e apprecIation ofl'iiC'Ori1igible or necessary contingency is stifled in thinking about freedom. F:reedom becomes res~r:icted to the confines of the sovereign state b~e only there can the institutionalization of democracy ~~ e~~hed. F;reedom becomes bound up with mastery or attul{eI]1~ecause the world is treated (at least implicitly)_as if it m~ susceptible to one aspiration or the other: it owes that much to us, for god's sake. When these bonds of insistence between the con'fending parties are discerned, we may also be in a position to locate the impulse to serenity inside the phenomenology of life and death summarized earlier. Perhaps a secret plea for secular consolation . binds together the contestants in these debates. If god (with a capital letter) i~ (or at least severely wounded), t~e World

hNt;lfmust be for u~J1 one w~ or the otllet: it must be susc~ !l~to our mastery or to our quest to become attuned to a 1i1l~ous direCtion installed in beir~. And perhaps that p1eal. hlHcribed pervasively in the twin projects of mastery and reallzs t lon, sip1Ultaneously exacerbates dangers and disciplines residin_giD IlIrc modernity andsscreens out i~retaJ12fu.!.~!!1.igh~~!~},atlz~ Ih~~J!l~~cogently. 1'1.- 3 t


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UTNIF2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Mick Niller A2 Nietzsche eats babies 1. No link- We are not a defense of the whole Nietzsche's work, rather our specific appropriation of his thought, as per our alternative. They should be expected to isolate a link between our argument and Nazism, not our author's political leanings. 2. Links more to the aff A. rape, genocide, etc are all the results of a logic which presumes that we are capable of ridding the world of that which offends us in order to realize a better existence. This is the logic of the aff! B. Morality enables genocide. Every historical act of violence is done in the name of service to some truth. The alternative makes this impossible, the moralism of the affmakes it more probable. C. nothing makes genocide more realistic than national service. The aff s call toward the state mobilizes the masses to perform their tasks, This is what makes it possible to round jews onto trains. 3. Their negative reading of Nietzsche is selective and intended only to justify their particular morality. Other readings of Nietzsche are available and should be preferred. [Connolly]


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With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji



UTNIF2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blolmson & Mick Niller

~~ir negat.ive reading of Nietzsche is selective and intended only to justify t e~ morality, Other readings of Nietzsche are available and should be pre1.erred.

Connolly, William E. Professor of Political Science at John Hopkins University 1991 , [Identity/ Difference: democratic negotiations of political paradox] -

£- I will advance some ingredients in a post-Nietzscheari political theory by working on the second and third points. 4,et me V something, though, about the first one, the reading of Nietzsche as the consummate phi~er of world mastery. While such a reading ~ossible, it is not the single or necessar .readin to be drawn ffoiiUi-t un er as protean as Ietzsc re, It tends to be given by those who endorse strong transcendental or teleological perspectives. Tirey presume tnat any ethIC of care anosetf-=lImltatlOn must flow from a teleotranscendental perspective, and that since Nietzsche nojsily repudiates such a p-ersp-ectiye, the coiner of the phrase "will i to"power" must endorse a ruthless philosophy in which a f~ \ exerclSemasteryoverother humans and nature. Many may firid tbis Nietzsche reassuring as a negative counterpoint to their Own thinkimplying that since this is where all followers of Nietzsche I I must end up, anyone of "good will" should buy into their perspe~i dve to avoid this result. Nietzsche thus becomes a foil used to cover I a-weak affirmative ar ument throu h ne ation of the 0 osin one. I Tfiere IS Irony in this strategx, since it is the strategy Nietzsc ie I, eX,E9sesas a favorite tactic of ressentiment, These theorists have failed to ex lore the possibilit)T that NietzI sche combines a tragic concep-tion 0 i e wit 1 nontheistic reveri~ and that together these provide a human basis for agonistic care and self-limitation.' , ' j-'9@i-etz·sdye-isLol?iaY!he-negative-role-for'Which~he~~en .. ','----------I




nomi~~ted, it must be shown not only that the mastery readingja11 be _~nstructed ?ut of.Nietzsche's texts but also that no other EO!si\ blhties more dIsturbIng to the aura of necessity attaching to the teIeotranscendental alternative can be distilled from them. And this tasK, in my view, has~n.a.ccomplished . ....,..'9,:)'_.G

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji


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,mbig'!pus relations with Niet2:scbk:~-work;ambjgm::!us because they ,Jiked t9,a2l!~allQ ~t !2"l~Wd.l1QtdQ aD }Xithout mutilfltin~ gllota,doris, falsifliX:2 ediriRps and ~~ni~g imE~~,~~~' On rheother hand.,

<W,e will have to return to thgse famous g@ssage~ wbeo:~iet~che conSi.ders. tl1.e.J.udai.smof. Ih.e. J..ev.·jsh tariest. Th. e)'.T ..hRveOfi.ten. p. fOd.u ce.d ... ,ili¢ Qif::ai.6ioii;;:j;;;;;;ptetiiipJl,S .. '!ekQQw .lbar lbe: t-iazi:; bad .


.,.Nietzs'~l;;himSlf did' not ha,,·eambiguous· relatign,s with the. Bism~rckian.regim~).~till:liUjYiili:l£il::Jierwaois,m and anl:i::Jae.mi~~m. He despised and hatedthet.rn hDo not associate with. an Tone who is ~Elicate'tin :tbi~sh e .m.7 And thecride coeur, UBut:finally > what do you think I feel when the name of'Zarathustra comes • ~.•.• ' from ~h.emouths (}f a.rtti·$emites!"~11In order to understand the sense e:? or Nietzschean reflections on Judaism. it must be recalled that the ~,..•..••...•. ..' '.' ".'...•. . HJe\,,>ish question'" had become" in the Hegelian school) a dialectical . •• theme par excellence, Nietzsche takes tip the question agaiIl btu
according to his own method. He asks: how is the prieSt constituted in t he hfsrory of the Jewish people? Under what conditions ;1$ he constihj,Stot:y? l'jgthin&isWs:lre



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,b.i~torjcal ag,g SPSi~l..§lJICb '0. ,;;oml?l;?£."is tij"tW..be (:al!;i~ lv,pe. 'The type ofthe priest .... here i~ no t oi:hC!I"rQblelU f()):" Nietzsche. A:o.d..t,bisSittl)e Jewi$hJ¥Qple!'Arbj~b ••Ju p . one moment i-? .its hfSloo;tbum! ,i,ts.c,2nciitiorts of existence in the erj~st;;is todai: [he peoe1e. to sa~e !=-urope.:Jto proteci it frOlllitself by inventing newc:onditions.#c What Niel~§cbe WtQt$( a!?:2.ul JUdaism ~arnot be., read witbollt.r:;ecaUin",what he wJ'Ot~to .Fritsch> all ~!l" s.emitic and raci.St writer: UI be ' u to sto sertdin me our. ublica ... .·--·-.-··.--:!ensjf"")tOu-pl~3.~; I fear·f2rln~i2{ft1.w~~7· ... -_,. ,--..--,-,-e~~wmn

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Israelc this is the rrue.typelogical problem .. This is why Nietzsche is 50 il1.sistent on rhe following point: I.am the inventor of the psychology of the priest (EH HI 01\.1) •.Iris true that there ate racial considerations

tuted - conditions which will proVe decisivefor lhe whole Of Eur(Jpean striking than ~i~t~he~s adtnif;ni2AlQLthe l;&ineso( bx:atl itM1:tbt .old rest::ullent.19 The Jewish prOblem is the same as the problem ofthe constitution. of the priest in this world of

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With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji

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UTNIF2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blolmson & Mick Niller The ballot is not a political decision (what should we do?) but an ethical one (how should I be?). You should not ask yourself how best you are able to save other people but how to live your life in a way that is responsible to you. Alan White. From Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth. 19.9Q... http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/ awhitejWNL%20web jWNL%20contents. htm The Nietzsche I present in this book is less exciting, perhaps, than the more notorious Nietzsche who champions blond beasts and master races. As I read him, Nietzsche champions neither, but neither does he develop a powerful political alternative. contrary, my Nietzsche has little to say that is of political importance. not, in my judgment, illuminate our political action. The most provocative teachings I find in Nietzsche are not political, but rather ethical; Nietzsche does not attempt to tell us how to save the world, but rather how to save ourselves -- how to save ourselves from living lives that we will come to view with regret rather than with pride. And he teaches that we can do that without becoming supermen who blithely crush their supposed inferiors beneath their feet On the I have argued that

he presents us with reasons for respecting others and encouraging diversity, but he does

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji


UTNIP 2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blolmson & Mick Niller Their demands for a stable text are self-defeating. By means of boiling down the alternative to one or two words, we will have lost its details, and thus its essence. Alan White. From Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth. 19~ http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/ awhiteJWNL%2oweb JWNL%2 ocontents. htm To the extent that my reconstruction of Nietzsche's teachings is convincing, I muffle, perhaps nearly silence, Nietzsche's thunder and fireworks. But what, then, domy Nietzsche's teachings boil down to? A bland combination of individualism and tolerance, easily digestible intellectually only because it provides so little food for thought, so little to challenge current preconceptions? Perhaps so; but if Nietzsche boils down to mental junk food, that is not because he offers us no intellectual nutrients, but rather because we will have boiled them away. Whatever is provocative or challenging in any philosophical teachings will be lost if the teachings are reduced to two words, be those words . "individualism" and "tolerance," or any others. If one wants two words for my Nietzsche, these are better than "racist" and "fascist"; but they are also virtually worthless because, as words with histories, they are indefinable. And if we attempted to specify what they would signify with respect to Nietzsche, we would be forced to retrieve all that we boiled away to come up with them in the first place. Like any god worthy of his or her divinity, Nietzsche's god is in his details


With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji


Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Mick Niller

Democratization is inconsistent with everything Nietzsche teaches and the Affirmatives attempt at rough equality eliminates the desire to control that makes life worthwhile and prevents the creation of a life affirming world Redhead, 1997 [Mark, professor of political science at the new school for social research, the journal of political philosophy volume 5, page 189-190]
pathos of I distance, Connolly produces a political vision that would not turn Nietzsche on his head as much as it would provoke his polemical hammer. First, within , Nietzsche's aristocratic politics the spiritualization of enmity only applies to agonistic relationships between subjects of the same order or rank. To Nietzsche "Equality in the face of one's enemy-first presupposition of an honest duel ... where one sees something as beneath one, one has not to wage war."35 One does battle only with enemies of equal strength and equal power because it is only through attempting to overcome equal opponents that one can accurately gauge how powerful one has become.l" Consequently, it is only an adversary of equal stature that has "value" and that one thus feels a spiritualized sense of enmity for, because it is only these adversaries that can provide us with a means of gauging the power of one's self. Instead of seeing that spiritualized enmity only transpires between adversaries that are of equal rank, Connolly makes the spiritualization of enmity a universalized ethos within his political vision. The result is a politics whose ethos of agonistic respect for others would make it sensitive "to the rights of difference against the weight of mastery and normality. "37 Yet in cultivating a politics that seeks to mitigate the domination and mastery of others, one would not cultivate an appreciation for "the groundless energies of life" but would run the risk of inhibiting lifc since "lifc itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of the strange and weaker, ... it is a consequence of the intrinsic will to power which is precisely the will to life. "38 Furthermore, while Connolly is correct ill locating Nietzschean freedom in the --~tr-uggle-betw.een-comp.eting identities, he misses the essential point that, to use Connolly's language, freedom comes from the ability to sustain an identlty 111 tIie face of a violent collision with others and does not come about by creating cushions that could lesson the impact of these collisions.P? Connolly'S misconception of Nietzschean freedom is important because it brings to light the second distinctly problematical aspect of Connolly's political

fBy seeking to fost~r something distinctly other than a Nietzschean


Wi~l contri~utions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji

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UTNIF2le6 Nietzsche Jake Blolmson & Mick Niller

vision-his yearning to mitigate inequality. To Nietzsche, "equality for equals, inequality for unequals" is the "true voice of justice" because of the hierarchical nature of the Nietzschean political world.t'' Nietzschean equality is something that is only shared by those of equal power because it is only those beings who, by evincing the same level of power, can not engender a relationship of domination and subjugation amongst themselves. Only amongst those who can't overwhelm or be overwhelmed by each other, who are capable of displaying an aura of spiritualized enmity towards each other, can a sense of reciprocity be found. Doctrines such as Connollian justice that glorify a sense of equality amongst people who inherently manifest varying degrees of a noble nature are the most poisonous of poisons because these doctrines act as an anathema to the most creative force in the Nietzschean world; the will to power of the most noble souls.f! By promoting a synthetic sense of equality Connolly curtails the will to power of the nobles by arbitrarily closing the "chasm between man and man class and class." He thereby negates the "long scale of orders of rank" that are crucial to the noble's ability to become (and be) its powerful creative self. Thus, Connolly's ideal of rough equality would not "tum the genealogist of resentment on his head" by promoting Nietzsche's life affirming ideals in a manner that is antithetical to Nietzsche's 0'\'11 politics. Instead, Connolly would .find himself in danger of emulating the Christian, whose message of "equal before god breeds a sickly and mediocre herd animal the European of today ... "42 Like the Christian, C0l1l1011y's rough equality would also "break down every proper autocratic, manly, conquering, tyrannical ... instincts proper to the highest and most sJl~ASi:uL_QLtlre-1Y-p-e_man,~.ho.se_j)ho.uldeJ:SNietzsche felt the creation of a life c:l.fJirmingsocial and political world dcpend~

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Ato.J?ic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- BenJ1 .




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The central tenets of Nietzsche's philosophy -- perspectivism and self-affirmation -- are vital to the empowerment of womyn, despite his cultural attachments,
Barbara Helm. Institute for Philosophy, University of Tnbingen, and Max-Planck Research Centre for Ornithology, Andechs, Germany. Combating Misogyny? Responses to Nietzsche by Turn-of-the-Century

German Feminists.
The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 27



The Viennese intellectual Rosa Mayreder analyzed Nietzsche's derisiveness toward women in the context of her theory of the "subjective gender idol," which, in turn, rested on two Nietzschean premises. Not only were her concepts of obiectivity and truth perspectivist; she also located gender thinking in the cognitive-physical constitution of individuals rather than in empirical experience. By distinguishing an "immanent" image of woman-a projection of the ego-from empirical women, Mayreder was able to read male images of women as symptoms of their own "psychosexual condition." The ego projects its desire outo an idol of the other sex, hoping that through a complementary partner it can receive "redemption." Mayreder traced Nietzsche's image of woman back to his desire for relief from the vexing quest for truth and meaning. According to Mayreder, Nietzsche implied that women were neither able nor welcome to partake of these pursuits but, rather, that they should confine themselves to entertaining men. To escape this conjecture, [End Page 71] Mayrederencouraged modem women to strive to replace abstract "womanhood," which is always an immanent idol, with a multitude of empirical female identities: "Nothing should be so important to women as fIghting against the abstraction into which they are constantly transformed by male thinking. They must fIght against \V0trlan as idol if they want to win their rights in the world as real persons."

Nietzsche's mysogyny warrants caution,however, overcoming sexism.

his philosophy is central to

Barbara Helm _Institute for Philosophy, University of Tjjhingen, and Max-Planck Research Centre for Ornithology, Andechs, Germany. Combating Misogyny? Responses to Nietzsche by Tum-of-the-Century

German Feminists.
The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 27



Today, debates over essentialism versus anti-essentialism or difference versus equality are still unresolved. Gender dualism continues to bear risks, but today's feminists may find li~asier to resist such-aar;gers. Wifr~referenceto NiaiSCl1e;Terilii1istSarecautlousl:;-;y------~ reconstructing the relationship between "woman" and "fuolher:"Concepts like sex, maternity, equality, and difference have themselves become objects of feminist scrutiny. Foucault's anti-essentialist genealogical writing, inspired by Nietzsche, has contributed much to overcoming "sexist" traps. 113 Misogynous traces in Nietzsche's reception by contemporary. women may advise today's feminists to approach his philosophy with caution. Yet, as Lynne Tirrell suggests, his writings may also· "contain the seeds ofa deconstruction of that misogyny. I' .

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji

UTNIF2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blohnson

& Mick Niller

( ) Kitsch ~Extend the first White card
The affirmative is so arrogant as to suppose that they are fulfilling a categorical agreement with being. In this world, they've decided, there should be not shit. The affirmative is intent on eradicating [patriarchy, heteronormativity, poverty, violence, etc] because its existence contradicts a divine command regarding what the world should be like. . The impact is the 2nd INC White card-- Kitsch results in the mentality of the grand march. Individual life is suffocated in a homogenizing categorical imperative. Furthermore, the grand march can never be finished as obstacles to its completion recur and are reinvented inevitably. That's the 4th White card. Shit is inevitable. Given this, accepting the aff's logic means committing the rest of our lives to serving a cause totally distant from us. No thank you!

( ) Grand March
Once we decide upon the universality of our ethic(s), life becomes an endless quest toward utopian ends. This means that perceived obstacles on the path toward perfection must be eliminated. . This is the logic that justifies genocide. Enemies to the cause are useless and potentially dangerous.

( ) Socratic Delusion
The aff assumes the position of Socrates, seeking out error in existence in order to diagnose and correct it. The afffantasizes about healing the wound of existence. Not only is this impossible but, more importantly, it devalues our lives. It leads us to believe that life is worth living only to the extent that it is perfectible.

( )Shit inev, judge.
The Aff's obsession with shit and its eradication implies that shitsweeping is all there is to life. The aff allows themselves to be so bogged down by the shitty parts of existence that they are unable to see much more. In fact, suffering, violence, exploitation, and all variety of evil shit is inevitable - very much a part of the human condition because life is will to power. Our inability to come to terms with this teaches us to view life as a sickness to be overcome. This is incommensurate with living life in a passionate or meaningful manner. There is much shit in the world - this much is true. But this does not make the world itself a beshitted monster. Joy lies in embracing and celebrating life as it is, as opposed to denying it in favor of an ideal life that cant be realized.

r)Alt-.----------------Completed nihilism means denying that the world must be unified or purposeful in order for it to be worth living. Accepting that this life -shitty as it may be-is our only life and that it is a life worthy of celebration means refusing the logic of the affirmative which teaches us that existence is justified only to the extent that we can perfect it No such perfection exists and we need not entertain this fantasy in order to enjoy life. Denigrating life for its lack of direction is as senseless as denigrating a beautiful painting for not actually containing depth. A painting cannot contain depth by its very nature but this does not detract from its beauty. Neither can life be perfected, but this does not detract from its beauty. Joy lies in dancing in the midst of shit rather than holding our nose in our own presence.

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji


U1NIF 2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blohnson /k, Mick NiUer


The radical individuality of their alternative is impossible and irresponsible. Space for life outside of social relations or the state no longer exists. The overmen must be reconsidered as a mode of political engagement.

Connony. William E. Professor of Political Science at John Hopkins University 1991
[Identity/ Difference: democratic negotiations of political paradox]
CBut the 'collapse of two types called "man" and "overinan"~also results from disappearance of the social space in:whicb tbis..figgre of sOlitude was suppQsed to reside. The overman, remember, rises above the reactive politics of society, both by cultivating certain dispositions while residing within society and by clearing a space on the edge of social life. In this marginal space projected by I' Nietzsche, one could not stifle the definitions others gave one, but lone could avoid extensive implication in a dense web of relations that would render it necessary either to accept those identifications




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or to struggle against them politically, The Nietzsche~ over~anl in its dominant presentation in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, ,llves a hfe of ",~ve ' soli~-one that escapes, or instant. e, ~ bold of t~ I, ~tat~uperfl~ous new idol," that "coldest of cold monsters' ~tells lies in all the tongues of good and evil": "Only where the state ends, there begins the human being who\is not sup~rfl~ous: there begins the song of necessity, the unique and inimitable tune .... Where the state e11ds--:lookthere my brothe'~~7Do you , not see it, the rainbow and the bndges of the overman? But this J,lictureof a marginal ~ace beyo~.effect!Ve reach?f the tentacles ~state no longer refers to anydisc~la.ce..m the late-mOClern time. The avoidances it counsels are no longer available, if they eyer were. Tp.e clean air it s~eks is too p.olluted 'at low ~ltitlldes and too thin to breathe at.fu!:ij}~gl~~~!.~ E:xactly what late-modern life renders inescar.able is the il1te.n, sive entaI,!glement of ever~one with evezy.one else. J';Joone is lett I ~lone anymore, though too many are compelled to fend for them- i selves as they respond to the violent impositions of state and soI ciety.. ~he social fabric of interdependenci~s and conflicts. is now too tiglitly woven; th!_@.!2s between the hnes of regglatlOn and .1 surveillance have tightened~p. This tightening of the social fabric cannot De measured oy ascertai.nin]''Whet, her~ore-er-fewer-p8Qple~ now live on the wrong side of officially definer norms-a mistake,! critics of the theme of "disciplinary society" repeatedly make when they support the thesis they seek to refute by pointing to those who! resist, evade, elude, and disrupt social practices of discipline and normalization. It can be measured by pointing to the enlarged network of intrusions and regulations the army: of misfits face as the I standards of normality are extended and intensified; it can be discerned in the resistances they require in order to sustain themselves amid these demands, and in the extension of disciplinary techniques to overcome those resistances. Those 'who want aggregate measures can count the number of people today whose primary job is to control, observe, confine, reform, discipline, treat, or corWith contr rect other people (think of the police, military personnel, welfare ~Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, Tile Last (wojraan, ana. -'[0 a sunstannany lesser extent- Benji
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agents, therapists, state security agents, private securi~y agents,

I advertising firms, prison officials, parole boards, nursing h?me

attendants, licensing agents, tax officials, and so on) and the various , Jake Blohnson clients, patients, delinquents, misfits, trou?led soul~, losers, subversives, and evaders who provide the pru:rtary objects of these practices. And they can compare this inde~-after sorting out

the complex dimensions that make every aggregate comparison , extremely coarse-with its counterpart a hundred (or even fifty) i , years ago. .. , . ,Perhiaps we can today listen to enunciations by Nlf:tzs.che a hundred years ago with ears attuned to a century of social mtensification:

Do you have courage, 0 my brothers? Ar~ you brave? Not .cou,rage before witnesses, but the courage of hermits and eagles, which IS no longer watched even by a god. IS Avoidall such unconditional peoplel They are a poor sicksort, a sort, of mob: they look sourly at this life, tqey pave the evil eye for this. earth. Avoid all such unconditional people! They have heavy feet : and sultry hearts: they do not know how to dance. How should the: earth be light for themi'!? ' .One dimension in Zarathustra's message can still be heard by those with ears, but the metaphors of wildness, hermits, eagles, snakes, caves, silence, deep wells, high mountains, solitude, mob, flight, and earth that populate Nietzsche's invocations of the overman no longer do double duty today. The "hermit" has become 'an anonymous member of a regulated multitude who are homeless; the "eagle" has become a protected species; the "mob" has become a criminal network entangled with official intelligence agencies; the "deep well" accumulates pollutants from road maintenance, toxic wastes, and fertilizer runoffs; urban "caves" have become nightly residences for homeless outcasts who restlessly haunt the streets by day; the "earth" has become a deposit of finite resources for late- i modern production. The Nietzschean metaphors now refer tb a , s.Eiritual disposition disjoined from topogg12hical sp-ace; they are i d.!!ined of reference to identifiable sites between..t:belines of social . organi~!on. Even the metaphors have become infiltrated by the significatioiis they would rise above. These changes in the signifying power of Nietzsche's nineI teenth'-century metaphors point to the collapse of social space for i the overman as an indep-enct:;nt1 solitary typ-e. The disti11Ctio11 be- ~ ,_, __ . i twem tYj2.es now g~.:a;r...J:D-StJ:.u!!lJleJ.JJ.itJ;jJ1 «ltd betwee11 set'!!s. TI~ i--.~,-. elevation to a fictive sp-aceabove the muck of reactive politics must ' . , " be translated into olitical en a ement with institutionalized pracI ~rce~Put another way: t!le overman mllst~i.t;h~r-b.e.c;ome eaUtiful a .., I soul or be dismantled as. an aJ~oli.tiGal-t~q~;..ci.the~.ietzschean c.. . c~i"tigueof 1'esse11timmt becomes an anachronism or it is refigured into a political philosoIiliY.. '. -, The first alternative in each of these disjunctions would exclude nontheistic reverence for life from active presence in the latemodern time. !Jetter, then, to dismantle the typology of "man" and ' : "o~" even if it liquidates the dream of an elevated being floating above the Rolitics of resentment, even if it en~les onein the very reactions and relations one strives to loosen or refigure, , ib ' eve_.n .. _ a I£.· WIth contri utio.......... .jf, it_means that.: eveLy-thing,becomes even m.ore__mbiguous. ). ( apt. Fascist .Io..A~.._...,£._;a_"" ... 1.L, ...,...""J ................ Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji

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Nietzsche lake Blolmson & Mick Niller Undermining metaphysics paves the way to pragmatism. rejection and defeatism.



Nietzsche sides with Rorty, not


Ian Johnston. There's Nothing Nietzsche Couldn't Teach Ya About the Raising of the Wrist. http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/introser/nietzs.htm


One group we can quicldy identify is those who have embraced Nietzsche's critique. who appeal to his writing to endorse their view that the search to ground out knowledge and moral claims in Truth are futile. and that we must therefore recognize the imperative Nietzsche laid before us to self-create our own lives. to ca1ne up with new self-descriptions as a means of affu:1ning the irrational basis of our individual hU1nanity. This position has been loosely termed Antifoundationalism. Two of its most prolni1lent and popular spokespersons in recent years have been Richard Rorty and Camille Paglia. Within Humanities departments the Deconstructionists (with Derrida as their gum) head the Nietzschean charge. Antifoundationalists tend to link Nietzsche closely with Kuhn and with Dewey (whose essay on Darwin we read) and sometimes with Wittgenstein and take central aim at anyone who would claim that some form of enquiry, like science, rational ethics, Marxism, or traditional religion has any form of privileged access to reality 01' the truth. The political stance of the Antifoundationalists tends to be radically romantic or pragmatic. Since we cannot ground our faith in any public motality 01' political creed. politics becomes something far less important than personal development or else we have to conduct our political life simply on a pragmatic basis. following the tules we can agree on. without according those rules any uruvetsal status or grounding in eternal principles. If mechanistic science is something we find. fot accidental reasons of histoty. sOlnething useful. then we will believe it for now. Thus, Galileo's system became adopted. not because it was true 01' closet to the truth that what it replaced, but si1nply because the vocabulaty he introduced intoour descriptions was something we found agreeable and ptactically helpful. When it ceases to fulfill our ptagmatic requirements, we will gradually change to some othet vocabulaty, some othet metaphor, some other vetsion of a game. History indicates that such a change will occur, but how and when it will take place or what the new vocabulary might be=these questions will be determined by the accidents of history, Si1nilatly, hU1nan tights ate i1nportant, not because dlete is any tationalnon-circulat proof that we ought to act in accotdance with these ptinciples, but si1nply because we have agreed, fot a~~~d~!:ta!historical reasons, dlat dlese principles ate useful. Such pragmatic agreements are all we have forpuGiic life,Gecause~is-Nietisdie-iiisists,we-611ii1ot JUS afi~nnohl" .---tiff clatins by appeals to the trudl. So we can agree about a schedule fot dle vatious games and distributing dle budget among them and we can, as a lnattet of convenience, set cettain rules for our discussions, but only as a practical tequire1nent of out histotical situation; not by any divine 01' rationally just system of distribution.

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji



Nietzsche Jake Blohnson & Mick Niller The agonism of democracy is the perfect expression of the will to power. To struggle politically is to develop the self against opposition.
Lawrence J. Hatab. "Prospects for a Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans." Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002) 132-147 How can we begin to apply the notion of agonistics to politics in general and democracy in particular? First of all, contestation and competition can be seen as fundamental to self-development and as an intrinsically social phenomenon. Agonistics helps us articulate the social and political ramifications of Nietzsche's concept of will to power. As Nietzsche put it in an 1887 note, "will to power can manifest itself only against resistances; it seeks that which resists it" (KSA 12, p.424). Power, therefore, is not simply an individual possession or a goal of action; it is more a global, interactive conception. For Nietzsche, every advance in life is an overcoming of some obstacle or counterforce, so that conflict is a mutual coconstitution of contending forces. [End Page 134] Opposition generates development. The human self is not formed in some internal sphere and then secondarily exposed to external relations and conflicts. The selfis constituted in and through what it opposes and what opposes it; in other words, the selfis formed through agonistic relations. Therefore, 81W annulment of one's Other would be an annulment of one's self in this sense. Competition can be understood as a shared activity for the sake of fostering high achievement and self-development, and therefore as an intrinsically social activity. lQ In the light of Nietzsche's appropriation of the two forms of Eris, it is necessary to distinguish between agonistic conflict and sheer violence. A radical agonistics rules out violence, because violence is actually an impulse to eliminate conflict by annihilating or incapacitating 811 opponent, bringing the agon to an end. 11 In a later work Nietzsche discusses the "spiritualization of hostility (Fe indsch aft), " wherein one must affirm both the presence and the power of one's opponents as implicated in one's own posture (TI "Morality as Antinature," 3). And in this passage Nietzsche specifically applies such a notion to the political realm. What this implies is that the category of the social need not be confined to something like peace or harmony. Agonistic relations, therefore, do not connote a deterioration of a social disposition and can thus be extended to political relations. How can democracy in general terms be understood as an agonistic activity? Allow me to quote from my previous work. Political judgments are not preordained or dictated; outcomes depend upon a contest of speeches where one view wins and other views lose in a tabulation of votes; since the results are binding and backed by the coercive power of the government. democratic elections and procedures establish temporary control and subordination-which, however, can always be altered or reversed because of the succession of periodic political contests .... Democratic elections allow for, and depend upon, peaceful exchanges and tTansitions of power. ... [LJanguage is the weapon in democratic contests. The binding results, however, produce tangible effects of gain and loss that make political exchanges more than just talk or a game .... The urgency of such political contests is that losers must yield to, and live under, the policies of the winner; we notice, therefore, specific configurations of power, of domination and subinissioii-ii-i'deinocl:atic politics. 11 The



With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji

UTNIF2k6 em Nietzsche = lake Blolmson & Mick Niller Nietzsche's philosophy of struggle provides a baseline for democracy. Social order creates spheres of conflict and overcoming conducive to self-creation and autonomy while simultaneously preventing tyranny or chaos.




Hatab. "Prospects for a Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans."

Journal of'Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002) 132-147 Those who take Nietzsche to be diagnosing social institutions as descendants of slave morality should take note of OM II, 11, where Nietzsche offers some interesting reflections on justice and law. He indicates that the global economy of nature is surely not a function of justice; yet workable conceptions of justice and injustice are established by the historical force of human law. Nietzsche does not indict such forces as slavish infIrmities. Legal arrangements are "exceptional conditions" that modulate natural forces of power in [End Page 136] social directions, and that are not an elimination of conflict but an instrument in channeling the continuing conflict of different power complexes. Surprisingly, Nietzsche attributes the historical emergence oflaw not to reactive resentment but to active, worldly forces that check and redirect the "senseless raging of revenge," and that are able to reconfIgure offenses as more "impersonal" violations oflegal provisions rather than sheer personal injuries. Here Nietzsche analyzes the law in a way analogous to his account of the Greek agon and its healthy sublimation of natural impulses for destruction. A legal system is a life-promoting cultural force that refashions natural energies in less savage and more productive directions. Finally, those who read Nietzsche as an anti-institutional transgressor and creator should heed TI ("Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," 39), where Nietzsche clearly diagnoses a repudiation of institutions as a form of decadence. Because of our modem faith in a foundational individual freedom, we no longer have the instincts for forming and sustaining the traditions and modes of authority that healthy institutions require. The whole of the West no longer possesses the instincts out of which institutions grow, out of which a future grows: perhaps nothing antagonizes its "modem spirit" so much. One lives for the day, one lives very fast, one lives very irresponsibly: precisely this is called "freedom." That which makes an institution an institution is despised, hated, repudiated: one fears the danger of a new slavery the moment the word "authority" is even spoken out loud. That is how far decadence has advanced in the value-instincts of our politicians, of our political parties: instinctivelv they prefer what disintegrates, what hastens the end. In the light of these remarks, a Nietzschean emphasis on power and agonistics offers signifIcant advantages for political philosophy. In some respects we are freed from the modem project of "justifying" the force of social institutions because of a stipulated freedom from constraint in the "state of nature." With a primal conception ofpower(s), we can retrieve an Aristotelian take on social institutions as fitting and productive of human existence. Forces of law need not be seen as alien to the self, but as modulations of a ubiquitous array of forces within which human beings can locate relative spheres of freedom. And an agonistic conception of political activity need not be taken as a corruption or degradation of an idealizedorder of ----- ---ljoliti cal-principles' or -social-virtues. Gur--own-iradition-·of-the-separation -ofpowers-and -anadversarial-Iegal system can be taken as a baseline conception of the nature, function, and proper operation of govermnent offIces and judicial practice. The founders of the Constitution inherited from Montesquieu the idea that a division of powers is the best check on tyranny. In other words, tyranny is avoided not by some project of harmony, but by multiplying the number of power sites in a govel11ment and affIrming their competition through mutual self-assertion [End Page 137] and mistrust. 1£ Our common law tradition is agonistic in both conception and practice. Most procedural rules are built around the idea of coequal competition in open cOUlibefore a jury who will decide the outcome, where the judge in most respects plays the role of an impartial referee. And the presumption of innocence is fundamentally meant to contest the government's power to prosecute and punish. 11 I think that both notions of separation of powers and legal adversarialism are compatible with Nietzsche's analysis of the law noted previously-that a legal order is not a means of preventing struggle, but "a means in the struggle between power-complexes" (OMII,II).


With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji


I~a I'

UTNIF2k6 Nietzsche I 77''--' Jake Blolmson& MickNiller ~ _.~ Far from denying life, democracy and human rights create the nec'iSsary foundation for the Nietzschean struggle for excellence.
Lawrence J. Hatab. "Prospects for a Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans." The
Journal a/Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002) 132-147



Assuming that politics should not be restricted and reserved for an elite, but open to the participation of all citizens, can we retain a sense of respect and political rights in appropriating Nietzsche for democracy? I think so. In fact, Nietzschean conceptions of agonistics and nonfoundational openness can go a long way toward articulating and defending democratic practices without the problems attaching to traditional principles of equality. If political respect implies inclusiveness and an open regard for the rightful participation of others, an agonistic model of politics can underwrite respect without the need for substantive conceptions of equality or even something like "equal regard." I have already mentioned that agonistics can be seen as a fundamentally social phenomenon. Since the self is formed in and through tensional relations with others, then any annulment of my Other would be an annulment of myself. Radical agonistics, then, discounts the idea of sheer autonomy and self-constitution. Such a tensional sociality can much more readily affirm the place of the Other in social relations than can modern models of subject-based freedom. Moreover, the structure of an agon conceived as a contest can readily underwrite political principles of fairness. Not onlydo I need an Other to prompt my own achievement, but the significance of any "victory" I might achieve demands an able opponent. As in athletics, defeating an incapable or incapacitated competitor winds up being meaningless. So I should not only will the presence of others in an agon, I should also want that they be able adversaries, that they have opportunities and capacities to succeed in the contest. And I should be able to honor the winner of a fair contest. Such is the logic of competition that contains a host of normative features, which might even include active provisions for helping people in political contests become more able participants. 25 In addition, agonistic respect need not be associated with something like positive regard or equal worth, a dissociation that can go further in facing up to actual political conditions and problematic connotations that can attach to liberal dispositions. Again allow me to quote my previous work. Democratic respect forbids exclusion, it demands inclusion; but respect for the Other as other can avoid a vapid sense of "tolerance," a sloppy "relativism," or a misplaced spirit of "neutrality." Agonistic respect allows us to simultaneously affirm our beliefs and affirm our opponents as worthy competitors [End Page 142] in public discourse. Here we can speak of respect without ignoring the fact that politics involves perpetual disagreement, and we have an adequate answer to the question "Why should I respect a view that I do not agree with?" In this way beliefs about what is best (aristos) can be coordinated with an openness to other beliefs and a willingness to - ~----~---aGcept the outcome of an open competition among the full citizenry(d~f7')os),_Democratic respect, therefore, is a dialogical mixture of affirmation and negation, a political bearing that entails giving all beliefs a hearing, refusing any belief an ultimate warrant, and perceiving one's own viewpoint as agonistically implicated with opposing viewpoints. In sum, we can combine 1) the historical tendency of democratic movements to promote free expression, pluralism, and liberation from traditional constraints, and 2) a Nietzschean perspectivism and agonistic respect, to arrive at a postmodern model of democracy that ~rovides both a nonfoundational openness and an atmosphere of civil political discourse. _§ An agonistic politics construed as competitive fairness can sustain a robust conception of political rights, not as something "natural" possessed by an original self, but as an epiphenomenal. procedural notion conferred upon citizens in order to sustain viable political practice. Constraints


With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji


UTNrp 2le6 Nietzsche ~/ \ \, r r~J\/~1fV Jake Blohnson & Mick NiUeI' ~ VV '" I

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on speech, association, access, and so on, simply insure lopsided political contests. We can avoid metaphysical models of rights and construe them as simply social and political phenomena: social in the sense of entailing reciprocal recognition and obligation; political in the sense of being guaranteed and enforced by the state. We can even defend so-called positive rights, such as a right to an adequate education, as requisite for fair competition in political discourse. Rights themselves can be understood as agonistic in that a right-hoider has a claim against some treatment by others or for some provision that might be denied by others. In this way rights can be construed as balancing power relations in social milieus, as a partial recession of one's own power on behalf of the power of others-which in fact is precisely how Nietzsche in an early work described fairness and rights (D 112). And, as is well known, the array of rights often issues conflicts of different and differing rights, and political life must engage in the ongoing balancing act of negotiating these tensions, a negotiation facilitated by precisely not defining rights as discrete entities inviolably possessed by an originating self. Beyond political rights, a broader conception of rights, often designated as human rights as distinct from political practice, can also be defended by way of the kind of nonfoundational. negative sense of selfhood inspired by Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, the self is a temporal openness infused with tragic limits, rather than some metaphysical essence, stable substance, or eternal entity. A via negativa can be utilized to account for rights as stemming not from what we are but from what we are not. So much of abusive or exclusionary treatment is animated by confident designations and reductions as to "natures" having to do with race, gender, class, role, character, and so on. [End Page 143] Nonfoundational challenges to "identity" may seem unsettling, but if we consider how identities figure in injustices, a good deal of work can be done to reconfigure rights as based in resistance. It is difficult to find some positive condition that can justify rights and do so without excluding or suppressing some other conditions. But a look at human history and experience can more readily understand rights and freedom as emerging out of the irrepressible tendency of human beings to resist and deny the adequacy of external attributions as to what or who they "are." It may be sufficient to defend rights simply in terms of the human capacity to say


With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji



Nietzsche .... Jake Blolmson & Mick Niller U The plan is a move toward democratic openness. This move, despite its risks offailure, is infinitely more courageous and life-affirming than the Alternative's defeated docility.
Lawrence J.











"Prospects for a Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans."


Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002) 132-147

Appel insists that a radical agonistics is a significant threat to democratic ideals and principles. Although he does little to develop how and why this may be so, the charge raises important questions facing postmodern, and particularly Nietzschean, approaches to democratic politics. In my work I have tried to face this question, admit the difficulty, and sU9Best a "tragic" model of democratic openness. to borrow from Nietzsche's interest in tragedy. L Many democratic theorists insist that politics must be grounded in secure principles, which themselves are incontestable, so as to rule out anti-democratic voices from having their day and possibly undermining democratic procedures or results. A radically agonistic, open conception of democracy that simply invites any and all parties to compete for favor seems utterly decisionist, with no justification beyond its contingent enactment. But from a historical perspective. despite metaphysical pretenses in some quarters, democratic foundings have in fact emerged out of the "abyss" of conventions and decisional moments. gj! And with the prospect of a constitutional convention in our system, it is evident from a performative standpoint that any results are actually possible in a democracy, even anti-democratic outcomes (not likely, but surely possible). The "tragedy" is that democracy could die at its own hands. Foundationalists would call such an outcome contradictory, but a tragic conception would see it as a possibility intrinsic to the openness of democratic practice. Can there be more than a simply negative register in such a tragic conception? I think so. Just as, for Nietzsche, the tragic allows us to be sensitized and energized for the fragile meanings of existence, thus enhancing life, a tragic politics could wean us from false comforts in foundations and open us to the urgent finite conditions of political life in an enhanced way. And even if one conceded the existence of foundational self-evident political principles, would the force of such principles by themselves necessarily be able to prevent non-democratic outcomes? If not, the force of such principles [End Page 144] would be restricted to the solace of intellectual rectitude that can comfort theorists while the walls are coming down. The nonexistence of foundational guarantees surely does not prevent one from living and fighting for democratic ideals. What is to be said of someone who, in the absence of a guarantee, would hesitate to act or be obstructed from acting or see action as tainted or less than authentic? Nietzsche would take this as weakness. The most profound element in Nietzsche's conceptions of will to power, agonistics, and eternal recurrence, in my view, can be put in the following way. For Nietzsche, to act in the world is always to act in the midst of otherness, of resistances or obstacles. Hence to dream of action without otherness is to annul action. To affirm one's Other as necessarily constitutive of oneself is not only to affirm the full field of action (which is the sense of eternal recurrence), but also to affirm action as action. that is to say, a real move in life amidst real resistances, as opposed to the fantasy of self-sufficient. fully free, uncontested-occurrences born "ln conceptions of divine perfection and continued in various philosophical models of demonstrative certainty and theoretical governance. The irony of a tragically open, agonistic politics is that it need not "infect" political life but in fact spur it toward the existential environment of it enactment. And as radically open. an agonistic politics has the virtue of precluding the silencing of any voice. something especially important when even purportedly democratic dispositions are comfortable with exclusions (frustrated by citizens who will not come around to being impartial enough, rational enough, secular enough, deliberative enough, communal enough, virtuous enough, and so on), thereby becoming susceptible to the most ironic and insidious form of tyranny done in democracy's name.


With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji


UTNIF2le6 Nietzsche lake Blohnson & Mick Niller They've misread Nietzsche as an anti-institutionalist. Self-creation occurs in coexistence with rules of law and order. The alternative is orgiastic selfannihlation.

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Lawrence J. Hatab. "Prospects for a Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans." The
Journal a/Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002) 132-147

It is a mistake, however, to read Nietzsche in simple terms as being against institutions and the rule of law on behalf of self-creation. First of all, even Nietzsche's early celebration of the Dionysian should not be taken as an anti- or extra-political gesture. In BT21, Nietzsche insists that the Apollonian has coequal status with the Dionysian, and the former is specifically connected with the political order, which is needed to temper the Dionysian impulse toward "ecstatic brooding" and "orgiastic self-annihilation." Those who read Nietzsche as resisting "normalization" and "discipline" (this includes most postmodern readings and Appel's as well 11), are not on very firm ground either. For one thing, Nietzschean creative freedom is selective and most people should be ruled by normative orders, because universal unrestricted freedom would cause havoc. 14 Moreover, even selective creative freedom is not an abandonment of order and constraint. Creativity breaks free of existing structures, but only to establish new ones. Shaping new forms requires formative powers prepared by disciplined skills and activated by refined instruments of production. Accordingly, creativity is a kind of "dancing in chains" (WS 140). ThCreative freedom, then, is not an abandonment of constraint, but a disruption of structure that still needs structure to prepare and execute departures from the norm.

With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji


UTNIF 2k6 Nietzsche Jake Blolmson & Micle Niller



The ubermensch is impossible after extinction. Nietzsche's idea of overcoming human must be combined with preserving human life.

Connolly, William E. Professor of Political Science at John Hopkins University 1991 [Identity/ Difference: democratic negotiations of political paradox]
says: "T11e most concerned ask toJa¥. 'How'js man t~reserved?' B?t Zarathustra is the first and only one to ask: 'How is man to be overcome?' "16 The idea is to stop WprryiJ;lg about the preservation of man, to strive to create a few OV~. Leaveto their own devices those WhO insist up-on being consumed b~entment, so that a few can cultivate another type of humanf~ The new type to be cultivated consists of a few free spirits who f fend off the resentment against the human condition that wells up I in everyone, a few who rise above the insistence that there be I symmetry between evil and responsibility, who live above the demand that some guilty agent worthy of punishment be located every time they themselves suffer, who recognize that existential , suffering is a precondition of wisdom. ! But this !ypological differentiation betw~en man and overman no longei makes much sense, if it ever did. For the overmanconstituted as an independentl detached type-refers simultaneously to a,spiritual disposition and to the residence of free spirits in a social space relatively insulated from reactive politics. The problem is that the disawearance of the relevant social p-reconditions confounds any division of humanity into two sEiritual types. If , tlle"re IS anything in the type to be admired, tlle ideal mlJst he dismantled as a distinct caste of solitary individuals and foldedW.!Q.. tli~ti~alfabric of1ate-modern society.·The "overman"no~ falls apart as ;1. s_e.t distinctiye disp-ositinns.concentratedin.a-p-ar-ticulaL' - ----of caste or !me~nd its sRiritual.!lualities. migrate to a set of dis~..o.SitiOifsll'1at may com}2ete for presence In any self. The type now becomes (as it already was to a significant degree) a voice in the self contending with other voices, including those of ressentiment,
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Nietzsche Jake Blolmson & Mick Niller


ThIS model is implicitly suggested by Foucault when he eschews the term "overman" (as well as "will to power") and shifts the center of gravity of Nietzschean discourse from heroes and classical tragic figures to everyday misfits such as Alex! Alexina and Pierre Riviere . . These textual moves are, I think, part of a strategy to fold Nietzschean agonism into the fabric of ordinary life by attending to' the extraordinary character of the latter. I seek to pursue this same ttail. The Nietzschean conception of a few who overcome resentment above politics while the rest remain stuck in the muck of resentment in' politics is not today viable on its own terms. Today circumStiiilcesrequire that many give the sign of the o-verman a presence in theinselves and in the ethicopolitical orientations they project onto the life of the whole. But this break with the spirit of Nietzsche requires further elucidation. T~e shift. re.f-¥-lts Ilartlr from the late-mo.dem Rossibility of> human se1f-extmct!On. In th1s new;worJd the fallure to "preserve maq." c~ish the human basis for the struggle Nietzsch n~.m.aJl." P~seryation and overcoming are now dtawh , clos 0 that each becomes a term in the other: the latter cannot succeed unless it touches the former. ut t e entanglement ~of_eaGh-with-the-othedn..socio oliticaLr.elationsJlleans_, :When the '_.__ .__ logic of this eritang ement 1Sworked out, t!!_atthe "oyertnan"las a II tY,:.p.e..cannot eliminate from its life some of the modalities'defin'ith;e of.~um.aD." If the overman was ever projected asa distinct type-s-and this is not certain-it now becomes refigured into a struggle within the self between the inclination to existential resentn;en.t and an affirmation of life that rises above this tendertcy.>l~lf.





With contributions from: Clem, Keymaster, Daria, Crazy Amy, Kashmir, The Atomic Girl, Capt. Fascist, Boring Andi, Uday, The Last (wo)Man, and -to a substantially lesser extent- Benji

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UTNIF 2le6 Nietzsche JaleeBlohnson & Micle Niller

The draft enables democratic a 0 . . . resentment and allows fo th ~c: flIsm.whlch ventilates existential r e aJ.l.1fmatlOn life. of

Connolly, William E. Professor ofPoli~ic~ Science~: John Hopkins University 1991 [I~entity/ Difference: democratic negotiations of political paradox]

. [So, let's relocate the critic temporarily, placing him in a hyp2:.. ~hetical world. He now lives in a democracy in which each citizen has a hand in maIntaining the accountabili of the state~ in which no member has, say, more t an five or six times as muchincome as any other; in which, therefore, general laws tend to apply to ever[o~ in a similar way; and in which if it is necessary to risk death to d.~!end the country,' ev_erzrQDe. the aEEropriatt;_gge aDO be~1!:b in_ categor is e uall susce tible to selection. This is a world in which everyone has e ective stan mg as a CItIzen, partly b~cause each has die effective opportunity,~.!!ould it prov~ttractiv;e or necessaq4..t.o. p}~rticipatein the common life of the soci~--:a world in which the 'pr~conditions of agonistic democracx are effectively.Ju_staJ.led, In;his later writings, however.Nietzsche gener~Ily expected that any practice of democracy would curtail independence and enhance existential resentment. Indeed, democratic idealism was likel X to become the most efficient conduit of the latter. I agree that no democrac will ter inate existential resentment. But i it unfo s(through the right idealism, democratic politics can be a mediiiiii through which to expose and redress tE:e politics of resentmen(









~ f\gonal democracy mables (but does not require) a?z~011e to come to ter~s with the strife and interdep'endence of identity\difference:to ask whether the drive to punish difference is an ex ression 'of existential resentment and whet. e evert ee m s of indignation j'""re . eet-a-mix-o nJusticeriu"""th:e-wotld a:-nd-rhe--demanQthat tlie world provide a· meaning for existential suffering. When democratid politics is robust, when it op-erates to disturb the naturaliza,tlon 9f settled convention's, when it exposes settled identities to wmel of the contestab1e contingencies that constitute them, ~1lo one is in a more favorable position to reconsider some of the de'm~dsbuilt into those c~tions_alldjdentities. One becorm;s

moreable to treat one's naturalized assum tiorts aboutTciC?!1tl!v..!nd otlrerness as conventIona~<$te.gQries of ~nsisten~'- ~i~~



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Nietzsche's philosophy not only justifies atrocities but praises those who committ them simply for their capacity to do so, The alternative permits genocide in the name of power.
Christopher Simpson. The Splendid Blond Beast. http://www.thirdworldtraveler.comlGenocide/SplendidBlondeBeast.htm11995

Friedrich Nietzsche called the aristocratic predators who write society's laws "the splendid blond beast" precisely because they so often behave as though they are beyond the reach of elementary morality. As he saw things, these elites have cut a path toward a certain sort of excellence consisting mainly of the exercise of power at the expense of others. When dealing with ordinary people, he said, they "revert to the innocence of wild animals .... We can imagine them returning from an orgy of murder, arson, rape and torture, jubilant and at peace with themselves as though they had committed a fraternity prank-convinced, moreover, that the poets for a long time to come will have something to sing about ~11dto praise." Their bmt~1ity was true c.ourage, Nietzsche thought, and the foundation of social order.
Tod8Y genocide-the deliherate destruction of

racial. cultural. or political



paramount example of the institutionalized and sanctioned violence of which Nietzsche spoke. Genocide has been a basic mechanism of empire and the national state since their inception and remains vvidcly practiced in "advanced" fu"ld"civilized" areas. Most genocides in this century have been perpetrated by nation-states upon ethnic minorities living within the state's own borders; most of the victims have been children. The people responsible for mass murder have by and large gotten away with what they have done. Most have succeeded in keeping wealth that they looted from their victims; most have never faced trial. Genocide is still difficult to eradicate because it is usually tolerated, at least by those who benefit from it.


Nietzsche is a misogynist. To hell with him. Robert c. Holub. Nietzsche and The Women's Question. http://wwwlearning. berkeley. edu/robertholub/teaching/syUabi/Lecture_Nietzsche_ Women. pdf 1999.


Nietzsche's final and perhaps most ludicrous remarks about the Women's Question occur in Ecce Homo. Declaring himself the "first psychologist of the eternal womanly"xxiv and the love-object of all woman, Nietzsche takes his parting shots at the movement trying to introduce equality between the sexes. Those who do not love him are "the abortive women, the 'emancipated' who lack the stuff for children" (EH 75). Here Nietzsche employs the stereotypical defamation for women who resist men and demand equal rights: they are abnormal, not feminine, and unable to procreate. At the same time that he claims all women love him, he simultaneously demonstrates a deep contempt: a woman is a "dangerous, creePing, subterranean little beast of prey"; they are more wicked than men; those who are good are aberrant; "goodness in a woman is already a form of degeneration" (EH 76). True to his biologism of the later years Nietzsche attributes to the "beautiful soul," a Goethean ideal of woman, a physiological disadvantage and categorizes the struggle for equal rights as a "symptom of sickness." He reserves his most venomous remarks, however, for the notion of "emancipation of women." For Nietzsche this ill-advised slogan is the instinctive hatred of the woman who has turned out ill. that is to say is incapable of bearing, for her who has turned out wellCthe struggle against 'man' is always only means, subtrefuge, tactic. When they elevate themselves as 'woman in herself, as 'higher woman', as 'idealist' woman, they want to lower the general level of rank of wom~n; no surer means for achieving that than high school education. trousers and the political rights of voting cattle. At bottom the emancipated are the anarchists in the world of the 'eternal womanly', the underprivileged whose deepest instinct is revenge. (EI-! 76) Amid this semi-insane raving of the near-mad philosopher, we can still glimpse the central motifs of his position on the Women's Question: the rejection of equality in politics and education, the destruction of hierarchy in the leveling of women, the natural, biological superiority of men, and therefore the futility of social emancipation. Nietzsche's solution to the Women's Question, like his solution to other social questions, lies in a hierarchical dystopia of the past projected into a future order. With these statements Nietzsche himself levels the - +subtleties and complexities that informed his views on women, as wellashis.-.---"-"early writings. His final legacy, articulated in an absolute rejection of modern values, unfortunately lacks the a.mbiguity that has otherwise made his philosophy so fascinatinq for subsequent generations. In his writings of the 1.880s Nietzsche made it difficult for emancipated women to subscribe to his thought; apparently, as recent trends in Nietzsche scholarship indicate, he did not make it quite hard enough.




Do not be taken in by their anti-moralist clammer, Ask a holocaust survivor if evil exists! The Alternative is complicit with the most horrific acts of human violence. Humanism may not be perfect but silence guarantees the perpetuation of a global crisis of civilization which threatens all1ife.

Ketels, 1996
The American Academy of Political and Social Science November, 1996· 548 Annals 45· THE HOLOCAUST; REMEMBERING FOR THE FUTURE: "Havel to the Castle!" The Power of the Word NAME: By VIOLET B. KETELS .. associate professor of English at Temple University)

THE political bestiality of our age is abetted by our vVillingncss to tolerate the dcconstructing of humanist values. The process begins with the cynical manipulation of language. It often ends in stupefying murderousness before which the world stands silent, frozen in impotent 'Iattentism"--a wait-and-see stance as unsuited to the human plight as a pacifier is to stopping up the hunger of a starving child. "We have let lapse our pledge to the 6 million Je,;vish victims of the Holocnust that their deaths might somehow be transfiguring for humankind. We allow "slaughterhouse men" tactical status at U.N. tables and "cast down our eyes when the depraved roar past." n1 Peacemakers, delegated by us and circumscribed by our fears, temporize with thugs who have revived lebensraum claims more boldly than Hitler did. In the Germany of the 1930s, a demonic. idea was born in a demented brain; the 'word went forth; orders were given, repeated, widely broadcast; and men, women, and children were herded into death camps. Their offshore signals, cries for help, did not summon us to rescue. We had become inured to the reality of human suffering. We could no longer hear what the words meant or did not credit them or not enough of us joined the chorus. Shrieking victims perished in the cold blankness of inhumane silence. We were deaf to the apocalyptic urgency in Solzhenitsyn's declaration from the Gulag that we must check the disastrous course of history. We were heedless of the lesson of his experience that only the unbending strength of the human spirit. fully taking its stand on the shifting frontier of encroaching violence and declaring "not one step further," though death may be the end of it-only this unwavering firmness offers anY genuine defense of peace for the individual, of genuine peace for mankind at large. n2

In past human crises, writers and thinkers strained language to the breaking point to keep alive the memory of the unimaginable, to keep the human conscience from forgetting. In the current context, however, intellectuals seem more devoted to abstract assaults on values than to thoughtful probing of the moral dimensions of human experience.
---~---- .."Heirs.of.the.ancient possessions of higher knowledge and 1iteracy ..skills,~'n3.wes.eem to hay~e .. __ lost our nerve, and not only because of Holocaust history and its tragic aftermath. We feel insecure before the empirical absolutes of hard science. We are intimidated by the "high modernist rage against mimesis and content," n4 monstrous progeny of the union between Nietzsche and philosophical form.alism, the grim proposal we have bought into that there is no truth, no objectivity, and no disinterested lmowledge. nS Less certain about the power of language, that "oldest flame of the [*47] humanist soul," n6 to :frame a credo to live by or criteria to judge by. we are vulnerable even to the discredited Paul de Man's indecent hint that "wars and revolutions are not empirical events ... but 'texts' masquerading as facts." n7 Truth and reality seem more elusive than they ever were in the past; values are pronounced to be mere fIctions of ruling elites to retain power. We are embarrassed by



Words collide and crack under these new skeptical strains, dissolving into banalities the colossal enormity of what must be expressed lest we forget. Remembering for the future has become doubly dispiriting by our having to remember for the present, too, our having to register and confront what is wrong here and now. The reality to be fixed in memory shifts as we seek words for it; the memory we set down is flawed by our subjectivities. It is selective, deceptive, partial, unreliable, and amoral. It plays tricks and can be invented. It stops up its ears to shut out what it does not dare to face. n8 Lodged in our brains; such axioms, certified by science and statistics, tempt us to concede the final irrelevance of words and memory. We have to get on with our lives. Besides, memories reconstructed in words, even when they are documented by evidence, have not often changed the world or fended off the powerful seductions to silence, forgetting, or denying. Especially denying, which, in the case of the Holocaust, has become an obscene industry competing in the open market of ideas for control of our sense of the past. It is said that the Holocaust never happened. Revisionist history with a vengeance is purveyed in words; something in words must be set against it. Yet what? How do we nerve to the task when we are increasingly disposed to cast both words and memory in a condition of cryogenic dubiety? Not only before but also since 1945, the criminality of governments, paraded as politics and fattening on linguistic manipulation and deliberately reimplanted memory of past real or imagined grievance, has spread calamity across the planet. "The cancer that has eaten at the entrails of Yugoslavia since Tito's death [has] Kosovo for its locus," but not merely as a piece of land. The country's rogue adventurers use the word "Kosovo" to reinvoke as sacred the land where Serbs were defeated by Turks in 13891 09 Memory of bloody massacres in 1389, sloganized and distorted in 1989, demands the bloody revenge of new massacres and returns civilization not to its past glory but to its gory tribal wars. As Matija Beckovic, the bard of Serb nationalism, writes, "It is as if the Serbian people waged only one battle--by widening the Kosovo charnel-house, by adding wailing upon wailing, by counting new martyrs to the martyrs of Kosovo .... Kosovo is the Serbianized [*48] history of the Flood--the Serbian New Testament." n10 A cover of Suddeuische Zeitung in 1994 was printed with blood donated by refugee women from Bosnia in an eerily perverse afterbirth of violence revisited. nl l We stand benumbed before mUltiplying horrors. As Vaclav Havel warned more than a decade ago, regimes that generate 111em"are ilie avant garde of a global crisis in civilization." The depersonalization of power in "system, ideology and apparat," pathological suspicions about ,._-_. ··----i1uman motives and meanings, the loosening of individual responsibility, the swiftness by which -~~~---~--.--~disastrous events follow one upon another "have deprived us of our conscience, of our COillmon sense and natural speech and thereby, of our actual hUinanity." n12 Nothing less than the transformation of human consciousness is likely to rescue us

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