Aristotle - Works [Translated under the editorship of W. D.

Ross]

Organon I – Categories Organon II - On Interpretation Organon III - Prior Analytics Organon IV - Posterior Analytics Organon V – Topics Organon VI - On Sophistical Refutations Physics On the Heavens On Generation and Corruption Meteorology On the Soul Parva Naturalia History of Animals On the Parts of Animals On the Motion of Animals On the Gait of Animals On the Generation of Animals Metaphysics Nicomachean Ethics Politics Athenian Constitution Rhetoric Poetics

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Aristotle – Categories [Translated by E. M. Edghill]

1 Things are said to be named ‘equivocally’ when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to the name ‘animal’; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an animal, his definition in the one case will be appropriate to that case only. On the other hand, things are said to be named ‘univocally’ which have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common. A man and an ox are both ‘animal’, and these are univocally so named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is the same in both cases: for if a man should state in what sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case would be identical with that in the other. Things are said to be named ‘derivatively’, which derive their name from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the grammarian derives his name from the word ‘grammar’, and the courageous man from the word ‘courage’.

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2 Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the latter are such expressions as ‘the man runs’, ‘the man wins’; of the former ‘man’, ‘ox’, ‘runs’, ‘wins’. Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never present in a subject. Thus ‘man’ is predicable of the individual man, and is never present in a subject. By being ‘present in a subject’ I do not mean present as parts are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the said subject. Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not predicable of any subject; or again, a certain whiteness may be present in the body (for colour requires a material basis), yet it is never predicable of anything. Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is predicable of grammar. There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the individual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which is individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable of a subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in a subject.

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3 When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the subject. Thus, ‘man’ is predicated of the individual man; but ‘animal’ is predicated of ‘man’; it will, therefore, be predicable of the individual man also: for the individual man is both ‘man’ and ‘animal’. If genera are different and co-ordinate, their differentiae are themselves different in kind. Take as an instance the genus ‘animal’ and the genus ‘knowledge’. ‘With feet’, ‘two-footed’, ‘winged’, ‘aquatic’, are differentiae of ‘animal’; the species of knowledge are not distinguished by the same differentiae. One species of knowledge does not differ from another in being ‘two-footed’. But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing to prevent their having the same differentiae: for the greater class is predicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae of the predicate will be differentiae also of the subject.

4 Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance are ‘man’ or ‘the horse’, of quantity, such terms as ‘two cubits long’ or ‘three cubits long’, of quality, such attributes as ‘white’, ‘grammatical’. ‘Double’, ‘half’, ‘greater’, fall under the category of relation; ‘in a the market place’, ‘in the Lyceum’, under that of place; ‘yesterday’, ‘last year’, under that of time. ‘Lying’, ‘sitting’,

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are terms indicating position, ‘shod’, ‘armed’, state; ‘to lance’, ‘to cauterize’, action; ‘to be lanced’, ‘to be cauterized’, affection. No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; it is by the combination of such terms that positive or negative statements arise. For every assertion must, as is admitted, be either true or false, whereas expressions which are not in any way composite such as ‘man’, ‘white’, ‘runs’, ‘wins’, cannot be either true or false.

5 Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse. But in a secondary sense those things are called substances within which, as species, the primary substances are included; also those which, as genera, include the species. For instance, the individual man is included in the species ‘man’, and the genus to which the species belongs is ‘animal’; these, therefore – that is to say, the species ‘man’ and the genus ‘animal, – are termed secondary substances. It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the definition of the predicate must be predicable of the subject. For instance, ‘man’ is predicted of the individual man. Now in this case the name of the species man’ is applied to the individual, for we use the term ‘man’ in describing the individual; and the definition of ‘man’ will also be predicated of the individual man, for the individual man is both man and animal. Thus, both the name and the definition of the species are predicable of the individual.

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With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present in a subject, it is generally the case that neither their name nor their definition is predicable of that in which they are present. Though, however, the definition is never predicable, there is nothing in certain cases to prevent the name being used. For instance, ‘white’ being present in a body is predicated of that in which it is present, for a body is called white: the definition, however, of the colour white’ is never predicable of the body. Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary substance or present in a primary substance. This becomes evident by reference to particular instances which occur. ‘Animal’ is predicated of the species ‘man’, therefore of the individual man, for if there were no individual man of whom it could be predicated, it could not be predicated of the species ‘man’ at all. Again, colour is present in body, therefore in individual bodies, for if there were no individual body in which it was present, it could not be present in body at all. Thus everything except primary substances is either predicated of primary substances, or is present in them, and if these last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist. Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than the genus, being more nearly related to primary substance. For if any one should render an account of what a primary substance is, he would render a more instructive account, and one more proper to the subject, by stating the species than by stating the genus. Thus, he would give a more instructive account of an individual man by stating that he was man than by stating that he was animal, for the former description is peculiar to the individual in a greater degree, while the latter is too general. Again, the man who gives an account of the nature of an individual tree will give a more instructive account by

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mentioning the species ‘tree’ than by mentioning the genus ‘plant’. Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances in virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie every. else, and that everything else is either predicated of them or present in them. Now the same relation which subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists also between the species and the genus: for the species is to the genus as subject is to predicate, since the genus is predicated of the species, whereas the species cannot be predicated of the genus. Thus we have a second ground for asserting that the species is more truly substance than the genus. Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera, no one is more truly substance than another. We should not give a more appropriate account of the individual man by stating the species to which he belonged, than we should of an individual horse by adopting the same method of definition. In the same way, of primary substances, no one is more truly substance than another; an individual man is not more truly substance than an individual ox. It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we exclude primary substances, we concede to species and genera alone the name ‘secondary substance’, for these alone of all the predicates convey a knowledge of primary substance. For it is by stating the species or the genus that we appropriately define any individual man; and we shall make our definition more exact by stating the former than by stating the latter. All other things that we state, such as that he is white, that he runs, and so on, are irrelevant to the definition. Thus it is just that these alone, apart from primary substances, should be called substances.

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Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because they underlie and are the subjects of everything else. Now the same relation that subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists also between the species and the genus to which the primary substance belongs, on the one hand, and every attribute which is not included within these, on the other. For these are the subjects of all such. If we call an individual man ‘skilled in grammar’, the predicate is applicable also to the species and to the genus to which he belongs. This law holds good in all cases. It is a common characteristic of all sub. stance that it is never present in a subject. For primary substance is neither present in a subject nor predicated of a subject; while, with regard to secondary substances, it is clear from the following arguments (apart from others) that they are not present in a subject. For ‘man’ is predicated of the individual man, but is not present in any subject: for manhood is not present in the individual man. In the same way, ‘animal’ is also predicated of the individual man, but is not present in him. Again, when a thing is present in a subject, though the name may quite well be applied to that in which it is present, the definition cannot be applied. Yet of secondary substances, not only the name, but also the definition, applies to the subject: we should use both the definition of the species and that of the genus with reference to the individual man. Thus substance cannot be present in a subject. Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the case that differentiae cannot be present in subjects. The characteristics ‘terrestrial’ and ‘two-footed’ are predicated of the species ‘man’, but not present in it. For they are not in man. Moreover, the definition of the differentia may be predicated of that of which the differentia itself is predicated. For instance, if the characteristic ‘terrestrial’ is predicated of the species ‘man’, the

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definition also of that characteristic may be used to form the predicate of the species ‘man’: for ‘man’ is terrestrial. The fact that the parts of substances appear to be present in the whole, as in a subject, should not make us apprehensive lest we should have to admit that such parts are not substances: for in explaining the phrase ‘being present in a subject’, we stated’ that we meant ‘otherwise than as parts in a whole’. It is the mark of substances and of differentiae that, in all propositions of which they form the predicate, they are predicated univocally. For all such propositions have for their subject either the individual or the species. It is true that, inasmuch as primary substance is not predicable of anything, it can never form the predicate of any proposition. But of secondary substances, the species is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and of the individual. Similarly the differentiae are predicated of the species and of the individuals. Moreover, the definition of the species and that of the genus are applicable to the primary substance, and that of the genus to the species. For all that is predicated of the predicate will be predicated also of the subject. Similarly, the definition of the differentiae will be applicable to the species and to the individuals. But it was stated above that the word ‘univocal’ was applied to those things which had both name and definition in common. It is, therefore, established that in every proposition, of which either substance or a differentia forms the predicate, these are predicated univocally. All substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the case of primary substance this is indisputably true, for the thing is a unit. In the case of secondary substances, when we speak, for instance, of ‘man’ or ‘animal’, our form of speech gives the impression that we are here also indicating that which is individual, but the impression is not strictly true; for a

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secondary substance is not an individual, but a class with a certain qualification; for it is not one and single as a primary substance is; the words ‘man’, ‘animal’, are predicable of more than one subject. Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the term ‘white’; ‘white’ indicates quality and nothing further, but species and genus determine the quality with reference to a substance: they signify substance qualitatively differentiated. The determinate qualification covers a larger field in the case of the genus that in that of the species: he who uses the word ‘animal’ is herein using a word of wider extension than he who uses the word ‘man’. Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could be the contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man or animal? It has none. Nor can the species or the genus have a contrary. Yet this characteristic is not peculiar to substance, but is true of many other things, such as quantity. There is nothing that forms the contrary of ‘two cubits long’ or of ‘three cubits long’, or of ‘ten’, or of any such term. A man may contend that ‘much’ is the contrary of ‘little’, or ‘great’ of ‘small’, but of definite quantitative terms no contrary exists. Substance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of degree. I do not mean by this that one substance cannot be more or less truly substance than another, for it has already been stated’ that this is the case; but that no single substance admits of varying degrees within itself. For instance, one particular substance, ‘man’, cannot be more or less man either than himself at some other time or than some other man. One man cannot be more man than another, as that which is white may be more or less white than some other white object, or as that which is beautiful may be more or less beautiful than some other beautiful object. The same quality, moreover, is said to

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subsist in a thing in varying degrees at different times. A body, being white, is said to be whiter at one time than it was before, or, being warm, is said to be warmer or less warm than at some other time. But substance is not said to be more or less that which it is: a man is not more truly a man at one time than he was before, nor is anything, if it is substance, more or less what it is. Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree. The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities. From among things other than substance, we should find ourselves unable to bring forward any which possessed this mark. Thus, one and the same colour cannot be white and black. Nor can the same one action be good and bad: this law holds good with everything that is not substance. But one and the selfsame substance, while retaining its identity, is yet capable of admitting contrary qualities. The same individual person is at one time white, at another black, at one time warm, at another cold, at one time good, at another bad. This capacity is found nowhere else, though it might be maintained that a statement or opinion was an exception to the rule. The same statement, it is agreed, can be both true and false. For if the statement ‘he is sitting’ is true, yet, when the person in question has risen, the same statement will be false. The same applies to opinions. For if any one thinks truly that a person is sitting, yet, when that person has risen, this same opinion, if still held, will be false. Yet although this exception may be allowed, there is, nevertheless, a difference in the manner in which the thing takes place. It is by themselves changing that substances admit contrary qualities. It is thus that that which was hot becomes cold, for it has entered into a different state. Similarly that which was white becomes black, and that which was bad good, by a process of change; and in the same way in all other cases it is by changing that substances are capable of admitting contrary qualities. But statements and
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opinions themselves remain unaltered in all respects: it is by the alteration in the facts of the case that the contrary quality comes to be theirs. The statement ‘he is sitting’ remains unaltered, but it is at one time true, at another false, according to circumstances. What has been said of statements applies also to opinions. Thus, in respect of the manner in which the thing takes place, it is the peculiar mark of substance that it should be capable of admitting contrary qualities; for it is by itself changing that it does so. If, then, a man should make this exception and contend that statements and opinions are capable of admitting contrary qualities, his contention is unsound. For statements and opinions are said to have this capacity, not because they themselves undergo modification, but because this modification occurs in the case of something else. The truth or falsity of a statement depends on facts, and not on any power on the part of the statement itself of admitting contrary qualities. In short, there is nothing which can alter the nature of statements and opinions. As, then, no change takes place in themselves, these cannot be said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities. But it is by reason of the modification which takes place within the substance itself that a substance is said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities; for a substance admits within itself either disease or health, whiteness or blackness. It is in this sense that it is said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities. To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities, the modification taking place through a change in the substance itself. Let these remarks suffice on the subject of substance.

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6 Quantity is either discrete or continuous. Moreover, some quantities are such that each part of the whole has a relative position to the other parts: others have within them no such relation of part to part. Instances of discrete quantities are number and speech; of continuous, lines, surfaces, solids, and, besides these, time and place. In the case of the parts of a number, there is no common boundary at which they join. For example: two fives make ten, but the two fives have no common boundary, but are separate; the parts three and seven also do not join at any boundary. Nor, to generalize, would it ever be possible in the case of number that there should be a common boundary among the parts; they are always separate. Number, therefore, is a discrete quantity. The same is true of speech. That speech is a quantity is evident: for it is measured in long and short syllables. I mean here that speech which is vocal. Moreover, it is a discrete quantity for its parts have no common boundary. There is no common boundary at which the syllables join, but each is separate and distinct from the rest. A line, on the other hand, is a continuous quantity, for it is possible to find a common boundary at which its parts join. In the case of the line, this common boundary is the point; in the case of the plane, it is the line: for the parts of the plane have also a common boundary. Similarly you can find a common boundary in the case of the parts of a solid, namely either a line or a plane.

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Space and time also belong to this class of quantities. Time, past, present, and future, forms a continuous whole. Space, likewise, is a continuous quantity; for the parts of a solid occupy a certain space, and these have a common boundary; it follows that the parts of space also, which are occupied by the parts of the solid, have the same common boundary as the parts of the solid. Thus, not only time, but space also, is a continuous quantity, for its parts have a common boundary. Quantities consist either of parts which bear a relative position each to each, or of parts which do not. The parts of a line bear a relative position to each other, for each lies somewhere, and it would be possible to distinguish each, and to state the position of each on the plane and to explain to what sort of part among the rest each was contiguous. Similarly the parts of a plane have position, for it could similarly be stated what was the position of each and what sort of parts were contiguous. The same is true with regard to the solid and to space. But it would be impossible to show that the arts of a number had a relative position each to each, or a particular position, or to state what parts were contiguous. Nor could this be done in the case of time, for none of the parts of time has an abiding existence, and that which does not abide can hardly have position. It would be better to say that such parts had a relative order, in virtue of one being prior to another. Similarly with number: in counting, ‘one’ is prior to ‘two’, and ‘two’ to ‘three’, and thus the parts of number may be said to possess a relative order, though it would be impossible to discover any distinct position for each. This holds good also in the case of speech. None of its parts has an abiding existence: when once a syllable is pronounced, it is not possible to retain it, so that, naturally, as the parts do not abide, they cannot have position. Thus, some quantities consist of parts which have position, and some of those which have not.

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Strictly speaking, only the things which I have mentioned belong to the category of quantity: everything else that is called quantitative is a quantity in a secondary sense. It is because we have in mind some one of these quantities, properly so called, that we apply quantitative terms to other things. We speak of what is white as large, because the surface over which the white extends is large; we speak of an action or a process as lengthy, because the time covered is long; these things cannot in their own right claim the quantitative epithet. For instance, should any one explain how long an action was, his statement would be made in terms of the time taken, to the effect that it lasted a year, or something of that sort. In the same way, he would explain the size of a white object in terms of surface, for he would state the area which it covered. Thus the things already mentioned, and these alone, are in their intrinsic nature quantities; nothing else can claim the name in its own right, but, if at all, only in a secondary sense. Quantities have no contraries. In the case of definite quantities this is obvious; thus, there is nothing that is the contrary of ‘two cubits long’ or of ‘three cubits long’, or of a surface, or of any such quantities. A man might, indeed, argue that ‘much’ was the contrary of ‘little’, and ‘great’ of ‘small’. But these are not quantitative, but relative; things are not great or small absolutely, they are so called rather as the result of an act of comparison. For instance, a mountain is called small, a grain large, in virtue of the fact that the latter is greater than others of its kind, the former less. Thus there is a reference here to an external standard, for if the terms ‘great’ and ‘small’ were used absolutely, a mountain would never be called small or a grain large. Again, we say that there are many people in a village, and few in Athens, although those in the city are many times as numerous as those in the village: or we say that a house has many in it, and a theatre few, though those in the theatre far outnumber those in the house. The terms ‘two cubits long,
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"three cubits long,’ and so on indicate quantity, the terms ‘great’ and ‘small’ indicate relation, for they have reference to an external standard. It is, therefore, plain that these are to be classed as relative. Again, whether we define them as quantitative or not, they have no contraries: for how can there be a contrary of an attribute which is not to be apprehended in or by itself, but only by reference to something external? Again, if ‘great’ and ‘small’ are contraries, it will come about that the same subject can admit contrary qualities at one and the same time, and that things will themselves be contrary to themselves. For it happens at times that the same thing is both small and great. For the same thing may be small in comparison with one thing, and great in comparison with another, so that the same thing comes to be both small and great at one and the same time, and is of such a nature as to admit contrary qualities at one and the same moment. Yet it was agreed, when substance was being discussed, that nothing admits contrary qualities at one and the same moment. For though substance is capable of admitting contrary qualities, yet no one is at the same time both sick and healthy, nothing is at the same time both white and black. Nor is there anything which is qualified in contrary ways at one and the same time. Moreover, if these were contraries, they would themselves be contrary to themselves. For if ‘great’ is the contrary of ‘small’, and the same thing is both great and small at the same time, then ‘small’ or ‘great’ is the contrary of itself. But this is impossible. The term ‘great’, therefore, is not the contrary of the term ‘small’, nor ‘much’ of ‘little’. And even though a man should call these terms not relative but quantitative, they would not have contraries.

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It is in the case of space that quantity most plausibly appears to admit of a contrary. For men define the term ‘above’ as the contrary of ‘below’, when it is the region at the centre they mean by ‘below’; and this is so, because nothing is farther from the extremities of the universe than the region at the centre. Indeed, it seems that in defining contraries of every kind men have recourse to a spatial metaphor, for they say that those things are contraries which, within the same class, are separated by the greatest possible distance. Quantity does not, it appears, admit of variation of degree. One thing cannot be two cubits long in a greater degree than another. Similarly with regard to number: what is ‘three’ is not more truly three than what is ‘five’ is five; nor is one set of three more truly three than another set. Again, one period of time is not said to be more truly time than another. Nor is there any other kind of quantity, of all that have been mentioned, with regard to which variation of degree can be predicated. The category of quantity, therefore, does not admit of variation of degree. The most distinctive mark of quantity is that equality and inequality are predicated of it. Each of the aforesaid quantities is said to be equal or unequal. For instance, one solid is said to be equal or unequal to another; number, too, and time can have these terms applied to them, indeed can all those kinds of quantity that have been mentioned. That which is not a quantity can by no means, it would seem, be termed equal or unequal to anything else. One particular disposition or one particular quality, such as whiteness, is by no means compared with another in terms of equality and inequality but rather in terms of similarity. Thus it is the distinctive mark of quantity that it can be called equal and unequal.

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7 Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of something else or related to something else, are explained by reference to that other thing. For instance, the word ‘superior’ is explained by reference to something else, for it is superiority over something else that is meant. Similarly, the expression ‘double’ has this external reference, for it is the double of something else that is meant. So it is with everything else of this kind. There are, moreover, other relatives, e.g. habit, disposition, perception, knowledge, and attitude. The significance of all these is explained by a reference to something else and in no other way. Thus, a habit is a habit of something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the attitude of something. So it is with all other relatives that have been mentioned. Those terms, then, are called relative, the nature of which is explained by reference to something else, the preposition ‘of’ or some other preposition being used to indicate the relation. Thus, one mountain is called great in comparison with son with another; for the mountain claims this attribute by comparison with something. Again, that which is called similar must be similar to something else, and all other such attributes have this external reference. It is to be noted that lying and standing and sitting are particular attitudes, but attitude is itself a relative term. To lie, to stand, to be seated, are not themselves attitudes, but take their name from the aforesaid attitudes. It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has a contrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowledge, too, has a contrary, ignorance. But this is not the mark of all relatives; ‘double’ and ‘triple’ have no contrary, nor indeed has any such term.

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It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree. For ‘like’ and ‘unlike’, ‘equal’ and ‘unequal’, have the modifications ‘more’ and ‘less’ applied to them, and each of these is relative in character: for the terms ‘like’ and ‘unequal’ bear ‘unequal’ bear a reference to something external. Yet, again, it is not every relative term that admits of variation of degree. No term such as ‘double’ admits of this modification. All relatives have correlatives: by the term ‘slave’ we mean the slave of a master, by the term ‘master’, the master of a slave; by ‘double’, the double of its hall; by ‘half’, the half of its double; by ‘greater’, greater than that which is less; by ‘less,’ less than that which is greater. So it is with every other relative term; but the case we use to express the correlation differs in some instances. Thus, by knowledge we mean knowledge the knowable; by the knowable, that which is to be apprehended by knowledge; by perception, perception of the perceptible; by the perceptible, that which is apprehended by perception. Sometimes, however, reciprocity of correlation does not appear to exist. This comes about when a blunder is made, and that to which the relative is related is not accurately stated. If a man states that a wing is necessarily relative to a bird, the connexion between these two will not be reciprocal, for it will not be possible to say that a bird is a bird by reason of its wings. The reason is that the original statement was inaccurate, for the wing is not said to be relative to the bird qua bird, since many creatures besides birds have wings, but qua winged creature. If, then, the statement is made accurate, the connexion will be reciprocal, for we can speak of a wing, having reference necessarily to a winged creature, and of a winged creature as being such because of its wings.

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Occasionally, perhaps, it is necessary to coin words, if no word exists by which a correlation can adequately be explained. If we define a rudder as necessarily having reference to a boat, our definition will not be appropriate, for the rudder does not have this reference to a boat qua boat, as there are boats which have no rudders. Thus we cannot use the terms reciprocally, for the word ‘boat’ cannot be said to find its explanation in the word ‘rudder’. As there is no existing word, our definition would perhaps be more accurate if we coined some word like ‘ruddered’ as the correlative of ‘rudder’. If we express ourselves thus accurately, at any rate the terms are reciprocally connected, for the ‘ruddered’ thing is ‘ruddered’ in virtue of its rudder. So it is in all other cases. A head will be more accurately defined as the correlative of that which is ‘headed’, than as that of an animal, for the animal does not have a head qua animal, since many animals have no head. Thus we may perhaps most easily comprehend that to which a thing is related, when a name does not exist, if, from that which has a name, we derive a new name, and apply it to that with which the first is reciprocally connected, as in the aforesaid instances, when we derived the word ‘winged’ from ‘wing’ and from ‘rudder’. All relatives, then, if properly defined, have a correlative. I add this condition because, if that to which they are related is stated as haphazard and not accurately, the two are not found to be interdependent. Let me state what I mean more clearly. Even in the case of acknowledged correlatives, and where names exist for each, there will be no interdependence if one of the two is denoted, not by that name which expresses the correlative notion, but by one of irrelevant significance. The term ‘slave,’ if defined as related, not to a master, but to a man, or a biped, or anything of that sort, is not reciprocally connected with that in relation to which it is defined, for the statement is not exact.

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Further, if one thing is said to be correlative with another, and the terminology used is correct, then, though all irrelevant attributes should be removed, and only that one attribute left in virtue of which it was correctly stated to be correlative with that other, the stated correlation will still exist. If the correlative of ‘the slave’ is said to be ‘the master’, then, though all irrelevant attributes of the said ‘master’, such as ‘biped’, ‘receptive of knowledge’, ‘human’, should be removed, and the attribute ‘master’ alone left, the stated correlation existing between him and the slave will remain the same, for it is of a master that a slave is said to be the slave. On the other hand, if, of two correlatives, one is not correctly termed, then, when all other attributes are removed and that alone is left in virtue of which it was stated to be correlative, the stated correlation will be found to have disappeared. For suppose the correlative of ‘the slave’ should be said to be ‘the man’, or the correlative of ‘the wing"the bird’; if the attribute ‘master’ be withdrawn from’ the man’, the correlation between ‘the man’ and ‘the slave’ will cease to exist, for if the man is not a master, the slave is not a slave. Similarly, if the attribute ‘winged’ be withdrawn from ‘the bird’, ‘the wing’ will no longer be relative; for if the so-called correlative is not winged, it follows that ‘the wing’ has no correlative. Thus it is essential that the correlated terms should be exactly designated; if there is a name existing, the statement will be easy; if not, it is doubtless our duty to construct names. When the terminology is thus correct, it is evident that all correlatives are interdependent. Correlatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously. This is for the most part true, as in the case of the double and the half. The existence of the half necessitates the existence of that of which it is a half. Similarly the existence of a master

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necessitates the existence of a slave, and that of a slave implies that of a master; these are merely instances of a general rule. Moreover, they cancel one another; for if there is no double it follows that there is no half, and vice versa; this rule also applies to all such correlatives. Yet it does not appear to be true in all cases that correlatives come into existence simultaneously. The object of knowledge would appear to exist before knowledge itself, for it is usually the case that we acquire knowledge of objects already existing; it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a branch of knowledge the beginning of the existence of which was contemporaneous with that of its object. Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to exist, cancels at the same time the knowledge which was its correlative, the converse of this is not true. It is true that if the object of knowledge does not exist there can be no knowledge: for there will no longer be anything to know. Yet it is equally true that, if knowledge of a certain object does not exist, the object may nevertheless quite well exist. Thus, in the case of the squaring of the circle, if indeed that process is an object of knowledge, though it itself exists as an object of knowledge, yet the knowledge of it has not yet come into existence. Again, if all animals ceased to exist, there would be no knowledge, but there might yet be many objects of knowledge. This is likewise the case with regard to perception: for the object of perception is, it appears, prior to the act of perception. If the perceptible is annihilated, perception also will cease to exist; but the annihilation of perception does not cancel the existence of the perceptible. For perception implies a body perceived and a body in which perception takes place. Now if that which is perceptible is annihilated, it follows that the body is annihilated, for the body is a perceptible thing; and if the body does not exist, it follows that perception also ceases to

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exist. Thus the annihilation of the perceptible involves that of perception. But the annihilation of perception does not involve that of the perceptible. For if the animal is annihilated, it follows that perception also is annihilated, but perceptibles such as body, heat, sweetness, bitterness, and so on, will remain. Again, perception is generated at the same time as the perceiving subject, for it comes into existence at the same time as the animal. But the perceptible surely exists before perception; for fire and water and such elements, out of which the animal is itself composed, exist before the animal is an animal at all, and before perception. Thus it would seem that the perceptible exists before perception. It may be questioned whether it is true that no substance is relative, as seems to be the case, or whether exception is to be made in the case of certain secondary substances. With regard to primary substances, it is quite true that there is no such possibility, for neither wholes nor parts of primary substances are relative. The individual man or ox is not defined with reference to something external. Similarly with the parts: a particular hand or head is not defined as a particular hand or head of a particular person, but as the hand or head of a particular person. It is true also, for the most part at least, in the case of secondary substances; the species ‘man’ and the species ‘ox’ are not defined with reference to anything outside themselves. Wood, again, is only relative in so far as it is some one’s property, not in so far as it is wood. It is plain, then, that in the cases mentioned substance is not relative. But with regard to some secondary substances there is a difference of opinion; thus, such terms as ‘head’ and ‘hand’ are defined with reference to that of which the things indicated are a part, and so it comes about that these appear to have a relative character. Indeed, if

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our definition of that which is relative was complete, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that no substance is relative. If, however, our definition was not complete, if those things only are properly called relative in the case of which relation to an external object is a necessary condition of existence, perhaps some explanation of the dilemma may be found. The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but the fact that a thing is explained with reference to something else does not make it essentially relative. From this it is plain that, if a man definitely apprehends a relative thing, he will also definitely apprehend that to which it is relative. Indeed this is self-evident: for if a man knows that some particular thing is relative, assuming that we call that a relative in the case of which relation to something is a necessary condition of existence, he knows that also to which it is related. For if he does not know at all that to which it is related, he will not know whether or not it is relative. This is clear, moreover, in particular instances. If a man knows definitely that such and such a thing is ‘double’, he will also forthwith know definitely that of which it is the double. For if there is nothing definite of which he knows it to be the double, he does not know at all that it is double. Again, if he knows that a thing is more beautiful, it follows necessarily that he will forthwith definitely know that also than which it is more beautiful. He will not merely know indefinitely that it is more beautiful than something which is less beautiful, for this would be supposition, not knowledge. For if he does not know definitely that than which it is more beautiful, he can no longer claim to know definitely that it is more beautiful than something else which is less beautiful: for it might be that nothing was less beautiful. It is, therefore, evident that if a man apprehends some relative thing definitely, he necessarily knows that also definitely to which it is related.

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Now the head, the hand, and such things are substances, and it is possible to know their essential character definitely, but it does not necessarily follow that we should know that to which they are related. It is not possible to know forthwith whose head or hand is meant. Thus these are not relatives, and, this being the case, it would be true to say that no substance is relative in character. It is perhaps a difficult matter, in such cases, to make a positive statement without more exhaustive examination, but to have raised questions with regard to details is not without advantage.

8 By ‘quality’ I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be such and such. Quality is a term that is used in many senses. One sort of quality let us call ‘habit’ or ‘disposition’. Habit differs from disposition in being more lasting and more firmly established. The various kinds of knowledge and of virtue are habits, for knowledge, even when acquired only in a moderate degree, is, it is agreed, abiding in its character and difficult to displace, unless some great mental upheaval takes place, through disease or any such cause. The virtues, also, such as justice, selfrestraint, and so on, are not easily dislodged or dismissed, so as to give place to vice. By a disposition, on the other hand, we mean a condition that is easily changed and quickly gives place to its opposite. Thus, heat, cold, disease, health, and so on are dispositions. For a man is disposed in one way or another with reference to these, but quickly changes, becoming cold instead of warm, ill instead of well. So it is with all other dispositions also, unless through
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lapse of time a disposition has itself become inveterate and almost impossible to dislodge: in which case we should perhaps go so far as to call it a habit. It is evident that men incline to call those conditions habits which are of a more or less permanent type and difficult to displace; for those who are not retentive of knowledge, but volatile, are not said to have such and such a ‘habit’ as regards knowledge, yet they are disposed, we may say, either better or worse, towards knowledge. Thus habit differs from disposition in this, that while the latter in ephemeral, the former is permanent and difficult to alter. Habits are at the same time dispositions, but dispositions are not necessarily habits. For those who have some specific habit may be said also, in virtue of that habit, to be thus or thus disposed; but those who are disposed in some specific way have not in all cases the corresponding habit. Another sort of quality is that in virtue of which, for example, we call men good boxers or runners, or healthy or sickly: in fact it includes all those terms which refer to inborn capacity or incapacity. Such things are not predicated of a person in virtue of his disposition, but in virtue of his inborn capacity or incapacity to do something with ease or to avoid defeat of any kind. Persons are called good boxers or good runners, not in virtue of such and such a disposition, but in virtue of an inborn capacity to accomplish something with ease. Men are called healthy in virtue of the inborn capacity of easy resistance to those unhealthy influences that may ordinarily arise; unhealthy, in virtue of the lack of this capacity. Similarly with regard to softness and hardness. Hardness is predicated of a thing because it has that capacity of resistance which enables it to withstand disintegration; softness, again, is predicated of a thing by reason of the lack of that capacity.

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A third class within this category is that of affective qualities and affections. Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of this sort of quality, together with all that is akin to these; heat, moreover, and cold, whiteness, and blackness are affective qualities. It is evident that these are qualities, for those things that possess them are themselves said to be such and such by reason of their presence. Honey is called sweet because it contains sweetness; the body is called white because it contains whiteness; and so in all other cases. The term ‘affective quality’ is not used as indicating that those things which admit these qualities are affected in any way. Honey is not called sweet because it is affected in a specific way, nor is this what is meant in any other instance. Similarly heat and cold are called affective qualities, not because those things which admit them are affected. What is meant is that these said qualities are capable of producing an ‘affection’ in the way of perception. For sweetness has the power of affecting the sense of taste; heat, that of touch; and so it is with the rest of these qualities. Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are not said to be affective qualities in this sense, but – because they themselves are the results of an affection. It is plain that many changes of colour take place because of affections. When a man is ashamed, he blushes; when he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so on. So true is this, that when a man is by nature liable to such affections, arising from some concomitance of elements in his constitution, it is a probable inference that he has the corresponding complexion of skin. For the same disposition of bodily elements, which in the former instance was momentarily present in the case of an access of shame, might be a result of a man’s natural temperament, so as to produce the corresponding colouring also as a natural characteristic. All conditions, therefore, of this kind, if caused by

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certain permanent and lasting affections, are called affective qualities. For pallor and duskiness of complexion are called qualities, inasmuch as we are said to be such and such in virtue of them, not only if they originate in natural constitution, but also if they come about through long disease or sunburn, and are difficult to remove, or indeed remain throughout life. For in the same way we are said to be such and such because of these. Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may easily be rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called, not qualities, but affections: for we are not said to be such virtue of them. The man who blushes through shame is not said to be a constitutional blusher, nor is the man who becomes pale through fear said to be constitutionally pale. He is said rather to have been affected. Thus such conditions are called affections, not qualities. In like manner there are affective qualities and affections of the soul. That temper with which a man is born and which has its origin in certain deep-seated affections is called a quality. I mean such conditions as insanity, irascibility, and so on: for people are said to be mad or irascible in virtue of these. Similarly those abnormal psychic states which are not inborn, but arise from the concomitance of certain other elements, and are difficult to remove, or altogether permanent, are called qualities, for in virtue of them men are said to be such and such. Those, however, which arise from causes easily rendered ineffective are called affections, not qualities. Suppose that a man is irritable when vexed: he is not even spoken of as a badtempered man, when in such circumstances he loses his temper somewhat, but rather is said to be affected. Such conditions are therefore termed, not qualities, but affections.

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The fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape that belongs to a thing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any other qualities of this type; each of these defines a thing as being such and such. Because it is triangular or quadrangular a thing is said to have a specific character, or again because it is straight or curved; in fact a thing’s shape in every case gives rise to a qualification of it. Rarity and density, roughness and smoothness, seem to be terms indicating quality: yet these, it would appear, really belong to a class different from that of quality. For it is rather a certain relative position of the parts composing the thing thus qualified which, it appears, is indicated by each of these terms. A thing is dense, owing to the fact that its parts are closely combined with one another; rare, because there are interstices between the parts; smooth, because its parts lie, so to speak, evenly; rough, because some parts project beyond others. There may be other sorts of quality, but those that are most properly so called have, we may safely say, been enumerated. These, then, are qualities, and the things that take their name from them as derivatives, or are in some other way dependent on them, are said to be qualified in some specific way. In most, indeed in almost all cases, the name of that which is qualified is derived from that of the quality. Thus the terms ‘whiteness’, ‘grammar’, ‘justice’, give us the adjectives ‘white’, ‘grammatical’, ‘just’, and so on. There are some cases, however, in which, as the quality under consideration has no name, it is impossible that those possessed of it should have a name that is derivative. For instance, the name given to the runner or boxer, who is so called in virtue of an inborn capacity, is not derived from that of any quality; for lob those capacities have no name assigned to them. In this, the inborn capacity is distinct from the science,

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with reference to which men are called, e.g. boxers or wrestlers. Such a science is classed as a disposition; it has a name, and is called ‘boxing’ or ‘wrestling’ as the case may be, and the name given to those disposed in this way is derived from that of the science. Sometimes, even though a name exists for the quality, that which takes its character from the quality has a name that is not a derivative. For instance, the upright man takes his character from the possession of the quality of integrity, but the name given him is not derived from the word ‘integrity’. Yet this does not occur often. We may therefore state that those things are said to be possessed of some specific quality which have a name derived from that of the aforesaid quality, or which are in some other way dependent on it. One quality may be the contrary of another; thus justice is the contrary of injustice, whiteness of blackness, and so on. The things, also, which are said to be such and such in virtue of these qualities, may be contrary the one to the other; for that which is unjust is contrary to that which is just, that which is white to that which is black. This, however, is not always the case. Red, yellow, and such colours, though qualities, have no contraries. If one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a quality. This will be evident from particular instances, if we apply the names used to denote the other categories; for instance, granted that justice is the contrary of injustice and justice is a quality, injustice will also be a quality: neither quantity, nor relation, nor place, nor indeed any other category but that of quality, will be applicable properly to injustice. So it is with all other contraries falling under the category of quality. Qualities admit of variation of degree. Whiteness is predicated of one thing in a greater or less degree than of another. This is

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also the case with reference to justice. Moreover, one and the same thing may exhibit a quality in a greater degree than it did before: if a thing is white, it may become whiter. Though this is generally the case, there are exceptions. For if we should say that justice admitted of variation of degree, difficulties might ensue, and this is true with regard to all those qualities which are dispositions. There are some, indeed, who dispute the possibility of variation here. They maintain that justice and health cannot very well admit of variation of degree themselves, but that people vary in the degree in which they possess these qualities, and that this is the case with grammatical learning and all those qualities which are classed as dispositions. However that may be, it is an incontrovertible fact that the things which in virtue of these qualities are said to be what they are vary in the degree in which they possess them; for one man is said to be better versed in grammar, or more healthy or just, than another, and so on. The qualities expressed by the terms ‘triangular’ and ‘quadrangular’ do not appear to admit of variation of degree, nor indeed do any that have to do with figure. For those things to which the definition of the triangle or circle is applicable are all equally triangular or circular. Those, on the other hand, to which the same definition is not applicable, cannot be said to differ from one another in degree; the square is no more a circle than the rectangle, for to neither is the definition of the circle appropriate. In short, if the definition of the term proposed is not applicable to both objects, they cannot be compared. Thus it is not all qualities which admit of variation of degree. Whereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned are peculiar to quality, the fact that likeness and unlikeness can be predicated with reference to quality only, gives to that category its distinctive feature. One thing is like another only with

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reference to that in virtue of which it is such and such; thus this forms the peculiar mark of quality. We must not be disturbed because it may be argued that, though proposing to discuss the category of quality, we have included in it many relative terms. We did say that habits and dispositions were relative. In practically all such cases the genus is relative, the individual not. Thus knowledge, as a genus, is explained by reference to something else, for we mean a knowledge of something. But particular branches of knowledge are not thus explained. The knowledge of grammar is not relative to anything external, nor is the knowledge of music, but these, if relative at all, are relative only in virtue of their genera; thus grammar is said be the knowledge of something, not the grammar of something; similarly music is the knowledge of something, not the music of something. Thus individual branches of knowledge are not relative. And it is because we possess these individual branches of knowledge that we are said to be such and such. It is these that we actually possess: we are called experts because we possess knowledge in some particular branch. Those particular branches, therefore, of knowledge, in virtue of which we are sometimes said to be such and such, are themselves qualities, and are not relative. Further, if anything should happen to fall within both the category of quality and that of relation, there would be nothing extraordinary in classing it under both these heads.

9 Action and affection both admit of contraries and also of variation of degree. Heating is the contrary of cooling, being heated of being cooled, being glad of being vexed. Thus they
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admit of contraries. They also admit of variation of degree: for it is possible to heat in a greater or less degree; also to be heated in a greater or less degree. Thus action and affection also admit of variation of degree. So much, then, is stated with regard to these categories. We spoke, moreover, of the category of position when we were dealing with that of relation, and stated that such terms derived their names from those of the corresponding attitudes. As for the rest, time, place, state, since they are easily intelligible, I say no more about them than was said at the beginning, that in the category of state are included such states as ‘shod’, ‘armed’, in that of place ‘in the Lyceum’ and so on, as was explained before.

10 The proposed categories have, then, been adequately dealt with. We must next explain the various senses in which the term ‘opposite’ is used. Things are said to be opposed in four senses: (i) as correlatives to one another, (ii) as contraries to one another, (iii) as privatives to positives, (iv) as affirmatives to negatives. Let me sketch my meaning in outline. An instance of the use of the word ‘opposite’ with reference to correlatives is afforded by the expressions ‘double’ and ‘half’; with reference to contraries by ‘bad’ and ‘good’. Opposites in the sense of ‘privatives’ and ‘positives’ are’ blindness’ and ‘sight’; in the sense of affirmatives and negatives, the propositions ‘he sits’, ‘he does not sit’.

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(i) Pairs of opposites which fall under the category of relation are explained by a reference of the one to the other, the reference being indicated by the preposition ‘of’ or by some other preposition. Thus, double is a relative term, for that which is double is explained as the double of something. Knowledge, again, is the opposite of the thing known, in the same sense; and the thing known also is explained by its relation to its opposite, knowledge. For the thing known is explained as that which is known by something, that is, by knowledge. Such things, then, as are opposite the one to the other in the sense of being correlatives are explained by a reference of the one to the other. (ii) Pairs of opposites which are contraries are not in any way interdependent, but are contrary the one to the other. The good is not spoken of as the good of the had, but as the contrary of the bad, nor is white spoken of as the white of the black, but as the contrary of the black. These two types of opposition are therefore distinct. Those contraries which are such that the subjects in which they are naturally present, or of which they are predicated, must necessarily contain either the one or the other of them, have no intermediate, but those in the case of which no such necessity obtains, always have an intermediate. Thus disease and health are naturally present in the body of an animal, and it is necessary that either the one or the other should be present in the body of an animal. Odd and even, again, are predicated of number, and it is necessary that the one or the other should be present in numbers. Now there is no intermediate between the terms of either of these two pairs. On the other hand, in those contraries with regard to which no such necessity obtains, we find an intermediate. Blackness and whiteness are naturally present in the body, but it is not necessary that either the one or the other should be present in the body, inasmuch as it is not true to say that everybody must be white or black. Badness and goodness, again, are predicated
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of man, and of many other things, but it is not necessary that either the one quality or the other should be present in that of which they are predicated: it is not true to say that everything that may be good or bad must be either good or bad. These pairs of contraries have intermediates: the intermediates between white and black are grey, sallow, and all the other colours that come between; the intermediate between good and bad is that which is neither the one nor the other. Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow and all the other colours that come between white and black; in other cases, however, it is not easy to name the intermediate, but we must define it as that which is not either extreme, as in the case of that which is neither good nor bad, neither just nor unjust. (iii) ‘privatives’ and ‘Positives’ have reference to the same subject. Thus, sight and blindness have reference to the eye. It is a universal rule that each of a pair of opposites of this type has reference to that to which the particular ‘positive’ is natural. We say that that is capable of some particular faculty or possession has suffered privation when the faculty or possession in question is in no way present in that in which, and at the time at which, it should naturally be present. We do not call that toothless which has not teeth, or that blind which has not sight, but rather that which has not teeth or sight at the time when by nature it should. For there are some creatures which from birth are without sight, or without teeth, but these are not called toothless or blind. To be without some faculty or to possess it is not the same as the corresponding ‘privative’ or ‘positive’. ‘Sight’ is a ‘positive’, ‘blindness’ a ‘privative’, but ‘to possess sight’ is not equivalent to ‘sight’, ‘to be blind’ is not equivalent to ‘blindness’. Blindness is a ‘privative’, to be blind is to be in a state of privation, but is

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not a ‘privative’. Moreover, if ‘blindness’ were equivalent to ‘being blind’, both would be predicated of the same subject; but though a man is said to be blind, he is by no means said to be blindness. To be in a state of ‘possession’ is, it appears, the opposite of being in a state of ‘privation’, just as ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ themselves are opposite. There is the same type of antithesis in both cases; for just as blindness is opposed to sight, so is being blind opposed to having sight. That which is affirmed or denied is not itself affirmation or denial. By ‘affirmation’ we mean an affirmative proposition, by ‘denial’ a negative. Now, those facts which form the matter of the affirmation or denial are not propositions; yet these two are said to be opposed in the same sense as the affirmation and denial, for in this case also the type of antithesis is the same. For as the affirmation is opposed to the denial, as in the two propositions ‘he sits’, ‘he does not sit’, so also the fact which constitutes the matter of the proposition in one case is opposed to that in the other, his sitting, that is to say, to his not sitting. It is evident that ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ are not opposed each to each in the same sense as relatives. The one is not explained by reference to the other; sight is not sight of blindness, nor is any other preposition used to indicate the relation. Similarly blindness is not said to be blindness of sight, but rather, privation of sight. Relatives, moreover, reciprocate; if blindness, therefore, were a relative, there would be a reciprocity of relation between it and that with which it was correlative. But this is not the case. Sight is not called the sight of blindness. That those terms which fall under the heads of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ are not opposed each to each as contraries, either, is plain from the following facts: Of a pair of contraries such that

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they have no intermediate, one or the other must needs be present in the subject in which they naturally subsist, or of which they are predicated; for it is those, as we proved,’ in the case of which this necessity obtains, that have no intermediate. Moreover, we cited health and disease, odd and even, as instances. But those contraries which have an intermediate are not subject to any such necessity. It is not necessary that every substance, receptive of such qualities, should be either black or white, cold or hot, for something intermediate between these contraries may very well be present in the subject. We proved, moreover, that those contraries have an intermediate in the case of which the said necessity does not obtain. Yet when one of the two contraries is a constitutive property of the subject, as it is a constitutive property of fire to be hot, of snow to be white, it is necessary determinately that one of the two contraries, not one or the other, should be present in the subject; for fire cannot be cold, or snow black. Thus, it is not the case here that one of the two must needs be present in every subject receptive of these qualities, but only in that subject of which the one forms a constitutive property. Moreover, in such cases it is one member of the pair determinately, and not either the one or the other, which must be present. In the case of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’, on the other hand, neither of the aforesaid statements holds good. For it is not necessary that a subject receptive of the qualities should always have either the one or the other; that which has not yet advanced to the state when sight is natural is not said either to be blind or to see. Thus ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ do not belong to that class of contraries which consists of those which have no intermediate. On the other hand, they do not belong either to that class which consists of contraries which have an intermediate. For under certain conditions it is necessary that either the one or the other should form part of the constitution of every appropriate subject. For when a thing has reached the
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stage when it is by nature capable of sight, it will be said either to see or to be blind, and that in an indeterminate sense, signifying that the capacity may be either present or absent; for it is not necessary either that it should see or that it should be blind, but that it should be either in the one state or in the other. Yet in the case of those contraries which have an intermediate we found that it was never necessary that either the one or the other should be present in every appropriate subject, but only that in certain subjects one of the pair should be present, and that in a determinate sense. It is, therefore, plain that ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ are not opposed each to each in either of the senses in which contraries are opposed. Again, in the case of contraries, it is possible that there should be changes from either into the other, while the subject retains its identity, unless indeed one of the contraries is a constitutive property of that subject, as heat is of fire. For it is possible that that that which is healthy should become diseased, that which is white, black, that which is cold, hot, that which is good, bad, that which is bad, good. The bad man, if he is being brought into a better way of life and thought, may make some advance, however slight, and if he should once improve, even ever so little, it is plain that he might change completely, or at any rate make very great progress; for a man becomes more and more easily moved to virtue, however small the improvement was at first. It is, therefore, natural to suppose that he will make yet greater progress than he has made in the past; and as this process goes on, it will change him completely and establish him in the contrary state, provided he is not hindered by lack of time. In the case of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’, however, change in both directions is impossible. There may be a change from possession to privation, but not from privation to possession. The man who has become blind does not regain his sight; the man who has become bald does not regain his hair; the man who has lost his teeth does not grow his grow a new set.
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(iv) Statements opposed as affirmation and negation belong manifestly to a class which is distinct, for in this case, and in this case only, it is necessary for the one opposite to be true and the other false. Neither in the case of contraries, nor in the case of correlatives, nor in the case of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’, is it necessary for one to be true and the other false. Health and disease are contraries: neither of them is true or false. ‘Double’ and ‘half’ are opposed to each other as correlatives: neither of them is true or false. The case is the same, of course, with regard to ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ such as ‘sight’ and ‘blindness’. In short, where there is no sort of combination of words, truth and falsity have no place, and all the opposites we have mentioned so far consist of simple words. At the same time, when the words which enter into opposed statements are contraries, these, more than any other set of opposites, would seem to claim this characteristic. ‘Socrates is ill’ is the contrary of ‘Socrates is well’, but not even of such composite expressions is it true to say that one of the pair must always be true and the other false. For if Socrates exists, one will be true and the other false, but if he does not exist, both will be false; for neither ‘Socrates is ill’ nor ‘Socrates is well’ is true, if Socrates does not exist at all. In the case of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’, if the subject does not exist at all, neither proposition is true, but even if the subject exists, it is not always the fact that one is true and the other false. For ‘Socrates has sight’ is the opposite of ‘Socrates is blind’ in the sense of the word ‘opposite’ which applies to possession and privation. Now if Socrates exists, it is not necessary that one should be true and the other false, for when he is not yet able to acquire the power of vision, both are false, as also if Socrates is altogether non-existent.

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But in the case of affirmation and negation, whether the subject exists or not, one is always false and the other true. For manifestly, if Socrates exists, one of the two propositions ‘Socrates is ill’, ‘Socrates is not ill’, is true, and the other false. This is likewise the case if he does not exist; for if he does not exist, to say that he is ill is false, to say that he is not ill is true. Thus it is in the case of those opposites only, which are opposite in the sense in which the term is used with reference to affirmation and negation, that the rule holds good, that one of the pair must be true and the other false.

11 That the contrary of a good is an evil is shown by induction: the contrary of health is disease, of courage, cowardice, and so on. But the contrary of an evil is sometimes a good, sometimes an evil. For defect, which is an evil, has excess for its contrary, this also being an evil, and the mean. which is a good, is equally the contrary of the one and of the other. It is only in a few cases, however, that we see instances of this: in most, the contrary of an evil is a good. In the case of contraries, it is not always necessary that if one exists the other should also exist: for if all become healthy there will be health and no disease, and again, if everything turns white, there will be white, but no black. Again, since the fact that Socrates is ill is the contrary of the fact that Socrates is well, and two contrary conditions cannot both obtain in one and the same individual at the same time, both these contraries could not exist at once: for if that Socrates was well was a fact, then that Socrates was ill could not possibly be one.

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It is plain that contrary attributes must needs be present in subjects which belong to the same species or genus. Disease and health require as their subject the body of an animal; white and black require a body, without further qualification; justice and injustice require as their subject the human soul. Moreover, it is necessary that pairs of contraries should in all cases either belong to the same genus or belong to contrary genera or be themselves genera. White and black belong to the same genus, colour; justice and injustice, to contrary genera, virtue and vice; while good and evil do not belong to genera, but are themselves actual genera, with terms under them.

12 There are four senses in which one thing can be said to be ‘prior’ to another. Primarily and most properly the term has reference to time: in this sense the word is used to indicate that one thing is older or more ancient than another, for the expressions ‘older’ and ‘more ancient’ imply greater length of time. Secondly, one thing is said to be ‘prior’ to another when the sequence of their being cannot be reversed. In this sense ‘one’ is ‘prior’ to ‘two’. For if ‘two’ exists, it follows directly that ‘one’ must exist, but if ‘one’ exists, it does not follow necessarily that ‘two’ exists: thus the sequence subsisting cannot be reversed. It is agreed, then, that when the sequence of two things cannot be reversed, then that one on which the other depends is called ‘prior’ to that other. In the third place, the term ‘prior’ is used with reference to any order, as in the case of science and of oratory. For in sciences

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which use demonstration there is that which is prior and that which is posterior in order; in geometry, the elements are prior to the propositions; in reading and writing, the letters of the alphabet are prior to the syllables. Similarly, in the case of speeches, the exordium is prior in order to the narrative. Besides these senses of the word, there is a fourth. That which is better and more honourable is said to have a natural priority. In common parlance men speak of those whom they honour and love as ‘coming first’ with them. This sense of the word is perhaps the most far-fetched. Such, then, are the different senses in which the term ‘prior’ is used. Yet it would seem that besides those mentioned there is yet another. For in those things, the being of each of which implies that of the other, that which is in any way the cause may reasonably be said to be by nature ‘prior’ to the effect. It is plain that there are instances of this. The fact of the being of a man carries with it the truth of the proposition that he is, and the implication is reciprocal: for if a man is, the proposition wherein we allege that he is true, and conversely, if the proposition wherein we allege that he is true, then he is. The true proposition, however, is in no way the cause of the being of the man, but the fact of the man’s being does seem somehow to be the cause of the truth of the proposition, for the truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact of the man’s being or not being. Thus the word ‘prior’ may be used in five senses.

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13 The term ‘simultaneous’ is primarily and most appropriately applied to those things the genesis of the one of which is simultaneous with that of the other; for in such cases neither is prior or posterior to the other. Such things are said to be simultaneous in point of time. Those things, again, are ‘simultaneous’ in point of nature, the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is the cause of the other’s being. This is the case with regard to the double and the half, for these are reciprocally dependent, since, if there is a double, there is also a half, and if there is a half, there is also a double, while at the same time neither is the cause of the being of the other. Again, those species which are distinguished one from another and opposed one to another within the same genus are said to be ‘simultaneous’ in nature. I mean those species which are distinguished each from each by one and the same method of division. Thus the ‘winged’ species is simultaneous with the ‘terrestrial’ and the ‘water’ species. These are distinguished within the same genus, and are opposed each to each, for the genus ‘animal’ has the ‘winged’, the ‘terrestrial’, and the ‘water’ species, and no one of these is prior or posterior to another; on the contrary, all such things appear to be ‘simultaneous’ in nature. Each of these also, the terrestrial, the winged, and the water species, can be divided again into subspecies. Those species, then, also will be ‘simultaneous’ point of nature, which, belonging to the same genus, are distinguished each from each by one and the same method of differentiation. But genera are prior to species, for the sequence of their being cannot be reversed. If there is the species ‘water-animal’, there will be the genus ‘animal’, but granted the being of the genus

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‘animal’, it does not follow necessarily that there will be the species ‘water-animal’. Those things, therefore, are said to be ‘simultaneous’ in nature, the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is in any way the cause of the other’s being; those species, also, which are distinguished each from each and opposed within the same genus. Those things, moreover, are ‘simultaneous’ in the unqualified sense of the word which come into being at the same time.

14 There are six sorts of movement: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place. It is evident in all but one case that all these sorts of movement are distinct each from each. Generation is distinct from destruction, increase and change of place from diminution, and so on. But in the case of alteration it may be argued that the process necessarily implies one or other of the other five sorts of motion. This is not true, for we may say that all affections, or nearly all, produce in us an alteration which is distinct from all other sorts of motion, for that which is affected need not suffer either increase or diminution or any of the other sorts of motion. Thus alteration is a distinct sort of motion; for, if it were not, the thing altered would not only be altered, but would forthwith necessarily suffer increase or diminution or some one of the other sorts of motion in addition; which as a matter of fact is not the case. Similarly that which was undergoing the process of increase or was subject to some other sort of motion would, if alteration were not a distinct form of motion, necessarily be subject to alteration also. But there are some
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things which undergo increase but yet not alteration. The square, for instance, if a gnomon is applied to it, undergoes increase but not alteration, and so it is with all other figures of this sort. Alteration and increase, therefore, are distinct. Speaking generally, rest is the contrary of motion. But the different forms of motion have their own contraries in other forms; thus destruction is the contrary of generation, diminution of increase, rest in a place, of change of place. As for this last, change in the reverse direction would seem to be most truly its contrary; thus motion upwards is the contrary of motion downwards and vice versa. In the case of that sort of motion which yet remains, of those that have been enumerated, it is not easy to state what is its contrary. It appears to have no contrary, unless one should define the contrary here also either as ‘rest in its quality’ or as ‘change in the direction of the contrary quality’, just as we defined the contrary of change of place either as rest in a place or as change in the reverse direction. For a thing is altered when change of quality takes place; therefore either rest in its quality or change in the direction of the contrary may be called the contrary of this qualitative form of motion. In this way becoming white is the contrary of becoming black; there is alteration in the contrary direction, since a change of a qualitative nature takes place.

15 The term ‘to have’ is used in various senses. In the first place it is used with reference to habit or disposition or any other quality, for we are said to ‘have’ a piece of knowledge or a virtue. Then, again, it has reference to quantity, as, for instance, in the
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case of a man’s height; for he is said to ‘have’ a height of three or four cubits. It is used, moreover, with regard to apparel, a man being said to ‘have’ a coat or tunic; or in respect of something which we have on a part of ourselves, as a ring on the hand: or in respect of something which is a part of us, as hand or foot. The term refers also to content, as in the case of a vessel and wheat, or of a jar and wine; a jar is said to ‘have’ wine, and a corn-measure wheat. The expression in such cases has reference to content. Or it refers to that which has been acquired; we are said to ‘have’ a house or a field. A man is also said to ‘have’ a wife, and a wife a husband, and this appears to be the most remote meaning of the term, for by the use of it we mean simply that the husband lives with the wife. Other senses of the word might perhaps be found, but the most ordinary ones have all been enumerated.

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Aristotle - On Interpretation [Translated by E. M. Edghill]

1 First we must define the terms ‘noun’ and ‘verb’, then the terms ‘denial’ and ‘affirmation’, then ‘proposition’ and ‘sentence.’ Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images. This matter has, however, been discussed in my treatise about the soul, for it belongs to an investigation distinct from that which lies before us. As there are in the mind thoughts which do not involve truth or falsity, and also those which must be either true or false, so it is in speech. For truth and falsity imply combination and separation. Nouns and verbs, provided nothing is added, are like thoughts without combination or separation; ‘man’ and ‘white’, as isolated terms, are not yet either true or false. In proof of this, consider the word ‘goat-stag.’ It has significance, but there is no truth or falsity about it, unless ‘is’ or ‘is not’ is added, either in the present or in some other tense.

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2 By a noun we mean a sound significant by convention, which has no reference to time, and of which no part is significant apart from the rest. In the noun ‘Fairsteed,’ the part ‘steed’ has no significance in and by itself, as in the phrase ‘fair steed.’ Yet there is a difference between simple and composite nouns; for in the former the part is in no way significant, in the latter it contributes to the meaning of the whole, although it has not an independent meaning. Thus in the word ‘pirate-boat’ the word ‘boat’ has no meaning except as part of the whole word. The limitation ‘by convention’ was introduced because nothing is by nature a noun or name – it is only so when it becomes a symbol; inarticulate sounds, such as those which brutes produce, are significant, yet none of these constitutes a noun. The expression ‘not-man’ is not a noun. There is indeed no recognized term by which we may denote such an expression, for it is not a sentence or a denial. Let it then be called an indefinite noun. The expressions ‘of Philo’, ‘to Philo’, and so on, constitute not nouns, but cases of a noun. The definition of these cases of a noun is in other respects the same as that of the noun proper, but, when coupled with ‘is’, ‘was’, or will be’, they do not, as they are, form a proposition either true or false, and this the noun proper always does, under these conditions. Take the words ‘of Philo is’ or ‘of or ‘of Philo is not’; these words do not, as they stand, form either a true or a false proposition.

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3 A verb is that which, in addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the notion of time. No part of it has any independent meaning, and it is a sign of something said of something else. I will explain what I mean by saying that it carries with it the notion of time. ‘Health’ is a noun, but ‘is healthy’ is a verb; for besides its proper meaning it indicates the present existence of the state in question. Moreover, a verb is always a sign of something said of something else, i.e. of something either predicable of or present in some other thing. Such expressions as ‘is not-healthy’, ‘is not, ill’, I do not describe as verbs; for though they carry the additional note of time, and always form a predicate, there is no specified name for this variety; but let them be called indefinite verbs, since they apply equally well to that which exists and to that which does not. Similarly ‘he was healthy’, ‘he will be healthy’, are not verbs, but tenses of a verb; the difference lies in the fact that the verb indicates present time, while the tenses of the verb indicate those times which lie outside the present. Verbs in and by themselves are substantival and have significance, for he who uses such expressions arrests the hearer’s mind, and fixes his attention; but they do not, as they stand, express any judgement, either positive or negative. For neither are ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ the participle ‘being’ significant of any fact, unless something is added; for they do not themselves indicate anything, but imply a copulation, of which we cannot form a conception apart from the things coupled.

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4 A sentence is a significant portion of speech, some parts of which have an independent meaning, that is to say, as an utterance, though not as the expression of any positive judgement. Let me explain. The word ‘human’ has meaning, but does not constitute a proposition, either positive or negative. It is only when other words are added that the whole will form an affirmation or denial. But if we separate one syllable of the word ‘human’ from the other, it has no meaning; similarly in the word ‘mouse’, the part ‘ouse’ has no meaning in itself, but is merely a sound. In composite words, indeed, the parts contribute to the meaning of the whole; yet, as has been pointed out, they have not an independent meaning. Every sentence has meaning, not as being the natural means by which a physical faculty is realized, but, as we have said, by convention. Yet every sentence is not a proposition; only such are propositions as have in them either truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is a sentence, but is neither true nor false. Let us therefore dismiss all other types of sentence but the proposition, for this last concerns our present inquiry, whereas the investigation of the others belongs rather to the study of rhetoric or of poetry.

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5 The first class of simple propositions is the simple affirmation, the next, the simple denial; all others are only one by conjunction. Every proposition must contain a verb or the tense of a verb. The phrase which defines the species ‘man’, if no verb in present, past, or future time be added, is not a proposition. It may be asked how the expression ‘a footed animal with two feet’ can be called single; for it is not the circumstance that the words follow in unbroken succession that effects the unity. This inquiry, however, finds its place in an investigation foreign to that before us. We call those propositions single which indicate a single fact, or the conjunction of the parts of which results in unity: those propositions, on the other hand, are separate and many in number, which indicate many facts, or whose parts have no conjunction. Let us, moreover, consent to call a noun or a verb an expression only, and not a proposition, since it is not possible for a man to speak in this way when he is expressing something, in such a way as to make a statement, whether his utterance is an answer to a question or an act of his own initiation. To return: of propositions one kind is simple, i.e. that which asserts or denies something of something, the other composite, i.e. that which is compounded of simple propositions. A simple proposition is a statement, with meaning, as to the presence of something in a subject or its absence, in the present, past, or future, according to the divisions of time.

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6 An affirmation is a positive assertion of something about something, a denial a negative assertion. Now it is possible both to affirm and to deny the presence of something which is present or of something which is not, and since these same affirmations and denials are possible with reference to those times which lie outside the present, it would be possible to contradict any affirmation or denial. Thus it is plain that every affirmation has an opposite denial, and similarly every denial an opposite affirmation. We will call such a pair of propositions a pair of contradictories. Those positive and negative propositions are said to be contradictory which have the same subject and predicate. The identity of subject and of predicate must not be ‘equivocal’. Indeed there are definitive qualifications besides this, which we make to meet the casuistries of sophists.

7 Some things are universal, others individual. By the term ‘universal’ I mean that which is of such a nature as to be predicated of many subjects, by ‘individual’ that which is not thus predicated. Thus ‘man’ is a universal, ‘Callias’ an individual. Our propositions necessarily sometimes concern a universal subject, sometimes an individual. If, then, a man states a positive and a negative proposition of universal character with regard to a universal, these two propositions are ‘contrary’. By the expression ‘a proposition of
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universal character with regard to a universal’, such propositions as ‘every man is white’, ‘no man is white’ are meant. When, on the other hand, the positive and negative propositions, though they have regard to a universal, are yet not of universal character, they will not be contrary, albeit the meaning intended is sometimes contrary. As instances of propositions made with regard to a universal, but not of universal character, we may take the ‘propositions ‘man is white’, ‘man is not white’. ‘Man’ is a universal, but the proposition is not made as of universal character; for the word ‘every’ does not make the subject a universal, but rather gives the proposition a universal character. If, however, both predicate and subject are distributed, the proposition thus constituted is contrary to truth; no affirmation will, under such circumstances, be true. The proposition ‘every man is every animal’ is an example of this type. An affirmation is opposed to a denial in the sense which I denote by the term ‘contradictory’, when, while the subject remains the same, the affirmation is of universal character and the denial is not. The affirmation ‘every man is white’ is the contradictory of the denial ‘not every man is white’, or again, the proposition ‘no man is white’ is the contradictory of the proposition ‘some men are white’. But propositions are opposed as contraries when both the affirmation and the denial are universal, as in the sentences ‘every man is white’, ‘no man is white’, ‘every man is just’, ‘no man is just’. We see that in a pair of this sort both propositions cannot be true, but the contradictories of a pair of contraries can sometimes both be true with reference to the same subject; for instance ‘not every man is white’ and some men are white’ are both true. Of such corresponding positive and negative propositions as refer to universals and have a universal character, one must be true and the other false. This is the case

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also when the reference is to individuals, as in the propositions ‘Socrates is white’, ‘Socrates is not white’. When, on the other hand, the reference is to universals, but the propositions are not universal, it is not always the case that one is true and the other false, for it is possible to state truly that man is white and that man is not white and that man is beautiful and that man is not beautiful; for if a man is deformed he is the reverse of beautiful, also if he is progressing towards beauty he is not yet beautiful. This statement might seem at first sight to carry with it a contradiction, owing to the fact that the proposition ‘man is not white’ appears to be equivalent to the proposition ‘no man is white’. This, however, is not the case, nor are they necessarily at the same time true or false. It is evident also that the denial corresponding to a single affirmation is itself single; for the denial must deny just that which the affirmation affirms concerning the same subject, and must correspond with the affirmation both in the universal or particular character of the subject and in the distributed or undistributed sense in which it is understood. For instance, the affirmation ‘Socrates is white’ has its proper denial in the proposition ‘Socrates is not white’. If anything else be negatively predicated of the subject or if anything else be the subject though the predicate remain the same, the denial will not be the denial proper to that affirmation, but on that is distinct. The denial proper to the affirmation ‘every man is white’ is ‘not every man is white’; that proper to the affirmation ‘some men are white’ is ‘no man is white’, while that proper to the affirmation ‘man is white’ is ‘man is not white’.

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We have shown further that a single denial is contradictorily opposite to a single affirmation and we have explained which these are; we have also stated that contrary are distinct from contradictory propositions and which the contrary are; also that with regard to a pair of opposite propositions it is not always the case that one is true and the other false. We have pointed out, moreover, what the reason of this is and under what circumstances the truth of the one involves the falsity of the other.

8 An affirmation or denial is single, if it indicates some one fact about some one subject; it matters not whether the subject is universal and whether the statement has a universal character, or whether this is not so. Such single propositions are: ‘every man is white’, ‘not every man is white’;’man is white’,’man is not white’; ‘no man is white’, ‘some men are white’; provided the word ‘white’ has one meaning. If, on the other hand, one word has two meanings which do not combine to form one, the affirmation is not single. For instance, if a man should establish the symbol ‘garment’ as significant both of a horse and of a man, the proposition ‘garment is white’ would not be a single affirmation, nor its opposite a single denial. For it is equivalent to the proposition ‘horse and man are white’, which, again, is equivalent to the two propositions ‘horse is white’, ‘man is white’. If, then, these two propositions have more than a single significance, and do not form a single proposition, it is plain that the first proposition either has more than one significance or else has none; for a particular man is not a horse.

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This, then, is another instance of those propositions of which both the positive and the negative forms may be true or false simultaneously.

9 In the case of that which is or which has taken place, propositions, whether positive or negative, must be true or false. Again, in the case of a pair of contradictories, either when the subject is universal and the propositions are of a universal character, or when it is individual, as has been said,’ one of the two must be true and the other false; whereas when the subject is universal, but the propositions are not of a universal character, there is no such necessity. We have discussed this type also in a previous chapter. When the subject, however, is individual, and that which is predicated of it relates to the future, the case is altered. For if all propositions whether positive or negative are either true or false, then any given predicate must either belong to the subject or not, so that if one man affirms that an event of a given character will take place and another denies it, it is plain that the statement of the one will correspond with reality and that of the other will not. For the predicate cannot both belong and not belong to the subject at one and the same time with regard to the future. Thus, if it is true to say that a thing is white, it must necessarily be white; if the reverse proposition is true, it will of necessity not be white. Again, if it is white, the proposition stating that it is white was true; if it is not white, the proposition to the opposite effect was true. And if it is not white, the man who states that it is making a false statement; and if the man who
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states that it is white is making a false statement, it follows that it is not white. It may therefore be argued that it is necessary that affirmations or denials must be either true or false. Now if this be so, nothing is or takes place fortuitously, either in the present or in the future, and there are no real alternatives; everything takes place of necessity and is fixed. For either he that affirms that it will take place or he that denies this is in correspondence with fact, whereas if things did not take place of necessity, an event might just as easily not happen as happen; for the meaning of the word ‘fortuitous’ with regard to present or future events is that reality is so constituted that it may issue in either of two opposite directions. Again, if a thing is white now, it was true before to say that it would be white, so that of anything that has taken place it was always true to say ‘it is’ or ‘it will be’. But if it was always true to say that a thing is or will be, it is not possible that it should not be or not be about to be, and when a thing cannot not come to be, it is impossible that it should not come to be, and when it is impossible that it should not come to be, it must come to be. All, then, that is about to be must of necessity take place. It results from this that nothing is uncertain or fortuitous, for if it were fortuitous it would not be necessary. Again, to say that neither the affirmation nor the denial is true, maintaining, let us say, that an event neither will take place nor will not take place, is to take up a position impossible to defend. In the first place, though facts should prove the one proposition false, the opposite would still be untrue. Secondly, if it was true to say that a thing was both white and large, both these qualities must necessarily belong to it; and if they will belong to it the next day, they must necessarily belong to it the next day. But if an event is neither to take place nor not to take place the next day, the element of chance will be eliminated. For

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example, it would be necessary that a sea-fight should neither take place nor fail to take place on the next day. These awkward results and others of the same kind follow, if it is an irrefragable law that of every pair of contradictory propositions, whether they have regard to universals and are stated as universally applicable, or whether they have regard to individuals, one must be true and the other false, and that there are no real alternatives, but that all that is or takes place is the outcome of necessity. There would be no need to deliberate or to take trouble, on the supposition that if we should adopt a certain course, a certain result would follow, while, if we did not, the result would not follow. For a man may predict an event ten thousand years beforehand, and another may predict the reverse; that which was truly predicted at the moment in the past will of necessity take place in the fullness of time. Further, it makes no difference whether people have or have not actually made the contradictory statements. For it is manifest that the circumstances are not influenced by the fact of an affirmation or denial on the part of anyone. For events will not take place or fail to take place because it was stated that they would or would not take place, nor is this any more the case if the prediction dates back ten thousand years or any other space of time. Wherefore, if through all time the nature of things was so constituted that a prediction about an event was true, then through all time it was necessary that that should find fulfillment; and with regard to all events, circumstances have always been such that their occurrence is a matter of necessity. For that of which someone has said truly that it will be, cannot fail to take place; and of that which takes place, it was always true to say that it would be. Yet this view leads to an impossible conclusion; for we see that both deliberation and action are causative with regard to the

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future, and that, to speak more generally, in those things which are not continuously actual there is potentiality in either direction. Such things may either be or not be; events also therefore may either take place or not take place. There are many obvious instances of this. It is possible that this coat may be cut in half, and yet it may not be cut in half, but wear out first. In the same way, it is possible that it should not be cut in half; unless this were so, it would not be possible that it should wear out first. So it is therefore with all other events which possess this kind of potentiality. It is therefore plain that it is not of necessity that everything is or takes place; but in some instances there are real alternatives, in which case the affirmation is no more true and no more false than the denial; while some exhibit a predisposition and general tendency in one direction or the other, and yet can issue in the opposite direction by exception. Now that which is must needs be when it is, and that which is not must needs not be when it is not. Yet it cannot be said without qualification that all existence and non-existence is the outcome of necessity. For there is a difference between saying that that which is, when it is, must needs be, and simply saying that all that is must needs be, and similarly in the case of that which is not. In the case, also, of two contradictory propositions this holds good. Everything must either be or not be, whether in the present or in the future, but it is not always possible to distinguish and state determinately which of these alternatives must necessarily come about. Let me illustrate. A sea-fight must either take place to-morrow or not, but it is not necessary that it should take place tomorrow, neither is it necessary that it should not take place, yet it is necessary that it either should or should not take place tomorrow. Since propositions correspond with facts, it is evident that when in future events there is a real alternative, and a

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potentiality in contrary directions, the corresponding affirmation and denial have the same character. This is the case with regard to that which is not always existent or not always nonexistent. One of the two propositions in such instances must be true and the other false, but we cannot say determinately that this or that is false, but must leave the alternative undecided. One may indeed be more likely to be true than the other, but it cannot be either actually true or actually false. It is therefore plain that it is not necessary that of an affirmation and a denial one should be true and the other false. For in the case of that which exists potentially, but not actually, the rule which applies to that which exists actually does not hold good. The case is rather as we have indicated.

10 An affirmation is the statement of a fact with regard to a subject, and this subject is either a noun or that which has no name; the subject and predicate in an affirmation must each denote a single thing. I have already explained’ what is meant by a noun and by that which has no name; for I stated that the expression ‘not-man’ was not a noun, in the proper sense of the word, but an indefinite noun, denoting as it does in a certain sense a single thing. Similarly the expression ‘does not enjoy health’ is not a verb proper, but an indefinite verb. Every affirmation, then, and every denial, will consist of a noun and a verb, either definite or indefinite. There can be no affirmation or denial without a verb; for the expressions ‘is’, ‘will be’, ‘was’, ‘is coming to be’, and the like are verbs according to our definition, since besides their specific meaning they convey the notion of time. Thus the primary
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affirmation and denial are ‘as follows: ‘man is’, ‘man is not’. Next to these, there are the propositions: ‘not-man is’, ‘not-man is not’. Again we have the propositions: ‘every man is, ‘every man is not’, ‘all that is not-man is’, ‘all that is not-man is not’. The same classification holds good with regard to such periods of time as lie outside the present. When the verb ‘is’ is used as a third element in the sentence, there can be positive and negative propositions of two sorts. Thus in the sentence ‘man is just’ the verb ‘is’ is used as a third element, call it verb or noun, which you will. Four propositions, therefore, instead of two can be formed with these materials. Two of the four, as regards their affirmation and denial, correspond in their logical sequence with the propositions which deal with a condition of privation; the other two do not correspond with these. I mean that the verb ‘is’ is added either to the term ‘just’ or to the term ‘not-just’, and two negative propositions are formed in the same way. Thus we have the four propositions. Reference to the subjoined table will make matters clear:

A. Affirmation Man is just

B. Denial Man is not just

D. Denial Man is not not-just

C. Affirmation Man is not-just

Here 'is' and 'is not' are added either to 'just' or to 'not-just'.

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This then is the proper scheme for these propositions, as has been said in the Analytics. The same rule holds good, if the subject is distributed. Thus we have the table:

A’. Affirmation Every man is just

B’. Denial Not every man is just

D’. Denial Not every man is not-just

C’. Affirmation Every man not-just is

Yet here it is not possible, in the same way as in the former case, that the propositions joined in the table by a diagonal line should both be true; though under certain circumstances this is the case. We have thus set out two pairs of opposite propositions; there are moreover two other pairs, if a term be conjoined with 'notman', the latter forming a kind of subject. Thus:

A”. Not-man is just

B”. Not-man is not just

D”. Not-man is not not-just

C”. Not-man is notjust

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This is an exhaustive enumeration of all the pairs of opposite propositions that can possibly be framed. This last group should remain distinct from those which preceded it, since it employs as its subject the expression ‘not-man’. When the verb ‘is’ does not fit the structure of the sentence (for instance, when the verbs ‘walks’, ‘enjoys health’ are used), that scheme applies, which applied when the word ‘is’ was added. Thus we have the propositions: ‘every man enjoys health’, ‘every man does-not-enjoy-health’, ‘all that is not-man enjoys health’, ‘all that is not-man does-not-enjoy-health’. We must not in these propositions use the expression ‘not every man’. The negative must be attached to the word ‘man’, for the word ‘every’ does not give to the subject a universal significance, but implies that, as a subject, it is distributed. This is plain from the following pairs: ‘man enjoys health’, ‘man does not enjoy health’; ‘not-man enjoys health’, ‘not man does not enjoy health’. These propositions differ from the former in being indefinite and not universal in character. Thus the adjectives ‘every’ and no additional significance except that the subject, whether in a positive or in a negative sentence, is distributed. The rest of the sentence, therefore, will in each case be the same. Since the contrary of the proposition ‘every animal is just’ is ‘no animal is just’, it is plain that these two propositions will never both be true at the same time or with reference to the same subject. Sometimes, however, the contradictories of these contraries will both be true, as in the instance before us: the propositions ‘not every animal is just’ and ‘some animals are just’ are both true.

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Further, the proposition ‘no man is just’ follows from the proposition ‘every man is not just’ and the proposition ‘not every man is not just’, which is the opposite of ‘every man is not-just’, follows from the proposition ‘some men are just’; for if this be true, there must be some just men. It is evident, also, that when the subject is individual, if a question is asked and the negative answer is the true one, a certain positive proposition is also true. Thus, if the question were asked Socrates wise?’ and the negative answer were the true one, the positive inference ‘Then Socrates is unwise’ is correct. But no such inference is correct in the case of universals, but rather a negative proposition. For instance, if to the question ‘Is every man wise?’ the answer is ‘no’, the inference ‘Then every man is unwise’ is false. But under these circumstances the inference ‘Not every man is wise’ is correct. This last is the contradictory, the former the contrary. Negative expressions, which consist of an indefinite noun or predicate, such as ‘not-man’ or ‘not-just’, may seem to be denials containing neither noun nor verb in the proper sense of the words. But they are not. For a denial must always be either true or false, and he that uses the expression ‘not man’, if nothing more be added, is not nearer but rather further from making a true or a false statement than he who uses the expression ‘man’. The propositions ‘everything that is not man is just’, and the contradictory of this, are not equivalent to any of the other propositions; on the other hand, the proposition ‘everything that is not man is not just’ is equivalent to the proposition ‘nothing that is not man is just’. The conversion of the position of subject and predicate in a sentence involves no difference in its meaning. Thus we say ‘man is white’ and ‘white is man’. If these were not equivalent,

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there would be more than one contradictory to the same proposition, whereas it has been demonstrated’ that each proposition has one proper contradictory and one only. For of the proposition ‘man is white’ the appropriate contradictory is ‘man is not white’, and of the proposition ‘white is man’, if its meaning be different, the contradictory will either be ‘white is not not-man’ or ‘white is not man’. Now the former of these is the contradictory of the proposition ‘white is not-man’, and the latter of these is the contradictory of the proposition ‘man is white’; thus there will be two contradictories to one proposition. It is evident, therefore, that the inversion of the relative position of subject and predicate does not affect the sense of affirmations and denials.

11 There is no unity about an affirmation or denial which, either positively or negatively, predicates one thing of many subjects, or many things of the same subject, unless that which is indicated by the many is really some one thing. do not apply this word ‘one’ to those things which, though they have a single recognized name, yet do not combine to form a unity. Thus, man may be an animal, and biped, and domesticated, but these three predicates combine to form a unity. On the other hand, the predicates ‘white’, ‘man’, and ‘walking’ do not thus combine. Neither, therefore, if these three form the subject of an affirmation, nor if they form its predicate, is there any unity about that affirmation. In both cases the unity is linguistic, but not real.

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If therefore the dialectical question is a request for an answer, i.e. either for the admission of a premiss or for the admission of one of two contradictories – and the premiss is itself always one of two contradictories – the answer to such a question as contains the above predicates cannot be a single proposition. For as I have explained in the Topics, question is not a single one, even if the answer asked for is true. At the same time it is plain that a question of the form ‘what is it?’ is not a dialectical question, for a dialectical questioner must by the form of his question give his opponent the chance of announcing one of two alternatives, whichever he wishes. He must therefore put the question into a more definite form, and inquire, e.g.. whether man has such and such a characteristic or not. Some combinations of predicates are such that the separate predicates unite to form a single predicate. Let us consider under what conditions this is and is not possible. We may either state in two separate propositions that man is an animal and that man is a biped, or we may combine the two, and state that man is an animal with two feet. Similarly we may use ‘man’ and ‘white’ as separate predicates, or unite them into one. Yet if a man is a shoemaker and is also good, we cannot construct a composite proposition and say that he is a good shoemaker. For if, whenever two separate predicates truly belong to a subject, it follows that the predicate resulting from their combination also truly belongs to the subject, many absurd results ensue. For instance, a man is man and white. Therefore, if predicates may always be combined, he is a white man. Again, if the predicate ‘white’ belongs to him, then the combination of that predicate with the former composite predicate will be permissible. Thus it will be right to say that he is a white man so on indefinitely. Or, again, we may combine the predicates ‘musical’, ‘white’, and ‘walking’, and these may

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be combined many times. Similarly we may say that Socrates is Socrates and a man, and that therefore he is the man Socrates, or that Socrates is a man and a biped, and that therefore he is a two-footed man. Thus it is manifest that if man states unconditionally that predicates can always be combined, many absurd consequences ensue. We will now explain what ought to be laid down. Those predicates, and terms forming the subject of predication, which are accidental either to the same subject or to one another, do not combine to form a unity. Take the proposition ‘man is white of complexion and musical’. Whiteness and being musical do not coalesce to form a unity, for they belong only accidentally to the same subject. Nor yet, if it were true to say that that which is white is musical, would the terms ‘musical’ and ‘white’ form a unity, for it is only incidentally that that which is musical is white; the combination of the two will, therefore, not form a unity. Thus, again, whereas, if a man is both good and a shoemaker, we cannot combine the two propositions and say simply that he is a good shoemaker, we are, at the same time, able to combine the predicates ‘animal’ and ‘biped’ and say that a man is an animal with two feet, for these predicates are not accidental. Those predicates, again, cannot form a unity, of which the one is implicit in the other: thus we cannot combine the predicate ‘white’ again and again with that which already contains the notion ‘white’, nor is it right to call a man an animal-man or a two-footed man; for the notions ‘animal’ and ‘biped’ are implicit in the word ‘man’. On the other hand, it is possible to predicate a term simply of any one instance, and to say that some one particular man is a man or that some one white man is a white man.

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or does it not? The verb ‘is’ is here used of Homer only incidentally. this is not the case. Thus it is not right to call a dead man a man.Yet this is not always possible: indeed. the predication of the simple term is impossible. we must consider the mutual relation of those affirmations and denials which assert or deny possibility or contingency. it is not true to say that because it is the object of opinion. the proposition being that Homer is a poet. Take the proposition ‘Homer is so-and-so’. but when they are not present. We admit that of composite expressions those are contradictory each to each which have the verb ‘to be’ its positive and 68 . not that he is. resolution is nevertheless not always possible. when in the adjunct there is some opposite which involves a contradiction. however. in the case of those predications which have within them no contradiction when the nouns are expanded into definitions. and wherein the predicates belong to the subject in their own proper sense and not in any indirect way. it is. 12 As these distinctions have been made. it is not impossible. not that it is. the individual may be the subject of the simple propositions as well as of the composite. in the independent sense of the word. impossibility or necessity: for the subject is not without difficulty. But in the case of that which is not. Thus. When. for the opinion held about it is that it is not. say ‘a poet’. resolution is never possible. Yet the facts of the case might rather be stated thus: when some such opposite elements are present. does it follow that Homer is.

both the positive and the negative propositions will be true. not ‘it cannot be’. then. Thus the contradictory of the proposition ‘man is’ is ‘man is not’. Now it appears that the same thing both may and may not be. for to say ‘man walks’ merely equivalent to saying ‘man is walking’. Thus the contradictory of ‘man walks’ is ‘man does not walk’. The same rule applies to the proposition ‘it is contingent that it 69 . of ‘it may be’ is ‘it cannot be’. For otherwise. not ‘not-man walks’. that positive and negative propositions are formed. either that the same predicate can be both applicable and inapplicable to one and the same subject at the same time. and the contradictory of ‘man is white’ is ‘man is not white’. in those propositions which do not contain the verb ‘to be’ the verb which takes its place will exercise the same function.negative form respectively. the contradictory of ‘it may be’ is may not be’. or that it is not by the addition of the verbs ‘be’ and ‘not be’. it will turn out true to say that a piece of wood is a man that is not white. Now if this is the case. But since it is impossible that contradictory propositions should both be true of the same subject. The contradictory. For it is a logical consequence of what we have said. everything that may be cut or may walk may also escape cutting and refrain from walking. If then this rule is universal. and the reason is that those things that have potentiality in this sense are not always actual. since either the positive or the negative proposition is true of any subject. not ‘man is not-white’. If the former of these alternatives must be rejected. respectively. for instance. for that which is capable of walking or of being seen has also a potentiality in the opposite direction. not ‘not-man is’. we must choose the latter. it follows that’ it may not be’ is not the contradictory of ‘it may be’. In such cases.

These indicate that a certain thing is or is not possible. and the contradictory of ‘it is necessary that it should not be’ is ‘it is not necessary that it should not be’.’ but ‘it is not necessary that it should be’. then. and the contradictory of ‘it may be’ is not ‘it may not be’. the same thing both may and may not be. Again. Thus the propositions ‘it may be’ and ‘it may not be’ appear each to imply the other: for. since these two propositions are not contradictory. The propositions which have to do with necessity are governed by the same principle. For it comes about that just as in the former instances the verbs ‘is’ and ‘is not’ were added to the subject-matter of the sentence ‘white’ and ‘man’. the contradictory of this is ‘it is not contingent that it should be’.should be’. The contradictory. The contradictory of ‘it is necessary that it should be’. The similar propositions. are added. so here ‘that it should be’ and ‘that it should not be’ are the subject-matter and ‘is possible’. of ‘it may not be’ is not ‘it cannot be’. Nor can the propositions ‘it may not be’ and ‘it cannot not be’ be at once true of the same subject. and the contradictory of ‘it is impossible that it should not be’ is ‘it is not impossible that it should not be’. may be dealt with in the same manner. such as ‘it is necessary’ and ‘it is impossible’. ‘is contingent’. is not ‘it is necessary that it should not be. 70 . for they are contradictory. the contradictory of ‘it is impossible that it should be’ is not ‘it is impossible that it should not be’ but ‘it is not impossible that it should be’. but cannot be’. just as in the former instances ‘is’ and ‘is not’ indicated that certain things were or were not the case. But the propositions ‘it may be’ and ‘it cannot be’ can never be true of the same subject at the same time. but ‘it cannot not be’.

To generalize. It is impossible.It is not impossible.It cannot be. we must.It is not true. and in making these terms into affirmations and denials we must combine them with ‘that it should be’ and ‘that it should not be’ respectively. From the proposition ‘it cannot not be’ or ‘it is not contingent that it should not be’ it follows that it 71 . From the proposition ‘it may not be’ or ‘it is contingent that it should not be’ it follows that it is not necessary that it should not be and that it is not impossible that it should not be. From the proposition ‘it cannot be’ or ‘it is not contingent’ it follows that it is necessary that it should not be and that it is impossible that it should be. It is necessary. It is true. It follows also that it is not impossible and not necessary. 13 Logical sequences follow in due course when we have arranged the propositions thus. It is contingent.It is not necessary. as has been stated. From the proposition ‘it may be’ it follows that it is contingent. define the clauses ‘that it should be’ and ‘that it should not be’ as the subjectmatter of the propositions. and the relation is reciprocal.It is not contingent. We must consider the following pairs as contradictory propositions: It may be.

D. It is not necessary that it It is necessary that it should should not be. It is not impossible that it It is impossible that it should should not be. Let us consider these statements by the help of a table: A. be. be. It cannot be. It cannot not be. not be.is necessary that it should be and that it is impossible that it should not be. not be. Now the propositions ‘it is impossible that it should be’ and ‘it is not impossible that it should be’ are consequent upon the propositions ‘it may be’. It is contingent. the contradictories upon the contradictories. It is contingent that it should It is not contingent that it not be. C. It is not impossible that it It is impossible that it should should be. ‘it is not contingent’. B. It may be. 72 . and ‘it cannot be’. It is not contingent. It is not necessary that it It is necessary that it should should be. should not be. It may not be. ‘it is contingent’.

inversely connected. and when it is impossible that a thing should not be. it is possible that it should be. but. and it is thus 73 . since one or the other must follow. for both these propositions may be true of the same subject. We must investigate the relation subsisting between these propositions and those which predicate necessity. so. as has been said. and the contradictory propositions belong to separate sequences. but that it should not be. For ‘it is impossible’ is a positive proposition and ‘it is not impossible’ is negative. The negative of the proposition ‘it is impossible’ is consequent upon the proposition ‘it may be’ and the corresponding positive in the first case upon the negative in the second. Yet perhaps it is impossible that the contradictory propositions predicating necessity should be thus arranged. for the propositions ‘it is impossible’ and ‘it is necessary’ are not equivalent. For when it is impossible that a thing should be. it is necessary. Thus. In this case. For the proposition ‘it is not necessary that it should be’ is not the negative of ‘it is necessary that it should not be’. For when it is necessary that a thing should be. those predicating necessity must follow with the contrary subject. (For if not. lies in the fact that the proposition ‘it is impossible’ is equivalent. to the proposition ‘it is necessary’. it is not necessary that it should be. contrary propositions follow respectively from contradictory propositions. if it is not possible. if the propositions predicating impossibility or non-impossibility follow without change of subject from those predicating possibility or nonpossibility. it is impossible. The reason why the propositions predicating necessity do not follow in the same kind of sequence as the rest. it is necessary that it should be. the opposite follows.But there is inversion. for when it is necessary that a thing should not be. That there is a distinction is clear. when used with a contrary subject. not that it should be.

the contradictory must follow. It may be questioned whether the proposition ‘it may be’ follows from the proposition ‘it is necessary that it should be’. it comes about therefore that the thing which must necessarily be need not be. Thus in this case also contradictory propositions follow contradictory in the way indicated. the proposition ‘it is necessary that it should be’ does not follow from the proposition ‘it may be’. one of the two alternatives will be excluded. nor does the proposition ‘it is necessary that it should not be’. but if it is necessary that it should be or that it should not be. For if a thing may be. therefore. then the proposition ‘it may not be’. It remains. Moreover the proposition ‘it is not necessary that it should not be’ is the contradictory of that which follows from the proposition ‘it cannot be’. or. and from that it follows that it is not necessary. if a man should maintain that this is not the contradictory. If not. which is absurd. which must necessarily be. For this is true also of that which must necessarily be. while. for ‘it cannot be’ is followed by ‘it is impossible that it should be’ and by ‘it is necessary that it should not be’. For the proposition ‘it may be’ implies a twofold possibility. that the proposition ‘it is not necessary that it should not be’ follows from the proposition ‘it may be’. 74 . namely that it cannot be. and no logical impossibilities occur when they are thus arranged. and the contradictory of this is the proposition ‘it is not necessary that it should not be’. it may also not be. But again.) Yet from the proposition ‘it may be’ it follows that it is not impossible.impossible that a thing should be. which is absurd. the twofold possibility vanishes. if either of the two former propositions is true.

which is false. in the other case. of contrary results. At the same time. it is true to say that it is not impossible that it should walk (or. being used in the one case with reference to facts. that is. But in some cases the word is used equivocally. thus much has been said to emphasize the truth that it is not every potentiality which admits of opposite results. as when a man is said to find walking possible because he is actually walking. and of that which has the capacity though not necessarily realized. the former can exist also in the case of that which has not this power. with reference to a state in which realization is conditionally practicable. that is. it is thought that if a thing may be cut it may also not be cut. This last sort of potentiality belongs only to that which can be in motion. that it should be). but 75 . However. an irrational capacity. For the term ‘possible’ is ambiguous. to that which is actualized. neither has anything that is always actual any twofold potentiality.Now both of these are false of that which necessarily is. if a thing may be it may also not be. as when a man is said to find walking possible because under certain conditions he would walk. as fire possesses the potentiality of giving out heat. and thus it would follow that a thing which must necessarily be may possibly not be. those that are irrational are not always thus constituted. There are exceptions. fire cannot both heat and not heat. in the other case. that it is not always the case that that which may be or may walk possesses also a potentiality in the other direction. Those potentialities which involve a rational principle are potentialities of more than one result. even where the word is used always in the same sense. then. and generally when a capacity is predicated because it is actually realized. Both of that which is walking and is actual. In the first place we must except those things which possess a potentiality not in accordance with a rational principle. Yet some even of those potentialities which are irrational admit of opposite results. As I have said. It is evident.

though posterior in time. in thought. Our conclusion. and that all else must be regarded as posterior to these. Thus. a second class consists of those things which are actual but also potential. a third class comprises those things which are never actualized.while we cannot predicate this latter kind of potentiality of that which is necessary in the unqualified sense of the word. we can predicate the former. ‘Callias is unjust’. ‘Callias is not just’. Now if the spoken word corresponds with the judgement of the mind. actuality also is prior to potentiality. though not in every sense in which the word may be used. We may perhaps state that necessity and its absence are the initial principles of existence and non-existence. that judgement is the contrary of 76 . whose actuality is in nature prior to their potentiality. that which is necessary is also possible. if that which is eternal is prior. namely. Take the propositions ‘Callias is just’. whether the proposition ‘every man is just’ finds its contrary in the proposition ‘no man is just’. we have to discover which of these form contraries. is this: that since the universal is consequent upon the particular. and if. 14 The question arises whether an affirmation finds its contrary in a denial or in another affirmation. the primary substances. or in the proposition ‘every man is unjust’. but are pure potentialities. It is plain from what has been said that that which is of necessity is actual. Some things are actualities without potentiality. then.

Which of these two is contrary to the true? And if they are one and the same. it is not the judgement which pronounces a contrary fact that is the contrary of another. in the way. as also those that opine that 77 . and if there are at the same time other attributes. that it is good. for the judgement concerning a good thing. that it is bad. for instance. the same must needs hold good with regard to spoken affirmations. may be one and the same. they both represent the truth. Yet the subjects here are contrary. in which the judgement ‘every man is just’ pronounces a contrary to that pronounced by the judgement ‘every man is unjust’. and another that it is not good.another. we must nevertheless refuse to treat as the contraries of the true judgement those which opine that some other attribute subsists which does not subsist. that it is good. but because they are to the contrary effect. and a third. but rather in the corresponding denial. There is a true judgement concerning that which is good. But if. then one affirmation will not find its contrary in another. that it is bad. that which forms the denial of the false judgement or that which affirms the contrary fact. Now if we take the judgement that that which is good is good. and that concerning a bad thing. another. which pronounces a contrary fact. in thought. which do not and cannot belong to the good. Let me illustrate. which is distinct. and whether they are so or not. which mode of expression forms the contrary? It is an error to suppose that judgements are to be defined as contrary in virtue of the fact that they have contrary subjects. that it is not good. a false judgement. But judgements are not contrary because they have contrary subjects. We must therefore consider which true judgement is the contrary of the false.

the second accidental. therefore. it seems. if it must necessarily be so in all other cases. that judgement is false. then the latter. If then of the two judgements one is contrary to the true judgement. which concerns its intrinsic nature. Further. then that false judgement likewise is most really false. Now where terms have no contrary. but that which is contradictory is the more truly contrary. The judgement that that which is good is bad is composite. Those judgements must rather be termed contrary to the true judgements. in which error is present. he who 78 . The first quality is part of its essence. the contradictory is either always the contrary or never. is the real contrary. For presumably the man who forms that judgement must at the same time understand that that which is good is not good. for contraries are among the things which differ most widely within the same class.some other attribute does not subsist which does subsist. Now that which is good is both good and not bad. the judgement that it is bad is one concerning that which is accidental. Now the judgement that that is good is not good is a false judgement concerning its intrinsic nature. for it is by accident that it is not bad. But if that true judgement is most really true. But it is the man who forms that judgement which is contrary to the true who is most thoroughly deceived. for instance. Now these judgements are those which are concerned with the starting points of generation. which concerns the subject’s intrinsic nature. and generation is the passing from one extreme to its opposite. for both these classes of judgement are of unlimited content. which forms the negative of the true. our conclusion in the case just dealt with would seem to be correct. Thus the judgement which denies the true judgement is more really false than that which positively asserts the presence of the contrary quality. therefore error is a like transition.

for this is false. the contrary judgement is that it is good.thinks a man is not a man forms a false judgement. It is evident that it will make no difference if we universalize the positive judgement. that it is not good. For the judgement that that which is good is good. the contrary of the judgement that everything that is good is good is that nothing that is good is good. what would form the contrary of the true judgement that that which is not good is not good. therefore. that it is not good. It remains. Let us consider. for this too might be true. parallel with the judgement that that that is not good is good. since two true judgements are never contrary and this judgement might be true at the same time as that with which it is connected. Nor is the judgement that it is not bad the contrary. therefore. moreover. of course. In the same way. fail to meet the case. then the principle is universal in its application. the judgement that that which is not good is not good is parallel with the judgement that that which is good is good. We may deal similarly with judgements concerning that which is not good. if the subject be understood in a universal sense. that of the judgement concerning that which is not good. Again. since both qualities might be predicated of the same subject. If then in these cases the negative is the contrary. The judgement that it is bad would. For since some things which are not good are bad. the judgement concerning that which is good. and this is identical with the judgement that everything that is good is good. For instance. for the universal negative judgement will form the contrary. Besides these there is the judgement that that which is good is not good. is the contrary of the judgement that it is good. both judgements may be true. 79 . is equivalent to the judgement that whatever is good is good.

and contrary conditions cannot subsist at one and the same time in the same subject. contrary propositions are those which state contrary conditions.If therefore this is the rule with judgements. ‘every man is good’. when two propositions are true. 80 . have for their contraries the propositions ‘nothing good is good’. also. Thus the propositions ‘everything good is good’. For whereas. ‘no man is good’. a man may state both at the same time without inconsistency. The contradictory propositions. ‘not every man is good’. it is plain that the universal denial is the contrary of the affirmation about the same subject. that neither true judgements nor true propositions can be contrary the one to the other. are ‘not everything good is good’. It is evident. on the other hand. and if spoken affirmations and denials are judgements expressed in words.

But this will make no difference to the production of a syllogism in either case. The demonstrative premiss differs from the dialectical. and what we mean by predicating one term of all. and after that.Prior Analytics [Translated by A. and a syllogism.Aristotle . whereas the dialectical premiss depends on the adversary’s choice between two contradictories. A premiss then is a sentence affirming or denying one thing of another. for both the demonstrator and the dialectician argue syllogistically after stating that something does or does not belong to 81 . a term.g. or ‘pleasure is not good’. but lays it down). This is either universal or particular or indefinite. of another. e. Jenkinson] Book I 1 We must first state the subject of our inquiry and the faculty to which it belongs: its subject is demonstration and the faculty that carries it out demonstrative science. by indefinite that it does or does not belong. and the nature of a perfect and of an imperfect syllogism. or none. ‘contraries are subjects of the same science’. without any mark to show whether it is universal or particular. We must next define a premiss. because the demonstrative premiss is the assertion of one of two contradictory statements (the demonstrator does not ask for his premiss. by particular that it belongs to some or not to some or not to all. By universal I mean the statement that something belongs to all or none of something else. the inclusion or noninclusion of one term in another as in a whole. J.

I mean by the last phrase that they produce the consequence. but have not been expressly stated as premisses. And we say that one term is predicated of all of another. Therefore a syllogistic premiss without qualification will be an affirmation or denial of something concerning something else in the way we have described. when a man is proceeding by question. That one term should be included in another as in a whole is the same as for the other to be predicated of all of the first. while a dialectical premiss is the giving of a choice between two contradictories. I call that a term into which the premiss is resolved.e. it will be demonstrative. something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so. may be taken as sufficiently defined by us in relation to our present need. I call that a perfect syllogism which needs nothing other than what has been stated to make plain what necessarily follows. or vice versa. certain things being stated. and dialectical premisses. but when he is syllogizing it is the assertion of that which is apparent and generally admitted. demonstrative. a syllogism is imperfect. that no further term is required from without in order to make the consequence necessary.something else. and by this. both the predicate and that of which it is predicated. whenever no instance of the subject can be found of which the other term 82 . The nature then of a premiss and the difference between syllogistic. if it is true and obtained through the first principles of its science. A syllogism is discourse in which. which are indeed the necessary consequences of the terms set down. ‘being’ being added and ‘not being’ removed. if it needs either one or more propositions. i. but will be stated accurately in the sequel. as has been said in the Topics.

if the premiss is particular. neither can any A be B. of premisses of these three kinds some are affirmative. 2 Every premiss states that something either is or must be or may be the attribute of something else. the particular affirmative must convert in part (for if some pleasure is good. 83 . if every pleasure. it would not be true that no B is A. Not every animal is a man. if no pleasure is good. the terms of the affirmative must be convertible.g. let B stand for animal and A for man. e. others particular. e. others indefinite. If no B is A. But if every B is A then some A is B. For if some B is A. not however. For if none were. For if some A (say C) were B. e. It is necessary then that in universal attribution the terms of the negative premiss should be convertible. some good must be pleasure.g. universally. But we assumed that every B is A. others negative. Similarly too. then some good will be pleasure). but every man is an animal. For if no A were B. there is no necessity that some of the As should not be B. But if some B is not A. again some affirmative and negative premisses are universal.is good. in respect of each of the three modes of attribution. but the particular negative need not convert.g.cannot be asserted: ‘to be predicated of none’ must be understood in the same way. for if some animal is not man. it does not follow that some man is not animal. then some of the As must be B. then no good will be pleasure. then no B would be A. but in part. then no B could be A. First then take a universal negative with the terms A and B. for C is a B.

For if that were not possible. affirmative statements will all convert in a manner similar to those described. For if it is possible for no man to be a horse. if one should say. admits of conversion like other negative statements. it is possible that man is not horse. it is necessary also that some A is B: for if there were no necessity. The universal negative converts universally. For in the former case the one term necessarily does not belong to the other. for the same reason which we have already stated. since possibility is used in several senses (for we say that what is necessary and what is not necessary and what is potential is possible). This has been already proved. Whatever is said to be possible. But the particular negative does not convert. For if it is possible that some A is B. it will be possible that some A is B. it would be possible also that some B is A. e. neither would some of the Bs be A necessarily. then some garment will necessarily be white. or that no garment is white. This has been already proved. either because B necessarily is A. For if it is possible that all or some B is A. then no B could possibly be A. or because B is not necessarily A.3 The same manner of conversion will hold good also in respect of necessary premisses. The particular negative also must be 84 . For if any white thing must be a garment.g. it is also admissible for no horse to be a man. each of the affirmatives converts into a particular. If all or some B is A of necessity. In respect of possible premisses. it is also admissible for nothing white to be a garment. If it is necessary that no B is A. in the latter there is no necessity that it should: and the premiss converts like other negative statements. it is necessary also that no A is B. and if it is admissible for no garment to be white. But in negative statements the case is different.

But if anything is said to be possible because it is the general rule and natural (and it is in this way we define the possible). This will be plain when we speak about the possible. the extremes must be related by a perfect syllogism. and the particular does. By extremes I mean both that term which is itself 85 .g. whatever the terms to which it is added. ‘it is not-good’ or ‘it is not-white’ or in a word ‘it is not-this’. the negative premisses can no longer be converted like the simple negatives. Whenever three terms are so related to one another that the last is contained in the middle as in a whole. I call that term middle which is itself contained in another and contains another in itself: in position also this comes in the middle. But this also will be proved in the sequel. when. e. the first as in or from a whole. subsequently we must speak of demonstration. 4 After these distinctions we now state by what means. Syllogism should be discussed before demonstration because syllogism is the general: the demonstration is a sort of syllogism. but not every syllogism is a demonstration. in predication. the universal negative premiss does not convert.treated like those dealt with above. and ‘is’ makes an affirmation always and in every case. and the middle is either contained in. and how every syllogism is produced. In conversion these premisses will behave like the other affirmative propositions. or excluded from. At present we may take this much as clear in addition to what has been said: the statement that it is possible that no B is A or some B is not A is affirmative in form: for the expression ‘is possible’ ranks along with ‘is’.

and B of all C. it is necessary that no C will be A. horse. there cannot be a syllogism by means of these premisses. As an example of a positive relation between the extremes take the terms science. if A is predicated of no B. nor the middle to any of the last. the other in part only. and B of all C. But if the first term belongs to all the middle. there will be no syllogism in respect of the extremes. for it is possible that the first should belong either to all or to none of the last. If A is predicated of all B. But if there is no necessary consequence. If then the terms are universally related. and that if a syllogism is possible the terms must be related as described. As an example of a universal affirmative relation between the extremes we may take the terms animal. but the middle to none of the last term. stone. But if one term is related universally. and if they are so related there will be a syllogism. I call that term the major in which the middle is contained and that term the 86 . man. a syllogism is impossible. or the terms are related in any other way.contained in another and that in which another is contained. and particularity with reference to the minor term affirmatively: but whenever the universality is posited in relation to the minor term. line. A must be predicated of all C: we have already explained what we mean by ‘predicated of all’. Nor again can syllogism be formed when neither the first term belongs to any of the middle. to its subject. for nothing necessary follows from the terms being so related. of a universal negative relation. it is clear in this figure when a syllogism will be possible and when not. so that neither a particular nor a universal conclusion is necessary. Similarly also. there must be a perfect syllogism whenever universality is posited with reference to the major term either affirmatively or negatively. the terms animal. man. medicine: of a negative relation science. unit. line.

Suppose the terms are animal. state.g. whether the minor premiss be indefinite or particular: e. whether affirmative or negative. man. it is necessary that some C is not A. if all B is A and some C is not B. For the major term may be predicable both of all and of none of the minor. The meaning of ‘predicated of none’ has also been defined. if some B is or is not A. And if no B is A but some C is B. white: then take some white things of which man is not predicated – swan and snow: the term inanimate is predicated of all of the one.minor which comes under the middle. white: next take some of the white things of which man is not predicated – swan and snow: animal is predicated of all of the one. Again let no B be A. Consequently there cannot be a syllogism. but of none of the other. can there be a syllogism. Take the terms white. Take the terms inanimate. there cannot be a syllogism. wisdom: of a negative relation. horse. but some B is or is not A or not every B is A. Then if ‘predicated of all’ means what was said above. but let some C not be B. a syllogism will not be possible. So there will be a perfect syllogism. and the minor premiss is negative and particular. raven. As an example of a positive relation between the extremes take the terms good.g. swan: white. state. or if not all C is B. But if the universality is posited with respect to the minor term either affirmatively or negatively. This holds good also if the premiss BC should be indefinite. ignorance. it is necessary that some C is A. The same terms may be taken also if the premiss BA is indefinite. 87 . horse. provided that it is affirmative: for we shall have the same syllogism whether the premiss is indefinite or particular. Again if no C is B. to some of which the middle term cannot be attributed. of none of the other. and all C is B. indefinite or particular: e. Nor when the major premiss is universal. whether the major premiss is positive or negative. good. man. Let all B be A and some C be B.

or to all of each subject or to none of either. white. and since if terms are assumed such that no C is B. Terms common to all the above are animal. and to none of another. by middle term in it I mean that which is predicated of both subjects. the terms must be related as we have stated: if they are related otherwise. Nor can there in any way be a syllogism if both the relations of subject and predicate are particular. Such a figure I call the first. or one indefinite and the other definite. It is clear then from what has been said that if there is a syllogism in this figure with a particular conclusion. by extremes the terms of which this is said. white. either positively or negatively. or not all C is B. by major extreme that which lies near the middle. horse: animal. no syllogism is possible anyhow. affirmative and negative. stone. A similar proof may also be given if the universal premiss is negative. 5 Whenever the same thing belongs to all of one subject. no syllogism follows (this has already been stated) it is clear that this arrangement of terms will not afford a syllogism: otherwise one would have been possible with a universal negative minor premiss. viz. or the one negative and the other affirmative. and it is true that some C is not B. 88 .Further since it is indefinite to say some C is not B. It is evident also that all the syllogisms in this figure are perfect (for they are all completed by means of the premisses originally taken) and that all conclusions are proved by this figure. whether no C is B. I call such a figure the second. universal and particular. or both indefinite. by minor that which is further away from the middle.

animal. O belongs to no M: but M (as was said) belongs to all N: O then will belong to no N: for the first figure has again been formed. then N will belong to no O. N will belong to no M: but M was assumed to belong to all O: consequently N will belong to no O. but it may be valid whether the terms are related universally or not. but not a perfect syllogism. then. animal. Thus it will be the same syllogism that proves both conclusions. others also are needed. and is first in position. the negative relation is convertible. It is clear then that a syllogism is formed when the terms are so related. Terms to illustrate a positive relation between the extremes are substance. animal. Again if M belongs to all N. for necessity is not perfectly established merely from the original premisses. 89 . substance. animal. number – substance being the middle term. It is possible to prove these results also by reductio ad impossibile. If then the terms are related universally a syllogism will be possible. line. but of all O. but to no O. man. N will belong to no O. stone. Since. a negative relation. A syllogism cannot be perfect anyhow in this figure. whenever the middle belongs to all of one subject and to none of another (it does not matter which has the negative relation). Nor is a syllogism possible when M is predicated neither of any N nor of any O. This has already been proved. Terms to illustrate a positive relation are line. but in no other way.The middle term stands outside the extremes. For if M belongs to no O. But if M is predicated of every N and O. man: a negative relation. But since the negative relation is convertible. there cannot be a syllogism. Let M be predicated of no N.

M must belong to all O: but we assumed that M does not belong to some O. but of some N. and let the major premiss be universal. but not of all N. Again if M belongs to all N. but to some O. the terms must be related as we stated at the outset: for if they are otherwise related no necessary consequence follows. and particularly to the minor and in a manner opposite to that of the universal statement: by ‘an opposite manner’ I mean. the particular is negative. Take the terms animal. substance. we have stated when a syllogism will be possible and when not: but if the premisses are similar in form. animal. unit: a negative relation. if the universal statement is negative. substance. Nor will there be a conclusion when M is predicated of no O. But if M is predicated of all O. And if M belongs to all N but not to all O. a syllogism will not be possible anyhow. I mean both negative or both affirmative. it is necessary that N does not belong to some O. If then the universal statement is opposed to the particular. raven. we shall conclude that N does not belong to all O: the proof is the same as the above. substance.g. 90 . and M is predicated also of all N. First let them be negative. science. it is necessary that N does not belong to some O: for if N belongs to all O. raven. N will belong to no M: but M was admitted to belong to some O: therefore N will not belong to some O: for the result is reached by means of the first figure. If the middle term is related universally to one of the extremes. the particular is affirmative: if the universal is affirmative. there will be no syllogism. For if M belongs to no N. Terms to illustrate a positive relation between the extremes are animal. but not to some O. white. For since the negative statement is convertible.It is clear then that if a syllogism is formed when the terms are universally related. a particular negative syllogism must result whenever the middle term is related universally to the major whether positively or negatively. e. animal.

Terms to illustrate the negative relation are white. not to some of the other. It is possible then for N to belong to all O or to no O. animal. swan. and one is universal. But if the minor premiss is universal. It is clear then from what has 91 . swan. terms for the negative relation are white. In this way then it is not admissible to take terms: our point must be proved from the indefinite nature of the particular statement. or belongs to neither universally. snow. clearly it will not be possible now either. Again let the premisses be affirmative. Evidently then. and since if it belongs to no O a syllogism is (as we have seen) not possible. For since it is true that M does not belong to some O. Nor is one possible if the middle term belongs to some of each of the extremes.g. and let the major premiss as before be universal. animal. stone.let M belong to no N. for the positive relation. or does not belong to some of either. If the premisses are affirmative. animal. animal. e. But it is not possible to find terms of which the extremes are related positively and universally. if M belongs to some O. even if it belongs to no O. or belongs to some of the one. Common terms for all the above are white. the other particular. animal. let M belong to all N and to some O. or is related to them indefinitely. and M belongs to no O. white. stone. a syllogism can. animal. For if N belonged to all O. Terms for the positive relation are white. inanimate. Terms to illustrate the negative relation are black. snow. man: white. whenever the premisses are similar in form. and not to some O. but M to no N. raven. not be formed anyhow. raven: for the negative relation. then M would belong to no O: but we assumed that it belongs to some O. and does not belong to some O. and not to some N. for the reason already stated: the point must be proved from the indefinite nature of the particular statement. It is possible then for N to belong either to all O or to no O. it is possible for N to belong either to all O or to no O. white. But it is not possible to take terms to illustrate the universal affirmative relation.

a syllogism results of necessity. or to none. If they are universal. and is last in position. both P and R will belong to this. N. the terms must be so related. i. be taken. by middle term in it I mean that of which both the predicates are predicated. and if there is a syllogism. P must belong to some R: for a syllogism in the first figure is produced. or if both belong to all. which either are contained in the terms of necessity or are assumed as hypotheses. and thus P will belong to some R. whenever both P and R belong to S.been said that if the terms are related to one another in the way stated. e. I call such a figure the third. For. whether universal or particular. of a third. And it is evident that an affirmative conclusion is not attained by means of this figure. S will belong to some R: consequently since P belongs to all S. it follows that P will necessarily belong to some R. 6 But if one term belongs to all. of it. But it is evident also that all the syllogisms in this figure are imperfect: for all are made perfect by certain supplementary statements. since the affirmative statement is convertible. by the minor that which is nearer to it. It is possible to demonstrate this also per impossibile and by exposition. but it may be valid whether the terms are related universally or not to the middle term. by the major extreme that which is further from the middle.e. A syllogism cannot be perfect in this figure either.g. and S to some R. when we prove per impossibile. The middle term stands outside the extremes. but all are negative. 92 . For if both P and R belong to all S. by extremes I mean the predicates. and another to none. should one of the Ss.

horse. there will be a syllogism to prove that P will necessarily not belong to some R. This may be demonstrated in the same way as the preceding. Again if R belongs to some S. It is clear then in this figure also when a syllogism will be possible and when not. no syllogism will be possible. no matter which of the premisses is universal. as in the former cases. when both are affirmative there must be a syllogism. Terms for the positive relation are animal. for the negative relation man. there will be no syllogism. P must belong to some R. Terms for the positive relation are animal. It might be proved also per impossibile. This may be demonstrated in the same way as before by converting the premiss RS. the other in part only. the minor affirmative. But when one is negative. if the terms are related universally. man. Nor can there be a syllogism when both terms are asserted of no S. But if one term is affirmative. and P to no S. For since the affirmative statement is convertible S will belong to some P: consequently since R belongs to all S. but when they are negative. man: for the negative relation animal. as in the former cases. R must also belong to some P: therefore P must belong to some R. the other affirmative. the other negative. there will be a syllogism to prove that the one extreme does not belong to some of the other: but if the relation is reversed. horse. if the major is negative. there will be a syllogism to prove that one extreme belongs to some of the other. For whenever both the terms are affirmative. But if R belongs to no S. inanimate – inanimate being the middle term.If R belongs to all S. inanimate. no syllogism will be possible. P to some S. P to all S. and if the affirmative is 93 . P must belong to some R. inanimate. For if R belongs to all S. And it is possible to demonstrate it also per impossibile and by exposition. horse. and P to all S. If one term is related universally to the middle. and S to some P.

it may be used truly of that also which belongs to none. the other particular. no syllogism will be possible. a syllogism will be possible whenever the minor term is affirmative. wild: for the negative relation. science.g. P will not belong to some R: for we shall have the first figure again.’ Since the expression ‘it does not belong to some’ is indefinite. man. e. animal. For if P belongs to all R. But if the negative term is universal. Clearly then no syllogism will be possible here. wild. if R belongs to some S. Proof is possible also without reduction ad impossibile. and R belongs to some S. then P will belong to all S: but we assumed that it did not. as has been shown. but P does not belong to some S. if P belongs to all S and R does not belong to some S. Terms for the positive relation are animal. animal. take the terms animal. then P will belong to some R: but we assumed that it belongs to no R. man. and R to some S. When the minor is related universally to the middle. there will be no syllogism.universal. wild – the middle in both being the term wild. But whenever the major is affirmative. For if P belongs to no S. and does not belong to some S. whenever the major is negative and the minor affirmative there will be a syllogism. and R belongs to all S. it is necessary that P does not belong to some R. When the major is related 94 . For the universal negative relation it is not possible to get terms. Nor is a syllogism possible when both are stated in the negative. For if P belongs to all S. if the premiss RS is converted. But if R belongs to no S. For if R belongs to all S. We must put the matter as before. animal. no syllogism is possible. But when the minor is negative. Terms for the universal affirmative relation are animate. if one of the Ss be taken to which P does not belong. man. science. but one is universal. wild.

Nor is a syllogism possible anyhow. then. It is clear also that all the syllogisms in this figure are imperfect (for all are made perfect by certain supplementary assumptions). Common terms for all are animal. For a positive relation terms cannot be found. a syllogism always results relating the minor to the major term. white. or if the premisses are indefinite. the other not to all. and does not belong to some S. or one belongs to some of the middle. if A belongs to all or some B. then P belongs to some S: but we assumed that it belongs to no S. a syllogism results of necessity. but if one is affirmative.g. It is clear then in this figure also when a syllogism will be possible. the terms must be so related. and if the negative is stated universally. and R to some S. Our point. must be proved from the indefinite nature of the particular statement. 7 It is evident also that in all the figures. or one belongs and the other does not to some of the middle. and if there is a syllogism. take as terms for a negative relation raven. white. and when not. and B belongs to no C: for if the premisses are converted it is necessary that C 95 . and that it will not be possible to reach a universal conclusion by means of this figure. if both the terms are affirmative or negative nothing necessary follows at all. if R belongs to some S. whether negative or affirmative. the other negative. if each of the extremes belongs to some of the middle or does not belong.universally to the middle. and that if the terms are as stated. whenever a proper syllogism does not result. For if P belongs to all R. e. inanimate. man. snow. white: animal.

e. It is evident also that the substitution of an indefinite for a particular affirmative will effect the same syllogism in all the figures. and B to some C. Similarly also demonstration will be possible in the case of the negative. because (as we saw) all are brought to a conclusion by means of conversion. In both ways the first figure is formed: if they are made perfect ostensively. e. if A and B belong to all C.does not belong to some A. then B will belong to no C: this we know by means of the second figure. It is clear too that all the imperfect syllogisms are made perfect by means of the first figure. it follows that A belongs to some C. Similarly also in the other figures: a syllogism always results by means of conversion. and B belongs to all C. and B belongs to some C. For if it belonged to no C. and conversion produces the first figure: if they are proved per impossibile. For all are brought to a conclusion either ostensively or per impossibile.g. Consequently. because on the assumption of the false statement the syllogism comes about by means of the first figure. reducing them ad impossibile. A will not belong to some C: for if it belonged to all C. and belongs to all B. In the first figure particular syllogisms are indeed made perfect by themselves. if A belongs to all B. in the last figure. though not all in the same way. each of the particular syllogisms by reductio ad impossibile. but it is possible also to prove them by means of the second figure. A would belong to no C: but (as we stated) it belongs to all C. It is possible also to reduce all syllogisms to the universal syllogisms in the first figure. then B will belong to no C: and this (as we saw) is the middle figure. For if A belongs to no B. it follows that A belongs to some B: for if A belonged to no B. since all syllogisms in the middle figure can be reduced to universal 96 .g. and belongs to no B. Similarly also with the rest. the universal syllogisms are made perfect by converting the negative premiss. Those in the second figure are clearly made perfect by these.

one syllogism concluding from what is necessary. are directly made perfect by means of those syllogisms. It is clear then that all syllogisms may be reduced to the universal syllogisms in the first figure. or may belong to something else (for many things belong indeed. 8 Since there is a difference according as something belongs. and how syllogisms of different figures are related to one another. by means of the particular syllogisms in the first figure: and these (we have seen) may be reduced to the universal syllogisms in the first figure: consequently also the particular syllogisms in the third figure may be so reduced. necessarily belongs. and since particular syllogisms in the first figure can be reduced to syllogisms in the middle figure. others neither necessarily nor indeed at all. We have stated then how syllogisms which prove that something belongs or does not belong to something else are constituted. but. if the terms are universal. 97 . it is clear that particular syllogisms can be reduced to universal syllogisms in the first figure. it is clear that there will be different syllogisms to prove each of these relations. when one of the premisses is particular. another from what is. and syllogisms with differently related terms. There is hardly any difference between syllogisms from necessary premisses and syllogisms from premisses which merely assert. both how syllogisms of the same figure are constituted in themselves.syllogisms in the first figure. then. but it is possible for them to belong). a third from what is possible. but not necessarily. Syllogisms in the third figure. When the terms are put in the same way.

g. 9 It happens sometimes also that when one premiss is necessary the conclusion is necessary. to every B. and we should give the same account of the expressions ‘to be contained in something as in a whole’ and ‘to be predicated of all of something’. But in the middle figure when the universal statement is affirmative. but B is taken as simply belonging to C: for if the premisses are taken in this way. For the negative statement is convertible alike in both cases. if A is taken as necessarily belonging or not belonging to B. and since C is one of the Bs. A will necessarily belong or not belong to C. to which the predicate does not belong. it is clear that for C also the positive or the 98 . or does not belong. For since necessarily belongs. and the particular negative. the demonstration will not take the same form. And each of the resulting syllogisms is in the appropriate figure. With the exceptions to be made below. a syllogism will or will not result alike in both cases. e. not however when either premiss is necessary. it must hold of some of that term in which this part is included: for the part taken is just some of that. But if the relation is necessary in respect of the part taken. in the same manner as in the case of simple predication. but it is necessary by the ‘exposition’ of a part of the subject of the particular negative proposition. the only difference being the addition of the expression ‘necessarily’ to the terms. but only when the major is.whether something belongs or necessarily belongs (or does not belong) to something else. the conclusion will be proved to be necessary by means of conversion. to make the syllogism in reference to this: with terms so chosen the conclusion will necessarily follow. and again in the third figure when the universal is affirmative and the particular negative.

if the universal premiss is necessary. the conclusion will not be necessary: for from the denial of such a conclusion nothing impossible results.g. Since then the negative 99 . The same is true of negative syllogisms. B animal. then the conclusion will be necessary. Similarly also if the major premiss is negative. But if the major premiss is not necessary. but let B simply belong to some C: it is necessary then that A belongs to some C necessarily: for C falls under B. if the negative premiss is necessary. First let the negative be necessary. Try the terms movement. but the minor is necessary. if A were movement.negative relation to A will hold necessarily. the conclusion will not be necessary. for B may be such that it is possible that A should belong to none of it. white. In particular syllogisms. Similarly also if the syllogism should be negative: for the proof will be the same. the conclusion will not be necessary. But this is false. nor does man. but if the affirmative. then the conclusion will be necessary. and A was assumed to belong necessarily to all B. animal. an example also makes it clear that the conclusion not be necessary. just as it does not in the universal syllogisms. let A be possible of no B. For if it were. but an animal does not move necessarily. not necessary. But if the particular premiss is necessary. for the proof is the same. but if the particular. Further. and let A belong to all B necessarily. 10 In the second figure. C man: man is an animal necessarily. whether the universal premiss is negative or affirmative. First let the universal be necessary. e. and simply belong to C. it would result both through the first figure and through the third that A belongs necessarily to some B.

statement is convertible. the conclusion will not be necessary. and let the premisses be assumed to correspond to what we had before: it is possible that animal should belong to nothing white. it follows that C necessarily does not belong to some A. Further. For C falls under A. B is possible of no A. but it is not necessary without qualification. C white. consequently C is possible of none of the Bs: for again we have obtained the first figure. not however so long as animal belongs to nothing white. Neither then is B possible of C: for conversion is possible without modifying the relation. Therefore the same result will obtain here. the first figure results. Consequently it is necessary that C does not belong to some A. if it is true (as was assumed) that A necessarily belongs to all B. Further one might show by an exposition of terms that the conclusion is not necessary without qualification. C will necessarily belong to no B. B man. but not necessarily: for it is possible for man to be born white. if the conclusion is necessary. though it is a necessary conclusion from the premisses. But A belongs to all C. For example let A be animal. Let A belong to all B necessarily. But it has been proved in the case of the first figure that if the negative major premiss is not necessary the conclusion will not be necessary either. consequently B is possible of no C. but to no C simply. The same result would be obtained if the minor premiss were negative: for if A is possible be of no C. But B at any rate must belong to some A. For if B necessarily belongs to no C. But if the affirmative premiss is necessary. C is possible of no A: but A belongs to all B. 100 . Consequently under these conditions the conclusion will be necessary. If then the negative premiss is converted. But nothing prevents such an A being taken that it is possible for C to belong to all of it. Man then will not belong to anything white.

11 In the last figure when the terms are related universally to the middle. but whenever the affirmative is necessary the conclusion will not be necessary. If then A necessarily belongs to all B. and both premisses are affirmative. then the conclusion will be necessary: but whenever the affirmative premiss is universal. Since the negative statement is convertible. then the conclusion will be necessary. because the universal is convertible into the particular: consequently if A 101 . and let AC be necessary. the conclusion will not be necessary. Nor again. which were used in the universal syllogisms. First then let the negative premiss be both universal and necessary: let it be possible for no B that A should belong to it. For whenever the negative premiss is both universal and necessary. it is clear that B will not belong to some C.Similar results will obtain also in particular syllogisms. the negative particular. and let A and B belong to all C. and let the major premiss be affirmative. the other affirmative. if the negative statement is necessary but particular. it will be possible for no A that B should belong to it: but A belongs to some C. But if one is negative. but does not belong to some C. whenever the negative is necessary the conclusion also will be necessary. The point can be demonstrated by means of the same terms. First let both the premisses be affirmative. Since then B belongs to all C. Again let the affirmative premiss be both universal and necessary. but not necessarily. For the same terms can be used to demonstrate the point. C also will belong to some B. consequently B necessarily does not belong to some of the Cs. will the conclusion be necessary. if one of the two is necessary. and let A simply belong to some C.

the conclusion will not be necessary. while C belongs to some of the Bs. it is necessary that A should belong to some B also. and A falls under C. A will necessarily not belong to some B either: for B is under C.belongs necessarily to all C. Or if that is not possible. whenever the universal is necessary the conclusion also must be necessary. in the case of the first figure. neither will the conclusion be necessary. it will belong necessarily also to some A. that if the negative premiss is not necessary. It is possible then that the term good should belong to no horse. and C belongs to some B. for it has been proved. Further. and it is necessary that the term animal should belong to every horse: but it is not necessary that some animal should not be good. For suppose BC is affirmative and necessary. Again let AC be negative. the point may be made clear by considering the terms. the premisses are universal. and if both are affirmative. The demonstration is the same as before. For C is convertible with some A: consequently if B belongs necessarily to all C. while AC is negative and not necessary. the other particular. then. A similar proof will be given also if BC is necessary. But if the affirmative is necessary. Let the term A be ‘good’. it is necessary that B 102 . Since then the affirmative is convertible. since it is possible for every animal to be good. If. but A necessarily belongs to no C. BC affirmative. for the particular affirmative also is convertible. and let the negative premiss be necessary. let the term C be ‘horse’. C also will belong to some B necessarily: consequently if A belongs to none of the Cs. we have stated when the conclusion will be necessary. The first figure then is formed. A will not belong to some of the Bs – but not of necessity. let that which B signifies be ‘animal’. Since then C is convertible with some B. But if one premiss is universal. If then it is necessary that B should belong to all C. take as the term ‘awake’ or ‘asleep’: for every animal can accept these. For B is under C.

Similarly and by means of the same terms proof can be made. and let A belong to all C. ‘man’ being middle. and when the affirmative is particular and necessary. For there is no necessity that some biped should be asleep or awake.should belong to some A. B biped. and that A should belong to B is not necessary. but if terms are wanted. the conclusion will not be necessary. but it is possible for A to belong to C. It is necessary that B should belong to some C. But when the premisses were thus. the conclusion will not be necessary. the point is clear if we look at the terms. take the terms ‘waking’ – ‘animal’ – ‘white’: for it is necessary that animal should belong to some white thing. but it is possible that waking should belong to none. the conclusion (as we proved was not necessary: consequently it is not here either. then A must belong to some B: for conversion is possible. but B belongs to some C. But if one premiss is affirmative. or the negative is particular. and it is not necessary that waking should not belong to some animal. when the universal affirmative is necessary. and the universal premiss is not necessary. the other negative. and C animal. ‘moving’. whether universal or particular. take the terms ‘waking’ – ‘animal’ – ‘man’. But if the particular premiss is necessary. Similarly also if AC should be necessary and universal: for B falls under C. But if B must belong to some A. If the proposition BC is converted the first figure is formed. take the terms ‘biped’. Let the premiss BC be both particular and necessary. Further. ‘animal’ being middle. whenever the universal is both negative and necessary the conclusion also will be necessary. But when the negative proposition being particular is necessary. Let A be waking. 103 . ‘animal’. it is necessary that A should not belong to some B. For if it is not possible that A should belong to any C. but the particular is necessary. not however necessarily. But whenever the affirmative proposition is necessary. should the proposition AC be both particular and necessary. The proof of this by reduction will be the same as before.

being assumed. how it comes about and how it differs from the proof of a simple statement. whether the syllogisms are affirmative or negative. But that my definition of the possible is correct is clear from the phrases by which we deny or on the contrary affirm possibility. the premiss must be necessary.12 It is clear then that a simple conclusion is not reached unless both premisses are simple assertions. I mean by ‘similar’. But in both cases. ‘it is not impossible to belong’. For the expressions ‘it is not possible to belong’. if the conclusion is necessary. ‘it is impossible to belong’. the premiss must be simple. but a necessary conclusion is possible although one only of the premisses is necessary. consequently their opposites also. We say indeed ambiguously of the necessary that it is possible. and ‘it is not 104 . results in nothing impossible. ‘it is possible to belong’. if the conclusion is a simple assertion. it is necessary that one premiss should be similar to the conclusion. We proceed to discuss that which is possible. 13 Perhaps enough has been said about the proof of necessity. when and how and by what means it can be proved. that the conclusion will be neither necessary nor simple unless a necessary or simple premiss is assumed. and ‘it is necessary not to belong’ are either identical or follow from one another. I use the terms ‘to be possible’ and ‘the possible’ of that which is not necessary but. Consequently this also is clear.

In one it means to happen generally and fall short of necessity. It results that all premisses in the mode of possibility are convertible into one another. will either be identical or follow from one another. man’s turning grey or growing or decaying. it comes about either necessarily or generally). e. That which is possible then will be not necessary and that which is not necessary will be possible. I mean not that the affirmative are convertible into the negative. it is possible also that it should not belong to B: and if it is possible that it should belong to all. but that those which are affirmative in form admit of conversion by opposition. For since that which is possible is not necessary. And such premisses are affirmative and not negative. or generally what happens by chance: for none of these inclines by nature in the one way more than in the opposite. Having made these distinctions we next point out that the expression ‘to be possible’ is used in two ways.g.necessary not to belong’. it is also possible that it should not belong to all. e. although if a man does exist. it is clear that if it is possible that A should belong to B. And similarly the other propositions in this mode can be converted. In another sense the expression means the indefinite. e. and that which is not necessary may possibly not belong.g. for ‘to be possible’ is in the same rank as ‘to be’. an animal’s walking or an earthquake’s taking place while it is walking. ‘it is possible to belong’ may be converted into ‘it is possible not to belong’. The same holds good in the case of particular affirmations: for the proof is identical. and ‘it is possible for A to belong to some B’ into ‘it is possible for A not to belong to some B’. and ‘it is possible for A to belong to all B’ into ‘it is possible for A to belong to no B’ or ‘not to all B’. or generally what naturally belongs to a thing (for this has not its necessity unbroken. since man’s existence is not continuous for ever.g. which can be both thus and not thus. For of everything the affirmation or the denial holds good. as was said above. 105 .

the other a problematic. as in the other cases. but they are concerned with things that are natural. but whenever A is possible of that of which B is true. Science and demonstrative syllogism are not concerned with things which are indefinite. and as a rule arguments and inquiries are made about things which are possible in this sense. or all B admits of A. These matters will be treated more definitely in the sequel. It is clear then that the expression ‘A may possibly belong to all B’ might be used in two senses. First then we must state the nature and characteristics of the syllogism which arises if B is possible of the subject of C. our business at present is to state the moods and nature of the syllogism made from possible premisses. and A is possible of the subject of B. for the expression ‘A is possible of the subject of B’ means that it is possible either of that of which B is stated or of that of which B may possibly be stated. 106 . not however in the same way: but what is natural is convertible because it does not necessarily belong (for in this sense it is possible that a man should not grow grey) and what is indefinite is convertible because it inclines this way no more than that. The expression ‘it is possible for this to belong to that’ may be understood in two senses: ‘that’ may mean either that to which ‘that’ belongs or that to which it may belong. because the middle term is uncertain. one premiss is a simple assertion.That which is possible in each of its two senses is convertible into its opposite. but it is unusual at any rate to inquire about them. A is possible of the subject of B. For thus both premisses are assumed in the mode of possibility. It makes no difference whether we say. Consequently we must start from premisses which are similar in form. Syllogisms indeed can be made about the former.

This has been stated above. For since it is possible that B should belong to no C. and A is possible for all B. No syllogism results from the assumed premisses. if A may belong to none of the Bs. and for B to belong to all C. then it is possible for A to belong to no C. the same syllogism again results.14 Whenever A may possibly belong to all B. For if A is possible for all B. But if one of the premisses is universal. or if both premisses are negative. and B to all C. it is necessary that A may possibly not belong to some of the Cs. or if one it is not perfect. the same syllogism results as before. For the necessity results from the conversion. and B may belong to some of the Cs. But whenever A may belong to all B. Consequently if B is possible for all C. 107 . then A is possible for some C. either no syllogism results. Similarly if it is possible for A to belong no B. Similarly if in both the premisses the negative is joined with ‘it is possible’: e. It is clear then that if the minor premiss is negative. it is possible also that it should belong to all C. For the statement that it is possible for A not to belong to that of which B may be true means (as we saw) that none of those things which can possibly fall under the term B is left out of account. when the major premiss is universal there will be a perfect syllogism. and B to none of the Cs. Again if A may belong to no B. and the universal is affirmative. the other particular. This is clear from the definition of being possible. there will be a perfect syllogism to prove that A may possibly belong to all C. and B for some C. The proof is the same as above. and B may belong to no C. but if the premiss BC is converted after the manner of problematic propositions. then indeed no syllogism results from the premisses assumed. but if they are converted we shall have the same syllogism as before. But if the particular premiss is negative.g. This is clear from the definition: for it was in this way that we explained ‘to be possible for one term to belong to all of another’.

where the major belongs necessarily to the minor. then a clear syllogism does not result from the assumed premisses. B may possibly not belong to some C. so that as predicates cover unequal areas. as in the cases given at the beginning. But if the major premiss is the minor universal. but if the particular premiss is converted and it is laid down that B possibly may belong to some C. But this is impossible. this is obvious if we take terms. and the negative by the affirmative. whether both are affirmative. A is possible for all B. Further. since premisses in the mode of possibility are convertible and it is possible for B to belong to more things than A can. we shall have the same conclusion as before. For nothing prevents B from reaching beyond A. Let C be that by which B extends beyond A. For every syllogism proves that something belongs either simply or necessarily or possibly. e. It is clear that there is no proof of the first or of the second. To C it is not possible that A should belong – either to all or to none or to some or not to some. It is clear then that if the terms are related in this manner. ‘animal’ – ‘white’ – ‘garment’. no syllogism results. Take as terms common to all the cases under consideration ‘animal’ – ‘white’ – ‘man’. for the necessary (as we stated) is not possible.the major still being universal and the minor particular. for if the premisses are as assumed. or negative. or different in quality. For the affirmative is destroyed by the negative. 108 . where it is not possible that the major should belong to the minor. Consequently there cannot be a syllogism to prove the possibility. There remains the proof of possibility. or if both are indefinite or particular. For it has been proved that if the terms are related in this manner it is both necessary that the major should belong to all the minor and not possible that it should belong to any. the major term is both possible for none of the minor and must belong to all of it.g. in no way will a syllogism be possible.

But possibility must be understood according to the definition laid down. At the same time it will be evident that they are imperfect: for the proof proceeds not from the premisses assumed. It is clear that perfect syllogisms result if the minor premiss states simple belonging: but that syllogisms will result if the modality of the premisses is reversed. and the premiss BC is affirmative. not as covering necessity. and A is possible for all B. a perfect syllogism results proving that A possibly belongs to no C. whenever the major premiss indicates possibility all the syllogisms will be perfect and establish possibility in the sense defined. the former stating possible. an imperfect in the second. This is sometimes forgotten. whether they are affirmative or negative.It is clear that if the terms are universal in possible premisses a syllogism always results in the first figure. Let A be possible for all B. and those which are negative will establish not possibility according to the definition. but that the major does not necessarily belong to any. the other a problematic. For if this is so. only a perfect syllogism results in the first case. B’s possibility will follow necessarily 109 . we say it is possible that it should belong to none or not to all. of the minor. Since C falls under B. must be proved per impossibile. and let B belong to all C. Likewise if the premiss AB is negative. So a perfect syllogism results. the latter simple attribution. or to all. 15 If one premiss is a simple proposition. First we must state that if B’s being follows necessarily from A’s being. but whenever the minor premiss indicates possibility all the syllogisms will be imperfect. clearly it is possible for all C also.

B also will be false but not impossible. the terms being so related. when it is possible for it to be. Since we have defined these points. might happen. For that which has happened. could not happen. then B’s possibility will follow from A’s possibility (and A is assumed to be possible). and if at the same time A is possible and B impossible. and D of F. it would be possible for A to happen without B. and if to happen. and B be possible for all C: it is necessary then that should be a 110 . that A is possible. the conclusion also is possible. but not impossible. But we must take the impossible and the possible not only in the sphere of becoming. For if C is predicated of D. B will be: for nothing follows of necessity from the being of some one thing.from A’s possibility. for example. one should indicate the premisses by A. and the conclusion by B. it would not only result that if A is necessary B is necessary. And if each is possible. B is possible. let A belong to all B. For since it has been proved that if B’s being is the consequence of A’s being. If then that which is possible. when the premisses are related in the manner stated to be that of the syllogism. then C is necessarily predicated of F. is. but also in the spheres of truth and predicability. Suppose. the consequence of the assumption will also be false and not impossible: e. Since this is proved it is evident that if a false and not impossible assumption is made. then to be.g. and B is impossible. i. when it is impossible. but also that if A is possible. the same thing would at the same time be possible and impossible. and if that which is impossible. not as meaning that if some single thing A is. and if B is the consequence of A. and the various other spheres in which we speak of the possible: for it will be alike in all. if A is false. If then. but from two at least. consequently B will be possible: for if it were impossible. Further we must understand the statement that B’s being depends on A’s being. when it has happened.e.

since if the premiss is understood with reference to the present moment. it is necessary that A possibly belongs to no C. then A would be possible for all C.e. But it was assumed that A is a possible attribute for all B. For if B belongs to all C. the middle ‘moving’. e. Suppose that it cannot belong. if nothing else were moving: but ‘moving’ is possible for every horse. These propositions being laid down. Further let the major term be ‘animal’. by assuming that B belongs to C. but B possibly belongs to all C. For though the assumption we made is false and not impossible. It is necessary then that A belongs to some B: for we have a syllogism in the third figure: but this is impossible. to the present or to a particular period. It is clear then that the universal must be understood simply. Again let the premiss AB be universal and negative. If then A is not possible for C but B belongs to all C. Thus it will be possible for A to belong to no C. and assume that A belongs to no B. then A is not possible for all B: for a syllogism is formed in the third degree.g. Suppose that it is not possible. but the conclusion necessary. as above. and A is possible for all B. i. there cannot be a syllogism. but assume that B belongs to all C: this is false but not impossible. the conclusion is impossible. It is necessary then that A is possible for all C. the the minor ‘man’. But the assumption was made that A is not possible for all C. yet ‘man’ is possible for no horse. but simply without qualification. without limitation in respect of time. We must understand ‘that which belongs to all’ with no limitation in respect of time. For man is necessarily animal. for if 111 . not possible. and that B belongs to C.possible attribute for all C. The premisses then will be as before. For nothing perhaps prevents ‘man’ belonging at a particular time to everything that is moving. It is possible also in the first figure to bring about the impossibility. For it is by the help of such premisses that we make syllogisms.

but the syllogism per impossibile establishes the contradictory which is opposed to this). nothing necessarily follows: but if the proposition BC is converted and it is assumed that B is possible for all C. If the minor premiss is negative and indicates possibility. and the minor premiss indicates that B may possibly belong to no C. but if the problematic premiss is converted.at is supposed false. Through these comes nothing 112 . and C ‘man’. but that which does not necessarily belong to any part of the subject (for this is the contradictory of the assumption which was made: for it was supposed that A necessarily belongs to some C. Further. For it is not necessary that no man should move. Through the premisses actually taken nothing necessary results in any way. C ‘man’. This syllogism then does not establish that which is possible according to the definition. If the terms are arranged thus. and B may possibly belong to no C. Let A belong to all B. B ‘intelligent’. the consequence is an impossible one. Let A be ‘raven’. And the conclusion will not be necessary. it is clear also from an example that the conclusion will not establish possibility. a syllogism results as before: for the terms are in the same relative positions. B ‘science’. But we must take our terms better. Likewise if both the relations are negative. if the major premiss states that A does not belong to B. Suppose that A belongs to no B. rather it is not necessary that any man should move. But neither is it always necessary. a syllogism will be possible. But A necessarily belongs to no C: so the conclusion does not establish possibility. Clearly then the conclusion establishes that one term does not necessarily belong to any instance of another term. A then belongs to no B: for no intelligent thing is a raven. but B is possible for all C. but if the problematic premiss is converted. But B is possible for all C: for every man may possibly be intelligent. Let A be ‘moving’. and let B possibly belong to no C. A then will belong to no B. we shall have a syllogism. as before. from the actual premisses taken there can be no syllogism.

white – animal – pitch. whether positive or negative. negative. whether the premiss AB is negative or affirmative. and the minor particular. in all cases there will be an imperfect syllogism. The demonstration is the same as before. and the particular is affirmative and assertoric. e. the other particular. the other affirmative. if A belongs to all B or to no B. we shall again have the same syllogism. But if one of the relations is universal. But if B is assumed to be possible for all C (and this is true) and if the premiss AB remains as before. sometimes it requires the conversion of one premiss. instead of possibly not belonging. Only some of them will be proved per impossibile. But whenever the particular premiss is assertoric and negative. others by the conversion of the problematic premiss. there will be a perfect syllogism. Clearly then if the terms are universal. there cannot be a syllogism. not problematic. and B may possibly not belong to some C. 113 .necessary. a syllogism results. and the minor is particular and problematic.g. as has been shown above. only sometimes it results from the premisses that are taken. or one is negative. As instances of the positive relation we may take the terms white – animal – snow. just as when the terms are universal. For if the premiss BC is converted in respect of possibility. then whenever the major premiss is universal and problematic. whether affirmative or negative. whenever the minor premiss is problematic a syllogism always results. As common instances of a necessary and positive relation we may take the terms white – animal – snow: of a necessary and negative relation. there cannot be a syllogism anyhow. of the negative. the other problematic. But if it be assumed that B does not belong to any C. We have stated when each of these happens and the reason why. but assertoric. And a syllogism will be possible by means of conversion when the major premiss is universal and assertoric. and problematic. But whenever the major premiss is universal. whether both premisses are negative or affirmative. and one of the premisses is assertoric.

whether either premiss is negative or affirmative. The demonstration is the same as above. and the major particular. It is evident then that if the major premiss is universal. not negative assertoric. of the necessary and negative relation. There cannot be an inference to the necessary negative proposition: for ‘not necessarily to belong’ is different from ‘necessarily not to belong’. whether problematic or assertoric. But if the minor premiss is universal. a syllogism always results. the other negative. nohow is a syllogism possible. If the premisses are affirmative the conclusion will be problematic. animal – white – garment. or the one problematic. Possibility in the conclusion must be understood in the same manner as before. but if the minor is universal nothing at all can ever be proved.white – animal – pitch. and assertoric negative. there will be a syllogism when the terms are related as before. but when the negative is necessary the conclusion will be problematic negative. the other assertoric. 114 . problematic or assertoric. whether the premisses are universal or not: but if one is affirmative. when the affirmative is necessary the conclusion will be problematic. For the demonstration must be made through the indefinite nature of the particular premiss. the other problematic. and a perfect syllogism when the minor premiss is necessary. 16 Whenever one premiss is necessary. Nor is a syllogism possible when the premisses are particular or indefinite. not assertoric. whether the premisses are universal or not. As instances of the necessary and positive relation we may take the terms animal – white – man.

For suppose A to belong to all C or to some C. Again. But if the minor premiss is negative. Now we assumed that A is not possible for any B. The syllogism will be perfect. We shall have an imperfect syllogism to prove that A may belong to all C. let A be possible for all B. and let necessarily A not be possible for any B. For if it were supposed that A belongs to some C. But it was originally laid down that B is possible for all C. as above. suppose first that the negative premiss is necessary. and the minor is necessary. The same terms as before serve both for the positive relation – 115 . not an assertoric negative. Since then the negative proposition is convertible. But if the premisses are not similar in quality. And it is clear that the possibility of belonging can be inferred. not imperfect: for it is completed directly through the original premisses. and it is laid down that A possibly does not belong to any B. Suppose A necessarily belongs to all B. It is necessary then that A belongs to no C. But A is supposed to belong to all C or to some C. but it will establish a problematic negative. and let B be possible for all C. That it is imperfect is clear from the proof: for it will be proved in the same manner as above. clearly the conclusion which follows is not necessary. Consequently B will not be possible for any C or for all C. when it is problematic a syllogism is possible by conversion. no impossible relation between B and C follows from these premisses. For the major premiss was problematic. not that A does belong to all C: and it is perfect. since the fact of not belonging is inferred. and further it is not possible to prove the assertoric conclusion per impossibile. B is not possible for any A. Nor again when both premisses are negative. We shall then have a syllogism to prove that A may belong to all C. let the affirmative premiss be necessary. and let A possibly not belong to any B. but when it is necessary no syllogism can be formed. and let B necessarily belong to all C.If the premisses are affirmative. Again. and let B necessarily belong to all C. but let B be possible for all C.

But it was laid down that B may belong to some C. Similarly if the relation is problematic: so the terms may be used for all cases. But when the particular affirmative in the negative syllogism. Whenever the negative proposition is necessary. 116 . or animal-white-pitch to illustrate the negative. or both particular. Nor again is a syllogism possible when the premisses are indefinite. e. and where it is necessary and negative.g. and of white to some inanimate. For the relation of animal to some white. The same relation will obtain in particular syllogisms. and the major premiss is particular and necessary. neither can B belong to any A. e. e. and if the universal is affirmative we may take the terms animal-white-swan to illustrate the positive relation. animal-white-inanimate.g. the conclusion will be negative assertoric: e. if it is not possible that A should belong to any B. But when the universal is necessary.g. if the universal is negative we may take the terms animal-whiteraven to illustrate the positive relation. The demonstration is the same as before. e. and problematic. whether affirmative or negative. is necessary. it is necessary that A should not belong to some of the Cs. Terms applicable in either case to illustrate the positive relation are animal-whiteman: to illustrate the negative. animal-white-man. For if A belongs to all C. to none of the Cs can B belong. there will not be an assertoric conclusion. animal-white-garment. But if the minor premiss is universal. AB the major premiss. and for the negative relation – whiteanimal-pitch. is both necessary and positive and necessary and negative. So if A belongs to all C.g. Premisses of this kind are possible both where the relation is positive and necessary.g. but B may belong to some of the Cs. or the universal proposition in the affirmative syllogism. and animal-white-snow to illustrate the negative and necessary relation. there cannot be a syllogism. but cannot belong to any B. the particular problematic.white-animal-snow. BC the minor premiss.

] 17 In the second figure whenever both premisses are problematic. it does not follow that all that can be this: consequently the negative proposition is not convertible. [It is clear also that all the syllogisms are imperfect and are perfected by means of the figures above mentioned. universal or particular. it does not follow that B may belong to no A. e. but if the negative premiss is necessary the conclusion is both problematic and negative assertoric. and since B may belong to no A. ‘B necessarily does not belong to some of 117 . whether they are contraries or contradictories. that if the negative premiss is assertoric the conclusion is problematic. no syllogism is possible. the other problematic. the other problematic.Clearly then from what has been said a syllogism results or not from similar relations of the terms whether we are dealing with simple existence or necessity. if A may belong to no B. Similarly when one premiss is necessary. For suppose it to follow and assume that B may belong to no A. Further. with this exception. these propositions are not incompatible. in the same sense as before.g. Here also we must understand the term ‘possible’ in the conclusion. But when one premiss is assertoric. Since then problematic affirmations are convertible with negations. First we must point out that the negative problematic proposition is not convertible. whether the premisses are affirmative or negative. if the affirmative is assertoric no syllogism is possible. ‘A may belong to no B’. But this is false: for if all this can be that. but if the universal negative is assertoric a conclusion can always be drawn. it is clear that B may belong to all A.

But this is impossible. not that A necessarily belongs to some B. just as it is not true to say that what necessarily belongs to some A may possibly belong to all A. it is possible that no man should be white (for it is also possible that every man should be white). if it is not possible that no A should be B. For the latter expression is used in two senses. But if this is assumed. Similarly also they are opposed to the proposition ‘A may belong to no B’. It is clear then that in relation to what is possible and not possible. but because in some cases it belongs necessarily. it is true that B necessarily belongs to some of the As: consequently A necessarily belongs to some of the Bs.e. by claiming assent to the following argument: ‘since it is false that B may belong to no A. therefore we say that it is not possible for it to belong to all. but that A necessarily does not belong to some B. it is true that it cannot belong to no A.the As’. another if some A is necessarily not B. It is clear from what has been said that the negative proposition is not convertible. i. in the sense originally defined. we must assume. one if A some is necessarily B. For it is not true to say that that which necessarily does not belong to some of the As may possibly not belong to any A. But if this is so. Moreover it is not possible to prove the convertibility of these propositions by a reductio ad absurdum. If any one then should claim that because it is not possible for C to belong to all D. but it is not true to say that it is possible that no white thing should be a man: for many white things are necessarily not men. Hence both the propositions ‘A necessarily belongs to some B’ and ‘A necessarily does not belong to some B’ are opposed to the proposition ‘A belongs to all B’.g. 118 .’ The argument cannot be admitted. for it does not follow that some A is necessarily B. and the necessary (as we saw) other than the possible. for the one statement is the contradictory of the other. it necessarily does not belong to some D. e. no absurdity results: consequently no syllogism. he would make a false assumption: for it does belong to all D.

and this must be either affirmative or negative. The demonstration can be made by means of the same terms. Let A be white. Neither is it possible for it not to belong. no false consequence results: for A may belong both to all C and to no C. the other problematic. if both the premisses are problematic. But neither is possible. Suppose the conclusion is affirmative: it will be proved by an example that the predicate cannot belong to the subject. but the necessary we found to be different from the possible. In general. if there is a syllogism. C horse. For it is necessary that no horse should be a man. the minor affirmative. 18 But if one premiss is assertoric. or both are particular or indefinite. And whenever one premiss is universal. suppose it possible that A may belong to no B and to all C. it is clear that its conclusion will be problematic because neither of the premisses is assertoric. That it is not possible for it to belong. the proof will always proceed through the same terms.This being proved. as has been said. or if both are affirmative or negative. Nor can a proof be obtained by a reductio ad absurdum: for if it is assumed that B can belong to all C. the other particular. A similar proof can be given if the major premiss is negative. Clearly then. Suppose the conclusion is negative: it will be proved that it is not problematic but necessary. By means of conversion no syllogism will result: for the major premiss. B man. if the affirmative is assertoric and the negative problematic no 119 . or in whatever other way the premisses can be altered. But it is not possible for B to belong nor not to belong to C. no syllogism results. No syllogism then results. It is possible then for A to belong to all of the one and to none of the other. is not convertible. For no horse is a man. is clear.

B will belong to no A. but can belong to all C. But if both premisses are affirmative. proving by means of the first figure that B may belong to no C. The proof is the same as above. health. nothing follows necessarily from these premisses as they stand. Similarly also if the minor premiss is negative.g.g. or particular. But when the affirmative premiss is problematic. and the assertoric proposition is universal. This arrangement of terms is possible both when the relation is positive. e. and the negative assertoric. no syllogism will be possible. But if both premisses are negative. The proof is the same and by the same terms. whether universal or particular. whether the other premiss is affirmative or negative. but when the negative proposition is assertoric. Suppose A belongs to no B. but if the problematic premiss is converted into its complementary affirmative a syllogism is formed to prove that B may belong to no C. But ex hypothesi can belong to all C: so a syllogism is made. a conclusion can be drawn by means of conversion. as before. e. The same will hold good if the syllogisms are particular. whether the premisses are universal or particular. no syllogism is possible. Nor can a conclusion be drawn when both premisses are indefinite. and when it is negative.syllogism will be possible. a syllogism can be obtained by converting the problematic premiss into its complementary affirmative as before. one being assertoric. whether affirmative or negative. the other problematic. 120 . man. Whenever the affirmative proposition is assertoric. as before: for we shall again have the first figure. Again if both the relations are negative. and by means of the same terms. health. But if the negative proposition is assertoric. animal. although no conclusion follows from the actual premisses. man. If the negative proposition is converted. we shall have a syllogism. no syllogism is possible (this is proved similarly and by the same examples as above). but particular. horse.

not merely a negative problematic but also a negative assertoric conclusion.19 If one of the premisses is necessary. A cannot belong to some of the Cs: but ex hypothesi it may belong to all.e. But at the same time it is clear that B will not belong to any C. Again let the affirmative proposition be necessary. White then necessarily belongs to swan. for that which is necessary is admittedly distinct from that which is possible. no syllogism is possible. and necessarily belonging to C. Clearly then we cannot draw a problematic conclusion.g. when the terms are so arranged. but if the affirmative premiss is necessary. (3) Further it is possible also. C swan. but may belong to all C. A being possible for all B. For motion necessarily belongs to what 121 . and man necessarily belongs to no swan. Let A be white. but necessarily belongs to all C. suppose that A may belong to no B. If the negative premiss is converted B will belong to no A: but A ex hypothesi is capable of belonging to all C: so once more a conclusion is drawn by the first figure that B may belong to no C. A similar proof can be given if the minor premiss is negative. and the other problematic. (2) Nor again can we draw a necessary conclusion: for that presupposes that both premisses are necessary. no conclusion is possible. B man. A for ‘motion’. or at any rate the negative premiss. Suppose that A necessarily belongs to no B. B for ‘animal’. and B belongs to some of the Cs. e. that B should belong to C: for nothing prevents C falling under B. When the terms are arranged in this way. the other problematic. For (1) it sometimes turns out that B necessarily does not belong to C. For assume that it does: then if A cannot belong to any B. but may belong to no man. i. then if the negative is necessary a syllogistic conclusion can be drawn. if C stands for ‘awake’.

A syllogism then is not possible at all. and A may possibly belong to all C: thus we have the first figure. A similar proof is possible if the major premiss is affirmative. no syllogistic conclusion can be drawn. when they are negative a syllogism can always be formed by converting the problematic premiss into its complementary affirmative as before. if the relation must be positive when the terms are related as above. Similarly if the minor premiss is negative. and is possible for every animal: and everything that is awake is animal. Similar relations will obtain in particular syllogisms. e. and the premiss 122 . This can be proved in the same way as for universal propositions. but when the affirmative proposition is universal and necessary. Nor is a syllogistic conclusion possible when both premisses are affirmative: this also may be proved as above. a syllogism will always be possible to prove both a problematic and a negative assertoric proposition (the proof proceeds by conversion). C man.g. Nor can the opposite affirmations be established. But when both premisses are negative. Clearly then the conclusion cannot be the negative assertion. Nor can the opposite affirmations be established: consequently no syllogism is possible. suppose that A is white. and by the same terms. For if the terms are so related. and possibly may not belong to C: if the premisses are converted B belongs to no A. Clearly the conclusion cannot be a negative assertoric or a negative necessary proposition because no negative premiss has been laid down either in the assertoric or in the necessary mode. since we have shown a case in which B necessarily does not belong to C.is awake. B swan. But if the premisses are similar in quality. But if the premisses are affirmative there cannot be a syllogism. For whenever the negative proposition is universal and necessary. there are cases in which B necessarily will not belong to C. Suppose A necessarily does not belong to B. Nor can the conclusion be a problematic negative proposition.

but if the affirmative premiss is necessary no conclusion can be drawn. and also when one premiss is problematic. and are completed by means of the figures mentioned. a conclusion can be drawn as above if the problematic premiss is converted into its complementary affirmative. But if both are indefinite or particular. proving not merely a negative problematic. but if it is negative the syllogism will result in a negative assertoric proposition.that definitely disconnects two terms is universal and necessary. It is clear too that a syllogism is possible or not under the same conditions whether the mode of the premisses is assertoric or necessary. The same proof will serve. When the premisses are problematic the conclusion will be problematic. And it is clear that all the syllogisms are imperfect. as above. the other assertoric. but also a negative assertoric proposition. First let the premisses be problematic and suppose that both A and B may possibly belong to every C. no syllogism can be formed. In these also we must understand the expression ‘possible’ in the conclusion in the same way as before. though nothing follows necessarily from the premisses as they are stated. and B may possibly 123 . if it is affirmative the conclusion will be neither necessary or assertoric. But when the other premiss is necessary. It is clear then from what has been said that if the universal and negative premiss is necessary. and the same terms. a syllogism is always possible. Since then the affirmative proposition is convertible into a particular. 20 In the last figure a syllogism is possible whether both or only one of the premisses is problematic.

no syllogism can be formed: for A must belong sometimes to all B and sometimes to no B. Similarly if the proposition BC is universal. take the terms horse-man-white – white being the middle term. But when both premisses are indefinite or particular. But if one of the premisses is universal. it follows that A may possibly not belong to some B: for we shall have the first figure again by conversion. Likewise also if the proposition AC is negative. So. To illustrate the affirmative relation take the terms animal-man-white. We shall have the first figure again if the particular premiss is converted. But if both premisses should be negative no necessary consequence will follow from them as they are stated. if ‘may possibly belong’ is substituted we shall again have the first figure by means of conversion. 124 . But if both premisses should be negative – the one universal and the other particular – although no syllogistic conclusion will follow from the premisses as they are put. Suppose that A may possibly belong to all C. to illustrate the negative. but if the premisses are converted into their corresponding affirmatives there will be a syllogism as before. For if A is possible for all C. And A if may possibly belong to no C. under the arrangement of the terms as in the case of assertoric propositions. the other particular. For if A and B may possibly not belong to C. and the proposition BC affirmative: for we shall again have the first figure by conversion. and C for some of the Bs. as above. if A is possible for every C. it follows that C may possibly belong to some B. or not. then A is possible for some of the Bs. it will follow if they are converted. For we have got the first figure. and C is possible for some of the Bs. a syllogism will be possible.belong to every C. but B may possibly belong to all C. and B to some C. then A is possible for some of the Bs.

the other problematic. or if AC is negative. If the proposition BC is converted. and A may possibly not belong to some C: it follows that may possibly not belong to some B. the proof will proceed by a reductio ad impossibile. But if the affirmative premiss is universal. So it is clear that we shall have not a pure but a problematic syllogistic conclusion.21 If one premiss is pure. BC affirmative. For if A necessarily belongs to all B. the negative particular. the particular affirmative. we shall have the first figure. no syllogistic conclusion can be drawn from the premisses as they stand. 125 . But if the minor premiss BC is negative. or if both premisses are negative. and a syllogism will be possible under the same arrangement of the terms as before. But it was assumed at the outset that A may possibly not belong to some C. the conclusion also (as we saw) is problematic. but if they are converted a syllogism is obtained as before. not pure. then when both are affirmative. the other particular. A will necessarily belong to all C: for this has been proved before. the conclusion will be problematic. First let the premisses be affirmative: suppose that A belongs to all C. no matter which of the two is pure. and B may possibly belong to all C. AC problematic. If one of the premisses is universal. in both cases the conclusion will be problematic: for the first figure is obtained once more. Suppose that B belongs to all C. we shall have the same sort of syllogisms: for all are completed by means of the first figure. Similarly if the proposition BC is pure. or when the universal is negative. and B (as has been assumed) belongs to all C. For when one of the premisses in the first figure is problematic. and the conclusion that A may possibly belong to some of the Bs. and it has been proved that if one premiss is problematic in that figure the conclusion also will be problematic.

The demonstration is the same as was given in the case of universal premisses. the other negative. But a necessary negative conclusion will not be possible. Suppose first that the premisses are affirmative. and proceeds by means of the same terms. A similar proof may be given if the proposition BC is necessary. but if the negative proposition is necessary both a problematic and a pure negative conclusion are possible. no syllogism will be possible. the other negative. Since then A must belong to all C. if the affirmative is necessary a problematic negative can be inferred.e. the other problematic. the conclusion (as we found) is problematic. i. and B may possibly belong to all C. but B may belong to all C.e. For suppose that A necessarily does not belong to C. suppose A may possibly belong to no C.Whenever both premisses are indefinite or particular. but B necessarily belongs to all C. when the premisses are affirmative a problematic affirmative conclusion can always be drawn. when one proposition is affirmative. the affirmative being necessary: i. we 126 . We shall have the first figure once more: and – since the negative premiss is problematic – it is clear that the conclusion will be problematic: for when the premisses stand thus in the first figure. it follows that A may (not does) belong to some B: for so it resulted in the first figure. and C may belong to some B. and AC is problematic. 22 If one of the premisses is necessary. any more than in the other figures. If the affirmative proposition BC is converted. that A necessarily belongs to all C. Again suppose one proposition is affirmative. But if the negative premiss is necessary. the conclusion will be not only that A may possibly not belong to some B but also that it does not belong to some B.

and when the conclusion is problematic. but if it is necessary a syllogism is not possible. To illustrate the former take the terms sleepsleeping horse-man. The proof will follow the same course as where the premisses are universal. But when the negative premiss is necessary.shall have the first figure. It is clear then in this figure also when and how a syllogism can be formed. it resulted that A might possibly not belong to some C. to illustrate the latter take the terms sleepwaking horse-man. Similar results will obtain if one of the terms is related universally to the middle. It is evident also that all syllogisms in this figure are imperfect. For the syllogisms must be made perfect by means of the first figure. But when the premisses stood thus. If both premisses are affirmative. and sometimes cannot possibly belong to any B. for the same kind of proof can be given whether the terms are universal or not. the conclusion also will be a pure negative proposition. and the negative premiss is necessary. so that a result which follows in the first figure follows also in the third. and that they are made perfect by means of the first figure. and when it is pure. the other affirmative. and also when one premiss is negative. as before. the latter being necessary. and the same terms may be used. not pure. consequently here it follows that A does not belong to some B. if it is problematic a syllogism can be formed by means of conversion. and that it did not belong to some C. the other in part. 127 . if it is problematic we shall have a syllogism by altering the premiss into its complementary affirmative. but if it is necessary no syllogism can be formed. the conclusion will be problematic. But when the minor premiss is negative and universal. But when the minor premiss is negative. For A sometimes necessarily belongs to all B.

nothing prevents a syllogism being formed. or something else of A. If then one wants to prove syllogistically A of B. the proposition originally in question will have been assumed. either as an attribute of it or as not an attribute of it. but it will not be in relation to B through the premisses taken. one must assert something of something else. For nothing necessarily follows from the assertion of some one thing concerning some other single thing. no syllogism will be possible. and that to something else and so on. and in general hypothetically. Let us speak first of ostensive syllogisms: for after these have been pointed out the truth of our contention will be clear with regard to those which are proved per impossibile. One sort of hypothetical proof is the reductio ad impossibile. and this either universally or in part. If then A be asserted of something else. when it has been proved that every syllogism is formed through one or other of these figures. and further either ostensively or hypothetically. Thus we must take another premiss as well. That every syllogism without qualification can be so treated. nor anything else of A. or something different of C. Nor when C belongs to something else. But if A should be asserted of C. nor anything of it. no connexion however being made 128 . but C should not be asserted of anything. It is necessary that every demonstration and every syllogism should prove either that something belongs or that it does not. If now A should be asserted of B.23 It is clear from what has been said that the syllogisms in these figures are made perfect by means of universal syllogisms in the first figure and are reduced to them. will be clear presently.

or again to take a premiss relating A to B. e. For all who effect an argument per impossibile infer syllogistically what is false. and C of B. One infers syllogistically that odd numbers come out equal to evens. and prove the original conclusion hypothetically when something impossible results from the assumption of its contradictory. For the syllogism in general is made out of premisses. since a falsehood results through contradicting this. and one proves hypothetically the incommensurability of the diagonal. It is clear then that the ostensive syllogisms are effected by means of the aforesaid figures. but affirm or deny peculiar attributes of each. But it is impossible to take a premiss in reference to B. which will connect the predications. For this we found to be reasoning per impossibile. if we are to have a syllogism relating this to that.with B. For in general we stated that no syllogism can establish the attribution of one thing to another. If then we must take something common in relation to both. unless some middle term is taken. that the diagonal of the square is incommensurate with the side. if we neither affirm nor deny anything of it. The argument is the same if several middle terms should be necessary to establish the relation to B. viz. because odd numbers are equal to evens if it is supposed to be commensurate. will a syllogism be possible concerning A in its relation to B. or both of C). for the figure will be the same whether there is one middle term or many. which is somehow related to each by way of predication.g. and this is possible in three ways (either by predicating A of C. and a syllogism relating this to that proceeds through premisses which relate this to that. and these are the figures of which we have spoken. or C of both. if we take nothing common. these considerations will show that reductiones ad also are effected in the same way. proving 129 . it is clear that every syllogism must be made in one or other of these figures. So we must take something midway between the two. and a syllogism referring to this out of premisses with the same reference.

it is not relevant to the subject proposed.something impossible by means of an hypothesis conceded at the beginning. Suppose the lines A and B have been drawn to the centre. one is assuming that which was proposed at the outset to be proved. or it will not refer to the subject proposed.g. every demonstration and every syllogism must be formed by means of the three figures mentioned above. or the original position will be begged. 24 Further in every syllogism one of the premisses must be affirmative. and the original conclusion is proved hypothetically. it is evident that syllogisms per impossibile also will be made through these figures. that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal. but the original thesis is reached by means of a concession or some other hypothesis. If then one should assume that the angle AC is equal to 130 . if one should claim that some pleasure is good. since the falsehood is established in reductions ad impossibile by an ostensive syllogism. if it is this very pleasure. Likewise all the other hypothetical syllogisms: for in every case the syllogism leads up to the proposition that is substituted for the original thesis. then if it is different from pleasure in music. But when this has been shown it is clear that every syllogism is perfected by means of the first figure and is reducible to the universal syllogisms in this figure. This is more obvious in geometrical proofs. and universality must be present: unless one of the premisses is universal either a syllogism will not be possible. Suppose we have to prove that pleasure in music is good. e. no syllogism will be possible. and we have already stated that ostensive syllogisms are effected by means of these figures. Consequently. If one should claim as a premiss that pleasure is good without adding ‘all’. But if this is true.

and that if a syllogism is formed the terms must be arranged in one of the ways that have been mentioned. but also in being necessary. 25 It is clear too that every demonstration will proceed through three terms and no more. and when a valid. We must consider also the other forms of predication. and again if one should assume that the angle C is equal to the angle D. which are themselves equal. he will beg the thing to be proved. while a particular statement is proved both from two universal premisses and from one only: consequently if the conclusion is universal. It is clear also when a syllogism in general can be made and when it cannot. And it is clear also that in every syllogism either both or one of the premisses must be like the conclusion. the remainders E and F are equal. problematic. pure. unless he also states that when equals are taken from equals the remainders are equal. It is clear then that in every syllogism there must be a universal premiss. but if the premisses are universal it is possible that the conclusion may not be universal.the angle BD. unless the same conclusion is 131 . without claiming generally that angles of semicircles are equal. I mean not only in being affirmative or negative. and further if one should assume that when equal angles are taken from the whole angles. and that a universal statement is proved only when all the premisses are universal. when a perfect syllogism can be formed. the premisses also must be universal. without the additional assumption that every angle of a segment is equal to every other angle of the same segment.

Some conclusion then follows from them.g. and again B by means of F and G. e. e.g. 132 . or (ii) A or B. and D. A and B and C. e. Suppose then that A stands in this relation to B. But if this can be called one syllogism. or A and C. and unconnected with one another. the other by inductive inference. and it must be either E. And if it is (i) E. and through the propositions C and D. by means of D and E. But if (iii) the conclusion is other than E or A or B. either (i) the syllogisms will be more than one. the syllogisms will be many. For nothing prevents there being several middles for the same terms. or one or other of the propositions A and B. But if C and D are so related that one is whole. (1) If it is E the syllogism will have A and B for its sole premisses. or through the propositions A and B. or B and C. but it cannot be reached as C is established by means of A and B. But in that case there is not one but several syllogisms. for the conclusions are many. unless for the sake of induction or of obscuring the argument or something of the sort. the propositions will have been assumed to no purpose. Or one may be obtained by syllogistic. It is necessary then that of these one should be related to another as whole to part: for it has already been proved that if a syllogism is formed some of its terms must be related in this way. C. or something other than these. some conclusion will follow from them also. But if C is not so related to D as to make a syllogism. the same conclusion may be reached by more than three terms in this way. or (ii) the same thing happens to be inferred by means of several terms only in the sense which we saw to be possible. not many. Suppose that the proposition E is inferred from the premisses A. or something other than these. B.g. It must either be E or one or other of C and D. Or again when each of the propositions A and B is obtained by syllogistic inference. the conclusion E may be established through the propositions A and B. But thus also the syllogisms are many. the other part.established by different pairs of propositions.

it turns out that these propositions have been assumed to no purpose. And if no conclusion follows from C and D. But whenever a conclusion is reached by means of prosyllogisms or by means of several continuous middle terms. and the premisses will be equal in number to the relations of 133 . the proposition AB by means of the middle terms C and D. this argument either has not been drawn syllogistically or it has assumed more than was necessary to establish its thesis. e. and the conclusions will be half the number of the premisses. and the syllogism does not prove the original proposition. the number of the terms will similarly exceed that of the premisses by one (for the extra term must either be added outside or inserted: but in either case it follows that the relations of predication are one fewer than the terms related). every syllogism will consist of an even number of premisses and an odd number of terms (for the terms exceed the premisses by one). So it is clear that every demonstration and every syllogism will proceed through three terms only.g. it is clear that a syllogistic conclusion follows from two premisses and not from more than two. and if from C and D either A or B follows or something else. to perfect the syllogisms. then there are several syllogisms. It is clear therefore that in whatever syllogistic argument the premisses through which the main conclusion follows (for some of the preceding conclusions must be premisses) are not even in number. and they do not establish the conclusion proposed: for we assumed that the syllogism proved E. unless a new premiss is assumed. If then syllogisms are taken with respect to their main premisses.(2) But if from the propositions A and B there follows not E but some other conclusion. This being evident. as was said at the beginning. For the three terms make two premisses.

Consequently since the premisses were (as we saw) even. the premisses must be odd: for along with one term one premiss is added. we must make them alternately even and odd at each addition. and in how many moods this is done. e. conclusions will be added less by one than the preexisting terms: for the conclusion is drawn not in relation to the single term last added. The premisses however will not always be even. but they will alternate – when the premisses are even. through the first in one mood. through the second in two. the terms odd. the terms must be odd. what sort of conclusion is established in each figure. if to ABC the term D is added. two conclusions are thereby added. The particular 134 . one in relation to A. Consequently the conclusions will be much more numerous than the terms or the premisses. the other in relation to B. For that which is concluded in many figures and through many moods is easier. a syllogism will not be constructed.g. and the terms odd. if a term is added from any quarter. And similarly too if the term is inserted in the middle: for in relation to one term only. it is evident to us both what sort of problem is difficult and what sort is easy to prove. Similarly with any further additions. 26 Since we understand the subjects with which syllogisms are concerned. the universal negative is proved both through the first figure and through the second. The universal affirmative is proved by means of the first figure only and by this in only one mood. But the conclusions will not follow the same arrangement either in respect to the terms or to the premisses. that which is concluded in few figures and through few moods is more difficult to attempt. but in relation to all the rest. when the terms are even.predication. For if one term is added.

But particular statements can be refuted in one way only – by proving that the predicate belongs either to all or to none. the number of the terms and premisses through which it proceeds. whether the predicate belongs to all or to some: and this we found possible in two figures. the relation of the premisses to one another. they are destroyed: and the particular negative is proved in all the figures. and the number of the figures appropriate to each problem. in one mood through the first. Similarly with universal negatives: the original statement is destroyed.affirmative is proved through the first and through the last figure. the character of the problem proved in each figure. all these matters are clear from what has been said. in two moods in the second. in three moods through the last. It is clear then that the universal affirmative is most difficult to establish. though it is possible to establish particular statements by means of universal. most easy to overthrow. In general. And in general we must not forget that it is possible to refute statements by means of one another. but once in the first. The particular negative is proved in all the figures. in three moods in the third. and particular statements by means of universal: but it is not possible to establish universal statements by means of particular. The manner in which every syllogism is produced. I mean. 135 . the universal negative in two. universals are easier game for the destroyer than particulars: for whether the predicate belongs to none or not to some. At the same time it is evident that it is easier to refute than to establish. But particular statements are easier to establish: for proof is possible in more figures and through more moods. universal statements by means of particular.

though other things can be predicated of them. But those to which it cannot belong need not be selected. Whatever lies between these limits can be spoken of in both ways: they may be stated of others.27 We must now state how we may ourselves always have a supply of syllogisms in reference to the problem proposed and by what road we may reach the principles relative to the problem: for perhaps we ought not only to investigate the construction of syllogisms. We shall explain in another place that there is an upward limit also to the process of predicating: for the present we must assume this. Of these ultimate predicates it is not possible to demonstrate another predicate.g. i. and again those which the thing follows. next we must lay down those attributes which follow the thing. e. or that that which approaches is Callias. And as a rule arguments and inquiries are concerned with these things. save incidentally: for we sometimes say that that white object is Socrates. and some things are themselves predicated of others.e. but also to have the power of making them. and those which cannot belong to it. It is clear then that some things are naturally not stated of anything: for as a rule each sensible thing is such that it cannot be predicated of anything. because the negative 136 . Neither can individuals be predicated of other things. We must select the premisses suitable to each problem in this manner: first we must lay down the subject and the definitions and the properties of the thing. the individual and sensible. and others stated of them. but other things may be predicated of them (for each of these is both man and animal). Of all the things which exist some are such that they cannot be predicated of anything else truly and universally. save as a matter of opinion.g. but nothing prior is predicated of them. but these may be predicated of other things. Cleon and Callias. and some are predicated of others. and yet others of them. man of Callias and animal of man. e.

g. If the statement is indefinite. The larger the supply a man has of these. Similarly one must select those attributes which the subject follows as wholes. without qualification. the more cogently will he demonstrate. those which are predicated as properties. the matter is clear. those things which the inferior term follows.g.statement implied above is convertible. that every animal follows man or every science music. But that which something follows receives the mark ‘every’. For some things are peculiar to the species as distinct from the genus. but we must choose those attributes which are peculiar to each subject. and what does not belong to animal does not belong to man). but if the statement is definite. it is uncertain whether the premiss is universal. and of the latter those which apparently and those which really belong. e. for what follows animal also follows man. Nor must we take as things which the superior term follows. e. what follows or does not follow the highest term universally must not be selected in dealing with the subordinate term (for these attributes have been taken in dealing with the superior term. for the reason given. for which we must obtain the attributes that follow. but only that it follows.g. Of the attributes which follow we must distinguish those which fall within the definition. e. Whenever the subject. and in proportion as he apprehends those which are truer. the more quickly will he reach a conclusion. But that which follows one must not suppose to follow as a whole. take as subjects of the predicate ‘animal’ what are really subjects of the 137 . for species being distinct there must be attributes peculiar to each. and those which are predicated as accidents. is contained by something else. not what follows a particular man but what follows every man: for the syllogism proceeds through universal premisses. that every man is every animal or justice is all good.g. and indeed we state it in a proposition: for the other statement is useless and impossible. e. But he must select not those which follow some particular but those which follow the thing as a whole.

the attribute originally in question must belong to the subject originally in question. 28 If men wish to establish something about some whole. For if any of these subjects is the same as any of these attributes. Whenever the one term has to belong to none of the other. one of the terms in question cannot possibly belong to any of the other. It is necessary indeed. if animal follows man. The reason why this is so will be clear in the sequel. and to the consequents of the predicate. they must look to the subjects of that which is being established (the subjects of which it happens to be asserted). One must apprehend also normal consequents and normal antecedents – for propositions which obtain normally are established syllogistically from premisses which obtain normally. some if not all of them having this character of normality. and the attributes which follow that of which it is to be predicated. If any members of these groups are identical.predicate ‘man’. the attribute in question must belong to some of the subject in question. that it should follow all these also. and to those attributes which cannot possibly be present in the predicate in question: or conversely to the attributes which cannot possibly be present in the subject. they must look for the terms of which the terms in question are predicable: for if any of these are identical. For the conclusion of each syllogism resembles its principles. For sometimes a syllogism 138 . one must look to the consequents of the subject. But these belong more properly to the choice of what concerns man. But if the purpose is to establish not a universal but a particular proposition. We must not however choose attributes which are consequent upon all the terms: for no syllogism can be made out of such premisses.

there will be a converted syllogism: for E will belong to all A since B belongs to A and E to B (for B was found to be identical with G): but that A should belong to all E is not necessary. If D and G are identical. Suppose again that the attributes of E are designated by F. Suppose the consequents of A are designated by B. but F belongs to all E. But if the object is to establish a particular negative proposition. It is clear then that in every proposition which requires proof we must look to the aforesaid relations of the subject and predicate in question: for all syllogisms proceed through these.in the first figure results. If F and D are identical. A must belong to some of the Es: for A follows C. and E follows all G. because it does not belong to D: but G falls under E: consequently A will not belong to some of the Es. If any members of these two groups are identical. If C and G are identical. but to no E: for it was assumed to be identical with H. if B and H are identical. the antecedents of E by G. and H belonged to none of the Es. A will not belong to some of the Es: for it will not belong to G. But if we are seeking consequents and antecedents we must 139 . Perhaps each of these statements will become clearer in the following way. sometimes a syllogism in the second. we must find antecedents of the subject in question and attributes which cannot possibly belong to the predicate in question. A must belong to all E: for F belongs to all E. but it must belong to some E because it is possible to convert the universal statement into a particular. it follows that one of the terms in question does not belong to some of the other. and F is identical with D. the antecedents of A by C. If then one of the Cs should be identical with one of the Fs. If B is identical with G. A will belong to none of the Fs. attributes which cannot possibly belong to A by D. Again. A will belong to none of the Es: for B will belong to all A. A will belong to none of the Es by a prosyllogism: for since the negative proposition is convertible. consequently A belongs to all E. and attributes which cannot belong to E by H. and A to all C.

For if A belongs to KF. in reference to E we must look to KF rather than to F alone. And A will belong to some E. This will be the middle term. and F belongs to all E: the middle figure because D belongs to no A. Clearly then all syllogisms proceed through the aforesaid figures. This is the last figure: for A will belong to no G.look for those which are primary and most universal. but if it does not follow the former. For it is proved that A belongs to all E.g. It is clear too that the inquiry proceeds through the three terms and the two premisses. if the consequents of the terms in question are identical. it may yet follow the latter. whenever D and G are identical. and E will belong to all G. And A will belong to no E. e. and to all E. So the first figure is formed. and we must not select consequents of all the terms. This is the last figure: for G becomes the middle term. because no syllogism is produced from them. because A belongs to no F. when D and F are identical. whenever C and G are apprehended to be the same.g. or if the antecedents of A are identical with those attributes which 140 . it belongs both to F and to E: but if it does not follow KF. and that all the syllogisms proceed through the aforesaid figures. and in reference to A we must look to KC rather than to C alone. and not belong to the other. since the negative statement is convertible. Similarly we must consider the antecedents of A itself: for if a term follows the primary antecedents. whenever an identical term is found among the Cs and Fs. e. and it is not possible to refute by means of a consequent of both the terms in question: for the middle term must belong to the one. A and E will be the extremes. it will follow those also which are subordinate. Thus we have both the first figure and the middle figure. For (as we saw) it is not possible at all to establish a proposition from consequents. And A will not belong to some E. the first. It is clear too that other methods of inquiry by selection of middle terms are useless to produce a syllogism. it may yet follow F.

cannot possibly belong to E. For if these are taken.g.g. and the middle term must be not diverse but identical. For the fact that B and G cannot belong to the same thing differs in no way from the fact that B is identical with some of the Hs: for that includes everything which cannot belong to E. either in the first or in the middle figure. and the syllogism results through these terms. or if those attributes are identical which cannot belong to either term: for no syllogism is produced by means of these. e. e. we have the middle figure with both premisses affirmative: if the antecedents of A are identical with attributes which cannot belong to E. Consequently B must be identical with some of the Hs. C and H. e. e. B and F.g. If attributes which cannot belong to either term are identical. if B and F are contraries or cannot belong to the same thing. C with H. Again. wherever it happens that a syllogism results from taking contraries or terms which cannot belong to the same thing. if B and G cannot belong to the same thing. It is evident too that we must find out which terms in this inquiry are identical. it follows that A will not belong to some of the Es: for then too we shall have the middle figure: for B will belong to all A and to no G. Consequently B must be identical with one of the Hs. both premisses are negative. But no syllogism is possible in this way. It is clear then that from the inquiries taken by themselves no syllogism results. a syllogism will be formed to prove that A belongs to none of the Es. It turns out then that those who inquire in this 141 . not which are different or contrary. Secondly. For if the consequents are identical. we have the first figure with its minor premiss negative.g. but if B and F are contraries B must be identical with one of the Hs. first because the object of our investigation is the middle term. For B will belong to all A and to no E. not however from the premisses taken but in the aforesaid mood. all arguments can be reduced to the aforesaid moods.

In both cases the same inquiry is involved. Similarly with the rest. it is clear that A will belong to no E. that A belongs to none of the Es. For both the demonstrations start from the same terms.g. 29 Syllogisms which lead to impossible conclusions are similar to ostensive syllogisms. because it turns out that otherwise B belongs to some of the Es and this is impossible – if now it is assumed that B belongs to no E and to all A. The proof per impossibile will always and in all cases be from the consequents and antecedents of the terms in question. In all cases 142 . Again if it has been proved by an ostensive syllogism that A belongs to no E.manner are looking gratuitously for some other way than the necessary way because they have failed to observe the identity of the Bs with the Hs. e. Similarly with the other propositions requiring proof. For suppose A to belong to some E: then since B belongs to all A and A to some of the Es. suppose it has been proved that A belongs to no E. B will belong to some of the Es: but it was assumed that it belongs to none. Again we may prove that A belongs to some E: for if A belonged to none of the Es. For what is proved ostensively may also be concluded syllogistically per impossibile by means of the same terms. and E belongs to all G. and what is proved per impossibile may also be proved ostensively.g. Whatever the problem the same inquiry is necessary whether one wishes to use an ostensive syllogism or a reduction to impossibility. A will belong to none of the Gs: but it was assumed to belong to all. e. assume that A belongs to some E and it will be proved per impossibile to belong to no E. they also are formed by means of the consequents and antecedents of the terms in question.

Each of the problems then can be proved in the manner described. that we must look to terms of the kinds mentioned whether we wish to use an ostensive syllogism or a reduction to impossibility. to which the syllogism establishing the false conclusion may relate. These points will be made clearer by the sequel. But we must consider and determine in how many ways hypothetical syllogisms are possible. then A would belong to every E: and again if the Ds and the Gs should be identical. and the method of the inquiry will be the same as before.it is necessary to find some common term other than the subjects of inquiry. In the other hypothetical syllogisms. so that if this premiss is converted. but the new terms introduced. and the other remains as it is. e. but E should be assumed to belong to the Gs only. when we discuss the reduction to impossibility: at present this much must be clear. but E should be predicated of the Gs only. the syllogism will be ostensive by means of the same terms. but it is possible to establish some of them syllogistically in another way. For if the Cs and the Gs should be identical. Clearly then we must consider the matter in this way also. with the addition of an hypothesis. For the ostensive syllogism differs from the reductio ad impossibile in this: in the ostensive syllogism both remisses are laid down in accordance with the truth. The method is the same whether the relation is necessary or possible. and the syllogism will proceed through terms arranged in the same order whether a possible or a pure 143 . I mean those which proceed by substitution. it follows that A will belong to none of the Es.g. For the inquiry will be the same. the inquiry will be directed to the terms of the problem to be proved – not the terms of the original problem. or by positing a certain quality. in the reductio ad impossibile one of the premisses is assumed falsely. universal problems by the inquiry which leads up to a particular conclusion.

We must find in the case of possible relations. in the pursuit of truth starting from premisses in which the arrangement of the terms is in accordance with truth. and these cannot be composed through other terms than the consequents and antecedents of the terms in question: for from these we obtain the premisses and find the middle term. but also that they cannot be formed in any other. both how they are characterized and how we must hunt for them. Consequently a syllogism cannot be formed by means of other terms. Similarly also with the other modes of predication. and we must supply ourselves with as many of these as possible. as well as terms that belong. in any art or study. or again whether we are 144 . 30 The method is the same in all cases. so as not to look to everything that is said about the terms of the problem or to the same points whether we are confirming or refuting.proposition is proved. terms which can belong though they actually do not: for we have proved that the syllogism which establishes a possible relation proceeds through these terms as well. We must look for the attributes and the subjects of both our terms. in philosophy. while if we look for dialectical syllogisms we must start from probable premisses. The principles of syllogisms have been stated in general terms. confirming them in another. For every syllogism has been proved to be formed through one of the aforementioned figures. refuting statements in one way. and consider them by means of the three terms. It is clear then from what has been said not only that all syllogisms can be formed in this way.

But in each science the principles which are peculiar are the most numerous. e. In general then we have explained fairly well how we must select premisses: we have discussed the matter accurately in the treatise concerning dialectic. and they attempted to persuade men that it was possible to make a demonstration of substance and essence. it begs. this very point had escaped all those who used the method of division. 31 It is easy to see that division into classes is a small part of the method we have described: for division is. We have also stated how we must select with reference to everything that is. Consequently. I mean for example that astronomical experience supplies the principles of astronomical science: for once the phenomena were adequately apprehended. whose nature does not admit of proof. for what it ought to prove. Consequently they did not understand what it is 145 . we should be able to discover the proof and demonstrate everything which admitted of proof. and whether we are refuting of all or some. we must look to fewer points and they must be definite. if the attributes of the thing are apprehended. so to speak. a weak syllogism. our business will then be to exhibit readily the demonstrations. the demonstrations of astronomy were discovered. and to make that clear.confirming of all or of some.g. Consequently it is the business of experience to give the principles which belong to each subject. about good or knowledge. For if none of the true attributes of things had been omitted in the historical survey. Similarly with any other art or science. First. and it always establishes something more general than the attribute in question.

In demonstrations. Now the true conclusion is that every D is either B or C. always dividing. taking A as mortal animal. Again. to be a mortal animal). Always dividing then in this way it turns out that these logicians assume as middle the universal term. nor to draw a conclusion about an accident or property 146 . B as footed. mortal by B. nor did they understand that it was possible to prove syllogistically in the manner we have described. so he assumes A of D as belonging to it. but it is not necessary that man should be a mortal animal – this is begged: and this is what ought to have been proved syllogistically. they do not make it clear. as we saw. but it is not necessary that man should be footed: this he assumes: and it is just this again which he ought to have demonstrated. that this is man or whatever the subject of inquiry may be: for they pursue the other method altogether. Let animal be the term signified by A. It is clear that it is neither possible to refute a statement by this method of division. and D as man. consequently it is necessary that man should be either a footed or a footless animal. consequently man must be either mortal or immortal. The man who divides assumes that every animal is either mortal or immortal: i. But division has a contrary intention: for it takes the universal as middle.e. the middle term through which the syllogism is formed must always be inferior to and not comprehend the first of the extremes. be signified by D. whatever is A is all either B or C. and he assumes A of D (for he assumed man. and let man. whose definition is to be got. And again. when there is a need to prove a positive statement.possible to prove syllogistically by division. and as extremes that which ought to have been the subject of demonstration and the differentiae. In conclusion. and immortal by C. and show it to be necessary. he lays it down that man is an animal. never even suspecting the presence of the rich supply of evidence which might be used. C as footless. he assumes in the same way that A inheres either in B or in C (for every mortal animal is either footed or footless).

nor in cases in which it is unknown whether it is thus or thus. It is clear then that this method of investigation is not suitable for every inquiry. but proof is not possible by this method.of a thing. C for ‘diagonal’. From what has been said it is clear from what elements demonstrations are formed and in what manner. But if he should assume that it is incommensurate. and the diagonal is a length. It will happen at the same time that what has been already said will be confirmed and its truth made clearer by what we are about to say. and further if we could resolve the syllogisms produced into the aforementioned figures. nor is it useful in those cases in which it is thought to be most suitable. and to what points we must look in each problem. If we should investigate the production of the syllogisms and had the power of discovering them. For everything that is true must in every respect agree with itself First then we must attempt to select the two premisses of the syllogism (for it is easier to divide into large parts than into small. nor about its genus.g. he will have assumed what he ought to have proved. He cannot then prove it: for this is his method. whether the diagonal is incommensurate. Let A stand for ‘incommensurate or commensurate’. B for ‘length’. he has proved that the diagonal is either incommensurate or commensurate. 32 Our next business is to state how we can reduce syllogisms to the aforementioned figures: for this part of the inquiry still remains. and the composite parts 147 . e. For if he assumes that every length is either commensurate or incommensurate. our original problem would be brought to a conclusion.

and invite the concession of others to no purpose. since the syllogism also is necessary. In some arguments it is easy to see what is wanting. if animal does. though something results when certain propositions are assumed.are larger than the elements out of which they are made).g. and we must posit the one and take away the other. it is necessary that any part of substance is substance. we must ourselves assume the one which is missing. and appear to be syllogisms. this has not however been drawn by syllogism from the propositions assumed. We are deceived in such cases because something necessary results from what is assumed. if the assumptions were made that substance is not annihilated by the annihilation of what is not substance. but not everything which is necessary is a syllogism. and if both premisses have not been stated. and that substance should exist. because something necessary results from what has been laid down. then that which is made out of them is destroyed: these propositions being laid down. but premisses are wanting. until we have reached the two premisses: for unless we have these. either in writing or in discussion: or men put forward the premisses of the principal syllogism. we 148 . Consequently. For sometimes men put forward the universal premiss. but omit those through which they are inferred. We must inquire then whether anything unnecessary has been assumed. and that if the elements out of which a thing is made are annihilated. we cannot reduce arguments put forward in the way described. but do not posit the premiss which is contained in it. Again if it is necessary that animal should exist. or anything necessary has been omitted. but some escape us. e. if man does. next we must inquire which are universal and which particular. But that which is necessary is wider than the syllogism: for every syllogism is necessary. it is necessary that substance should exist if man does: but as yet the conclusion has not been drawn syllogistically: for the premisses are not in the shape we required.

the last figure. Since we know what sort of thesis is established in each figure. a syllogism cannot be made: for a middle term has not been taken. the other predicated. It is placed similarly too if the premisses are not universal: for the middle term is determined in the same way. and this ought not to escape our notice. and B of C: it would seem that a syllogism is possible since the terms stand thus: but nothing necessary results. sometimes they are deceived by the similarity in the positing of the terms. If then the middle term is a predicate and a subject of predication. but for that which is appropriate to the thesis in hand.must not try to reduce it directly. the middle figure: if other things are predicated of it. Clearly then. we shall have the first figure: if it both is a predicate and is denied of something. E. We must take that term as middle which is stated in both the remisses: for it is necessary that the middle should be found in both premisses in all the figures.g. or if it is a predicate. For it was thus that we found the middle term placed in each figure. but must first state the two premisses. we shall recognize the figure by the position of the middle term. or one is denied. and something else is denied of it. then divide them into their terms. If the thesis is established in more figures than one. in what sort the particular is described. 33 Men are frequently deceived about syllogisms because the inference is necessary. if the same term is not stated more than once in the course of an argument. as has been said above. if A is stated of B. 149 . and in which the universal. clearly we must not look for all the figures. nor does a syllogism.

The reason for this is that the terms are not set out well in the statement. It is true then that A belongs to B. It is true to predicate B of C: for Miccalus is musical Miccalus. This argument then is identical with the former. But A does not belong to C: for Aristomenes is perishable. for it is not true universally that musical Miccalus perishes tomorrow: but unless this is assumed. This deception then arises through ignoring a small distinction.Let A represent the term ‘being eternal’. It would seem to follow that health cannot belong to any man. For Aristomenes as an object of thought is eternal. 34 Men will frequently fall into fallacies through not setting out the terms of the premiss well. But B also belongs to C: for Aristomenes is Aristomenes as an object of thought.g. no syllogism (as we have shown) is possible. since 150 . suppose A to be health. C ‘Aristomenes’. But to state A of C is false at any rate. Again let C stand for ‘Miccalus’. that every Aristomenes who is an object of thought is eternal. A for ‘perishing to-morrow’. B disease. C man. e. since Aristomenes is perishable. But this is false. B for ‘musical Miccalus’. It is true to say that A cannot belong to any B (for health belongs to no disease) and again that B belongs to every C (for every man is capable of disease). For no syllogism was made although the terms stood thus: that required that the premiss AB should be stated universally. For if we accept the conclusion as though it made no difference whether we said ‘This belong to that’ or ‘This belongs to all of that’. Also A can be predicated of B: for musical Miccalus might perish to-morrow. B ‘Aristomenes as an object of thought’.

Sometimes too fallacies will result from such a search. if ‘healthy’ is substituted for ‘health’ and ‘diseased’ for ‘disease’.g. Hence it is difficult to reduce syllogisms with such terms. 35 We must not always seek to set out the terms a single word: for we shall often have complexes of words to which a single name is not given. no fallacy arises. In the third figure the fallacy results in reference to possibility. But unless this is assumed no conclusion results. may possibly belong to the same thing. no syllogism can be made. save in respect of possibility: but such a conclusion is not impossible: for it is possible that health should belong to no man. Let A stand for two right angles. but it is possible that health should belong to every man. It is evident then that in all these cases the fallacy arises from the setting out of the terms: for if the things that are in the conditions are substituted. For it is not true to say that being healthy cannot belong to one who is diseased.if the things which are in the conditions are substituted. they could belong to one another. but cannot belong to one another. C for 151 . and in general contraries. B for triangle. e. Again the fallacy may occur in a similar way in the middle figure: ‘it is not possible that health should belong to any disease. e. For health and diseae and knowledge and ignorance. This is not in agreement with what was said before: for we stated that when several things could belong to the same thing. the belief that syllogism can establish that which has no mean.g. It is clear then that in such premisses what possesses the condition ought always to be substituted for the condition and taken as the term. consequently it is not possible that disease should belong to any man’.

For it is clear that the middle must not always be assumed to be an individual thing. the conclusion is that there is knowledge of the good. Then A belongs to B. It happens sometimes that the first term is stated of the middle. as happens in the case mentioned. But we must suppose the verb ‘to belong’ to have as many meanings as the senses in which the verb ‘to be’ is used. but sometimes a complex of words. Let A stand for ‘there being a single science’. and B for things which are contrary to one another. and in which the assertion that a thing ‘is’ may be said to be true. e.g. Sometimes the middle term is 152 . though wisdom is knowledge. and wisdom is of the good. A then belongs to C because of B: but A belongs to B without the mediation of another term: for the triangle in virtue of its own nature contains two right angles. The same holds if the premisses are negative. if wisdom is knowledge. consequently there will be no middle term for the proposition AB.isosceles triangle. not in the sense that contraries are the fact of there being a single science of them. but the middle is not stated of the third term. Take for example the statement that there is a single science of contraries. 36 That the first term belongs to the middle. but in the sense that it is true to say of the contraries that there is a single science of them. and the middle to the extreme. The good then is not knowledge. although it is demonstrable. must not be understood in the sense that they can always be predicated of one another or that the first term will be predicated of the middle in the same way as the middle is predicated of the last term.

and if there is a science of the good. we conclude that there is a genus of the good.stated of the third.’ Or again it may be said that there is a sign of laughter.g. For we state this universally without qualification. if there is a science of everything that has a quality. The first term then is predicated of the extreme. good.g. consequently laughter is not a sign. The same holds good where the relation is negative. but there is not a sign of a sign. We must take as terms opportunity-right timeGod: but the premiss must be understood according to the case of the noun. but the first is not stated of the middle. nor the middle of the third. of a good. contraries. not in oblique cases. man. the conclusion is that there is a science of the good. Sometimes neither the first term is stated of the middle. and sometimes not: e.g. But nothing is predicated of anything. but the premisses ought to be understood with reference to the cases of each term –either the dative. e. For ‘that does not belong to this’ does not always mean that ‘this is not that’. in relation to the terms of the thesis. Again take the inference ‘opportunity is not the right time: for opportunity belongs to God. of contraries. e. but sometimes that ‘this is not of that’ or ‘for that’.g. but the right time does not. in which the thesis is refuted because the genus is asserted in a particular way. e. but the good is not science. e. nor is that which has a quality or is a contrary. while the first is sometimes stated of the third. but there is a becoming of pleasure: so pleasure is not a becoming. This holds in the other cases too.g. but in the premisses one thing is not stated of another. or is a contrary. 153 . though the good is both of these. if there is a genus of that of which there is a science. that the terms ought always to be stated in the nominative. ‘there is not a motion of a motion or a becoming of a becoming. e. since nothing is useful to God’. and if there is a science of the good. And if that of which there is a science is a genus.g. of man. and the good both is a contrary and has a quality. we conclude that the good is a genus.

38 A term which is repeated in the premisses ought to be joined to the first extreme. the expression ‘that it is good’ (or ‘qua good’) should be joined to the first term. For justice is identical with a good. For of the good there is knowledge that it is good. For to predicate of justice the term ‘good that it is good’ is false and not intelligible. not to the middle. ‘double of this’. or the accusative. 37 The expressions ‘this belongs to that’ and ‘this holds true of that’ must be understood in as many ways as there are different categories. Let A stand for ‘knowledge that it is good’.g. In this way an analysis of the argument can be made. ‘that which strikes or sees this’. It is true to predicate A of B. Also it is true to predicate B of C. We must consider these points and define them better. C for justice. e. and these categories must be taken either with or without qualification. e. or the genitive. Similarly if it should be proved 154 .g. but B will not be true of C. But if the expression ‘that it is good’ were added to B. the conclusion will not follow: for A will be true of B. that it is good.‘equal to this’. ‘man is an animal’.g. or in whatever other way the word falls in the premiss. I mean for example that if a syllogism should be made proving that there is knowledge of justice. e. B for good. or the nominative. and further as simple or compound: the same holds good of the corresponding negative expressions.

If it has been proved to be an object of knowledge without qualification. but that it is. The position of the terms is not the same when something is established without qualification and when it is qualified by some attribute or condition. e. when the good is proved to be an object of knowledge and when it is proved to be an object of knowledge that it is good. and C stand for ‘good’. that it is something. and 155 . and word and phrase. and phrase for phrase. 39 We ought also to exchange terms which have the same value. It is true to predicate A of B: for ex hypothesi there is a science of that which is something. that it is good: for ex hypothesi the term ‘something’ indicates the thing’s special nature. the addition must be joined to the extreme.g. we should not have had a syllogism proving that there is knowledge of the good.that the healthy is an object of knowledge qua good. C for good. B too is true of C: for that which C represents is something. the middle term must be ‘that which is something’. not ‘being something’. we must put as middle term ‘that which is’. But if ‘being’ were taken as middle and ‘being’ simply were joined to the extreme. or man perishable qua an object of sense: in every case in which an addition is made to the predicate. that it is good. let A stand for knowledge that it is. Consequently A is true of C: there will then be knowledge of the good. Clearly then in syllogisms which are thus limited we must take the terms in the way stated. Let A stand for ‘knowledge that it is something’. of goatstag an object of knowledge qua not existing. word for word. e. but if we add the qualification ‘that it is good’. B for being.g. B stand for ‘something’.

it is not necessary that A should 156 . but if the object is to prove that pleasure is good. let B stand for beautiful. then whether B belongs to all C or merely belongs to C. that A belongs to all of that to which B belongs. Similarly in all other cases.always take a word in preference to a phrase: for thus the setting out of the terms will be easier. either in fact or in speech. 41 It is not the same. but if the syllogism is to prove that pleasure is the good. the term will be ‘good’. but not to everything of which B is predicated. and that A belongs to all of that to all of which B belongs: for nothing prevents B from belonging to C. the term must be ‘the good’. it is better to take as the terms the supposable and the opinable in preference to the phrase suggested. For example if it makes no difference whether we say that the supposable is not the genus of the opinable or that the opinable is not identical with a particular kind of supposable (for what is meant is the same in both statements). 40 Since the expressions ‘pleasure is good’ and ‘pleasure is the good’ are not identical. it is true to say that beauty belongs to that which is white. we must not set out the terms in the same way. but not perhaps to everything that is white. though not to all C: e. and C for white. If beauty belongs to something white. If then A belongs to B.g.

so also is A: but if B is not said of all of the third term. Clearly then we must analyse arguments in accordance with this. nothing prevents B belonging to C. but imitate the geometrician who says that ‘this line a foot long’ or ‘this straight line’ or ‘this line without breadth’ exists although it does not. I do not say to all C. the prover does not prove from them. For in general. as it is to demonstrate without the premisses of the syllogism. ‘A is said of all the things of which B is said’. and yet A not belonging to all C or to any C at all. We must not suppose that something absurd results through setting out the terms: for we do not use the existence of this particular thing. but does not use the diagrams in the sense that he reasons from them. there is no necessity that A should be said of all of it.belong. it will follow that A can be said of all of that of all of which B is said. If however A is said of that of all of which B may be said. Since not every problem is proved in every figure. And if B is said of all of a third term. but one through one figure. another through another. 42 We should not forget that in the same syllogism not all conclusions are reached through one figure. and so no syllogism a is formed. not as though it were impossible to demonstrate without these illustrative terms. if two things are not related as whole to part and part to whole. But if A belongs to everything of which B is truly stated. but certain problems in each 157 . but even to C at all. We (I mean the learner) use the process of setting out terms like perception by sense. If then we take three terms it is clear that the expression ‘A is said of all of which B is said’ means this.

44 Further we must not try to reduce hypothetical syllogisms. But the agreement does not come from a syllogism. e. if a man proves that water is a drinkable liquid. 158 . This argument cannot be reduced: but the proof that there is not a single faculty can. For they have not been proved by syllogism. The latter argument perhaps was a syllogism: but the former was an hypothesis. but assented to by agreement. but from an hypothesis.figure. For instance if a man should suppose that unless there is one faculty of contraries. And yet one must agree. of what is healthy and what is sickly: for the same thing will then be at the same time healthy and sickly. for with the given premisses it is not possible to reduce them. there cannot be one science. He has shown that there is not one faculty of all contraries.g. it is clear from the conclusion in what figure the premisses should be sought. and should then argue that not every faculty is of contraries. 43 In reference to those arguments aiming at a definition which have been directed to prove some part of the definition. but he has not proved that there is not a science. not the whole definition: for so we shall be less likely to be disturbed by the length of the term: e. we must take as terms drinkable and water. we must take as a term the point to which the argument has been directed.g.

We shall describe in the sequel their differences. but the reduction to what is impossible can be analysed since it is proved by syllogism. these we ought to consider and mark out clearly. and B to all C. though the rest of the argument cannot. but if the 159 . e. These cannot be analysed either. whereas in the latter. that it is not possible to resolve such arguments into the figures. 45 Whatever problems are proved in more than one figure. and the various ways in which hypothetical arguments are formed: but at present this much must be clear.g. because the falsity is patent. because the conclusion is reached from an hypothesis. and a syllogism in the middle figure to the first. that then odd numbers are equal to evens. e. But these differ from the previous arguments: for in the former a preliminary agreement must be reached if one is to accept the conclusion. Many other arguments are brought to a conclusion by the help of an hypothesis. e.g. The point will be clear in the sequel. the falsity of what follows from the assumption that the diagonal is commensurate. then A belongs to no C. viz. then contraries fall under the same science.g. an agreement that if there is proved to be one faculty of contraries. men still accept the reasoning. not all however but some only. Thus the first figure. If A belongs to no B. a negative syllogism in the first figure can be reduced to the second. can be reduced to another figure. And we have explained the reason. if they have been established in one figure by syllogism.The same holds good of arguments which are brought to a conclusion per impossibile. even if no preliminary agreement has been made.

For B will belong to no A and A to some C. For C belongs to no A. and A to all B: therefore C belongs to no B. e. viz. but only one of the two particular syllogisms. whenever the negative statement concerns the major extreme. e. and to some C. but not to all C: for the statement AB does not admit of conversion. Convert the negative statement and you will have the middle figure. Let A belong to all B and B to some C. Similarly if the syllogism is not universal but particular. But when the affirmative statement concerns the major extreme. C must be made first term.negative statement is converted. if A belongs to no B.g. Since the particular affirmative is convertible. when the negative statement is not universal: all the rest can be resolved. we shall have the middle figure. C will belong to some B: but A belonged to all B: so that the third figure is formed. no resolution will be possible. Let A and B be affirmed of all C: 160 . and to all C. if A belongs to no B and to some C: convert the negative statement and you will have the first figure. reduction to the first figure will be possible. The universal syllogisms in the second figure can be reduced to the first. Similarly if the syllogism is negative: for the particular affirmative is convertible: therefore A will belong to no B. For B belongs to no A. Convert the negative statement.g. and you will have the first figure. and the negative C. For B will belong to no A and A to all C. Let A belong to no B and to all C. nor would there be a syllogism if it did. Again syllogisms in the third figure cannot all be resolved into the first. Of the syllogisms in the last figure one only cannot be resolved into the first.g. and B to some C. though all syllogisms in the first figure can be resolved into the third. if A belongs to all B. But if the affirmative statement concerns B. But if the syllogism is particular. B then belongs to no C: for the negative statement is convertible. e.

then C can be converted partially with either A or B: C then belongs to some B. and A to no C. But if B belongs to all C and A to some C. the other cannot. For if A belongs to no B and to some C. But if the negative statement is particular. and so C will be middle term. One of the syllogisms in the middle figure can. But since the particular statement is convertible. the affirmative particular: for A will belong to no C. For C then will belong to 161 . Consequently we shall get the first figure. resolution will not be possible: for neither of the premisses is universal after conversion.g. be resolved into the third figure. the first term must be B: for B belongs to all C. if B belongs to all C. therefore B belongs to some A. A will belong to some B. Syllogisms in the third figure can be resolved into the middle figure. Let B belong to all C. so that B belongs to no A and C to some A. both B and C alike are convertible in relation to A. resolution is possible. e. the transition to the other figure is made. when the terms are universal we must take them in a similar way. Whenever the universal statement is negative. the argument is the same: for B is convertible in reference to C. no resolution will be possible. If the syllogism is negative. A therefore is middle term. But when A belongs to all B.g. and C to some of the Bs. If A belongs to all C and B to some C. It is clear that in order to resolve the figures into one another the premiss which concerns the minor extreme must be converted in both the figures: for when this premiss is altered. and not to some C. and A to no C: then C will belong to some B. and A not belong to some C: convert the statement BC and both premisses will be particular. and C to some of the Bs. whenever the negative statement is universal. if A belongs to no C. Similarly if the negative statement is universal. e. and C to some A. if A belongs to all C. and B to some or all C.

but an affirmation and a denial which are opposed to 162 . e.no A and to some B.g. no resolution will be possible: for the particular negative does not admit of conversion. so is that of ‘he knows what is good’ to ‘he knows what is not-good’. It is clear then that the same syllogisms cannot be resolved in these figures which could not be resolved into the first figure. and is possessed of knowledge of what is good and of what is not-good). If then ‘he is not able to walk’ means the same as ‘he is able not to walk’. It is clear from what we have said how we ought to reduce syllogisms. and that when syllogisms are reduced to the first figure these alone are confirmed by reduction to what is impossible. but ‘not to be white’. capacity to walk and incapacity to walk will belong at the same time to the same person (for the same man can both walk and not-walk. and that the figures may be resolved into one another. For there is no difference between the expressions ‘he knows what is good’ and ‘he is knowing what is good’. The relation of ‘he can walk’ to ‘he can not-walk’ is similar to the relation of ‘it is white’ to ‘it is not-white’. For they do not mean the same thing. But if the negative statement is particular. it makes some difference whether we suppose the expressions ‘not to be this’ and ‘to be not-this’ are identical or different in meaning. 46 In establishing or refuting. nor is ‘to be not-white’ the negation of ‘to be white’. The reason for this is as follows. ‘not to be white’ and ‘to be not-white’. or ‘he can walk’ and ‘he is able to walk’: therefore there is no difference between their contraries ‘he cannot walk’-’he is not able to walk’.

For when two pairs correspond. But every affirmation has a corresponding negation. but they will never belong to the same thing. and this is the unequal. and either C or D will belong to everything. Nor is ‘to be not-equal’ the same as ‘not to be equal’: for there is something underlying the one. if it is not a negation clearly it must in a sense be an affirmation. Therefore it is clear that ‘it is not-good’ is not the denial of ‘it is good’. Wherefore not everything is either equal or unequal. viz.one another do not belong at the same time to the same thing. Then either A or B will belong to everything. B for ‘not to be good’. the denial must belong. For if it is true to say ‘it is a not-white’. or be a not-white log and be a white log. let C stand for ‘to be not-good’ and be placed under B. if the one pair are different from one another. consequently if the affirmation does not belong. cannot be a not-white log either. But since a thing 163 . but there is nothing underlying the other. so ‘to be not-good’ is not the same as ‘not to be good’. it is true also to say ‘it is not white’: for it is impossible that a thing should simultaneously be white and be not-white. And B must belong to everything to which C belongs. As then ‘not to know what is good’ is not the same as ‘to know what is not good’. But C does not always belong to B: for what is not a log at all. but everything is equal or is not equal. If then every single statement may truly be said to be either an affirmation or a negation. Let A stand for ‘to be good’. but they will never belong to the same thing. Further the expressions ‘it is a not-white log’ and ‘it is not a white log’ do not imply one another’s truth. For either C or D belongs to everything to which A belongs. it must be a log: but that which is not a white log need not be a log at all. On the other hand D belongs to everything to which A belongs. The relation of these statements to one another is as follows. The negation then of ‘it is not-good’ is ‘it is not not-good’. For if ‘it is a not-white log’. the other pair also must be different. and let D stand for not to be not-good’ and be placed under A. that which is not-equal.

cannot be simultaneously not-white and white. In many things also. Consequently D is true. 164 . it is evident that the method of proving each cannot be the same. i. and that it is true to call it not-white. and one is an affirmation. viz. Since it is clear that ‘it is not-white’ and ‘it is not white’ mean different things. to some of which something belongs which does not belong to others. For the expression ‘it is true’ stands on a similar footing to ‘it is’. the other a denial. It is clear also that A and C cannot together belong to the same thing.e. we must assume that whatever is an animal either is musical or is notmusical. and the proof has been made. If then it is to be true to say that whatever is a man is musical or is not-musical. while that each is not-white or all are not-white is false. viz. Privative terms are similarly related positive ter terms respect of this arrangement. that whatever is an animal is not white or may not be white. For the negation of ‘it is true to call it white’ is not ‘it is true to call it not-white’ but ‘it is not true to call it white’. For of that which is white it is true to say that it is not not-white. C for ‘unequal’. But A is not true of all D. that it is a white log. and that B and D may possibly belong to the same thing. Let A stand for ‘equal’. That whatever is a man is not musical is proved destructively in the three ways mentioned. Similarly also ‘every animal is not-white’ is not the negation of ‘every animal is white’ (for both are false): the proper negation is ‘every animal is not white’. For of that which is not a log at all it is not true to say A. D must belong to everything to which A belongs. that it is a white log. But we may prove that it is true to call it white or not-white in the same way for both are proved constructively by means of the first figure. for this means that it is not-white. but A is not true. B for ‘not equal’. the negation may be true in a similar way. D for ‘not unequal’.g. that all are not white or that each is not white. e.

It results sometimes even in such an arrangement of terms that one is deceived through not apprehending the opposites rightly. and since C cannot belong to that to which B belongs. Again since either F or B belongs to everything. e. it is possible that A and D should belong to the same thing. we may reason that ‘if A and B cannot belong at the same time to the same thing. For since either C or D necessarily belongs to everything. since it is possible that D and A should belong at the same time to the same thing. it is clear that D must follow B. because it carries A along with it and A and B cannot belong to the same thing. and again C and D are related in the same way. It is necessary then that either A or F should belong to everything: for either the affirmation or the denial must belong. one of which must belong to everything. but C or D belongs to everything. And again either C or H must belong to everything: for they are related as affirmation and denial. but B and C cannot. Therefore H belongs to everything to which F belongs. because A follows C. but it is necessary that one of them should belong to whatever the other does not belong to: and again C and D are related in the same way.g. And A and D may belong to the same thing. It is clear then that B does not reciprocate with D either. and one of the two necessarily belongs to everything. and since H 165 . But B and C cannot belong to the same thing. And ex hypothesi A belongs to everything ever thing to which C belongs. ‘Assume that F stands for the negation of A and B. and similarly either H or D. and so something impossible results. First it is clear from the following consideration that D follows B. Again since C does not reciprocate with but A. and again that H stands for the negation of C and D. and A follows C but the relation cannot be reversed. then D must follow B and the relation cannot be reversed.In general whenever A and B are such that they cannot belong at the same time to the same thing. and follows everything which C follows: it will result that B belongs necessarily to everything to which D belongs’: but this is false.

For not good is the negation of good: and not-good is not identical with ‘neither good nor not-good’. If then A follows C. Since some syllogisms are universal. The fallacy arises because perhaps it is not necessary that A or F should belong to everything. B must follow D’. the negative yield only the stated conclusion. others particular. But this is false: for as we proved the sequence is reversed in terms so constituted. further what we must look for when a refuting and establishing propositions. and of particular syllogisms the affirmative yield more than one. and how we should investigate a given problem in any branch of inquiry. the character and number of the premisses. when and how a syllogism is formed. For all propositions are convertible save only the particular negative: and the conclusion states one definite thing about another definite thing. or that F or B should belong to everything: for F is not the denial of A. Book II 1 We have already explained the number of the figures. Consequently all syllogisms save the particular negative 166 . B must follow D: for we know this. all the universal syllogisms give more than one result.follows F. Similarly also with C and D. also by what means we shall obtain principles appropriate to each subject. For two negations have been assumed in respect to one term.

In the second figure it will be possible to infer only that which is subordinate to the conclusion. we conclude that B belongs to no C. e. But in particular syllogisms there will be no necessity of inferring what is subordinate to the conclusion (for a syllogism does not result when this premiss is particular). it has been assumed without proof that B does not belong to A. not however through the syllogism. e. then B must belong to some A: and if A has been proved to belong to no B. But it is possible to give another reason concerning those which are universal. then D will be included in A. But if A does not belong to some B. And yet B does not belong to E. This then is the reason common to all syllogisms whether universal or particular. Similarly if the syllogism is negative. clearly B does not belong to it. then B belongs to no A. and C is included in A. Again if E is included in C as in a whole.yield more than one conclusion.g. the latter in the conclusion. then E will be included in A. if A has been proved to to all or to some B. if E is subordinate to A. But while it has been proved through the syllogism that B belongs to no C. but whatever is subordinate to the middle term may be inferred. e.g. e.g. Nothing can be inferred about that which is subordinate to C. 167 . if A belongs to all B and B to some C. whatever is subordinate to B or C must accept the predicate A: for if D is included in B as in a whole. But that B does not belong to what is subordinate to A is not clear by means of the syllogism. if A belongs to no B and to all C. if the former are placed in the middle. consequently it does not result through the syllogism that B does not belong to E. If then D is subordinate to C.g. it is not necessary that B should not belong to some A: for it may possibly belong to all A. if the conclusion AB is proved through C. and B is included in A. This is a different conclusion from the former. For all the things that are subordinate to the middle term or to the conclusion may be proved by the same syllogism.

is made clear by this consideration. only not through the syllogism. and two relations of subject and predicate or 168 . be supposed that it is possible. true however only in respect to the fact. B must be true: otherwise it will turn out that the same thing both is and is not at the same time. For what results necessarily is the conclusion. the other false. or to be false. If it is necessary that B should be when A is. The conclusion is either true or false necessarily. But this is impossible. For that is not possible. it is necessary that A should not be when B is not. but a true conclusion may be drawn from false premisses. not to the reason. The reason cannot be established from false premisses: why this is so will be explained in the sequel. just as in the universal syllogisms what is subordinate to the middle term is proved (as we saw) from a premiss which is not demonstrated: consequently either a conclusion is not possible in the case of universal syllogisms or else it is possible also in the case of particular syllogisms. That which is subordinate to the conclusion cannot be proved. when a single fact is given. From true premisses it is not possible to draw a false conclusion. First then that it is not possible to draw a false conclusion from true premisses. Let it not. the other subordinate can be proved. If then A is true. 2 It is possible for the premisses of the syllogism to be true. that something should necessarily result. but not through the preceding syllogism. Similarly in the other figures. because A is laid down as a single term. and the means by which this comes about are at the least three terms.something can be inferred about that which is subordinate to B. or to be the one true.

whether both the premisses are false or only one. consequently though both the premisses are false the conclusion is true: for every man is an animal. e. Consequently if one term is taken to belong to none of that to which it does belong. or if what belongs to all is assumed to belong to none.premisses.g. neither let B belong to C. if what belongs to none is assumed to belong to all. and the other term is taken to belong to all of that to which it does not belong. This is possible. e. The same holds good of negative syllogisms: it is not possible to prove a false conclusion from true premisses.g. nor stone to any man. it is necessary that A should belong to all that to which C belongs. If then it is true that A belongs to all that to which B belongs. and that B belongs to all that to which C belongs. and this cannot be false: for then the same thing will belong and not belong at the same time. So A is posited as one thing. it does not matter which of the two is false. provided that this is not either of the premisses indifferently. if the same terms are taken and man is put as middle: for neither animal nor man belongs to any stone. the conclusion will not be true. a true conclusion will be possible. For it is possible that neither A nor B should belong to any C. A will belong to all C. although A belongs to all B. though both the premisses are false the conclusion will be true. Let A belong to no 169 . If then A is taken to belong to all B and B to all C. (3) But if one only of the premisses is false.g. being two premisses taken together. e. But from what is false a true conclusion may be drawn. (1) Let A belong to the whole of C. animal belongs to no stone. I mean by ‘wholly false’ the contrary of the truth. e. if it is taken as wholly false: but if the premiss is not taken as wholly false. but to none of the Bs. (2) A similar proof may be given if each premiss is partially false. AB.g. but animal belongs to every man. Similarly with the negative. but if the premiss BC is wholly false. when the first premiss is wholly false.

that A belongs to all B. and B to all C. For A will belong to all C.B. e. and B to all C. Similarly there cannot be a true conclusion if A belongs to all B. but horse to no man. that A belongs to nothing to which B belongs: here the conclusion must be false. and B belonged to all C. then if we take as premisses that A belongs to all B. which is assumed. but while the true premiss BC is assumed. and B to all C. (4) But if the premiss is not wholly false. since A belonged to nothing to which B belonged.g. and that B should belong to all C. the conclusion will be true. If then the premiss BC which I take is true. If then it is assumed that A belongs to all B and B to all C. Similarly if the statement AB is negative. though B belongs to no C. whether affirmative or negative. it is impossible that the conclusion should be true: for A belonged to none of the Cs. e. and B to all C. Similarly if the premiss AB is negative. and the premiss BC is wholly false. animal to every swan and to some white thing. a true syllogism will be possible: for nothing prevents A belonging to all B and to all C. e. and if B belongs to all C. For it is possible that A should 170 . (5) But if the premiss AB. but to no snow. It is clear then that when the first premiss is wholly false. For if A belongs to all C and to some B. the wholly false premiss AB is also assumed. and white to all snow. animal to some white thing. viz. viz. the conclusion cannot be true. and white to every swan. since A belongs to everything to which B belongs. although the premiss BC is wholly false. and the premiss AB is wholly false. and the other premiss is true. these being species of the same genus which are not subordinate one to the other: for animal belongs both to horse and to man.g.g. a true conclusion is possible. and B to all C. For it is possible that A should belong to some B and to no C. is wholly true. A will belong to all C truly: for every swan is an animal. then will belong to no C. If then one should assume that A belongs to no B.

If then snow is taken as middle. and the particular is false. If then it is assumed that A belongs to all B. the premiss BC true. a genus to the species of another genus and its difference: for animal neither belongs to any wisdom nor to any instance of ‘speculative’. and when both are false. animal belongs to no snow. e. Similarly if the premiss AB is negative. e. and the other true. but not to some C. though B belongs to some C. A will belong to all C: and this ex hypothesi is true. Similarly if the premiss AB is negative: for it is possible that A should belong to the whole of B. and the conclusion true. and the other true.belong neither to any B nor to any C. In particular syllogisms it is possible when the first premiss is wholly false. and B to some C. but wisdom belongs to some instance of ‘speculative’. If then it is assumed that A belongs to no B. a genus to species of another genus: for animal belongs neither to music nor to the art of healing. and that B should not belong to any C. and snow to some white thing. the conclusion will be true.g. but to some C. and B to all C. and B to some C. For it is possible that A should neither belong to any B nor to any C. a genus to its species and difference: for animal belongs to every man and to every footed thing. animal belongs to every 171 .g. e. but to some white thing. will belong to no C: and this ex hypothesi is true. although B belongs to some C. while B belongs to some C. e. (6) And if the premiss BC is not wholly false but in part only. For nothing prevents A belonging to the whole of B and of C. and when the first is true. then the premiss BC is wholly false. and it is assumed that A belongs to the whole of B. also when the first premiss is false in part. If then it should be assumed that A belongs to no B. e. and B to all C. and animal as first term. even so the conclusion may be true.g. nor does music belong to the art of healing. that the conclusion should be true. (7) For nothing prevents A belonging to no B. and B to all C.g. and man to some footed things though not to all.g.

And the premiss AB is true. animal to every swan and to some black things. e. (If the premiss AB is false in part. which ex hypothesi is true. and beautiful belonging to something great. while B belongs to no C. and not to some C. and B belonging to some C. and number belongs to nothing white.g. the premiss BC will be true. (10) Also if the premiss AB is partially false. e. if B is the contrary of C. For nothing prevents A belonging to some B and to some C. the conclusion will be true although the premiss AB is wholly false. and B to some C. and B to some C. For nothing prevents A belonging to the whole of B and to some C. the conclusion may be true. and in the same positions. though swan belongs to no black thing. and the premiss BC is false. the a premiss AB will be partially false. e. the conclusion may be true. For nothing prevents A belonging both to B and to some C. Consequently if it should be assumed that A belongs to all B.g. though B belongs to no C. and B to some C. then A will not belong to some C. For the same terms will serve. If then number is taken as middle. and both are accidents of the same genus: for animal belongs to some white things and to some 172 . the conclusion may be true.g. (9) Again if the premiss AB is true. to prove the point. Similarly if the premiss AB is negative.man. consequently if man be taken as middle term and it is assumed that A belongs to no B but B belongs to some C. and the conclusion true. and it is assumed that A belongs to no B. Similarly if the premiss AB is negative. but man belongs to some white. If then A is assumed to belong to all B. animal to something beautiful and to something great. a genus to the species of another genus and to the accident of its own species: for animal belongs to no number and not to some white things. the premiss BC false. e. and the premiss BC is false too.g. although the statement BC is false. the conclusion will be true. but does not follow some white. while B belongs to no C. For it is possible that A should belong to no B.

when one is true. then if the premisses are stated contrariwise and it is assumed that A belongs to all B and to no 173 . and B to some C. the conclusion will be true. animal belongs to every swan. when both premisses are wholly false. e. then A does not belong to some C. For it is possible that A may belong to no B and to some C. Consequently if it is assumed that A belongs to no B. and number to nothing white. while B belongs to no C. If then it is assumed that A belongs to all B. (11) Also though both premisses are false the conclusion may be true. but the premisses arc false. e. while B belongs to no C. the other partially false. For (1) if A belongs to no B and to all C. 3 In the middle figure it is possible in every way to reach a true conclusion through false premisses.g. animal to no stone and to every horse. if one is wholly false.g. For nothing prevents A belonging to the whole of B. and swan belongs to nothing black. though both premisses are false. and not to some black things. and B to some C. The conclusion then is true. but to some white things. whether the syllogisms are universal or particular. a genus in relation to the species of another genus. viz.black things. the other partially true. e.g. If then it is assumed that A belongs to all B and B to some C. the conclusion will be true. but white belongs to no black thing. Similarly also if the premiss AB is negative. if one is quite true. the other wholly false (it does not matter which of the two premisses is false). and not to some C. if both premisses are partially false. and to the accident of its own species: for animal belongs to no number. when each is partially false. Similarly if the premiss AB is negative: for the same terms arranged in the same way will serve for the proof.

e. though the premisses are wholly false they will yield a true conclusion. e. For animal belongs to every horse and man. e. a genus to its co-ordinate species. For nothing prevents A belonging to some B. the one premiss will be wholly false. the other wholly true: for nothing prevents A belonging to all B and to all C.g. and no man is a horse. but to no C. animal to some white things and to some black things.C. Consequently if it is assumed that A belongs to the whole of B. though white belongs to no raven. while B belongs to no C. though B belongs to no C. the negative wholly true. If then it is assumed that A belongs to no B.g. and none of the other. For it is possible that A should belong to some B and to some C. 174 . If then it is assumed that animal belongs to all of the one. animal to some white things and to every raven. the premiss AC is wholly true. Similarly if the negative statement is transposed: the proof can be made by means of the same terms. (3) Also if one premiss is partially false. If then it is assumed that A belongs to all B and to no C. the premiss AC wholly true. For it is possible that A should belong to some B and to all C. but not to C as a whole. and B to no C. though B belongs to no C. and the conclusion is true. though white belongs to nothing black. and white belongs to no pitch. animal belongs to some white things. but to no pitch. the other wholly true. Also if the affirmative premiss is partially false. the other wholly true. Similarly if A belongs to all B and to no C: for we shall have the same syllogism. and the conclusion true. (4) And if both the premisses are partially false. e. the premiss AB is partially false.g. the conclusion may be true. but to the whole of C. (2) Again if one premiss is wholly false. and the conclusion will be true whichever term the negative statement concerns. a true conclusion is possible.g. the premiss AB is partially false.

g. while B does not belong to some C.g. though B does not follow some C. and not to some C. the premiss AB which is universal is wholly false. For it is possible that should A belong both to B and to C as wholes. and the conclusion true. but the conclusion is true. but man does not follow every footed thing. Also a true conclusion is possible when the universal premiss is true. e. 175 . animal belongs to nothing lifeless. if the negative premiss is transposed. and the universal premiss true. and lifeless will not belong to some white things. and the conclusion is true. the particular false. the premiss AC is true. If then it is stated that A belongs to no B and to some C. Similarly if the premiss which is stated universally is affirmative. Consequently if it is assumed that A belongs to the whole of B. e. but the particular false. though B does not belong to some C.g. the universal premiss is true. animal belongs to no number nor to anything lifeless. though man will not belong to some white things. and does not belong to some white things.g. the universal premiss is wholly false. e. and number does not follow some lifeless things. Similarly if the premiss AB is affirmative: for it is possible that A should belong to no B. If then it is stated that A belongs to all B and not to some C. but does not belong to some C. a genus in relation to its species and difference: for animal follows every man and footed things as a whole. It is clear also that our thesis holds in particular syllogisms. Similarly. e. If then it is stated that A belongs to no B and to some C. and the particular is false. animal to every man and to some white things. the proof can be made by means of the same terms. the conclusion will be true.both premisses are partially false. though B does not belong to some C. and the conclusion is true. For nothing prevents A following neither B nor C at all. For (5) nothing prevents A belonging to all B and to some C. the particular premiss is true.

If then A is assumed to belong to the whole of B. the other false. alike when both premisses are wholly false. but the conclusion true. since it is possible that A should belong both to B and to C as wholes.g. e. If then it is assumed that A and B belong to all C. Similarly if the universal premiss is affirmative and the particular negative.g. and A to no C. when one premiss is partly false. For it is possible that A should follow no B and all C. the other affirmative. though B does not belong to some C. animal follows no science but every man. and vice versa.(6) It is clear too that though both premisses are false they may yield a true conclusion. animal to every swan. e. Similarly if one premiss is negative. when one premiss is wholly true. the other wholly true. For it is possible that B should belong to no C. but A to all C. when each is partly false. 4 In the last figure a true conclusion may come through what is false. though man belongs to some footed things. neither man nor footed follows anything lifeless. and that should not belong to some B. but the conclusion is true. the premisses are both false. A will not belong to some B: and the conclusion is true. black belongs to no swan. and not to follow some C. and animal not to everything black. and in every other way in which it is possible to alter the premisses. the premisses are false but the conclusion is true. 176 . e. though the premisses are false. while A belongs to some B. For (1) nothing prevents neither A nor B from belonging to any C.g. though science does not follow every man. though B does not follow some C. Consequently if it is assumed that B belongs to all C. For if it is assumed that A belongs to no B and to some C. the premisses will be wholly false.

though A belongs to some B. and B to all C. Taking these then as terms. the premiss AC wholly false. and the conclusion true. the premiss BC is wholly true. (3) Similarly if one of the premisses assumed is wholly false. Also if both the premisses assumed are affirmative. but the conclusion is true. the premisses are partially false. the conclusion may be true. Similarly if the premiss AC which is assumed is true: the proof can be made through the same terms. and B from belonging. e. For nothing prevents both A and B from belonging to some C while A belongs to some B. For it is possible that both A and B should follow all C. but the conclusion is true.g. black to no swan. white does not belong to some animals. and black to some animals. the other wholly true. the conclusion may be true.g. and the conclusion is true.(2) Also if each premiss is partly false. For nothing prevents B from following all C. white and beautiful belong to some animals. to some C. The same terms will serve for the proof.g. For nothing prevents A from not belonging. e. and white to some beautiful things. If then it is stated that A and B belong to all C. 177 . while A does not belong to all B. Similarly if the statement BC is false. animal belongs to every swan. the statement AC true. animal and white follow every swan. the premiss BC will be wholly true. both premisses are partly false.g. the premiss AC is wholly false. e. beautiful belongs to some animals. and white does not belong to everything beautiful. Consequently if it is assumed that A belongs to no C. the conclusion may be true. if one assumes that B belongs to the whole of C. though A does not belong to some B. though animal does not belong to everything white. e. but A does not belong to C at all. and A from not belonging to C at all. Consequently if it is assumed that A and B belong to every C. Similarly if the premiss AC is stated as negative.

therefore it is assumed that B belongs to the whole of C. while A belongs to some B. the conclusion true. and the premiss BC is partly false. the premiss AC is wholly true. biped belongs to every man. The same applies to negative statements. Also the conclusion may be true if one premiss is negative.(4) Again if one premiss is wholly true. negative terms in negative. either all or some of them. a true conclusion is possible: this can be proved. and the conclusion is true. For the same terms must be taken as have been taken when the premisses are universal. but when the conclusion is true. the other premiss wholly true. and B to all C. beautiful not to every man. For it makes no difference to the setting out of the terms. the premisses of the argument must be false. If then it is assumed that both A and B belong to the whole of C. It is clear then that if the conclusion is false. that A should not belong to all B. (5) It is clear also in the case of particular syllogisms that a true conclusion may come through what is false. it is possible that the conclusion should be true. Again since it has been proved that if A belongs to no C and B to some C. it is clear that if the premiss AC is wholly true. e. in every possible way. it is possible that A should not belong to some C. the conclusion may be true. and A to some C. the premiss AC partly false. positive terms in positive syllogisms. For it is possible that B should belong to all C. For if it is assumed that A belongs to no C.g. and A to no C. the other affirmative. For since it is possible that B should belong to the whole of C. whether one assumes that what belongs to none belongs to all or that what belongs to some belongs to all. Similarly if of the premisses assumed AC is true and BC partly false. and beautiful to some bipeds. when they are so. and. if the same terms as before are transposed. the premiss BC is wholly true. the negative premiss is partly false. the other partly false. and A to some C. it is not necessary that the 178 . and the premiss BC partly false.

the other necessarily is. it is necessary. is white it is necessary that that. (But this is impossible.e. A will necessarily not be white. and it has been proved through B.) For if B is not great. A) should not be. If then when this is not white B must be great. yet it is possible.premisses should be true. and since B is great that C should not be white. it is necessary that B should be great. For whenever since this. by converting one of the premisses simply and inferring the premiss which was assumed in the original syllogism: e. B. should be great. that if the one is. but it is not necessitated. it results that if B is not great. I mean. i. that the conclusion may none the less be true. B itself is great. then it is necessary if is white that C should not be white. for example. suppose it has been necessary to prove that A belongs to all C. the former will not be either. then if the latter is not. just as if it were proved through three terms. A. But if. that the former (viz. but if the latter is. that it is impossible that B should necessarily be great since A is white and that B should necessarily be great since A is not white. The reason is that when two things are so related to one another. it necessarily results that if B is not great. since one of two things is. either one or all.g. if the latter is not. suppose that A should now be proved to belong to B by assuming that A 179 . If then B is not great A cannot be white. And whenever it is necessary. 5 Circular and reciprocal proof means proof by means of the conclusion. though no part of the syllogism is true. But it is impossible that the same thing should be necessitated by the being and by the not-being of the same thing. that the other should be. when A is not white. it is great. it is not necessary that the former should be.

and A to all B. In no other way is reciprocal proof possible. one of the premisses from which the syllogism results must be undemonstrated: for it is not possible to demonstrate through these terms that the third belongs to the middle or the middle to the first. and B to all A.g. C must belong to all B. It is clear then that only if the terms are convertible is 180 . the proof is not circular: for neither of the propositions assumed is the same as before: if one of the accepted terms is taken as middle. e. and C must belong to A. it is possible to demonstrate everything reciprocally. and A is assumed to belong to C. which was the conclusion of the first syllogism. Consequently if we succeed in demonstrating this premiss.belongs to C. and C to B – so A belongs to B: but in the first syllogism the converse was assumed. If then it is assumed that C belongs to all B. that B belongs to C. If then it is assumed that B belongs to all C. all the premisses will have been proved reciprocally. that A belongs to B. Or suppose it is necessary to prove that B belongs to C. if A and B and C are convertible with one another. and similarly the proposition BC through the conclusion and the premiss AB converted. only one of the premisses of the first syllogism can be assumed in the second: for if both of them are taken the same conclusion as before will result: but it must be different. If another term is taken as middle. both the premisses assumed have been proved. and B to belong to A but the converse was assumed in the earlier syllogism. viz. Suppose the proposition AC has been demonstrated through B as middle term. and the premiss BA: for we have used these alone without demonstrating them. Again if it is assumed that C belongs to all A. and again the proposition AB through the conclusion and the premiss BC converted. viz. If the terms are not convertible. But it is necessary to prove both the premiss CB. and C to all A. If the terms are convertible. we shall have a syllogism relating B to A. In both these syllogisms the premiss CA has been assumed without being demonstrated: the other premisses had ex hypothesi been proved.

In negative syllogisms reciprocal proof is as follows. and B of by assuming that C is said of and C is proved of A through these premisses. and this is circular demonstration. If it is necessary to prove that B belongs to C. Further a syllogism cannot be made at all if the other premiss is converted: for the result is that both premisses are particular. and the proof must start from the conclusion and the other premiss. and A to none of the Bs: we conclude that A belongs to none of the Cs. But we must assume that B belongs to all of that to none of which longs. Consequently each of the three propositions has been made a conclusion.circular and reciprocal demonstration possible (if the terms are not convertible. But the particular premiss may be proved. Clearly it is impossible to demonstrate the universal premiss: for what is universal is proved through propositions which are universal. If then it is assumed that B belongs to all A and the 181 . but the conclusion is not universal. so that we use the conclusion for the demonstration. to assume the conclusion and the converse of one of the premisses. but the particular premiss can be demonstrated. and deduce the remaining premiss. It is necessary then that B should belong to all C. If again it is necessary to prove that A belongs to none of the Bs (which was previously assumed) A must belong to no C. Let A belong to none of the Cs (which was the previous conclusion) and assume that B belongs to all of that to none of which A belongs. Suppose that A has been proved of some C through B. the matter stands as we said above). In particular syllogisms it is not possible to demonstrate the universal premiss through the other propositions. the proposition AB must no longer be converted as before: for the premiss ‘B belongs to no A’ is identical with the premiss ‘A belongs to no B’. Let B belong to all C. and C to all B: thus the previous premiss is reversed. But it turns out in these also that we use for the demonstration the very thing that is being proved: for C is proved of B.

i. Let A belong to all B. But if the syllogism not universal. But it is possible to prove the particular premiss.conclusion is retained. An affirmative proposition is not proved because both premisses of the new syllogism are not affirmative (for the conclusion is negative) but an affirmative proposition is (as we saw) proved from premisses which are both affirmative. Let A belong to all B. therefore. B will belong to some C: for we obtain the first figure and A is middle. with B as middle. But if the syllogism is negative. 6 In the second figure it is not possible to prove an affirmative proposition in this way.e ‘B belongs to some of that to some of which A does not belong’: otherwise no syllogism results because the particular premiss is negative. Through the conclusion. if the proposition AB is converted as in the universal syllogism. a syllogism will be possible. but if another premiss is assumed in addition. consequently B belongs to no A: neither then does A belong to B. A will not belong to some C. and one premiss. and not to all C: the conclusion is BC. The negative is proved as follows. and the other affirmative. but not to all C. it is necessary that A should belong to no C: for we get the second figure. If then it is assumed that B belongs to all A. For C belongs to all A and B to no C. and to no C: we conclude that B belongs to no C. the universal premiss cannot be proved. for the same reason as we gave above. B 182 . for the reason given above. If then it is assumed that B belongs to all A. we shall have the first figure. but a negative proposition may be proved. but the particular premiss can be proved whenever the universal statement is affirmative. we get no syllogism. But if the premiss AB was negative. it is not possible to prove the universal premiss.

if C belongs to some B. and the universal concerns the minor extreme. and that to this: but we must assume besides that if this belongs to some of that. But if the universal premiss is negative. Let A belong to all C and B to some C: the conclusion is the statement AB. But it is not the same that this should belong to that. but when it concerns the other extreme. 7 In the third figure. the other particular. it will be possible to prove the proposition AC.being middle. But if B belongs to all C. And yet it is necessary. that belongs to some of this. the premiss AC will not be demonstrated by the conversion of AB: for it turns out that either both or one of the premisses is negative. it has been proved that C belongs to some B. and A to some B. If then it is assumed that C belongs to all A. When both the premisses assumed are affirmative. proof will be possible. proof of the latter will sometimes be possible. it is not possible to prove them reciprocally: for that which is universal is proved through statements which are universal. when it is assumed that C belongs to all B. so that it is clear that it is not possible at all to prove through this figure the universal premiss. and A to some C. But if one premiss is universal. when both premisses are taken universally. but that B belongs to some C has not been proved. but the conclusion in this figure is always particular. consequently a syllogism will not be possible. that B should belong to some C. But the proof will proceed as in the universal syllogisms. if it is assumed that A belongs to some of that to some of which B does not belong. sometimes not. impossible. For if C belongs to all B and A 183 . But if this is assumed the syllogism no longer results from the conclusion and the other premiss.

In no other way is it possible by converting the universal premiss to prove the other: for in no other way can a syllogism be formed.to some B. if the conclusion is negative through the last. For it is assumed that that belongs to all of that to none of which this belongs. to some of which this does not belong. B being middle. Let B belong to all C.g. proof is possible through the second figure and through the first. if A belongs to no C. If then it is assumed that C belongs to some of that to some of which does not belong. viz. the other premiss is not except as before. In the middle figure. and the affirmative is universal. it is necessary that C should belong to some of the Bs. And whenever one premiss is affirmative the other negative. if it is assumed that that belongs to some of that. when the syllogism is universal. and A not to some C: the conclusion is that A does not belong to some B. and B to some C: the conclusion is that A does not belong to some B. e. But when the negative premiss is universal. but when particular through the second and the last. the other premiss can be proved. B being middle. it is necessary that A should belong to some C. It is clear also that in the third figure and in the middle figure those syllogisms which are not made through those figures themselves either are not of the nature of circular proof or are imperfect. 184 . it is necessary that A should not belong to some C. If then it is assumed further that C belongs to all B. It is clear then that in the first figure reciprocal proof is made both through the third and through the first figure – if the conclusion is affirmative through the first. In the third figure all proofs are made through itself.

not to no B at all. For (as we saw) the universal is not proved through the last figure. For if it should stand. if the conclusion has been changed into its opposite and one of the premisses stands. B will belong to no C. the conclusion also must stand. If the conclusion is converted into its contradictory. and of ‘to some’ to ‘not to some’. and B to all C. Similarly if the syllogism is negative. A will belong. B will belong to none of the Cs. by contrary opposition I mean the opposition of ‘to all’ to ‘to none’. And if A belongs to no C. but not to all B. It makes a difference whether the conclusion is converted into its contradictory or into its contrary. B 185 .8 To convert a syllogism means to alter the conclusion and make another syllogism to prove that either the extreme cannot belong to the middle or the middle to the last term. Then if it is assumed that A belongs to all C. In a word it is not possible to refute universally by conversion the premiss which concerns the major extreme: for the refutation always proceeds through the third since it is necessary to take both premisses in reference to the minor extreme. and of ‘to some’ to ‘to none’. the syllogisms will be contradictory and not universal. through B as middle term. For the same syllogism does not result whichever form the conversion takes. that the other premiss should be destroyed. This will be made clear by the sequel. If then it should be assumed that A belongs to no C. For it is necessary. A will belong to some B: but in the original premiss it belonged to no B. Suppose that A been proved of C. Then if A belongs not to all C. but to all B. Let the syllogism be affirmative. so that the conclusion also will be particular. By contradictory opposition I mean the opposition of ‘to all’ to ‘not to all’. and to no B. but to all B. For one premiss is particular. Suppose it has been proved that A belongs to no C through B. and let it be converted as stated. And if A and B belong to all C.

and to no B. neither of the premisses is universal. If then it is assumed that A belongs to no C. For if A belongs to some C. and should not belong to some C. And if A belongs to some C. A will not belong to some B: and if A belongs to no C. B will belong. but B belongs to all C.will belong not to all C. Similarly if the syllogism is negative. But the original premiss is not yet refuted: for it is possible that B should belong to some C. as in the universal syllogisms. and B to some C. 9 In the second figure it is not possible to refute the premiss which concerns the major extreme by establishing something 186 . but to all B. The proof is the same as before. but to all B. Suppose that A has been proved of some C. and B to all C. as was originally assumed. both premisses are refuted: but if the assumption is that A belongs to some C. Thus both premisses are refuted. refutation in which the conclusion reached by O. A will belong not to all B. then B will not belong to some C. The universal premiss AB cannot be affected by a syllogism at all: for if A does not belong to some of the Cs. And if A belongs not to all C. not to no C at all. For the result is no longer. A will belong to some B. neither. neither premiss is refuted. But neither can be refuted if the conclusion is converted into its contrary. both premisses may be refuted. conversion lacks universality. For if A does not belong to some C. but – not to some C. but when it is converted into its contrary. Similarly if the syllogism is negative: for if it should be assumed that A belongs to all C. but no refutation at all. B will belong to no C. but B belongs to some of the Cs. In particular syllogisms when the conclusion is converted into its contradictory.

both premisses can be refuted. since the first figure is produced. Let A belong to all B and to no C: conclusion BC. and the proposition AB stands. and A to no C. If then it is assumed that B belongs to some C. But if the conclusion BC is converted into its contradictory. For if B belongs to all C. A will belong to some C. the conclusion of the refutation will be the contrary of the minor premiss of the first. But if the conclusion is converted into its contradictory. the premiss. But the original statement has not been refuted: for it is possible that A should belong to some C and also not to some C. no syllogism will be possible: for neither of the premisses taken is universal. the premiss AB will be refuted as before. and A to all B. and to some C: the conclusion is BC. For if B belongs to some C. as also happened in the first figure. A will belong to no C: but it was assumed to belong to some C. and A to no C. If B belongs to all C. then A will not belong to some B. If the syllogism is particular. and the statement AB stands. The other premiss can be refuted in a manner similar to the conversion: I mean. Consequently the proposition AB is not refuted. whichever form the conversion of the conclusion may take. Again if B belongs to some C and A to some C. Again if B belongs to some C. when the conclusion is converted into its contrary neither premiss can be refuted. so that the syllogism results in the contradictory of the minor premiss.’ if the conclusion is converted into its contradictory. A will belong to all C. AC by its contradictory. For the conclusion of the refutation will always be in the third figure. A similar proof can be given if the premisses are transposed in respect of their quality. Suppose that A belongs to no B. both premisses can be refuted. the conclusion will be that A does not belong to some C.contrary to it. and in this figure (as we saw) there is no universal syllogism. if into its contradictory. and A to no B. the contradictory. if the conclusion of the first syllogism is converted into its contrary. Again if 187 . If then it is assumed that B belongs to all C. then A belongs not to all B: the figure is the last.

neither of the premisses can be refuted in any of the syllogisms. And similarly if one of the premisses is not universal. But we found that no syllogism is possible thus either in the first or in the middle figure. Suppose it has been proved that A does not belong to some B.B belongs to all C and A to some C. but belongs to all C. The same proof can be given if the universal statement is affirmative. both the premisses can be refuted. a syllogism could be made. and to C. and B to all C. but B belongs to all C. as we saw. For either both premisses arrived at by the conversion must be particular. A will not belong to some C: if A belongs to no B. C being taken as middle. and B to some C. will a syllogism be possible about B and C. and to all C. Whenever then the contrary of the 188 . both premisses may be refuted and in all the moods. and the premisses being universal. AC being negative: for it was thus that. For if A belongs to no B. Similarly if the original syllogism is negative. BC being affirmative. For if A belongs to no B. If then it is assumed that A does not belong to some B. then A belongs to no C: again if A belongs to no B. A similar proof can be given if the premisses are not universal. A will belong to some B. or the universal premiss must refer to the minor extreme. but when the conclusion is converted into its contradictory. 10 In the third figure when the conclusion is converted into its contrary. But if the conclusion is converted into its contradictory. no syllogism is formed about A and C. Nor if A does not belong to some B. B belongs to no C. Suppose it has been proved that A belongs to some B. B will belong to no C.

If then A belongs to all B. and to no C. From what has been said it is clear how a syllogism results in each figure when the conclusion is converted. For if A belongs to all B. and B to C.conclusion is assumed a syllogism will not be possible. It is clear that in the first figure the syllogisms are formed through the middle and the last figures. For AC becomes universal and negative. it results that A belongs to some C: but it was supposed to belong to no C. Again if A belongs to all B. the premiss which concerns the minor through the middle figure. 189 . the other premiss particular and affirmative. If A belongs to some B and B to some C. was a syllogism possible concerning B and C. Again if A belongs to all B. and B to all C. they are refuted. A belongs to all C: but A was supposed originally to belong to no C. then B belongs to no C: but it was supposed to belong to all C. the premiss which concerns the major is always refuted through the first figure. In the second figure syllogisms proceed through the first and the last figures. and the premiss which concerns the minor extreme is always refuted through the first figure. the premiss which concerns the major extreme through the last. the premiss which concerns the major through the last figure. if A belongs to some B. is obtained. no syllogism is possible (as we saw) about A and C. in the other way they are not. Therefore the premisses are not refuted. Nor. For if A belongs to some B. and the premiss which concerns the minor extreme is alway refuted through the middle figure. no syllogism results: nor yet if A belongs to some B. A similar proof is possible if the premisses are not universal. Thus in one way the premisses are refuted. In the third figure the refutation proceeds through the first and the middle figures. and to no C. then B belongs to no C: but it was assumed to belong to some C. But when the contradictory of the conclusion is assumed. and to no C. and B to some C. and to no C. when a result contrary to the premiss. and when a result contradictory to the premiss.

but if it is supposed that A belongs to no B. The terms are alike in both. For if A belongs to no B.11 It is clear then what conversion is. then if it is supposed that A does not belong to all B or belongs to no B. and take besides another premiss concerning either of the terms. All the problems can be proved per impossibile in all the figures. Suppose that A belongs not to all B. For it resembles conversion. The syllogism per impossibile is proved when the contradictory of the conclusion stated and another premiss is assumed. differing only in this: conversion takes place after a syllogism has been formed and both the premisses have been taken. how it is effected in each figure. and what syllogism results. For example if A belongs to all B. Let this be impossible: it is 190 . Similarly in the other figures: for whatever moods admit of conversion admit also of the reduction per impossibile. when the premiss BD is assumed as well we shall prove syllogistically what is false. or that B belongs to all D. and B belongs to all D. C being middle. But this is impossible: consequently the supposition is false: its contradictory then is true. but because it is clear that it is true. viz. but to all C (which was admitted to be true). thus we get the first figure. or to no B. If then it is supposed that A does not belong to all B. no syllogism results whichever term the assumed premiss concerns. A belongs to no D. but not the problem proposed. excepting the universal affirmative. that C belongs to all A. but a reduction to the impossible takes place not because the contradictory has been agreed to already. it can be made in all the figures. which is proved in the middle and third figures. it follows that C belongs to no B or not to all B. but not in the first. and the premisses of both are taken in the same way.

It is necessary then that C should belong to some B. But this is impossible (for let it be true and clear that A belongs to all C): consequently if this is false. But we have not yet shown it to be necessary that A belongs to no B. and let it have been assumed that C belongs to all A. But this is impossible. Consequently it is clear that the universal affirmative cannot be proved in the first figure per impossibile. we shall have a syllogism and a conclusion which is impossible. e. if it does not belong to all B. so that it is false that A belongs to all B. that A does not belong to some B. so that the supposition is false: in that case it is true that A belongs to no B. but the 191 . and let it have been assumed that C belongs to all A. But the universal affirmative is not necessarily true if the universal negative is false. If the contrary is supposed. But the particular affirmative and the universal and particular negatives can all be proved. no syllogism will be possible.false then A belongs to no B. it is necessary that A should belong to some B. It is necessary then that C should belong to all B. no syllogism results. But let this be impossible. nor does it do so when it is supposed that A does not belong to all B. Then it is necessary that A should belong to no C or not to all C. Similarly if the other premiss taken concerns B. Suppose that A belongs to all B. Clearly then we must suppose the contradictory.g. Again suppose that A belongs to some B. Suppose that A belongs to no B. we shall have a syllogism and an impossible conclusion. But if the premiss assumed concerns B. but the problem in hand is not proved. We may proceed in the same way if the proposition CA has been taken as negative. and let it have been assumed that B belongs to all or to some C. Nor can a conclusion be drawn when the contrary of the conclusion is supposed. But if the other premiss assumed relates to A. But if the premiss CA is assumed as well. no syllogism will be possible.

the affirmation must be true. Therefore it is the contradictory that we must suppose. then if it is proved that the negation does not hold. consequently it is true that A belongs to no B. For if A belongs to some B. and does not belong to some B. It is clear then that not the contrary but the contradictory ought to be supposed in all the syllogisms. but that it belongs to no B. For thus we shall have necessity of inference. But if the negative proposition concerns B. But in neither way does it suit to maintain the contrary: for it is not necessary 192 . the hypothesis is false. it is not proved that A belongs not to all B. the truth is refuted as well. so that if this is impossible. but that it belongs to all B. it is false that A belongs to some B. for the original conclusion was that A belongs to some B. and C to all A. Consequently we must not suppose that A belongs to some B. since it is impossible to draw a false conclusion from true premisses: but in fact it is true: for A belongs to some B. To prove that A does not belong to all B. we must suppose that it belongs to all B: for if A belongs to all B. For if of everything one or other of two contradictory statements holds good. and C to all A. Again if it is not admitted that the affirmation is true. Further the impossible does not result from the hypothesis: for then the hypothesis would be false. then C will belong to some B. The same results if the original proposition CA was negative: for thus also we get a syllogism. Similarly if we should be proving that A does not belong to some B: for if ‘not to belong to some’ and ‘to belong not to all’ have the same meaning. and the claim we make is one that will be generally accepted. the claim that the negation is true will be generally accepted. the demonstration of both will be identical.hypothesis is not refuted. If then this is impossible. If the hypothesis is that A belongs not to all but to some B. Similarly if the other premiss assumed concerns B. But if this is proved. then C belongs to all B. nothing is proved.

This is impossible. if this is impossible. and let A belong to no C. For if A belongs to no B. so that it is false that A belongs to no B. 193 .that if the universal negative is false. It is necessary then that C should not belong to some B. But though this is false. But originally it belonged to all B. it does not follow that it is true that A belongs to all B. It is true then that A belongs to all B. we shall have the same results as in the first figure. Suppose that A does not belong to all B. When A belongs to some B. but to all C. But this is impossible (for suppose it to be clear that C belongs to all B): consequently the hypothesis is false. Again suppose that A belongs to some B. and let it have been assumed that A belongs to all C. But in the middle and the last figures this also is proved. But if the contrary is supposed. C will not belong to all B. Consequently. If then A belongs not to all B. consequently the hypothesis is false: A then will belong to no B. It is necessary then that C should belong to no B. nor is it generally accepted that if the one is false the other is true. But if it is supposed that A does not belong to some B. A must belong to some B. the universal affirmative should be true. C will belong to no B. and let A belong to all C. we shall have a syllogism and a result which is impossible: but the problem in hand is not proved. and to all C. suppose that A belongs to no B. 12 It is clear then that in the first figure all problems except the universal affirmative are proved per impossibile.

But if it is supposed that A belongs to no B. and let it have been assumed that C belongs to all B. For if A belongs to all B and C to some B. so it is false that A belongs to all B. If A belongs to no B. But in that case it is true that A belongs not to all B. Suppose that A does not belong to some B. so that it is true that A belongs to all B. suppose A belongs to some B. 13 Similarly they can all be formed in the last figure. we shall have the same results as before. then A belongs to some C. suppose it does belong to all B. But this we assumed not to be so. Then it is necessary that A should belong to some C. But to prove that A belongs to some B. and to no C. But ex hypothesi it belongs to no C. If then this is impossible. but C belongs to all B: then A does not belong to some C. If then this is false. It is necessary then that C should belong to no B. we shall have the same result as before. and C to some B. it is true that A belongs to some B. we shall have a syllogism and a conclusion which is impossible: but the problem in hand is not proved: for if the contrary is supposed. If however it is assumed that A belongs to some B. It is clear then that all the syllogisms can be formed in the middle figure. the problem is not proved. When A belongs to no B. A will belong not to all C. it is false that A does not belong to some B. this hypothesis must be made.When A does not belong to an B. But this is impossible: so that it is true that A does not belong to all B. so that it is false that A belongs to some B. 194 . But this hypothesis must be made if we are prove that A belongs not to all B. But if it is supposed that A belongs to all B.

whereas ostensive proof starts from admitted positions. Suppose that A has been proved to belong to no B. are proved in a way. the former takes one of these. And it is plain that in the middle figure an affirmative conclusion. the truth will be found in the first. indeed. along with the contradictory of the original conclusion. the truth will be found in the middle or the last figure. and in the last figure a universal conclusion. take two premisses that are admitted. if negative in the middle. Also in the ostensive proof it is not necessary that the conclusion should be known.It is clear then that in all the syllogisms which proceed per impossibile the contradictory must be assumed. and that which is proved per impossibile can be proved ostensively. and the original premisses that C belongs to all A and to 195 . nor that one should suppose beforehand that it is true or not: in the other it is necessary to suppose beforehand that it is not true. if affirmative in the last. through the first figure. Both. the method is the same in both cases. through the same terms. or not to all B. but the latter takes the premisses from which the syllogism starts. Whenever the syllogism is formed in the first figure. Whenever the syllogism is formed in the last figure. It makes no difference whether the conclusion is affirmative or negative. if affirmative in first. Whenever the syllogism is formed in the middle figure. if negative in the middle. Everything which is concluded ostensively can be proved per impossibile. 14 Demonstration per impossibile differs from ostensive proof in that it posits what it wishes to refute by reduction to a statement admitted to be false. whatever the problem may be. Then the hypothesis must have been that A belongs to some B. the truth will be found in the first and middle figures.

For thus the syllogism was made and the impossible conclusion reached. Then the hypothesis must have been that A belongs not to all B. Again suppose it has been proved that A belongs to some B. and C to all B. we have the last figure. The hypothesis is that A belongs to all B. Again suppose it has been proved in the middle figure that A belongs to all B. and C to some B. If the syllogism is not universal. And it is clear from these premisses that A must belong to some B. If the syllogism is negative. Similarly too. if C belongs to all A and to no B. and C to all B: for thus we shall get what is impossible. But this is the middle figure. but proof has been given that A does not belong to some B. and the original premisses that A belongs to all C.no B. Similarly if has been proved not to belong to all B. Similarly if B or A should be assumed to belong to some C. But if A belongs to all C. But if A and B belong to all C. Again suppose it has been proved in the third figure that A belongs to all B. Then the hypothesis must have been that A 196 . if the premiss CA should be negative: for thus also we have the middle figure. and the original premisses that B belongs to all C. and the original premisses that A belongs to all C. we may infer in the same way. and C to all B. and the original premisses are that C belongs to all A but not to all B. the hypothesis must have been that A belongs to some B. the original premisses that A belongs to no C. For the hypothesis is that A belongs to all B. And it is clear from these premisses that A belongs to no B. The hypothesis here is that is that A belongs to no B. and C belongs to some B: for thus we get the first figure. and the original premisses that A belongs to no C. so that the first figure results. Similarly if it has been proved that A belongs to some B: for the hypothesis then must have been that A belongs to no B. we have the first figure. and A either to all or to some C: for in this way we shall get what is impossible.

so that we obtain immediately the figures through which each problem will be solved. and A to all C. viz. for thus we shall get what is impossible. universal affirmative to particular negative.e. universal affirmative to universal negative. and A belongs to all C. will be made clear in this way. and the original premisses that C belongs to all B. and the original premisses that C belongs to no A and to all B. and in what figure this is not possible. Verbally four kinds of opposition are possible. i. Similarly it will be possible if the syllogisms are ostensive to reduce them ad impossibile in the terms which have been taken. and it is not possible to separate one method from the other. It is clear then that it is possible through the same terms to prove each of the problems ostensively as well. For the syllogisms become identical with those which are obtained by means of conversion. particular 197 . Similarly if the demonstration establishes a particular proposition: the hypothesis then must have been that A belongs to no B. Similarly if the demonstration is not universal. and the original premisses that C belongs to some B.belongs not to all B. 15 In what figure it is possible to draw a conclusion from premisses which are opposed. the premisses that C belongs to no A and to some B: and this is the middle figure. And the original premisses form the first figure. whenever the contradictory of the conclusion of the ostensive syllogism is taken as a premiss. and this is the middle figure. It is clear then that every thesis can be proved in both ways. If the syllogism is negative. per impossibile and ostensively. the hypothesis must have been that A belongs to some B. The hypothesis will then be that A belongs to all B.

and particular affirmative to particular negative: but really there are only three: for the particular affirmative is only verbally opposed to the particular negative. for A belongs to all B but to no C. ‘no science is good’. A belongs to all B and to no C. Consequently it is possible that 198 . Let A stand for good. the other negative: no negative syllogism is possible because opposites affirm and deny the same predicate of the same subject. the affirmative statement concerned B. but one thing is denied of it. the one affirmative. so that a particular science will not be a science. Similarly if after taking ‘every science is good’ one took ‘the science of medicine is not good’. and the middle term in the first figure is not predicated of both extremes. and it is affirmed of something else: but such premisses are not opposed. but opposites are. and affirmatively of the other. and B is science. the universal affirmative and the universal negative. Of the genuine opposites I call those which are universal contraries. and A supposition: for after taking ‘no science is supposition’. If then one assumes that every science is good. a particular science will not be a science if A belongs to all C but to no B. This syllogism differs from the preceding because the relations between the terms are reversed: before. so that B belongs to no C: no science then is a science.g. Again. In the middle figure a syllogism can be made both oLcontradictories and of contraries. e. one has assumed that a particular science is supposition. C medicine. the others I call contradictories. now it concerns C. In the first figure no syllogism whether affirmative or negative can be made out of opposed premisses: no affirmative syllogism is possible because both premisses must be affirmative. Similarly if one premiss is not universal: for the middle term is always that which is stated negatively of one extreme. and no science is good. let B and C stand for science. ‘every science is good’.affirmative to universal negative.

not to all of the other. we may have either universal affirmative and negative. So it is clear in how many ways and in what figures a 199 . Similarly in the third figure. or particular affirmative and universal negative. ‘all science is good’ and ‘no science is good’ or ‘some science is not good’. but only if the terms subordinate to the middle are such that they are either identical or related as whole to part. if one is particular. or universal affirmative and particular negative. or to all C and to no B. viz. though not always or in every mood. but a negative syllogism is possible whether the terms are universal or not. e. or to assume it in the way suggested in the Topics. or to all of the one.contradictories may lead to a conclusion. Similarly if the premiss BA is not assumed universally. and the relations between the terms may be reversed. he has assumed that B belongs to all A and C to no A. This does not usually escape notice. Let B and C stand for science. In the third figure an affirmative syllogism can never be made out of opposite premisses. it follows that opposite statements may be assumed as premisses in six ways. A for medicine. The premisses are contrary if the terms are taken universally. Since there are three oppositions to affirmative statements. they are contradictory.g. it results that some science is not science. But it is possible to establish one part of a contradiction through other premisses. If then one should assume that all medicine is science and that no medicine is science. Otherwise it is impossible: for the premisses cannot anyhow be either contraries or contradictories. We must recognize that it is possible to take opposites in the way we said. so that a particular science will not be a science. for the reason given in reference to the first figure. here too the relation between the terms may be reversed. A may belong to all B and to no C. For if some medicine is science and again no medicine is science.

g. For the syllogism owed its contrariety to its contradictory premisses. or we must argue from two syllogisms. It is evident also that in fallacious reasonings nothing prevents a contradiction to the hypothesis from resulting. if a thing is good. that it is not an animal because the syllogism springs out of a contradiction and the terms presupposed are either identical or related as whole and part. or he 200 . but this happens in many ways. if an animal. as has been said before. it is proved that it is not good. e.syllogism can be made by means of premisses which are opposed. e. if something is odd. it is not odd. ‘every animal is white and not white’. But we must recognize that contraries cannot be inferred from a single syllogism in such a way that we conclude that what is not good is good. assuming. e. 16 To beg and assume the original question is a species of failure to demonstrate the problem proposed. that every science is supposition. Either we must introduce the contradiction by an additional assumption.g. For the syllogism is always contrary to the fact. but none of it is supposition’ (which is the mode in which refutations are made). is it possible that the premisses should be really contrary. if we assume such premisses we shall get a result that contradicts our hypothesis. as was said before. In no other way than this. and we proceed ‘man is an animal’. and then assuming ‘Medicine is a science.. A man may not reason syllogistically at all. but it is not possible if the premisses are opposed.g. e. It is clear too that from false premisses it is possible to draw a true conclusion. or anything of that sort unless a self-contradictory premiss is at once assumed.g.

it is not yet clear whether he begs the original question. But if one were to make the conversion. and if one should assume that A does belong to B. But if they are not convertible. it is also possible to make a transition to other things which would naturally be proved through the thesis proposed. but it is evident that he is not demonstrating: for what is as uncertain as the question to be answered cannot be a principle of a demonstration. for demonstration proceeds from what is more certain and is prior. For one might equally well prove that A belongs to B through those terms if they are convertible. But that is impossible.may argue from premisses which are less known or equally unknown. or the one belongs to the other. what is subordinate to them through something else). and B through C. then he begs the original question. and also whether A belongs to B. and other things by means of something else (the first principles through themselves. if A should be proved through B. If however B is so related to C that they are identical. or he may establish the antecedent by means of its consequents. it is the fact that they are not that prevents such a demonstration. or if they are plainly convertible. the original question is begged.g. Now begging the question is none of these: but since we get to know some things naturally through themselves. This is what those persons do who suppose that they are constructing parallel straight lines: for they fail to see that they are assuming facts which it is impossible to demonstrate unless the parallels exist. not the method of demonstrating. e. and demonstrate it through them. This may be done by assuming what is in question at once. if it is: in this way everything will be selfevident. though it was natural that C should be proved through A: for it turns out that those who reason thus are proving A by means of itself. If then it is uncertain whether A belongs to C. So it turns out that those who reason thus merely say a particular thing is. whenever a man tries to prove what is not self-evident by means of itself. then he 201 .

In scientific demonstrations the question is begged when the terms are really related in the manner described. this being as uncertain as the question whether A belongs to C. in other words failing to prove when the failure is due to the thesis to be proved and the premiss through which it is proved being equally uncertain. If then begging the question is proving what is not self-evident by means of itself. and both premisses do not beg the question indifferently (in a similar way the question may be begged in the middle figure). viz. the question may be begged in the middle and third figures in both ways. proving that which is not self-evident by means of itself. the question is not yet begged. only in the third and first figures. 202 . or because the same predicate belongs to subjects which are identical. the question is begged when identical predicates are denied of the same subject. For we have explained the meaning of begging the question. in dialectical arguments when they are according to common opinion so related. If however A and B are identical either because they are convertible or because A follows B.would be doing what we have described and effecting a reciprocal proof with three propositions. either because predicates which are identical belong to the same subject. then the question is begged for the same reason as before. If the syllogism is negative. though. because the terms in negative syllogisms are not convertible. Similarly if he should assume that B belongs to C. but no demonstration is made. if the syllogism is affirmative.

This may happen whether one traces the connexion upwards or downwards. which we frequently make in argument. wishing to prove that the diagonal of the square is incommensurate with the side. B to C. but that is not possible in ostensive proofs: since if an assumption is refuted.g. and it should be false that B 203 . For we use the expression ‘false cause’. a syllogism can no longer be drawn in reference to it. and C to D. when the syllogism is concluded in spite of the refutation of this position. is made primarily in the case of a reductio ad impossibile. Another case is where the impossible conclusion is connected with the hypothesis. and so establish a reductio ad impossibile: for Zeno’s false theorem has no connexion at all with the original assumption. For to put that which is not the cause as the cause. e. as we have explained in the Topics. should try to prove Zeno’s theorem that motion is impossible. if a man. but does not result from it. but urge that something false has been assumed in the earlier parts of the argument.g. The most obvious case of the irrelevance of an assumption to a conclusion which is false is when a syllogism drawn from middle terms to an impossible conclusion is independent of the hypothesis. that the conclusion results indifferently whether the hypothesis is made or not. for here what one denies is not assumed as a premiss. if it is laid down that A belongs to B. it cannot be objected that the syllogism does not depend on the assumption laid down. nor will he use the formula in the case of an ostensive proof. Further when anything is refuted ostensively by the terms ABC. is just this: e. to rebut the proposition which was being proved by the reduction. ‘False cause’. and when the original hypothesis is so related to the impossible conclusion. For unless a man has contradicted this proposition he will not say.17 The objection that ‘this is not the reason why the result is false’. It is clear then that the expression ‘false cause’ can only be used in the case of a reductio ad impossibile.

and that K belongs to C and C to D. In this way too the impossible conclusion would result. but rather we mean that when the first assumption is eliminated. the impossible conclusion must be connected with that term which is subject in the hypothesis: for if it is impossible that F should belong to B. Consequently since the impossibility results whether the first assumption is suppressed or not. since it is not perhaps absurd that the same false result should follow from several 204 . Similarly if one takes the terms in an ascending series. the impossible conclusion would still stand. e. the impossible conclusion will disappear if B is eliminated. Similarly when the syllogisms are negative. suppose that A belongs to B. the impossible conclusion must be connected with that term which is predicate in the hypothesis: for if it is impossible that A should belong to D. If one traces the connexion upwards. For if it were laid down that A belongs not to B but to K. the same impossibility results through the remaining premisses. though the original hypothesis were eliminated. But the impossible conclusion ought to be connected with the original terms: in this way it will depend on the hypothesis. it being false that F belongs to A.belongs to D: for if we eliminated A and assumed all the same that B belongs to C and C to D. the false conclusion will no longer result after A has been eliminated. Or again trace the connexion upwards. e. It is clear then that when the impossibility is not related to the original terms.g. it would appear to be independent of that assumption. Or perhaps we ought not to understand the statement that the false conclusion results independently of the assumption.g. Or perhaps even so it may sometimes be independent. E to A and F to E. the false conclusion does not result on account of the assumption. the false conclusion would not depend on the original hypothesis. when one traces the connexion downwards. in the sense that if something else were supposed the impossibility would result.

one of these higher propositions must be false. Every syllogism is made out of two or more premisses. if C is established through A and B. one or both of them must be false: for (as we proved) a false syllogism cannot be drawn from two premisses. E. and G. 19 In order to avoid having a syllogism drawn against us we must take care. e. e. F. 18 A false argument depends on the first false statement in it. whenever an opponent asks us to admit the reason without the conclusions. If then the false conclusion is drawn from two premisses. that parallels meet. 205 . How we ought to watch the middle in reference to each conclusion. and these through D. and that term which is stated more than once is the middle. since we know that a syllogism cannot be drawn without a middle term.g. is evident from our knowing what kind of thesis is proved in each figure. both on the assumption that the interior angle is greater than the exterior and on the assumption that a triangle contains more than two right angles. and G.g. E. not to grant him the same term twice over in his premisses. This will not escape us since we know how we are maintaining the argument. But if the premisses are more than two. Therefore the conclusion and the error results from one of them. and on this the argument depends: for A and B are inferred by means of D.hypotheses. F.

although if a syllogism is possible it does not follow that a refutation is possible. being affirmative. it is clear when refutation will be possible and when impossible. they ought in attack to try to conceal. a refutation must take place: for a refutation is a syllogism which establishes the contradictory. and next whether D belongs to E. and so on. the other negative: consequently. For if a refutation were possible. C. he ought to begin with that: in this way he will most likely deceive his opponent. D. if what is laid down is contrary to the conclusion. B. 20 Since we know when a syllogism can be formed and how its terms must be related. For example suppose that A is to be inferred to be true of F. after that he may ask whether B belongs to C.That which we urge men to beware of in their admissions. a syllogism must be possible. secondly if instead of inviting assent to propositions which are closely connected they take as far as possible those that are not connected by middle terms. I mean. For as has been shown a syllogism is possible whether the terms are related in affirmative propositions or one proposition is affirmative. Similarly refutation 206 . or the answers alternate (one. A refutation is possible whether everything is conceded. the other negative). instead of asking whether B belongs to C. and E being middle terms. If the syllogism is drawn through one middle term. if. One ought then to ask whether A belongs to B. This will be possible first. they take the necessary premisses and leave the conclusions in the dark. But if nothing is conceded. instead of drawing the conclusions of preliminary syllogisms. a refutation is impossible: for no syllogism is possible (as we saw) when all the terms are negative: therefore no refutation is possible.

g. but although knowing the one.g. e. For if he thinks that A belongs to everything to which B belongs. but some one thinks that A belongs to all B. that A belongs to all B. a man may forget the other and think the opposite true. Again if a man were to make a mistake about the members of a single series. and he knows that B belongs to D. Does he then maintain after this simply that what he knows. since the part is included in the whole. this he maintains he does not think at all: but that is impossible.g. and B to D. if it is possible that the same predicate should belong to more than one subject immediately. Suppose that A belongs to B and to C in virtue of their nature. but A to no C. but to no C: he will both know that A belongs to D. In the former case.is not possible if nothing is conceded universally: since the fields of refutation and syllogism are defined in the same way. he does not think? For he knows in a way that A belongs to C through B. and think that it does not. he will both know and not know the same thing in respect of the same thing. and both B and C belong to all D. and C to D. so that what he knows in a way. where the middle term does not belong to the same series. but to no C. suppose A belongs to B. so error may arise in our thought about them. then he knows that 207 . 21 It sometimes happens that just as we are deceived in the arrangement of the terms. e. it is not possible to think both the premisses with reference to each of the two middle terms: e. If then a man thinks that A belongs to all B. B to C. and that B and C belong to all D in the same way. For it turns out that the first premiss of the one syllogism is either wholly or partially contrary to the first premiss of the other. and C to all D.

An error of this kind is similar to the error into which we fall concerning particulars: e. he knows that A belongs to C. if we know that the figure is a triangle. let A stand for two right angles. but along with the process of being led to see the general principle he receives a knowledge of the particulars. though he knew that every triangle contains two right angles. consequently his knowledge will not be contrary to his ignorance. For it never happens that a man starts with a foreknowledge of the particular. C for a particular diagram of a triangle. The argument in the Meno that learning is recollection may be criticized in a similar way. but we do not know them by the kind of knowledge which is proper 208 . consequently he will know and not know the same thing at the same time.g. and B to all C. by an act (as it were) of recognition. meaning to have the knowledge either of the universal or of the particulars.A belongs to D. But nothing prevents his being ignorant that C exists. but if he thinks that A belongs to everything to which B belongs. Thus then he knows that C contains two right angles with a knowledge of the universal. if A belongs to all B. For the expression ‘to know that every triangle has its angles equal to two right angles’ is ambiguous. For we know some things directly. By a knowledge of the universal then we see the particulars. Consequently if again he thinks that A belongs to nothing to which C belongs. B for triangle. he thinks that A does not belong to some of that to which B belongs. If then a man knows that A belongs to everything to which B belongs.g. and again thinks that A does not belong to some of that to which B belongs. e. In this way then it is not possible to think. but not with a knowledge of the particulars.g. e. and B to D. A man might think that C did not exist. but nothing prevents a man thinking one premiss of each syllogism of both premisses of one of the two syllogisms: e. that the angles are equal to two right angles. A will belong to all C. these beliefs are wholly or partially contrary. Similarly in all other cases. and again A belongs to no C.g. A belongs to all B.

For we know no sensible thing. and thinking that this animal is with foal: for he does not know that A belongs to C. 209 . The error in respect of the middle term is not contrary to the knowledge obtained through the syllogism. For to know is used in three senses: it may mean either to have knowledge of the universal or to have knowledge proper to the matter in hand or to exercise such knowledge: consequently three kinds of error also are possible. So it is evident that if he knows the one and does not know the other. And this is the relation of knowledge of the universal to knowledge of the particular. but not that we should have the knowledge and error that are contrary to one another: rather we have the knowledge of the universal but make a mistake in apprehending the particular. provided that his knowledge and his error are not contrary. For when he thinks that the mule is with foal he has not the knowledge in the sense of its actual exercise. Nothing then prevents a man both knowing and being mistaken about the same thing. knowing that every mule is sterile and that this is a mule. even if we happen to have perceived it. Similarly in the cases stated above. and that B again belongs to C. but without the actual exercise of that knowledge. once it has passed beyond the range of our senses.to them. And this happens also to the man whose knowledge is limited to each of the premisses and who has not previously considered the particular question. unless he considers the two propositions together. consequently it is possible that we may make mistakes about them.g. nor on the other hand has his thought caused an error contrary to his knowledge: for the error contrary to the knowledge of the universal would be a syllogism. e. Nothing prevents a man who knows both that A belongs to the whole of B. thinking that A does not belong to C. he will fall into error. nor is the thought in respect of one middle term contrary to that in respect of the other. except by means of the universal and the possession of the knowledge which is proper to the particular.

A is true of C. he will think that C is B.But he who thinks the essence of good is the essence of bad will think the same thing to be the essence of good and the essence of bad. and B as A. and B belongs to everything to which A belongs. B is convertible also with A. and similarly that B is A. For if A belongs to C through B. save incidentally. Perhaps then this is necessary if a man will grant the first point. neither will A belong to C. If then B is convertible with A. similarly with the word ‘think’. 22 Whenever the extremes are convertible it is necessary that the middle should be convertible with both. but A does not belong to B. e. Let A stand for the essence of good and B for the essence of bad. For it is possible to think this in many different ways. B also is convertible in relation to A. Since then he thinks B and C identical. C will be convertible with A. for we saw that if C is the same as B. And if C is convertible with B. Similarly also with the word ‘is’. neither then will C: for ex hypothesi B belonged to all C. if B belongs to C. And if C is convertible in relation to A and to B. that any one could suppose the essence of good to be the essence of bad. consequently that C is A. and A is true of all of which B is true. and C is convertible with B through A as middle. for C is said of that of all of which B is said. Suppose B does not belong to A. C is the same as A. Similarly if the conclusion is negative. B is convertible with A. But we must consider this matter better. For just as we saw that if B is true of all of which C is true. Similarly therefore with ‘opine’. and again C for the essence of good. But presumably that is false. then if A and C are convertible and C belongs everything to which A belongs. through C as middle.g. For C belongs to that to which B belongs: but C does not belong to 210 .

Again when A and B belong to the whole of C. and C to B by conversion. and if A or C must belong to anything whatever. but they cannot belong together.that to which A belongs. since they also are opposites. and similarly D is preferable to C. For if B does not belong to something to which D belongs. it is necessary that A and B should be convertible: for since A is said of B and C only. B is an object of aversion to the same 211 . and D belongs to that to which C belongs. the preceding moods do not do so as in the affirmative syllogism. it is clear that A belongs to it. Therefore C and D belong together. and B also belongs to all C. then if A and C together are preferable to B and D together. except A itself. it is clear that B will be said of everything of which A is said. For two syllogisms have been put together. Again if A or B belongs to everything and if C or D belongs to everything. then B and D will be such that one or other belongs to anything whatever. then when A and C are convertible B and D are convertible. A must be preferable to D. and since A or C belongs to everything. it is necessary that A should belong to all B: for since A belongs to all C. of two opposites A and B. For example if that which is uncreated is incorruptible and that which is incorruptible is uncreated. When. Again if A and B are convertible. But this is impossible. A will belong to all B. and C is convertible with B. but not together. since they are opposites: and C is similarly related to D. If then A is an object of desire to the same extent as D. And this alone starts from the conclusion. For A is an object of desire to the same extent as B is an object of aversion. For since B belongs to that to which A belongs. When A belongs to the whole of B and to C and is affirmed of nothing else. it is necessary that what is created should be corruptible and what is corruptible should have been created. and B is affirmed both of itself and of C. But if A then C: for they are convertible. A is preferable to B. and similarly C and D. it is clear that B or D belongs to everything. but not together.

to the beloved’s granting the favour (represented by D) without being such as to grant it (represented by B). 23 It is clear then how the terms are related in conversion. A cannot be equally desirable with D. If then every lover in virtue of his love would prefer A. and yet should not grant it (for which C stands). And indeed the same is true of the other desires and arts. the receiving of affection. then this is its end. then B must be less an object of aversion than C: for the less is opposed to the less. Intercourse then either is not an end at all or is an end relative to the further end. it is clear that A (being of such a nature) is preferable to granting the favour. will be equally objects of desire or aversion. but also rhetorical syllogisms and in general any form of 212 . the other an object of desire). Therefore both A and C together. To receive affection then is preferable in love to sexual intercourse. But ex hypothesi this is not so. for then B along with D would be equally desirable with A along with C. and B and D together. But since A and C are preferable to B and D. Love then is more dependent on friendship than on intercourse. viz. that the beloved should be such as to grant a favour.extent as C (since each is to the same extent as each – the one an object of aversion. and in respect of being in a higher degree objects of aversion or of desire. And if it is most dependent on receiving affection. We must now state that not only dialectical and demonstrative syllogisms are formed by means of the aforesaid figures. But the greater good and lesser evil are preferable to the lesser good and greater evil: the whole BD then is preferable to the whole AC. A then is preferable to D. and C consequently is less an object of aversion than B. But if D is preferable to A.

e. mule. But B also (‘not possessing bile’) belongs to all C. B for bileless. when there is no middle term. man. however it may be presented. and the extreme is convertible with one of them. it is necessary that A should belong to B. 213 . it consists in proving through C that A belongs to B. the former proves the major to belong to the middle by means of the third.g. For it has already been proved that if two things belong to the same thing. and C for the particular long-lived animals. consists in establishing syllogistically a relation between one extreme and the middle by means of the other extreme.g. For every belief comes either through syllogism or from induction. or rather the syllogism which springs out of induction. If then C is convertible with B. A then belongs to the whole of C: for whatever is bileless is long-lived. and the middle term is not wider in extension. For this is the manner in which we make inductions. But we must apprehend C as made up of all the particulars.persuasion. through induction. For example let A stand for longlived. For induction proceeds through an enumeration of all the cases. if B is the middle term between A and C. then the other predicate will belong to the predicate that is converted. Such is the syllogism which establishes the first and immediate premiss: for where there is a middle term the syllogism proceeds through the middle term. syllogism through the middle term is prior and better known. e. And in a way induction is opposed to syllogism: for the latter proves the major term to belong to the third term by means of the middle. Now induction. but syllogism through induction is clearer to us. In the order of nature. horse.

C Athenians against Thebans. and to fight against the Thebans is to fight against neighbours. that the war against the Phocians was an evil to the Thebans. e. because induction starting from all the particular cases proves (as we saw) that the major term belongs to the middle. Similarly if the belief in the relation of the middle term to the extreme should be produced by several similar cases. It differs from induction. Since then to fight against neighbours is an evil. Now it is clear that B belongs to C and to D (for both are cases of making war upon one’s neighbours) and that A belongs to D (for the war against the Phocians did not turn out well for the Thebans): but that A belongs to B will be proved through D. Clearly then to argue by example is neither like reasoning from part to whole. 214 . It ought to be known both that the middle belongs to the third term. and does not apply the syllogistic conclusion to the minor term. For example let A be evil. nor like reasoning from whole to part. If then we wish to prove that to fight with the Thebans is an evil. we must assume that to fight against neighbours is an evil.24 We have an ‘example’ when the major term is proved to belong to the middle by means of a term which resembles the third. it is clear that to fight against the Thebans is an evil. whereas argument by example does make this application and does not draw its proof from all the particular cases. D Thebans against Phocians. Evidence of this is obtained from similar cases. and one of them is known. when both particulars are subordinate to the same term.g. B making war against neighbours. but rather reasoning from part to part. and that the first belongs to that which resembles the third.

It differs from a premiss. But when BC is not more probable than AC. F for circle. E for rectilinear figure. since we have taken a new term. If there were only one term intermediate between E and F (viz. but a premiss either cannot be particular at all or not in universal syllogisms. that the circle is made equal to a rectilinear figure by the help of lunules).25 By reduction we mean an argument in which the first term clearly belongs to the middle. we have a reduction: for we are nearer to knowledge. For example let D stand for squaring. If now the statement BC is equally or more probable than AC. An objection is brought in two ways and through two figures. Or again suppose that the terms intermediate between B and C are few: for thus too we are nearer knowledge. because it may be particular. and the intermediate terms are not few. B for knowledge. being so far without knowledge that A belongs to C. For in any of these cases it turns out that we approach more nearly to knowledge. but the relation of the middle to the last term is uncertain though equally or more probable than the conclusion. Now it is clear that knowledge can be taught: but it is uncertain whether virtue is knowledge. we should be near to knowledge. C for justice. in two ways because every objection is either universal or particular. by two figures because objections are brought in 215 . For example let A stand for what can be taught. or again an argument in which the terms intermediate between the last term and the middle are few. 26 An objection is a premiss contrary to a premiss. I do not call this reduction: nor again when the statement BC is immediate: for such a statement is knowledge.

e.g. If a man maintains a universal affirmative. In general if a man urges a universal objection he must frame his contradiction with reference to the universal of the terms taken by his opponent. the latter from the third. Similarly if the premiss objected to is negative. his opponent must reply that there is a single science of all opposites. B for contraries. If a man premises that contraries are subjects of a single science. For if a man maintains that contraries are not subjects of a single science. we reply with a universal or a particular negative. Thus we must have the first figure: for the term which embraces the original subject becomes the middle term. the latter from the third figure. e. the objection may be either that opposites are never subjects of a single science.opposition to the premiss. And we have the third figure: for the particular term assumed is 216 . if a man maintains that contraries are not subjects of the same science. For example let stand for there being a single science. or that the knowable and the unknowable are not subjects of a single science: this proof is in the third figure: for it is true of C (the knowable and the unknowable) that they are contraries. e. so that we get the first figure. and contraries are opposites. what is healthy and what is sickly.g. he will point out that the knowable and the unknowable are not subjects of the same science: ‘contraries’ is universal relatively to these. the former is proved from the first figure. and opposites can be proved only in the first and third figures. and it is false that they are the subjects of a single science. the objector must frame his contradiction with reference to a term relatively to which the subject of his opponent’s premiss is universal.g. If the objection is particular. we reply either that all opposites or that certain contraries. are subjects of the same science: the former argument issues from the first.

27 A probability and a sign are not identical. For this reason also this is the only figure from which proof by signs cannot be obtained. Consequently we bring objections in these figures only: for in them only are opposite syllogisms possible. because C does not follow B. is a probability. but have its new premiss quite clear immediately. Now an enthymeme is a syllogism starting from probabilities or signs. e. e. Premisses from which it is possible to draw the contrary conclusion are what we start from when we try to make objections.g. Besides. the knowable and the unknowable. We must consider later the other kinds of objection. This can be made clear only by other premisses. namely the objection from contraries. for the most part thus and thus. A sign means a demonstrative proposition necessary or generally approved: for anything such that when it is another thing is. if it should not be granted that A belongs to B. e. an objection in the middle figure would require a fuller argument. to be or not to be. and inquire whether a particular objection cannot be elicited from the first figure or a negative objection from the second.g. ‘the envious hate’. is a sign of the other’s being or having come into being. ‘the beloved show affection’. since the second figure cannot produce an affirmative conclusion. But an objection ought not to turn off into other things. and from common opinion. but a probability is a generally approved proposition: what men know to happen or not to happen.middle. and a sign may be taken in three 217 . from similars. or when it has come into being the other has come into being before or after.g.

though they state the former. We must either divide signs in the way stated. and this woman also is pale. but if the other is stated as well. people suppose it has been proved that she is with child. it is not therefore necessary that all other wise men should be good. B for wise men. e. since ambitious men are generous and Pittacus is ambitious. C for woman. it is not necessary that she should be with child. C woman. Truth then may be found in signs whatever their kind. Now if the one proposition is stated. we have only a sign. B for being with child. since Pittacus is not only good but wise. since Pittacus is good. a syllogism. B to have milk. that which proceeds through the last figure is refutable even if the conclusion is true. corresponding to the position of the middle term in the figures. and among them designate the middle term as the index (for people call that the 218 . but they have the differences we have stated. comes through the last figure. ‘Pittacus is generous. Let A stand for good. The proof that wise men are good.’ Or again ‘Wise men are good. Let A stand for paleness. It is true then to affirm both A and B of C: only men do not say the latter.g.’ In this way then syllogisms are formed. The proof that a woman is with child because she is pale is meant to come through the middle figure: for since paleness follows women with child and is a concomitant of this woman. C for Pittacus. because they know it. since the syllogism is not universal nor correlative to the matter in question: for though Pittacus is good. For it may be taken as in the first figure or the second or the third. But the syllogism which proceeds through the middle figure is always refutable in any case: for a syllogism can never be formed when the terms are related in this way: for though a woman with child is pale. Let A represent to be with child.ways. only that which proceeds through the first figure is irrefutable if it is true (for it is universal). For example the proof that a woman is with child because she has milk is in the first figure: for to have milk is the middle term.

for though perhaps by learning music a man has made some change in his soul. e. If then this were granted and also that for each change there is a corresponding sign. e. since it is necessary that it should have a single sign – we shall then be able to infer character from features. They will then have the sign: for ex hypothesi there is one sign corresponding to each affection. this is not one of those affections which are natural to us.index which makes us know. and some other kinds of animal as well. though not proper to it alone. and we can collect signs of this sort in these animals which have only one affection proper to them – but each affection has its sign. we shall be able to infer character from features. if it is granted that the body and the soul are changed together by the natural affections: I say ‘natural’. according to our usual manner of speaking.g. how shall we know which of the signs which are its proper concomitants is the sign of a particular affection? Perhaps if both belong to some other kind though not to the 219 . Suppose this sign is the possession of large extremities: this may belong to other kinds also though not universally. The same thing then will be found in another kind. if the lion is both brave and generous. But if the kind as a whole has two properties. For if there is an affection which belongs properly to an individual kind. and the middle term above all has this character). it is necessary that there should be a sign of it: for ex hypothesi body and soul are affected together. and we could state the affection and sign proper to each kind of animal. For the sign is proper in the sense stated. and man may be brave. It is possible to infer character from features.g. or else we must call the arguments derived from the extremes signs. because the affection is proper to the whole kind. rather I refer to passions and desires when I speak of natural emotions. courage to lions. that derived from the middle term the index: for that which is proved through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true. If then this is so.

let A stand for courage. in those kinds in which each is found though not in the whole of their members. some members possess one of the affections and not the other: e. and if. but also to others.whole of it. if a man is brave but not generous.g. B for large extremities. large extremities. B then belongs to everything to which C belongs. there would not be a single sign correlative with each affection. and C for lion. but is wider than the third term and not convertible with it: e. then. To judge character from features. is possible in the first figure if the middle term is convertible with the first extreme. but possesses.g. but is convertible with B: otherwise. 220 . of the two signs. and to nothing besides. But A belongs to everything to which B belongs. it is clear that this is the sign of courage in the lion also.

the syllogism assuming an audience that accepts its premisses. Mure] Book I 1 All instruction given or received by way of argument proceeds from pre-existent knowledge. and sometimes both assumptions are essential. the persuasion exerted by rhetorical arguments is in principle the same.Posterior Analytics [Translated by G. induction exhibiting the universal as implicit in the clearly known particular. in others comprehension of the meaning of the term used. and that ‘triangle’ means so and so. This becomes evident upon a survey of all the species of such instruction. for each of these latter make use of old knowledge to impart new. we assume that every predicate can be either truly affirmed or truly denied of any subject. The mathematical sciences and all other speculative disciplines are acquired in this way. Recognition of a truth may in some cases contain as factors both previous knowledge and also knowledge acquired simultaneously with 221 . and so are the two forms of dialectical reasoning. Thus. or enthymeme. The pre-existent knowledge required is of two kinds. a form of syllogism. a kind of induction. Again. The reason is that these several objects are not equally obvious to us. In some cases admission of the fact must be assumed. as regards ‘unit’ we have to make the double assumption of the meaning of the word and the existence of the thing. syllogistic and inductive. R. since they use either example. G.Aristotle .

and so a fortiori of the evenness. If this distinction is not drawn. The questioner then produces a particular pair. For example. Before he was led on to recognition or before he actually drew a conclusion. The solution which some people offer is to assert that they do not know that every pair is even. for we cannot accept the solution which some people offer.that recognition – knowledge. of the existence. but any and every number or triangle without reservation. in a manner not.e. what they made the subject of their premiss. If he did not in an unqualified sense of the term know the existence of this triangle. we are faced with the dilemma in the Meno: either a man will learn nothing or what he already knows. this latter. or ‘every rectilinear figure which you know to be such’: the predicate is always construed as applicable to any and every 222 . but it was only at the actual moment at which he was being led on to recognize this as true in the instance before him that he came to know ‘this figure inscribed in the semicircle’ to be a triangle. know that every pair is even?’ He says he does know it. A man is asked. there is here no recognition through a middle of a minor term as subject to a major. For some things (viz. we should perhaps say that in a manner he knew. i. the student knew beforehand that the angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles. of the particulars actually falling under the universal and therein already virtually known. not merely every triangle or number which they know to be such. i. of which he was unaware. or do you not. how could he know without qualification that its angles were equal to two right angles? No: clearly he knows not without qualification but only in the sense that he knows universally. the singulars finally reached which are not predicable of anything else as subject) are only learnt in this way. viz. For no premiss is ever couched in the form ‘every number which you know to be such’. but only that everything which they know to be a pair is even: yet what they know to be even is that of which they have demonstrated evenness.e. ‘Do you.

immediate. Consequently the proper object of unqualified scientific knowledge is something which cannot be other than it is.instance of the thing. There may be another manner of knowing as well – that will be discussed later. not if in some sense he knew what he was learning. in the condition described. a syllogism. The strange thing would be. By demonstration I mean a syllogism productive of scientific knowledge. that the fact could not be other than it is. as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist knows. primary. On the other hand. Assuming then that my thesis as to the nature of scientific knowing is correct. Now that scientific knowing is something of this sort is evident – witness both those who falsely claim it and those who actually possess it. in another not knowing it. and. 2 We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing. the grasp of which is eo ipso such knowledge. while the latter are also actually. that is. the premisses of demonstrated knowledge must be true. since the former merely imagine themselves to be. but if he were to know it in that precise sense and manner in which he was learning it. when we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends. I imagine there is nothing to prevent a man in one sense knowing what he is learning. as the cause of that fact and of no other. the basic truths will not be 223 . What I now assert is that at all events we do know by demonstration. better known than and prior to the conclusion. which is further related to them as effect to cause. further. Unless these conditions are satisfied.

it predicates a single attribute of a single subject. that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with its side. prior. means precisely to have a demonstration of them. it lays down one part to the definite exclusion of the other because that part is true. better known than it. The premisses must be primary and indemonstrable. I mean that they must be the ‘appropriate’ basic truths. not being productive of scientific knowledge. will not be demonstration. since to have knowledge. if it be not accidental knowledge. A ‘basic truth’ in a demonstration is an immediate proposition. this antecedent knowledge being not our mere understanding of the meaning. for I identify primary premiss and basic truth. Syllogism there may indeed be without these conditions.e. otherwise they will require demonstration in order to be known. it assumes either part indifferently. i. since we possess scientific knowledge of a thing only when we know its cause. e. The premisses must be the causes of the conclusion. and they are thus exactly opposed to one another. of things which are demonstrable. Now the most universal causes are furthest from sense and particular causes are nearest to sense. The premisses must be true: for that which is non-existent cannot be known – we cannot know. and prior to it. but knowledge of the fact as well. antecedently known. its causes. If a proposition is dialectical. In saying that the premisses of demonstrated knowledge must be primary. An immediate proposition is one which has no other proposition prior to it. but such syllogism.g. objects without qualification prior and better known are those further from sense. A proposition is either part of an enunciation. Now ‘prior’ and ‘better known’ are ambiguous terms. in order to be causes. for there is a difference between what is prior and better known in the order of being and what is prior and better known to man.‘appropriate’ to the conclusion. if it is demonstrative. The term ‘enunciation’ denotes either part of a 224 . I mean that objects nearer to sense are prior and better known to man.

Definition is a ‘thesis’ or a ‘laying something down’. I call an immediate basic truth of syllogism a ‘thesis’ when. But we are faced with this paradox if a student whose belief rests 225 . A contradiction is an opposition which of its own nature excludes a middle.e. The part of a contradiction which conjoins a predicate with a subject is an affirmation. unless he has either actual knowledge of it or something better than actual knowledge. precisely because of our knowledge of the latter is the effect of our knowledge of the premisses. it is a definition. and the ground of the syllogism is the facts constituting its premisses. we must not only know the primary premisses – some if not all of them – beforehand. e. if it does not so assert.e. but know them better than the conclusion: for the cause of an attribute’s inherence in a subject always itself inheres in the subject more firmly than that attribute. are more convinced of them – than their consequences. though it is not susceptible of proof by the teacher. the part disjoining them is a negation. but it is not a hypothesis. of our conviction – of a fact is the possession of such a syllogism as we call demonstration. it is a hypothesis. So since the primary premisses are the cause of our knowledge – i. asserts either the existence or the non-existence of a subject.contradiction indifferently. yet ignorance of it does not constitute a total bar to progress on the part of the pupil: one which the pupil must know if he is to learn anything whatever is an axiom. of our conviction – it follows that we know them better – that is. i. If a thesis assumes one part or the other of an enunciation. Now since the required ground of our knowledge – i. since the arithmetician lays it down that to be a unit is to be quantitatively indivisible. for to define what a unit is is not the same as to affirm its existence. I call it an axiom because there are such truths and we give them the name of axioms par excellence. Now a man cannot believe in anything more than in the things he knows.e.g. the cause of our loving anything is dearer to us than the object of our love.

but rests on the mere supposition that the premisses are true. there is no scientific knowledge. Neither doctrine is either true or a necessary deduction from the premisses. knowledge of the conclusions which follow from them is not pure scientific knowledge nor properly knowing at all.on demonstration has not prior knowledge. a man must believe in some. but that all truths are demonstrable. maintain that an infinite regress is involved. on the ground that if behind the prior stands no primary. For indeed the conviction of pure science must be unshakable. yet these are unknowable because incapable of demonstration. The other party agree with them as regards knowing. owing to the necessity of knowing the primary premisses. he must not only have a better knowledge of the basic truths and a firmer conviction of them than of the connexion which is being demonstrated: more than this. And since thus one cannot know the primary premisses. nothing must be more certain or better known to him than these basic truths in their character as contradicting the fundamental premisses which lead to the opposed and erroneous conclusion. which according to them is the only form of knowledge. assuming that there is no way of knowing other than by demonstration. Others think there is. for one cannot traverse an infinite series): if on the other hand – they say – the series terminates and there are primary premisses. we could not know the posterior through the prior (wherein they are right. but 226 . if a man sets out to acquire the scientific knowledge that comes through demonstration. holding that it is only possible by demonstration. The first school. 3 Some hold that. if not in all. of the basic truths more than in the conclusion. Moreover.

and since the regress must end in immediate truths. that which proceeds from truths better known to us. The advocates of circular demonstration are not only faced with the difficulty we have just stated: in addition their theory reduces to the mere statement that if a thing exists. our definition of unqualified knowledge will prove faulty. but only possible if ‘demonstration’ be extended to include that other method of argument which rests on a distinction between truths prior to us and truths without qualification prior. those truths must be indemonstrable. knowledge of the immediate premisses is independent of demonstration. (The necessity of this is obvious. the second form of demonstration. the method by which induction produces knowledge. Our own doctrine is that not all knowledge is demonstrative: on the contrary.) Such. on the ground that demonstration may be circular and reciprocal. is our doctrine. Perhaps. for to constitute the circle it makes no difference whether many terms or few or even only two are taken. is not demonstration in the unqualified sense of the term. then it does exist – an easy way of proving anything. But if we accept this extension of its meaning. for since we must know the prior premisses from which the demonstration is drawn. B must be. i. if A is. however. C 227 .e. then. and in addition we maintain that besides scientific knowledge there is its originative source which enables us to recognize the definitions. Thus by direct proof. That this is so can be clearly shown by taking three terms. for there seem to be two kinds of it. and the same things cannot simultaneously be both prior and posterior to one another: so circular demonstration is clearly not possible in the unqualified sense of ‘demonstration’.they see no difficulty in holding that all truths are demonstrated. Now demonstration must be based on premisses prior to and better known than the conclusion. if B is.

If. Consequently the upholders of circular demonstration are in the position of saying that if A is. Now. C must be’: but C and A have been identified. A must be – a simple way of proving anything. even such circular demonstration is impossible except in the case of attributes that imply one another. 4 Since the object of pure scientific knowledge cannot be other than it is. C must be. Since then – by the circular proof – if A is. A must be. then. A may be substituted for C above. And since demonstrative knowledge is only 228 . B must be. or at least none which proves both the original premisses. ‘peculiar’ properties. Propositions the terms of which are not convertible cannot be circularly demonstrated at all. to prove all the assumptions on which the original conclusion rested. C must be’.must be. it is possible. and if B is. the truth obtained by demonstrative knowledge will be necessary. as has been shown in my writings on the syllogism. and since convertible terms occur rarely in actual demonstrations. Moreover. A is implied in B and C. and B and C are reciprocally implied in one another and in A. Then ‘if B is. A must be’=‘if B is. which above gave the conclusion ‘if A is. it is clearly frivolous and impossible to say that demonstration is reciprocal and that therefore everything can be demonstrated. But it has also been shown that in the other figures either no conclusion is possible. it has been shown that the positing of one thing – be it one term or one premiss – never involves a necessary consequent: two premisses constitute the first and smallest foundation for drawing a conclusion at all and therefore a fortiori for the demonstrative syllogism of science. therefore if A is. by circular demonstration in the first figure. viz.

I call ‘true in every instance’ what is truly predicable of all instances – not of one to the exclusion of others – and at all times. prime and compound. not at this or that time only. square and oblong. Thus straight and curved belong to line.g. Essential attributes are (1) such as belong to their subject as elements in its essential nature (e. it is not true. 229 .g. then if it be true to say ‘this is a man’. let us define what we mean by an attribute ‘true in every instance of its subject’. to number.g. for the very being or ‘substance’ of triangle and line is composed of these elements. an ‘essential’ attribute. while they belong to certain subjects. ‘this is an animal’ is also true. line thus belongs to triangle. e. musical or white is a ‘coincident’ of animal. and also the formula defining any one of these attributes contains its subject – e. if animal is truly predicable of every instance of man. There is evidence for this in the fact that the objection we raise against a proposition put to us as true in every instance is either an instance in which. and if the one be true now the other is true now. which are contained in the formulae defining triangle and line): (2) such that. point to line. it follows that demonstration is an inference from necessary premisses. what is their character: and as a preliminary. Extending this classification to all other attributes. line or number as the case may be. A corresponding account holds if point is in every instance predicable as contained in line. or an occasion on which.e. and a ‘commensurate and universal’ attribute. So we must consider what are the premisses of demonstration – i.g. I distinguish those that answer the above description as belonging essentially to their respective subjects. whereas attributes related in neither of these two ways to their subjects I call accidents or ‘coincidents’.present when we have a demonstration. odd and even. e. the subjects to which they belong are contained in the attribute’s own defining formula.

we should say. then its death is also essentially connected with the cutting. it was. if a beast dies when its throat is being cut. ‘the walking [thing]’ walks and is white in virtue of being something else besides. all attributes which (within that sphere) are essential either in the sense that their subjects are contained in them. within number what is not odd is even. or in the sense that they are contained in their subjects. So far then as concerns the sphere of connexions scientifically known in the unqualified sense of that term.g. a coincidence. essential attributes must inhere in their subjects of necessity. e. one not so connected is ‘coincidental’. are necessary as well as consequentially connected with their subjects.Further (a) that is essential which is not predicated of a subject other than itself: e. e. whereas substance.g. is not what it is in virtue of being something else besides. not predicated of a subject I call essential. So. not death a ‘coincident’ of the cutting. on the other hand. in the sense of whatever signifies a ‘this somewhat’. because the cutting was the cause of death. there is a consequential connexion. 230 . If. For it is impossible for them not to inhere in their subjects either simply or in the qualified sense that one or other of a pair of opposites must inhere in the subject. in number either oddness or evenness. Things. For within a single identical genus the contrary of a given attribute is either its privative or its contradictory. then. e. An example of the latter is ‘While he was walking it lightened’: the lightning was not due to his walking. in line must be either straightness or curvature.g. inasmuch as within this sphere even is a necessary consequent of not-odd. things predicated of a subject I call accidental or ‘coincidental’.g. since any given predicate must be either affirmed or denied of any subject. In another sense again (b) a thing consequentially connected with anything is essential. the predication is essential.

g. and the attribute that belongs to its subject as such. for they belong to line as such.g. So whatever can be shown to have its angles equal to two right angles. (1) the equality of its angles to two right angles is not a commensurately universal attribute of figure. and triangle as such has two right angles. for it is essentially equal to two right angles. or to possess any other attribute. point and straight belong to line essentially. The essential attribute. of any predicate is the proof of it as belonging to this first subject commensurately and universally: while the proof of it as belonging to the other subjects to which it attaches is demonstration only in a secondary and unessential 231 . I term ‘commensurately universal’ an attribute which belongs to every instance of its subject. from which it clearly follows that all commensurate universals inhere necessarily in their subjects. are identical. we have established the distinction between the attribute which is ‘true in every instance’ and the ‘essential’ attribute. On the other hand. Thus. this attribute cannot be demonstrated of any figure selected at haphazard. then. e. For though it is possible to show that a figure has its angles equal to two right angles. and to every instance essentially and as such. An attribute belongs commensurately and universally to a subject when it can be shown to belong to any random instance of that subject and when the subject is the first thing to which it can be shown to belong. any isosceles triangle has its angles equal to two right angles. in the essential sense. nor in demonstrating does one take a figure at random – a square is a figure but its angles are not equal to two right angles. yet isosceles triangle is not the primary subject of this attribute but triangle is prior.Thus. E. in any random instance of itself and primarily – that is the first subject to which the predicate in question belongs commensurately and universally. and the demonstration.

that is to be taken to mean that it is true of a given subject primarily and as such. If a proof were given that perpendiculars to the same line are parallel. yet the demonstration will not be true of this subject primarily and commensurately and universally.sense. But it is not so. for the parallelism depends not on these angles being equal to one another because each is a right angle. it is of wider application. When a demonstration is true of a subject primarily and commensurately and universally. We make this mistake (1) when the subject is an individual or individuals above which there is no universal to be found: (2) when the subjects belong to different species and there is a higher universal. An example of (1) would be as follows: if isosceles were the only triangle. 5 We must not fail to observe that we often fall into error because our conclusion is not in fact primary and commensurately universal in the sense in which we think we prove it so. it would be thought to have its angles equal to two right angles qua isosceles. but it has no name: (3) when the subject which the demonstrator takes as a whole is really only a part of a larger whole. Case (3) may be thus exemplified. it might be supposed that lines thus perpendicular were the proper subject of the demonstration because being parallel is true of every instance of them. Nor again (2) is equality to two right angles a commensurately universal attribute of isosceles. but simply on their being equal to one another. Alternation used to be 232 . for then the demonstration will be true of the individual instances within the part and will hold in every instance of it. An instance of (2) would be the law that proportionals alternate.

with each or all equilaterals.e. and when it is unqualified knowledge? If triangle be identical in essence with equilateral.demonstrated separately of numbers. it will be asked. for they do not possess this attribute qua lines or qua numbers. ‘does this attribute belong to the subject of which it has been demonstrated qua triangle or qua isosceles? What is the point at which the subject. lines. then. as long as one treats separately equilateral. Hence. even if there is no other species of triangle but these. the proof is commensurately universal. durations. one does not know it of ‘all triangles’. but qua manifesting this generic character which they are postulated as possessing universally. solids. When. Because there was no single name to denote that in which numbers. and durations. does our knowledge fail of commensurate universality. ‘But’. to what subject can it be demonstrated as belonging commensurately and universally?)’ Clearly this point is the first term in which it is found to inhere 233 . even if one prove of each kind of triangle that its angles are equal to two right angles. to which it belongs is primary? (i. To-day. whether by means of the same or different proofs. and because they differed specifically from one another. one does not yet know.e. and isosceles. still. then our knowledge fails of commensurate universality. except sophistically. nor even that ‘all’ triangles have it – unless ‘all’ means ‘each taken singly’: if ‘all’ means ‘as a whole class’. scalene. this property was proved of each of them separately. that triangle has its angles equal to two right angles. For one does not know that triangle as such has this property. then. though there be none in which one does not recognize this property. i. lengths. and the attribute belongs to equilateral qua triangle. then clearly we have unqualified knowledge: if on the other hand it be not. though it could have been proved of them all by a single demonstration. however. nor does one yet know that triangle has this property commensurately and universally. and solids are identical.

or else premise that the conclusion of demonstration is necessary and that a demonstrated conclusion cannot be other than it is. or contain their subjects as elements in their own essential nature. ‘But’ – you may say – ’eliminate figure or limit. 6 Demonstrative knowledge must rest on necessary basic truths. and triangle is the subject to which it can be demonstrated as belonging commensurately and universally. and the attribute vanishes. and accidental attributes are not necessary to their subjects. Now attributes attaching essentially to their subjects attach necessarily to them: for essential attributes are either elements in the essential nature of their subjects. yet if your premisses are necessary you 234 .as the elimination of inferior differentiae proceeds. for the object of scientific knowledge cannot be other than it is.) It follows from this that premisses of the demonstrative syllogism must be connexions essential in the sense explained: for all attributes must inhere essentially or else be accidental. Thus the angles of a brazen isosceles triangle are equal to two right angles: but eliminate brazen and isosceles and the attribute remains. We must either state the case thus. For though you may reason from true premisses without demonstrating. (The pairs of opposites which the latter class includes are necessary because one member or the other necessarily inheres. and then infer that the conclusion must be developed from necessary premisses. ‘Then what is the first?’ If it is triangle.’ True. but figure and limit are not the first differentiae whose elimination destroys the attribute. it will be in virtue of triangle that the attribute belongs to all the other subjects of which it is predicable.

235 . such as the sophists’ assumption that to know is the same as to possess knowledge. which can only be the primary law of the genus constituting the subject matter of the demonstration. though there be no change in him nor in the fact. if a man is without knowledge now. since this conclusion does not owe its necessity to the middle term. may have perished in the interval. we suppose a syllogism in which. the middle term of the demonstration. this situation is possible and might occur. yet he has not knowledge. and (2) not all truth is ‘appropriate’. Even if the link has not actually perished but is liable to perish. yet B. though A necessarily inheres in C. Where demonstration is possible. one who can give no account which includes the cause has no scientific knowledge. A further proof that the conclusion must be the development of necessary premisses is as follows. Or again. then neither had he knowledge previously. and though he will still retain the steps of the argument. the mediating link is a contingent fact. But the mediating link. then. though he still retains the steps of the argument. or at any rate so far as our opponent’s previous argument goes.will assuredly demonstrate – in such necessity you have at once a distinctive character of demonstration. and if so. This shows how naive it is to suppose one’s basic truths rightly chosen if one starts with a proposition which is (1) popularly accepted and (2) true. is not necessarily connected with A and C. though there is no change in himself or in the fact and no lapse of memory on his part. then the man who argues thus has no reasoned knowledge of the conclusion. not being necessary. If. But such a condition cannot be knowledge. That demonstration proceeds from necessary premisses is also indicated by the fact that the objection we raise against a professed demonstration is that a premiss of it is not a necessary truth – whether we think it altogether devoid of necessity. For (1) popular acceptance or rejection is no criterion of a basic truth. and therefore had not knowledge before. for though the conclusion is necessary.

the middle through which it was proved may yet quite easily be non-necessary. if the conclusion is not a necessary connexion. To sum up. in the sense in which I here speak of it. just as true premisses always give a true conclusion. then A too will be a necessary predicate of C. for since an accident. Thus: let A be predicated non-necessarily of C but necessarily of B. however. Either he will mistake the non-necessary for the necessary and believe the necessity of the conclusion without knowing it. might be raised as to why in dialectic. and therefore must clearly be obtained through a necessary middle term. may also not inhere. You can in fact infer the necessary even from a non-necessary premiss. then A is necessarily predicated of C. which by hypothesis it is not. it is impossible to prove its inherence as a necessary conclusion. or else he will not even believe it – in which case he will be equally ignorant. just as you can infer the true from the not true.When the conclusion is necessary. But when the conclusion is nonnecessary the middle cannot be necessary either. Thus. when the middle is necessary the conclusion must be necessary. and let B be a necessary predicate of C. Would not the result be the same if one asked any questions whatever and then merely stated one’s conclusion? The solution is that determinate questions have to be put. whether he actually infers the mere fact through middle terms or the reasoned fact and from immediate premisses. such and such determinate premisses should be proposed in order to deal with such and such determinate problems. A difficulty. Of accidents that are not essential according to our definition of essential there is no demonstrative knowledge. not because the replies to 236 . then: demonstrative knowledge must be knowledge of a necessary nexus. if A is necessarily predicated of B and B of C. On the other hand. otherwise its possessor will know neither the cause nor the fact that his conclusion is a necessary connexion.

one will not know it as essential nor know its reason). (2) the axioms. prove geometrical truths by arithmetic. (3) the subject – genus whose attributes. i. but because these answers are propositions which if the answerer affirm.e. Since it is just those attributes within every genus which are essential and possessed by their respective subjects as such that are necessary it is clear that both the conclusions and the premisses of demonstrations which produce scientific knowledge are essential. since accidents are not necessary one does not necessarily have reasoned knowledge of a conclusion drawn from them (this is so even if the accidental premisses are invariable but not essential. The axioms which are premisses of demonstration may be identical in two or more sciences: but in the case of two different genera such as arithmetic and 237 . further. for though the conclusion be actually essential. We may conclude that the middle must be consequentially connected with the minor. i. are revealed by the demonstration. 7 It follows that we cannot in demonstrating pass from one genus to another.them affirm facts which necessitate facts affirmed by the conclusion. he must affirm the conclusion and affirm it with truth if they are true. For there are three elements in demonstration: (1) what is proved. axioms which are premisses of demonstration. the conclusion – an attribute inhering essentially in a genus. for instance. but to have reasoned knowledge of a conclusion is to know it through its cause. essential properties. as in proofs through signs. For accidents are not necessary: and. We cannot.e. and the major with the middle.

the genus must be either absolutely or to some extent the same. Arithmetical demonstration and the other sciences likewise possess. their own genera. in virtue of the fundamental truths of their peculiar genus: it cannot show. That is why it cannot be proved by geometry that opposites fall under one science. Geometry again cannot prove of lines any property which they do not possess qua lines. as optical theorems to geometry or harmonic theorems to arithmetic). but through some property which it shares with other genera. Therefore no attribute can be demonstrated nor known by strictly scientific 238 .geometry you cannot apply arithmetical demonstration to the properties of magnitudes unless the magnitudes in question are numbers. as predicated. for these qualities do not belong to lines in virtue of their peculiar genus.g. for example. because the extreme and the middle terms must be drawn from the same genus: otherwise. 8 It is also clear that if the premisses from which the syllogism proceeds are commensurately universal. nor even that the product of two cubes is a cube. the conclusion of such i. transference is clearly impossible. in the unqualified sense – must also be eternal. that the straight line is the most beautiful of lines or the contrary of the circle. If this is not so. so that if the demonstration is to pass from one sphere to another. each of them. How in certain cases transference is possible I will explain later. i. unless these theorems are related as subordinate to superior (e. Nor can the theorem of any one science be demonstrated by means of another science. they will not be essential and will thus be accidents.e.e.

which the subject may share with another – and consequently they apply equally to subjects different in kind.g. or else only differs from a demonstration in the order of its terms. because the attribute’s connexion with its perishable subject is not commensurately universal but temporary and special. 9 It is clear that if the conclusion is to show an attribute inhering as such. therefore. not commensurately universal. clearly eternal: whereas so far as they are not eternal they are not fully commensurate. since a definition is either a primary premiss or a conclusion of a demonstration.knowledge to inhere in perishable things. Demonstration and science of merely frequent occurrences – e. as such. nothing can be demonstrated except from its ‘appropriate’ basic truths. because the predicate will be predicable of some instances of the subject and not of others). one premiss must be perishable and not commensurately universal (perishable because only if it is perishable will the conclusion be perishable. and immediate premisses does not constitute knowledge. of eclipse as happening to the moon – are. The proof can only be accidental. The same is true of definitions. for they operate by taking as their middle a common character – a character. so that the conclusion can only be that a fact is true at the moment – not commensurately and universally. not as belonging to its 239 . Consequently a proof even from true. Other subjects too have properties attaching to them in the same way as eclipse attaches to the moon. If such a demonstration is made. They therefore afford knowledge of an attribute only as inhering accidentally. indemonstrable. Such proofs are like Bryson’s method of squaring the circle.

This is so because he knows better whose knowledge is deduced from higher causes. which. even these apparent exceptions show that no attribute is strictly demonstrable except from its ‘appropriate’ basic truths. for basic truths from which they might be deduced would be basic truths of all that is. to which the attributes essentially belong. and the science to which they belonged would possess universal sovereignty.subject as such: otherwise they would not have been applicable to another genus. It is no less evident that the peculiar basic truths of each inhering attribute are indemonstrable. his knowledge would be science in a higher or the highest degree. The only exceptions to this rule are such cases as theorems in harmonics which are demonstrable by arithmetic.g. but with a qualification – the fact falls under a separate science (for the subject genus is separate). Such theorems are proved by the same middle terms as arithmetical properties. and as an inference from basic premisses essential and ‘appropriate’ to the subject – unless we know. if he knows better than others or best of all. the middle must belong to the same kind as the major and minor terms. as things are. Our knowledge of any attribute’s connexion with a subject is accidental unless we know that connexion through the middle term in virtue of which it inheres. but the reasoned fact concerns the superior science. however. But. with such exceptions as we have mentioned of 240 . and as inferred from basic premisses essential and ‘appropriate’ to that subject: so that if that middle term also belongs essentially to the minor. the property of possessing angles equal to two right angles as belonging to that subject in which it inheres essentially. Thus. in the case of these sciences have the requisite identity of character. demonstration is not transferable to another genus. for his knowledge is from prior premisses when it derives from causes themselves uncaused: hence. e.

But that is not so: the conclusion must be homogeneous with the basic facts of the science. Thus we assume the meaning alike of unity. for it is hard to be sure whether one’s knowledge is based on the basic truths appropriate to each attribute – the differentia of true knowledge. We think we have scientific knowledge if we have reasoned from true and primary premisses. straight. the definitions of line and straight. It is hard to be sure whether one knows or not. but common only in the sense of analogous. common truths are such as ‘take equals from equals and equals remain’. in the case of the remainder proof is required. As regards both these primary truths and the attributes dependent on them the meaning of the name is assumed. 10 I call the basic truths of every genus those clements in it the existence of which cannot be proved. The fact of their existence as regards the primary truths must be assumed. or of arithmetical demonstrations to those of harmonics.g. Peculiar truths are. and triangular. Only so much of these common truths is required as 241 . but it has to be proved of the remainder. the attributes. e. but while as regards unity and magnitude we assume also the fact of their existence. being of use only in so far as they fall within the genus constituting the province of the science in question.the application of geometrical demonstrations to theorems in mechanics or optics. and some are common. Of the basic truths used in the demonstrative sciences some are peculiar to each science.

and the basic premisses. in arithmetic units. but of their essential attributes only the meaning is assumed. the subject genus whose essential attributes it examines. (2) the so-called axioms. because all syllogism. we might not expressly posit the existence of the genus if its existence were obvious (for instance. Astronomy too proceeds in the same way. or we might omit to assume expressly the meaning of the attributes if it were well understood.g. geometry that of incommensurable. is addressed not to the spoken word. and therefore a fortiori demonstration. That which expresses necessary self-grounded fact. square and cube. is well known and so not expressly assumed. and the essential attributes of which it investigates. or by the arithmetician only to numbers.falls within the genus in question: for a truth of this kind will have the same force even if not used generally but applied by the geometer only to magnitudes. but to the 242 . the attributes. is distinct both from the hypotheses of a science and from illegitimate postulate – I say ‘must believe’. the existence of hot and cold is more evident than that of number). For example arithmetic assumes the meaning of odd and even. which are primary premisses of its demonstration. Also peculiar to a science are the subjects the existence as well as the meaning of which it assumes. Both the existence and the meaning of the subjects are assumed by these sciences. e. In the way the meaning of axioms.g. and which we must necessarily believe. (3) the attributes. in geometry points and lines. such as ‘Take equals from equals and equals remain’. For indeed every demonstrative science has three elements: (1) that which it posits. whereas the existence of these attributes is demonstrated by means of the axioms and from previous conclusions as premisses. the meaning of which it assumes. or of deflection or verging of lines. Yet some sciences may very well pass over some of these elements. e. Nevertheless in the nature of the case the essential elements of demonstration are three: the subject.

Therein lies the distinction between hypothesis and illegitimate postulate: the latter is the contrary of the pupil’s opinion. demonstrable. That which is capable of proof but assumed by the teacher without proof is. The definition – viz. Hypotheses. The truth is that the geometer does not draw any conclusion from the being of the particular line of which he speaks. Definitions require only to be understood. but from what his diagrams symbolize. A further distinction is that all hypotheses and illegitimate postulates are either universal or particular. Nor are the geometer’s hypotheses false. hypothesis. though only in a limited sense hypothesis – that is. if the pupil believes and accepts it. and though we can always raise objections to the spoken word. on the contrary. the same assumption is an illegitimate postulate. when it is actually neither. whereas a definition is neither. urging that one must not employ falsehood and that the geometer is uttering falsehood in stating that the line which he draws is a foot long or straight. relatively to the pupil. to the inward discourse we cannot always object. if the pupil has no opinion or a contrary opinion on the matter. postulate facts on the being of which depends the being of the fact inferred. but assumed and used without demonstration. 243 . those which are not expressed as statements that anything is or is not – are not hypotheses: but it is in the premisses of a science that its hypotheses are contained. as some have held. and this is not hypothesis – unless it be contended that the pupil’s hearing is also an hypothesis required by the teacher.discourse within the soul.

The reason is that the major term is predicable not only of the middle. and then not always universally. to which the man of science applies his demonstrations. The law that every predicate can be either truly affirmed or truly denied of every subject is posited by such demonstration as uses reductio ad impossibile. but of something other than the middle as well. the corresponding negative. and if the universal goes.11 So demonstration does not necessarily imply the being of Forms nor a One beside a Many. and the conclusion follows: for it will still be true to say that Callias – even if it be also true to say that not-Callias – is animal and not not-animal. or again to the minor term. I mean (as I have already explained). then. however. in which case the proof lays down as its major premiss that the major is truly affirmed of the middle but falsely denied. For grant a minor term of which it is true to predicate man – even if it be also true to predicate not-man of it – still grant simply that man is animal and not not-animal. the middle term goes witb. We conclude. that there must be a single identical term unequivocally predicable of a number of individuals. The law that it is impossible to affirm and deny simultaneously the same predicate of the same subject is not expressly posited by any demonstration except when the conclusion also has to be expressed in that form. but so far as it is requisite. so that the conclusion is not affected even if the middle is extended to cover the original middle term and also what is not the original middle term. that is. of the genus – the genus. In virtue 244 . if we add to the middle. It makes no difference. since without this possibility we cannot save the universal. being of wider application. within the limits. it. and so demonstration becomes impossible. but it does necessarily imply the possibility of truly predicating one of many.

of the common elements of demonstration – I mean the common axioms which are used as premisses of demonstration, not the subjects nor the attributes demonstrated as belonging to them – all the sciences have communion with one another, and in communion with them all is dialectic and any science which might attempt a universal proof of axioms such as the law of excluded middle, the law that the subtraction of equals from equals leaves equal remainders, or other axioms of the same kind. Dialectic has no definite sphere of this kind, not being confined to a single genus. Otherwise its method would not be interrogative; for the interrogative method is barred to the demonstrator, who cannot use the opposite facts to prove the same nexus. This was shown in my work on the syllogism.

12 If a syllogistic question is equivalent to a proposition embodying one of the two sides of a contradiction, and if each science has its peculiar propositions from which its peculiar conclusion is developed, then there is such a thing as a distinctively scientific question, and it is the interrogative form of the premisses from which the ‘appropriate’ conclusion of each science is developed. Hence it is clear that not every question will be relevant to geometry, nor to medicine, nor to any other science: only those questions will be geometrical which form premisses for the proof of the theorems of geometry or of any other science, such as optics, which uses the same basic truths as geometry. Of the other sciences the like is true. Of these questions the geometer is bound to give his account, using the basic truths of geometry in conjunction with his previous conclusions; of the basic truths the geometer, as

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such, is not bound to give any account. The like is true of the other sciences. There is a limit, then, to the questions which we may put to each man of science; nor is each man of science bound to answer all inquiries on each several subject, but only such as fall within the defined field of his own science. If, then, in controversy with a geometer qua geometer the disputant confines himself to geometry and proves anything from geometrical premisses, he is clearly to be applauded; if he goes outside these he will be at fault, and obviously cannot even refute the geometer except accidentally. One should therefore not discuss geometry among those who are not geometers, for in such a company an unsound argument will pass unnoticed. This is correspondingly true in the other sciences. Since there are ‘geometrical’ questions, does it follow that there are also distinctively ‘ungeometrical’ questions? Further, in each special science – geometry for instance – what kind of error is it that may vitiate questions, and yet not exclude them from that science? Again, is the erroneous conclusion one constructed from premisses opposite to the true premisses, or is it formal fallacy though drawn from geometrical premisses? Or, perhaps, the erroneous conclusion is due to the drawing of premisses from another science; e.g. in a geometrical controversy a musical question is distinctively ungeometrical, whereas the notion that parallels meet is in one sense geometrical, being ungeometrical in a different fashion: the reason being that ‘ungeometrical’, like ‘unrhythmical’, is equivocal, meaning in the one case not geometry at all, in the other bad geometry? It is this error, i.e. error based on premisses of this kind – ‘of’ the science but false – that is the contrary of science. In mathematics the formal fallacy is not so common, because it is the middle term in which the ambiguity lies, since the major is predicated of the whole of the middle and the middle of the whole of the minor (the predicate of course never has the prefix ‘all’); and in mathematics one can, so to speak, see these middle
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terms with an intellectual vision, while in dialectic the ambiguity may escape detection. E.g. ‘Is every circle a figure?’ A diagram shows that this is so, but the minor premiss ‘Are epics circles?’ is shown by the diagram to be false. If a proof has an inductive minor premiss, one should not bring an ‘objection’ against it. For since every premiss must be applicable to a number of cases (otherwise it will not be true in every instance, which, since the syllogism proceeds from universals, it must be), then assuredly the same is true of an ‘objection’; since premisses and ‘objections’ are so far the same that anything which can be validly advanced as an ‘objection’ must be such that it could take the form of a premiss, either demonstrative or dialectical. On the other hand, arguments formally illogical do sometimes occur through taking as middles mere attributes of the major and minor terms. An instance of this is Caeneus’ proof that fire increases in geometrical proportion: ‘Fire’, he argues, ‘increases rapidly, and so does geometrical proportion’. There is no syllogism so, but there is a syllogism if the most rapidly increasing proportion is geometrical and the most rapidly increasing proportion is attributable to fire in its motion. Sometimes, no doubt, it is impossible to reason from premisses predicating mere attributes: but sometimes it is possible, though the possibility is overlooked. If false premisses could never give true conclusions ‘resolution’ would be easy, for premisses and conclusion would in that case inevitably reciprocate. I might then argue thus: let A be an existing fact; let the existence of A imply such and such facts actually known to me to exist, which we may call B. I can now, since they reciprocate, infer A from B. Reciprocation of premisses and conclusion is more frequent in mathematics, because mathematics takes definitions, but never an accident, for its premisses – a second characteristic

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distinguishing disputations.

mathematical

reasoning

from

dialectical

A science expands not by the interposition of fresh middle terms, but by the apposition of fresh extreme terms. E.g. A is predicated of B, B of C, C of D, and so indefinitely. Or the expansion may be lateral: e.g. one major A, may be proved of two minors, C and E. Thus let A represent number – a number or number taken indeterminately; B determinate odd number; C any particular odd number. We can then predicate A of C. Next let D represent determinate even number, and E even number. Then A is predicable of E.

13 Knowledge of the fact differs from knowledge of the reasoned fact. To begin with, they differ within the same science and in two ways: (1) when the premisses of the syllogism are not immediate (for then the proximate cause is not contained in them – a necessary condition of knowledge of the reasoned fact): (2) when the premisses are immediate, but instead of the cause the better known of the two reciprocals is taken as the middle; for of two reciprocally predicable terms the one which is not the cause may quite easily be the better known and so become the middle term of the demonstration. Thus (2) (a) you might prove as follows that the planets are near because they do not twinkle: let C be the planets, B not twinkling, A proximity. Then B is predicable of C; for the planets do not twinkle. But A is also predicable of B, since that which does not twinkle is near – we must take this truth as having been reached by induction or sense-perception. Therefore A is a necessary predicate of C; so that we have demonstrated that the

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planets are near. This syllogism, then, proves not the reasoned fact but only the fact; since they are not near because they do not twinkle, but, because they are near, do not twinkle. The major and middle of the proof, however, may be reversed, and then the demonstration will be of the reasoned fact. Thus: let C be the planets, B proximity, A not twinkling. Then B is an attribute of C, and A – not twinkling – of B. Consequently A is predicable of C, and the syllogism proves the reasoned fact, since its middle term is the proximate cause. Another example is the inference that the moon is spherical from its manner of waxing. Thus: since that which so waxes is spherical, and since the moon so waxes, clearly the moon is spherical. Put in this form, the syllogism turns out to be proof of the fact, but if the middle and major be reversed it is proof of the reasoned fact; since the moon is not spherical because it waxes in a certain manner, but waxes in such a manner because it is spherical. (Let C be the moon, B spherical, and A waxing.) Again (b), in cases where the cause and the effect are not reciprocal and the effect is the better known, the fact is demonstrated but not the reasoned fact. This also occurs (1) when the middle falls outside the major and minor, for here too the strict cause is not given, and so the demonstration is of the fact, not of the reasoned fact. For example, the question ‘Why does not a wall breathe?’ might be answered, ‘Because it is not an animal’; but that answer would not give the strict cause, because if not being an animal causes the absence of respiration, then being an animal should be the cause of respiration, according to the rule that if the negation of causes the non-inherence of y, the affirmation of x causes the inherence of y; e.g. if the disproportion of the hot and cold elements is the cause of ill health, their proportion is the cause of health; and conversely, if the assertion of x causes the inherence of y, the negation of x must cause y’s noninherence. But in the case given this consequence does not result; for not every animal breathes. A syllogism with this kind

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of cause takes place in the second figure. Thus: let A be animal, B respiration, C wall. Then A is predicable of all B (for all that breathes is animal), but of no C; and consequently B is predicable of no C; that is, the wall does not breathe. Such causes are like far-fetched explanations, which precisely consist in making the cause too remote, as in Anacharsis’ account of why the Scythians have no flute-players; namely because they have no vines. Thus, then, do the syllogism of the fact and the syllogism of the reasoned fact differ within one science and according to the position of the middle terms. But there is another way too in which the fact and the reasoned fact differ, and that is when they are investigated respectively by different sciences. This occurs in the case of problems related to one another as subordinate and superior, as when optical problems are subordinated to geometry, mechanical problems to stereometry, harmonic problems to arithmetic, the data of observation to astronomy. (Some of these sciences bear almost the same name; e.g. mathematical and nautical astronomy, mathematical and acoustical harmonics.) Here it is the business of the empirical observers to know the fact, of the mathematicians to know the reasoned fact; for the latter are in possession of the demonstrations giving the causes, and are often ignorant of the fact: just as we have often a clear insight into a universal, but through lack of observation are ignorant of some of its particular instances. These connexions have a perceptible existence though they are manifestations of forms. For the mathematical sciences concern forms: they do not demonstrate properties of a substratum, since, even though the geometrical subjects are predicable as properties of a perceptible substratum, it is not as thus predicable that the mathematician demonstrates properties of them. As optics is related to geometry, so another science is related to optics, namely the theory of the rainbow. Here knowledge of the fact is within the
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province of the natural philosopher, knowledge of the reasoned fact within that of the optician, either qua optician or qua mathematical optician. Many sciences not standing in this mutual relation enter into it at points; e.g. medicine and geometry: it is the physician’s business to know that circular wounds heal more slowly, the geometer’s to know the reason why.

14 Of all the figures the most scientific is the first. Thus, it is the vehicle of the demonstrations of all the mathematical sciences, such as arithmetic, geometry, and optics, and practically all of all sciences that investigate causes: for the syllogism of the reasoned fact is either exclusively or generally speaking and in most cases in this figure – a second proof that this figure is the most scientific; for grasp of a reasoned conclusion is the primary condition of knowledge. Thirdly, the first is the only figure which enables us to pursue knowledge of the essence of a thing. In the second figure no affirmative conclusion is possible, and knowledge of a thing’s essence must be affirmative; while in the third figure the conclusion can be affirmative, but cannot be universal, and essence must have a universal character: e.g. man is not two-footed animal in any qualified sense, but universally. Finally, the first figure has no need of the others, while it is by means of the first that the other two figures are developed, and have their intervals closepacked until immediate premisses are reached. Clearly, therefore, the first figure is the primary condition of knowledge.

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15 Just as an attribute A may (as we saw) be atomically connected with a subject B, so its disconnexion may be atomic. I call ‘atomic’ connexions or disconnexions which involve no intermediate term; since in that case the connexion or disconnexion will not be mediated by something other than the terms themselves. It follows that if either A or B, or both A and B, have a genus, their disconnexion cannot be primary. Thus: let C be the genus of A. Then, if C is not the genus of B – for A may well have a genus which is not the genus of B – there will be a syllogism proving A’s disconnexion from B thus: all A is C, no B is C, therefore no B is A. Or if it is B which has a genus D, we have all B is D, no D is A, therefore no B is A, by syllogism; and the proof will be similar if both A and B have a genus. That the genus of A need not be the genus of B and vice versa, is shown by the existence of mutually exclusive coordinate series of predication. If no term in the series ACD... is predicable of any term in the series BEF..., and if G – a term in the former series – is the genus of A, clearly G will not be the genus of B; since, if it were, the series would not be mutually exclusive. So also if B has a genus, it will not be the genus of A. If, on the other hand, neither A nor B has a genus and A does not inhere in B, this

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disconnexion must be atomic. If there be a middle term, one or other of them is bound to have a genus, for the syllogism will be either in the first or the second figure. If it is in the first, B will have a genus – for the premiss containing it must be affirmative: if in the second, either A or B indifferently, since syllogism is possible if either is contained in a negative premiss, but not if both premisses are negative. Hence it is clear that one thing may be atomically disconnected from another, and we have stated when and how this is possible.

16 Ignorance – defined not as the negation of knowledge but as a positive state of mind – is error produced by inference. (1) Let us first consider propositions asserting a predicate’s immediate connexion with or disconnexion from a subject. Here, it is true, positive error may befall one in alternative ways; for it may arise where one directly believes a connexion or disconnexion as well as where one’s belief is acquired by inference. The error, however, that consists in a direct belief is without complication; but the error resulting from inference – which here concerns us – takes many forms. Thus, let A be atomically disconnected from all B: then the conclusion inferred through a middle term C, that all B is A, will be a case of error produced by syllogism. Now, two cases are possible. Either (a) both premisses, or (b) one premiss only, may be false. (a) If neither A is an attribute of any C nor C of any B, whereas the contrary was posited in both cases, both premisses will be false. (C may quite well be so related to A and B that C is neither subordinate to A nor a universal attribute of B: for B, since A was
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said to be primarily disconnected from B, cannot have a genus, and A need not necessarily be a universal attribute of all things. Consequently both premisses may be false.) On the other hand, (b) one of the premisses may be true, though not either indifferently but only the major A-C since, B having no genus, the premiss C-B will always be false, while A-C may be true. This is the case if, for example, A is related atomically to both C and B; because when the same term is related atomically to more terms than one, neither of those terms will belong to the other. It is, of course, equally the case if A-C is not atomic. Error of attribution, then, occurs through these causes and in this form only – for we found that no syllogism of universal attribution was possible in any figure but the first. On the other hand, an error of non-attribution may occur either in the first or in the second figure. Let us therefore first explain the various forms it takes in the first figure and the character of the premisses in each case. (c) It may occur when both premisses are false; e.g. supposing A atomically connected with both C and B, if it be then assumed that no C is and all B is C, both premisses are false. (d) It is also possible when one is false. This may be either premiss indifferently. A-C may be true, C-B false – A-C true because A is not an attribute of all things, C-B false because C, which never has the attribute A, cannot be an attribute of B; for if C-B were true, the premiss A-C would no longer be true, and besides if both premisses were true, the conclusion would be true. Or again, C-B may be true and A-C false; e.g. if both C and A contain B as genera, one of them must be subordinate to the other, so that if the premiss takes the form No C is A, it will be false. This makes it clear that whether either or both premisses are false, the conclusion will equally be false.

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In the second figure the premisses cannot both be wholly false; for if all B is A, no middle term can be with truth universally affirmed of one extreme and universally denied of the other: but premisses in which the middle is affirmed of one extreme and denied of the other are the necessary condition if one is to get a valid inference at all. Therefore if, taken in this way, they are wholly false, their contraries conversely should be wholly true. But this is impossible. On the other hand, there is nothing to prevent both premisses being partially false; e.g. if actually some A is C and some B is C, then if it is premised that all A is C and no B is C, both premisses are false, yet partially, not wholly, false. The same is true if the major is made negative instead of the minor. Or one premiss may be wholly false, and it may be either of them. Thus, supposing that actually an attribute of all A must also be an attribute of all B, then if C is yet taken to be a universal attribute of all but universally non-attributable to B, CA will be true but C-B false. Again, actually that which is an attribute of no B will not be an attribute of all A either; for if it be an attribute of all A, it will also be an attribute of all B, which is contrary to supposition; but if C be nevertheless assumed to be a universal attribute of A, but an attribute of no B, then the premiss C-B is true but the major is false. The case is similar if the major is made the negative premiss. For in fact what is an attribute of no A will not be an attribute of any B either; and if it be yet assumed that C is universally non-attributable to A, but a universal attribute of B, the premiss C-A is true but the minor wholly false. Again, in fact it is false to assume that that which is an attribute of all B is an attribute of no A, for if it be an attribute of all B, it must be an attribute of some A. If then C is nevertheless assumed to be an attribute of all B but of no A, C-B will be true but C-A false. It is thus clear that in the case of atomic propositions erroneous inference will be possible not only when both premisses are false but also when only one is false.
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17 In the case of attributes not atomically connected with or disconnected from their subjects, (a) (i) as long as the false conclusion is inferred through the ‘appropriate’ middle, only the major and not both premisses can be false. By ‘appropriate middle’ I mean the middle term through which the contradictory – i.e. the true-conclusion is inferrible. Thus, let A be attributable to B through a middle term C: then, since to produce a conclusion the premiss C-B must be taken affirmatively, it is clear that this premiss must always be true, for its quality is not changed. But the major A-C is false, for it is by a change in the quality of A-C that the conclusion becomes its contradictory – i.e. true. Similarly (ii) if the middle is taken from another series of predication; e.g. suppose D to be not only contained within A as a part within its whole but also predicable of all B. Then the premiss D-B must remain unchanged, but the quality of A-D must be changed; so that D-B is always true, A-D always false. Such error is practically identical with that which is inferred through the ‘appropriate’ middle. On the other hand, (b) if the conclusion is not inferred through the ‘appropriate’ middle – (i) when the middle is subordinate to A but is predicable of no B, both premisses must be false, because if there is to be a conclusion both must be posited as asserting the contrary of what is actually the fact, and so posited both become false: e.g. suppose that actually all D is A but no B is D; then if these premisses are changed in quality, a conclusion will follow and both of the new premisses will be false. When, however, (ii) the middle D is not subordinate to A, A-D will be true, D-B false – A-D true because A was not subordinate to D, D-B false because if it had been true, the

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conclusion too would have been true; but it is ex hypothesi false. When the erroneous inference is in the second figure, both premisses cannot be entirely false; since if B is subordinate to A, there can be no middle predicable of all of one extreme and of none of the other, as was stated before. One premiss, however, may be false, and it may be either of them. Thus, if C is actually an attribute of both A and B, but is assumed to be an attribute of A only and not of B, C-A will be true, C-B false: or again if C be assumed to be attributable to B but to no A, C-B will be true, C-A false. We have stated when and through what kinds of premisses error will result in cases where the erroneous conclusion is negative. If the conclusion is affirmative, (a) (i) it may be inferred through the ‘appropriate’ middle term. In this case both premisses cannot be false since, as we said before, C-B must remain unchanged if there is to be a conclusion, and consequently A-C, the quality of which is changed, will always be false. This is equally true if (ii) the middle is taken from another series of predication, as was stated to be the case also with regard to negative error; for D-B must remain unchanged, while the quality of A-D must be converted, and the type of error is the same as before. (b) The middle may be inappropriate. Then (i) if D is subordinate to A, A-D will be true, but D-B false; since A may quite well be predicable of several terms no one of which can be subordinated to another. If, however, (ii) D is not subordinate to A, obviously A-D, since it is affirmed, will always be false, while D-B may be either true or false; for A may very well be an attribute of no D, whereas all B is D, e.g. no science is animal, all music is science. Equally well A may be an attribute of no D, and D of no B. It emerges, then, that if the middle term is not

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subordinate to the major, not only both premisses but either singly may be false. Thus we have made it clear how many varieties of erroneous inference are liable to happen and through what kinds of premisses they occur, in the case both of immediate and of demonstrable truths.

18 It is also clear that the loss of any one of the senses entails the loss of a corresponding portion of knowledge, and that, since we learn either by induction or by demonstration, this knowledge cannot be acquired. Thus demonstration develops from universals, induction from particulars; but since it is possible to familiarize the pupil with even the so-called mathematical abstractions only through induction – i.e. only because each subject genus possesses, in virtue of a determinate mathematical character, certain properties which can be treated as separate even though they do not exist in isolation – it is consequently impossible to come to grasp universals except through induction. But induction is impossible for those who have not sense-perception. For it is sense-perception alone which is adequate for grasping the particulars: they cannot be objects of scientific knowledge, because neither can universals give us knowledge of them without induction, nor can we get it through induction without sense-perception.

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19 Every syllogism is effected by means of three terms. One kind of syllogism serves to prove that A inheres in C by showing that A inheres in B and B in C; the other is negative and one of its premisses asserts one term of another, while the other denies one term of another. It is clear, then, that these are the fundamentals and so-called hypotheses of syllogism. Assume them as they have been stated, and proof is bound to follow – proof that A inheres in C through B, and again that A inheres in B through some other middle term, and similarly that B inheres in C. If our reasoning aims at gaining credence and so is merely dialectical, it is obvious that we have only to see that our inference is based on premisses as credible as possible: so that if a middle term between A and B is credible though not real, one can reason through it and complete a dialectical syllogism. If, however, one is aiming at truth, one must be guided by the real connexions of subjects and attributes. Thus: since there are attributes which are predicated of a subject essentially or naturally and not coincidentally – not, that is, in the sense in which we say ‘That white (thing) is a man’, which is not the same mode of predication as when we say ‘The man is white’: the man is white not because he is something else but because he is man, but the white is man because ‘being white’ coincides with ‘humanity’ within one substratum – therefore there are terms such as are naturally subjects of predicates. Suppose, then, C such a term not itself attributable to anything else as to a subject, but the proximate subject of the attribute B – i.e. so that B-C is immediate; suppose further E related immediately to F, and F to B. The first question is, must this series terminate, or can it proceed to infinity? The second question is as follows: Suppose nothing is essentially predicated of A, but A is predicated primarily of H and of no intermediate prior term, and suppose H similarly related to G and G to B; then must this series also terminate, or can it too proceed to infinity? There is
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this much difference between the questions: the first is, is it possible to start from that which is not itself attributable to anything else but is the subject of attributes, and ascend to infinity? The second is the problem whether one can start from that which is a predicate but not itself a subject of predicates, and descend to infinity? A third question is, if the extreme terms are fixed, can there be an infinity of middles? I mean this: suppose for example that A inheres in C and B is intermediate between them, but between B and A there are other middles, and between these again fresh middles; can these proceed to infinity or can they not? This is the equivalent of inquiring, do demonstrations proceed to infinity, i.e. is everything demonstrable? Or do ultimate subject and primary attribute limit one another? I hold that the same questions arise with regard to negative conclusions and premisses: viz. if A is attributable to no B, then either this predication will be primary, or there will be an intermediate term prior to B to which a is not attributable – G, let us say, which is attributable to all B – and there may still be another term H prior to G, which is attributable to all G. The same questions arise, I say, because in these cases too either the series of prior terms to which a is not attributable is infinite or it terminates. One cannot ask the same questions in the case of reciprocating terms, since when subject and predicate are convertible there is neither primary nor ultimate subject, seeing that all the reciprocals qua subjects stand in the same relation to one another, whether we say that the subject has an infinity of attributes or that both subjects and attributes – and we raised the question in both cases – are infinite in number. These questions then cannot be asked – unless, indeed, the terms can reciprocate by two different modes, by accidental predication in one relation and natural predication in the other.

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20 Now, it is clear that if the predications terminate in both the upward and the downward direction (by ‘upward’ I mean the ascent to the more universal, by ‘downward’ the descent to the more particular), the middle terms cannot be infinite in number. For suppose that A is predicated of F, and that the intermediates – call them B B’ B”... – are infinite, then clearly you might descend from and find one term predicated of another ad infinitum, since you have an infinity of terms between you and F; and equally, if you ascend from F, there are infinite terms between you and A. It follows that if these processes are impossible there cannot be an infinity of intermediates between A and F. Nor is it of any effect to urge that some terms of the series AB...F are contiguous so as to exclude intermediates, while others cannot be taken into the argument at all: whichever terms of the series B...I take, the number of intermediates in the direction either of A or of F must be finite or infinite: where the infinite series starts, whether from the first term or from a later one, is of no moment, for the succeeding terms in any case are infinite in number.

21 Further, if in affirmative demonstration the series terminates in both directions, clearly it will terminate too in negative demonstration. Let us assume that we cannot proceed to infinity either by ascending from the ultimate term (by ‘ultimate term’ I mean a term such as was, not itself attributable to a

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subject but itself the subject of attributes), or by descending towards an ultimate from the primary term (by ‘primary term’ I mean a term predicable of a subject but not itself a subject). If this assumption is justified, the series will also terminate in the case of negation. For a negative conclusion can be proved in all three figures. In the first figure it is proved thus: no B is A, all C is B. In packing the interval B-C we must reach immediate propositions – as is always the case with the minor premiss – since B-C is affirmative. As regards the other premiss it is plain that if the major term is denied of a term D prior to B, D will have to be predicable of all B, and if the major is denied of yet another term prior to D, this term must be predicable of all D. Consequently, since the ascending series is finite, the descent will also terminate and there will be a subject of which A is primarily non-predicable. In the second figure the syllogism is, all A is B, no C is B,..no C is A. If proof of this is required, plainly it may be shown either in the first figure as above, in the second as here, or in the third. The first figure has been discussed, and we will proceed to display the second, proof by which will be as follows: all B is D, no C is D..., since it is required that B should be a subject of which a predicate is affirmed. Next, since D is to be proved not to belong to C, then D has a further predicate which is denied of C. Therefore, since the succession of predicates affirmed of an ever higher universal terminates, the succession of predicates denied terminates too. The third figure shows it as follows: all B is A, some B is not C. Therefore some A is not C. This premiss, i.e. C-B, will be proved either in the same figure or in one of the two figures discussed above. In the first and second figures the series terminates. If we use the third figure, we shall take as premisses, all E is B, some E is not C, and this premiss again will be proved by a similar prosyllogism. But since it is assumed that the series of descending subjects also terminates, plainly the series of more universal non-predicables will terminate also. Even supposing
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that the proof is not confined to one method, but employs them all and is now in the first figure, now in the second or third – even so the regress will terminate, for the methods are finite in number, and if finite things are combined in a finite number of ways, the result must be finite. Thus it is plain that the regress of middles terminates in the case of negative demonstration, if it does so also in the case of affirmative demonstration. That in fact the regress terminates in both these cases may be made clear by the following dialectical considerations.

22 In the case of predicates constituting the essential nature of a thing, it clearly terminates, seeing that if definition is possible, or in other words, if essential form is knowable, and an infinite series cannot be traversed, predicates constituting a thing’s essential nature must be finite in number. But as regards predicates generally we have the following prefatory remarks to make. (1) We can affirm without falsehood ‘the white (thing) is walking’, and that big (thing) is a log’; or again, ‘the log is big’, and ‘the man walks’. But the affirmation differs in the two cases. When I affirm ‘the white is a log’, I mean that something which happens to be white is a log – not that white is the substratum in which log inheres, for it was not qua white or qua a species of white that the white (thing) came to be a log, and the white (thing) is consequently not a log except incidentally. On the other hand, when I affirm ‘the log is white’, I do not mean that something else, which happens also to be a log, is white (as I should if I said ‘the musician is white,’ which would mean ‘the man who happens also to be a musician is white’); on

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the contrary, log is here the substratum – the substratum which actually came to be white, and did so qua wood or qua a species of wood and qua nothing else. If we must lay down a rule, let us entitle the latter kind of statement predication, and the former not predication at all, or not strict but accidental predication. ‘White’ and ‘log’ will thus serve as types respectively of predicate and subject. We shall assume, then, that the predicate is invariably predicated strictly and not accidentally of the subject, for on such predication demonstrations depend for their force. It follows from this that when a single attribute is predicated of a single subject, the predicate must affirm of the subject either some element constituting its essential nature, or that it is in some way qualified, quantified, essentially related, active, passive, placed, or dated. (2) Predicates which signify substance signify that the subject is identical with the predicate or with a species of the predicate. Predicates not signifying substance which are predicated of a subject not identical with themselves or with a species of themselves are accidental or coincidental; e.g. white is a coincident of man, seeing that man is not identical with white or a species of white, but rather with animal, since man is identical with a species of animal. These predicates which do not signify substance must be predicates of some other subject, and nothing can be white which is not also other than white. The Forms we can dispense with, for they are mere sound without sense; and even if there are such things, they are not relevant to our discussion, since demonstrations are concerned with predicates such as we have defined. (3) If A is a quality of B, B cannot be a quality of A – a quality of a quality. Therefore A and B cannot be predicated reciprocally of one another in strict predication: they can be affirmed without

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falsehood of one another, but not genuinely predicated of each other. For one alternative is that they should be substantially predicated of one another, i.e. B would become the genus or differentia of A – the predicate now become subject. But it has been shown that in these substantial predications neither the ascending predicates nor the descending subjects form an infinite series; e.g. neither the series, man is biped, biped is animal, &c., nor the series predicating animal of man, man of Callias, Callias of a further. subject as an element of its essential nature, is infinite. For all such substance is definable, and an infinite series cannot be traversed in thought: consequently neither the ascent nor the descent is infinite, since a substance whose predicates were infinite would not be definable. Hence they will not be predicated each as the genus of the other; for this would equate a genus with one of its own species. Nor (the other alternative) can a quale be reciprocally predicated of a quale, nor any term belonging to an adjectival category of another such term, except by accidental predication; for all such predicates are coincidents and are predicated of substances. On the other hand – in proof of the impossibility of an infinite ascending series – every predication displays the subject as somehow qualified or quantified or as characterized under one of the other adjectival categories, or else is an element in its substantial nature: these latter are limited in number, and the number of the widest kinds under which predications fall is also limited, for every predication must exhibit its subject as somehow qualified, quantified, essentially related, acting or suffering, or in some place or at some time. I assume first that predication implies a single subject and a single attribute, and secondly that predicates which are not substantial are not predicated of one another. We assume this because such predicates are all coincidents, and though some are essential coincidents, others of a different type, yet we maintain that all of them alike are predicated of some
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substratum and that a coincident is never a substratum – since we do not class as a coincident anything which does not owe its designation to its being something other than itself, but always hold that any coincident is predicated of some substratum other than itself, and that another group of coincidents may have a different substratum. Subject to these assumptions then, neither the ascending nor the descending series of predication in which a single attribute is predicated of a single subject is infinite. For the subjects of which coincidents are predicated are as many as the constitutive elements of each individual substance, and these we have seen are not infinite in number, while in the ascending series are contained those constitutive elements with their coincidents – both of which are finite. We conclude that there is a given subject (D) of which some attribute (C) is primarily predicable; that there must be an attribute (B) primarily predicable of the first attribute, and that the series must end with a term (A) not predicable of any term prior to the last subject of which it was predicated (B), and of which no term prior to it is predicable. The argument we have given is one of the so-called proofs; an alternative proof follows. Predicates so related to their subjects that there are other predicates prior to them predicable of those subjects are demonstrable; but of demonstrable propositions one cannot have something better than knowledge, nor can one know them without demonstration. Secondly, if a consequent is only known through an antecedent (viz. premisses prior to it) and we neither know this antecedent nor have something better than knowledge of it, then we shall not have scientific knowledge of the consequent. Therefore, if it is possible through demonstration to know anything without qualification and not merely as dependent on the acceptance of certain premisses – i.e. hypothetically – the series of intermediate predications must terminate. If it does not terminate, and beyond any predicate taken as higher than another there remains another still higher,
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then every predicate is demonstrable. Consequently, since these demonstrable predicates are infinite in number and therefore cannot be traversed, we shall not know them by demonstration. If, therefore, we have not something better than knowledge of them, we cannot through demonstration have unqualified but only hypothetical science of anything. As dialectical proofs of our contention these may carry conviction, but an analytic process will show more briefly that neither the ascent nor the descent of predication can be infinite in the demonstrative sciences which are the object of our investigation. Demonstration proves the inherence of essential attributes in things. Now attributes may be essential for two reasons: either because they are elements in the essential nature of their subjects, or because their subjects are elements in their essential nature. An example of the latter is odd as an attribute of number – though it is number’s attribute, yet number itself is an element in the definition of odd; of the former, multiplicity or the indivisible, which are elements in the definition of number. In neither kind of attribution can the terms be infinite. They are not infinite where each is related to the term below it as odd is to number, for this would mean the inherence in odd of another attribute of odd in whose nature odd was an essential element: but then number will be an ultimate subject of the whole infinite chain of attributes, and be an element in the definition of each of them. Hence, since an infinity of attributes such as contain their subject in their definition cannot inhere in a single thing, the ascending series is equally finite. Note, moreover, that all such attributes must so inhere in the ultimate subject – e.g. its attributes in number and number in them – as to be commensurate with the subject and not of wider extent. Attributes which are essential elements in the nature of their subjects are equally finite: otherwise definition would be impossible. Hence, if all the attributes predicated are essential and these cannot be infinite, the
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ascending series will descending series too.

terminate,

and

consequently

the

If this is so, it follows that the intermediates between any two terms are also always limited in number. An immediately obvious consequence of this is that demonstrations necessarily involve basic truths, and that the contention of some – referred to at the outset – that all truths are demonstrable is mistaken. For if there are basic truths, (a) not all truths are demonstrable, and (b) an infinite regress is impossible; since if either (a) or (b) were not a fact, it would mean that no interval was immediate and indivisible, but that all intervals were divisible. This is true because a conclusion is demonstrated by the interposition, not the apposition, of a fresh term. If such interposition could continue to infinity there might be an infinite number of terms between any two terms; but this is impossible if both the ascending and descending series of predication terminate; and of this fact, which before was shown dialectically, analytic proof has now been given.

23 It is an evident corollary of these conclusions that if the same attribute A inheres in two terms C and D predicable either not at all, or not of all instances, of one another, it does not always belong to them in virtue of a common middle term. Isosceles and scalene possess the attribute of having their angles equal to two right angles in virtue of a common middle; for they possess it in so far as they are both a certain kind of figure, and not in so far as they differ from one another. But this is not always the case: for, were it so, if we take B as the common middle in virtue of which A inheres in C and D, clearly B would inhere in C and D

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through a second common middle, and this in turn would inhere in C and D through a third, so that between two terms an infinity of intermediates would fall – an impossibility. Thus it need not always be in virtue of a common middle term that a single attribute inheres in several subjects, since there must be immediate intervals. Yet if the attribute to be proved common to two subjects is to be one of their essential attributes, the middle terms involved must be within one subject genus and be derived from the same group of immediate premisses; for we have seen that processes of proof cannot pass from one genus to another. It is also clear that when A inheres in B, this can be demonstrated if there is a middle term. Further, the ‘elements’ of such a conclusion are the premisses containing the middle in question, and they are identical in number with the middle terms, seeing that the immediate propositions – or at least such immediate propositions as are universal – are the ‘elements’. If, on the other hand, there is no middle term, demonstration ceases to be possible: we are on the way to the basic truths. Similarly if A does not inhere in B, this can be demonstrated if there is a middle term or a term prior to B in which A does not inhere: otherwise there is no demonstration and a basic truth is reached. There are, moreover, as many ‘elements’ of the demonstrated conclusion as there are middle terms, since it is propositions containing these middle terms that are the basic premisses on which the demonstration rests; and as there are some indemonstrable basic truths asserting that ‘this is that’ or that ‘this inheres in that’, so there are others denying that ‘this is that’ or that ‘this inheres in that’ – in fact some basic truths will affirm and some will deny being. When we are to prove a conclusion, we must take a primary essential predicate – suppose it C – of the subject B, and then suppose A similarly predicable of C. If we proceed in this

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manner, no proposition or attribute which falls beyond A is admitted in the proof: the interval is constantly condensed until subject and predicate become indivisible, i.e. one. We have our unit when the premiss becomes immediate, since the immediate premiss alone is a single premiss in the unqualified sense of ‘single’. And as in other spheres the basic element is simple but not identical in all – in a system of weight it is the mina, in music the quarter-tone, and so on – so in syllogism the unit is an immediate premiss, and in the knowledge that demonstration gives it is an intuition. In syllogisms, then, which prove the inherence of an attribute, nothing falls outside the major term. In the case of negative syllogisms on the other hand, (1) in the first figure nothing falls outside the major term whose inherence is in question; e.g. to prove through a middle C that A does not inhere in B the premisses required are, all B is C, no C is A. Then if it has to be proved that no C is A, a middle must be found between and C; and this procedure will never vary. (2) If we have to show that E is not D by means of the premisses, all D is C; no E, or not all E, is C; then the middle will never fall beyond E, and E is the subject of which D is to be denied in the conclusion. (3) In the third figure the middle will never fall beyond the limits of the subject and the attribute denied of it.

24 Since demonstrations may be either commensurately universal or particular, and either affirmative or negative; the question arises, which form is the better? And the same question may be put in regard to so-called ‘direct’ demonstration and reductio ad
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impossibile. Let us first examine the commensurately universal and the particular forms, and when we have cleared up this problem proceed to discuss ‘direct’ demonstration and reductio ad impossibile. The following considerations might lead some minds to prefer particular demonstration. (1) The superior demonstration is the demonstration which gives us greater knowledge (for this is the ideal of demonstration), and we have greater knowledge of a particular individual when we know it in itself than when we know it through something else; e.g. we know Coriscus the musician better when we know that Coriscus is musical than when we know only that man is musical, and a like argument holds in all other cases. But commensurately universal demonstration, instead of proving that the subject itself actually is x, proves only that something else is x – e.g. in attempting to prove that isosceles is x, it proves not that isosceles but only that triangle is x – whereas particular demonstration proves that the subject itself is x. The demonstration, then, that a subject, as such, possesses an attribute is superior. If this is so, and if the particular rather than the commensurately universal forms demonstrates, particular demonstration is superior. (2) The universal has not a separate being over against groups of singulars. Demonstration nevertheless creates the opinion that its function is conditioned by something like this – some separate entity belonging to the real world; that, for instance, of triangle or of figure or number, over against particular triangles, figures, and numbers. But demonstration which touches the real and will not mislead is superior to that which moves among unrealities and is delusory. Now commensurately universal demonstration is of the latter kind: if we engage in it we find ourselves reasoning after a fashion well illustrated by

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the argument that the proportionate is what answers to the definition of some entity which is neither line, number, solid, nor plane, but a proportionate apart from all these. Since, then, such a proof is characteristically commensurate and universal, and less touches reality than does particular demonstration, and creates a false opinion, it will follow that commensurate and universal is inferior to particular demonstration. We may retort thus. (1) The first argument applies no more to commensurate and universal than to particular demonstration. If equality to two right angles is attributable to its subject not qua isosceles but qua triangle, he who knows that isosceles possesses that attribute knows the subject as qua itself possessing the attribute, to a less degree than he who knows that triangle has that attribute. To sum up the whole matter: if a subject is proved to possess qua triangle an attribute which it does not in fact possess qua triangle, that is not demonstration: but if it does possess it qua triangle the rule applies that the greater knowledge is his who knows the subject as possessing its attribute qua that in virtue of which it actually does possess it. Since, then, triangle is the wider term, and there is one identical definition of triangle – i.e. the term is not equivocal – and since equality to two right angles belongs to all triangles, it is isosceles qua triangle and not triangle qua isosceles which has its angles so related. It follows that he who knows a connexion universally has greater knowledge of it as it in fact is than he who knows the particular; and the inference is that commensurate and universal is superior to particular demonstration. (2) If there is a single identical definition i.e. if the commensurate universal is unequivocal – then the universal will possess being not less but more than some of the particulars, inasmuch as it is universals which comprise the imperishable, particulars that tend to perish.

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(3) Because the universal has a single meaning, we are not therefore compelled to suppose that in these examples it has being as a substance apart from its particulars – any more than we need make a similar supposition in the other cases of unequivocal universal predication, viz. where the predicate signifies not substance but quality, essential relatedness, or action. If such a supposition is entertained, the blame rests not with the demonstration but with the hearer. (4) Demonstration is syllogism that proves the cause, i.e. the reasoned fact, and it is rather the commensurate universal than the particular which is causative (as may be shown thus: that which possesses an attribute through its own essential nature is itself the cause of the inherence, and the commensurate universal is primary; hence the commensurate universal is the cause). Consequently commensurately universal demonstration is superior as more especially proving the cause, that is the reasoned fact. (5) Our search for the reason ceases, and we think that we know, when the coming to be or existence of the fact before us is not due to the coming to be or existence of some other fact, for the last step of a search thus conducted is eo ipso the end and limit of the problem. Thus: ‘Why did he come?’ ‘To get the money – wherewith to pay a debt – that he might thereby do what was right.’ When in this regress we can no longer find an efficient or final cause, we regard the last step of it as the end of the coming – or being or coming to be – and we regard ourselves as then only having full knowledge of the reason why he came. If, then, all causes and reasons are alike in this respect, and if this is the means to full knowledge in the case of final causes such as we have exemplified, it follows that in the case of the other causes also full knowledge is attained when an attribute no longer inheres because of something else. Thus, when we

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learn that exterior angles are equal to four right angles because they are the exterior angles of an isosceles, there still remains the question ‘Why has isosceles this attribute?’ and its answer ‘Because it is a triangle, and a triangle has it because a triangle is a rectilinear figure.’ If rectilinear figure possesses the property for no further reason, at this point we have full knowledge – but at this point our knowledge has become commensurately universal, and so we conclude that commensurately universal demonstration is superior. (6) The more demonstration becomes particular the more it sinks into an indeterminate manifold, while universal demonstration tends to the simple and determinate. But objects so far as they are an indeterminate manifold are unintelligible, so far as they are determinate, intelligible: they are therefore intelligible rather in so far as they are universal than in so far as they are particular. From this it follows that universals are more demonstrable: but since relative and correlative increase concomitantly, of the more demonstrable there will be fuller demonstration. Hence the commensurate and universal form, being more truly demonstration, is the superior. (7) Demonstration which teaches two things is preferable to demonstration which teaches only one. He who possesses commensurately universal demonstration knows the particular as well, but he who possesses particular demonstration does not know the universal. So that this is an additional reason for preferring commensurately universal demonstration. And there is yet this further argument: (8) Proof becomes more and more proof of the commensurate universal as its middle term approaches nearer to the basic truth, and nothing is so near as the immediate premiss which is itself the basic truth. If, then, proof from the basic truth is more accurate than proof not so derived, demonstration which

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depends more closely on it is more accurate than demonstration which is less closely dependent. But commensurately universal demonstration is characterized by this closer dependence, and is therefore superior. Thus, if A had to be proved to inhere in D, and the middles were B and C, B being the higher term would render the demonstration which it mediated the more universal. Some of these arguments, however, are dialectical. The clearest indication of the precedence of commensurately universal demonstration is as follows: if of two propositions, a prior and a posterior, we have a grasp of the prior, we have a kind of knowledge – a potential grasp – of the posterior as well. For example, if one knows that the angles of all triangles are equal to two right angles, one knows in a sense – potentially – that the isosceles’ angles also are equal to two right angles, even if one does not know that the isosceles is a triangle; but to grasp this posterior proposition is by no means to know the commensurate universal either potentially or actually. Moreover, commensurately universal demonstration is through and through intelligible; particular demonstration issues in sense-perception.

25 The preceding arguments constitute our defence of the superiority of commensurately universal to particular demonstration. That affirmative demonstration excels negative may be shown as follows. (1) We may assume the superiority ceteris paribus of the demonstration which derives from fewer postulates or hypotheses – in short from fewer premisses; for, given that all
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these are equally well known, where they are fewer knowledge will be more speedily acquired, and that is a desideratum. The argument implied in our contention that demonstration from fewer assumptions is superior may be set out in universal form as follows. Assuming that in both cases alike the middle terms are known, and that middles which are prior are better known than such as are posterior, we may suppose two demonstrations of the inherence of A in E, the one proving it through the middles B, C and D, the other through F and G. Then A-D is known to the same degree as A-E (in the second proof), but A-D is better known than and prior to A-E (in the first proof); since A-E is proved through A-D, and the ground is more certain than the conclusion. Hence demonstration by fewer premisses is ceteris paribus superior. Now both affirmative and negative demonstration operate through three terms and two premisses, but whereas the former assumes only that something is, the latter assumes both that something is and that something else is not, and thus operating through more kinds of premiss is inferior. (2) It has been proved that no conclusion follows if both premisses are negative, but that one must be negative, the other affirmative. So we are compelled to lay down the following additional rule: as the demonstration expands, the affirmative premisses must increase in number, but there cannot be more than one negative premiss in each complete proof. Thus, suppose no B is A, and all C is B. Then if both the premisses are to be again expanded, a middle must be interposed. Let us interpose D between A and B, and E between B and C. Then clearly E is affirmatively related to B and C, while D is affirmatively related to B but negatively to A; for all B is D, but there must be no D which is A. Thus there proves to be a single negative premiss, A-D. In the further prosyllogisms too it is the same, because in the terms of an affirmative syllogism the

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middle is always related affirmatively to both extremes; in a negative syllogism it must be negatively related only to one of them, and so this negation comes to be a single negative premiss, the other premisses being affirmative. If, then, that through which a truth is proved is a better known and more certain truth, and if the negative proposition is proved through the affirmative and not vice versa, affirmative demonstration, being prior and better known and more certain, will be superior. (3) The basic truth of demonstrative syllogism is the universal immediate premiss, and the universal premiss asserts in affirmative demonstration and in negative denies: and the affirmative proposition is prior to and better known than the negative (since affirmation explains denial and is prior to denial, just as being is prior to not-being). It follows that the basic premiss of affirmative demonstration is superior to that of negative demonstration, and the demonstration which uses superior basic premisses is superior. (4) Affirmative demonstration is more of the nature of a basic form of proof, because it is a sine qua non of negative demonstration.

26 Since affirmative demonstration is superior to negative, it is clearly superior also to reductio ad impossibile. We must first make certain what is the difference between negative demonstration and reductio ad impossibile. Let us suppose that no B is A, and that all C is B: the conclusion necessarily follows that no C is A. If these premisses are assumed, therefore, the negative demonstration that no C is A is direct. Reductio ad impossibile, on the other hand, proceeds as follows. Supposing
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we are to prove that does not inhere in B, we have to assume that it does inhere, and further that B inheres in C, with the resulting inference that A inheres in C. This we have to suppose a known and admitted impossibility; and we then infer that A cannot inhere in B. Thus if the inherence of B in C is not questioned, A’s inherence in B is impossible. The order of the terms is the same in both proofs: they differ according to which of the negative propositions is the better known, the one denying A of B or the one denying A of C. When the falsity of the conclusion is the better known, we use reductio ad impossible; when the major premiss of the syllogism is the more obvious, we use direct demonstration. All the same the proposition denying A of B is, in the order of being, prior to that denying A of C; for premisses are prior to the conclusion which follows from them, and ‘no C is A’ is the conclusion, ‘no B is A’ one of its premisses. For the destructive result of reductio ad impossibile is not a proper conclusion, nor are its antecedents proper premisses. On the contrary: the constituents of syllogism are premisses related to one another as whole to part or part to whole, whereas the premisses A-C and A-B are not thus related to one another. Now the superior demonstration is that which proceeds from better known and prior premisses, and while both these forms depend for credence on the not-being of something, yet the source of the one is prior to that of the other. Therefore negative demonstration will have an unqualified superiority to reductio ad impossibile, and affirmative demonstration, being superior to negative, will consequently be superior also to reductio ad impossibile.

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27 The science which is knowledge at once of the fact and of the reasoned fact, not of the fact by itself without the reasoned fact, is the more exact and the prior science. A science such as arithmetic, which is not a science of properties qua inhering in a substratum, is more exact than and prior to a science like harmonics, which is a science of pr,operties inhering in a substratum; and similarly a science like arithmetic, which is constituted of fewer basic elements, is more exact than and prior to geometry, which requires additional elements. What I mean by ‘additional elements’ is this: a unit is substance without position, while a point is substance with position; the latter contains an additional element.

28 A single science is one whose domain is a single genus, viz. all the subjects constituted out of the primary entities of the genus – i.e. the parts of this total subject – and their essential properties. One science differs from another when their basic truths have neither a common source nor are derived those of the one science from those the other. This is verified when we reach the indemonstrable premisses of a science, for they must be within one genus with its conclusions: and this again is verified if the conclusions proved by means of them fall within one genus – i.e. are homogeneous.

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29 One can have several demonstrations of the same connexion not only by taking from the same series of predication middles which are other than the immediately cohering term e.g. by taking C, D, and F severally to prove A-B – but also by taking a middle from another series. Thus let A be change, D alteration of a property, B feeling pleasure, and G relaxation. We can then without falsehood predicate D of B and A of D, for he who is pleased suffers alteration of a property, and that which alters a property changes. Again, we can predicate A of G without falsehood, and G of B; for to feel pleasure is to relax, and to relax is to change. So the conclusion can be drawn through middles which are different, i.e. not in the same series – yet not so that neither of these middles is predicable of the other, for they must both be attributable to some one subject. A further point worth investigating is how many ways of proving the same conclusion can be obtained by varying the figure.

30 There is no knowledge by demonstration of chance conjunctions; for chance conjunctions exist neither by necessity nor as general connexions but comprise what comes to be as something distinct from these. Now demonstration is concerned only with one or other of these two; for all reasoning proceeds from necessary or general premisses, the conclusion being necessary if the premisses are necessary and general if

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the premisses are general. Consequently, if chance conjunctions are neither general nor necessary, they are not demonstrable.

31 Scientific knowledge is not possible through the act of perception. Even if perception as a faculty is of ‘the such’ and not merely of a ‘this somewhat’, yet one must at any rate actually perceive a ‘this somewhat’, and at a definite present place and time: but that which is commensurately universal and true in all cases one cannot perceive, since it is not ‘this’ and it is not ‘now’; if it were, it would not be commensurately universal – the term we apply to what is always and everywhere. Seeing, therefore, that demonstrations are commensurately universal and universals imperceptible, we clearly cannot obtain scientific knowledge by the act of perception: nay, it is obvious that even if it were possible to perceive that a triangle has its angles equal to two right angles, we should still be looking for a demonstration – we should not (as some say) possess knowledge of it; for perception must be of a particular, whereas scientific knowledge involves the recognition of the commensurate universal. So if we were on the moon, and saw the earth shutting out the sun’s light, we should not know the cause of the eclipse: we should perceive the present fact of the eclipse, but not the reasoned fact at all, since the act of perception is not of the commensurate universal. I do not, of course, deny that by watching the frequent recurrence of this event we might, after tracking the commensurate universal, possess a demonstration, for the commensurate universal is elicited from the several groups of singulars.

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The commensurate universal is precious because it makes clear the cause; so that in the case of facts like these which have a cause other than themselves universal knowledge is more precious than sense-perceptions and than intuition. (As regards primary truths there is of course a different account to be given.) Hence it is clear that knowledge of things demonstrable cannot be acquired by perception, unless the term perception is applied to the possession of scientific knowledge through demonstration. Nevertheless certain points do arise with regard to connexions to be proved which are referred for their explanation to a failure in sense-perception: there are cases when an act of vision would terminate our inquiry, not because in seeing we should be knowing, but because we should have elicited the universal from seeing; if, for example, we saw the pores in the glass and the light passing through, the reason of the kindling would be clear to us because we should at the same time see it in each instance and intuit that it must be so in all instances.

32 All syllogisms cannot have the same basic truths. This may be shown first of all by the following dialectical considerations. (1) Some syllogisms are true and some false: for though a true inference is possible from false premisses, yet this occurs once only – I mean if A for instance, is truly predicable of C, but B, the middle, is false, both A-B and B-C being false; nevertheless, if middles are taken to prove these premisses, they will be false because every conclusion which is a falsehood has false premisses, while true conclusions have true premisses, and false and true differ in kind. Then again, (2) falsehoods are not all derived from a single identical set of principles: there are

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falsehoods which are the contraries of one another and cannot coexist, e.g. ‘justice is injustice’, and ‘justice is cowardice’; ‘man is horse’, and ‘man is ox’; ‘the equal is greater’, and ‘the equal is less.’ From established principles we may argue the case as follows, confining ourselves therefore to true conclusions. Not even all these are inferred from the same basic truths; many of them in fact have basic truths which differ generically and are not transferable; units, for instance, which are without position, cannot take the place of points, which have position. The transferred terms could only fit in as middle terms or as major or minor terms, or else have some of the other terms between them, others outside them. Nor can any of the common axioms – such, I mean, as the law of excluded middle – serve as premisses for the proof of all conclusions. For the kinds of being are different, and some attributes attach to quanta and some to qualia only; and proof is achieved by means of the common axioms taken in conjunction with these several kinds and their attributes. Again, it is not true that the basic truths are much fewer than the conclusions, for the basic truths are the premisses, and the premisses are formed by the apposition of a fresh extreme term or the interposition of a fresh middle. Moreover, the number of conclusions is indefinite, though the number of middle terms is finite; and lastly some of the basic truths are necessary, others variable. Looking at it in this way we see that, since the number of conclusions is indefinite, the basic truths cannot be identical or limited in number. If, on the other hand, identity is used in another sense, and it is said, e.g. ‘these and no other are the fundamental truths of geometry, these the fundamentals of calculation, these again of medicine’; would the statement mean anything except that the sciences have basic truths? To

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call them identical because they are self-identical is absurd, since everything can be identified with everything in that sense of identity. Nor again can the contention that all conclusions have the same basic truths mean that from the mass of all possible premisses any conclusion may be drawn. That would be exceedingly naive, for it is not the case in the clearly evident mathematical sciences, nor is it possible in analysis, since it is the immediate premisses which are the basic truths, and a fresh conclusion is only formed by the addition of a new immediate premiss: but if it be admitted that it is these primary immediate premisses which are basic truths, each subjectgenus will provide one basic truth. If, however, it is not argued that from the mass of all possible premisses any conclusion may be proved, nor yet admitted that basic truths differ so as to be generically different for each science, it remains to consider the possibility that, while the basic truths of all knowledge are within one genus, special premisses are required to prove special conclusions. But that this cannot be the case has been shown by our proof that the basic truths of things generically different themselves differ generically. For fundamental truths are of two kinds, those which are premisses of demonstration and the subject-genus; and though the former are common, the latter – number, for instance, and magnitude – are peculiar.

33 Scientific knowledge and its object differ from opinion and the object of opinion in that scientific knowledge is commensurately universal and proceeds by necessary connexions, and that which is necessary cannot be otherwise. So though there are things which are true and real and yet can be otherwise, scientific knowledge clearly does not concern

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them: if it did, things which can be otherwise would be incapable of being otherwise. Nor are they any concern of rational intuition – by rational intuition I mean an originative source of scientific knowledge – nor of indemonstrable knowledge, which is the grasping of the immediate premiss. Since then rational intuition, science, and opinion, and what is revealed by these terms, are the only things that can be ‘true’, it follows that it is opinion that is concerned with that which may be true or false, and can be otherwise: opinion in fact is the grasp of a premiss which is immediate but not necessary. This view also fits the observed facts, for opinion is unstable, and so is the kind of being we have described as its object. Besides, when a man thinks a truth incapable of being otherwise he always thinks that he knows it, never that he opines it. He thinks that he opines when he thinks that a connexion, though actually so, may quite easily be otherwise; for he believes that such is the proper object of opinion, while the necessary is the object of knowledge. In what sense, then, can the same thing be the object of both opinion and knowledge? And if any one chooses to maintain that all that he knows he can also opine, why should not opinion be knowledge? For he that knows and he that opines will follow the same train of thought through the same middle terms until the immediate premisses are reached; because it is possible to opine not only the fact but also the reasoned fact, and the reason is the middle term; so that, since the former knows, he that opines also has knowledge. The truth perhaps is that if a man grasp truths that cannot be other than they are, in the way in which he grasps the definitions through which demonstrations take place, he will have not opinion but knowledge: if on the other hand he apprehends these attributes as inhering in their subjects, but not in virtue of the subjects’ substance and essential nature

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possesses opinion and not genuine knowledge; and his opinion, if obtained through immediate premisses, will be both of the fact and of the reasoned fact; if not so obtained, of the fact alone. The object of opinion and knowledge is not quite identical; it is only in a sense identical, just as the object of true and false opinion is in a sense identical. The sense in which some maintain that true and false opinion can have the same object leads them to embrace many strange doctrines, particularly the doctrine that what a man opines falsely he does not opine at all. There are really many senses of ‘identical’, and in one sense the object of true and false opinion can be the same, in another it cannot. Thus, to have a true opinion that the diagonal is commensurate with the side would be absurd: but because the diagonal with which they are both concerned is the same, the two opinions have objects so far the same: on the other hand, as regards their essential definable nature these objects differ. The identity of the objects of knowledge and opinion is similar. Knowledge is the apprehension of, e.g. the attribute ‘animal’ as incapable of being otherwise, opinion the apprehension of ‘animal’ as capable of being otherwise – e.g. the apprehension that animal is an element in the essential nature of man is knowledge; the apprehension of animal as predicable of man but not as an element in man’s essential nature is opinion: man is the subject in both judgements, but the mode of inherence differs. This also shows that one cannot opine and know the same thing simultaneously; for then one would apprehend the same thing as both capable and incapable of being otherwise – an impossibility. Knowledge and opinion of the same thing can coexist in two different people in the sense we have explained, but not simultaneously in the same person. That would involve a man’s simultaneously apprehending, e.g. (1) that man is essentially animal – i.e. cannot be other than animal – and (2)

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that man is not essentially animal, that is, we may assume, may be other than animal. Further consideration of modes of thinking and their distribution under the heads of discursive thought, intuition, science, art, practical wisdom, and metaphysical thinking, belongs rather partly to natural science, partly to moral philosophy.

34 Quick wit is a faculty of hitting upon the middle term instantaneously. It would be exemplified by a man who saw that the moon has her bright side always turned towards the sun, and quickly grasped the cause of this, namely that she borrows her light from him; or observed somebody in conversation with a man of wealth and divined that he was borrowing money, or that the friendship of these people sprang from a common enmity. In all these instances he has seen the major and minor terms and then grasped the causes, the middle terms. Let A represent ‘bright side turned sunward’, B ‘lighted from the sun’, C the moon. Then B, ‘lighted from the sun’ is predicable of C, the moon, and A, ‘having her bright side towards the source of her light’, is predicable of B. So A is predicable of C through B.

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Book II

1 The kinds of question we ask are as many as the kinds of things which we know. They are in fact four: – (1) whether the connexion of an attribute with a thing is a fact, (2) what is the reason of the connexion, (3) whether a thing exists, (4) What is the nature of the thing. Thus, when our question concerns a complex of thing and attribute and we ask whether the thing is thus or otherwise qualified – whether, e.g. the sun suffers eclipse or not – then we are asking as to the fact of a connexion. That our inquiry ceases with the discovery that the sun does suffer eclipse is an indication of this; and if we know from the start that the sun suffers eclipse, we do not inquire whether it does so or not. On the other hand, when we know the fact we ask the reason; as, for example, when we know that the sun is being eclipsed and that an earthquake is in progress, it is the reason of eclipse or earthquake into which we inquire. Where a complex is concerned, then, those are the two questions we ask; but for some objects of inquiry we have a different kind of question to ask, such as whether there is or is not a centaur or a God. (By ‘is or is not’ I mean ‘is or is not, without further qualification’; as opposed to ‘is or is not [e.g.] white’.) On the other hand, when we have ascertained the thing’s existence, we inquire as to its nature, asking, for instance, ‘what, then, is God?’ or ‘what is man?’.

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2 These, then, are the four kinds of question we ask, and it is in the answers to these questions that our knowledge consists. Now when we ask whether a connexion is a fact, or whether a thing without qualification is, we are really asking whether the connexion or the thing has a ‘middle’; and when we have ascertained either that the connexion is a fact or that the thing is – i.e. ascertained either the partial or the unqualified being of the thing-and are proceeding to ask the reason of the connexion or the nature of the thing, then we are asking what the ‘middle’ is. (By distinguishing the fact of the connexion and the existence of the thing as respectively the partial and the unqualified being of the thing, I mean that if we ask ‘does the moon suffer eclipse?’, or ‘does the moon wax?’, the question concerns a part of the thing’s being; for what we are asking in such questions is whether a thing is this or that, i.e. has or has not this or that attribute: whereas, if we ask whether the moon or night exists, the question concerns the unqualified being of a thing.) We conclude that in all our inquiries we are asking either whether there is a ‘middle’ or what the ‘middle’ is: for the ‘middle’ here is precisely the cause, and it is the cause that we seek in all our inquiries. Thus, ‘Does the moon suffer eclipse?’ means ‘Is there or is there not a cause producing eclipse of the moon?’, and when we have learnt that there is, our next question is, ‘What, then, is this cause? for the cause through which a thing is – not is this or that, i.e. has this or that attribute, but without qualification is – and the cause through which it is – not is without qualification, but is this or that as having some essential attribute or some accident – are both alike the middle’. By that which is without qualification I mean the subject, e.g. moon or earth or sun or triangle; by that which

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a subject is (in the partial sense) I mean a property, e.g. eclipse, equality or inequality, interposition or non-interposition. For in all these examples it is clear that the nature of the thing and the reason of the fact are identical: the question ‘What is eclipse?’ and its answer ‘The privation of the moon’s light by the interposition of the earth’ are identical with the question ‘What is the reason of eclipse?’ or ‘Why does the moon suffer eclipse?’ and the reply ‘Because of the failure of light through the earth’s shutting it out’. Again, for ‘What is a concord? A commensurate numerical ratio of a high and a low note’, we may substitute ‘What ratio makes a high and a low note concordant? Their relation according to a commensurate numerical ratio.’ ‘Are the high and the low note concordant?’ is equivalent to ‘Is their ratio commensurate?’; and when we find that it is commensurate, we ask ‘What, then, is their ratio?’. Cases in which the ‘middle’ is sensible show that the object of our inquiry is always the ‘middle’: we inquire, because we have not perceived it, whether there is or is not a ‘middle’ causing, e.g. an eclipse. On the other hand, if we were on the moon we should not be inquiring either as to the fact or the reason, but both fact and reason would be obvious simultaneously. For the act of perception would have enabled us to know the universal too; since, the present fact of an eclipse being evident, perception would then at the same time give us the present fact of the earth’s screening the sun’s light, and from this would arise the universal. Thus, as we maintain, to know a thing’s nature is to know the reason why it is; and this is equally true of things in so far as they are said without qualification to he as opposed to being possessed of some attribute, and in so far as they are said to be possessed of some attribute such as equal to right angles, or greater or less.

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3 It is clear, then, that all questions are a search for a ‘middle’. Let us now state how essential nature is revealed and in what way it can be reduced to demonstration; what definition is, and what things are definable. And let us first discuss certain difficulties which these questions raise, beginning what we have to say with a point most intimately connected with our immediately preceding remarks, namely the doubt that might be felt as to whether or not it is possible to know the same thing in the same relation, both by definition and by demonstration. It might, I mean, be urged that definition is held to concern essential nature and is in every case universal and affirmative; whereas, on the other hand, some conclusions are negative and some are not universal; e.g. all in the second figure are negative, none in the third are universal. And again, not even all affirmative conclusions in the first figure are definable, e.g. ‘every triangle has its angles equal to two right angles’. An argument proving this difference between demonstration and definition is that to have scientific knowledge of the demonstrable is identical with possessing a demonstration of it: hence if demonstration of such conclusions as these is possible, there clearly cannot also be definition of them. If there could, one might know such a conclusion also in virtue of its definition without possessing the demonstration of it; for there is nothing to stop our having the one without the other. Induction too will sufficiently convince us of this difference; for never yet by defining anything – essential attribute or accident – did we get knowledge of it. Again, if to define is to acquire knowledge of a substance, at any rate such attributes are not substances.

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It is evident, then, that not everything demonstrable can be defined. What then? Can everything definable be demonstrated, or not? There is one of our previous arguments which covers this too. Of a single thing qua single there is a single scientific knowledge. Hence, since to know the demonstrable scientifically is to possess the demonstration of it, an impossible consequence will follow: – possession of its definition without its demonstration will give knowledge of the demonstrable. Moreover, the basic premisses definitions, and it has already been found indemonstrable; either the demonstrable and will depend on regress will be endless; or the indemonstrable definitions. of demonstrations are shown that these will be basic premisses will be prior premisses, and the primary truths will be

But if the definable and the demonstrable are not wholly the same, may they yet be partially the same? Or is that impossible, because there can be no demonstration of the definable? There can be none, because definition is of the essential nature or being of something, and all demonstrations evidently posit and assume the essential nature – mathematical demonstrations, for example, the nature of unity and the odd, and all the other sciences likewise. Moreover, every demonstration proves a predicate of a subject as attaching or as not attaching to it, but in definition one thing is not predicated of another; we do not, e.g. predicate animal of biped nor biped of animal, nor yet figure of plane – plane not being figure nor figure plane. Again, to prove essential nature is not the same as to prove the fact of a connexion. Now definition reveals essential nature, demonstration reveals that a given attribute attaches or does not attach to a given subject; but different things require different demonstrations – unless the one demonstration is related to the other as part to whole. I add this because if all

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triangles have been proved to possess angles equal to two right angles, then this attribute has been proved to attach to isosceles; for isosceles is a part of which all triangles constitute the whole. But in the case before us the fact and the essential nature are not so related to one another, since the one is not a part of the other. So it emerges that not all the definable is demonstrable nor all the demonstrable definable; and we may draw the general conclusion that there is no identical object of which it is possible to possess both a definition and a demonstration. It follows obviously that definition and demonstration are neither identical nor contained either within the other: if they were, their objects would be related either as identical or as whole and part.

4 So much, then, for the first stage of our problem. The next step is to raise the question whether syllogism – i.e. demonstration – of the definable nature is possible or, as our recent argument assumed, impossible. We might argue it impossible on the following grounds: – (a) syllogism proves an attribute of a subject through the middle term; on the other hand (b) its definable nature is both ‘peculiar’ to a subject and predicated of it as belonging to its essence. But in that case (1) the subject, its definition, and the middle term connecting them must be reciprocally predicable of one another; for if A is to C, obviously A is ‘peculiar’ to B and B to C – in fact all three terms are ‘peculiar’ to one another: and further (2) if A inheres in the essence of all B and B is predicated

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universally of all C as belonging to C’s essence, A also must be predicated of C as belonging to its essence. If one does not take this relation as thus duplicated – if, that is, A is predicated as being of the essence of B, but B is not of the essence of the subjects of which it is predicated – A will not necessarily be predicated of C as belonging to its essence. So both premisses will predicate essence, and consequently B also will be predicated of C as its essence. Since, therefore, both premisses do predicate essence – i.e. definable form – C’s definable form will appear in the middle term before the conclusion is drawn. We may generalize by supposing that it is possible to prove the essential nature of man. Let C be man, A man’s essential nature – two-footed animal, or aught else it may be. Then, if we are to syllogize, A must be predicated of all B. But this premiss will be mediated by a fresh definition, which consequently will also be the essential nature of man. Therefore the argument assumes what it has to prove, since B too is the essential nature of man. It is, however, the case in which there are only the two premisses – i.e. in which the premisses are primary and immediate – which we ought to investigate, because it best illustrates the point under discussion. Thus they who prove the essential nature of soul or man or anything else through reciprocating terms beg the question. It would be begging the question, for example, to contend that the soul is that which causes its own life, and that what causes its own life is a self-moving number; for one would have to postulate that the soul is a self-moving number in the sense of being identical with it. For if A is predicable as a mere consequent of B and B of C, A will not on that account be the definable form of C: A will merely be what it was true to say of C. Even if A is predicated of all B inasmuch as B is identical with

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a species of A, still it will not follow: being an animal is predicated of being a man – since it is true that in all instances to be human is to be animal, just as it is also true that every man is an animal – but not as identical with being man. We conclude, then, that unless one takes both the premisses as predicating essence, one cannot infer that A is the definable form and essence of C: but if one does so take them, in assuming B one will have assumed, before drawing the conclusion, what the definable form of C is; so that there has been no inference, for one has begged the question.

5 Nor, as was said in my formal logic, is the method of division a process of inference at all, since at no point does the characterization of the subject follow necessarily from the premising of certain other facts: division demonstrates as little as does induction. For in a genuine demonstration the conclusion must not be put as a question nor depend on a concession, but must follow necessarily from its premisses, even if the respondent deny it. The definer asks ‘Is man animal or inanimate?’ and then assumes – he has not inferred – that man is animal. Next, when presented with an exhaustive division of animal into terrestrial and aquatic, he assumes that man is terrestrial. Moreover, that man is the complete formula, terrestrial-animal, does not follow necessarily from the premisses: this too is an assumption, and equally an assumption whether the division comprises many differentiae or few. (Indeed as this method of division is used by those who proceed by it, even truths that can be inferred actually fail to appear as such.) For why should not the whole of this formula

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be true of man, and yet not exhibit his essential nature or definable form? Again, what guarantee is there against an unessential addition, or against the omission of the final or of an intermediate determinant of the substantial being? The champion of division might here urge that though these lapses do occur, yet we can solve that difficulty if all the attributes we assume are constituents of the definable form, and if, postulating the genus, we produce by division the requisite uninterrupted sequence of terms, and omit nothing; and that indeed we cannot fail to fulfil these conditions if what is to be divided falls whole into the division at each stage, and none of it is omitted; and that this – the dividendum – must without further question be (ultimately) incapable of fresh specific division. Nevertheless, we reply, division does not involve inference; if it gives knowledge, it gives it in another way. Nor is there any absurdity in this: induction, perhaps, is not demonstration any more than is division, et it does make evident some truth. Yet to state a definition reached by division is not to state a conclusion: as, when conclusions are drawn without their appropriate middles, the alleged necessity by which the inference follows from the premisses is open to a question as to the reason for it, so definitions reached by division invite the same question. Thus to the question ‘What is the essential nature of man?’ the divider replies ‘Animal, mortal, footed, biped, wingless’; and when at each step he is asked ‘Why?’, he will say, and, as he thinks, proves by division, that all animal is mortal or immortal: but such a formula taken in its entirety is not definition; so that even if division does demonstrate its formula, definition at any rate does not turn out to be a conclusion of inference.

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6 Can we nevertheless actually demonstrate what a thing essentially and substantially is, but hypothetically, i.e. by premising (1) that its definable form is constituted by the ‘peculiar’ attributes of its essential nature; (2) that such and such are the only attributes of its essential nature, and that the complete synthesis of them is peculiar to the thing; and thus – since in this synthesis consists the being of the thing – obtaining our conclusion? Or is the truth that, since proof must be through the middle term, the definable form is once more assumed in this minor premiss too? Further, just as in syllogizing we do not premise what syllogistic inference is (since the premisses from which we conclude must be related as whole and part), so the definable form must not fall within the syllogism but remain outside the premisses posited. It is only against a doubt as to its having been a syllogistic inference at all that we have to defend our argument as conforming to the definition of syllogism. It is only when some one doubts whether the conclusion proved is the definable form that we have to defend it as conforming to the definition of definable form which we assumed. Hence syllogistic inference must be possible even without the express statement of what syllogism is or what definable form is. The following type of hypothetical proof also begs the question. If evil is definable as the divisible, and the definition of a thing’s contrary – if it has one the contrary of the thing’s definition; then, if good is the contrary of evil and the indivisible of the divisible, we conclude that to be good is essentially to be indivisible. The question is begged because definable form is assumed as a premiss, and as a premiss which is to prove definable form. ‘But not the same definable form’, you may object. That I admit, for in demonstrations also we premise that

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‘this’ is predicable of ‘that’; but in this premiss the term we assert of the minor is neither the major itself nor a term identical in definition, or convertible, with the major. Again, both proof by division and the syllogism just described are open to the question why man should be animal-bipedterrestrial and not merely animal and terrestrial, since what they premise does not ensure that the predicates shall constitute a genuine unity and not merely belong to a single subject as do musical and grammatical when predicated of the same man.

7 How then by definition shall we prove substance or essential nature? We cannot show it as a fresh fact necessarily following from the assumption of premisses admitted to be facts – the method of demonstration: we may not proceed as by induction to establish a universal on the evidence of groups of particulars which offer no exception, because induction proves not what the essential nature of a thing is but that it has or has not some attribute. Therefore, since presumably one cannot prove essential nature by an appeal to sense perception or by pointing with the finger, what other method remains? To put it another way: how shall we by definition prove essential nature? He who knows what human – or any other – nature is, must know also that man exists; for no one knows the nature of what does not exist – one can know the meaning of the phrase or name ‘goat-stag’ but not what the essential nature of a goat-stag is. But further, if definition can prove what is the essential nature of a thing, can it also prove that it exists? And how will it prove them both by the same process, since
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definition exhibits one single thing and demonstration another single thing, and what human nature is and the fact that man exists are not the same thing? Then too we hold that it is by demonstration that the being of everything must be proved – unless indeed to be were its essence; and, since being is not a genus, it is not the essence of anything. Hence the being of anything as fact is matter for demonstration; and this is the actual procedure of the sciences, for the geometer assumes the meaning of the word triangle, but that it is possessed of some attribute he proves. What is it, then, that we shall prove in defining essential nature? Triangle? In that case a man will know by definition what a thing’s nature is without knowing whether it exists. But that is impossible. Moreover it is clear, if we consider the methods of defining actually in use, that definition does not prove that the thing defined exists: since even if there does actually exist something which is equidistant from a centre, yet why should the thing named in the definition exist? Why, in other words, should this be the formula defining circle? One might equally well call it the definition of mountain copper. For definitions do not carry a further guarantee that the thing defined can exist or that it is what they claim to define: one can always ask why. Since, therefore, to define is to prove either a thing’s essential nature or the meaning of its name, we may conclude that definition, if it in no sense proves essential nature, is a set of words signifying precisely what a name signifies. But that were a strange consequence; for (1) both what is not substance and what does not exist at all would be definable, since even nonexistents can be signified by a name: (2) all sets of words or sentences would be definitions, since any kind of sentence could be given a name; so that we should all be talking in definitions, and even the Iliad would be a definition: (3) no demonstration can prove that any particular name means any

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particular thing: neither, therefore, do definitions, in addition to revealing the meaning of a name, also reveal that the name has this meaning. It appears then from these considerations that neither definition and syllogism nor their objects are identical, and further that definition neither demonstrates nor proves anything, and that knowledge of essential nature is not to be obtained either by definition or by demonstration.

8 We must now start afresh and consider which of these conclusions are sound and which are not, and what is the nature of definition, and whether essential nature is in any sense demonstrable and definable or in none. Now to know its essential nature is, as we said, the same as to know the cause of a thing’s existence, and the proof of this depends on the fact that a thing must have a cause. Moreover, this cause is either identical with the essential nature of the thing or distinct from it; and if its cause is distinct from it, the essential nature of the thing is either demonstrable or indemonstrable. Consequently, if the cause is distinct from the thing’s essential nature and demonstration is possible, the cause must be the middle term, and, the conclusion proved being universal and affirmative, the proof is in the first figure. So the method just examined of proving it through another essential nature would be one way of proving essential nature, because a conclusion containing essential nature must be inferred through a middle which is an essential nature just as a ‘peculiar’ property must be inferred through a middle which is a ‘peculiar’ property; so that of the two definable natures of a single thing this method will prove one and not the other.

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Now it was said before that this method could not amount to demonstration of essential nature – it is actually a dialectical proof of it – so let us begin again and explain by what method it can be demonstrated. When we are aware of a fact we seek its reason, and though sometimes the fact and the reason dawn on us simultaneously, yet we cannot apprehend the reason a moment sooner than the fact; and clearly in just the same way we cannot apprehend a thing’s definable form without apprehending that it exists, since while we are ignorant whether it exists we cannot know its essential nature. Moreover we are aware whether a thing exists or not sometimes through apprehending an element in its character, and sometimes accidentally, as, for example, when we are aware of thunder as a noise in the clouds, of eclipse as a privation of light, or of man as some species of animal, or of the soul as a self-moving thing. As often as we have accidental knowledge that the thing exists, we must be in a wholly negative state as regards awareness of its essential nature; for we have not got genuine knowledge even of its existence, and to search for a thing’s essential nature when we are unaware that it exists is to search for nothing. On the other hand, whenever we apprehend an element in the thing’s character there is less difficulty. Thus it follows that the degree of our knowledge of a thing’s essential nature is determined by the sense in which we are aware that it exists. Let us then take the following as our first instance of being aware of an element in the essential nature. Let A be eclipse, C the moon, B the earth’s acting as a screen. Now to ask whether the moon is eclipsed or not is to ask whether or not B has occurred. But that is precisely the same as asking whether A has a defining condition; and if this condition actually exists, we assert that A also actually exists. Or again we may ask which side of a contradiction the defining condition necessitates: does it make the angles of a triangle equal or not equal to two right angles? When we have found the answer, if the premisses are

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immediate, we know fact and reason together; if they are not immediate, we know the fact without the reason, as in the following example: let C be the moon, A eclipse, B the fact that the moon fails to produce shadows though she is full and though no visible body intervenes between us and her. Then if B, failure to produce shadows in spite of the absence of an intervening body, is attributable A to C, and eclipse, is attributable to B, it is clear that the moon is eclipsed, but the reason why is not yet clear, and we know that eclipse exists, but we do not know what its essential nature is. But when it is clear that A is attributable to C and we proceed to ask the reason of this fact, we are inquiring what is the nature of B: is it the earth’s acting as a screen, or the moon’s rotation or her extinction? But B is the definition of the other term, viz. in these examples, of the major term A; for eclipse is constituted by the earth acting as a screen. Thus, (1) ‘What is thunder?’ ‘The quenching of fire in cloud’, and (2) ‘Why does it thunder?’ ‘Because fire is quenched in the cloud’, are equivalent. Let C be cloud, A thunder, B the quenching of fire. Then B is attributable to C, cloud, since fire is quenched in it; and A, noise, is attributable to B; and B is assuredly the definition of the major term A. If there be a further mediating cause of B, it will be one of the remaining partial definitions of A. We have stated then how essential nature is discovered and becomes known, and we see that, while there is no syllogism – i.e. no demonstrative syllogism – of essential nature, yet it is through syllogism, viz. demonstrative syllogism, that essential nature is exhibited. So we conclude that neither can the essential nature of anything which has a cause distinct from itself be known without demonstration, nor can it be demonstrated; and this is what we contended in our preliminary discussions.

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9 Now while some things have a cause distinct from themselves, others have not. Hence it is evident that there are essential natures which are immediate, that is are basic premisses; and of these not only that they are but also what they are must be assumed or revealed in some other way. This too is the actual procedure of the arithmetician, who assumes both the nature and the existence of unit. On the other hand, it is possible (in the manner explained) to exhibit through demonstration the essential nature of things which have a ‘middle’, i.e. a cause of their substantial being other than that being itself; but we do not thereby demonstrate it.

10 Since definition is said to be the statement of a thing’s nature, obviously one kind of definition will be a statement of the meaning of the name, or of an equivalent nominal formula. A definition in this sense tells you, e.g. the meaning of the phrase ‘triangular character’. When we are aware that triangle exists, we inquire the reason why it exists. But it is difficult thus to learn the definition of things the existence of which we do not genuinely know – the cause of this difficulty being, as we said before, that we only know accidentally whether or not the thing exists. Moreover, a statement may be a unity in either of two ways, by conjunction, like the Iliad, or because it exhibits a single predicate as inhering not accidentally in a single subject. That then is one way of defining definition. Another kind of definition is a formula exhibiting the cause of a thing’s

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existence. Thus the former signifies without proving, but the latter will clearly be a quasi-demonstration of essential nature, differing from demonstration in the arrangement of its terms. For there is a difference between stating why it thunders, and stating what is the essential nature of thunder; since the first statement will be ‘Because fire is quenched in the clouds’, while the statement of what the nature of thunder is will be ‘The noise of fire being quenched in the clouds’. Thus the same statement takes a different form: in one form it is continuous demonstration, in the other definition. Again, thunder can be defined as noise in the clouds, which is the conclusion of the demonstration embodying essential nature. On the other hand the definition of immediates is an indemonstrable positing of essential nature. We conclude then that definition is (a) an indemonstrable statement of essential nature, or (b) a syllogism of essential nature differing from demonstration in grammatical form, or (c) the conclusion of a demonstration giving essential nature. Our discussion has therefore made plain (1) in what sense and of what things the essential nature is demonstrable, and in what sense and of what things it is not; (2) what are the various meanings of the term definition, and in what sense and of what things it proves the essential nature, and in what sense and of what things it does not; (3) what is the relation of definition to demonstration, and how far the same thing is both definable and demonstrable and how far it is not.

11 We think we have scientific knowledge when we know the cause, and there are four causes: (1) the definable form, (2) an
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antecedent which necessitates a consequent, (3) the efficient cause, (4) the final cause. Hence each of these can be the middle term of a proof, for (a) though the inference from antecedent to necessary consequent does not hold if only one premiss is assumed – two is the minimum – still when there are two it holds on condition that they have a single common middle term. So it is from the assumption of this single middle term that the conclusion follows necessarily. The following example will also show this. Why is the angle in a semicircle a right angle? – or from what assumption does it follow that it is a right angle? Thus, let A be right angle, B the half of two right angles, C the angle in a semicircle. Then B is the cause in virtue of which A, right angle, is attributable to C, the angle in a semicircle, since B=A and the other, viz. C,=B, for C is half of two right angles. Therefore it is the assumption of B, the half of two right angles, from which it follows that A is attributable to C, i.e. that the angle in a semicircle is a right angle. Moreover, B is identical with (b) the defining form of A, since it is what A’s definition signifies. Moreover, the formal cause has already been shown to be the middle. (c) ‘Why did the Athenians become involved in the Persian war?’ means ‘What cause originated the waging of war against the Athenians?’ and the answer is, ‘Because they raided Sardis with the Eretrians’, since this originated the war. Let A be war, B unprovoked raiding, C the Athenians. Then B, unprovoked raiding, is true of C, the Athenians, and A is true of B, since men make war on the unjust aggressor. So A, having war waged upon them, is true of B, the initial aggressors, and B is true of C, the Athenians, who were the aggressors. Hence here too the cause – in this case the efficient cause – is the middle term. (d) This is no less true where the cause is the final cause. E.g. why does one take a walk after supper? For the sake of one’s health. Why does a house exist? For the preservation of one’s goods. The end in view is in the one case health, in the other preservation. To ask the reason why one must walk after supper

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is precisely to ask to what end one must do it. Let C be walking after supper, B the non-regurgitation of food, A health. Then let walking after supper possess the property of preventing food from rising to the orifice of the stomach, and let this condition be healthy; since it seems that B, the non-regurgitation of food, is attributable to C, taking a walk, and that A, health, is attributable to B. What, then, is the cause through which A, the final cause, inheres in C? It is B, the non-regurgitation of food; but B is a kind of definition of A, for A will be explained by it. Why is B the cause of A’s belonging to C? Because to be in a condition such as B is to be in health. The definitions must be transposed, and then the detail will become clearer. Incidentally, here the order of coming to be is the reverse of what it is in proof through the efficient cause: in the efficient order the middle term must come to be first, whereas in the teleological order the minor, C, must first take place, and the end in view comes last in time. The same thing may exist for an end and be necessitated as well. For example, light shines through a lantern (1) because that which consists of relatively small particles necessarily passes through pores larger than those particles – assuming that light does issue by penetration – and (2) for an end, namely to save us from stumbling. If then, a thing can exist through two causes, can it come to be through two causes – as for instance if thunder be a hiss and a roar necessarily produced by the quenching of fire, and also designed, as the Pythagoreans say, for a threat to terrify those that lie in Tartarus? Indeed, there are very many such cases, mostly among the processes and products of the natural world; for nature, in different senses of the term ‘nature’, produces now for an end, now by necessity. Necessity too is of two kinds. It may work in accordance with a thing’s natural tendency, or by constraint and in opposition to it;

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as, for instance, by necessity a stone is borne both upwards and downwards, but not by the same necessity. Of the products of man’s intelligence some are never due to chance or necessity but always to an end, as for example a house or a statue; others, such as health or safety, may result from chance as well. It is mostly in cases where the issue is indeterminate (though only where the production does not originate in chance, and the end is consequently good), that a result is due to an end, and this is true alike in nature or in art. By chance, on the other hand, nothing comes to be for an end.

12 The effect may be still coming to be, or its occurrence may be past or future, yet the cause will be the same as when it is actually existent – for it is the middle which is the cause – except that if the effect actually exists the cause is actually existent, if it is coming to be so is the cause, if its occurrence is past the cause is past, if future the cause is future. For example, the moon was eclipsed because the earth intervened, is becoming eclipsed because the earth is in process of intervening, will be eclipsed because the earth will intervene, is eclipsed because the earth intervenes. To take a second example: assuming that the definition of ice is solidified water, let C be water, A solidified, B the middle, which is the cause, namely total failure of heat. Then B is attributed to C, and A, solidification, to B: ice when B is occurring, has formed when B has occurred, and will form when B shall occur.

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This sort of cause, then, and its effect come to be simultaneously when they are in process of becoming, and exist simultaneously when they actually exist; and the same holds good when they are past and when they are future. But what of cases where they are not simultaneous? Can causes and effects different from one another form, as they seem to us to form, a continuous succession, a past effect resulting from a past cause different from itself, a future effect from a future cause different from it, and an effect which is coming-to-be from a cause different from and prior to it? Now on this theory it is from the posterior event that we reason (and this though these later events actually have their source of origin in previous events – a fact which shows that also when the effect is coming-to-be we still reason from the posterior event), and from the event we cannot reason (we cannot argue that because an event A has occurred, therefore an event B has occurred subsequently to A but still in the past – and the same holds good if the occurrence is future) – cannot reason because, be the time interval definite or indefinite, it will never be possible to infer that because it is true to say that A occurred, therefore it is true to say that B, the subsequent event, occurred; for in the interval between the events, though A has already occurred, the latter statement will be false. And the same argument applies also to future events; i.e. one cannot infer from an event which occurred in the past that a future event will occur. The reason of this is that the middle must be homogeneous, past when the extremes are past, future when they are future, coming to be when they are coming-to-be, actually existent when they are actually existent; and there cannot be a middle term homogeneous with extremes respectively past and future. And it is a further difficulty in this theory that the time interval can be neither indefinite nor definite, since during it the inference will be false. We have also to inquire what it is that holds events together so that the coming-to-be now occurring in actual things follows

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upon a past event. It is evident, we may suggest, that a past event and a present process cannot be ‘contiguous’, for not even two past events can be ‘contiguous’. For past events are limits and atomic; so just as points are not ‘contiguous’ neither are past events, since both are indivisible. For the same reason a past event and a present process cannot be ‘contiguous’, for the process is divisible, the event indivisible. Thus the relation of present process to past event is analogous to that of line to point, since a process contains an infinity of past events. These questions, however, must receive a more explicit treatment in our general theory of change. The following must suffice as an account of the manner in which the middle would be identical with the cause on the supposition that coming-to-be is a series of consecutive events: for in the terms of such a series too the middle and major terms must form an immediate premiss; e.g. we argue that, since C has occurred, therefore A occurred: and C’s occurrence was posterior, A’s prior; but C is the source of the inference because it is nearer to the present moment, and the starting-point of time is the present. We next argue that, since D has occurred, therefore C occurred. Then we conclude that, since D has occurred, therefore A must have occurred; and the cause is C, for since D has occurred C must have occurred, and since C has occurred A must previously have occurred. If we get our middle term in this way, will the series terminate in an immediate premiss, or since, as we said, no two events are ‘contiguous’, will a fresh middle term always intervene because there is an infinity of middles? No: though no two events are ‘contiguous’, yet we must start from a premiss consisting of a middle and the present event as major. The like is true of future events too, since if it is true to say that D will exist, it must be a prior truth to say that A will exist, and the cause of this conclusion is C; for if D will exist, C will exist prior to D, and if C

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will exist, A will exist prior to it. And here too the same infinite divisibility might be urged, since future events are not ‘contiguous’. But here too an immediate basic premiss must be assumed. And in the world of fact this is so: if a house has been built, then blocks must have been quarried and shaped. The reason is that a house having been built necessitates a foundation having been laid, and if a foundation has been laid blocks must have been shaped beforehand. Again, if a house will be built, blocks will similarly be shaped beforehand; and proof is through the middle in the same way, for the foundation will exist before the house. Now we observe in Nature a certain kind of circular process of coming-to-be; and this is possible only if the middle and extreme terms are reciprocal, since conversion is conditioned by reciprocity in the terms of the proof. This – the convertibility of conclusions and premisses – has been proved in our early chapters, and the circular process is an instance of this. In actual fact it is exemplified thus: when the earth had been moistened an exhalation was bound to rise, and when an exhalation had risen cloud was bound to form, and from the formation of cloud rain necessarily resulted and by the fall of rain the earth was necessarily moistened: but this was the starting-point, so that a circle is completed; for posit any one of the terms and another follows from it, and from that another, and from that again the first. Some occurrences are universal (for they are, or come-to-be what they are, always and in ever case); others again are not always what they are but only as a general rule: for instance, not every man can grow a beard, but it is the general rule. In the case of such connexions the middle term too must be a general rule. For if A is predicated universally of B and B of C, A too must be predicated always and in every instance of C, since to hold in every instance and always is of the nature of the universal. But

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we have assumed a connexion which is a general rule; consequently the middle term B must also be a general rule. So connexions which embody a general rule – i.e. which exist or come to be as a general rule – will also derive from immediate basic premisses.

13 We have already explained how essential nature is set out in the terms of a demonstration, and the sense in which it is or is not demonstrable or definable; so let us now discuss the method to be adopted in tracing the elements predicated as constituting the definable form. Now of the attributes which inhere always in each several thing there are some which are wider in extent than it but not wider than its genus (by attributes of wider extent mean all such as are universal attributes of each several subject, but in their application are not confined to that subject). while an attribute may inhere in every triad, yet also in a subject not a triad – as being inheres in triad but also in subjects not numbers at all – odd on the other hand is an attribute inhering in every triad and of wider application (inhering as it does also in pentad), but which does not extend beyond the genus of triad; for pentad is a number, but nothing outside number is odd. It is such attributes which we have to select, up to the exact point at which they are severally of wider extent than the subject but collectively coextensive with it; for this synthesis must be the substance of the thing. For example every triad possesses the attributes number, odd, and prime in both senses, i.e. not only as possessing no divisors, but also as not being a sum of numbers. This, then, is precisely what triad is, viz. a number, odd, and

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It will then be of wider extent than triad – assuming that wider potential extent is the character of a genus. working through the proximate common differentiae. that the synthesis of them constitutes the substance of triad is shown by the following argument. it must be related to triad as a genus named or nameless. 312 .g. into triad and dyad – and then endeavour to seize their definitions by the method we have described – the definition. for instance – he should examine the properties ‘peculiar’ to the species. because we make the further assumption that the substance of each subject is the predication of elements in its essential nature down to the last differentia characterizing the individuals.prime in the former and also the latter sense of the term: for these attributes taken severally apply. the last to the dyad also as well as to the triad.e. for example. having established what the category is to which the subaltern genus belongs – quantity or quality. He should proceed thus because the attributes of the genera compounded of the infimae species will be clearly given by the definitions of the species. triad will thus possess these attributes necessarily. i. it will be identical with the being of triad. since the basic element of them all is the definition. If on the other hand this synthesis is applicable to no subject other than the individual triads. but. the first two to all odd numbers. It follows that any other synthesis thus exhibited will likewise be identical with the being of the subject. Now since we have shown above’ that attributes predicated as belonging to the essential nature are necessary and that universals are necessary. to no other subject. If it is not identical with the being of triad. and since the attributes which we select as inhering in triad. Further. After that. or in any other subject whose attributes we select in this way. of straight line or circle or right angle. taken collectively. are predicated as belonging to its essential nature. The author of a hand-book on a subject that is a generic whole should divide the genus into its first infimae species – number e.

the primary differentiation of bird is that within which falls every bird.g. and the attributes inhere essentially in the simple infimae species. The like is true of every other genus. explain above. in fact. But.the simple infirma species. The primary differentiation of animal is that within which all animal falls. whether outside animal or a subaltern genus of animal. it is not all animal which is either whole-winged or split-winged but all winged animal. So. division is the only possible method of avoiding the omission of any element of the essential nature. the dividendum will not fall whole into this division: e. or biped-animal-tame. but rather to assume everything at the start and to be no better than an initial assumption made without division. for it is winged animal to which this differentiation belongs. the order in which the attributes are predicated does make a difference – it matters whether we say animal-tame-biped. in the genera only in virtue of these. then the elements we assume have necessarily been reached by division. To define and divide one need not know the whole of existence. They might. seem to be of no use at all. indeed. Yet some hold it impossible to know the differentiae 313 . Thus. e. and again out of this and the further differentia man (or whatever else is the unity under construction) is constituted. but that merely towards collecting the essential nature they may be of use we will proceed to show.g. Divisions according to differentiae are a useful accessory to this method. What force they have as proofs we did. For if every definable thing consists of two elements and ‘animal-tame’ forms a unity. if we proceed in this way. Again. indeed. if the primary genus is assumed and we then take one of the lower divisions. of fish that within which falls every fish. we can be sure that nothing has been omitted: by any other method one is bound to omit something without knowing it.

just as one can conclude the inherence of an accident through the topic of the accident. when one has taken one’s differing pair of opposites and assumed that the two sides exhaust the genus. since many differentiae inhere in things specifically identical. for our second term will be the first of the remainder. For it is obvious that when by this process one reaches subjects incapable of further differentiation one will possess the formula defining the substance. and one cannot. anything contained in the genus must lie on one of the two sides. (3) the omission of no such elements. Moreover. know each thing without knowing its differentiae. to postulate that the division exhausts the genus is not illegitimate if the opposites exclude a middle. since when the higher term is excluded. The first is feasible because one can establish genus and differentia through the topic of the genus. 314 . Now first of all this is a fallacy: not every differentia precludes identity. and other than that from which it differs.distinguishing each thing from every single other thing without knowing every single other thing. and one has further verified its presence in one of them. since everything is identical with that from which it does not differ. they say. Secondly. then it does not matter whether or not one knows all the other subjects of which the differentiae are also predicated. since if it is the differentia of that genus. our third the first of those which follow the second in a ‘contiguous’ series. Having assumed this we at once proceed in the same way with the lower terms. (2) the arrangement of these in the right order. since there must be one such term. and this will be ensured if the term selected is predicable of all the others but not all they of it. The right order will be achieved if the right term is assumed as primary. In establishing a definition by division one should keep three objects in view: (1) the admission only of elements in the definable form. and that the subject one seeks to define is present in one or other of them. though not in the substance of these nor essentially.

If we were inquiring what the essential nature of pride is. that as soon as we have taken the last differentia to form the concrete totality. since all these terms we have selected are elements in the definable form. we should examine instances of proud men 315 . To resume our account of the right method of investigation: We must start by observing a set of similar – i. and shown that the whole we finally reach is not further divisible – i. But if we reach not one formula but two or more. Our procedure makes it clear that no elements in the definable form have been omitted: we have taken the differentia that comes first in the order of division. We must then apply the same process to another set of individuals which belong to one species and are generically but not specifically identical with the former set. if there were. because there is now no further differentia. and so on. we should again consider whether the results established possess any identity.e. and nothing lacking. Next we have taken the differentia of the whole thus reached. specifically identical – individuals. is not the case. which. and persevere until we reach a single formula.e. For it is clear that there is no superfluous addition. the final concrete would admit of division into species. evidently the definiendum cannot be one thing but must be more than one. e. and consider what element they have in common. pointing out that animal.that term of the remainder which is ‘contiguous’ to it will be primary. and that the subject accepts one of the two as its predicate. Now the primary term is a genus. I may illustrate my meaning as follows. and likewise in members of further species. is divisible exhaustively into A and B. When we have established what the common element is in all members of this second species. and this term taken in conjunction with its differentiae is a genus: moreover the differentiae are all included. this totality admits of no division into species.g. we said. since any omission would have to be a genus or a differentia. since this will be the definition of the thing.

If they have none. as such. they have in common. just as inferential movement is the minimum required in demonstrations. and that is why our procedure should be from the several species to the universal genera – this for the further reason too that equivocation is less readily detected in genera than in infimae species. I take these two results and inquire what common element have equanimity amid the vicissitudes of life and impatience of dishonour. and we shall attain perspicuity if we can collect separately the definition of each species through the group of singulars which we have established e. and then if these have in common indifference alike to good and ill fortune.g. or Socrates. clearly metaphors and metaphorical expressions are precluded in definition: otherwise dialectic would involve metaphors.we know of to see what. that it was intolerance of insult. the definition of acuteness. it was this which drove Alcibiades to war. but only of sound – and so proceed to the common universal with a careful avoidance of equivocation. perspicuity is essential in definitions. Besides. there will be two genera of pride. We may add that if dialectical disputation must not employ metaphors. the definition of similarity not unqualified but restricted to colours and to figures. or Achilles and Ajax were proud. It is also easier by this method to define the single species than the universal. We should next examine other cases. Indeed.g. we should find on inquiring what they all had in common. 316 . every definition is always universal and commensurate: the physician does not prescribe what is healthy for a single eye. Lysander. Achilles wrath. but for all eyes or for a determinate species of eye. if Alcibiades was proud. for example. e. and Ajax to suicide.

Then it is clear in virtue of what character B inheres in D – namely A – and that it inheres in C and E for the same reason: and throughout the remaining subgenera always the same rule applies. We are now taking our examples from the traditional classnames. 317 . if this first subgenus is bird. the essential properties of every bird – and so on. always characterizing the proximate subgenus. although these too possess common properties as if there were a single osseous nature. B the properties of every animal. or horse – possess their properties.g.properties belong to it. For example. they are animals. and an animal’s bone. as the common properties of horned animals we collect the possession of a third stomach and only one row of teeth. Then since it is clear in virtue of what character they possess these attributes – namely their horned character – the next question is. C D E various species of animal.g. The method of selection consists in laying down the common genus of all our subjects of investigation – if e.g. and then consider with what species it is connected and what. a fish’s spine.14 In order to formulate the connexions we wish to prove we have to select our analyses and divisions. we next lay down the properties essentially connected with the first of the remaining classes – e. We must collect any other common character which we observe. These established. we lay down what the properties are which inhere in every animal. to what species does the possession of horns attach? Yet a further method of selection is by analogy: for we cannot find a single identical name to give to a squid’s pounce. Let A be animal. This will clearly at once enable us to say in virtue of what character the subgenera – man. e. but we must not confine ourselves to considering these.

For example: Why does the Nile rise towards the end of the month? Because towards its close the month is more stormy. whether. and of the rainbow: the connexions to be proved which these questions embody are identical generically. let us say. but specifically they are different. in the former the earth’s interposition. the fall of 318 . there is present also the cause of the eclipse or of the fall of the leaves – the possession of broad leaves. For. for instance. 16 The question might be raised with regard to cause and effect whether when the effect is present the cause also is present. namely all those whose difference consists in their concerning different subjects or in their mode of manifestation. because all three are forms of repercussion. of reflection.15 Some connexions that require proof are identical in that they possess an identical ‘middle’ e. its effect will be at once implied by it – the eclipse by the earth’s interposition. Here the one cause is subordinate to the other. This latter class may be exemplified by the questions as to the causes respectively of echo.g. Other connexions that require proof only differ in that the ‘middle’ of the one is subordinate to the ‘middle’ of the other. in the latter case. a whole group might be proved through ‘reciprocal replacement’ – and of these one class are identical in genus. if this cause is not present. these phenomena will have some other cause: if it is present. one might argue. if a plant sheds its leaves or the moon is eclipsed. Why is the month more stormy towards its close? Because the moon is waning.

they cannot each be the cause of the other (for cause is prior to effect. then. can a single effect have more than one cause? One might argue as follows: if the same attribute is predicable of more than one thing as its primary subject. If. and B will be the cause of A’s inherence in D. that the eclipse is not the cause of the interposition. they will be logically coincident and each capable of proof through the other. Thus. is obvious because the interposition is an element in the definition of eclipse. F vine. let D be broad-leaved. C of A’s inherence in E.the leaves by the possession of broad leaves. A will then inhere in D and E. but the interposition of the eclipse. suggest that if the connexion to 319 . The presence of the cause thus necessitates that of the effect. But we can also demonstrate that the vine has broad leaves because it is deciduous. then A inheres in C (every vine is deciduous). let B be a primary subject in which A inheres. and the earth’s interposition is the cause of the moon’s eclipse and not the eclipse of the interposition) – if. On the other hand. demonstration through the cause is of the reasoned fact and demonstration not through the cause is of the bare fact. and the middle term B is the cause. Now if A inheres in B (for every broad-leaved plant is deciduous). B the possession of broad leaves. which shows that the eclipse is known through the interposition and not vice versa. but if so. and B in C (every vine possessing broad leaves). and D in E (for every deciduous plant has broad leaves): therefore every vine has broad leaves. and the cause is its deciduous character. however. Then E inheres in F (since every vine is deciduous). but the presence of the effect necessitates the presence not of all that may cause it but only of a cause which yet need not be the whole cause. and D and E primary subjects of B and C respectively. and C another primary subject of A. C vine. however. one who knows it through the eclipse knows the fact of the earth’s interposition but not the reasoned fact. We may. E deciduous. Moreover. Let me illustrate: Let A be deciduous character.

is both different and identical. for example. Now it is possible to consider the effect and its subject as an accidental conjunction. deciduous character will belong exclusively to a subject which is a whole. and when they are numbers. In all proportionals this is so. the middle will correspond to the extremes.e. Take the question why proportionals alternate. i. coagulation must be present. But if they are accepted as such. generically one if they are generically one. be convertible. if this whole has species. So in these universal and commensurate connexions the ‘middle’ and its effect must reciprocate.be proved is always universal and commensurate. For instance. Supposing. Again. and be equivocal if they are equivocal. different in so far as lines are lines and not numbers. not only will the cause be a whole but also the effect will be universal and commensurate. though such conjunctions would not be regarded as connexions demanding scientific proof. and. the cause of likeness between colour and colour is other than that 320 .e. either to all species of plant or to a single species. The cause when they are lines. and if coagulation is present – not in any subject but in a tree – then that tree must be deciduous. universally and commensurately to those species – i. then if a tree is deciduous. identical as involving a given determinate increment. 17 Can the cause of an identical effect be not identical in every instance of the effect but different? Or is that impossible? Perhaps it is impossible if the effect is demonstrated as essential and not as inhering in virtue of a symptom or an accident – because the middle is then the definition of the major term – though possible if the demonstration is not essential. that the reason why trees are deciduous is the coagulation of sap.

but it is coextensive with the species taken collectively (in this instance with all figures whose external angles are equal to four right angles). Again. and a premiss asserting it of the whole subject. the possession of external angles equal to four right angles is an attribute wider than triangle or are). and B of every species of D. We may illustrate as follows. for the middle is a definition of the major. because you will first reach a middle next the subject. And the middle likewise reciprocates.g. If an explanation in formal terms of the inter-relation of cause and effect is demanded. Let A be an attribute of all B. or something else of the sort. which is incidentally the reason why all the sciences are built up through definition. it is a definition of deciduous. in the case of colours identity of the act of perceiving them. and is of wider extent than fig: but it is not wider than but coextensive with the totality of the species. Then B will be a universal attribute of each species of D (since I call such an 321 . for likeness here is equivocal. and is at the same time of wider extent than vine. effect. The truth is that cause. and after that a middle – the coagulation of sap or something of the sort – proving the connexion of the first middle with the major: but it is the coagulation of sap at the junction of leaf-stalk and stem which defines deciduous. meaning perhaps in the latter case equality of the ratios of the sides and equality of the angles. connexions requiring proof which are identical by analogy middles also analogous. I say that. Then if you take the middle which is proximate. but so that both A and B are wider than their respective subjects. the effect is wider than the subject (e. and subject are reciprocally predicable in the following way. If the species are taken severally. Deciduous is a universal attribute of vine.between figure and figure. and of fig. we shall offer the following.

and I call an attribute primary universal if it is commensurate. not with each species severally but with their totality). and it extends beyond each of them taken separately. or the middle which is proximate to the species? Clearly the cause is that nearest to each species severally in which it is manifested. To illustrate formally: C is the cause of B’s inherence in D. united by possessing some common cause? This cause we must look for. For instance. the cause of longevity in quadrupeds is lack of bile. Thus. then. 18 If immediate premisses are not reached at once. all the species of E will be united by possessing some common cause other than B: otherwise how shall we be able to say that A is predicable of all of which E is predicable. hence 322 . otherwise why should B be the cause of A’s inherence in D any more than A the cause of B’s inherence in D? Now if A is an attribute of all the species of E. Let us call it C. but not in subjects specifically identical. as there was of A’s inherence in all the species of D? Then are the species of E. too. for that is the cause of the subject’s falling under the universal. is the cause of the property’s inherence in the several species the middle which is proximate to the primary universal. We conclude. i. while E is not predicable of all of which A can be predicated? I mean how can there fail to be some special cause of A’s inherence in E.attribute universal even if it is not commensurate. and there is not merely one middle but several middles.e. in birds a dry constitution – or certainly something different. that the same effect may have more than one cause. B is the cause of A’s inherence in the species of D: consequently A must be of wider extent than B. several causes.

and the conditions required to produce. Now it is strange if we possess them from birth. 19 As regards syllogism and demonstration. as we used to find in the case of demonstration. for it means that we possess apprehensions more accurate than demonstration and fail to notice them. whether the developed states of knowledge are not innate but come to be in us.C is the cause of A’s inherence in D. and the conditions required to produce each of them. nor can they come to be in us if we are without knowledge of them to the extent of having no 323 . demonstrative knowledge. So it emerges that neither can we possess them from birth. or scientific knowledge of the latter. how they become known and what is the developed state of knowledge of them is made clear by raising some preliminary problems. and of the former a different kind of knowledge. B of A’s inherence in C. or are innate but at first unnoticed. We have already said that scientific knowledge through demonstration is impossible unless a man knows the primary immediate premisses. and with that also the definition of. how could we apprehend and learn without a basis of pre-existent knowledge? For that is impossible. while the cause of A’s inherence in B is B itself. and. If on the other hand we acquire them and do not previously possess them. are now clear. But there are questions which might be raised in respect of the apprehension of these immediate premisses: one might not only ask whether it is of the same kind as the apprehension of the conclusions. since it is the same as demonstration. As to the basic premisses. but also whether there is or is not scientific knowledge of both. further. the definition of.

until the original formation has been restored.such developed state at all. though with insufficient clearness. but from sense-perception. and out of frequently repeated memories of the same thing develops experience. It is like a rout in battle stopped by first one man making a stand and then another. skill in the sphere of coming to be and science in the sphere of being. nor developed from other higher states of knowledge. Therefore we must possess a capacity of some sort. When one of a number of logically indiscriminable particulars has made a stand. the one beside the many which is a single identity within them all – originate the skill of the craftsman and the knowledge of the man of science. the earliest 324 . from the universal now stabilized in its entirety within the soul. The soul is so constituted as to be capable of this process. animals in which it does come into being have perception and can continue to retain the sense-impression in the soul: and when such persistence is frequently repeated a further distinction at once arises between those which out of the persistence of such sense-impressions develop a power of systematizing them and those which do not. So animals in which this persistence does not come to be have either no knowledge at all outside the act of perceiving. in some the sense-impression comes to persist. in others it does not. for they possess a congenital discriminative capacity which is called sense-perception. And this at least is an obvious characteristic of all animals. From experience again – i.e. But though sense-perception is innate in all animals. Let us now restate the account given already. or no knowledge of objects of which no impression persists. We conclude that these states of knowledge are neither innate in a determinate form. So out of sense-perception comes to be what we call memory. but not such as to rank higher in accuracy than these developed states. for a number of memories constitute a single experience.

while science as a whole is similarly related as originative source to the whole body of fact. Now of the thinking states by which we grasp truth. scientific knowledge of scientific knowledge. whereas scientific knowing and intuition are always true: further. and the process does not cease until the indivisible concepts. others admit of error – opinion. its content is universal – is man. Thus it is clear that we must get to know the primary premisses by induction. and all scientific knowledge is discursive. are established: e.universal is present in the soul: for though the act of senseperception is of the particular.If. and calculation. the true universals. for example. such and such a species of animal is a step towards the genus animal. for instance. for the method by which even sense-perception implants the universal is inductive. no other kind of thought except intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge. not the man Callias. therefore. A fresh stand is made among these rudimentary universals. it is the only other kind of true thinking except scientific knowing. 325 .g. intuition will be the originative source of scientific knowledge. it will be intuition that apprehends the primary premisses – a result which also follows from the fact that demonstration cannot be the originative source of demonstration. nor. From these considerations it follows that there will be no scientific knowledge of the primary premisses. some are unfailingly true. consequently. whereas primary premisses are more knowable than demonstrations. which by the same process is a step towards a further generalization. and since except intuition nothing can be truer than scientific knowledge. And the originative source of science grasps the original basic premiss.

or by the most notable and 326 . (a) It is a ‘demonstration’. or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premisses which are primary and true: (b) reasoning. those opinions are ‘generally accepted’ which are accepted by every one or by the majority or by the philosophers – i. on the other hand.e. Pickard-Cambridge] Book I 1 Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from opinions that are generally accepted about every problem propounded to us. and also shall ourselves. then. First. Things are ‘true’ and ‘primary’ which are believed on the strength not of anything else but of themselves: for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to ask any further for the why and wherefore of them. avoid saying anything that will obstruct us. and what its varieties are. in order to grasp dialectical reasoning: for this is the object of our search in the treatise before us. each of the first principles should command belief in and by itself. certain things being laid down. Now reasoning is an argument in which. A. by all.Aristotle – Topics [Translated by W. On the other hand. when standing up to an argument. something other than these necessarily comes about through them. or by the majority. if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted. we must say what reasoning is. when the premisses from which the reasoning starts are true and primary. is ‘dialectical’.

In general. but are not really such. For this form of reasoning appears to differ from the reasonings mentioned above. though appropriate to the science in question. Further (d). he does not assume opinions that are received either by every one or by the majority or by philosophers – that is to say. reasoning is ‘contentious’ if it starts from opinions that seem to be generally accepted. For he does not fall within the definition. For in none of the opinions which we call generally accepted is the illusion entirely on the surface. and as a rule even to persons with little power of comprehension. for the nature of the fallacy in these is obvious immediately. Again (c). by all. nor yet generally accepted. since it appears to reason. So then. in regard both to all that we have already discussed and to those which we shall discuss later. but does not really do so. or again if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted. are not true. as happens in the case of the principles of contentious arguments. because it is not our purpose to give the exact definition 327 . the man who draws a false figure reasons from things that are neither true and primary. of the contentious reasonings mentioned. the former really deserves to be called ‘reasoning’ as well.illustrious of them. but not ‘reasoning’. or by the most illustrious of them – but he conducts his reasoning upon assumptions which. The foregoing must stand for an outline survey of the species of reasoning. as happens (for example) in the case of geometry and her sister sciences. or by most. but the other should be called ‘contentious reasoning’. for he effects his mis-reasoning either by describing the semicircles wrongly or by drawing certain lines in a way in which they could not be drawn. we may remark that that amount of distinction between them may serve. For not every opinion that seems to be generally accepted actually is generally accepted. besides all the reasonings we have mentioned there are the mis-reasonings that start from the premisses peculiar to the special sciences.

2 Next in order after the foregoing. we shall meet them on the ground not of other people’s convictions but of their own. For purposes of casual encounters.of any of them. while we shift the ground of any argument that they appear to us to state unsoundly. we consider it quite enough from the point of view of the line of inquiry before us to be able to recognize each of them in some sort of way. That it is useful as a training is obvious on the face of it. because the ability to raise searching difficulties on both sides of a subject will make us detect more easily the truth and error about the several points that arise. or most appropriately. and this task belongs properly. casual encounters. 328 . and the philosophical sciences. It has a further use in relation to the ultimate bases of the principles used in the several sciences. we must say for how many and for what purposes the treatise is useful. They are three – intellectual training. it is useful because when we have counted up the opinions held by most people. For it is impossible to discuss them at all from the principles proper to the particular science in hand. For the study of the philosophical sciences it is useful. seeing that the principles are the prius of everything else: it is through the opinions generally held on the particular points that these have to be discussed. The possession of a plan of inquiry will enable us more easily to argue about the subject proposed. to dialectic: for dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries. we merely want to describe them in outline.

should be ranked together with the genus. we must see of what parts our inquiry consists. makes it clear that according to our present division. and with what materials they start. let us divide the ‘peculiar’ into both the aforesaid parts. and speak of it as a ‘property’. if he omits none of the available means. applying as it does to a class (or genus). however. while the subjects on which reasonings take place are ‘problems’. the 329 . and are identical. and what kind of. Now the materials with which arguments start are equal in number. things arguments take place. 4 First. we should have sufficiently won our goal. and (b) how we are to become well supplied with these. or the doctor to heal. Since. while part does not. with the subjects on which reasonings take place. of what is peculiar to anything part signifies its essence. still. For it is not every method that the rhetorician will employ to persuade. For arguments start with ‘propositions’.3 We shall be in perfect possession of the way to proceed when we are in a position like that which we occupy in regard to rhetoric and medicine and faculties of that kind: this means the doing of that which we choose with the materials that are available. while of the remainder let us adopt the terminology which is generally current about these things. What we have said. we shall say that his grasp of the science is adequate. Now every proposition and every problem indicates either a genus or a peculiarity or an accident – for the differentia too. then. then. and call that part which indicates the essence a ‘definition’. Now if we were to grasp (a) with reference to how many.

use the word ‘definitory’ also of such a remark as ‘The «becoming» is «beautiful»‘. Naturally. is it not?’ the result is a proposition: but if thus. is it not?’ or ‘«Animal» is the genus of man. ‘Are sensation and knowledge the same or different?’. namely either property or definition or genus or accident. however. and ‘accident’. and that all the above-mentioned 330 . One may. Similarly too in other cases. ‘genus’. A ‘definition’ is a phrase signifying a thing’s essence.elements turn out to be four. In a word we may call ‘definitory’ everything that falls under the same branch of inquiry as definitions. then. for it is sometimes possible to define the meaning of a phrase as well. try it as they may. Do not let any one suppose us to mean that each of these enunciated by itself constitutes a proposition or problem. ‘property’. all told. People whose rendering consists of a term only. For if it be put in this way. The difference between a problem and a proposition is a difference in the turn of the phrase. but only that it is from these that both problems and propositions are formed. because a definition is always a phrase of a certain kind. problems and propositions are equal in number: for out of every proposition you will make a problem if you change the turn of the phrase. and likewise also of the question. or of a phrase in lieu of another phrase. «‘An animal that walks on two feet» is the definition of man. ‘Is «an animal that walks on two feet» a definition of man or no?’ [or ‘Is «animal» his genus or no?’] the result is a problem. 5 We must now say what are ‘definition’. for argument about definitions is mostly concerned with questions of sameness and difference. clearly do not render the definition of the thing in question. It is rendered in the form either of a phrase in lieu of a term.

A ‘property’ is a predicate which does not indicate the essence of a thing. however. in the case of man. it is appropriate to say ‘He is an animal’. A ‘genus’ is what is predicated in the category of essence of a number of things exhibiting differences in kind. That is to say. Thus it is a property of man to-be-capable of learning grammar: for if A be a man. even though at a certain time it may happen to belong to him alone. For no one calls anything a ‘property’ which may possibly belong to something else. and if he be capable of learning grammar. e. if asked that question. as. please. that they are not the same is enough of itself to overthrow it.g. The question. while ‘two-footed’ is in point of fact ascribed as a property in certain relations. ‘Is one thing in the same genus as another or in a 331 . then he is capable of learning grammar. To show. but a ‘temporary’ or a ‘relative’ property: for ‘being on the right hand side’ is a temporary property. ‘What is the object before you?’.g. we shall be well supplied by the same turn of argument with lines of attack upon their definitions as well: for when we have shown that they are not the same we shall have demolished the definition. ‘sleep’ in the case of man. Observe. but yet belongs to that thing alone. for example. it is a property of man relatively to a horse and a dog. it will be called not a ‘property’ absolutely. That nothing which may belong to anything else than A is a convertible predicate of A is clear: for it does not necessarily follow that if something is asleep it is a man. that the converse of this last statement does not hold: for to show that they are the same is not enough to establish a definition. if any such thing were actually to be called a property. We should treat as predicates in the category of essence all such things as it would be appropriate to mention in reply to the question.examples are of this character is clear on the face of them. he is a man. and is predicated convertibly of it. e. For if we are able to argue that two things are the same or are different.

we shall have argued that these things are not in the same genus. Of the definitions of accident the second is the better: for if he adopts the first. For in all such cases the question is ‘to which of the two does the predicate in question happen (accidit) to belong more closely?’ It is clear on the face of it that there is nothing to prevent an accident from becoming a temporary or relative property. the question. ‘Is the honourable or the expedient preferable?’ and ‘Is the life of virtue or the life of self-indulgence the pleasanter?’. for example. neither a definition nor a property nor a genus yet belongs to the thing: (something which may possibly either belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing. if he is to understand it. any one is bound. and any other problem which may happen to be phrased in terms like these. though it is none of the foregoing – i.) the ‘sitting posture’ may belong or not belong to some selfsame thing. and at another not white. So then. it is still a property relatively to those who are not sitting. such as. to know already what ‘definition’ and ‘genus’ and ‘property’ are.e. there is nothing to prevent an accident from becoming both a 332 . Thus the sitting posture is an accident. we shall have argued that they are in the same genus. for a question of that kind as well falls under the same branch of inquiry as the genus: for having argued that ‘animal’ is the genus of man. An ‘accident’ is (i) something which. for there is nothing to prevent the same thing being at one time white. but will be a temporary property.g. when expressed in language that is drawn in any kind of way from what happens (accidit) to be true of them. whenever a man is the only person sitting. To Accident are to be attached also all comparisons of things together.different one?’ is also a ‘generic’ question. while if he be not the only one sitting. Likewise also ‘whiteness’. whereas if we show that it is the genus of the one but not of the other. as (e. and likewise also of ox. whereas the second is sufficient of itself to tell us the essential meaning of the term in question.

333 . The questions I mean have practically been already assigned to their several branches.relative and a temporary property. as was said before. and then. So then. we shall have demolished the definition. and other questions we must relegate each to the particular branch to which it most naturally belongs.’ we must outline a division of our subject. so that. it would be very obscure indeed. starting from the rules that are appropriate in each case. or that the genus rendered in the definition is not the true genus. even were one found. For when we have shown that the attribute in question fails to belong only to the term defined. speaking of them as ‘definitory’ and ‘generic’ questions. it will probably be easier to make our way right through the task before us.’ all the points we have enumerated might in a certain sense be called ‘definitory’. 6 We must not fail to observe that all remarks made in criticism of a ‘property’ and ‘genus’ and ‘accident’ will be applicable to ‘definitions’ as well. Rather. a special plan of inquiry must be laid down for each of the classes we have distinguished. as would be remarked also in the case of an accident. to use the phrase previously employed. But we must not on this account expect to find a single line of inquiry which will apply universally to them all: for this is not an easy thing to find. as we do also in the case of a property. and of little service for the treatise before us. but a property absolutely it will never be. or that any of the things mentioned in the phrase used does not belong. and.

For the reaon why all water is said to be specifically the same as all other water is because of a certain likeness it bears to it.g. its most literal and primary use is found whenever the sameness is rendered in reference to an alternative name or definition. that the likeness is more emphatic: that is why we do not distinguish it from the things that in one way or another are called ‘the same’ in view of unity of species.7 First of all we must define the number of senses borne by the term ‘Sameness’. but they present no differences in respect of their species. For all such things seem to be of one family and to resemble one another. It might appear that the sense in which water from the same spring is called ‘the same water’ is somehow different and unlike the senses mentioned above: but really such a case as this ought to be ranked in the same class with the things that in one way or another are called ‘the same’ in view of unity of species. into three divisions. It is generally supposed that the term ‘the same’ is most used in a sense agreed on by every one when applied to what is numerically one. specifically. too. Similarly. But even so. those things are called generically the same which fall under the same genus. roughly speaking. Sameness would be generally regarded as falling. We generally apply the term numerically or specifically or generically – numerically in cases where there is more than one name but only one thing. as when a cloak is said to be the same as a doublet. or one horse and another: for things like this that fall under the same species are said to be ‘specifically the same’. and the only difference in the case of water drawn from the same spring is this. or an animal that walks on two feet is said to be the same as a man: a second sense is when it is rendered in reference to a property. ‘doublet’ and ‘cloak’. such as a horse and a man. as when what can acquire knowledge is called the 334 . where there is more than one thing. as one man and another. e. it is apt to be rendered in more than one sense.

it would be its definition or property. he will. indicating him by name. if not.’ three senses are to be distinguished. so we bid him call to us ‘the man who is sitting’ or ‘who is conversing over there’ – clearly supposing ourselves to be indicating the same object by its name and by its accident. For all these uses mean to signify numerical unity.same as a man. Now one way to confirm that the elements mentioned above are those out of which and through which and to which arguments proceed. is by induction: for if any one were to survey propositions and problems one by one. we change our description. Another way to confirm it is through reasoning. on the other hand. what is predicated convertibly. That what I have just said is true may be best seen where one form of appellation is substituted for another. is called the same as Socrates. and what naturally travels upward the same as fire: while a third use is found when it is rendered in reference to some term drawn from Accident. as has been said. For often when we give the order to call one of the people who are sitting down. For every predicate of a subject must of necessity be either convertible with its subject or not: and if it is convertible. but does not signify the essence. as when the creature who is sitting. 8 Of ‘sameness’ then. it either is or is not one of the terms 335 . it is a property: for this was what a property is. If. or who is musical. we think. it is the definition. it would be seen that each was formed either from the definition of something or from its property or from its genus or from its accident. for if it signifies the essence. it is not predicated convertibly of the thing. whenever the person to whom we give the order happens not to understand us. understand better from some accidental feature. viz.

if a magnitude of a cubit be set before him and he says that what is set there is a magnitude of a cubit. sometimes a quality. Time. he will be describing its essence and signifying a quantity. one kind of predicate is asserted of another kind. also. sometimes some one of the other types of predicate. he states its essence and signifies a quality. on the other hand. Activity. Likewise. if either it be asserted of itself. if it be not one of those terms. for accident was said’ to be what belongs as an attribute to a subject without being either its definition or its genus or a property. we must distinguish between the classes of predicates in which the four orders in question are found. it does 336 . These are ten in number: Essence. in the other cases: for each of these kinds of predicate. clearly it would be an accident. he states its essence and signifies a substance. Relation. 9 Next. on the face of it that the man who signifies something’s essence signifies sometimes a substance. too. State. signifies an essence: if. also. Quality. then. Place. Passivity. For the accident and genus and property and definition of anything will always be in one of these categories: for all the propositions found through these signify either something’s essence or its quality or quantity or some one of the other types of predicate. It is clear. then it will be the genus or the differentia. Quantity. Likewise. inasmuch as the definition consists of genus and differentiae. or its genus be asserted of it. For when man is set before him and he says that what is set there is ‘a man’ or ‘an animal’. whereas. Position.contained in the definition of the subject: and if it be one of those terms. but when a white colour is set before him and he says that what is set there is ‘white’ or is ‘a colour’.

10 First. Now a dialectical proposition consists in asking something that is held by all men or by most men or by the philosophers. it might pass for a general opinion that there is but one science of fluteplaying as well. or by most.e. while to the former no one would assent. supposing it to be a general opinion that the knowledge of contraries is the same. then. whereas. i. also propositions which contradict the contraries of opinions that are taken to be generally accepted. are the subjects on which arguments take place. for a man would probably assent to the view of the philosophers.not signify an essence. a definition must be given of a ‘dialectical proposition’ and a ‘dialectical problem’. it might probably pass for a general opinion also that the perception of contraries is the same: also. and so many. but a quantity or a quality or one of the other kinds of predicate. and also all opinions that are in accordance with the recognized arts. if it be not contrary to the opinions of most men. Dialectical propositions also include views which are like those generally accepted. supposing it to be a general opinion that there is but one single science of grammar. and the materials with which they start. if it be a general opinion that there is 337 . How we are to acquire them. or by the most notable of these. provided it be not contrary to the general opinion. then. Thus. and by what means we are to become well supplied with them. nor yet make a problem of what is obvious to everybody or to most people: for the latter admits of no doubt. For it is not every proposition nor yet every problem that is to be set down as dialectical: for no one in his senses would make a proposition of what no one holds. either by all. Such. falls next to be told.

g. Also. Clearly also. that one ought to do harm to one’s friends is contrary to the general view. Likewise. it will also be a general opinion that one ought not to do them harm. it might pass for a general opinion that there is more than one science of flute-playing as well: for all these seem to be alike and akin. and that either by itself. and that one ought not to do them harm is the contradictory of that contrary. Likewise.g. Here. on a question of medicine they will agree with the doctor. or as a help to the solution of some other 338 . it will look like a general opinion that the contrary predicate belongs to the contrary subject: e. 11 A dialectical problem is a subject of inquiry that contributes either to choice and avoidance. if one ought to do good to one’s friends. and on a question of geometry with the geometrician. one ought also to do evil to one’s enemies. on comparison. e. or to truth and knowledge. all opinions that are in accordance with the arts are dialectical propositions. for people are likely to assent to the views held by those who have made a study of these things. also. also. the contrary being that one ought to do good to one’s enemies. propositions contradicting the contraries of general opinions will pass as general opinions: for if it be a general opinion that one ought to do good to one’s friends.more than one science of grammar. one ought not to do good to one’s enemies: this too is the contradictory of the view contrary to the general view. and likewise also in other cases. Likewise also. if one ought to do good to one’s friends. in other cases. it might appear also as if doing good to one’s friends were a contrary to doing evil to one’s enemies: but whether this is or is not so in reality as well will be stated in the course of the discussion upon contraries.

g. others also in regard to which we have no argument because they are so vast. 339 . or the view of Heraclitus that all things are in motion. For even if a man does not accept this view. For some problems it is useful to know with a view to choice or avoidance. Problems. e. again. then. be something on which either people hold no opinion either way. or being so eternally. whether pleasure is to be chosen or not. the view maintained by the sophists that what is need not in every case either have come to be or be eternal: for a musician who is a grammarian ‘is’ so without ever having ‘come to be’ so. It must.g. the question whether the universe is eternal or no: for into questions of that kind too it is possible to inquire. or each of them among themselves.g. e.g. moreover. and we find it difficult to give our reasons. and propositions are to be defined as aforesaid. are not useful in and by themselves for either of these purposes. A ‘thesis’ is a supposition of some eminent philosopher that conflicts with the general opinion. Problems also include questions in regard to which reasonings conflict (the difficulty then being whether so – and so is so or not. e. or that Being is one. e. in order that through them we may come to know something else. but for the sake of other things. whether the universe is eternal or not: others. or the philosophers to the masses.such problem. or the masses hold a contrary opinion to the philosophers. but yet help us in regard to some such problems. he might do so on the ground that it is reasonable. there being convincing arguments for both views). as Melissus says: for to take notice when any ordinary person expresses views contrary to men’s usual opinions would be silly. while some it is useful to know merely with a view to knowledge.g. the view that contradiction is impossible. e. for there are many things which we do not wish to know in and by themselves. Or it may be a view about which we have a reasoned theory contrary to men’s usual opinions. as Antisthenes said.

while those who are puzzled to know whether snow is white or not need perception. nor every thesis. 12 Having drawn these definitions. on the other Reasoning. nor yet be too far removed from it: for the former cases admit of no doubt.g. though a problem is not always a thesis. but only one which might puzzle one of those who need argument. For people who are puzzled to know whether one ought to honour the gods and love one’s parents or not need punishment. Practically all dialectical problems indeed are now called ‘theses’. not punishment or perception. however. while the latter involve difficulties too great for the art of the trainer. or that the one or the other class disagree among themselves. There is on the one hand Induction. Not every problem. should be examined. is clear: for it follows of necessity from what has been said that either the mass of men disagree with the philosophers about the thesis. for our object in thus distinguishing them has not been to create a terminology.Now a ‘thesis’ also is a problem. the argument that supposing the skilled pilot is 340 . That a thesis. e. The subjects should not border too closely upon the sphere of demonstration. inasmuch as some problems are such that we have no opinion about them either way. seeing that the thesis is a supposition in conflict with general opinion. but to recognize what differences happen to be found between them. But it should make no difference whichever description is used. also forms a problem. we must distinguish how many species there are of dialectical arguments. Now what reasoning is has been said before: induction is a passage from individuals to universals.

and likewise the skilled charioteer. and (3) The relation of the healthy to health is like that of the vigorous to vigour’. and is applicable generally to the mass of men. (2) the power to distinguish in how many senses particular expression is used. (3) the discovery of the differences of things. then in general the skilled man is the best at his particular task. while the former cannot’. arguments are constructed.g. The means whereby we are to become well supplied with reasonings are four: (1) the securing of propositions.the most effective. as well. (1) ‘The desirable may mean either the honourable or the pleasant or the expedient’. The last three. of things about which. the second upon the differences of things. though reasoning is more forcible and effective against contradictious people. Induction is the more convincing and clear: it is more readily learnt by the use of the senses. then. 341 . are to be distinguished in the way we have said before. The first proposition depends upon the use of one term in several senses. and (2) Sensation differs from knowledge in that the latter may be recovered again after it has been lost. (4) the investigation of likeness. e. 13 The classes. are in a certain sense propositions: for it is possible to make a proposition corresponding to each of them. the third upon their likenesses. and of things out of which.

Propositions such as the following are ethical. and. for in hearing we admit something into ourselves. We should select also from the written handbooks of argument. ‘The perception of contraries is the same’ – the knowledge of them being so – and ‘we see by admission of something into ourselves. for so it is. or opinions contrary to those that seem to be generally held.14 Propositions should be selected in a number of ways corresponding to the number of distinctions drawn in regard to the proposition: thus one may first take in hand the opinions held by all or by most men or by the philosophers. In the margin. not by an emission’. ‘Empedocles said that the elements of bodies were four’: for any one might assent to the saying of some generally accepted authority. should be taken as a principle or accepted position. beginning with the category of essence. as was laid down before. or most. We must make propositions also of the contradictories of opinions contrary to those that seem to be generally held. or the most notable of them.g. and we taste in the same way. again. for they are posited by those who do not also see what exception there may be. we do not emit. ‘On Good’. too.g.g. too. e. and should draw up sketch-lists of them upon each several kind of subject. e. by all.g. some are on natural philosophy. all statements that seem to be true in all or in most cases. e. while some are logical. 342 . in the case of the other senses. Likewise also in the other cases. Of propositions and problems there are – to comprehend the matter in outline – three divisions: for some are ethical propositions. but also those that are like these. putting them down under separate headings. It is useful also to make them by selecting not only those opinions that actually are accepted. Moreover.e. e. one should indicate also the opinions of individual thinkers. or ‘On Life’ – and that ‘On Good’ should deal with every form of good. all opinions that are in accordance with the arts. i.

g.g. but we must also try to render their definitions. The nature of each of the aforesaid kinds of proposition is not easily rendered in a definition. e. and that what conduces to vigour and what conduces to health are called so in another. Likewise also in other cases. then. but also that the former are so called because of a certain intrinsic quality they themselves have.g. next.g. As regards the number of senses a term bears. and that ‘of relative terms’. In the same way these two should again be divided. 15 On the formation. of ‘white and black’. the one should be made into many. examining them in the light of the illustrations given above. but we have to try to recognize each of them by means of the familiarity attained through induction. ‘Is the knowledge of opposites the same or not?’.‘Ought one rather to obey one’s parents or the laws. we must not merely say that justice and courage are called ‘good’ in one sense. as long as division is possible. then.g. e. ‘The knowledge of contraries is the same’. e. the latter because they are productive of a certain result 343 . but for dialectic only with an eye to general opinion. E. if they disagree?’. For purposes of philosophy we must treat of these things according to their truth. such as this are logical. of propositions. the above remarks are enough. the knowledge of ‘good and evil’. we must not only treat of those terms which bear different senses. ‘Is the universe eternal or not?’ Likewise also with problems. e. ‘The knowledge of opposites is the same’. or ‘cold and hot’. All propositions should be taken in their most universal form. while such as this are on natural philosophy.

g. but in the latter case we judge by sight. Again Barhu (‘flat’. For here again there is no discrepancy in the names used. as applied to a house. Whether a term bears a number of specific meanings or one only.and not because of any intrinsic quality in themselves. but in the former by taste. ‘fine’ as applied to a picture has ‘ugly’ as its contrary. ‘heavy’) in the case of a note has ‘sharp’ as its contrary. may be considered by the following means. the contrary of ‘sharp’ bears several meanings. just as ‘colour’ is too. in the 344 . First. for corresponding to each of the former terms the meaning of its contrary will be different. though ‘sharp’ is the contrary of each. Likewise. then. Similarly also in other cases. but the difference in kind between the meanings is at once obvious: for colour is not called ‘clear’ in a like sense to sound. In some cases there is no discrepancy of any sort in the names used. This is plain also through sensation: for of things that are the same in kind we have the same sensation. but a difference of kind between the meanings is at once obvious: e. look and see if its contrary bears a number of meanings. inasmuch as its contrary also is so used. so that Barhu is used with a number of meanings. but in the case of a solid mass ‘light’. there is no discrepancy. ‘ramshackle’. As regards the names. whether the discrepancy between them be one of kind or one of names. also. also does ‘sharp’. in the former by hearing.g. e. For ‘sharp’ will not be the same when contrary to ‘dull’ and to ‘flat’. Likewise also with ‘sharp’ and ‘dull’ in regard to flavours and solid edges: here in the latter case we judge by touch. and if so. the contrary of ‘sharp’ in the case of a note is ‘flat’. so that ‘fine’ is an ambiguous term. in the case of ‘clear’ and ‘obscure’: for sound is called ‘clear’ and ‘obscure’. but. Clearly. then. For in some cases a difference is at once displayed even in the names. whereas we do not judge clearness by the same sensation in the case of sound and of colour. while in the case of a solid edge it is ‘dull’.

others have none. while others have but one. the opposite is to put it to active use. then the opposite of it also will be used in more than one meaning. look and see if it bears more than one meaning. is an ambiguous term. e. e. e. whereas in regard to sound there is but one. or. then.case either of the original terms or of their contraries: for the contrary also of sharp in either sense is ‘dull’. ‘Clear’. e. if some meanings and their contraries have an intermediate.g. and likewise also ‘obscure’. it is ‘harsh’. as is the case with ‘clear’ and ‘obscure’. viz. therefore. while as used of the physical activity (kissing) it has none: clearly. for in the case of colours there are numbers of intermediates. while another has absolutely none. (2) to fail to put that power to active use. viz.g. so that ‘pleasure’ is used in more than one sense. (1) to fail to possess the power of sight. Moreover. whereas the pleasure of seeing that the diagonal is incommensurate with the side has none. in the case of the contradictory opposite. it follows necessarily that ‘to see’ also has more than one meaning: for there will be an opposite to each sense of ‘to fail to see’. while of ‘not to put the power of sight to active use’. 345 . Again. if they have.g. whereas in the case of sound they have none. if some of them have more than one intermediate. see in regard to their intermediates. Further. used of the frame of mind. But if this has more than one meaning. For if this bears more than one meaning. moreover. or if both have one but not the same one. ‘to fail to see’ a phrase with more than one meaning.g. see if one sense of a term has a contrary. the pleasure of drinking has a contrary in the pain of thirst. to ‘love’ is an ambiguous term. To ‘love’ also. has to ‘hate’ as its contrary. ‘clear’ and ‘obscure’ in the case of colours have ‘grey’ as an intermediate. the opposite of ‘not to possess the power of sight’ is to possess it. See. ‘harsh’. as some people say that a harsh sound is intermediate.

e. then ‘healthily’ also will be used to mean ‘in such a way as to produce’ or ‘preserve’ or ‘betoken’ health. then so will the remaining term: e. as applied to the soul and to the body. In the same way also.g.g. then ‘healthily’ also will be used with more than one meaning: e. For if they are not the same. if ‘to have sense’ be used with more than one meaning. examine the case of terms that denote the privation or presence of a certain state: for if the one term bears more than one meaning. Sometimes it signifies what happens at a certain time. then ‘to be wanting in sense’ too will be used with more than one meaning.g. Likewise also in other cases. temperate or courageous or just: and likewise also. and in the case of medicine ‘productive of health’. also. if ‘healthy’ describes both what produces health and what preserves health and what betokens health. Moreover. whereas as applied to the soul it means to be of a certain quality. then ‘just’.g. ‘good’ in the case of food means ‘productive of pleasure’.g. if the word ‘justly’ be used of judging according to one’s own opinion. if ‘healthy’ has more than one meaning. since animals naturally possess each kind of ‘sense’. and see if they are the same in all cases. e. Look also at the classes of the predicates signified by the term. and also of judging as one ought.g.Moreover. and vice versa. will be used with more than one meaning. both as applied to the soul and as applied to the body. whenever the original term bears more than one meaning. as (e. For if ‘justly’ has more than one meaning. examine the inflected forms. That the opposition between the terms now in question depends upon the privation or presence of a certain state is clear. the inflexion also that is formed from it will be used with more than one meaning. as applied to the soul and to the body.) the good that 346 . as applied to ‘man’. for there will be a meaning of ‘just’ to each of the meanings of ‘justly’. then clearly the term is ambiguous: e. then ‘just’ also will be used in like manner.

while a sharp dagger is one containing a sharp angle (point). In the same way also ‘clear’.g. as the mathematical theorists of harmony tell us. too. Likewise also whenever we call the raven a ‘flying biped animal’. For the definition of them that corresponds to the name is different: for the one will be declared to be an animal of a certain kind. however. both the genera are predicated of raven. clearly the term before you does so as well. whereas a sharp (acute) angle is one that is less than a right angle. so that both the genera are predicated of it. as applied to a body. e. Often it signifies what is of certain quantity. and also their definition. as applied to the proper amount: for the proper amount too is called good. but in regard to a note it denotes what is ‘easy to hear’. nor vice versa. as (e. 347 . then. and the other to be an engine of a certain kind. Look also and see not only if the genera of the term before you are different without being subaltern. So then the term ‘good’ is ambiguous. the genera be subaltern. signifies a colour. which denotes both the animal and the engine. is in a closely similar case: for the same term does not bear the same meaning in all its applications: for a sharp note is a swift note.) ‘animal’ is the genus of ‘raven’.) ‘donkey’. But in the case of genera that are not subaltern this does not happen.happens at the right time: for what happens at the right time is called good. we do not call it an animal. Look also at the genera of the objects denoted by the same term. If. we also say that it is a certain kind of animal. but also in the case of its contrary: for if its contrary bears several senses. ‘Sharp’. and so is ‘bird’. as well. Thus (e. Whenever therefore we say that the raven is a bird.g.g. and see if they are different without being subaltern. for whenever we call a thing an ‘engine’. there is no necessity for the definitions to be different. we declare it to be a bird: in this way.

see if the terms cannot be compared as ‘more or less’ or as ‘in like manner’. white) sound and a ‘clear’ garment.g. for they will always be used either in like manner. however. For then if what is peculiar in each case be abstracted. This does not happen in the case of ambiguous terms. if in the latter case it means that ‘it is of the right amount to produce health’.g. have been had the meaning of ‘clear’ in each case been synonymous. e. those of ‘animal’ and ‘knowledge’ (for the differentiae of these are different). ‘Clear’. white) body’ of a ‘clear note’.g. ‘a body ‘and’ a note’. whereas in the for it means that ‘it is such as to betoken what kind of state prevails’. of a ‘clear (lit. For neither are these things said to be clear or sharp ‘in a like degree’.g. Moreover. e. If (e. For the former will be body possessing such and such a colour’. as is the case (e. Now since of genera that are different without being subaltern the differentiae also are different in kind. Often in the actual definitions as well ambiguity creeps in unawares. the same expression ought to remain over. It should.) any one describes what betokens and what produces health as ‘related commensurably to health’. and a ‘sharp’ flavour and a ‘sharp’ note. Abstract. then.g.It is useful also to look at the definition that arises from the use of the term in combination. and the remainder in each case is not the same.g. e.) with a ‘clear’ (lit. while the latter will be ‘a note easy to hear’. look and see if the meanings comprised under the same term are 348 . and ‘sharp’ are ambiguous. we must not desist but go on to examine in what sense he has used the term ‘commensurably’ in each case. then. in the cases just mentioned. or else in a greater degree in one case. For synonyms are always comparable. e. nor yet is the one said to be clearer or sharper than the other. and for this reason the definitions also should be examined.

‘colour’ in bodies and ‘colour’ in tunes: for the differentiae of ‘colour’ in bodies are ‘sight-piercing’ and ‘sight compressing’. Colour. e. white) as applied to a body is a species of colour. the differences are entirely obvious. for things that are the same have the same differentiae.differentiae of genera that are different without being subaltern. e. ‘Sharp’. of a number of meanings in a term may be investigated by these and like means. Again.g. provided they be not very much too far apart. and also from one genus to another. e. as (e.g.g. as e. is an ambiguous term: for it forms differentiae of genera that are different without being subaltern. ‘Wherein does sensation differ from knowledge?: for in the case of genera that are very far apart.g. then. whereas ‘colour’ in melodies has not the same differentiae. is an ambiguous term. look and see if one of the meanings included under the same term be a species and another a differentia.g. for one note is differentiated from another by being ‘clear’. 16 The presence. 349 . The differences which things present to each other should be examined within the same genera. see if the actual meanings included under the same term themselves have different differentiae.) clear’ (lit. For being ‘sharp’ differentiates note from note. then. and likewise also one solid from another. and wisdom from temperance?’ – for all these belong to the same genus. since the species is never the differentia of anything. ‘sharp’ is of a ‘note’ and a ‘solid’. ‘Wherein does justice differ from courage. then. whereas in the case of a note it is a differentia. Moreover.

we shall be more easily able to see in one glance the points of likeness. the formulae being ‘A:B = C:D’ (e. and as is a calm in the sea. in so far they are alike. so is windlessness in the air). and also upon which of them the former directs his mind when he makes his assertion. 18 It is useful to have examined the number of meanings of a term both for clearness’ sake (for a man is more likely to know what it is he asserts.17 Likeness should be studied. so is reason in the soul. for in so far as they have any identical attribute. e. For as long as it is not clear in how many senses a term is used.g. for in the case of the rest.g. so is sensation related to the object of sensation). to a man and a horse and a dog. if it bas been made clear to him how many meanings it may have). so is C in D’ (e. and also with a view to ensuring that our reasonings shall be in accordance with the actual facts and not addressed merely to the term used. first. and ‘As A is in B. it is possible that the answerer and the questioner are not directing their minds upon the same thing: whereas when once it has been made clear how many meanings there are. as sight is in the eye. to see if any identical attribute belongs to them all. Practice is more especially needed in regard to terms that are far apart. in the case of things belonging to different genera.g. the 350 . We should also look at things which belong to the same genus. as knowledge stands to the object of knowledge.

The discovery of the differences of things helps us both in reasonings about sameness and difference. however. with regard 351 . and also in recognizing what any particular thing is. if our answerer happens not to know the number of meanings of our terms. If. is not possible in all cases. but only when of the many senses some are true and others are false. because it is by means of an induction of individuals in cases that are alike that we claim to bring the universal in evidence: for it is not easy to do this if we do not know the points of likeness. dialecticians should therefore by all means beware of this kind of verbal discussion.questioner would then look ridiculous if he failed to address his argument to this. unless any one is absolutely unable to discuss the subject before him in any other way. but shall know if the questioner fails to address his argument to the same point. we shall certainly never be misled by false reasoning. That it helps us in reasoning about sameness and difference is clear: for when we have discovered a difference of any kind whatever between the objects before us. does not belong properly to dialectic. The examination of likeness is useful with a view both to inductive arguments and to hypothetical reasonings. It helps us also both to avoid being misled and to mislead by false reasoning: for if we know the number of meanings of a term. This manner of argument. and also with a view to the rendering of definitions. then. It is useful for inductive arguments. because we usually distinguish the expression that is proper to the essence of each particular thing by means of the differentiae that are proper to it. however. It is useful for hypothetical reasonings because it is a general opinion that among similars what is true of one is true also of the rest. and when we ourselves put the questions we shall be able to mislead him. This. we shall already have shown that they are not the same: while it helps us in recognizing what a thing is.

It is useful for the rendering of definitions because. the sameness of a calm at sea. the examination of likeness is useful for purposes of definition. we shall secure a preliminary admission that however it is in these cases. so it is also in the case before us. then. we shall get the credit of defining not inappropriately. and windlessness in the air (each being a form of rest).to any of them we are well supplied with matter for a discussion. then. 352 . if we are able to see in one glance what is the same in each individual case of it. and of a point on a line and the unit in number – each being a starting point. It is clear. for the observance of which the aforesaid means are useful. Likewise. If. whereby reasonings are effected. are as follows. the matter before us as well: for we have first made the hypothesis that however it is in these cases. also. we render as the genus what is common to all the cases. in the case of objects widely divergent. Definition-mongers too nearly always render them in this way: they declare the unit to be the startingpoint of number. e. and the point the startingpoint of a line.g. we shall be at no loss into what genus we ought to put the object before us when we define it: for of the common predicates that which is most definitely in the category of essence is likely to be the genus. and have then proved the point as regards these cases. The means. so it is also in the case before us: then when we have shown the former we shall have shown. are these: the commonplace rules. that they place them in that which is common to both as their genus. on the strength of the hypothesis. then.

for if ‘to be an animal is an attribute of S’. For none of these attributes can possibly belong or not belong in part. because such are common to both universal and particular problems. First. Likewise. Likewise. if we show that it does not belong in any case. if drawn from the genus. others particular. for in the case of accidents and in no other it is possible for something to be true conditionally and not universally. e. for if ‘to be capable of learning grammar is an attribute of S’. also. we shall also have shown that it belongs in some cases.Book II 1 Of problems some are universal. and because people more usually introduce theses asserting a predicate than denying it. then it will be true by conversion to say that ‘S is an animal that walks on two feet’. then. The conversion of an appropriate name which is drawn from the element ‘accident’ is an extremely precarious thing. Names drawn from the elements ‘definition’ and ‘property’ and ‘genus’ are bound to be convertible. The methods of establishing and overthrowing a view universally are common to both kinds of problems. 353 . In the case of accidents. The same is true also in the case of a property. particular problems are such as ‘Some pleasure is good’ and ‘Some pleasure is not good’. they must either belong or not belong absolutely. we shall also have shown that it does not belong in every case. then ‘S is an animal’. if ‘to be an animal that walks on two feet is an attribute of S’. while those who argue with them overthrow it. Universal problems are such as ‘Every pleasure is good’ and ‘No pleasure is good’.g. for when we have shown that a predicate belongs in every case. then ‘S will be capable of learning grammar’. we must speak of the methods of overthrowing a view universally. also.

but colour is its genus. commit error. is not a necessary process in the case of accidents.g. then.g.) that ‘Justice happens (accidit) to be a virtue’. For a predicate drawn from the genus is never ascribed to the species in an inflected form. e.g. caused either by false statement or by transgression of the established diction. if one were to say that white happens (accidit) to be a colour – for being a colour does not happen by accident to white.on the other hand. The assertor may of course define it so in so many words. For those who make false statements. so that it is not enough to show that whiteness or justice is an attribute of a man in order to show that he is white or just. saying (e. suppose that one were to say that whiteness is coloured or that walking is in motion. Conversion. for the species take on both the name and the definition of their genera.g. We must also define the errors that occur in problems. for it is open to dispute it and say that he is white or just in part only. A man therefore who says that white is ‘coloured’ has 354 . there is nothing to prevent an attribute (e.g. but always the genera are predicated of their species literally. whiteness or justice) belonging in part. calling a planetree a ‘man’) transgress the established terminology. 2 Now one commonplace rule is to look and see if a man has ascribed as an accident what belongs in some other way. and those who call objects by the names of other objects (e. but often even without such definition it is obvious that he has rendered the genus as an accident. e. and say that an attribute belongs to thing which does not belong to it. This mistake is most commonly made in regard to the genera of things. They are of two kinds.

also.) whether it be so of just deeds and unjust. or of blindness and sight. a man. or of being and not-being: for if in any case it be shown that the knowledge of them is not the same we shall have demolished the problem.g. and of contradictory terms. a log. Another rule is to make definitions both of an accident and of its subject. if a man has said that the knowledge of opposites is the same. or else bring a negative instance to show in what case it is not so: for if he does neither of these things. you should again divide these until you come to those that are not further divisible. seeing that he has used an inflected form. e. and a horse. Clearly then he renders it as an accident. and not in their infinite multitude: for then the inquiry will proceed more directly and in fewer steps. and then look and see if anything untrue has been assumed as true 355 . a refusal to assert it will make him look absurd. nor yet as its property or as its definition: for the definition and property of a thing belong to it and to nothing else. Likewise. This rule is convertible for both destructive and constructive purposes: for if. whereas many things besides white are coloured. we may then claim that the other should actually assert it universally.g. a stone. You should look and begin with the most primary groups. if no clear result be reached so far in these cases. Another rule is to examine all cases where a predicate has been either asserted or denied universally to belong to something. when we have suggested a division.not rendered ‘coloured’ as its genus. and then proceed in order down to those that are not further divisible: e. if the predicate belongs in no case. either of both separately or else of one of them. Look at them species by species.g. you should look and see whether it be so of relative opposites and of contraries and of terms signifying the privation or presence of certain states. and see (e. the predicate appears to hold in all or in a large number of cases. or of the double and the half. Then.

Again. to see if the good man is jealous. but when we ask what kind of things are or are not of such and such a kind. it becomes obvious.) to see if it is possible to wrong a god.g. Thus (e. if he is ‘jealous’ who grieves at the successes of the good. e.g. and what should not. clearly it is not possible for a god to be wronged: for it is impossible that God should be injured. Again. as do most men: but in saying whether the object before us tends to produce 356 . ask who is the ‘jealous’ man and what is ‘jealousy’. you should say that we ought to use our terms to mean the same things as most people mean by them.g. ask what is ‘to wrong’? For if it be ‘to injure deliberately’.in the definitions. you should define what kind of things should be called as most men call them. it is right to call ‘healthy’ whatever tends to produce health. A man should substitute definitions also for the terms contained in his definitions. Moreover. a man should make the problem into a proposition for himself. and he is ‘indignant’ who grieves at the successes of the evil. we should not here go with the multitude: e.g. and then bring a negative instance against it: for the negative instance will be a ground of attack upon the assertion. clearly the good man is not jealous: for then he would be bad. For if ‘jealousy’ is pain at the apparent success of some well-behaved person. and not stop until he comes to a familiar term: for often if the definition be rendered whole. the point at issue is not cleared up. For this is useful both for establishing and for overthrowing a view: e. This rule is very nearly the same as the rule to look into cases where a predicate has been attributed or denied universally: but it differs in the turn of the argument. then clearly the indignant man would not be jealous. Moreover. ask who each of them is: for then it will be obvious whether the statement is true or false. whereas if for one of the terms used in the definition a definition be stated. to see if the indignant man is jealous.

if we cannot show it of both senses. to argue that if the soul of man be immortal. For if we want to establish a statement. 3 Moreover. if we cannot show it of both senses: whereas if we are overthrowing a statement. you should show your case of one of its several senses. Whereas in establishing a statement we ought to secure a preliminary admission that if it belongs in any case whatever. For it is not enough to discuss a single instance in order to show that an attribute belongs universally. This rule is to be observed in cases where the difference of meaning is undetected. if a term be used in several senses. so that a previous admission must be secured that if any soul whatever 357 . Of course.health or not. and likewise also if we show that it belongs in a single case. then every soul is immortal. we shall demolish the universal denial of it. then the other man will object that the point which he himself questioned has not been discussed. for supposing this to be obvious.g. we should adopt the language no longer of the multitude but of the doctor. e. This commonplace rule is convertible for purposes both of establishing and of overthrowing a view. if you cannot show it of both. we shall have demolished the universal assertion of it. in overthrowing a statement there is no need to start the discussion by securing any admission. we shall show that in one sense the attribute does not belong. either when the statement asserts or when it denies the attribute universally: for if we show that in any case whatever the attribute does not belong. it belongs universally. but only the other point. supposing this claim to be a plausible one. and it has been laid down that it is or that it is not an attribute of S. we shall show that in one sense the attribute belongs.

but in some other way: e. however.) medicine is the science both of producing health and of dieting. you should try either to establish or to demolish both descriptions of the subject in question.) the essential fact that the triangle has its angles equal to two right angles. if it is possible in some sense. as (e. or again they may be an essential and an accidental attribute. The same rule applies also when the number of senses into which it is divided is more than two. it clearly is altogether impossible that it should be so. If. you should show the one. that it is impossible to show both. again. distinguish how many meanings it has before proceeding either to demolish or to establish it: e. Distinguish as many meanings as are 358 . and the accidental fact that the equilateral figure has them so: for it is because of the accident of the equilateral triangle happening to be a triangle that we know that it has its angles equal to two right angles. it is not possible in any sense of the term that the science of many things should be the same. ‘The science of many things is one’: here ‘many things’ may mean the end and the means to that end.g. This is not to be done in every case. as (e. the variety of meanings of a term be obvious. or that it is neither honourable nor expedient. e.) the geometrician can argue that the triangle has its angles equal to two right angles. Supposing.g.g. by showing that it is honourable and expedient.g. as the science of contraries is said to be the same (for of contraries the one is no more an end than the other). or they may be both of them ends. then. or.be immortal. but only whenever we are not easily able to quote any single argument applying to all cases in common. then clearly it is possible. Again. supposing ‘the right’ to mean ‘the expedient’ or ‘the honourable’. as (e.g. then every soul is immortal. but differ not by way of ambiguity of a term. adding an indication that it is true in the one sense and not in the other. If. consider those expressions whose meanings are many.g.

and leave the rest aside. treated either as an end or as a means to its end. This commonplace rule also is available for both purposes alike. that a particular science is of a particular thing. or as accidentally connected with it. to substitute ‘clear’ for ‘exact’ in describing a conception. We must deal also in these cases as well with any uncertainty about the number of meanings involved. e. For essentially he desires the sweet. and ‘being fussy’ for ‘being busy’: for when the expression is made more familiar.g. or as a thing desired accidentally.required: e. 359 . or is not. 4 Moreover. we should bring forward all such meanings as admit that view and should divide them only into those meanings which also are required for the establishment of our case: whereas if we want to overthrow a view. The same rule holds true also of desire and all other terms that have more than one object. as. This rule is useful in dealing with relative terms: for cases of this kind are generally cases of relative terms. Further. the thesis becomes easier to attack. we should bring forward all that do not admit that view. e. the sweet-toothed person desires it not because it is wine but because it is sweet.g. or again that it is not ‘of’ it in any of the aforesaid ways. His desire for it is therefore accidental.g. in the case of wine. that one thing is. For the ‘desire of X’ may mean the desire of it as an end (e. if we want to establish a view. he no longer desires it. and only accidentally the wine: for if it be dry. it is well to alter a term into one more familiar.g. the desire of being doctored).g. both for establishing and for overthrowing a view. ‘of’ another should be established by means of the same commonplace rules. the desire of health) or as a means to an end (e.

but not so ‘man’. In the present instance the proof proceeds from the genus and relates to the species: for ‘to judge’ is the genus of ‘to perceive’.In order to show that contrary attributes belong to the same thing. that belong to the species must of necessity belong also to the genus. and since those things that are possessed of the genus in question. then animal also is good. for ‘animal’ is flying and quadruped. Now the former commonplace argument is fallacious for purposes of establishing a view. On the other hand. while it is possible to judge rightly or wrongly. and to perceive is to judge. whereas all those that are wanting to the species are not of necessity wanting to the genus. while the second is true. then also there will be applied to it the term ‘grammatical’ or ‘musical’ knowledge. on the other hand. for all the attributes which do not belong to the genus do not belong to the species either. then in regard to perception as well rightness and wrongness must be possible. the former argument is true while the latter is fallacious. For there is no necessity that all the attributes that belong to the genus should belong also to the species. Since those things of which the genus is predicated must also of necessity have one of its species predicated of them.g. for purposes of overthrowing a view. for the man who perceives judges in a certain way.g. look at its genus. if to anything the term ‘scientific knowledge’ be applied. All the attributes. e.g. But per contra it may proceed from the species to the genus: for all the attributes that belong to the species belong to the genus as well. if we want to show that rightness and wrongness are possible in regard to perception. and if any one 360 . or knowledge of one of the other sciences. for if ‘man’ is good. e. or are described by terms derived from that genus. if there is a bad and a good knowledge there is also a bad and a good disposition: for ‘disposition’ is the genus of knowledge. must also of necessity be possessed of one of its species or be described by terms derived from one of its species (e.

and if one is not enough. look among the definitions. or what it is whose reality necessarily follows if the thing in question be real: if you wish to establish a view inquire what there is on whose reality the reality of the thing in question will follow (for if the former be shown to be real.g. clearly it does not move.) it can grow or be destroyed or come to be. ask what it is that is real if the thing in question be real. This commonplace rule is common for both purposes. for if we show that what follows from the thing in question is unreal. of the thing before you. e. or will be described by a term derived from one of them. 361 . and so forth with all the other species of motion.g. then the thing in question will also have been shown to be real). that the soul is in motion). clearly it does not move at all.possesses scientific knowledge or is described by a term derived from ‘science’. whether (e. For it will be easier to attack people when committed to a definition: for an attack is always more easily made on definitions. both for overthrowing and for establishing a view: for if the soul moves with one of the species of motion. look and see whether it be possible for the soul to be moved with any of the species of motion.g. while if you want to overthrow a view. For if it be not moved in any of these ways. while if it does not move with any of the species of motion. look and see in regard to the thing in question. Moreover. we shall have demolished the thing in question. real or apparent. as a ‘grammarian’ or a ‘musician’) – therefore if any expression be asserted that is in any way derived from the genus (e. what it is whose reality conditions the reality of the thing in question. then he will also possess grammatical or musical knowledge or knowledge of one of the other sciences. draw upon several. If you are not well equipped with an argument against the assertion. clearly it does move.

suppose a man to have stated that what is being nourished of necessity grows: for animals are always of necessity being nourished. the view originally laid down is demolished as well. Likewise. to see if there be any discrepancy anywhere: e. arrives at a certain statement and then tries to demolish that statement: for when once this has been demolished.g. also. It is really necessary whenever the answerer has denied any view that would be useful in attacking the thesis.Moreover. sometimes neither an apparent nor a real necessity. For we are said to know things present and future (e. there is the sophistic turn of argument. Likewise. whether it be that the man who is standing up to the argument has refused to 362 .g. and relevant to the thesis. sometimes an apparent necessity. and when moreover the view in question happens to be one of a kind on which he has a good stock of lines of argument. when the point to which the discussion comes to be directed appears to be useful. and the questioner thereupon addresses his arguments to the support of this view. if he has said that knowing is remembering: for the one is concerned with past time. whereby we draw our opponent into the kind of statement against which we shall be well supplied with lines of argument. look at the time involved. by an induction made by means of the view laid down. This process is sometimes a real necessity. but they do not always grow. that there will be an eclipse). without being really so. whereas it is impossible to remember anything save what is in the past. whereas the other has to do also with the present and the future. 5 Moreover. it is really necessary whenever he (the questioner) first. It is an apparent necessity. also.

and foreign to. is the easier to demolish. and it is the answerer’s luck to be confuted on a mere side issue You should beware of the last of the aforesaid methods. The remaining case is when the point to which the discussion comes to be directed is neither really nor apparently necessary. it increases the confusion of questioners if. For this reason. the answerer should not lose his temper.g. for it appears to be wholly disconnected from.concede something. or whether he (the questioner) has first reached it by a plausible induction based upon the thesis and then tries to demolish it. any one who has made any statement whatever has in a certain sense made several statements. supposing we are well supplied as regards the one for arguing 363 . as a rule. 6 In regard to subjects which must have one and one only of two predicates. For. so that by the demolition of any single one of these consequences. of whatever kind. the man who said ‘X is a man’ has also said that it is an animal and that it is animate and a biped and capable of acquiring reason and knowledge. adding an indication whenever he assents although he does not agree with the view.) a man must have either a disease or health. the art of dialectic. as (e. but assent to those statements that are of no use in attacking the thesis. and sometimes the original thesis. the original statement is demolished as well.g. after all propositions of this kind have been granted them. Moreover. But you should beware here too of making a change to a more difficult subject: for sometimes the consequence. inasmuch as each statement has a number of necessary consequences: e. they can then draw no conclusion. moreover.

we shall have shown that the remaining one does not belong. for a 364 . it always gives an opportunity for attack. just as also the expression ‘of a good hope’ may be taken to mean the man who hopes for good things. we shall be well equipped as regards the remaining one as well. The same is true also if he has declared a mere matter of chance to happen of necessity or usually. or if a usual event (or. so that his mistake is even worse if he has declared them to be good of necessity.g. but the man the state of whose heart is strong. Likewise also ‘well-starred’ may be taken to mean the man whose star is good. This rule is convertible for both purposes: for when we have shown that the one attribute belongs. For if a necessary event has been asserted to occur usually. others usually. you may devise a line of attack by reinterpreting a term in its literal meaning. if men are usually bad.’ For a man’s star is his soul. its contrary) has been stated to occur of necessity. failing such an event itself. and so has made a mistake: and so he has if he has declared the usual attribute to be necessary: for then he declares it to belong universally when it does not so belong. according to the use now established. the expression ‘strong at heart’ will suggest not the courageous man. Clearly then the rule is useful for both purposes. Moreover. Likewise also if he has declared the contrary of what is usual to be necessary. if therefore a necessary event has been asserted to occur usually.its presence or absence. clearly the speaker has denied an attribute to be universal which is universal. as Xenocrates says ‘well-starred is he who has a noble soul’. we shall have shown that the remaining one does belong. Some things occur of necessity. For the contrary of a usual attribute is always a comparatively rare attribute: e. they are comparatively seldom good. others however it may chance.g. while if we show that the one does not belong. with the implication that it is most fitting so to take it rather than in its established meaning: e.

and this too gives two modes.g. If then any one says that joyfulness is an accidental attribute of cheerfulness. he would be declaring it to be an accidental attribute of itself.chance event happens neither of necessity nor usually.g. e. if he has stated without any distinction that disinherited persons are bad. If the thing happens usually. Or (3) a single verb may be attached to both objects: and this also gives two modes. to wit. to 365 . or per contra to do evil to friends and to do good to enemies. then even supposing his statement does not distinguish whether he meant that it happens usually or that it happens necessarily. 7 Inasmuch as contraries can be conjoined with each other in six ways. in order that it may help us both in demolishing and in establishing a view. and four of these conjunctions constitute a contrariety. that the modes of conjunction are six is clear: for either (1) each of the contrary verbs will be conjoined to each of the contrary objects. to do good to friends and to do evil to friends. and this gives two modes: e.g. taking it to be a different thing because it has a different name. Or else (2) both verbs may be attached to one object. Pleasure. to do good to friends and to do evil to enemies. or to do good to enemies and to do evil to enemies. Well then. look and see also if he has stated a thing to be an accident of itself. we must grasp the subject of contraries. e.g. you may assume in discussing it that he means that they are so necessarily. Moreover. as Prodicus used to divide pleasures into joy and delight and good cheer: for all these are names of the same thing. it is open to you to discuss it on the assumption that he meant that it happens necessarily: e.

and the other objectionable. Nor is the doing of evil to friends contrary to the doing of good to enemies: for both of these are objectionable and belong to the same disposition: and one objectionable thing is not generally thought to be the contrary of another. and the other an expression denoting a defect: for an excess is generally thought to belong to the class of objectionable things.do good to friends and to do good to enemies. and likewise also a defect. and the one is desirable. Likewise. For to do good to friends is contrary to the doing of evil to friends: for it proceeds from the contrary disposition. and the other objectionable. if we examine them in the same way. for the doing of good to friends is not contrary to the doing of evil to enemies: for both courses are desirable and belong to the same disposition. Select therefore whichever of the two contraries is useful in attacking the thesis. Moreover. But the other four all constitute a contrariety. the same course has more than one contrary. and the one belongs to a reasonable disposition and the other to a bad. The first two then of the aforesaid conjunctions do not constitute any contrariety. For the doing of good to friends has as its contrary both the doing of good to enemies and the doing of evil to friends. or to do evil to friends and evil to enemies. 366 . see whether it belongs to the subject to which the accident in question has been declared to belong: for if the latter belongs the former could not belong. then. Clearly. if the accident of a thing have a contrary. for it is impossible that contrary predicates should belong at the same time to the same thing. unless the one be an expression denoting an excess. we shall find that the contraries of each of the others also are two in number. from what has been said. The case is the same also in regard to the other conjunctions: for in each combination the one course is desirable.

if we show that the contrary belongs. if there be posited an accident which has a contrary.g. while on the other hand. look and see if anything has been said about something. You should therefore look and see if its contrary. to wit.Or again. if they exist in us: for it is through the sensation of sight that we recognize the Form present in each individual. those Ideas are at rest and are objects of thought. look and see if that which admits of the accident will admit of its contrary as well: for the same thing admits of contraries. we shall have shown that the accident neither belongs nor can possibly belong. friendship. contrary predicates must necessarily belong to the thing: e. For purposes.g. and moreover that they are objects both of sensation and of thought. then.) if he has asserted that hatred follows anger. it will help you to assert that it may possibly belong. Again. as has been said. For then the result will be that they are both in motion and at rest. this rule should be observed: but for purposes of establishing one. of such a kind that if it be true. if he has said that the ‘Ideas’ exist in us. it follows necessarily that all that is in us moves with us as well. it is impossible that they should be unmoved: for when we move. hatred would in that case be in the ‘spirited faculty’: for that is where anger is. Likewise also if he has asserted that the faculty of desire is ignorant. of overthrowing a view. be also in the ‘spirited faculty’: for if not – if friendship is in the faculty of desire – then hatred could not follow anger. Thus (e. For according to the views of those who posit the existence of Ideas. For having shown that the thing in question will not admit of the contrary of the accident asserted. though the rule will not help you to assert that the accident actually belongs. Clearly also they are objects of sensation. it would be capable of knowledge as well: and this is not generally held – I mean that the faculty of desire is capable of knowledge. we shall not 367 . For if it were capable of ignorance. or that the thing is capable of the contrary. while if they exist in us.

and vice upon the other.g. you should look for arguments among the contradictories of your terms.) that ‘If the honourable is pleasant.) as that man be an animal. so far as may be required. a postulate of this sort should be made. either directly or conversely. (e. therefore.g. what is not an animal is not a man’: and likewise also in other instances of contradictories. so is the former’. what is not pleasant is not honourable. also. then what is honourable is pleasant’. Clearly. and upon the one 368 . and you should secure them by means of induction – such arguments (e. while if the latter be untrue. and see if the contrary of the one follows upon the contrary of the other. Now the sequence is direct in a case such as that of courage and cowardice: for upon the one of them virtue follows. that it is possible for it to belong. For in those cases the sequence is converse: for ‘animal’ follows upon ‘man but ‘not-animal’ does not follow upon ‘not-man’. but conversely ‘not-man’ upon ‘not-animal’. ‘If what is not pleasant be not honourable. Likewise. Then look also at the case of the contraries of S and P in the thesis. then. both when you are demolishing and when you are establishing a view: secure arguments of this kind as well by means of induction. In all cases. both when demolishing and when establishing a view.indeed as yet have shown that the accident asserted does belong as well. converting the order of their sequence. our proof will merely have gone to this point. 8 Seeing that the modes of opposition are four in number. the conversion of the sequence formed by contradiction of the terms of the thesis is a method convertible for both purposes.

in the latter case also is direct. therefore. therefore. Only. If. The sequence is. The case of relative terms should also be studied in like manner to that of a state and its privation: for the sequence of these as well is direct. rare in the case of contraries. however. e. The sequence. usually the sequence is direct. in the case of relative terms. as sensation follows sight. while absence of sensation follows blindness. while upon the other it follows that it is objectionable. Likewise also in other cases. and if sight be a sensation. rather debility follows upon disease. clearly the sequence is converse. You should look also into cases of the privation or presence of a state in like manner to the case of contraries. and the other the privation of it. Again. it must of necessity do so as well in the original statement. then 1/3 is a fraction: for 3/1 is relative to 1/3. if knowledge be a conceiving. if 3/1 is a multiple. Converse sequence is. For the opposition of sensation to absence of sensation is an opposition of the presence to the privation of a state: for the one of them is a state. An objection may be made that there is no necessity for the sequence to take place. then. for the desirable is the contrary of the objectionable.g. In this case. whereas sensation is not 369 . the contrary of the one term does not follow upon the contrary of the other either directly or conversely.g. but disease does not follow upon debility. and so is a multiple to a fraction. in the case of such privations the converse sequence does not occur: the sequence is always bound to be direct: e. in the way described: for the object of sensation is an object of knowledge. converse in such a case as this: Health follows upon vigour.it follows that it is desirable. clearly neither does the one term follow upon the other in the statement made: whereas if the one followed the other in the case of the contraries. then also the object of sight is an object of sensation. then also the object of knowledge is an object of conception. on the other hand.

‘Coordinate’. whatever its kind. of the same kindred series is shown to be good or praiseworthy. ‘healthy habits’ are coordinates of ‘health’ and a ‘vigorous constitutional’ of a ‘vigorous constitution’ and so forth also in other cases. then. then all the rest as well come to be shown to be so: e. e. whereas ‘inflected forms’ are such as the following: ‘justly’. ‘courageously’. if ‘justice’ be something praiseworthy. Likewise also things that tend to produce and to preserve anything are called co-ordinates of that which they tend to produce and to preserve. then. and ‘courageously’ to courage. The objection is. on the ground that neither is sensation knowledge. of a man or thing. of a man or an act. as (e. as e. Clearly. 9 Again look at the case of the co-ordinates and inflected forms of the terms in the thesis.g. It is usually held that words when used in their inflected forms as well are co-ordinates. ‘healthily’. and such as are formed in this way. both in demolishing and in establishing it. to show that the object of sensation is not an object of knowledge.g. when any one member. for many people deny that there is knowledge of objects of sensation.g. however. and ‘justly’ connote something praiseworthy. usually describes cases such as these. then so will ‘just’. 370 . not generally received as really true. Moreover. ‘justly’.g. Then ‘justly’ will be rendered also ‘praiseworthily’. and ‘courageous deeds’ and the ‘courageous man’ are co-ordinates of courage. e.) ‘justly’ in relation to justice.knowledge. By co-ordinates’ are meant terms such as the following: ‘Just deeds’ and the ‘just man’ are coordinates of ‘justice’. ‘just’. and then ‘co-ordinate’ describes all the members of the same kindred series. ‘justice’.g. the principle stated is just as useful for the contrary purpose.

Also. Look not only in the case of the subject mentioned. whereas if the modes of destruction count as evil.g. In regard to modes of destruction the converse is true: for if the modes of destruction rank as good things. If. For those things whose modes of generation rank among good things. their modes of generation be evil. on the other hand. both in demolishing and in establishing a view. look at the modes of generation and destruction of a thing. and if they themselves be good. whereas if causes destructive of them are good. are themselves also good. for neither is evil painful: or that. and at the things which tend to produce or to destroy it. themselves also rank as good. they themselves rank as evil. argue that good is not necessarily pleasant. they themselves count as good. if justice be knowledge. The same argument applies also to things tending to produce and destroy: for things whose productive causes are good.derived will by the same inflexion from ‘the praiseworthy’ whereby ‘justly’ is derived from ‘justice’. so also are their modes of generation. but also in the case of its contrary. as in the instance given just now: for ‘unjustly’ is more likely to seem equivalent to ‘skilfully’ than to ‘unskilfully’. then they themselves also are evil. for all we are claiming now is that the contrary of P shall follow the contrary of S. then injustice is ignorance: and if ‘justly’ means ‘knowingly’ and ‘skilfully’. if the latter be the case. neither is the former. This commonplace rule has been stated before in dealing with the sequence of contraries. then they themselves rank as evil things. so is the former. 371 . then ‘unjustly’ means ‘ignorantly’ and ‘unskilfully’: whereas if the latter be not true. for the contrary predicate: e. Moreover.

then. and see if they are in like case. the latter proposition be not true. Moreover. The rule in question is useful for both purposes. neither does it belong where it is less likely to belong. then supposing it does not belong to the subject to which it is the more likely to belong. then also to ‘know many things’ is to ‘be thinking of many things’. that to ‘know’ a thing is to ‘think of’ it. as we have said. it is so with the other like things as well. while if it does not follow. neither is it so in the case of the others. Another rule is: If one predicate be attributed to two subjects. the accident does not belong. look at things which are like the subject in question. if to ‘know’ a thing be to ‘think of’ it. Thus. You should establish this by induction. Look and see also whether the cases are alike as regards a single thing and a number of things: for sometimes there is a discrepancy. whereas if it be not so in the case of some one of them. for if it be as stated in the case of some one like thing. neither was the former that dealt with a single thing. so also will one opinion. both those which are and those which are generally held to be like.g. argue from greater and less degrees. for it is possible to know many things but not to be thinking of them. if pleasure be good. In regard to greater degrees there are four commonplace rules. whereas this is not true. and if to possess sight be to see. see whether also to do a greater wrong is a greater evil. while if it does belong where it 372 . if one branch of knowledge has more than one object. If.10 Again. viz. clearly the accident belongs. Now this rule is of use for both purposes: for if an increase of the accident follows an increase of the subject. see whether also a greater pleasure be a greater good: and if to do a wrong be evil. then also to possess hearing will be to hear. e. One is: See whether a greater degree of the predicate follows a greater degree of the subject: e. Likewise also in the case of other things.g.

373 . then if the one which is more generally thought to belong does not belong. then it belongs as well where it is more likely.is less likely to belong. then if the one which is more usually thought to belong to the one subject does not belong. for if the one predicate does not belong to the one subject. then. neither does the remaining one. if the one does not belong. or. the remaining predicate belongs to the remaining subject as well. you can argue from the fact that an attribute belongs. in three ways. The case is the same also if two predicates belong in a like degree to two subjects. neither does it belong to the other. neither does the remaining predicate belong to the remaining subject. neither does the one that is less generally thought to belong. Moreover: If two predicates be attributed to two subjects. those described in the last three rules given in regard to a greater degree. Again: If two predicates be attributed to one subject. if the one which is less usually thought to belong to the one subject does belong. while if the one predicate does belong to the one subject. while if it belongs to the one. to two subjects in a like degree. so also does the other. if the one that is less generally thought to belong does belong. then if it does not belong to the one. viz. or. Or. or is supposed to belong. so too does the remaining predicate to the remaining subject. or is generally supposed to belong. while if the one does belong. the remaining one belongs as well.’ For supposing that one predicate belongs. it belongs to the remaining one as well. neither does the remaining predicate belong to the remaining subject. Moreover. in a like degree. supposing two predicates to belong in a like degree to the same subject.

from greater or less or like degrees of truth in the aforesaid number of ways. Moreover. The rule is not applicable in all cases. Again. in the case of other attributes.11 You can argue. Likewise. whereas formerly it was not white or good. then the thing added will itself as well be of that character. you should argue from the addition of one thing to another. it is possible also absolutely. but only in those in which the excess described as an ‘increased intensity’ is found to take place. The above rule is. 374 . also. however. it is not thereby made clear whether in itself it may not be good: for the addition of good to evil does not necessarily make the whole good. then. either. any predicate of which we can speak of greater or less degrees belongs also absolutely: for greater or less degrees of good or of white will not be attributed to what is not good or white: for a bad thing will never be said to have a greater or less degree of goodness than another. Moreover. then the thing added will be white or good – it will possess the character it imparts to the whole as well. and at a given time and place: for if the predicate be possible in some respect. if an addition of something to a given object intensifies the character which it had as given. but a man is a man for all that. but always of badness. For if the thing added does not make the other good. You should examine in the same way predicates attributed in a given respect. any more than the addition of white to black makes the whole white. for the purpose of overthrowing a predication: for several predicates of which we cannot speak of a greater degree belong absolutely: for the term ‘man’ is not attributed in greater and less degrees. not convertible for overthrowing a view. This rule is not convertible. If the addition of one thing to another makes that other good or white.

Likewise.Likewise. A thing is ‘absolutely’ so which without any addition you are prepared to say is honourable or the contrary. Or possibly this again may indicate a relativity not to a certain time. In the same way also it is a good thing at certain places to follow see and such a diet. but to a certain state of health: for it is all the same whenever it occurs. will be said to be so ‘absolutely’. e.g. among the Triballi.g. because no one is prudent by nature. they may be generous or temperately inclined. in infected areas. to honour the gods you will declare to be honourable without adding anything. at certain times it is a good thing to take medicines. e. but it is not so absolutely. absolutely. just because they are Triballi. e. whereas it is not possible for it to escape absolutely. because that is honourable absolutely. when one is ill. but absolutely it is not possible to exist singly and alone. it is not honourable. it is possible for a destructible thing to escape destruction at a given time.g. On the other hand. though it is not a good thing absolutely. if only one be in that state. Moreover.g. while absolutely they are not good by nature. also. 375 . An objection may be raised that in a given respect people may be good by nature. e.) you will deny that to sacrifice one’s father is honourable: it is honourable only to certain persons: it is not therefore honourable absolutely. also. whereas. in certain places it is possible to live singly and alone. In the same way also it is in certain places honourable to sacrifice one’s father. Or possibly this may indicate a relativity not to places but to persons: for it is all the same wherever they may be: for everywhere it will be held honourable among the Triballi themselves. So that whatever without any addition is generally accounted to be honourable or dishonourable or anything else of that kind. Thus (e.g. is what is predicated at a given time or place: for what is absolutely impossible is not possible either in any respect or at any place or time. Again.

or by men who are good in any particular line.Book III 1 The question which is the more desirable. our judgement will record our assent that whichever side happens to have the advantage is the more desirable. or. or by the experts in regard to any particular class of things. whatever most men or all men or all things would choose. in medicine or in carpentry those things are more desirable which most. doctors would choose. then. that which is more lasting or secure is more desirable than that which is less so: and so is that which is more likely to be chosen by the prudent or by the good man or by the right law. You should direct the argument you intend to 376 . in such cases if we can show a single advantage. or more than one.g. the good: for everything aims at the good. or all.g. because we do not see any advantage on either side as compared with the other. should be examined upon the following lines: only first of all it must be clearly laid down that the inquiry we are making concerns not things that are widely divergent and that exhibit great differences from one another (for nobody raises any doubt whether happiness or wealth is more desirable). of two or more things. Clearly. when they make their choice as such. but things that are nearly related and about which we commonly discuss for which of the two we ought rather to vote. e. either whatever most of them or what all of them would choose.e. e. First. i. in general. or the better.

e. virtue than luck (for the former in itself. e. whereas the latter is not: for nothing which does not happen to belong to the genus in question is called by the generic name.g. and the former is called ‘a good’. Of what is ‘better’ or ‘more desirable’ the absolute standard is the verdict of the better science. in order that they may do us no harm. in order that they may do us no harm. Likewise also in other cases.g.g. Also.g. vice and 377 .g.employ to whatever purpose you require. even though it will make no difference to us. Also. health is more desirable than gymnastics: for the former is desired for itself. In the second place. e. and the latter per accidens. a different turn of expression.g. For we desire justice in our friends for itself. e. whereas the other does not. justice than a just man. This last principle is the same as the one that precedes it. that which is desired for itself is more desirable than that which is desired for something else. a ‘white man’ is not ‘a colour’. and so in other cases of the same kind. that which is known as ‘an x’ is more desirable than that which does not come within the genus ‘x’ – e. for the former falls within the genus ‘good’. justice in our friends than justice in our enemies: for the former is desirable in itself. though relatively to a given individual the standard may be his own particular science. and even though they be in India. however. with. that which is desirable in itself is more desirable than what is desirable per accidens. e. the latter for something else. the latter per accidens: for we desire that our enemies should be just per accidens. whereas in our enemies we desire it for something else. the cause of good things). Also. that which is in itself the cause of good is more desirable than what is so per accidens. for what is in itself the cause of evil is more objectionable than what is so per accidens. Likewise also in the case of the contrary.

strength being a feature of the sinews and bones. in respect of their properties the one surpasses the other. recovery of health than a surgical operation. Also the competent is more desirable than the incompetent. Also the end is generally supposed to be more desirable than the means. too. e. So too what is good by nature is more desirable than the good that is not so by nature. and the hot and the cold. the man who needs an operation. justice than the just man.g. that which lies nearer the end. to a god rather than to a man. e.g. for the one is good by nature. a means directed towards the end of life is more desirable than a means to anything else. what is good absolutely is more desirable than what is good for a particular person. viz. Also. whereas the others are inherent in what is secondary. Moreover. while beauty is generally supposed to consist in a certain symmetry of the limbs. and to the soul rather than to the body. whereas in the other case the goodness is acquired. Also that is better which is inherent in things better or prior or more honourable: thus (e.g. that which contributes to happiness than that which contributes to prudence.chance: for the one is bad in itself. whereas chance is so per accidens. So too the property of the better thing is better than the property of the worse. Also the attribute is more desirable which belongs to the better and more honourable subject. of two productive agents that one is more desirable whose end is better. and of two means. the latter only for a particular person.g.g.g. while between a productive agent and an end we can decide by a proportional sum whenever the excess of the one end over the other is greater than that of the latter over its own 378 . e. for the former is good absolutely. e. the property of God than the property of man: for whereas in respect of what is common in both of them they do not differ at all from each other. in fact in all the primary constituents of an animal. e.) health is better than strength and beauty: for the former is inherent in the moist and the dry. In general.

we should look at them from the standpoint of their consequences. that is more desirable which is followed by the less evil. it follows that he was ignorant before and knows 379 . therefore. what produces happiness is more desirable than health: for it exceeds the same standard by a greater amount. the excess of what produces happiness over what produces health is greater than that of health over what produces health.g. while the latter do so not in themselves but for something else: for no one prizes wealth for itself but always for something else. Clearly. for there are prior consequences and later consequences: e.productive means: e. For the former belong in themselves to the class of things precious and praiseworthy. For what produces happiness exceeds what produces health just as much as happiness exceeds health. For the one which is followed by the greater good is the more desirable: or. whereas we prize friendship for itself. and justice than strength. e. then what produces happiness is better than health. But health exceeds what produces health by a smaller amount. Our survey from the point of view of consequences lies in two directions. what is in itself nobler and more precious and praiseworthy is more desirable than what is less so. if a man learns. whenever two things are very much like one another. and we cannot see any superiority in the one over the other of them. supposing the excess of happiness over health to be greater than that of health over what produces health.g. 2 Moreover. yet there may possibly be some unpleasant consequence involved to turn the scale. friendship than wealth. Moreover. if the consequences be evil.g. ergo. even though nothing else is likely to come to us from it. For though both may be desirable.

prudence is more desirable in old age. together with what is. while courage is only useful at times.g. As a rule. because he does not expect them to be prudent. e. freedom from pain in old age more than in youth: for it is of greater consequence in old age. On the same principle also.g. Also.g. for no man chooses the young to guide him. for then the two together are not more desirable than the one. than health alone. viz. that one of two things which if all possess. e. e. recovery of health and health. inasmuch as we desire recovery of health for the sake of health. Likewise also with temperance. Also. everything is more desirable at the season when it is of greater consequence. e. for it is in youth that the active exercise of courage is more imperatively required. that is more desirable which is more useful at every season or at most seasons. justice and temperance rather than courage: for they are always useful. the combination of happiness and something else which is not good may be more desirable than the combination of justice and courage. we do not need the other thing. and likewise when free from pain than when attended with pain.afterwards. the smaller number in the greater. An objection may be raised suppose in some particular case the one is valued for the sake of the other. either absolutely or when the one is included in the other. whichever of the consequences suits your purpose. Moreover. to be more desirable than a greater number of good things. is more desirable than that 380 . Also it is quite possible for what is not good.g. Also. You should take. for the young are more troubled by their passions than are their elders. a greater number of good things is more desirable than a smaller. Also. With courage. the converse is the case. the same things are more valuable if accompanied than if unaccompanied by pleasure. the later consequence is the better to consider. therefore.

whereas a horse bears none: for the monkey is not the more handsome creature.g. Another commonplace rule is that what is nearer to the good is better and more desirable. With the generations or acquisitions of things the opposite is the case: for things whose acquisition or generation is more desirable are themselves also desirable. if one is more like the better thing while another is more like the worse. An objection may be raised to this that it is not true: for it is quite possible that Ajax did not resemble Achilles more nearly than Odysseus in the points which made Achilles the best of them. e. there would be no use for courage. for a thing whose loss or whose contrary is more objectionable is itself more desirable. Again. whereas the one which is like the worse 381 . Moreover. despite its nearer resemblance to a man. and still justice would be of use. in the case of two things. what more nearly resembles the good: thus justice is better than a just man. some say that Ajax was a better man than Odysseus because he was more like Achilles. while that of Odysseus to Nestor is strong.which all may possess and still we want the other one as well. Look also to see whether the resemblance be that of a caricature. i. Take the case of justice and courage. admits of an objection: for quite possibly the one only slightly resembles the better. supposing the resemblance of Ajax to Achilles to be slight. Also.e. however. and that Odysseus was a good man. that which is more like than another thing to something better than itself. whereas all might be courageous. though unlike Achilles. then that is likely to be better which is more like the better. while the other strongly resembles the worse. if everybody were just.g. like the resemblance of a monkey to a man. Also it may be that the one which is like the better type shows a degrading likeness. as e. Likewise also with the losses and contraries of things. judge by the destructions and losses and generations and acquisitions and contraries of things: for things whose destruction is more objectionable are themselves more desirable. This too.

but it is not more desirable for a man who lacks the necessities of life. Also. superfluities are better than necessities.g. if the best man be better than the best horse. Moreover. what is better is not also more desirable: for there is no necessity that because it is better it should also be more desirable: at least to be a philosopher is better than to make money. e. then also A is better than B without qualification. if the best in A be better than the best in B. then also the best of the members of A is better than the best of the members of B.g. Moreover. then also Man is better than Horse without qualification. Another rule is that the more conspicuous good is more desirable than the less conspicuous. and are sometimes more desirable as well: for the good life is better than mere life. e. Also the more personal possession is more desirable than the more widely shared. Also. things which we like rather to do to our friend are more desirable than those we like to do to the man in the street.type improves upon it: witness the likeness of a horse to a donkey. and that of a monkey to a man. if Man be better than Horse. The expression ‘superfluity’ applies whenever a man possesses the 382 . and the more difficult than the easier: for we appreciate better the possession of things that cannot be easily acquired. Sometimes. that which is more free from connexion with evil: for what is not attended by any unpleasantness is more desirable than what is so attended. if A be without qualification better than B. whereas towards the man in the street the converse is the case. Also. whereas mere life itself is a necessity. things which our friends can share are more desirable than those they cannot.g. and good life is a superfluity. then also the best man is better than the best horse. e. just dealing and the doing of good rather than the semblance of them: for we would rather really do good to our friends than seem to do so. Also. though.

what cannot be got from another is more desirable than what can be got from another as well. If both possess it. if of two things we repudiate the one in order to be thought to possess the other. necessities are more desirable.g.) is the case of justice compared with courage. perhaps. Roughly speaking. just as also what makes things warm is warmer than what does not. as (e.) we repudiate the love of hard work in order that people may think us geniuses.). of things that belong to the same species one which possesses the peculiar virtue of the species is more desirable than one which does not. Also. Also. and that is more desirable in whose absence it is more blameworthy for a man not to be vexed. that is more desirable in whose absence it is less blameworthy for people to be vexed. while superfluities are better. if one thing makes good whatever it touches. 383 .) is not desirable without prudence. A is more desirable if A is desirable without B. 3 Moreover. then that one is more desirable which we wish to be thought to possess. but prudence is desirable without power. If both do so. Also.necessities of life and sets to work to secure as well other noble acquisitions. and the other the body.g. the former is more desirable. but not B without A: power (e. then the one which possesses it in a greater degree is more desirable. then that one is more desirable which does so in a greater degree. while another does not. thus (e. Moreover. or if it render good the better and more important object – if (e. the one makes good the soul.g. Moreover.g.

then also justice means something more desirable than courage. Likewise. a thing is more desirable if. and see if the addition of A to the same thing as B makes the whole more desirable than does the addition of B. the one which is more highly preferable to it is more desirable than the less highly preferable. or if the one exceeds an even higher standard. friends than money. when the excess of a thing is more desirable than the excess of something else. judge by means of an addition. the one which exceeds is the more desirable. Nay more.g. judge things by their inflexions and uses and actions and works. and if justice be more desirable than courage. then also ‘justly’ means something more desirable than ‘courageously’. Again. as (e. but not the other. So also that of which a man would rather that it were his by his own doing is more desirable than what he would rather get by another’s doing. whichever it be whose subtraction makes the remainder a lesser good.g.) if you took a saw and a sickle in combination with the art of carpentry: for in the combination the saw is a more desirable thing. that thing is itself also more desirable than the other. it makes the whole greater good. if there be two things both preferable to something. beware of adducing a case in which the common term uses. Moreover. but it is not a more desirable thing without qualification. or in some other way helps the case of. if ‘justly’ means something more desirable than ‘courageously’.g. one of the things added to it. you should judge by means of subtraction: for the thing upon whose subtraction the remainder is a lesser good may be taken to be a greater good.) friendship than money: for an excess of friendship is more desirable than an excess of money. Moreover.Moreover. however. Similarly also in the other cases. when added to a lesser good. e. if one thing exceeds while the other falls short of the same standard of good. and judge these by them: for they go with each other: e. also.g. 384 . as (e. You must. Moreover.

Moreover. e.Also.g. if one thing be desirable for itself.g. and with a view to what ends. e. that which serves to promote virtue more than that which serves to promote pleasure. For what is useful for all or most of them may be taken to be more desirable than what is not useful in like manner. you should distinguish in how many senses ‘desirable’ is used. A thing may be taken to be more precious in itself which we choose rather for itself. i.g. you would not care to have it. whichever is the more precious for itself.e. Also. expediency or honour or pleasure. it is more desirable both for itself and for the look of it. disease more than ugliness: for disease is a greater hindrance both to pleasure and to being good. for that is more objectionable which stands more in the way of what is desirable. If the same characters belong to both things you should look and see which possesses them more markedly. supposing no one knew of it. and the other for the look of it. e.g.) health than beauty. argue by showing that the thing in question is in like measure objectionable and desirable: for a thing of such a character that a man might well desire and object to it alike is less desirable than the other which is desirable only. Again. Also. is also better and more desirable. while the other thing is desirable on the one ground alone. the former is more desirable. which of the two is the more pleasant or more honourable or more expedient. 385 . Likewise also in the case of objectionable things. without anything else being likely to come of it. Moreover. as (e. A thing is defined as being desired for the look of it if. that is more desirable which serves the better purpose.

4 Comparisons of things together should therefore be conducted in the manner prescribed. The same commonplace rules are useful also for showing that anything is simply desirable or objectionable: for we have only to subtract the excess of one thing over another. For if what is more precious be more desirable, then also what is precious is desirable; and if what is more useful be more desirable, then also what is useful is desirable. Likewise, also, in the case of other things which admit of comparisons of that kind. For in some cases in the very course of comparing the things together we at once assert also that each of them, or the one of them, is desirable, e.g. whenever we call the one good ‘by nature’ and the other ‘not by nature’: for dearly what is good by nature is desirable.

5 The commonplace rules relating to comparative degrees and amounts ought to be taken in the most general possible form: for when so taken they are likely to be useful in a larger number of instances. It is possible to render some of the actual rules given above more universal by a slight alteration of the expression, e.g. that what by nature exhibits such and such a quality exhibits that quality in a greater degree than what exhibits it not by nature. Also, if one thing does, and another does not, impart such and such a quality to that which possesses it, or to which it belongs, then whichever does impart it is of that quality in greater degree than the one which does not impart it; and if both impart it, then that one exhibits it in a greater degree which imparts it in a greater degree.

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Moreover, if in any character one thing exceeds and another falls short of the same standard; also, if the one exceeds something which exceeds a given standard, while the other does not reach that standard, then clearly the first-named thing exhibits that character in a greater degree. Moreover, you should judge by means of addition, and see if A when added to the same thing as B imparts to the whole such and such a character in a more marked degree than B, or if, when added to a thing which exhibits that character in a less degree, it imparts that character to the whole in a greater degree. Likewise, also, you may judge by means of subtraction: for a thing upon whose subtraction the remainder exhibits such and such a character in a less degree, itself exhibits that character in a greater degree. Also, things exhibit such and such a character in a greater degree if more free from admixture with their contraries; e.g. that is whiter which is more free from admixture with black. Moreover, apart from the rules given above, that has such and such a character in greater degree which admits in a greater degree of the definition proper to the given character; e.g. if the definition of ‘white’ be ‘a colour which pierces the vision’, then that is whiter which is in a greater degree a colour that pierces the vision.

6 If the question be put in a particular and not in a universal form, in the first place the universal constructive or destructive commonplace rules that have been given may all be brought into use. For in demolishing or establishing a thing universally we also show it in particular: for if it be true of all, it is true also of some, and if untrue of all, it is untrue of some. Especially handy and of general application are the commonplace rules

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that are drawn from the opposites and co-ordinates and inflexions of a thing: for public opinion grants alike the claim that if all pleasure be good, then also all pain is evil, and the claim that if some pleasure be good, then also some pain is evil. Moreover, if some form of sensation be not a capacity, then also some form of failure of sensation is not a failure of capacity. Also, if the object of conception is in some cases an object of knowledge, then also some form of conceiving is knowledge. Again, if what is unjust be in some cases good, then also what is just is in some cases evil; and if what happens justly is in some cases evil, then also what happens unjustly is in some cases good. Also, if what is pleasant is in some cases objectionable, then pleasure is in some cases an objectionable thing. On the same principle, also, if what is pleasant is in some cases beneficial, then pleasure is in some cases a beneficial thing. The case is the same also as regards the things that destroy, and the processes of generation and destruction. For if anything that destroys pleasure or knowledge be in some cases good, then we may take it that pleasure or knowledge is in some cases an evil thing. Likewise, also, if the destruction of knowledge be in some cases a good thing or its production an evil thing, then knowledge will be in some cases an evil thing; e.g. if for a man to forget his disgraceful conduct be a good thing, and to remember it be an evil thing, then the knowledge of his disgraceful conduct may be taken to be an evil thing. The same holds also in other cases: in all such cases the premiss and the conclusion are equally likely to be accepted. Moreover you should judge by means of greater or smaller or like degrees: for if some member of another genus exhibit such and such a character in a more marked degree than your object, while no member of that genus exhibits that character at all, then you may take it that neither does the object in question exhibit it; e.g. if some form of knowledge be good in a greater degree than pleasure, while no form of knowledge is good, then
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you may take it that pleasure is not good either. Also, you should judge by a smaller or like degree in the same way: for so you will find it possible both to demolish and to establish a view, except that whereas both are possible by means of like degrees, by means of a smaller degree it is possible only to establish, not to overthrow. For if a certain form of capacity be good in a like degree to knowledge, and a certain form of capacity be good, then so also is knowledge; while if no form of capacity be good, then neither is knowledge. If, too, a certain form of capacity be good in a less degree than knowledge, and a certain form of capacity be good, then so also is knowledge; but if no form of capacity be good, there is no necessity that no form of knowledge either should be good. Clearly, then, it is only possible to establish a view by means of a less degree. Not only by means of another genus can you overthrow a view, but also by means of the same, if you take the most marked instance of the character in question; e.g. if it be maintained that some form of knowledge is good, then, suppose it to be shown that prudence is not good, neither will any other kind be good, seeing that not even the kind upon which there is most general agreement is so. Moreover, you should go to work by means of an hypothesis; you should claim that the attribute, if it belongs or does not belong in one case, does so in a like degree in all, e.g. that if the soul of man be immortal, so are other souls as well, while if this one be not so, neither are the others. If, then, it be maintained that in some instance the attribute belongs, you must show that in some instance it does not belong: for then it will follow, by reason of the hypothesis, that it does not belong to any instance at all. If, on the other hand, it be maintained that it does not belong in some instance, you must show that it does belong in some instance, for in this way it will follow that it belongs to all instances. It is clear that the maker of the hypothesis universalizes the question, whereas it was stated in a particular form: for he claims that the maker of
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a particular admission should make a universal admission, inasmuch as he claims that if the attribute belongs in one instance, it belongs also in all instances alike. If the problem be indefinite, it is possible to overthrow a statement in only one way; e.g. if a man has asserted that pleasure is good or is not good, without any further definition. For if he meant that a particular pleasure is good, you must show universally that no pleasure is good, if the proposition in question is to be demolished. And likewise, also, if he meant that some particular pleasure is not good you must show universally that all pleasure is good: it is impossible to demolish it in any other way. For if we show that some particular pleasure is not good or is good, the proposition in question is not yet demolished. It is clear, then, that it is possible to demolish an indefinite statement in one way only, whereas it can be established in two ways: for whether we show universally that all pleasure is good, or whether we show that a particular pleasure is good, the proposition in question will have been proved. Likewise, also, supposing we are required to argue that some particular pleasure is not good, if we show that no pleasure is good or that a particular pleasure is not good, we shall have produced an argument in both ways, both universally and in particular, to show that some particular pleasure is not good. If, on the other hand, the statement made be definite, it will be possible to demolish it in two ways; e.g. if it be maintained that it is an attribute of some particular pleasure to be good, while of some it is not: for whether it be shown that all pleasure, or that no pleasure, is good, the proposition in question will have been demolished. If, however, he has stated that only one single pleasure is good, it is possible to demolish it in three ways: for by showing that all pleasure, or that no pleasure, or that more than one pleasure, is good, we shall have demolished the statement in question. If the statement be made still more definite, e.g. that prudence alone of the virtues
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is knowledge, there are four ways of demolishing it: for if it be shown that all virtue is knowledge, or that no virtue is so, or that some other virtue (e.g. justice) is so, or that prudence itself is not knowledge, the proposition in question will have been demolished. It is useful also to take a look at individual instances, in cases where some attribute has been said to belong or not to belong, as in the case of universal questions. Moreover, you should take a glance among genera, dividing them by their species until you come to those that are not further divisible, as has been said before:’ for whether the attribute is found to belong in all cases or in none, you should, after adducing several instances, claim that he should either admit your point universally, or else bring an objection showing in what case it does not hold. Moreover, in cases where it is possible to make the accident definite either specifically or numerically, you should look and see whether perhaps none of them belongs, showing e.g. that time is not moved, nor yet a movement, by enumerating how many species there are of movement: for if none of these belong to time, clearly it does not move, nor yet is a movement. Likewise, also, you can show that the soul is not a number, by dividing all numbers into either odd or even: for then, if the soul be neither odd nor even, clearly it is not a number. In regard then to Accident, you should set to work by means like these, and in this manner.

Book IV

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1 Next we must go on to examine questions relating to Genus and Property. These are elements in the questions that relate to definitions, but dialecticians seldom address their inquiries to these by themselves. If, then, a genus be suggested for something that is, first take a look at all objects which belong to the same genus as the thing mentioned, and see whether the genus suggested is not predicated of one of them, as happens in the case of an accident: e.g. if ‘good’ be laid down to be the genus of ‘pleasure’, see whether some particular pleasure be not good: for, if so, clearly good’ is not the genus of pleasure: for the genus is predicated of all the members of the same species. Secondly, see whether it be predicated not in the category of essence, but as an accident, as ‘white’ is predicated of ‘snow’, or ‘self-moved’ of the soul. For ‘snow’ is not a kind of ‘white’, and therefore ‘white’ is not the genus of snow, nor is the soul a kind of ‘moving object’: its motion is an accident of it, as it often is of an animal to walk or to be walking. Moreover, ‘moving’ does not seem to indicate the essence, but rather a state of doing or of having something done to it. Likewise, also, ‘white’: for it indicates not the essence of snow, but a certain quality of it. So that neither of them is predicated in the category of ‘essence’. Especially you should take a look at the definition of Accident, and see whether it fits the genus mentioned, as (e.g.) is also the case in the instances just given. For it is possible for a thing to be and not to be self-moved, and likewise, also, for it to be and not to be white. So that neither of these attributes is the genus but an accident, since we were saying that an accident is an attribute which can belong to a thing and also not belong. Moreover, see whether the genus and the species be not found in the same division, but the one be a substance while the other

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is a quality, or the one be a relative while the other is a quality, as (e.g.) ‘slow’ and ‘swan’ are each a substance, while ‘white’ is not a substance but a quality, so that ‘white’ is not the genus either of ‘snow’ or of ‘swan’. Again, knowledge’ is a relative, while ‘good’ and ‘noble’ are each a quality, so that good, or noble, is not the genus of knowledge. For the genera of relatives ought themselves also to be relatives, as is the case with ‘double’: for multiple’, which is the genus of ‘double’, is itself also a relative. To speak generally, the genus ought to fall under the same division as the species: for if the species be a substance, so too should be the genus, and if the species be a quality, so too the genus should be a quality; e.g. if white be a quality, so too should colour be. Likewise, also, in other cases. Again, see whether it be necessary or possible for the genus to partake of the object which has been placed in the genus. ‘To partake’ is defined as ‘to admit the definition of that which is partaken. Clearly, therefore, the species partake of the genera, but not the genera of the species: for the species admits the definition of the genus, whereas the genus does not admit that of the species. You must look, therefore, and see whether the genus rendered partakes or can possibly partake of the species, e.g. if any one were to render anything as genus of ‘being’ or of ‘unity’: for then the result will be that the genus partakes of the species: for of everything that is, ‘being’ and ‘unity’ are predicated, and therefore their definition as well. Moreover, see if there be anything of which the species rendered is true, while the genus is not so, e.g. supposing ‘being’ or ‘object of knowledge’ were stated to be the genus of ‘object of opinion’. For ‘object of opinion’ will be a predicate of what does not exist; for many things which do not exist are objects of opinion; whereas that ‘being’ or ‘object of knowledge’ is not predicated of what does not exist is clear. So that neither ‘being’ nor ‘object of knowledge’ is the genus of ‘object of opinion’: for of the

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objects of which the species is predicated, the genus ought to be predicated as well. Again, see whether the object placed in the genus be quite unable to partake of any of its species: for it is impossible that it should partake of the genus if it do not partake of any of its species, except it be one of the species reached by the first division: these do partake of the genus alone. If, therefore, ‘Motion’ be stated as the genus of pleasure, you should look and see if pleasure be neither locomotion nor alteration, nor any of the rest of the given modes of motion: for clearly you may then take it that it does not partake of any of the species, and therefore not of the genus either, since what partakes of the genus must necessarily partake of one of the species as well: so that pleasure could not be a species of Motion, nor yet be one of the individual phenomena comprised under the term ‘motion’. For individuals as well partake in the genus and the species, as (e.g.) an individual man partakes of both ‘man’ and ‘animal’. Moreover, see if the term placed in the genus has a wider denotation than the genus, as (e.g.) ‘object of opinion’ has, as compared with ‘being’: for both what is and what is not are objects of opinion, so that ‘object of opinion’ could not be a species of being: for the genus is always of wider denotation than the species. Again, see if the species and its genus have an equal denotation; suppose, for instance, that of the attributes which go with everything, one were to be stated as a species and the other as its genus, as for example Being and Unity: for everything has being and unity, so that neither is the genus of the other, since their denotation is equal. Likewise, also, if the ‘first’ of a series and the ‘beginning’ were to be placed one under the other: for the beginning is first and the first is the beginning, so that either both expressions are identical or at any rate neither is the genus of the other. The elementary principle in regard to all such cases is that the genus has a

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wider denotation than the species and its differentia: for the differentia as well has a narrower denotation than the genus. See also whether the genus mentioned fails, or might be generally thought to fail, to apply to some object which is not specifically different from the thing in question; or, if your argument be constructive, whether it does so apply. For all things that are not specifically different have the same genus. If, therefore, it be shown to apply to one, then clearly it applies to all, and if it fails to apply to one, clearly it fails to apply to any; e.g. if any one who assumes ‘indivisible lines’ were to say that the ‘indivisible’ is their genus. For the aforesaid term is not the genus of divisible lines, and these do not differ as regards their species from indivisible: for straight lines are never different from each other as regards their species.

2 Look and see, also, if there be any other genus of the given species which neither embraces the genus rendered nor yet falls under it, e.g. suppose any one were to lay down that ‘knowledge’ is the genus of justice. For virtue is its genus as well, and neither of these genera embraces the remaining one, so that knowledge could not be the genus of justice: for it is generally accepted that whenever one species falls under two genera, the one is embraced by the other. Yet a principle of this kind gives rise to a difficulty in some cases. For some people hold that prudence is both virtue and knowledge, and that neither of its genera is embraced by the other: although certainly not everybody admits that prudence is knowledge. If, however, any one were to admit the truth of this assertion, yet it would still be generally agreed to be necessary that the genera

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of the same object must at any rate be subordinate either the one to the other or both to the same, as actually is the case with virtue and knowledge. For both fall under the same genus; for each of them is a state and a disposition. You should look, therefore, and see whether neither of these things is true of the genus rendered; for if the genera be subordinate neither the one to the other nor both to the same, then what is rendered could not be the true genus. Look, also, at the genus of the genus rendered, and so continually at the next higher genus, and see whether all are predicated of the species, and predicated in the category of essence: for all the higher genera should be predicated of the species in the category of essence. If, then, there be anywhere a discrepancy, clearly what is rendered is not the true genus. [Again, see whether either the genus itself, or one of its higher genera, partakes of the species: for the higher genus does not partake of any of the lower.] If, then, you are overthrowing a view, follow the rule as given: if establishing one, then – suppose that what has been named as genus be admitted to belong to the species, only it be disputed whether it belongs as genus – it is enough to show that one of its higher genera is predicated of the species in the category of essence. For if one of them be predicated in the category of essence, all of them, both higher and lower than this one, if predicated at all of the species, will be predicated of it in the category of essence: so that what has been rendered as genus is also predicated in the category of essence. The premiss that when one genus is predicated in the category of essence, all the rest, if predicated at all, will be predicated in the category of essence, should be secured by induction. Supposing, however, that it be disputed whether what has been rendered as genus belongs at all, it is not enough to show that one of the higher genera is predicated of the species in the category of essence: e.g. if any one has rendered ‘locomotion’ as the genus of walking, it is not enough to show
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that walking is ‘motion’ in order to show that it is ‘locomotion’, seeing that there are other forms of motion as well; but one must show in addition that walking does not partake of any of the species of motion produced by the same division except locomotion. For of necessity what partakes of the genus partakes also of one of the species produced by the first division of the genus. If, therefore, walking does not partake either of increase or decrease or of the other kinds of motion, clearly it would partake of locomotion, so that locomotion would be the genus of walking. Again, look among the things of which the given species is predicated as genus, and see if what is rendered as its genus be also predicated in the category of essence of the very things of which the species is so predicated, and likewise if all the genera higher than this genus are so predicated as well. For if there be anywhere a discrepancy, clearly what has been rendered is not the true genus: for had it been the genus, then both the genera higher than it, and it itself, would all have been predicated in the category of essence of those objects of which the species too is predicated in the category of essence. If, then, you are overthrowing a view, it is useful to see whether the genus fails to be predicated in the category of essence of those things of which the species too is predicated. If establishing a view, it is useful to see whether it is predicated in the category of essence: for if so, the result will be that the genus and the species will be predicated of the same object in the category of essence, so that the same object falls under two genera: the genera must therefore of necessity be subordinate one to the other, and therefore if it be shown that the one we wish to establish as genus is not subordinate to the species, clearly the species would be subordinate to it, so that you may take it as shown that it is the genus.

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Look, also, at the definitions of the genera, and see whether they apply both to the given species and to the objects which partake of the species. For of necessity the definitions of its genera must be predicated of the species and of the objects which partake of the species: if, then, there be anywhere a discrepancy, clearly what has been rendered is not the genus. Again, see if he has rendered the differentia as the genus, e.g. ‘immortal’ as the genus of ‘God’. For ‘immortal’ is a differentia of ‘living being’, seeing that of living beings some are mortal and others immortal. Clearly, then, a bad mistake has been made; for the differentia of a thing is never its genus. And that this is true is clear: for a thing’s differentia never signifies its essence, but rather some quality, as do ‘walking’ and ‘biped’. Also, see whether he has placed the differentia inside the genus, e.g. by taking ‘odd’ as a number’. For ‘odd’ is a differentia of number, not a species. Nor is the differentia generally thought to partake of the genus: for what partakes of the genus is always either a species or an individual, whereas the differentia is neither a species nor an individual. Clearly, therefore, the differentia does not partake of the genus, so that ‘odd’ too is no species but a differentia, seeing that it does not partake of the genus. Moreover, see whether he has placed the genus inside the species, e.g. by taking ‘contact’ to be a ‘juncture’, or ‘mixture’ a ‘fusion’, or, as in Plato’s definition,’ ‘locomotion’ to be the same as ‘carriage’. For there is no necessity that contact should be juncture: rather, conversely, juncture must be contact: for what is in contact is not always joined, though what is joined is always in contact. Likewise, also, in the remaining instances: for mixture is not always a ‘fusion’ (for to mix dry things does not fuse them), nor is locomotion always ‘carriage’. For walking is not generally thought to be carriage: for ‘carriage’ is mostly used

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of things that change one place for another involuntarily, as happens in the case of inanimate things. Clearly, also, the species, in the instances given, has a wider denotation than the genus, whereas it ought to be vice versa. Again, see whether he has placed the differentia inside the species, by taking (e.g.) ‘immortal’ to be ‘a god’. For the result will be that the species has an equal or wider denotation: and this cannot be, for always the differentia has an equal or a wider denotation than the species. Moreover, see whether he has placed the genus inside the differentia, by making ‘colour’ (e.g.) to be a thing that ‘pierces’, or ‘number’ a thing that is ‘odd’. Also, see if he has mentioned the genus as differentia: for it is possible for a man to bring forward a statement of this kind as well, e.g. that ‘mixture’ is the differentia of ‘fusion’, or that change of place’ is the differentia of ‘carriage’. All such cases should be examined by means of the same principles: for they depend upon common rules: for the genus should have a wider denotation that its differentia, and also should not partake of its differentia; whereas, if it be rendered in this manner, neither of the aforesaid requirements can be satisfied: for the genus will both have a narrower denotation than its differentia, and will partake of it. Again, if no differentia belonging to the genus be predicated of the given species, neither will the genus be predicated of it; e.g. of ‘soul’ neither ‘odd’ nor ‘even’ is predicated: neither therefore is ‘number’. Moreover, see whether the species is naturally prior and abolishes the genus along with itself: for the contrary is the general view. Moreover, if it be possible for the genus stated, or for its differentia, to be absent from the alleged species, e.g. for ‘movement’ to be absent from the ‘soul’, or ‘truth and falsehood’ from ‘opinion’, then neither of the terms stated could be its genus or its differentia: for the general view is that the genus and the differentia accompany the species, as long as it exists.

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3 Look and see, also, if what is placed in the genus partakes or could possibly partake of any contrary of the genus: for in that case the same thing will at the same time partake of contrary things, seeing that the genus is never absent from it, while it partakes, or can possibly partake, of the contrary genus as well. Moreover, see whether the species shares in any character which it is utterly impossible for any member of the genus to have. Thus (e.g.) if the soul has a share in life, while it is impossible for any number to live, then the soul could not be a species of number. You should look and see, also, if the species be a homonym of the genus, and employ as your elementary principles those already stated for dealing with homonymity: for the genus and the species are synonymous. Seeing that of every genus there is more than one species, look and see if it be impossible that there should be another species than the given one belonging to the genus stated: for if there should be none, then clearly what has been stated could not be a genus at all. Look and see, also, if he has rendered as genus a metaphorical expression, describing (e.g. ‘temperance’ as a ‘harmony’: a ‘harmony’: for a genus is always predicated of its species in its literal sense, whereas ‘harmony’ is predicated of temperance not in a literal sense but metaphorically: for a harmony always consists in notes. Moreover, if there be any contrary of the species, examine it. The examination may take different forms; first of all see if the

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contrary as well be found in the same genus as the species, supposing the genus to have no contrary; for contraries ought to be found in the same genus, if there be no contrary to the genus. Supposing, on the other hand, that there is a contrary to the genus, see if the contrary of the species be found in the contrary genus: for of necessity the contrary species must be in the contrary genus, if there be any contrary to the genus. Each of these points is made plain by means of induction. Again, see whether the contrary of the species be not found in any genus at all, but be itself a genus, e.g. ‘good’: for if this be not found in any genus, neither will its contrary be found in any genus, but will itself be a genus, as happens in the case of ‘good’ and ‘evil’: for neither of these is found in a genus, but each of them is a genus. Moreover, see if both genus and species be contrary to something, and one pair of contraries have an intermediary, but not the other. For if the genera have an intermediary, so should their species as well, and if the species have, so should their genera as well, as is the case with (1) virtue and vice and (2) justice and injustice: for each pair has an intermediary. An objection to this is that there is no intermediary between health and disease, although there is one between evil and good. Or see whether, though there be indeed an intermediary between both pairs, i.e. both between the species and between the genera, yet it be not similarly related, but in one case be a mere negation of the extremes, whereas in the other case it is a subject. For the general view is that the relation should be similar in both cases, as it is in the cases of virtue and vice and of justice and injustice: for the intermediaries between both are mere negations. Moreover, whenever the genus has no contrary, look and see not merely whether the contrary of the species be found in the same genus, but the intermediate as well: for the genus containing the extremes contains the intermediates as well, as (e.g.) in the case of white and black: for ‘colour’ is the genus both of these and of all the intermediate colours as well.

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An objection may be raised that ‘defect’ and ‘excess’ are found in the same genus (for both are in the genus ‘evil’), whereas moderate amount’, the intermediate between them, is found not in ‘evil’ but in ‘good’. Look and see also whether, while the genus has a contrary, the species has none; for if the genus be contrary to anything, so too is the species, as virtue to vice and justice to injustice. Likewise. also, if one were to look at other instances, one would come to see clearly a fact like this. An objection may be raised in the case of health and disease: for health in general is the contrary of disease, whereas a particular disease, being a species of disease, e.g. fever and ophthalmia and any other particular disease, has no contrary. If, therefore, you are demolishing a view, there are all these ways in which you should make your examination: for if the aforesaid characters do not belong to it, clearly what has been rendered is not the genus. If, on the other hand, you are establishing a view, there are three ways: in the first place, see whether the contrary of the species be found in the genus stated, suppose the genus have no contrary: for if the contrary be found in it, clearly the species in question is found in it as well. Moreover, see if the intermediate species is found in the genus stated: for whatever genus contains the intermediate contains the extremes as well. Again, if the genus have a contrary, look and see whether also the contrary species is found in the contrary genus: for if so, clearly also the species in question is found in the genus in question. Again, consider in the case of the inflexions and the coordinates of species and genus, and see whether they follow likewise, both in demolishing and in establishing a view. For whatever attribute belongs or does not belong to one belongs or does not belong at the same time to all; e.g. if justice be a

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particular form of knowledge, then also ‘justly’ is ‘knowingly’ and the just man is a man of knowledge: whereas if any of these things be not so, then neither is any of the rest of them.

4 Again, consider the case of things that bear a like relation to one another. Thus (e.g.) the relation of the pleasant to pleasure is like that of the useful to the good: for in each case the one produces the other. If therefore pleasure be a kind of ‘good’, then also the pleasant will be a kind of ‘useful’: for clearly it may be taken to be productive of good, seeing that pleasure is good. In the same way also consider the case of processes of generation and destruction; if (e.g.) to build be to be active, then to have built is to have been active, and if to learn be to recollect, then also to have learnt is to have recollected, and if to be decomposed be to be destroyed, then to have been decomposed is to have been destroyed, and decomposition is a kind of destruction. Consider also in the same way the case of things that generate or destroy, and of the capacities and uses of things; and in general, both in demolishing and in establishing an argument, you should examine things in the light of any resemblance of whatever description, as we were saying in the case of generation and destruction. For if what tends to destroy tends to decompose, then also to be destroyed is to be decomposed: and if what tends to generate tends to produce, then to be generated is to be produced, and generation is production. Likewise, also, in the case of the capacities and uses of things: for if a capacity be a disposition, then also to be capable of something is to be disposed to it, and if the use of anything be an activity, then to use it is to be active, and to have used it is to have been active.

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If the opposite of the species be a privation, there are two ways of demolishing an argument, first of all by looking to see if the opposite be found in the genus rendered: for either the privation is to be found absolutely nowhere in the same genus, or at least not in the same ultimate genus: e.g. if the ultimate genus containing sight be sensation, then blindness will not be a sensation. Secondly, if there be a sensation. Secondly, if there be a privation opposed to both genus and species, but the opposite of the species be not found in the opposite of the genus, then neither could the species rendered be in the genus rendered. If, then, you are demolishing a view, you should follow the rule as stated; but if establishing one there is but one way: for if the opposite species be found in the opposite genus, then also the species in question would be found in the genus in question: e.g. if ‘blindness’ be a form of ‘insensibility’, then ‘sight’ is a form of ‘sensation’. Again, look at the negations of the genus and species and convert the order of terms, according to the method described in the case of Accident: e.g. if the pleasant be a kind of good, what is not good is not pleasant. For were this no something not good as well would then be pleasant. That, however, cannot be, for it is impossible, if ‘good’ be the genus of pleasant, that anything not good should be pleasant: for of things of which the genus is not predicated, none of the species is predicated either. Also, in establishing a view, you should adopt the same method of examination: for if what is not good be not pleasant, then what is pleasant is good, so that ‘good’ is the genus of ‘pleasant’. If the species be a relative term, see whether the genus be a relative term as well: for if the species be a relative term, so too is the genus, as is the case with ‘double’ and ‘multiple’: for each is a relative term. If, on the other hand, the genus be a relative term, there is no necessity that the species should be so as well:

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for ‘knowledge’is a relative term, but not so ‘grammar’. Or possibly not even the first statement would be generally considered true: for virtue is a kind of ‘noble’ and a kind of ‘good’ thing, and yet, while ‘virtue’ is a relative term, ‘good’ and ‘noble’ are not relatives but qualities. Again, see whether the species fails to be used in the same relation when called by its own name, and when called by the name of its genus: e.g. if the term ‘double’ be used to mean the double of a ‘half’, then also the term ‘multiple’ ought to be used to mean multiple of a ‘half’. Otherwise ‘multiple’ could not be the genus of ‘double’. Moreover, see whether the term fail to be used in the same relation both when called by the name of its genus, and also when called by those of all the genera of its genus. For if the double be a multiple of a half, then ‘in excess of ‘will also be used in relation to a ‘half’: and, in general, the double will be called by the names of all the higher genera in relation to a ‘half’. An objection may be raised that there is no necessity for a term to be used in the same relation when called by its own name and when called by that of its genus: for ‘knowledge’ is called knowledge ‘of an object’, whereas it is called a ‘state’ and ‘disposition’ not of an ‘object’ but of the ‘soul’. Again, see whether the genus and the species be used in the same way in respect of the inflexions they take, e.g. datives and genitives and all the rest. For as the species is used, so should the genus be as well, as in the case of ‘double’ and its higher genera: for we say both ‘double of’ and ‘multiple of’ a thing. Likewise, also, in the case of ‘knowledge’: for both knowledge’ itself and its genera, e.g. ‘disposition’ and ‘state’, are said to be ‘of’ something. An objection may be raised that in some cases it is not so: for we say ‘superior to’ and ‘contrary to’ so and so, whereas ‘other’, which is the genus of these terms, demands not ‘to’ but ‘than’: for the expression is ‘other than’ so and so.

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Again, see whether terms used in like case relationships fail to yield a like construction when converted, as do ‘double’ and ‘multiple’. For each of these terms takes a genitive both in itself and in its converted form: for we say both a half of’ and ‘a fraction of’ something. The case is the same also as regards both ‘knowledge’ and ‘conception’: for these take a genitive, and by conversion an ‘object of knowledge’ and an ‘object of conception’ are both alike used with a dative. If, then, in any cases the constructions after conversion be not alike, clearly the one term is not the genus of the other. Again, see whether the species and the genus fail to be used in relation to an equal number of things: for the general view is that the uses of both are alike and equal in number, as is the case with ‘present’ and ‘grant’. For a present’ is of something or to some one, and also a ‘grant’ is of something and to some one: and ‘grant’ is the genus of ‘present’, for a ‘present’ is a ‘grant that need not be returned’. In some cases, however, the number of relations in which the terms are used happens not to be equal, for while ‘double’ is double of something, we speak of ‘in excess’ or ‘greater’ in something, as well as of or than something: for what is in excess or greater is always in excess in something, as well as in excess of something. Hence the terms in question are not the genera of ‘double’, inasmuch as they are not used in relation to an equal number of things with the species. Or possibly it is not universally true that species and genus are used in relation to an equal number of things. See, also, if the opposite of the species have the opposite of the genus as its genus, e.g. whether, if ‘multiple’ be the genus of ‘double’, ‘fraction’ be also the genus of ‘half’. For the opposite of the genus should always be the genus of the opposite species. If, then, any one were to assert that knowledge is a kind of sensation, then also the object of knowledge will have to be a kind of object of sensation, whereas it is not: for an object of

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knowledge is not always an object of sensation: for objects of knowledge include some of the objects of intuition as well. Hence ‘object of sensation’ is not the genus of ‘object of knowledge’: and if this be so, neither is ‘sensation’ the genus of ‘knowledge’. Seeing that of relative terms some are of necessity found in, or used of, the things in relation to which they happen at any time to be used (e.g. ‘disposition’ and ‘state’ and ‘balance’; for in nothing else can the aforesaid terms possibly be found except in the things in relation to which they are used), while others need not be found in the things in relation to which they are used at any time, though they still may be (e.g. if the term ‘object of knowledge’ be applied to the soul: for it is quite possible that the knowledge of itself should be possessed by the soul itself, but it is not necessary, for it is possible for this same knowledge to be found in some one else), while for others, again, it is absolutely impossible that they should be found in the things in relation to which they happen at any time to be used (as e.g. that the contrary should be found in the contrary or knowledge in the object of knowledge, unless the object of knowledge happen to be a soul or a man) – you should look, therefore, and see whether he places a term of one kind inside a genus that is not of that kind, e.g. suppose he has said that ‘memory’ is the ‘abiding of knowledge’. For ‘abiding’ is always found in that which abides, and is used of that, so that the abiding of knowledge also will be found in knowledge. Memory, then, is found in knowledge, seeing that it is the abiding of knowledge. But this is impossible, for memory is always found in the soul. The aforesaid commonplace rule is common to the subject of Accident as well: for it is all the same to say that ‘abiding’ is the genus of memory, or to allege that it is an accident of it. For if in any way whatever memory be the abiding of knowledge, the same argument in regard to it will apply.

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5 Again, see if he has placed what is a ‘state’ inside the genus ‘activity’, or an activity inside the genus ‘state’, e.g. by defining ‘sensation’ as ‘movement communicated through the body’: for sensation is a ‘state’, whereas movement is an ‘activity’. Likewise, also, if he has said that memory is a ‘state that is retentive of a conception’, for memory is never a state, but rather an activity. They also make a bad mistake who rank a ‘state’ within the ‘capacity’ that attends it, e.g. by defining ‘good temper’ as the ‘control of anger’, and ‘courage’ and ‘justice’ as ‘control of fears’ and of ‘gains’: for the terms ‘courageous’ and ‘good-tempered’ are applied to a man who is immune from passion, whereas ‘self-controlled’ describes the man who is exposed to passion and not led by it. Quite possibly, indeed, each of the former is attended by a capacity such that, if he were exposed to passion, he would control it and not be led by it: but, for all that, this is not what is meant by being ‘courageous’ in the one case, and ‘good tempered’ in the other; what is meant is an absolute immunity from any passions of that kind at all. Sometimes, also, people state any kind of attendant feature as the genus, e.g. ‘pain’ as the genus of ‘anger’ and ‘conception’ as that of conviction’. For both of the things in question follow in a certain sense upon the given species, but neither of them is genus to it. For when the angry man feels pain, the pain bas appeared in him earlier than the anger: for his anger is not the cause of his pain, but his pain of his anger, so that anger emphatically is not pain. By the same reasoning, neither is conviction conception: for it is possible to have the same

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conception even without being convinced of it, whereas this is impossible if conviction be a species of conception: for it is impossible for a thing still to remain the same if it be entirely transferred out of its species, just as neither could the same animal at one time be, and at another not be, a man. If, on the other hand, any one says that a man who has a conception must of necessity be also convinced of it, then ‘conception’ and ‘conviction’ will be used with an equal denotation, so that not even so could the former be the genus of the latter: for the denotation of the genus should be wider. See, also, whether both naturally come to be anywhere in the same thing: for what contains the species contains the genus as well: e.g. what contains ‘white’ contains ‘colour’ as well, and what contains ‘knowledge of grammar’ contains ‘knowledge’ as well. If, therefore, any one says that ‘shame’ is ‘fear’, or that ‘anger’ is ‘pain’, the result will be that genus and species are not found in the same thing: for shame is found in the ‘reasoning’ faculty, whereas fear is in the ‘spirited’ faculty, and ‘pain’ is found in the faculty of ‘desires’. (for in this pleasure also is found), whereas ‘anger’ is found in the ‘spirited’ faculty. Hence the terms rendered are not the genera, seeing that they do not naturally come to be in the same faculty as the species. Likewise, also, if ‘friendship’ be found in the faculty of desires, you may take it that it is not a form of ‘wishing’: for wishing is always found in the ‘reasoning’ faculty. This commonplace rule is useful also in dealing with Accident: for the accident and that of which it is an accident are both found in the same thing, so that if they do not appear in the same thing, clearly it is not an accident. Again, see if the species partakes of the genus attributed only in some particular respect: for it is the general view that the genus is not thus imparted only in some particular respect: for a man is not an animal in a particular respect, nor is grammar

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knowledge in a particular respect only. Likewise also in other instances. Look, therefore, and see if in the case of any of its species the genus be imparted only in a certain respect; e.g. if ‘animal’ has been described as an ‘object of perception’ or of ‘sight’. For an animal is an object of perception or of sight in a particular respect only; for it is in respect of its body that it is perceived and seen, not in respect of its soul, so that – ‘object of sight’ and ‘object of perception’ could not be the genus of ‘animal’. Sometimes also people place the whole inside the part without detection, defining (e.g.) ‘animal’ as an ‘animate body’; whereas the part is not predicated in any sense of the whole, so that ‘body’ could not be the genus of animal, seeing that it is a part. See also if he has put anything that is blameworthy or objectionable into the class ‘capacity’ or ‘capable’, e.g. by defining a ‘sophist’ or a ‘slanderer’, or a ‘thief’ as ‘one who is capable of secretly thieving other people’s property’. For none of the aforesaid characters is so called because he is ‘capable’ in one of these respects: for even God and the good man are capable of doing bad things, but that is not their character: for it is always in respect of their choice that bad men are so called. Moreover, a capacity is always a desirable thing: for even the capacities for doing bad things are desirable, and therefore it is we say that even God and the good man possess them; for they are capable (we say) of doing evil. So then ‘capacity’ can never be the genus of anything blameworthy. Else, the result will be that what is blameworthy is sometimes desirable: for there will be a certain form of capacity that is blameworthy. Also, see if he has put anything that is precious or desirable for its own sake into the class ‘capacity’ or ‘capable’ or ‘productive’ of anything. For capacity, and what is capable or productive of anything, is always desirable for the sake of something else.

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Or see if he has put anything that exists in two genera or more into one of them only. For some things it is impossible to place in a single genus, e.g. the ‘cheat’ and the ‘slanderer’: for neither he who has the will without the capacity, nor he who has the capacity without the will, is a slanderer or cheat, but he who has both of them. Hence he must be put not into one genus, but into both the aforesaid genera. Moreover, people sometimes in converse order render genus as differentia, and differentia as genus, defining (e.g.) astonishment as ‘excess of wonderment’ and conviction as ‘vehemence of conception’. For neither ‘excess’ nor ‘vehemence’ is the genus, but the differentia: for astonishment is usually taken to be an ‘excessive wonderment’, and conviction to be a ‘vehement conception’, so that ‘wonderment’ and ‘conception’ are the genus, while ‘excess’ and ‘vehemence’ are the differentia. Moreover, if any one renders ‘excess’ and ‘vehemence’ as genera, then inanimate things will be convinced and astonished. For ‘vehemence’ and ‘excess’ of a thing are found in a thing which is thus vehement and in excess. If, therefore, astonishment be excess of wonderment the astonishment will be found in the wonderment, so that ‘wonderment’ will be astonished! Likewise, also, conviction will be found in the conception, if it be ‘vehemence of conception’, so that the conception will be convinced. Moreover, a man who renders an answer in this style will in consequence find himself calling vehemence vehement and excess excessive: for there is such a thing as a vehement conviction: if then conviction be ‘vehemence’, there would be a ‘vehement vehemence’. Likewise, also, there is such a thing as excessive astonishment: if then astonishment be an excess, there would be an ‘excessive excess’. Whereas neither of these things is generally believed, any more than that knowledge is a knower or motion a moving thing.

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Sometimes, too, people make the bad mistake of putting an affection into that which is affected, as its genus, e.g. those who say that immortality is everlasting life: for immortality seems to be a certain affection or accidental feature of life. That this saying is true would appear clear if any one were to admit that a man can pass from being mortal and become immortal: for no one will assert that he takes another life, but that a certain accidental feature or affection enters into this one as it is. So then ‘life’ is not the genus of immortality. Again, see if to an affection he has ascribed as genus the object of which it is an affection, by defining (e.g.) wind as ‘air in motion’. Rather, wind is ‘a movement of air’: for the same air persists both when it is in motion and when it is still. Hence wind is not ‘air’ at all: for then there would also have been wind when the air was not in motion, seeing that the same air which formed the wind persists. Likewise, also, in other cases of the kind. Even, then, if we ought in this instance to admit the point that wind is ‘air in motion’, yet we should accept a definition of the kind, not about all those things of which the genus is not true, but only in cases where the genus rendered is a true predicate. For in some cases, e.g. ‘mud’ or ‘snow’, it is not generally held to be true. For people tell you that snow is ‘frozen water’ and mud is earth mixed with moisture’, whereas snow is not water, nor mud earth, so that neither of the terms rendered could be the genus: for the genus should be true of all its species. Likewise neither is wine ‘fermented water’, as Empedocles speaks of ‘water fermented in wood’;’ for it simply is not water at all.

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6 Moreover, see whether the term rendered fail to be the genus of anything at all; for then clearly it also fails to be the genus of the species mentioned. Examine the point by seeing whether the objects that partake of the genus fail to be specifically different from one another, e.g. white objects: for these do not differ specifically from one another, whereas of a genus the species are always different, so that ‘white’ could not be the genus of anything. Again, see whether he has named as genus or differentia some feature that goes with everything: for the number of attributes that follow everything is comparatively large: thus (e.g.) ‘Being’ and ‘Unity’ are among the number of attributes that follow everything. If, therefore, he has rendered ‘Being’ as a genus, clearly it would be the genus of everything, seeing that it is predicated of everything; for the genus is never predicated of anything except of its species. Hence Unity, inter alia, will be a species of Being. The result, therefore, is that of all things of which the genus is predicated, the species is predicated as well, seeing that Being and Unity are predicates of absolutely everything, whereas the predication of the species ought to be of narrower range. If, on the other hand, he has named as differentia some attribute that follows everything, clearly the denotation of the differentia will be equal to, or wider than, that of the genus. For if the genus, too, be some attribute that follows everything, the denotation of the differentia will be equal to its denotation, while if the genus do not follow everything, it will be still wider. Moreover, see if the description ‘inherent in S’ be used of the genus rendered in relation to its species, as it is used of ‘white’ in the case of snow, thus showing clearly that it could not be the genus: for ‘true of S’ is the only description used of the genus in

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relation to its species. Look and see also if the genus fails to be synonymous with its species. For the genus is always predicated of its species synonymously. Moreover, beware, whenever both species and genus have a contrary, and he places the better of the contraries inside the worse genus: for the result will be that the remaining species will be found in the remaining genus, seeing that contraries are found in contrary genera, so that the better species will be found in the worse genus and the worse in the better: whereas the usual view is that of the better species the genus too is better. Also see if he has placed the species inside the worse and not inside the better genus, when it is at the same time related in like manner to both, as (e.g.) if he has defined the ‘soul’ as a ‘form of motion’ or ‘a form of moving thing’. For the same soul is usually thought to be a principle alike of rest and of motion, so that, if rest is the better of the two, this is the genus into which the soul should have been put. Moreover, judge by means of greater and less degrees: if overthrowing a view, see whether the genus admits of a greater degree, whereas neither the species itself does so, nor any term that is called after it: e.g. if virtue admits of a greater degree, so too does justice and the just man: for one man is called ‘more just than another’. If, therefore, the genus rendered admits of a greater degree, whereas neither the species does so itself nor yet any term called after it, then what has been rendered could not be the genus. Again, if what is more generally, or as generally, thought to be the genus be not so, clearly neither is the genus rendered. The commonplace rule in question is useful especially in cases where the species appears to have several predicates in the category of essence, and where no distinction has been drawn between them, and we cannot say which of them is genus; e.g.

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both ‘pain’ and the ‘conception of a slight’ are usually thought to be predicates of ‘anger in the category of essence: for the angry man is both in pain and also conceives that he is slighted. The same mode of inquiry may be applied also to the case of the species, by comparing it with some other species: for if the one which is more generally, or as generally, thought to be found in the genus rendered be not found therein, then clearly neither could the species rendered be found therein. In demolishing a view, therefore, you should follow the rule as stated. In establishing one, on the other hand, the commonplace rule that you should see if both the genus rendered and the species admit of a greater degree will not serve: for even though both admit it, it is still possible for one not to be the genus of the other. For both ‘beautiful’ and ‘white’ admit of a greater degree, and neither is the genus of the other. On the other hand, the comparison of the genera and of the species one with another is of use: e.g. supposing A and B to have a like claim to be genus, then if one be a genus, so also is the other. Likewise, also, if what has less claim be a genus, so also is what has more claim: e.g. if ‘capacity’ have more claim than ‘virtue’ to be the genus of self-control, and virtue be the genus, so also is capacity. The same observations will apply also in the case of the species. For instance, supposing A and B to have a like claim to be a species of the genus in question, then if the one be a species, so also is the other: and if that which is less generally thought to be so be a species, so also is that which is more generally thought to be so. Moreover, to establish a view, you should look and see if the genus is predicated in the category of essence of those things of which it has been rendered as the genus, supposing the species rendered to be not one single species but several different ones: for then clearly it will be the genus. If, on the other, the species rendered be single, look and see whether the genus be

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predicated in the category of essence of other species as well: for then, again, the result will be that it is predicated of several different species. Since some people think that the differentia, too, is a predicate of the various species in the category of essence, you should distinguish the genus from the differentia by employing the aforesaid elementary principles – (a) that the genus has a wider denotation than the differentia; (b) that in rendering the essence of a thing it is more fitting to state the genus than the differentia: for any one who says that ‘man’ is an ‘animal’ shows what man is better than he who describes him as ‘walking’; also (c) that the differentia always signifies a quality of the genus, whereas the genus does not do this of the differentia: for he who says ‘walking’ describes an animal of a certain quality, whereas he who says ‘animal’ describes an animal of a certain quality, whereas he who says ‘animal’ does not describe a walking thing of a certain quality. The differentia, then, should be distinguished from the genus in this manner. Now seeing it is generally held that if what is musical, in being musical, possesses knowledge in some respect, then also ‘music’ is a particular kind of ‘knowledge’; and also that if what walks is moved in walking, then ‘walking’ is a particular kind of ‘movement’; you should therefore examine in the aforesaid manner any genus in which you want to establish the existence of something; e.g. if you wish to prove that ‘knowledge’ is a form of ‘conviction’, see whether the knower in knowing is convinced: for then clearly knowledge would be a particular kind of conviction. You should proceed in the same way also in regard to the other cases of this kind. Moreover, seeing that it is difficult to distinguish whatever always follows along with a thing, and is not convertible with it, from its genus, if A follows B universally, whereas B does not

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follow A universally – as e.g. ‘rest’ always follows a ‘calm’ and ‘divisibility’ follows ‘number’, but not conversely (for the divisible is not always a number, nor rest a calm) – you may yourself assume in your treatment of them that the one which always follows is the genus, whenever the other is not convertible with it: if, on the other hand, some one else puts forward the proposition, do not accept it universally. An objection to it is that ‘not-being’ always follows what is ‘coming to be’ (for what is coming to be is not) and is not convertible with it (for what is not is not always coming to be), and that still ‘not-being’ is not the genus of ‘coming to be’: for ‘not-being’ has not any species at all. Questions, then, in regard to Genus should be investigated in the ways described.

Book V

1 The question whether the attribute stated is or is not a property, should be examined by the following methods: Any ‘property’ rendered is always either essential and permanent or relative and temporary: e.g. it is an ‘essential property’ of man to be ‘by nature a civilized animal’: a ‘relative property’ is one like that of the soul in relation to the body, viz. that the one is fitted to command, and the other to obey: a ‘permanent property’ is one like the property which belongs to God, of being an ‘immortal living being’: a ‘temporary property’
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is one like the property which belongs to any particular man of walking in the gymnasium. [The rendering of a property ‘relatively’ gives rise either to two problems or to four. For if he at the same time render this property of one thing and deny it of another, only two problems arise, as in the case of a statement that it is a property of a man, in relation to a horse, to be a biped. For one might try both to show that a man is not a biped, and also that a horse is a biped: in both ways the property would be upset. If on the other hand he render one apiece of two attributes to each of two things, and deny it in each case of the other, there will then be four problems; as in the case of a statement that it is a property of a man in relation to a horse for the former to be a biped and the latter a quadruped. For then it is possible to try to show both that a man is not naturally a biped, and that he is a quadruped, and also that the horse both is a biped, and is not a quadruped. If you show any of these at all, the intended attribute is demolished.] An ‘essential’ property is one which is rendered of a thing in comparison with everything else and distinguishes the said thing from everything else, as does ‘a mortal living being capable of receiving knowledge’ in the case of man. A ‘relative’ property is one which separates its subject off not from everything else but only from a particular definite thing, as does the property which virtue possesses, in comparison with knowledge, viz. that the former is naturally produced in more than one faculty, whereas the latter is produced in that of reason alone, and in those who have a reasoning faculty. A ‘permanent’ property is one which is true at every time, and never fails, like being’ compounded of soul and body’, in the case of a living creature. A ‘temporary’ property is one which is true at some particular time, and does not of necessity always

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follow; as, of some particular man, that he walks in the marketplace. To render a property ‘relatively’ to something else means to state the difference between them as it is found either universally and always, or generally and in most cases: thus a difference that is found universally and always, is one such as man possesses in comparison with a horse, viz. being a biped: for a man is always and in every case a biped, whereas a horse is never a biped at any time. On the other hand, a difference that is found generally and in most cases, is one such as the faculty of reason possesses in comparison with that of desire and spirit, in that the former commands, while the latter obeys: for the reasoning faculty does not always command, but sometimes also is under command, nor is that of desire and spirit always under command, but also on occasion assumes the command, whenever the soul of a man is vicious. Of ‘properties’ the most ‘arguable’ are the essential and permanent and the relative. For a relative property gives rise, as we said before, to several questions: for of necessity the questions arising are either two or four, or that arguments in regard to these are several. An essential and a permanent property you can discuss in relation to many things, or can observe in relation to many periods of time: if essential’, discuss it in comparison with many things: for the property ought to belong to its subject in comparison with every single thing that is, so that if the subject be not distinguished by it in comparison with everything else, the property could not have been rendered correctly. So a permanent property you should observe in relation to many periods of time; for if it does not or did not, or is not going to, belong, it will not be a property. On the other hand, about a temporary property we do not inquire further than in regard to the time called ‘the present’; and so arguments in regard to it are not many; whereas an arguable’

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question is one in regard to which it is possible for arguments both numerous and good to arise. The so-called ‘relative’ property, then, should be examined by means of the commonplace arguments relating to Accident, to see whether it belongs to the one thing and not to the other: on the other hand, permanent and essential properties should be considered by the following methods.

2 First, see whether the property has or has not been rendered correctly. Of a rendering being incorrect or correct, one test is to see whether the terms in which the property is stated are not or are more intelligible – for destructive purposes, whether they are not so, and for constructive purposes, whether they are so. Of the terms not being more intelligible, one test is to see whether the property which he renders is altogether more unintelligible than the subject whose property he has stated: for, if so, the property will not have been stated correctly. For the object of getting a property constituted is to be intelligible: the terms therefore in which it is rendered should be more intelligible: for in that case it will be possible to conceive it more adequately, e.g. any one who has stated that it is a property of ‘fire’ to ‘bear a very close resemblance to the soul’, uses the term ‘soul’, which is less intelligible than ‘fire’ – for we know better what fire is than what soul is –, and therefore a ‘very close resemblance to the soul’ could not be correctly stated to be a property of fire. Another test is to see whether the attribution of A (property) to B (subject) fails to be more intelligible. For not only should the property be more intelligible than its subject, but also it should be something whose

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attribution to the particular subject is a more intelligible attribution. For he who does not know whether it is an attribute of the particular subject at all, will not know either whether it belongs to it alone, so that whichever of these results happens, its character as a property becomes obscure. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of fire to be ‘the primary element wherein the soul is naturally found’, has introduced a subject which is less intelligible than ‘fire’, viz. whether the soul is found in it, and whether it is found there primarily; and therefore to be ‘the primary element in which the soul is naturally found’ could not be correctly stated to be a property of ‘fire’. On the other hand, for constructive purposes, see whether the terms in which the property is stated are more intelligible, and if they are more intelligible in each of the aforesaid ways. For then the property will have been correctly stated in this respect: for of constructive arguments, showing the correctness of a rendering, some will show the correctness merely in this respect, while others will show it without qualification. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that the ‘possession of sensation’ is a property of ‘animal’ has both used more intelligible terms and has rendered the property more intelligible in each of the aforesaid senses; so that to ‘possess sensation’ would in this respect have been correctly rendered as a property of ‘animal’. Next, for destructive purposes, see whether any of the terms rendered in the property is used in more than one sense, or whether the whole expression too signifies more than one thing. For then the property will not have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) seeing that to ‘being natural sentient’ signifies more than one thing, viz. (1) to possess sensation, (2) to use one’s sensation, being naturally sentient’ could not be a correct statement of a property of ‘animal’. The reason why the term you use, or the whole expression signifying the property, should not bear more than one meaning is this, that an expression bearing more than one meaning makes the object described
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obscure, because the man who is about to attempt an argument is in doubt which of the various senses the expression bears: and this will not do, for the object of rendering the property is that he may understand. Moreover, in addition to this, it is inevitable that those who render a property after this fashion should be somehow refuted whenever any one addresses his syllogism to that one of the term’s several meanings which does not agree. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether both all the terms and also the expression as a whole avoid bearing more than one sense: for then the property will have been correctly stated in this respect. Thus (e.g.) seeing that ‘body’ does not bear several meanings, nor quickest to move upwards in space’, nor yet the whole expression made by putting them together, it would be correct in this respect to say that it is a property of fire to be the ‘body quickest to move upwards in space’. Next, for destructive purposes, see if the term of which he renders the property is used in more than one sense, and no distinction has been drawn as to which of them it is whose property he is stating: for then the property will not have been correctly rendered. The reasons why this is so are quite clear from what has been said above: for the same results are bound to follow. Thus (e.g.) seeing that ‘the knowledge of this’ signifies many things for it means (1) the possession of knowledge by it, (2) the use of its knowledge by it, (3) the existence of knowledge about it, (4) the use of knowledge about it – no property of the ‘knowledge of this’ could be rendered correctly unless he draw a distinction as to which of these it is whose property he is rendering. For constructive purposes, a man should see if the term of which he is rendering the property avoids bearing many senses and is one and simple: for then the property will have been correctly stated in this respect. Thus (e.g.) seeing that ‘man’ is used in a single sense, ‘naturally civilized animal’ would be correctly stated as a property of man.
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Next, for destructive purposes, see whether the same term has been repeated in the property. For people often do this undetected in rendering ‘properties’ also, just as they do in their ‘definitions’ as well: but a property to which this has happened will not have been correctly stated: for the repetition of it confuses the hearer; thus inevitably the meaning becomes obscure, and further, such people are thought to babble. Repetition of the same term is likely to happen in two ways; one is, when a man repeatedly uses the same word, as would happen if any one were to render, as a property of fire, ‘the body which is the most rarefied of bodies’ (for he has repeated the word ‘body’); the second is, if a man replaces words by their definitions, as would happen if any one were to render, as a property of earth, ‘the substance which is by its nature most easily of all bodies borne downwards in space’, and were then to substitute ‘substances of such and such a kind’ for the word ‘bodies’: for ‘body’ and ‘a substance of such and such a kind’ mean one and the same thing. For he will have repeated the word ‘substance’, and accordingly neither of the properties would be correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he avoids ever repeating the same term; for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) seeing that he who has stated ‘animal capable of acquiring knowledge’ as a property of man has avoided repeating the same term several times, the property would in this respect have been correctly rendered of man. Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered in the property any such term as is a universal attribute. For one which does not distinguish its subject from other things is useless, and it is the business of the language Of ‘properties’, as also of the language of definitions, to distinguish. In the case contemplated, therefore, the property will not have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a
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property of knowledge to be a ‘conception incontrovertible by argument, because of its unity’, has used in the property a term of that kind, viz. ‘unity’, which is a universal attribute; and therefore the property of knowledge could not have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has avoided all terms that are common to everything and used a term that distinguishes the subject from something: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as he who has said that it is a property of a ‘living creature’ to ‘have a soul’ has used no term that is common to everything, it would in this respect have been correctly stated to be a property of a ‘living creature’ to ‘have a soul’. Next, for destructive purposes see whether he renders more than one property of the same thing, without a definite proviso that he is stating more than one: for then the property will not have been correctly stated. For just as in the case of definitions too there should be no further addition beside the expression which shows the essence, so too in the case of properties nothing further should be rendered beside the expression that constitutes the property mentioned: for such an addition is made to no purpose. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is a property of fire to be ‘the most rarefied and lightest body’ has rendered more than one property (for each term is a true predicate of fire alone); and so it could not be a correctly stated property of fire to be ‘the most rarefied and lightest body’. On the other hand, for constructive purposes, see whether he has avoided rendering more than one property of the same thing, and has rendered one only: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is a property of a liquid to be a ‘body adaptable to every shape’ has rendered as its property a single character and not several, and so the property of ‘liquid’ would in this respect have been correctly stated.
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3 Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has employed either the actual subject whose property he is rendering, or any of its species: for then the property will not have been correctly stated. For the object of rendering the property is that people may understand: now the subject itself is just as unintelligible as it was to start with, while any one of its species is posterior to it, and so is no more intelligible. Accordingly it is impossible to understand anything further by the use of these terms. Thus (e.g.) any one who has said that it is property of ‘animal’ to be ‘the substance to which «man» belongs as a species’ has employed one of its species, and therefore the property could not have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he avoids introducing either the subject itself or any of its species: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of a living creature to be ‘compounded of soul and body’ has avoided introducing among the rest either the subject itself or any of its species, and therefore in this respect the property of a ‘living creature’ would have been correctly rendered. You should inquire in the same way also in the case of other terms that do or do not make the subject more intelligible: thus, for destructive purposes, see whether he has employed anything either opposite to the subject or, in general, anything simultaneous by nature with it or posterior to it: for then the property will not have been correctly stated. For an opposite is simultaneous by nature with its opposite, and what is simultaneous by nature or is posterior to it does not make its subject more intelligible. Thus (e.g.) any one who has said that it

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is a property of good to be ‘the most direct opposite of evil’, has employed the opposite of good, and so the property of good could not have been correctly rendered. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has avoided employing anything either opposite to, or, in general, simultaneous by nature with the subject, or posterior to it: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of knowledge to be ‘the most convincing conception’ has avoided employing anything either opposite to, or simultaneous by nature with, or posterior to, the subject; and so the property of knowledge would in this respect have been correctly stated. Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered as property something that does not always follow the subject but sometimes ceases to be its property: for then the property will not have been correctly described. For there is no necessity either that the name of the subject must also be true of anything to which we find such an attribute belonging; nor yet that the name of the subject will be untrue of anything to which such an attribute is found not to belong. Moreover, in addition to this, even after he has rendered the property it will not be clear whether it belongs, seeing that it is the kind of attribute that may fall: and so the property will not be clear. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of animal ‘sometimes to move and sometimes to stand still’ rendered the kind of property which sometimes is not a property, and so the property could not have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has rendered something that of necessity must always be a property: for then the property will have been in this respect correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of virtue to be ‘what makes its possessor good’ has rendered as property something that always follows, and so the property of virtue would in this respect have been correctly rendered.
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Next, for destructive purposes, see whether in rendering the property of the present time he has omitted to make a definite proviso that it is the property of the present time which he is rendering: for else the property will not have been correctly stated. For in the first place, any unusual procedure always needs a definite proviso: and it is the usual procedure for everybody to render as property some attribute that always follows. In the second place, a man who omits to provide definitely whether it was the property of the present time which he intended to state, is obscure: and one should not give any occasion for adverse criticism. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated it as the property of a particular man ‘to be sitting with a particular man’, states the property of the present time, and so he cannot have rendered the property correctly, seeing that he has described it without any definite proviso. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether, in rendering the property of the present time, he has, in stating it, made a definite proviso that it is the property of the present time that he is stating: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is the property of a particular man ‘to be walking now’, has made this distinction in his statement, and so the property would have been correctly stated. Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered a property of the kind whose appropriateness is not obvious except by sensation: for then the property will not have been correctly stated. For every sensible attribute, once it is taken beyond the sphere of sensation, becomes uncertain. For it is not clear whether it still belongs, because it is evidenced only by sensation. This principle will be true in the case of any attributes that do not always and necessarily follow. Thus (e.g.) any one who has stated that it is a property of the sun to be ‘the brightest star that moves over the earth’, has used in describing the property an expression of that kind, viz. ‘to move over the
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earth’, which is evidenced by sensation; and so the sun’s property could not have been correctly rendered: for it will be uncertain, whenever the sun sets, whether it continues to move over the earth, because sensation then fails us. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has rendered the property of a kind that is not obvious to sensation, or, if it be sensible, must clearly belong of necessity: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of a surface to be ‘the primary thing that is coloured’, has introduced amongst the rest a sensible quality, ‘to be coloured’, but still a quality such as manifestly always belongs, and so the property of ‘surface’ would in this respect have been correctly rendered. Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered the definition as a property: for then the property will not have been correctly stated: for the property of a thing ought not to show its essence. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is the property of man to be ‘a walking, biped animal’ has rendered a property of man so as to signify his essence, and so the property of man could not have been correctly rendered. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether the property which he has rendered forms a predicate convertible with its subject, without, however, signifying its essence: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) he who has stated that it is a property of man to be a ‘naturally civilized animal’ has rendered the property so as to be convertible with its subject, without, however, showing its essence, and so the property of man’ would in this respect have been correctly rendered. Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered the property without having placed the subject within its essence. For of properties, as also of definitions, the first term to be rendered should be the genus, and then the rest of it should be

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appended immediately afterwards, and should distinguish its subject from other things. Hence a property which is not stated in this way could not have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is a property of a living creature to ‘have a soul’ has not placed ‘living creature’ within its essence, and so the property of a living creature could not have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether a man first places within its essence the subject whose property he is rendering, and then appends the rest: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) he who has stated that is a property of man to be an ‘animal capable of receiving knowledge’, has rendered the property after placing the subject within its essence, and so the property of ‘man’ would in this respect have been correctly rendered.

4 The inquiry, then, whether the property has been correctly rendered or no, should be made by these means. The question, on the other hand, whether what is stated is or is not a property at all, you should examine from the following points of view. For the commonplace arguments which establish absolutely that the property is accurately stated will be the same as those that constitute it a property at all: accordingly they will be described in the course of them. Firstly, then, for destructive purposes, take a look at each subject of which he has rendered the property, and see (e.g.) if it fails to belong to any of them at all, or to be true of them in that particular respect, or to be a property of each of them in respect of that character of which he has rendered the property: for

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then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is not true of the geometrician that he ‘cannot be deceived by an argument’ (for a geometrician is deceived when his figure is misdrawn), it could not be a property of the man of science that he is not deceived by an argument. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether the property rendered be true of every instance, and true in that particular respect: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus, for example, in as much as the description ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’ is true of every man, and true of him qua man, it would be a property of man to be ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’. commonplace rule means – for destructive purposes, see if the description fails to be true of that of which the name is true; and if the name fails to be true of that of which the description is true: for constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the description too is predicated of that of which the name is predicated, and if the name too is predicated of that of which the description is predicated.] Next, for destructive purposes, see if the description fails to apply to that to which the name applies, and if the name fails to apply to that to which the description applies: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as the description ‘a living being that partakes of knowledge’ is true of God, while ‘man’ is not predicated of God, to be a living being that partakes of knowledge’ could not be a property of man. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the name as well be predicated of that of which the description is predicated, and if the description as well be predicated of that of which the name is predicated. For then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) the predicate ‘living creature’ is true of that of which ‘having a soul’ is true, and ‘having a soul’ is true of that of which the

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predicate ‘living creature’ is true; and so ‘having a soul would be a property of ‘living creature’. Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has rendered a subject as a property of that which is described as ‘in the subject’: for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as he who has rendered ‘fire’ as the property of ‘the body with the most rarefied particles’, has rendered the subject as the property of its predicate, ‘fire’ could not be a property of ‘the body with the most rarefied particles’. The reason why the subject will not be a property of that which is found in the subject is this, that then the same thing will be the property of a number of things that are specifically different. For the same thing has quite a number of specifically different predicates that belong to it alone, and the subject will be a property of all of these, if any one states the property in this way. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he has rendered what is found in the subject as a property of the subject: for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property, if it be predicated only of the things of which it has been stated to be the property. Thus (e.g.) he who has said that it is a property of ‘earth’ to be ‘specifically the heaviest body’ has rendered of the subject as its property something that is said of the thing in question alone, and is said of it in the manner in which a property is predicated, and so the property of earth would have been rightly stated. Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has rendered the property as partaken of: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. For an attribute of which the subject partakes is a constituent part of its essence: and an attribute of that kind would be a differentia applying to some one species. E.g. inasmuch as he who has said that ‘walking on two feet’ is property of man has rendered the property as partaken of, ‘walking on two feet’ could not be a property of ‘man’. For

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constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he has avoided rendering the property as partaken of, or as showing the essence, though the subject is predicated convertibly with it: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) he who has stated that to be ‘naturally sentient’ is a property of ‘animal’ has rendered the property neither as partaken of nor as showing the essence, though the subject is predicated convertibly with it; and so to be ‘naturally sentient’ would be a property of ‘animal’. Next, for destructive purposes, see if the property cannot possibly belong simultaneously, but must belong either as posterior or as prior to the attribute described in the name: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property either never, or not always. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is possible for the attribute ‘walking through the market-place’ to belong to an object as prior and as posterior to the attribute ‘man’, ‘walking through the market-place’ could not be a property of ‘man’ either never, or not always. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if it always and of necessity belongs simultaneously, without being either a definition or a differentia: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) the attribute ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’ always and of necessity belongs simultaneously with the attribute ‘man’, and is neither differentia nor definition of its subject, and so ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’ would be a property of ‘man’. Next, for destructive purposes, see if the same thing fails to be a property of things that are the same as the subject, so far as they are the same: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is no property of a ‘proper object of pursuit’ to ‘appear good to certain persons’, it could not be a property of the ‘desirable’ either to ‘appear good to certain persons’: for ‘proper object of pursuit’

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and ‘desirable’ mean the same. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the same thing be a property of something that is the same as the subject, in so far as it is the same. For then is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is called a property of a man, in so far as he is a man, ‘to have a tripartite soul’, it would also be a property of a mortal, in so far as he is a mortal, to have a tripartite soul. This commonplace rule is useful also in dealing with Accident: for the same attributes ought either to belong or not belong to the same things, in so far as they are the same. Next, for destructive purposes, see if the property of things that are the same in kind as the subject fails to be always the same in kind as the alleged property: for then neither will what is stated to be the property of the subject in question. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as a man and a horse are the same in kind, and it is not always a property of a horse to stand by its own initiative, it could not be a property of a man to move by his own initiative; for to stand and to move by his own initiative are the same in kind, because they belong to each of them in so far as each is an ‘animal’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if of things that are the same in kind as the subject the property that is the same as the alleged property is always true: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) since it is a property of man to be a ‘walking biped,’ it would also be a property of a bird to be a ‘flying biped’: for each of these is the same in kind, in so far as the one pair have the sameness of species that fall under the same genus, being under the genus ‘animal’, while the other pair have that of differentiae of the genus, viz. of ‘animal’. This commonplace rule is deceptive whenever one of the properties mentioned belongs to some one species only while the other belongs to many, as does ‘walking quadruped’.

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Inasmuch as ‘same’ and ‘different’ are terms used in several senses, it is a job to render to a sophistical questioner a property that belongs to one thing and that only. For an attribute that belongs to something qualified by an accident will also belong to the accident taken along with the subject which it qualifies; e.g. an attribute that belongs to ‘man’ will belong also to ‘white man’, if there be a white man, and one that belongs to ‘white man’ will belong also to ‘man’. One might, then, bring captious criticism against the majority of properties, by representing the subject as being one thing in itself, and another thing when combined with its accident, saying, for example, that ‘man’ is one thing, and white man’ another, and moreover by representing as different a certain state and what is called after that state. For an attribute that belongs to the state will belong also to what is called after that state, and one that belongs to what is called after a state will belong also to the state: e.g. inasmuch as the condition of the scientist is called after his science, it could not be a property of ‘science’ that it is ‘incontrovertible by argument’; for then the scientist also will be incontrovertible by argument. For constructive purposes, however, you should say that the subject of an accident is not absolutely different from the accident taken along with its subject; though it is called ‘another’ thing because the mode of being of the two is different: for it is not the same thing for a man to be a man and for a white man to be a white man. Moreover, you should take a look along at the inflections, and say that the description of the man of science is wrong: one should say not ‘it’ but ‘he is incontrovertible by argument’; while the description of Science is wrong too: one should say not ‘it’ but ‘she is incontrovertible by argument’. For against an objector who sticks at nothing the defence should stick at nothing.

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5 Next, for destructive purposes, see if, while intending to render an attribute that naturally belongs, he states it in his language in such a way as to indicate one that invariably belongs: for then it would be generally agreed that what has been stated to be a property is upset. Thus (e.g.) the man who has said that ‘biped’ is a property of man intends to render the attribute that naturally belongs, but his expression actually indicates one that invariably belongs: accordingly, ‘biped’ could not be a property of man: for not every man is possessed of two feet. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he intends to render the property that naturally belongs, and indicates it in that way in his language: for then the property will not be upset in this respect. Thus (e.g.) he who renders as a property of ‘man’ the phrase ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’ both intends, and by his language indicates, the property that belongs by nature, and so ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’ would not be upset or shown in that respect not to be a property of man. Moreover, as regards all the things that are called as they are primarily after something else, or primarily in themselves, it is a job to render the property of such things. For if you render a property as belonging to the subject that is so called after something else, then it will be true of its primary subject as well; whereas if you state it of its primary subject, then it will be predicated also of the thing that is so called after this other. Thus (e.g.) if any one renders , coloured’ as the property of ‘surface’, ‘coloured’ will be true of body as well; whereas if he render it of ‘body’, it will be predicated also of ‘surface’. Hence the name as well will not be true of that of which the description is true.

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In the case of some properties it mostly happens that some error is incurred because of a failure to define how as well as to what things the property is stated to belong. For every one tries to render as the property of a thing something that belongs to it either naturally, as ‘biped’ belongs to ‘man’, or actually, as ‘having four fingers’ belongs to a particular man, or specifically, as ‘consisting of most rarefied particles’ belongs to ‘fire’, or absolutely, as ‘life’ to ‘living being’, or one that belongs to a thing only as called after something else, as ‘wisdom’ to the ‘soul’, or on the other hand primarily, as ‘wisdom’ to the ‘rational faculty’, or because the thing is in a certain state, as ‘incontrovertible by argument’ belongs to a ‘scientist’ (for simply and solely by reason of his being in a certain state will he be ‘incontrovertible by argument’), or because it is the state possessed by something, as ‘incontrovertible by argument’ belongs to ‘science’, or because it is partaken of, as ‘sensation’ belongs to ‘animal’ (for other things as well have sensation, e.g. man, but they have it because they already partake of ‘animal’), or because it partakes of something else, as ‘life’ belongs to a particular kind of ‘living being’. Accordingly he makes a mistake if he has failed to add the word ‘naturally’, because what belongs naturally may fail to belong to the thing to which it naturally belongs, as (e.g.) it belongs to a man to have two feet: so too he errs if he does not make a definite proviso that he is rendering what actually belongs, because one day that attribute will not be what it now is, e.g. the man’s possession of four fingers. So he errs if he has not shown that he states a thing to be such and such primarily, or that he calls it so after something else, because then its name too will not be true of that of which the description is true, as is the case with ‘coloured’, whether rendered as a property of ‘surface’ or of ‘body’. So he errs if he has not said beforehand that he has rendered a property to a thing either because that thing possesses a state, or because it is a state possessed by something; because then it will not be a

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property. For, supposing he renders the property to something as being a state possessed, it will belong to what possesses that state; while supposing he renders it to what possesses the state, it will belong to the state possessed, as did ‘incontrovertible by argument’ when stated as a property of ‘science’ or of the ‘scientist’. So he errs if he has not indicated beforehand that the property belongs because the thing partakes of, or is partaken of by, something; because then the property will belong to certain other things as well. For if he renders it because its subject is partaken of, it will belong to the things which partake of it; whereas if he renders it because its subject partakes of something else, it will belong to the things partaken of, as (e.g.) if he were to state ‘life’ to be a property of a ‘particular kind of living being’, or just of ‘living being. So he errs if he has not expressly distinguished the property that belongs specifically, because then it will belong only to one of the things that fall under the term of which he states the property: for the superlative belongs only to one of them, e.g. ‘lightest’ as applied to ‘fire’. Sometimes, too, a man may even add the word ‘specifically’, and still make a mistake. For the things in question should all be of one species, whenever the word ‘specifically’ is added: and in some cases this does not occur, as it does not, in fact, in the case of fire. For fire is not all of one species; for live coals and flame and light are each of them ‘fire’, but are of different species. The reason why, whenever ‘specifically’ is added, there should not be any species other than the one mentioned, is this, that if there be, then the property in question will belong to some of them in a greater and to others in a less degree, as happens with ‘consisting of most rarefied particles’ in the case of fire: for ‘light’ consists of more rarefied particles than live coals and flame. And this should not happen unless the name too be predicated in a greater degree of that of which the description is truer; otherwise the rule that where the description is truer the name

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too should be truer is not fulfilled. Moreover, in addition to this, the same attribute will be the property both of the term which has it absolutely and of that element therein which has it in the highest degree, as is the condition of the property ‘consisting of most rarefied particles’ in the case of ‘fire’: for this same attribute will be the property of ‘light’ as well: for it is ‘light’ that ‘consists of the most rarefied particles’. If, then, any one else renders a property in this way one should attack it; for oneself, one should not give occasion for this objection, but should define in what manner one states the property at the actual time of making the statement. Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has stated a thing as a property of itself: for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. For a thing itself always shows its own essence, and what shows the essence is not a property but a definition. Thus (e.g.) he who has said that ‘becoming’ is a property of ‘beautiful’ has rendered the term as a property of itself (for ‘beautiful’ and ‘becoming’ are the same); and so ‘becoming’ could not be a property of ‘beautiful’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he has avoided rendering a thing as a property of itself, but has yet stated a convertible predicate: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus he who has stated ‘animate substance’ as a property of ‘living-creature’ has not stated ‘living-creature’ as a property of itself, but has rendered a convertible predicate, so that ‘animate substance’ would be a property of ‘living-creature’. Next, in the case of things consisting of like parts, you should look and see, for destructive purposes, if the property of the whole be not true of the part, or if that of the part be not predicated of the whole: for then what has been stated to be the property will not be a property. In some cases it happens that this is so: for sometimes in rendering a property in the case of

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things that consist of like parts a man may have his eye on the whole, while sometimes he may address himself to what is predicated of the part: and then in neither case will it have been rightly rendered. Take an instance referring to the whole: the man who has said that it is a property of the ‘sea’ to be ‘the largest volume of salt water’, has stated the property of something that consists of like parts, but has rendered an attribute of such a kind as is not true of the part (for a particular sea is not ‘the largest volume of salt water’); and so the largest volume of salt water’ could not be a property of the ‘sea’. Now take one referring to the part: the man who has stated that it is a property of ‘air’ to be ‘breathable’ has stated the property of something that consists of like parts, but he has stated an attribute such as, though true of some air, is still not predicable of the whole (for the whole of the air is not breathable); and so ‘breathable’ could not be a property of ‘air’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether, while it is true of each of the things with similar parts, it is on the other hand a property of them taken as a collective whole: for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) while it is true of earth everywhere that it naturally falls downwards, it is a property of the various particular pieces of earth taken as ‘the Earth’, so that it would be a property of ‘earth’ ‘naturally to fall downwards’.

6 Next, look from the point of view of the respective opposites, and first (a) from that of the contraries, and see, for destructive purposes, if the contrary of the term rendered fails to be a property of the contrary subject. For then neither will the contrary of the first be a property of the contrary of the second.

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Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as injustice is contrary to justice, and the lowest evil to the highest good, but ‘to be the highest good’ is not a property of ‘justice’, therefore ‘to be the lowest evil’ could not be a property of ‘injustice’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the contrary is the property of the contrary: for then also the contrary of the first will be the property of the contrary of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as evil is contrary to good, and objectionable to desirable, and ‘desirable’ is a property of ‘good’, ‘objectionable’ would be a property of ‘evil’. Secondly (h) look from the point of view of relative opposites and see, for destructive purposes, if the correlative of the term rendered fails to be a property of the correlative of the subject: for then neither will the correlative of the first be a property of the correlative of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘double’ is relative to ‘half’, and ‘in excess’ to ‘exceeded’, while ‘in excess’ is not a property of ‘double’, exceeded’ could not be a property of ‘half’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the correlative of the alleged property is a property of the subject’s correlative: for then also the correlative of the first will be a property of the correlative of the second: e.g. inasmuch as ‘double’ is relative to ‘half’, and the proportion 1:2 is relative to the proportion 2:1, while it is a property of ‘double’ to be ‘in the proportion of 2 to 1’, it would be a property of ‘half’ to be ‘in the proportion of 1 to 2’. Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes, see if an attribute described in terms of a state (X) fails to be a property of the given state (Y): for then neither will the attribute described in terms of the privation (of X) be a property of the privation (of Y). Also if, on the other hand, an attribute described in terms of the privation (of X) be not a property of the given privation (of Y), neither will the attribute described in terms of the state (X) be a property of the state (Y). Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is not predicated as a property of ‘deafness’ to be a ‘lack of sensation’, neither

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could it be a property of ‘hearing’ to be a ‘sensation’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if an attribute described in terms of a state (X) is a property of the given state (Y): for then also the attribute that is described in terms of the privation (of X) will be a property of the privation (of Y). Also, if an attribute described in terms of a privation (of X) be a property of the privation (of Y), then also the attribute that is described in terms of the state (X) will be a property of the state (Y). Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘to see’ is a property of ‘sight’, inasmuch as we have sight, ‘failure to see’ would be a property of ‘blindness’, inasmuch as we have not got the sight we should naturally have. Next, look from the point of view of positive and negative terms; and first (a) from the point of view of the predicates taken by themselves. This common-place rule is useful only for a destructive purpose. Thus (e.g.) see if the positive term or the attribute described in terms of it is a property of the subject: for then the negative term or the attribute described in terms of it will not be a property of the subject. Also if, on the other hand, the negative term or the attribute described in terms of it is a property of the subject, then the positive term or the attribute described in terms of it will not be a property of the subject: e.g. inasmuch as ‘animate’ is a property of ‘living creature’, ‘inanimate’ could not be a property of ‘living creature’. Secondly (b) look from the point of view of the predicates, positive or negative, and their respective subjects; and see, for destructive purposes, if the positive term falls to be a property of the positive subject: for then neither will the negative term be a property of the negative subject. Also, if the negative term fails to be a property of the negative subject, neither will the positive term be a property of the positive subject. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘animal’ is not a property of ‘man’, neither could ‘not-animal’ be a property of ‘not-man’. Also if ‘not-animal’

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seems not to be a property of ‘not-man’, neither will ‘animal’ be a property of ‘man’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the positive term is a property of the positive subject: for then the negative term will be a property of the negative subject as well. Also if the negative term be a property of the negative subject, the positive will be a property of the positive as well. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is a property of ‘notliving being’ ‘not to live’, it would be a property of ‘living being’ ‘to live’: also if it seems to be a property of ‘living being’ ‘to live’, it will also seem to be a property of ‘not-living being’ ‘not to live’. Thirdly (c) look from the point of view of the subjects taken by themselves, and see, for destructive purposes, if the property rendered is a property of the positive subject: for then the same term will not be a property of the negative subject as well. Also, if the term rendered be a property of the negative subject, it will not be a property of the positive. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘animate’ is a property of ‘living creature’, ‘animate’ could not be a property of ‘not-living creature’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, if the term rendered fails to be a property of the affirmative subject it would be a property of the negative. This commonplace rule is, however, deceptive: for a positive term is not a property of a negative, or a negative of a positive. For a positive term does not belong at all to a negative, while a negative term, though it belongs to a positive, does not belong as a property. Next, look from the point of view of the coordinate members of a division, and see, for destructive purposes, if none of the coordinate members (parallel with the property rendered) be a property of any of the remaining set of co-ordinate members (parallel with the subject): for then neither will the term stated be a property of that of which it is stated to be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘sensible living being’ is not a property of any

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of the other living beings, ‘intelligible living being’ could not be a property of God. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if some one or other of the remaining co-ordinate members (parallel with the property rendered) be a property of each of these co-ordinate members (parallel with the subject): for then the remaining one too will be a property of that of which it has been stated not to be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is a property of ‘wisdom’ to be essentially ‘the natural virtue of the rational faculty’, then, taking each of the other virtues as well in this way, it would be a property of ‘temperance’ to be essentially ‘the natural virtue of the faculty of desire’. Next, look from the point of view of the inflexions, and see, for destructive purposes, if the inflexion of the property rendered fails to be a property of the inflexion of the subject: for then neither will the other inflexion be a property of the other inflexion. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘beautifully’ is not a property of ‘justly’, neither could ‘beautiful’ be a property of ‘just’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the inflexion of the property rendered is a property of the inflexion of the subject: for then also the other inflexion will be a property of the other inflexion. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘walking biped’ is a property of man, it would also be any one’s property ‘as a man’ to be described ‘as a walking biped’. Not only in the case of the actual term mentioned should one look at the inflexions, but also in the case of its opposites, just as has been laid down in the case of the former commonplace rules as well.’ Thus, for destructive purposes, see if the inflexion of the opposite of the property rendered fails to be the property of the inflexion of the opposite of the subject: for then neither will the inflexion of the other opposite be a property of the inflexion of the other opposite. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘well’ is not a property of ‘justly’, neither could ‘badly’ be a property of ‘unjustly’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the inflexion of the opposite of the property originally suggested is a property of
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the inflexion of the opposite of the original subject: for then also the inflexion of the other opposite will be a property of the inflexion of the other opposite. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘best’ is a property of ‘the good’, ‘worst’ also will be a property of ‘the evil’.

7 Next, look from the point of view of things that are in a like relation, and see, for destructive purposes, if what is in a relation like that of the property rendered fails to be a property of what is in a relation like that of the subject: for then neither will what is in a relation like that of the first be a property of what is in a relation like that of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as the relation of the builder towards the production of a house is like that of the doctor towards the production of health, and it is not a property of a doctor to produce health, it could not be a property of a builder to produce a house. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is in a relation like that of the property rendered is a property of what is in a relation like that of the subject: for then also what is in a relation like that of the first will be a property of what is in a relation like that of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as the relation of a doctor towards the possession of ability to produce health is like that of a trainer towards the possession of ability to produce vigour, and it is a property of a trainer to possess the ability to produce vigour, it would be a property of a doctor to possess the ability to produce health. Next look from the point of view of things that are identically related, and see, for destructive purposes, if the predicate that is identically related towards two subjects fails to be a property of

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the subject which is identically related to it as the subject in question; for then neither will the predicate that is identically related to both subjects be a property of the subject which is identically related to it as the first. If, on the other hand, the predicate which is identically related to two subjects is the property of the subject which is identically related to it as the subject in question, then it will not be a property of that of which it has been stated to be a property. (e.g.) inasmuch as prudence is identically related to both the noble and the base, since it is knowledge of each of them, and it is not a property of prudence to be knowledge of the noble, it could not be a property of prudence to be knowledge of the base. If, on the other hand, it is a property of prudence to be the knowledge of the noble, it could not be a property of it to be the knowledge of the base.] For it is impossible for the same thing to be a property of more than one subject. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, this commonplace rule is of no use: for what is ‘identically related’ is a single predicate in process of comparison with more than one subject. Next, for destructive purposes, see if the predicate qualified by the verb ‘to be’ fails to be a property of the subject qualified by the verb ‘to be’: for then neither will the destruction of the one be a property of the other qualified by the verb ‘to be destroyed’, nor will the ‘becoming’the one be a property of the other qualified by the verb ‘to become’. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is not a property of ‘man’ to be an animal, neither could it be a property of becoming a man to become an animal; nor could the destruction of an animal be a property of the destruction of a man. In the same way one should derive arguments also from ‘becoming’ to ‘being’ and ‘being destroyed’, and from ‘being destroyed’ to ‘being’ and to ‘becoming’ exactly as they have just been given from ‘being’ to ‘becoming’ and ‘being destroyed’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the subject set down as qualified by the verb ‘to be’ has the predicate set down
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as so qualified, as its property: for then also the subject qualified by the very ‘to become’ will have the predicate qualified by ‘to become’ as its property, and the subject qualified by the verb to be destroyed’ will have as its property the predicate rendered with this qualification. Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is a property of man to be a mortal, it would be a property of becoming a man to become a mortal, and the destruction of a mortal would be a property of the destruction of a man. In the same way one should derive arguments also from ‘becoming’ and ‘being destroyed’ both to ‘being’ and to the conclusions that follow from them, exactly as was directed also for the purpose of destruction. Next take a look at the ‘idea’ of the subject stated, and see, for destructive purposes, if the suggested property fails to belong to the ‘idea’ in question, or fails to belong to it in virtue of that character which causes it to bear the description of which the property was rendered: for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘being motionless’ does not belong to ‘man-himself’ qua ‘man’, but qua ‘idea’, it could not be a property of ‘man’ to be motionless. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the property in question belongs to the idea, and belongs to it in that respect in virtue of which there is predicated of it that character of which the predicate in question has been stated not to be a property: for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it belongs to ‘livingcreature-itself’ to be compounded of soul and body, and further this belongs to it qua ‘living-creature’, it would be a property of ‘living-creature’ to be compounded of soul and body.

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8 Next look from the point of view of greater and less degrees, and first (a) for destructive purposes, see if what is more-P fails to be a property of what is more-S: for then neither will what is less-P be a property of what is less-S, nor least-P of least-S, nor most-P of most-S, nor P simply of S simply. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as being more highly coloured is not a property of what is more a body, neither could being less highly coloured be a property of what is less a body, nor being coloured be a property of body at all. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is more-P is a property of what is more-S: for then also what is less-P will be a property of what is less S, and least-P of least-S, and most-P of most-S, and P simply of S simply. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as a higher degree of sensation is a property of a higher degree of life, a lower degree of sensation also would be a property of a lower degree of life, and the highest of the highest and the lowest of the lowest degree, and sensation simply of life simply. Also you should look at the argument from a simple predication to the same qualified types of predication, and see, for destructive purposes, if P simply fails to be a property of S simply; for then neither will more-P be a property of more-S, nor less-P of less-S, nor most-P of most-S, nor least-P of least-S. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘virtuous’ is not a property of ‘man’, neither could ‘more virtuous’ be a property of what is ‘more human’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if P simply is a property of S simply: for then more P also will be a property of more-S, and less-P of less-S, and least-P of least-S, and most-P of most-S. Thus (e.g.) a tendency to move upwards by nature is a property of fire, and so also a greater tendency to move upwards by nature would be a property of what is more fiery. In the same way too one should look at all these matters from the point of view of the others as well.

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Secondly (b) for destructive purposes, see if the more likely property fails to be a property of the more likely subject: for then neither will the less likely property be a property of the less likely subject. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘perceiving’ is more likely to be a property of ‘animal’ than ‘knowing’ of ‘man’, and ‘perceiving’ is not a property of ‘animal’, ‘knowing’ could not be a property of ‘man’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the less likely property is a property of the less likely subject; for then too the more likely property will be a property of the more likely subject. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘to be naturally civilized’ is less likely to be a property of man than ‘to live’ of an animal, and it is a property of man to be naturally civilized, it would be a property of animal to live. Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes, see if the predicate fails to be a property of that of which it is more likely to be a property: for then neither will it be a property of that of which it is less likely to be a property: while if it is a property of the former, it will not be a property of the latter. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘to be coloured’ is more likely to be a property of a ‘surface’ than of a ‘body’, and it is not a property of a surface, ‘to be coloured’ could not be a property of ‘body’; while if it is a property of a ‘surface’, it could not be a property of a ‘body’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, this commonplace rule is not of any use: for it is impossible for the same thing to be a property of more than one thing. Fourthly (d) for destructive purposes, see if what is more likely to be a property of a given subject fails to be its property: for then neither will what is less likely to be a property of it be its property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘sensible’ is more likely than ‘divisible’ to be a property of ‘animal’, and ‘sensible’ is not a property of animal, ‘divisible’ could not be a property of animal. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is less likely to be a property of it is a property; for then what is more

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likely to be a property of it will be a property as well. Thus, for example, inasmuch as ‘sensation’ is less likely to be a property of ‘animal’ than life’, and ‘sensation’ is a property of animal, ‘life’ would be a property of animal. Next, look from the point of view of the attributes that belong in a like manner, and first (a) for destructive purposes, see if what is as much a property fails to be a property of that of which it is as much a property: for then neither will that which is as much a property as it be a property of that of which it is as much a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘desiring’ is as much a property of the faculty of desire as reasoning’ is a property of the faculty of reason, and desiring is not a property of the faculty of desire, reasoning could not be a property of the faculty of reason. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is as much a property is a property of that of which it is as much a property: for then also what is as much a property as it will be a property of that of which it is as much a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is as much a property of ‘the faculty of reason’ to be ‘the primary seat of wisdom’ as it is of ‘the faculty of desire’ to be ‘the primary seat of temperance’, and it is a property of the faculty of reason to be the primary seat of wisdom, it would be a property of the faculty of desire to be the primary seat of temperance. Secondly (b) for destructive purposes, see if what is as much a property of anything fails to be a property of it: for then neither will what is as much a property be a property of it. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘seeing’ is as much a property of man as ‘hearing’, and ‘seeing’ is not a property of man, ‘hearing’ could not be a property of man. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is as much a property of it is its property: for then what is as much a property of it as the former will be its property as well. Thus (e.g.) it is as much a property of the soul to be the primary possessor of a part that desires as of a part

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that reasons, and it is a property of the soul to be the primary possessor of a part that desires, and so it be a property of the soul to be the primary possessor of a part that reasons. Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes, see if it fails to be a property of that of which it is as much a property: for then neither will it be a property of that of which it is as much a property as of the former, while if it be a property of the former, it will not be a property of the other. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘to burn’ is as much a property of ‘flame’ as of ‘live coals’, and ‘to burn’ is not a property of flame, ‘to burn’ could not be a property of live coals: while if it is a property of flame, it could not be a property of live coals. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, this commonplace rule is of no use. The rule based on things that are in a like relation’ differs from the rule based on attributes that belong in a like manner,’ because the former point is secured by analogy, not from reflection on the belonging of any attribute, while the latter is judged by a comparison based on the fact that an attribute belongs. Next, for destructive purposes, see if in rendering the property potentially, he has also through that potentiality rendered the property relatively to something that does not exist, when the potentiality in question cannot belong to what does not exist: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus (e.g.) he who has said that ‘breathable’ is a property of ‘air’ has, on the one hand, rendered the property potentially (for that is ‘breathable’ which is such as can be breathed), and on the other hand has also rendered the property relatively to what does not exist: – for while air may exist, even though there exist no animal so constituted as to breathe the air, it is not possible to breathe it if no animal exist: so that it will not, either, be a property of air to be such as can be breathed at a time when

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there exists no animal such as to breathe it and so it follows that ‘breathable’ could not be a property of air. For constructive purposes, see if in rendering the property potentially he renders the property either relatively to something that exists, or to something that does not exist, when the potentiality in question can belong to what does not exist: for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus e.g.) he who renders it as a property of ‘being’ to be ‘capable of being acted upon or of acting’, in rendering the property potentially, has rendered the property relatively to something that exists: for when ‘being’ exists, it will also be capable of being acted upon or of acting in a certain way: so that to be ‘capable of being acted upon or of acting’ would be a property of ‘being’. Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has stated the property in the superlative: for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. For people who render the property in that way find that of the object of which the description is true, the name is not true as well: for though the object perish the description will continue in being none the less; for it belongs most nearly to something that is in being. An example would be supposing any one were to render ‘the lightest body’ as a property of ‘fire’: for, though fire perish, there eh re will still be some form of body that is the lightest, so that ‘the lightest body’ could not be a property of fire. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he has avoided rendering the property in the superlative: for then the property will in this respect have been property of man has not rendered the property correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as he in the superlative, the property would in who states ‘a naturally civilized animal’ as a this respect have been correctly stated.

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Book VI

1 The discussion of Definitions falls into five parts. For you have to show either (1) that it is not true at all to apply the expression as well to that to which the term is applied (for the definition of Man ought to be true of every man); or (2) that though the object has a genus, he has failed to put the object defined into the genus, or to put it into the appropriate genus (for the framer of a definition should first place the object in its genus, and then append its differences: for of all the elements of the definition the genus is usually supposed to be the principal mark of the essence of what is defined): or (3) that the expression is not peculiar to the object (for, as we said above as well, a definition ought to be peculiar): or else (4) see if, though he has observed all the aforesaid cautions, he has yet failed to define the object, that is, to express its essence. (5) It remains, apart from the foregoing, to see if he has defined it, but defined it incorrectly. Whether, then, the expression be not also true of that of which the term is true you should proceed to examine according to the commonplace rules that relate to Accident. For there too the question is always ‘Is so and so true or untrue?’: for whenever we argue that an accident belongs, we declare it to be true, while whenever we argue that it does not belong, we declare it to be untrue. If, again, he has failed to place the object in the appropriate genus, or if the expression be not peculiar to the

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Again. then. It remains. ‘Becoming is a passage into being’. if the term defined be used in different senses and he has spoken without distinguishing between them: for then it is not clear to which of them the definition rendered applies. if the expression used be longer than is necessary: for all additional matter in a definition is superfluous. Likewise also. in regard to obscurity is.g. See if the meaning intended by the definition involves an ambiguity with any other. (secondly. then. Clearly. or else defined incorrectly. each of the aforesaid branches is divided into a number of others. then.object. more mistakes are made in the latter task on account of its greater difficulty. Accordingly the attack becomes easier in the latter case than in the former. First. seeing that the whole purpose of rendering it is to make something known). Incorrectness falls into two branches: (1) first. or ‘Health is the balance of hot and cold elements’. we must proceed to examine if it has been defined incorrectly: for with anything it is easier to do it than to do it correctly. and one can then bring a captious objection on the ground that the definition does not apply to all the things whose definition he has rendered: and this kind of thing is 453 . 2 One commonplace rule. then. we must go on to examine the case according to the commonplace rules that relate to genus and property. e. to prescribe how to investigate whether the object has been either not defined at all. the use of obscure language (for the language of a definition ought to be the very clearest possible. Here ‘passage’ and ‘balance’ are ambiguous terms: it is accordingly not clear which of the several possible senses of the term he intends to convey.

nor yet literally. or temperance as a ‘harmony’. For an unusual phrase is always obscure.g. So then. the questioner may himself distinguish the various senses of the term rendered in the definition. Another rule is. see if he uses terms that are unfamiliar. he speaks falsely: for an 454 . if a man says that the law is literally a ‘measure’ or an ‘image’. Sometimes a phrase is used neither ambiguously. Or. then the same object will occur in two genera of which neither contains the other: for harmony does not contain virtue. for those who use metaphors do so always in view of some likeness: whereas this kind of phrase makes nothing clear. if harmony be the genus of temperance. again. or the marrow as ‘boneformed’. Again. if he has defined knowledge as ‘unsupplantable’. Such phrases are worse than metaphor.particularly easy in the case where the definer does not see the ambiguity of his terms. nor yet metaphorically. for the latter does make its meaning to some extent clear because of the likeness involved. for instance. and then institute his argument against each: for if the expression used be not adequate to the subject in any of its senses. nor virtue harmony. as applied to the law. for there is no likeness to justify the description ‘measure’ or ‘image’. as when Plato describes the eye as ‘brow-shaded’. as when the law is said to be the ‘measure’ or ‘image’ of the things that are by nature just. Moreover. nor is the law ordinarily so called in a literal sense. e. also. it is clear that he cannot have defined it in any sense aright. in the case of temperance: for harmony is always found between notes. For a metaphorical expression is always obscure. See if he has used a metaphorical expression. as. or the earth as a ‘nurse’. or a certain spider as poison-fanged’. It is possible. to argue sophistically against the user of a metaphorical expression as though he had used it in its literal sense: for the definition stated will not apply to the term defined.

image is something produced by imitation. Or see if. and one that is worse than any sort of metaphorical expression. though the additional matter may be peculiar to the given term. first of all look and see whether he has used any attribute that belongs universally. If. Now any term that belongs to everything separates off the given object from absolutely nothing. For the genus ought to divide the object from things in general. unless there were an inscription. while any that belongs to all the things that fall under the same genus does not separate it off from the things contained in the same genus. when it is merely stated by itself. it is not evident what it defines: just as in the works of the old painters. again. and this is not found in the case of the law. or to all that fall under the same genus as the object defined: for the mention of this is sure to be redundant. either to real objects in general. Moreover. on the other hand. Any addition. it is clear that he has used an unclear expression. yet even when it is struck out the rest of the expression too is peculiar and makes clear the essence of the 455 . then. he does not mean the term literally. of that kind will be pointless. he has phrased the definition redundantly. see if. you should proceed to examine on lines such as these. and the differentia from any of the things contained in the same genus. 3 If. If. Or. on the other hand. for definitions that have been correctly rendered also indicate their contraries as well. the definition be not clear. see if from the expression used the definition of the contrary be not clear. then. the figures used to be unrecognizable.

for instance. yet does not declare the essence. the whole too becomes peculiar. for stated the other way the definition would not be true unless the phlegm comes first of all. and still the expression is peculiar and makes clear his essence. Moreover. the whole too will be peculiar: for absolutely always. as Plato defined it. For in that case. for the soul is just ‘the self-moving’. Here the addition of the word ‘undigested’ is superfluous.term.g. if the remainder of the expression be peculiar. in the definition of man. the addition ‘capable of receiving knowledge’ is superfluous. would also be the definition of the soul. Whereas if any part of the expression do not apply to everything that falls under the same species. Thus. Thus (e. but only the first of the undigested matters. so that the addition ‘undigested’ is required. for strike it out. Such.) it is said that the definition of phlegm is the ‘undigested moisture that comes first off food’. Or perhaps the phlegm is not absolutely the first thing to come off the food. assuming it to be stated as a ‘self-moving number’. if to something peculiar anything whatever that is true be added. see if anything contained in the definition fails to apply to everything that falls under the same species: for this sort of definition is worse than those which include an attribute belonging to all things universally. Which of the two is the real state of the case it is difficult to determine clearly: the right way to treat the matter in all cases is to be guided by convenience. seeing that ‘the first’ is one and not many. it is impossible that the expression as a whole should be peculiar: for it will not 456 . though appropriate. Speaking generally. everything is superfluous upon whose removal the remainder still makes the term that is being defined clear. so that even when undigested’ is left out the definition will still be peculiar to the subject: for it is impossible that both phlegm and also something else should both be the first to arise from the food. if the word ‘number’ be eliminated. Or perhaps the expression used.

then we should certainly have ‘biped’ predicated twice of the same thing. that wisdom defines and contemplates reality:’ for definition is a certain type of contemplation. Likewise also in the case of ‘desire’ as well: for it is not ‘conation’ that is said to be ‘for the pleasant’. but when the same thing is more than once predicated of a subject. but rather the whole idea. 457 . so that the word ‘biped’ is only used as a predicate once.be predicated convertibly with the object.) ‘desire’ is a ‘conation for the pleasant’. e. Absurdity results. Or perhaps there is no absurdity in this. because the attribute ‘six feet high’ does not belong to everything that falls under the same species. saying (e. For all privation is a privation of some natural attribute.g. so that what is the same as desire will also be ‘for the pleasant’. so that by adding the words ‘and contemplates’ over again he says the same thing twice over. Again. but as a matter of fact the subject said to be a biped is’a walking biped animal’. e. like Xenocrates. Accordingly our definition of desire becomes ‘conation-for-the-pleasant’: for the word ‘desire’ is the exact equivalent of the words ‘conation-for-the-pleasant’. ‘a walking biped animal six feet high’: for an expression of that kind is not predicated convertibly with the term. Likewise. For ‘biped’ is not a predicate of ‘walking animal’: if it were.g. But this involves no real absurdity.g. too. see if he has said the same thing more than once. those fail who say that ‘cooling’ is ‘the privation of natural heat’. what is the same as man is a biped: but ‘a walking biped animal’ is the same as man. so that there too the predication is only made once. so that both alike will be ‘for the pleasant’. if he says. so that the addition of the word ‘natural’ is superfluous: it would have been enough to say ‘privation of heat’. For ‘desire’ is always ‘for the pleasant’. not when the same word is uttered twice. and therefore walking biped animal is a biped’. for consider this instance: ‘Man is a biped’: therefore. for the word ‘privation’ shows of itself that the heat meant is natural heat.

accordingly. For the reason why the definition is rendered is to make known the term stated. Otherwise. if he defines ‘medicine’ as ‘knowledge of what makes for health in animals and men’. But whether he has mentioned and defined its essence or no. so that he says the same thing more than once. 4 Whether. see if a universal have been mentioned and then a particular case of it be added as well. This sort of view. ‘Equity is a remission of what is expedient and just’. a man defines a thing correctly or incorrectly you should proceed to examine on these and similar lines. so that both would then be definitions of the same object.Again. and a better one. and we make things known by taking not any random terms. as is done in demonstrations (for so it is with all teaching and learning). then. for what is just is a branch of what is expedient and is therefore included in the latter term: its mention is therefore redundant. or ‘the law’ as ‘the image of what is by nature noble and just’.g. there are to be a number of definitions of the same thing. for what is just is a branch of what is noble. So also. there will be more than one definition of the same thing: for clearly he who defines through terms that are prior and more intelligible has also framed a definition. however. an addition of the particular after the universal has been already stated. e. does not generally find acceptance: for of each real object the essence is single: if. it is clear that a man who does not define through terms of this kind has not defined at all. see if he has failed to make the definition through terms that are prior and more intelligible. then. the essence of the object will be the same as it is represented to be 458 . should be examined as follows: First of all. but such as are prior and more intelligible.

either supposing that its terms are absolutely less intelligible. a line. for instance. for most people learn things like the former earlier than the latter. Absolutely. for any ordinary intelligence can grasp them. unless it so happens that the same thing is more intelligible both to us and also absolutely. One must. whereas the others require an exact and exceptional understanding. however. Likewise. then. it is better to try to make what is posterior known through what is prior. any one who has not defined a thing through terms that are prior and more intelligible has not defined it at all. since a correct definition must define a thing 459 . inasmuch as the definitions are different. it may perhaps be necessary to frame the expression through terms that are intelligible to them. Among definitions of this kind are those of a point. a line than a plane. a point. or supposing that they are less intelligible to us: for either sense is possible. inasmuch as such a way of procedure is more scientific. also. for it is the prius and starting-point of all number. The statement that a definition has not been made through more intelligible terms may be understood in two senses. just as also a unit is more intelligible than a number. and a line more than a point. a line of a plane. Whereas to us it sometimes happens that the converse is the case: for the solid falls under perception most of all – more than a plane – and a plane more than a line. a letter is more intelligible than a syllable. Of course. a plane of a solid. Clearly. and these representations are not the same. and a plane than a solid. and a plane. in dealing with persons who cannot recognize things through terms of that kind. all of which explain the prior by the posterior. Thus absolutely the prior is more intelligible than the posterior. not fail to observe that those who define in this way cannot show the essential nature of the term they define. than a line. for they say that a point is the limit of a line.in each of the definitions. then.

if the definition is to be constructed from what is more intelligible to particular individuals. as they become more sharpwitted. and made use of in the course of discussion as occasion requires. All such points as this ought to be made very precise. whereas if the genus or the differentia be known it does not follow of necessity that the species is known as well: thus the species is less intelligible. those who say that such definitions. then. are really and truly definitions. They are also more intelligible. so that these are prior to the species. also. the species. not the same things to all. but through what is absolutely more intelligible: for only in this way could the definition come always to be one and the same. but to those who are in a sound state of understanding. just as what is absolutely healthy is what is healthy to those in a sound state of body. different things are more intelligible to different people. as it happens. For. for if the species be known. and the species too is annulled.through its genus and its differentiae. the genus and differentia must of necessity be known as well (for any one who knows what a man is knows also what ‘animal’ and ‘walking’ are). and so a different definition would have to be rendered to each several person. and prior to. not to all. It is clear. the converse. will have to say that there are several definitions of one and the same thing. The demolition of a definition will most surely win a general 460 . viz. that. so that those who hold that a definition ought to be rendered through what is more intelligible to particular individuals would not have to render the same definition at all times even to the same person. Perhaps. Moreover. first of all the objects of sense. then. those which proceed from what is intelligible to this. to the same people different things are more intelligible at different times. and these belong to the order of things which are absolutely more intelligible than. that the right way to define is not through terms of that kind. what is absolutely intelligible is what is intelligible. or the other man. For annul the genus and differentia. Moreover.

and all the terms that are essentially relative: for in all such cases the essential being is the same as a certain relation to something. One form. e. and use them as occasion may seem to require.’ Another form occurs if we find that the definition has been rendered of what is at rest and definite through what is indefinite and in motion: for what is still and definite is prior to what is indefinite and in motion. that both are objects of the same science. supposing any one had defined the sun as a star that appears by day’.i. observe that it is perhaps not possible to define some things in any other way.g. so that the one is not even more intelligible than the other. so that it is impossible to understand the one term without the other.g.g. e. and accordingly in the definition of the one the other too must be embraced. For in bringing in ‘day’ he brings in the sun. exchange the word for its definition. however.g. e. To detect errors of this sort. Clearly. good through evil: for opposites are always simultaneous by nature. This passes unobserved when the actual name of the object is not used. the double without the half. Some people think.approval if the definer happens to have framed his expression neither from what is absolutely more intelligible nor yet from what is so to us. One must. as we remarked before. so that in bringing in the ‘day’ he has brought in the sun. (2) Another is – if he has used the term defined itself. e. the definition of ‘day’ as the ‘passage of the sun over the earth’. 461 . whoever has said ‘the passage of the sun over the earth’ has said ‘the sun’. of the failure to work through more intelligible terms is the exhibition of the prior through the posterior. then. Of the failure to use terms that are prior there are three forms: (1) The first is when an opposite has been defined through its opposite. One ought to learn up all such points as these. also.

for to be ‘divided in half’ means to be divided into two. see whether. ‘an odd number’ as ‘that which is greater by one than an even number’. the definition of ‘body’ as ‘that which has three dimensions’.g. Moreover. and two is even. as ‘that which knows how to count’: for it is not stated what it is that has three dimensions. ‘An «even number» is «a number divisible into halves»‘. e. e. For the co-ordinate members of a division that are derived from the same genus are simultaneous by nature and ‘odd’ and ‘even’ are such terms: for both are differentiae of number. supposing any one to give it. though the object is in a genus. it has not been placed in a genus. in using the subordinate term one is bound to use the other as well: for whoever employs the term ‘virtue’ employs the term ‘good’.g. This sort of error is always found where the essence of the object does not stand first in the expression. one commonplace rule relates to the failure to frame the expression by means of terms that are prior and more intelligible: and of this the subdivisions are those specified above. see if he has defined a superior through a subordinate term. so that the latter terms are subordinate to the former. A second is.g. For ‘half’ is derived from ‘two’. 5 Generally speaking. e. and ‘two’ is an even number: virtue also is a kind of good. see if he has defined one coordinate member of a division by another. also. or the definition of ‘man’. then. seeing that virtue is a certain kind of good: likewise.(3) Again. whoever employs the term ‘half’ employs the term ‘even’. or what it is that 462 . or ‘«the good» is a «state of virtue» ‘. Likewise also.

’ Moreover. see if he uses language which transgresses the genera of the things he defines.g. Moreover. as has been said before. e. since it is impossible that there should be more than one definition of the same thing. Again.knows how to count: whereas the genus is meant to indicate just this. for any one else besides the doctor is capable of producing disease. see if he has rendered it as relative to the worse rather than to the better. if the thing in question be not placed in its own proper genus.g. Here. e. and is submitted first of the terms in the definition. all those terms which are not used essentially in relation to both things: as medicine is said to deal with the production of disease and health. but the former only by accident: for it is absolutely alien to medicine to produce disease. then.g. for it is said essentially to do the latter. justice as a ‘state that produces equality’ or ‘distributes what is equal’: for by defining 463 . he has failed to render it in relation to all of them. For in rendering it as ‘knowledge of writing’ has no more defined it than by rendering it as ‘knowledge of reading’: neither in fact has succeeded. in some cases that what has been said corresponds to the actual state of things: in some it does not. while the term to be defined is used in relation to many things.) if he define ‘grammar’ as the ‘knowledge how to write from dictation’: for he ought also to say that it is a knowledge how to read as well. but only he who mentions both these things. for every form of knowledge and potentiality is generally thought to be relative to the best. as (e. It is only. one must examine it according to the elementary rules in regard to genera. defining. see if. Moreover. In fact he has done it perhaps worse. however. the man who renders medicine as relative to both of these things has not defined it any better than he who mentions the one only. in a case where the term to be defined is used in relation to several things.

or has mentioned something such as is utterly incapable of being a differentia of anything. then. 6 Again. too. if not. neither of them could be a differentia of the genus. e. for instance. Or see if. and so by leaving out the genus of justice he fails to express its essence: for the essence of a thing must in each case bring in its genus.it so he passes outside the sphere of virtue. seeing that all the higher genera are predicated of the lower. ‘flying’. it ought to be put into its nearest genus. for then. ‘aquatic’. On the other hand. and ‘biped’. For if a man has not defined the object by the differentiae peculiar to it. it yet is not true of the genus. clearly he has not defined it at all: for the aforesaid terms do not differentiate anything at all. For a genus is always divided by differentiae that are co-ordinate members of a division. It is the same thing if the object be not put into its nearest genus. we must examine in like manner whether the differentiae. for the man who puts it into the nearest one has stated all the higher genera. For then he would not have left out anything: but would merely have mentioned the subordinate genus by an expression instead of by name. Further. as. that he has stated be those of the genus. does not state the subordinate genus as well: in saying ‘plant’ a man does not specify ‘a tree’. for.g. clearly the one stated could not be a differentia of the genus. by the terms ‘walking’. for differentiae that 464 . in regard to the differentiae. he who mentions merely the higher genus by itself. or else to the higher genus all the differentiae ought to be appended whereby the nearest genus is defined. we must see whether the differentia stated possesses anything that is co-ordinate with it in a division. Either. though the contrasted differentia exists. clearly. ‘animal’ or ‘substance’.

and this is what is done by those who assert the real existence of the ‘Ideas’. if it is to be true of the genus at all: and this is contrary to the fact: for there exist both lengths which have. how will it be predicable of the genus that it has breadth or that it lacks it? For one assertion or the other will have to be true of ‘length’ universally. see if he divides the genus by a negation. The usefulness of this principle is found in meeting those who assert the existence of ‘Ideas’: for if absolute length exist. If. it will admit of the definition of the differentia. as those do who define line as ‘length without breadth’: for this means simply that it has not any breadth. this be no true differentia. and the genus and differentia constitute the definition of the species. length must always either lack breadth or possess it. so that ‘length’ as well. But ‘length without breadth’ is the definition of a species.are co-ordinates in a division with the differentia of a thing are all true of the genus to which the thing belongs. i. also. Likewise. clearly. The genus will then be found to partake of its own species: for. Moreover. 465 . also. as also is ‘length with breadth’: for ‘without breadth’ and ‘with breadth’ are differentiae. this could not be a specific differentia of the genus: for a specific differentia. however. and lengths which have not. Hence the only people against whom the rule can be employed are those who assert that a genus is always numerically one. see if. Likewise. For then. seeing that it is a coordinate member of a division with this. if added to the genus. yet the addition of it to the genus fails to make a species. no more is the one adduced. Hence the genus would admit of the definition of its species. for they allege that absolute length and absolute animal are the genus. will be either with or without breadth. breadth. always makes a species. seeing that one or the other of the aforesaid differentiae is of necessity predicated of the genus. though it be true. the genus of ‘line’.e. since of everything either an affirmation or its negation is true.

if ‘state’ is the genus of virtue. in defining privations. on the principle that the same thing cannot be in two genera of which neither contains the other: for ‘good’ does not include ‘state’. whether the differentia belongs only by accident to the object defined. for co-ordinate in the division with that which is possessed of breadth is that which possesses no breadth and that only. whereas ‘good’ indicates not the essence but a quality: and to indicate a quality is generally held to be the function of the differentia.g. e. ‘a state’ indicates the essence of virtue. Look and see. For ‘blind’ means a thing which cannot see when its nature is to see.g. see if he has stated the genus as the differentia. e. and dividing it by such an affirmation as is bound to have a negation as its co-ordinate in a division. Moreover. whether the differentia rendered indicates an individual rather than a quality: for the general view is that the differentia always expresses a quality. nor vice versa: for not every state is good nor every good a ‘state’. Again. for jeering is a kind of insolence. further. further. as do those who define ‘contumely’ as ‘insolence accompanied by jeering’. clearly ‘good’ cannot be its genus: it must rather be the differentia’. See. e. see if he rendered the species as a differentia. i.g. supposing he had defined something as ‘length possessed of breadth’. For the differentia is never an 466 . it is a species and not a differentia. and consequently.e. could not be genera. so that again the genus is divided by a negation. Both. Or possibly ‘good’ here is not the genus but the differentia. There is no difference between dividing the genus by a negation.It may be that in some cases the definer is obliged to employ a negation as well. ‘Virtue is a good or noble state: for ‘good’ is the genus of ‘virtue’. then. Moreover.

the result will be that the differentia is a species: if. Again. or any of the things which are under the species. Again. Moreover. Moreover. for the general view is that the genus is predicated. neither contained in nor containing the genus in question. for instance. but of the objects of which the differentia is predicated. ‘man’ be predicated. then ‘animal’ would be predicated of the species several times over. Look and see also if the differentia mentioned belongs to a different genus. For if ‘animal’ is to be predicated of each of its differentiae.g. for the differentiae are predicates of the species.accidental attribute. Likewise you must inquire also if the species or any of the objects that come under it is predicated of the differentia: for this is impossible. see if the genus be predicated of the differentia. seeing that the differentia is a term with a wider range than the various species. 467 . not of the actual differentia itself which we predicate of the species. but prior to the species. e. For none of the aforesaid can possibly be predicated of the genus.) is predicated of ‘man’ or ‘ox’ or other walking animals. the differentiae will be all either species or individuals. if any of the species be predicated of it. is predicable of the genus. Animal (e. the differentia is clearly the human race. see if the differentia fails to be prior to the species: for the differentia ought to be posterior to the genus. any more than the genus is: for the differentia of a thing cannot both belong and not belong to it. not of the differentia. if either the differentia or the species. For the general view is that the same differentia cannot be used of two non-subaltern genera. then he could not have defined the term. seeing that the genus is the term with the widest range of all.g. Moreover. Else the result will be that the same species as well will be in two non-subaltern genera: for each of the differentiae imports its own genus. if they are animals. for every animal is either a species or an individual.

and ‘biped’ is the differentia of both. each of the genera as well is true of that of which the differentia is true. See. still it is aquatic: and likewise a land-animal. if intensified. The words ‘except they both be subordinate members of the same genus’ ought therefore to be added. and we ought to add the words ‘except they both be subordinate members of the same genus’. it is clear also that there is no necessity for the differentia to carry with it the whole of the genus to which it belongs. Hence. while the differentia is not of that kind: for the differentia is 468 . for ‘aquatic’ does not mean ‘in’ anything. If. But all the same. people condemn those who divide animals by means of the terms ‘walking’ and ‘aquatic’. if he has rendered ‘existence in’ something as the differentia of a thing’s essence: for the general view is that locality cannot differentiate between one essence and another. subverts the essence of the thing. if ever the differentia does denote existence in something. clearly he will have made a bad mistake. for both these are subordinate to ‘animal’. Thus ‘walking animal’ and ‘flying animal’ are non-subaltern genera. but only the one or the other of its limbs together with the genera that are higher than this. Again. see if he has rendered an affection as the differentia: for every affection. that the same differentia may be used of two non-subaltern genera. on the ground that ‘walking’ and ‘aquatic’ indicate mere locality. even though it be in the water. Or perhaps it is not impossible for the same differentia to be used of two non-subaltern genera. but a certain quality: for even if the thing be on the dry land. too. it clearly follows that the species must be in two non-subaltern genera. From this possibility. as ‘biped’ carries with it either ‘flying’ or ‘walking animal’. nor does it denote a locality. too. Or possibly in this case the censure is undeserved.‘walking’ and ‘biped’ import with them the genus ‘animal’. will still be a and not an aquatic-animal. then.

whenever a term happens to be used in a number of relations. by defining ‘wisdom’ as the virtue of ‘man’ or of the ‘soul.g. if intensified. for the differentiae of relative terms are themselves relative. 469 . and by the science that deals specially with that thing’. there will be no ‘man’. Again. and it is absolutely impossible for a thing to exist without its own special differentia: for if there be no ‘walking’. Thus sight can only be used for seeing. he has failed to introduce it in its primary relation: e.generally considered rather to preserve that which it differentiates. Look and see also if the definer renders each relative term relatively to its natural purpose: for while in some cases the particular relative term can be used in relation to its natural purpose only and to nothing else. Or see if. Still. as in the case also of knowledge. This is classed as speculative. we may lay down absolutely that a thing cannot have as its differentia anything in respect of which it is subject to alteration: for all things of that kind. practical and productive. and each of these denotes a relation: for it speculates upon something.’ rather than of the ‘reasoning faculty’: for ‘wisdom’ is the virtue primarily of the reasoning faculty: for it is in virtue of this that both the man and his soul are said to be wise. In fact. destroy its essence. If. see if he has failed to render the differentia of a relative term relatively to something else. he has made a mistake: for that is not its natural function. The definition of a thing’s natural function is ‘that for which it would be used by the prudent man. but a strigil can also be used to dip up water. if any one were to define a strigil as an instrument for dipping water. then. some can be used in relation to something else as well. he has made a mistake: for we undergo absolutely no alteration in respect of our differentiae. a man has rendered any differentia of this kind. and produces something and does something. acting as such.

people make bad mistakes in matters of this sort. all those who say that ‘sleep’ is a ‘failure of sensation’. Sometimes. Moreover. but only a cause of pain: nor again is a failure of sensation sleep. too. For a living 470 . or cause for effect. Likewise also an equality between contrary reasonings would be generally considered to be a cause of perplexity: for it is when we reflect on both sides of a question and find everything alike to be in keeping with either course that we are perplexed which of the two we are to do. however. or that ‘pain’ is a ‘violent disruption of parts that are naturally conjoined’. since pain will be present in them. Similar in character. Likewise. For sleep is not an attribute of sensation. is the definition of ‘health’. is formed in the soul. e.Moreover. if it is a failure of sensation. if the thing of which the term defined has been stated to be an affection or disposition. say. nor pain of parts naturally conjoined: for then inanimate things will be in pain. or whatever it may be. as knowledge. but the one is the cause of the other: for either we go to sleep because sensation fails. whereas it ought to be. supposing the ‘immortal’ to be defined as a ‘living thing immune at present from destruction’. as a ‘balance of hot and cold elements’: for then health will be necessarily exhibited by the hot and cold elements: for balance of anything is an attribute inherent in those things of which it is the balance. being a disposition of soul.g. or that ‘perplexity’ is a state of ‘equality between contrary reasonings’. be unable to admit it. Moreover.g. the definer has made a mistake. so that health would be an attribute of them. with regard to all periods of time look and see whether there be any discrepancy between the differentia and the thing defined: e. or sensation fails because we go to sleep. too. For the disruption of parts naturally conjoined is not pain. For every disposition and every affection is formed naturally in that of which it is an affection or disposition. perplexity is not an attribute of opposite reasonings. people who define in this way put effect for cause.

indeed. in this case this result does not follow. then. 7 You should look and see also whether the term being defined is applied in consideration of something other than the definition rendered. or. this commonplace rule ought to be followed. Still. so that it is not meant that it is immortal only at present. or that at present it is such that it never can be destroyed.g. then the two could not be the same. This would not be right. we say that a living thing is at present immune from destruction. if ever it does happen that what has been rendered according to the definition belongs in the present only or past. Moreover.thing that is immune ‘at present’ from destruction will be immortal ‘at present’. what is rendered according to the definition admits of degrees 471 . whereas what is rendered according to the definition does not. Suppose (e. owing to the ambiguity of the words ‘immune at present from destruction’: for it may mean either that the thing has not been destroyed at present.) a definition of ‘justice’ as the ‘ability to distribute what is equal’. we mean that it is at present a living thing of such a kind as never to be destroyed: and this is equivalent to saying that it is immortal. for ‘just’ describes rather the man who chooses. then. vice versa. Whenever. Possibly. So. than the man who is able to distribute what is equal: so that justice could not be an ability to distribute what is equal: for then also the most just man would be the man with the most ability to distribute what is equal. or that it cannot be destroyed at present. whereas what is meant by the word does not so belong. as we have said. see if the thing admits of degrees.

see if he renders the definition relative to two things taken separately: thus. while of ‘pleasant to the ears’ the opposite is not pleasant to the cars’: clearly. suppose two things to be before you. but more particularly to one of them. Moreover. if they had been the same. so that both do not become intensified at once: they certainly should. For ‘pleasant to the ears’ will be the same as ‘beautiful’. Moreover. If. it will be both beautiful and not beautiful. Take. the beautiful’ is ‘what is pleasant to the eyes or to the ears»: or ‘the real’ is ‘what is capable of being acted upon or of acting’. and likewise will be both real and not real. see if. suppose sexual love to be the desire for intercourse: for he who is more intensely in love has not a more intense desire for intercourse. and the opposite of ‘beautiful’ is ‘not beautiful’. are identical. they yet do not both become greater together: e. For either both must admit them or else neither. then. if indeed what is rendered according to the definition is the same as the thing.while the thing does not. Again. therefore. so that ‘not pleasant to the ears’ will be the same as ‘not beautiful’: for of identical things the opposites. too. Moreover. For then the same thing will be both beautiful and not beautiful. the definition of ‘fire’ as the ‘body that consists of the most rarefied particles’. but flame is less the body that consists of the most rarefied particles than is light: whereas both ought to be more applicable to the same thing.g. In like 472 . see if the one expression applies alike to both the objects before you. while the other does not apply to both alike. for instance. however. see if the term to be defined applies more particularly to the one to which the content of the definition is less applicable. something be pleasant to the eyes but not to the ears. had they been the same thing. For ‘fire’ denotes flame rather than light. ‘not pleasant to the ears’ is the same thing as ‘not beautiful’. while both of them admit of degrees.

if he has defined ‘knowledge’ as an ‘incontrovertible conception’ or ‘wishing’ as ‘painless conation’. that desire is not for the pleasant but for pleasure: for this is our purpose in choosing what is pleasant as well. and then see if there be any discrepancy between them. Moreover. of both genera and differentiae and all the other terms rendered in definitions you should frame definitions in lieu of the terms.g. also. therefore.g. Likewise. Or perhaps this rule is 473 . whatever it is. either in itself or in respect of its genus. Look and see also if that in relation to which he has rendered the term be a process or an activity: for nothing of that kind is an end. Or see if a relative term has been described not in relation to its end. seeing that the being of every relative term is identical with being in a certain relation to something. to have said that knowledge is ‘conception of a knowable’ and that wishing is ‘conation for a good’. e. see whether the definition fails to mention that to which the term. for the completion of the activity or process is the end rather than the process or activity itself. the end in anything being whatever is best in it or gives its purpose to the rest. For of everything relative the essence is relative to something else. is relative.manner we shall show also that the same thing is both real and unreal. e. either in itself or in respect of its genus. to which its genus is relative. or that. He ought. Certainly it is what is best or final that should be stated. if he has defined ‘grammar’ as ‘knowledge of letters’: whereas in the definition there ought to be rendered either the thing to which the term itself is relative. 8 If the term defined be relative.

and cause. also. e. Likewise. or in the case of the incontinent man the quality of the pleasures. and in any other cases where it applies. Moreover. should be stated. in defining the covetous man the quantity of money he aims at.g. the quality and quantity of the honour the striving for which makes a man ambitious: for all men strive for honour. see if the word ‘apparent’ is left out. but only apparently so. One should always attack deficiency. or ‘pleasant’. e. therefore. Likewise. whereas they ought to specify as well quantity.g. or an earthquake as a movement of the earth’. for almost everybody prefers the present experience of pleasure to its cessation. Again see in some cases if he has failed to distinguish the quantity or quality or place or other differentiae of an object. so that they would count the activity as the end rather than its completion. or a wind as a ‘movement of the air’. also. ‘wishing is a conation after the good’. in the case of conations. Or again. so that it is not enough to define the ambitious man as him who strives for honour. people sometimes define night as a ‘shadow on the earth’. For it is not the man who gives way to any sort of pleasure whatever who is called incontinent. For often those who exhibit the conation do not perceive what is good or pleasant. in other cases of the kind: for by omitting any differentiae whatever he fails to state the essence of the term. They ought. so that their aim need not be really good or pleasant. or ‘desire is a conation after the pleasant’ – instead of saying ‘the apparently good’. irrespective of its manner and the amount involved. but the aforesaid differentiae must be added. On the other hand. but only he who gives way to a certain kind of pleasure. nor a movement of the air a wind. quality. to have rendered the definition also accordingly. any one who maintains the existence of Ideas 474 . For a movement of the earth does not constitute an earthquake.not true in all cases. or a cloud as ‘condensation of the air’. place.

in definitions of this sort it happens that what the definer defines is in a sense more than one thing: for in defining knowledge. if the definition be of the state of anything. e. in the case of relative terms. supposing belief to be relative to some object of belief. Speaking generally. see if the species is rendered as relative to a species of that to which the genus is rendered as relative.g. see whether a particular belief is made relative to some particular object of belief: and. while if it be of what is in the state. look at what is in the state. even though he does render the word in question: for there can be no Idea of anything merely apparent: the general view is that an Idea is always spoken of in relation to an Idea: thus absolute desire is for the absolutely pleasant. and absolute wishing is for the absolutely good. 9 Moreover. For if the first be made clear. then. and what it is to know and to be ignorant. too. using the elementary principles drawn from consideration of contraries and of coordinates. We have.ought to be brought face to face with his Ideas. Thus if the pleasant be identical with the beneficial. look at the state: and likewise also in other cases of the kind. they therefore cannot be for an apparent good or an apparently pleasant: for the existence of an absolutely – apparently – good or pleasant would be an absurdity. a man in a sense defines ignorance as well. to be on our guard in all such cases against discrepancy. and likewise also what has knowledge and what lacks it. see whether a particular multiple be made relative 475 . then. Moreover. the others become in a certain sense clear as well. the man who is pleased is benefited. if a multiple be relative to a fraction.

For if it be not so rendered. supposing any one were to define equality as the contrary of inequality: for then he is defining it through the term which denotes privation of it. whether (e.) inequality is generally held to be the privation of equality (for ‘unequal’ merely describes things that are not equal’). and this becomes clear. also.g.to a particular fraction. Seeing. Thus (e. it is therefore clear that that contrary whose form denotes the privation must of necessity be defined through the other. for else we should find that each is being interpreted by the other. e.) the definition of ‘half’ is the opposite of that of ‘double’: for if ‘double’ is ‘that which exceeds another by an equal amount to that other’.g.) if ‘useful’=‘productive of good’.g. a man who so defines is bound to use in his definition the very term he is defining. For to the contrary term will apply the definition that is contrary in some one of the ways in which contraries are conjoined. whereas the other cannot then be defined through the one whose form denotes the privation. then. ‘injurious’=productive of evil’ or ‘destructive of good’. See. so 476 . Suppose. clearly a mistake has been made. the one is sometimes a word forced to denote the privation of the other. For to say ‘inequality’ is the same as to say ‘privation of equality’. if the opposite of the term has the opposite definition. with contraries. We must in the case of contrary terms keep an eye on this mistake. Moreover. for one or the other of thee is bound to be contrary to the term originally used. ‘half’ is ‘that which is exceeded by an amount equal to itself’. neither of these things to be the contrary of the term originally used. too. as (e. Therefore equality so defined will be ‘the contrary of the privation of equality’. if for the word we substitute its definition.g. then clearly neither of the definitions rendered later could be the definition of the contrary of the term originally defined: and therefore the definition originally rendered of the original term has not been rightly rendered either. moreover. In the same way. that of contraries.

whether in defining ‘ignorance’ a privation he has failed to say that it is the privation of ‘knowledge’. since it is clear that ‘evil’ too will be ‘the contrary of good’ (for the definition of things that are contrary in this must be rendered in a like manner). the result again is that he uses the very term being defined: for ‘good’ is inherent in the definition of ‘evil’. has failed to render the thing in which it is primarily formed. then. see if in rendering a term formed to denote privation. and not in the ‘reasoning faculty’: for if in any of these respects he fails. or.g. If. Clearly. then. however. Examine further whether he has defined by the expression ‘a privation’ a term that is not used to denote a privation: thus a mistake of this sort also would be generally thought to be incurred in the case of ‘error’ by any one who is not using it as a merely negative term. suppose ‘good’ to be defined as ‘the contrary of evil’.) in ‘man’ or in ‘the soul’.that he would have used the very word to be defined. but rather that which 477 . For what is generally thought to be in error is not that which has no knowledge.g. e. or whatever it may be whose privation it is: also if he has omitted to add either any term at all in which the privation is naturally formed. or else that in which it is naturally formed primarily. e. that neither of the contraries be so formed as to denote privation. e. or contrary. then ‘good’ will be the ‘contrary of the contrary of good’. he has used the very word to be defined. he has failed to render the term of which it is the privation. if he has failed to say that ‘blindness’ is the ‘privation of sight in an eye’: for a proper rendering of its essence must state both of what it is the privation and what it is that is deprived.g. though he has added this. he has made a mistake. Suppose. the state. but yet the definition of it be rendered in a manner like the above. ‘good’ be the contrary of evil. or has failed to add in what it is naturally formed. Likewise. then.g. placing it (e. also. and evil be nothing other than the ‘contrary of good’. Moreover.

g. are synonymous. congenitally present with it’: for this is found in plants as much as in animals. in the Platonic definition where he adds the word ‘mortal’ in his definitions of living creatures: for the Idea (e. moreover. Further. the absolute Man) is not mortal. if. if ‘beneficial’ means ‘productive of health’. For in some cases it will not do so. is not used to denote a mere privation of knowledge. So always wherever the words ‘capable of acting on’ or ‘capable of being acted upon’ are added. see if he has rendered a single common definition of terms that are used ambiguously. so that the definition will not fit the Idea. or of motion.g. see whether the like inflexions in the definition apply to the like inflexions of the term.g. e. ‘Error’. In dealing with these people even arguments of this kind are useful. e. This is.has been deceived. whereas ‘life’ is generally understood to mean not one 478 . 10 Moreover. does ‘beneficially’ mean productively of health’ and a ‘benefactor’ a ‘producer of health’? Look too and see whether the definition given will apply to the Idea as well. then. then. it is not true of any one of the objects described by the term. the definition applies in a like manner to the whole range of the ambiguous term. what happens to Dionysius’ definition of ‘life’ when stated as ‘a movement of a creature sustained by nutriment. the definition and the Idea are absolutely bound to be discrepant: for those who assert the existence of Ideas hold that they are incapable of being acted upon. and for this reason we do not talk of inanimate things or of children as ‘erring’. For terms whose definition corresponding their common name is one and the same.

the one previously rendered and also the later one. Further. but to be one thing in animals and another in plants. and. In either case. and yet fail to see that he has rendered a definition common to both senses instead of one peculiar to the sense he intends.kind of thing only. as the case may be: for people are more ready to agree when they do not foresee what the consequence will be. If. Since ambiguous terms sometimes pass unobserved. whenever the definition rendered fails to apply universally. he is equally at fault. see if the definition of this second meaning applies also to the other meanings: for if so. vice versa. this meaning must clearly be synonymous with those others. Otherwise. it is best in questioning to treat such terms as though they were synonymous (for the definition of the one sense will not apply to the other. so that the answerer will be generally thought not to have defined it correctly. It is possible to hold the view that life is a synonymous term and is always used to describe one thing only. whereas in answering you should yourself distinguish between the senses. however. one should secure a preliminary admission on such points. as some answerers call ‘ambiguous’ what is really synonymous. and the man asserts that what is really synonymous is ambiguous because the definition he has rendered will not apply to the second sense as well. Again. and therefore to render the definition in this way on purpose: or it may quite well happen that a man may see the ambiguous character of the word. or else prove beforehand that so-and-so is ambiguous or synonymous. for to a synonymous term the definition should apply in its full range). call synonymous what is really ambiguous supposing their definition applies to both senses of the term. for there are applicable to them two distinct definitions in explanation of the term. if any one were to define 479 . there will be more than one definition of those other meanings. whichever course he pursues. and wish to render the definition of the one sense only. viz. no admission has been made.

if the term defined be a compound notion.g. take away the definition of one of the elements in the complex. Suppose. ‘such that its centre is in a line with its extremes’) ought to be a definition of straight’. and see if also the rest of the definition defines the rest of it: if not. yet in a question of terminology one is bound to employ the received and traditional usage and not to upset matters of that sort. Moreover. 11 Suppose now that a definition has been rendered of some complex term. but that even the term does not properly apply to all those senses.a term used in several senses. But an infinite straight line has neither centre nor extremes and yet is straight so that this remainder does not define the remainder of the term. For the exchange in such cases is bound to be merely one of term for term. finding that his definition does not apply to them all. e. just because his definition will not do so either. were to contend not that the term is ambiguous. it is clear that neither does the whole definition define the whole complex. seeing that there are no more terms used now than formerly. such that its centre is in a line with its extremes’. that some one has defined a ‘finite straight line’ as ‘the limit of a finite plane. see if the definition rendered be equimembral with the term defined. whereas in a 480 . if now the definition of a finite line’ be the ‘limit of a finite plane’. then one may retort to such a man that though in some things one must not use the language of the people. the rest (viz. and. A definition is said to be equimembral with the term defined when the number of the elements compounded in the latter is the same as the number of nouns and verbs in the definition. in the case of some if not of all.

as in the example just given: for ‘speculative’ is a less familiar term than knowledge. It might be held that this criticism is ridiculous: because there is no reason why the most familiar term should not describe the differentia. and the genus is always the most familiar term of all. Moreover. Look and see also whether. and moreover is less intelligible when put in that form. the term to be altered would also be that denoting the genus and not the differentia. or if not. seeing that it is the less familiar. clearly it is of the differentia rather than of the genus that a definition should be rendered. that ought to have been changed. 481 . the explanation of ‘speculative knowledge’ as ‘speculative conception’: for conception is not the same as knowledge – as it certainly ought to be if the whole is to be the same too: for though the word ‘speculative’ is common to both expressions. the sense fails still to be the same. ‘cloak’ instead of ‘doublet’. a man is substituting for a term not merely another term but a phrase. so that it is not this. for the differentia is less familiar than the genus. if possible in every case.g. For at that rate. Take.definition terms ought to be rendered by phrases. if actually a less well known term be substituted. for instance. ‘pellucid mortal’ for ‘white man’: for it is no definition. for the one is the genus and the other the differentia. e. and not the genus. yet the remainder is different. but the differentia. in the majority. seeing that the object of rendering the definition is to make the subject familiar. simple objects too could be defined by merely calling them by a different name. however. If. The mistake is even worse. clearly. see if in replacing one of the terms by something else he has exchanged the genus and not the differentia. e. in the exchange of words. in which case.g.

Now both a line and a body have a middle. those who in the case of relative terms do not distinguish to what the object is related. whereas what is contained in the definition is not. If. are wrong either wholly or in part.g. further definition is required of how it has a middle: for the word ‘number’ is common to both expressions. whereas ‘white’ does exist.If he has rendered the definition of the differentia. the phrase ‘with a middle’ be used in several senses. with other 482 . yet they are not ‘odd’. see whether the definition rendered is common to it and something else as well: e. Moreover. 12 Again. e. while if it be a science of some real thing. the definition is clearly altogether false.g. For if medicine be not a science of anything that is real. for it ought to hold of all reality. e. So that this will either discredit the definition or prove that it is no definition at all. Suppose ‘white’ to be defined as ‘colour mingled with fire’: for what is bodiless cannot be mingled with body. whenever he says that an odd number is a ‘number with a middle’. so that this could not be a definition of ‘odd’. if it is said to be of Reality essentially and not accidentally: as is the case with other relative terms: for every object of knowledge is a term relative to knowledge: likewise. on the other hand. it is partly false. but have described it only so as to include it among too large a number of things. see if the term of which he renders the definition is a reality.g. suppose some one to have defined ‘medicine’ as a science of Reality’. also. but not of another. so that ‘colour’ ‘mingled with fire’ could not exist. the sense here intended requires to be defined. and it is the word ‘odd’ for which the phrase has been substituted.

and omit nothing’. so that it would be a correct rendering to render the object in relation to any one whatsoever of these. and it is better for a thing to be desirable in itself than to be desirable for 483 . It might be said that it is possible for what is desirable in itself to be desirable for something else as well: but still to define what is desirable in itself in such a way is none the less wrong: for the essence contains par excellence what is best in anything. Such is the definition of a rhetorician as ‘one who can always see what will persuade in the given circumstances. then. have for their object some real thing. and the other a good thief: whereas it is not the actual pilfering in secret.g. or of a thief. again. for what produces or preserves something else is one of the things desirable for something else. or as in any way desirable because of something else. For there is no reason why the same thing should not be both real and white and good. if to render what it is accidentally be a correct way to render it. such a definition does not define any science at all. as ‘one who pilfers in secret’: for clearly.relative terms. then each and every relative term would be used in relation not to one thing but to a number of things. then the one will be a good rhetorician. see if he has rendered what is desirable for its own sake as desirable for what it produces or does. Moreover. by saying that justice is ‘what preserves the laws’ or that wisdom is ‘what produces happiness’. not general. inasmuch as all such are convertible. but the wish to do it. moreover. people define not the thing but only the thing in a good or perfect condition. that constitutes the thief. if they each do this. It is. if the right way to render account of a thing be to render it as it is not in itself but accidentally. e. Again. Clearly. for a definition ought to be peculiar to its own term. so that each will be a science of reality. Sometimes. impossible that a definition of this sort should be peculiar to the term rendered: for not only but the majority of the other sciences too.

as in a house and other things of that sort: for there. In general. suppose. though neither of them has it by himself). 13 See also whether in defining anything a man has defined it as an ‘A and B’. be a profligate. for then both will exhibit both justice and injustice: for if justice be temperance and bravery. though brave. both and yet neither will be just: for both together have justice. you may have the parts and yet not have the whole. clearly. or as a ‘product of A and B’ or as an ‘A+B’. then injustice will be cowardice and profligacy.something else. all the ways of showing that the whole is not the same as the sum of its parts are useful in meeting the type just described. justice to be defined as ‘temperance and courage. 484 . and yet this will follow if the one be temperate and yet a coward. for a man who defines in this way seems to assert that the parts are the same as the whole. and yet each singly fails to have it. e.g. Even if the situation here described does not so far appear very absurd because of the occurrence of this kind of thing in other cases also (for it is quite possible for two men to have a mina between them. and the other. yet least that they should have contrary attributes surely seems quite absurd. the definition will be true of both and yet of neither of them. If he defines it as and B’. too.’ For if of two persons each has one of the two only. so that this is rather what the definition too ought to have indicated. so that parts and whole cannot be the same. The arguments are particularly appropriate in cases where the process of putting the parts together is obvious.

or. see whether the parts perish together with the whole: for it ought to happen. but in a number of them. but only in combination. if the parts be good or evil and the whole neither. a line and a number. and yet the product be no more good than evil. e. both parts and whole are found primarily in some single subject. clearly that term could not be the product of these things: for the whole is bound to be in the same things wherein its parts are. suppose shamelessness be defined as ‘the product of courage and false opinion’: here the goodness of courage exceeds the evil of false opinion. and bad or neutral in 485 . see if the one thing is more distinctly good than the other is evil. see if that medium is not the same. unless each be in itself good or bad. If so. or at least more good than evil. accordingly the product of these ought to have corresponded to this excess. and to be either good without qualification. vice versa. whereas the things which he has said produce it are not found primarily in any single subject. so that the whole will then be found primarily not in one subject only. or. but one thing in the case of the whole and another in that of the parts. Or again. on the other hand. vice versa. or for things good or bad to produce a neutral thing. Again. that the whole perishes when the parts perish. per contra.g. If. when the whole perishes.g. they are good taken singly. for many things that are productive are not good in themselves. there is no necessity that the parts should perish too. Or it may be that this does not necessarily follow. look and see in the first place if A and B cannot in the nature of things have a single product: for some things are so related to one another that nothing can come of them. e. For it is impossible either for a neutral thing to produce something good or bad. see if the whole be good or evil. but each in a separate one. however.If. Or again. he has said that the term being defined is not ‘A and B’ but the ‘product of A and B’. see if the term that has been defined is in the nature of things found primarily in some single subject. and the parts neither. Moreover.

supposing the expression to mean that they exist either in some identical thing capable of 486 . then. need not necessarily be the case. This again. and see if there is none of them in which A could be said to exist ‘+ B. Moreover. If. but if they are both administered in a mixture. or as the ‘product of A and B. as produced from a better and worse. What has just been said is most clearly illustrated in the case of things that make for health or sickness. distinguish between the different senses in which one thing may be said to be ‘+’ another. but that it is a product of them compounded in such and such a way. Moreover. see whether the whole. see if the whole be synonymous with one of the elements: for it ought not to be. however. he admits that ‘A+B’ is + B’ is the same as either of these two things. the whole may very well not be good. Moreover. the first thing to be said is that ‘A+B’ means the same either as ‘A and B’. the same criticisms will apply as have already been given for meeting each of them. bad. just as in the case of a house: for here the materials do not make a house irrespective of the way they are put together. or the ‘drink made of honey and water’. If a man has defined an object as ‘A+B’. For the essence of any compound thing is not merely that it is a product of so-and-so. if they are not. for some drugs are such that each taken alone is good.g.’ Thus e. Again. fails to be worse than the better and better than the worse element. see if he has failed to state the manner of their composition: for the mere mention of its elements is not enough to make the thing intelligible.combination. as in the cases just instanced. unless the elements compounded be in themselves good.’ for ‘honey+water’ means either the honey and the water. any more than in the case of syllables: for the syllable is not synonymous with any of the letters of which it is made up.

rather. a definition of anger as ‘pain with a consciousness of being slighted’. and if this be in no way true of the A and B in question. or else in the same place or in the same time. If. suppose courage to have been defined as ‘daring with right reasoning’: here it is possible that the person exhibits daring in robbery. among the various senses above distinguished. and right reasoning in regard to the means of health: but he may have ‘the former quality+the latter’ at the same time. Some definitions rendered in this form fail to come under the aforesaid division at all. in relation to medical treatment (for a man may exhibit both daring and right reasoning in respect of medical treatment). For the two must not relate to any casual object that is the same.g. e. or whatever is more properly speaking its function than this. even though both be used in the same relation as well. e.g. but to occur ‘because of’ a thing is not the same as to occur ‘+ a thing’ in any of its aforesaid senses. meeting the perils of war. it be true that A and B are each found in the same time as the other. however.g. clearly the definition rendered could not hold of anything. Thus e. e. not even this combination of ‘the one+the other ‘makes him ‘courageous’. as there is no possible way in which A can exist B’. 487 . look and see if possibly the two are not used in the same relation. they must relate to the function of courage. any more than each to a different object. still.containing them (as e. none the less. and not as yet be courageous! Moreover. For what this means to say is that it is because of a consciousness of this sort that the pain occurs.g.g. justice and courage are found in the soul).

and every kind of living creature. though a compound. that neither of the aforesaid substances is the same as a ‘composition’ at all: for a composition always has a decomposition as its contrary. then no other compound could be a composition either. so too is the whole definition. as (e. if one knows that part and sees it to be incorrectly rendered: for if the part be demolished. one should attack some part of it.g. For it is not enough to say it is a composition. It appears. if in the nature of a thing two contraries are equally liable to occur. one should first 488 . Again. earth. if he have described the whole compounded as the ‘composition’ of these things (e. bone. else there will be more than one definition of the same thing. and the thing has been defined through the one. for how is it any more a definition to define it through this one than through the other.) in a definition of ‘flesh’ or ‘bone’ as the ‘composition of fire. again.14 Again. but when compounded in one way they form flesh. when in another. ‘a living creature’ as a ‘composition of soul and body’). Also. if it is equally probable that every compound is a composition or else that none is. clearly it has not been defined. Where. Moreover. first of all see whether he has omitted to state the kind of composition.g. is never a composition. if defined as a substance capable of receiving knowledge: for it has a like capacity for receiving ignorance. moreover. a definition is obscure. seeing that both alike are naturally liable to occur in it? Such is the definition of the soul. but you should also go on to define the kind of composition: for these things do not form flesh irrespective of the manner of their composition. whereas neither of the aforesaid has any contrary. even when one cannot attack the definition as a whole for lack of acquaintance with the whole. and air’.

and more indicative of the object defined. For one is bound. if the emendation is better. let so much suffice. or else himself to explain clearly whatever it is that his definition means. In combating definitions it is always one of the chief elementary principles to take by oneself a happy shot at a definition of the object before one. and then proceed to examine it. so one ought to do in the case of definitions as well: one ought oneself to propose a second definition: for if it is seen to be better. then. just as in the assemblies the ordinary practice is to move an emendation of the existing law and. Moreover.of all correct and reshape it in order to make some part of it clear and get a handle for attack. or to adopt some correctly expressed definition. so that one is better supplied with lines of attack. they repeal the existing law. Book VII 489 . clearly the definition already laid down will have been demolished. on the principle that there cannot be more than one definition of the same thing. and also any superfluous addition. As to definitions. For the answerer is bound either to accept the sense as taken by the questioner. with the model (as it were) before one’s eyes. to discern both any shortcoming in any features that the definition ought to have.

For where things are absolutely the same. in the most literal of the meanings ascribed to ‘sameness’ (and we said’ that ‘the same’ applies in the most literal sense to what is numerically one). seeing that of all forms of life the good life is the most desirable and so also is the happy life: for ‘the most desirable’ and the greatest’ apply but to one thing. in any of the recognized forms of opposition. in a case where one of two things is said to be something or other in a superlative degree. Again it may be examined in the light of those things which tend to produce or to destroy the things in question of their formation and destruction. Look and see also. Likewise. and ‘justly’ is the same as ‘bravely’. that Peloponnesians are the same as Spartans. if the one 490 .’ Likewise also in other cases of the kind. in the case of their opposites: for if two things be the same. For it is the same thing to take the opposite of the one or that of the other. and so are the things that tend to produce or to destroy them. for it does not follow because Peloponnesians and Spartans are the bravest of the Greeks. it only follows that the one must be included under the other as ‘Spartans’ are under ‘Peloponnesians’: for otherwise. For if justice be the same as courage. of the two things termed ‘greatest’ or most desirable’ must be numerically one: otherwise no proof will have been given that they are the same.1 Whether two things are ‘the same’ or ‘different’. then too the just man is the same as the brave man. Each. seeing that ‘Peloponnesian’ is not any one person nor yet ‘Spartan’. seeing that they are the same. their opposites also will be the same. too. their formations and destructions also are the same. however. Thus Xenocrates argues that the happy life and the good life are the same. if the other of these alleged identical things can also be described by a superlative in the same respect. may be examined in the light of their inflexions and coordinates and opposites. and in general of any thing that is related in like manner to each.

Again. the one being ‘good’ and the other evil’. if it is to be proved to be ‘the same’ as another. the other also is the same as it: for if they be not both the same as the same thing. If in any of these respects there is a discrepancy. For then the Peloponnesians are bound to be better than the Spartans. seeing that the one class is not included under the other. or the one being ‘virtue’ and the other ‘knowledge’: or see if. the differentiae predicted of either be not the same. Again. nor yet the good life. so must the other also. they are therefore the same. so that it does not follow that. clearly neither are they the same as one another. each will be better than the other. Likewise also the Spartans must perforce be better than the Peloponnesians.class be not included under the other. see if the genus of each be not the same. Moreover. Likewise also in other cases. the one (e. and if the one belong to anything as an accident.g. look and see if. This also is why Xenocrates fails to prove his case: for the happy life is not numerically single. the other as a ‘practical’ science. for they too are better than anybody else. but only that the one falls under the other.) being distinguished as a ‘speculative’ science. though the genus is the same. for they are better than anybody else. 491 . See further whether. clearly they are not the same. instead of both being found in one class of predicates. because they are both the most desirable. the one signifies a quality and the other a quantity or relation. supposing the one to be the same as something. each then is better than the other! Clearly therefore what is styled ‘best’ and ‘greatest’ must be a single thing. examine them in the light of their accidents or of the things of which they are accidents: for any accident belonging to the one must belong also to the other.

Moreover. Suppose (e. see whether things that are the same in one way are the same also in a different way. and see whether the addition of each to the same thing fails to make the same whole. showing that they are not the same. just as it is not the case that a man desires intercourse more intensely. For all that is predicated of the one should be predicated also of the other. Moreover. from the point of view of ‘degrees’. they do not admit it at the same time. and of whatever the one is a predicate. the vessel will not be less but more empty. Moreover.g. So that by a supposition. see if the one admits an increase of degree but not the other. the more intensely he is in love. examine them by means of an addition. for ‘double’ and ‘a multiple of’ do not signify the same thing. the other should be a predicate of it as well. so that love and the desire for intercourse are not the same. as happens to those who assert that ‘empty’ is the same as ‘full of air’: for clearly if the air be exhausted. and in the things of which they are predicated. Speaking generally. though it will no longer be full of air. as ‘sameness’ is a term used in many senses. the remainders ought to have signified the same thing: but they do not. the one character is annulled and not the other. that A and B are the same. subtracting the words ‘a half’ from each. For there is either no necessity or even no 492 . but also whether it is possible for a supposition to bring it about. which may be true or may be false (it makes no difference which). one ought to be on the look-out for any discrepancy anywhere in any sort of predicate of each term. or if the subtraction of the same thing from each leaves a different remainder. or if though both admit it.) that he has declared ‘double a half’ to be the same as ‘a multiple of a half’: then. Inquire also not only if some impossible consequence results directly from the statement made.

possibility that things that are the same specifically or generically should be numerically the same. if so. and it is with the question whether they are or are not the same in that sense that we are concerned. If. clearly the expression rendered could not be a definition. see whether the one can exist without the other. 2 Such is the number of the commonplace rules that relate to ‘sameness’. for it is not enough to show the sameness of content between the expression and the term. the first thing to observe is that few if any who engage in discussion arrive at a definition by reasoning: they always assume something of the kind as their starting points – both in geometry and in 493 . as was said before:’ for if what is signified by the term and by the expression be not the same. on the other hand. 3 This then is the way. in order to establish that the former is a definition. for. helps in the matter of definition. whereby the attempt to demolish a definition should always be made. Moreover. they could not be the same. None of the constructive commonplaces. we desire to establish one. and these the arguments. on the other hand. but a definition must have also all the other characters already announced. It is clear from what has been said that all the destructive commonplaces relating to sameness are useful also in questions of definition.

the definition given must of necessity be that of the term before us. have to be examined each as a whole in the way we have said. That a definition may thus be reached by a process of reasoning is obvious. but for the purposes of the inquiry now before us the same commonplace rules serve. and how it should be given. surveying the expressions used both as wholes and in detail: for if the opposite definition defines that opposite term. for it is impossible that anything else should be a definition. For we have to examine into the contraries and other opposites of the thing. however. First of all. for if the contrary thing be found in the contrary genus to that stated in the definition. and accordingly we need only make the bare statement that to reason to a thing’s definition and essence is quite possible. then. The means whereby it should be established have been more precisely defined elsewhere. At present it concerns us only so far as is required for our present purpose. see that the genus rendered is correctly rendered. and the thing before you is not in that same genus. and also in detail as follows. In the second place. seeing that there is not anything else predicated of the thing in the category of essence. The expressions. then it would clearly be in the contrary genus: for contraries must of necessity be either in the same genus or in contrary 494 .arithmetic and the other studies of that kind. that contraries may be conjoined in more than one way. and genera and differentiae are so predicated in that category: it is obvious that if one were to get an admission that so and so are the only attributes predicated in that category. the expression containing so and so would of necessity be a definition. we have to select from those contraries the one whose contrary definition seems most obvious. For if a definition is an expression signifying the essence of the thing and the predicates contained therein ought also to be the only ones which are predicated of the thing in the category of essence. belongs to another inquiry. to say accurately what a definition is. Seeing.

or both genera and differentiae will be contrary. while. clearly the expression given must be the right definition. unless the contraries be found within the same genus: of things whose genera are themselves contraries it may very well be that the same differentia is used of both. either all are contrary to those of its contrary. each other. or. the differentiae will be the same and the genera contrary. too. for the one tends to pierce the vision. Seeing. that both the genus and the differentiae have been rightly rendered. then those rendered in the definition would be predicated of the term before us. that the differentiae of contraries are either contrary or else the same.g. seeing that the definition consists of genus and differentiae. or the same as. then. while the other tends to compress it. seeing that the body as well has its virtue and vice. for the one is a virtue and the other a vice of the soul: ‘of the soul’. that are predicated of contraries we expect to be contrary. So that if contrary differentiae to those in the definition are predicated of the contrary term. e. of justice and injustice. the definition of the term before you will be apparent also: for since its contrary is found either in the same genus or in the contrary genus. vice versa. those of white and black. is the differentia in both cases. then.g. But this much at least is true. if the definition of the contrary term be apparent. the contrary differentia to that given be predicated of the contrary term and not of the one in hand.genera. 495 . or at least some of them are so while the rest remain the same. e. clearly the differentia stated must be predicated of the latter. clearly of the term before you there will be predicated either the same genus as of its contrary. If. else contraries will have the same definition. for that both should be the same is not possible. It might be replied that there is no necessity why contrary differentiae should be predicated of contraries. and likewise also the differentiae predicated of opposites are either contrary to. The differentiae. of its differentiae. And that is all. Speaking generally. therefore.

and ‘destructively’ means ‘in such a way as to decompose its essence’. the others must of necessity be agreed to as well. this will also be the definition of each of the rest as well. If.’ For each of these things is related in like manner to its own peculiar end. Likewise also with the rest: an admission of any one of them whatever. so that if one of them is defined as ‘productive of’ that end. Thus if forgetfulness be the loss of knowledge. Moreover. and B defines B. 496 . ‘vigorous’ too will mean ‘productive of vigour’. then A too defines a. then to be destroyed is to have its essence decomposed. then. if again ‘destructive’ means ‘apt to decompose something’s essence’. look at it from the point of view of its inflexions and coordinates. in all the ways in which it is possible to establish a result by comparing two and two together. also. if A’s claim to define a is like B’s to define B. look at it from the point of and like degrees. Likewise. and to have forgotten is to have lost knowledge. Further. Moreover. any one whatever of these is agreed to. to forget is to lose knowledge. For genera and definitions are bound to correspond in either case. This examination from the point of view of greater degrees is of no use when a single definition is compared with two things. for there cannot possibly be one definition of two things or two of the same thing.Moreover. For if ‘healthy’ means ‘productive of health’. if destruction is the decomposition of the thing’s essence. and all the rest are admitted too. then also ‘destruction’ means ‘the decomposition of its essence’. and ‘useful’ will mean ‘productive of good. look at it from the point of view of things that stand in relations that are like each other. or two definitions with one thing. Thus if A defines a better than B defines and B is a definition of so too is A of a.

e. Yet without these premisses it is impossible to reason to a definition.’ Moreover see if a man has used a term metaphorically. or predicated it of itself as though it were something different. for a 497 . that you should examine the individual cases. and then look to see in the case of their various species whether the definition applies. For to see for oneself. there is no telling whether the formula stated or some other one is its definition. too. and these therefore are those which it is most important to master and to have ready to hand: for they are the most useful on the greatest number of occasions. for if any other things as well are predicated of the thing in the category of essence. This sort of inquiry is of service against those who assume the existence of Ideas. So too if any other of the commonplace rules is of general application and effective. the most important are those of most general application: for these are the most effective. and that only the genus and differentiae are predicated in the category of essence. that of the elements of the definition rendered the one is genus and the other differentia. For the species is synonymous with its individuals. and to secure from those whom one is questioning. as has been said before. 5 That it is more difficult to establish than to overthrow a definition. it should be employed. Of the rest. an admission of premisses of this sort is no simple matter. e.g.g. is obvious from considerations presently to be urged.4 The most handy of all the commonplace arguments are those just mentioned and those from co-ordinates and inflexions.

the definition is thereby demolished. but not to it alone. Further. For in both cases it is easier to overthrow than to establish. and must moreover be convertible. on the other hand. Moreover. in establishing a case. whereas to establish it is necessary to 498 . so that to overthrow it. Now in demolishing a definition it is sufficient to argue against one point only (for if we have overthrown any single point whatsoever. is enough to overthrow it universally: and there is no need to prove the converse of this in order to show that the term is predicated of things of which the expression is not predicated. The point is clear also from the following: It is easier to draw one conclusion than many. one is bound to bring people to the view that everything contained in the definition is attributable. In overthrowing a view. not even so is there any need to prove the converse of the proposition in the process of overthrowing the definition. whereas in establishing a definition. if the definition rendered is to be peculiar to the subject.definition is an expression indicating the essence of a thing. The case stands likewise in regard to the property and genus of a term also. it is only necessary to demolish one of the terms used. For merely to show that the definition fails to be predicated of every one of the things of which the term is predicated. even supposing it should be necessary to overthrow something by a universal proposition. Moreover. As regards the property this is clear from what has been said: for as a rule the property is rendered in a complex phrase. even if it applies to everything embraced under the term. we shall have demolished the definition). there is no longer any necessity to show one’s point universally: for it is enough to show that the formula is untrue of any one of the things embraced under the term. the reasoning brought forward must be universal: for the definition put forward must be predicated of everything of which the term is predicated.

easier to establish than to overthrow: for to establish it. the quicker an argument comes: for there is more likelihood of a mistake occurring in a large than in a small number of things. as was explained in the case of the definition. while of overthrowing it there are two ways: for if it has been shown that it belongs either never or not in a certain case. whereas to overthrow it. it is enough to show its failure to belong either in some particular case or in every case. It appears. whereas to overthrow one it is enough to show in a single case only that it fails to belong: further. it has to be shown that it never belongs at all. in fact. in establishing a genus it is not enough to show that it belongs. 499 . as though. Moreover. it is clear that you are bound to establish it in one way only. For on account of the number of statements involved we are presented in the definition with the greatest number of points for attack. one has to show that it belongs in every case. the original statement has been demolished. For in establishing a property one has to show that it is true of everything included under the term in question. In regard to the genus. on the contrary. whereas to overthrow it. for to establish it. even if it belongs to everything falling under the term. but not to that only. It is clear also that the easiest thing of all is to overthrow a definition. The particular proposition is. it is enough to show that it does not belong in one single case. just as in other things to destroy is easier than to create. whereas in overthrowing it. it is enough to show that it belongs in a particular instance. by showing that it belongs in every case. it is overthrown in this case as well. too. nearly all the other rules that apply to the definition will apply also to the property of a thing. viz. but also that it belongs as genus has to be shown. and the more plentiful the material. so in these matters too to overthrow is easier than to establish. In the case of an accidental attribute the universal proposition is easier to overthrow than to establish. Then.reason to them all.

the other rules too may be used as means for attacking a definition: for if either the formula be not peculiar. The easiest thing of all to establish is an accidental predicate: for in other cases one has to show not only that the predicate belongs. so long as they do belong. the property is most nearly of this kind: for it is easier to demolish. So that it is impossible to use one set as a basis of attack upon the other except in the case of definition. it is the easiest of all things to demolish a definition. On the other hand.Moreover. yet the genus may very well not belong as a property without as yet being thereby demolished. nor yet of the rest: for only those relating to accidental attributes apply generally to all the aforesaid kinds of attribute. and that the formula is peculiar to the term). that the attributes stated belong. and moreover. both because of the number of things that people must be brought to accept. nor the accident as a genus or property. Of the rest.e. and this has to be done correctly. Likewise also the property need not belong as a genus. besides this. and. For there one both has to establish all those other points by reasoning (i. On the other hand. because it belongs to its subject alone and is predicated convertibly with its subject. that the formula indicates the essence of the thing. but also that it belongs in such and such a particular way: whereas in the case of the accident it is enough to show merely that it belongs. because as a rule it contains several terms. For while each of the aforesaid kinds of attribute must belong to the thing in question. against the others we cannot bring all of the arguments drawn from definitions. an accidental 500 . Clearly. then. while to establish one is the hardest. or the genus rendered be the wrong one. the definition is thereby demolished. besides this. or something included in the formula fail to belong. and that the genus rendered is the true genus. while it is the hardest to establish.

in the case of an accidental predicate the only way to demolish it is to show that it does not belong at all. first of all. he must frame them and arrange them one by one to himself. select the ground from which he should make his attack. or that it does not belong in the particular way stated. secondly. because it affords the least material: for in stating accident a man does not add how the predicate belongs. by showing either that the predicate does not belong. while in other cases it is possible to demolish what is said in two ways. and accordingly. thirdly and lastly. Now so far as the selection of his ground is concerned the problem is one alike for the philosopher and the dialectician. Any one who intends to frame questions must. Book VIII 1 Next there fall to be discussed the problems of arrangement and method in pitting questions.predicate is the hardest thing to overthrow. and 501 . The commonplace arguments through which we shall be well supplied with lines of argument with regard to our several problems have now been enumerated at about sufficient length. Not so with the philosopher. but how to go on to arrange his points and frame his questions concerns the dialectician only: for in every problem of that kind a reference to another party is involved. he must proceed actually to put them to the other party.

if he does not. but of opposites: for. Beside these there is no other premiss which need be secured: these are the ones whereby you should try to multiply and formulate your questions.the man who is investigating by himself: the premisses of his reasoning. or to render the argument more clear. Rather one should soar as far aloof from them as possible. Nay. seeing that contraries are opposites. one should ask him to admit it not of contraries. which have to be adopted. Thus if one desires to secure an admission that the knowledge of contraries is one. but inasmuch as an undertaking of this sort is always conducted against another person. by formulating a proposition to that 502 . The necessary premisses through which the reasoning is effected. if he grants this. or to lend weight to the argument. although true and familiar. other than the necessary premisses. ought not to be propounded directly in so many words. The sources from which one’s commonplace arguments should be drawn have already been described:’ we have now to discuss the arrangement and formation of questions and first to distinguish the premisses. we are obliged to employ them as well. they serve either inductively to secure the universal premiss being granted. one should secure the admission by induction. Those which are used to conceal the conclusion serve a controversial purpose only. one will then argue that the knowledge of contraries is also the same. or to conceal the conclusion. may be refused by the answerer because they lie too near the original statement and so he foresees what will follow if he grants them: but for this the philosopher does not care. he may possibly be even anxious to secure axioms as familiar and as near to the question in hand as possible: for these are the bases on which scientific reasonings are built up. Those which are secured other than these are of four kinds. By necessary premisses are meant those through which the actual reasoning is constructed.

Moreover. other than these. Speaking generally. to most people if not invariably. it is still open to one to formulate them in so many words. The way to employ them respectively is as follows: Induction should proceed from individual cases to the universal and from the known to the unknown.effect in the case of some particular pair of contraries. for this is likely to keep the answerer at the greatest possible distance from the original proposition. The premisses. Concealment of one’s plan is obtained by securing through prosyllogisms the premisses through which the proof of the original proposition is going to be constructed – and as many of them as possible. This is likely to be effected by making syllogisms to prove not only the necessary premisses but also some of those which are required to establish them. showing the conclusion. because the previous syllogisms have not been made articulate to him: while the final syllogism. it is unclear how it comes about. a man who desires to get information by a concealed method should so put his questions that when he has put his whole argument and has stated the conclusion. and the objects of perception are better known. must be secured with a view to the latter. but why is that?’ This result will be secured best of all by the method above described: for if one states only the final conclusion. do not state the conclusions of these premisses but draw them later one after another. people still ask ‘Well. is likely to be kept least articulate if we 503 . For one must secure the necessary premisses either by reasoning or by induction. This is because the coming conclusion is less easily discerned at the greater distance and in the process of induction. even if one cannot reach the required premisses in this way. while at the same time. or else partly by one and partly by the other. that were mentioned above. for the answerer does not foresee on what grounds it is based. although any propositions which are too obvious to be denied may be formulated in so many words.

of the definition of ‘anger’ it is not so easy to find an objection.lay down not the secured propositions on which it is based. if this were secured. we should have universally what we intend. wherever possible. In the case. for people deceive themselves. they often find that the answerer refuses to grant them because on the actual term itself he is readier with his objection. that ‘anger’ is a desire for vengeance on account of an apparent slight: for. because we become angry with our parents. into thinking that they are not making the admission universally. too. not to secure the admissions claimed as the bases of the syllogisms in their proper order. but we do not desire vengeance on them. but in order to get at something else: for people 504 . the conclusion that will result from them is more obvious in advance. but still it gives a certain plausibility and air of reasonableness to the denial of the proposition. however. that the ‘angry man’ does not desire vengeance. but alternately those that conduce to one conclusion and those that conduce to another. on the other hand. If. whenever the definition is taken in regard to a coordinate. and were to secure this. if those which go together are set side by side.g. people formulate propositions relating to the actual terms themselves. for upon some people it is vengeance enough to cause them pain and make them sorry. Moreover. It is a useful rule. e. Very likely the objection is not valid. but only the grounds on which we reason to them. formulate your proposition as though you did so not for its own sake. One should also. An instance would be. for. clearly. supposing one had to secure the admission that the angry man desires vengeance on account of an apparent slight. secure the universal premiss by a definition relating not to the precise terms themselves but to their co-ordinates.

occasionally to bring an objection against oneself: for answerers are put off their guard against those who appear to be arguing impartially. formulate your premiss as though it were a mere illustration: for people admit the more readily a proposition made to serve some other purpose. Moreover. what is secured is not the universal under which all the like cases fall. for in induction it is the universal whose admission is secured from the particulars. Moreover. to add that ‘So and so is generally held or commonly said’. and if the one has been secured. and not required on its own account. Further. even though you really require the point: for insistence always arouses the more opposition. do not formulate the very proposition you need to secure. Moreover. and the universal involved is less patent. try to secure admissions by means of likeness: for such admissions are plausible. people are more ready to say what they themselves think. This argument resembles induction. make the other person admit that as knowledge and ignorance of contraries is the same.are shy of granting what an opponent’s case really requires.g. the other has 505 . do not be insistent. but rather something from which that necessarily follows: for people are more willing to admit the latter. so too perception of contraries is the same. for people are shy of upsetting the received opinion unless they have some positive objection to urge: and at the same time they are cautious about upsetting such things because they themselves too find them useful. Speaking generally. whereas in arguments from likeness. It is a good rule also. or vice versa. but is not the same thing. a questioner should leave it as far as possible doubtful whether he wishes to secure an admission of his proposition or of its opposite: for if it be uncertain what their opponent’s argument requires. It is useful too. e. because it is not so clear from this what the result will be. so is the knowledge also. that since the perception is the same.

For everything of this kind lends additional ornament to the argument.been secured also. What sort of process induction is obvious: as for distinction. Ornament is attained by induction and distinction of things closely akin. confident in their own character. and let the illustrations be relevant and drawn from things that 506 . unless the conclusion that will result actually stares them in the face. would not be granted. an instance of the kind of thing meant is the distinction of one form of knowledge as better than another by being either more accurate. while at the close of an argument they show their ill-temper. or the distinction of sciences into speculative. so far as the conclusion goes. examples and comparisons should be adduced. as do those who draw false geometrical figures: for in the multitude of details the whereabouts of the fallacy is obscured. practical. or concerned with better objects. For this reason also a questioner sometimes evades observation as he adds in a corner what. For concealment. it is well to expand the argument and insert things that it does not require at all. For clearness. and productive. On the other hand. one should put last the point which one most wishes to have conceded. though there is no necessity to say them. Again. for people are specially inclined to deny the first questions put to them. because most people in asking questions put first the points which they are most eager to secure. Likewise also with those who consider themselves smart at answering: for when they have admitted most of what you want they finally talk clap-trap to the effect that the conclusion does not follow from their admissions: yet they say ‘Yes’ readily. in dealing with some people propositions of this sort should be put forward first: for ill-tempered men admit most readily what comes first. then. Moreover. and imagining that they cannot suffer any reverse. the rules which should be followed are the above. if he formulated it by itself.

therefore. they use the phrase ‘in all cases of this sort’. for many things appear to answer to like descriptions that do not really do so. If one has made an induction on the strength of several cases and yet the answerer refuses to grant the universal proposition. But until one has oneself stated in what cases it is so. then it is fair to demand his objection. One ought. and which are not: and in this connexion people often throw dust in each others’ eyes in their discussion. to try oneself to coin a word to cover all things of the given sort. This point has been treated previously as well. it is not fair to demand that he shall say in what cases it is not so: for one should make the induction first.’ In induction. is most useful against the crowd. or to the questioner to suggest falsely that it does answer to a like description. and say that the thing advanced does not answer to a like description. so as to leave no opportunity either to the answerer to dispute. 2 In dialectics. 507 . the one party asserting the likeness of things that are not alike. as in Homer and not as in Choerilus. syllogism should be employed in reasoning against dialecticians rather than against the crowd: induction. and the other disputing the likeness of things that are. But it is one of the very hardest things to distinguish which of the things adduced are ‘of this sort’. but in others this is not easy. when people need to secure the universal. because there is no established general term that covers all the resemblances: in this case. it is possible in some cases to ask the question in its universal form. and then demand the objection.we know. One ought. for then the proposition is likely to become clearer. on the other hand.

and form the remainder into a universal proposition. and bring their objection not in regard to the thing itself. therefore. that ‘the greater good has the greater evil as its opposite. If. which is a less good thing than vigour. and assert the remainder. unless 508 . as for instance two is the one prime number among the even numbers: for. One should similarly treat those who object to the statement that ‘the greater the good. but in regard to some homonym of it: thus they argue that a man can very well have a colour or a foot or a hand other than his own. that if a person have lost knowledge of a thing while it still remains. however. he then has forgotten it.g. e. unless that subject happen to be the one and only thing of the kind. but he has not forgotten it. because if the thing alters.g.moreover. People sometimes object to a universal proposition. the greater the evil that is its opposite’: for they allege that health. but to the actual thing asserted. you should draw the distinction before putting your question in such cases: for so long as the ambiguity remains undetected.g. Accordingly the thing to do is to withdraw the part objected to. so long will the objection to the proposition be deemed valid. the objector ought to make his objection in regard to some other. In this case too. e. to claim that the objections should not be brought in reference to the actual subject of the proposition. and a cook may have a foot that is not his own. the questioner should withdraw the point objected to. has a greater evil as its opposite: for disease is a greater evil than debility. he checks the series of questions by an objection in regard not to some homonym. therefore. for a painter may have a colour that is not his own. in the case of forgetfulness and having forgotten: for people refuse to admit that the man who has lost his knowledge of a thing has forgotten it. e. we have to withdraw the point objected to. unless he can say that this subject is unique of its kind. until he secures what he requires. To meet them. he has lost knowledge of it. for when it has been withdrawn. the man is more likely to admit the proposition.

one does reason to an impossible conclusion. and the man shakes his head.the one good involves the other as well’. you formulate the proposition on the strength of many cases and he has no objection to bring. Whenever it is possible to reason to the same conclusion either through or without a reduction per impossibile. but also if. if one is demonstrating and not arguing dialectically it makes no difference which method of reasoning be adopted. then when asked for an objection he certainly will be unable to render one. as vigour involves health. if. without so doing. unless its falsehood is too plainly manifest. Propositions that are partly false and partly true are of this type: for in the case of these it is possible by withdrawing a part to leave the rest true. he will be forced to admit the proposition because he cannot foresee in the rest of it any case where it does not hold true: if he refuse to admit it. but in argument with another reasoning per impossibile should be avoided. and to which either no objection whatever appears or at least not any on the surface: for when people cannot see any case in which it is not so. no dispute can arise. people deny that it is impossible. he refuses to admit the point because he foresees something of the kind: for if the point objected to be withdrawn. so that the questioners do not get what they want. however. it looks as if the reasoning had failed. If. you may claim that he shall admit it: for a premiss is valid in dialectics which thus holds in several instances and to which no objection is forthcoming. One should put forward all propositions that hold true of several cases. even if it be not put as a question but 509 . on the other hand. For where one has reasoned without the reduction per impossibile. This should be done not only when he formulates an objection. For often. they admit it for true. if it be. The conclusion should not be put in the form of a question.

he does it because the person questioned does not answer the questions. people deny it. whenever you have yourself distinguished and formulated them.advanced as a consequence.g. and the other denies it. Not every universal question can form a dialectical proposition as ordinarily understood. For this reason questions of this kind are not dialectical unless the questioner himself draws distinctions or divisions before expressing them.g. or this. it looks altogether as if the reasoning had failed. then. For if he does so though the person questioned keeps on answering the questions. on the other hand. or else asks the same question a large number of times: in the one case he merely babbles. and then those who do not see that it follows upon the previous admissions do not realize that those who deny it have been refuted: when. Any one who keeps on asking one thing for a long time is a bad inquirer. the one man merely asks it as a question without even saying that it so follows. Hence one should endeavour to formulate propositions of this kind in this form. If. and he will not admit them at all. in the other he fails to reason: for reasoning always consists of a small number of premisses. ‘Good means this. he is at fault in not taking him to task or breaking off the discussion. ‘What is man?’ or ‘How many meanings has «the good»?’ For a dialectical premiss must be of a form to which it is possible to reply ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. does it not?’ For questions of this sort are easily answered by a Yes or a No. e. It is at the same time also perhaps fair to ask the other man how many meanings of ‘the good’ there are. e. 510 . whereas to the aforesaid it is not possible. clearly he asks a large number of questions.

because of the small number of those steps.3 There are certain hypotheses upon which it is at once difficult to bring. of all definitions to treat in argument are those that employ terms about which. and. it is safe to suppose that. while the latter have to be arrived at through many steps if one wishes to secure a continuous proof from first principles. that lie too close to the first principle are hard to treat in argument: for it is not possible to bring many arguments in regard to them. Such (e. in the first place. it is uncertain whether they are used in one sense or several. and because of the impossibility of saying whether this obscurity is due to their being used metaphorically. whenever any problem proves intractable. it is impossible to argue upon such terms. For the former require definition. or else all discussion about them wears the air of mere sophistry: for to prove anything is impossible unless one begins with the appropriate principles. nor do they pay any attention if the questioner makes a definition: and yet until it is clear what it is that is proposed. whether they are used literally or metaphorically by the definer. In general. For because of their obscurity. further. an argument. This sort of thing happens particularly in the case of the first principles: for while the other propositions are shown through these. The hardest.) are those things which stand first and those which stand last in the order of nature. and easy to stand up to. too. between the conclusion and the principle.g. however. Now to define first principles is just what answerers do not care to do. it is impossible to refute them. whereby the succeeding propositions have to be shown. it either needs definition or else bears either 511 . The inferences. and connects inference with inference till the last are reached. it is not easy to discuss it. these cannot be shown through anything else: we are obliged to understand every item of that sort by a definition.

or to supply the intermediate premisses: for it is through these that the final conclusions are shown.g. ‘Has one thing one contrary or many?’: here when the term ‘contraries’ has been properly defined. It appears also in mathematics that the difficulty in using a figure is sometimes due to a defect in definition. or else the reason is that we have yet to discover in the first place just this – in which of the aforesaid directions the source of our difficulty lies: when we have made this clear. to show them is difficult and may even prove quite impossible. on the other hand. it is a harder task to argue to the 512 . It often happens that a difficulty is found in discussing or arguing a given position because the definition has not been correctly rendered: e. If. the nature of a line or of a circle. only the arguments that can be brought in regard to each of them are not many. be laid down. Whenever. e. One may be sure then. the definition of the starting-points be not laid down. or it is not far removed from the first principles. then obviously our business must be either to define or to distinguish. e. if the definitions involved. The most primary of the elementary principles are without exception very easy to show.g. whenever a position is hard to discuss. it is easy to bring people to see whether it is possible for the same thing to have several contraries or not: in the same way also with other terms requiring definition. or a metaphorical sense.g. The case of the significance of verbal expressions is like that of these mathematical conceptions. that one or other of the aforesaid things has happened to it. because there are not many intermediate steps. in proving that the line which cuts the plane parallel to one side divides similarly both the line which it cuts and the area.several senses. the fact asserted becomes immediately clear: for the areas have the same fraction subtracted from them as have the sides: and this is the definition of ‘the same ratio’. whereas if the definition be given. on the other hand.

than to the resulting position. 513 . i. whereas in a dialectical exercise he may do so if he is merely satisfied of its truth. then. on the other hand. we must first define what is the business of a good answerer. With regard to the giving of answers.e. In other words. 4 As to the formulation. a doubt may arise whether such claims should be admitted or not: for if a man is going to refuse to admit it and claim that you shall argue to it as well. as of a good questioner. but only his position: for one may. he will be giving the signal for a harder undertaking than was originally proposed: if. perhaps. it be essential to reason through premisses that are better assured. The business of the questioner is so to develop the argument as to make the answerer utter the most extrvagant paradoxes that necessarily follow because of his position: while that of the answerer is to make it appear that it is not he who is responsible for the absurdity or paradox. if. he had better grant it. about enough has been said. Clearly. he had better refuse. the premiss. then. the circumstances under which such admissions should be claimed are different for a mere questioner and for a serious teacher. when once taken up. then. it is essential not to enhance the difficulty of the problem. he grants it.point claimed. If. he will be giving the original thesis credence on the strength of what is less credible than itself. and arrangement of one’s questions. distinguish between the mistake of taking up a wrong position to start with. in serious inquiry he ought not to grant it. on the other hand. and that of not maintaining it properly. unless he be more sure about it than about the conclusion.

then. in an assembly of disputants discussing in the spirit not of a competition but of an examination and inquiry. then. whereas in a competition the business of the questioner is to appear by all means to produce an effect upon the other. The manner. by some given person. e. to admit or to refuse to admit what has been asked. of its acceptance or rejection. the latter 514 . whereas if the former be generally accepted. on the other hand. as we have no tradition bequeathed to us by others. let us try to say something upon the matter for ourselves. by the speaker or by some one else. as is the latter from that of those who discuss things together in the spirit of inquiry: for a learner should always state what he thinks: for no one is even trying to teach him what is false. and what kind of things he should and should not grant for the correct or incorrect defence of his position: – inasmuch. i. while that of the answerer is to appear unaffected by him.5 Inasmuch as no rules are laid down for those who argue for the sake of training and of examination: – and the aim of those engaged in teaching or learning is quite different from that of those engaged in a competition. whatever it be. makes no difference: for the right way to answer. the statement laid down by the answerer be generally rejected.e. however. there are as yet no articulate rules about what the answerer should aim at. will be the same in either case. If. The thesis laid down by the answerer before facing the questioner’s argument is bound of necessity to be one that is either generally accepted or generally rejected or else is neither: and moreover is so accepted or rejected either absolutely or else with a restriction. the conclusion aimed at by the questioner is bound to be one generally accepted.g.

clearly the conclusion sought by the questioner will be one generally rejected without qualification. the answerer should admit all views that are generally accepted and. Now since a man who reasons correctly demonstrates his proposed conclusion from premisses that are more generally accepted. the answerer should not grant them. (3) Likewise. what is laid down is generally neither rejected nor accepted. and more generally accepted than his proposed conclusion. of the views not generally accepted. then. for then. or what is accepted indeed. of those that are not generally accepted. (2) If. the answerer ought not to grant either what is thus absolutely not accepted at all. if the less familiar is to be inferred through the more familiar. the view laid down by the answerer be one that is generally 515 . Consequently. and more familiar. it is clear that (1) where the view laid down by him is one that generally is absolutely rejected. any that are more generally accepted than the questioner’s conclusion. Accordingly. the statement laid down by the answerer be generally accepted without qualification. For if the statement laid down by the answerer be generally rejected. too. but accepted less generally than the questioner’s conclusion. too. If. anything that appears to be true should be granted. on the other hand.is generally rejected: for the conclusion which the questioner tries to draw is always the opposite of the statement laid down. For then he will probably be thought to have argued sufficiently well. if any of the questions put to him be not of this character. if the statement laid down by the answerer be neither rejected generally nor generally accepted. for in that case the result will be that the arguments will be more generally accepted. all that are less generally rejected than the conclusion sought by the questioner. If. the conclusion will be of the same type as well. and. on the other hand. the conclusion aimed at by the questioner will be one that is generally accepted. so that the premisses secured by the questioner should all be views generally accepted.

This is why those. but only by the answerer. who introduce other’s opinions. in order to avoid the appearance of being a simpleton. and must grant or refuse to grant the point asked. If it be relevant and also be generally accepted. not because they do not themselves believe this. he should admit 516 . 6 It is clear.’ refuse to admit the impossibility of contraries belonging at the same time to the same thing. the answerer be defending some one else’s opinion. Now every question asked is bound to involve some view that is either generally held or generally rejected or neither. their aim being to speak as would the man who stated the position. then the standard whereby the latter must judge what is generally accepted or not.g. but because on Heraclitus’ principles one has to say so. again. e. then the views that are accepted absolutely must be taken as the standard of comparison: whereas if the view laid down be one that is not generally accepted or rejected. and is also bound to be either relevant to the argument or irrelevant: if then it be a view generally accepted and irrelevant.accepted or rejected without qualification. then. that ‘good and evil are the same thing. If. whether the position he lays down be a view generally accepted without qualification or accepted by some definite person. as Heraclitus says. too. what the aims of the answerer should be. then clearly it will be the latter’s judgement to which he must have regard in granting or denying the various points. is himself. the answerer should grant it and remark that it is the accepted view: if it be a view not generally accepted and irrelevant. he should grant it but add a comment that it is not generally accepted. The same thing is done also by those who take on the defence of one another’s positions.

For then the answerer will not be held to be personally accountable for what happens to him. if it be irrelevant to the argument. the original problem collapses. If he understands the question and yet it covers many senses. then. it be relevant. seeing that all the premisses that are more generally accepted than the conclusion are granted him. is always permitted to say ‘I do not understand’: he is not compelled to reply ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to a question which may mean different things. if he grants the several points with his eyes open. if. he ought not to hesitate to say that he does not understand it. 7 The questioner should be met in a like manner also in the case of terms used obscurely. should yet protest that the proposition is too absurd to be admitted. if he does not understand. when men ask these things.that it is the view generally accepted but say that it lies too close to the original proposition. Clearly. again. then supposing what it says to be universally true 517 .e. it may be granted without restriction. while admitting that if it be granted the conclusion sought follows. then. and also the questioner will be able to draw his inference. in several senses. For the answerer. Those who try to draw an inference from premisses more generally rejected than the conclusion clearly do not reason correctly: hence. it be a view that is neither rejected generally nor generally accepted. Suppose. if it be granted. in the first place. and that if it be granted the problem proposed collapses. the answerer should add the comment that. the answerer. for often people encounter some difficulty from assenting to questions that are not clearly put. if what is said be not clear. however. they ought not to be granted. If what is claimed by the questioner be relevant but too generally rejected. i.

he should say. 518 . but assents to the question having in view the one sense of the words. far more likely is he to be thought illtempered – although even counter-proof is not enough: for we often hear arguments that are contrary to common opinions. then. he obviously shows illtemper. in the other false: for if he leave this distinction till later. if they are true and generally held. shows ill-temper. I meant the other sense’: for if a term or expression covers more than one thing. If he does not foresee the ambiguity. ‘That was not what I had in view when I admitted it. a man refuses to grant the universal when supported by many instances. then. On the other hand. 8 A premiss in reasoning always either is one of the constituent elements in the reasoning.or false. if the questioner takes it in the other sense. he cannot even attempt a counter-proof that it is not true. or else goes to establish one of these: (and you can always tell when it is secured in order to establish something else by the fact of a number of similar questions being put: for as a rule people secure their universal by means either of induction or of likeness): – accordingly the particular propositions should all be admitted. If. although he has no negative instance to show. he should add a comment that it bears different senses. he should give it an unqualified assent or denial: if. however. the question is both clear and simple. either real or apparent. and also that in one it is true. he should answer either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. moreover. it is easy to disagree. it becomes uncertain whether originally as well he perceived the ambiguity or not. on the other hand. for to bring the argument to a standstill without a negative instance. against the universal one should try to bring some negative instance. If. it be partly true and partly false. If.

and that to do injustice is better than to suffer it. suppose any one were to say that everything is in motion or that nothing is. and also there are all those which only a bad character would choose. supposing him to maintain them not for the sake of argument but because he really thinks them. so as to wreck the reasoning. e. even though the point demolished be false. a man refuses to admit the proposition without having either a negative instance or some counter-argument to bring against it. For the 519 . and which are implicitly opposed to men’s wishes. – but still. then. e.g. for clearly his business is to oppose those positions from which questioners demolish what he has laid down. e. For people then hate him.g. clearly he is ill-tempered: for ill-temper in argument consists in answering in ways other than the above. He should beware of maintaining a hypothesis that is generally rejected: and this it may be in two ways: for it may be one which results in absurd statements.g. the argument of Zeno that it is impossible to move or to traverse the stadium. 10 Of all arguments that reason to a false conclusion the right solution is to demolish the point on which the fallacy that occurs depends: for the demolition of any random point is no solution.whose solution is yet difficult. that pleasure is the good. If. this is no reason for omitting to assert the opposites of these views. 9 Before maintaining either a thesis or a definition the answerer should try his hand at attacking it by himself.

writes’ and ‘Socrates is sitting’: for from these it follows that ‘Socrates is writing’. If. and still be no nearer a solution of the argument. but the reason of the fallacy should also be proved: for then it would be clear whether the man makes his objection with his eyes open or not. ‘He who sits.g. it is not this that needs to be demolished. it would be impossible in such a case to apply the same solution. Any one who knows that it is on such and such a point that the argument depends. or by stating an objection directed against the questioner: for often when a solution has not as a matter of fact been brought. then it would be against his questions.argument may contain many falsehoods. but it is not on that that fallacy of the argument depends: for supposing that any one should happen to be sitting and not writing. The fourth and worst kind of objection is that which is directed to the time allowed for 520 . the objection would properly be directed against the questioner. There are four possible ways of preventing a man from working his argument to a conclusion. Now we may demolish the proposition ‘Socrates is sitting’. whereas if something additional be granted the conclusion comes about. knows the solution of it. it may be true that the point claimed is false. then. even if the point demolished be a falsehood. has given the solution of the argument completely. who has demolished the point on which the fallacy depends. one may object to the questions asked: for it may happen that what the questioner wants does not follow from the questions he has asked because he has asked them badly. For it is not enough to object. if he can do so. e. then. yet the questioner is rendered thereby unable to pursue the argument any farther. suppose some one to secure the premisses. It can be done either by demolishing the point on which the falsehood that comes about depends. Accordingly. Thirdly. the questioner be unable to pursue his argument farther. writes’: for he who sits does not always write. but rather that ‘He who sits. He. just as in the case of a figure falsely drawn.

11 Adverse criticism of an argument on its own merits. Moreover.discussion: for some people bring objections of a kind which would take longer to answer than the length of the discussion in hand. For often. are two different things. Accordingly it sometimes becomes necessary to attack the speaker and not his position. not a discussion. clearly one has to reason not only to true conclusions. the dialectician is compelled to demolish it: and then false propositions have to be formulated. and not always through true premisses. it has to be demolished by means of false propositions: for it is possible for a given man to believe what is not the fact more 521 . but sometimes through false as well. and of it when presented in the form of questions. four ways of making objections: but of them the first alone is a solution: the others are just hindrances and stumbling-blocks to prevent the conclusions. when a true proposition is put forward. since arguments of this kind are held not for the sake of instruction but for purposes of practice and examination. but also to false ones. Sometimes also when a false proposition is put forward. because he will not grant the steps of which a correct argument might have been made against his position: for it is not in the power of the one side only to effect properly a result that depends on both alike. There are then. their argument becomes a contest. as we said. For often the failure to carry through the argument correctly in discussion is due to the person questioned. when the answerer lies in wait for the points that are contrary to the questioner and becomes abusive as well: when people lose their tempers in this way.

clear that adverse criticism 522 . he does grant points of that kind. It is. however. The principle that a man who hinders the common business is a bad partner. for which reason they often assent. for this rests with the answerer. makes it clear that adverse criticism is not to be passed in a like strain upon the argument on its own merits. It makes no difference whether he effects this as answerer or as questioner: for both he who asks contentious questions is a bad dialectician. except with mere contestants. clearly applies to an argument as well. then. and upon the questioner: for it may very well be that the argument is bad. and also he who in answering fails to grant the obvious answer or to understand the point of the questioner’s inquiry. He. because while refusing to grant other points. and when they are claiming what originally they set out to prove – for often when they are talking by themselves they say contrary things. then. for these cannot both reach the same goal. however. for in arguments as well there is a common aim in view. it will be easier to persuade or help him. whether his conclusion be false or true: what kind of syllogisms are dialectical has already been said. if the argument be made to depend on something that he holds. What has been said. when questioned. but that the questioner has argued with the answerer in the best possible way: for when men lose their tempers. The responsibility. Inasmuch as it is indeterminate when people are claiming the admission of contrary things. who would rightly convert any one to a different opinion should do so in a dialectical and not in a contentious manner. Accordingly. for more than one cannot possibly win. just as a geometrician should reason geometrically.firmly than the truth. and admit afterwards what they have previously denied. it may perhaps be impossible to make one’s inferences straight-forwardly as one would wish: we have to do as we can. to contrary things and to what originally had to be proved – the argument is sure to become vitiated.

so that if a man brings people to accept his point from opinions that are as generally received as the case admits. described above. not even the argument itself is 523 . (4) Again. suppose the premisses be less generally held and less credible than the conclusion. One must not claim that the reasoning to a proposed view shall in every case equally be a view generally accepted and convincing: for it is a direct result of the nature of things that some subjects of inquiry shall be easier and some harder. though constructed from the premisses. when. or if. so that it is not through them that the inference comes about. he has argued his case correctly. were to be irrelevant to the original position. In itself an argument is liable to five kinds of adverse criticism: (1) The first is when neither the proposed conclusion nor indeed any conclusion at all is drawn from the questions asked. supposing certain additions would bring an inference about but yet these additions were to be weaker than those that were put as questions and less generally held than the conclusion. then. Clearly. supposing certain withdrawals could effect the same: for sometimes people secure more premisses than are necessary. if not all. supposing the reasoning. neither any withdrawals nor additions nor both together can bring the conclusions about. and in the manner. of the premisses on which the conclusion rests are false or generally rejected. they require more trouble to prove than the proposed view. though true. and when most. (5) Moreover.is not to be passed in a like manner upon questioners and upon their arguments. (3) The third is. moreover. (2) The second is.

but that something is other than what is wanted and has no bearing whatever on the conclusion. general opinion be for the one and neither for nor against the other. requires only such as are generally held and true. may sometimes be worse than one which is not so concluded. whereas the latter. as is clear from the Analytics. With those which bring about a true conclusion by means of false premisses. or if it be for the one and against the other. then. being commendable in itself. A philosopheme is a demonstrative inference: an epichireme is a dialectical inference: a sophism is a contentious inference: an aporeme is an inference that reasons dialectically to a contradiction. If something were to be shown from premisses. then no inference as to the latter can be drawn from it: and if there appears to be. it is not fair to find fault: for a false conclusion must of necessity always be reached from a false premiss.open to the same adverse criticism when taken in relation to the proposed conclusion and when taken by itself. though requiring certain additions. whenever there are many propositions both generally held and also true whereby it could easily be proved. For there is nothing to prevent the argument being open to reproach in itself. it may very well be that the conclusion shown is something held more strongly than either. even though brought to a conclusion. on the other hand. Whenever by the argument stated something is demonstrated. and yet open to reproach in relation to the proposed conclusion. if the 524 . not a proof. or again. vice versa. whenever the premisses of the former are silly. but a true conclusion may sometimes be drawn even from false premisses. and yet commendable in relation to the proposed conclusion. but not accepted with like conviction. If. It is possible also that an argument. it will be a sophism. while its conclusion is not so. both of which are views generally accepted. and moreover does not rest as an argument on these additions.

Wherein lies the viciousness of the reasoning? Simply in that it conceals the ground on which the argument depends. when he might employ fewer steps and those already included in his argument: suppose him to be showing (e. and that the most ordinary. sense. they will be alike for the conclusion also: if. 12 An argument is clear in one. when the propositions secured are such as compel the conclusion. the one preponderates. It is also a fault in reasoning when a man shows something through a long chain of steps. and the argument is concluded through premisses that are themselves conclusions: moreover. 525 . and this is the type most usually advanced. and suppose him to make his postulates as follows: ‘x-in-itself is more fully x than anything else’: ‘there genuinely exists an object of opinion in itself’: therefore ‘the object-of-opinion-in-itself is more fully an object of opinion than the particular objects of opinion’.) that one opinion is more properly so called than another.g. which will be «opinion» in a more accurate sense than the particular opinions’: and it has been postulated both that ‘a genuine opinion-in-itself exists’. if it be so brought to a conclusion as to make no further questions necessary: in another sense. Now ‘a relative term is more fully itself when its correlate is more fully itself’: and ‘there exists a genuine opinion-in-itself. it is so also if some step is omitted that generally is firmly accepted.pro and con be alike in the case of the premisses. on the other hand. and that ‘x-in-itself is more fully x than anything else’: therefore ‘this will be opinion in a more accurate sense’. the conclusion too will follow suit.

it is bad: if they be both false and also 526 . Clearly then the first thing to ask in regard to the argument in itself is. as happens when a non-medical argument is taken to be a medical one. though an argument which leads to a false conclusion may also be of this type. the second. as was said above as well. the third. but only when he is not aware of it: for we often accept on its merits in preference to many true ones an argument which demolishes some true proposition if it does so from premisses as far as possible generally accepted. whereas if. be generally accepted. a true conclusion may be drawn even from premisses that are not true. and this will then be demonstrated. ‘Of what kind of premisses does it consist?’: for if the latter. Fallacy in argument is due to a mistake of the arguer rather than of the argument: yet it is not always the fault of the arguer either. ‘Is the conclusion true or false?’. they be generally rejected. the argument is dialectical. or one which is not geometrical for a geometrical argument. though false. though true. sometimes true: for while a false conclusion is always the result of false premisses. whether the result reached be true or false: (4) if the conclusion be reached through false premisses: of this type the conclusion is sometimes false.An argument is called fallacious in four senses: (1) when it appears to be brought to a conclusion. For an argument of that kind does demonstrate other things that are true: for one of the premisses laid down ought never to be there at all. however. If. ‘Has it a conclusion?’. or one which is not dialectical for dialectical. and is not really so – what is called ‘contentious’ reasoning: (2) when it comes to a conclusion but not to the conclusion proposed – which happens principally in the case of reductiones ad impossibile: (3) when it comes to the proposed conclusion but not according to the mode of inquiry appropriate to the case. the argument is worse than many arguments that lead to a false conclusion. a true conclusion were to be reached through premisses that are false and utterly childish.

or. then the other. fifthly.) he were trying to prove that the knowledge of contraries is one and were to claim that the knowledge of opposites in general is one: for then he is generally thought to be begging.g. A third way is if any one were to beg in particular cases what he undertakes to show universally: e. or a term and an expression. that he had to show that medicine is a science of what leads to health and to disease. clearly it is bad.entirely contrary to general opinion. that which he ought to have shown by itself. if he undertook to show that the knowledge of contraries is always one. if he were to beg the one or the 527 . but it is more apt to escape detection in the case of different terms. either altogether or else in relation to the particular matter in hand. that mean the same thing. a man begs the question if he begs his conclusion piecemeal: supposing e.g. along with a number of other things. 13 Of the ways in which a questioner may beg the original question and also beg contraries the true account has been given in the Analytics:’ but an account on the level of general opinion must be given now. A second way occurs whenever any one begs universally something which he has to demonstrate in a particular case: suppose (e. and begged it of certain pairs of contraries: for he also is generally considered to be begging independently and by itself what. he ought to have shown. together with a number of other things.g. People appear to beg their original question in five ways: the first and most obvious being if any one begs the actual point requiring to be shown: this is easily detected when put in so many words. Again. and were to claim first the one.

if he were to beg the contrary terms of an antithesis. Again. even without begging the opposites in so many words. if any one were to beg an opposite affirmation and negation. he were to claim that the knowledge of what makes for health or for disease is different. and were to beg that the side is incommensurable with the diagonal. The securing of contraries differs from begging the original question in this way: in the latter case the mistake lies in regard to the conclusion. thirdly. in a certain relation which they bear to one another. if having secured that the knowledge of contraries is one. e. secondly.g. 528 .other of a pair of statements that necessarily involve one other. he were to beg two premisses such that this contradictory statement that is opposite to the first conclusion will follow from them.g. for it is by a glance at the conclusion that we tell that the original question has been begged: whereas contrary views lie in the premisses. firstly. For it would happen. The ways in which people assume contraries are equal in number to those in which they beg their original question. fifthly. suppose a man begs the contrary of the conclusion which necessarily comes about through the premisses laid down. viz. to try to secure universally the contradictory statement. or. e. that the same thing is good and evil. fourthly. if he had to show that the diagonal is incommensurable with the side. suppose any one were to claim something universally and then proceed to beg its contradictory in some particular case.g. suppose him. after postulating the latter view. and this would happen suppose. e.

Select. 529 . If we cannot find any one else to argue with. for by a right liking or disliking for whatever is proposed to them they rightly select what is best.14 The best way to secure training and practice in arguments of this kind is in the first place to get into the habit of converting the arguments. Always. as contributing to knowledge and to philosophic wisdom the power of discerning and holding in one view the results of either of two hypotheses is no mean instrument. and after a few attempts we shall know several arguments by heart. arguments relating to the same thesis and range them side by side: for this produces a plentiful supply of arguments for carrying a point by sheer force. seeing that. in dealing with any proposition. given all the premisses. For a task of this kind a certain natural ability is required: in fact real natural ability just is the power right to choose the true and shun the false. whenever one is well stocked with arguments pro and con: for then you find yourself on your guard against contrary statements to the one you wish to secure. be on the look-out for a line of argument both pro and con: and on discovering it at once set about looking for the solution of it: for in this way you will soon find that you have trained yourself at the same time in both asking questions and answering them. the conclusion was bound to follow. Moreover. some one of the premisses is demolished. For in this way we shall be better equipped for dealing with the proposition stated. and in refutation also it is of great service. for it then only remains to make a right choice of one of them. moreover. we should argue with ourselves. For by ‘conversion’ of an argument is meant the taking the reverse of the conclusion together with the remaining propositions asked and so demolishing one of those that were conceded: for it follows necessarily that if the conclusion be untrue. Men of natural ability can do this.

e. you should get into the habit of turning one argument into several. Moreover. to master the heads under which other arguments mostly tend to fall. get a good stock of definitions: and have those of familiar and primary ideas at your fingers’ ends: for it is through these that reasonings are effected. For just as in a person with a trained memory. and conceal your procedure as darkly as you can: this kind of effect is best produced by keeping as far as possible away from topics akin to the subject of the argument.It is best to know by heart arguments upon those questions which are of most frequent occurrence. moreover. and in arithmetic to have the multiplication table up to ten at one’s fingers’ ends – and indeed it makes a great difference in one’s knowledge of the multiples of other numbers too – likewise also in arguments it is a great advantage to be well up in regard to first principles. You should try. This can be done with arguments that are entirely universal. Records of discussions should be made in a universal form. so these habits too will make a man readier in reasoning. the statement that ‘there cannot be one knowledge of more than one thing’: for that is the case with both relative terms and contraries and co-ordinates. even though one has argued only some particular case: for this 530 . Moreover. or hypothesis. It is better to commit to memory a premiss of general application than an argument: for it is difficult to be even moderately ready with a first principle. and to have a thorough knowledge of premisses at the tip of one’s tongue.g. a memory of things themselves is immediately caused by the mere mention of their loci. For just as in geometry it is useful to be practised in the elements. and particularly in regard to those propositions which are ultimate: for in discussing these answerers frequently give up in despair. each under its number. because he has his premisses classified before his mind’s eye.

always examine arguments to see whether they rest on principles of general application: for all particular arguments really reason universally. moreover. from your exercises in argumentation you should try to carry away either a syllogism on some subject or a refutation or a proposition or an objection. because it is impossible to reason at all without using universals. For yourself.will enable one to turn a single rule into several. in deductive against an expert. as a single thing – whereas to formulate an objection is to make one thing into many. In general. speaking generally. For against any one who is ready to try all means in order to seem not to be beaten. To formulate a proposition is to form a number of things into one – for the conclusion to which the argument leads must be taken generally. partly granting. nor practise upon the man in the street: for there are some people with whom any argument is bound to degenerate. for the objector either distinguishes or demolishes. You should try. You should. a particular demonstration always contains a universal demonstration. it is indeed fair to try 531 . Do not argue with every one. For it is the skilled propounder and objector who is.e. from inductive reasoners their parallel cases. too. and the whole object of training is to acquire ability. for this is the thing in which they are respectively trained. or whether some one put his question properly or improperly (whether it was yourself or some one else) and the point which made it the one or the other. partly denying the statements proposed. a dialectician. You should display your training in inductive reasoning against a young man. i. you should as far as possible avoid universalizing your reasonings. however. For this is what gives one ability. especially in regard to propositions and objections. moreover. as well. to secure from those skilled in deduction their premisses. A like rule applies in Rhetoric as well to enthymemes.

For you see how in practising together people cannot refrain from contentious argument. Wherefore the best rule is.all means of bringing about one’s conclusion: but it is not good form. or bad argument is sure to result. These are those that are universal. 532 . It is best also to have ready-made arguments relating to those questions in which a very small stock will furnish us with arguments serviceable on a very large number of occasions. and those in regard to which it is rather difficult to produce points for ourselves from matters of everyday experience. not lightly to engage with casual acquaintances.

though inexperience may make them appear so: for inexperienced people obtain only. while others seem to be so. That some reasonings are genuine. too. through a certain likeness between the genuine and the sham. while others seem to be so but are not. too. A. while others are not and merely seem to be such to our sense. This happens with arguments. a distant view of these things. is evident. Now some of them do not really achieve this. with inanimate things.On Sophistical Refutations [Translated by W. for of these. some are really silver and others gold. while those made of yellow metal look golden. For reasoning rests on certain statements such that they involve necessarily the assertion of something other than what has been stated. through what has been stated: refutation is reasoning involving the contradictory of the given conclusion. while others merely seem to be so by blowing and rigging themselves out as the tribesmen do their victims for sacrifice. So it is. For physically some people are in a vigorous condition. by dint of embellishing themselves. as it were. what appear to be refutations but are really fallacies instead. i.Aristotle . and of these the most prolific and usual domain is 533 . though they seem to do so for a number of reasons. In the same way both reasoning and refutation are sometimes genuine. things made of litharge and tin seem to be of silver. as also elsewhere. e.g. We will begin in the natural order with the first. sometimes not.e. Pickard-Cambridge] 1 Let us now discuss sophistic refutations. and some people are beautiful thanks to their beauty.

for them. For this reason. there exists both reasoning and refutation that is apparent but not real. But the two cases (names and things) are not alike. then. Clearly. and the other upon the securing of one. Those. while things are infinite in number. than to be wise without seeming to be (for the art of the sophist is the semblance of wisdom without the reality. who would be sophists are bound to study the class of arguments aforesaid: for it is worth their while: for a faculty of this kind will make a man seem to be wise. Inevitably. have a number of meanings. and this is the purpose they happen to have in view. and for others to be mentioned later. and it is at this kind of ability that those aim whom we call sophists. follows in the things as well. the same formulae.the argument that turns upon names only. Now for some people it is better worth while to seem to be wise. then. It is impossible in a discussion to bring in the actual things discussed: we use their names as symbols instead of them. and the sophist is one who makes money from an apparent but unreal wisdom). and a single name. then. To reduce it to a single point of contrast it is the business of one who knows a thing. himself to avoid fallacies in the subjects which he knows and to be able to show up the man who makes them. just as people who calculate suppose in regard to their counters. those who are not clever in manipulating their counters are taken in by the experts. then. in counting. and of these accomplishments the one depends on the faculty to render an answer. Let us now go on to discuss how many kinds there are of 534 . then. Accordingly just as. and therefore we suppose that what follows in the names. in the same way in arguments too those who are not well acquainted with the force of names misreason both in their own discussions and when they listen to others. For names are finite and so is the sum-total of formulae. there exists a class of arguments of this kind. it is clearly essential also to seem to accomplish the task of a wise man rather than to accomplish it without seeming to do so.

sophistical arguments. to the contradictory of a given thesis: examination-arguments are those that reason from premisses which are accepted by the answerer and which any one who pretends to possess knowledge of the subject is bound to know-in what manner. while that of dialectic arguments and examination-arguments has been discussed elsewhere: let us now proceed to speak of the arguments used in competitions and contests. has been defined in another treatise: contentious arguments are those that reason or appear to reason to a conclusion from premisses that appear to be generally accepted but are not so. and Contentious arguments. Dialectical. and how many in number are the elements of which this faculty is composed. Examination-arguments. and how many branches there happen to be of this inquiry. 2 Of arguments in dialogue form there are four classes: Didactic. The subject. Didactic arguments are those that reason from the principles appropriate to each subject and not from the opinions held by the answerer (for the learner should take things on trust): dialectical arguments are those that reason from premisses generally accepted. then. of demonstrative arguments has been discussed in the Analytics. and the other factors that contribute to this art. 535 .

For 536 . accent. Those ways of producing the false appearance of an argument which depend on language are six in number: they are ambiguity. For to ‘learn’ is ambiguous. it signifies both ‘to understand’ by the use of knowledge. 4 There are two styles of refutation: for some depend on the language used. division of words. to constrain him to repeat himself a number of times: or it is to produce the appearance of each of these things without the reality. and fifthly to reduce the opponent in the discussion to babbling – i. ‘Evils are good: for what needs to be is good. paradox. amphiboly. refutation. to use an ungrammatical expression. form of expression. combination.e. i. solecism. or fourthly to reduce him to solecism.e.3 First we must grasp the number of aims entertained by those who argue as competitors and rivals to the death. and evils must needs be’. or as a third best to lead him into paradox. Arguments such as the following depend upon ambiguity. fallacy. For they choose if possible plainly to refute the other party. Again. while some are independent of language. or as the second best to show that he is committing some fallacy. to make him repeat himself. to make the answerer. and by syllogistic proof based on this – and it may be on other assumptions as well – that this is the number of ways in which we might fall to mean the same thing by the same names or expressions. in consequence of the argument. and also ‘to acquire knowledge’. or. ‘Those learn who know: for it is those who know their letters who learn the letters dictated to them’. as a last resort. Of this we may assure ourselves both by induction. These are five in number.

as often is the case with evils. ‘knowing letters’. that you profess to-be: you profess a stone to-be: ergo you profess-to-be a stone’. Of course.‘what needs to be’ has a double meaning: it means what is inevitable. There are three varieties of these ambiguities and amphibolies: (1) When either the expression or the name has strictly more than one meaning. and he who is recovering who is in health: but it is the seated man who stood up.g. ‘Speaking of the silent is possible’: for ‘speaking of the silent’ also has a double meaning: it may mean that the speaker is silent or that the things of which he speaks are so. the man who was recovering was the sick man. Also. Moreover. or ‘has so and so done to him’ is not single in meaning: sometimes it means ‘the man who is sick or is seated now’. For ‘The sick man does so and so’. while on the other hand we say of good things as well that they ‘need to be’. too (for evil of some kind is inevitable). sometimes ‘the man who was sick formerly’.g. both ‘knowing’ and ‘letters’. Examples such as the following depend upon amphiboly: ‘I wish that you the enemy may capture’. For each word. e. possibly has a single meaning: but both together have more than one – either that the letters themselves have knowledge or that someone else has it of them. ‘There must be knowledge of what one knows’: for it is possible by this phrase to mean that knowledge belongs to both the knower and the known. aetos and the ‘dog’. e. (3) when words that have a simple sense taken alone have more than one meaning in combination. (2) when by custom we use them so. but that he was sick formerly. ‘There must be sight of what one sees: one sees the pillar: ergo the pillar has sight’. Also. Also the thesis. Also. who really was sick at the time: but the man who is in health is not sick at the same time: he is ‘the sick man’ in the sense not that he is sick now. and the sick man who was recovering’. ‘What you profess to-be. 537 . ‘The same man is both seated and standing and he is both sick and in health: for it is he who stood up who is standing.

‘I made thee a slave once a free man’. pronouncing the ou with an acuter accent. e. For the same phrase would not be thought always to have the same meaning when divided and when combined. whereas if one does not combine them. it means that when he is not writing he has the power to write. Thus (e. too. depend on these modes of speech. ‘He now if he has learnt his letters’. Moreover. Also. there is the saying that ‘One single thing if you can carry a crowd you can carry too’. in the passage about Agamemnon’s dream.g. they say that Zeus did not himself say ‘We grant him the fulfilment of his prayer’.Amphiboly and ambiguity. Instances such as these. if one combines the words ‘to write-while-not-writing’: for then it means that he has the power to write and not to write at once. The same applies to the latter phrase.) some people emend Homer against those who criticize as unnatural his expression to men ou kataputhetai ombro. a masculine thing by a feminine termination. or a feminine thing 538 . For the meaning is not the same if one divides the words and if one combines them in saying that ‘it is possible to walk-while-sitting’ and write while not writing. An argument depending upon accent it is not easy to construct in unwritten discussion. Upon division depend the propositions that 5 is 2 and 3. but that he bade the dream grant it. and ‘God-like Achilles left fifty a hundred men’. when what is really different is expressed in the same form. in written discussions and in poetry it is easier. Upon the combination of words there depend instances such as the following: ‘A man can walk while sitting. and that the greater is equal: for it is that amount and more besides. For they solve the difficulty by a change of accent. then. Also.g. Others come about owing to the form of expression used. then. and can write while not writing’. e.g. turn upon the accentuation. and odd.

Refutations. on the other hand. a certain condition – while the other denotes a certain action. and so forth with the other divisions previously’ laid down.) ‘flourishing’ is a word which in the form of its expression is like ‘cutting’ or ‘building’: yet the one denotes a certain quality – i. that depend on Accident occur whenever any attribute is claimed to belong in like manner to a thing and to 539 . that are independent of language there are seven kinds: (1) that which depends upon Accident: (2) the use of an expression absolutely or not absolutely but with some qualification of respect or place. then. when a quality is expressed by a termination proper to quantity or vice versa. 5 Fallacies. or what is active by a passive word. or relation: (3) that which depends upon ignorance of what ‘refutation’ is: (4) that which depends upon the consequent: (5) that which depends upon assuming the original conclusion: (6) stating as cause what is not the cause: (7) the making of more than one question into one. again. or a neuter by either a masculine or a feminine. or. Thus (e. or time.e. Of fallacies. In the same manner also in the other instances. or a state by an active word. that depend upon language are drawn from these common-place rules.g. For it is possible to use an expression to denote what does not belong to the class of actions at all as though it did so belong. then.by a masculine.

occur whenever an expression used in a particular sense is taken as though it were used absolutely. they say. were to suppose at the conclusion of his questions that therefore he had proved dialectically that he was both white and not white.g. suppose a man were to secure the statement that t