Kerence K. Tibayan F2A/Reled 21 WHAT IS CRITICAL THEORY?

The foundations of the critical theory of society are in the early philosophical manuscripts of Karl Marx (Marx, 1963). Prior to the 1840's, social theory, political theory, "scientific" sociology, and classical political economy existed as coherent intellectual traditions, but a critical theory of society had not yet emerged. Utopian socialism, scientific political economy, and critical philosophy existed, but were not yet combined in a critical theory of society which could reflect the class struggles and social revolutions which were transforming Europe in the middle of the 19th century. Dialectical materialism is a strand of Marxism synthesizing Hegel's dialectics and Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach's materialism. According to certain followers of Karl Marx, it is the philosophical basis of Marxism, although this remains a controversial assertion due to the disputed status of science and naturalism in Marx's thought. The basic idea of dialectical materialism is that every economic order grows to a state of maximum efficiency, while at the same time developing internal contradictions or weaknesses that contribute to its decay. Dialectics is the science of the general and abstract laws of the development of nature, society, and thought. Its principal features are:

The universe is an integral whole in which things are interdependent, rather than a mixture of things isolated from each other. The natural world or cosmos is in a state of constant motion: "All nature, from the smallest thing to the biggest, from a grain of sand to the sun, from the protista to man, is in a constant state of coming into being and going out of being, in a constant flux, in a ceaseless state of movement and change." --Friedrich Engels, Dialectics of Nature.

Development is a process whereby insignificant and imperceptible quantitative changes lead to fundamental, qualitative changes. Qualitative changes occur not gradually, but rapidly and abruptly, as leaps from one state to another. A simple example from the physical world is the heating of water: a one degree increase in temperature is a quantitative change, but between water of 100 degrees and steam of 100 degrees (the effect latent heat) there is a qualitative change. "Merely quantitative differences, beyond a certain point, pass into qualitative changes." --Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1.

All things contain within themselves internal dialectical contradictions, which are the primary cause of motion, change, and development in the world. It is important to note that 'dialectical contradiction' is not about simple 'opposites' or 'negation'. For formal approaches, the core message of 'dialectical opposition / contradiction' must be understood as 'some sense' opposition between the objects involved in a directly associated context.

The methodological basis of the critical theory of society is the dialectical logic of George F. Hegel (1956). According to the principles of dialectical logic, "That which is cannot be true," (Marcuse, 1941). In other words, our existing society of racism, genocide, and possible nuclear holocaust cannot be the "truth" of human existence. Truth must lie somewhere else, not in the facts of the given reality, but in the negation or transcendence of those facts. Truth lies in the attempt to go beyond this reality to a better world. Thus, truth lies in our attempt to change the world, in our critique of the established reality,. A critical sociological analysis is true insofar as it helps change the world and make it a more human place in which to live. So while reality may lie quite beyond human comprehension and can never be reduced to words, truth is the living of each moment of human life to its maximum potential, the unfolding of reality from its potential to a lived practice or actuality of human existence. In contrast to a.critical analysis, much of sociology remains at the level of the "facticity of the given," (Marcuse, 1964 :170-203). The difference between reality as it presently appears and its essential Qualities is not distinguished. Such analysis has the effect of justifying the status quo whether it intends to do so or not. Ideology in Marx There is no systematic theoretical exposition of ideology in Marx. Indeed, the term often appears in a more polemical sense than theoretical. Furthermore, there are distinct and apparently contradictory uses of the concept to be found. Thus, I am not concerned here with expounding a novel interpretation of Marxs theory of ideology it is not clear to me that he has one. As a consequence, Larrain (1983: 1) notes, there is no single Marxist conception of ideology or agreement as to which version should be considered the properly Marxist one.There are, however, two broad concepts which subsume the varying interpretations a neutral concept and a negative one.2 The latter is particularly interesting for Marxs critique of morality. On this account, ideology refers to distorted thought; thought which masks class interests and real contradictions and conceals its complicity in relations of domination. According to the former, ideology refers to the totality of forms of social consciousness, or to the political ideas of social groups or classes. This concept does not seem to pose problems for morality in itself, for there may then be class moralities (although issues of relativism may then arise). Therefore I will focus on various interpretations that fall under the critical category. In what follows I briefly sketch different ideas found in the negative concept. In doing so I am highly selective: I am interested only in the aspects which may be preserved. I look at religion,idealism and apologia as instances of ideology. Common to all three are the themes of abstraction, ahistoricity, and the inversion of subject and object.3 Ideology as Symptom: The Case of Religion As iek (1994: 9) notes, religion is for Marx ideology par excellence, and although Marx does not yet use the term ideology, it is in his early critique of religion that we may find the seeds of his later account(s) of ideology. But in what sense is religion ideology? Marx (1975: 175) writes, The basis of irreligious criticism is: Man makes religion, religion does not make man. Religion is the self- conscious and self-esteem of man who has either not yet found himself or has already lost himself

again. Marx follows Feuerbach in thinking that religion represents a form of alienation. According to Feuerbach, the idea of God is nothing more than human beings own essence, mistakenly externalized and projected as alien. Human beings misconceive their own powers and qualities as divine powers and qualities; they empty themselves into an imaginary deity, formed of their own natures, which they then kneel down before. God is the highest subjectivity of man abstracted from himself, Feuerbach (1989: 31) writes; Religion is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself (Ibid: 33). Marx similarly holds that religion is a form of alienation, objectification and projection of what are in reality human powers. But Marx emphasises that this alienation has its basis in the real state of things. A society that is entrapped by religious illusions is not merely mistaken; it is a society that has need of an illusion: man is no abstract being encamped outside the world. Man is the world of man, the state, society. This state, this society, produces religion, an inverted world-consciousness, because they are in an inverted world. Religionis the fantastic realisation of the human essence because the human essence has no true reality. The struggle against the religion is therefore indirectly a fight against the world of which religion is the spiritual aroma. (1975: 175) Marx asserts that the religious sentiment is itself a social product (2000: 173). Merely showing that the divine is actually the alienated and deified powers of human beings will not suffice, for human beings are socially situated, and have real needs corresponding to their situation, and that they imagine their own powers to be divine is no accident. Only by comprehending human beings as they really are in the world, understanding the circumstances which give rise to their religiosity, and altering these may the illusion of religion be dispelled. Religion is a false, inverted consciousness, but it is not merely false. It provides a fantastical resolution to real contradiction. This inverted consciousness is a product of the social world. It is a response to a world that is not fit for human beings. Religion is but a symptom, the cause of which is a deficient reality itself. Hence: To abolish religion as the illusory happiness of the people is to demand their real happiness. The demand to give up illusions about the existing state of affairs is the demand to give up a state of affairs which needs illusions. The criticism of religion is therefore in embryo the criticism of the vale of tears, the halo of which is religion. (Marx,1975: 176) In other words, the illusion of religion only acquires an apparently autonomous existence it inhabits an independent realm in the clouds because of real contradictions in the real world which give rise to an imaginary world. These real contradictions must be understood and revolutionised in practice abolished in order to shed the religious illusion. If Marx talks of religion as ideology