Risk Assessment Data Directory

Report No. 434 – 3 March 2010

Storage incident frequencies
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers



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.............................................................3..............................5 Scope and Definitions .............................2 1......................................5..4 4.............. 6 Underground Storage Tanks ......................................................... 14 Diesel....................................2 Pressurised Storage Vessels.............. 1 Application ......................... 1 Definitions ..........1.... 8 Atmospheric Storage Tanks .........................................................................................1 3.........................3.......................0 Recommended Data Sources for Further Information ...................................... 13 Methanol......................................4 1.......................................1 4......................................2...................... 2 Pressurised Storage Vessels ...........................................5 4............2........................2....................................................... 4 2.....2 Oil Storage on FPSOs....................0 3.....5.... 9 4................................................................0 1..................................................... 7 Guidance on Use of Data .............................0 6.....................RADD – Storage incident frequencies Contents: 1.................................................... 8 Selection of Generic Value for Atmospheric Storage Tanks ...................2 4.......... 7 General validity ..1 Refrigerated Storage Tanks ...........................................2 Summary of Recommended Data .................................................................................0 2..... 1 Refrigerated Storage Tank Designs ..................1............... 13 Non-process Hydrocarbon Storage Offshore ..........................2........ 12 4.........2 4............3 1............ 10 Selection of Generic Value for Refrigerated Storage Tanks ....... 4 Atmospheric Storage Tanks ............................................................. 7 Review of Data Sources ................................................2.........1 1......... 4 Refrigerated Storage Tanks ...................................................................2....................5 2....................1 4............ 15 References ............................................................................................................... 6 Oil Storage on FPSOs...........................................2 1........... 8 Overfilling....3 2...............................................................................................................................................................................2 2....... 3 Underground Storage Tanks..................................................................................... 10 4..................... 15 ©OGP 1 .....................1 4.........3 4........... 3 Non-process Hydrocarbon Storage Offshore...................................................... 11 Selection of Generic Value for Pressurised Storage Vessels..................................... 7 Uncertainties ....................4 2.....................1 1....................................................... 1 Atmospheric Storage Tanks..................................6 3......0 4............................................................. 6 Non-process Hydrocarbon Storage Offshore .1 4................ 11 Accident Source Data ................................................................ 14 5.................1 2.. 5 Pressurised Storage Vessels..........................

RADD – Storage incident frequencies Abbreviations: API ASME ATK BG BLEVE DNV FPSO GRI HSE IPO LNG LPG MIC OREDA QRA SRD WOAD American Petroleum Institute American Society of Mechanical Engineers Aviation Turbine Kerosene British Gas Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion Det Norske Veritas Floating Production. Storage and Offloading Unit Gas Research Institute Health & Safety Executive Interprovinciaal Overleg Liquefied Natural Gas Liquefied Petroleum Gas Methyl Isocyanate Offshore Reliability Database Quantified Risk Assessment Safety and Reliability Directorate World-wide Offshore Accident Databank 2 ©OGP .

2. Annular pontoon roof. • Floating roof tanks. FPSOs typically store large quantities of crude oil in cargo oil tanks. and excavated or leached storage caverns. These have a vapour space between the liquid surface and the tank roof. Oil storage on FPSOs 5. Only fires/explosions from the cargo oil tanks are considered. Underground storage tanks can be divided into buried or mounded storage tanks (mainly for fuels such as petrol and LPG). They are usually fabricated from mild steel on a concrete base. Refrigerated storage 3. this is periodically transferred to shuttle tankers. Cone roof – up to about 76 m diameter. The main types are [1]: • Fixed roof tanks.0) frequencies of releases from the following types of storage: 1. Atmospheric storage 2. Pressurised storage 4. ©OGP 1 . The roof requires a seal around the edge against the tank walls. These have a roof that floats on the liquid surface to reduce vapour loss. diesel and ATK systems together with the associated pipework. These are a combination of both types. Double-deck roof.07 bar.1 Scope and Definitions Application This datasheet presents (Section 2. They are designed to withstand an internal pressure/vacuum of 0.RADD – Storage incident frequencies 1. surrounded by a low bund wall.0 presents guidance how failure frequencies for buried or mounded storage tanks might be estimated.2 1. They are subdivided by roof design: − − Domed roof – up to about 20 m diameter.0 1.1 Definitions Atmospheric Storage Tanks Atmospheric storage tanks contain liquids ambient pressure and at or near ambient temperature. They require a vent for vapour at the top of the tank. Underground storage For refrigerated storage tanks previous studies and available historical data have been reviewed to produce a consistent set of estimates of frequencies of catastrophic rupture for different designs of refrigerated storage tanks. • Fixed plus internal floating roof tanks. Types of roof design include: − − − Pan roof. Non-process hydrocarbon storage offshore includes methanol. Section 2. Non-process Hydrocarbon Storage Offshore 6. 1.

To minimise the pool of escaping liquid. sphere supported at the equator by a vertical cylinder. thus providing a seal. The main types are [2]: • Single containm ent tanks. The action of the liquefied gas acting on the primary container (the metal membrane) is transferred directly to the pre-stressed concrete secondary container through the load bearing insulation. the lower part of the support cylinder is made of concrete and the tank is protected by a domed concrete cover. The secondary container is intended to contain any leakage of the refrigerated liquid. when considering tank ruptures and roof fires. this type is now rare. These are typically earth pits where the ground around the pit is frozen by the cold liquid.2 Refrigerated Storage Tank Designs There are several different designs of refrigerated storage tank. • • • • Underground tanks have been constructed in the past. These are designed and constructed so that the primary container.0 failures from the tank walls are considered. the secondary container should be located at a distance not exceeding 6m from the primary container. The outer roof is supported by the secondary container. which supports the primary container. In practice. Spherical.RADD – Storage incident frequencies In Section 2. Due to practical difficulties. 1. The primary container contains the refrigerated liquid under normal operating conditions. Full containm ent tanks. These are a single primary container and generally an outer shell designed and constructed so that the primary container is required to meet the low temperature ductility requirements for storage of the product. but is not intended to contain any vapour resulting from this leakage. These are designed and constructed so that both self supporting primary container and the secondary container are capable of independently containing the refrigerated liquid stored and for one of them its vapour. For onshore tanks. The vapour of the primary container is contained by a steel liner which forms with the membrane an integral gastight containment. Mem brane tank. The secondary containment shall be capable both of containing the refrigerated liquid and of controlled venting of the vapour resulting from product leakage after a credible event. Strictly. The primary container contains the refrigerated liquid under normal operating conditions. The outside of the tank and the aluminium part of the support cylinder are insulated by means of a panel system to the required thickness for the specified boil-off rate.2. pipes within the bund and pressure relief valves should be excluded. is capable of containing both the liquefied gas and its vapour under normal operating conditions and the concrete secondary container. many studies include failures at these points because available failure data often does not distinguish them clearly from failures of the tank itself. Double containm ent tanks. However. Spherical Storage Tanks. The secondary container can be 1m to 2m distance from the primary container. the distinction is not important. 2 ©OGP . constituted by a membrane. failures of associated equipment such as inlet/outlet valves. These are designed and constructed so that both the inner self supporting primary container and the secondary container are capable of independently containing the refrigerated liquid stored. should be capable of containing all the liquefied gas stored in the primary container and of controlled venting of the vapour resulting from product leakage of the inner tank. single containment tanks consisting of an unstiffened. and different failure frequencies may be applicable.

Other equipment may influence the failure rate. Lines into and out of the vessel.0 covers pressure vessels and any equipment directly associated with them.3 Pressurised Storage Vessels Pressurised storage tanks are considered to be storage tanks operating under pressure of at least 0. are frequently stored on offshore installations in unpressurised tanks of a few m3 capacity. chemical gas explosions). these materials may be ignited and so have the potential to cause a fire that could result in injury or possibly fatality. typically used in dedicated storage installations.2. Although the lines into and out of the vessel are not included in the scope. although the flange itself is not included. some have been larger causing damage and fatalities. However. non process hydrocarbons such as diesel and ATK. electrical fires. subdivided for this analysis into: − − These are Large storage vessels – spheres and bullets (long cylindrical tanks) in excess of approximately 50 m3 capacity. Section 2. nozzles and instrumentation (with associated flanges).5 bar. In the event of a leak or rupture. The highest standard.g. ©OGP 3 . Most types of non-process fire involve materials other than hydrocarbons (e. 1. and are categorised for the purposes of QRA (quantified risk assessment) as follows: • Storage vessels – in which fluids are held under stable conditions.4 Non-process Hydrocarbon Storage Offshore The term “non-process fires” covers any fires and explosions that are not covered by the modelling of process hydrocarbon events.g. i. Such issues are not addressed in this datasheet but should be considered separately if appropriate. • Small containers – portable cylinders and drums less than approximately 2 m3 capacity. The corresponding US code is the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Connection points are included up to the first flange. and the associated flanges and valves are not included in the scope. Some data are available for such systems. They include a wide variety of vessels. Medium storage vessels – fixed cylindrical tanks less than approximately 50 m3 capacity. 1992. such as relief systems being blocked. Although most non-process fires are very small incidents (e. and the inspection cover (manway). It divides vessels into 3 categories. The main UK design code is BS 5500:1991 Specification for Unfired Fusion Welded Pressure Vessels (see [1] p12/20). requires full non-destructive testing of main seam welds. 1. a chip-pan fire in the galley lasting a few seconds). the actual number of lines would have an influence on the failure rate. The frequency of non-process fires may be larger than process fires.2.e. typically used in industrial or domestic installations. suggesting that they should not be overlooked if the risk analysis is to be comprehensive. as failures are more likely at the connection points where these lines join the vessel.RADD – Storage incident frequencies The characteristics of each type are set out in BS EN 1473. Category 1. and other hazardous materials such as methanol.

0 failures of the first two types are discussed.1. Failures of the supply system.1 Atm ospheric Storage Tank Leak Frequencies Type of Tank Floating roof Fixed/ floating roof Type of Release Liquid spill on roof Sunken roof Liquid spill outside tank Tank rupture Leak Frequency (per tank year) 1.8 × 10 3.2. typically used for liquefied gas or crude oil storage at refineries or storage terminals. Caverns – large excavated in-ground tanks.0 × 10 -3 -3 -3 -6 The frequencies of different types of fire/explosion are summarised in Table 2. Salt dome caverns – large capacity storage located deep underground in natural rock formations. the surface facilities may include underground pipes. gas driers and metering systems.RADD – Storage incident frequencies 1. Table 2. 2. surface facilities may include surge vessels. and metering as well as above-ground dispensing pumps. On a petrol tank.5 Underground Storage Tanks There are several types of underground storage tanks: • • • • Petrol filling station tanks – small buried atmospheric tanks. injection pumps. typically used for petrol at filling stations. Underground pressure vessels – small buried or mounded pressure vessels.2.1 × 10 2.6 × 10 1. Only failures of the tank itself are considered.0 2. such as loading from road tankers and leaks from loading hoses are also excluded.1 Summary of Recommended Data Atmospheric Storage Tanks The best available estimates of leak frequencies for atmospheric tanks are summarised in Table 2. 4 ©OGP . In Section 2. typically used for LPG. typically used for storage of gas under pressure. On a gas storage tank. surface facilities are excluded.

0 × 10 -6 2.0 × 10 -5 -5 2.6 × 10 9.0 × 10 2. earthquake or impact.2 × 10 -3 -4 9.2 Atm ospheric Storage Tank Fire Frequencies Type of Fire Floating Roof Tank (per tank year) Fixed Roof Tank (per tank year) Fixed plus Internal Floating Roof Tank (per tank year) 1.RADD – Storage incident frequencies Table 2.3 × 10 2. in seismically active zones – specialist analysis of the failure likelihood should be sought.2 Refrigerated Storage Tanks Estimates of frequencies of catastrophic rupture for different designs of refrigerated storage tanks are shown in Table 2.5 × 10 1. Table 2. Where there is the potential for such loading – in particular.0 × 10 9.5 × 10 9.3 × 10 7.0 × 10 -5 -5 -5 -3 Rim seal fire Full surface fire on roof Internal explosion & full surface fire Internal explosion without fire Vent fire Small bund fire Large bund fire (full bund area) 1.0 × 10 1.5 × 10 9. ©OGP 5 .0 × 10 0 0 -5 Secondary Containment 2 7.0 × 10 6.3 Sum m ary of Refrigerated Storage Tank Leak Frequencies Tank Design Catastrophic Rupture Frequency (per tank per year) Primary Containment Only 1 Existing Single Containment Tanks New Single Containment Tanks Double Containment Tanks Full containment tanks3 Membrane tank 1 2 3 Leak Frequency (per connection year) Primary Containment Only 1.0 × 10 -5 -5 -5 -5 -5 -5 9. combined with loading such as wind. welds or connected pipework due to use of inadequate materials.3.0 × 10 6. can be caused by brittle failure of tank walls.0 × 10 1.0 × 10 6.0 × 10 1.0 × 10 1.6 × 10 1.0 × 10 -5 -6 -7 -5 -7 -8 -5 -7 -7 -8 -8 The pool area is that of the secondary containment For single containment tanks this scenario corresponds to bund overtopping 3 No collapse is considered for these tank types if they have a concrete roof A leak or rupture of the tank.0 × 10 1.3 × 10 2.0 × 10 2.3 × 10 1. releasing some or all of its contents.

4 Sum m ary of Pressure Vessel Leak Frequencies Hole Diameter Range 1-3 mm 3-10 mm 10–50 mm 50-150 mm >150 mm TOTAL Nominal 2 mm 5 mm 25 mm 100 mm* Catastrophic Leak Frequency (per vessel year) Storage Vessels 2.5 Offshore Methanol Storage Leak Frequencies (per year) Small Tank Pipework Total Fraction 1. using fault tree analysis. more recent data (see Section 4. taking account of adjacent fire sources capable of causing this event.3 × 10 1.6 × 10 7. taking account of the specific design features of the installation and the potential for human error.2 × 10 7.5 and Table 2. the tank frequencies given can be multiplied up and the totals recalculated.5 × 10 74% -3 -3 -3 Medium 4. Table 2. Where there is more than one tank. However.6 present release frequencies for methanol and diesel/ATK systems offshore.0 × 10 0.3 × 10 1.3 × 10 4. and there was very limited experience with FPSOs at that time compared with now.9 × 10 9.4 Oil Storage on FPSOs A frequency of fires in cargo oil tanks of 8.2% -5 -5 Total 2.8 x 10-4 per tanker year was derived from data on oil tankers [33].6 × 10 1.0 × 10 3. 2.3 Pressurised Storage Vessels Table 2.3 × 10 1. Table 2.g.6 × 10 2.RADD – Storage incident frequencies 2.3 × 10 10% -4 -3 -3 Rupture 3. This data is over 15 years old and based on oil tankers.0 × 10 1.4 gives leak frequencies for typical hole size categories. A suitable frequency for QRA is therefore best obtained by a theoretical approach.3 × 10 100% -3 -2 -2 6 ©OGP .5 Non-process Hydrocarbon Storage Offshore Table 2.1 × 10 1.0 × 10 -7 -6 *Or diameter of largest pipe connection if this is smaller The frequency of a tank BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion) should be calculated using fault tree analysis. e. 2.7 × 10 4.4) does not permit a better estimate.0 × 10 15% -4 -3 -3 Large 2.6 × 10 -7 -7 1.7 × 10 -5 -5 -6 -6 -7 -5 Small Containers 4.1 × 10 1. Previous such analysis indicates that a frequency in the range 10-7 to 10-5 per vessel year would be expected for a large storage vessel.4 × 10 4.1 × 10 4. where the system includes the tank and the associated pipework.

Furthermore. the applicability of the failure modes in the historical events to modern tank designs may also be inappropriate because of improvements in tank design. it may not eject the intervening soil and so may be limited in rate and velocity by this.4 should be used for unpressurised storage of methanol and non-process hydrocarbons offshore.3 × 10 2. Likewise.0 can be used for storage tanks and containers for onshore facilities containing refrigerated and ambient liquids.2 Uncertainties The sources of uncertainty in the estimated leak and fire frequencies are discussed in Section 4.0 for the different tank types.3 × 10 2.RADD – Storage incident frequencies Table 2. there is inadequate data to estimate the frequencies of leaks from storage caverns and a specialist assessment of this is recommended.6 × 10 2. those presented in Section 2. ©OGP 7 . Note also that a leak from a buried or mounded tank is likely first to be into the surrounding soil and may not reach the open air.8 × 10 2.0 × 10 3.9 × 10 10% -4 -3 -3 Rupture 3. Estimates of leak frequencies for large pressure vessels. These approaches are not yet sufficiently developed to recommend standard frequencies and so for buried/ mounded tanks a specific assessment by a risk specialist is recommended. this involves eliminating external impact and fire escalation cases.0 tends to be greatest for catastrophic failures due to lack of failure experience. 3. even if it does. The uncertainty in the frequencies presented in Section 2.6 Underground Storage Tanks There is inadequate data to estimate the frequencies of failures of underground tanks directly.6 Offshore Diesel/ATK Storage Leak Frequencies (per year) Small Tank Pipework Total Fraction 1.1 Guidance on Use of Data General validity The data presented in Section 2. for both the overall leak frequencies and the rupture frequencies.1 × 10 2. 3. The derivation and application of the data is discussed further in Section 4.6x 10 15% -4 -3 Large 2. In general. The uncertainty in values for atmospheric storage tanks could be represented by a range of at least a factor of 10 higher or lower.2 × 10 74% -3 -2 -2 Medium 4.0 × 10 100% -3 -2 -2 -3 2.1 × 10 4. range over 4 orders of magnitude.7 × 10 3.1% -5 -5 Total 2. and they are usually obtained using data for above ground tanks and eliminating contributions from hazards that are not relevant.0.0 3.6 × 10 4.0 × 10 0.

1. the best available estimate is from a Technica study for tank operators in Singapore [3]. which is consistent with the absence of ruptures in the LASTFIRE data. they are assumed applicable to all sizes of floating roof tanks. Explosions inside fixed roof tanks may produce debris that damages adjacent tanks (e.g. For tanks with both fixed and internal floating roof. 2 events described in [6]). For large floating roof tanks.0 4. these tend to be used for more highly flammable products. while the frequency of full-surface fires is as for fixed roof tanks. [5] lists 107 events during 1951-95 (see [1] App I). For explosions in fixed roof tanks. In the absence of any other data. Comparison of sources for atmospheric tank leak frequency data suggests that the uncertainty in these values could be represented by a range of at least a factor of 10 higher or lower. 9 × 10-5 per tank year. Romeoville. no such incidents are known. i. For catastrophic ruptures. The bund fire frequencies are assumed applicable to all types of tanks. while the roof is supported on legs above the tank base. although the event may be fatal for people inside the tank at the time (e. For fixed roof tanks. The full surface fire frequency is 50% of this. 8 ©OGP . Explosions may occur inside fixed roof tanks if flammable vapour is ignited.RADD – Storage incident frequencies 4.e. 24 September 1977). [4] lists 69 such events during 1981-96. so the value of 1.0 × 10-4 per tank year. so this may offset any reduction in the average fire frequency. Floating roof tanks are designed to eliminate flammable vapour within the tank. the LASTFIRE study [4] provides the best available fire frequencies. For tanks with fixed plus internal floating roof. it is assumed that the frequency of rim seal fires is as for open-top floating roof tanks. The LASTFIRE data [4] is considered the most reliable source for releases from floating roof tanks. If the tank contains liquid. Selection of Generic Value for Atmospheric Storage Tanks 4.g. the Singapore study [3] and API [5] give values in the range 1.8 × 10-4 to 3. the ratio of fires and explosions in world-wide event data has been used.000 bbl is believed to be the best estimate for rupture frequency. In the absence of better information. However. For fixed roof tanks. there may be no further fire. the fire frequency might be expected to be lower than for the other designs. However. but in principle explosions may also occur: • Inside the tank when empty. The Singapore data is considered to be comprehensive and is more recent. this is likely to result in a full-surface fire. an estimate based on US petroleum industry experience has been used.1 • • • Review of Data Sources Atmospheric Storage Tanks Failure experience was reviewed from a number of sources: [3] includes 122 cases of atmospheric storage tank fires world-wide during 1965-89. the frequencies of appropriate fire/explosion types have been selected from the other tank types. If the tank is empty but not gas free. The frequency based on US petroleum industry tanks >10.1 A wide variation is apparent in the source data.8 × 10-4 per tank year is adopted here.

Technica [3] analysed 122 tank fires from MHIDAS. 4. The LASTFIRE report suggests that 19% of all leaks outside of a storage tanks were caused by overfilling. There are a large number of variables involved in the mechanism for overfill. this is expected to produce a flash fire rather than an explosion. ©OGP 9 . the frequency is assumed to be 2 × 10-5 per tank year. in which 2% were initiated by explosions. However.906 tank years for open-top floatingroof tanks. They also refer to world-wide experience. this event has little practical significance for risk analysis. LASTFIRE [4] gives no cases of explosions in 33.g. DNV [7] analysed MHIDAS reports of fires on crude oil tanks.5 × 10-5 per year for explosions without fires.1. However. there were 3 explosions that did not result in fires in the tank. this should be modelled in the risk analysis as a tank leak. Outside the tank area. It is therefore recommended that to model overfill effectively would require detailed analysis using fault tree techniques. In an opentop tank. It is not known how many of these were in fixed or floating roof tanks.7 explosions to date”. There is insufficient information to give a ratio of fires and explosions significantly different to that estimated above for open top floating roof tanks. These would be included in the fire frequencies above. Making the common assumption that this is equivalent to “0. which do not identify the type of tank involved. Most reports of explosions are derived from press accounts (e. in which 19 out of 92 were reported as explosions followed by fires.RADD – Storage incident frequencies • Above the roof but inside the shell. such explosions may occur in tanks with fixed plus internal floating roof. for which the tank population is not known. In addition. as it is similar to the frequency for tanks with fixed plus internal floating roof estimated below. A total of about 22% of these incidents were recorded as involving explosions. if ignited. Based on the frequency of 9 × 10-5 per year adopted above for full surface fires. if vapour leaks past the floating roof. It is not known how many of these were in fixed or floating roof tanks.2 Overfilling The main causes of liquid spill onto the roof were roof fracture and overfill. • No previous estimate of explosion frequency is available for storage tanks. if vapour drifts into a confined space before ignition occurs. In tanks with an internal floating roof. However. this suggests an additional frequency of 2. Failure experience for fires/explosions where there is definite information about the roof type and ignition consequences indicate that in tanks without an internal floating roof. This may be conservative. all full surface fires began with explosions. This suggests that as many as 20% of fires may begin with explosion-like events. there has been one incident of a full-surface fire with no report of any preceding explosion. MHIDAS).

but some may not be applicable to modern tanks. They also have the merit of having been used in a well-known public-domain QRA. This approach is very uncertain. No single study is superior in all respects. The values from the Second Canvey Report are between the BG and historical estimates above. The BG estimate is based on the most extensive engineering investigation of failure modes.2 Refrigerated Storage Tanks There have been several estimates of the failure frequency for refrigerated storage tanks. aircraft impacts) and is strongly influenced by judgement. The total number of liquid leaks may be lower. it does indicate that rupture frequencies as low as 10-6 per tank year would be very difficult to justify when compared to actual accident experience. The BG and historical 10 ©OGP . and both the failure experience and the tank exposure estimates may be inaccurate. 4. an overall leak frequency is 16 / (2000 × 30) = 2.2. This would give a historical catastrophic rupture frequency of 2/(2000 × 30) = 3 × 10-5 per tank year. this becomes 2. Nevertheless. These include: • • • • • • • • First Canvey Report [11] BG Estimate [12. They are therefore adopted as cautious best estimates. but this may be offset if some events have been omitted from MHIDAS. This would be 6 × 10-5 per tank year if the small tank and escalation events were included. although it has been estimated as approximately 2000 tanks. 14] Second Canvey Report [8] SRD LPG Study LA LNG Study COVO Study [9] GRI Data IPO Values [10] None of the above analyses are superior in all respects. These leaks were mainly small. The Second Canvey Study [8] addressed double-wall LNG tanks. and IPO [10] further addressed double and full containment tanks. Historical data is mainly influenced by single wall tanks. and the applicability of the failure modes in the historical events to modern tank designs is unclear.7 × 10-4 per tank year. All these sources and available historical data have been reviewed to produce a consistent set of estimates of frequencies of catastrophic rupture for different designs of refrigerated storage tanks. there have been only 2 spontaneous catastrophic ruptures of large refrigerated tanks although this might rise to 3 if the small tank at Varennes was included and to 4 if the escalation event at Guayaquil was included. The world-wide population of refrigerated storage tanks is not known with any precision. addressing different tank designs.g.1 Selection of Generic Value for Refrigerated Storage Tanks During the last 30 years.1 × 10-4 per tank year. since some of these may have been vapour leaks. the COVO study [9] addressed double integrity tanks. 16 leaks from refrigerated storage tanks have been reported during the period 1965-95. 13. Excluding ruptures and escalation events. Using this value.RADD – Storage incident frequencies 4. but it appears to neglect some failure modes (e. The estimate based on historical failure experience automatically includes all failure modes. A number of sources were reviewed in estimating the generic values for refrigerated storage.

3 × 10-6 is appropriate for them. Worms. causing 41 fatalities. Double containment tanks have the same frequencies. The historical data is probably dominated by single-wall ammonia tanks. that caused 18 fatalities. Rupture of an ammonia tank.RADD – Storage incident frequencies estimates could be used as optimistic and pessimistic sensitivity tests respectively. so frequencies cannot be compared. A 46 m3 refrigerated stainless steel pressure vessel containing methyl isocyanate (MIC) suffered a release through the relief valve. ©OGP 11 .3. Major accidents involving medium storage vessels listed by Lees [1] include: • • Leak from of LPG tank. South Africa. With the exception of the IPO study. Dakar. Bhopal. including the well known Feyzin and Mexico City disasters.e. The IPO judgements suggest a probability of 0. Baton Rouge. a further reduction by a factor of 100 compared to double integrity tanks. Leak of MIC from tank. Full containment tanks do reduce the frequencies of release further. each of the studies referenced above addresses a different type of tank. 10 December 1976. The IPO values could be used as a more optimistic sensitivity test. A leak from a chlorine tank. The further probability of release beyond the secondary containment depends on the likelihood of common cause failures. The release may have been due to entry of water causing an exothermic reaction that increased the temperature and pressure until the relief valve lifted. Rupture of a CO2 tank. USA. 4. The IPO judgements suggest a frequency of 1 × 10-8 may be appropriate for them. The effect of double integrity tanks would be to reduce the frequency further.e. This can be compared to the difference of a factor of 10 assumed in the LA LNG study. 3 December 1984. and hence the catastrophic failure frequency of 3 × 10-5 is appropriate for them. The COVO value [9] of 1 × 10-6 may be appropriate for this. Louisiana. The rupture of an ammonia tank at Potchefstroom. Middlesex. but these apply to releases into the middle space.25. The cloud of toxic gas caused approximately 2000 fatalities among nearby residents. There were no fatalities but 10. Senegal. i. which seems subjectively realistic. 20 November 1980. UK. BLEVEs and leaks of LPG tanks. Germany. • • Gould [15] lists 16 failures of chlorine tanks in the range 4 to 30 tonnes.1 Pressurised Storage Vessels Accident Source Data Lees [1] lists several major accidents involving large storage vessels including: • • • Ruptures. 13 July 1973.000 people were evacuated. The difference is a factor of 4. The Canvey studies related to double-wall LNG tanks. There have been no formal considerations of the effects of tank design on failure frequencies. a further reduction by a factor of 7. and hence the value of 7. Wealdstone. i. 21 November 1988. India. March 1992.3 4.

3. These judgements could be represented by a size distribution 100 times lower than the HSE offshore data. Nevertheless. In the absence of any collection of data on leak frequencies from storage vessels (spheres and bullet tanks). Several judgmental reviews of data applied to LPG storage vessels [9. 4. its use is only justifiable in the absence of better data. but this is not supported by other sources. which is of questionable relevance. together with a rupture probability. this is appropriate for medium storage vessels. Using the population of 132.000 vessel years up to 1989 [16]. at Kings Ripton in 1988) in a population of approximately 925.000 vessels in 1991 [18] allows the exposure up to the end of 1998 to be estimated as 2. Some studies have argued that such events are not possible.RADD – Storage incident frequencies 4.2 Selection of Generic Value for Pressurised Storage Vessels The best available source of leak frequencies for hydrocarbon process pressure vessels is provided by the HSE hydrocarbon release database [19]. This indicates a BLEVE frequency of 1 × 10-6 per vessel year. there is no high-quality data on leak frequency.25] give leak frequencies in the range 5 × 10-6 to 6 × 10-5 per vessel year.24. This would be a leak frequency of 5 × 10-5 per vessel year and a rupture frequency of 5 × 10-7 per year. Comparison of the above estimates of leak frequencies for large pressure vessels suggests both the overall leak frequencies and the rupture frequencies range over 4 orders of magnitude.000 vessel years. Since 98% of the exposure relates to vessels under 5 tonnes capacity. available analyses indicate that these are not significantly different to the leak frequencies from steam boilers [20]. An earlier published estimate was 3 × 10-6 per vessel year [17].113. critical crack lengths could be so short that a leak-beforebreak condition can be excluded.3. 12 ©OGP . Arulanantham & Lees [22] show a leak frequency for storage vessels that is not significantly different to that for process vessels. None are particularly authoritative. Available estimates of leak frequencies from small containers (drums and cylinders) for liquefied gases indicate leak frequencies a further factor of 50 lower than for steam boilers. Gould [15] considered that the air receiver data from [20] was more appropriate for storage vessels. Pressure vessel design and inspection involves extensive effort to avoid catastrophic cold rupture. the catastrophic rupture of the vessel will need to be represented in a different way to a rupture the size of the connecting pipe. For large/medium storage vessels. but it gives frequencies a factor of 100 lower than estimated above for process vessels. for modelling purposes. due to the absence of temperature cycling. These appear to be based on Davenport [20]. This source does not give a leak size distribution. A realistic leak size distribution might therefore use a continuous function up to the size of the largest connecting pipe.23. Most studies have used data on steam boilers. although Davenport [20] shows no significant difference in the frequencies.1 Additional Source Data for BLEVEs In the UK. giving a frequency of 5 × 10-7 per vessel year. and therefore this factor has been applied to the process vessel size distribution. Fracture mechanics analysis [21] has indicated that under normal circumstances defects in a stress-relieved vessel will cause a leak rather than a catastrophic failure.1. For vessels that are not stress-relieved. only one BLEVE of a fixed LPG vessel is known (a domestic vessel of less than 1 tonne capacity. However.

This is best addressed using a fault tree approach. 4.RADD – Storage incident frequencies The published estimate of rupture frequency of 2. and is considered suitable for a sensitivity test. It is therefore assumed that otherwise similar pressure vessels in different industries have approximately the same leak frequencies. One involved overfilling and the other involved dropping liquid nitrogen onto the deck (above a tank). combined with modelling of possible fire scenarios and their impact on the tank. both of these can be considered to be due to human error. Most of these were recently reported events in the Norwegian Sector. which consequently cracked. There have been 2 incidents involving cargo tanks. Similar leak frequencies have been observed for process vessels in the onshore process industry [22] and the offshore industry (OREDA and HSE). where reporting standards are highest. 43 of which ignited. There have been no incidents of FPSO cargo oil tank failure up to 2005 [32] other than due to human error. The HSE hydrocarbon release database includes 117 leaks involving non-process hydrocarbons in the UK Sector during 1992-97. This value does not take account of design improvements that resulted from these events. 4.3. classification into process and non-process fires may be imprecise. Based on data in [32].2.5 Non-process Hydrocarbon Storage Offshore The main source of data on non-process fires is the WOAD database [28].8 × 10-4 per year for cargo tank fires/explosions on FPSOs. of which 12 were destroyed by BLEVE. and hence this data is impossible to combine with the WOAD data. In neither case was there ignition. It includes 802 fire/explosion events up to 1996.7 × 10-8 by Sooby & Tolchard [18] is as yet unsupported by any collection of failure data. Few BLEVEs of storage vessels have been reported since 1984. The HSE offshore accident and incident ©OGP 13 . The installation names and incident dates are not available. 4. Since WOAD relies on public domain reports. The likelihood of a BLEVE on a given tank depends on its fire protection measures and the site layout. of which 516 did not involve a hydrocarbon leak and hence were probably non-process fires. This frequency was adjusted assuming the COT fire frequency is related to the number of tanks. Therefore the current frequency should be lower. leading to a BLEVE frequency of approximately 10-5 per vessel year [27]. It is a factor of 20 below that proposed above.4 Oil Storage on FPSOs A 1990 study [33] obtained a frequency of fires/explosions on oil tankers over 6000 GRT of 2. there have been no fire/explosion incidents on FPSOs operating in UKCS up to 2005.2 × 10-3 per year from IMO data [34] for the period 1982-86.) A further 20% reduction was applied to reflect the historical trend in risk between 1972 and 1986 to obtain a frequency of 8.1 BLEVE Data There were at least 25 large storage spheres world-wide subjected to fire impingement during 1955-87. The published report [29] includes system populations and leak frequencies for different utilities systems. and hence the tanker frequency was reduced by 50% (6 tanks on FPSO compared with typically 12 on tankers.

The data presented in Table 2.RADD – Storage incident frequencies statistics reports (e. Although leak size distributions are included. The total number of leaks from a methanol system is taken from [31] and set at 1. Calculating methanol leak frequencies is awkward because the systems in the HSE database include both methanol and other fluids. diesel” and an exposure 1511 diesel utilities systems. A further contribution to the failure frequency might arise from escalation of other events near to the tank. For example. the systems are dedicated to a single product. The rupture frequency is 3.0 × 10-5 per yr and the remaining small. Therefore the frequency should use the total number of leaks. An alternative approach is to use generic equipment leak frequencies. there is insufficient leak experience to give smooth distributions. For flow lines and manifolds. to give a frequency of 3.5 is a “system” leak frequency combining a tank leak frequency distribution and a pipe work leak. [30]) include numbers of fires/explosions.tank) between Small (75%). In the HSE database. 14 ©OGP .5. 4. there is insufficient leak experience to give smooth distributions. 4.6 × 10-3 per tank year.3 × 10-2 per system year. Although leak size distributions are included. Calculating diesel leak frequencies from these is awkward because the systems in the HSE database include both diesel and other fluids. Medium (15%) and Large (10%) releases. the tank leak frequency could be based on the pressure vessel value of 1. but the population data includes condensate lines.5. none of the 12 methanol leaks during 1992-97 were from methanol tanks.5 × 10-4 per year. This assumes that the frequencies are the same for methanol and condensate. medium and large tank leak frequencies are calculated based on a continuous leak frequency function.1 × 10-2 per system year. Methanol leaks might occur due to over-filling of the tank. to prevent collapse of the tank in a fire.g. For example.2 Diesel In [29] diesel leaks may be included under several systems. The contribution from pipework. The deluge system should be adequate to cover the whole tank evenly as well as the tank supports. and leaks from the oil and gas lines should be included under process leaks.5 × 10-4 per year. both methanol and other lines are included in all systems. but do not provide any information to distinguish process and non-process fires. pumps and flanges is calculated by dividing the remaining leak frequency (system . An alternative approach is to use generic equipment leak frequencies. oil. The HSE use the 31 leaks categorised as “utilities. this omits diesel leaks from other systems. Using data from [29] the overall contribution from tank leaks is 2. However.4 × 10-2 per system year. the tank leak frequency could be based on the pressure vessel value of 1. An alternative approach would be to divide the total of 52 leaks by the 1511 diesel utilities systems. For process systems. to give a frequency of 2.1 Methanol In [29] methanol leaks may be included under several systems. Therefore the frequency should use only the methanol leaks. taking account of the filling frequency and the tank’s high-level and high-pressure trips. and a fault tree analysis could be made of this.

A Second Report . However. Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. Reidel Publishing Co. F. C1998. LASTFIRE 1997.A Pilot Study. 5. HSE 1981. Project No. Am erican Petroleum Institute Publication 2021A. London: HMSO. Lees. C8263. these 6 leaks in 1511 system-years would give a frequency of 4 × 10-3 per tank year. 4. Assuming that each of the diesel systems had one tank.0 and discussed in Sections 3. Large Atmospheric Storage Tank Fires . 2nd. onshore installations. Technica 1990.tank) between Small (75%).0 × 10-2 per year.. HAZOP Study and Risk Assessment of Venezia Refinery. Singapore. BS EN 1473: 1997. Canvey . A Risk Analysis of Six Potentially Hazardous Industrial Objects in the Rijnmond Area . Interim Study .A Joint Oil Industry Project to Review the Fire Related Risks of Large Open-Top Floating Roof Storage Tanks. 5 of the 52 diesel leaks during 1992-97 were from tanks and one was from a pressure vessel.Prevention and Suppression of Fires in Large Aboveground Atmospheric Storage Tanks. The rupture frequency is 3. medium and large tank leak frequencies are calculated based on a continuous leak frequency function. Fires and Explosions in Atmospheric Fixed Roof Storage Tanks. Health & Safety Executive. Atmospheric Storage Tank Study.0 Recommended Data Sources for Further Information For further information. 6.RADD – Storage incident frequencies In the HSE database. ed. Medium (15%) and Large (10%) releases. Eliminating leaks involving these systems gives a system leak frequency of 3. 2. DNV 1997. pumps and flanges is calculated by dividing the remaining leak frequency (system . API 1998. Using data from [29] the overall contribution from tank leaks is 2. 5. Installation and equipment of liquefied natural gas – Design of 3.6 × 10-3 per tank year.0 should be consulted. this frequency includes oil export and well systems. C383005. Confidential Report for Oil Refineries Ltd. Confidential Report for Oil & Petrochem ical Industries Technical and Safety Com m ittee. The data presented in Table 2. The total number of leaks from a diesel system is taken from [31] and set at 3. The contribution from pipework.0 and 4. ©OGP 15 . Rijnm ond Public Authority 1982. DNV 1998. Project No. 1. the data sources used to develop the release frequencies presented in Section 2.An Investigation of Potential Hazards from Operations in the Canvey Island/Thurrock Area 3 years After Publication of the Canvey Report. Project No. 7.P.0 References The principal source references are shown in bold.6 have been calculated using a similar approach to that used for methanol leaks. 8. 6. 9.4 × 10-2 per year. Confidential Report for AgipPetroli SpA.0 × 10-5 per year and the remaining small. (the “COVO Study”). 1996. Dordrecht: D. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.

An Analysis of a 100 te Propane Storage Vesse”. K. The Predicted BLEVE Frequency of a Selected 200 m3 Butane Sphere on a Refinery Site. P. Conference on Risk & Safety Management in the Gas Industry. 25. M. F. Risk Assessment for the Siting of Developments near Liquefied Petroleum Gas Installations. 93. 18. 13. British Gas 1981a. 24. 15. J. 1997. & Chow.D. UKAEA Safety and Reliability Directorate Report SRD R314. T. Crossthwaite. Quantitative Risk Assessment Methodology for LPG Installations. IChemE Symp. An Assessment of the Probability of Unintentionally Filling to the Roof an Above Ground LNG Storage Tank at the Canvey Island Methane Terminal. 16 ©OGP . Health & Safety Executive. March. 14. J. Minah. 28. 1988. Hong Kong. Canvey – An Investigation of Potential Hazards from Operations in the Canvey Island/Thurrock Area. Ser. HSE (1997a): Offshore Hydrocarbon Release Statistics. HSE 1978. IChemE Symp. Report SRD/HSE/R603. Manchester. & Reeves. Fitzpatrick. K. and Nussey. Ser.B.RADD – Storage incident frequencies 10. Selway.B. 1988. 27. Handleiding voor het opstellen en beoordelen van een extern veiligheidsrapport. British Gas Engineering Research Station Report ERS R1983.J.A. Interprovinciaal Overleg. Hong Kong. N. 1993. R. Pres.W. 110. Offshore Hydrocarbon Releases Statistics 1999.P. A. 1997. Gould. 16. Fault Tree Analysis of the Catastrophic Failure of Bulk Chlorine Vessels. 12. Int.P. & Lees. 29. 1986.K. Arulanatham. 1985. October. Reeves. Pape. AEA Technology. A. T. W. Further Studies on the Integrity and Modes of Failure of Canvey Above Ground Storage Tanks. 322. W OAD. British Gas 1979. J. 1993. Hong Kong. 17. 1988. 21. British Gas Fundamental Studies Group Report FST 812. An Initial Prediction of the BLEVE Frequency of a 100 Tonne Butane Storage Vessel. Offshore Technology Report OTO 97 950. Davenport. SRD Report R492.W. LPG Installation Design and General Risk Assessment Methodology Employed by the Gas Standards Office. 367-388. Reliability 91. DNV. 1981. London: HMSO.C. C.C. Some Data on the Reliability of Pressure Equipment in the Chemical Plant Environment. & Hurst. London: HMSO. London. ACDS 1991. UK. Smith.. 22. London: HMSO. 1993. 26. Ves & Piping 9 327-338. EFCE event no. Conference on Risk & Safety Management in the Gas Industry. 19. 11. A Further Survey of Pressure Vessel Failures in the UK. V. F. SRD Report R488. Offshore Technology Report OTO 1999 079. Estimation of Cold Failure Frequency of LPG Tanks in Europe”. British Gas 1981b. R. & Tolchard. 20. Health & Safety Executive. IPO 1994. Sooby. Blything.M. The Hazard of Rollover – Canvey Terminal Above Ground Storage Tanks. 23. HSE 2000.. Whittle. W orld Offshore Accident Database. A Basic Approach for the Analysis of Risks From Major Toxic Hazards. 1991.J.H. Health & Safety Executive. Assessment and Control of Major Hazards. EMSD Symposium on Risk and Safety Management in the Gas Industry. D.

Technica. 33. Accident statistics for floating offshore units on the UK Continental Shelf 1980-2005. Casualty Statistics. ©OGP 17 . Health & Safety Executive. Report of the Steering Group. A Guide to Quantitative Risk Assessment for Offshore Installations. 1987. 99/100. 1990. 1972-1986). Annexes 1 – 3 (Analyses of Casualties to Tankers. Project No. Port Risks in Great Britain from Marine Transport of Dangerous Substances in Bulk: A Risk Assessment. C1216. Det Norkse Veritas 2007. MSC 54/INf 6. HSE (1997b): Offshore Accident and Incident Statistics Report. J R 1999. IMO. 31. Health & Safety Executive.RADD – Storage incident frequencies 30. Offshore Technology Report OTO 97 951. 32. ISBN 1 870553 365. 34. Publication No. London: CMPT. 1997. Research Report RR567. 26. Report for The Health & Safety Executive. Spouge.

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