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(Redirected from Madhyamakalamkara) Madhyamakalamkara (Sanskrit) Madhyamākalaṃkāra (IAST) (8th century CE) is a Buddhist text held to have been originally composed in Sanskrit by Śāntarakṣita (725–788) but extant in Tibetan. The Tibetan text was translated from the Sanskrit by Surendrabodhi (Wylie: lha dbang byang chub) and Yeshe De (Wylie: ye shes sde).
■ 1 Nature of text ■ 1.1 Dharmic dialogue ■ 1.2 Madhyamākalaṃkāra and Samye Ling: entwined traditions and historical context ■ 1.3 Madhyamākalaṃkāra: an English discourse and literature review ■ 1.3.1 Annotation key ■ 2 Nomenclature, orthography and etymology ■ 3 Logic ■ 3.1 Apoha: negation of the opposite ■ 3.2 Trairūpya: the triple-character of inferential sign ■ 4 Exegetical tradition and commentary ■ 4.1 Kamalaśīla's Commentary ■ 4.2 Ju Mipham's Commentary ■ 4.3 Gyaltsab Je's commentary ■ 4.4 Tulku Sungrap's commentary ■ 5 'Neither one nor many' (gcig du 'bral ba'i gtan tshigs) ■ 5.1 Mindstream ■ 6 Five assertions ■ 6.1 First assertion ■ 6.2 Second assertion ■ 6.3 Third assertion ■ 6.4 Fourth assertion ■ 6.5 Fifth assertion ■ 7 Notes ■ 8 Primary resources ■ 9 References
Nature of text
In the short verse text of the Madhyamākalaṃkāra, Śāntarakṣita details his two truths philosophical synthesis of the conventional truth of Yogacara with the ultimate truth of the Madhyamaka with the assistance of Buddhist logic, with a protracted discussion of the argument of "neither one nor many" (gcig du 'bral ba'i gtan tshigs).
its founder who also became its first Kenpo). is a doxographic reprise in brief. contemplated and realized' (Sanskrit: mulaprajna) by senior 'exegetes' (Tibetan: khenpo.g. etc. a critical thumbnail-survey of the philosophical History of Buddhism and its inter. Though somewhat lyrical. Importantly. that is.
Madhyamākalaṃkāra: an English discourse and literature review
Lipman (1979) opened the discourse of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra into English.). but was again foregrounded by the eloquent Commentary of Ju Mipham (1846–1912) composed in 1876. translation in the co-denotation of transposition and transportation. where the Buddhadharma was already evident and for the most part flourishing in culturally specific forms. Japan. the text became marginalized due to the rise of Prasaṅgika Mādhyamaka post-construction of the Prasaṅgika/Svatantrika doxographic dichotomy of Patsap Nyima Drak (1055–1145). The text was seminal and formative in the tradition of Samye which came to be known as a Nyingma institution in contradistinction to the emergent Sarma traditions of the latter translation phase heralded by Atisha (980-1054). it contains the fullness of the Sutrayana and Mahayana traditions' development in its place of origin.
Madhyamākalaṃkāra and Samye Ling: entwined traditions and historical context
The Madhyamākalaṃkāra and its living tradition inaugurated by Śāntarakṣita. it is a pedagogical discourse on the developmental iteration of the yana. Ceylon. the Tibetan Plateau..Dharmic dialogue
Madhyamākalaṃkāra.. belonging to the former and Sanatana Dharma (verse: ?). Therefore. quality and degree). Geshe). to be 'studied. Jain Dharma (verse: ?) and Sikh Dharma (verse: ?) belonging to the latter. where the synthesis of the Madhyamālaṃkāra was institutionalized and taught at the fortified Samye Ling (sited by Śāntarakṣita. more than a millennium after the root text's translation to Tibet.
. before the Buddhadharma tradition of India was further transposed and acculturated by the various cultures to the Far East (e. the text documents the Nyingma view of the Two Truths and as such. China. east of India. with demarcation of kyil highlands.g. Kashmir. etc. Historically. an executive summary and key to his encyclopedic Tattvasamgraha. the philosophical challenges posed by both non-Buddhadharma Dharmic Traditions and the nonDharmic traditions of India. evident in India up until his departure from India to Tibet. etc. is a canonical work. safeguarded by the Himalaya. by Śāntarakṣita in the 8th khor viewed from above century at the request of the Dharmaraja Trisongdetsen. a required text of the Nyingma 'syllabus' (Tibetan: shedra). and elsewhere (e. and crystallizes a dialectical sophistication in the employ of Indian logic and sports the pristine diamond-like clarity of vigorous courtyard debate to be expected of a Khenpo of Nalanda Vihara (khenpo: by station. It enshrines: refutations to the challenges of various Buddhist systems and tenets from both within the tradition. if you will. its defensive walls and the sacred geometry of the mandala upon which it is founded and the foundation dance of Vajrakilaya performed by Padmasambhava to remove energetic obstructions and obfuscations of its construction and continuity. survived the destruction of Nalanda Vihara and the ascendancy of the Moslem Empire in Medieval India during the 13th century eclipse of Buddhism in its place of origin through its fortuitous transplantation to the Indian Samye Ling. the status quo in situ.).and intra-Dharmic dialogue of the medieval Mohammadan (archaic employed purposefully).
the principles of the vast and the profound as originally set forth by Asaṇga (fl.tsadra. the three conditions of the correct sign.php/spros_bral) (accessed: Saturday February 28. evidence which in turn may be another item of knowledge. 2006) provides a strong working definition of "spros bral". 4th century) and Nāgārjuna (possibly 150-250 CE) respectively. ‘Indian Logic’ was influenced by the study of grammar.
‘Indian Logic’ is primarily a study of inference-patterns and ‘inference’ (anumāna. 2006) provides a working definition of "phyi_don". Tib.php/phyi_don) (accessed: Saturday February 28.org/index. Skt. is also characterized by its use of the pramāṇa methods of Dignāga (5th-6th century) and Dharmakīrti (6th-7th century) as integral steps towards the realization of the ultimate. Although masters such as Ārya Vimuktisena (6th century CE) are said to have set forth their presentations of the Madhyamaka in a way that employs the assertions specific to the Vijñānavāda. it is important to be familiar with the teachings on probative signs and reasoning and. ‘Indian Logic’ should not be understood as logic in the sense of ‘Aristotelian syllogistic’ (Greek or Classical Logic) or ‘modern predicate calculus’ (modern Western Logic). (NB: original quotation did not contain metatext)
Annotation key = Dharma Dictionary (June.
. 2009) ‡ = Dharma Dictionary (May.tsadra. from information supplied by evidence. but as anumāna-theory. epistemology. phyi don‡). niṣprapañca. This synthesis of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka. the two great currents of Mahāyāna philosophy. Madhyamaka-alamkara)". 157) render Mipham's advice that the following elements of Buddhist logic are required to engage the text: In general.. Source:  (http://rywiki. Vidyabhusana (1921). whereas. a system in its own right. though a key difference between Western Logic and Indian Logic is that certain epistemological issues are included within Indian Logic. Doctor (2004: p. and all the methods of proof or refutation. in modern Western Logic they are deliberately excluded. Indian Logic includes general questions regarding the ‘nature of the derivation of knowledge’.org/index. whereas Greek or Classical Logic which principally informed modern Western Logic was influenced by the study of mathematics. Randle (1930) and Stcherbatsky (1930) employed terms such as “Indian Logic” and “Buddhist Logic” which established this terminology. spros bral†) is realized through insight into the nonexistence of any external matter (bāhyārtha.The Madhyamākalaṃkāra and attendant commentary of Ju Mipham (1846–1912) is available in two scholarly English renderings: Doctor (2004) and Padmakara Translation Group (2005). a pramāṇa. etymology: ‘anu’ subsequent + manas ‘perception.. the notions of other-elimination. Blumenthal (2004) also provides a rendering of the Madhyamālaṃkāra along with the commentary of Gyaltsab Je (1364–1432). orthography and etymology
Berzin (2006: unpaginated) renders the title in English as "A Filigree of the Middle Way (dBu-ma rgyan. within that context. Śāntarakṣita was the one to found an actual system in which the ultimate freedom from constructs (Skt. 2009)
Nomenclature.ix) states that the Madhyamākalaṃkāra: . mind’ ) is identified as a ‘source of knowledge’. Padmakara Translation Group (2005: p. Source:  (http://rywiki.is renowned as the principal scripture of the Yogācāramadhyamaka.
Manjughosha is a name of Manjushri. It should be present in the case or object under consideration. an entity is defined as being the negation of its opposite. Suchness. Wylie: dbu ma rgyan gyi dka' 'grel)
'Commentary on Difficult Points' (Sanskrit: Madhyamālaṃkāra-panjika. 713-763)
Ju Mipham's Commentary
(Wylie: dbu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad 'jam dbyangs bla ma dgyes pa'i zhal lung)
Ju Mipham's Commentary (Wylie: dbu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad 'jam dbyangs bla ma dgyes pa'i zhal lung) has been rendered into English by Doctor (2004) as "Speech of Delight".Apoha: negation of the opposite
According to the doctrine of 'Apoha' (called in Tibetan gshan-sel-wa). Combining these.g. or none of the sapakṣas. Wylie: dbu ma rgyan gyi dka' 'grel) by Kamalaśīla (fl.
. and of King Trisongdetsen. the sign may be present in all.
Trairūpya: the triple-character of inferential sign
Dignaga formulated the following ‘three conditions’ (Sanskrit: trairūpya. 382): Seeing that there are many reasons for expounding the Madhyamakalankara. gave to me the Indian and Tibetan commentaries on the Madhyamakalankara. scholarship and realized understanding beyond letters and words of this 19th century Rimé luminary. who is the very personification of the compassion of the abbot Bodhisattva. there are three possibilities: the sign may be present in all. The title conveys Mipham's samaya in honouring the charge or dictate of his rootguru (rtsa ba'i bla ma). who is supreme Manjushri appearing in the form of a monk in saffron robes. asking me to study them well and to compose a commentary. whose very name I hardly dare to pronounce. e. rendered by the Padmakara Translation Group (2005: p. however. and whose renown fills the world. Wylie: tshul-gsum). Likewise. Dignaga constructed his ‘wheel of reason’ (Sanskrit: Hetucakra). who is the sovereign among the learned and accomplished. is the revealing of Mipham's Guru Yoga from the colophon. we have to assume that it is present in the pakṣa. And as his diamondlike injunction came down upon my head. a cow is that which is not a not-cow. Jamyang Khyentse Wangpo (1820–1892). of the master Padmasambhava. he claimed a logical ‘sign’ or ‘mark’ (linga) must fulfill: 1. It should be present in a ‘similar case’ or a homologue (sapakṣa) 3. To identify a sign. which. the ‘subject-locus' (pakṣa) 2. our incomparable guide. that is the first condition is already satisfied. Jamyang Khyentse Wangpo.
Exegetical tradition and commentary
(Sanskrit: Madhyamālaṃkāra-panjika. Rigpa Shedra (August. unbounded in his kindness. and is employed as term of deep respect for his root-guru and bespeaks of the vast learning. It should not be present in any ‘dissimilar case’ or heterologue (vipakṣa) When a ‘sign’ or ‘mark’ (linga) is identified. 2008) render the Commentary into English thus: "Words to Delight My Teacher Manjughosha". some. I earnestly gave myself to the task. who bound the mandate of the commentary upon Mipham. some or none of the vipakṣas.
for the ultimate truth. if a continuum were a composite of the moments. et al.
Gyaltsab Je's commentary
(Wylie: dbu ma rgyan gyi brjed byang)
Gyaltsab Je (1364–1432). extending it to all sentient beings of the Bhavacakra. and other proponents of the Svatantrika Madhyamaka school. also known as Tulku Sungrap wrote the commentary rendered into English as "The Sword to Cut Through False Views" (Wylie: dbu ma rgyan gyi mchan 'grel nyung ngu lta ngan gcod pa'i ral gri). either each moment would be a continuum or there would be no separate moments. 1903–1957). Padmakara Translation Group provide a salient qualification of the term 'person' (Wylie: gang zag). (2006: pp.
. the fourth function as well). convey the importance of Mipham's Commentary to the Nyingmapa and their view of the Two Truths doctrine in light of the 'Svatantrika Madhyamaka' ("those who assert the ultimate is the illusory nature") view and its Shentong Madhyamaka refinement as qualifying the 'Prasangika Madhyamaka' ("those who make no assertions"): Then. To explain further.
'Neither one nor many' (gcig du 'bral ba'i gtan tshigs)
The continuum of the mindstream or 'stream of being' of sentient beings is one application of the argument of "neither one nor many" (gcig du 'bral ba'i gtan tshigs). dbu ma rgyan gyi brjed byang (Remembering 'The Ornament of the Middle Way'). 1996: p. there are two schools of Madhyamaka: those who assert the ultimate is the illusory nature. (1983. particularly for those who follow Mipham Rinpoche's understanding of the Shentong Madhyamaka view. Shantarakshita.' This commentary by Mipham Rinpoche is often considered the most important philosophical text of the Nyingma lineage in Tibet. 160). Their view is clearly explained in Mipham Jamyang Gyatso's commentary on Shantarakshita's 'Ornament of the Middle Way. refutes the true singularity of the person. This view was put forth by Kamalashila. and those who make no assertions. The continuum is not the individual moments nor their composite. the first says that the illusory nature is established when the perceiver of an object experiences a perception of that object as being unreal. As Hopkins. 'Neither one nor many' is an application of the third function of the Catuṣkoti of Indian Logic (and thereby according to apoha. in the ninth shloka of the Madhyamālaṃkāra. though technically understood to be "neither one nor many". et al.
Tulku Sungrap's commentary
(Wylie: dbu ma rgyan gyi mchan 'grel nyung ngu lta ngan gcod pa'i ral gri)
Lobzang Dongak Chökyi Gyatso (Wylie: blo bzang mdo sngags chos kyi rgya mtsho. where 'person' instead is conveyed as a continuum. 193–194) in their survey of the Rimé movement. it cannot be found. convey in their magnum opus in refutation of whether or not a 'series' may be considered a 'unit': When a continuum of a lifetime is sought in the individual moments of the continuum.Ringu Tulku.
Śāntarakṣita uses the Sautrantika distinction that objects of cognition can be of two kinds: abstract mental objects which are merely theoretical . When it is said that "the person wandered in cyclic existence but attained liberation.
The person is not able to be pointed out As other than existing momentarily. Due to which they are asserted as mind-only. wandering beings speak of the self. 219) bottom right: Other than as the utterly momentary The person cannot be demonstrated. Madhyamālaṃkāra 9. by Doctor (2004: p. The way he asserts cognition or consciousness in the absence of an object — that knows itself and illuminates itself — is uncommon. "I!" without any examination or investigation. first by the Padmakara Translation Group (2005: p. rendered by Padmakara Translation Group (2005: p. 180) bottom left. is assumed to be a single entity and is called a person. Objects — which is to say fully qualified objects of comprehension — are posited only with respect to things that are able to perform functions." and so forth. 180) on bottom left and Doctor (2004: p. many successive (conscious) instants are brought together and are so designated. The various appearances of the external appear through or due to the power of one's own mind." a "man. liberation. he made five assertions while not unique to Śāntarakṣita's view individually uncommonly integrated nonetheless: 1. The conceptual mind refers to this as a "self. It is therefore clearly and thoroughly understood That it possesses no nature as one or as many.
In the first. according to Ju Mipham. and the continuity from one cyclic existence to another." this is posited because of having bound together a multitude of successive instants.including generalities like classes of objects and labels for them .
Ju Mipham is commenting on this root verse is rendered as follows. The ultimate is divided into the enumerated ultimate and the non-enumerated ultimate.and then objects of cognition of actual things. 219) bottom right: The streams of being of sentient beings form the basis for imputing such conventions as bondage. and [it is those instants] that are included in the stream of being.
The continuum of sentient beings. "I am. the ground that is said to be either fettered or liberated and extends from life to life in samsara. 4. Thus they think. 2. On the occasion of settling the enumerated ultimate. To define actual things he
. Based on the mental observation of those [instants]. It should be clearly noted That it has no true existence in the singular or plural. It is because of attachment to these streams as if they were singular that the convention of the so-called person is imputed. and so forth. the individual.Following is the same shloka. 5. When it is said that a "person" wanders in samsara and attains nirvana. People do not examine what it is that constitutes their uninterrupted continuum and simply take it for their "self" and think. the objects found by the individual valid cognitions are apprehended without contradiction."
In addition and related to that. 3. and second.
one reaches the path of seeing. cannot refute in a single stroke all four conceptual extremes. he incorporates Dharmakirti's valid cognition that analyzes conventionalities but also connects that with valid cognition that analyzes for ultimacy. that consciousness can be aware of the objects of cognition.
In the fourth. In part. Once all extremes have been analyzed then the student finally arrives at the nonenumerative or true ultimate. Sanskrit: caturanta): The intellect of ordinary people. he does this by noting that a clear distinction can be made when one is analyzing for each case. In contemplating step by step and enumerating through the conceptual extremes a student does not realize the ultimate truth but moves in a progressive manner toward the ultimate. That is to say. So in terms of analyzing the extremes of existence and non-existence. Ju Mipham later qualified the meaning to be that within conventions we can say that all cognition is self-aware of itself and not a separate material thing.
In the third. which investigates ultimate reality.says things that can perform some sort of function. Further. he suggests students first contemplate the lack of inherent existence and establish this first. he further asserts that analysis of objects with respect to those approximate or enumerated ultimates does not create a problem of true establishment. As part of his reasoning for why this is useful. but generally when relating to conventionalities he asserts that a mind-only position is recommended. separate thing from the objects of cognition. including the use of two different approaches of valid cognition — one for the conventional domain and one used for
. Then after that contemplate the extreme of non-existence. which Shantaraksita founded. He still affirms the supremacy of the Madhyamaka school when students analyze for ultimacy. But by refuting these four extremes one after the other and by meditating properly.
Samye Monastery. This position was later critiqued by Je Tsongkhapa as implying that a self-reflexive awareness is an existent. he makes a distinction between the ultimate way of abiding — established by the method of the Madhyamaka — which he calls the non-enumerated ultimate and an approximate or enumerated ultimate that is a lesser conventional understanding of the ultimate yet which leads one closer to the non-enumerated ultimate. This is called the view that sees the dharmadatu. The Sautantrika used that distinction for conventional and ultimate truth. he uses the consciousness-only view as the way a student may relate to conventional appearances in postmeditation as the best way to progress along the path. who references the 'four conceptual extremes' (Wylie: mtha' bzhi. but Śāntarakṣita discards the merely theoretical or generality objects completely and then discusses the objects of cognition of actual things as conventional truth.
In the second. he asserts that a self-reflexive awareness exists conventionally. in the present time
In the fifth. Mipham quotes Gorampa.
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