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Berger Source: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1, After the Third World? (2004), pp. 9-39 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993775 Accessed: 16/01/2009 06:18
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Third World Quarterly, Vol 25, No 1, pp 9-39, 2004
World? fate of
MARK T BERGER
ABSTRACT The idea of the Third World, which is usually traced to the late
1940s or early 1950s, was increasingly used to try and generate unity and support among an emergent group of nation-states whose governments were reluctant to take sides in the Cold War. These leaders and governmentssought to displace the 'East-West' conflict with the 'North-South' conflict. The rise of Third Worldismin the 1950s and 1960s was closely connected to a range of national liberation projects and specific forms of regionalism in the erstwhile colonies of Asia and Africa, as well as the former mandates and new nationstates of the Middle East, and the 'older' nation-states of Latin America. Exponents of Third Worldismin this period linked it to national liberation and various forms of Pan-Asianism, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Africanism and PanAmericanism.The weakeningor demise of the first generation of Third Worldist regimes in the 1960s and 1970s coincided with or was followed by the emergence of a second generation of Third Worldistregimes that articulated a more radical, explicitly socialist, vision. A moderateform of Third Worldism also became significantat the UnitedNations in the 1970s: it was centred on the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEo). By the 1980s, however, Third Worldismhad entered into a period of dramatic decline. With the end of the Cold War, some movements,governmentsand commentatorshave sought to reorient and revitalise the idea of a Third World,while others have argued that it has lost its relevance. This introductoryarticle provides a critical overview of the history of Third Worldism, while clarifying both its constraints and its appeal. As a world-historical movement, Third Worldism(in both its first and second generation modalities) emerged out of the activities and ideas of anti-colonial nationalists and their efforts to mesh highly romanticisedinterpretations of pre-colonial traditions and cultures with the utopianismembodied by Marxismand socialism specifically, and 'Western'visions of modernisationand developmentmore generally. Apartfrom the problems associated with combining these differentstrands, ThirdWorldismalso went into decline because of the contradictions inherent in the process of decolonisation and in the new international politico-economic order, in the context of the changing character, and eventual end, of the global political economy of the Cold War.
Mark T Berger is in the IntermationalStudies Program of the University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia. E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org. ISSN 0143-6597 printISSN 1360-2241 online/04/010009-31 ? 2004 Third World Quarterly DOI: 10.1080/0143659042000185318
MARK T BERGER
In its pure, unadulterated form, Third Worldism did not suffer approximationor partialresults. It had chosen utopia as its standard,history as its demandingjudge. It would have to live with history's hard and unappealableverdict.'
From the bustling Gambir Railway Station, located on the eastern side of Lapangan Merdeka (Freedom Square) in central Jakarta,one can take a train south and east through the seemingly endless slums, plazas and suburbs of Indonesia's capital. The urban sprawl of Jakartagradually gives way to rice paddies, and eventually the train ascends into the hills. If the trainis an express train, it will take about three hours to arrive at another of the largest cities in Indonesia and the capital of the province of West Java. High in the hills the provincial capital is cool compared with the sweltering humidity of the coast. Leaving the train, the traveller can make his/her way to Jalan Asia-Afrika (Asia-Africa Avenue) and Gedung Merdeka(FreedomBuilding) near the centre of town. Inside this building is a museumcommemorating famous meeting that a involved, among others, Sukarno,Jawaharlal Nehru, Ho Chi Minh, GamalAbdel Nasser and Zhou Enlai. The city, of course, is Bandung,and the conference,held from 17 to 24 April 1955 was the Asian-African Conference. More than any other single event, this conferencein a hithertoobscurecity (in an Indonesiathat had only emerged as a sovereign nation-state in the 1940s) symbolised the moment of arrivalfor the Third World.2 Participantsand observers subsequentlyconjured with the 'Bandung Spirit', while others now talk retrospectively of a 'Bandung Era' (1955-75).3 The historic meeting in Bandungbecame the touchstoneof a wide arrayof initiatives associated directly and indirectly with Third Worldism.4The idea of the Third World was increasingly deployed to generate unity and support among a growing number of non-aligned nation-stateswhose leaders sought to displace the 'East-West' (cold war) conflict and foregroundthe 'North-South' conflict.5 The 1970s were the 'golden age' of ThirdWorldism.Some commentators point, for example, to the Declarationand Programmeof Action for the Establishment of a New Economic Order,passed in April 1974 by the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, as evidence of the 'triumphof Third Worldism'.6While a numberof governmentscommitted to Third Worldism had appearedand/ordisappearedin the 1950s and 1960s, the 1970s saw the emergence of a number of new rulers who adopted a distinctly revolutionary Third Worldist tone and outlook in Asia, Africa and Latin America. By the 1980s, however, ThirdWorldismas both a revolutionaryand a reformistproject had entered into a period of precipitous decline. With the end of the Cold War, some movements, governmentsand commentators have sought to reorient and revitalise the idea of a Third World, while others have arguedthat it has lost its relevance. The views of the former are not homogeneous, but they all generally agree that the new circumstances of the post-cold war era and the 21st century can still be clarified via the elaboration and reconfigurationof the idea of the Third World and/or that progressive political initiatives can still be pursued under the umbrella of some sort of revised form of Third Worldism.7Critics of Third Worldism, however, often emphasise its profoundshortcomingsduringthe Cold War. They also emphasise 10
and the appeals of. Ceylon. the overall consolidation of Third Worldism is groundedin the post-1945 conjunctureof decolonisation. second-generation regimes (as alreadysuggested) were generally more explicitly socialist in their overall approach to national liberationand economic development than first-generation regimes.ThirdWorldism eventually came crashing down because of the contradictionsbetween its utopian vision on the one hand and the ungainly scaffolding for a rising Third World provided by the emergentnew nation-statesand the international political-economic order of the Cold War on the other. India and Pakistan was a result of their frustrationwith the 11 . Apart from the problems associated with combining these different culturaland politico-intellectualstrands.More specifically. the BandungConferenceflowed from the slow pace of decolonisation and the way in which the United Nations had become enmeshed in the rivalry between the two cold war superpowers. In an effort both to establish an historical frameworkfor the contributionsthat follow and to take a position in the ongoing debate about the idea of the Third World this introductoryarticle provides a critical overview of the history of the rise and demise of ThirdWorldismin its classical form.9 considerableinternaldiversity.12 For example. As a worldThird Worldism (in both its first.national liberationand the Cold War.8 This special 25th anniversaryissue of Third WorldQuarterlycontains a wide range of contributions.In some cases this involves 'reinventingthe ThirdWorld'. I attemptto clarify both the constraintson. modalities) emerged out of the activities and ideas of anti-colonial nationalists of and their efforts to mesh often highly romanticisedinterpretations pre-colonial traditionsand cultures with the utopianismembodied by Marxism and socialism specifically.AFTER THE THIRD WORLD? that the spatial and political divisions of the cold war era between the First. Second and ThirdWorlds.11 the same time. terminal) decline.and second-generation historical movement. and 'Western' visions of modernisation and development more generally. while in other cases the authorsmake a case for 'ending with the Third World'. 1950s-60s Challenging neocolonialism I: the dawn of Third Worldism The first stirrings of Third Worldism can be traced to the complex milieux of At colonialism and anti-colonialnationalismin the early 20th century. economic and territorial distinctionsthat have become irrelevant.all of which engage with the idea of the ThirdWorld and with ThirdWorldism. had become so thoroughlyscrambledby the dawn of the post-cold war era that the idea of the Third World now imposes a dubious homogeneity on a large and diverse area of the world at the same time as Third Worldism is groundedin political.10 Third World rising: first-generation Bandung regimes. the organisation of the Bandung Conference by the governments of newly independent Indonesia. ThirdWorldism in the context of its wider emergence and its eventual (and in my view at least. of course. Movements and governmentsdirectly informedby ThirdWorldismin the cold war era can be divided into first-generation (1950s-60s) and second-generation(1960sWhile these generations overlapped and displayed 70s) Bandung regimes.
or neocolonialism of the USA. provide the indirect inspirationfor various Third Worldist organisations.MARKT BERGER new membershipin the United Nations. these leaders and the other assembled delegates emphasised their opposition to colonialism. as already emphasised. The final communique of the conference condemned all 'manifestations'of colonialism and was thus widely viewed as not only an attack on the formal colonialism of the Western Europeanpowers. the establishmentof an economic development fund to be operated by the United Nations. The French war (1954-62) to prevent Algerian independence was underway at this time and representativesof the Front de LiberationNationale (FLN). Prime Minister of India (1947-64). including delegates from the USSR and China. Also included in the proceedingswere membersof the African National Congress.A particularlyradical example was the formationof the African-Asian Peoples' SolidarityOrganisation(AAPSo) at a meeting in Cairo in 1957.'6 In September 1961 the First Conference of Heads of State or Governmentof Non-Aligned Countries was held in Belgrade. singling out South Africa and Israel for their failure in this regard. nation-statesor nationalist movements in Asia and Africa. In contrast to Bandung. Ho Chi Minh. which was primarily a meeting of government leaders. Despite a number of meetings in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Kwame Nkrumah. AApso soon lost its significance in the context of the Sino-Soviet split and the formation of the more moderate Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. which would become known as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) by the 1970s.The key figures at the conference.the futurePrime Minister of Ghana. President of 12 . Gamal Abdel Nasser.'5 Although the Bandung Conference failed to lead directly to any long-term organisational initiatives (a second Asian-African Conference planned for Algiers in 1965 never took place because of the politics of the Sino-Soviet split) it did. and the main leaders of the first generationof Bandungregimes.Presidentof Indonesia (1945-65). were Sukarno. increasedsupportfor humanrights and the 'self-determination of peoples and nations'. but also on the Soviet occupation of EasternEurope and the informal colonialism. singling out French colonialism in North Africa for particularcriticism.and negotiationsto reduce the building and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. AAPSO was set up as an organisationof ruling and non-rulingpolitical parties. JawaharlalNehru. as well as observers from Greek Cypriot and AfricanAmerican organisations. leader of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (1954-69).'3 The 1955 meeting in Bandung was attendedby delegations from 29. President of Egypt (1954-70). Hosted by Josip Broz Tito. which would eventually come to power in the 1960s and occupy an importantposition in the Third Worldist pantheon. Yugoslavia. By 1953political logjam surrounding 54 no new membershad been inductedinto the organisationsince the acceptance of Indonesia in January1950. There was also a major debate as to whether Soviet domination of Eastern Europe was equivalent to Western European colonialism in Asia and Africa. The proceedings ended with a call for: increased technical and culturalco-operationbetween the governmentsof Asia and Africa. Prime Minister (1949-76) and Foreign Minister (1949-58) of the People's Republic of China. were in attendancein Bandung.'4 At the Bandung meeting. (1957-66) and Zhou Enlai. primarilynew.
which had been in attendancein Bandung. After 1949 the People's Republic of China (PRC) had initially aligned itself with Moscow.such as Pakistan.most nationalistmovements and ThirdWorld regimes had diplomatic. however.At the Bandung Conference Zhou Enlai had successfully vied with Nehru for a leading role among the non-aligned nation-statesin Asia. it was attended by officials from 25 governments and A representativesfrom 19 different national liberationmovements. but this stipulationdid not lead to the exclusion of representatives from Castro's Cuba from the meeting. The Belgrade Conference was followed by Cairo in 1964.Also. Alliance and Mutual Assistance with the USSR in 1950. At the same time in rural areas they focused on land redistribution.the execution and purging of landlords and the consolidation of the power of the Communist Party. while Zhou Enlai's personal relationship with U Nu of Burma led to the resolution of concerns about their sharedborder. Laos and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) were also strengthenedin the late 1950s.18 By the time of the non-aligned meeting in Cairo in 1964.19 This coincided with the rise and fall of the PRC's commitment to a Soviet-style development model and its increasing efforts in the 1950s to play a leadership role in the emerging Third World. A numberof formerFrench colonies that were closely tied to Paris were also excluded. were excluded if they were seen to be clearly orientatedtowards the USA or Soviet Union. From 1949-53 Mao and the Chinese leadershipfollowed economic policies that included co-operatingwith or allowing the continued commercial activities of those members of the bourgeoisie who had not worked with the Japanese.China's relations with Cambodia. growth they were concernedabout low levels of agricultural and excessive centralisation. In 1954 the Chinese and leadershipset up a state planning apparatus began nationalisingindustryand commerce. as already noted. Despite Third Worldist attemptsat non-alignment. economic and military relations with one or both of the superpowers. By the second half of the 1950s. while in 1955 they moved to collective agriculturealong Soviet lines.17 numberof governments.This was the context for the launch of the Great Leap Forward (1958-61). set up in 13 . Third Worldism was furthercomplicated by the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s. the complicated and conflicting interests of the new nations in Asia and Africa (against the backdropof the universalisationof a system of sovereign nationthe states centred on the United Nations) were increasingly-preventing creation of a strong coalition of non-aligned governments. then Lusaka (Zambia) in 1970 and Algiers in 1973. In the wake of BandungChina's relations with Indonesiaincreasingly improved. signing a Treaty of Friendship. many members of the Chinese leadershipbecame increasingly critical of the operation of the Soviet model in China.20 The Great Leap Forward was closely connected to China's various foreign policy initiatives towards the emerging Third World generally and towards SoutheastAsia more specifically. if not before. In particular. even though Havana was becoming an importantclient-ally of Moscow. while only Thailand and the Philippines had joined the US-sponsored Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation(SEATO).AFTER THE THIRD WORLD? Yugoslavia (1953-80). The Chinese CommunistParty (ccP) leadership was seeking to increase China's economic significance and its international position dramatically.
As the Chinese leadership's war of words with Moscow and Washington escalated. Beijing sought to position itself as a key nation-statein. the China-led Third Worldist push had limited success-reflected in Beijing's unsuccessful effort to have the USSR excluded from the 'Second BandungConference'that had been scheduledto meet in Algeria in June 1965.MARK T BERGER 1954 to support South Vietnam. The USSR and USA signed a nuclear test ban treaty in 1963 which was roundly criticised by Mao.beyond Asia.21 The winding back of the policies associated with the Great Leap Forwardin the early 1960s coincided with the complete ruptureof Beijing's relationship with Moscow.27 In part as a result of these changes.Washingtoncould help ensure that India would serve as an anchor for. India was regardedas an For importantprize: they conjured with the political and ideological benefits for Washington that an alliance with one of the most influential non-aligned governments in Asia would bring. by the end of the 1950s the US approachto 14 .24In the 1950s Nehru's international profile and his commitmentto a combinationof parliamentary democracy. if the USA strengthenedties with Nehru's government.25 some observersin the USA. however.23 Challenging Neocolonialism II: a tryst with destiny India's credentialsas a leading ThirdWorldist state were also in relative decline more generally by the mid-1960s. democratic capitalist development in the Third World to counter the explicitly anti-capitalist and state-socialistalternativesexemplified by China and the Soviet Union. for other US strategists Pakistan was the most importantnation-state in the region for military-strategic reasons:they emphasisedits proximityto the Soviet Union and its position in relation to the Middle East. Prime Minister Nehru's opposition to China's manoeuvres also flowed from the fact that the relatively good relationsbetween China and India that had characterised the 1950s had been completely rupturedby the Sino-Indianwar of 1962 fought along the disputed Himalayanfrontier. and growing friction with the USA. while his diplomacy sought to mobilise a Pan-Asian coalition and a broader grouping of non-aligned Third World regimes.26 In this period the governmentin New Delhi set about balancing its relationship with Washingtonby deepening its economic and militarylinks to Moscow. China successfully tested its own nuclear weapon in 1964. such as Egypt and India. At the same time Pakistanalso became a founding memberof the US-sponsoredSEATO that was formally established in February 1955. economic planning and socialist principles helped to focus considerableworld attentionon India. Gopal Krishna has characterisedthe Indian diplomatic trajectoryin this period as a 'retreatfrom idealism'. while also seeking to maintaingood relations with the Chinese government. meanwhile. a wider Third Worldist challenge well. By 1954 the emphasis on the relative importanceof Pakistanhad led to the decision to enter into a mutual security agreement between the USA and the government of Pakistan. According to this vision. and model of.22 Beijing's initiative led to the cancellation of the conference when many of the governments involved. Ultimately. However. if not the leader of. saw continued benefits in maintainingtheir connections to Moscow and thus not supportingBeijing.
voiced by Senator John F Kennedy and others. despite the much publicised Soviet supportfor national development in India.29 ment is often seen as being shaped by the Soviet model. Sukarno. Nehru's government also drew on China's post-1949 approach to In nationaldevelopment. Nehru certainly rejected key aspects of the Soviet model and his perspective bore similarities to social democratic currents in Western Europe.31 Within less than two years of Nehru's death. By the late 1950s Indonesia had embraced an approachto economic development that involved an increasingly high level of the state interventionto restructure economy in the context of the nationalisation of Dutch owned property.28 Nehruvian socialism and Nehru's commitment to Third Worldism reached their peak during the second half of the 1950s. The Indonesian state directed earnings from the commodity export sector into the primarily state-owned and state-operated 15 .AFTERTHETHIRDWORLD? South Asia had shifted away from an emphasis on Pakistan and towards an emphasis on India.especially its approachto agriculture. for some observers Nehru's views by the 1950s had much more in common with social democracy in post-1945 Western Europe than they did with state-socialism in the Soviet Union.In fact. Nehruvian socialism exemplifies the way in which Marxism was assimilated to national circumstances in the wider context of decolonisation. the Indonesianleader had also attaineda position in the Third Worldist pantheonthat was as transcendent During the 1950s parliaas. although different from. however.Islam and Marxism. via its generous trade and aid arrangements. and prolonged anti-communistpurge in Indonesia. in particular. By the time Nehru died in May 1964 the notion that a benevolent technocraticelite could successful guide India to Nehru's distinctive vision of Indian socialism and that India could both be part of a broad ThirdWorld coalition and serve as a model for other parts of the Third World was already in crisis. undermining the US claim that the democratic-capitalist model was superior to the state-socialist model of national development. Worriedthat the USSR. By the end of the 1950s the Eisenhower administrationalso shared the concern.30 fact. However. that economic decline in India could enhance the Chinese government's prestige in international affairs. that occupied by Nehru.33 mentary democracy in Indonesia had increasingly given way to what Sukarno called 'Guided Democracy'.was gaining influence in Indian government circles.and concerned that if the Indian government failed to achieve its national development plans the strengthof the country's communist movement would increase. a project that was embodied in his famous formulation Nasionalis-AgamaKomunis (NASAKOM)-was overthrown by General Suharto in a bloody and While Nehru had earlier. economic aid programmeto PresidentEisenhowerexpandedhis administration's India in his final years in office.anotherkey exponent of Third Worldism-who sought to synthesise nationalism. his approach was always temperedby a critiqueof the lack of democracyin the Soviet Union and the human cost of Soviet industrialisation.32 somewhat patronisingly. the Cold War and the emergence of Third Worldism.regardedSukarnoas one of his 'disciples' in Asia and antagonisedhis host in Bandung in 1955 as a result. as were the first generation of Bandung Nehru's conception of state-guidednational developregimes more generally.
educationand transportation. By the early 1960s. food production.39 The Suez crisis (which involved an ultimatelyunsuccessfulAnglo-French-Israeli effort to regain control of the Canal) dramatically undermined British prestige and influence in the 16 . He played these parties off against each other. representedan explicitly state-led attempt at national development. to mention as payment not on foreign debts. 'Guided Democracy'. Following Sukarno's overthrow in 1965-66. bolsteredby the ThirdWorldist vision of which he was an important proponent. underpinned by Sukarno's strident anti-Westernnationalism and its synthesis with NASAKOM.MARK T BERGER sector. Export earningswere also directed towardspublic works. manufacturing health. which involved full presidential powers and rule by decree.36 When it came. erected on the foundationsof Sukarno'sfailed state-guided national development project. which had been an importantsource of supportfor Sukarno. stagnation and decline in the sugar and rubber sectors.Suhartopresided over an increasingly conservative anti-communistand authoritarian version of national developmentalism in Indonesia. bringing Indonesia into close alignment with the USA and Japan.35 This was taking place against the backdrop of a conflict (Konfrontasi) with Malaysia over the setting of their respective postcolonial borders.34 Apart from the military. But it was not until over 30 years later. Suharto dramatically reorientated Indonesia's military and economic links. on July 23 1952. the Communist Party (Pm) and a major Muslim party. Egypt effectively became a protectorate of Britain in the 1880s (a status that was formalisedin 1914). at the same time as he pitted the mainly anti-communistmilitary against the PKi.taking over direct control of large sectors of the economy in the late 1950s. had resulted in a shortage of funds and a serious balance of paymentsproblem. that Egyptiannationalistsousted the British-backedKing Faroukin a bloodless coup. combined with falling commodity prices.37 Challenging neocolonialism III: an appointmentwith destiny Anotherpivotal first-generation Bandungregime was Egypt underGamal Abdel Nasser.38 Of particular geostrategic importancebecause of the Suez Canal. This initiated a process that led to the departure all British troops from Egypt of and the Egyptian takeover of the Suez Canal in 1956. The Indonesian Army (ABRI) played an ever more important political and economic role under Sukarno.By the first half of the 1960s it was increasinglyapparentthat not only was Indonesia's economy on the brink of collapse. rested on a complex web of political alliances that revolved aroundthe PartaiNasional Indonesia(NationalistPartyof Indonesia-PNI). Sukarno's 'Guided Democracy'. the end of Sukarno'sregime in Indonesiainvolved a much sharperbreak with first-generationThird Worldism than did the more gradual waning of Nehruvian socialism in India. After World War I the former Ottomanprovince emerged as a nominally independentmonarchy with links to Britainthat were increasinglyperceived by Egyptiannationalistsas neocolonial. After World War II Egypt emerged at the centre of Pan-Arabismand the wider Third-Worldistpush in the Middle East. but the political structurecentred on Sukarnowas also in crisis. however. against the backdrop of the effective elimination of the large PKi.
Kuwait in 1961. Formed in the waning days of World War II at a conference in Alexandria attendedby the governments of Egypt and Iraq. Nasser not only sought to link his brandof Egyptiannationalismto Pan-Arabism.Until the mid-1960s the main foci of activity for the League were supportingthe Palestinians against Israel and attempting to check the French presence in Lebanon and North Africa. Syria. industrialisationand socialism were usually conflated.With his death in 1970 Egyptian influence on the League declined. Qatar. Libya joined the League in 1951. For example. the Arab League was ostensibly aimed at the promotionof economic. then Bahrain.4sAt the same time.42At the same time.44 A key. followed by Tunisia and Morocco in 1958. seemed increasingly tepid. had been directly influenced by Nasser's own trajectory. Saudi Arabia. if not always terribly effective.4 the socialism of the first generationof Bandungregimes. however. but there was no significant central governing body and it operated as a relatively decentralised collection of nation-states. Algeria in 1962. South Yemen (formerly Aden) in 1968. The central goal was industrialisation. A representative of the PalestinianArabs also attendedthe initial conference. not only of an expanding group of united and liberated Arab nation-states. and his vague conception of socialism. technical and cultural interactionbetween the governmentsand people in the Arab world. Nasser was presiding by the late 1950s over the dramaticdeepening of the state-led national developmentproject in Egypt. and along with Lebanon. At the same time the Egyptian leader clearly linked nationalismand import-substitution industrialisation both wider social to (or populist-socialist) goals and to the broaderThird Worldist agenda and the struggle against neocolonialism. In a well known speech in late 1958 (at a time when Egypt was part of the United Arab Republic (UAR) with Syria). Sudanjoined in 1956. . throughoutthe 1950s and 1960s. While Nasser was presidentof Egypt he dominated the organisation.Nasser's ideas became increasingly A socialist over the course of his years in office.He conjuredwith the idea of an independentEgypt as the pivot. vehicle for Nasser's influence in the Middle East was the Arab League.the regime that emerged in Tripoli was far more radical and far less secular in its approach. however. while that of the Palestine LiberationOrganisation(PLO) rose.40 radicaland secularnationalist.4' Shortly after coming to power he published Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution. although the coup in Libya. going so far as to federate Egypt with Syria to form the United Arab Republic .but of Africa and the Islamic world as well. but also in Pan-Arabism and Third Worldism. A council based in Cairo guided the operationsof the League. like Nehru in India and Sukarnoin Indonesia. led by Muammar Qaddafi in 1966. in Nasser's grandiose vision of progress. Oman and the Trucial States in 1971.Transjordan the Yemen. such as Nasser's Egypt. the headquartersof the League shifted from Cairo to Tunis. Nasser said that 'we have an appointmentwith destiny to build up in the UAR a strong nation which feels independent'and in which everyone works for themselves 'not for foreigners' and 'imperialists' From the vantage point of the 1970s.AFTER THE THIRD WORLD? region at the same time as it catapultedNasser to prominenceas a major figure not only in Egyptian nationalism. After Anwar Sadat became president of Egypt. which held up the Egyptian military as the vanguard of the national struggle against 'feudalism'and 'imperialism'.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s Egyptiangovernmentradio repeatedly irritated London and Pariswith its enthusiasticsupportfor the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya in the early 1950s and the FLN in Algeria during its struggle against French colonialism from 1954 to 1962.MARKT BERGER (1958-61). In 1960.Nkrumah(who ruledGhanauntil he was overthrown in a military coup in 1966) and Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea formed the Ghana-Guineaunion in 1958. something that could be more effectively carried out on a regional or transnationalbasis. which was. the first colony in southern Africa to gain independence. the key figure in Pan-Africanismand the key African ThirdWorldistin the 1950s and early 1960s He was. While Pan-Africanism underpinned the push by Nkrumah and others for national self-determination and some form of post-colonial socialism. Kwame Nkrumah.49 Nevertheless.as was the Ghana-Guinea-Maliunion.For example. this vision remainedlinked to the goal of recuperating Africa's pre-colonialculturalheritage and the building of regional unity along culturalas well as political lines. although the erstwhile colonies of Africa had gained political independence. in turn. not to mention the Federation of Mali (Senegal and Mali). it became an independent nation-statein 1957. Formerly the British colony of the Gold Coast. At the same time Muammar Qaddafi has spearheadeda recent attemptto revitalise Pan-Africanismand the OAU.50 Meanwhile.which had been discussed as early as the 1860s and had gained some significance in political and cultural terms in the USA between the first and second world wars against the backdropof the HarlemRenaissance.48Meanwhile. His government provided political and material assistance to national liberation movements in Africa.5' In the post-cold war era Nkrumah's concern that independent African nation-states could only progress as part of a wider economic and political grouping is now seen as more prescient than ever. attemptsto deepen the political structuresof Pan-Africanismin the immediatepost-colonial period were relatively short-lived. national liberation could not be achieved until they attained economic independencevia a break with neocolonialism. Nkrumah published Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. but also to Pan-Islamism and Pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanismsurvived in an attenuated form with the formationof the Organisationof African Unity (OAU) in 1963. were inducted into the United Nations.47 was the first prime minister of Ghana.52 18 . emphasising cooperative agriculture and state-guided industrialisation. of course.includingthe major new national polities of Nigeria and the Republic of the Congo (formerly the Belgian Congo).However. this was a relatively brief arrangement. shortly before the Ghanaian military overthrew him in 1966. However. PanAfricanism. for example. with the latter having been reorganisedand renamed the African Union (AU). 16 new Africannation-states.46 Despite Nasser's support for national liberation in Africa.took on an increasingly explicit socialist tone by the 1930s and 1940s. which argued that. Numerousothertransitionsfrom colony to nation-statesoon followed. The regional vision that informed PanAfricanism increasingly lost momentum as more and more independent nation-statesemerged. With the judicious use of militaryand economic aid Qaddafiensuredthat42 of the member governmentsof what would become the AU showed up for a major conference in Tripoli in 1999.
progressive credentials that emerged in the second half of the 1970s are counted. some commentators.)In fact. Qaddafiand Castro came to Bandung power against the backdrop of a wider wave of second-generationregimes that included those of Ahmed Ben Bella (1962-65) and Houari Boumedienne (1965-78) in Algeria. If the revolutionaryregimes with dubious long-term. India and Egypt. which was.the Philippines and elsewhere in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Guinea-Bissau from 1974 under Amilcar Cabral's successors. Iran and Afghanistan in Central Asia. albeit unsuccessful revolutionary movements were gaining ground in El Salvador. the second-generation Bandung regimes (framed by the Cuban Revolution at the beginning and the Nicaraguan Revolution at the end). Cambodiaand Laos in SoutheastAsia. 1960s-70s Third World reorientated:second-generation The golden age of Third Worldism Qaddafistill leads one of the few survivingone-time second-generationBandung regimes. Grenadaunder Maurice Bishop in the Caribbeanwas also part of this wave. He also includes Ghana and the Philippines in the same category as Indonesia. were exemplars of the 'bourgeois national project initiated by the Bandung Conference'. Libya under MuammarQaddafi after 1969.Guatemala.53 Like Che Guevaraafter him. for which figures like Lumumbaand Guevara became powerful symbols. Mozambique under Samora Moises Machel (197586) and Nicaraguaunderthe Sandinistas(1979-90).such as E San Juan Jr. increasingly intersected with a major revolutionary wave between 1974 and 1980. at the same time as major. more unambiguouslysocialist. This far from exhaustive list could also include the rapid rise and fall of Patrice Lumumba.54 Second-generationBandung regimes (with the exception of post-1979 Iran.the other main survivor from this period is Fidel Castro in Cuba. emphasise that the first-generation regimes. the Derg (Committee) in Ethiopia (1974-91). Jamaicaunder Michael Manley (1972-80). Chile under Salvador Allende (1970-73). the People's Republic of Angola under the PopularMovement for the Liberationof Angola (MPLA) after 1975. while juxta19 . led by nationalists such as Sukarno. Tanzania under Julius Nyerere (1965-85). positioned as a revolutionaryThird Worldist regime) reflected a more radical.the leader of the MouvementNational Congolais (MNC) who emerged as the key figure and Prime Minister in the Republic of the Congo at the time of independencein June 1960 until his assassination by the Belgian authorities (with the complicity of Washington)in January1961. Lumumba'searly death quickly elevated him to a position of major significance in the pantheon of Third Worldist leaders.Nehru and Nasser. Meanwhile. and sometimes still is. ThirdWorldism than the first-generation Bandung regimes. (Important exceptions were the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. like Angola. More broadly. and Zimbabwe.AFTER THE THIRD WORLD? Bandung regimes. if not short-term. Apart from Qaddafi. which were both first-generation Bandung regimes led by Communistparties committed to Marxism-Leninismand state-socialism. Guinea-Bissauand Mozambique Prnncipe emerged out of the collapse of the Portuguese Empire) in Africa. who has been in power since 1959. along with Sao Tome e and Cape Verde (which. the list of 'revolutionary'regimes in this period not already mentioned above includes: Vietnam.
Furthermore. he drew on Marxism ratherthan positioning himself as a Marxist. this characterisation does not actually apply to many of the first-generation Bandung regimes. Nehru and Sukarnowith newly independentnation-states generally. but to view the former as simply anticommunist national bourgeois projects not only misrepresentstheir intellectual and organisationalrelationshipto Marxism. less radical than the second-generationBandung regimes. the Middle East and Latin America. While the Bandung Conference had brought together a relatively small number of leaders from mainly recently independent nation-states in Asia in order to stake out a non-aligned position in the Cold War. the latter group was still generally more radical than the former. he simplifies the 'complexity' of the 'colonialism and its aftermath' he is seeking to understand.59Second20 .58 While the representation of the first generation of Bandung regimes as reformist supportersof the national bourgeoisie and the second generation as revolutionary Marxists committed to state-socialism is overdrawn. one of the key events for the second generation was the TricontinentalConference of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa. the 1966 TricontinentalConference in Havana involved delegates from throughoutAsia. Nehru. At the same time San Juan celebrates leadersof the second generationmovements such as Amilcar Cabral. representingthem all as 'postcolonial states' that were 'modernising on the basis of anticommunismand pragmatic philosophy'. as outlined in the previous section of this introduction.Cabral's particularly pragmatic brand of socialism makes him an exceedingly poor example of the ostensibly sharpbreak between the bourgeois nationalismof the first-generationof Bandung leaders and the second-generationof which Cabral was a member. held in Havana in January 1966. For example. FirstgenerationBandung regimes were certainly.by making such a sharpdistinctionbetween the 'national bourgeois project' of first-generationBandung leaders and the socialism of primarilysecond-generationleaders.57 Ironically. He says he is primarilyconcernedwith using Cabral'to refute the argumentthat historical materialistthinking is useless in grasping the complexity of colonialism and its aftermath'. San Juan situates the first-generationBandung regimes led by Nasser.MARK T BERGER posing these 'nationalistbourgeois struggles' with Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh and Cuba under Fidel Castro.56 San Juan acknowledges that 'we cannot of course returnwholesale to the classic period of nationalliberationstruggles'. by and large. Sukarno and even Nasser often had a more complicated relationship with 'socialism' and their own national communist parties than is conveyed by San Juan's formulation.who led the African Party for the Independenceof Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC)from 1956 until his assassinationin 1973. Africa. It articulateda far more radical anti-imperialagenda that located the participantsfirmly in the socialist camp at the same time as they formally emphasised their independence from the USSR and Maoist China.but also stereotypesthe complexities of their interactions with the cold war superpowers. While he was widely regarded as progressive. Asia and Latin America. while relying on 'Soviet military support' and engaging in a 'cynical playing of the 'American card' 55 However. if the Bandung conference was symbolically the most importantmeeting for the first generationof Bandungregimes.
AFTER THE THIRD WORLD? generation Bandung Regimes. and the replacement of Nikita Khrushchev(1953-64) by Leonid Brezhnev (1964-82). revolutionaryregimes were also directly inspired and. representedthe practicalcomplement to the rise and spread of dependency theory (along with other revitalised Marxist theories of development and social and political change). played a central role in the call for a New InternationalEconomic Order (NIEo) at the United Nations in the mid-1970s.63 Following the founding meeting of the OAU in Addis Abba in May 1963.6 Following the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.62Robert Malley goes so far as to call the FLN's ascension to power in 1962 'a defining moment in the history of ThirdWorldism'.61The triumphof the FLN Algeria marked an important turning point for the region and for Third Worldism more generally. emerged in the 1960s and 1970s as a key figure in Third Worldism.67This approachhad the effect of further encouraging many revolutionaries to break completely with Moscow in the 1960s and try to emulate the Cuban revolution. While the new regime in Cuba became highly dependenton the Soviet Union. delivered a particularlystirringaddress to those in attendanceas 'one of the leaders of the Third World struggle'. Ben Bella was also able to gamer allies in sub-SaharanAfrica during what would be a relatively brief period as presidentof the Algerian republic. military officer who enjoyed considerable popular support in Algeria and remained more or less committed to the populist socialism and state-guided economics of his predecessor. as will be discussed below. At the same time. Ben Bella. supportedby Castro's Cuba. for example.65 Meanwhile. in the case of Algeria. his The latter. the Algerian leader.64 In 1965 Ben Bella was ousted in a military coup led by Houari Boumedienne. in the context of the expanding Cold War. directly or indirectly linked to the tricontinentalism of the late 1960s and 1970s. Boumedienne. Triumphand tragedy:from exhausted colonialism to exhausted nationalism In Algeria the escalating military struggle against French colonialism that began in 1954. The example of the Vietnamese revolution had influenced many of the second-generationBandung regimes. culminatedin the departure emergence of an independent of the exhaustedcolonial rulersand the triumphant in Algeria in July 1962. the way in which the Cuban revolution overthrew a regime that had long enjoyed the support of Washington and embarked after 1959 on the creation of a radical socialist state in such close proximity to the USA was also extremely importantto Marxist and Third Worldist intellectuals and revolution66 aries. The Algerian Revolution was pivotal to Third Worldism because the struggle had been so lengthy and violent at the same time as the FLN was 'acutely aware' of the struggle's 'international dimension'. members of the Cuban leadership continued to 21 . While attractingthe attentionof the USA for his radicalideas and his links with Cuba. Moscow increasingly urged the Communistpartiesin Latin America to adopt a gradualapproach to social change. a charismatic Defense Minister and also his formercomrade-in-arms.60In this era secondgenerationBandung Regimes and their supportersattemptedto radicalise statemediated national developmentefforts in various ways in the name of socialism and national liberation.
the early 1960s in particularwere characterisedby a concerted effort to try and spread the Cuban revolution to the rest of Latin America and beyond. This effort was a disappointment. Africa was a different matter-Cuban troops played an important.even pivotal. and he soon shifted his focus back to Latin America.MARK T BERGER articulatea far more revolutionarystance than their patrons in Moscow in this period-Havana gave considerable encouragement and support to insurgent groups in Nicaragua and Guatemala which had split from the traditional communist movement (or had never been linked to it in the first place). combinedwith the overthrowof dictatorshipin Portugalitself. ruralinsurgency and Cuban militancy in Latin America were curtailed. However. and found in foco theory the key to initiating action. While Fidel Castro increasingly aligned himself with the Soviet Union and sought to focus on building communism in Cuba as the 1960s progressed. He was capturedand executed in October 1967 by counter-insurgency troops of the Bolivian armed forces.68 Che Guevara personified revolutionaryidealism and Third Worldism in its second-generationform. Guevara was increasingly influenced by Trotskyism and by the idea that the success of Cuban communismwas dependenton the spread of revolution to the rest of the Third World. At the same time the Cuban governmenthad helped to educate and influence an entire generationof revolutionariesin Latin America and beyond.70 As the 1970s began Cubanpolicy in Latin America had come more into line with that of the USSR.72And. With foquismo Guevara emphasised that a small nucleus of guerrillas could provide the leadership and revolutionary elan required to establish a successful guerrillainsurgency. although Cuba had curtailed its direct involvement in Latin America by the 1970s.a process that continued into the post-cold war era.69 Following Guevara's death.74 and Angola and Mozambique. Guevara departed from Trotsky's emphasis on a vanguardparty.however.continuedto be torn by externallyfunded guerrillainsurgencies seeking to topple the Marxist and Third Worldist leadership. Angola representsa particularlystarkexample of the 22 . Guinea-Bissauand Sao Tom' e Prnncipe Cape Verde. and the virtual elimination of guerrilla groups in Colombia. three. led to the independenceof Angola. only apparentlywinding down in the case of Angola in recent times. Mozambique. Venezuela and Guatemalaby the end of the 1960s. armedstrugglesin Portugal'scolonies. This process was reflected in Che Guevara's assertion of the need to create 'two.and its leader Carlos Fonseca (who was killed in 1976 in a battle with Somoza's nationalguard).was profoundly influenced by the Cuban experience.In early 1965 Guevararesigned from the Cuban government and led an expedition to the Congo.His efforts to foment revolutionwere also regardedwith suspicion by the Bolivian CommunistParty. the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (SandinistaNational LiberationFront-FSLN)in Nicaragua. in particular. many Vietnams' and it reached its zenith with his death in 1967 in Bolivia.7' For example. However. In 1974-75 the ongoing.73As has already been noted. role in the revolution in Angola in the 1970s. In fact. Africa was a major arena of the revolutionaryresurgence of the late 1970s. arriving with his small group of foquistas in Bolivia. his guerrilla group failed to gain the support of the indigenous inhabitantsof the Bolivian highlands.
AFTERTHETHIRDWORLD? tragedy that came in the wake of national liberation and the ostensible pursuit of Third Worldist goals. but flowed from.77For example. launched the famous Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).These elaboratetariff systems and dual exchange rates. in the context of complex colonial legacies. despite these efforts. and built on.Mugabe himself sought to burnishhis Third Worldist and nationalist credentials at the latest meeting of the NonAligned Movement in Kuala Lumpur in late February2003. earlier efforts to address the structural inequalities of the international politicaleconomic order. and the incoming leader of NAM. combined with the expansion of the education system.81 call for a restructuring the world economy in favour of the nation-statesof the ThirdWorld made at the special session of the General Assembly of the UN between 9 April and 2 May 1974 was reinforcedby the 1973 oil crisis. However.Mugabe. What followed was a protractedwar of national liberationled by the PatrioticFront. His increasingly erraticand despotic rule. and now President. while millions of Zimbabweanswere facing the prospect of a major famine as a result of Mugabe's government's shortcomings.75White-ruledRhodesia also emerged as central to the wider dynamics of national liberation and the Cold War in southernAfrica. delivered to Washington and the West at the summit. Mahathir Mohamad.79The statemediated national development project as it emerged in Africa and elsewhere rested on a growing range of governmentalstructuresto manage productionfor domestic and export markets.78 The last avatar of development economics: The NIEO and the global crisis of national development ThirdWorldistregimes such as Mugabe's in Zimbabwehad come to power with what were still profoundlyhierarchical the intentionof dramatically transforming and primarily rural societies via land reform and state-directedimport-substitution industrialisationstrategies. which sometimes never went beyond the planning stage. underthe leadershipof Ian Smith.80 general crisis provided the context for the UN Declarationon the Establishment of The of a New International Economic Order(NIEO). In 1965 the white settlers of SouthernRhodesia. joining the Iraqi delegation. long-standing divisions in these societies. health care and other social services and led to the emergence of overburdenedstates that increasingly buckled under rising This foreign debt and the predationsof corruptelites both civilian and military.76In 1980 Zimbabwe achieved full independence and majority rule under the elected governmentof former guerrillaleader.and most state-capitalistand socialist-orientated national development projects in the ThirdWorld were already in crisis before relative late-comers such as Mugabe even came to power. an uneasy coalition of Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African Political Union (zAPu) and Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).These previous efforts included the establishmentof the Group 23 . were reinforced and reconfiguredratherthan undermined. has become an extreme example of the exhaustion of national liberation as a political project and of the tragedy of Third Worldism more generally. General Than Shwe of Burma and Fidel Castro in their enthusiastic support for the lambasting that their host. and a range of subsidies on food and other items. which is now in its third decade.
The rise of conservative.85For example. This new global structurewould have requiredthe power to reorganiseglobal markets and extracttaxes at a global level and then redistribute them globally as well. MohammedReza Pahlavi (1954-79).83The call for an NIEO followed on the heels of the 1973 oil crisis and the demonstrationby the Organisationof Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) of its ability to set the price of oil. Carlos Andres Perez (1973-78) and Luis Echeverrma Alvarez (1970-76) and the Shah of Iran. OPEC'S growing influence weakened rather than strengthened Third Worldism. Prebisch. anti-communist.the 'last avatar' of post-World War II development economics. Implementingsuch a set of reformswould have requireda new global structure of governance that went far beyond the UN-centred internationalsystem. in turn. never implemented. representeda major obstacle to the realisationof the NiEO and the wider Third Worldist project. using the latteras a forum to encourage preferentialtariffs for exports from the late-industrialisingnation-statesof the ThirdWorld. while the latter was. The immediateimpetus for the NIEO. the intellectual anchor of state-mediatedcapitalist development between the 1940s and the 1970s. President of Algeria. The changes asked for in the NIEO were. the Bandungera was alreadycoming to a close. the new 'petro-states' were also in a position by the 1980s to resist the economic liberalising thrust of the US-led globalisation project.84 Third World retreating: the end of the Bandung era.The NIEO effectively called for the extension to the internationaleconomic system of the redistributiveframeworkthat had been consolidatedin the social democraciesof Western Europe after World War II but was now in crisis at its point of origin. wars between the 24 . and their often strong links to the USA. in the words of one commentator. taken at its meeting in Algiers in September 1973. oil-rich nation-states. At the very moment when the ThirdWorld was being seen by some observersto have 'come of age'. The other main sponsors were the presidentsof Venezuela and Mexico. Of course. of course. to ask the UN to hold a special session on 'problems relating to raw 82 materials and development'. in a somewhat contradictoryfashion. meanwhile. who was Director-Generalof the UNRauil sponsoredEconomic Commissionfor Latin America (Comision Economica para America Latina-CEPAL) from 1948 to 1962. a central figure in the promotion and planning of the NIEO Declaration was Houari Boumedienne. who was responsible for the initial request to the UN that a special session on international economic developmentbe held. also helped to found and then went on to head UNCTAD from 1964 to 1969. While some commentatorssee OPEC's assertivenessin the 1970s as an example of the wider ThirdWorldistpush in this period. 1980s-2000s The climacteric of Third Worldism The 1980s ushered in the climacteric of Third Worldism. was the decision by the Non-Aligned Movement.MARKT BERGER of 77 at the 1962 Economic Conference of Developing Countriesin Cairo and the establishment in 1964 of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). As noted earlier. In retrospectthe NIEO was. particularly in the Middle East.
a key regional focus of the New Cold War. The Carteradministration (1977-80) also attemptedto improve its relations with the Indian government. Once the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan to prop up the increasingly embattledstate-socialistregime in Kabul in late 1979. played an importantrole (along with the Saudi Arabianand the Chinese governments) in supporting the loose coalition of resistance groups (Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen) fighting the Soviet occupation. was restoredand then significantlyincreased. displaced by the globalisation project. NAM played an increasinglylimited role in internationalaffairs during the so-called New Cold War and after. the Reagan administrationpresided over an unprecedentedmilitary build-up and a reinvigorated anti-communist crusade directed at the Soviet bloc and Third Worldist regimes such as Nicaragua. the emphasis on restructuringthe world economy to address the North-South divide was challenged with increasing effectiveness by the emergent US-led globalisation project.and the country's powerful intelligence organisation. and the subsequent spread of neoliberal economic policies and practices. The general deterioration of US relations with Pakistan was paralleled by improvementsin US relations with India in the post-cold war era. On the of one hand the administration Bill Clinton (1992-2000) introduceda range of 25 . Prime Minister IndiraGandhi. The InternationalMonetary Fund and the World Bank. pointed to the obvious failure of socialist internationalism Third Worldism.89 During the New Cold War. who was trying to lessen reliance on the USSR.90Apart from Central America. under Prime Minister Morarji Desai (1977-80). was Southwest Asia. by the beginning of the 1980s. This situation only changed when Soviet military forces withdrew from Afghanistan (between May 1988 and February1989). once the USA resumedmilitary and economic aid to Pakistanand increasingly tilted towards China against the in backdropof Washingtonand Beijing's rapprochement the 1970s and the war in Afghanistanafter 1979. Despite regular meetings.which Washington had suspended because of nuclear testing by Islamabad. US aid to Pakistan. moved again to strengthenIndian relations with the USSR.AFTER THE THIRD WORLD? 'red brotherhood' of Vietnam. the governments of Margaret Thatcher in Britain (1979-90) and Helmut Kohl in (West) Germany(1982-98).86 More broadly. encouragedthe governmentsof the ThirdWorld to liberalise trade. the UN-sponsored idea of a New InternationalEconomic Order disappearedfrom view. and when the subsequentend of the Cold War brought about the end of all US aid to Pakistan (in the context of renewed US concern about Pakistan'sclandestinenuclearweapons programmein the 1990s).In the 1980s the Pakistanimilitary.privatisetheir public sectors and deregulatetheir This trend also coincided with the renewal of the Cold War financial sectors. Cambodia.87 With the world recession and the Debt Crisis at the start of the 1980s.88 and the further weakening of the Non-Aligned Movement. which also highlights the vicissitudes of non-alignmentspecifically and Third Worldism more generally. However. who replaced Desai in 1980. Laos and China in the late 1970s and its close relative.91 While there were clear shifts in direction and geographical orientation in post-cold war USA foreign policy there were also significantcontinuities. from the end of the 1970s to the late 1980s.the Inter-ServicesIntelligence directorate(isi). supported by the administration of Ronald Reagan (1981-88).
the Clinton administrationemphasised at the Clinton outset that it intended to shift from 'containmentto enlargement'.9 'necessary to achieve sustainable democracy' A greater emphasis was also assistance and sustainable development. However. that had emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union. building and expanding 'civil society' and improving 'governance'. while Egypt has been a majorstrategic outpost for Washington since 1977 when Nasser's successor. the basis of US foreign aid policy after the Cold War make clear the relative continuityin US strategicthinkingin that the 1990s. and enhance the political stability of.97Despite the high degree of continuity in US foreign policy in the 1990s.France.MARKT BERGER reforms that were ostensibly aimed at 'enlargingthe community of democratic nations worldwide' with importantimplicationsfor the erstwhile ThirdWorld. the four main goals of US foreign aid in the post-cold war era were identified in the 1997 US Agency for International Development (USAID) StrategicPlan as: the promotionof the 'rule of law'.98 main goal was not just to 'securethe peace won advised that his administration's in the Cold War'. but limited changes to. a post-communistRussia that still possesses a majorcapacity for nuclearwarfareand is the world's second largest oil exporter after Saudi Arabia.Since the late 1970s US policy towardsEgypt has viewed With the end of the it as the key to making and expandingpeace in the region. but to strengthen the country's 'national security' by . In the year the bill was passed Israel and Egypt received over one-third of all US foreign aid. For example. 'enlargingthe communityof marketdemocracies' However.94 This was more or less the same percentagefor Israel and Egypt as they had received in the 1980s.Movement towards all these objectives was regardedby USAID as . Anwar Sadat. Israel's importanceto US foreign policy (and to domestic US politics) goes back decades. while the 1994 figure for sub-Saharan million. like the administration of his predecessor. There was also a continuedfocus on the Middle East. like Bush before him. such as the Ukraine. The figurefor Israelwas US$3 billion and for Egypt it was Africa as a whole was $800 $2. the Clinton team understood that the immediate post-cold war world conferredclear geopolitical and economic advantageson the USA and they sought primarilyto manage and maintainthe status quo. Clinton.92 For example. Bush Sr administration. ended his government's ties to the USSR and became a central player in the to US-sponsoredpeace process in the region. From the time of this reorientation the end of the 1990s Cairo received at least $46 billion in militaryand economic aid from Washington. also attemptedto maintainas high a level of defence spending as possible. Like the Clinton remainedfocused on the majorpowers: the UK. at the same time as Central America quickly droppedfrom view. relatedparticularly a concernto improve relations with. Germany.96 The redirectionof. the placed on humanitarian foreign aid bill that was passed by the US Congress in 1994 continued.1 billion. Through26 . Russia.95 Cold War foreign aid was also directedincreasinglyat the formerSecond World. Japanand China. planningdocumentsand the public pronouncements emanated from the administrationof George Bush Sr (1989-92) reflected the continued preoccupationwith Russia and some of the other successor states. to again for broadgeopolitical reasons. the promotionof 'elections and political processes'.to reflect a commitment to often long-standing geopolitical concerns. not surprisingly.
were perceived as regions where no vital US security or economic interests were at stake. For increasingly influential neoliberals the capitalist transformationof Asia had undermined the Third Worldist idea that the hierarchicalcharacterof the world economy was holding back the Third World. the Clinton administration clearly viewed Europe."? This reflected the wider approachthat perceived a close connection between China's economic development and geopolitics. Interestingly. in fact. In ideological terms. MahathirMohamad (1981-2003). At the same time. Europe was apparentlyat the top of the list. by the 1980s the Prime Minister of Malaysia. but at the very moment when Third Worldism was in dramatic 27 . Meanwhile. But.AFTER THE THIRD WORLD? out the 1990s rhetoric about humanitarianintervention to the contrary. which he. Latin America. It was in the Asia-Pacific. In this period East Asia/the Asia-Pacific was regarded as number two and rising. the notion of a Third World still remained relevant. a 1995 Departmentof Defense document described the US military operations in the Asia-Pacific as the 'foundation for economic growth' and the 'oxygen' of 'development'. and from the perspective of proponentsof state-mediateddevelopment as well.101 was consummatedby the turnto the marketon the part of the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (the only first-generation Bandung regimes that had pursued fully fledged state-socialism) in the 1980s and 1990s. Lee Kuan Yew was entitled From ThirdWorldto First). and the need for. now the developing countries of the Third World could become successful late-developersby emulatingthe Newly Industrialising Countries(NIcs)of Asia. Africa and South Asia. was articulatinga particularlystridentanti-WesternPan-Asianismthat was grounded in an explicitly racial conception of national and internationalpower relations.102 Most of the key elements of this shift are reflected in the efforts of Singaporean leader. while presiding over a state-guidedexport-orientated projectgroundedin a very particular history. where the end of the Bandung era and the decline of ThirdWorldism more generally had become particularlyevident well before the end of the Cold War.103Meanwhile. The interconnectionbetween security and economic development was also particularlyobvious in the thinking of defence planners in relation to East Asia. Third Worldism. as the search for threats to the US position in the world shifted increasingly to East Asia in the 1990s. nevertheless. He linked (whose recent autobiography an increasingly conservative nationalism to an equally conservative Panindustrialisation Asianism. by the late 1970s successful capitalist development in East Asia had displaced the socialist agenda contained in the This process of displacement idea of the Third World and Third Worldism. For example.represented as providing developmentlessons for the rest of the world. From this perspective. Third Worldism was increasingly marginalised in Asia by efforts to promote a distinctly post-Third Worldist Pan-Asianism groundedin state guided capitalist development.East Asia/the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East/SouthwestAsia as the three most importantregions in the world in terms of US strategyand security. For a growing number of observers the economic success of the Newly Industrialising Countries of Northeast and Southeast Asia by the 1980s and 1990s had called into question many of the tenets of.however. while the Middle East/Southwest Asia was third. Mahathirnot only increasinglytook on the mantle of the voice of Asia.
He goes on to argue that the post-cold war world order centred on US hegemony is weakening rather than strengtheningthose forces that support liberal democracy in Indonesia. Saul is especially interested in the presidency of Nelson Mandela's successor. Under Mbeki. the ANC has continued to present itself as a leader of the ThirdWorld. reinforcing the consolidation of illiberal democracy and the rise of 'neo-Third Worldism' in Indonesia and beyond. he also positioned himself as a voice of the ThirdWorld.as alreadynoted. Reinventing the Third World As demonstratedby Mahathir's Third Worldism. This provides the backdrop for a detailed examination of the intellectual sources for ideas and definitions of democracy deployed by contemporary Indonesianpolitical actors in their efforts to rebuild the archipelago's political system in the wake of the demise of Suharto's New Order. the idea of a ThirdWorld continuesto have geopolitical. Thabo Mbeki. which have worked 'to deflect consideration away from the options pressed by other. relevance at the geopolitical level. For Hadiz. This growing grassrootsopposition might eventually help to steer South Africa-via 28 .'05She concludes. argues Saul. 'profoundcontradictionsinherent in the ANc's effort both to retain its Third Worldist credentials and to present itself as a reliable client to the BrettonWoods institutionsand foreign investors'. significance in many quarters.In 'The rise of neo-ThirdWorldism: the Indonesian trajectory and the consolidation of illiberal democracy'. there are. undergirdedby Malaysia's assumptionof the leadershipof NAM.MARK T BERGER decline. while the idea of a Third World has continued. that it still retains strategic relevance in some geopolitical circumstances. with a focus on debates about democratisationin Indonesia. groundinghis analysis by focusing on the African National Congress (ANc) in South Africa since its election to government and the end of apartheid in 1994. albeit diminishing.In fact. This has meant that. however. neo-Third Worldism has revived the most conservative characteristicsof Third Worldism without retaining any of the progressive and internationalistideals of the early cold war era. He looks at what he regards as both the strengthsand weaknesses of the continueduse of the ThirdWorld. there has been a dramaticdecline in its conceptualrelevance for comparative political analysis. as the ANC reaches the 10-yearmark as a governing party. Since 1994 the ANc has followed a series of policies that Saul describes as 'deeply compromisedquasi-reformism'. However. if not conceptual."4Against this backdrop. John Saul also looks at the significance of the deployment of Third Worldist rhetoric in the post-cold war era. His article examines both the older and more recent theories of modernisationand developmentin the ThirdWorld. in her contributionto this special issue Vicky Randall argues that. much more meaningfully radical internationaland South African labour organisations. a numberof significantgrassrootsmovements have increasingly opted to mobilise against the government's 'bankruptpolicies'. Vedi Hadiz suggests the Third World retains even more conceptual utility than that implied by Randall. Mahathirassumed the chairmanshipof NAM (which now has 114 member nation-states)in February2003.environmentalgroups and social movements'.
looking at the ways in which indigenous Fijians and Fiji's Indian communities have sought to reconstitutenational and communal identities via various strategies that involve transnationalnetworking as well as more localised approaches. following a detailed discussion of primitive accumulation and global public goods.For Moore. argues Moore. Taking up a set of concerns that flows from the same geographical location and the same political-economic question. proposes that a better alternativeis to be found in what he calls 'public accumulation'. Moore seeks to advance the ongoing debate about progress beyond the cold war nomenclatureof three worlds of development into the increasingly global. 29 . Third Worldist regimes embraced 'a future dominatedby alternativesof Europeanorigin'. but still highly differentiated. In its 'First Age'. is also the 'Second Age of the Third World'. political-economic terrainof the 21st century.Drawing on the specificity of the postcolonial Fijian trajectoryshe proffers a 'non-reductiveway to think about decolonisation. of transnationalisation the Fijian conflict. 'which was a premise of this mapping'. route towards proletarianisation and private property' is both accelerated and aggravated under neoliberal globalisation. Devleena Ghosh looks closely at the possibilities and prospects for postcolonial Fiji in the wake of a series of major political and or social crises in the past 15 years. movements and governments that are increasingly looking for and applying 'innovative and appropriatelyrevolutionary approaches to challenge the geographical. especially when confronted with the ever-present but usually hidden state'.AFTER THE THIRD WORLD? the dramatictransformation the ANCor the establishmentof a new political of project in South Africa with the same potentialfor hegemony as the ANC-away from quasi-reformism and back into the ranks of the progressive groups. by contrast. At the same time he seeks to retain and reinvent the notion of the Third World. In 'Spectres of the Third World: global modernity and the end of the three worlds' he emphasises that the three worlds of development 'was a productof Eurocentricmappings of the world to deal with the postcolonial situation'that unfolded in the aftermathof World War II. cultural transformationand notions of autonomy and Third World solidarity'. 'the uneven. Meanwhile. destructive and creative. The brutalityof primitive accumulationin the post-cold war era has thrown 'contemporary development theory into disarray. says Moore. By 'mortgaging' their future to some form of socialism or some form of capitalism. The post-cold war era of neoliberal globalisation. A key response by development role of the increasingly internationalised theorists has been the notion of 'global public goods'. From a complementaryperspective Arif Dirlik probes the Eurocentricdimensions of Third Worldism. in her contribution. the identity of the Third World is now framed by its re-entryinto the protractedprocess of primitive accumulation. Moore. She emphasises the deterritorialisation. the Third World' was defined by comparisons with advancedcapitalism and state socialism and by Third Worldist efforts to pursue a non-aligned path between the two superpowersand the competing models of development they represented.In its 'Second Age'. Meanwhile. 'Re-crossing a different water: colonialism and Third Worldism in Fiji'.racial and class-based hierarchiesof global inequality'. David Moore examines the current crisis in development theory and development policy.
Meanwhile. and the associated ideas of developmentand non-alignmentwere predicatedupon the core concept of the nationalbourgeoisie and associated notions of the inherentlyprogressive potential of nationalism'.While the post-cold war era flows directly from 'the struggles that the idea of three worlds sought to capture.In her view this historical turningpoint also signals 'the definitive end of the idea of the Third World and its associated ideology of Third Worldism. is one of 'global modernity' by which he means 'a post-Eurocentricmodernity that has scramblednotions of space and time inheritedfrom modernity'. meanwhile. has also argued that the age of the Third World has passed irrevocably into history.. frameworkof global power relations grounded in the transformationof the centre-peripherydynamics that underpinnedthe earlier development framework. been repeatedlyproclaimedand contested over the past two decades'. those struggles have led to unanticipated reconfigurations globally.highlighting the way that neoliberalglobalisationhas emerged as a new. For Desai. I 30 . the 'post-globalisationphase' ushered in by the 'war on terrorism'representsa particularly'aggressive' form of 'US imperialism'.. Furthermore.. His article historicises the 'developmentframework'and its links to the making and unmaking of the Third World (the latter formulation was. of course.. although this end has. made well known by Arturo Escobar in the mid-1990s in his influentialbook. The analysis I have offered in this introductoryarticle. In particular Dirlik examines the way in which the 'spectre of the ThirdWorld' continues to inform questions about globalisationand modernityregardlessof whetheror not we are reinventing the Third World or ending with the Third World. In fact she goes furtherthanMakki and arguesthat: 'if globalisationspelled the end of development . including the reconfiguration of capitalism. Instead. Fouad Makki traces the history of the idea of development and its rise to centralityin 'understanding global hierarchiesof wealth and power'. in 'From national bourgeoisie to rogues. 'idea of a united and rising Third World the had a greater reality as a hope than it ever had as an objective historical possibility'. the US imperium is 'no longer based on primarily financial globalisation' as the means by which Washington and US-based corporationsexercise and extend global power.MARK T BERGER the present juncture. Dirlik argues. EncounteringDevelopment: The Making and Unmakingof the Third World).US imperialismis 'now more openly based on the directcontrol of productiveassets and territory'. of course. then the launchingof the war on terrorismsignals the end of globalisation'. which has globalised following the fall of the second world (the world of socialisms)' and produced a range of new challenges. failures and bullies: 21st century imperialism and the unravelling of the Third World'. According to Desai. but still fragile. In 'Transforming centre-peripheryrelations'. Ending with the Third World In contrastto the contributors to discussed above the rest of the contributors this special issue clearly seek to exorcise the spectre of the Third World and move beyond the three worlds frameworkratherthan revise or reinvent it. Radhika Desai draws attentionto the fragility of neoliberal globalisation. She argues that 'the idea of the ThirdWorld.
Furthermore. Significantly. the dominant political and policy prescriptions for alleviating inequality and immiseration are still articulatedprimarily. The failure of Third Worldism-as an ideological trend centred on a wide array of anti-colonial nationalisms and national liberation movements that linked the utopian strands of Marxism and/or liberalism to romantic conceptions of the pre-colonial era-needs to be set against the wider history of decolonisation. via strategies of poverty reduction and development that focus explicitly on 'developing coun31 . however. The way in which the Third World has been appropriatedas part of the managerialrepertoireof the US-led globalisationproject is highlighted in detail in Heloise Weber's article. economic and territorialdivision of the globe lingers on in the continued use of the idea of a Third World to manage diverse and complex polities in an era when the US-led globalisation project is at the centre of the reshaping of the nation-state system and the global political-economic order. the formationof new nation-statesand the Cold War. however. It was the contradictions inherent in the universalisation of the nation-state system and the global economic orderof the cold war era that both producedthe Third Worldist challenge and eventually helped to undermine it as a serious alternativeto liberal capitalism or state-socialism. is intellectually and conceptually bankrupt.Implicit in much of the discussion about globalisation (whetherby proponentsor critics) is the idea that territorially grounded notions of the political should be superseded by an approachthat takes global social formationsas it primaryfocus and views world order as socially and not territoriallyconstituted. even if the mantle of ThirdWorldism can successfully be taken up in the post-cold war era by non-statecentredmovements. 'Reconstitutingthe Third World? Poverty reduction and territorialityin the global politics of development'. Once in power.At the same time. even in a limited or reinvented form.AFTER THE THIRD WORLD? have also emphasisedthat the state-centredcharacterof Third Worldism and its emphasis on an alliance of ostensibly sovereign territorialnation-statesis a key element in the overall failure of Third Worldism generally and of the failure of a wide arrayof state-guidednationaldevelopmentprojects more specifically. She notes that world politics are increasingly conceptualised by development theorists and policy makers in terms of globalisation and/or fragmentation. As we have seen. the nation-statebecame the embodimentof the efforts of both the first.while politically Third Worldism has already lost any relevance or legitimacy it once had.and second-generation Bandung regimes to mediate the transformative impact of colonialism and build an anti-colonialpolitics that combined tradition and cultural specificity with Marxism and/or 'Western' modernity more generally. it can be argued that the notion of the Third World has now been most successfully appropriated the very US-led globalisation project that propoby nents of a reinvented Third Worldism want to challenge. I take the view that the notion of a Third World.if not exclusively. Bandung regimes used Third Worldism as a powerful legitimating narrativeat the same time as they were unable to realise the prosperity and progress that national liberation and independence were supposed to deliver. Challenging neoliberal globalisation and post-cold war capitalismmeans moving beyond the territorialpolitics of nationstates-a politics to which Third Worldism is inextricably connected. the now irrelevanttripartite political.
For Weber the Third World is being reconstituted within the contemporaryglobal orderin a way that cuts across efforts to pursue 'social solidarityas a political project-both within and across state boundaries'. which operateunder a new logic. Another key characteristicof this new era is 'the emergence of self-organising social movement networks. This means that the Third World serves as a key site of 'empowerment'in the global politics of development and also as a key site of 'disciplinaryefforts to manage the contradictions'of neoliberal globalisation. peoples and economies world wide' which is in turn complementedby what he calls 'global coloniality': a process that involves 'the heightened marginalisationand suppression of the knowledge and culture of subalterngroups'. in fact. In 'ThirdWorldism and the lineages of global fascism: the regroupingof the global South in the neoliberalera'. it is not just the continueddeploymentof the ThirdWorld that is problematic-it is. Rajeev Patel and Philip McMichael also seek 32 . While the PRSP approachhas been promotedas a way of strengthening democracy. hence. He argues that. Weberpoints in particular the recentrevision of conditionallending strategies. At the same time. which he defines as 'an economic-military-ideological order that subordinates regions. fostering forms of counter-hegemonicglobalisation'. against the backdrop of the globalisationproject. Escobarpoints to the need for 'imaginingafter the ThirdWorld'. ArturoEscobar also sees a need to overcome the limits the idea of the Third World continues to place on the pursuit of progress.MARKT BERGER tries' and the 'Third World'. it also becomes clear that it is necessary to move 'beyond the paradigmof modernityand. to centred on the introductionof the 'Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) approach' by both the IMF and the World Bank. She concludes that the PRSP approachultimately promotes a type of governance that 'reconstitutesthe Third World' geographically regardless of the increasingly supra-territorial characterof globalisation. The post-cold war context for this project includes what he calls an emergent 'new US-based form of imperial globality'. and beyond modernity. she emphasises that the centrality of 'territorial politics' to the dominant discourse on development and world order is most readily apparentin relationto the theory and practicearoundthe 'governanceof the Third World'.Weber argues that the PRSP approach is best seen as an effort to 'constitutionalise' a particulartype of 'supra-stategovernance of the Third World' via detailed conditions and constraintsthat include directly linking poverty alleviation and development objectives to the goals of the World TradeOrganization(wTo). as it becomes increasingly clear that 'there are modernproblems for which there are no modern solutions'. For Escobar 'these movements represent the best hope for reworking imperial globality and global coloniality in ways that make imagining after the Third World. As part of an effort to do this he looks in particular at the social movements in black communitieson the Pacific Coast of Colombia. Weber argues that.a viable project'. the 'continued political significance of the territorialin strategiesof neoliberalgovernance' that needs to be addressedand challenged. beyond the ThirdWorld'. By and large the 'governance of the Third World' is approached via the incorporation of the politics of development (or more specifically by focusing on the question of poverty reduction) in the so-called 'developing countries' into the overall frameworkof 'neoliberal governance'.
Furthermore. or the forces of 'globalisation-from-below' or counterglobalisation). Olesen argues that one of the importantaspects of the global solidarity efforts that surroundthe Zapatistasis the partial dissolution of cold war era ideas about 'solidarity with the Third World' and the 'one-way' paternalismthat was often centralto this type of support. focuses on the way that the Zapatistasquickly became an importantrallying point for progressive organisationsand solidarity activists in Europe and North America and beyond. Conclusion: history. Olesen.Many of the post-cold war global solidarityefforts aroundthe Zapatistasare based on what he suggests is a new. the romantic guerrilla Marxism and Third Worldism of the cold war era.AFTER THE THIRD WORLD? to move the politics of development beyond the Third World. increasingly articulate an approach to 'sovereignty' that runs counter to the dominantconception of state sovereignty that was universalised during the rise and decline of Third Worldism between the 1940s and the 1970s. SubcomandanteMarcos.This reflects the changing characterof the post-cold war global order and the notion that there are lessons flowing in both directions in a world in which the analyticalsalience and political purchaseof the idea of the First World and the Third World have dramaticallydiminished or disappearedentirely. and designed to mobilise citizens in ways favourable to capital'. the ThirdWorld and ThirdWorldism are linked to a wide range 33 . They emphasise that many 'contemporaryresistances to neoliberalism' (global justice movements. destiny and the fate of Third Worldism The articles in this special issue both reflect. As Thomas Olesen emphasises. the overall breadth and significance of the idea of the Third World and the practice of Third Worldism.106 A major exemplar of 'globalisation-from-below'has been the rise of the Zapatistas in southern Mexico in the post-cold war era. the rebellion launched on 1 January1994 by the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN). These 'new internationalisms'. rooted in a regime of sovereign state control. better known as the Zapatistas. now recognise the state's complicity with capital. They argue that the theory and practice of development generally has been grounded in a form of 'biopolitics. meanwhile. In the mid-1990s they emerged as a symbol of progressive social change for those looking for new political alternatives in a post-cold war world apparently bereft of systemic alternatives to neoliberal globalisation.107 Virtually all observers agree that the uprising in Chiapas representedan importantdeparturefrom the the Marxism and Third Worldism of this era. Furthermore.Third Worldism 'embracedthis form of sovereignty and its biopolitics' at the same time as Third Worldism can be also be located in direct relation to the rise of 'global fascism'. 'two-way' relationshipbetween the Zapatistasand their international supporters. In the second half of the 1990s the Zapatistas and their main spokesperson.which have emerged from the wreckage of Third Worldism. As they also make clear. but also clearly distinct from. both the history of. and the current perspectives on. and reflect on. increasingly occupied an importantinternationalposition comparable with. captured the imaginationof activists and academics in the Americas and aroundthe world. Zapatistashave had an importantimpact on progressive politics in Mexico and in Latin America.
M Kamrava.1964. Third World Quarterly. 1990. The History of Development: From WesternOrigins to Global Faith. 6 G Rist. 1994.The Origins of Economic InequalityBetween Nations: A Critique of Western Theories of Developmentand Underdevelopment. Three Worlds of Development. 1993. London:Unwin Hyman. IL Horowitz.14 (1). the conception of Third Worldism provided in Malley.which was held at the Instituteof CommonwealthStudies (University of London. but also departs in key respects from. New York: HarversterWheatsheaf. DevelopmentTheory and the Three Worlds: Toward an InternationalPolitical Economy of Development. R Malley. pp2. Third World Quarterly. p 143. Eurocentrism. in Slater et al. It is hoped that by bringing together a number of approachesto the question of 'After the Third World?' this special issue will facilitate and stimulate engagement with the power of the idea of the Third World and the wide range of Third Worldist currentsand their relationshipto the changing global order of the 21st century. 'Who killed the ThirdWorld?'. 16 (4). 'Introduction'. Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World.Boulder. North. NC: University of North Carolina Press. J Manor. CA: University of California Press. E Said. Djakarta:Prapantja. Third World Quarterly. M Williams. Berkeley. 2 For example. RethinkingThird World Politics. Schutz & Dorr (eds). Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient. organisationsand initiatives engaged in the rethinking of the history and contemporarysignificance of the Third World against the backdrop of a whole range of other trends. 7For example. The notion of a Third World also became central to academic and policy-orientated work on development and underdevelopment. 1995. in Slater. 1992.in Manor (ed). 1956. 15 December 2002) at which a much earlier version of this chapter was presented.13 (4). Notes I would like to thank Tim Shaw and all the other participantsin the 'Workshop on Globalization/New Regionalisms/Development'. and B Hettne. 'Third World: rejected or rediscovered?'. such as the non-alignmentmovement and the United Nations. For the notion of the 'Bandung era' (1955-75) see S Amin. 1993. See also CP Romulo. The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global 1 34 . IL Gendzier. 'Re-articulatingthe Third World coalition: the role of the environmentalagenda'. 1996. 13 (4).Revolution and the Turn to Islam. 1999. are the assumptionsthat: 1) the 'popular masses' in the Third World had 'revolutionaryaspirations'. p 104. 1985.as I am using the term here. London: Longman. This definition is similar to.NJ: Princeton University Press. 'Global transformation and the Third World: challenges and prospects'. New York: Oxford University Press.East. CO: Lynne Rienner. I would like to thank Sally Morphet for her particularlydetailed comments. Bandung Spirit: Moving on the Tide of History. West. and 4) in foreign policy terms these nation-states should form an alliance that would act collectively under the umbrella of various regional and internationalforms of political and economic co-operation. Chapel Hill. 1991. New York: Oxford University Press. 'Political culture and a new definition of the Third World'. G Hawthorn.MARK T BERGER of political and intellectualpositions. M Williams. Washington Quarterly. The Call From Algeria. South: Major Developments in InternationalPolitics Since 1945. RethinkingThird World Politics. Princeton. 1995. 1995. 72. The Meaning of Bandung. 3) the vehicle for the achievement of this transformationwas a strong and centralised nation-state.2) the fulfilment of these aspirationswas an inevitable working out of history that linked pre-colonial forms of egalitarianismto the realisation of a future utopia. Slater. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. RA Packenham.Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science. 1964. New York: Wiley. A Dirlik. CO: Westview Press. 1989. R Abdulgani. see RE Bissell. Edward Said enthusiasticallyoverstated the situation when he said that: 'By the time of the Bandung Conferencein 1955 the entire Orienthad gained its political independencefrom the Western empires and confronteda new configurationof imperialpowers.Boulder. V Randall. The Third World. Global Transformation and the Third World. G Lundestad. "'Waiting for a text?" ComparingThird World politics' in Manor. the United States and the Soviet Union'. Global Transformation and the Third World. The Call From Algeria: Third Worldism. 1973. Schutz & Doff. C Ramirez-Faria. London: Zed Press. 94-114. 'Introduction:toward a better understandingof global transformation and the Third World'.London: Zed Press. 1991. London: Penguin Books.P Worsley. RO Slater. 1966. InternationalEconomic Organisationsand the Third World. p 140. 4 The key elements of ThirdWorldism. BM Schutz & SR Dorr. 2002.
118. 25 (4). 98 (631). 2003. National Culture and the New Global System. A Hoogvelt. CA: University of California Press. pp. R Malley. For example. London: University College London Press. Empire. p. 13 P Lyon. MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. in H Bull & A Watson (eds). G Crow.NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press.Journal of Contemporary Asia. EncounteringDevelopment: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World.London: Macmillan.The Bandung Conference. Furthermore. 1999. 1998. This gap is nicely filled by CJ Christie. OxfordLiteraryReview. MT Berger. The Expansion of International Society.Basingstoke: Palgrave. pp 17-33. 'ThirdWorldist relativism: a new form of imperialism'. and M Hardt. JE Goldthorpe. 1997. see J-F Bayart. 1999. 'Why "ThirdWorld"?Origin. Current History. See Sauvy. 14 Aout 1952. Une Planete'. P Darby. 2000. talk in terms of a single Bandung generation. 2000. 'The Third Worldist moment'. 191-192. 1999. C Thomas. democracy and socialism. 16 pp Malley. 1955. Young restates the importance of Marxism to anti-colonialnationalismand also reinstatesMarxismin the wider history of postcolonial theory. 2000. 1984. 2001. 98 (631). See. 1995. Asia and Europe in the pursuit of peace. pp 288. 1984. V Randall & R Theobald. and R Pinkney. CulturalDiversity and Development. 'Is there a Third World?'. NY: Cornell University Press. Third World Quarterly. R Kiely. Anticolonialism in British Politics: The Left and the End of Empire. 12. 1995. 10 MT Berger. London: Cassell. 9 (4). p 90. London: Macmillan. pp 197-198. London: Routledge. Globalization and the Postcolonial World: The New Political Economy of Development. Cambridge. Ideology and Revolution in Southeast Asia 1900-1980: Political Ideas of the Anti-Colonial Era.from David Scott's notion of three Bandung generations. April 1955. ComparativeSociology and Social Theory:Beyond the Three Worlds. 14 For first hand accounts of the conference see A Appadorai. CurrentHistory. 1993. A The Fiction of Imperialism: Reading Between International Relations and Postcolonialism. The Sociology of Post-Colonial Societies: Economic Disparity. New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs. by contrast. Berkeley.in Westad (ed). MW Lewis. A Escobar. L'Observateur. HW Brands. p 43. 12 The notion of the Third World is often traced to the writing in the early 1950s of the French economist. TheAsian-African Conference. P Gilroy. pp 229-230. 1994. The Call From Algeria. G McTurnanKahin. 1997. 'The global politics of development: towards a new research agenda'. definition and usage'. 221-222. Millennium: Journal of International Studies. Ithaca. 18 P Willetts. Review of International Studies. CO: Westview Press. 1998.London:Bergin & Garvey. 1987. 14. Refashioning Futures: Criticism after Postcoloniality. A Payne. AN Roy. L Wolf-Phillips. Political Change and Underdevelopment: Critical Introductionto Third WorldPolitics. See RJC Young.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. CO: Lynne Reinner. 1996. 15 (2). New York: Columbia University Press. The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World. NJ: Princeton University Press. 14. Identityand Nationalism at the End of the Colour Line. 1998. Richmond: Curzon Press. pp 168-179. See also TC Lewellen. 2001. F Buell. London: Macmillan. 'Finishing with the idea of the Third World: the concept of political trajectory'. 1997. Baltimore. 1990. The Third World Coalition in World Politics. The Call From Algeria. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Princeton. The Myth of Continents:A Critique of Metageography. The Non-AlignedMovement:The Origins of a ThirdWorldAlliance. Dependencyand Development:An Introductionto the ThirdWorld. 'Trois Mondes. CO: Westview Press. A Loomba.New Left Review II. for example. in Manor.AFTER THE THIRD WORLD? Capitalism. 2001. MA: HarvardUniversity Press.Bandung. Other writers. London: Zed Press. see Malley. See D Scott. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1999. Alfred Sauvy. 'The rise and demise of national development and the origins of post-cold war capitalism'. Cultural Politics in the Third World. Boulder. 'Today's Bandung?'. Princeton. p 3. 2002. Boulder. The Third Worldin the Age of Globalisation: Requiem or New Agenda?. 17 RF Betts. 1999. l5 Young. For a good discussion of the origins of Third Worldism. 19 OA Westad. Democracy in the Third World.1947-1960. 1994. and RA Mortimer. Stephen Howe. Between Camps:Race. pp 101-37. 25 (2). 1978. M Hardt & A Negri. Other observers have suggested that its origins also lie in the somewhat earlier politics by LabourParty MPs in Britain following the onset promotionof a 'ThirdForce' in international of the Cold War in 1947. 'The end of the "ThirdWorld"?'. 1991. Postcolonialism. 2001. pp 15-16. Third World Quarterly. Ideology and Revolution in Southeast Asia 1900-1980. London: Allen Lane. Boulder. Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction. 2001. 1956. Indonesia. M Kamrava. 'The emergence of the ThirdWorld'. 'Overworkingthe "ThirdWorld"'. 131-132. Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet 35 . 1 (1).this coincided with the call for a 'Third Force' on the part of Fenner Brockway (a British socialist) to unite people and movements in Africa.Oxford: Blackwell. 9 I am following on. The one region not well covered by Young is Southeast Asia. but departing. Although Robert Young does not use the term 'Third Worldism'. 'Where is the Third World now?'. MW Lewis & KE Wigen. Progress in Development Studies. his encyclopaedic history of postcolonialism is also a detailed history of Third Worldism. Christie. no. Rethinking Third World Politics. 1995. 'Introduction'. Decolonization. 30 (2). 345.
MA: HarvardUniversity Press. his over rhetoricalperformancesas maximum leader'. The Rise of East Asia: Critical Visions of the Pacific Century. 20 Although the Great Leap Forwarddepartedfrom the Soviet model. in M Goldman& A Gordon(eds). in K Koonings & D Kruijt (eds). 38 M Doran. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. 4( As observers. WA: University of Washington Press. 2003. see also C Jian. MA: University of Massachusetts Press. Third World Quarterly. China's Africa Revolution. M Goldman & AJ Nathan. but it also resonated with Stalinist approachesto agriculturein the 1930s in its human costs. in D Engerman. The Idea of India. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ultimately. London: RoutledgeCurzon. pp 466-467. Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy. India and Pakistan. NC: University of North Carolina Press. pp 124-125. Chapel Hill. Stanford.NY: Cornell University Press. to transformEgypt into the major Arab and third 36 . 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NJ: Princeton University Press. New York: Columbia University Press. pp 137-141. and D Engerman. 1996. pp 298-299. Cambridge. Ithaca. G McTurnan Kahin. 2002. 1997. The Gradual Revolution: India's Political Economy. 1961-1965: Britain. 29 S Khilnani. pp 7. pp72-79. both the Chinese leadershipand most outside observers took the view that. Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic Development. In the 1960s the PRC increasingly pursued a rural-orientatedcommunism based on mass mobilisation culminatingin the social and economic upheaval of the CulturalRevolution in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Nehru. pp 269-271. New Delhi: Sage Publications. JD Legge. Southeast Asia: A Testament. he was 'the first modern Egyptian leader .. The Expansion of International Society. 221-222. London: Zed Press. Princeton. 2002. up to the second half of the 1970s. 'Creating socialist economies: Stalinist political economy and the impact of ideas'. 1978. 1998. Sukarno:A Political Biography. 33 Wolpert. 23 JW Garver. pp 159-174. Nehru: A Tryst With Destiny. pp 174-175. London: IB Tauris. 28 D Merrill. in MT Berger & DA Borer (eds).Trade and Influence. 1994.Arab Nationalism in the TwentiethCentury:From Triumph to Despair. New York: FarrarStraus Giroux. China's economy remained groundedin the Soviet model. Institutionsand Political Change. in D Shambaugh(ed). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ideology and Revolution in Southeast Asia. 'The Chinese state during the Maoist era'. 34 N Schulte Nordholt. 1984. it not only retained links to Stalinist conceptions of economic development. Protracted Conflict: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century. 21 M Stuart-Fox. Amherst. Nehru. 37 MT Berger. 2002. pp 215-218. 2001. The loss of life from famine between 1958 and 1961 is now calculated to run to upwardsof 30 million people. and FC Teiwes. and global capitalism'. 22 See A Hutchison. 31 S Seth. Sydney: Allen and Unwin. have emphasised. 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in or New York: Monthly Review Press. 45 By the 1980s there were majordivisions within the Arab League. New York: Monthly Review Press. 42 GA Nasser. Young. Reading: Garnet Publishing. and Malley. 'Egyptianrites'.London: Verso. on the Developmentof Underdevelopment Dependence. The Call From Algeria. 61 IM Wall. 1945-1981. R Schulze. 260-267. Conflicting Missions: Havana. Postcolonialism. 1967. 1992. p 190. 240-241. the United States and the Algerian War. pp 185-186. 2002. Postcolonialism. Washington. For a good overview of the recent literatureon this issue see A Shatz. see D Rooney. 'Gadhafi seen as root of instability in Africa'. 2001. New York: Monthly Review. Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present. with the PAIGC as an educational organising force that seeks to articulate the national-popularwill'. 86-87. France. Frank. Amf7carCabral: RevolutionaryLeadership and People's War. 44 Young. 46 pp 123-135. Postcolonialism. 57 For San Juan. p 161. CO: Lynne Rienner.LatinAmerica: Underdevelopment Revolution:Essays and the ImmediateEnemy. The Assassination of Lumumba. 1972. For a similar perspective see A Ahmad. 1974. Modernity and Postcolonial Studies. New York: Monthly Review Press. pp 236. p 213. while Cape Verde was inducted into the United Nations in 1975. How Europe UnderdevelopedAfrica. Frank. August 21 2003. London: Zed Press. 37 . 43 MM Wahba. Guardian Weekly. London: Bogle-L'OuverturePublications. 75-80. NC: University of North Carolina Press. London: I. Marxism. Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. 81 50 Young. 1988. 'Army. London: Heinemann. New York Review of Books. 1989. 52 D Farah. Literatures. New York: Monthly Review Press. 12 supportedthe UN-sponsored and US-led 'Gulf war' against Iraq in February 1991 after the latter's invasion of Kuwait. Conflicting Missions. 56 pp 8-9. EW Said.this latterconcept immanentin the daily lives of African peoples can be transformed denoting the peoples' exercise of their historical right of self-determinationthrough the mediation of the national liberation movement. In Theory: Classes. 62 M Connelly. Postcolonialism. 2002. Nations. African Decolonisation. 1994. pp 182-184. 238. CA: University of California Press. pp 92-110. P Chabal. Postcolonialism. and Africa. Boulder. 177. 1983. 1959-1976. Political Arnies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy. KwameNkrumah:The Political Kingdomin the Third World. 2001. 2002. Amin. 1992. state and nation in Algeria'. 1994.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Lumpen-Bourgeoisie. W Rodney. The particularlydark side of both the FLN's eventual triumphand the tactics of the French colonial authoritiesin their effort to avert defeat are now well known and the subject of considerable debate. pp 38-39. New York: Oxford University Press. B. DC: Public Affairs Press. 49 F Cooper. London: Granta. 53 L De Witte. pp 291-304. 1976. Class and Politics in Latin AmerLumpen-Development: 1969. Third World:An Essay on Soivet-AmericanRelations. pp 221-222. 1991. p 28. 2002. in Said. London: HutchinsonRadius. and Amin. Imperialism and Unequal Development. UnequalDevelopment:An Essay on the Social of Underdevelopment. 1955. 41 Young. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. London: Edward Arnold. Amilcar Cabral's Revolutionary Theory and Practice: A Critical Guide. 5 E San JuanJr. 48 HS Wilson. 54 F Halliday. 1977. ica. Cabral's 'originality' and significance lay in 'his recognising that the nation-in-itself into a nation-for-itself. pp 58-59. Tauris. pp 189-190. The year after Cabral's death Guinea-Bissau emerged as an independent state under President Luis de Almeida Cabral. Berkeley. A Diplomatic Revolution:Algeria's Fight for Independenceand the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era. and R Chilcote. San Juan. 49 (18). 51 K Nkrumah. The Role of the State in the Egyptian Economy. 47 4 For a good critical overview. Formations of Peripheral Capitalism. Accumulationon a WorldScale: A Critiqueof the Theory Sussex: HarvesterPress. in K Koonings & D Kruijt (eds). 2002. 'Postcolonialism and the problematic of uneven development'. New York: Monthly Review Press. Cold War. 59 Young. 63 Malley. 65 L Addi. The Call From Algeria. 2002. 1972. 'Postcolonialismand the problematicof uneven development' in C Bartolovich & N Lazarus (eds). 60 AG Frank. P Gleijeses. or S Amin.ERTHE THIRD WORLD? world country'. pp 233-237. 64 Gleijeses. Out of a membershipof 20 governments. Capitalism and Underdevelopment Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil. 'The torture of Algiers'. 2000. Reflections on Exile and Other Literary and Cultural Essays. London: Verso. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution. pp 70. pp 29-31.AFT. 2002. London: ]B Tauris. Empire of Chaos. Chapel Hill. pp 53-57. S Amin. p 111. 1968. Washington. p 81. pp 190-191. A Modern History of the Islamic World.
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