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Aristotle - The Complete Aristotle

Aristotle - The Complete Aristotle

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The Complete Aristotle

Aristotle

Published: 2007 Tag(s): Philosophy Biology Ethics Politics Rhetoric Poetry Logic Metaphysics Physics

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About this Publication
This publication was adapted from the web edition published by eBooks@Adelaide (http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/), which is part of the online ebook library of The University of Adelaide Library at the University of Adelaide in South Australia. That edition was rendered into HTML by Steve Thomas and last updated in 2007. The complete works of Aristotle and their translations in the web edition are reproduced in this compilation under a Creative Commons License, and ergo this publication falls under the same license. The English translations for many of the works can also be found elsewhere on the Internet; especially at Project Gutenberg (http://www.gutenberg.org/). The University of Adelaide Library is located on North Terrace in Adelaide, South Australia 5005, AUSTRALIA. It may be reached by telephone (+61 8 8303 5372), fax (+61 8 8303 4369), or email (ebooks@adelaide.edu.au). The license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/au/) states the following: You are free to copy, distribute, display, and perform the work, and to make derivative works under the following conditions: you must attribute the work in the manner specified by the licensor; you may not use this work for commercial purposes; if you alter, transform, or build upon this work, you may distribute the resulting work only under a license identical to this one. For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to others the license terms of this work. Any of these conditions can be waived if you get permission from the licensor. Your fair use and other rights are in no way affected by the above. Compilation and organization of this publication, and creation of the book cover, is all courtesy of atheologic@gmail.com. To learn more about Aristotle, his works, and the translators, check out Wikipedia (but only trust what you can verify). A note should be made that none of the writings have been edited from its online source. However, some words have been changed to lowercase lettering, and any errors found by readers should be reported to atheologic@gmail.com for corrections in a republication.

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Table of Contents
The Complete Aristotle Part 1: Logic (Organon) Categories, translated by E. M. Edghill On Interpretation, translated by E. M. Edghill Prior Analytics (2 Books), translated by A. J. Jenkinson Posterior Analytics (2 Books), translated by G. R. G. Mure Topics (8 Books), translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge Sophistical Refutations, translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge Part 2: Universal Physics Physics (8 Books), translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye On the Heavens (4 Books), translated by J. L. Stocks On Gerneration and Corruption (2 Books), translated by H. H. Joachim Meteorology (4 Books), translated by E. W. Webster Part 3: Human Physics On the Soul (3 Books), translated by J. A. Smith On Sense and the Sensible, translated by J. I. Beare On Memory and Reminiscence, translated by J. I. Beare On Sleep and Sleeplessness, translated by J. I. Beare On Dreams, translated by J. I. Beare On Prophesying by Dreams, translated by J. I. Beare On Longevity and Shortness of Life, translated by G. R. T. Ross On Youth, Old Age, Life and Death, and Respiration, translated by G. R. T. Ross Part 4: Animal Physics The History of Animals (9 Books), translated by D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson On the Parts of Animals (4 Books), translated by William Ogle On the Motion of Animals, translated by A. S. L. Farquharson On the Gait of Animals, translated by A. S. L. Farquharson On the Generation of Animals (5 Books), translated by Arthur Platt Part 5: Metaphysics

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(15 Books), translated by W. D. Ross Part 6: Ethics and Politics Nicomachean Ethics (10 Books), translated by W. D. Ross Politics (8 Books), translated by Benjamin Jowett The Athenian Constitution, translated by Sir Frederic G. Kenyon Part 7: Aesthetic Writings Rhetoric (3 Books), translated by W. Rhys Roberts Poetics, translated by S. H. Butcher

eBooks@Adelaide, 2007 Steve Thomas

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Part 1 Logic (Organon)

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Categories
Translated by E. M. Edghill
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Things are said to be named ‘equivocally’ when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to the name ‘animal’; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an animal, his definition in the one case will be appropriate to that case only. On the other hand, things are said to be named ‘univocally’ which have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common. A man and an ox are both ‘animal’, and these are univocally so named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is the same in both cases: for if a man should state in what sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case would be identical with that in the other. Things are said to be named ‘derivatively’, which derive their name from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the grammarian derives his name from the word ‘grammar’, and the courageous man from the word ‘courage’.
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Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the latter are such expressions as ‘the man runs’, ‘the man wins’; of the former ‘man’, ‘ox’, ‘runs’, ‘wins’. Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never present in a subject. Thus ‘man’ is predicable of the individual man, and is never present in a subject. By being ‘present in a subject’ I do not mean present as parts are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the said subject. Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not predicable of any subject; or again, a

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certain whiteness may be present in the body (for colour requires a material basis), yet it is never predicable of anything. Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is predicable of grammar. There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the individual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which is individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable of a subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in a subject.
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When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the subject. Thus, ‘man’ is predicated of the individual man; but ‘animal’ is predicated of ‘man’; it will, therefore, be predicable of the individual man also: for the individual man is both ‘man’ and ‘animal’. If genera are different and co-ordinate, their differentiae are themselves different in kind. Take as an instance the genus ‘animal’ and the genus ‘knowledge’. ‘With feet’, ‘two-footed’, ‘winged’, ‘aquatic’, are differentiae of ‘animal’; the species of knowledge are not distinguished by the same differentiae. One species of knowledge does not differ from another in being ‘two-footed’. But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing to prevent their having the same differentiae: for the greater class is predicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae of the predicate will be differentiae also of the subject.
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Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance are ‘man’ or ‘the horse’, of quantity, such terms as ‘two cubits long’ or ‘three cubits long’, of quality, such attributes as ‘white’, ‘grammatical’. ‘Double’, ‘half’, ‘greater’, fall under the category of relation; ‘in a the market place’, ‘in the Lyceum’, under that of place; ‘yesterday’, ‘last year’, under that of time. ‘Lying’, ‘sitting’, are terms indicating position, ‘shod’, ‘armed’,

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state; ‘to lance’, ‘to cauterize’, action; ‘to be lanced’, ‘to be cauterized’, affection. No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; it is by the combination of such terms that positive or negative statements arise. For every assertion must, as is admitted, be either true or false, whereas expressions which are not in any way composite such as ‘man’, ‘white’, ‘runs’, ‘wins’, cannot be either true or false.
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Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse. But in a secondary sense those things are called substances within which, as species, the primary substances are included; also those which, as genera, include the species. For instance, the individual man is included in the species ‘man’, and the genus to which the species belongs is ‘animal’; these, therefore-that is to say, the species ‘man’ and the genus ‘animal,-are termed secondary substances. It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the definition of the predicate must be predicable of the subject. For instance, ‘man’ is predicted of the individual man. Now in this case the name of the species man’ is applied to the individual, for we use the term ‘man’ in describing the individual; and the definition of ‘man’ will also be predicated of the individual man, for the individual man is both man and animal. Thus, both the name and the definition of the species are predicable of the individual. With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present in a subject, it is generally the case that neither their name nor their definition is predicable of that in which they are present. Though, however, the definition is never predicable, there is nothing in certain cases to prevent the name being used. For instance, ‘white’ being present in a body is predicated of that in which it is present, for a body is called white: the definition, however, of the colour white’ is never predicable of the body. Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary substance or present in a primary substance. This becomes evident by reference to particular instances which occur. ‘Animal’ is predicated of the species ‘man’, therefore of the individual man, for if there were no individual man of whom it could be predicated, it could not be predicated of the species ‘man’ at all. Again, colour is present in body, therefore in

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individual bodies, for if there were no individual body in which it was present, it could not be present in body at all. Thus everything except primary substances is either predicated of primary substances, or is present in them, and if these last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist. Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than the genus, being more nearly related to primary substance. For if any one should render an account of what a primary substance is, he would render a more instructive account, and one more proper to the subject, by stating the species than by stating the genus. Thus, he would give a more instructive account of an individual man by stating that he was man than by stating that he was animal, for the former description is peculiar to the individual in a greater degree, while the latter is too general. Again, the man who gives an account of the nature of an individual tree will give a more instructive account by mentioning the species ‘tree’ than by mentioning the genus ‘plant’. Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances in virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie every. else, and that everything else is either predicated of them or present in them. Now the same relation which subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists also between the species and the genus: for the species is to the genus as subject is to predicate, since the genus is predicated of the species, whereas the species cannot be predicated of the genus. Thus we have a second ground for asserting that the species is more truly substance than the genus. Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera, no one is more truly substance than another. We should not give a more appropriate account of the individual man by stating the species to which he belonged, than we should of an individual horse by adopting the same method of definition. In the same way, of primary substances, no one is more truly substance than another; an individual man is not more truly substance than an individual ox. It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we exclude primary substances, we concede to species and genera alone the name ‘secondary substance’, for these alone of all the predicates convey a knowledge of primary substance. For it is by stating the species or the genus that we appropriately define any individual man; and we shall make our definition more exact by stating the former than by stating the latter. All other things that we state, such as that he is white, that he

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runs, and so on, are irrelevant to the definition. Thus it is just that these alone, apart from primary substances, should be called substances. Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because they underlie and are the subjects of everything else. Now the same relation that subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists also between the species and the genus to which the primary substance belongs, on the one hand, and every attribute which is not included within these, on the other. For these are the subjects of all such. If we call an individual man ‘skilled in grammar’, the predicate is applicable also to the species and to the genus to which he belongs. This law holds good in all cases. It is a common characteristic of all sub. stance that it is never present in a subject. For primary substance is neither present in a subject nor predicated of a subject; while, with regard to secondary substances, it is clear from the following arguments (apart from others) that they are not present in a subject. For ‘man’ is predicated of the individual man, but is not present in any subject: for manhood is not present in the individual man. In the same way, ‘animal’ is also predicated of the individual man, but is not present in him. Again, when a thing is present in a subject, though the name may quite well be applied to that in which it is present, the definition cannot be applied. Yet of secondary substances, not only the name, but also the definition, applies to the subject: we should use both the definition of the species and that of the genus with reference to the individual man. Thus substance cannot be present in a subject. Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the case that differentiae cannot be present in subjects. The characteristics ‘terrestrial’ and ‘two-footed’ are predicated of the species ‘man’, but not present in it. For they are not in man. Moreover, the definition of the differentia may be predicated of that of which the differentia itself is predicated. For instance, if the characteristic ‘terrestrial’ is predicated of the species ‘man’, the definition also of that characteristic may be used to form the predicate of the species ‘man’: for ‘man’ is terrestrial. The fact that the parts of substances appear to be present in the whole, as in a subject, should not make us apprehensive lest we should have to admit that such parts are not substances: for in explaining the phrase ‘being present in a subject’, we stated’ that we meant ‘otherwise than as parts in a whole’. It is the mark of substances and of differentiae that, in all propositions of which they form the predicate, they are predicated univocally. For all

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such propositions have for their subject either the individual or the species. It is true that, inasmuch as primary substance is not predicable of anything, it can never form the predicate of any proposition. But of secondary substances, the species is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and of the individual. Similarly the differentiae are predicated of the species and of the individuals. Moreover, the definition of the species and that of the genus are applicable to the primary substance, and that of the genus to the species. For all that is predicated of the predicate will be predicated also of the subject. Similarly, the definition of the differentiae will be applicable to the species and to the individuals. But it was stated above that the word ‘univocal’ was applied to those things which had both name and definition in common. It is, therefore, established that in every proposition, of which either substance or a differentia forms the predicate, these are predicated univocally. All substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the case of primary substance this is indisputably true, for the thing is a unit. In the case of secondary substances, when we speak, for instance, of ‘man’ or ‘animal’, our form of speech gives the impression that we are here also indicating that which is individual, but the impression is not strictly true; for a secondary substance is not an individual, but a class with a certain qualification; for it is not one and single as a primary substance is; the words ‘man’, ‘animal’, are predicable of more than one subject. Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the term ‘white’; ‘white’ indicates quality and nothing further, but species and genus determine the quality with reference to a substance: they signify substance qualitatively differentiated. The determinate qualification covers a larger field in the case of the genus that in that of the species: he who uses the word ‘animal’ is herein using a word of wider extension than he who uses the word ‘man’. Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could be the contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man or animal? It has none. Nor can the species or the genus have a contrary. Yet this characteristic is not peculiar to substance, but is true of many other things, such as quantity. There is nothing that forms the contrary of ‘two cubits long’ or of ‘three cubits long’, or of ‘ten’, or of any such term. A man may contend that ‘much’ is the contrary of ‘little’, or ‘great’ of ‘small’, but of definite quantitative terms no contrary exists. Substance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of degree. I do not mean by this that one substance cannot be more or less truly

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substance than another, for it has already been stated’ that this is the case; but that no single substance admits of varying degrees within itself. For instance, one particular substance, ‘man’, cannot be more or less man either than himself at some other time or than some other man. One man cannot be more man than another, as that which is white may be more or less white than some other white object, or as that which is beautiful may be more or less beautiful than some other beautiful object. The same quality, moreover, is said to subsist in a thing in varying degrees at different times. A body, being white, is said to be whiter at one time than it was before, or, being warm, is said to be warmer or less warm than at some other time. But substance is not said to be more or less that which it is: a man is not more truly a man at one time than he was before, nor is anything, if it is substance, more or less what it is. Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree. The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities. From among things other than substance, we should find ourselves unable to bring forward any which possessed this mark. Thus, one and the same colour cannot be white and black. Nor can the same one action be good and bad: this law holds good with everything that is not substance. But one and the selfsame substance, while retaining its identity, is yet capable of admitting contrary qualities. The same individual person is at one time white, at another black, at one time warm, at another cold, at one time good, at another bad. This capacity is found nowhere else, though it might be maintained that a statement or opinion was an exception to the rule. The same statement, it is agreed, can be both true and false. For if the statement ‘he is sitting’ is true, yet, when the person in question has risen, the same statement will be false. The same applies to opinions. For if any one thinks truly that a person is sitting, yet, when that person has risen, this same opinion, if still held, will be false. Yet although this exception may be allowed, there is, nevertheless, a difference in the manner in which the thing takes place. It is by themselves changing that substances admit contrary qualities. It is thus that that which was hot becomes cold, for it has entered into a different state. Similarly that which was white becomes black, and that which was bad good, by a process of change; and in the same way in all other cases it is by changing that substances are capable of admitting contrary qualities. But statements and opinions themselves remain unaltered in all respects: it is by the alteration in the facts of the case that the contrary quality comes to be theirs. The statement ‘he is sitting’ remains unaltered, but

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it is at one time true, at another false, according to circumstances. What has been said of statements applies also to opinions. Thus, in respect of the manner in which the thing takes place, it is the peculiar mark of substance that it should be capable of admitting contrary qualities; for it is by itself changing that it does so. If, then, a man should make this exception and contend that statements and opinions are capable of admitting contrary qualities, his contention is unsound. For statements and opinions are said to have this capacity, not because they themselves undergo modification, but because this modification occurs in the case of something else. The truth or falsity of a statement depends on facts, and not on any power on the part of the statement itself of admitting contrary qualities. In short, there is nothing which can alter the nature of statements and opinions. As, then, no change takes place in themselves, these cannot be said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities. But it is by reason of the modification which takes place within the substance itself that a substance is said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities; for a substance admits within itself either disease or health, whiteness or blackness. It is in this sense that it is said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities. To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities, the modification taking place through a change in the substance itself. Let these remarks suffice on the subject of substance.
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Quantity is either discrete or continuous. Moreover, some quantities are such that each part of the whole has a relative position to the other parts: others have within them no such relation of part to part. Instances of discrete quantities are number and speech; of continuous, lines, surfaces, solids, and, besides these, time and place. In the case of the parts of a number, there is no common boundary at which they join. For example: two fives make ten, but the two fives have no common boundary, but are separate; the parts three and seven also do not join at any boundary. Nor, to generalize, would it ever be possible in the case of number that there should be a common boundary among

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the parts; they are always separate. Number, therefore, is a discrete quantity. The same is true of speech. That speech is a quantity is evident: for it is measured in long and short syllables. I mean here that speech which is vocal. Moreover, it is a discrete quantity for its parts have no common boundary. There is no common boundary at which the syllables join, but each is separate and distinct from the rest. A line, on the other hand, is a continuous quantity, for it is possible to find a common boundary at which its parts join. In the case of the line, this common boundary is the point; in the case of the plane, it is the line: for the parts of the plane have also a common boundary. Similarly you can find a common boundary in the case of the parts of a solid, namely either a line or a plane. Space and time also belong to this class of quantities. Time, past, present, and future, forms a continuous whole. Space, likewise, is a continuous quantity; for the parts of a solid occupy a certain space, and these have a common boundary; it follows that the parts of space also, which are occupied by the parts of the solid, have the same common boundary as the parts of the solid. Thus, not only time, but space also, is a continuous quantity, for its parts have a common boundary. Quantities consist either of parts which bear a relative position each to each, or of parts which do not. The parts of a line bear a relative position to each other, for each lies somewhere, and it would be possible to distinguish each, and to state the position of each on the plane and to explain to what sort of part among the rest each was contiguous. Similarly the parts of a plane have position, for it could similarly be stated what was the position of each and what sort of parts were contiguous. The same is true with regard to the solid and to space. But it would be impossible to show that the arts of a number had a relative position each to each, or a particular position, or to state what parts were contiguous. Nor could this be done in the case of time, for none of the parts of time has an abiding existence, and that which does not abide can hardly have position. It would be better to say that such parts had a relative order, in virtue of one being prior to another. Similarly with number: in counting, ‘one’ is prior to ‘two’, and ‘two’ to ‘three’, and thus the parts of number may be said to possess a relative order, though it would be impossible to discover any distinct position for each. This holds good also in the case of speech. None of its parts has an abiding existence: when once a syllable is pronounced, it is not possible to retain it, so that, naturally, as the parts

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do not abide, they cannot have position. Thus, some quantities consist of parts which have position, and some of those which have not. Strictly speaking, only the things which I have mentioned belong to the category of quantity: everything else that is called quantitative is a quantity in a secondary sense. It is because we have in mind some one of these quantities, properly so called, that we apply quantitative terms to other things. We speak of what is white as large, because the surface over which the white extends is large; we speak of an action or a process as lengthy, because the time covered is long; these things cannot in their own right claim the quantitative epithet. For instance, should any one explain how long an action was, his statement would be made in terms of the time taken, to the effect that it lasted a year, or something of that sort. In the same way, he would explain the size of a white object in terms of surface, for he would state the area which it covered. Thus the things already mentioned, and these alone, are in their intrinsic nature quantities; nothing else can claim the name in its own right, but, if at all, only in a secondary sense. Quantities have no contraries. In the case of definite quantities this is obvious; thus, there is nothing that is the contrary of ‘two cubits long’ or of ‘three cubits long’, or of a surface, or of any such quantities. A man might, indeed, argue that ‘much’ was the contrary of ‘little’, and ‘great’ of ‘small’. But these are not quantitative, but relative; things are not great or small absolutely, they are so called rather as the result of an act of comparison. For instance, a mountain is called small, a grain large, in virtue of the fact that the latter is greater than others of its kind, the former less. Thus there is a reference here to an external standard, for if the terms ‘great’ and ‘small’ were used absolutely, a mountain would never be called small or a grain large. Again, we say that there are many people in a village, and few in Athens, although those in the city are many times as numerous as those in the village: or we say that a house has many in it, and a theatre few, though those in the theatre far outnumber those in the house. The terms ‘two cubits long, “three cubits long,’ and so on indicate quantity, the terms ‘great’ and ‘small’ indicate relation, for they have reference to an external standard. It is, therefore, plain that these are to be classed as relative. Again, whether we define them as quantitative or not, they have no contraries: for how can there be a contrary of an attribute which is not to be apprehended in or by itself, but only by reference to something external? Again, if ‘great’ and ‘small’ are contraries, it will come about that the same subject can admit contrary qualities at one and the same time,

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and that things will themselves be contrary to themselves. For it happens at times that the same thing is both small and great. For the same thing may be small in comparison with one thing, and great in comparison with another, so that the same thing comes to be both small and great at one and the same time, and is of such a nature as to admit contrary qualities at one and the same moment. Yet it was agreed, when substance was being discussed, that nothing admits contrary qualities at one and the same moment. For though substance is capable of admitting contrary qualities, yet no one is at the same time both sick and healthy, nothing is at the same time both white and black. Nor is there anything which is qualified in contrary ways at one and the same time. Moreover, if these were contraries, they would themselves be contrary to themselves. For if ‘great’ is the contrary of ‘small’, and the same thing is both great and small at the same time, then ‘small’ or ‘great’ is the contrary of itself. But this is impossible. The term ‘great’, therefore, is not the contrary of the term ‘small’, nor ‘much’ of ‘little’. And even though a man should call these terms not relative but quantitative, they would not have contraries. It is in the case of space that quantity most plausibly appears to admit of a contrary. For men define the term ‘above’ as the contrary of ‘below’, when it is the region at the centre they mean by ‘below’; and this is so, because nothing is farther from the extremities of the universe than the region at the centre. Indeed, it seems that in defining contraries of every kind men have recourse to a spatial metaphor, for they say that those things are contraries which, within the same class, are separated by the greatest possible distance. Quantity does not, it appears, admit of variation of degree. One thing cannot be two cubits long in a greater degree than another. Similarly with regard to number: what is ‘three’ is not more truly three than what is ‘five’ is five; nor is one set of three more truly three than another set. Again, one period of time is not said to be more truly time than another. Nor is there any other kind of quantity, of all that have been mentioned, with regard to which variation of degree can be predicated. The category of quantity, therefore, does not admit of variation of degree. The most distinctive mark of quantity is that equality and inequality are predicated of it. Each of the aforesaid quantities is said to be equal or unequal. For instance, one solid is said to be equal or unequal to another; number, too, and time can have these terms applied to them, indeed can all those kinds of quantity that have been mentioned.

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That which is not a quantity can by no means, it would seem, be termed equal or unequal to anything else. One particular disposition or one particular quality, such as whiteness, is by no means compared with another in terms of equality and inequality but rather in terms of similarity. Thus it is the distinctive mark of quantity that it can be called equal and unequal.
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Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of something else or related to something else, are explained by reference to that other thing. For instance, the word ‘superior’ is explained by reference to something else, for it is superiority over something else that is meant. Similarly, the expression ‘double’ has this external reference, for it is the double of something else that is meant. So it is with everything else of this kind. There are, moreover, other relatives, e.g. habit, disposition, perception, knowledge, and attitude. The significance of all these is explained by a reference to something else and in no other way. Thus, a habit is a habit of something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the attitude of something. So it is with all other relatives that have been mentioned. Those terms, then, are called relative, the nature of which is explained by reference to something else, the preposition ‘of’ or some other preposition being used to indicate the relation. Thus, one mountain is called great in comparison with son with another; for the mountain claims this attribute by comparison with something. Again, that which is called similar must be similar to something else, and all other such attributes have this external reference. It is to be noted that lying and standing and sitting are particular attitudes, but attitude is itself a relative term. To lie, to stand, to be seated, are not themselves attitudes, but take their name from the aforesaid attitudes. It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has a contrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowledge, too, has a contrary, ignorance. But this is not the mark of all relatives; ‘double’ and ‘triple’ have no contrary, nor indeed has any such term. It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree. For ‘like’ and ‘unlike’, ‘equal’ and ‘unequal’, have the modifications ‘more’ and ‘less’ applied to them, and each of these is relative in character: for the terms ‘like’ and ‘unequal’ bear ‘unequal’ bear a reference to something external. Yet, again, it is not every relative term that admits of variation of degree. No term such as ‘double’ admits of this modification. All

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relatives have correlatives: by the term ‘slave’ we mean the slave of a master, by the term ‘master’, the master of a slave; by ‘double’, the double of its hall; by ‘half’, the half of its double; by ‘greater’, greater than that which is less; by ‘less,’ less than that which is greater. So it is with every other relative term; but the case we use to express the correlation differs in some instances. Thus, by knowledge we mean knowledge the knowable; by the knowable, that which is to be apprehended by knowledge; by perception, perception of the perceptible; by the perceptible, that which is apprehended by perception. Sometimes, however, reciprocity of correlation does not appear to exist. This comes about when a blunder is made, and that to which the relative is related is not accurately stated. If a man states that a wing is necessarily relative to a bird, the connexion between these two will not be reciprocal, for it will not be possible to say that a bird is a bird by reason of its wings. The reason is that the original statement was inaccurate, for the wing is not said to be relative to the bird qua bird, since many creatures besides birds have wings, but qua winged creature. If, then, the statement is made accurate, the connexion will be reciprocal, for we can speak of a wing, having reference necessarily to a winged creature, and of a winged creature as being such because of its wings. Occasionally, perhaps, it is necessary to coin words, if no word exists by which a correlation can adequately be explained. If we define a rudder as necessarily having reference to a boat, our definition will not be appropriate, for the rudder does not have this reference to a boat qua boat, as there are boats which have no rudders. Thus we cannot use the terms reciprocally, for the word ‘boat’ cannot be said to find its explanation in the word ‘rudder’. As there is no existing word, our definition would perhaps be more accurate if we coined some word like ‘ruddered’ as the correlative of ‘rudder’. If we express ourselves thus accurately, at any rate the terms are reciprocally connected, for the ‘ruddered’ thing is ‘ruddered’ in virtue of its rudder. So it is in all other cases. A head will be more accurately defined as the correlative of that which is ‘headed’, than as that of an animal, for the animal does not have a head qua animal, since many animals have no head. Thus we may perhaps most easily comprehend that to which a thing is related, when a name does not exist, if, from that which has a name, we derive a new name, and apply it to that with which the first is reciprocally connected, as in the aforesaid instances, when we derived the word ‘winged’ from ‘wing’ and from ‘rudder’.

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All relatives, then, if properly defined, have a correlative. I add this condition because, if that to which they are related is stated as haphazard and not accurately, the two are not found to be interdependent. Let me state what I mean more clearly. Even in the case of acknowledged correlatives, and where names exist for each, there will be no interdependence if one of the two is denoted, not by that name which expresses the correlative notion, but by one of irrelevant significance. The term ‘slave,’ if defined as related, not to a master, but to a man, or a biped, or anything of that sort, is not reciprocally connected with that in relation to which it is defined, for the statement is not exact. Further, if one thing is said to be correlative with another, and the terminology used is correct, then, though all irrelevant attributes should be removed, and only that one attribute left in virtue of which it was correctly stated to be correlative with that other, the stated correlation will still exist. If the correlative of ‘the slave’ is said to be ‘the master’, then, though all irrelevant attributes of the said ‘master’, such as ‘biped’, ‘receptive of knowledge’, ‘human’, should be removed, and the attribute ‘master’ alone left, the stated correlation existing between him and the slave will remain the same, for it is of a master that a slave is said to be the slave. On the other hand, if, of two correlatives, one is not correctly termed, then, when all other attributes are removed and that alone is left in virtue of which it was stated to be correlative, the stated correlation will be found to have disappeared. For suppose the correlative of ‘the slave’ should be said to be ‘the man’, or the correlative of ‘the wing”the bird’; if the attribute ‘master’ be withdrawn from’ the man’, the correlation between ‘the man’ and ‘the slave’ will cease to exist, for if the man is not a master, the slave is not a slave. Similarly, if the attribute ‘winged’ be withdrawn from ‘the bird’, ‘the wing’ will no longer be relative; for if the so-called correlative is not winged, it follows that ‘the wing’ has no correlative. Thus it is essential that the correlated terms should be exactly designated; if there is a name existing, the statement will be easy; if not, it is doubtless our duty to construct names. When the terminology is thus correct, it is evident that all correlatives are interdependent. Correlatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously. This is for the most part true, as in the case of the double and the half. The existence of the half necessitates the existence of that of which it is a half. Similarly the existence of a master necessitates the existence of a slave, and that of a slave implies that of a master; these are merely instances of a general rule. Moreover, they cancel one another; for if there is no double it follows that there is no half, and vice versa; this rule also applies to all

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such correlatives. Yet it does not appear to be true in all cases that correlatives come into existence simultaneously. The object of knowledge would appear to exist before knowledge itself, for it is usually the case that we acquire knowledge of objects already existing; it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a branch of knowledge the beginning of the existence of which was contemporaneous with that of its object. Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to exist, cancels at the same time the knowledge which was its correlative, the converse of this is not true. It is true that if the object of knowledge does not exist there can be no knowledge: for there will no longer be anything to know. Yet it is equally true that, if knowledge of a certain object does not exist, the object may nevertheless quite well exist. Thus, in the case of the squaring of the circle, if indeed that process is an object of knowledge, though it itself exists as an object of knowledge, yet the knowledge of it has not yet come into existence. Again, if all animals ceased to exist, there would be no knowledge, but there might yet be many objects of knowledge. This is likewise the case with regard to perception: for the object of perception is, it appears, prior to the act of perception. If the perceptible is annihilated, perception also will cease to exist; but the annihilation of perception does not cancel the existence of the perceptible. For perception implies a body perceived and a body in which perception takes place. Now if that which is perceptible is annihilated, it follows that the body is annihilated, for the body is a perceptible thing; and if the body does not exist, it follows that perception also ceases to exist. Thus the annihilation of the perceptible involves that of perception. But the annihilation of perception does not involve that of the perceptible. For if the animal is annihilated, it follows that perception also is annihilated, but perceptibles such as body, heat, sweetness, bitterness, and so on, will remain. Again, perception is generated at the same time as the perceiving subject, for it comes into existence at the same time as the animal. But the perceptible surely exists before perception; for fire and water and such elements, out of which the animal is itself composed, exist before the animal is an animal at all, and before perception. Thus it would seem that the perceptible exists before perception. It may be questioned whether it is true that no substance is relative, as seems to be the case, or whether exception is to be made in the case of certain secondary substances. With regard to primary substances, it is quite true that there is no such possibility, for neither wholes nor parts of

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primary substances are relative. The individual man or ox is not defined with reference to something external. Similarly with the parts: a particular hand or head is not defined as a particular hand or head of a particular person, but as the hand or head of a particular person. It is true also, for the most part at least, in the case of secondary substances; the species ‘man’ and the species ‘ox’ are not defined with reference to anything outside themselves. Wood, again, is only relative in so far as it is some one’s property, not in so far as it is wood. It is plain, then, that in the cases mentioned substance is not relative. But with regard to some secondary substances there is a difference of opinion; thus, such terms as ‘head’ and ‘hand’ are defined with reference to that of which the things indicated are a part, and so it comes about that these appear to have a relative character. Indeed, if our definition of that which is relative was complete, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that no substance is relative. If, however, our definition was not complete, if those things only are properly called relative in the case of which relation to an external object is a necessary condition of existence, perhaps some explanation of the dilemma may be found. The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but the fact that a thing is explained with reference to something else does not make it essentially relative. From this it is plain that, if a man definitely apprehends a relative thing, he will also definitely apprehend that to which it is relative. Indeed this is self-evident: for if a man knows that some particular thing is relative, assuming that we call that a relative in the case of which relation to something is a necessary condition of existence, he knows that also to which it is related. For if he does not know at all that to which it is related, he will not know whether or not it is relative. This is clear, moreover, in particular instances. If a man knows definitely that such and such a thing is ‘double’, he will also forthwith know definitely that of which it is the double. For if there is nothing definite of which he knows it to be the double, he does not know at all that it is double. Again, if he knows that a thing is more beautiful, it follows necessarily that he will forthwith definitely know that also than which it is more beautiful. He will not merely know indefinitely that it is more beautiful than something which is less beautiful, for this would be supposition, not knowledge. For if he does not know definitely that than which it is more beautiful, he can no longer claim to know definitely that it is more beautiful than something else which is less beautiful: for it might be that nothing was less beautiful. It is, therefore, evident that if a man

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apprehends some relative thing definitely, he necessarily knows that also definitely to which it is related. Now the head, the hand, and such things are substances, and it is possible to know their essential character definitely, but it does not necessarily follow that we should know that to which they are related. It is not possible to know forthwith whose head or hand is meant. Thus these are not relatives, and, this being the case, it would be true to say that no substance is relative in character. It is perhaps a difficult matter, in such cases, to make a positive statement without more exhaustive examination, but to have raised questions with regard to details is not without advantage.
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By ‘quality’ I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be such and such. Quality is a term that is used in many senses. One sort of quality let us call ‘habit’ or ‘disposition’. Habit differs from disposition in being more lasting and more firmly established. The various kinds of knowledge and of virtue are habits, for knowledge, even when acquired only in a moderate degree, is, it is agreed, abiding in its character and difficult to displace, unless some great mental upheaval takes place, through disease or any such cause. The virtues, also, such as justice, self-restraint, and so on, are not easily dislodged or dismissed, so as to give place to vice. By a disposition, on the other hand, we mean a condition that is easily changed and quickly gives place to its opposite. Thus, heat, cold, disease, health, and so on are dispositions. For a man is disposed in one way or another with reference to these, but quickly changes, becoming cold instead of warm, ill instead of well. So it is with all other dispositions also, unless through lapse of time a disposition has itself become inveterate and almost impossible to dislodge: in which case we should perhaps go so far as to call it a habit. It is evident that men incline to call those conditions habits which are of a more or less permanent type and difficult to displace; for those who are not retentive of knowledge, but volatile, are not said to have such and such a ‘habit’ as regards knowledge, yet they are disposed, we may say, either better or worse, towards knowledge. Thus habit differs from disposition in this, that while the latter in ephemeral, the former is permanent and difficult to alter.

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Habits are at the same time dispositions, but dispositions are not necessarily habits. For those who have some specific habit may be said also, in virtue of that habit, to be thus or thus disposed; but those who are disposed in some specific way have not in all cases the corresponding habit. Another sort of quality is that in virtue of which, for example, we call men good boxers or runners, or healthy or sickly: in fact it includes all those terms which refer to inborn capacity or incapacity. Such things are not predicated of a person in virtue of his disposition, but in virtue of his inborn capacity or incapacity to do something with ease or to avoid defeat of any kind. Persons are called good boxers or good runners, not in virtue of such and such a disposition, but in virtue of an inborn capacity to accomplish something with ease. Men are called healthy in virtue of the inborn capacity of easy resistance to those unhealthy influences that may ordinarily arise; unhealthy, in virtue of the lack of this capacity. Similarly with regard to softness and hardness. Hardness is predicated of a thing because it has that capacity of resistance which enables it to withstand disintegration; softness, again, is predicated of a thing by reason of the lack of that capacity. A third class within this category is that of affective qualities and affections. Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of this sort of quality, together with all that is akin to these; heat, moreover, and cold, whiteness, and blackness are affective qualities. It is evident that these are qualities, for those things that possess them are themselves said to be such and such by reason of their presence. Honey is called sweet because it contains sweetness; the body is called white because it contains whiteness; and so in all other cases. The term ‘affective quality’ is not used as indicating that those things which admit these qualities are affected in any way. Honey is not called sweet because it is affected in a specific way, nor is this what is meant in any other instance. Similarly heat and cold are called affective qualities, not because those things which admit them are affected. What is meant is that these said qualities are capable of producing an ‘affection’ in the way of perception. For sweetness has the power of affecting the sense of taste; heat, that of touch; and so it is with the rest of these qualities. Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are not said to be affective qualities in this sense, but —because they themselves are the results of an affection. It is plain that many changes of colour take place because of affections. When a man is ashamed, he blushes; when he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so on. So true is this, that when a man

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is by nature liable to such affections, arising from some concomitance of elements in his constitution, it is a probable inference that he has the corresponding complexion of skin. For the same disposition of bodily elements, which in the former instance was momentarily present in the case of an access of shame, might be a result of a man’s natural temperament, so as to produce the corresponding colouring also as a natural characteristic. All conditions, therefore, of this kind, if caused by certain permanent and lasting affections, are called affective qualities. For pallor and duskiness of complexion are called qualities, inasmuch as we are said to be such and such in virtue of them, not only if they originate in natural constitution, but also if they come about through long disease or sunburn, and are difficult to remove, or indeed remain throughout life. For in the same way we are said to be such and such because of these. Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may easily be rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called, not qualities, but affections: for we are not said to be such virtue of them. The man who blushes through shame is not said to be a constitutional blusher, nor is the man who becomes pale through fear said to be constitutionally pale. He is said rather to have been affected. Thus such conditions are called affections, not qualities. In like manner there are affective qualities and affections of the soul. That temper with which a man is born and which has its origin in certain deep-seated affections is called a quality. I mean such conditions as insanity, irascibility, and so on: for people are said to be mad or irascible in virtue of these. Similarly those abnormal psychic states which are not inborn, but arise from the concomitance of certain other elements, and are difficult to remove, or altogether permanent, are called qualities, for in virtue of them men are said to be such and such. Those, however, which arise from causes easily rendered ineffective are called affections, not qualities. Suppose that a man is irritable when vexed: he is not even spoken of as a bad-tempered man, when in such circumstances he loses his temper somewhat, but rather is said to be affected. Such conditions are therefore termed, not qualities, but affections. The fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape that belongs to a thing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any other qualities of this type; each of these defines a thing as being such and such. Because it is triangular or quadrangular a thing is said to have a specific character, or again because it is straight or curved; in fact a thing’s shape in every case gives rise to a qualification of it.

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Rarity and density, roughness and smoothness, seem to be terms indicating quality: yet these, it would appear, really belong to a class different from that of quality. For it is rather a certain relative position of the parts composing the thing thus qualified which, it appears, is indicated by each of these terms. A thing is dense, owing to the fact that its parts are closely combined with one another; rare, because there are interstices between the parts; smooth, because its parts lie, so to speak, evenly; rough, because some parts project beyond others. There may be other sorts of quality, but those that are most properly so called have, we may safely say, been enumerated. These, then, are qualities, and the things that take their name from them as derivatives, or are in some other way dependent on them, are said to be qualified in some specific way. In most, indeed in almost all cases, the name of that which is qualified is derived from that of the quality. Thus the terms ‘whiteness’, ‘grammar’, ‘justice’, give us the adjectives ‘white’, ‘grammatical’, ‘just’, and so on. There are some cases, however, in which, as the quality under consideration has no name, it is impossible that those possessed of it should have a name that is derivative. For instance, the name given to the runner or boxer, who is so called in virtue of an inborn capacity, is not derived from that of any quality; for lob those capacities have no name assigned to them. In this, the inborn capacity is distinct from the science, with reference to which men are called, e.g. boxers or wrestlers. Such a science is classed as a disposition; it has a name, and is called ‘boxing’ or ‘wrestling’ as the case may be, and the name given to those disposed in this way is derived from that of the science. Sometimes, even though a name exists for the quality, that which takes its character from the quality has a name that is not a derivative. For instance, the upright man takes his character from the possession of the quality of integrity, but the name given him is not derived from the word ‘integrity’. Yet this does not occur often. We may therefore state that those things are said to be possessed of some specific quality which have a name derived from that of the aforesaid quality, or which are in some other way dependent on it. One quality may be the contrary of another; thus justice is the contrary of injustice, whiteness of blackness, and so on. The things, also, which are said to be such and such in virtue of these qualities, may be contrary the one to the other; for that which is unjust is contrary to that which is just, that which is white to that which is black. This, however, is not

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always the case. Red, yellow, and such colours, though qualities, have no contraries. If one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a quality. This will be evident from particular instances, if we apply the names used to denote the other categories; for instance, granted that justice is the contrary of injustice and justice is a quality, injustice will also be a quality: neither quantity, nor relation, nor place, nor indeed any other category but that of quality, will be applicable properly to injustice. So it is with all other contraries falling under the category of quality. Qualities admit of variation of degree. Whiteness is predicated of one thing in a greater or less degree than of another. This is also the case with reference to justice. Moreover, one and the same thing may exhibit a quality in a greater degree than it did before: if a thing is white, it may become whiter. Though this is generally the case, there are exceptions. For if we should say that justice admitted of variation of degree, difficulties might ensue, and this is true with regard to all those qualities which are dispositions. There are some, indeed, who dispute the possibility of variation here. They maintain that justice and health cannot very well admit of variation of degree themselves, but that people vary in the degree in which they possess these qualities, and that this is the case with grammatical learning and all those qualities which are classed as dispositions. However that may be, it is an incontrovertible fact that the things which in virtue of these qualities are said to be what they are vary in the degree in which they possess them; for one man is said to be better versed in grammar, or more healthy or just, than another, and so on. The qualities expressed by the terms ‘triangular’ and ‘quadrangular’ do not appear to admit of variation of degree, nor indeed do any that have to do with figure. For those things to which the definition of the triangle or circle is applicable are all equally triangular or circular. Those, on the other hand, to which the same definition is not applicable, cannot be said to differ from one another in degree; the square is no more a circle than the rectangle, for to neither is the definition of the circle appropriate. In short, if the definition of the term proposed is not applicable to both objects, they cannot be compared. Thus it is not all qualities which admit of variation of degree. Whereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned are peculiar to quality, the fact that likeness and unlikeness can be predicated with reference to quality only, gives to that category its distinctive feature. One

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thing is like another only with reference to that in virtue of which it is such and such; thus this forms the peculiar mark of quality. We must not be disturbed because it may be argued that, though proposing to discuss the category of quality, we have included in it many relative terms. We did say that habits and dispositions were relative. In practically all such cases the genus is relative, the individual not. Thus knowledge, as a genus, is explained by reference to something else, for we mean a knowledge of something. But particular branches of knowledge are not thus explained. The knowledge of grammar is not relative to anything external, nor is the knowledge of music, but these, if relative at all, are relative only in virtue of their genera; thus grammar is said be the knowledge of something, not the grammar of something; similarly music is the knowledge of something, not the music of something. Thus individual branches of knowledge are not relative. And it is because we possess these individual branches of knowledge that we are said to be such and such. It is these that we actually possess: we are called experts because we possess knowledge in some particular branch. Those particular branches, therefore, of knowledge, in virtue of which we are sometimes said to be such and such, are themselves qualities, and are not relative. Further, if anything should happen to fall within both the category of quality and that of relation, there would be nothing extraordinary in classing it under both these heads.
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Action and affection both admit of contraries and also of variation of degree. Heating is the contrary of cooling, being heated of being cooled, being glad of being vexed. Thus they admit of contraries. They also admit of variation of degree: for it is possible to heat in a greater or less degree; also to be heated in a greater or less degree. Thus action and affection also admit of variation of degree. So much, then, is stated with regard to these categories. We spoke, moreover, of the category of position when we were dealing with that of relation, and stated that such terms derived their names from those of the corresponding attitudes. As for the rest, time, place, state, since they are easily intelligible, I say no more about them than was said at the beginning, that in the category of state are included such states as ‘shod’, ‘armed’, in that of place ‘in the Lyceum’ and so on, as was explained before.

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10

The proposed categories have, then, been adequately dealt with. We must next explain the various senses in which the term ‘opposite’ is used. Things are said to be opposed in four senses: (i) as correlatives to one another, (ii) as contraries to one another, (iii) as privatives to positives, (iv) as affirmatives to negatives. Let me sketch my meaning in outline. An instance of the use of the word ‘opposite’ with reference to correlatives is afforded by the expressions ‘double’ and ‘half’; with reference to contraries by ‘bad’ and ‘good’. Opposites in the sense of ‘privatives’ and ‘positives’ are’ blindness’ and ‘sight’; in the sense of affirmatives and negatives, the propositions ‘he sits’, ‘he does not sit’. (i) Pairs of opposites which fall under the category of relation are explained by a reference of the one to the other, the reference being indicated by the preposition ‘of’ or by some other preposition. Thus, double is a relative term, for that which is double is explained as the double of something. Knowledge, again, is the opposite of the thing known, in the same sense; and the thing known also is explained by its relation to its opposite, knowledge. For the thing known is explained as that which is known by something, that is, by knowledge. Such things, then, as are opposite the one to the other in the sense of being correlatives are explained by a reference of the one to the other. (ii) Pairs of opposites which are contraries are not in any way interdependent, but are contrary the one to the other. The good is not spoken of as the good of the had, but as the contrary of the bad, nor is white spoken of as the white of the black, but as the contrary of the black. These two types of opposition are therefore distinct. Those contraries which are such that the subjects in which they are naturally present, or of which they are predicated, must necessarily contain either the one or the other of them, have no intermediate, but those in the case of which no such necessity obtains, always have an intermediate. Thus disease and health are naturally present in the body of an animal, and it is necessary that either the one or the other should be present in the body of an animal. Odd and even, again, are predicated of number, and it is necessary that the one or the other should be present in numbers. Now there is no intermediate between the terms of either of these two pairs. On the other hand, in those contraries with regard to which no such necessity obtains, we find an intermediate. Blackness and whiteness are naturally present in the body, but it is not necessary that either the one or the other should

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be present in the body, inasmuch as it is not true to say that everybody must be white or black. Badness and goodness, again, are predicated of man, and of many other things, but it is not necessary that either the one quality or the other should be present in that of which they are predicated: it is not true to say that everything that may be good or bad must be either good or bad. These pairs of contraries have intermediates: the intermediates between white and black are grey, sallow, and all the other colours that come between; the intermediate between good and bad is that which is neither the one nor the other. Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow and all the other colours that come between white and black; in other cases, however, it is not easy to name the intermediate, but we must define it as that which is not either extreme, as in the case of that which is neither good nor bad, neither just nor unjust. (iii) ‘privatives’ and ‘Positives’ have reference to the same subject. Thus, sight and blindness have reference to the eye. It is a universal rule that each of a pair of opposites of this type has reference to that to which the particular ‘positive’ is natural. We say that that is capable of some particular faculty or possession has suffered privation when the faculty or possession in question is in no way present in that in which, and at the time at which, it should naturally be present. We do not call that toothless which has not teeth, or that blind which has not sight, but rather that which has not teeth or sight at the time when by nature it should. For there are some creatures which from birth are without sight, or without teeth, but these are not called toothless or blind. To be without some faculty or to possess it is not the same as the corresponding ‘privative’ or ‘positive’. ‘Sight’ is a ‘positive’, ‘blindness’ a ‘privative’, but ‘to possess sight’ is not equivalent to ‘sight’, ‘to be blind’ is not equivalent to ‘blindness’. Blindness is a ‘privative’, to be blind is to be in a state of privation, but is not a ‘privative’. Moreover, if ‘blindness’ were equivalent to ‘being blind’, both would be predicated of the same subject; but though a man is said to be blind, he is by no means said to be blindness. To be in a state of ‘possession’ is, it appears, the opposite of being in a state of ‘privation’, just as ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ themselves are opposite. There is the same type of antithesis in both cases; for just as blindness is opposed to sight, so is being blind opposed to having sight. That which is affirmed or denied is not itself affirmation or denial. By ‘affirmation’ we mean an affirmative proposition, by ‘denial’ a negative.

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Now, those facts which form the matter of the affirmation or denial are not propositions; yet these two are said to be opposed in the same sense as the affirmation and denial, for in this case also the type of antithesis is the same. For as the affirmation is opposed to the denial, as in the two propositions ‘he sits’, ‘he does not sit’, so also the fact which constitutes the matter of the proposition in one case is opposed to that in the other, his sitting, that is to say, to his not sitting. It is evident that ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ are not opposed each to each in the same sense as relatives. The one is not explained by reference to the other; sight is not sight of blindness, nor is any other preposition used to indicate the relation. Similarly blindness is not said to be blindness of sight, but rather, privation of sight. Relatives, moreover, reciprocate; if blindness, therefore, were a relative, there would be a reciprocity of relation between it and that with which it was correlative. But this is not the case. Sight is not called the sight of blindness. That those terms which fall under the heads of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ are not opposed each to each as contraries, either, is plain from the following facts: Of a pair of contraries such that they have no intermediate, one or the other must needs be present in the subject in which they naturally subsist, or of which they are predicated; for it is those, as we proved,’ in the case of which this necessity obtains, that have no intermediate. Moreover, we cited health and disease, odd and even, as instances. But those contraries which have an intermediate are not subject to any such necessity. It is not necessary that every substance, receptive of such qualities, should be either black or white, cold or hot, for something intermediate between these contraries may very well be present in the subject. We proved, moreover, that those contraries have an intermediate in the case of which the said necessity does not obtain. Yet when one of the two contraries is a constitutive property of the subject, as it is a constitutive property of fire to be hot, of snow to be white, it is necessary determinately that one of the two contraries, not one or the other, should be present in the subject; for fire cannot be cold, or snow black. Thus, it is not the case here that one of the two must needs be present in every subject receptive of these qualities, but only in that subject of which the one forms a constitutive property. Moreover, in such cases it is one member of the pair determinately, and not either the one or the other, which must be present. In the case of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’, on the other hand, neither of the aforesaid statements holds good. For it is not necessary that a subject receptive of the qualities should always have either the one or the other;

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that which has not yet advanced to the state when sight is natural is not said either to be blind or to see. Thus ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ do not belong to that class of contraries which consists of those which have no intermediate. On the other hand, they do not belong either to that class which consists of contraries which have an intermediate. For under certain conditions it is necessary that either the one or the other should form part of the constitution of every appropriate subject. For when a thing has reached the stage when it is by nature capable of sight, it will be said either to see or to be blind, and that in an indeterminate sense, signifying that the capacity may be either present or absent; for it is not necessary either that it should see or that it should be blind, but that it should be either in the one state or in the other. Yet in the case of those contraries which have an intermediate we found that it was never necessary that either the one or the other should be present in every appropriate subject, but only that in certain subjects one of the pair should be present, and that in a determinate sense. It is, therefore, plain that ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ are not opposed each to each in either of the senses in which contraries are opposed. Again, in the case of contraries, it is possible that there should be changes from either into the other, while the subject retains its identity, unless indeed one of the contraries is a constitutive property of that subject, as heat is of fire. For it is possible that that that which is healthy should become diseased, that which is white, black, that which is cold, hot, that which is good, bad, that which is bad, good. The bad man, if he is being brought into a better way of life and thought, may make some advance, however slight, and if he should once improve, even ever so little, it is plain that he might change completely, or at any rate make very great progress; for a man becomes more and more easily moved to virtue, however small the improvement was at first. It is, therefore, natural to suppose that he will make yet greater progress than he has made in the past; and as this process goes on, it will change him completely and establish him in the contrary state, provided he is not hindered by lack of time. In the case of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’, however, change in both directions is impossible. There may be a change from possession to privation, but not from privation to possession. The man who has become blind does not regain his sight; the man who has become bald does not regain his hair; the man who has lost his teeth does not grow his grow a new set. (iv) Statements opposed as affirmation and negation belong manifestly to a class which is distinct, for in this case, and in this

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case only, it is necessary for the one opposite to be true and the other false. Neither in the case of contraries, nor in the case of correlatives, nor in the case of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’, is it necessary for one to be true and the other false. Health and disease are contraries: neither of them is true or false. ‘Double’ and ‘half’ are opposed to each other as correlatives: neither of them is true or false. The case is the same, of course, with regard to ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ such as ‘sight’ and ‘blindness’. In short, where there is no sort of combination of words, truth and falsity have no place, and all the opposites we have mentioned so far consist of simple words. At the same time, when the words which enter into opposed statements are contraries, these, more than any other set of opposites, would seem to claim this characteristic. ‘Socrates is ill’ is the contrary of ‘Socrates is well’, but not even of such composite expressions is it true to say that one of the pair must always be true and the other false. For if Socrates exists, one will be true and the other false, but if he does not exist, both will be false; for neither ‘Socrates is ill’ nor ‘Socrates is well’ is true, if Socrates does not exist at all. In the case of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’, if the subject does not exist at all, neither proposition is true, but even if the subject exists, it is not always the fact that one is true and the other false. For ‘Socrates has sight’ is the opposite of ‘Socrates is blind’ in the sense of the word ‘opposite’ which applies to possession and privation. Now if Socrates exists, it is not necessary that one should be true and the other false, for when he is not yet able to acquire the power of vision, both are false, as also if Socrates is altogether non-existent. But in the case of affirmation and negation, whether the subject exists or not, one is always false and the other true. For manifestly, if Socrates exists, one of the two propositions ‘Socrates is ill’, ‘Socrates is not ill’, is true, and the other false. This is likewise the case if he does not exist; for if he does not exist, to say that he is ill is false, to say that he is not ill is true. Thus it is in the case of those opposites only, which are opposite in the sense in which the term is used with reference to affirmation and negation, that the rule holds good, that one of the pair must be true and the other false.

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11

That the contrary of a good is an evil is shown by induction: the contrary of health is disease, of courage, cowardice, and so on. But the contrary of an evil is sometimes a good, sometimes an evil. For defect, which is an evil, has excess for its contrary, this also being an evil, and the mean. which is a good, is equally the contrary of the one and of the other. It is only in a few cases, however, that we see instances of this: in most, the contrary of an evil is a good. In the case of contraries, it is not always necessary that if one exists the other should also exist: for if all become healthy there will be health and no disease, and again, if everything turns white, there will be white, but no black. Again, since the fact that Socrates is ill is the contrary of the fact that Socrates is well, and two contrary conditions cannot both obtain in one and the same individual at the same time, both these contraries could not exist at once: for if that Socrates was well was a fact, then that Socrates was ill could not possibly be one. It is plain that contrary attributes must needs be present in subjects which belong to the same species or genus. Disease and health require as their subject the body of an animal; white and black require a body, without further qualification; justice and injustice require as their subject the human soul. Moreover, it is necessary that pairs of contraries should in all cases either belong to the same genus or belong to contrary genera or be themselves genera. White and black belong to the same genus, colour; justice and injustice, to contrary genera, virtue and vice; while good and evil do not belong to genera, but are themselves actual genera, with terms under them.
12

There are four senses in which one thing can be said to be ‘prior’ to another. Primarily and most properly the term has reference to time: in this sense the word is used to indicate that one thing is older or more ancient than another, for the expressions ‘older’ and ‘more ancient’ imply greater length of time. Secondly, one thing is said to be ‘prior’ to another when the sequence of their being cannot be reversed. In this sense ‘one’ is ‘prior’ to ‘two’. For if ‘two’ exists, it follows directly that ‘one’ must exist, but if ‘one’ exists, it does not follow necessarily that ‘two’ exists: thus the sequence

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subsisting cannot be reversed. It is agreed, then, that when the sequence of two things cannot be reversed, then that one on which the other depends is called ‘prior’ to that other. In the third place, the term ‘prior’ is used with reference to any order, as in the case of science and of oratory. For in sciences which use demonstration there is that which is prior and that which is posterior in order; in geometry, the elements are prior to the propositions; in reading and writing, the letters of the alphabet are prior to the syllables. Similarly, in the case of speeches, the exordium is prior in order to the narrative. Besides these senses of the word, there is a fourth. That which is better and more honourable is said to have a natural priority. In common parlance men speak of those whom they honour and love as ‘coming first’ with them. This sense of the word is perhaps the most far-fetched. Such, then, are the different senses in which the term ‘prior’ is used. Yet it would seem that besides those mentioned there is yet another. For in those things, the being of each of which implies that of the other, that which is in any way the cause may reasonably be said to be by nature ‘prior’ to the effect. It is plain that there are instances of this. The fact of the being of a man carries with it the truth of the proposition that he is, and the implication is reciprocal: for if a man is, the proposition wherein we allege that he is true, and conversely, if the proposition wherein we allege that he is true, then he is. The true proposition, however, is in no way the cause of the being of the man, but the fact of the man’s being does seem somehow to be the cause of the truth of the proposition, for the truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact of the man’s being or not being. Thus the word ‘prior’ may be used in five senses.
13

The term ‘simultaneous’ is primarily and most appropriately applied to those things the genesis of the one of which is simultaneous with that of the other; for in such cases neither is prior or posterior to the other. Such things are said to be simultaneous in point of time. Those things, again, are ‘simultaneous’ in point of nature, the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is the cause of the other’s being. This is the case with regard to the double and the half, for these are reciprocally dependent, since, if there is a double, there is

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also a half, and if there is a half, there is also a double, while at the same time neither is the cause of the being of the other. Again, those species which are distinguished one from another and opposed one to another within the same genus are said to be ‘simultaneous’ in nature. I mean those species which are distinguished each from each by one and the same method of division. Thus the ‘winged’ species is simultaneous with the ‘terrestrial’ and the ‘water’ species. These are distinguished within the same genus, and are opposed each to each, for the genus ‘animal’ has the ‘winged’, the ‘terrestrial’, and the ‘water’ species, and no one of these is prior or posterior to another; on the contrary, all such things appear to be ‘simultaneous’ in nature. Each of these also, the terrestrial, the winged, and the water species, can be divided again into subspecies. Those species, then, also will be ‘simultaneous’ point of nature, which, belonging to the same genus, are distinguished each from each by one and the same method of differentiation. But genera are prior to species, for the sequence of their being cannot be reversed. If there is the species ‘water-animal’, there will be the genus ‘animal’, but granted the being of the genus ‘animal’, it does not follow necessarily that there will be the species ‘water-animal’. Those things, therefore, are said to be ‘simultaneous’ in nature, the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is in any way the cause of the other’s being; those species, also, which are distinguished each from each and opposed within the same genus. Those things, moreover, are ‘simultaneous’ in the unqualified sense of the word which come into being at the same time.
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There are six sorts of movement: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place. It is evident in all but one case that all these sorts of movement are distinct each from each. Generation is distinct from destruction, increase and change of place from diminution, and so on. But in the case of alteration it may be argued that the process necessarily implies one or other of the other five sorts of motion. This is not true, for we may say that all affections, or nearly all, produce in us an alteration which is distinct from all other sorts of motion, for that which is affected need not suffer either increase or diminution or any of the other sorts of motion. Thus alteration is a distinct sort of motion; for, if it were not, the thing altered would

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not only be altered, but would forthwith necessarily suffer increase or diminution or some one of the other sorts of motion in addition; which as a matter of fact is not the case. Similarly that which was undergoing the process of increase or was subject to some other sort of motion would, if alteration were not a distinct form of motion, necessarily be subject to alteration also. But there are some things which undergo increase but yet not alteration. The square, for instance, if a gnomon is applied to it, undergoes increase but not alteration, and so it is with all other figures of this sort. Alteration and increase, therefore, are distinct. Speaking generally, rest is the contrary of motion. But the different forms of motion have their own contraries in other forms; thus destruction is the contrary of generation, diminution of increase, rest in a place, of change of place. As for this last, change in the reverse direction would seem to be most truly its contrary; thus motion upwards is the contrary of motion downwards and vice versa. In the case of that sort of motion which yet remains, of those that have been enumerated, it is not easy to state what is its contrary. It appears to have no contrary, unless one should define the contrary here also either as ‘rest in its quality’ or as ‘change in the direction of the contrary quality’, just as we defined the contrary of change of place either as rest in a place or as change in the reverse direction. For a thing is altered when change of quality takes place; therefore either rest in its quality or change in the direction of the contrary may be called the contrary of this qualitative form of motion. In this way becoming white is the contrary of becoming black; there is alteration in the contrary direction, since a change of a qualitative nature takes place.
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The term ‘to have’ is used in various senses. In the first place it is used with reference to habit or disposition or any other quality, for we are said to ‘have’ a piece of knowledge or a virtue. Then, again, it has reference to quantity, as, for instance, in the case of a man’s height; for he is said to ‘have’ a height of three or four cubits. It is used, moreover, with regard to apparel, a man being said to ‘have’ a coat or tunic; or in respect of something which we have on a part of ourselves, as a ring on the hand: or in respect of something which is a part of us, as hand or foot. The term refers also to content, as in the case of a vessel and wheat, or of a jar and wine; a jar is said to ‘have’ wine, and a corn-measure wheat. The expression in such cases has reference to content. Or it refers to that

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which has been acquired; we are said to ‘have’ a house or a field. A man is also said to ‘have’ a wife, and a wife a husband, and this appears to be the most remote meaning of the term, for by the use of it we mean simply that the husband lives with the wife. Other senses of the word might perhaps be found, but the most ordinary ones have all been enumerated.

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On Interpretation
Translated by E. M. Edghill
1

First we must define the terms ‘noun’ and ‘verb’, then the terms ‘denial’ and ‘affirmation’, then ‘proposition’ and ‘sentence.’ Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images. This matter has, however, been discussed in my treatise about the soul, for it belongs to an investigation distinct from that which lies before us. As there are in the mind thoughts which do not involve truth or falsity, and also those which must be either true or false, so it is in speech. For truth and falsity imply combination and separation. Nouns and verbs, provided nothing is added, are like thoughts without combination or separation; ‘man’ and ‘white’, as isolated terms, are not yet either true or false. In proof of this, consider the word ‘goat-stag.’ It has significance, but there is no truth or falsity about it, unless ‘is’ or ‘is not’ is added, either in the present or in some other tense.
2

By a noun we mean a sound significant by convention, which has no reference to time, and of which no part is significant apart from the rest. In the noun ‘Fairsteed,’ the part ‘steed’ has no significance in and by itself, as in the phrase ‘fair steed.’ Yet there is a difference between simple and composite nouns; for in the former the part is in no way significant, in the latter it contributes to the meaning of the whole, although it has not an independent meaning. Thus in the word ‘pirate-boat’ the word ‘boat’ has no meaning except as part of the whole word. The limitation ‘by convention’ was introduced because nothing is by nature a noun or name-it is only so when it becomes a symbol; inarticulate sounds, such as those which brutes produce, are significant, yet none of these constitutes a noun.

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The expression ‘not-man’ is not a noun. There is indeed no recognized term by which we may denote such an expression, for it is not a sentence or a denial. Let it then be called an indefinite noun. The expressions ‘of Philo’, ‘to Philo’, and so on, constitute not nouns, but cases of a noun. The definition of these cases of a noun is in other respects the same as that of the noun proper, but, when coupled with ‘is’, ‘was’, or will be’, they do not, as they are, form a proposition either true or false, and this the noun proper always does, under these conditions. Take the words ‘of Philo is’ or ‘of or ‘of Philo is not’; these words do not, as they stand, form either a true or a false proposition.
3

A verb is that which, in addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the notion of time. No part of it has any independent meaning, and it is a sign of something said of something else. I will explain what I mean by saying that it carries with it the notion of time. ‘Health’ is a noun, but ‘is healthy’ is a verb; for besides its proper meaning it indicates the present existence of the state in question. Moreover, a verb is always a sign of something said of something else, i.e. of something either predicable of or present in some other thing. Such expressions as ‘is not-healthy’, ‘is not, ill’, I do not describe as verbs; for though they carry the additional note of time, and always form a predicate, there is no specified name for this variety; but let them be called indefinite verbs, since they apply equally well to that which exists and to that which does not. Similarly ‘he was healthy’, ‘he will be healthy’, are not verbs, but tenses of a verb; the difference lies in the fact that the verb indicates present time, while the tenses of the verb indicate those times which lie outside the present. Verbs in and by themselves are substantival and have significance, for he who uses such expressions arrests the hearer’s mind, and fixes his attention; but they do not, as they stand, express any judgement, either positive or negative. For neither are ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ the participle ‘being’ significant of any fact, unless something is added; for they do not themselves indicate anything, but imply a copulation, of which we cannot form a conception apart from the things coupled.

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4

A sentence is a significant portion of speech, some parts of which have an independent meaning, that is to say, as an utterance, though not as the expression of any positive judgement. Let me explain. The word ‘human’ has meaning, but does not constitute a proposition, either positive or negative. It is only when other words are added that the whole will form an affirmation or denial. But if we separate one syllable of the word ‘human’ from the other, it has no meaning; similarly in the word ‘mouse’, the part ‘ouse’ has no meaning in itself, but is merely a sound. In composite words, indeed, the parts contribute to the meaning of the whole; yet, as has been pointed out, they have not an independent meaning. Every sentence has meaning, not as being the natural means by which a physical faculty is realized, but, as we have said, by convention. Yet every sentence is not a proposition; only such are propositions as have in them either truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is a sentence, but is neither true nor false. Let us therefore dismiss all other types of sentence but the proposition, for this last concerns our present inquiry, whereas the investigation of the others belongs rather to the study of rhetoric or of poetry.
5

The first class of simple propositions is the simple affirmation, the next, the simple denial; all others are only one by conjunction. Every proposition must contain a verb or the tense of a verb. The phrase which defines the species ‘man’, if no verb in present, past, or future time be added, is not a proposition. It may be asked how the expression ‘a footed animal with two feet’ can be called single; for it is not the circumstance that the words follow in unbroken succession that effects the unity. This inquiry, however, finds its place in an investigation foreign to that before us. We call those propositions single which indicate a single fact, or the conjunction of the parts of which results in unity: those propositions, on the other hand, are separate and many in number, which indicate many facts, or whose parts have no conjunction. Let us, moreover, consent to call a noun or a verb an expression only, and not a proposition, since it is not possible for a man to speak in this way when he is expressing something, in such a way as to make a

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statement, whether his utterance is an answer to a question or an act of his own initiation. To return: of propositions one kind is simple, i.e. that which asserts or denies something of something, the other composite, i.e. that which is compounded of simple propositions. A simple proposition is a statement, with meaning, as to the presence of something in a subject or its absence, in the present, past, or future, according to the divisions of time.
6

An affirmation is a positive assertion of something about something, a denial a negative assertion. Now it is possible both to affirm and to deny the presence of something which is present or of something which is not, and since these same affirmations and denials are possible with reference to those times which lie outside the present, it would be possible to contradict any affirmation or denial. Thus it is plain that every affirmation has an opposite denial, and similarly every denial an opposite affirmation. We will call such a pair of propositions a pair of contradictories. Those positive and negative propositions are said to be contradictory which have the same subject and predicate. The identity of subject and of predicate must not be ‘equivocal’. Indeed there are definitive qualifications besides this, which we make to meet the casuistries of sophists.
7

Some things are universal, others individual. By the term ‘universal’ I mean that which is of such a nature as to be predicated of many subjects, by ‘individual’ that which is not thus predicated. Thus ‘man’ is a universal, ‘Callias’ an individual. Our propositions necessarily sometimes concern a universal subject, sometimes an individual. If, then, a man states a positive and a negative proposition of universal character with regard to a universal, these two propositions are ‘contrary’. By the expression ‘a proposition of universal character with regard to a universal’, such propositions as ‘every man is white’, ‘no man is white’ are meant. When, on the other hand, the positive and negative propositions, though they have regard to a universal, are yet not of universal character, they will not be contrary, albeit the meaning intended is sometimes contrary. As instances of propositions made with regard to a

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universal, but not of universal character, we may take the ‘propositions ‘man is white’, ‘man is not white’. ‘Man’ is a universal, but the proposition is not made as of universal character; for the word ‘every’ does not make the subject a universal, but rather gives the proposition a universal character. If, however, both predicate and subject are distributed, the proposition thus constituted is contrary to truth; no affirmation will, under such circumstances, be true. The proposition ‘every man is every animal’ is an example of this type. An affirmation is opposed to a denial in the sense which I denote by the term ‘contradictory’, when, while the subject remains the same, the affirmation is of universal character and the denial is not. The affirmation ‘every man is white’ is the contradictory of the denial ‘not every man is white’, or again, the proposition ‘no man is white’ is the contradictory of the proposition ‘some men are white’. But propositions are opposed as contraries when both the affirmation and the denial are universal, as in the sentences ‘every man is white’, ‘no man is white’, ‘every man is just’, ‘no man is just’. We see that in a pair of this sort both propositions cannot be true, but the contradictories of a pair of contraries can sometimes both be true with reference to the same subject; for instance ‘not every man is white’ and some men are white’ are both true. Of such corresponding positive and negative propositions as refer to universals and have a universal character, one must be true and the other false. This is the case also when the reference is to individuals, as in the propositions ‘Socrates is white’, ‘Socrates is not white’. When, on the other hand, the reference is to universals, but the propositions are not universal, it is not always the case that one is true and the other false, for it is possible to state truly that man is white and that man is not white and that man is beautiful and that man is not beautiful; for if a man is deformed he is the reverse of beautiful, also if he is progressing towards beauty he is not yet beautiful. This statement might seem at first sight to carry with it a contradiction, owing to the fact that the proposition ‘man is not white’ appears to be equivalent to the proposition ‘no man is white’. This, however, is not the case, nor are they necessarily at the same time true or false. It is evident also that the denial corresponding to a single affirmation is itself single; for the denial must deny just that which the affirmation affirms concerning the same subject, and must correspond with the

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affirmation both in the universal or particular character of the subject and in the distributed or undistributed sense in which it is understood. For instance, the affirmation ‘Socrates is white’ has its proper denial in the proposition ‘Socrates is not white’. If anything else be negatively predicated of the subject or if anything else be the subject though the predicate remain the same, the denial will not be the denial proper to that affirmation, but on that is distinct. The denial proper to the affirmation ‘every man is white’ is ‘not every man is white’; that proper to the affirmation ‘some men are white’ is ‘no man is white’, while that proper to the affirmation ‘man is white’ is ‘man is not white’. We have shown further that a single denial is contradictorily opposite to a single affirmation and we have explained which these are; we have also stated that contrary are distinct from contradictory propositions and which the contrary are; also that with regard to a pair of opposite propositions it is not always the case that one is true and the other false. We have pointed out, moreover, what the reason of this is and under what circumstances the truth of the one involves the falsity of the other.
8

An affirmation or denial is single, if it indicates some one fact about some one subject; it matters not whether the subject is universal and whether the statement has a universal character, or whether this is not so. Such single propositions are: ‘every man is white’, ‘not every man is white’;’man is white’,’man is not white’; ‘no man is white’, ‘some men are white’; provided the word ‘white’ has one meaning. If, on the other hand, one word has two meanings which do not combine to form one, the affirmation is not single. For instance, if a man should establish the symbol ‘garment’ as significant both of a horse and of a man, the proposition ‘garment is white’ would not be a single affirmation, nor its opposite a single denial. For it is equivalent to the proposition ‘horse and man are white’, which, again, is equivalent to the two propositions ‘horse is white’, ‘man is white’. If, then, these two propositions have more than a single significance, and do not form a single proposition, it is plain that the first proposition either has more than one significance or else has none; for a particular man is not a horse. This, then, is another instance of those propositions of which both the positive and the negative forms may be true or false simultaneously.

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9

In the case of that which is or which has taken place, propositions, whether positive or negative, must be true or false. Again, in the case of a pair of contradictories, either when the subject is universal and the propositions are of a universal character, or when it is individual, as has been said,’ one of the two must be true and the other false; whereas when the subject is universal, but the propositions are not of a universal character, there is no such necessity. We have discussed this type also in a previous chapter. When the subject, however, is individual, and that which is predicated of it relates to the future, the case is altered. For if all propositions whether positive or negative are either true or false, then any given predicate must either belong to the subject or not, so that if one man affirms that an event of a given character will take place and another denies it, it is plain that the statement of the one will correspond with reality and that of the other will not. For the predicate cannot both belong and not belong to the subject at one and the same time with regard to the future. Thus, if it is true to say that a thing is white, it must necessarily be white; if the reverse proposition is true, it will of necessity not be white. Again, if it is white, the proposition stating that it is white was true; if it is not white, the proposition to the opposite effect was true. And if it is not white, the man who states that it is making a false statement; and if the man who states that it is white is making a false statement, it follows that it is not white. It may therefore be argued that it is necessary that affirmations or denials must be either true or false. Now if this be so, nothing is or takes place fortuitously, either in the present or in the future, and there are no real alternatives; everything takes place of necessity and is fixed. For either he that affirms that it will take place or he that denies this is in correspondence with fact, whereas if things did not take place of necessity, an event might just as easily not happen as happen; for the meaning of the word ‘fortuitous’ with regard to present or future events is that reality is so constituted that it may issue in either of two opposite directions. Again, if a thing is white now, it was true before to say that it would be white, so that of anything that has taken place it was always true to say ‘it is’ or ‘it will be’. But if it was always true to say that a thing is or will be, it is not possible that it should not be or not be about to be, and when a thing cannot not come to be, it is impossible that it should not come to be, and when it is impossible that it should not come to be, it must come to be. All, then, that is about to be

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must of necessity take place. It results from this that nothing is uncertain or fortuitous, for if it were fortuitous it would not be necessary. Again, to say that neither the affirmation nor the denial is true, maintaining, let us say, that an event neither will take place nor will not take place, is to take up a position impossible to defend. In the first place, though facts should prove the one proposition false, the opposite would still be untrue. Secondly, if it was true to say that a thing was both white and large, both these qualities must necessarily belong to it; and if they will belong to it the next day, they must necessarily belong to it the next day. But if an event is neither to take place nor not to take place the next day, the element of chance will be eliminated. For example, it would be necessary that a sea-fight should neither take place nor fail to take place on the next day. These awkward results and others of the same kind follow, if it is an irrefragable law that of every pair of contradictory propositions, whether they have regard to universals and are stated as universally applicable, or whether they have regard to individuals, one must be true and the other false, and that there are no real alternatives, but that all that is or takes place is the outcome of necessity. There would be no need to deliberate or to take trouble, on the supposition that if we should adopt a certain course, a certain result would follow, while, if we did not, the result would not follow. For a man may predict an event ten thousand years beforehand, and another may predict the reverse; that which was truly predicted at the moment in the past will of necessity take place in the fullness of time. Further, it makes no difference whether people have or have not actually made the contradictory statements. For it is manifest that the circumstances are not influenced by the fact of an affirmation or denial on the part of anyone. For events will not take place or fail to take place because it was stated that they would or would not take place, nor is this any more the case if the prediction dates back ten thousand years or any other space of time. Wherefore, if through all time the nature of things was so constituted that a prediction about an event was true, then through all time it was necessary that that should find fulfillment; and with regard to all events, circumstances have always been such that their occurrence is a matter of necessity. For that of which someone has said truly that it will be, cannot fail to take place; and of that which takes place, it was always true to say that it would be.

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Yet this view leads to an impossible conclusion; for we see that both deliberation and action are causative with regard to the future, and that, to speak more generally, in those things which are not continuously actual there is potentiality in either direction. Such things may either be or not be; events also therefore may either take place or not take place. There are many obvious instances of this. It is possible that this coat may be cut in half, and yet it may not be cut in half, but wear out first. In the same way, it is possible that it should not be cut in half; unless this were so, it would not be possible that it should wear out first. So it is therefore with all other events which possess this kind of potentiality. It is therefore plain that it is not of necessity that everything is or takes place; but in some instances there are real alternatives, in which case the affirmation is no more true and no more false than the denial; while some exhibit a predisposition and general tendency in one direction or the other, and yet can issue in the opposite direction by exception. Now that which is must needs be when it is, and that which is not must needs not be when it is not. Yet it cannot be said without qualification that all existence and non-existence is the outcome of necessity. For there is a difference between saying that that which is, when it is, must needs be, and simply saying that all that is must needs be, and similarly in the case of that which is not. In the case, also, of two contradictory propositions this holds good. Everything must either be or not be, whether in the present or in the future, but it is not always possible to distinguish and state determinately which of these alternatives must necessarily come about. Let me illustrate. A sea-fight must either take place to-morrow or not, but it is not necessary that it should take place to-morrow, neither is it necessary that it should not take place, yet it is necessary that it either should or should not take place to-morrow. Since propositions correspond with facts, it is evident that when in future events there is a real alternative, and a potentiality in contrary directions, the corresponding affirmation and denial have the same character. This is the case with regard to that which is not always existent or not always nonexistent. One of the two propositions in such instances must be true and the other false, but we cannot say determinately that this or that is false, but must leave the alternative undecided. One may indeed be more likely to be true than the other, but it cannot be either actually true or actually false. It is therefore plain that it is not necessary that of an affirmation and a denial one should be true and the other false. For in the case of that which exists potentially, but not actually, the rule which

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applies to that which exists actually does not hold good. The case is rather as we have indicated.
10

An affirmation is the statement of a fact with regard to a subject, and this subject is either a noun or that which has no name; the subject and predicate in an affirmation must each denote a single thing. I have already explained’ what is meant by a noun and by that which has no name; for I stated that the expression ‘not-man’ was not a noun, in the proper sense of the word, but an indefinite noun, denoting as it does in a certain sense a single thing. Similarly the expression ‘does not enjoy health’ is not a verb proper, but an indefinite verb. Every affirmation, then, and every denial, will consist of a noun and a verb, either definite or indefinite. There can be no affirmation or denial without a verb; for the expressions ‘is’, ‘will be’, ‘was’, ‘is coming to be’, and the like are verbs according to our definition, since besides their specific meaning they convey the notion of time. Thus the primary affirmation and denial are ‘as follows: ‘man is’, ‘man is not’. Next to these, there are the propositions: ‘not-man is’, ‘not-man is not’. Again we have the propositions: ‘every man is, ‘every man is not’, ‘all that is not-man is’, ‘all that is not-man is not’. The same classification holds good with regard to such periods of time as lie outside the present. When the verb ‘is’ is used as a third element in the sentence, there can be positive and negative propositions of two sorts. Thus in the sentence ‘man is just’ the verb ‘is’ is used as a third element, call it verb or noun, which you will. Four propositions, therefore, instead of two can be formed with these materials. Two of the four, as regards their affirmation and denial, correspond in their logical sequence with the propositions which deal with a condition of privation; the other two do not correspond with these. I mean that the verb ‘is’ is added either to the term ‘just’ or to the term ‘not-just’, and two negative propositions are formed in the same way. Thus we have the four propositions. Reference to the subjoined table will make matters clear: < tbody>

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A. Affirmation. Man is just \ /

B. Denial. Man is not just / \

D. Denial. Man is not not-just C. Affirmation. Man is not-just Here ‘is’ and ‘is not’ are added either to ‘just’ or to ‘not-just’. This then is the proper scheme for these propositions, as has been said in the Analytics. The same rule holds good, if the subject is distributed. Thus we have the table: < tbody> A'. Affirmation. Every man is just B'. Denial. Not every man is just \ / / \

D'. Denial. Not every man is not- C'. Affirmation. Every man is notjust just. Yet here it is not possible, in the same way as in the former case, that the propositions joined in the table by a diagonal line should both be true; though under certain circumstances this is the case. We have thus set out two pairs of opposite propositions; there are moreover two other pairs, if a term be conjoined with ‘not-man’, the latter forming a kind of subject. Thus: < tbody> A". Not-man is just. \ / B". Not-man is not just / \

D". Not-man is not not-just. C". Not-man is not-just. This is an exhaustive enumeration of all the pairs of opposite propositions that can possibly be framed. This last group should remain distinct

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from those which preceded it, since it employs as its subject the expression ‘not-man’. When the verb ‘is’ does not fit the structure of the sentence (for instance, when the verbs ‘walks’, ‘enjoys health’ are used), that scheme applies, which applied when the word ‘is’ was added. Thus we have the propositions: ‘every man enjoys health’, ‘every man does-not-enjoy-health’, ‘all that is not-man enjoys health’, ‘all that is notman does-not-enjoy-health’. We must not in these propositions use the expression ‘not every man’. The negative must be attached to the word ‘man’, for the word ‘every’ does not give to the subject a universal significance, but implies that, as a subject, it is distributed. This is plain from the following pairs: ‘man enjoys health’, ‘man does not enjoy health’; ‘not-man enjoys health’, ‘not man does not enjoy health’. These propositions differ from the former in being indefinite and not universal in character. Thus the adjectives ‘every’ and no additional significance except that the subject, whether in a positive or in a negative sentence, is distributed. The rest of the sentence, therefore, will in each case be the same. Since the contrary of the proposition ‘every animal is just’ is ‘no animal is just’, it is plain that these two propositions will never both be true at the same time or with reference to the same subject. Sometimes, however, the contradictories of these contraries will both be true, as in the instance before us: the propositions ‘not every animal is just’ and ‘some animals are just’ are both true. Further, the proposition ‘no man is just’ follows from the proposition ‘every man is not just’ and the proposition ‘not every man is not just’, which is the opposite of ‘every man is not-just’, follows from the proposition ‘some men are just’; for if this be true, there must be some just men. It is evident, also, that when the subject is individual, if a question is asked and the negative answer is the true one, a certain positive proposition is also true. Thus, if the question were asked Socrates wise?’ and the negative answer were the true one, the positive inference ‘Then Socrates is unwise’ is correct. But no such inference is correct in the case of universals, but rather a negative proposition. For instance, if to the question ‘Is every man wise?’ the answer is ‘no’, the inference ‘Then every man is unwise’ is false. But under these circumstances the inference ‘Not every man is wise’ is correct. This last is the contradictory, the former the contrary. Negative expressions, which consist of an indefinite noun or predicate, such as ‘not-man’ or ‘not-just’, may seem to be denials containing neither noun nor verb in the proper sense of the words. But they are not.

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For a denial must always be either true or false, and he that uses the expression ‘not man’, if nothing more be added, is not nearer but rather further from making a true or a false statement than he who uses the expression ‘man’. The propositions ‘everything that is not man is just’, and the contradictory of this, are not equivalent to any of the other propositions; on the other hand, the proposition ‘everything that is not man is not just’ is equivalent to the proposition ‘nothing that is not man is just’. The conversion of the position of subject and predicate in a sentence involves no difference in its meaning. Thus we say ‘man is white’ and ‘white is man’. If these were not equivalent, there would be more than one contradictory to the same proposition, whereas it has been demonstrated’ that each proposition has one proper contradictory and one only. For of the proposition ‘man is white’ the appropriate contradictory is ‘man is not white’, and of the proposition ‘white is man’, if its meaning be different, the contradictory will either be ‘white is not not-man’ or ‘white is not man’. Now the former of these is the contradictory of the proposition ‘white is not-man’, and the latter of these is the contradictory of the proposition ‘man is white’; thus there will be two contradictories to one proposition. It is evident, therefore, that the inversion of the relative position of subject and predicate does not affect the sense of affirmations and denials.
11

There is no unity about an affirmation or denial which, either positively or negatively, predicates one thing of many subjects, or many things of the same subject, unless that which is indicated by the many is really some one thing. do not apply this word ‘one’ to those things which, though they have a single recognized name, yet do not combine to form a unity. Thus, man may be an animal, and biped, and domesticated, but these three predicates combine to form a unity. On the other hand, the predicates ‘white’, ‘man’, and ‘walking’ do not thus combine. Neither, therefore, if these three form the subject of an affirmation, nor if they form its predicate, is there any unity about that affirmation. In both cases the unity is linguistic, but not real. If therefore the dialectical question is a request for an answer, i.e. either for the admission of a premiss or for the admission of one of two contradictories-and the premiss is itself always one of two

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Those predicates. For if. e. would the terms ‘musical’ and ‘white’ form a unity. and inquire. he is a white man. for it is only incidentally that that 51 . or unite them into one. if predicates may always be combined. Thus it is manifest that if man states unconditionally that predicates can always be combined. Or. do not combine to form a unity. Yet if a man is a shoemaker and is also good. if the predicate ‘white’ belongs to him. if it were true to say that that which is white is musical.contradictories-the answer to such a question as contains the above predicates cannot be a single proposition. Take the proposition ‘man is white of complexion and musical’.. we may combine the predicates ‘musical’.g. many absurd results ensue. Again. and state that man is an animal with two feet. then the combination of that predicate with the former composite predicate will be permissible. and that therefore he is the man Socrates. Whiteness and being musical do not coalesce to form a unity. and these may be combined many times. whether man has such and such a characteristic or not. Similarly we may use ‘man’ and ‘white’ as separate predicates. ‘white’. Some combinations of predicates are such that the separate predicates unite to form a single predicate. We will now explain what ought to be laid down. we cannot construct a composite proposition and say that he is a good shoemaker. Therefore. For as I have explained in the Topics. or we may combine the two. and that therefore he is a two-footed man. Let us consider under what conditions this is and is not possible. and terms forming the subject of predication. We may either state in two separate propositions that man is an animal and that man is a biped. even if the answer asked for is true. He must therefore put the question into a more definite form. for a dialectical questioner must by the form of his question give his opponent the chance of announcing one of two alternatives. whenever two separate predicates truly belong to a subject. Similarly we may say that Socrates is Socrates and a man. question is not a single one. for they belong only accidentally to the same subject. Thus it will be right to say that he is a white man so on indefinitely. many absurd consequences ensue. which are accidental either to the same subject or to one another. and ‘walking’. or that Socrates is a man and a biped. For instance. again. whichever he wishes. Nor yet. it follows that the predicate resulting from their combination also truly belongs to the subject. a man is man and white. At the same time it is plain that a question of the form ‘what is it?’ is not a dialectical question.

Thus.which is musical is white. we are. but when they are not present. for the notions ‘animal’ and ‘biped’ are implicit in the word ‘man’. 12 As these distinctions have been made. if a man is both good and a shoemaker. Yet this is not always possible: indeed. the predication of the simple term is impossible. in the case of those predications which have within them no contradiction when the nouns are expanded into definitions. not form a unity. the proposition being that Homer is a poet. whereas. Thus. again. at the same time. of which the one is implicit in the other: thus we cannot combine the predicate ‘white’ again and again with that which already contains the notion ‘white’. for the opinion held about it is that it is not. able to combine the predicates ‘animal’ and ‘biped’ and say that a man is an animal with two feet. cannot form a unity. when in the adjunct there is some opposite which involves a contradiction. therefore. for these predicates are not accidental. and to say that some one particular man is a man or that some one white man is a white man. Thus it is not right to call a dead man a man. Yet the facts of the case might rather be stated thus: when some such opposite elements are present. not that it is. or does it not? The verb ‘is’ is here used of Homer only incidentally. say ‘a poet’. does it follow that Homer is. not that he is. again. the individual may be the subject of the simple propositions as well as of the composite. however. resolution is nevertheless not always possible. On the other hand. Those predicates. When. we cannot combine the two propositions and say simply that he is a good shoemaker. and wherein the predicates belong to the subject in their own proper sense and not in any indirect way. it is not true to say that because it is the object of opinion. it is possible to predicate a term simply of any one instance. resolution is never possible. it is not impossible. nor is it right to call a man an animal-man or a two-footed man. in the independent sense of the word. this is not the case. the combination of the two will. we must consider the mutual relation of those affirmations and denials which assert or deny 52 . But in the case of that which is not. Take the proposition ‘Homer is so-and-so’. it is.

of ‘it may be’ is ‘it cannot be’. for instance. or that it is not by the addition of the verbs ‘be’ and ‘not be’. we must choose the latter. that positive and negative propositions are formed. since either the positive or the negative proposition is true of any subject. may be dealt with in the same manner. in those propositions which do not contain the verb ‘to be’ the verb which takes its place will exercise the same function. and the contradictory of ‘man is white’ is ‘man is not white’. respectively. We admit that of composite expressions those are contradictory each to each which have the verb ‘to be’ its positive and negative form respectively. ‘is contingent’. The similar propositions. then. not ‘not-man is’.possibility or contingency. not ‘man is not-white’. are added. everything that may be cut or may walk may also escape cutting and refrain from walking. In such cases. it follows that’ it may not be’ is not the contradictory of ‘it may be’. both the positive and the negative propositions will be true. for to say ‘man walks’ merely equivalent to saying ‘man is walking’. Now it appears that the same thing both may and may not be. the contradictory of this is ‘it is not contingent that it should be’. Thus the contradictory of the proposition ‘man is’ is ‘man is not’. The same rule applies to the proposition ‘it is contingent that it should be’. such as ‘it is necessary’ and ‘it is impossible’. If the former of these alternatives must be rejected. either that the same predicate can be both applicable and inapplicable to one and the same subject at the same time. Now if this is the case. it will turn out true to say that a piece of wood is a man that is not white. But since it is impossible that contradictory propositions should both be true of the same subject. For it comes about that just as in the former instances the verbs ‘is’ and ‘is not’ were added to the subject-matter of the sentence ‘white’ and ‘man’. The contradictory. Thus the contradictory of ‘man walks’ is ‘man does not walk’. so here ‘that it should be’ and ‘that it should not be’ are the subject-matter and ‘is possible’. For it is a logical consequence of what we have said. For otherwise. impossibility or necessity: for the subject is not without difficulty. the contradictory of ‘it may be’ is may not be’. not ‘notman walks’. not ‘it cannot be’. for that which is capable of walking or of being seen has also a potentiality in the opposite direction. and the reason is that those things that have potentiality in this sense are not always actual. 53 . If then this rule is universal.

The propositions which have to do with necessity are governed by the same principle. It is contingent. To generalize. but ‘it cannot not be’. we must. It is not necessary. It is true. just as in the former instances ‘is’ and ‘is not’ indicated that certain things were or were not the case. Nor can the propositions ‘it may not be’ and ‘it cannot not be’ be at once true of the same subject. for they are contradictory.’ but ‘it is not necessary that it should be’. The contradictory of ‘it is necessary that it should be’. as has been stated. the same thing both may and may not be. It is impossible. It is not contingent. It cannot be. and in making these terms into affirmations and denials we must combine them with ‘that it should be’ and ‘that it should not be’ respectively. 54 . is not ‘it is necessary that it should not be. The contradictory. It is necessary. and the contradictory of ‘it is necessary that it should not be’ is ‘it is not necessary that it should not be’. It is not true. and the contradictory of ‘it is impossible that it should not be’ is ‘it is not impossible that it should not be’. But the propositions ‘it may be’ and ‘it cannot be’ can never be true of the same subject at the same time. Again. define the clauses ‘that it should be’ and ‘that it should not be’ as the subject-matter of the propositions. then. We must consider the following pairs as contradictory propositions: < tbody> It may be. It is not impossible.These indicate that a certain thing is or is not possible. the contradictory of ‘it is impossible that it should be’ is not ‘it is impossible that it should not be’ but ‘it is not impossible that it should be’. and the contradictory of ‘it may be’ is not ‘it may not be’. Thus the propositions ‘it may be’ and ‘it may not be’ appear each to imply the other: for. but cannot be’. since these two propositions are not contradictory. of ‘it may not be’ is not ‘it cannot be’.

It follows also that it is not impossible and not necessary. ‘it is not contingent’. It is not necessary that it should be. Let us consider these statements by the help of a table: < tbody> A. It is necessary that it should not be. and ‘it cannot be’. From the proposition ‘it cannot be’ or ‘it is not contingent’ it follows that it is necessary that it should not be and that it is impossible that it should be. the contradictories upon the contradictories. It is impossible that it should be. It cannot be. It is not impossible that it should be. be. Now the propositions ‘it is impossible that it should be’ and ‘it is not impossible that it should be’ are consequent upon the propositions ‘it may be’. From the proposition ‘it cannot not be’ or ‘it is not contingent that it should not be’ it follows that it is necessary that it should be and that it is impossible that it should not be. It is contingent. It is not contingent that it should not be. ‘it is contingent’. From the proposition ‘it may not be’ or ‘it is contingent that it should not be’ it follows that it is not necessary that it should not be and that it is not impossible that it should not be. It is not impossible that it should It is impossible that it should not not be. B. It is not contingent. It may be. be. C.13 Logical sequences follow in due course when we have arranged the propositions thus. and the relation is reciprocal. It cannot not be. But there is inversion. D. From the proposition ‘it may be’ it follows that it is contingent. It is not necessary that it should not It is necessary that it should be. It is contingent that it should not be. It may not be. The negative of the proposition ‘it is impossible’ is consequent upon the 55 .

For ‘it is impossible’ is a positive proposition and ‘it is not impossible’ is negative. if either of the two former propositions is true. it comes about therefore that the thing which must necessarily be need not be. so. if the propositions predicating impossibility or non-impossibility follow without change of subject from those predicating possibility or non-possibility. but. and the contradictory propositions belong to separate sequences. to the proposition ‘it is necessary’. for both these propositions may be true of the same subject. contrary propositions follow respectively from contradictory propositions. But again. while. since one or the other must follow. inversely connected. it is impossible.) Yet from the proposition ‘it may be’ it follows that it is not impossible. it is not necessary that it should be. one of the two alternatives will be excluded. as has been said. For this is true also of that which must necessarily be. Yet perhaps it is impossible that the contradictory propositions predicating necessity should be thus arranged. (For if not. which is absurd. but that it should not be. lies in the fact that the proposition ‘it is impossible’ is equivalent. In this case. and when it is impossible that a thing should not be. it is possible that it should be. for the propositions ‘it is impossible’ and ‘it is necessary’ are not equivalent. which must necessarily be. For the proposition ‘it may be’ implies a twofold possibility. For when it is necessary that a thing should be. Thus. That there is a distinction is clear. but if it is necessary that it should be or that it should not be. that the proposition ‘it is not necessary that it should not be’ follows from the proposition ‘it may be’. nor does the proposition ‘it is necessary that it should not be’. therefore. the proposition ‘it is necessary that it should be’ does not follow from the proposition ‘it may be’. the opposite follows. the twofold possibility vanishes. and it is thus impossible that a thing should be. 56 . For the proposition ‘it is not necessary that it should be’ is not the negative of ‘it is necessary that it should not be’. and from that it follows that it is not necessary. The reason why the propositions predicating necessity do not follow in the same kind of sequence as the rest. We must investigate the relation subsisting between these propositions and those which predicate necessity. For if a thing may be. if it is not possible. It remains. those predicating necessity must follow with the contrary subject. it is necessary. when used with a contrary subject.proposition ‘it may be’ and the corresponding positive in the first case upon the negative in the second. For when it is impossible that a thing should be. it may also not be. not that it should be. which is absurd. it is necessary that it should be. for when it is necessary that a thing should not be.

with reference to a state in which realization is conditionally practicable. that is. it is thought that if a thing may be cut it may also not be cut. for ‘it cannot be’ is followed by ‘it is impossible that it should be’ and by ‘it is necessary that it should not be’. and no logical impossibilities occur when they are thus arranged. as fire possesses the potentiality of giving out heat. and generally when a capacity is predicated because it is actually realized. Those potentialities which involve a rational principle are potentialities of more than one result. as when a man is said to find walking possible because he is actually walking.Moreover the proposition ‘it is not necessary that it should not be’ is the contradictory of that which follows from the proposition ‘it cannot be’. But in some cases the word is used equivocally. the contradictory must follow. Now both of these are false of that which necessarily is. those that are irrational are not always thus constituted. Both of that which is walking and is actual. It is evident. For the term ‘possible’ is ambiguous. but 57 . This last sort of potentiality belongs only to that which can be in motion. being used in the one case with reference to facts. as when a man is said to find walking possible because under certain conditions he would walk. an irrational capacity. It may be questioned whether the proposition ‘it may be’ follows from the proposition ‘it is necessary that it should be’. neither has anything that is always actual any twofold potentiality. which is false. and the contradictory of this is the proposition ‘it is not necessary that it should not be’. and thus it would follow that a thing which must necessarily be may possibly not be. Yet some even of those potentialities which are irrational admit of opposite results. There are exceptions. At the same time. even where the word is used always in the same sense. it is true to say that it is not impossible that it should walk (or. if a thing may be it may also not be. that is. namely that it cannot be. However. fire cannot both heat and not heat. If not. or. Thus in this case also contradictory propositions follow contradictory in the way indicated. that it is not always the case that that which may be or may walk possesses also a potentiality in the other direction. that it should be). to that which is actualized. if a man should maintain that this is not the contradictory. then the proposition ‘it may not be’. in the other case. of contrary results. thus much has been said to emphasize the truth that it is not every potentiality which admits of opposite results. As I have said. then. In the first place we must except those things which possess a potentiality not in accordance with a rational principle. and of that which has the capacity though not necessarily realized. in the other case. the former can exist also in the case of that which has not this power.

It is plain from what has been said that that which is of necessity is actual. We may perhaps state that necessity and its absence are the initial principles of existence and non-existence. then. There is a true judgement concerning that which is good. Now if the spoken word corresponds with the judgement of the mind. Let me illustrate. whose actuality is in nature prior to their potentiality. in thought. though not in every sense in which the word may be used. that which is necessary is also possible. another. and that all else must be regarded as posterior to these. and a 58 . a third class comprises those things which are never actualized. for instance. We must therefore consider which true judgement is the contrary of the false. 14 The question arises whether an affirmation finds its contrary in a denial or in another affirmation. then one affirmation will not find its contrary in another. we can predicate the former. in which the judgement ‘every man is just’ pronounces a contrary to that pronounced by the judgement ‘every man is unjust’. is this: that since the universal is consequent upon the particular. Some things are actualities without potentiality. which pronounces a contrary fact. actuality also is prior to potentiality. and if. it is not the judgement which pronounces a contrary fact that is the contrary of another. a false judgement. we have to discover which of these form contraries. namely. if that which is eternal is prior. Take the propositions ‘Callias is just’. that which forms the denial of the false judgement or that which affirms the contrary fact. that it is not good. in the way. or in the proposition ‘every man is unjust’. that it is good. But if. though posterior in time. the primary substances. in thought. ‘Callias is unjust’. whether the proposition ‘every man is just’ finds its contrary in the proposition ‘no man is just’. the same must needs hold good with regard to spoken affirmations. but rather in the corresponding denial. ‘Callias is not just’. Thus. but are pure potentialities. that judgement is the contrary of another. Our conclusion.while we cannot predicate this latter kind of potentiality of that which is necessary in the unqualified sense of the word. a second class consists of those things which are actual but also potential.

in which error is present. then that false judgement likewise is most really false. for both these classes of judgement are of unlimited content. and that concerning a bad thing. Now if we take the judgement that that which is good is good. the second accidental. 59 . Those judgements must rather be termed contrary to the true judgements. it seems. Thus the judgement which denies the true judgement is more really false than that which positively asserts the presence of the contrary quality. that it is good. If then of the two judgements one is contrary to the true judgement. which is distinct. that it is bad. which concerns the subject’s intrinsic nature. which mode of expression forms the contrary? It is an error to suppose that judgements are to be defined as contrary in virtue of the fact that they have contrary subjects. But judgements are not contrary because they have contrary subjects. for contraries are among the things which differ most widely within the same class. But if that true judgement is most really true. is the real contrary. Yet the subjects here are contrary. the judgement that it is bad is one concerning that which is accidental. they both represent the truth. then the latter.third. The first quality is part of its essence. and whether they are so or not. The judgement that that which is good is bad is composite. as also those that opine that some other attribute does not subsist which does subsist. Now the judgement that that is good is not good is a false judgement concerning its intrinsic nature. which do not and cannot belong to the good. which concerns its intrinsic nature. that it is bad. but because they are to the contrary effect. for the judgement concerning a good thing. therefore error is a like transition. and generation is the passing from one extreme to its opposite. and if there are at the same time other attributes. but that which is contradictory is the more truly contrary. for it is by accident that it is not bad. But it is the man who forms that judgement which is contrary to the true who is most thoroughly deceived. Now these judgements are those which are concerned with the starting points of generation. and another that it is not good. Which of these two is contrary to the true? And if they are one and the same. Now that which is good is both good and not bad. we must nevertheless refuse to treat as the contraries of the true judgement those which opine that some other attribute subsists which does not subsist. may be one and the same. For presumably the man who forms that judgement must at the same time understand that that which is good is not good.

that it is not good. have for their contraries the propositions ‘nothing good is good’. therefore. Besides these there is the judgement that that which is good is not good. for the universal negative judgement will form the contrary. and if spoken affirmations and denials are judgements expressed in words. of course. ‘not every man is good’. what would form the contrary of the true judgement that that which is not good is not good. Thus the propositions ‘everything good is good’. 60 . It is evident that it will make no difference if we universalize the positive judgement. are ‘not everything good is good’. the contradictory is either always the contrary or never. ‘no man is good’. Again. moreover. our conclusion in the case just dealt with would seem to be correct. Nor is the judgement that it is not bad the contrary. if it must necessarily be so in all other cases. both judgements may be true. that of the judgement concerning that which is not good. For the judgement that that which is good is good. for instance. The contradictory propositions. Let us consider. therefore. parallel with the judgement that that that is not good is good. is equivalent to the judgement that whatever is good is good. and this is identical with the judgement that everything that is good is good. If therefore this is the rule with judgements. that it is not good. For since some things which are not good are bad. that judgement is false. is the contrary of the judgement that it is good. since two true judgements are never contrary and this judgement might be true at the same time as that with which it is connected. fail to meet the case. since both qualities might be predicated of the same subject. In the same way. It remains. therefore. then the principle is universal in its application. ‘every man is good’. For instance. which forms the negative of the true.Further. The judgement that it is bad would. the judgement concerning that which is good. for this is false. it is plain that the universal denial is the contrary of the affirmation about the same subject. Now where terms have no contrary. if the subject be understood in a universal sense. the contrary judgement is that it is good. on the other hand. the judgement that that which is not good is not good is parallel with the judgement that that which is good is good. the contrary of the judgement that everything that is good is good is that nothing that is good is good. for this too might be true. We may deal similarly with judgements concerning that which is not good. he who thinks a man is not a man forms a false judgement. If then in these cases the negative is the contrary.

when two propositions are true. that neither true judgements nor true propositions can be contrary the one to the other. a man may state both at the same time without inconsistency. 61 . contrary propositions are those which state contrary conditions.It is evident. and contrary conditions cannot subsist at one and the same time in the same subject. For whereas. also.

as has been said in the Topics. The demonstrative premiss differs from the dialectical. But this will make no difference to the production of a syllogism in either case. but when he is syllogizing it is the assertion of that which is apparent and generally admitted. or none. of another. A premiss then is a sentence affirming or denying one thing of another. demonstrative. for both the demonstrator and the dialectician argue syllogistically after stating that something does or does not belong to something else. without any mark to show whether it is universal or particular. by particular that it belongs to some or not to some or not to all. it will be demonstrative. and after that. ‘contraries are subjects of the same science’. but will be stated accurately in the sequel. or ‘pleasure is not good’. if it is true and obtained through the first principles of its science. Therefore a syllogistic premiss without qualification will be an affirmation or denial of something concerning something else in the way we have described. whereas the dialectical premiss depends on the adversary’s choice between two contradictories. The nature then of a premiss and the difference between syllogistic. e. by indefinite that it does or does not belong. while a dialectical premiss is the giving of a choice between two contradictories. and a syllogism. This is either universal or particular or indefinite. We must next define a premiss.Prior Analytics. By universal I mean the statement that something belongs to all or none of something else.g. and the nature of a perfect and of an imperfect syllogism. Jenkinson < div id="book1" class="book"> 1 We must first state the subject of our inquiry and the faculty to which it belongs: its subject is demonstration and the faculty that carries it out demonstrative science. when a man is proceeding by question. and dialectical premisses. 62 . but lays it down). because the demonstrative premiss is the assertion of one of two contradictory statements (the demonstrator does not ask for his premiss. Book I Translated by A. the inclusion or noninclusion of one term in another as in a whole. J. may be taken as sufficiently defined by us in relation to our present need. and what we mean by predicating one term of all. a term.

or vice versa. For if some B is A. then no B could be A. for if some animal is not man. Similarly too. and by this. not however. If no B is A. but have not been expressly stated as premisses. whenever no instance of the subject can be found of which the other term cannot be asserted: ‘to be predicated of none’ must be understood in the same way. both the predicate and that of which it is predicated. but in part. For if none were.is good. 2 Every premiss states that something either is or must be or may be the attribute of something else. then no good will be pleasure. in respect of each of the three modes of attribution. it does not follow that some man is not animal. But we assumed that every B is A. of premisses of these three kinds some are affirmative. the particular affirmative must convert in part (for if some pleasure is good. if the premiss is particular.e. But if every B is A then some A is B. ‘being’ being added and ‘not being’ removed. if no pleasure is good. then some of the As must be B. it would not be true that no B is A. a syllogism is imperfect. It is necessary then that in universal attribution the terms of the negative premiss should be convertible. First then take a universal negative with the terms A and B. which are indeed the necessary consequences of the terms set down. again some affirmative and negative premisses are universal.I call that a term into which the premiss is resolved. certain things being stated. And we say that one term is predicated of all of another. A syllogism is discourse in which.g. e. if it needs either one or more propositions. But if some B 63 . neither can any A be B. i. For if some A (say C) were B. I call that a perfect syllogism which needs nothing other than what has been stated to make plain what necessarily follows. others negative. then some good will be pleasure). something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so. but the particular negative need not convert. the terms of the affirmative must be convertible. others particular. some good must be pleasure. That one term should be included in another as in a whole is the same as for the other to be predicated of all of the first. For if no A were B. I mean by the last phrase that they produce the consequence. others indefinite. for C is a B. then no B would be A.g. that no further term is required from without in order to make the consequence necessary. universally. e. if every pleasure.

but every man is an animal. and the particular does.g. In respect of possible premisses. it is necessary also that no A is B. This will be plain when we speak about the possible. or that no garment is white. For if it is possible that all or some B is A. it is also admissible for no horse to be a man. then some garment will necessarily be white. For if that were not possible. But the particular negative does not convert. But if anything is said to be possible because it is the general rule and natural (and it is in this way we define the possible). Not every animal is a man. each of the affirmatives converts into a particular. and if it is admissible for no garment to be white. e. At present we may take this much as clear in addition to what has been said: the statement that it is possible that no B is A or some B is not A is affirmative in form: for the expression ‘is possible’ ranks along with ‘is’.g. 3 The same manner of conversion will hold good also in respect of necessary premisses. the negative premisses can no longer be converted like the simple negatives. e. the universal negative premiss does not convert. if one should say. For in the former case the one term necessarily does not belong to the other. The particular negative also must be treated like those dealt with above. for the same reason which we have already stated. it will be possible that some A is B. and ‘is’ makes an affirmation always and in every 64 . For if any white thing must be a garment. This has been already proved. or because B is not necessarily A. If it is necessary that no B is A. there is no necessity that some of the As should not be B. If all or some B is A of necessity. For if it is possible that some A is B. For if it is possible for no man to be a horse. it is also admissible for nothing white to be a garment. in the latter there is no necessity that it should: and the premiss converts like other negative statements. then no B could possibly be A.is not A. since possibility is used in several senses (for we say that what is necessary and what is not necessary and what is potential is possible). affirmative statements will all convert in a manner similar to those described. The universal negative converts universally. But in negative statements the case is different. Whatever is said to be possible. admits of conversion like other negative statements. either because B necessarily is A. let B stand for animal and A for man. This has been already proved. neither would some of the Bs be A necessarily. it is necessary also that some A is B: for if there were no necessity. it would be possible also that some B is A. it is possible that man is not horse.

As an example of a positive relation between the extremes take the terms science. But if the first term belongs to all the middle. stone. but the middle to none of the last term. But this also will be proved in the sequel. when. for nothing necessary follows from the terms being so related. 4 After these distinctions we now state by what means.g. man. 65 . But if there is no necessary consequence. and B of all C.case. In conversion these premisses will behave like the other affirmative propositions. of a universal negative relation. Similarly also. nor the middle to any of the last. if A is predicated of no B. and how every syllogism is produced. so that neither a particular nor a universal conclusion is necessary. it is clear in this figure when a syllogism will be possible and when not. there cannot be a syllogism by means of these premisses. I call that term middle which is itself contained in another and contains another in itself: in position also this comes in the middle. and the middle is either contained in. the terms animal. Whenever three terms are so related to one another that the last is contained in the middle as in a whole. e. A must be predicated of all C: we have already explained what we mean by ‘predicated of all’. the first as in or from a whole. As an example of a universal affirmative relation between the extremes we may take the terms animal. for it is possible that the first should belong either to all or to none of the last. ‘it is not-good’ or ‘it is not-white’ or in a word ‘it is not-this’. line. the extremes must be related by a perfect syllogism. and if they are so related there will be a syllogism. and that if a syllogism is possible the terms must be related as described. Syllogism should be discussed before demonstration because syllogism is the general: the demonstration is a sort of syllogism. medicine: of a negative relation science. line. or excluded from. whatever the terms to which it is added. horse. in predication. If then the terms are universally related. subsequently we must speak of demonstration. there will be no syllogism in respect of the extremes. If A is predicated of all B. By extremes I mean both that term which is itself contained in another and that in which another is contained. and B of all C. it is necessary that no C will be A. unit. but not every syllogism is a demonstration. man. Nor again can syllogism be formed when neither the first term belongs to any of the middle.

and the minor premiss is negative and particular. And if no B is A but some C is B. there cannot be a syllogism. but of none of the other. For the major term may be predicable both of all and of none of the minor. Let all B be A and some C be B. horse. state.But if one term is related universally. Suppose the terms are animal. it is necessary that some C is not A. Again let no B be A. good. But if the universality is posited with respect to the minor term either affirmatively or negatively. and since if terms are assumed such that no C is B. no syllogism follows (this has already been stated) it is clear that this arrangement of terms will not afford a 66 . but some B is or is not A or not every B is A. there must be a perfect syllogism whenever universality is posited with reference to the major term either affirmatively or negatively. if some B is or is not A.g. to some of which the middle term cannot be attributed. indefinite or particular: e. and particularity with reference to the minor term affirmatively: but whenever the universality is posited in relation to the minor term. or the terms are related in any other way. provided that it is affirmative: for we shall have the same syllogism whether the premiss is indefinite or particular. whether no C is B. horse. if all B is A and some C is not B. Again if no C is B. but let some C not be B. wisdom: of a negative relation. swan: white. So there will be a perfect syllogism. man. whether the major premiss is positive or negative. This holds good also if the premiss BC should be indefinite. can there be a syllogism. to its subject. Take the terms white. Take the terms inanimate. it is necessary that some C is A. a syllogism will not be possible. whether affirmative or negative. Further since it is indefinite to say some C is not B. and all C is B. of none of the other. I call that term the major in which the middle is contained and that term the minor which comes under the middle. white: next take some of the white things of which man is not predicated-swan and snow: animal is predicated of all of the one. or not all C is B. state. or if not all C is B. The same terms may be taken also if the premiss BA is indefinite. man. Consequently there cannot be a syllogism. ignorance.g. raven. As an example of a positive relation between the extremes take the terms good. The meaning of ‘predicated of none’ has also been defined. a syllogism is impossible. Then if ‘predicated of all’ means what was said above. white: then take some white things of which man is not predicated-swan and snow: the term inanimate is predicated of all of the one. and it is true that some C is not B. the other in part only. Nor when the major premiss is universal. whether the minor premiss be indefinite or particular: e.

For if M belongs to no O. 5 Whenever the same thing belongs to all of one subject. but it may be valid whether the terms are related universally or not. whenever the middle belongs to all of one subject and to none of another (it does not matter which has the negative relation). If then the terms are related universally a syllogism will be possible. but in no other way. white. by extremes the terms of which this is said. or the one negative and the other affirmative. Such a figure I call the first. horse: animal. then N will belong to no O. stone. or to all of each subject or to none of either. affirmative and negative. the terms must be related as we have stated: if they are related otherwise. 67 . A similar proof may also be given if the universal premiss is negative.syllogism: otherwise one would have been possible with a universal negative minor premiss. no syllogism is possible anyhow. This has already been proved. Nor can there in any way be a syllogism if both the relations of subject and predicate are particular. Since. by major extreme that which lies near the middle. It is evident also that all the syllogisms in this figure are perfect (for they are all completed by means of the premisses originally taken) and that all conclusions are proved by this figure. It is clear then from what has been said that if there is a syllogism in this figure with a particular conclusion. The middle term stands outside the extremes. either positively or negatively. by minor that which is further away from the middle. by middle term in it I mean that which is predicated of both subjects. viz. and is first in position. But since the negative relation is convertible. O belongs to no M: but M (as was said) belongs to all N: O then will belong to no N: for the first figure has again been formed. N will belong to no O. Let M be predicated of no N. Thus it will be the same syllogism that proves both conclusions. but of all O. Again if M belongs to all N. Terms common to all the above are animal. and to none of another. I call such a figure the second. universal and particular. or both indefinite. N will belong to no M: but M was assumed to belong to all O: consequently N will belong to no O. the negative relation is convertible. It is possible to prove these results also by reductio ad impossibile. but to no O. A syllogism cannot be perfect anyhow in this figure. or one indefinite and the other definite. white. then.

If the middle term is related universally to one of the extremes. I mean both negative or both affirmative. substance. First let them be negative. but not a perfect syllogism. raven. man. and not to 68 . if the universal statement is negative. a syllogism will not be possible anyhow. white. But if M is predicated of all O. but to some O. a negative relation. man: a negative relation. raven. For since the negative statement is convertible. but of some N. M must belong to all O: but we assumed that M does not belong to some O. it is necessary that N does not belong to some O: for if N belongs to all O. stone.g. and M is predicated also of all N. and let the major premiss be universal. N will belong to no M: but M was admitted to belong to some O: therefore N will not belong to some O: for the result is reached by means of the first figure. animal. animal. but not of all N. And if M belongs to all N but not to all O.It is clear then that a syllogism is formed when the terms are so related. Take the terms animal. substance. e. Terms to illustrate a positive relation between the extremes are animal. but not to some O. But if M is predicated of every N and O. and particularly to the minor and in a manner opposite to that of the universal statement: by ‘an opposite manner’ I mean. a particular negative syllogism must result whenever the middle term is related universally to the major whether positively or negatively. we have stated when a syllogism will be possible and when not: but if the premisses are similar in form. If then the universal statement is opposed to the particular. the particular is affirmative: if the universal is affirmative. animal. it is necessary that N does not belong to some O. there will be no syllogism. Nor is a syllogism possible when M is predicated neither of any N nor of any O. we shall conclude that N does not belong to all O: the proof is the same as the above. animal. Terms to illustrate a positive relation between the extremes are substance. For if M belongs to no N. Nor will there be a conclusion when M is predicated of no O. It is clear then that if a syllogism is formed when the terms are universally related. animal. substance. line. number-substance being the middle term. others also are needed. Again if M belongs to all N. substance. there cannot be a syllogism. science. the particular is negative. animal. Terms to illustrate a positive relation are line. unit: a negative relation. let M belong to no N. for necessity is not perfectly established merely from the original premisses. the terms must be related as we stated at the outset: for if they are otherwise related no necessary consequence follows.

animal. and if there is a syllogism. and does not belong to some O. raven: for the negative relation. if M belongs to some O. whether universal or particular. or is related to them indefinitely. and M belongs to no O. and not to some N. Terms to illustrate the negative relation are black. not to some of the other. but M to no N. not be formed anyhow. a syllogism results of necessity. or belongs to some of the one. or does not belong to some of either. which either are contained in the terms of necessity or are assumed as hypotheses.e.some O. For since it is true that M does not belong to some O. i. Nor is one possible if the middle term belongs to some of each of the extremes. If the premisses are affirmative. But it is evident also that all the syllogisms in this figure are imperfect: for all are made perfect by certain supplementary statements. white. Again let the premisses be affirmative. Evidently then. Terms to illustrate the negative relation are white. Terms for the positive relation are white. a syllogism can. animal. For if N belonged to all O. clearly it will not be possible now either. But it is not possible to take terms to illustrate the universal affirmative relation. 69 . raven. animal. and since if it belongs to no O a syllogism is (as we have seen) not possible. It is clear then from what has been said that if the terms are related to one another in the way stated. stone. and let the major premiss as before be universal. snow. animal. e. swan. stone. it is possible for N to belong either to all O or to no O. let M belong to all N and to some O. even if it belongs to no O.g. But if the minor premiss is universal. It is possible then for N to belong to all O or to no O. then M would belong to no O: but we assumed that it belongs to some O. animal. the other particular. man: white. the terms must be so related. or belongs to neither universally. In this way then it is not admissible to take terms: our point must be proved from the indefinite nature of the particular statement. It is possible then for N to belong either to all O or to no O. snow. and one is universal. And it is evident that an affirmative conclusion is not attained by means of this figure. for the positive relation. But it is not possible to find terms of which the extremes are related positively and universally. but all are negative. when we prove per impossibile. terms for the negative relation are white. swan. white. inanimate. whenever the premisses are similar in form. animal. Common terms for all the above are white. for the reason already stated: the point must be proved from the indefinite nature of the particular statement.

or if both belong to all. when both are affirmative there must be a syllogism. as in the former cases. by extremes I mean the predicates. of it. should one of the Ss. N. no syllogism will be possible. the other in part only. It is possible to demonstrate this also per impossibile and by exposition. For whenever both the terms are affirmative. no matter which of the premisses is universal. I call such a figure the third. For. but it may be valid whether the terms are related universally or not to the middle term. there will be a syllogism to prove that P will necessarily not belong to some R. no syllogism will be possible. it follows that P will necessarily belong to some R. If they are universal. This may be demonstrated in the same way as before by converting the premiss RS. whenever both P and R belong to S. inanimate-inanimate being the middle term. e. of a third. and S to some R. Nor can there be a syllogism when both terms are asserted of no S. be taken. A syllogism cannot be perfect in this figure either. S will belong to some R: consequently since P belongs to all S. P must belong to some R. inanimate. horse. but when they are negative. there will be no syllogism. horse. For since the affirmative statement is convertible S will belong to some P: 70 .g. It is clear then in this figure also when a syllogism will be possible and when not. inanimate. If R belongs to all S. or to none. P to some S. by the minor that which is nearer to it. and thus P will belong to some R. if the major is negative. the other affirmative. man. Terms for the positive relation are animal. by middle term in it I mean that of which both the predicates are predicated. P must belong to some R: for a syllogism in the first figure is produced. there will be a syllogism to prove that the one extreme does not belong to some of the other: but if the relation is reversed. Terms for the positive relation are animal. man: for the negative relation animal. For if R belongs to all S. If one term is related universally to the middle. horse. by the major extreme that which is further from the middle. But if R belongs to no S.6 But if one term belongs to all. P to all S. and is last in position. there will be a syllogism to prove that one extreme belongs to some of the other. and P to no S. since the affirmative statement is convertible. But when one is negative. for the negative relation man. The middle term stands outside the extremes. It might be proved also per impossibile. if the terms are related universally. the minor affirmative. and another to none. For if both P and R belong to all S. both P and R will belong to this.

animal. then P will belong to all S: but we assumed that it did not. animal. it is necessary that P does not belong to some R. then P will belong to some R: but we assumed that it belongs to no R. take as terms for a negative relation raven. then. and R belongs to all S. if R belongs to some S. Terms for the positive relation are animal. P must belong to some R. there will be no syllogism. and if the affirmative is universal. But if R belongs to no S. and R belongs to some S. if P belongs to all S and R does not belong to some S. For the universal negative relation it is not possible to get terms. science. P will not belong to some R: for we shall have the first figure again. When the minor is related universally to the middle. For if P belongs to all R. But whenever the major is affirmative. man. Again if R belongs to some S. science. but P does not belong to some S. if R belongs to some S. Terms for the universal affirmative relation are animate. When the major is related universally to the middle. as has been shown. Proof is possible also without reduction ad impossibile. if one of the Ss be taken to which P does not belong. For if P belongs to all S. white. then P belongs to some S: but we assumed that it belongs to no S. For if R belongs to all S. Nor is a syllogism possible when both are stated in the negative. We must put the matter as before. no syllogism will be possible. if the premiss RS is converted. must be proved from the indefinite nature of the particular statement. Our point. and R to some S. But if one term is affirmative. e. But when the minor is negative. R must also belong to some P: therefore P must belong to some R. man. the other negative. and does not belong to some S. For a positive relation terms cannot be found. and P to all S.consequently since R belongs to all S. wild: for the negative relation. animal. But if the negative term is universal. wild. no syllogism is possible. take the terms animal.g. and S to some P. wild-the middle in both being the term wild. it may be used truly of that also which belongs to none. a syllogism will be possible whenever the minor term is affirmative. For if P belongs to no S. wild. and R to some S.’ Since the expression ‘it does not belong to some’ is indefinite. as in the former cases. man. snow. the other particular. And it is possible to demonstrate it also per impossibile and by exposition. 71 . For if P belongs to all R. but one is universal. and does not belong to some S. whenever the major is negative and the minor affirmative there will be a syllogism. Clearly then no syllogism will be possible here. This may be demonstrated in the same way as the preceding.

if each of the extremes belongs to some of the middle or does not belong. It is evident also that the substitution of an indefinite for a particular affirmative will effect the same syllogism in all the figures. and B belongs to no C: for if the premisses are converted it is necessary that C does not belong to some A. In both ways the first figure is formed: if they are made perfect ostensively. a syllogism always results relating the minor to the major term. e. Similarly also with the rest. if A and B belong to all C. It is possible also to reduce all syllogisms to the universal syllogisms in the first figure.g. It is clear also that all the syllogisms in this figure are imperfect (for all are made perfect by certain supplementary assumptions). the terms must be so related. Common terms for all are animal. or if the premisses are indefinite. though not all in the same way. inanimate. white: animal. and that it will not be possible to reach a universal conclusion by means of this figure. man.g. the universal syllogisms are made perfect by converting the negative premiss. and when not.Nor is a syllogism possible anyhow. a syllogism results of necessity. and conversion produces the first figure: if they are proved per impossibile. it follows that A belongs to some B: for if A belonged to no B. whenever a proper syllogism does not result. if A belongs to all or some B. e. the other not to all. or one belongs to some of the middle. each of the particular 72 . white. and B belongs to all C. and if there is a syllogism. and if the negative is stated universally. It is clear too that all the imperfect syllogisms are made perfect by means of the first figure. and that if the terms are as stated. if both the terms are affirmative or negative nothing necessary follows at all. but if one is affirmative. whether negative or affirmative. because on the assumption of the false statement the syllogism comes about by means of the first figure. Those in the second figure are clearly made perfect by these. 7 It is evident also that in all the figures. A would belong to no C: but (as we stated) it belongs to all C. Similarly also in the other figures: a syllogism always results by means of conversion. or one belongs and the other does not to some of the middle. For all are brought to a conclusion either ostensively or per impossibile. It is clear then in this figure also when a syllogism will be possible. the other negative. in the last figure. because (as we saw) all are brought to a conclusion by means of conversion.

the only difference being the 73 . and belongs to no B. if the terms are universal.syllogisms by reductio ad impossibile. a third from what is possible. and B belongs to some C. both how syllogisms of the same figure are constituted in themselves. but not necessarily. then B will belong to no C: and this (as we saw) is the middle figure. Syllogisms in the third figure. It is clear then that all syllogisms may be reduced to the universal syllogisms in the first figure. and syllogisms with differently related terms. 8 Since there is a difference according as something belongs. when one of the premisses is particular. then. by means of the particular syllogisms in the first figure: and these (we have seen) may be reduced to the universal syllogisms in the first figure: consequently also the particular syllogisms in the third figure may be so reduced. it is clear that particular syllogisms can be reduced to universal syllogisms in the first figure. When the terms are put in the same way. or may belong to something else (for many things belong indeed. In the first figure particular syllogisms are indeed made perfect by themselves. reducing them ad impossibile. For if A belongs to no B. necessarily belongs. whether something belongs or necessarily belongs (or does not belong) to something else. Consequently. For if it belonged to no C. it is clear that there will be different syllogisms to prove each of these relations. one syllogism concluding from what is necessary. since all syllogisms in the middle figure can be reduced to universal syllogisms in the first figure. another from what is. e. then B will belong to no C: this we know by means of the second figure. if A belongs to all B. and belongs to all B. A will not belong to some C: for if it belonged to all C. but it is possible also to prove them by means of the second figure. and how syllogisms of different figures are related to one another. are directly made perfect by means of those syllogisms. but it is possible for them to belong). and since particular syllogisms in the first figure can be reduced to syllogisms in the middle figure. but.g. Similarly also demonstration will be possible in the case of the negative. it follows that A belongs to some C. a syllogism will or will not result alike in both cases. We have stated then how syllogisms which prove that something belongs or does not belong to something else are constituted. and B to some C. There is hardly any difference between syllogisms from necessary premisses and syllogisms from premisses which merely assert. others neither necessarily nor indeed at all.

B animal. not however when either premiss is necessary. For since necessarily belongs. but only when the major is. the conclusion will not be necessary. Similarly also if the major premiss is negative. e.addition of the expression ‘necessarily’ to the terms. it would result both through the first figure and through the third that A belongs necessarily to some B. whether the universal premiss is negative or affirmative. if A were movement. to make the syllogism in reference to this: with terms so chosen the conclusion will necessarily follow. but an animal does not move necessarily. if the universal premiss is necessary. With the exceptions to be made below. but B is taken as simply belonging to C: for if the premisses are taken in this way. In particular syllogisms. Further. nor does man. But in the middle figure when the universal statement is affirmative. the conclusion will be proved to be necessary by means of conversion. the conclusion will not be necessary. the demonstration will not take the same form. but let B simply belong to some C: it is necessary then that A belongs to 74 .g. 9 It happens sometimes also that when one premiss is necessary the conclusion is necessary. it is clear that for C also the positive or the negative relation to A will hold necessarily. and we should give the same account of the expressions ‘to be contained in something as in a whole’ and ‘to be predicated of all of something’. For if it were. then the conclusion will be necessary. But if the major premiss is not necessary. to every B. to which the predicate does not belong. but the minor is necessary. but it is necessary by the ‘exposition’ of a part of the subject of the particular negative proposition. But if the relation is necessary in respect of the part taken.g. For the negative statement is convertible alike in both cases. e. But this is false. And each of the resulting syllogisms is in the appropriate figure. or does not belong. C man: man is an animal necessarily. if A is taken as necessarily belonging or not belonging to B. in the same manner as in the case of simple predication. for the proof is the same. A will necessarily belong or not belong to C. it must hold of some of that term in which this part is included: for the part taken is just some of that. and let A belong to all B necessarily. and again in the third figure when the universal is affirmative and the particular negative. an example also makes it clear that the conclusion not be necessary. and since C is one of the Bs. First let the universal be necessary. for B may be such that it is possible that A should belong to none of it. but if the particular. and the particular negative.

the conclusion will not be necessary: for from the denial of such a conclusion nothing impossible results. C will necessarily belong to no B. but it is not necessary without qualification. Consequently it is necessary that C does not belong to some A. The same result would be obtained if the minor premiss were negative: for if A is possible be of no C. The same is true of negative syllogisms. B man. if the conclusion is necessary. B is possible of no A. just as it does not in the universal syllogisms. But it has been proved in the case of the first figure that if the negative major premiss is not necessary the conclusion will not be necessary either. For C falls under A. the first figure results. Similarly also if the syllogism should be negative: for the proof will be the same. For example let A be animal. though it is a necessary conclusion from the premisses. Therefore the same result will obtain here. Consequently under these conditions the conclusion will be necessary. But A belongs to all C. then the conclusion will be necessary. and simply belong to C. and let the premisses be assumed to correspond to what we had before: it is possible that animal should belong to nothing white. but if the affirmative. Neither then is B possible of C: for conversion is possible without modifying the relation. Try the terms movement. if the negative premiss is necessary. If then the negative premiss is converted. But nothing prevents such an A being taken that it is possible for C to belong to all of it.some C necessarily: for C falls under B. but not necessarily: for it is possible for man to be born white. consequently C is possible of none of the Bs: for again we have obtained the first figure. 75 . if it is true (as was assumed) that A necessarily belongs to all B. let A be possible of no B. Since then the negative statement is convertible. Further. Let A belong to all B necessarily. For if B necessarily belongs to no C. But B at any rate must belong to some A. But if the particular premiss is necessary. not necessary. consequently B is possible of no C. 10 In the second figure. it follows that C necessarily does not belong to some A. animal. Further one might show by an exposition of terms that the conclusion is not necessary without qualification. But if the affirmative premiss is necessary. C white. not however so long as animal belongs to nothing white. Man then will not belong to anything white. white. the conclusion will not be necessary. but to no C simply. C is possible of no A: but A belongs to all B. First let the negative be necessary. and A was assumed to belong necessarily to all B.

but whenever the affirmative is necessary the conclusion will not be necessary. For the same terms can be used to demonstrate the point. but not necessarily. and let the major premiss be affirmative. which were used in the universal syllogisms. First let both the premisses be affirmative. A similar proof will be given also if BC is necessary. The point can be demonstrated by means of the same terms. if one of the two is necessary. the conclusion will not be necessary. Since then B belongs to all C. C also will belong to some B necessarily: consequently if A belongs to none of 76 . First then let the negative premiss be both universal and necessary: let it be possible for no B that A should belong to it. 11 In the last figure when the terms are related universally to the middle. whenever the negative is necessary the conclusion also will be necessary. the conclusion will not be necessary.Similar results will obtain also in particular syllogisms. then the conclusion will be necessary: but whenever the affirmative premiss is universal. the other affirmative. and let the negative premiss be necessary. A will necessarily not belong to some B either: for B is under C. if the negative statement is necessary but particular. the negative particular. But if one is negative. But if the affirmative is necessary. For whenever the negative premiss is both universal and necessary. and let A and B belong to all C. If then A necessarily belongs to all B. For C is convertible with some A: consequently if B belongs necessarily to all C. but does not belong to some C. and let AC be necessary. will the conclusion be necessary. For B is under C. then the conclusion will be necessary. Nor again. For suppose BC is affirmative and necessary. it will be possible for no A that B should belong to it: but A belongs to some C. Again let the affirmative premiss be both universal and necessary. consequently B necessarily does not belong to some of the Cs. C also will belong to some B. because the universal is convertible into the particular: consequently if A belongs necessarily to all C. it will belong necessarily also to some A. BC affirmative. Since then C is convertible with some B. Since then the affirmative is convertible. Again let AC be negative. Since the negative statement is convertible. while AC is negative and not necessary. it is necessary that A should belong to some B also. it is clear that B will not belong to some C. The first figure then is formed. but A necessarily belongs to no C. and both premisses are affirmative. and C belongs to some B. and let A simply belong to some C.

But if one premiss is universal. Let the premiss BC be both particular and necessary. But if one premiss is affirmative. it is necessary that A should not belong to some B. or the negative is particular. it is necessary that B should belong to some A. But when the premisses were thus. for the particular affirmative also is convertible. let that which B signifies be ‘animal’. Similarly also if AC should be necessary and universal: for B falls under C. for it has been proved. Let A be waking. and it is necessary that the term animal should belong to every horse: but it is not necessary that some animal should not be good. the conclusion will not be necessary. Or if that is not possible. Further. but the particular is necessary. whenever the universal is both negative and necessary the conclusion also will be necessary. and if both are affirmative. Let the term A be ‘good’. It is possible then that the term good should belong to no horse. the premisses are universal. when the universal affirmative is necessary. and C animal. It is necessary that B should belong to some C. But if the particular premiss is necessary. and the universal premiss is not necessary. If. and that A should belong to B is not necessary. Further. then. whenever the universal is necessary the conclusion also must be necessary. For if it is not possible that A should belong to any C. take as the term ‘awake’ or ‘asleep’: for every animal can accept these. the conclusion will not be necessary. we have stated when the conclusion will be necessary. the point is clear if we look at the terms. The proof of this by reduction will be the same as before. that if the negative premiss is not necessary. the point may be made clear by considering the terms. take the 77 . not however necessarily. the conclusion (as we proved was not necessary: consequently it is not here either. and A falls under C.the Cs. whether universal or particular. while C belongs to some of the Bs. The demonstration is the same as before. B biped. in the case of the first figure. For there is no necessity that some biped should be asleep or awake. let the term C be ‘horse’. but B belongs to some C. Similarly and by means of the same terms proof can be made. A will not belong to some of the Bs-but not of necessity. If then it is necessary that B should belong to all C. then A must belong to some B: for conversion is possible. and let A belong to all C. but if terms are wanted. If the proposition BC is converted the first figure is formed. But if B must belong to some A. since it is possible for every animal to be good. should the proposition AC be both particular and necessary. neither will the conclusion be necessary. But whenever the affirmative proposition is necessary. but it is possible for A to belong to C. the other particular. the other negative.

13 Perhaps enough has been said about the proof of necessity. ‘it is possible to belong’. the premiss must be necessary. will either be identical or follow from one another. I mean by ‘similar’. but a necessary conclusion is possible although one only of the premisses is necessary. and when the affirmative is particular and necessary. ‘it is not impossible to belong’. and ‘it is not necessary not to belong’. We say indeed ambiguously of the necessary that it is possible. and ‘it is necessary not to belong’ are either identical or follow from one another. I mean not that the affirmative are convertible into the negative. and it is not necessary that waking should not belong to some animal. For of everything the affirmation or the denial holds good. But when the negative proposition being particular is necessary.terms ‘waking’-’animal’-’man’. that the conclusion will be neither necessary nor simple unless a necessary or simple premiss is assumed. how it comes about and how it differs from the proof of a simple statement. consequently their opposites also. For the expressions ‘it is not possible to belong’. but it is possible that waking should belong to none. I use the terms ‘to be possible’ and ‘the possible’ of that which is not necessary but. when and how and by what means it can be proved. That which is possible then will be not necessary and that which is not necessary will be possible. take the terms ‘waking’-’animal’-’white’: for it is necessary that animal should belong to some white thing. ‘animal’ being middle. whether the syllogisms are affirmative or negative. 12 It is clear then that a simple conclusion is not reached unless both premisses are simple assertions. Consequently this also is clear. results in nothing impossible. but that those which are affirmative in form admit of conversion by opposition. ‘it is possible to belong’ may be converted into ‘it is possible not to 78 . But that my definition of the possible is correct is clear from the phrases by which we deny or on the contrary affirm possibility. the premiss must be simple. take the terms ‘biped’. ‘moving’. ‘animal’. if the conclusion is a simple assertion. it is necessary that one premiss should be similar to the conclusion.g. We proceed to discuss that which is possible. But in both cases. ‘man’ being middle. if the conclusion is necessary. ‘it is impossible to belong’. e. It results that all premisses in the mode of possibility are convertible into one another. being assumed.

and as a rule arguments and inquiries are made about things which are possible in this sense. but it is unusual at any rate to inquire about them. an animal’s walking or an earthquake’s taking place while it is walking. And such premisses are affirmative and not negative. or generally what happens by chance: for none of these inclines by nature in the one way more than in the opposite. or generally what naturally belongs to a thing (for this has not its necessity unbroken. since man’s existence is not continuous for ever. and that which is not necessary may possibly not belong. because the middle term is uncertain. The same holds good in the case of particular affirmations: for the proof is identical. The expression ‘it is possible for this to belong to that’ may be understood in two senses: ‘that’ may mean either that to which ‘that’ belongs or that to which it may belong. e. although if a man does exist. for ‘to be possible’ is in the same rank as ‘to be’.belong’. Syllogisms indeed can be made about the former. These matters will be treated more definitely in the sequel. it is possible also that it should not belong to B: and if it is possible that it should belong to all. It makes no difference whether we say. A is possible of the subject of B. e. it comes about either necessarily or generally). Having made these distinctions we next point out that the expression ‘to be possible’ is used in two ways. and ‘it is possible for A to belong to all B’ into ‘it is possible for A to belong to no B’ or ‘not to all B’. not however in the same way: but what is natural is convertible because it does not necessarily belong (for in this sense it is possible that a man should not grow grey) and what is indefinite is convertible because it inclines this way no more than that. but they are concerned with things that are natural. man’s turning grey or growing or decaying. And similarly the other propositions in this mode can be converted. as was said above. it is also possible that it should not belong to all. Science and demonstrative syllogism are not concerned with things which are indefinite. In another sense the expression means the indefinite. or all B 79 . it is clear that if it is possible that A should belong to B. our business at present is to state the moods and nature of the syllogism made from possible premisses. In one it means to happen generally and fall short of necessity. for the expression ‘A is possible of the subject of B’ means that it is possible either of that of which B is stated or of that of which B may possibly be stated. and ‘it is possible for A to belong to some B’ into ‘it is possible for A not to belong to some B’. That which is possible in each of its two senses is convertible into its opposite.g. For since that which is possible is not necessary.g. which can be both thus and not thus.

either no syllogism results. The proof is the same as above. It is clear then that the expression ‘A may possibly belong to all B’ might be used in two senses. For the statement that it is possible for A not to belong to that of which B may be true means (as we saw) that none of those things which can possibly fall under the term B is left out of account. if A may belong to none of the Bs. First then we must state the nature and characteristics of the syllogism which arises if B is possible of the subject of C. For thus both premisses are assumed in the mode of possibility. but if they are converted we shall have the same syllogism as before. It is clear then that if the minor premiss is negative. This is clear from the definition: for it was in this way that we explained ‘to be possible for one term to belong to all of another’. Consequently if B is possible for all C. then A is possible for some C. it is necessary that A may possibly not belong to some of the Cs. it is possible also that it should belong to all C. A is possible for 80 . and A is possible for all B. e.g. as in the other cases. and for B to belong to all C. This is clear from the definition of being possible. when the major premiss is universal there will be a perfect syllogism. Similarly if it is possible for A to belong no B. but whenever A is possible of that of which B is true. and the universal is affirmative. Again if A may belong to no B. the other a problematic. or if one it is not perfect.g. but if the premiss BC is converted after the manner of problematic propositions. Consequently we must start from premisses which are similar in form. For since it is possible that B should belong to no C. But whenever A may belong to all B. there will be a perfect syllogism to prove that A may possibly belong to all C. the same syllogism results as before. But if one of the premisses is universal. or if both premisses are negative. and B for some C. and B to none of the Cs. and B may belong to some of the Cs. then indeed no syllogism results from the premisses assumed. the other particular. the major still being universal and the minor particular. then it is possible for A to belong to no C. 14 Whenever A may possibly belong to all B. For the necessity results from the conversion. and B may belong to no C. Similarly if in both the premisses the negative is joined with ‘it is possible’: e. For if A is possible for all B. one premiss is a simple assertion. and B to all C. But if the particular premiss is negative.admits of A. the same syllogism again results. This has been stated above. No syllogism results from the assumed premisses. and A is possible of the subject of B.

whenever the major premiss indicates possibility all the syllogisms will be perfect and establish possibility in the sense defined. where the major belongs necessarily to the minor. only a perfect syllogism results in the first case. B may possibly not belong to some C. for the necessary (as we stated) is not possible. this is obvious if we take terms. Let C be that by which B extends beyond A. or negative. for if the premisses are as assumed. so that as predicates cover unequal areas. But if the major premiss is the minor universal. It is clear that there is no proof of the first or of the second. as in the cases given at the beginning. but if the particular premiss is converted and it is laid down that B possibly may belong to some C. It is clear that if the terms are universal in possible premisses a syllogism always results in the first figure. in no way will a syllogism be possible. we shall have the same conclusion as before. not as covering necessity. It is clear then that if the terms are related in this manner. whether both are affirmative. But possibility must be understood according to the definition laid down. no syllogism results. the major term is both possible for none of the minor and must belong to all of it. There remains the proof of possibility. This is sometimes forgotten. ‘animal’-’white’-’garment’. since premisses in the mode of possibility are convertible and it is possible for B to belong to more things than A can. an imperfect in the second. whether they are affirmative or negative. For the affirmative is destroyed by the negative. For every syllogism proves that something belongs either simply or necessarily or possibly. where it is not possible that the major should belong to the minor. Further. the other a problematic.all B. and the negative by the affirmative. For it has been proved that if the terms are related in this manner it is both necessary that the major should belong to all the minor and not possible that it should belong to any. 15 If one premiss is a simple proposition. But this is impossible. Take as terms common to all the cases under consideration ‘animal’-’white’-’man’. or if both are indefinite or particular. Consequently there cannot be a syllogism to prove the possibility. or different in quality. For nothing prevents B from reaching beyond A. then a clear syllogism does not result from the assumed premisses. but whenever the minor premiss indicates possibility all the syllogisms will be 81 . To C it is not possible that A should belong-either to all or to none or to some or not to some.

could not happen. It is clear that perfect syllogisms result if the minor premiss states simple belonging: but that syllogisms will result if the modality of the premisses is reversed. then to be. and those which are negative will establish not possibility according to the definition. And if each is possible. and the various other spheres in which we speak of the possible: for it will be alike in all. and the conclusion by B. but that the major does not necessarily belong to any. of the minor. But we must take the impossible and the possible not only in the sphere of becoming. a perfect syllogism results proving that A possibly belongs to no C. Let A be possible for all B. must be proved per impossibile. B is possible. if A is false. and if that which is impossible. we say it is possible that it should belong to none or not to all. not as meaning that if some single thing A is. and D of F. that A is possible. First we must state that if B’s being follows necessarily from A’s being. i. is. Since this is proved it is evident that if a false and not impossible assumption is made. the consequence of the assumption will also be false and not impossible: e. For since it has been proved that if B’s being is the consequence of A’s being. when it is impossible. then B’s possibility will follow from A’s possibility (and A is assumed to be 82 . but also that if A is possible. Likewise if the premiss AB is negative. Suppose. when it has happened. the former stating possible. Further we must understand the statement that B’s being depends on A’s being. and if to happen. the latter simple attribution. then C is necessarily predicated of F. B’s possibility will follow necessarily from A’s possibility. it would be possible for A to happen without B. the terms being so related. For if C is predicated of D. but not impossible. For if this is so. So a perfect syllogism results. B also will be false but not impossible. and if at the same time A is possible and B impossible. At the same time it will be evident that they are imperfect: for the proof proceeds not from the premisses assumed. and let B belong to all C.e. but also in the spheres of truth and predicability. If then.g. Since C falls under B.imperfect. one should indicate the premisses by A. and A is possible for all B. might happen. and if B is the consequence of A. for example. it would not only result that if A is necessary B is necessary. the conclusion also is possible. when the premisses are related in the manner stated to be that of the syllogism. clearly it is possible for all C also. For that which has happened. If then that which is possible. and B is impossible. B will be: for nothing follows of necessity from the being of some one thing. and the premiss BC is affirmative. or to all. when it is possible for it to be. but from two at least.

e. by assuming that B belongs to C. Thus it will be possible for A to belong to no C. but that which does not necessarily belong to any part of the subject (for this is the contradictory of the assumption which was made: for it was supposed that A necessarily belongs to some C. the consequence is an impossible one. and that B belongs to C. there cannot be a syllogism. But the assumption was made that A is not possible for all C. Further let the major term be ‘animal’. since if the premiss is understood with reference to the present moment. It is necessary then that A belongs to some B: for we have a syllogism in the third figure: but this is impossible. it is necessary that A possibly belongs to no C. For nothing perhaps prevents ‘man’ belonging at a particular time to everything that is moving. This syllogism then does not establish that which is possible according to the definition. not possible. consequently B will be possible: for if it were impossible. but the conclusion necessary. but assume that B belongs to all C: this is false but not impossible. the conclusion is impossible. as above. Since we have defined these points. e. Again let the premiss AB be universal and negative. and assume that A belongs to no B. Suppose that it is not possible. but B possibly belongs to all C. then A would be possible for all C. and A is possible for all B. It is clear then that the universal must be understood simply. We must understand ‘that which belongs to all’ with no limitation in respect of time.g. Let A be ‘raven’. but simply without qualification. These propositions being laid down. if nothing else were moving: but ‘moving’ is possible for every horse. It is possible also in the first figure to bring about the impossibility. But it was assumed that A is a possible attribute for all B. for if at is supposed false. to the present or to a particular period. the same thing would at the same time be possible and impossible. but the syllogism per impossibile establishes the contradictory which is opposed to this). it is clear also from an example that the conclusion will not establish possibility. without limitation in respect of time. For man is necessarily animal. For it is by the help of such premisses that we make syllogisms. For though the assumption we made is false and not impossible. If then A is not possible for C but B belongs to all C. A then 83 . the the minor ‘man’. and B be possible for all C: it is necessary then that should be a possible attribute for all C. i. Suppose that it cannot belong. let A belong to all B. The premisses then will be as before. It is necessary then that A is possible for all C.possible). the middle ‘moving’. yet ‘man’ is possible for no horse. B ‘intelligent’. then A is not possible for all B: for a syllogism is formed in the third degree. Further. For if B belongs to all C. and C ‘man’.

rather it is not necessary that any man should move. instead of possibly not belonging. but if the problematic premiss is converted. But if one of the relations is universal. Suppose that A belongs to no B. but assertoric. whether affirmative or negative. But if B is assumed to be possible for all C (and this is true) and if the premiss AB remains as before. we shall again have the same syllogism. and the minor premiss indicates that B may possibly belong to no C. We have stated when each of these happens and the reason why. just as when the terms are universal. and one of the premisses is assertoric. but B is possible for all C. and B may possibly belong to no C. But B is possible for all C: for every man may possibly be intelligent. only sometimes it results from the premisses that are taken. Likewise if both the relations are negative. But if it be assumed that B does not belong to any C. the other particular. Clearly then if the terms are universal. But neither is it always necessary. sometimes it requires the conversion of one premiss. But A necessarily belongs to no C: so the conclusion does not establish possibility. the other problematic. then whenever the major premiss is universal and problematic. as before. For it is not necessary that no man should move. not problematic.belongs to no B: for no intelligent thing is a raven. The demonstration is the same as before. As common instances of a necessary and positive relation we may take the terms white-animal-snow: of a necessary and negative relation. B ‘science’. Clearly then the conclusion establishes that one term does not necessarily belong to any instance of another term. If the minor premiss is negative and indicates possibility. whether the premiss AB is negative or affirmative. And the conclusion will not be necessary. If the terms are arranged thus. But whenever the major premiss is universal. Through these comes nothing necessary. Let A belong to all B. there cannot be a syllogism anyhow. there will be a perfect syllogism. but if the problematic premiss is converted. whiteanimal-pitch. Through the premisses actually taken nothing necessary results in any way. whether both premisses are negative or 84 . a syllogism results as before: for the terms are in the same relative positions. But we must take our terms better. if the major premiss states that A does not belong to B. and the particular is affirmative and assertoric. and let B possibly belong to no C. whenever the minor premiss is problematic a syllogism always results. Let A be ‘moving’. and the minor is particular and problematic. nothing necessarily follows: but if the proposition BC is converted and it is assumed that B is possible for all C. a syllogism will be possible. we shall have a syllogism. A then will belong to no B. C ‘man’. from the actual premisses taken there can be no syllogism.

The demonstration is the same as above. But whenever the particular premiss is assertoric and negative. the other negative. We shall have an imperfect syllogism to prove that A may 85 . whether the premisses are universal or not. whether positive or negative. animal-white-garment. when the affirmative is necessary the conclusion will be problematic. but if the minor is universal nothing at all can ever be proved. as has been shown above.affirmative. 16 Whenever one premiss is necessary. there will be a syllogism when the terms are related as before. whether the premisses are universal or not: but if one is affirmative. If the premisses are affirmative the conclusion will be problematic. As instances of the positive relation we may take the terms white-animal-snow. of the necessary and negative relation. the other assertoric. Nor is a syllogism possible when the premisses are particular or indefinite. and problematic. As instances of the necessary and positive relation we may take the terms animal-white-man. there cannot be a syllogism. If the premisses are affirmative. if A belongs to all B or to no B. a syllogism always results. For the demonstration must be made through the indefinite nature of the particular premiss. Only some of them will be proved per impossibile. in all cases there will be an imperfect syllogism. a syllogism results.g. It is evident then that if the major premiss is universal. the other problematic. of the negative. whether either premiss is negative or affirmative. Suppose A necessarily belongs to all B. Possibility in the conclusion must be understood in the same manner as before. For if the premiss BC is converted in respect of possibility. e. and let B be possible for all C. and assertoric negative. and the major particular. white-animal-pitch. not negative assertoric. nohow is a syllogism possible. but when the negative is necessary the conclusion will be problematic negative. negative. or the one problematic. And a syllogism will be possible by means of conversion when the major premiss is universal and assertoric. whether problematic or assertoric. But if the minor premiss is universal. not assertoric. and a perfect syllogism when the minor premiss is necessary. clearly the conclusion which follows is not necessary. and B may possibly not belong to some C. problematic or assertoric. the other affirmative. or one is negative. others by the conversion of the problematic premiss. There cannot be an inference to the necessary negative proposition: for ‘not necessarily to belong’ is different from ‘necessarily not to belong’. and the minor particular.

e. and the minor is necessary. So if A belongs to all C. whether affirmative or negative. and let B necessarily belong to all C. the conclusion will be negative assertoric: e. and let B necessarily belong to all C. Now we assumed that A is not possible for any B. but it will establish a problematic negative. and let A possibly not belong to any B.g. We shall then have a syllogism to prove that A may belong to all C. Again. Again. there will not be an assertoric conclusion.g. and problematic. is necessary. and let necessarily A not be possible for any B. 86 . Consequently B will not be possible for any C or for all C. But it was laid down that B may belong to some C. suppose first that the negative premiss is necessary. For suppose A to belong to all C or to some C. It is necessary then that A belongs to no C. but cannot belong to any B. And it is clear that the possibility of belonging can be inferred. For if A belongs to all C. and further it is not possible to prove the assertoric conclusion per impossibile. The same relation will obtain in particular syllogisms.belong to all C.g. when it is problematic a syllogism is possible by conversion. to none of the Cs can B belong. it is necessary that A should not belong to some of the Cs. The syllogism will be perfect. BC the minor premiss. or the universal proposition in the affirmative syllogism. Whenever the negative proposition is necessary. but when it is necessary no syllogism can be formed. not an assertoric negative. But it was originally laid down that B is possible for all C. That it is imperfect is clear from the proof: for it will be proved in the same manner as above. not imperfect: for it is completed directly through the original premisses. B is not possible for any A. Nor again when both premisses are negative. if it is not possible that A should belong to any B. since the fact of not belonging is inferred. and for the negative relation-white-animal-pitch. let A be possible for all B. The demonstration is the same as before. no impossible relation between B and C follows from these premisses. Since then the negative proposition is convertible. But if the premisses are not similar in quality. neither can B belong to any A. not that A does belong to all C: and it is perfect. as above. But A is supposed to belong to all C or to some C. But if the minor premiss is negative. and it is laid down that A possibly does not belong to any B. AB the major premiss. but B may belong to some of the Cs. let the affirmative premiss be necessary. But if the minor premiss is universal. The same terms as before serve both for the positive relation-white-animal-snow. For the major premiss was problematic. For if it were supposed that A belongs to some C. e. but let B be possible for all C. But when the particular affirmative in the negative syllogism.

and where it is necessary and negative. Here also we must understand the term ‘possible’ in the conclusion. that if the negative premiss is assertoric the conclusion is problematic. no syllogism is possible.g. there cannot be a syllogism. Similarly when one premiss is necessary. Since then problematic affirmations are convertible with negations. if A may belong to no B. e. with this exception. in the same sense as before. and animal-white-snow to illustrate the negative and necessary relation. but if the universal negative is assertoric a conclusion can always be drawn. Clearly then from what has been said a syllogism results or not from similar relations of the terms whether we are dealing with simple existence or necessity. Premisses of this kind are possible both where the relation is positive and necessary. and if the universal is affirmative we may take the terms animal-white-swan to illustrate the positive relation. [It is clear also that all the syllogisms are imperfect and are perfected by means of the figures above mentioned. and of white to some inanimate. universal or particular. the other problematic. Nor again is a syllogism possible when the premisses are indefinite. it is clear that B may belong to all A. animal-white-garment. Terms applicable in either case to illustrate the positive relation are animal-white-man: to illustrate the negative. if the universal is negative we may take the terms animal-white-raven to illustrate the positive relation. if the affirmative is assertoric no syllogism is possible. and since B may belong to no A. is both necessary and positive and necessary and negative. or both particular. For suppose it to follow and assume that B may belong to no A.] 17 In the second figure whenever both premisses are problematic. but if the negative premiss is necessary the conclusion is both problematic and negative assertoric. whether the premisses are affirmative or negative. But when the universal is necessary. whether they are contraries or contradictories. or animal-white-pitch to illustrate the negative. the other problematic. First we must point out that the negative problematic proposition is not convertible. But this is false: 87 .g. animal-white-inanimate.g.and the major premiss is particular and necessary. e. For the relation of animal to some white. e. animal-white-man. But when one premiss is assertoric. it does not follow that B may belong to no A. the particular problematic. Similarly if the relation is problematic: so the terms may be used for all cases.

but because in some cases it belongs necessarily. and the necessary (as we saw) other than the possible. if it is not possible that no A should be B. But this is impossible. it is possible that no man should be white (for it is also possible that every man should be white). therefore we say that it is not possible for it to belong to all. we must assume. for it does not follow that some A is necessarily B. It is clear from what has been said that the negative proposition is not convertible. Moreover it is not possible to prove the convertibility of these propositions by a reductio ad absurdum. ‘A may belong to no B’. but that A necessarily does not belong to some B. It is clear then that in relation to what is possible and not possible. Hence both the propositions ‘A necessarily belongs to some B’ and ‘A necessarily does not belong to some B’ are opposed to the proposition ‘A belongs to all B’. these propositions are not incompatible. This being proved. not that A necessarily belongs to some B. In general. it necessarily does not belong to some D. By means of conversion no syllogism will result: for the major premiss. it is clear that its conclusion will be 88 . For the latter expression is used in two senses. If any one then should claim that because it is not possible for C to belong to all D. e. he would make a false assumption: for it does belong to all D. ‘B necessarily does not belong to some of the As’.g.for if all this can be that. is not convertible. it does not follow that all that can be this: consequently the negative proposition is not convertible. But if this is assumed. for the one statement is the contradictory of the other. if there is a syllogism. it is true that it cannot belong to no A. another if some A is necessarily not B. no absurdity results: consequently no syllogism. For it is not true to say that that which necessarily does not belong to some of the As may possibly not belong to any A. Nor can a proof be obtained by a reductio ad absurdum: for if it is assumed that B can belong to all C. Further. no false consequence results: for A may belong both to all C and to no C.e.’ The argument cannot be admitted. suppose it possible that A may belong to no B and to all C. But if this is so. Similarly also they are opposed to the proposition ‘A may belong to no B’. but it is not true to say that it is possible that no white thing should be a man: for many white things are necessarily not men. just as it is not true to say that what necessarily belongs to some A may possibly belong to all A. one if A some is necessarily B. by claiming assent to the following argument: ‘since it is false that B may belong to no A. in the sense originally defined. as has been said. it is true that B necessarily belongs to some of the As: consequently A necessarily belongs to some of the Bs. i.

the other problematic. animal. but can belong to all C.g. e. Suppose the conclusion is affirmative: it will be proved by an example that the predicate cannot belong to the subject. Clearly then. and when it is negative. the proof will always proceed through the same terms. Let A be white. Suppose A belongs to no B. But it is not possible for B to belong nor not to belong to C. no syllogism is possible (this is proved similarly and by the same examples 89 . nothing follows necessarily from these premisses as they stand. And whenever one premiss is universal. horse. But if both premisses are negative.g. For no horse is a man. C horse. A similar proof can be given if the major premiss is negative. or if both are affirmative or negative. and the negative assertoric. B man. man. The same will hold good if the syllogisms are particular. Suppose the conclusion is negative: it will be proved that it is not problematic but necessary. For it is necessary that no horse should be a man. The demonstration can be made by means of the same terms. Similarly also if the minor premiss is negative. e. or both are particular or indefinite. whether universal or particular. But if both premisses are affirmative. But when the affirmative premiss is problematic. no syllogism will be possible. is clear. one being assertoric. That it is not possible for it to belong. the other problematic. and by means of the same terms. Neither is it possible for it not to belong. proving by means of the first figure that B may belong to no C. This arrangement of terms is possible both when the relation is positive. the minor affirmative. If the negative proposition is converted.problematic because neither of the premisses is assertoric. But ex hypothesi can belong to all C: so a syllogism is made. if both the premisses are problematic. but if the problematic premiss is converted into its complementary affirmative a syllogism is formed to prove that B may belong to no C. It is possible then for A to belong to all of the one and to none of the other. B will belong to no A. health. health. the other particular. The proof is the same as above. or in whatever other way the premisses can be altered. Whenever the affirmative proposition is assertoric. we shall have a syllogism. No syllogism then results. and this must be either affirmative or negative. whether the premisses are universal or particular. but the necessary we found to be different from the possible. 18 But if one premiss is assertoric. But neither is possible. if the affirmative is assertoric and the negative problematic no syllogism will be possible. man. as before: for we shall again have the first figure. no syllogism results.

and man necessarily belongs to no swan. Clearly then we cannot draw a problematic conclusion. Suppose that A necessarily belongs to no B. that B should belong to C: for nothing prevents C falling under B. (2) Nor again can we draw a necessary conclusion: for that presupposes that both premisses are necessary. for that which is necessary is admittedly distinct from that which is possible. For motion necessarily belongs to what is awake. when the terms are so arranged. a syllogism can be obtained by converting the problematic premiss into its complementary affirmative as before.g. and the assertoric proposition is universal. and necessarily belonging to C. but if the affirmative premiss is necessary. and the other problematic. not merely a negative problematic but also a negative assertoric conclusion. But at the same time it is clear that B will not belong to any C. For (1) it sometimes turns out that B necessarily does not belong to C. i. but necessarily belongs to all C. (3) Further it is possible also. Clearly then the conclusion cannot be the negative assertion. A being possible for all B. whether affirmative or negative. C swan. A cannot belong to some of the Cs: but ex hypothesi it may belong to all. although no conclusion follows from the actual premisses. But if the negative proposition is assertoric. If the negative premiss is converted B will belong to no A: but A ex hypothesi is capable of belonging to all C: so once more a conclusion is drawn by the first figure that B may belong to no C. The proof is the same and by the same terms. B for ‘animal’. Again if both the relations are negative. a conclusion can be drawn by means of conversion. 19 If one of the premisses is necessary. but when the negative proposition is assertoric. White then necessarily belongs to swan. no syllogism is possible. Nor can a conclusion be drawn when both premisses are indefinite. no conclusion is possible. whether the other premiss is affirmative or negative. and B belongs to some of the Cs. Again let the affirmative proposition be necessary. as before. but may belong to no man. Let A be white. and is possible for every animal: and everything that is awake is animal. suppose that A may belong to no B. or particular. A for ‘motion’. if the relation must be positive when the terms are 90 . When the terms are arranged in this way. A similar proof can be given if the minor premiss is negative.e. no syllogism is possible. B man.as above). if C stands for ‘awake’. but may belong to all C. the other problematic. e. or at any rate the negative premiss. but particular. then if the negative is necessary a syllogistic conclusion can be drawn. For assume that it does: then if A cannot belong to any B.

proving not merely a negative problematic. C man. For if the terms are so related. But if the premisses are affirmative there cannot be a syllogism. It is clear too that a syllogism is possible or not under the same conditions whether the mode of the premisses is assertoric or necessary. Suppose A necessarily does not belong to B. and by the same terms. A similar proof is possible if the major premiss is affirmative. a conclusion can be drawn as above if the problematic premiss is converted into its complementary affirmative. no syllogistic conclusion can be drawn. e. though nothing follows necessarily from the premisses as they are stated. suppose that A is white. Nor can the opposite affirmations be established.related as above. and A may possibly belong to all C: thus we have the first figure. but if the affirmative premiss is necessary no conclusion can be drawn. A syllogism then is not possible at all. and the same terms. a syllogism is always possible. and possibly may not belong to C: if the premisses are converted B belongs to no A. The same proof will serve. B swan. And it is clear that all the syllogisms are imperfect. when they are negative a syllogism can always be formed by converting the problematic premiss into its complementary affirmative as before. But if the premisses are similar in quality. there are cases in which B necessarily will not belong to C. Nor is a syllogistic conclusion possible when both premisses are affirmative: this also may be proved as above. Similarly if the minor premiss is negative. But when both premisses are negative. a syllogism will always be possible to prove both a problematic and a negative assertoric proposition (the proof proceeds by conversion). Clearly the conclusion cannot be a negative assertoric or a negative necessary proposition because no negative premiss has been laid down either in the assertoric or in the necessary mode. since we have shown a case in which B necessarily does not belong to C. Similar relations will obtain in particular syllogisms.g. Nor can the opposite affirmations be established: consequently no syllogism is possible. but when the affirmative proposition is universal and necessary. no syllogism can be formed. Nor can the conclusion be a problematic negative proposition. but also a negative assertoric proposition. But if both are indefinite or particular. 91 . This can be proved in the same way as for universal propositions. It is clear then from what has been said that if the universal and negative premiss is necessary. and are completed by means of the figures mentioned. For whenever the negative proposition is universal and necessary. and the premiss that definitely disconnects two terms is universal and necessary.

it follows that C may possibly belong to some B. For if A is possible for all C. but B may possibly belong to all C. if ‘may possibly belong’ is substituted we shall again have the first figure by means of conversion. and C for some of the Bs. and C is possible for some of the Bs. to illustrate the negative. it follows that A may possibly not belong to some B: for we shall have the first figure again by conversion. and B may possibly belong to every C. a syllogism will be possible. and also when one premiss is problematic. 92 . as above. Since then the affirmative proposition is convertible into a particular. When the premisses are problematic the conclusion will be problematic. For we have got the first figure. but if the premisses are converted into their corresponding affirmatives there will be a syllogism as before. and the proposition BC affirmative: for we shall again have the first figure by conversion. take the terms horseman-white—white being the middle term. Likewise also if the proposition AC is negative. or not. First let the premisses be problematic and suppose that both A and B may possibly belong to every C. And A if may possibly belong to no C. and B to some C. But if one of the premisses is universal. as above. but if it is negative the syllogism will result in a negative assertoric proposition. But if both premisses should be negative-the one universal and the other particular-although no syllogistic conclusion will follow from the premisses as they are put. the other assertoric. the other particular. no syllogism can be formed: for A must belong sometimes to all B and sometimes to no B. then A is possible for some of the Bs. But if both premisses should be negative no necessary consequence will follow from them as they are stated. Suppose that A may possibly belong to all C. under the arrangement of the terms as in the case of assertoric propositions. To illustrate the affirmative relation take the terms animal-man-white. then A is possible for some of the Bs. it will follow if they are converted. if it is affirmative the conclusion will be neither necessary or assertoric.20 In the last figure a syllogism is possible whether both or only one of the premisses is problematic. But when both premisses are indefinite or particular. So. Similarly if the proposition BC is universal. For if A and B may possibly not belong to C. In these also we must understand the expression ‘possible’ in the conclusion in the same way as before. We shall have the first figure again if the particular premiss is converted. if A is possible for every C. But when the other premiss is necessary.

and proceeds by means of the same terms. if the affirmative is necessary a problematic negative can be inferred. and B may possibly belong to all C. the other particular. and B (as has been assumed) belongs to all C. A will necessarily belong to all C: for this has been proved before. but if they are converted a syllogism is obtained as before. we shall have the first figure. But if the affirmative premiss is universal. First let the premisses be affirmative: suppose that A belongs to all C. then when both are affirmative. the proof will proceed by a reductio ad impossibile. If the proposition BC is converted. 22 If one of the premisses is necessary. The demonstration is the same as was given in the case of universal premisses. no matter which of the two is pure. the particular affirmative. when the premisses are affirmative a problematic affirmative conclusion can always be drawn. the other problematic. the other problematic. So it is clear that we shall have not a pure but a problematic syllogistic conclusion. But if the minor premiss BC is negative. Whenever both premisses are indefinite or particular. and the conclusion that A may possibly belong to some of the Bs. BC affirmative. and A may possibly not belong to some C: it follows that may possibly not belong to some B. and it has been proved that if one premiss is problematic in that figure the conclusion also will be problematic. in both cases the conclusion will be problematic: for the first figure is obtained once more. But it was assumed at the outset that A may possibly not belong to some C. If one of the premisses is universal. For if A necessarily belongs to all B. the conclusion also (as we saw) is problematic. the conclusion will be problematic. no syllogistic conclusion can be drawn from the premisses as they stand. Suppose that B belongs to all C. the negative particular. but if the negative proposition is necessary both a problematic and a pure 93 . no syllogism will be possible. or if both premisses are negative. we shall have the same sort of syllogisms: for all are completed by means of the first figure. or when the universal is negative. when one proposition is affirmative. Similarly if the proposition BC is pure. and a syllogism will be possible under the same arrangement of the terms as before. the other negative.21 If one premiss is pure. not pure. For when one of the premisses in the first figure is problematic. AC problematic. or if AC is negative.

as before. the other in part. it resulted that A might possibly not belong to some C. But a necessary negative conclusion will not be possible. But when the minor premiss is negative and universal. If the affirmative proposition BC is converted. and sometimes cannot possibly belong to any B. but if it is necessary no syllogism can be formed. suppose A may possibly belong to no C. The proof will follow the same course as where the premisses are universal. but B necessarily belongs to all C. Since then A must belong to all C. the conclusion will be not only that A may possibly not belong to some B but also that it does not belong to some B. and also when one premiss is negative.e. But when the negative premiss is necessary. if it is problematic we shall have a syllogism by altering the premiss into its complementary affirmative. But when the premisses stood thus. If both premisses are affirmative. For suppose that A necessarily does not belong to C. we shall have the first figure. not pure. for the same kind of proof can be given whether the terms are universal or not. the affirmative being necessary: i. and the same terms may be used. the latter being necessary. A similar proof may be given if the proposition BC is necessary. 94 . and that it did not belong to some C. We shall have the first figure once more: and-since the negative premiss is problematic-it is clear that the conclusion will be problematic: for when the premisses stand thus in the first figure. But if the negative premiss is necessary. if it is problematic a syllogism can be formed by means of conversion. so that a result which follows in the first figure follows also in the third. i. but B may belong to all C. Suppose first that the premisses are affirmative.negative conclusion are possible. it follows that A may (not does) belong to some B: for so it resulted in the first figure. But when the minor premiss is negative. the conclusion will be problematic. Again suppose one proposition is affirmative. the conclusion (as we found) is problematic. To illustrate the former take the terms sleep-sleeping horse-man. the conclusion also will be a pure negative proposition. consequently here it follows that A does not belong to some B. and C may belong to some B. For the syllogisms must be made perfect by means of the first figure. For A sometimes necessarily belongs to all B. but if it is necessary a syllogism is not possible. and the negative premiss is necessary. the other negative. Similar results will obtain if one of the terms is related universally to the middle. any more than in the other figures. and B may possibly belong to all C. to illustrate the latter take the terms sleepwaking horse-man. and AC is problematic.e. that A necessarily belongs to all C. the other affirmative.

But it is impossible to take a premiss in reference to B. which is somehow related to each by way of predication. It is evident also that all syllogisms in this figure are imperfect. nor anything else of A. and in general hypothetically. or something different of C.It is clear then in this figure also when and how a syllogism can be formed. if we neither affirm nor deny anything of it. and when it is pure. It is necessary that every demonstration and every syllogism should prove either that something belongs or that it does not. Thus we must take another premiss as well. and when the conclusion is problematic. unless some middle term is taken. and that to something else and so on. no connexion however being made with B. will a syllogism be possible concerning A in its relation to B. either as an attribute of it or as not an attribute of it. no syllogism will be possible. but affirm or 95 . If now A should be asserted of B. if we take nothing common. and a syllogism relating this to that proceeds through premisses which relate this to that. but C should not be asserted of anything. nothing prevents a syllogism being formed. and further either ostensively or hypothetically. and this either universally or in part. when it has been proved that every syllogism is formed through one or other of these figures. For nothing necessarily follows from the assertion of some one thing concerning some other single thing. If then A be asserted of something else. one must assert something of something else. or again to take a premiss relating A to B. For the syllogism in general is made out of premisses. but it will not be in relation to B through the premisses taken. nor anything of it. That every syllogism without qualification can be so treated. For in general we stated that no syllogism can establish the attribution of one thing to another. If then one wants to prove syllogistically A of B. Nor when C belongs to something else. But if A should be asserted of C. One sort of hypothetical proof is the reductio ad impossibile. or something else of A. and that they are made perfect by means of the first figure. the proposition originally in question will have been assumed. will be clear presently. and a syllogism referring to this out of premisses with the same reference. 23 It is clear from what has been said that the syllogisms in these figures are made perfect by means of universal syllogisms in the first figure and are reduced to them. Let us speak first of ostensive syllogisms: for after these have been pointed out the truth of our contention will be clear with regard to those which are proved per impossibile.

if we are to have a syllogism relating this to that. But if this is true. and these are the figures of which we have spoken. One infers syllogistically that odd numbers come out equal to evens. viz. or both of C). that the diagonal of the square is incommensurate with the side. So we must take something midway between the two. The argument is the same if several middle terms should be necessary to establish the relation to B. these considerations will show that reductiones ad also are effected in the same way. or it will not refer to the 96 . but the original thesis is reached by means of a concession or some other hypothesis. e. and we have already stated that ostensive syllogisms are effected by means of these figures. it is clear that every syllogism must be made in one or other of these figures. 24 Further in every syllogism one of the premisses must be affirmative. because odd numbers are equal to evens if it is supposed to be commensurate. and universality must be present: unless one of the premisses is universal either a syllogism will not be possible. Consequently. and this is possible in three ways (either by predicating A of C. Likewise all the other hypothetical syllogisms: for in every case the syllogism leads up to the proposition that is substituted for the original thesis. It is clear then that the ostensive syllogisms are effected by means of the aforesaid figures. and the original conclusion is proved hypothetically. If then we must take something common in relation to both. But when this has been shown it is clear that every syllogism is perfected by means of the first figure and is reducible to the universal syllogisms in this figure. every demonstration and every syllogism must be formed by means of the three figures mentioned above. proving something impossible by means of an hypothesis conceded at the beginning. and prove the original conclusion hypothetically when something impossible results from the assumption of its contradictory. For all who effect an argument per impossibile infer syllogistically what is false.g. it is evident that syllogisms per impossibile also will be made through these figures. since the falsehood is established in reductions ad impossibile by an ostensive syllogism.deny peculiar attributes of each. For this we found to be reasoning per impossibile. and C of B. which will connect the predications. and one proves hypothetically the incommensurability of the diagonal. since a falsehood results through contradicting this. for the figure will be the same whether there is one middle term or many. or C of both.

e. without the additional assumption that every angle of a segment is equal to every other angle of the same segment. And it is clear also that in every syllogism either both or one of the premisses must be like the conclusion. and that if a syllogism is formed the terms must be arranged in one of the ways that have been mentioned. pure. Suppose we have to prove that pleasure in music is good. while a particular statement is proved both from two universal premisses and from one only: consequently if the conclusion is universal. the conclusion E may be established through the propositions A and B. If one should claim as a premiss that pleasure is good without adding ‘all’. or B and C. This is more obvious in geometrical proofs.g. But in 97 . or through the propositions A and B. I mean not only in being affirmative or negative. and through the propositions C and D. but also in being necessary. For nothing prevents there being several middles for the same terms. If then one should assume that the angle AC is equal to the angle BD. or the original position will be begged. if it is this very pleasure. We must consider also the other forms of predication. it is not relevant to the subject proposed. and further if one should assume that when equal angles are taken from the whole angles. but if the premisses are universal it is possible that the conclusion may not be universal.g. and when a valid. the remainders E and F are equal. or A and C. one is assuming that which was proposed at the outset to be proved. the premisses also must be universal. It is clear then that in every syllogism there must be a universal premiss. when a perfect syllogism can be formed. 25 It is clear too that every demonstration will proceed through three terms and no more. e. then if it is different from pleasure in music. problematic. It is clear also when a syllogism in general can be made and when it cannot. and again if one should assume that the angle C is equal to the angle D. unless the same conclusion is established by different pairs of propositions. without claiming generally that angles of semicircles are equal. and that a universal statement is proved only when all the premisses are universal. that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal.subject proposed. if one should claim that some pleasure is good. he will beg the thing to be proved. which are themselves equal. Suppose the lines A and B have been drawn to the centre. no syllogism will be possible. unless he also states that when equals are taken from equals the remainders are equal.

for the conclusions are many. and again B by means of F and G. or something other than these. some conclusion will follow from them also. (1) If it is E the syllogism will have A and B for its sole premisses. the other by inductive inference. e. to perfect the syllogisms. Some conclusion then follows from them. but it cannot be reached as C is established by means of A and B. and if from C and D either A or B follows or something else. the same conclusion may be reached by more than three terms in this way. But if (iii) the conclusion is other than E or A or B. Or again when each of the propositions A and B is obtained by syllogistic inference. But if C and D are so related that one is whole. and it must be either E. or something other than these. it is clear that a syllogistic conclusion follows from two premisses and not from more than two. And if it is (i) E. It is necessary then that of these one should be related to another as whole to part: for it has already been proved that if a syllogism is formed some of its terms must be related in this way.g. And if no conclusion follows from C and D.g. the propositions will have been assumed to no purpose. For the three terms make two premisses. or (ii) the same thing happens to be inferred by means of several terms only in the sense which we saw to be possible. unless for the sake of induction or of obscuring the argument or something of the sort. and unconnected with one another. by means of D and E. and they do not establish the conclusion proposed: for we assumed that the syllogism proved E. or (ii) A or B. Suppose then that A stands in this relation to B. B. as was said at the beginning. It must either be E or one or other of C and D. This being evident. Suppose that the proposition E is inferred from the premisses A. It is clear therefore that in whatever syllogistic argument the premisses through which the main conclusion 98 . (2) But if from the propositions A and B there follows not E but some other conclusion. So it is clear that every demonstration and every syllogism will proceed through three terms only. A and B and C. But thus also the syllogisms are many. But if this can be called one syllogism. C. the syllogisms will be many. But if C is not so related to D as to make a syllogism. Or one may be obtained by syllogistic. the other part.that case there is not one but several syllogisms. and D. e. either (i) the syllogisms will be more than one. and the syllogism does not prove the original proposition. then there are several syllogisms. unless a new premiss is assumed. or one or other of the propositions A and B. not many. it turns out that these propositions have been assumed to no purpose.

g. what sort of conclusion is established in each figure. e. every syllogism will consist of an even number of premisses and an odd number of terms (for the terms exceed the premisses by one). Consequently the conclusions will be much more numerous than the terms or the premisses. But whenever a conclusion is reached by means of prosyllogisms or by means of several continuous middle terms. the number of the terms will similarly exceed that of the premisses by one (for the extra term must either be added outside or inserted: but in either case it follows that the relations of predication are one fewer than the terms related). the terms odd. For that which is concluded in many figures and through many moods is easier. this argument either has not been drawn syllogistically or it has assumed more than was necessary to establish its thesis. a syllogism will not be constructed. and the premisses will be equal in number to the relations of predication. The universal affirmative is proved by means of the first figure only and by this in only one mood. two conclusions are thereby added. that which is concluded in few figures and through few moods is more difficult to attempt. conclusions will be added less by one than the pre-existing terms: for the conclusion is drawn not in relation to the single term last added. when the terms are even. And similarly too if the term is inserted in the middle: for in relation to one term only. the other in relation to B. but they will alternate-when the premisses are even. e. 26 Since we understand the subjects with which syllogisms are concerned. and the terms odd. The premisses however will not always be even. the premisses must be odd: for along with one term one premiss is added. if to ABC the term D is added. and the conclusions will be half the number of the premisses. and in how many moods this is done. the proposition AB by means of the middle terms C and D. Similarly with any further additions. we must make them alternately even and odd at each addition. but in relation to all the rest. For if one term is added. the universal negative is proved both 99 .follows (for some of the preceding conclusions must be premisses) are not even in number. the terms must be odd. But the conclusions will not follow the same arrangement either in respect to the terms or to the premisses. one in relation to A. If then syllogisms are taken with respect to their main premisses. Consequently since the premisses were (as we saw) even. if a term is added from any quarter.g. it is evident to us both what sort of problem is difficult and what sort is easy to prove.

I mean. But particular statements are easier to establish: for proof is possible in more figures and through more moods. the universal negative in two. most easy to overthrow. all these matters are clear from what has been said. and some 100 .through the first figure and through the second. in two moods in the second. At the same time it is evident that it is easier to refute than to establish. Of all the things which exist some are such that they cannot be predicated of anything else truly and universally. e. in one mood through the first.g. whether the predicate belongs to all or to some: and this we found possible in two figures. the character of the problem proved in each figure. 27 We must now state how we may ourselves always have a supply of syllogisms in reference to the problem proposed and by what road we may reach the principles relative to the problem: for perhaps we ought not only to investigate the construction of syllogisms. but other things may be predicated of them (for each of these is both man and animal). Similarly with universal negatives: the original statement is destroyed. But particular statements can be refuted in one way only-by proving that the predicate belongs either to all or to none.e. It is clear then that the universal affirmative is most difficult to establish. the number of the terms and premisses through which it proceeds. The manner in which every syllogism is produced. Cleon and Callias. And in general we must not forget that it is possible to refute statements by means of one another. the individual and sensible. In general. but nothing prior is predicated of them. but once in the first. and some things are themselves predicated of others. through the first in one mood. The particular affirmative is proved through the first and through the last figure. the relation of the premisses to one another. universals are easier game for the destroyer than particulars: for whether the predicate belongs to none or not to some. and particular statements by means of universal: but it is not possible to establish universal statements by means of particular. through the second in two. though it is possible to establish particular statements by means of universal. i. they are destroyed: and the particular negative is proved in all the figures. in three moods in the third. and the number of the figures appropriate to each problem. universal statements by means of particular. but also to have the power of making them. The particular negative is proved in all the figures. in three moods through the last.

e. But he must select not those which follow some particular but those which follow the thing as a whole. We shall explain in another place that there is an upward limit also to the process of predicating: for the present we must assume this.g. or that that which approaches is Callias. e. But that which something follows receives the mark ‘every’. Of these ultimate predicates it is not possible to demonstrate another predicate. the more cogently will he demonstrate. e. e. it is uncertain whether the premiss is universal. is contained by something else. for which we must obtain the attributes that follow. and those which cannot belong to it. because the negative statement implied above is convertible.are predicated of others. without qualification. save incidentally: for we sometimes say that that white object is Socrates. Of the attributes which follow we must distinguish those which fall within the definition. for the reason given. The larger the supply a man has of these. but if the statement is definite. Neither can individuals be predicated of other things. Whenever the subject. and of the latter those which apparently and those which really belong. that every man is every animal or justice is all good. It is clear then that some things are naturally not stated of anything: for as a rule each sensible thing is such that it cannot be predicated of anything. But that which follows one must not suppose to follow as a whole. next we must lay down those attributes which follow the thing. Whatever lies between these limits can be spoken of in both ways: they may be stated of others. and yet others of them.g. man of Callias and animal of man. We must select the premisses suitable to each problem in this manner: first we must lay down the subject and the definitions and the properties of the thing. and again those which the thing follows. and in proportion as he apprehends those which are truer. not what follows a particular man but what follows every man: for the syllogism proceeds through universal premisses. those which are predicated as properties. that every animal follows man or every science music. and those which are predicated as accidents. But those to which it cannot belong need not be selected. save as a matter of opinion. If the statement is indefinite. but these may be predicated of other things. and indeed we state it in a proposition: for the other statement is useless and impossible. but only that it follows. though other things can be predicated of them. what follows or does not follow the highest term universally must not be selected in dealing with the subordinate term (for 101 . And as a rule arguments and inquiries are concerned with these things.g. and others stated of them. Similarly one must select those attributes which the subject follows as wholes.g. the matter is clear. the more quickly will he reach a conclusion.

One must apprehend also normal consequents and normal antecedents-. and to those attributes which cannot possibly be present in the predicate in question: or conversely to the attributes which cannot possibly be present in the subject. the attribute in question must belong to some of the subject in question. for propositions which obtain normally are established syllogistically from premisses which obtain normally. For if any of these subjects is the same as any of these attributes.these attributes have been taken in dealing with the superior term. one of the terms in question cannot possibly belong to any of the other. if animal follows man. If any members of these two groups are identical. But these belong more properly to the choice of what concerns man. But if the object is to establish a particular negative proposition. the attribute originally in question must belong to the subject originally in question. Nor must we take as things which the superior term follows. that it should follow all these also. for what follows animal also follows man. For the conclusion of each syllogism resembles its principles. But if the purpose is to establish not a universal but a particular proposition. we must find antecedents of the subject in question and attributes which cannot possibly belong to the predicate in question. they must look for the terms of which the terms in question are predicable: for if any of these are identical. and what does not belong to animal does not belong to man). one must look to the consequents of the subject. It is necessary indeed. it follows that one of the 102 . and to the consequents of the predicate. and the attributes which follow that of which it is to be predicated. 28 If men wish to establish something about some whole. take as subjects of the predicate ‘animal’ what are really subjects of the predicate ‘man’. If any members of these groups are identical. Whenever the one term has to belong to none of the other. those things which the inferior term follows. For sometimes a syllogism in the first figure results. some if not all of them having this character of normality. e. For some things are peculiar to the species as distinct from the genus. for species being distinct there must be attributes peculiar to each. but we must choose those attributes which are peculiar to each subject.g. The reason why this is so will be clear in the sequel. sometimes a syllogism in the second. they must look to the subjects of that which is being established (the subjects of which it happens to be asserted). We must not however choose attributes which are consequent upon all the terms: for no syllogism can be made out of such premisses.

But if we are seeking consequents and antecedents we must look for those which are primary and most universal. A will belong to none of the Es: for B will belong to all A. e. This is the last figure: for G becomes the middle term. in reference to E we must look to KF rather than to F alone. Perhaps each of these statements will become clearer in the following way. A will belong to none of the Es by a prosyllogism: for since the negative proposition is convertible. Suppose again that the attributes of E are designated by F. and in reference to A we must look to KC rather than to C alone. whenever C and G are apprehended to be the same. but to no E: for it was assumed to be identical with H. A will belong to none of the Fs. it may yet follow F. If B is identical with G. If F and D are identical. If then one of the Cs should be identical with one of the Fs. and A to all C. because it does not belong to D: but G falls under E: consequently A will not belong to some of the Es. If D and G are identical.terms in question does not belong to some of the other. attributes which cannot possibly belong to A by D. and H belonged to none of the Es. it belongs both to F and to E: but if it does not follow KF. Similarly we must consider the antecedents of A itself: for if a term follows the primary antecedents. whenever an identical term is found among the Cs and Fs. and F is identical with D. A will not belong to some of the Es: for it will not belong to G. if B and H are identical. A must belong to all E: for F belongs to all E. For it is proved that A belongs to all E. For if A belongs to KF. A must belong to some of the Es: for A follows C. but if it does not follow the former. consequently A belongs to all E. and that all the syllogisms proceed through the aforesaid figures. It is clear too that the inquiry proceeds through the three terms and the two premisses. If C and G are identical. A and E will be the extremes. there will be a converted syllogism: for E will belong to all A since B belongs to A and E to B (for B was found to be identical with G): but that A should belong to all E is not necessary. the antecedents of A by C.g. It is clear then that in every proposition which requires proof we must look to the aforesaid relations of the subject and predicate in question: for all syllogisms proceed through these. it may yet follow the latter. 103 . And A will belong to no E. And A will belong to some E. but F belongs to all E. it will follow those also which are subordinate. So the first figure is formed. but it must belong to some E because it is possible to convert the universal statement into a particular. and attributes which cannot belong to E by H. and E follows all G. the antecedents of E by G. Suppose the consequents of A are designated by B. Again. This will be the middle term.

if the consequents of the terms in question are identical. all arguments can be reduced to the aforesaid moods. and it is not possible to refute by means of a consequent of both the terms in question: for the middle term must belong to the one. and not belong to the other. and F belongs to all E: the middle figure because D belongs to no A. For B will belong to all A and to no E. B and F. This is the last figure: for A will belong to no G. Thus we have both the first figure and the middle figure. and the middle term must be not diverse but identical. e. For the fact that B and G cannot belong to the same thing differs in no way from the fact that B is 104 . either in the first or in the middle figure. because A belongs to no F. not however from the premisses taken but in the aforesaid mood. Consequently B must be identical with one of the Hs.g. or if the antecedents of A are identical with those attributes which cannot possibly belong to E. Clearly then all syllogisms proceed through the aforesaid figures. For if the consequents are identical. wherever it happens that a syllogism results from taking contraries or terms which cannot belong to the same thing. we have the first figure with its minor premiss negative.g. it follows that A will not belong to some of the Es: for then too we shall have the middle figure: for B will belong to all A and to no G. e. if B and F are contraries or cannot belong to the same thing.g. e. Secondly. C with H. For if these are taken. the first.when D and F are identical. and E will belong to all G. or if those attributes are identical which cannot belong to either term: for no syllogism is produced by means of these. But no syllogism is possible in this way. if B and G cannot belong to the same thing. It is evident too that we must find out which terms in this inquiry are identical. because no syllogism is produced from them. e. both premisses are negative. Again. we have the middle figure with both premisses affirmative: if the antecedents of A are identical with attributes which cannot belong to E. For (as we saw) it is not possible at all to establish a proposition from consequents. And A will not belong to some E. first because the object of our investigation is the middle term. not which are different or contrary. Consequently B must be identical with some of the Hs.g. whenever D and G are identical. e. It is clear too that other methods of inquiry by selection of middle terms are useless to produce a syllogism. and to all E. If attributes which cannot belong to either term are identical. a syllogism will be formed to prove that A belongs to none of the Es. C and H. since the negative statement is convertible.g. and we must not select consequents of all the terms.

Again we may prove that A belongs to some E: for if A belonged to none of the Es.g. In all cases it is necessary to find some common term other than the subjects of inquiry. It turns out then that those who inquire in this manner are looking gratuitously for some other way than the necessary way because they have failed to observe the identity of the Bs with the Hs. For what is proved ostensively may also be concluded syllogistically per impossibile by means of the same terms. they also are formed by means of the consequents and antecedents of the terms in question. For suppose A to belong to some E: then since B belongs to all A and A to some of the Es. e. e. Similarly with the other propositions requiring proof. and the syllogism results through these terms. B will belong to some of the Es: but it was assumed that it belongs to none. Similarly with the rest. that A belongs to none of the Es. and the other remains as it is. assume that A belongs to some E and it will be proved per impossibile to belong to no E. For the ostensive syllogism differs from the reductio ad impossibile in this: in the ostensive syllogism both remisses are laid down 105 . it is clear that A will belong to no E. In both cases the same inquiry is involved. suppose it has been proved that A belongs to no E. so that if this premiss is converted.identical with some of the Hs: for that includes everything which cannot belong to E. 29 Syllogisms which lead to impossible conclusions are similar to ostensive syllogisms. For both the demonstrations start from the same terms. Again if it has been proved by an ostensive syllogism that A belongs to no E. to which the syllogism establishing the false conclusion may relate. and E belongs to all G. Whatever the problem the same inquiry is necessary whether one wishes to use an ostensive syllogism or a reduction to impossibility. because it turns out that otherwise B belongs to some of the Es and this is impossible-if now it is assumed that B belongs to no E and to all A. and what is proved per impossibile may also be proved ostensively.g. but if B and F are contraries B must be identical with one of the Hs. The proof per impossibile will always and in all cases be from the consequents and antecedents of the terms in question. It is clear then that from the inquiries taken by themselves no syllogism results. the syllogism will be ostensive by means of the same terms. A will belong to none of the Gs: but it was assumed to belong to all.

We must find in the case of possible relations. as well as terms that belong. But we must consider and determine in how many ways hypothetical syllogisms are possible. then A would belong to every E: and again if the Ds and the Gs should be identical. in any art or study. Similarly also with the other modes of predication. but E should be predicated of the Gs only. It is clear then from what has been said not only that all syllogisms can be formed in this way. These points will be made clearer by the sequel. but it is possible to establish some of them syllogistically in another way. Each of the problems then can be proved in the manner described. terms which can belong though they actually do not: for we have proved that the syllogism which establishes a possible relation proceeds through these terms as well.in accordance with the truth. but the new terms introduced. We must look for the attributes and the subjects of both our terms. e. The method is the same whether the relation is necessary or possible. it follows that A will belong to none of the Es. and the method of the inquiry will be the same as before. In the other hypothetical syllogisms. the inquiry will be directed to the terms of the problem to be proved-not the terms of the original problem. and 106 . Clearly then we must consider the matter in this way also. in philosophy. in the reductio ad impossibile one of the premisses is assumed falsely. For every syllogism has been proved to be formed through one of the aforementioned figures. but E should be assumed to belong to the Gs only. and these cannot be composed through other terms than the consequents and antecedents of the terms in question: for from these we obtain the premisses and find the middle term.g. but also that they cannot be formed in any other. that we must look to terms of the kinds mentioned whether we wish to use an ostensive syllogism or a reduction to impossibility. For the inquiry will be the same. 30 The method is the same in all cases. For if the Cs and the Gs should be identical. universal problems by the inquiry which leads up to a particular conclusion. and the syllogism will proceed through terms arranged in the same order whether a possible or a pure proposition is proved. when we discuss the reduction to impossibility: at present this much must be clear. Consequently a syllogism cannot be formed by means of other terms. with the addition of an hypothesis. or by positing a certain quality. I mean those which proceed by substitution.

refuting statements in one way. about good or knowledge. this very point had escaped all those who used the method of division. a weak syllogism. or again whether we are confirming of all or of some. In general then we have explained fairly well how we must select premisses: we have discussed the matter accurately in the treatise concerning dialectic. I mean for example that astronomical experience supplies the principles of astronomical science: for once the phenomena were adequately apprehended. confirming them in another. whose nature does not admit of proof.g. the 107 . while if we look for dialectical syllogisms we must start from probable premisses. when there is a need to prove a positive statement. and it always establishes something more general than the attribute in question. so as not to look to everything that is said about the terms of the problem or to the same points whether we are confirming or refuting. we should be able to discover the proof and demonstrate everything which admitted of proof. we must look to fewer points and they must be definite. and to make that clear. in the pursuit of truth starting from premisses in which the arrangement of the terms is in accordance with truth. Consequently they did not understand what it is possible to prove syllogistically by division. Consequently it is the business of experience to give the principles which belong to each subject. it begs. First. The principles of syllogisms have been stated in general terms. 31 It is easy to see that division into classes is a small part of the method we have described: for division is. Consequently. e. For if none of the true attributes of things had been omitted in the historical survey. and they attempted to persuade men that it was possible to make a demonstration of substance and essence. if the attributes of the thing are apprehended. In demonstrations. so to speak. Similarly with any other art or science. But in each science the principles which are peculiar are the most numerous. We have also stated how we must select with reference to everything that is.we must supply ourselves with as many of these as possible. and whether we are refuting of all or some. and consider them by means of the three terms. for what it ought to prove. both how they are characterized and how we must hunt for them. the demonstrations of astronomy were discovered. nor did they understand that it was possible to prove syllogistically in the manner we have described. our business will then be to exhibit readily the demonstrations.

g. nor about its genus. they do not make it clear. But division has a contrary intention: for it takes the universal as middle. whose definition is to be got. and D as man. whether the diagonal is incommensurate. 108 . that this is man or whatever the subject of inquiry may be: for they pursue the other method altogether. consequently man must be either mortal or immortal. And again. nor is it useful in those cases in which it is thought to be most suitable. he assumes in the same way that A inheres either in B or in C (for every mortal animal is either footed or footless). and he assumes A of D (for he assumed man. It is clear then that this method of investigation is not suitable for every inquiry. and show it to be necessary. It is clear that it is neither possible to refute a statement by this method of division. mortal by B. but it is not necessary that man should be a mortal animal-this is begged: and this is what ought to have been proved syllogistically. Always dividing then in this way it turns out that these logicians assume as middle the universal term. The man who divides assumes that every animal is either mortal or immortal: i. In conclusion. e. so he assumes A of D as belonging to it. he will have assumed what he ought to have proved. Again. B for ‘length’. He cannot then prove it: for this is his method. Let animal be the term signified by A. as we saw. whatever is A is all either B or C. taking A as mortal animal. nor in cases in which it is unknown whether it is thus or thus. For if he assumes that every length is either commensurate or incommensurate. to be a mortal animal). B as footed. he lays it down that man is an animal. and the diagonal is a length. but it is not necessary that man should be footed: this he assumes: and it is just this again which he ought to have demonstrated. Let A stand for ‘incommensurate or commensurate’. be signified by D. nor to draw a conclusion about an accident or property of a thing. and let man. always dividing. But if he should assume that it is incommensurate. Now the true conclusion is that every D is either B or C.e. never even suspecting the presence of the rich supply of evidence which might be used. and immortal by C. but proof is not possible by this method.middle term through which the syllogism is formed must always be inferior to and not comprehend the first of the extremes. C for ‘diagonal’. C as footless. consequently it is necessary that man should be either a footed or a footless animal. and as extremes that which ought to have been the subject of demonstration and the differentiae. he has proved that the diagonal is either incommensurate or commensurate.

Again if it is necessary that animal should exist. this has not however been drawn by syllogism from the propositions assumed. next we must inquire which are universal and which particular.From what has been said it is clear from what elements demonstrations are formed and in what manner. In some arguments it is easy to see what is wanting. and the composite parts are larger than the elements out of which they are made). or anything necessary has been omitted. and that if the elements out of which a thing is made are annihilated. if the assumptions were made that substance is not annihilated by the annihilation of what is not substance. and to what points we must look in each problem. We must inquire then whether anything unnecessary has been assumed. we cannot reduce arguments put forward in the way described. For sometimes men put forward the universal premiss. it is necessary that substance should exist if man does: but as yet the conclusion has not been drawn syllogistically: for the premisses are not in the shape we required. we must ourselves assume the one which is missing. It will happen at the same time that what has been already said will be confirmed and its truth made clearer by what we are about to say. then that which is made out of them is destroyed: these propositions being laid down.g. if animal does. e. but some escape us. if man does. If we should investigate the production of the syllogisms and had the power of discovering them. it is necessary that any part of substance is substance. and that substance should exist. and appear to be syllogisms. and we must posit the one and take away the other. For everything that is true must in every respect agree with itself First then we must attempt to select the two premisses of the syllogism (for it is easier to divide into large parts than into small. and invite the concession of others to no purpose. and further if we could resolve the syllogisms produced into the aforementioned figures. We are deceived in such cases because something necessary 109 . because something necessary results from what has been laid down. but omit those through which they are inferred. 32 Our next business is to state how we can reduce syllogisms to the aforementioned figures: for this part of the inquiry still remains. either in writing or in discussion: or men put forward the premisses of the principal syllogism. our original problem would be brought to a conclusion. but premisses are wanting. but do not posit the premiss which is contained in it. and if both premisses have not been stated. until we have reached the two premisses: for unless we have these.

For it was thus that we found the middle term placed in each figure. Let A represent the term ‘being eternal’. For no syllogism was made although the terms stood thus: that required that the premiss AB should be stated universally. and B of C: it would seem that a syllogism is possible since the terms stand thus: but nothing necessary results. the other predicated. but must first state the two premisses. Clearly then. since the syllogism also is necessary. that every Aristomenes who is an object of thought is eternal. then divide them into their terms. clearly we must not look for all the figures.results from what is assumed. we must not try to reduce it directly. sometimes they are deceived by the similarity in the positing of the terms. B ‘Aristomenes as an object of thought’. in what sort the particular is described. Again let C stand for ‘Miccalus’. or one is denied. For Aristomenes as an object of thought is eternal. and in which the universal. we shall have the first figure: if it both is a predicate and is denied of something. Since we know what sort of thesis is established in each figure. and something else is denied of it. the last figure. but for that which is appropriate to the thesis in hand. B for ‘musical Miccalus’.g. though something results when certain propositions are assumed. If then the middle term is a predicate and a subject of predication. a syllogism cannot be made: for a middle term has not been taken. but not everything which is necessary is a syllogism. nor does a syllogism. But A does not belong to C: for Aristomenes is perishable. since Aristomenes is perishable. or if it is a predicate. It is placed similarly too if the premisses are not universal: for the middle term is determined in the same way. It is true then that A belongs to B. if A is stated of B. E. we shall recognize the figure by the position of the middle term. 33 Men are frequently deceived about syllogisms because the inference is necessary. the middle figure: if other things are predicated of it. If the thesis is established in more figures than one. A 110 . if the same term is not stated more than once in the course of an argument. But this is false. We must take that term as middle which is stated in both the remisses: for it is necessary that the middle should be found in both premisses in all the figures. Consequently. as has been said above. But that which is necessary is wider than the syllogism: for every syllogism is necessary. But B also belongs to C: for Aristomenes is Aristomenes as an object of thought. C ‘Aristomenes’. and this ought not to escape our notice.

It would seem to follow that health cannot belong to any man. they could belong to one another. consequently it is not possible that disease should belong to any man’. no syllogism (as we have shown) is possible. For health and diseae and knowledge and ignorance. This argument then is identical with the former. It is clear then that in such premisses what possesses the condition ought always to be substituted for the condition and taken as the term. Also A can be predicated of B: for musical Miccalus might perish to-morrow. if ‘healthy’ is substituted for ‘health’ and ‘diseased’ for ‘disease’. For if we accept the conclusion as though it made no difference whether we said ‘This belong to that’ or ‘This belongs to all of that’. C man. B disease. In the third figure the fallacy results in reference to possibility. but cannot belong to one another. This is not in agreement with what was said before: for we stated that when several things could belong to the same thing.g. It is evident then that in all these cases the fallacy arises from the setting out of the terms: for if the things that are in the conditions are substituted. 34 Men will frequently fall into fallacies through not setting out the terms of the premiss well. no fallacy arises. but it is possible that health should belong to every man. It is true to say that A cannot belong to any B (for health belongs to no disease) and again that B belongs to every C (for every man is capable of disease). For it is not true to say that being healthy cannot belong to one who is diseased. 111 . The reason for this is that the terms are not set out well in the statement. suppose A to be health. This deception then arises through ignoring a small distinction. It is true to predicate B of C: for Miccalus is musical Miccalus. But to state A of C is false at any rate. and in general contraries.for ‘perishing to-morrow’. save in respect of possibility: but such a conclusion is not impossible: for it is possible that health should belong to no man.g. for it is not true universally that musical Miccalus perishes to-morrow: but unless this is assumed. Again the fallacy may occur in a similar way in the middle figure: ‘it is not possible that health should belong to any disease. no syllogism can be made. since if the things which are in the conditions are substituted. e. e. But unless this is assumed no conclusion results. may possibly belong to the same thing.

But we must suppose the verb ‘to belong’ to have as many meanings as the senses in which the verb ‘to be’ is used. and the middle to the extreme. nor the middle of the third. Take for example the statement that there is a single science of contraries. 36 That the first term belongs to the middle.g.g. Let A stand for two right angles.g. For it is clear that the middle must not always be assumed to be an individual thing. if wisdom is knowledge. the belief that syllogism can establish that which has no mean. the conclusion is that there is a science of the good. A then belongs to C because of B: but A belongs to B without the mediation of another term: for the triangle in virtue of its own nature contains two right angles. Let A stand for ‘there being a single science’. must not be understood in the sense that they can always be predicated of one another or that the first term will be predicated of the middle in the same way as the middle is predicated of the last term. Sometimes too fallacies will result from such a search. while the first is sometimes stated of 112 . although it is demonstrable. or is a contrary. Hence it is difficult to reduce syllogisms with such terms. consequently there will be no middle term for the proposition AB. but the first is not stated of the middle. e. The same holds if the premisses are negative. and the good both is a contrary and has a quality.35 We must not always seek to set out the terms a single word: for we shall often have complexes of words to which a single name is not given. e. but in the sense that it is true to say of the contraries that there is a single science of them. though the good is both of these. but the good is not science. Sometimes the middle term is stated of the third. B for triangle. It happens sometimes that the first term is stated of the middle. but sometimes a complex of words. the conclusion is that there is knowledge of the good. The good then is not knowledge. C for isosceles triangle. if there is a science of everything that has a quality. but the middle is not stated of the third term. Then A belongs to B. as happens in the case mentioned. e. and in which the assertion that a thing ‘is’ may be said to be true. not in the sense that contraries are the fact of there being a single science of them. though wisdom is knowledge. and B for things which are contrary to one another. nor is that which has a quality or is a contrary. and wisdom is of the good. Sometimes neither the first term is stated of the middle.

We must take as terms opportunity-right time-God: but the premiss must be understood according to the case of the noun.the third. if there is a genus of that of which there is a science. e. man. of man.g. ‘double of this’. We must consider these points and define them better. ‘there is not a motion of a motion or a becoming of a becoming. or the accusative. e. but there is not a sign of a sign. but sometimes that ‘this is not of that’ or ‘for that’. 37 The expressions ‘this belongs to that’ and ‘this holds true of that’ must be understood in as many ways as there are different categories. e. 38 A term which is repeated in the premisses ought to be joined to the first extreme. The same holds good where the relation is negative. For ‘that does not belong to this’ does not always mean that ‘this is not that’. of contraries.g. and if there is a science of the good. I mean for example that if a syllogism should be made proving that there is knowledge of justice.g. For we state this universally without qualification. or the nominative. of a good. e. and further as simple or compound: the same holds good of the corresponding negative expressions. ‘man is an animal’. This holds in the other cases too. e. e. and these categories must be taken either with or without qualification. ‘that which strikes or sees this’. but there is a becoming of pleasure: so pleasure is not a becoming.g. The first term then is predicated of the extreme. consequently laughter is not a sign. and sometimes not: e. and if there is a science of the good.g. And if that of which there is a science is a genus. that it is 113 . in relation to the terms of the thesis. but in the premisses one thing is not stated of another. but the premisses ought to be understood with reference to the cases of each term-either the dative. we conclude that there is a genus of the good. e. But nothing is predicated of anything. that the terms ought always to be stated in the nominative. in which the thesis is refuted because the genus is asserted in a particular way. or in whatever other way the word falls in the premiss.g. contraries. or the genitive. not in oblique cases.g.g. but the right time does not. we conclude that the good is a genus. good.’ Or again it may be said that there is a sign of laughter. Again take the inference ‘opportunity is not the right time: for opportunity belongs to God. since nothing is useful to God’. not to the middle. ‘equal to this’.

and phrase for phrase. of goat-stag an object of knowledge qua not existing.g. Also it is true to predicate B of C. C for justice. but if we add the qualification ‘that it is good’. Consequently A is true of C: there will then be knowledge of the good. but B will not be true of C. we must put as middle term ‘that which is’. that it is good. and always take a word in preference to a phrase: for thus the setting out of the terms will be easier. For justice is identical with a good. but that it is. B too is true of C: for that which C represents is something. the conclusion will not follow: for A will be true of B. e. For of the good there is knowledge that it is good. For example if it makes no difference whether we say that the supposable is not the genus of the opinable or that the opinable is not 114 . that it is good: for ex hypothesi the term ‘something’ indicates the thing’s special nature. B for being. C for good.good. not ‘being something’. the addition must be joined to the extreme. that it is something. For to predicate of justice the term ‘good that it is good’ is false and not intelligible. If it has been proved to be an object of knowledge without qualification. word for word. In this way an analysis of the argument can be made. Let A stand for ‘knowledge that it is something’. the expression ‘that it is good’ (or ‘qua good’) should be joined to the first term. e. and word and phrase. let A stand for knowledge that it is. and C stand for ‘good’. But if the expression ‘that it is good’ were added to B. the middle term must be ‘that which is something’. The position of the terms is not the same when something is established without qualification and when it is qualified by some attribute or condition.g. B stand for ‘something’. or man perishable qua an object of sense: in every case in which an addition is made to the predicate. Similarly if it should be proved that the healthy is an object of knowledge qua good. 39 We ought also to exchange terms which have the same value. we should not have had a syllogism proving that there is knowledge of the good. It is true to predicate A of B. It is true to predicate A of B: for ex hypothesi there is a science of that which is something. Let A stand for ‘knowledge that it is good’. Clearly then in syllogisms which are thus limited we must take the terms in the way stated. when the good is proved to be an object of knowledge and when it is proved to be an object of knowledge that it is good. B for good. But if ‘being’ were taken as middle and ‘being’ simply were joined to the extreme.

41 It is not the same. then whether B belongs to all C or merely belongs to C. let B stand for beautiful. and so no syllogism a is formed. though not to all C: e. it is better to take as the terms the supposable and the opinable in preference to the phrase suggested. but if the object is to prove that pleasure is good. Similarly in all other cases. if two things are not related as whole to part and part to whole. the term must be ‘the good’. the term will be ‘good’. and that A belongs to all of that to all of which B belongs: for nothing prevents B from belonging to C. but does not use the diagrams in the sense that he reasons from them. If then A belongs to B. and yet A not belonging to all C or to any C at all. 40 Since the expressions ‘pleasure is good’ and ‘pleasure is the good’ are not identical. but not to everything of which B is predicated. either in fact or in speech. we must not set out the terms in the same way. it will follow that A can be said of all of that of all of which B is said.identical with a particular kind of supposable (for what is meant is the same in both statements). it is true to say that beauty belongs to that which is white. And if B is said of all of a third term. the prover does not prove from them. If beauty belongs to something white. there is no necessity that A should be said of all of it. I do not say to all C. but if the syllogism is to prove that pleasure is the good. But if A belongs to everything of which B is truly stated. and C for white. ‘A is said of all the things of which B is said’. nothing prevents B belonging to C. so also is A: but if B is not said of all of the third term. We (I mean the learner) use the process of setting out terms like perception by sense. but imitate the geometrician who says that ‘this line a foot long’ or ‘this straight line’ or ‘this line without breadth’ exists although it does not. If then we take three terms it is clear that the expression ‘A is said of all of which B is said’ means this. not as though it were impossible to demonstrate without 115 . For in general. but not perhaps to everything that is white. We must not suppose that something absurd results through setting out the terms: for we do not use the existence of this particular thing.g. that A belongs to all of that to which B belongs. but even to C at all. it is not necessary that A should belong. If however A is said of that of all of which B may be said.

42 We should not forget that in the same syllogism not all conclusions are reached through one figure. The latter argument perhaps was a syllogism: but the former was an hypothesis. These cannot be analysed either. though the rest of the argument cannot. we must take as terms drinkable and water. But the agreement does not come from a syllogism. but certain problems in each figure. And yet one must agree. but one through one figure. we must take as a term the point to which the argument has been directed. but the reduction to what is impossible can be analysed since it is proved by syllogism. but he has not proved that there is not a science.g. Clearly then we must analyse arguments in accordance with this. as it is to demonstrate without the premisses of the syllogism. but from an hypothesis. another through another. of what is healthy and what is sickly: for the same thing will then be at the same time healthy and sickly. if a man proves that water is a drinkable liquid. and should then argue that not every faculty is of contraries. For instance if a man should suppose that unless there is one faculty of contraries. He has shown that there is not one faculty of all contraries.these illustrative terms. e. not the whole definition: for so we shall be less likely to be disturbed by the length of the term: e. For they have not been proved by syllogism. for with the given premisses it is not possible to reduce them. 44 Further we must not try to reduce hypothetical syllogisms. The same holds good of arguments which are brought to a conclusion per impossibile. there cannot be one science. it is clear from the conclusion in what figure the premisses should be sought. but assented to by agreement.g. because the conclusion is reached from an hypothesis. 43 In reference to those arguments aiming at a definition which have been directed to prove some part of the definition. But these differ from the previous arguments: for in the former a preliminary agreement must be reached if one 116 . Since not every problem is proved in every figure. This argument cannot be reduced: but the proof that there is not a single faculty can.

g. But if the affirmative statement concerns B. viz. If A belongs to no B. if A belongs to no B and to some C: convert the negative statement and you will have the first figure. But when the affirmative statement concerns the major extreme. For B will belong to no A and A to all C. But if the syllogism is particular.g. whenever the negative statement concerns the major extreme. and B to all C. can be reduced to another figure.g.g. Similarly if the syllogism is not universal but particular. and A to all B: therefore C belongs to no B. e. whereas in the latter. that then odd numbers are equal to evens. and you will have the first figure. if they have been established in one figure by syllogism. reduction to the first figure will be possible. The point will be clear in the sequel. we shall have the middle figure. Many other arguments are brought to a conclusion by the help of an hypothesis. We shall describe in the sequel their differences. then contraries fall under the same science. not all however but some only. if A belongs to all B. Thus the first figure. For B belongs to no A. and to all C. e. The universal syllogisms in the second figure can be reduced to the first. men still accept the reasoning. no resolution will be possible. the falsity of what follows from the assumption that the diagonal is commensurate. because the falsity is patent. and B to some C. if A belongs to no B. e.g. e. nor would there be a syllogism if it did. Convert the negative statement. e. e.g. a negative syllogism in the first figure can be reduced to the second. that it is not possible to resolve such arguments into the figures. And we have explained the reason. For C belongs to no A. and the negative C. but only one of the two particular syllogisms. an agreement that if there is proved to be one faculty of contraries. Let A belong to no B and to all C. 117 . but if the negative statement is converted. and the various ways in which hypothetical arguments are formed: but at present this much must be clear. even if no preliminary agreement has been made. but not to all C: for the statement AB does not admit of conversion. Convert the negative statement and you will have the middle figure. For B will belong to no A and A to some C. 45 Whatever problems are proved in more than one figure. then A belongs to no C. these we ought to consider and mark out clearly. B then belongs to no C: for the negative statement is convertible. C must be made first term.is to accept the conclusion. and a syllogism in the middle figure to the first.

Consequently we shall get the first figure. Of the syllogisms in the last figure one only cannot be resolved into the first. But 118 . the affirmative particular: for A will belong to no C. the argument is the same: for B is convertible in reference to C. For C then will belong to no A and to some B. the first term must be B: for B belongs to all C.g. and A to no C: then C will belong to some B. if A belongs to all C. and not to some C.Again syllogisms in the third figure cannot all be resolved into the first. and so C will be middle term. Let B belong to all C. e. be resolved into the third figure. resolution is possible. A will belong to some B. and A not belong to some C: convert the statement BC and both premisses will be particular. if A belongs to no C. Similarly if the negative statement is universal. though all syllogisms in the first figure can be resolved into the third. the transition to the other figure is made. Similarly if the syllogism is negative: for the particular affirmative is convertible: therefore A will belong to no B. But if B belongs to all C and A to some C. But if the negative statement is particular. no resolution will be possible. the other cannot. It is clear that in order to resolve the figures into one another the premiss which concerns the minor extreme must be converted in both the figures: for when this premiss is altered. Syllogisms in the third figure can be resolved into the middle figure. if B belongs to all C. whenever the negative statement is universal. and C to some of the Bs. If the syllogism is negative. and A to no C.g. resolution will not be possible: for neither of the premisses is universal after conversion. when the terms are universal we must take them in a similar way. C will belong to some B: but A belonged to all B: so that the third figure is formed. viz. both B and C alike are convertible in relation to A. and C to some A. therefore B belongs to some A. Let A belong to all B and B to some C. Whenever the universal statement is negative. A therefore is middle term. when the negative statement is not universal: all the rest can be resolved. and C to some of the Bs. so that B belongs to no A and C to some A. For if A belongs to no B and to some C. But since the particular statement is convertible. If A belongs to all C and B to some C. and to some C. e. and B to some or all C. One of the syllogisms in the middle figure can. But when A belongs to all B. Let A and B be affirmed of all C: then C can be converted partially with either A or B: C then belongs to some B. Since the particular affirmative is convertible.

The reason for this is as follows. Nor is ‘to be not-equal’ the same as ‘not to be equal’: for there is something underlying the one. 46 In establishing or refuting. viz. but there is nothing underlying the other. but ‘not to be white’. it makes some difference whether we suppose the expressions ‘not to be this’ and ‘to be not-this’ are identical or different in meaning. nor is ‘to be not-white’ the negation of ‘to be white’. so is that of ‘he knows what is good’ to ‘he knows what is not-good’. As then ‘not to know what is good’ is not the same as ‘to know what is not good’.g. and that when syllogisms are reduced to the first figure these alone are confirmed by reduction to what is impossible. and that the figures may be resolved into one another. and is possessed of knowledge of what is good and of what is not-good). If then every single statement may truly be said to be either an affirmation or a negation. so ‘to be not-good’ is not the same as ‘not to be good’. Therefore it is clear that ‘it is not-good’ is not the denial of ‘it is good’. and this is the unequal. It is clear then that the same syllogisms cannot be resolved in these figures which could not be resolved into the first figure. but everything is equal or is not equal. If then ‘he is not able to walk’ means the same as ‘he is able not to walk’. Wherefore not everything is either equal or unequal. It is clear from what we have said how we ought to reduce syllogisms. For when two pairs correspond. it must be a log: but that which is not a white log need not be a log at all. e. For if ‘it is a not-white log’. that which is not-equal. The relation of ‘he can walk’ to ‘he can not-walk’ is similar to the relation of ‘it is white’ to ‘it is not-white’. Further the expressions ‘it is a not-white log’ and ‘it is not a white log’ do not imply one another’s truth. no resolution will be possible: for the particular negative does not admit of conversion. or ‘he can walk’ and ‘he is able to walk’: therefore there is no difference between their contraries ‘he cannot walk’-’he is not able to walk’. if the one pair are different from one another. the other pair also must be different. if it 119 . For they do not mean the same thing. but an affirmation and a denial which are opposed to one another do not belong at the same time to the same thing. For there is no difference between the expressions ‘he knows what is good’ and ‘he is knowing what is good’. ‘not to be white’ and ‘to be not-white’.if the negative statement is particular. capacity to walk and incapacity to walk will belong at the same time to the same person (for the same man can both walk and not-walk.

D must belong to everything to which A belongs. let C stand for ‘to be not-good’ and be placed under B.is not a negation clearly it must in a sense be an affirmation. the denial must belong. But A is not true of all D. cannot be a not-white log either. the negation may be true in a similar way. Privative terms are similarly related positive ter terms respect of this arrangement. but A is not true. it is true also to say ‘it is not white’: for it is impossible that a thing should simultaneously be white and be notwhite. Since it is clear that ‘it is notwhite’ and ‘it is not white’ mean different things. For the expression ‘it is true’ stands on a similar footing to ‘it is’. For of that which is white it is true to say that it is not not-white.g. it is evident that the method of proving each cannot be the same. And B must belong to everything to which C belongs. that it is a white log. D for ‘not unequal’. For if it is true to say ‘it is a not-white’. Let A stand for ‘equal’. But since a thing cannot be simultaneously not-white and white. while that each is not-white or all are not-white is false. and let D stand for not to be not-good’ and be placed under A. For of that which is not a log at all it is not true to say A.e. viz. consequently if the affirmation does not belong. But every affirmation has a corresponding negation. e. B for ‘not equal’. but they will never belong to the same thing. In many things also. But C does not always belong to B: for what is not a log at all. viz. to some of which something belongs which does not belong to others. i. C for ‘unequal’. Similarly also ‘every animal is not-white’ is not the negation of ‘every animal is white’ (for both are false): the proper negation is ‘every animal is not white’. the other a denial. Consequently D is true. that all are not white or that each is not white. but they will never belong to the same thing. and that it is true to call it not-white. or be a not-white log and be a white log. that whatever is an animal is not white or may not be white. For either C or D belongs to everything to which A belongs. For the negation of ‘it is true to call it white’ is not ‘it is true to call it not- 120 . that it is a white log. On the other hand D belongs to everything to which A belongs. and either C or D will belong to everything. The relation of these statements to one another is as follows. But we may prove that it is true to call it white or not-white in the same way for both are proved constructively by means of the first figure. B for ‘not to be good’. and that B and D may possibly belong to the same thing. Let A stand for ‘to be good’. and one is an affirmation. Then either A or B will belong to everything. for this means that it is not-white. It is clear also that A and C cannot together belong to the same thing. The negation then of ‘it is notgood’ is ‘it is not not-good’.

The fallacy arises because perhaps it is not necessary that A or F should belong to everything. In general whenever A and B are such that they cannot belong at the same time to the same thing. And A and D may belong to the same thing. we must assume that whatever is an animal either is musical or is not-musical. ‘Assume that F stands for the negation of A and B. but B and C cannot. but C or D belongs to everything. and since H follows F. it is clear that D must follow B. but it is necessary that one of them should belong to whatever the other does not belong to: and again C and D are related in the same way. But this is false: for as we proved the sequence is reversed in terms so constituted. If then A follows C. That whatever is a man is not musical is proved destructively in the three ways mentioned. Again since C does not reciprocate with but A. because A follows C. But B and C cannot belong to the same thing. because it carries A along with it and A and B cannot belong to the same thing. and again that H stands for the negation of C and D. If then it is to be true to say that whatever is a man is musical or is not-musical. one of which must belong to everything. it is possible that A and D should belong to the same thing.white’ but ‘it is not true to call it white’. and A follows C but the relation cannot be reversed. For not good is the negation of 121 . Again since either F or B belongs to everything. then D must follow B and the relation cannot be reversed. since it is possible that D and A should belong at the same time to the same thing. B must follow D: for we know this. And ex hypothesi A belongs to everything ever thing to which C belongs. First it is clear from the following consideration that D follows B. and so something impossible results. and similarly either H or D. For since either C or D necessarily belongs to everything. It is necessary then that either A or F should belong to everything: for either the affirmation or the denial must belong. or that F or B should belong to everything: for F is not the denial of A. Therefore H belongs to everything to which F belongs.g. and again C and D are related in the same way. and the proof has been made. and since C cannot belong to that to which B belongs. and follows everything which C follows: it will result that B belongs necessarily to everything to which D belongs’: but this is false. It is clear then that B does not reciprocate with D either. B must follow D’. and one of the two necessarily belongs to everything. It results sometimes even in such an arrangement of terms that one is deceived through not apprehending the opposites rightly. e. And again either C or H must belong to everything: for they are related as affirmation and denial. we may reason that ‘if A and B cannot belong at the same time to the same thing.

122 .good: and not-good is not identical with ‘neither good nor not-good’. Similarly also with C and D. For two negations have been assumed in respect to one term.

g.g. all the universal syllogisms give more than one result. if A belongs to no B and to all C. it is not necessary that B should not belong to some A: for it may possibly belong to all A. For all the things that are subordinate to the middle term or to the conclusion may be proved by the same syllogism. and B is included in A. J. In the second figure it will be possible to infer only that which is subordinate to the conclusion. then E will be included in A. Book II Translated by A. e. further what we must look for when a refuting and establishing propositions. But that B does not belong to what is subordinate to A is not clear by means of the syllogism. clearly B does not belong to it. and how we should investigate a given problem in any branch of inquiry. But it is possible to give another reason concerning those which are universal. if the conclusion AB is proved through C. then D will be included in A. Again if E is included in C as in a whole. e. if E is subordinate to A. But if A does not belong to some B. when and how a syllogism is formed. the latter in the conclusion. others particular. then B must belong to some A: and if A has been proved to belong to no B. Consequently all syllogisms save the particular negative yield more than one conclusion. e. Jenkinson < div id="book2" class="book"> 1 We have already explained the number of the figures. And yet B does not belong to E. and of particular syllogisms the affirmative yield more than one. and C is included in A. This then is the reason common to all syllogisms whether universal or particular.g. then B belongs to no A. the character and number of the premisses. This is a different conclusion from the former. the negative yield only the stated conclusion. whatever is subordinate to B or C must accept the predicate A: for if D is included in B as in a whole. if the former are placed in the middle.Prior Analytics. But while it has been 123 . Similarly if the syllogism is negative. Since some syllogisms are universal. also by what means we shall obtain principles appropriate to each subject. If then D is subordinate to C. For all propositions are convertible save only the particular negative: and the conclusion states one definite thing about another definite thing. we conclude that B belongs to no C. if A has been proved to to all or to some B.

and this cannot be false: for then the same thing will belong 124 . just as in the universal syllogisms what is subordinate to the middle term is proved (as we saw) from a premiss which is not demonstrated: consequently either a conclusion is not possible in the case of universal syllogisms or else it is possible also in the case of particular syllogisms. not however through the syllogism. 2 It is possible for the premisses of the syllogism to be true. The reason cannot be established from false premisses: why this is so will be explained in the sequel. But this is impossible. If it is necessary that B should be when A is. If then it is true that A belongs to all that to which B belongs. The conclusion is either true or false necessarily. That which is subordinate to the conclusion cannot be proved. If then A is true. or to be the one true. Similarly in the other figures. For what results necessarily is the conclusion. and two relations of subject and predicate or premisses. the other subordinate can be proved. when a single fact is given. Nothing can be inferred about that which is subordinate to C. is made clear by this consideration. true however only in respect to the fact. B must be true: otherwise it will turn out that the same thing both is and is not at the same time. that something should necessarily result. but whatever is subordinate to the middle term may be inferred. not to the reason. because A is laid down as a single term. it is necessary that A should not be when B is not. and that B belongs to all that to which C belongs. consequently it does not result through the syllogism that B does not belong to E. but a true conclusion may be drawn from false premisses. if A belongs to all B and B to some C. it is necessary that A should belong to all that to which C belongs. or to be false.g. the other false. only not through the syllogism. First then that it is not possible to draw a false conclusion from true premisses. Let it not. From true premisses it is not possible to draw a false conclusion.proved through the syllogism that B belongs to no C. be supposed that it is possible. something can be inferred about that which is subordinate to B. But in particular syllogisms there will be no necessity of inferring what is subordinate to the conclusion (for a syllogism does not result when this premiss is particular). For that is not possible. but not through the preceding syllogism. e. and the means by which this comes about are at the least three terms. it has been assumed without proof that B does not belong to A.

viz. e. a true conclusion will be possible. 125 . If then the premiss BC which I take is true. animal to every swan and to some white thing. e. being two premisses taken together. neither let B belong to C. For it is possible that neither A nor B should belong to any C. but animal belongs to every man. and B to all C. if the same terms are taken and man is put as middle: for neither animal nor man belongs to any stone. provided that this is not either of the premisses indifferently. If then A is taken to belong to all B and B to all C. (1) Let A belong to the whole of C. though both the premisses are false the conclusion will be true. A will belong to all C. e. For if A belongs to all C and to some B. and B to all C. Consequently if one term is taken to belong to none of that to which it does belong. the wholly false premiss AB is also assumed. nor stone to any man. whether both the premisses are false or only one. but to none of the Bs. (4) But if the premiss is not wholly false. when the first premiss is wholly false. and B to all C. Similarly with the negative. So A is posited as one thing. AB. I mean by ‘wholly false’ the contrary of the truth. viz. It is clear then that when the first premiss is wholly false. and the premiss AB is wholly false. animal belongs to no stone. (2) A similar proof may be given if each premiss is partially false.g.and not belong at the same time. although A belongs to all B. if what belongs to none is assumed to belong to all. whether affirmative or negative. and white to every swan. a true conclusion is possible. The same holds good of negative syllogisms: it is not possible to prove a false conclusion from true premisses. since A belongs to everything to which B belongs.g. it is impossible that the conclusion should be true: for A belonged to none of the Cs. but while the true premiss BC is assumed. the conclusion will not be true. For A will belong to all C. Let A belong to no B. that A belongs to nothing to which B belongs: here the conclusion must be false. and the other premiss is true. since A belonged to nothing to which B belonged. But from what is false a true conclusion may be drawn.g. but if the premiss BC is wholly false. it does not matter which of the two is false. (3) But if one only of the premisses is false. that A belongs to all B. e.g. e. consequently though both the premisses are false the conclusion is true: for every man is an animal. the conclusion cannot be true. and the other term is taken to belong to all of that to which it does not belong. and B belonged to all C. This is possible. Similarly there cannot be a true conclusion if A belongs to all B. if it is taken as wholly false: but if the premiss is not taken as wholly false.g. or if what belongs to all is assumed to belong to none. and if B belongs to all C.

(7) For nothing prevents A belonging to no B. and white to all snow. even so the conclusion may be true. For it is possible that A should belong neither to any B nor to any C.g.g. e. Similarly if the statement AB is negative. If then it is assumed that A belongs to no B. and man to some footed things though not to all. but to no snow. nor does music belong to the art of healing. a genus to species of another genus: for animal belongs neither to music nor to the art of healing. and B to all C. and B to some C. A will belong to all C truly: for every swan is an animal. If then one should assume that A belongs to no B. and that B should not belong to any C. For it is possible that A should neither belong to any B nor to any C.then if we take as premisses that A belongs to all B. and B to all C. that the conclusion should be true. If then it is assumed that A belongs to all B. then will belong to no C. while B belongs to some C.g. Similarly if the premiss AB is negative. A will belong to all C: and this ex hypothesi is true. and animal as first term. and B to all C.g. a genus to its species and difference: for animal belongs to every man and to every footed thing. and B to all C. e. For it is possible that A should belong to some B and to no C. though B belongs to some C. Similarly if the premiss AB is negative. animal to some white thing. also when the first premiss is false in part. If then snow is taken as middle.g. In particular syllogisms it is possible when the first premiss is wholly false. and B to all C. the conclusion will be true. If then it is assumed that A belongs to all B and B to all C. then the 126 . and when the first is true. e. and B to some C. If then it should be assumed that A belongs to no B. the conclusion will be true. animal belongs to no snow. a true syllogism will be possible: for nothing prevents A belonging to all B and to all C. For nothing prevents A belonging to the whole of B and of C. a genus to the species of another genus and its difference: for animal neither belongs to any wisdom nor to any instance of ‘speculative’. (5) But if the premiss AB. but horse to no man. but to some white thing. e. though B belongs to no C. and the premiss BC is wholly false. e. is wholly true.g. although the premiss BC is wholly false. (6) And if the premiss BC is not wholly false but in part only. but to some C. and it is assumed that A belongs to the whole of B. and the other true. and the other true. will belong to no C: and this ex hypothesi is true. and snow to some white thing. but wisdom belongs to some instance of ‘speculative’. and that B should belong to all C. these being species of the same genus which are not subordinate one to the other: for animal belongs both to horse and to man. which is assumed. e. and the particular is false. and when both are false.

and number belongs to nothing white. but does not follow some white. and B to some C. Similarly if the premiss AB is negative: for it is possible that A should belong to the whole of B. and B belonging to some C. although the statement BC is false. animal to something beautiful and to something great. the conclusion may be true. e. Similarly if the premiss AB is negative. For nothing prevents A belonging both to B and to some C. e. If then number is taken as middle. while B belongs to no C.g. and the premiss BC is false. animal belongs to every man. but not to some C. the a premiss AB will be partially false. and the conclusion true. the conclusion may be true. but white belongs to no black thing. Consequently if it should be assumed that A belongs to all B.g. but man belongs to some white. the premiss BC true. and 127 . which ex hypothesi is true. though B belongs to no C. and B to some C. and it is assumed that A belongs to no B. to prove the point. and beautiful belonging to something great. and in the same positions. If then A is assumed to belong to all B. if B is the contrary of C. e. and not to some C.premiss BC is wholly false. the conclusion will be true although the premiss AB is wholly false. Similarly if the premiss AB is negative: for the same terms arranged in the same way will serve for the proof. (11) Also though both premisses are false the conclusion may be true. For it is possible that A may belong to no B and to some C. If then it is assumed that A belongs to all B. then A will not belong to some C. and B to some C. the conclusion may be true. and both are accidents of the same genus: for animal belongs to some white things and to some black things. e. animal to every swan and to some black things. (If the premiss AB is false in part. (9) Again if the premiss AB is true. the conclusion will be true. although B belongs to some C. Similarly if the premiss AB is negative. and the conclusion true.g.g. the conclusion will be true. For it is possible that A should belong to no B. e. while B belongs to no C. while B belongs to no C. the premiss BC will be true.g. (10) Also if the premiss AB is partially false. e. For nothing prevents A belonging to some B and to some C. For the same terms will serve. For nothing prevents A belonging to the whole of B and to some C.g. though swan belongs to no black thing. a genus to the species of another genus and to the accident of its own species: for animal belongs to no number and not to some white things. and the premiss BC is false too. the premiss BC false. and B to some C. consequently if man be taken as middle term and it is assumed that A belongs to no B but B belongs to some C. And the premiss AB is true. a genus in relation to the species of another genus.

though B belongs to no C. when each is partially false. For it is possible that A should belong to some B and to all C. the other wholly false (it does not matter which of the two premisses is false). e. Also if the affirmative premiss is partially false. whether the syllogisms are universal or particular. the conclusion will be true. and the conclusion will be true whichever term the negative statement concerns. and B to some C.to the accident of its own species: for animal belongs to no number. and none of the other. the one premiss will be wholly false. If then it is assumed that A belongs to no B. and number to nothing white. e. if one is wholly false. Similarly if A belongs to all B and to no C: for we shall have the same syllogism. (2) Again if one premiss is wholly false. the premiss AB is partially false. and swan belongs to nothing black. when both premisses are wholly false.g. The conclusion then is true. the negative wholly true. the other partially true. but to the whole of C. viz. animal to no stone and to every horse. then A does not belong to some C. For nothing prevents A belonging to the whole of B. e. the premiss AC wholly true.g. a genus to its co-ordinate species. the other wholly true: for nothing prevents A belonging to all B and to all C. Consequently if it is assumed that A belongs to no B. the other partially false. though the premisses are wholly false they will yield a true conclusion. though white belongs to no raven. For animal belongs to every horse and man. though both premisses are false. and not to some black things. Similarly if the negative statement is transposed: the proof can be made by means of the same terms. For nothing prevents A belonging to some B. (3) Also if one premiss is partially false. For (1) if A belongs to no B and to all C. e. the other wholly true. and no man is a horse.g. but to some white things. If then it is assumed that A belongs to all B and B to some C. though B belongs to no C. if one is quite true. if both premisses are partially false. 3 In the middle figure it is possible in every way to reach a true conclusion through false premisses. the other wholly true. but 128 . when one is true. If then it is assumed that animal belongs to all of the one. a true conclusion is possible.g. Similarly also if the premiss AB is negative. and the conclusion true. but the premisses arc false. animal belongs to every swan. and not to some C. while B belongs to no C. animal to some white things and to every raven. then if the premisses are stated contrariwise and it is assumed that A belongs to all B and to no C.

For nothing prevents A following neither B nor C at all. and number does not follow some lifeless things. Similarly. though B does not follow some C. but to no pitch. though white belongs to nothing black. though man will not belong to some white things. the universal premiss is wholly false. For if it is assumed that A 129 . the premiss AC is true. e. but the conclusion is true. For it is possible that A should belong to some B and to some C. and the conclusion true. but to no C. For (5) nothing prevents A belonging to all B and to some C. e. the universal premiss is true.g. but man does not follow every footed thing. but the particular false. Consequently if it is assumed that A belongs to the whole of B. but does not belong to some C. the conclusion may be true. the particular premiss is true. though B does not belong to some C. the premiss AB is partially false. the premiss AC is wholly true. For it is possible that should A belong both to B and to C as wholes.g. a genus in relation to its species and difference: for animal follows every man and footed things as a whole. while B does not belong to some C. (4) And if both the premisses are partially false. e. and white belongs to no pitch. both premisses are partially false. while B belongs to no C. the particular false. and lifeless will not belong to some white things. If then it is stated that A belongs to all B and not to some C. If then it is stated that A belongs to no B and to some C. though B does not belong to some C. It is clear also that our thesis holds in particular syllogisms. since it is possible that A should belong both to B and to C as wholes. if the negative premiss is transposed. If then it is stated that A belongs to no B and to some C. and the particular is false.not to C as a whole. animal to every man and to some white things. and the universal premiss true. though B does not follow some C. If then it is assumed that A belongs to all B and to no C. animal to some white things and to some black things. and not to some C. animal belongs to no number nor to anything lifeless. Similarly if the premiss AB is affirmative: for it is possible that A should belong to no B. e. e. Also a true conclusion is possible when the universal premiss is true. e. (6) It is clear too that though both premisses are false they may yield a true conclusion. Consequently if it is assumed that A belongs to the whole of B. the conclusion will be true. the proof can be made by means of the same terms. and does not belong to some white things. and the conclusion is true.g. and the conclusion is true. Similarly if the premiss which is stated universally is affirmative. animal belongs to some white things. and B to no C.g. and the conclusion is true.g. animal belongs to nothing lifeless. the premiss AB which is universal is wholly false.g.

For nothing prevents A from not belonging. e. neither man nor footed follows anything lifeless. Consequently if it is assumed that B belongs to all C. though the premisses are false. though A does not belong to some B. the other affirmative. the conclusion may be true. though animal does not belong to everything white. (3) Similarly if one of the premisses assumed is wholly false.g. For it is possible that A should follow no B and all C. alike when both premisses are wholly false. (2) Also if each premiss is partly false. the other wholly true. white and beautiful belong to some animals. If then it is assumed that A and B belong to all C. Similarly if one premiss is negative.belongs to no B and to some C. but the conclusion is true. For (1) nothing prevents neither A nor B from belonging to any C. and B to all C. black belongs to no swan. though man belongs to some footed things. when one premiss is wholly true.g. to some C. though science does not follow every man. Similarly if the universal premiss is affirmative and the particular negative.g. but the conclusion true. both premisses are partly false. while A belongs to some B. the premisses will be wholly false. If then it is stated that A and B belong to all C. and vice versa. while A does not belong to all B. when each is partly false. and B from belonging. but the conclusion is true.g. though B does not belong to some C. Similarly if the premiss AC is stated as negative. For it is possible that B should belong to no C. beautiful belongs to some animals. Consequently if it is assumed that A belongs to no C. white does not belong to some animals. e. the premisses are partially false. e. but the conclusion is true. Taking these 130 . the premisses are both false. animal to every swan.g. the other false. animal and white follow every swan. the other wholly true. 4 In the last figure a true conclusion may come through what is false. but A to all C. and white to some beautiful things. For it is possible that both A and B should follow all C. and animal not to everything black. and in every other way in which it is possible to alter the premisses. e. and white does not belong to everything beautiful. when one premiss is partly false. e. For nothing prevents both A and B from belonging to some C while A belongs to some B. the premisses are false but the conclusion is true. e. and that should not belong to some B. A will not belong to some B: and the conclusion is true. and A to no C.g. animal follows no science but every man. If then A is assumed to belong to the whole of B. and not to follow some C.

the other partly false.g. the premiss BC is wholly true. when they are so. e. and A from not belonging to C at all. negative terms in negative. and beautiful to some bipeds. it is possible that the conclusion should be true. the statement AC true. it is possible that A should not belong to some C. (4) Again if one premiss is wholly true. the conclusion may be true. For it makes no difference to the setting out of the terms. either all or some of them. Also the conclusion may be true if one premiss is negative. Consequently if it is assumed that A and B belong to every C. For if it is assumed that A belongs to no C. the premiss BC is wholly true. while A belongs to some B. and the conclusion true. if the same terms as before are transposed. Again since it has been proved that if A belongs to no C and B to some C. It is clear then that if the conclusion is false. if one assumes that B belongs to the whole of C. the conclusion may be true. (5) It is clear also in the case of particular syllogisms that a true conclusion may come through what is false.g. Similarly if of the premisses assumed AC is true and BC partly false. animal belongs to every swan. and A to no C. For nothing prevents B from following all C. though A belongs to some B. Similarly if the statement BC is false. For the same terms must be taken as have been taken when the premisses are universal. it is clear that if the premiss AC is wholly true. the premiss BC will be wholly true. in every possible way. biped belongs to every man. and the premiss BC partly false. black to no swan. the premiss AC is wholly true. and the conclusion is true. the premiss AC wholly false. the premiss AC is wholly false. If then it is assumed that both A and B belong to the whole of C. but when the conclusion 131 . positive terms in positive syllogisms. For it is possible that B should belong to all C. and the conclusion is true.then as terms. that A should not belong to all B. For since it is possible that B should belong to the whole of C. the other premiss wholly true. the other affirmative. Also if both the premisses assumed are affirmative. the premisses of the argument must be false. and the premiss BC is partly false. Similarly if the premiss AC which is assumed is true: the proof can be made through the same terms. a true conclusion is possible: this can be proved. and black to some animals. beautiful not to every man. the conclusion true. e. The same terms will serve for the proof. the premiss AC partly false. but A does not belong to C at all. whether one assumes that what belongs to none belongs to all or that what belongs to some belongs to all. The same applies to negative statements. therefore it is assumed that B belongs to the whole of C. the negative premiss is partly false. and. and A to some C. and B to all C. and A to some C. the conclusion may be true.

the proof is not circular: for neither of the propositions assumed is the same as before: if one of the accepted terms is taken as middle. the other necessarily is. it results that if B is not great. and it has been proved through B. A. is white it is necessary that that. since one of two things is. viz. If then B is not great A cannot be white.is true. viz. by converting one of the premisses simply and inferring the premiss which was assumed in the original syllogism: e. But if. yet it is possible. A will necessarily not be white. A) should not be. then it is necessary if is white that C should not be white. one of the premisses from which the syllogism results must be undemonstrated: for it is not possible to demonstrate through these terms 132 . only one of the premisses of the first syllogism can be assumed in the second: for if both of them are taken the same conclusion as before will result: but it must be different. and A is assumed to belong to C. it is great. it is necessary. then if the latter is not. that if the one is. and since B is great that C should not be white. it is necessary that B should be great. when A is not white. B. that it is impossible that B should necessarily be great since A is white and that B should necessarily be great since A is not white. I mean. the former will not be either. For whenever since this. If then when this is not white B must be great. The reason is that when two things are so related to one another. 5 Circular and reciprocal proof means proof by means of the conclusion. should be great. suppose that A should now be proved to belong to B by assuming that A belongs to C. B itself is great. i. that B belongs to C. it is not necessary that the premisses should be true. (But this is impossible. if the latter is not. that A belongs to B. that the other should be. that the former (viz. In no other way is reciprocal proof possible. If another term is taken as middle. for example. but if the latter is.e. and B to belong to A but the converse was assumed in the earlier syllogism. but it is not necessitated. either one or all. Or suppose it is necessary to prove that B belongs to C.g. that the conclusion may none the less be true. and C to B-so A belongs to B: but in the first syllogism the converse was assumed. which was the conclusion of the first syllogism.) For if B is not great. though no part of the syllogism is true. If the terms are not convertible. But it is impossible that the same thing should be necessitated by the being and by the not-being of the same thing. it is not necessary that the former should be. suppose it has been necessary to prove that A belongs to all C. And whenever it is necessary. just as if it were proved through three terms. it necessarily results that if B is not great.

In both these syllogisms the premiss CA has been assumed without being demonstrated: the other premisses had ex hypothesi been proved. But it is necessary to prove both the premiss CB. Let A belong to none of the Cs (which was the previous conclusion) and assume that B belongs to all of that to none of which A belongs. we shall have a syllogism relating B to A. If again it is necessary to prove that A belongs to none of the Bs (which was previously assumed) A must belong to no C. to assume the conclusion and the converse of one of the premisses. In particular syllogisms it is not possible to demonstrate the universal premiss through the other propositions. But we must assume that B belongs to all of that to none of which longs. and this is circular demonstration. C must belong to all B.g.that the third belongs to the middle or the middle to the first. and C must belong to A. and similarly the proposition BC through the conclusion and the premiss AB converted. Consequently if we succeed in demonstrating this premiss. and the premiss BA: for we have used these alone without demonstrating them. and B to all A. If then it is assumed that C belongs to all B. In negative syllogisms reciprocal proof is as follows. the matter stands as we said above). e. and A to none of the Bs: we conclude that A belongs to none of the Cs. If it is necessary to prove that B belongs to C. Suppose the proposition AC has been demonstrated through B as middle term. and B of by assuming that C is said of and C is proved of A through these premisses. it is possible to demonstrate everything reciprocally. If then it is assumed that B belongs to all C. If the terms are convertible. Again if it is assumed that C belongs to all A. both the premisses assumed have been proved. It is clear then that only if the terms are convertible is circular and reciprocal demonstration possible (if the terms are not convertible. Let B belong to all C. and C to all A. Consequently each of the three propositions has been made a conclusion. the proposition AB must no longer be converted as before: for the premiss ‘B belongs to no A’ is identical with the premiss ‘A belongs to no B’. and C to all B: thus the previous premiss is reversed. but the particular premiss can be demonstrated. and again the proposition AB through the conclusion and the premiss BC converted. and A to all B. if A and B and C are convertible with one another. But it turns out in these also that we use for the demonstration the very thing that is being proved: for C is proved of B. so that we use the conclusion for the demonstration. Clearly it is impossible to demonstrate the universal premiss: for what is universal is proved through propositions which are 133 . and deduce the remaining premiss. all the premisses will have been proved reciprocally. It is necessary then that B should belong to all C.

but if another premiss is assumed in addition. A will not belong to some C. and the other affirmative. but the particular premiss can be proved whenever the universal statement is affirmative. a syllogism will be possible. 134 . 6 In the second figure it is not possible to prove an affirmative proposition in this way.e ‘B belongs to some of that to some of which A does not belong’: otherwise no syllogism results because the particular premiss is negative. Through the conclusion. consequently B belongs to no A: neither then does A belong to B. we shall have the first figure. For C belongs to all A and B to no C. therefore. if it is assumed that A belongs to some of that to some of which B does not belong. if the proposition AB is converted as in the universal syllogism. the premiss AC will not be demonstrated by the conversion of AB: for it turns out that either both or one of the premisses is negative. But if the syllogism not universal. we get no syllogism. If then it is assumed that B belongs to all A and the conclusion is retained. Let A belong to all B. but the conclusion is not universal. but not to all C. Suppose that A has been proved of some C through B. But the particular premiss may be proved. But the proof will proceed as in the universal syllogisms. i. B being middle. If then it is assumed that B belongs to all A. But if the universal premiss is negative. If then it is assumed that B belongs to all A. and one premiss. consequently a syllogism will not be possible. But if the premiss AB was negative. B will belong to some C: for we obtain the first figure and A is middle. An affirmative proposition is not proved because both premisses of the new syllogism are not affirmative (for the conclusion is negative) but an affirmative proposition is (as we saw) proved from premisses which are both affirmative.universal. for the same reason as we gave above. The negative is proved as follows. Further a syllogism cannot be made at all if the other premiss is converted: for the result is that both premisses are particular. but a negative proposition may be proved. and not to all C: the conclusion is BC. it is not possible to prove the universal premiss. Let A belong to all B. But if the syllogism is negative. But it is possible to prove the particular premiss. it is necessary that A should belong to no C: for we get the second figure. and the proof must start from the conclusion and the other premiss. the universal premiss cannot be proved. and to no C: we conclude that B belongs to no C. for the reason given above. with B as middle.

and that to this: but we must assume besides that if this belongs to some of that. But if this is assumed the syllogism no longer results from the conclusion and the other premiss. When both the premisses assumed are affirmative. Let A belong to all C and B to some C: the conclusion is the statement AB. but that B belongs to some C has not been proved. if the conclusion is negative through the last. And whenever one premiss is affirmative the other negative. e. it will be possible to prove the proposition AC. when the syllogism is universal. it is necessary that C should belong to some of the Bs.7 In the third figure. and B to some C: the conclusion is that A does not belong to some B. In no other way is it possible by converting the universal premiss to prove the other: for in no other way can a syllogism be formed. but the conclusion in this figure is always particular. If then it is assumed that C belongs to some of that to some of which does not belong. it is not possible to prove them reciprocally: for that which is universal is proved through statements which are universal. when both premisses are taken universally. But when the negative premiss is universal. and A not to some C: the conclusion is that A does not belong to some B. but when it concerns the other extreme. For it is assumed that that belongs to all of that to none of which this belongs. if A belongs to no C. proof is 135 . It is clear then that in the first figure reciprocal proof is made both through the third and through the first figure-if the conclusion is affirmative through the first. and the universal concerns the minor extreme. and A to some B. proof of the latter will sometimes be possible. impossible. sometimes not. And yet it is necessary. the other premiss can be proved.g. But it is not the same that this should belong to that. Let B belong to all C. when it is assumed that C belongs to all B. it is necessary that A should belong to some C. proof will be possible. But if B belongs to all C. if it is assumed that that belongs to some of that. viz. B being middle. if C belongs to some B. If then it is assumed further that C belongs to all B. But if one premiss is universal. that belongs to some of this. to some of which this does not belong. so that it is clear that it is not possible at all to prove through this figure the universal premiss. the other particular. If then it is assumed that C belongs to all A. and A to some C. the other premiss is not except as before. and the affirmative is universal. B being middle. it has been proved that C belongs to some B. In the middle figure. For if C belongs to all B and A to some B. that B should belong to some C. it is necessary that A should not belong to some C.

136 . And if A belongs not to all C. Similarly if the syllogism is negative. Similarly if the syllogism is negative. but to all B. A will belong. and B to all C. and of ‘to some’ to ‘to none’. And if A belongs to no C. Then if it is assumed that A belongs to all C. if the conclusion has been changed into its opposite and one of the premisses stands. If then it should be assumed that A belongs to no C. that the other premiss should be destroyed. Let the syllogism be affirmative. And if A and B belong to all C. B will belong not to all C. If the conclusion is converted into its contradictory. by contrary opposition I mean the opposition of ‘to all’ to ‘to none’. but to all B. For if it should stand. For if A belongs to some C. and let it be converted as stated. In a word it is not possible to refute universally by conversion the premiss which concerns the major extreme: for the refutation always proceeds through the third since it is necessary to take both premisses in reference to the minor extreme. so that the conclusion also will be particular. For one premiss is particular. Suppose that A been proved of C. the syllogisms will be contradictory and not universal. It makes a difference whether the conclusion is converted into its contradictory or into its contrary. For it is necessary. A will belong to some B: but in the original premiss it belonged to no B. the conclusion also must stand. and of ‘to some’ to ‘not to some’. This will be made clear by the sequel. through B as middle term. For the same syllogism does not result whichever form the conversion takes. It is clear also that in the third figure and in the middle figure those syllogisms which are not made through those figures themselves either are not of the nature of circular proof or are imperfect. but when particular through the second and the last. but not to all B. By contradictory opposition I mean the opposition of ‘to all’ to ‘not to all’. and to no B. B will belong to none of the Cs.possible through the second figure and through the first. not to no C at all. 8 To convert a syllogism means to alter the conclusion and make another syllogism to prove that either the extreme cannot belong to the middle or the middle to the last term. In the third figure all proofs are made through itself. but B belongs to all C. For (as we saw) the universal is not proved through the last figure. and to no B. A will belong not to all B. Suppose it has been proved that A belongs to no C through B. B will belong. B will belong to no C. Then if A belongs not to all C. not to no B at all.

A will not belong to some B: and if A belongs to no C. and A to no C. but when it is converted into its contrary. and A to all B. neither. But neither can be refuted if the conclusion is converted into its contrary. and should not belong to some C. Again if B belongs to some C. if the conclusion of the first syllogism is converted into its contrary. A will belong to some B. AC by its contradictory. and B to all C. The proof is the same as before. If then it is assumed that A belongs to no C. and the proposition AB stands. as was originally assumed. But the original premiss is not yet refuted: for it is possible that B should belong to some C. Similarly if the syllogism is negative: for if it should be assumed that A belongs to all C. neither of the premisses is universal. If B belongs to all C. then A belongs not to all B: the figure is the last. the contradictory. For if A does not belong to some C. For if B belongs to some C. If then it is assumed that B belongs to all C. the premiss AB will be refuted as before. For the conclusion of the refutation will always be in the third figure. Suppose that A has been proved of some C. But if the conclusion BC is converted into its contradictory. Let A belong to all B and to no C: conclusion BC. both premisses are refuted: but if the assumption is that A belongs to some C. as in the universal syllogisms. refutation in which the conclusion reached by O. And if A belongs to some C. Thus both premisses are refuted. since the first figure is produced. B will belong to no C.but-not to some C. A will belong to all C. but no refutation at all. the premiss. and in this figure (as we saw) there is no universal syllogism. whichever form the conversion of the conclusion may take. The other premiss can be refuted in a manner similar to the conversion: I mean. neither premiss is refuted. but to all B. but to all B. For the result is no longer. and B to some C. the conclusion of the refutation will be the contrary of the minor premiss of the first. both premisses may be refuted. 9 In the second figure it is not possible to refute the premiss which concerns the major extreme by establishing something contrary to it. if into its contradictory. so that the syllogism results in the contradictory of the minor 137 . then A will not belong to some B. and A to no C. The universal premiss AB cannot be affected by a syllogism at all: for if A does not belong to some of the Cs. In particular syllogisms when the conclusion is converted into its contradictory. conversion lacks universality. but B belongs to some of the Cs. then B will not belong to some C. A will belong to some C.

neither of the premisses can be refuted in any of the syllogisms. B belongs to no C.premiss. both premisses can be refuted. Suppose it has been proved that A belongs to some B. and B to some C. and to some C: the conclusion is BC. The same proof can be given if the universal statement is affirmative. But if the conclusion is converted into its contradictory. A will not belong to some C: if A belongs to no B. and to all C. BC being affirmative. as also happened in the first figure. B will belong to no C. Nor if A does not belong to some B. Suppose that A belongs to no B. C being taken as middle. A will belong to some B. but B belongs to all C. both premisses may be refuted and in all the moods. For either both premisses arrived at by the conversion must be particular. For if A belongs to no B. both the premisses can be refuted. A similar proof can be given if the premisses are not universal. or the universal premiss must refer to the minor extreme. Similarly if the original syllogism is negative. But we found that no syllogism is possible thus either in the first or in the middle figure. AC 138 . Consequently the proposition AB is not refuted. then A belongs to no C: again if A belongs to no B. and B to all C. but belongs to all C. and to C. Again if B belongs to all C and A to some C. both premisses can be refuted. and A to no B. If the syllogism is particular. will a syllogism be possible about B and C. If then it is assumed that A does not belong to some B. when the conclusion is converted into its contrary neither premiss can be refuted. Suppose it has been proved that A does not belong to some B. But the original statement has not been refuted: for it is possible that A should belong to some C and also not to some C.’ if the conclusion is converted into its contradictory. no syllogism is formed about A and C. and the statement AB stands. and the premisses being universal. If then it is assumed that B belongs to some C. But if the conclusion is converted into its contradictory. no syllogism will be possible: for neither of the premisses taken is universal. Again if B belongs to some C and A to some C. the conclusion will be that A does not belong to some C. A will belong to no C: but it was assumed to belong to some C. And similarly if one of the premisses is not universal. For if B belongs to all C. but when the conclusion is converted into its contradictory. A similar proof can be given if the premisses are transposed in respect of their quality. 10 In the third figure when the conclusion is converted into its contrary. For if A belongs to no B.

But when the contradictory of the conclusion is assumed. no syllogism is possible (as we saw) about A and C. the premiss which concerns the major through the last figure. a syllogism could be made. A similar proof is possible if the premisses are not universal.being negative: for it was thus that. if A belongs to some B. In the second figure syllogisms proceed through the first and the last figures. A belongs to all C: but A was supposed originally to belong to no C. it can be made in all the figures. and to no C. Whenever then the contrary of the conclusion is assumed a syllogism will not be possible. then B belongs to no C: but it was assumed to belong to some C. Again if A belongs to all B. Nor. no syllogism results: nor yet if A belongs to some B. and to no C. If A belongs to some B and B to some C. it results that A belongs to some C: but it was supposed to belong to no C. It is clear that in the first figure the syllogisms are formed through the middle and the last figures. the premiss which concerns the major is always refuted through the first figure. the premiss which concerns the minor through the middle figure. and B to some C. For if A belongs to some B. In the third figure the refutation proceeds through the first and the middle figures. how it is effected in each figure. is obtained. and what syllogism results. 11 It is clear then what conversion is. Thus in one way the premisses are refuted. For if A belongs to all B. and to no C. and the premiss which concerns the minor extreme is alway refuted through the middle figure. and when a result contradictory to the premiss. differing only in this: conversion takes place after a syllogism has been formed and both the premisses have been taken. but a reduction to the 139 . For AC becomes universal and negative. in the other way they are not. then B belongs to no C: but it was supposed to belong to all C. the other premiss particular and affirmative. when a result contrary to the premiss. and the premiss which concerns the minor extreme is always refuted through the first figure. was a syllogism possible concerning B and C. and B to C. as we saw. For it resembles conversion. Again if A belongs to all B. Therefore the premisses are not refuted. If then A belongs to all B. they are refuted. From what has been said it is clear how a syllogism results in each figure when the conclusion is converted. the premiss which concerns the major extreme through the last. and to no C. The syllogism per impossibile is proved when the contradictory of the conclusion stated and another premiss is assumed. and B to all C.

Consequently it is clear that the universal affirmative cannot be proved in the first figure per impossibile. but to all C (which was admitted to be true). thus we get the first figure. But the universal affirmative is not necessarily true if the universal negative is false. The terms are alike in both. but not in the first. e. and let it have been assumed that B belongs to all or to some C. and the premisses of both are taken in the same way. that C belongs to all A. or that B belongs to all D. Suppose that A belongs to no B. nor does it do so when it is supposed that A does not belong to all B. it is necessary that A should belong to some B. but if it is supposed that A belongs to no B. that A does not belong to some B. If then it is supposed that A does not belong to all B. and let it have been assumed that C belongs to all A. Let this be impossible: it is false then A belongs to no B. Similarly in the other figures: for whatever moods admit of conversion admit also of the reduction per impossibile. But if the premiss CA is assumed as well. viz. All the problems can be proved per impossibile in all the figures. it follows that C belongs to no B or not to all B. A belongs to no D. Clearly then we must suppose the contradictory. But this is impossible (for let it be true and clear that A belongs to all C): consequently if this is false. or to no B. For if A belongs to no B. but not the problem proposed. But this is impossible: consequently the supposition is false: its contradictory then is true. But let this be impossible. It is necessary then that C should belong to some B. C being middle. no syllogism will be possible. But if the premiss assumed 140 . excepting the universal affirmative. We may proceed in the same way if the proposition CA has been taken as negative.g. Nor can a conclusion be drawn when the contrary of the conclusion is supposed. Then it is necessary that A should belong to no C or not to all C.impossible takes place not because the contradictory has been agreed to already. which is proved in the middle and third figures. no syllogism results whichever term the assumed premiss concerns. For example if A belongs to all B. no syllogism results. Again suppose that A belongs to some B. and B belongs to all D. but because it is clear that it is true. and take besides another premiss concerning either of the terms. But if the other premiss assumed relates to A. Suppose that A belongs not to all B. But the particular affirmative and the universal and particular negatives can all be proved. so that the supposition is false: in that case it is true that A belongs to no B. when the premiss BD is assumed as well we shall prove syllogistically what is false. then if it is supposed that A does not belong to all B or belongs to no B.

then if it is proved that the negation does not hold. Suppose that A belongs to all B. then C will belong to some B. but the hypothesis is not refuted. but that it belongs to all B. for the original conclusion was that A belongs to some B. we shall have a syllogism and an impossible conclusion. If the hypothesis is that A belongs not to all but to some B. It is clear then that not the contrary but the contradictory ought to be supposed in all the syllogisms. no syllogism will be possible. To prove that A does not belong to all B. For if of everything one or other of two contradictory statements holds good. and does not belong to some B. but the problem in hand is not proved. consequently it is true that A belongs to no B. It is necessary then that C should belong to all B. we must suppose that it belongs to all B: for if A belongs to all B. and let it have been assumed that C belongs to all A. if it does not belong to all B. and C to all A. If then this is impossible. the demonstration of both will be identical. Similarly if the other premiss assumed concerns B. nor is it generally accepted that if the one is false the other is true. But this is impossible. But if the negative proposition concerns B. Further the impossible does not result from the hypothesis: for then the hypothesis would be false. But we have not yet shown it to be necessary that A belongs to no B. the claim that the negation is true will be generally accepted.concerns B. so that if this is impossible. Similarly if the other premiss taken concerns B. it is false that A belongs to some B. we shall have a syllogism and a conclusion which is impossible. since it is impossible to draw a false conclusion from true premisses: but in fact it is true: for A belongs to some B. But in neither way does it suit to maintain the contrary: for it is not necessary that if the universal negative is false. nothing is proved. If the contrary is supposed. The same results if the original proposition CA was negative: for thus also we get a syllogism. Similarly if we should be proving that A does not belong to some B: for if ‘not to belong to some’ and ‘to belong not to all’ have the same meaning. Consequently we must not suppose that A belongs to some B. For thus we shall have necessity of inference. But if this is proved. but that it belongs to no B. the universal affirmative should be true. Therefore it is the contradictory that we must suppose. and C to all A. the hypothesis is false. and the claim we make is one that will be generally accepted. For if A belongs to some B. Again if it is not admitted that the affirmation is true. the truth is refuted as well. the affirmation must be true. it is not proved that A belongs not to all B. then C belongs to all B. so that it is false that A belongs to all B. 141 .

so that it is false that A belongs to no B. C will not belong to all B. For if A belongs to no B. But if it is supposed that A belongs to no B. But this is impossible: so that it is true that A does not belong to all B. suppose it does belong to all B. But in the middle and the last figures this also is proved. and C to some B. 142 . and to all C. It is clear then that all the syllogisms can be formed in the middle figure. suppose that A belongs to no B. When A belongs to some B. we shall have a syllogism and a result which is impossible: but the problem in hand is not proved. But to prove that A belongs to some B. Again suppose that A belongs to some B. But though this is false. and let A belong to no C. it is true that A belongs to some B. If A belongs to no B.12 It is clear then that in the first figure all problems except the universal affirmative are proved per impossibile. If then this is false. it does not follow that it is true that A belongs to all B. 13 Similarly they can all be formed in the last figure. This is impossible. and let it have been assumed that A belongs to all C. If then A belongs not to all B. we shall have a syllogism and a conclusion which is impossible: but the problem in hand is not proved: for if the contrary is supposed. A will belong not to all C. But this is impossible (for suppose it to be clear that C belongs to all B): consequently the hypothesis is false. consequently the hypothesis is false: A then will belong to no B. this hypothesis must be made. But originally it belonged to all B. But if the contrary is supposed. But if it is supposed that A does not belong to some B. we shall have the same results as in the first figure. Suppose that A does not belong to all B. Suppose that A does not belong to some B. It is necessary then that C should belong to no B. if this is impossible. it is false that A does not belong to some B. C will belong to no B. and to no C. It is necessary then that C should belong to no B. so that it is true that A belongs to all B. If then this is impossible. When A does not belong to an B. It is necessary then that C should not belong to some B. Consequently. but to all C. but C belongs to all B: then A does not belong to some C. we shall have the same results as before. A must belong to some B. It is true then that A belongs to all B. and let A belong to all C.

suppose A belongs to some B. through the same terms. Whenever the syllogism is formed in the last figure. are proved in a way. the problem is not proved. take two premisses that are admitted.When A belongs to no B. along with the contradictory of the original conclusion. but the latter takes the premisses from which the syllogism starts. the truth will be found in the first. For if A belongs to all B and C to some B. the truth will be found in the middle or the last figure. if affirmative in first. Suppose that A has been proved to belong to no B. so it is false that A belongs to all B. It is clear then that in all the syllogisms which proceed per impossibile the contradictory must be assumed. if negative in the middle. And it is plain that in the middle figure an affirmative conclusion. nor that one should suppose beforehand that it is true or not: in the other it is necessary to suppose beforehand that it is not true. But in that case it is true that A belongs not to all B. so that it is false that A belongs to some B. For thus the syllogism was made and the impossible conclusion reached. But this hypothesis must be made if we are prove that A belongs not to all B. or not to all B. But this we assumed not to be so. if negative in the middle. But ex hypothesi it belongs to no C. and in the last figure a universal conclusion. Then it is necessary that A should belong to some C. Whenever the syllogism is formed in the first figure. and let it have been assumed that C belongs to all B. the truth will be found in the first and middle figures. and the original premisses that C belongs to all A and to no B. through the first figure. Both. indeed. the method is the same in both cases. But if it is supposed that A belongs to all B. the former takes one of these. Also in the ostensive proof it is not necessary that the conclusion should be known. But this is the middle 143 . Whenever the syllogism is formed in the middle figure. and that which is proved per impossibile can be proved ostensively. then A belongs to some C. Everything which is concluded ostensively can be proved per impossibile. It makes no difference whether the conclusion is affirmative or negative. we shall have the same result as before. whatever the problem may be. If however it is assumed that A belongs to some B. Then the hypothesis must have been that A belongs to some B. if affirmative in the last. whereas ostensive proof starts from admitted positions. 14 Demonstration per impossibile differs from ostensive proof in that it posits what it wishes to refute by reduction to a statement admitted to be false.

Again suppose it has been proved that A belongs to some B. we have the last figure. If the syllogism is negative. and the original premisses are that C belongs to all A but not to all B. If the syllogism is negative. and A either to all or to some C: for in this way we shall get what is impossible. the premisses that C belongs to no A and to some B: and this is the middle figure. and A to all C. and C to all B: for thus we shall get what is impossible.figure. we may infer in the same way. and the original premisses that C belongs to no A and to all B. Then the hypothesis must have been that A belongs not to all B. so that the first figure results. For the hypothesis is that A belongs to all B. Similarly if it has been proved that A belongs to some B: for the hypothesis then must have been that A belongs to no B. and C belongs to some B: for thus we get the first figure. But if A belongs to all C. and A belongs to all C. and the original premisses that C belongs to some B. Similarly it will be possible if the syllogisms are ostensive to reduce them ad impossibile in the terms which 144 . Again suppose it has been proved in the third figure that A belongs to all B. The hypothesis here is that is that A belongs to no B. And the original premisses form the first figure. and C to all B. Then the hypothesis must have been that A belongs not to all B. we have the first figure. the hypothesis must have been that A belongs to some B. the original premisses that A belongs to no C. for thus we shall get what is impossible. It is clear then that it is possible through the same terms to prove each of the problems ostensively as well. if the premiss CA should be negative: for thus also we have the middle figure. The hypothesis will then be that A belongs to all B. Similarly if has been proved not to belong to all B. Similarly if B or A should be assumed to belong to some C. and C to some B. the hypothesis must have been that A belongs to some B. and the original premisses that C belongs to all B. Similarly too. and C to all B. and the original premisses that B belongs to all C. But if A and B belong to all C. but proof has been given that A does not belong to some B. Again suppose it has been proved in the middle figure that A belongs to all B. if C belongs to all A and to no B. The hypothesis is that A belongs to all B. Similarly if the demonstration establishes a particular proposition: the hypothesis then must have been that A belongs to no B. And it is clear from these premisses that A belongs to no B. and the original premisses that A belongs to no C. If the syllogism is not universal. and this is the middle figure. and the original premisses that A belongs to all C. Similarly if the demonstration is not universal. And it is clear from these premisses that A must belong to some B. and the original premisses that A belongs to all C.

viz. particular affirmative to universal negative. let B and C stand for science. It is clear then that every thesis can be proved in both ways. for A belongs to all B but to no C. ‘no science is good’. the one affirmative. per impossibile and ostensively. the others I call contradictories. universal affirmative to particular negative. Let A stand for good. Again. whenever the contradictory of the conclusion of the ostensive syllogism is taken as a premiss. Of the genuine opposites I call those which are universal contraries. now it concerns 145 . Similarly if after taking ‘every science is good’ one took ‘the science of medicine is not good’. and particular affirmative to particular negative: but really there are only three: for the particular affirmative is only verbally opposed to the particular negative.g. one has assumed that a particular science is supposition. C medicine. the other negative: no negative syllogism is possible because opposites affirm and deny the same predicate of the same subject. and no science is good. Verbally four kinds of opposition are possible. e.e. so that a particular science will not be a science. the universal affirmative and the universal negative. will be made clear in this way. ‘every science is good’. A belongs to all B and to no C. i. and B is science. In the first figure no syllogism whether affirmative or negative can be made out of opposed premisses: no affirmative syllogism is possible because both premisses must be affirmative. so that we obtain immediately the figures through which each problem will be solved. If then one assumes that every science is good. the affirmative statement concerned B. 15 In what figure it is possible to draw a conclusion from premisses which are opposed. but opposites are. and the middle term in the first figure is not predicated of both extremes. universal affirmative to universal negative. but one thing is denied of it. and it is affirmed of something else: but such premisses are not opposed. and in what figure this is not possible. This syllogism differs from the preceding because the relations between the terms are reversed: before. and A supposition: for after taking ‘no science is supposition’. For the syllogisms become identical with those which are obtained by means of conversion.have been taken. and it is not possible to separate one method from the other. a particular science will not be a science if A belongs to all C but to no B. so that B belongs to no C: no science then is a science. In the middle figure a syllogism can be made both oLcontradictories and of contraries.

For if some medicine is science and again no medicine is science. they are contradictory. viz. and affirmatively of the other. or universal affirmative and particular negative. if something is odd. So it is clear in how many ways and in what figures a syllogism can be made by means of premisses which are opposed. Similarly if one premiss is not universal: for the middle term is always that which is stated negatively of one extreme. We must recognize that it is possible to take opposites in the way we said. A may belong to all B and to no C. but a negative syllogism is possible whether the terms are universal or not. e.C.g. and the relations between the terms may be reversed. It is clear too that from false premisses it is possible to draw a true conclusion. if one is particular. This does not usually escape notice. Since there are three oppositions to affirmative statements. Similarly in the third figure. but it is not possible if the premisses are opposed. A for medicine. here too the relation between the terms may be reversed. For the 146 . we may have either universal affirmative and negative. it is not odd. it is proved that it is not good. though not always or in every mood. ‘all science is good’ and ‘no science is good’ or ‘some science is not good’. e. It is evident also that in fallacious reasonings nothing prevents a contradiction to the hypothesis from resulting. The premisses are contrary if the terms are taken universally. not to all of the other. but only if the terms subordinate to the middle are such that they are either identical or related as whole to part. as has been said before. In the third figure an affirmative syllogism can never be made out of opposite premisses. if a thing is good. e. If then one should assume that all medicine is science and that no medicine is science. it results that some science is not science. or to all of the one. Similarly if the premiss BA is not assumed universally. or to all C and to no B. if an animal. Otherwise it is impossible: for the premisses cannot anyhow be either contraries or contradictories.g. or to assume it in the way suggested in the Topics. But it is possible to establish one part of a contradiction through other premisses. it follows that opposite statements may be assumed as premisses in six ways. Consequently it is possible that contradictories may lead to a conclusion. for the reason given in reference to the first figure. that it is not an animal because the syllogism springs out of a contradiction and the terms presupposed are either identical or related as whole and part. or particular affirmative and universal negative. he has assumed that B belongs to all A and C to no A. Let B and C stand for science.g. so that a particular science will not be a science. For the syllogism is always contrary to the fact.

In no other way than this. and other things by means of something else (the first principles through themselves. whenever a man tries to prove what is not self-evident by means of itself. but it is evident that he is not 147 . and if one should assume that A does belong to B. This may be done by assuming what is in question at once. that every science is supposition. If then it is uncertain whether A belongs to C. if it is: in this way everything will be self-evident. But we must recognize that contraries cannot be inferred from a single syllogism in such a way that we conclude that what is not good is good. what is subordinate to them through something else).g. it is not yet clear whether he begs the original question. e. if A should be proved through B. as was said before. e. But that is impossible. is it possible that the premisses should be really contrary. and also whether A belongs to B. ‘every animal is white and not white’. So it turns out that those who reason thus merely say a particular thing is.syllogism owed its contrariety to its contradictory premisses..g. then he begs the original question. or he may argue from premisses which are less known or equally unknown. e. it is also possible to make a transition to other things which would naturally be proved through the thesis proposed. assuming. for demonstration proceeds from what is more certain and is prior. but none of it is supposition’ (which is the mode in which refutations are made). or we must argue from two syllogisms. and then assuming ‘Medicine is a science. Either we must introduce the contradiction by an additional assumption. or he may establish the antecedent by means of its consequents. and we proceed ‘man is an animal’. and B through C. Now begging the question is none of these: but since we get to know some things naturally through themselves. 16 To beg and assume the original question is a species of failure to demonstrate the problem proposed. but this happens in many ways. or anything of that sort unless a self-contradictory premiss is at once assumed. A man may not reason syllogistically at all.g. if we assume such premisses we shall get a result that contradicts our hypothesis. though it was natural that C should be proved through A: for it turns out that those who reason thus are proving A by means of itself. This is what those persons do who suppose that they are constructing parallel straight lines: for they fail to see that they are assuming facts which it is impossible to demonstrate unless the parallels exist. and demonstrate it through them.

the question may be begged in the middle and third figures in both ways. the question is not yet begged. this being as uncertain as the question whether A belongs to C. if the syllogism is affirmative. then the question is begged for the same reason as before. But if they are not convertible.demonstrating: for what is as uncertain as the question to be answered cannot be a principle of a demonstration. the original question is begged. For we have explained the meaning of begging the question. but urge that something false has been assumed in the earlier parts of the argument. 17 The objection that ‘this is not the reason why the result is false’. For one might equally well prove that A belongs to B through those terms if they are convertible. viz. only in the third and first figures. and both premisses do not beg the question indifferently (in a similar way the question may be begged in the middle figure). Similarly if he should assume that B belongs to C. If the syllogism is negative. to rebut the proposition which was being proved by the reduction. But if one were to make the conversion. In scientific demonstrations the question is begged when the terms are really related in the manner described. or the one belongs to the other. or if they are plainly convertible. not the method of demonstrating. If then begging the question is proving what is not self-evident by means of itself. If however A and B are identical either because they are convertible or because A follows B. but no demonstration is made. If however B is so related to C that they are identical. it is the fact that they are not that prevents such a demonstration. or because the same predicate belongs to subjects which are identical. because the terms in negative syllogisms are not convertible. in other words failing to prove when the failure is due to the thesis to be proved and the premiss through which it is proved being equally uncertain. the question is begged when identical predicates are denied of the same subject. either because predicates which are identical belong to the same subject. which we frequently make in argument. nor will he use the formula in 148 . ‘False cause’. For unless a man has contradicted this proposition he will not say. though. in dialectical arguments when they are according to common opinion so related. then he would be doing what we have described and effecting a reciprocal proof with three propositions. proving that which is not selfevident by means of itself. is made primarily in the case of a reductio ad impossibile.

wishing to prove that the diagonal of the square is incommensurate with the side. e. the false conclusion would not depend on the original hypothesis. but that is not possible in ostensive proofs: since if an assumption is refuted. The most obvious case of the irrelevance of an assumption to a conclusion which is false is when a syllogism drawn from middle terms to an impossible conclusion is independent of the hypothesis. it being false that F belongs to A.g. it cannot be objected that the syllogism does not depend on the assumption laid down. should try to prove Zeno’s theorem that motion is impossible. and when the original hypothesis is so related to the impossible conclusion. But the impossible conclusion ought to be connected with the original terms: in this way it will depend on the hypothesis.the case of an ostensive proof. Or again trace the connexion upwards. if it is laid down that A belongs to B. is just this: e. Further when anything is refuted ostensively by the terms ABC. e.g. the impossible conclusion must be connected with that term which is predicate in the hypothesis: for if it is impossible that A should belong to D. 149 . though the original hypothesis were eliminated. In this way too the impossible conclusion would result. This may happen whether one traces the connexion upwards or downwards. suppose that A belongs to B. If one traces the connexion upwards. the false conclusion does not result on account of the assumption. e. and it should be false that B belongs to D: for if we eliminated A and assumed all the same that B belongs to C and C to D. when one traces the connexion downwards.g. if a man. For we use the expression ‘false cause’. E to A and F to E. for here what one denies is not assumed as a premiss. when the syllogism is concluded in spite of the refutation of this position. the impossible conclusion must be connected with that term which is subject in the hypothesis: for if it is impossible that F should belong to B. and C to D. and so establish a reductio ad impossibile: for Zeno’s false theorem has no connexion at all with the original assumption. a syllogism can no longer be drawn in reference to it. as we have explained in the Topics. Similarly when the syllogisms are negative. but does not result from it. B to C.g. It is clear then that the expression ‘false cause’ can only be used in the case of a reductio ad impossibile. that the conclusion results indifferently whether the hypothesis is made or not. the false conclusion will no longer result after A has been eliminated. It is clear then that when the impossibility is not related to the original terms. Another case is where the impossible conclusion is connected with the hypothesis. For to put that which is not the cause as the cause. the impossible conclusion will disappear if B is eliminated.

that parallels meet.g. and G. Consequently since the impossibility results whether the first assumption is suppressed or not. and on this the argument depends: for A and B are inferred by means of D. they ought in attack to try to conceal. F. if. But if the premisses are more than two. Or perhaps we ought not to understand the statement that the false conclusion results independently of the assumption. Similarly if one takes the terms in an ascending series. e.Or perhaps even so it may sometimes be independent. both on the assumption that the interior angle is greater than the exterior and on the assumption that a triangle contains more than two right angles. E. Every syllogism is made out of two or more premisses. and that term which is stated more than once is the middle. not to grant him the same term twice over in his premisses. e. one or both of them must be false: for (as we proved) a false syllogism cannot be drawn from two premisses. If then the false conclusion is drawn from two premisses. they take the necessary premisses and leave the conclusions in the dark. This will be possible first. one of these higher propositions must be false. 18 A false argument depends on the first false statement in it. F. the same impossibility results through the remaining premisses. secondly if instead of 150 . This will not escape us since we know how we are maintaining the argument. and these through D. and G. in the sense that if something else were supposed the impossibility would result. but rather we mean that when the first assumption is eliminated. whenever an opponent asks us to admit the reason without the conclusions. Therefore the conclusion and the error results from one of them. How we ought to watch the middle in reference to each conclusion.g. That which we urge men to beware of in their admissions. the impossible conclusion would still stand. is evident from our knowing what kind of thesis is proved in each figure. E. if C is established through A and B. For if it were laid down that A belongs not to B but to K. since we know that a syllogism cannot be drawn without a middle term. instead of drawing the conclusions of preliminary syllogisms. since it is not perhaps absurd that the same false result should follow from several hypotheses. and that K belongs to C and C to D. 19 In order to avoid having a syllogism drawn against us we must take care. it would appear to be independent of that assumption.

But if nothing is conceded. Again if a man were to make a mistake about the members of a single series.inviting assent to propositions which are closely connected they take as far as possible those that are not connected by middle terms. D. a man may forget the other and think the opposite true. after that he may ask whether B belongs to C. a refutation is impossible: for no syllogism is possible (as we saw) when all the terms are negative: therefore no refutation is possible. 20 Since we know when a syllogism can be formed and how its terms must be related. and E being middle terms. the other negative: consequently. the other negative). instead of asking whether B belongs to C. e. Suppose that A belongs to B and to C in virtue of their nature. and C to D. If then a man thinks that A belongs to all B. it is clear when refutation will be possible and when impossible. and so on. For if a refutation were possible. but to no C: he will both know that A belongs to D. but some one thinks that A belongs to all B.g. but although knowing the one. although if a syllogism is possible it does not follow that a refutation is possible. if what is laid down is contrary to the conclusion. and next whether D belongs to E. and think that it does not. and C to all D. and that B and C belong to all D in the same way. B. B to C. e. but A to no C. a syllogism must be possible. Does he then 151 . being affirmative. if it is possible that the same predicate should belong to more than one subject immediately. 21 It sometimes happens that just as we are deceived in the arrangement of the terms.g. C. or the answers alternate (one. so error may arise in our thought about them. I mean. Similarly refutation is not possible if nothing is conceded universally: since the fields of refutation and syllogism are defined in the same way. suppose A belongs to B. and B to D. he ought to begin with that: in this way he will most likely deceive his opponent. A refutation is possible whether everything is conceded. For example suppose that A is to be inferred to be true of F. If the syllogism is drawn through one middle term. he will both know and not know the same thing in respect of the same thing. One ought then to ask whether A belongs to B. a refutation must take place: for a refutation is a syllogism which establishes the contradictory. For as has been shown a syllogism is possible whether the terms are related in affirmative propositions or one proposition is affirmative.

Consequently if again he thinks that A belongs to nothing to which C belongs. B for triangle. he does not think? For he knows in a way that A belongs to C through B. that A belongs to all B. and B to all C. if A belongs to all B. where the middle term does not belong to the same series. A man might think that C did not exist. and B to D. but to no C. e. that the angles are equal to two right angles.g. but if he thinks that A belongs to everything to which B belongs. but not with a knowledge of the particulars. A belongs to all B. In the former case. For if he thinks that A belongs to everything to which B belongs. For it never happens that a man starts with a foreknowledge of the particular. by an act (as it were) of recognition. and he knows that B belongs to D. he thinks that A does not belong to some of that to which B belongs. For the expression ‘to know that every triangle has its angles equal to two right angles’ is ambiguous. e. so that what he knows in a way. though he knew that every triangle contains two right angles. An error of this kind is similar to the error into which we fall concerning particulars: e. consequently he will know and not know the same thing at the same time. he knows that A belongs to C.g. 152 . and both B and C belong to all D. consequently his knowledge will not be contrary to his ignorance. but along with the process of being led to see the general principle he receives a knowledge of the particulars. Similarly in all other cases. then he knows that A belongs to D. If then a man knows that A belongs to everything to which B belongs.maintain after this simply that what he knows. In this way then it is not possible to think. Thus then he knows that C contains two right angles with a knowledge of the universal. The argument in the Meno that learning is recollection may be criticized in a similar way.g. let A stand for two right angles. if we know that the figure is a triangle. since the part is included in the whole. and again thinks that A does not belong to some of that to which B belongs. this he maintains he does not think at all: but that is impossible. For it turns out that the first premiss of the one syllogism is either wholly or partially contrary to the first premiss of the other. meaning to have the knowledge either of the universal or of the particulars. but nothing prevents a man thinking one premiss of each syllogism of both premisses of one of the two syllogisms: e. it is not possible to think both the premisses with reference to each of the two middle terms: e. and again A belongs to no C. C for a particular diagram of a triangle.g.g. For we know some things directly. these beliefs are wholly or partially contrary. A will belong to all C. But nothing prevents his being ignorant that C exists.

and that B again belongs to C. knowing that every mule is sterile and that this is a mule. except by means of the universal and the possession of the knowledge which is proper to the particular. unless he considers the two propositions together. Let A stand for the essence of good and B for the essence of bad. and similarly that B is A. And this happens also to the man whose knowledge is limited to each of the premisses and who has not previously considered the particular question. Nothing prevents a man who knows both that A belongs to the whole of B. nor is the thought in respect of one middle term contrary to that in respect of the other. Perhaps then this 153 . and again C for the essence of good. but without the actual exercise of that knowledge. For to know is used in three senses: it may mean either to have knowledge of the universal or to have knowledge proper to the matter in hand or to exercise such knowledge: consequently three kinds of error also are possible. For we know no sensible thing. A is true of C. consequently that C is A. once it has passed beyond the range of our senses.g. But he who thinks the essence of good is the essence of bad will think the same thing to be the essence of good and the essence of bad. Similarly therefore with ‘opine’. he will think that C is B. e. thinking that A does not belong to C. similarly with the word ‘think’. even if we happen to have perceived it.By a knowledge of the universal then we see the particulars. The error in respect of the middle term is not contrary to the knowledge obtained through the syllogism. Similarly also with the word ‘is’. but not that we should have the knowledge and error that are contrary to one another: rather we have the knowledge of the universal but make a mistake in apprehending the particular. provided that his knowledge and his error are not contrary. he will fall into error. And this is the relation of knowledge of the universal to knowledge of the particular. Similarly in the cases stated above. and A is true of all of which B is true. Nothing then prevents a man both knowing and being mistaken about the same thing. For when he thinks that the mule is with foal he has not the knowledge in the sense of its actual exercise. For just as we saw that if B is true of all of which C is true. for we saw that if C is the same as B. but we do not know them by the kind of knowledge which is proper to them. and thinking that this animal is with foal: for he does not know that A belongs to C. consequently it is possible that we may make mistakes about them. nor on the other hand has his thought caused an error contrary to his knowledge: for the error contrary to the knowledge of the universal would be a syllogism. So it is evident that if he knows the one and does not know the other. C is the same as A. and B as A. Since then he thinks B and C identical.

then if A and C are convertible and C belongs everything to which A belongs. Similarly if the conclusion is negative. But we must consider this matter better. And if C is convertible with B. and B belongs to everything to which A belongs. C will be convertible with A. For it is possible to think this in many different ways. but A does not belong to B. B is convertible also with A. For if A belongs to C through B.g. neither will A belong to C. For two syllogisms have been put together. 22 Whenever the extremes are convertible it is necessary that the middle should be convertible with both. and D belongs to that to which C belongs. through C as middle. it is clear that B or D belongs to everything. and C is convertible with B. it is necessary that what is created should be corruptible and what is corruptible should have been created. For C belongs to that to which B belongs: but C does not belong to that to which A belongs. And if C is convertible in relation to A and to B.is necessary if a man will grant the first point. for C is said of that of all of which B is said. and C is convertible with B through A as middle. For if B does not belong to something to which D belongs. B is convertible with A. When A belongs to the whole of B and to C and is affirmed of nothing else. and B also belongs to all C. it is clear that A belongs to it. but not together. it is clear that B will be said of everything of which A is said. it is necessary that A and B should be convertible: for since A is said of B and C only. If then B is convertible with A. save incidentally. but not together. that any one could suppose the essence of good to be the essence of bad. For since B belongs to that to which A belongs. if B belongs to C. Therefore C and D belong together. but they cannot belong together. and similarly C and D. e. and since A or C belongs to everything. and if A or C must belong to anything whatever. neither then will C: for ex hypothesi B belonged to all C. Again if A or B belongs to everything and if C or D belongs to everything. then B and D will be such that one or other belongs to anything whatever. then when A and C are convertible B and D are convertible. And this alone starts from the conclusion. Again if A and B are convertible. the preceding moods do not do so as in the affirmative syllogism. But presumably that is false. except A itself. it is necessary that A should 154 . B also is convertible in relation to A. But this is impossible. Again when A and B belong to the whole of C. Suppose B does not belong to A. For example if that which is uncreated is incorruptible and that which is incorruptible is uncreated. But if A then C: for they are convertible. and B is affirmed both of itself and of C.

But if D is preferable to A. consists in establishing syllogistically a relation between one extreme 155 . If then every lover in virtue of his love would prefer A. and in respect of being in a higher degree objects of aversion or of desire. and similarly D is preferable to C. and C to B by conversion. viz. it is clear that A (being of such a nature) is preferable to granting the favour. For every belief comes either through syllogism or from induction. 23 It is clear then how the terms are related in conversion.belong to all B: for since A belongs to all C. Intercourse then either is not an end at all or is an end relative to the further end. And if it is most dependent on receiving affection. the receiving of affection. then this is its end. But ex hypothesi this is not so. B is an object of aversion to the same extent as C (since each is to the same extent as each-the one an object of aversion. of two opposites A and B. A is preferable to B. And indeed the same is true of the other desires and arts. If then A is an object of desire to the same extent as D. for then B along with D would be equally desirable with A along with C. Now induction. and C consequently is less an object of aversion than B. We must now state that not only dialectical and demonstrative syllogisms are formed by means of the aforesaid figures. To receive affection then is preferable in love to sexual intercourse. since they also are opposites. the other an object of desire). Therefore both A and C together. however it may be presented. then B must be less an object of aversion than C: for the less is opposed to the less. A cannot be equally desirable with D. When. For A is an object of desire to the same extent as B is an object of aversion. that the beloved should be such as to grant a favour. But since A and C are preferable to B and D. since they are opposites: and C is similarly related to D. or rather the syllogism which springs out of induction. but also rhetorical syllogisms and in general any form of persuasion. But the greater good and lesser evil are preferable to the lesser good and greater evil: the whole BD then is preferable to the whole AC. will be equally objects of desire or aversion. and B and D together. then if A and C together are preferable to B and D together. A must be preferable to D. A then is preferable to D. and yet should not grant it (for which C stands). Love then is more dependent on friendship than on intercourse. to the beloved’s granting the favour (represented by D) without being such as to grant it (represented by B). A will belong to all B.

but syllogism through induction is clearer to us. C Athenians against Thebans. A then belongs to the whole of C: for whatever is bileless is long-lived. D Thebans against Phocians. If then we wish to prove that to fight with the Thebans is an evil. when there is no middle term. For it has already been proved that if two things belong to the same thing. In the order of nature.g. 156 .g. it is clear that to fight against the Thebans is an evil. For example let A stand for long-lived.g. But B also (’not possessing bile’) belongs to all C. and to fight against the Thebans is to fight against neighbours. that the war against the Phocians was an evil to the Thebans. horse. then the other predicate will belong to the predicate that is converted. syllogism through the middle term is prior and better known. e. Similarly if the belief in the relation of the middle term to the extreme should be produced by several similar cases. if B is the middle term between A and C. For induction proceeds through an enumeration of all the cases. we must assume that to fight against neighbours is an evil. man. If then C is convertible with B. B making war against neighbours. it is necessary that A should belong to B. It ought to be known both that the middle belongs to the third term. Now it is clear that B belongs to C and to D (for both are cases of making war upon one’s neighbours) and that A belongs to D (for the war against the Phocians did not turn out well for the Thebans): but that A belongs to B will be proved through D. and that the first belongs to that which resembles the third. and the extreme is convertible with one of them. and C for the particular long-lived animals. it consists in proving through C that A belongs to B. e. mule. e. through induction. Evidence of this is obtained from similar cases. For this is the manner in which we make inductions. And in a way induction is opposed to syllogism: for the latter proves the major term to belong to the third term by means of the middle.and the middle by means of the other extreme. the former proves the major to belong to the middle by means of the third. For example let A be evil. B for bileless. 24 We have an ‘example’ when the major term is proved to belong to the middle by means of a term which resembles the third. and the middle term is not wider in extension. Such is the syllogism which establishes the first and immediate premiss: for where there is a middle term the syllogism proceeds through the middle term. But we must apprehend C as made up of all the particulars. Since then to fight against neighbours is an evil.

because induction starting from all the particular cases proves (as we saw) that the major term belongs to the middle. being so far without knowledge that A belongs to C. Now it is clear that knowledge can be taught: but it is uncertain whether virtue is knowledge. that the circle is made equal to a rectilinear figure by the help of lunules). E for rectilinear figure. whereas argument by example does make this application and does not draw its proof from all the particular cases. B for knowledge. C for justice. when both particulars are subordinate to the same term. If a man maintains a universal affirmative. but rather reasoning from part to part. we should be near to knowledge. but a premiss either cannot be particular at all or not in universal syllogisms. because it may be particular. Or again suppose that the terms intermediate between B and C are few: for thus too we are nearer knowledge. but the relation of the middle to the last term is uncertain though equally or more probable than the conclusion. nor like reasoning from whole to part. An objection is brought in two ways and through two figures. we have a reduction: for we are nearer to knowledge. by two figures because objections are brought in opposition to the premiss. 25 By reduction we mean an argument in which the first term clearly belongs to the middle. 26 An objection is a premiss contrary to a premiss. or again an argument in which the terms intermediate between the last term and the middle are few. For example let A stand for what can be taught. I do not call this reduction: nor again when the statement BC is immediate: for such a statement is knowledge. F for circle. in two ways because every objection is either universal or particular.Clearly then to argue by example is neither like reasoning from part to whole. and does not apply the syllogistic conclusion to the minor term. For example let D stand for squaring. If there were only one term intermediate between E and F (viz. and one of them is known. we reply with a universal or a particular negative. and opposites can be proved only in the first and third figures. It differs from induction. the former is proved 157 . and the intermediate terms are not few. If now the statement BC is equally or more probable than AC. But when BC is not more probable than AC. It differs from a premiss. since we have taken a new term. For in any of these cases it turns out that we approach more nearly to knowledge.

and inquire whether a particular objection cannot be elicited from the first figure or a negative objection from the second. e. are subjects of the same science: the former argument issues from the first. For this reason also this is the only figure from which proof by signs cannot be obtained. he will point out that the knowable and the unknowable are not subjects of the same science: ‘contraries’ is universal relatively to these.g. what is healthy and what is sickly. In general if a man urges a universal objection he must frame his contradiction with reference to the universal of the terms taken by his opponent.g. the objector must frame his contradiction with reference to a term relatively to which the subject of his opponent’s premiss is universal. This can be made clear only by other premisses. e. e.g. Besides. and from common opinion. If a man premises that contraries are subjects of a single science. an objection in the middle figure would require a fuller argument. Consequently we bring objections in these figures only: for in them only are opposite syllogisms possible.from the first figure. but have its new premiss quite clear immediately. We must consider later the other kinds of objection. so that we get the first figure. we reply either that all opposites or that certain contraries. his opponent must reply that there is a single science of all opposites. the latter from the third. because C does not follow B. For if a man maintains that contraries are not subjects of a single science. e. Similarly if the premiss objected to is negative. if a man maintains that contraries are not subjects of the same science. the latter from the third figure. or that the knowable and the unknowable are not subjects of a single science: this proof is in the third figure: for it is true of C (the knowable and the unknowable) that they are contraries. since the second figure cannot produce an affirmative conclusion. If the objection is particular. e. and contraries are opposites. 158 .g. namely the objection from contraries. But an objection ought not to turn off into other things. the knowable and the unknowable. Thus we must have the first figure: for the term which embraces the original subject becomes the middle term. B for contraries. the objection may be either that opposites are never subjects of a single science. from similars. For example let stand for there being a single science.g. Premisses from which it is possible to draw the contrary conclusion are what we start from when we try to make objections. and it is false that they are the subjects of a single science. if it should not be granted that A belongs to B. And we have the third figure: for the particular term assumed is middle.

a syllogism. B for wise men. since Pittacus is good. A sign means a demonstrative proposition necessary or generally approved: for anything such that when it is another thing is. C for Pittacus. The proof that wise men are good. that which proceeds through the last figure is refutable even if the conclusion is true. people suppose it has been proved that she is with child. it is not necessary that she should be with child. B to have milk. e. comes through the last figure. For example the proof that a woman is with child because she has milk is in the first figure: for to have milk is the middle term. for the most part thus and thus. ‘Pittacus is generous. ‘the envious hate’. The proof that a woman is with child because she is pale is meant to come through the middle figure: for since paleness follows women with child and is a concomitant of this woman. is a sign of the other’s being or having come into being. Let A stand for good. C woman. It is true then to affirm both A and B of C: only men do not say the latter.’ In this way then syllogisms are formed. corresponding to the position of the middle term in the figures. because they know it. e.g. and a sign may be taken in three ways. Truth then may be found in signs whatever their kind. and this woman also is pale. B for being with child. is a probability. since ambitious men are generous and Pittacus is ambitious. only that which proceeds through the first figure is irrefutable if it is true (for it is universal). Now if the one proposition is stated.’ Or again ‘Wise men are good. We must either divide signs in the way stated.27 A probability and a sign are not identical. it is not therefore necessary that all other wise men should be good. but if the other is stated as well. Let A stand for paleness.g. since Pittacus is not only good but wise. or when it has come into being the other has come into being before or after. since the syllogism is not universal nor correlative to the matter in question: for though Pittacus is good. C for woman. Let A represent to be with child. For it may be taken as in the first figure or the second or the third. and among them designate the middle term as the index (for people call that the index which 159 . but a probability is a generally approved proposition: what men know to happen or not to happen. though they state the former. ‘the beloved show affection’. to be or not to be. But the syllogism which proceeds through the middle figure is always refutable in any case: for a syllogism can never be formed when the terms are related in this way: for though a woman with child is pale. but they have the differences we have stated. Now an enthymeme is a syllogism starting from probabilities or signs. we have only a sign.

but possesses.g. It is possible to infer character from features. there would not be a single sign correlative with each affection. let A stand for courage. B then belongs to everything to which C belongs. then. For if there is an affection which belongs properly to an individual kind. But A belongs to everything to which B belongs. in those kinds in which each is found though not in the whole of their members. we shall be able to infer character from features. if a man is brave but not generous. but is wider than the third term and not convertible with it: e. If then this were granted and also that for each change there is a corresponding sign. and we could state the affection and sign proper to each kind of animal. but also to others. e. and the middle term above all has this character). e. according to our usual manner of speaking. and some other kinds of animal as well. B for large extremities.g. it is necessary that there should be a sign of it: for ex hypothesi body and soul are affected together.g. and to nothing besides. if the lion is both brave and generous. But if the kind as a whole has two properties. because the affection is proper to the whole kind. If then this is so. and man may be brave. how shall we know which of the signs which are its proper concomitants is the sign of a particular affection? Perhaps if both belong to some other kind though not to the whole of it. rather I refer to passions and desires when I speak of natural emotions. large extremities. of the two signs. some members possess one of the affections and not the other: e. but is convertible with B: otherwise. For the sign is proper in the sense stated. is possible in the first figure if the middle term is convertible with the first extreme. it is clear that this is the sign of courage in the lion also. Suppose this sign is the possession of large extremities: this may belong to other kinds also though not universally.makes us know. if it is granted that the body and the soul are changed together by the natural affections: I say ‘natural’. or else we must call the arguments derived from the extremes signs. since it is necessary that it should have a single sign-we shall then be able to infer character from features. They will then have the sign: for ex hypothesi there is one sign corresponding to each affection.g. though not proper to it alone. this is not one of those affections which are natural to us. that derived from the middle term the index: for that which is proved through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true. 160 . for though perhaps by learning music a man has made some change in his soul. and if. To judge character from features. courage to lions. The same thing then will be found in another kind. and C for lion. and we can collect signs of this sort in these animals which have only one affection proper to them-but each affection has its sign.

in a manner not. and sometimes both assumptions are essential. a kind of induction. the student knew beforehand that the angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles. as regards ‘unit’ we have to make the double assumption of the meaning of the word and the existence of the thing. Book I Translated by G. the persuasion exerted by rhetorical arguments is in principle the same. Mure < div id="book1" class="book"> 1 All instruction given or received by way of argument proceeds from pre-existent knowledge. G. a form of syllogism. and that ‘triangle’ means so and so. or enthymeme. For example. the syllogism assuming an audience that accepts its premisses. and so are the two forms of dialectical reasoning. The pre-existent knowledge required is of two kinds. The reason is that these several objects are not equally obvious to us. since they use either example. This becomes evident upon a survey of all the species of such instruction. Before he was led on to recognition or before he actually drew a conclusion. we assume that every predicate can be either truly affirmed or truly denied of any subject. there is here no recognition through a middle of a minor term as subject to a major. 161 . for each of these latter make use of old knowledge to impart new. in others comprehension of the meaning of the term used.Posterior Analytics. we should perhaps say that in a manner he knew. Again. but it was only at the actual moment at which he was being led on to recognize this as true in the instance before him that he came to know ‘this figure inscribed in the semicircle’ to be a triangle. syllogistic and inductive. this latter. of the particulars actually falling under the universal and therein already virtually known. Thus. Recognition of a truth may in some cases contain as factors both previous knowledge and also knowledge acquired simultaneously with that recognition-knowledge. In some cases admission of the fact must be assumed. For some things (viz. induction exhibiting the universal as implicit in the clearly known particular. The mathematical sciences and all other speculative disciplines are acquired in this way. i. the singulars finally reached which are not predicable of anything else as subject) are only learnt in this way. R.e.

when we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends. 2 We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing. we are faced with the dilemma in the Meno: either a man will learn nothing or what he already knows. There may be another manner of knowing as well-that will be discussed later. know that every pair is even?’ He says he does know it. as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist knows. and so a fortiori of the evenness. as the cause of that fact and of no other. viz. The solution which some people offer is to assert that they do not know that every pair is even. a syllogism. that is. A man is asked. not if in some sense he knew what he was learning. On the other hand. For no premiss is ever couched in the form ‘every number which you know to be such’. in the condition described. Now that scientific knowing is something of this sort is evident-witness both those who falsely claim it and those who actually possess it. while the latter are also actually. of the existence. ‘Do you.If he did not in an unqualified sense of the term know the existence of this triangle. but if he were to know it in that precise sense and manner in which he was learning it. The strange thing would be. further. By demonstration I mean a syllogism productive of scientific knowledge. The questioner then produces a particular pair. how could he know without qualification that its angles were equal to two right angles? No: clearly he knows not without qualification but only in the sense that he knows universally. the grasp of which is eo ipso such 162 . but only that everything which they know to be a pair is even: yet what they know to be even is that of which they have demonstrated evenness. that the fact could not be other than it is. or ‘every rectilinear figure which you know to be such’: the predicate is always construed as applicable to any and every instance of the thing. in another not knowing it. not merely every triangle or number which they know to be such. what they made the subject of their premiss. If this distinction is not drawn. and. for we cannot accept the solution which some people offer. but any and every number or triangle without reservation. or do you not. I imagine there is nothing to prevent a man in one sense knowing what he is learning. Consequently the proper object of unqualified scientific knowledge is something which cannot be other than it is.e. i. of which he was unaware. since the former merely imagine themselves to be. What I now assert is that at all events we do know by demonstration.

for there is a difference between what is prior and better known in the order of being and what is prior and better known to man. The term ‘enunciation’ denotes either part of a contradiction indifferently. if it be not accidental knowledge. The premisses must be the causes of the conclusion. primary. for I identify primary premiss and basic truth. A proposition is either part of an enunciation. the part disjoining them is a negation. otherwise they will require demonstration in order to be known. its causes. though it is not susceptible of proof by the teacher. An immediate proposition is one which has no other proposition prior to it. Assuming then that my thesis as to the nature of scientific knowing is correct. will not be demonstration. the basic truths will not be ‘appropriate’ to the conclusion. this antecedent knowledge being not our mere understanding of the meaning. In saying that the premisses of demonstrated knowledge must be primary. The premisses must be primary and indemonstrable. it assumes either part indifferently. The premisses must be true: for that which is non-existent cannot be known-we cannot know. antecedently known. but such syllogism. if it is demonstrative. I mean that objects nearer to sense are prior and better known to man. objects without qualification prior and better known are those further from sense. immediate. that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with its side. of things which are demonstrable. Now the most universal causes are furthest from sense and particular causes are nearest to sense. which is further related to them as effect to cause. means precisely to have a demonstration of them. A ‘basic truth’ in a demonstration is an immediate proposition. I call an immediate basic truth of syllogism a ‘thesis’ when. Now ‘prior’ and ‘better known’ are ambiguous terms. e.g. but knowledge of the fact as well. If a proposition is dialectical. the premisses of demonstrated knowledge must be true. The part of a contradiction which conjoins a predicate with a subject is an affirmation. since we possess scientific knowledge of a thing only when we know its cause. in order to be causes. prior. I mean that they must be the ‘appropriate’ basic truths. Syllogism there may indeed be without these conditions. yet ignorance of it does not constitute a total bar to progress on the part of the pupil: one which the 163 . better known than and prior to the conclusion. not being productive of scientific knowledge. i. since to have knowledge. Unless these conditions are satisfied. it lays down one part to the definite exclusion of the other because that part is true. and prior to it. and they are thus exactly opposed to one another.knowledge. A contradiction is an opposition which of its own nature excludes a middle. better known than it.e. it predicates a single attribute of a single subject.

but it is not a hypothesis. of our conviction-it follows that we know them better-that is. Others think there is. e. asserts either the existence or the non-existence of a subject. since the arithmetician lays it down that to be a unit is to be quantitatively indivisible. So since the primary premisses are the cause of our knowledge-i. I call it an axiom because there are such truths and we give them the name of axioms par excellence. the cause of our loving anything is dearer to us than the object of our love.pupil must know if he is to learn anything whatever is an axiom. it is a definition. it is a hypothesis. Moreover. Definition is a ‘thesis’ or a ‘laying something down’. The first school. But we are faced with this paradox if a student whose belief rests on demonstration has not prior knowledge. if a man sets out to acquire the scientific knowledge that comes through demonstration. but know them better than the conclusion: for the cause of an attribute’s inherence in a subject always itself inheres in the subject more firmly than that attribute. there is no scientific knowledge. unless he has either actual knowledge of it or something better than actual knowledge. of our conviction-of a fact is the possession of such a syllogism as we call demonstration. nothing must be more certain or better known to him than these basic truths in their character as contradicting the fundamental premisses which lead to the opposed and erroneous conclusion. If a thesis assumes one part or the other of an enunciation. owing to the necessity of knowing the primary premisses.e. if it does not so assert. i. 3 Some hold that. he must not only have a better knowledge of the basic truths and a firmer conviction of them than of the connexion which is being demonstrated: more than this. and the ground of the syllogism is the facts constituting its premisses.g.e. For indeed the conviction of pure science must be unshakable. for to define what a unit is is not the same as to affirm its existence. Neither doctrine is either true or a necessary deduction from the premisses. if not in all. Now a man cannot believe in anything more than in the things he knows. are more convinced of them-than their consequences. of the basic truths more than in the conclusion. a man must believe in some. Now since the required ground of our knowledge-i.e. we must not only know the primary premisses-some if not all of them-beforehand. precisely because of our knowledge of the latter is the effect of our knowledge of the premisses. but that all truths are demonstrable. assuming that there is no 164 .

we could not know the posterior through the prior (wherein they are right. maintain that an infinite regress is involved.way of knowing other than by demonstration. i. The other party agree with them as regards knowing. then it does exist-an easy way of proving anything. yet these are unknowable because incapable of demonstration. is our doctrine. but they see no difficulty in holding that all truths are demonstrated. and the same things cannot simultaneously be both prior and posterior to one another: so circular demonstration is clearly not possible in the unqualified sense of ‘demonstration’. and since the regress must end in immediate truths. which according to them is the only form of knowledge. but only possible if ‘demonstration’ be extended to include that other method of argument which rests on a distinction between truths prior to us and truths without qualification prior. and in addition we maintain that besides scientific knowledge there is its originative source which enables us to recognize the definitions. the second form of demonstration. then. knowledge of the immediate premisses is independent of demonstration. but rests on the mere supposition that the premisses are true. But if we accept this extension of its meaning. holding that it is only possible by demonstration. That this is so can be clearly shown by taking three terms. for one cannot traverse an infinite series): if on the other hand-they say-the series terminates and there are primary premisses. for since we must know the prior premisses from which the demonstration is drawn. The advocates of circular demonstration are not only faced with the difficulty we have just stated: in addition their theory reduces to the mere statement that if a thing exists. that which proceeds from truths better known to us. on the ground that if behind the prior stands no primary. the method by which induction produces knowledge. Now demonstration must be based on premisses prior to and better known than the conclusion. however. if A is.) Such. on the ground that demonstration may be circular and reciprocal. (The necessity of this is obvious.e. B 165 . for to constitute the circle it makes no difference whether many terms or few or even only two are taken. is not demonstration in the unqualified sense of the term. our definition of unqualified knowledge will prove faulty. Thus by direct proof. for there seem to be two kinds of it. those truths must be indemonstrable. Our own doctrine is that not all knowledge is demonstrative: on the contrary. knowledge of the conclusions which follow from them is not pure scientific knowledge nor properly knowing at all. And since thus one cannot know the primary premisses. Perhaps.

‘peculiar’ properties. if B is. If. C must be’: but C and A have been identified. C must be. it follows that demonstration is an inference from necessary premisses. A must be’=’if B is. I call ‘true in every instance’ what is truly predicable of all instancesnot of one to the exclusion of others-and at all times. then if it be true to say ‘this is a man’. it has been shown that the positing of one thing-be it one term or one premiss-never involves a necessary consequent: two premisses constitute the first and smallest foundation for drawing a conclusion at all and therefore a fortiori for the demonstrative syllogism of science. and since convertible terms occur rarely in actual demonstrations. Since then-by the circular proof-if A is. So we must consider what are the premisses of demonstration-i. it is possible. Now. Moreover.must be. and if the one be true now the other is true now. the truth obtained by demonstrative knowledge will be necessary. 4 Since the object of pure scientific knowledge cannot be other than it is. ‘this is an animal’ is also true. Propositions the terms of which are not convertible cannot be circularly demonstrated at all. it is clearly frivolous and impossible to say that demonstration is reciprocal and that therefore everything can be demonstrated. But it has also been shown that in the other figures either no conclusion is possible. or at least none which proves both the original premisses. A must be. and a ‘commensurate and universal’ attribute. C must be. Consequently the upholders of circular demonstration are in the position of saying that if A is. A must be-a simple way of proving anything. viz. A is implied in B and C. even such circular demonstration is impossible except in the case of attributes that imply one another. And since demonstrative knowledge is only present when we have a demonstration. then. let us define what we mean by an attribute ‘true in every instance of its subject’. B must be. C must be’. and if B is. as has been shown in my writings on the syllogism. an ‘essential’ attribute.g. not at this or that time only. if animal is truly predicable of every instance of man. e. A corresponding account holds if point is in every instance predicable as contained in line. which above gave the conclusion ‘if A is. Then ‘if B is. to prove all the assumptions on which the original conclusion rested. and B and C are reciprocally implied in one another and in A. There is 166 . what is their character: and as a preliminary. A may be substituted for C above. therefore if A is.e. by circular demonstration in the first figure.

a coincidence.g. whereas attributes related in neither of these two ways to their subjects I call accidents or ‘coincidents’. it was. For it is impossible for them not to inhere in their subjects either simply or in the qualified sense that one or other of a pair of opposites must inhere in the subject. it is not true. whereas substance. the predication is essential. the subjects to which they belong are contained in the attribute’s own defining formula. Thus straight and curved belong to line. Things. in the sense of whatever signifies a ‘this somewhat’. not predicated of a subject I call essential. If. in number 167 . square and oblong. all attributes which (within that sphere) are essential either in the sense that their subjects are contained in them. e. line or number as the case may be. ‘the walking [thing]’ walks and is white in virtue of being something else besides. An example of the latter is ‘While he was walking it lightened’: the lightning was not due to his walking. line thus belongs to triangle. because the cutting was the cause of death. Essential attributes are (1) such as belong to their subject as elements in its essential nature (e. So far then as concerns the sphere of connexions scientifically known in the unqualified sense of that term. then its death is also essentially connected with the cutting. which are contained in the formulae defining triangle and line): (2) such that. to number. or an occasion on which. for the very being or ‘substance’ of triangle and line is composed of these elements. and also the formula defining any one of these attributes contains its subjecte.evidence for this in the fact that the objection we raise against a proposition put to us as true in every instance is either an instance in which.g.g. while they belong to certain subjects. we should say. things predicated of a subject I call accidental or ‘coincidental’. point to line. then.g. or in the sense that they are contained in their subjects. In another sense again (b) a thing consequentially connected with anything is essential. prime and compound. musical or white is a ‘coincident’ of animal. Extending this classification to all other attributes. are necessary as well as consequentially connected with their subjects.g. is not what it is in virtue of being something else besides. not death a ‘coincident’ of the cutting. Further (a) that is essential which is not predicated of a subject other than itself: e. odd and even. in line must be either straightness or curvature. one not so connected is ‘coincidental’. there is a consequential connexion. e. e. on the other hand. I distinguish those that answer the above description as belonging essentially to their respective subjects.g. if a beast dies when its throat is being cut.

e. An attribute belongs commensurately and universally to a subject when it can be shown to belong to any random instance of that subject and when the subject is the first thing to which it can be shown to belong. Nor again (2) is equality to two right angles a commensurately universal attribute of isosceles. and the demonstration. point and straight belong to line essentially. yet isosceles triangle is not the primary subject of this attribute but triangle is prior. for it is essentially equal to two right angles. since any given predicate must be either affirmed or denied of any subject. this attribute cannot be demonstrated of any figure selected at haphazard. or to possess any other attribute. we have established the distinction between the attribute which is ‘true in every instance’ and the ‘essential’ attribute. nor in demonstrating does one take a figure at random-a square is a figure but its angles are not equal to two right angles. inasmuch as within this sphere even is a necessary consequent of not-odd. within number what is not odd is even.g. On the other hand. and the attribute that belongs to its subject as such.g. I term ‘commensurately universal’ an attribute which belongs to every instance of its subject. for they belong to line as such. (1) the equality of its angles to two right angles is not a commensurately universal attribute of figure. The essential attribute. Thus. For though it is possible to show that a figure has its angles equal to two right angles. and triangle as such has two right angles. then. are identical. essential attributes must inhere in their subjects of necessity. So. Thus.either oddness or evenness.g. of any predicate is the proof of it as belonging to this first subject commensurately and universally: while the proof of it as belonging to the other subjects to which it attaches is demonstration only in a secondary and unessential sense. in any random instance of itself and primarily-that is the first subject to which the predicate in question belongs commensurately and universally. For within a single identical genus the contrary of a given attribute is either its privative or its contradictory. from which it clearly follows that all commensurate universals inhere necessarily in their subjects. So whatever can be shown to have its angles equal to two right angles. 168 . E. in the essential sense. any isosceles triangle has its angles equal to two right angles. it is of wider application. and to every instance essentially and as such. e.

For one does not know that triangle as such has this property. and solids are identical. it would be thought to have its angles equal to two right angles qua isosceles. however. whether by means of the same or different proofs. and isosceles. solids. An instance of (2) would be the law that proportionals alternate. for then the demonstration will be true of the individual instances within the part and will hold in every instance of it. nor does one yet know that triangle has this property commensurately and universally. To-day. but simply on their being equal to one another. that triangle has its angles equal to two right angles. but it has no name: (3) when the subject which the demonstrator takes as a whole is really only a part of a larger whole. lines. When a demonstration is true of a subject primarily and commensurately and universally. scalene. Because there was no single name to denote that in which numbers. durations. though it could have been proved of them all by a single demonstration. still. Alternation used to be demonstrated separately of numbers. Case (3) may be thus exemplified. for they do not possess this attribute qua lines or qua numbers. If a proof were given that perpendiculars to the same line are parallel. An example of (1) would be as follows: if isosceles were the only triangle. it might be supposed that lines thus perpendicular were the proper subject of the demonstration because being parallel is true of every instance of them. But it is not so. this property was proved of each of them separately. Hence. as long as one treats separately equilateral. the proof is commensurately universal. nor even that ‘all’ triangles have it-unless ‘all’ means ‘each taken singly’: if ‘all’ means ‘as a whole class’. but qua manifesting this generic character which they are postulated as possessing universally. and durations. for the parallelism depends not on these angles being equal to one another because each is a right angle. and because they differed specifically from one another. We make this mistake (1) when the subject is an individual or individuals above which there is no universal to be found: (2) when the subjects belong to different species and there is a higher universal. that is to be taken to mean that it is true of a given subject primarily and as such. yet the demonstration will not be true of this subject primarily and commensurately and universally. except sophistically. then. lengths. even if one prove of each kind of triangle that its angles are equal to two right angles. one does not yet know.5 We must not fail to observe that we often fall into error because our conclusion is not in fact primary and commensurately universal in the sense in which we think we prove it so. even if there is no other species of triangle but these. though there be none 169 .

(The pairs of opposites which the latter class includes are necessary because one member or the other necessarily inheres. or contain their subjects as elements in their own essential nature. to what subject can it be demonstrated as belonging commensurately and universally?)’ Clearly this point is the first term in which it is found to inhere as the elimination of inferior differentiae proceeds.’ True. and when it is unqualified knowledge? If triangle be identical in essence with equilateral. does our knowledge fail of commensurate universality. it will be asked.) It follows from this that premisses of the demonstrative syllogism must be connexions essential in the sense explained: for all attributes must inhere essentially or else be accidental. and triangle is the subject to which it can be demonstrated as belonging commensurately and universally. and then infer that the conclusion must be developed from necessary premisses. When. yet if your premisses are necessary 170 . and the attribute vanishes. For though you may reason from true premisses without demonstrating. to which it belongs is primary? (i. but figure and limit are not the first differentiae whose elimination destroys the attribute. then clearly we have unqualified knowledge: if on the other hand it be not. ‘Then what is the first?’ If it is triangle. ‘does this attribute belong to the subject of which it has been demonstrated qua triangle or qua isosceles? What is the point at which the subject.e. ‘But’-you may say-’eliminate figure or limit. then our knowledge fails of commensurate universality. it will be in virtue of triangle that the attribute belongs to all the other subjects of which it is predicable. for the object of scientific knowledge cannot be other than it is. or else premise that the conclusion of demonstration is necessary and that a demonstrated conclusion cannot be other than it is. one does not know it of ‘all triangles’.in which one does not recognize this property. We must either state the case thus. then. and accidental attributes are not necessary to their subjects. 6 Demonstrative knowledge must rest on necessary basic truths. Now attributes attaching essentially to their subjects attach necessarily to them: for essential attributes are either elements in the essential nature of their subjects. Thus the angles of a brazen isosceles triangle are equal to two right angles: but eliminate brazen and isosceles and the attribute remains. i.e. ‘But’. with each or all equilaterals. and the attribute belongs to equilateral qua triangle.

Thus. and if so. Where demonstration is possible. this situation is possible and might occur. You can in fact infer the necessary even from a non-necessary premiss. A further proof that the conclusion must be the development of necessary premisses is as follows. On the other hand. That demonstration proceeds from necessary premisses is also indicated by the fact that the objection we raise against a professed demonstration is that a premiss of it is not a necessary truth-whether we think it altogether devoid of necessity. then. the mediating link is a contingent fact. Thus: let A be predicated non-necessarily of C but necessarily of B. yet B. yet he has not knowledge. though he still retains the steps of the argument. if A is necessarily predicated of B and B of C. is not necessarily connected with A and C. the middle term of the demonstration. we suppose a syllogism in which. Or again. the middle through which it was proved may yet quite easily be non-necessary. But the mediating link. which can only be the primary law of the genus constituting the subject matter of the demonstration. This shows how naive it is to suppose one’s basic truths rightly chosen if one starts with a proposition which is (1) popularly accepted and (2) true. When the conclusion is necessary. if a man is without knowledge now. though there be no change in him nor in the fact. one who can give no account which includes the cause has no scientific knowledge. though there is no change in himself or in the fact and no lapse of memory on his part. Even if the link has not actually perished but is liable to perish. then neither had he knowledge previously. and though he will still retain the steps of the argument. But when the conclusion is nonnecessary the middle cannot be necessary either. and (2) not all truth is ‘appropriate’. then the man who argues thus has no reasoned knowledge of the conclusion. though A necessarily inheres in C. for though the conclusion is necessary. not being necessary. when the middle is necessary the conclusion must be necessary. and therefore had not knowledge before. just as true premisses always give a true conclusion. since this conclusion does not owe its necessity to the middle term. But such a condition cannot be knowledge. then A is necessarily predicated of C. For (1) popular acceptance or rejection is no criterion of a basic truth. If.you will assuredly demonstrate-in such necessity you have at once a distinctive character of demonstration. just as you can infer the true from the not true. may have perished in the interval. or at any rate so far as our opponent’s previous argument goes. and let B be a necessary 171 . such as the sophists’ assumption that to know is the same as to possess knowledge.

but to have reasoned knowledge of a conclusion is to know it through its cause. for since an accident. if the conclusion is not a necessary connexion. or else he will not even believe it-in which case he will be equally ignorant. A difficulty. but because these answers are propositions which if the answerer affirm. further. Since it is just those attributes within every genus which are essential and possessed by their respective subjects as such that are necessary it is clear that both the conclusions and the premisses of demonstrations which produce scientific knowledge are essential. For accidents are not necessary: and. Of accidents that are not essential according to our definition of essential there is no demonstrative knowledge. he must affirm the conclusion and affirm it with truth if they are true. whether he actually infers the mere fact through middle terms or the reasoned fact and from immediate premisses. We may conclude that the middle must be consequentially connected with the minor. for though the conclusion be actually essential. might be raised as to why in dialectic. then A too will be a necessary predicate of C. since accidents are not necessary one does not necessarily have reasoned knowledge of a conclusion drawn from them (this is so even if the accidental premisses are invariable but not essential. otherwise its possessor will know neither the cause nor the fact that his conclusion is a necessary connexion. however. may also not inhere. To sum up. then: demonstrative knowledge must be knowledge of a necessary nexus. such and such determinate premisses should be proposed in order to deal with such and such determinate problems. in the sense in which I here speak of it. which by hypothesis it is not. Either he will mistake the non-necessary for the necessary and believe the necessity of the conclusion without knowing it. one will not know it as essential nor know its reason). 172 . and the major with the middle. it is impossible to prove its inherence as a necessary conclusion.predicate of C. Would not the result be the same if one asked any questions whatever and then merely stated one’s conclusion? The solution is that determinate questions have to be put. and therefore must clearly be obtained through a necessary middle term. not because the replies to them affirm facts which necessitate facts affirmed by the conclusion. as in proofs through signs.

for these qualities do not belong to lines in virtue of their peculiar genus. but through some property which it shares with other genera.g. How in certain cases transference is possible I will explain later. nor even that the product of two cubes is a cube. i. for example. For there are three elements in demonstration: (1) what is proved. that the straight line is the most beautiful of lines or the contrary of the circle.e. as predicated. Therefore no attribute can be demonstrated nor known by strictly scientific knowledge to inhere in perishable things. in the unqualified sense-must also be eternal. If such a demonstration is made. as optical theorems to geometry or harmonic theorems to arithmetic). are revealed by the demonstration. That is why it cannot be proved by geometry that opposites fall under one science. i. unless these theorems are related as subordinate to superior (e. in virtue of the fundamental truths of their peculiar genus: it cannot show.e. the conclusion of such i. axioms which are premisses of demonstration.7 It follows that we cannot in demonstrating pass from one genus to another. each of them. because the attribute’s connexion with its perishable subject is not commensurately universal but temporary and special. one 173 . transference is clearly impossible. i. the genus must be either absolutely or to some extent the same. Geometry again cannot prove of lines any property which they do not possess qua lines. We cannot. the conclusion-an attribute inhering essentially in a genus. The axioms which are premisses of demonstration may be identical in two or more sciences: but in the case of two different genera such as arithmetic and geometry you cannot apply arithmetical demonstration to the properties of magnitudes unless the magnitudes in question are numbers. because the extreme and the middle terms must be drawn from the same genus: otherwise. (2) the axioms. their own genera. 8 It is also clear that if the premisses from which the syllogism proceeds are commensurately universal. (3) the subject-genus whose attributes. If this is not so. prove geometrical truths by arithmetic. The proof can only be accidental. they will not be essential and will thus be accidents.e.e. for instance. Arithmetical demonstration and the other sciences likewise possess. Nor can the theorem of any one science be demonstrated by means of another science. essential properties. so that if the demonstration is to pass from one sphere to another.

but with a qualification-the fact falls under a separate science (for the subject genus is separate). for they operate by taking as their middle a common character-a character. the middle must belong to the same kind as the major and minor terms. The same is true of definitions. Our knowledge of any attribute’s connexion with a subject is accidental unless we know that connexion through the middle term in virtue of which it inheres. not commensurately universal. The only exceptions to this rule are such cases as theorems in harmonics which are demonstrable by arithmetic. the property of possessing angles equal to two right angles as belonging to that subject in which it inheres essentially. Thus. as such. and as an inference from basic premisses essential and ‘appropriate’ to the subject-unless we know. even these apparent exceptions show that no attribute is strictly demonstrable except 174 . since a definition is either a primary premiss or a conclusion of a demonstration. and immediate premisses does not constitute knowledge. not as belonging to its subject as such: otherwise they would not have been applicable to another genus. but the reasoned fact concerns the superior science. They therefore afford knowledge of an attribute only as inhering accidentally. Such theorems are proved by the same middle terms as arithmetical properties. to which the attributes essentially belong. 9 It is clear that if the conclusion is to show an attribute inhering as such. Consequently a proof even from true. which the subject may share with another-and consequently they apply equally to subjects different in kind. e.premiss must be perishable and not commensurately universal (perishable because only if it is perishable will the conclusion be perishable. Such proofs are like Bryson’s method of squaring the circle.g. or else only differs from a demonstration in the order of its terms. Other subjects too have properties attaching to them in the same way as eclipse attaches to the moon. nothing can be demonstrated except from its ‘appropriate’ basic truths. clearly eternal: whereas so far as they are not eternal they are not fully commensurate. Demonstration and science of merely frequent occurrences-e. therefore. so that the conclusion can only be that a fact is true at the moment-not commensurately and universally. because the predicate will be predicable of some instances of the subject and not of others).g. indemonstrable. and as inferred from basic premisses essential and ‘appropriate’ to that subject: so that if that middle term also belongs essentially to the minor. of eclipse as happening to the moon-are.

common truths are such as ‘take equals from equals and equals remain’. for his knowledge is from prior premisses when it derives from causes themselves uncaused: hence. and some are common. being of use only in so far as they fall within the genus constituting the province of the science in question. or of arithmetical demonstrations to those of harmonics. Of the basic truths used in the demonstrative sciences some are peculiar to each science. with such exceptions as we have mentioned of the application of geometrical demonstrations to theorems in mechanics or optics. The fact of their existence as regards the primary truths must be assumed. which. We think we have scientific knowledge if we have reasoned from true and primary premisses. in the case of these sciences have the requisite identity of character. if he knows better than others or best of all. Peculiar truths are. in the case of the remainder proof is required.g. straight. however. but while as regards unity and magnitude we assume also the fact of their existence. demonstration is not transferable to another genus. As regards both these primary truths and the attributes dependent on them the meaning of the name is assumed. or by the 175 . It is hard to be sure whether one knows or not. for it is hard to be sure whether one’s knowledge is based on the basic truths appropriate to each attribute-the differentia of true knowledge. Thus we assume the meaning alike of unity. It is no less evident that the peculiar basic truths of each inhering attribute are indemonstrable. This is so because he knows better whose knowledge is deduced from higher causes. as things are. Only so much of these common truths is required as falls within the genus in question: for a truth of this kind will have the same force even if not used generally but applied by the geometer only to magnitudes. the attributes. But. his knowledge would be science in a higher or the highest degree. But that is not so: the conclusion must be homogeneous with the basic facts of the science. but it has to be proved of the remainder. the definitions of line and straight. e.from its ‘appropriate’ basic truths. 10 I call the basic truths of every genus those clements in it the existence of which cannot be proved. and triangular. but common only in the sense of analogous. and the science to which they belonged would possess universal sovereignty. for basic truths from which they might be deduced would be basic truths of all that is.

e. is addressed not to the spoken word. such as ‘Take equals from equals and equals remain’. Both the existence and the meaning of the subjects are assumed by these sciences. Also peculiar to a science are the subjects the existence as well as the meaning of which it assumes. e. the subject genus whose essential attributes it examines. the existence of hot and cold is more evident than that of number). relatively to the pupil. in arithmetic units. in geometry points and lines. if the pupil has no opinion or a contrary opinion on the matter. and the basic premisses. hypothesis. is well known and so not expressly assumed. to the inward discourse we cannot always object. and therefore a fortiori demonstration. That which expresses necessary self-grounded fact. but of their essential attributes only the meaning is assumed. The definition-viz. square and cube. the attributes. In the way the meaning of axioms. That which is capable of proof but assumed by the teacher without proof is. or we might omit to assume expressly the meaning of the attributes if it were well understood. because all syllogism. and this is not hypothesis-unless it be contended that the 176 . and the essential attributes of which it investigates. but to the discourse within the soul. (2) the so-called axioms. the meaning of which it assumes. For indeed every demonstrative science has three elements: (1) that which it posits. For example arithmetic assumes the meaning of odd and even. and which we must necessarily believe. (3) the attributes. those which are not expressed as statements that anything is or is not-are not hypotheses: but it is in the premisses of a science that its hypotheses are contained. though only in a limited sense hypothesis-that is. we might not expressly posit the existence of the genus if its existence were obvious (for instance. is distinct both from the hypotheses of a science and from illegitimate postulate-I say ‘must believe’. demonstrable. Definitions require only to be understood. whereas the existence of these attributes is demonstrated by means of the axioms and from previous conclusions as premisses. Yet some sciences may very well pass over some of these elements. Therein lies the distinction between hypothesis and illegitimate postulate: the latter is the contrary of the pupil’s opinion. Astronomy too proceeds in the same way. the same assumption is an illegitimate postulate.arithmetician only to numbers. or of deflection or verging of lines. which are primary premisses of its demonstration.g. but assumed and used without demonstration. geometry that of incommensurable. Nevertheless in the nature of the case the essential elements of demonstration are three: the subject. and though we can always raise objections to the spoken word.g. if the pupil believes and accepts it.

that there must be a single identical term unequivocally predicable of a number of individuals. so that the conclusion is not affected even if the middle is extended to cover the original middle term and also what is not the original middle term. the middle term goes witb. The truth is that the geometer does not draw any conclusion from the being of the particular line of which he speaks. however. The law that every predicate can be either truly affirmed or truly denied of every subject is posited by such demonstration as uses reductio ad impossibile. but of something other than the middle as well. The law that it is impossible to affirm and deny simultaneously the same predicate of the same subject is not expressly posited by any demonstration except when the conclusion also has to be expressed in that form. but it does necessarily imply the possibility of truly predicating one of many. that is. or again to the minor term. We conclude. if we add to the middle. and then not always universally. whereas a definition is neither.pupil’s hearing is also an hypothesis required by the teacher. of the genus-the genus. and so demonstration becomes impossible. it. The reason is that the major term is predicable not only of the middle. Nor are the geometer’s hypotheses false. urging that one must not employ falsehood and that the geometer is uttering falsehood in stating that the line which he draws is a foot long or straight. since without this possibility we cannot save the universal. and the conclusion follows: for it will still be true to say that Callias—even if it be also true to say that not-Callias—is animal and not not-animal. A further distinction is that all hypotheses and illegitimate postulates are either universal or particular. but from what his diagrams symbolize. as some have held. being of wider application. to which the man of science applies his 177 . Hypotheses. in which case the proof lays down as its major premiss that the major is truly affirmed of the middle but falsely denied. within the limits. then. It makes no difference. For grant a minor term of which it is true to predicate man-even if it be also true to predicate not-man of it—still grant simply that man is animal and not not-animal. and if the universal goes. but so far as it is requisite. I mean (as I have already explained). 11 So demonstration does not necessarily imply the being of Forms nor a One beside a Many. on the contrary. postulate facts on the being of which depends the being of the fact inferred. the corresponding negative. when it is actually neither.

If. Of the other sciences the like is true. One should therefore not discuss geometry among those who are not geometers.demonstrations. This is correspondingly true in the other sciences. The like is true of the other sciences. for the interrogative method is barred to the demonstrator. who cannot use the opposite facts to prove the same nexus. as such. such as optics. nor is each man of science bound to answer all inquiries on each several subject. In virtue of the common elements of demonstration-I mean the common axioms which are used as premisses of demonstration. not being confined to a single genus. and if each science has its peculiar propositions from which its peculiar conclusion is developed. is not bound to give any account. if he goes outside these he will be at fault. but only such as fall within the defined field of his own science. to the questions which we may put to each man of science. he is clearly to be applauded. and it is the interrogative form of the premisses from which the ‘appropriate’ conclusion of each science is developed. nor to medicine. nor to any other science: only those questions will be geometrical which form premisses for the proof of the theorems of geometry or of any other science. 12 If a syllogistic question is equivalent to a proposition embodying one of the two sides of a contradiction. Of these questions the geometer is bound to give his account. This was shown in my work on the syllogism. the law that the subtraction of equals from equals leaves equal remainders. or other axioms of the same kind. which uses the same basic truths as geometry. using the basic truths of geometry in conjunction with his previous conclusions. 178 . then. Hence it is clear that not every question will be relevant to geometry. and in communion with them all is dialectic and any science which might attempt a universal proof of axioms such as the law of excluded middle. in controversy with a geometer qua geometer the disputant confines himself to geometry and proves anything from geometrical premisses. then there is such a thing as a distinctively scientific question. and obviously cannot even refute the geometer except accidentally. then. not the subjects nor the attributes demonstrated as belonging to them-all the sciences have communion with one another. Otherwise its method would not be interrogative. Dialectic has no definite sphere of this kind. of the basic truths the geometer. There is a limit. for in such a company an unsound argument will pass unnoticed.

for premisses and conclusion would in 179 . since the syllogism proceeds from universals. Sometimes. is equivocal.Since there are ‘geometrical’ questions. either demonstrative or dialectical. he argues. see these middle terms with an intellectual vision. whereas the notion that parallels meet is in one sense geometrical. i. one should not bring an ‘objection’ against it. it is impossible to reason from premisses predicating mere attributes: but sometimes it is possible. since the major is predicated of the whole of the middle and the middle of the whole of the minor (the predicate of course never has the prefix ‘all’). because it is the middle term in which the ambiguity lies.g. E. meaning in the one case not geometry at all. If false premisses could never give true conclusions ‘resolution’ would be easy. In mathematics the formal fallacy is not so common. An instance of this is Caeneus’ proof that fire increases in geometrical proportion: ‘Fire’. If a proof has an inductive minor premiss. since premisses and ‘objections’ are so far the same that anything which can be validly advanced as an ‘objection’ must be such that it could take the form of a premiss. and in mathematics one can. in a geometrical controversy a musical question is distinctively ungeometrical.e. perhaps. is the erroneous conclusion one constructed from premisses opposite to the true premisses. which. and yet not exclude them from that science? Again. and so does geometrical proportion’.g. in each special science-geometry for instance-what kind of error is it that may vitiate questions. no doubt. but the minor premiss ‘Are epics circles?’ is shown by the diagram to be false. arguments formally illogical do sometimes occur through taking as middles mere attributes of the major and minor terms. or is it formal fallacy though drawn from geometrical premisses? Or. the erroneous conclusion is due to the drawing of premisses from another science. error based on premisses of this kind-’of’ the science but false-that is the contrary of science. For since every premiss must be applicable to a number of cases (otherwise it will not be true in every instance. On the other hand. ‘Is every circle a figure?’ A diagram shows that this is so. though the possibility is overlooked. in the other bad geometry? It is this error. so to speak. ‘increases rapidly. being ungeometrical in a different fashion: the reason being that ‘ungeometrical’. There is no syllogism so. while in dialectic the ambiguity may escape detection. but there is a syllogism if the most rapidly increasing proportion is geometrical and the most rapidly increasing proportion is attributable to fire in its motion. it must be). e. does it follow that there are also distinctively ‘ungeometrical’ questions? Further. then assuredly the same is true of an ‘objection’. like ‘unrhythmical’.

g. since they reciprocate. may be reversed. Reciprocation of premisses and conclusion is more frequent in mathematics. because they are near.g. since they are not near because they do not twinkle. Then A is predicable of E. so that we have demonstrated that the planets are near. but instead of the cause the better known of the two reciprocals is taken as the middle. Or the expansion may be lateral: e. Therefore A is a necessary predicate of C. let the existence of A imply such and such facts actually known to me to exist. B of C. But A is also predicable of B. A not twinkling.that case inevitably reciprocate. since that which does not twinkle is near—we must take this truth as having been reached by induction or sense-perception. I can now. but by the apposition of fresh extreme terms. C and E. but. then. may be proved of two minors. A proximity. B proximity. because mathematics takes definitions. Thus let A represent number-a number or number taken indeterminately. E. Thus (2) (a) you might prove as follows that the planets are near because they do not twinkle: let C be the planets. proves not the reasoned fact but only the fact. C any particular odd number. for of two reciprocally predicable terms the one which is not the cause may quite easily be the better known and so become the middle term of the demonstration. however. and so indefinitely. A is predicated of B. To begin with. Next let D represent determinate even number. B determinate odd number. We can then predicate A of C. infer A from B. Then B is an attribute of C. This syllogism. The major and middle of the proof. Then B is predicable of C. I might then argue thus: let A be an existing fact. one major A. for its premisses-a second characteristic distinguishing mathematical reasoning from dialectical disputations. Consequently A is predicable of C. they differ within the same science and in two ways: (1) when the premisses of the syllogism are not immediate (for then the proximate cause is not contained in them-a necessary condition of knowledge of the reasoned fact): (2) when the premisses are immediate. and the 180 . C of D. do not twinkle. A science expands not by the interposition of fresh middle terms. Thus: let C be the planets. and E even number. but never an accident. for the planets do not twinkle. which we may call B. and A-not twinkling-of B. 13 Knowledge of the fact differs from knowledge of the reasoned fact. and then the demonstration will be of the reasoned fact. B not twinkling.

mathematical and acoustical harmonics. the negation of x must cause y’s non-inherence. since its middle term is the proximate cause. but of no C. as in Anacharsis’ account of why the Scythians have no flute-players. harmonic problems to arithmetic. as when optical problems are subordinated to geometry. Thus: let A be animal. in cases where the cause and the effect are not reciprocal and the effect is the better known. the question ‘Why does not a wall breathe?’ might be answered. Such causes are like far-fetched explanations. e. This also occurs (1) when the middle falls outside the major and minor. according to the rule that if the negation of causes the non-inherence of y.g. but that answer would not give the strict cause. the affirmation of x causes the inherence of y. and conversely. and so the demonstration is of the fact. (Let C be the moon. the data of observation to astronomy. Thus: since that which so waxes is spherical. then being an animal should be the cause of respiration. clearly the moon is spherical. and A waxing. that is. do the syllogism of the fact and the syllogism of the reasoned fact differ within one science and according to the position of the middle terms. since the moon is not spherical because it waxes in a certain manner. B respiration. Another example is the inference that the moon is spherical from its manner of waxing. But there is another way too in which the fact and the reasoned fact differ. not of the reasoned fact. A syllogism with this kind of cause takes place in the second figure. for here too the strict cause is not given. namely because they have no vines. Put in this form. e. This occurs in the case of problems related to one another as subordinate and superior. (Some of these sciences bear almost the same name. then. the wall does not breathe. For example. which precisely consist in making the cause too remote. mechanical problems to stereometry. but waxes in such a manner because it is spherical. C wall. their proportion is the cause of health. and since the moon so waxes. but if the middle and major be reversed it is proof of the reasoned fact. the fact is demonstrated but not the reasoned fact.) Again (b).g. But in the case given this consequence does not result. ‘Because it is not an animal’. mathematical and nautical astronomy. Thus. if the assertion of x causes the inherence of y. and that is when they are investigated respectively by different sciences. Then A is predicable of all B (for all that breathes is animal). because if not being an animal causes the absence of respiration. B spherical. and consequently B is predicable of no C. for not every animal breathes. the syllogism turns out to be proof of the fact.syllogism proves the reasoned fact. if the disproportion of the hot and cold elements is the cause of ill health.) Here it is the 181 .

and knowledge of a thing’s essence must be affirmative. and practically all of all sciences that investigate causes: for the syllogism of the reasoned fact is either exclusively or generally speaking and in most cases in this figure-a second proof that this figure is the most scientific. geometry. for grasp of a reasoned conclusion is the primary condition of knowledge. For the mathematical sciences concern forms: they do not demonstrate properties of a substratum. knowledge of the reasoned fact within that of the optician. and are often ignorant of the fact: just as we have often a clear insight into a universal.g. but universally. These connexions have a perceptible existence though they are manifestations of forms. the geometer’s to know the reason why. 14 Of all the figures the most scientific is the first. man is not two-footed animal in any qualified sense. Thus. and have their intervals closepacked until immediate premisses are reached.business of the empirical observers to know the fact. e. and essence must have a universal character: e. the first figure has no need of the others. either qua optician or qua mathematical optician.g. but cannot be universal. medicine and geometry: it is the physician’s business to know that circular wounds heal more slowly. therefore. the first figure is the primary condition of knowledge. In the second figure no affirmative conclusion is possible. such as arithmetic. Finally. Here knowledge of the fact is within the province of the natural philosopher. since. even though the geometrical subjects are predicable as properties of a perceptible substratum. while in the third figure the conclusion can be affirmative. it is not as thus predicable that the mathematician demonstrates properties of them. Many sciences not standing in this mutual relation enter into it at points. the first is the only figure which enables us to pursue knowledge of the essence of a thing. As optics is related to geometry. so another science is related to optics. while it is by means of the first that the other two figures are developed. of the mathematicians to know the reasoned fact. 182 . namely the theory of the rainbow. but through lack of observation are ignorant of some of its particular instances. it is the vehicle of the demonstrations of all the mathematical sciences. Clearly. for the latter are in possession of the demonstrations giving the causes. and optics. Thirdly.

the series would not be mutually exclusive. either A or B indifferently. Or if it is B which has a genus D. one or other of them is bound to have a genus. for the syllogism will be either in the first or the second figure. neither A nor B has a genus and A does not inhere in B. or both A and B. if it were. no D is A. and we have stated when and how this is possible. 183 . If. since in that case the connexion or disconnexion will not be mediated by something other than the terms themselves.and if G-a term in the former series-is the genus of A. no B is C. That the genus of A need not be the genus of B and vice versa.15 Just as an attribute A may (as we saw) be atomically connected with a subject B. Thus: let C be the genus of A. on the other hand. therefore no B is A. If no term in the series ACD… is predicable of any term in the series BEF… . I call ‘atomic’ connexions or disconnexions which involve no intermediate term. but not if both premisses are negative. If it is in the first. so its disconnexion may be atomic. this disconnexion must be atomic. by syllogism. is shown by the existence of mutually exclusive coordinate series of predication. since syllogism is possible if either is contained in a negative premiss. if C is not the genus of B-for A may well have a genus which is not the genus of B-there will be a syllogism proving A’s disconnexion from B thus: all A is C. B will have a genus-for the premiss containing it must be affirmative: if in the second. It follows that if either A or B. and the proof will be similar if both A and B have a genus. have a genus. Hence it is clear that one thing may be atomically disconnected from another. So also if B has a genus. therefore no B is A. their disconnexion cannot be primary. Then. it will not be the genus of A. we have all B is D. since. If there be a middle term. clearly G will not be the genus of B.

supposing A atomically connected with both C and B. because when the same term is related atomically to more terms than one. the premiss C-B will always be false. both premisses will be false. A is related atomically to both C and B.g. cannot be an attribute of B. cannot have a genus. B having no genus. but the error resulting from inference-which here concerns us-takes many forms. Error of attribution. Thus. Here. for it may arise where one directly believes a connexion or disconnexion as well as where one’s belief is acquired by inference. (a) If neither A is an attribute of any C nor C of any B. The error. A-C may be true. the premiss A-C would 184 . then. of course. C-B false-A-C true because A is not an attribute of all things. (c) It may occur when both premisses are false. however. (C may quite well be so related to A and B that C is neither subordinate to A nor a universal attribute of B: for B. It is. both premisses are false. since A was said to be primarily disconnected from B. occurs through these causes and in this form only-for we found that no syllogism of universal attribution was possible in any figure but the first. may be false. whereas the contrary was posited in both cases. Consequently both premisses may be false. This may be either premiss indifferently. Either (a) both premisses. that consists in a direct belief is without complication. (b) one of the premisses may be true. e. let A be atomically disconnected from all B: then the conclusion inferred through a middle term C. which never has the attribute A. if it be then assumed that no C is and all B is C. will be a case of error produced by syllogism. while A-C may be true. or (b) one premiss only. Let us therefore first explain the various forms it takes in the first figure and the character of the premisses in each case. it is true. (d) It is also possible when one is false. (1) Let us first consider propositions asserting a predicate’s immediate connexion with or disconnexion from a subject.) On the other hand. for if C-B were true. C-B false because C. two cases are possible. that all B is A. an error of non-attribution may occur either in the first or in the second figure. and A need not necessarily be a universal attribute of all things. Now. This is the case if. for example.16 Ignorance-defined not as the negation of knowledge but as a positive state of mind-is error produced by inference. equally the case if A-C is not atomic. though not either indifferently but only the major A-C since. On the other hand. neither of those terms will belong to the other. positive error may befall one in alternative ways.

taken in this way. the conclusion will equally be false.g. not wholly. and if it be yet assumed that C is universally non-attributable to A. But this is impossible. On the other hand. C-B will be true but C-A false. for if it be an attribute of all A. there is nothing to prevent both premisses being partially false.no longer be true. no middle term can be with truth universally affirmed of one extreme and universally denied of the other: but premisses in which the middle is affirmed of one extreme and denied of the other are the necessary condition if one is to get a valid inference at all. The case is similar if the major is made the negative premiss. if both C and A contain B as genera. supposing that actually an attribute of all A must also be an attribute of all B. they are wholly false. e. one of them must be subordinate to the other. Or one premiss may be wholly false. C-A will be true but C-B false. for if it be an attribute of all B. and besides if both premisses were true. but if C be nevertheless assumed to be a universal attribute of A. Thus. then if it is premised that all A is C and no B is C. C-B may be true and A-C false. Or again. so that if the premiss takes the form No C is A. their contraries conversely should be wholly true. but a universal attribute of B. it will be false. but an attribute of no B. 185 . Again. This makes it clear that whether either or both premisses are false. The same is true if the major is made negative instead of the minor. e. which is contrary to supposition. if actually some A is C and some B is C. yet partially. the conclusion would be true.g. then the premiss C-B is true but the major is false. actually that which is an attribute of no B will not be an attribute of all A either. then if C is yet taken to be a universal attribute of all but universally non-attributable to B. both premisses are false. In the second figure the premisses cannot both be wholly false. it must be an attribute of some A. It is thus clear that in the case of atomic propositions erroneous inference will be possible not only when both premisses are false but also when only one is false. For in fact what is an attribute of no A will not be an attribute of any B either. false. Therefore if. it will also be an attribute of all B. the premiss C-A is true but the minor wholly false. for if all B is A. and it may be either of them. Again. in fact it is false to assume that that which is an attribute of all B is an attribute of no A. If then C is nevertheless assumed to be an attribute of all B but of no A.

C-A false. as we said 186 . and it may be either of them. suppose that actually all D is A but no B is D. C-A will be true. if C is actually an attribute of both A and B. D-B false-A-D true because A was not subordinate to D. however. a conclusion will follow and both of the new premisses will be false. as was stated before.17 In the case of attributes not atomically connected with or disconnected from their subjects. and so posited both become false: e. but is assumed to be an attribute of A only and not of B. We have stated when and through what kinds of premisses error will result in cases where the erroneous conclusion is negative. If the conclusion is affirmative. A-D always false. both premisses must be false. there can be no middle predicable of all of one extreme and of none of the other. for it is by a change in the quality of A-C that the conclusion becomes its contradictory-i. may be false. since to produce a conclusion the premiss C-B must be taken affirmatively. but the quality of A-D must be changed. Thus. Thus. since if B is subordinate to A. D-B false because if it had been true. it is clear that this premiss must always be true. But the major A-C is false. When. One premiss. (ii) the middle D is not subordinate to A. true. both premisses cannot be entirely false.g. A-D will be true. for its quality is not changed.g. Then the premiss D-B must remain unchanged. the true-conclusion is inferrible. C-B will be true. e. let A be attributable to B through a middle term C: then. however.e. but it is ex hypothesi false. By ‘appropriate middle’ I mean the middle term through which the contradictory-i. Similarly (ii) if the middle is taken from another series of predication. then if these premisses are changed in quality. (a) (i) as long as the false conclusion is inferred through the ‘appropriate’ middle. Such error is practically identical with that which is inferred through the ‘appropriate’ middle. C-B false: or again if C be assumed to be attributable to B but to no A. because if there is to be a conclusion both must be posited as asserting the contrary of what is actually the fact. the conclusion too would have been true. In this case both premisses cannot be false since. (a) (i) it may be inferred through the ‘appropriate’ middle term. On the other hand. (b) if the conclusion is not inferred through the ‘appropriate’ middle-(i) when the middle is subordinate to A but is predicable of no B. only the major and not both premisses can be false.e. suppose D to be not only contained within A as a part within its whole but also predicable of all B. so that D-B is always true. When the erroneous inference is in the second figure.

will always be false. since it is affirmed. For it is sense-perception alone which is adequate for grasping the particulars: they cannot be objects of scientific knowledge. only because each subject genus possesses. and D of no B.g. nor can we get it through induction without senseperception. not only both premisses but either singly may be false. however. and that. 187 . the quality of which is changed. in virtue of a determinate mathematical character. C-B must remain unchanged if there is to be a conclusion. obviously A-D. It emerges. Thus demonstration develops from universals. Equally well A may be an attribute of no D. whereas all B is D. and the type of error is the same as before. induction from particulars. as was stated to be the case also with regard to negative error. But induction is impossible for those who have not sense-perception.before. that if the middle term is not subordinate to the major. Then (i) if D is subordinate to A. this knowledge cannot be acquired. e. while D-B may be either true or false. (b) The middle may be inappropriate. will always be false. all music is science. no science is animal. because neither can universals give us knowledge of them without induction. 18 It is also clear that the loss of any one of the senses entails the loss of a corresponding portion of knowledge. but since it is possible to familiarize the pupil with even the so-called mathematical abstractions only through induction-i. If. for A may very well be an attribute of no D. This is equally true if (ii) the middle is taken from another series of predication. since we learn either by induction or by demonstration. A-D will be true. while the quality of A-D must be converted.e. Thus we have made it clear how many varieties of erroneous inference are liable to happen and through what kinds of premisses they occur. but D-B false. since A may quite well be predicable of several terms no one of which can be subordinated to another. and consequently A-C. in the case both of immediate and of demonstrable truths. then. for D-B must remain unchanged. certain properties which can be treated as separate even though they do not exist in isolation-it is consequently impossible to come to grasp universals except through induction. (ii) D is not subordinate to A.

which is not the same mode of predication as when we say ‘The man is white’: the man is white not because he is something else but because he is man. so that B-C is immediate. and F to B. and between these again fresh middles. can these proceed to infinity or can they not? This is the equivalent of inquiring. One kind of syllogism serves to prove that A inheres in C by showing that A inheres in B and B in C. or can it proceed to infinity? The second question is as follows: Suppose nothing is essentially predicated of A. is it possible to start from that which is not itself attributable to anything else but is the subject of attributes. but the white is man because ‘being white’ coincides with ‘humanity’ within one substratum-therefore there are terms such as are naturally subjects of predicates. Assume them as they have been stated. that these are the fundamentals and so-called hypotheses of syllogism. C such a term not itself attributable to anything else as to a subject. and proof is bound to followproof that A inheres in C through B. that is. The first question is. then must this series also terminate. and suppose H similarly related to G and G to B. but A is predicated primarily of H and of no intermediate prior term. in the sense in which we say ‘That white (thing) is a man’. It is clear. can there be an infinity of middles? I mean this: suppose for example that A inheres in C and B is intermediate between them. and ascend to infinity? The second is the problem whether one can start from that which is a predicate but not itself a subject of predicates. one can reason through it and complete a dialectical syllogism. and descend to infinity? A third question is. If our reasoning aims at gaining credence and so is merely dialectical. then. If. then. one is aiming at truth.19 Every syllogism is effected by means of three terms. if the extreme terms are fixed. while the other denies one term of another. and again that A inheres in B through some other middle term. one must be guided by the real connexions of subjects and attributes. the other is negative and one of its premisses asserts one term of another. or can it too proceed to infinity? There is this much difference between the questions: the first is. but between B and A there are other middles. but the proximate subject of the attribute B—i. do 188 . it is obvious that we have only to see that our inference is based on premisses as credible as possible: so that if a middle term between A and B is credible though not real. Suppose. suppose further E related immediately to F. Thus: since there are attributes which are predicated of a subject essentially or naturally and not coincidentally-not. and similarly that B inheres in C. must this series terminate.e. however.

189 . by ‘downward’ the descent to the more particular). and equally. then clearly you might descend from and find one term predicated of another ad infinitum. indeed. there are infinite terms between you and A. The same questions arise. i.e. it is clear that if the predications terminate in both the upward and the downward direction (by ‘upward’ I mean the ascent to the more universal. then either this predication will be primary. which is attributable to all Band there may still be another term H prior to G. the middle terms cannot be infinite in number. for the succeeding terms in any case are infinite in number. because in these cases too either the series of prior terms to which a is not attributable is infinite or it terminates. the terms can reciprocate by two different modes. seeing that all the reciprocals qua subjects stand in the same relation to one another. since you have an infinity of terms between you and F. is everything demonstrable? Or do ultimate subject and primary attribute limit one another? I hold that the same questions arise with regard to negative conclusions and premisses: viz. 20 Now. since when subject and predicate are convertible there is neither primary nor ultimate subject. For suppose that A is predicated of F. whether we say that the subject has an infinity of attributes or that both subjects and attributes-and we raised the question in both cases-are infinite in number. It follows that if these processes are impossible there cannot be an infinity of intermediates between A and F.demonstrations proceed to infinity. while others cannot be taken into the argument at all: whichever terms of the series B… I take. whether from the first term or from a later one. the number of intermediates in the direction either of A or of F must be finite or infinite: where the infinite series starts. These questions then cannot be asked-unless. if A is attributable to no B. I say. or there will be an intermediate term prior to B to which a is not attributable-G. let us say. One cannot ask the same questions in the case of reciprocating terms. if you ascend from F. by accidental predication in one relation and natural predication in the other. which is attributable to all G. is of no moment. and that the intermediates-call them BB’B”… -are infinite. Nor is it of any effect to urge that some terms of the series AB… F are contiguous so as to exclude intermediates.

Consequently. But since it is assumed that the series of descending subjects also terminates. we shall take as premisses. Next. i.. no C is B. but employs them all and is now in the first figure. Therefore. If we use the third figure. since it is required that B should be a subject of which a predicate is affirmed. since D is to be proved not to belong to C. if in affirmative demonstration the series terminates in both directions. the descent will also terminate and there will be a subject of which A is primarily non-predicable. all C is B. If proof of this is required. since the ascending series is finite. In the first and second figures the series terminates. and if the major is denied of yet another term prior to D. no C is D… . since the succession of predicates affirmed of an ever higher universal terminates. The third figure shows it as follows: all B is A. In the second figure the syllogism is. This premiss. the succession of predicates denied terminates too. all E is B. plainly the series of more universal non-predicables will terminate also. D will have to be predicable of all B. Let us assume that we cannot proceed to infinity either by ascending from the ultimate term (by ‘ultimate term’ I mean a term such as was. As regards the other premiss it is plain that if the major term is denied of a term D prior to B. Even supposing that the proof is not confined to one method. C-B. all A is B. clearly it will terminate too in negative demonstration. some B is not C. will be proved either in the same figure or in one of the two figures discussed above.e.. In packing the interval B-C we must reach immediate propositions—as is always the case with the minor premiss—since B-C is affirmative. this term must be predicable of all D. If this assumption is justified. Therefore some A is not C. some E is not C. plainly it may be shown either in the first figure as above. and we will proceed to display the second. or by descending towards an ultimate from the primary term (by ‘primary term’ I mean a term predicable of a subject but not itself a subject). proof by which will be as follows: all B is D. then D has a further predicate which is denied of C. For a negative conclusion can be proved in all three figures. in the second as here. and this premiss again will be proved by a similar prosyllogism. the series will also terminate in the case of negation. not itself attributable to a subject but itself the subject of attributes). In the first figure it is proved thus: no B is A.21 Further. or in the third. The first figure has been discussed. now in the second or third-even so the regress will 190 .no C is A.

if it does so also in the case of affirmative demonstration. or again. Predicates 191 . predicates constituting a thing’s essential nature must be finite in number. or that it is in some way qualified. if essential form is knowable. quantified. When I affirm ‘the white is a log’. the predicate must affirm of the subject either some element constituting its essential nature. active. We shall assume. (1) We can affirm without falsehood ‘the white (thing) is walking’. ‘the log is big’. that the predicate is invariably predicated strictly and not accidentally of the subject. then. and the white (thing) is consequently not a log except incidentally. for on such predication demonstrations depend for their force. essentially related. That in fact the regress terminates in both these cases may be made clear by the following dialectical considerations. and that big (thing) is a log’. I mean that something which happens to be white is a log-not that white is the substratum in which log inheres. seeing that if definition is possible.’ which would mean ‘the man who happens also to be a musician is white’). it clearly terminates. let us entitle the latter kind of statement predication. on the contrary. (2) Predicates which signify substance signify that the subject is identical with the predicate or with a species of the predicate. But the affirmation differs in the two cases. 22 In the case of predicates constituting the essential nature of a thing. and an infinite series cannot be traversed. passive. and did so qua wood or qua a species of wood and qua nothing else.terminate. or not strict but accidental predication. On the other hand. for the methods are finite in number. or dated. or in other words. I do not mean that something else. ‘White’ and ‘log’ will thus serve as types respectively of predicate and subject. Thus it is plain that the regress of middles terminates in the case of negative demonstration. the result must be finite. is white (as I should if I said ‘the musician is white. If we must lay down a rule. and ‘the man walks’. and the former not predication at all. log is here the substratum-the substratum which actually came to be white. It follows from this that when a single attribute is predicated of a single subject. for it was not qua white or qua a species of white that the white (thing) came to be a log. and if finite things are combined in a finite number of ways. which happens also to be a log. when I affirm ‘the log is white’. But as regards predicates generally we have the following prefatory remarks to make. placed.

g. for every predication must exhibit its subject as somehow qualified. and an infinite series cannot be traversed in thought: consequently neither the ascent nor the descent is infinite. subject as an element of its essential nature. man of Callias. neither the series. and even if there are such things. Callias of a further. For all such substance is definable. e. acting or suffering. These predicates which do not signify substance must be predicates of some other subject.not signifying substance which are predicated of a subject not identical with themselves or with a species of themselves are accidental or coincidental. Hence they will not be predicated each as the genus of the other. seeing that man is not identical with white or a species of white. white is a coincident of man. or else is an element in its substantial nature: these latter are limited in number. e. (3) If A is a quality of B. and secondly that predicates which are not substantial are not predicated of one another. since a substance whose predicates were infinite would not be definable. We assume this because such predicates are 192 . Therefore A and B cannot be predicated reciprocally of one another in strict predication: they can be affirmed without falsehood of one another. for this would equate a genus with one of its own species. but rather with animal. B cannot be a quality of A-a quality of a quality. &c. Nor (the other alternative) can a quale be reciprocally predicated of a quale. B would become the genus or differentia of A-the predicate now become subject. nor the series predicating animal of man. and nothing can be white which is not also other than white.g. On the other hand-in proof of the impossibility of an infinite ascending series-every predication displays the subject as somehow qualified or quantified or as characterized under one of the other adjectival categories. or in some place or at some time. except by accidental predication. they are not relevant to our discussion. essentially related. I assume first that predication implies a single subject and a single attribute.e. i. since man is identical with a species of animal. quantified. since demonstrations are concerned with predicates such as we have defined. For one alternative is that they should be substantially predicated of one another. The Forms we can dispense with.. but not genuinely predicated of each other. and the number of the widest kinds under which predications fall is also limited. But it has been shown that in these substantial predications neither the ascending predicates nor the descending subjects form an infinite series. nor any term belonging to an adjectival category of another such term. for they are mere sound without sense. for all such predicates are coincidents and are predicated of substances. is infinite. man is biped. biped is animal.

but an analytic process will show more briefly that neither the ascent nor the 193 . nor can one know them without demonstration. Predicates so related to their subjects that there are other predicates prior to them predicable of those subjects are demonstrable. we shall not know them by demonstration. yet we maintain that all of them alike are predicated of some substratum and that a coincident is never a substratum-since we do not class as a coincident anything which does not owe its designation to its being something other than itself. premisses prior to it) and we neither know this antecedent nor have something better than knowledge of it. an alternative proof follows. If it does not terminate. since these demonstrable predicates are infinite in number and therefore cannot be traversed. and beyond any predicate taken as higher than another there remains another still higher. if it is possible through demonstration to know anything without qualification and not merely as dependent on the acceptance of certain premisses-i. then we shall not have scientific knowledge of the consequent. The argument we have given is one of the so-called proofs. and that another group of coincidents may have a different substratum. others of a different type. We conclude that there is a given subject (D) of which some attribute (C) is primarily predicable. we cannot through demonstration have unqualified but only hypothetical science of anything. that there must be an attribute (B) primarily predicable of the first attribute. while in the ascending series are contained those constitutive elements with their coincidents-both of which are finite. For the subjects of which coincidents are predicated are as many as the constitutive elements of each individual substance.e. then every predicate is demonstrable. and of which no term prior to it is predicable. neither the ascending nor the descending series of predication in which a single attribute is predicated of a single subject is infinite. but of demonstrable propositions one cannot have something better than knowledge. but always hold that any coincident is predicated of some substratum other than itself. and though some are essential coincidents. hypothetically-the series of intermediate predications must terminate.all coincidents. therefore. and these we have seen are not infinite in number. Subject to these assumptions then. we have not something better than knowledge of them. Secondly. As dialectical proofs of our contention these may carry conviction. Consequently. if a consequent is only known through an antecedent (viz. and that the series must end with a term (A) not predicable of any term prior to the last subject of which it was predicated (B). If. Therefore.

for this would mean the inherence in odd of another attribute of odd in whose nature odd was an essential element: but then number will be an ultimate subject of the whole infinite chain of attributes. its attributes in number and number in them-as to be commensurate with the subject and not of wider extent. multiplicity or the indivisible. and of this fact. which are elements in the definition of number. An example of the latter is odd as an attribute of number-though it is number’s attribute. Hence. and that the contention of some-referred to at the outset-that all truths are demonstrable is mistaken. of a fresh term. This is true because a conclusion is demonstrated by the interposition. it would mean that no interval was immediate and indivisible. the ascending series will terminate. it follows that the intermediates between any two terms are also always limited in number. which before was shown dialectically.descent of predication can be infinite in the demonstrative sciences which are the object of our investigation. that all such attributes must so inhere in the ultimate subject-e. and be an element in the definition of each of them. Note. but this is impossible if both the ascending and descending series of predication terminate. if all the attributes predicated are essential and these cannot be infinite. yet number itself is an element in the definition of odd. moreover. since if either (a) or (b) were not a fact. and consequently the descending series too. analytic proof has now been given. the ascending series is equally finite. Attributes which are essential elements in the nature of their subjects are equally finite: otherwise definition would be impossible. An immediately obvious consequence of this is that demonstrations necessarily involve basic truths. and (b) an infinite regress is impossible. (a) not all truths are demonstrable. since an infinity of attributes such as contain their subject in their definition cannot inhere in a single thing. not the apposition. If such interposition could continue to infinity there might be an infinite number of terms between any two terms. They are not infinite where each is related to the term below it as odd is to number. of the former. Demonstration proves the inherence of essential attributes in things. or because their subjects are elements in their essential nature. but that all intervals were divisible. Hence. Now attributes may be essential for two reasons: either because they are elements in the essential nature of their subjects. If this is so. 194 .g. In neither kind of attribution can the terms be infinite. For if there are basic truths.

so that between two terms an infinity of intermediates would fall-an impossibility. it does not always belong to them in virtue of a common middle term. moreover. and as there are some indemonstrable basic truths asserting that ‘this is that’ or that ‘this inheres in that’. of one another. this can be demonstrated if there is a middle term. Similarly if A does not inhere in B. the ‘elements’ of such a conclusion are the premisses containing the middle in question. It is also clear that when A inheres in B. But this is not always the case: for. clearly B would inhere in C and D through a second common middle. since it is propositions containing these middle terms that are the basic premisses on which the demonstration rests. so there are others denying that ‘this is that’ or that ‘this inheres in that’-in fact some basic truths will affirm and some will deny being. Further. Thus it need not always be in virtue of a common middle term that a single attribute inheres in several subjects. no proposition or attribute 195 . were it so. there is no middle term. and then suppose A similarly predicable of C. If we proceed in this manner. we must take a primary essential predicate-suppose it C-of the subject B. and not in so far as they differ from one another. since there must be immediate intervals. demonstration ceases to be possible: we are on the way to the basic truths. as many ‘elements’ of the demonstrated conclusion as there are middle terms. or not of all instances. There are. the middle terms involved must be within one subject genus and be derived from the same group of immediate premisses. Isosceles and scalene possess the attribute of having their angles equal to two right angles in virtue of a common middle. seeing that the immediate propositions-or at least such immediate propositions as are universal-are the ‘elements’.23 It is an evident corollary of these conclusions that if the same attribute A inheres in two terms C and D predicable either not at all. on the other hand. and they are identical in number with the middle terms. When we are to prove a conclusion. Yet if the attribute to be proved common to two subjects is to be one of their essential attributes. this can be demonstrated if there is a middle term or a term prior to B in which A does not inhere: otherwise there is no demonstration and a basic truth is reached. If. for they possess it in so far as they are both a certain kind of figure. if we take B as the common middle in virtue of which A inheres in C and D. and this in turn would inhere in C and D through a third. for we have seen that processes of proof cannot pass from one genus to another.

since the immediate premiss alone is a single premiss in the unqualified sense of ‘single’. e. and this procedure will never vary. 24 Since demonstrations may be either commensurately universal or particular. and when we have cleared up this problem proceed to discuss ‘direct’ demonstration and reductio ad impossibile. and so on—so in syllogism the unit is an immediate premiss. proves only that something else is 196 . But commensurately universal demonstration. e.which falls beyond A is admitted in the proof: the interval is constantly condensed until subject and predicate become indivisible. (3) In the third figure the middle will never fall beyond the limits of the subject and the attribute denied of it.e. (1) The superior demonstration is the demonstration which gives us greater knowledge (for this is the ideal of demonstration). is C. no C is A. in music the quarter-tone. one. instead of proving that the subject itself actually is x. the question arises. In syllogisms. a middle must be found between and C. then. We have our unit when the premiss becomes immediate. or not all E. Then if it has to be proved that no C is A. which prove the inherence of an attribute. we know Coriscus the musician better when we know that Coriscus is musical than when we know only that man is musical. then the middle will never fall beyond E. (1) in the first figure nothing falls outside the major term whose inherence is in question. which form is the better? And the same question may be put in regard to socalled ‘direct’ demonstration and reductio ad impossibile. (2) If we have to show that E is not D by means of the premisses. to prove through a middle C that A does not inhere in B the premisses required are. and E is the subject of which D is to be denied in the conclusion. i. no E. all D is C. and we have greater knowledge of a particular individual when we know it in itself than when we know it through something else. In the case of negative syllogisms on the other hand. And as in other spheres the basic element is simple but not identical in all-in a system of weight it is the mina.g. and a like argument holds in all other cases.g. Let us first examine the commensurately universal and the particular forms. nothing falls outside the major term. and in the knowledge that demonstration gives it is an intuition. and either affirmative or negative. all B is C. The following considerations might lead some minds to prefer particular demonstration.

then. and the inference is that commensurate and universal is superior to particular demonstration. To sum up the whole matter: if a subject is proved to possess qua triangle an attribute which it does not in fact possess qua triangle. Demonstration nevertheless creates the opinion that its function is conditioned by something like this-some separate entity belonging to the real world. If equality to two right angles is attributable to its subject not qua isosceles but qua triangle. over against particular triangles. (1) The first argument applies no more to commensurate and universal than to particular demonstration. solid. possesses an attribute is superior. it will follow that commensurate and universal is inferior to particular demonstration. figures. and less touches reality than does particular demonstration. 197 . it is isosceles qua triangle and not triangle qua isosceles which has its angles so related. as such. it proves not that isosceles but only that triangle is x—whereas particular demonstration proves that the subject itself is x. that. to a less degree than he who knows that triangle has that attribute. the term is not equivocal-and since equality to two right angles belongs to all triangles. If this is so. that a subject.e. then. such a proof is characteristically commensurate and universal. Since. and numbers. Now commensurately universal demonstration is of the latter kind: if we engage in it we find ourselves reasoning after a fashion well illustrated by the argument that the proportionate is what answers to the definition of some entity which is neither line. he who knows that isosceles possesses that attribute knows the subject as qua itself possessing the attribute. (2) The universal has not a separate being over against groups of singulars. nor plane. of triangle or of figure or number. for instance. But demonstration which touches the real and will not mislead is superior to that which moves among unrealities and is delusory. but a proportionate apart from all these. particular demonstration is superior. in attempting to prove that isosceles is x. triangle is the wider term. and creates a false opinion. then. that is not demonstration: but if it does possess it qua triangle the rule applies that the greater knowledge is his who knows the subject as possessing its attribute qua that in virtue of which it actually does possess it. number. The demonstration.x—e. It follows that he who knows a connexion universally has greater knowledge of it as it in fact is than he who knows the particular. and there is one identical definition of triangle-i. We may retort thus. Since.g. and if the particular rather than the commensurately universal forms demonstrates.

(5) Our search for the reason ceases. the blame rests not with the demonstration but with the hearer. i. where the predicate signifies not substance but quality. viz. when we learn that exterior angles are equal to four right angles because they are the exterior angles of an isosceles. and the commensurate universal is primary. If. when the coming to be or existence of the fact before us is not due to the coming to be or existence of some other fact.’ When in this regress we can no longer find an efficient or final cause.e. all causes and reasons are alike in this respect. hence the commensurate universal is the cause). or action. and it is rather the commensurate universal than the particular which is causative (as may be shown thus: that which possesses an attribute through its own essential nature is itself the cause of the inherence. we regard the last step of it as the end of the comingor being or coming to be-and we regard ourselves as then only having full knowledge of the reason why he came.’ If rectilinear figure possesses the property for no further reason. (3) Because the universal has a single meaning. that is the reasoned fact. inasmuch as it is universals which comprise the imperishable.(2) If there is a single identical definition i. If such a supposition is entertained. it follows that in the case of the other causes also full knowledge is attained when an attribute no longer inheres because of something else. (4) Demonstration is syllogism that proves the cause. then. Thus: ‘Why did he come?’ ‘To get the money-wherewith to pay a debt-that he might thereby do what was right. if the commensurate universal is unequivocal-then the universal will possess being not less but more than some of the particulars. we are not therefore compelled to suppose that in these examples it has being as a substance apart from its particulars-any more than we need make a similar supposition in the other cases of unequivocal universal predication. essential relatedness. Consequently commensurately universal demonstration is superior as more especially proving the cause.e. the reasoned fact. Thus. particulars that tend to perish. there still remains the question ‘Why has isosceles this attribute?’ and its answer ‘Because it is a triangle. and we think that we know. at this point we have full knowledge-but at this point our 198 . for the last step of a search thus conducted is eo ipso the end and limit of the problem. and if this is the means to full knowledge in the case of final causes such as we have exemplified. and a triangle has it because a triangle is a rectilinear figure.

a prior and a posterior. and is therefore superior. even if one does not know that the isosceles is a triangle. however. But objects so far as they are an indeterminate manifold are unintelligible. proof from the basic truth is more accurate than proof not so derived. we have a kind of knowledge-a potential grasp-of the posterior as well. Moreover. He who possesses commensurately universal demonstration knows the particular as well. (6) The more demonstration becomes particular the more it sinks into an indeterminate manifold. we have a grasp of the prior. so far as they are determinate. of the more demonstrable there will be fuller demonstration. one knows in a sense-potentially-that the isosceles’ angles also are equal to two right angles. are dialectical. commensurately universal demonstration is 199 . is the superior. if A had to be proved to inhere in D. If. being more truly demonstration. Hence the commensurate and universal form. (7) Demonstration which teaches two things is preferable to demonstration which teaches only one. while universal demonstration tends to the simple and determinate. and so we conclude that commensurately universal demonstration is superior. But commensurately universal demonstration is characterized by this closer dependence. The clearest indication of the precedence of commensurately universal demonstration is as follows: if of two propositions. B being the higher term would render the demonstration which it mediated the more universal. And there is yet this further argument: (8) Proof becomes more and more proof of the commensurate universal as its middle term approaches nearer to the basic truth. Thus. but to grasp this posterior proposition is by no means to know the commensurate universal either potentially or actually. and the middles were B and C. if one knows that the angles of all triangles are equal to two right angles. intelligible: they are therefore intelligible rather in so far as they are universal than in so far as they are particular. From this it follows that universals are more demonstrable: but since relative and correlative increase concomitantly. and nothing is so near as the immediate premiss which is itself the basic truth. demonstration which depends more closely on it is more accurate than demonstration which is less closely dependent.knowledge has become commensurately universal. but he who possesses particular demonstration does not know the universal. For example. So that this is an additional reason for preferring commensurately universal demonstration. then. Some of these arguments.

Then A-D is known to the same degree as A-E (in the second proof). The argument implied in our contention that demonstration from fewer assumptions is superior may be set out in universal form as follows. since A-E is proved through A-D. but A-D is better known than and prior to A-E (in the first proof). Let us interpose D between A and B. Hence demonstration by fewer premisses is ceteris paribus superior. Thus there proves to be a single negative premiss. (1) We may assume the superiority ceteris paribus of the demonstration which derives from fewer postulates or hypotheses-in short from fewer premisses. In the further prosyllogisms too it is the same. where they are fewer knowledge will be more speedily acquired. (2) It has been proved that no conclusion follows if both premisses are negative. the other through F and G. particular demonstration issues in sense-perception. and all C is B. the one proving it through the middles B. and the ground is more certain than the conclusion. the affirmative premisses must increase in number. 25 The preceding arguments constitute our defence of the superiority of commensurately universal to particular demonstration. Then if both the premisses are to be again expanded. C and D. we may suppose two demonstrations of the inherence of A in E. because in the terms of an affirmative syllogism the middle is 200 . That affirmative demonstration excels negative may be shown as follows. for. given that all these are equally well known. A-D. for all B is D. while D is affirmatively related to B but negatively to A. suppose no B is A. but there must be no D which is A. and that middles which are prior are better known than such as are posterior. the latter assumes both that something is and that something else is not. and that is a desideratum.through and through intelligible. the other affirmative. and thus operating through more kinds of premiss is inferior. Thus. Then clearly E is affirmatively related to B and C. Assuming that in both cases alike the middle terms are known. Now both affirmative and negative demonstration operate through three terms and two premisses. but that one must be negative. but whereas the former assumes only that something is. a middle must be interposed. and E between B and C. but there cannot be more than one negative premiss in each complete proof. So we are compelled to lay down the following additional rule: as the demonstration expands.

If these premisses are assumed. and if the negative proposition is proved through the affirmative and not vice versa. All the same the proposition denying A of B is. in a negative syllogism it must be negatively related only to one of them. it is clearly superior also to reductio ad impossibile. will be superior. Supposing we are to prove that does not inhere in B. When the falsity of the conclusion is the better known. when the major premiss of the syllogism is the more obvious. that through which a truth is proved is a better known and more certain truth. If. A’s inherence in B is impossible. the one denying A of B or the one denying A of C. for premisses are prior to the conclusion which follows from them. and we then infer that A cannot inhere in B. and so this negation comes to be a single negative premiss. affirmative demonstration. and further that B inheres in C. This we have to suppose a known and admitted impossibility. we have to assume that it does inhere. in the order of being. (3) The basic truth of demonstrative syllogism is the universal immediate premiss. on the other hand. just as being is prior to not-being). (4) Affirmative demonstration is more of the nature of a basic form of proof. It follows that the basic premiss of affirmative demonstration is superior to that of negative demonstration. we use reductio ad impossible. being prior and better known and more certain. and ‘no C is A’ is the conclusion. we use direct demonstration. with the resulting inference that A inheres in C. Let us suppose that no B is A. and the demonstration which uses superior basic premisses is superior. then. proceeds as follows. prior to that denying A of C. the other premisses being affirmative. therefore. ‘no B is 201 . because it is a sine qua non of negative demonstration. We must first make certain what is the difference between negative demonstration and reductio ad impossibile. Reductio ad impossibile. and that all C is B: the conclusion necessarily follows that no C is A. and the universal premiss asserts in affirmative demonstration and in negative denies: and the affirmative proposition is prior to and better known than the negative (since affirmation explains denial and is prior to denial. the negative demonstration that no C is A is direct.always related affirmatively to both extremes. Thus if the inherence of B in C is not questioned. 26 Since affirmative demonstration is superior to negative. The order of the terms is the same in both proofs: they differ according to which of the negative propositions is the better known.

Now the superior demonstration is that which proceeds from better known and prior premisses. Therefore negative demonstration will have an unqualified superiority to reductio ad impossibile. A science such as arithmetic. For the destructive result of reductio ad impossibile is not a proper conclusion.A’ one of its premisses. the latter contains an additional element. and similarly a science like arithmetic. all the subjects constituted out of the primary entities of the genus-i. 28 A single science is one whose domain is a single genus. One science differs from another when their basic truths have neither a common source nor are derived those of the one science from those the other. nor are its antecedents proper premisses.e. which is constituted of fewer basic elements. which requires additional elements. yet the source of the one is prior to that of the other. are homogeneous. which is not a science of properties qua inhering in a substratum. is more exact than and prior to geometry. is more exact than and prior to a science like harmonics. viz.operties inhering in a substratum. which is a science of pr. whereas the premisses A-C and A-B are not thus related to one another. is the more exact and the prior science. for they must be within one genus with its conclusions: and this again is verified if the conclusions proved by means of them fall within one genus-i.e. On the contrary: the constituents of syllogism are premisses related to one another as whole to part or part to whole. will consequently be superior also to reductio ad impossibile. the parts of this total subject-and their essential properties. and while both these forms depend for credence on the not-being of something. while a point is substance with position. being superior to negative. not of the fact by itself without the reasoned fact. This is verified when we reach the indemonstrable premisses of a science. 27 The science which is knowledge at once of the fact and of the reasoned fact. What I mean by ‘additional elements’ is this: a unit is substance without position. and affirmative demonstration. 202 .

Seeing.29 One can have several demonstrations of the same connexion not only by taking from the same series of predication middles which are other than the immediately cohering term e. Consequently. and G relaxation. the conclusion being necessary if the premisses are necessary and general if the premisses are general. if chance conjunctions are neither general nor necessary. A further point worth investigating is how many ways of proving the same conclusion can be obtained by varying the figure.e. Even if perception as a faculty is of ‘the such’ and not merely of a ‘this somewhat’. they are not demonstrable. 30 There is no knowledge by demonstration of chance conjunctions. We can then without falsehood predicate D of B and A of D. it would not be commensurately universal-the term we apply to what is always and everywhere. and that which alters a property changes. for all reasoning proceeds from necessary or general premisses. we 203 . D. that demonstrations are commensurately universal and universals imperceptible.g. yet one must at any rate actually perceive a ‘this somewhat’. So the conclusion can be drawn through middles which are different. for to feel pleasure is to relax. for they must both be attributable to some one subject. we clearly cannot obtain scientific knowledge by the act of perception: nay. i. Now demonstration is concerned only with one or other of these two. D alteration of a property. B feeling pleasure. we can predicate A of G without falsehood. and G of B. for chance conjunctions exist neither by necessity nor as general connexions but comprise what comes to be as something distinct from these. it is obvious that even if it were possible to perceive that a triangle has its angles equal to two right angles. by taking C. therefore. Thus let A be change. Again. if it were. not in the same series-yet not so that neither of these middles is predicable of the other. 31 Scientific knowledge is not possible through the act of perception. and to relax is to change. and F severally to prove A-B—but also by taking a middle from another series. since it is not ‘this’ and it is not ‘now’. for he who is pleased suffers alteration of a property. and at a definite present place and time: but that which is commensurately universal and true in all cases one cannot perceive.

unless the term perception is applied to the possession of scientific knowledge through demonstration. if.should still be looking for a demonstration-we should not (as some say) possess knowledge of it. and 204 . both A-B and B-C being false. yet this occurs once only-I mean if A for instance. they will be false because every conclusion which is a falsehood has false premisses. but because we should have elicited the universal from seeing. we saw the pores in the glass and the light passing through. while true conclusions have true premisses. the middle. is false. deny that by watching the frequent recurrence of this event we might. possess a demonstration. not because in seeing we should be knowing. e. for perception must be of a particular. This may be shown first of all by the following dialectical considerations. for example. and false and true differ in kind. The commensurate universal is precious because it makes clear the cause. (1) Some syllogisms are true and some false: for though a true inference is possible from false premisses. and saw the earth shutting out the sun’s light. whereas scientific knowledge involves the recognition of the commensurate universal. so that in the case of facts like these which have a cause other than themselves universal knowledge is more precious than sense-perceptions and than intuition. for the commensurate universal is elicited from the several groups of singulars. is truly predicable of C. Nevertheless certain points do arise with regard to connexions to be proved which are referred for their explanation to a failure in sense-perception: there are cases when an act of vision would terminate our inquiry.) Hence it is clear that knowledge of things demonstrable cannot be acquired by perception. of course. 32 All syllogisms cannot have the same basic truths. Then again. but B. if middles are taken to prove these premisses. but not the reasoned fact at all. the reason of the kindling would be clear to us because we should at the same time see it in each instance and intuit that it must be so in all instances. (2) falsehoods are not all derived from a single identical set of principles: there are falsehoods which are the contraries of one another and cannot coexist. since the act of perception is not of the commensurate universal.g. So if we were on the moon. ‘justice is injustice’. after tracking the commensurate universal. (As regards primary truths there is of course a different account to be given. I do not. nevertheless. we should not know the cause of the eclipse: we should perceive the present fact of the eclipse.

That would be exceedingly naive. Not even all these are inferred from the same basic truths. nor yet admitted that basic truths differ so as to be generically different for each science. and a fresh conclusion is only formed by the addition of a new immediate premiss: but if it be admitted that it is these primary immediate premisses which are basic truths. these again of medicine’. I mean. e. these the fundamentals of calculation. or else have some of the other terms between them. since the number of conclusions is indefinite. it is not true that the basic truths are much fewer than the conclusions. 205 . and some attributes attach to quanta and some to qualia only.‘justice is cowardice’. If. and it is said. and lastly some of the basic truths are necessary. units. for the basic truths are the premisses. nor is it possible in analysis. as the law of excluded middle-serve as premisses for the proof of all conclusions. however. cannot take the place of points. identity is used in another sense.g. For the kinds of being are different. Nor can any of the common axioms-such. Moreover. and ‘the equal is less. and ‘man is ox’. and the premisses are formed by the apposition of a fresh extreme term or the interposition of a fresh middle. confining-ourselves therefore to true conclusions. ‘man is horse’. for it is not the case in the clearly evident mathematical sciences. since everything can be identified with everything in that sense of identity. many of them in fact have basic truths which differ generically and are not transferable. for instance.’ From established principles we may argue the case as follows. The transferred terms could only fit in as middle terms or as major or minor terms. which are without position. Nor again can the contention that all conclusions have the same basic truths mean that from the mass of all possible premisses any conclusion may be drawn. since it is the immediate premisses which are the basic truths. ‘these and no other are the fundamental truths of geometry. the basic truths cannot be identical or limited in number. would the statement mean anything except that the sciences have basic truths? To call them identical because they are self-identical is absurd. the number of conclusions is indefinite. others variable. it is not argued that from the mass of all possible premisses any conclusion may be proved. and proof is achieved by means of the common axioms taken in conjunction with these several kinds and their attributes. ‘the equal is greater’. which have position. it remains to consider the possibility that. on the other hand. Looking at it in this way we see that. though the number of middle terms is finite. while the basic truths of all knowledge are within one genus. If. each subject-genus will provide one basic truth. others outside them. Again.

and so is the kind of being we have described as its object. though actually so. Besides. things which can be otherwise would be incapable of being otherwise. 33 Scientific knowledge and its object differ from opinion and the object of opinion in that scientific knowledge is commensurately universal and proceeds by necessary connexions. For fundamental truths are of two kinds. for opinion is unstable. But that this cannot be the case has been shown by our proof that the basic truths of things generically different themselves differ generically. which is the grasping of the immediate premiss. since the former knows. the latter-number. he will have not opinion but 206 . he that opines also has knowledge. Nor are they any concern of rational intuition-by rational intuition I mean an originative source of scientific knowledge-nor of indemonstrable knowledge. because it is possible to opine not only the fact but also the reasoned fact. for he believes that such is the proper object of opinion. and opinion. can the same thing be the object of both opinion and knowledge? And if any one chooses to maintain that all that he knows he can also opine. it follows that it is opinion that is concerned with that which may be true or false. why should not opinion be knowledge? For he that knows and he that opines will follow the same train of thought through the same middle terms until the immediate premisses are reached. and though the former are common. He thinks that he opines when he thinks that a connexion. and that which is necessary cannot be otherwise. in the way in which he grasps the definitions through which demonstrations take place. and what is revealed by these terms. then. never that he opines it. for instance. So though there are things which are true and real and yet can be otherwise. scientific knowledge clearly does not concern them: if it did. so that. and magnitude-are peculiar. This view also fits the observed facts. and can be otherwise: opinion in fact is the grasp of a premiss which is immediate but not necessary. while the necessary is the object of knowledge. Since then rational intuition. In what sense. science.special premisses are required to prove special conclusions. The truth perhaps is that if a man grasp truths that cannot be other than they are. and the reason is the middle term. when a man thinks a truth incapable of being otherwise he always thinks that he knows it. are the only things that can be ‘true’. may quite easily be otherwise. those which are premisses of demonstration and the subject-genus.

The identity of the objects of knowledge and opinion is similar. Knowledge and opinion of the same thing can co-exist in two different people in the sense we have explained. but not in virtue of the subjects’ substance and essential nature possesses opinion and not genuine knowledge. for then one would apprehend the same thing as both capable and incapable of being otherwise-an impossibility. The sense in which some maintain that true and false opinion can have the same object leads them to embrace many strange doctrines. if obtained through immediate premisses. we may assume. the two opinions have objects so far the same: on the other hand. art. may be other than animal.g. and his opinion. intuition. will be both of the fact and of the reasoned fact. of the fact alone. and in one sense the object of true and false opinion can be the same. to have a true opinion that the diagonal is commensurate with the side would be absurd: but because the diagonal with which they are both concerned is the same. but not simultaneously in the same person. e. partly to moral philosophy. (1) that man is essentially animal-i. 207 . the apprehension that animal is an element in the essential nature of man is knowledge.knowledge: if on the other hand he apprehends these attributes as inhering in their subjects. That would involve a man’s simultaneously apprehending. e.g. that is. practical wisdom. the attribute ‘animal’ as incapable of being otherwise. and metaphysical thinking. it is only in a sense identical. particularly the doctrine that what a man opines falsely he does not opine at all. opinion the apprehension of ‘animal’ as capable of being otherwise-e. belongs rather partly to natural science. in another it cannot. cannot be other than animal-and (2) that man is not essentially animal. Thus. if not so obtained.g. as regards their essential definable nature these objects differ. The object of opinion and knowledge is not quite identical. just as the object of true and false opinion is in a sense identical. Further consideration of modes of thinking and their distribution under the heads of discursive thought. the apprehension of animal as predicable of man but not as an element in man’s essential nature is opinion: man is the subject in both judgements. Knowledge is the apprehension of. science. There are really many senses of ‘identical’. but the mode of inherence differs.e. This also shows that one cannot opine and know the same thing simultaneously.

34 Quick wit is a faculty of hitting upon the middle term instantaneously. 208 . It would be exemplified by a man who saw that the moon has her bright side always turned towards the sun. the middle terms. Then B. ‘having her bright side towards the source of her light’. and A. Let A represent ‘bright side turned sunward’. So A is predicable of C through B. or observed somebody in conversation with a man of wealth and divined that he was borrowing money. ‘lighted from the sun’ is predicable of C. namely that she borrows her light from him. B ‘lighted from the sun’. is predicable of B. or that the friendship of these people sprang from a common enmity. C the moon. the moon. In all these instances he has seen the major and minor terms and then grasped the causes. and quickly grasped the cause of this.

and it is in the answers to these questions that our knowledge consists.g. Thus. when we know the fact we ask the reason. when our question concerns a complex of thing and attribute and we ask whether the thing is thus or otherwise qualified-whether.e. Now when we ask whether a connexion is a fact. ‘what. Book II Translated by G. then. it is the reason of eclipse or earthquake into which we inquire. Where a complex is concerned.) On the other hand.] white’. On the other hand. R. Mure < div id="book2" class="book"> 1 The kinds of question we ask are as many as the kinds of things which we know. we are really asking whether the connexion or the thing has a ‘middle’. or whether a thing without qualification is. as. when we know that the sun is being eclipsed and that an earthquake is in progress. without further qualification’. we inquire as to its nature. (2) what is the reason of the connexion. we do not inquire whether it does so or not. That our inquiry ceases with the discovery that the sun does suffer eclipse is an indication of this. those are the two questions we ask. then. as opposed to ‘is or is not [e. and when we have ascertained either that the connexion is a fact or that the thing is-i. ascertained either the partial or the unqualified being of the thing-and are proceeding to ask the reason 209 . They are in fact four:-(1) whether the connexion of an attribute with a thing is a fact. e. for instance. for example. and if we know from the start that the sun suffers eclipse. 2 These.Posterior Analytics. the sun suffers eclipse or not-then we are asking as to the fact of a connexion.g. asking. G. but for some objects of inquiry we have a different kind of question to ask. (3) whether a thing exists. are the four kinds of question we ask. (By ‘is or is not’ I mean ‘is or is not. such as whether there is or is not a centaur or a God. is God?’ or ‘what is man?’. then. when we have ascertained the thing’s existence. (4) What is the nature of the thing.

the present fact of an eclipse being evident. i. eclipse.’ ‘Are the high and the low note concordant?’ is equivalent to ‘Is their ratio commensurate?’. but is this or that as having some essential attribute or some accident-are both alike the middle’. e. an eclipse. ‘Does the moon suffer eclipse?’ means ‘Is there or is there not a cause producing eclipse of the moon?’.g. Cases in which the ‘middle’ is sensible show that the object of our inquiry is always the ‘middle’: we inquire. and when we find that it is commensurate.e.e. Again. Thus.g. then.of the connexion or the nature of the thing. if we ask whether the moon or night exists. then. by that which a subject is (in the partial sense) I mean a property. the question concerns a part of the thing’s being.) We conclude that in all our inquiries we are asking either whether there is a ‘middle’ or what the ‘middle’ is: for the ‘middle’ here is precisely the cause. but both fact and reason would be obvious simultaneously. is this cause? for the cause through which a thing is-not is this or that. equality or inequality. has this or that attribute. because we have not perceived it. the question concerns the unqualified being of a thing. and when we have learnt that there is. interposition or non-interposition. 210 . our next question is. For the act of perception would have enabled us to know the universal too. whether there is or is not a ‘middle’ causing. is their ratio?’. By that which is without qualification I mean the subject. On the other hand. or ‘does the moon wax?’. then we are asking what the ‘middle’ is.g. moon or earth or sun or triangle. For in all these examples it is clear that the nature of the thing and the reason of the fact are identical: the question ‘What is eclipse?’ and its answer ‘The privation of the moon’s light by the interposition of the earth’ are identical with the question ‘What is the reason of eclipse?’ or ‘Why does the moon suffer eclipse?’ and the reply ‘Because of the failure of light through the earth’s shutting it out’. e. has or has not this or that attribute: whereas. but without qualification is-and the cause through which it is-not is without qualification. e. i. ‘What. since. and it is the cause that we seek in all our inquiries. (By distinguishing the fact of the connexion and the existence of the thing as respectively the partial and the unqualified being of the thing. we may substitute ‘What ratio makes a high and a low note concordant? Their relation according to a commensurate numerical ratio. I mean that if we ask ‘does the moon suffer eclipse?’. we ask ‘What. for what we are asking in such questions is whether a thing is this or that. if we were on the moon we should not be inquiring either as to the fact or the reason. for ‘What is a concord? A commensurate numerical ratio of a high and a low note’.

at any rate such attributes are not substances.g. then. not even all affirmative conclusions in the first figure are definable. some conclusions are negative and some are not universal.perception would then at the same time give us the present fact of the earth’s screening the sun’s light. ‘every triangle has its angles equal to two right angles’. whereas. If there could. and in so far as they are said to be possessed of some attribute such as equal to right angles. or greater or less. as we maintain. What then? Can everything definable be demonstrated. I mean. none in the third are universal. an 211 .g. And let us first discuss certain difficulties which these questions raise. then. An argument proving this difference between demonstration and definition is that to have scientific knowledge of the demonstrable is identical with possessing a demonstration of it: hence if demonstration of such conclusions as these is possible. that all questions are a search for a ‘middle’. for never yet by defining anything-essential attribute or accident-did we get knowledge of it. or not? There is one of our previous arguments which covers this too. since to know the demonstrable scientifically is to possess the demonstration of it. if to define is to acquire knowledge of a substance. that not everything demonstrable can be defined. And again. Let us now state how essential nature is revealed and in what way it can be reduced to demonstration. one might know such a conclusion also in virtue of its definition without possessing the demonstration of it. both by definition and by demonstration. beginning what we have to say with a point most intimately connected with our immediately preceding remarks. and from this would arise the universal. e. on the other hand. It might. all in the second figure are negative. Induction too will sufficiently convince us of this difference. be urged that definition is held to concern essential nature and is in every case universal and affirmative. Hence. Again. for there is nothing to stop our having the one without the other. 3 It is clear. Thus. what definition is. It is evident. and this is equally true of things in so far as they are said without qualification to he as opposed to being possessed of some attribute. namely the doubt that might be felt as to whether or not it is possible to know the same thing in the same relation. to know a thing’s nature is to know the reason why it is. there clearly cannot also be definition of them. e. and what things are definable. Of a single thing qua single there is a single scientific knowledge.

or the primary truths will be indemonstrable definitions. may they yet be partially the same? Or is that impossible. I add this because if all triangles have been proved to possess angles equal to two right angles. e. since the one is not a part of the other. then. and we may draw the general conclusion that there is no identical object of which it is possible to possess both a definition and a demonstration. as our recent argument assumed. and it has already been shown that these will be found indemonstrable.impossible consequence will follow:-possession of its definition without its demonstration will give knowledge of the demonstrable. either the basic premisses will be demonstrable and will depend on prior premisses. Again. predicate animal of biped nor biped of animal. for the first stage of our problem. we do not. Moreover. the nature of unity and the odd. and all the other sciences likewise. the basic premisses of demonstrations are definitions. So it emerges that not all the definable is demonstrable nor all the demonstrable definable. for isosceles is a part of which all triangles constitute the whole. and the regress will be endless.e. The next step is to raise the question whether syllogism-i. Now definition reveals essential nature. every demonstration proves a predicate of a subject as attaching or as not attaching to it. but different things require different demonstrations-unless the one demonstration is related to the other as part to whole.g. because there can be no demonstration of the definable? There can be none. to prove essential nature is not the same as to prove the fact of a connexion. and all demonstrations evidently posit and assume the essential nature-mathematical demonstrations. Moreover. It follows obviously that definition and demonstration are neither identical nor contained either within the other: if they were. then this attribute has been proved to attach to isosceles. 212 . But if the definable and the demonstrable are not wholly the same. demonstration reveals that a given attribute attaches or does not attach to a given subject. impossible. 4 So much. demonstration-of the definable nature is possible or. nor yet figure of plane-plane not being figure nor figure plane. because definition is of the essential nature or being of something. But in the case before us the fact and the essential nature are not so related to one another. but in definition one thing is not predicated of another. for example. their objects would be related either as identical or as whole and part.

if we are to syllogize. A also must be predicated of C as belonging to its essence. that is. Since. and the middle term connecting them must be reciprocally predicable of one another. the case in which there are only the two premisses-i. or aught else it may be. A man’s essential nature—two-footed animal. A must be predicated of all B. A is predicated as being of the essence of B. obviously A is ‘peculiar’ to B and B to C-in fact all three terms are ‘peculiar’ to one another: and further (2) if A inheres in the essence of all B and B is predicated universally of all C as belonging to C’s essence. because it best illustrates the point under discussion. since B too is the essential nature of man. but B is not of the essence of the subjects of which it is predicated-A will not necessarily be predicated of C as belonging to its essence. therefore. If one does not take this relation as thus duplicated-if. But in that case (1) the subject. It would be begging the question. 213 . We may generalize by supposing that it is possible to prove the essential nature of man. for one would have to postulate that the soul is a self-moving number in the sense of being identical with it. and that what causes its own life is a self-moving number. just as it is also true that every man is an animal-but not as identical with being man. Let C be man. A will not on that account be the definable form of C: A will merely be what it was true to say of C. So both premisses will predicate essence. its definition. and consequently B also will be predicated of C as its essence. in which the premisses are primary and immediatewhich we ought to investigate. Even if A is predicated of all B inasmuch as B is identical with a species of A. Thus they who prove the essential nature of soul or man or anything else through reciprocating terms beg the question. which consequently will also be the essential nature of man. definable form-C’s definable form will appear in the middle term before the conclusion is drawn.We might argue it impossible on the following grounds:-(a) syllogism proves an attribute of a subject through the middle term. It is. for if A is to C. still it will not follow: being an animal is predicated of being a man-since it is true that in all instances to be human is to be animal. both premisses do predicate essence-i. Then. on the other hand (b) its definable nature is both ‘peculiar’ to a subject and predicated of it as belonging to its essence. Therefore the argument assumes what it has to prove. for example.e. however. But this premiss will be mediated by a fresh definition. For if A is predicable as a mere consequent of B and B of C. to contend that the soul is that which causes its own life.e.

Nevertheless. division does not involve inference. and yet not exhibit his essential nature or definable form? Again. but must follow necessarily from its premisses. he assumes that man is terrestrial. perhaps. it gives it in another way. one cannot infer that A is the definable form and essence of C: but if one does so take them. is not demonstration any more than is division. Next. Yet to state a definition reached by division is not to state a conclusion: as. when conclusions are drawn without their appropriate 214 . what the definable form of C is. so that there has been no inference. (Indeed as this method of division is used by those who proceed by it. terrestrial-animal.) For why should not the whole of this formula be true of man. and that this-the dividendum-must without further question be (ultimately) incapable of fresh specific division. and that indeed we cannot fail to fulfil these conditions if what is to be divided falls whole into the division at each stage. and if. before drawing the conclusion. or against the omission of the final or of an intermediate determinant of the substantial being? The champion of division might here urge that though these lapses do occur. postulating the genus. we produce by division the requisite uninterrupted sequence of terms. as was said in my formal logic. The definer asks ‘Is man animal or inanimate?’ and then assumes-he has not inferred-that man is animal. even if the respondent deny it. and none of it is omitted. that unless one takes both the premisses as predicating essence. yet we can solve that difficulty if all the attributes we assume are constituents of the definable form. we reply. even truths that can be inferred actually fail to appear as such. when presented with an exhaustive division of animal into terrestrial and aquatic. what guarantee is there against an unessential addition. et it does make evident some truth. that man is the complete formula. For in a genuine demonstration the conclusion must not be put as a question nor depend on a concession. and omit nothing. 5 Nor. Moreover. does not follow necessarily from the premisses: this too is an assumption. Nor is there any absurdity in this: induction. is the method of division a process of inference at all. then. since at no point does the characterization of the subject follow necessarily from the premising of certain other facts: division demonstrates as little as does induction. and equally an assumption whether the division comprises many differentiae or few. for one has begged the question. if it gives knowledge.We conclude. in assuming B one will have assumed.

just as in syllogizing we do not premise what syllogistic inference is (since the premisses from which we conclude must be related as whole and part). since proof must be through the middle term. so the definable form must not fall within the syllogism but remain outside the premisses posited. Hence syllogistic inference must be possible even without the express statement of what syllogism is or what definable form is. If evil is definable as the divisible. i. It is only against a doubt as to its having been a syllogistic inference at all that we have to defend our argument as conforming to the definition of syllogism. but in this premiss the term we assert of the minor is neither the 215 . the alleged necessity by which the inference follows from the premisses is open to a question as to the reason for it. ‘But not the same definable form’. and that the complete synthesis of them is peculiar to the thing. that all animal is mortal or immortal: but such a formula taken in its entirety is not definition.e. as he thinks. proves by division. biped. but hypothetically. so definitions reached by division invite the same question. and. the definable form is once more assumed in this minor premiss too? Further. definition at any rate does not turn out to be a conclusion of inference. The following type of hypothetical proof also begs the question. so that even if division does demonstrate its formula. 6 Can we nevertheless actually demonstrate what a thing essentially and substantially is. and when at each step he is asked ‘Why?’. footed. by premising (1) that its definable form is constituted by the ‘peculiar’ attributes of its essential nature. Thus to the question ‘What is the essential nature of man?’ the divider replies ‘Animal.middles. wingless’. we conclude that to be good is essentially to be indivisible. for in demonstrations also we premise that ‘this’ is predicable of ‘that’. then. and thus-since in this synthesis consists the being of the thing-obtaining our conclusion? Or is the truth that. if good is the contrary of evil and the indivisible of the divisible. mortal. It is only when some one doubts whether the conclusion proved is the definable form that we have to defend it as conforming to the definition of definable form which we assumed. and as a premiss which is to prove definable form. (2) that such and such are the only attributes of its essential nature. and the definition of a thing’s contrary-if it has one the contrary of the thing’s definition. That I admit. you may object. he will say. The question is begged because definable form is assumed as a premiss.

since presumably one cannot prove essential nature by an appeal to sense perception or by pointing with the finger. But further. Moreover it is clear. since definition exhibits one single thing and demonstration another single thing. Therefore. if we consider the methods of defining actually in use. but that it is possessed of some attribute he proves. then. that we shall prove in defining essential nature? Triangle? In that case a man will know by definition what a thing’s nature is without knowing whether it exists. or convertible. because induction proves not what the essential nature of a thing is but that it has or has not some attribute. and what human nature is and the fact that man exists are not the same thing? Then too we hold that it is by demonstration that the being of everything must be proved-unless indeed to be were its essence. But that is impossible. Again. Hence the being of anything as fact is matter for demonstration. if definition can prove what is the essential nature of a thing. since being is not a genus. can it also prove that it exists? And how will it prove them both by the same process. what other method remains? To put it another way: how shall we by definition prove essential nature? He who knows what human-or any other-nature is.major itself nor a term identical in definition. and this is the actual procedure of the sciences. for no one knows the nature of what does not existone can know the meaning of the phrase or name ‘goat-stag’ but not what the essential nature of a goat-stag is. that definition does not prove that the thing defined exists: since 216 . must know also that man exists. both proof by division and the syllogism just described are open to the question why man should be animal-biped-terrestrial and not merely animal and terrestrial. it is not the essence of anything. What is it. and. 7 How then by definition shall we prove substance or essential nature? We cannot show it as a fresh fact necessarily following from the assumption of premisses admitted to be facts-the method of demonstration: we may not proceed as by induction to establish a universal on the evidence of groups of particulars which offer no exception. with the major. since what they premise does not ensure that the predicates shall constitute a genuine unity and not merely belong to a single subject as do musical and grammatical when predicated of the same man. for the geometer assumes the meaning of the word triangle.

since even non-existents can be signified by a name: (2) all sets of words or sentences would be definitions. yet why should the thing named in the definition exist? Why. should this be the formula defining circle? One might equally well call it the definition of mountain copper. for (1) both what is not substance and what does not exist at all would be definable. Since. so that we should all be talking in definitions. and if its cause is distinct from it. Moreover. the proof is in the first figure. For definitions do not carry a further guarantee that the thing defined can exist or that it is what they claim to define: one can always ask why. and further that definition neither demonstrates nor proves anything. this cause is either identical with the essential nature of the thing or distinct from it. the essential nature of the thing is either demonstrable or indemonstrable. if the cause is distinct from the thing’s essential nature and demonstration is possible. in other words. the same as to know the cause of a thing’s existence. also reveal that the name has this meaning. as we said. in addition to revealing the meaning of a name. and. because a conclusion containing essential nature must be 217 . therefore. since any kind of sentence could be given a name. But that were a strange consequence. It appears then from these considerations that neither definition and syllogism nor their objects are identical. the cause must be the middle term. therefore. if it in no sense proves essential nature. and that knowledge of essential nature is not to be obtained either by definition or by demonstration. we may conclude that definition. Consequently.even if there does actually exist something which is equidistant from a centre. and the proof of this depends on the fact that a thing must have a cause. 8 We must now start afresh and consider which of these conclusions are sound and which are not. and even the Iliad would be a definition: (3) no demonstration can prove that any particular name means any particular thing: neither. and whether essential nature is in any sense demonstrable and definable or in none. the conclusion proved being universal and affirmative. to define is to prove either a thing’s essential nature or the meaning of its name. and what is the nature of definition. Now to know its essential nature is. So the method just examined of proving it through another essential nature would be one way of proving essential nature. is a set of words signifying precisely what a name signifies. do definitions.

is attributable A to C. As often as we have accidental knowledge that the thing exists. failure to produce shadows in spite of the absence of an intervening body. Now to ask whether the moon is eclipsed or not is to ask whether or not B has occurred. we know fact and reason together. but the reason 218 . if the premisses are immediate. and if this condition actually exists. When we are aware of a fact we seek its reason. whenever we apprehend an element in the thing’s character there is less difficulty. Thus it follows that the degree of our knowledge of a thing’s essential nature is determined by the sense in which we are aware that it exists. and to search for a thing’s essential nature when we are unaware that it exists is to search for nothing. C the moon. of eclipse as a privation of light. Let us then take the following as our first instance of being aware of an element in the essential nature.inferred through a middle which is an essential nature just as a ‘peculiar’ property must be inferred through a middle which is a ‘peculiar’ property. is attributable to B. Moreover we are aware whether a thing exists or not sometimes through apprehending an element in its character. Let A be eclipse. and clearly in just the same way we cannot apprehend a thing’s definable form without apprehending that it exists. we know the fact without the reason. if they are not immediate. it is clear that the moon is eclipsed. as in the following example: let C be the moon. we assert that A also actually exists. B the earth’s acting as a screen. Now it was said before that this method could not amount to demonstration of essential nature-it is actually a dialectical proof of it-so let us begin again and explain by what method it can be demonstrated. for example. yet we cannot apprehend the reason a moment sooner than the fact. A eclipse. for we have not got genuine knowledge even of its existence. as. so that of the two definable natures of a single thing this method will prove one and not the other. when we are aware of thunder as a noise in the clouds. we must be in a wholly negative state as regards awareness of its essential nature. On the other hand. Or again we may ask which side of a contradiction the defining condition necessitates: does it make the angles of a triangle equal or not equal to two right angles? When we have found the answer. since while we are ignorant whether it exists we cannot know its essential nature. or of the soul as a self-moving thing. and sometimes accidentally. or of man as some species of animal. and eclipse. B the fact that the moon fails to produce shadows though she is full and though no visible body intervenes between us and her. and though sometimes the fact and the reason dawn on us simultaneously. But that is precisely the same as asking whether A has a defining condition. Then if B.

On the other hand. others have not. A thunder. cloud. a cause of their substantial being other than that being itself. are equivalent. i. 10 Since definition is said to be the statement of a thing’s nature. that essential nature is exhibited. in these examples. Thus. Let C be cloud. and we see that. This too is the actual procedure of the arithmetician. or of an equivalent nominal formula. since fire is quenched in it. or the moon’s rotation or her extinction? But B is the definition of the other term. nor can it be demonstrated. no demonstrative syllogism-of essential nature.e. viz. But when it is clear that A is attributable to C and we proceed to ask the reason of this fact. and this is what we contended in our preliminary discussions. e. the meaning of the phrase ‘triangular character’. while there is no syllogism-i. who assumes both the nature and the existence of unit. we inquire the reason why it exists. is attributable to B. A definition in this sense tells you. of the major term A. B the quenching of fire. that is are basic premisses. But it 219 . and B is assuredly the definition of the major term A. and (2) ‘Why does it thunder?’ ‘Because fire is quenched in the cloud’. So we conclude that neither can the essential nature of anything which has a cause distinct from itself be known without demonstration. 9 Now while some things have a cause distinct from themselves. demonstrative syllogism. Hence it is evident that there are essential natures which are immediate. viz. (1) ‘What is thunder?’ ‘The quenching of fire in cloud’. noise.why is not yet clear. and A. and we know that eclipse exists.g. it will be one of the remaining partial definitions of A.e. yet it is through syllogism. for eclipse is constituted by the earth acting as a screen. If there be a further mediating cause of B. we are inquiring what is the nature of B: is it the earth’s acting as a screen. but we do not thereby demonstrate it. Then B is attributable to C. obviously one kind of definition will be a statement of the meaning of the name. it is possible (in the manner explained) to exhibit through demonstration the essential nature of things which have a ‘middle’. but we do not know what its essential nature is. and of these not only that they are but also what they are must be assumed or revealed in some other way. When we are aware that triangle exists. We have stated then how essential nature is discovered and becomes known.

and stating what is the essential nature of thunder. like the Iliad. Moreover. and there are four causes: (1) the definable form. a statement may be a unity in either of two ways. (4) the final cause. (2) what are the various meanings of the term definition. Again. (2) an antecedent which necessitates a consequent. differing from demonstration in the arrangement of its terms. since the first statement will be ‘Because fire is quenched in the clouds’. while the statement of what the nature of thunder is will be ‘The noise of fire being quenched in the clouds’. and in what sense and of what things it does not. On the other hand the definition of immediates is an indemonstrable positing of essential nature. thunder can be defined as noise in the clouds. (3) what is the relation of definition to demonstration. and in what sense and of what things it proves the essential nature. by conjunction. For there is a difference between stating why it thunders. Thus the former signifies without proving. That then is one way of defining definition. and how far the same thing is both definable and demonstrable and how far it is not. 11 We think we have scientific knowledge when we know the cause. that we only know accidentally whether or not the thing exists. or (b) a syllogism of essential nature differing from demonstration in grammatical form. Another kind of definition is a formula exhibiting the cause of a thing’s existence. but the latter will clearly be a quasi-demonstration of essential nature.is difficult thus to learn the definition of things the existence of which we do not genuinely know-the cause of this difficulty being. We conclude then that definition is (a) an indemonstrable statement of essential nature. or (c) the conclusion of a demonstration giving essential nature. as we said before. in the other definition. Our discussion has therefore made plain (1) in what sense and of what things the essential nature is demonstrable. Hence each of these can be the middle term of a proof. or because it exhibits a single predicate as inhering not accidentally in a single subject. and in what sense and of what things it is not. which is the conclusion of the demonstration embodying essential nature. (3) the efficient cause. Thus the same statement takes a different form: in one form it is continuous demonstration. for (a) though the inference from antecedent to necessary consequent does not hold if only one premiss is assumed-two is the minimum-still when there are two it holds 220 .

and let this condition be healthy. why does one take a walk after supper? For the sake of one’s health. here the order of coming to be is the reverse of what it is in proof through the efficient cause: in the efficient order the middle term must come to be first. (c) ‘Why did the Athenians become involved in the Persian war?’ means ‘What cause originated the waging of war against the Athenians?’ and the answer is. ‘Because they raided Sardis with the Eretrians’. who were the aggressors. C the angle in a semicircle. the formal cause has already been shown to be the middle. Why is the angle in a semicircle a right angle?-or from what assumption does it follow that it is a right angle? Thus. the Athenians. B the half of two right angles. is attributable to C. Moreover. for A will be explained by it. Then B is the cause in virtue of which A. B unprovoked raiding. must first take place. Moreover. the non-regurgitation of food. the final cause. Why does a house exist? For the preservation of one’s goods.e. 221 . The definitions must be transposed. the angle in a semicircle. from which it follows that A is attributable to C. then. Incidentally. the non-regurgitation of food. Why is B the cause of A’s belonging to C? Because to be in a condition such as B is to be in health. C. health. and the end in view comes last in time. and B is true of C. To ask the reason why one must walk after supper is precisely to ask to what end one must do it. B is identical with (b) the defining form of A. and that A. Therefore it is the assumption of B.on condition that they have a single common middle term. the initial aggressors. So it is from the assumption of this single middle term that the conclusion follows necessarily. Let A be war. is attributable to B. A health. is attributable to C. and then the detail will become clearer. since men make war on the unjust aggressor. Hence here too the cause-in this case the efficient cause-is the middle term. since B=A and the other. for C is half of two right angles. having war waged upon them. inheres in C? It is B. viz. is the cause through which A. and A is true of B. So A. The following example will also show this.g. C the Athenians. E. unprovoked raiding. since it is what A’s definition signifies. but B is a kind of definition of A. (d) This is no less true where the cause is the final cause. What. taking a walk. that the angle in a semicircle is a right angle. is true of C. B the non-regurgitation of food. is true of B. i. let A be right angle. since this originated the war. The end in view is in the one case health. right angle. in the other preservation. the half of two right angles. Let C be walking after supper. whereas in the teleological order the minor. since it seems that B. the Athenians.=B. C. Then let walking after supper possess the property of preventing food from rising to the orifice of the stomach. Then B.

let C be water. and also designed. the moon was eclipsed because the earth intervened. or by constraint and in opposition to it. If then. and the end is consequently good). may result from chance as well. to B: ice when B is occurring. that a result is due to an end. but not by the same necessity. light shines through a lantern (1) because that which consists of relatively small particles necessarily passes through pores larger than those particles-assuming that light does issue by penetrationand (2) for an end. for instance. can it come to be through two causes-as for instance if thunder be a hiss and a roar necessarily produced by the quenching of fire. produces now for an end. has formed when B has occurred. 12 The effect may be still coming to be. and this is true alike in nature or in art. B the middle. in different senses of the term ‘nature’. as. is becoming eclipsed because the earth is in process of intervening. solidification. which is the cause. and A. Then B is attributed to C. as for example a house or a statue. It may work in accordance with a thing’s natural tendency. Necessity too is of two kinds. now by necessity. or its occurrence may be past or future. yet the cause will be the same as when it is actually existent-for it is the middle which is the cause-except that if the effect actually exists the cause is actually existent. is eclipsed because the earth intervenes. if its occurrence is past the cause is past. To take a second example: assuming that the definition of ice is solidified water. namely total failure of heat. It is mostly in cases where the issue is indeterminate (though only where the production does not originate in chance. for nature. there are very many such cases. By chance. For example. mostly among the processes and products of the natural world. others. namely to save us from stumbling. by necessity a stone is borne both upwards and downwards.The same thing may exist for an end and be necessitated as well. nothing comes to be for an end. A solidified. a thing can exist through two causes. For example. on the other hand. and will form when B shall occur. as the Pythagoreans say. if it is coming to be so is the cause. will be eclipsed because the earth will intervene. such as health or safety. for a threat to terrify those that lie in Tartarus? Indeed. Of the products of man’s intelligence some are never due to chance or necessity but always to an end. if future the cause is future. 222 .

These questions. a past effect resulting from a past cause different from itself. the latter statement will be false. We have also to inquire what it is that holds events together so that the coming-to-be now occurring in actual things follows upon a past event. 223 . and an effect which is coming-to-be from a cause different from and prior to it? Now on this theory it is from the posterior event that we reason (and this though these later events actually have their source of origin in previous events—a fact which shows that also when the effect is comingto-be we still reason from the posterior event). since a process contains an infinity of past events. for not even two past events can be ‘contiguous’. then.e. though A has already occurred. be the time interval definite or indefinite. and there cannot be a middle term homogeneous with extremes respectively past and future. must receive a more explicit treatment in our general theory of change. and the same holds good when they are past and when they are future. occurred. the subsequent event. coming to be when they are coming-to-be. since during it the inference will be false. one cannot infer from an event which occurred in the past that a future event will occur. so just as points are not ‘contiguous’ neither are past events. for the process is divisible. for in the interval between the events. And the same argument applies also to future events. The reason of this is that the middle must be homogeneous. a future effect from a future cause different from it. it will never be possible to infer that because it is true to say that A occurred. therefore an event B has occurred subsequently to A but still in the pastand the same holds good if the occurrence is future)-cannot reason because. It is evident. i. and its effect come to be simultaneously when they are in process of becoming. and from the event we cannot reason (we cannot argue that because an event A has occurred. And it is a further difficulty in this theory that the time interval can be neither indefinite nor definite. that a past event and a present process cannot be ‘contiguous’. Thus the relation of present process to past event is analogous to that of line to point. past when the extremes are past. For past events are limits and atomic. we may suggest. But what of cases where they are not simultaneous? Can causes and effects different from one another form. therefore it is true to say that B. since both are indivisible.This sort of cause. future when they are future. and exist simultaneously when they actually exist. For the same reason a past event and a present process cannot be ‘contiguous’. as they seem to us to form. however. a continuous succession. the event indivisible. actually existent when they are actually existent.

but C is the source of the inference because it is nearer to the present moment. And here too the same infinite divisibility might be urged. will a fresh middle term always intervene because there is an infinity of middles? No: though no two events are ‘contiguous’. yet we must start from a premiss consisting of a middle and the present event as major. will the series terminate in an immediate premiss. In actual fact it is exemplified thus: when the earth had been moistened an exhalation was bound to rise. and this is possible only if the middle and extreme terms are reciprocal. and from the formation of cloud rain necessarily resulted and by the fall of rain the earth was necessarily moistened: but this was the starting-point. The reason is that a house having been built necessitates a foundation having been laid. Again. C will exist prior to D. for if D will exist. and proof is through the middle in the same way. since conversion is conditioned by reciprocity in the terms of the proof. A’s prior. since D has occurred. We next argue that. and from that again the first. for since D has occurred C must have occurred. 224 . and the circular process is an instance of this. The like is true of future events too. A will exist prior to it. for posit any one of the terms and another follows from it. since C has occurred. since if it is true to say that D will exist. But here too an immediate basic premiss must be assumed. since future events are not ‘contiguous’. and if a foundation has been laid blocks must have been shaped beforehand. and the cause of this conclusion is C. blocks will similarly be shaped beforehand. Then we conclude that. we argue that. therefore A occurred: and C’s occurrence was posterior. therefore A must have occurred.g. This-the convertibility of conclusions and premisses-has been proved in our early chapters. Now we observe in Nature a certain kind of circular process of coming-to-be. no two events are ‘contiguous’. and the cause is C. and since C has occurred A must previously have occurred. as we said. if a house will be built. for the foundation will exist before the house. and from that another. so that a circle is completed. And in the world of fact this is so: if a house has been built. e. If we get our middle term in this way. therefore C occurred. then blocks must have been quarried and shaped. and when an exhalation had risen cloud was bound to form. it must be a prior truth to say that A will exist.The following must suffice as an account of the manner in which the middle would be identical with the cause on the supposition that coming-to-be is a series of consecutive events: for in the terms of such a series too the middle and major terms must form an immediate premiss. and if C will exist. or since. since D has occurred. and the starting-point of time is the present.

not only as possessing no divisors. odd. A too must be predicated always and in every instance of C. then.e. odd. for this synthesis must be the substance of the thing.e. up to the exact point at which they are severally of wider extent than the subject but collectively coextensive with it. Now since we have shown above’ that attributes predicated as belonging to the essential nature are necessary and that universals are necessary. viz. or come-to-be what they are. but it is the general rule. and prime in the former and also the latter sense of the term: for these attributes taken severally apply. For if A is predicated universally of B and B of C. but in their application are not confined to that subject). so let us now discuss the method to be adopted in tracing the elements predicated as constituting the definable form. while an attribute may inhere in every triad. which exist or come to be as a general rule-will also derive from immediate basic premisses. and since the attributes which we select as inhering in triad. but which does not extend beyond the genus of triad. or in any other subject whose 225 . But we have assumed a connexion which is a general rule. and the sense in which it is or is not demonstrable or definable. always and in ever case). 13 We have already explained how essential nature is set out in the terms of a demonstration. for pentad is a number. and prime in both senses.Some occurrences are universal (for they are. It is such attributes which we have to select. but. a number. Now of the attributes which inhere always in each several thing there are some which are wider in extent than it but not wider than its genus (by attributes of wider extent mean all such as are universal attributes of each several subject. taken collectively. In the case of such connexions the middle term too must be a general rule. but nothing outside number is odd. For example every triad possesses the attributes number. not every man can grow a beard. yet also in a subject not a triad-as being inheres in triad but also in subjects not numbers at all-odd on the other hand is an attribute inhering in every triad and of wider application (inhering as it does also in pentad). since to hold in every instance and always is of the nature of the universal. the first two to all odd numbers. i. So connexions which embody a general rule-i. the last to the dyad also as well as to the triad. is precisely what triad is. others again are not always what they are but only as a general rule: for instance. to no other subject. but also as not being a sum of numbers. This. consequently the middle term B must also be a general rule.

Divisions according to differentiae are a useful accessory to this method. He should proceed thus because the attributes of the genera compounded of the infimae species will be clearly given by the definitions of the species. but rather to assume everything at the start and to be no better than an initial assumption made without division. working through the proximate common differentiae. if the primary genus is assumed and we then take one of 226 . or biped-animal-tame. Again. because we make the further assumption that the substance of each subject is the predication of elements in its essential nature down to the last differentia characterizing the individuals.e. into triad and dyad-and then endeavour to seize their definitions by the method we have described-the definition. After that. but that merely towards collecting the essential nature they may be of use we will proceed to show. and the attributes inhere essentially in the simple infimae species. having established what the category is to which the subaltern genus belongs-quantity or quality. it must be related to triad as a genus named or nameless. it will be identical with the being of triad. and again out of this and the further differentia man (or whatever else is the unity under construction) is constituted. indeed.g. i. They might. the simple infirma species. Thus. The author of a hand-book on a subject that is a generic whole should divide the genus into its first infimae species-number e. are predicated as belonging to its essential nature. If on the other hand this synthesis is applicable to no subject other than the individual triads.attributes we select in this way. But. Further. of straight line or circle or right angle. explain above. It follows that any other synthesis thus exhibited will likewise be identical with the being of the subject. for example. for instance-he should examine the properties ‘peculiar’ to the species. If it is not identical with the being of triad. seem to be of no use at all. then the elements we assume have necessarily been reached by division. triad will thus possess these attributes necessarily. the order in which the attributes are predicated does make a difference—it matters whether we say animal-tame-biped. What force they have as proofs we did. in fact. indeed. For if every definable thing consists of two elements and ‘animal-tame’ forms a unity. since the basic element of them all is the definition. in the genera only in virtue of these. that the synthesis of them constitutes the substance of triad is shown by the following argument. division is the only possible method of avoiding the omission of any element of the essential nature. It will then be of wider extent than triad-assuming that wider potential extent is the character of a genus.

anything contained in the genus must lie on one of the two sides. So. (2) the arrangement of these in the right order.g.g. Having assumed this we at once proceed in the same way with the lower terms. they say. The primary differentiation of animal is that within which all animal falls. e. if we proceed in this way. Now first of all this is a fallacy: not every differentia precludes identity. our third the first of those which follow the 227 . know each thing without knowing its differentiae. since many differentiae inhere in things specifically identical. the dividendum will not fall whole into this division: e. we can be sure that nothing has been omitted: by any other method one is bound to omit something without knowing it. since there must be one such term. The like is true of every other genus. and that the subject one seeks to define is present in one or other of them. then it does not matter whether or not one knows all the other subjects of which the differentiae are also predicated. it is not all animal which is either whole-winged or splitwinged but all winged animal. to postulate that the division exhausts the genus is not illegitimate if the opposites exclude a middle. Secondly. For it is obvious that when by this process one reaches subjects incapable of further differentiation one will possess the formula defining the substance. (3) the omission of no such elements. since everything is identical with that from which it does not differ. for our second term will be the first of the remainder. for it is winged animal to which this differentiation belongs. and this will be ensured if the term selected is predicable of all the others but not all they of it. The first is feasible because one can establish genus and differentia through the topic of the genus. and one cannot. of fish that within which falls every fish. To define and divide one need not know the whole of existence. Moreover. when one has taken one’s differing pair of opposites and assumed that the two sides exhaust the genus.the lower divisions. whether outside animal or a subaltern genus of animal. In establishing a definition by division one should keep three objects in view: (1) the admission only of elements in the definable form. Yet some hold it impossible to know the differentiae distinguishing each thing from every single other thing without knowing every single other thing. just as one can conclude the inherence of an accident through the topic of the accident. since if it is the differentia of that genus. the primary differentiation of bird is that within which falls every bird. though not in the substance of these nor essentially. and one has further verified its presence in one of them. The right order will be achieved if the right term is assumed as primary. and other than that from which it differs.

I take these two results and inquire what common element have equanimity amid the vicissitudes of life and impatience of dishonour. We must then apply the same process to another set of individuals which belong to one species and are generically but not specifically identical with the former set. if Alcibiades was proud. and shown that the whole we finally reach is not further divisible-i. since this will be the definition of the thing. specifically identical-individuals. as such. Besides. there will be two genera of pride. and persevere until we reach a single formula. Next we have taken the differentia of the whole thus reached. When we have established what the common element is in all members of this second species. and nothing lacking. that it was intolerance of insult. Our procedure makes it clear that no elements in the definable form have been omitted: we have taken the differentia that comes first in the order of division. every definition is always universal and commensurate: the physician 228 . which. If we were inquiring what the essential nature of pride is. or Achilles and Ajax were proud.second in a ‘contiguous’ series. To resume our account of the right method of investigation: We must start by observing a set of similar-i. for example. they have in common. e. evidently the definiendum cannot be one thing but must be more than one. and consider what element they have in common. since when the higher term is excluded. that as soon as we have taken the last differentia to form the concrete totality. But if we reach not one formula but two or more. e. we should again consider whether the results established possess any identity. Achilles wrath. we should examine instances of proud men we know of to see what. we said. and so on. this totality admits of no division into species. that term of the remainder which is ‘contiguous’ to it will be primary. If they have none. and that the subject accepts one of the two as its predicate.e. For it is clear that there is no superfluous addition.e.g. pointing out that animal. and this term taken in conjunction with its differentiae is a genus: moreover the differentiae are all included. Lysander. or Socrates. if there were. because there is now no further differentia. I may illustrate my meaning as follows. it was this which drove Alcibiades to war. Now the primary term is a genus.g. since all these terms we have selected are elements in the definable form. since any omission would have to be a genus or a differentia. we should find on inquiring what they all had in common. is divisible exhaustively into A and B. and then if these have in common indifference alike to good and ill fortune. the final concrete would admit of division into species. is not the case. and Ajax to suicide. We should next examine other cases. and likewise in members of further species.

and we shall attain perspicuity if we can collect separately the definition of each species through the group of singulars which we have established e. we next lay down the properties essentially connected with the first of the remaining classes-e. B the properties of every animal. as the common properties of horned animals we collect the possession of a third stomach and only one row of teeth. 14 In order to formulate the connexions we wish to prove we have to select our analyses and divisions.g. Then since it is clear in virtue of what character they possess these attributes-namely their horned 229 . clearly metaphors and metaphorical expressions are precluded in definition: otherwise dialectic would involve metaphors.does not prescribe what is healthy for a single eye. the definition of acuteness. but only of sound-and so proceed to the common universal with a careful avoidance of equivocation. perspicuity is essential in definitions. and that is why our procedure should be from the several species to the universal genera-this for the further reason too that equivocation is less readily detected in genera than in infimae species.g. We must collect any other common character which we observe. if this first subgenus is bird. It is also easier by this method to define the single species than the universal. For example. C D E various species of animal. Let A be animal. e. we lay down what the properties are which inhere in every animal.g.properties belong to it. This will clearly at once enable us to say in virtue of what character the subgenera-man. Indeed. or horsepossess their properties. but for all eyes or for a determinate species of eye. just as inferential movement is the minimum required in demonstrations. We are now taking our examples from the traditional class-names. Then it is clear in virtue of what character B inheres in D-namely A-and that it inheres in C and E for the same reason: and throughout the remaining subgenera always the same rule applies.g. We may add that if dialectical disputation must not employ metaphors. but we must not confine ourselves to considering these. The method of selection consists in laying down the common genus of all our subjects of investigation-if e. always characterizing the proximate subgenus. and then consider with what species it is connected and what. These established. the essential properties of every bird-and so on. they are animals. the definition of similarity not unqualified but restricted to colours and to figures.

for instance. namely all those whose difference consists in their concerning different subjects or in their mode of manifestation. C vine. let us say. but if so. Here the one cause is subordinate to the other. if this cause is not present. one might argue. then A inheres in C (every vine is 230 . 16 The question might be raised with regard to cause and effect whether when the effect is present the cause also is present. B the possession of broad leaves. if a plant sheds its leaves or the moon is eclipsed.character-the next question is. Other connexions that require proof only differ in that the ‘middle’ of the one is subordinate to the ‘middle’ of the other. there is present also the cause of the eclipse or of the fall of the leaves-the possession of broad leaves. but specifically they are different. and an animal’s bone.g. For example: Why does the Nile rise towards the end of the month? Because towards its close the month is more stormy. For. Now if A inheres in B (for every broad-leaved plant is deciduous). its effect will be at once implied by it-the eclipse by the earth’s interposition. a whole group might be proved through ‘reciprocal replacement’-and of these one class are identical in genus. these phenomena will have some other cause: if it is present. of reflection. although these too possess common properties as if there were a single osseous nature. a fish’s spine. because all three are forms of repercussion. they will be logically coincident and each capable of proof through the other. the fall of the leaves by the possession of broad leaves. and B in C (every vine possessing broad leaves). in the former the earth’s interposition. to what species does the possession of horns attach? Yet a further method of selection is by analogy: for we cannot find a single identical name to give to a squid’s pounce. whether. Let me illustrate: Let A be deciduous character. This latter class may be exemplified by the questions as to the causes respectively of echo. Why is the month more stormy towards its close? Because the moon is waning. 15 Some connexions that require proof are identical in that they possess an identical ‘middle’ e. in the latter case. and of the rainbow: the connexions to be proved which these questions embody are identical generically.

F vine. and D and E primary subjects of B and C respectively. and. let B be a primary subject in which A inheres. however. be convertible. is obvious because the interposition is an element in the definition of eclipse. i. that the reason why trees are deciduous is the coagulation of sap. and the cause is its deciduous character. Thus. and the earth’s interposition is the cause of the moon’s eclipse and not the eclipse of the interposition)-if. suggest that if the connexion to be proved is always universal and commensurate.e. E deciduous. they cannot each be the cause of the other (for cause is prior to effect. On the other hand. For instance. Moreover. The presence of the cause thus necessitates that of the effect. that the eclipse is not the cause of the interposition. if this whole has species. however. and D in E (for every deciduous plant has broad leaves): therefore every vine has broad leaves. universally and commensurately to those species-i. If. and C another primary subject of A. but the presence of the effect necessitates the presence not of all that may cause it but only of a cause which yet need not be the whole cause. We may. then. can a single effect have more than one cause? One might argue as follows: if the same attribute is predicable of more than one thing as its primary subject. then if a tree is deciduous. one who knows it through the eclipse knows the fact of the earth’s interposition but not the reasoned fact. C of A’s inherence in E. let D be broad-leaved. and the middle term B is the cause. either to all species of plant or to a single species. Then E inheres in F (since every vine is deciduous). Supposing. but the interposition of the eclipse. A will then inhere in D and E. not only will the cause be a whole but also the effect will be universal and commensurate.deciduous). demonstration through the cause is of the reasoned fact and demonstration not through the cause is of the bare fact. for example. deciduous character will belong exclusively to a subject which is a whole. which shows that the eclipse is known through the interposition and not vice versa. So in these universal and commensurate connexions the ‘middle’ and its effect must reciprocate.e. coagulation must be present. But we can also demonstrate that the vine has broad leaves because it is deciduous. 17 Can the cause of an identical effect be not identical in every instance of the effect but different? Or is that impossible? Perhaps it is impossible if 231 . and if coagulation is present-not in any subject but in a tree-then that tree must be deciduous. and B will be the cause of A’s inherence in D.

for likeness here is equivocal. Again. And the middle likewise reciprocates. and is at the same time of wider extent than vine. and subject are reciprocally predicable in the following way. But if they are accepted as such. because you will first reach a middle next the subject.the effect is demonstrated as essential and not as inhering in virtue of a symptom or an accident-because the middle is then the definition of the major term-though possible if the demonstration is not essential. effect. and when they are numbers. If an explanation in formal terms of the inter-relation of cause and effect is demanded. Then B will be a universal attribute of each 232 . or something else of the sort. Deciduous is a universal attribute of vine. Again. and a premiss asserting it of the whole subject. the effect is wider than the subject (e. generically one if they are generically one. meaning perhaps in the latter case equality of the ratios of the sides and equality of the angles. We may illustrate as follows. and of fig. is both different and identical. and B of every species of D. Let A be an attribute of all B. it is a definition of deciduous. I say that. we shall offer the following. for the middle is a definition of the major. and after that a middle-the coagulation of sap or something of the sortproving the connexion of the first middle with the major: but it is the coagulation of sap at the junction of leaf-stalk and stem which defines deciduous. The cause when they are lines. the middle will correspond to the extremes. but it is coextensive with the species taken collectively (in this instance with all figures whose external angles are equal to four right angles). Now it is possible to consider the effect and its subject as an accidental conjunction. The truth is that cause. Then if you take the middle which is proximate. the cause of likeness between colour and colour is other than that between figure and figure. but so that both A and B are wider than their respective subjects. in the case of colours identity of the act of perceiving them. the possession of external angles equal to four right angles is an attribute wider than triangle or are).g. connexions requiring proof which are identical by analogy middles also analogous. identical as involving a given determinate increment. and is of wider extent than fig: but it is not wider than but coextensive with the totality of the species. though such conjunctions would not be regarded as connexions demanding scientific proof. Take the question why proportionals alternate. If the species are taken severally. In all proportionals this is so. which is incidentally the reason why all the sciences are built up through definition. different in so far as lines are lines and not numbers. and be equivocal if they are equivocal.

and I call an attribute primary universal if it is commensurate. all the species of E will be united by possessing some common cause other than B: otherwise how shall we be able to say that A is predicable of all of which E is predicable. Thus. B of A’s inherence in C. As to the basic premisses. and with that also the definition of. and the conditions required to produce. and there is not merely one middle but several middles. for that is the cause of the subject’s falling under the universal. 19 As regards syllogism and demonstration. while E is not predicable of all of which A can be predicated? I mean how can there fail to be some special cause of A’s inherence in E. is the cause of the property’s inherence in the several species the middle which is proximate to the primary universal. demonstrative knowledge. otherwise why should B be the cause of A’s inherence in D any more than A the cause of B’s inherence in D? Now if A is an attribute of all the species of E. hence C is the cause of A’s inherence in D. then. too. not with each species severally but with their totality). the cause of longevity in quadrupeds is lack of bile. united by possessing some common cause? This cause we must look for. and the conditions required to produce each of them. how they become known and what is the developed 233 . in birds a dry constitution-or certainly something different. Let us call it C. 18 If immediate premisses are not reached at once. i. the definition of.e. To illustrate formally: C is the cause of B’s inherence in D.species of D (since I call such an attribute universal even if it is not commensurate. and it extends beyond each of them taken separately. B is the cause of A’s inherence in the species of D: consequently A must be of wider extent than B. while the cause of A’s inherence in B is B itself. are now clear. since it is the same as demonstration. several causes. For instance. or the middle which is proximate to the species? Clearly the cause is that nearest to each species severally in which it is manifested. We conclude. that the same effect may have more than one cause. as there was of A’s inherence in all the species of D? Then are the species of E. but not in subjects specifically identical.

state of knowledge of them is made clear by raising some preliminary problems. 234 . We have already said that scientific knowledge through demonstration is impossible unless a man knows the primary immediate premisses. Therefore we must possess a capacity of some sort. From experience again-i. but also whether there is or is not scientific knowledge of both. or are innate but at first unnoticed. whether the developed states of knowledge are not innate but come to be in us. as we used to find in the case of demonstration. for it means that we possess apprehensions more accurate than demonstration and fail to notice them. how could we apprehend and learn without a basis of pre-existent knowledge? For that is impossible. And this at least is an obvious characteristic of all animals. in some the sense-impression comes to persist. from the universal now stabilized in its entirety within the soul. and. So out of sense-perception comes to be what we call memory. and of the former a different kind of knowledge. for they possess a congenital discriminative capacity which is called sense-perception. If on the other hand we acquire them and do not previously possess them. So animals in which this persistence does not come to be have either no knowledge at all outside the act of perceiving. animals in which it does come into being have perception and can continue to retain the sense-impression in the soul: and when such persistence is frequently repeated a further distinction at once arises between those which out of the persistence of such sense-impressions develop a power of systematizing them and those which do not. for a number of memories constitute a single experience.e. skill in the sphere of coming to be and science in the sphere of being. further. the one beside the many which is a single identity within them all-originate the skill of the craftsman and the knowledge of the man of science. or scientific knowledge of the latter. But though sense-perception is innate in all animals. But there are questions which might be raised in respect of the apprehension of these immediate premisses: one might not only ask whether it is of the same kind as the apprehension of the conclusions. but not such as to rank higher in accuracy than these developed states. in others it does not. nor can they come to be in us if we are without knowledge of them to the extent of having no such developed state at all. or no knowledge of objects of which no impression persists. So it emerges that neither can we possess them from birth. and out of frequently repeated memories of the same thing develops experience. Now it is strange if we possess them from birth.

it is the only other kind of true thinking except scientific knowing. for example. for the method by which even sense-perception implants the universal is inductive. The soul is so constituted as to be capable of this process. while science as a whole is similarly related as originative source to the whole body of fact. others admit of error-opinion. some are unfailingly true. until the original formation has been restored. the true universals. A fresh stand is made among these rudimentary universals. Thus it is clear that we must get to know the primary premisses by induction. When one of a number of logically indiscriminable particulars has made a stand. are established: e. It is like a rout in battle stopped by first one man making a stand and then another. it will be intuition that apprehends the primary premisses-a result which also follows from the fact that demonstration cannot be the originative source of demonstration. and since except intuition nothing can be truer than scientific knowledge. for instance. and the process does not cease until the indivisible concepts. not the man Callias. nor developed from other higher states of knowledge. which by the same process is a step towards a further generalization. such and such a species of animal is a step towards the genus animal. whereas scientific knowing and intuition are always true: further. Now of the thinking states by which we grasp truth. but from sense-perception. its content is universal-is man. therefore. the earliest universal is present in the soul: for though the act of sense-perception is of the particular.g. whereas primary premisses are more knowable than demonstrations. And the originative source of science grasps the original basic premiss. intuition will be the originative source of scientific knowledge. consequently. From these considerations it follows that there will be no scientific knowledge of the primary premisses. scientific knowledge of scientific knowledge.If. no other kind of thought except intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge. Let us now restate the account given already. and all scientific knowledge is discursive. 235 . nor. and calculation. though with insufficient clearness.We conclude that these states of knowledge are neither innate in a determinate form.

in order to grasp dialectical reasoning: for this is the object of our search in the treatise before us. those opinions are ‘generally accepted’ which are accepted by every one or by the majority or by the philosophers-i. for the nature of the fallacy in these is obvious immediately. or by the most notable and illustrious of them. For not every opinion that seems to be generally accepted actually is generally accepted.Topics. but the other should be called ‘contentious 236 . as happens in the case of the principles of contentious arguments. each of the first principles should command belief in and by itself. and what its varieties are. of the contentious reasonings mentioned. is ‘dialectical’. avoid saying anything that will obstruct us. Pickard-Cambridge < div id="book1" class="book" title="Book I"> 1 Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from opinions that are generally accepted about every problem propounded to us. and as a rule even to persons with little power of comprehension. or again if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted. On the other hand. Things are ‘true’ and ‘primary’ which are believed on the strength not of anything else but of themselves: for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to ask any further for the why and wherefore of them. (a) It is a ‘demonstration’. on the other hand. or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premisses which are primary and true: (b) reasoning. and also shall ourselves.e. something other than these necessarily comes about through them. the former really deserves to be called ‘reasoning’ as well. then. Again (c). reasoning is ‘contentious’ if it starts from opinions that seem to be generally accepted. A. Now reasoning is an argument in which. by all. So then. Book I Translated by W. when the premisses from which the reasoning starts are true and primary. we must say what reasoning is. but are not really such. when standing up to an argument. For in none of the opinions which we call generally accepted is the illusion entirely on the surface. certain things being laid down. or by the majority. if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted. First.

we must say for how many and for what purposes the treatise is useful. we merely want to describe them in outline. but not ‘reasoning’. in regard both to all that we have already discussed and to those which we shall discuss later.reasoning’. That it is useful as a training is obvious on the face of it. he does not assume opinions that are received either by every one or by the majority or by philosophers-that is to say. as happens (for example) in the case of geometry and her sister sciences. it is useful because when we have counted up the opinions held by most people. The foregoing must stand for an outline survey of the species of reasoning. though appropriate to the science in question. For this form of reasoning appears to differ from the reasonings mentioned above. the man who draws a false figure reasons from things that are neither true and primary. besides all the reasonings we have mentioned there are the mis-reasonings that start from the premisses peculiar to the special sciences. but does not really do so. or by most. we consider it quite enough from the point of view of the line of inquiry before us to be able to recognize each of them in some sort of way. while we shift the ground of any argument that they appear to us to state unsoundly. by all. Further (d). for he effects his misreasoning either by describing the semicircles wrongly or by drawing certain lines in a way in which they could not be drawn. They are three-intellectual training. or by the most illustrious of them-but he conducts his reasoning upon assumptions which. are not true. we may remark that that amount of distinction between them may serve. For he does not fall within the definition. It has a further use in relation to the ultimate bases of the principles used in the 237 . we shall meet them on the ground not of other people’s convictions but of their own. < div id="section2" class="section" title="2"> 2 Next in order after the foregoing. since it appears to reason. The possession of a plan of inquiry will enable us more easily to argue about the subject proposed. because the ability to raise searching difficulties on both sides of a subject will make us detect more easily the truth and error about the several points that arise. and the philosophical sciences. In general. For purposes of casual encounters. For the study of the philosophical sciences it is useful. because it is not our purpose to give the exact definition of any of them. casual encounters. nor yet generally accepted.

and what kind of. to dialectic: for dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries.several sciences. < div id="section4" class="section" title="4"> 4 First. and are identical. while the subjects on which reasonings take place are ‘problems’. things arguments take place. For it is not every method that the rhetorician will employ to persuade. What we have said. Since. we should have sufficiently won our goal. then. and with what materials they start. namely either 238 . if he omits none of the available means. or most appropriately. still. Now the materials with which arguments start are equal in number. < div id="section3" class="section" title="3"> 3 We shall be in perfect possession of the way to proceed when we are in a position like that which we occupy in regard to rhetoric and medicine and faculties of that kind: this means the doing of that which we choose with the materials that are available. Now every proposition and every problem indicates either a genus or a peculiarity or an accident-for the differentia too. however. with the subjects on which reasonings take place. and speak of it as a ‘property’. and (h) how we are to become well supplied with these. seeing that the principles are the prius of everything else: it is through the opinions generally held on the particular points that these have to be discussed. let us divide the ‘peculiar’ into both the aforesaid parts. then. the elements turn out to be four. we must see of what parts our inquiry consists. of what is peculiar to anything part signifies its essence. For arguments start with ‘propositions’. or the doctor to heal. we shall say that his grasp of the science is adequate. should be ranked together with the genus. and call that part which indicates the essence a ‘definition’. makes it clear that according to our present division. while of the remainder let us adopt the terminology which is generally current about these things. all told. applying as it does to a class (or genus). while part does not. For it is impossible to discuss them at all from the principles proper to the particular science in hand. and this task belongs properly. Now if we were to grasp (a) with reference to how many.

People whose rendering consists of a term only. ‘Are sensation and knowledge the same or different?’. because a definition is always a phrase of a certain kind. It is rendered in the form either of a phrase in lieu of a term. A ‘definition’ is a phrase signifying a thing’s essence. For if it be put in this way. A ‘property’ is a predicate which does not indicate the essence of a thing. for argument about definitions is mostly concerned with questions of sameness and difference. that they are not the same is enough of itself to overthrow it. is it not?’ or ‘”Animal” is the genus of man. for it is sometimes possible to define the meaning of a phrase as well. ‘property’. Similarly too in other cases. and likewise also of the question. use the word ‘definitory’ also of such a remark as ‘The “becoming” is “beautiful”’. problems and propositions are equal in number: for out of every proposition you will make a problem if you change the turn of the phrase. but yet belongs to that thing alone. “’An animal that walks on two feet” is the definition of man. and ‘accident’. < div id="section5" class="section" title="5"> 5 We must now say what are ‘definition’. To show. that the converse of this last statement does not hold: for to show that they are the same is not enough to establish a definition. and is predicated convertibly 239 . The difference between a problem and a proposition is a difference in the turn of the phrase. but only that it is from these that both problems and propositions are formed. please. In a word we may call ‘definitory’ everything that falls under the same branch of inquiry as definitions. and that all the above-mentioned examples are of this character is clear on the face of them. Naturally. however. however. try it as they may. Observe. ‘Is “an animal that walks on two feet” a definition of man or no?’ [or ‘Is “animal” his genus or no?’] the result is a problem.property or definition or genus or accident. is it not?’ the result is a proposition: but if thus. For if we are able to argue that two things are the same or are different. or of a phrase in lieu of another phrase. we shall be well supplied by the same turn of argument with lines of attack upon their definitions as well: for when we have shown that they are not the same we shall have demolished the definition. clearly do not render the definition of the thing in question. then. One may. ‘genus’. Do not let any one suppose us to mean that each of these enunciated by itself constitutes a proposition or problem.

whereas if we show that it is the genus of the one but not of the other.e. Thus it is a property of man to-be-capable of learning grammar: for if A be a man. For no one calls anything a ‘property’ which may possibly belong to something else. it will be called not a ‘property’ absolutely. and any 240 .) the ‘sitting posture’ may belong or not belong to some self-same thing. we shall have argued that they are in the same genus. and likewise also of ox. ‘sleep’ in the case of man. e. e. for example. while ‘two-footed’ is in point of fact ascribed as a property in certain relations. A ‘genus’ is what is predicated in the category of essence of a number of things exhibiting differences in kind. to know already what ‘definition’ and ‘genus’ and ‘property’ are. when expressed in language that is drawn in any kind of way from what happens (accidit) to be true of them. even though at a certain time it may happen to belong to him alone. then he is capable of learning grammar. it is a property of man relatively to a horse and a dog. for example. ‘Is the honourable or the expedient preferable?’ and ‘Is the life of virtue or the life of self-indulgence the pleasanter?’. if asked that question. the question. such as. neither a definition nor a property nor a genus yet belongs to the thing: (something which may possibly either belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing. ‘Is one thing in the same genus as another or in a different one?’ is also a ‘generic’ question. That is to say. though it is none of the foregoing-i. any one is bound. we shall have argued that these things are not in the same genus. he is a man. Likewise also ‘whiteness’. The question. in the case of man. as (e. it is appropriate to say ‘He is an animal’. Of the definitions of accident the second is the better: for if he adopts the first.g. and at another not white.of it. for a question of that kind as well falls under the same branch of inquiry as the genus: for having argued that ‘animal’ is the genus of man. and if he be capable of learning grammar. We should treat as predicates in the category of essence all such things as it would be appropriate to mention in reply to the question. if any such thing were actually to be called a property. whereas the second is sufficient of itself to tell us the essential meaning of the term in question. ‘What is the object before you?’. That nothing which may belong to anything else than A is a convertible predicate of A is clear: for it does not necessarily follow that if something is asleep it is a man. but a ‘temporary’ or a ‘relative’ property: for ‘being on the right hand side’ is a temporary property. for there is nothing to prevent the same thing being at one time white. if he is to understand it. An ‘accident’ is (i) something which.g. To Accident are to be attached also all comparisons of things together.g. as.

< div id="section7" class="section" title="7"> 241 . and then. even were one found. while if he be not the only one sitting. and other questions we must relegate each to the particular branch to which it most naturally belongs. < div id="section6" class="section" title="6"> 6 We must not fail to observe that all remarks made in criticism of a ‘property’ and ‘genus’ and ‘accident’ will be applicable to ‘definitions’ as well. as was said before. it would be very obscure indeed. there is nothing to prevent an accident from becoming both a relative and a temporary property. starting from the rules that are appropriate in each case. But we must not on this account expect to find a single line of inquiry which will apply universally to them all: for this is not an easy thing to find. it is still a property relatively to those who are not sitting. we shall have demolished the definition. The questions I mean have practically been already assigned to their several branches. Thus the sitting posture is an accident. and. For in all such cases the question is ‘to which of the two does the predicate in question happen (accidit) to belong more closely?’ It is clear on the face of it that there is nothing to prevent an accident from becoming a temporary or relative property. For when we have shown that the attribute in question fails to belong only to the term defined. So then. as would be remarked also in the case of an accident. as we do also in the case of a property. or that any of the things mentioned in the phrase used does not belong. Rather.other problem which may happen to be phrased in terms like these. speaking of them as ‘definitory’ and ‘generic’ questions. So then. to use the phrase previously employed. but will be a temporary property.’ all the points we have enumerated might in a certain sense be called ‘definitory’. so that. or that the genus rendered in the definition is not the true genus. it will probably be easier to make our way right through the task before us. and of little service for the treatise before us. whenever a man is the only person sitting. but a property absolutely it will never be.’ we must outline a division of our subject. a special plan of inquiry must be laid down for each of the classes we have distinguished.

we think. he will. too. where there is more than one thing. roughly speaking. such as a horse and a man. For all these uses mean to signify numerical unity. It might appear that the sense in which water from the same spring is called ‘the same water’ is somehow different and unlike the senses mentioned above: but really such a case as this ought to be ranked in the same class with the things that in one way or another are called ‘the same’ in view of unity of species. we change our description. those things are called generically the same which fall under the same genus. and the only difference in the case of water drawn from the same spring is this. as when a cloak is said to be the same as a doublet. that the likeness is more emphatic: that is why we do not distinguish it from the things that in one way or another are called ‘the same’ in view of unity of species. It is generally supposed that the term ‘the same’ is most used in a sense agreed on by every one when applied to what is numerically one.7 First of all we must define the number of senses borne by the term ‘Sameness’. For the reaon why all water is said to be specifically the same as all other water is because of a certain likeness it bears to it. specifically. its most literal and primary use is found whenever the sameness is rendered in reference to an alternative name or definition. indicating him by name. and what naturally travels upward the same as fire: while a third use is found when it is rendered in reference to some term drawn from Accident. For all such things seem to be of one family and to resemble one another. We generally apply the term numerically or specifically or generically-numerically in cases where there is more than one name but only one thing. or an animal that walks on two feet is said to be the same as a man: a second sense is when it is rendered in reference to a property. Sameness would be generally regarded as falling. Similarly. as one man and another. it is apt to be rendered in more than one sense. For often when we give the order to call one of the people who are sitting down.g. so we bid him call to us ‘the man who is sitting’ or ‘who 242 . into three divisions. ‘doublet’ and ‘cloak’. But even so. or who is musical. or one horse and another: for things like this that fall under the same species are said to be ‘specifically the same’. e. as when the creature who is sitting. understand better from some accidental feature. is called the same as Socrates. That what I have just said is true may be best seen where one form of appellation is substituted for another. but they present no differences in respect of their species. as when what can acquire knowledge is called the same as a man. whenever the person to whom we give the order happens not to understand us.

sometimes a quality. for if it signifies the essence. State. clearly it would be an accident. It is clear. it either is or is not one of the terms contained in the definition of the subject: and if it be one of those terms. but does not signify the essence.’ three senses are to be distinguished. as has been said. it is the definition. it is not predicated convertibly of the thing. on the face of it that the man who signifies something’s essence signifies sometimes a substance. < div id="section8" class="section" title="8"> 8 Of ‘sameness’ then.is conversing over there’-clearly supposing ourselves to be indicating the same object by its name and by its accident. what is predicated convertibly. These are ten in number: Essence. for accident was said’ to be what belongs as an attribute to a subject without being either its definition or its genus or a property. Quantity. it would be its definition or property. whereas. it would be seen that each was formed either from the definition of something or from its property or from its genus or from its accident. Position. if it be not one of those terms. is by induction: for if any one were to survey propositions and problems one by one. on the other hand. if not. For every predicate of a subject must of necessity be either convertible with its subject or not: and if it is convertible. Another way to confirm it is through reasoning. Time. Place. Activity. < div id="section9" class="section" title="9"> 9 Next. If. For the accident and genus and property and definition of anything will always be in one of these categories: for all the propositions found through these signify either something’s essence or its quality or quantity or some one of the other types of predicate. Relation. then. we must distinguish between the classes of predicates in which the four orders in question are found. too. sometimes some one of the 243 . Passivity. viz. then it will be the genus or the differentia. Quality. inasmuch as the definition consists of genus and differentiae. it is a property: for this was what a property is. Now one way to confirm that the elements mentioned above are those out of which and through which and to which arguments proceed.

signifies an essence: if. if a magnitude of a cubit be set before him and he says that what is set there is a magnitude of a cubit. nor yet make a problem of what is obvious to everybody or to most people: for the latter admits of no doubt. provided it be not contrary to the general opinion. but a quantity or a quality or one of the other kinds of predicate. falls next to be told. or by the most notable of these. For it is not every proposition nor yet every problem that is to be set down as dialectical: for no one in his senses would make a proposition of what no one holds. it might probably pass for a general opinion also that the perception of contraries is the same: also. and the materials with which they start. either by all. one kind of predicate is asserted of another kind. he states its essence and signifies a quality. and by what means we are to become well supplied with them. in the other cases: for each of these kinds of predicate. for a man would probably assent to the view of the philosophers. also propositions which contradict the contraries of opinions that are taken to be generally accepted. Likewise. Dialectical propositions also include views which are like those generally accepted. also. also. if it be a general opinion that there is more than 244 . and also all opinions that are in accordance with the recognized arts. if it be not contrary to the opinions of most men. while to the former no one would assent. it does not signify an essence. How we are to acquire them. he will be describing its essence and signifying a quantity.e. then. < div id="section10" class="section" title="10"> 10 First. Such. he states its essence and signifies a substance. Likewise. a definition must be given of a ‘dialectical proposition’ and a ‘dialectical problem’. but when a white colour is set before him and he says that what is set there is ‘white’ or is ‘a colour’. on the other hand. supposing it to be a general opinion that there is but one single science of grammar. For when man is set before him and he says that what is set there is ‘a man’ or ‘an animal’. Thus. or by most. Now a dialectical proposition consists in asking something that is held by all men or by most men or by the philosophers. if either it be asserted of itself. are the subjects on which arguments take place. it might pass for a general opinion that there is but one science of fluteplaying as well. whereas. then.other types of predicate. and so many. supposing it to be a general opinion that the knowledge of contraries is the same. or its genus be asserted of it. i.

It must. For some problems it is useful to know with a view to choice or avoidance. Also. e. or each of them among themselves. be something on which either people hold no opinion either way. also. and that one ought not to do them harm is the contradictory of that contrary. but for the sake of other things. in other cases. if one ought to do good to one’s friends. and that either by itself. all opinions that are in accordance with the arts are dialectical propositions. the contrary being that one ought to do good to one’s enemies. or as a help to the solution of some other such problem. one ought also to do evil to one’s enemies. it might appear also as if doing good to one’s friends were a contrary to doing evil to one’s enemies: but whether this is or is not so in reality as well will be stated in the course of the discussion upon contraries. whether the universe is eternal or not: others.g. or to truth and knowledge. propositions contradicting the contraries of general opinions will pass as general opinions: for if it be a general opinion that one ought to do good to one’s friends. for people are likely to assent to the views held by those who have made a study of these things. or the masses hold a contrary opinion to the philosophers. on a question of medicine they will agree with the doctor. are not useful in and by themselves for either of these purposes. whether pleasure is to be chosen or not. one ought not to do good to one’s enemies: this too is the contradictory of the view contrary to the general view. Likewise also. e. again. e. and likewise also in other cases. that one ought to do harm to one’s friends is contrary to the general view.g. it might pass for a general opinion that there is more than one science of flute-playing as well: for all these seem to be alike and akin. also. Clearly also. but yet help us in regard to some such problems. if one ought to do good to one’s friends. it will also be a general opinion that one ought not to do them harm.one science of grammar. it will look like a general opinion that the contrary predicate belongs to the contrary subject: e. Likewise. on comparison. Here. or the philosophers to the masses.g.g. Likewise. < div id="section11" class="section" title="11"> 11 A dialectical problem is a subject of inquiry that contributes either to choice and avoidance. for there are many things which we do not wish to know in and by themselves. and on a question of geometry with the geometrician. moreover. in order that through them we may come to 245 . while some it is useful to know merely with a view to knowledge.

for our object in thus distinguishing them has not been to create a terminology. but to recognize what differences happen to be found between them. 246 . or that Being is one. as Antisthenes said. while those who are puzzled to know whether snow is white or not need perception.know something else. nor yet be too far removed from it: for the former cases admit of no doubt. and we find it difficult to give our reasons.g. or the view of Heraclitus that all things are in motion. inasmuch as some problems are such that we have no opinion about them either way. e. and propositions are to be defined as aforesaid. while the latter involve difficulties too great for the art of the trainer. as Melissus says: for to take notice when any ordinary person expresses views contrary to men’s usual opinions would be silly. however. The subjects should not border too closely upon the sphere of demonstration. he might do so on the ground that it is reasonable. For people who are puzzled to know whether one ought to honour the gods and love one’s parents or not need punishment. Now a ‘thesis’ also is a problem. though a problem is not always a thesis. A ‘thesis’ is a supposition of some eminent philosopher that conflicts with the general opinion. the view maintained by the sophists that what is need not in every case either have come to be or be eternal: for a musician who is a grammarian ‘is’ so without ever having ‘come to be’ so. e. That a thesis. then. or that the one or the other class disagree among themselves. the view that contradiction is impossible. others also in regard to which we have no argument because they are so vast. also forms a problem. seeing that the thesis is a supposition in conflict with general opinion. is clear: for it follows of necessity from what has been said that either the mass of men disagree with the philosophers about the thesis. e. Not every problem.g. Problems. not punishment or perception. should be examined. Problems also include questions in regard to which reasonings conflict (the difficulty then being whether so-and so is so or not. there being convincing arguments for both views). Or it may be a view about which we have a reasoned theory contrary to men’s usual opinions. nor every thesis. the question whether the universe is eternal or no: for into questions of that kind too it is possible to inquire.g. Practically all dialectical problems indeed are now called ‘theses’. But it should make no difference whichever description is used. or being so eternally. For even if a man does not accept this view. but only one which might puzzle one of those who need argument.

though reasoning is more forcible and effective against contradictious people. and of things out of which.g.g. are to be distinguished in the way we have said before.< div id="section12" class="section" title="12"> 12 Having drawn these definitions. while the former cannot’. e. The means whereby we are to become well supplied with reasonings are four: (1) the securing of propositions. and (2) Sensation differs from knowledge in that the latter may be recovered again after it has been lost. (2) the power to distinguish in how many senses particular expression is used. e. then in general the skilled man is the best at his particular task. Induction is the more convincing and clear: it is more readily learnt by the use of the senses. and likewise the skilled charioteer. (1) ‘The desirable may mean either the honourable or the pleasant or the expedient’. arguments are constructed. of things about which. then. (3) the discovery of the differences of things. Now what reasoning is has been said before: induction is a passage from individuals to universals. on the other Reasoning. There is on the one hand Induction. and is applicable generally to the mass of men. are in a certain sense propositions: for it is possible to make a proposition corresponding to each of them. and (3) The relation of the healthy to health is like that of the vigorous to vigour’. The last three. the second upon the differences of things. < div id="section14" class="section" title="14"> 247 . < div id="section13" class="section" title="13"> 13 The classes. the argument that supposing the skilled pilot is the most effective. we must distinguish how many species there are of dialectical arguments. (4) the investigation of likeness. the third upon their likenesses. as well. The first proposition depends upon the use of one term in several senses.

beginning with the category of essence. but we have to try to recognize each of them by means of the familiarity attained through induction. too.g. ‘Ought one rather to obey one’s parents or the laws. Likewise also in the other cases. ‘Is the knowledge of opposites the same or not?’. and. We must make propositions also of the contradictories of opinions contrary to those that seem to be generally held. or ‘On Life’-and that ‘On Good’ should deal with every form of good. e. for so it is. or the most notable of them. e. ‘Empedocles said that the elements of bodies were four’: for any one might assent to the saying of some generally accepted authority. for in hearing we admit something into ourselves. i. ‘The perception of contraries is the same’-the knowledge of them being so-and ‘we see by admission of something into ourselves. or opinions contrary to those that seem to be generally held. while such as this are on natural philosophy. should be taken as a principle or accepted position. in the case of the other senses.14 Propositions should be selected in a number of ways corresponding to the number of distinctions drawn in regard to the proposition: thus one may first take in hand the opinions held by all or by most men or by the philosophers. We should select also from the written handbooks of argument. but also those that are like these. or most. e.g. examining them in the light of the illustrations given above. if they disagree?’. ‘On Good’. e. e.g. e. as was laid down before. ‘Is the universe eternal or not?’ Likewise also with problems. and should draw up sketch-lists of them upon each several kind of subject. Of propositions and problems there are-to comprehend the matter in outline-three divisions: for some are ethical propositions. by all. Propositions such as the following are ethical.g. not by an emission’.g. again. such as this are logical. one should indicate also the opinions of individual thinkers. putting them down under separate headings. For purposes of philosophy we must treat of these things according to their truth. all opinions that are in accordance with the arts. The nature of each of the aforesaid kinds of proposition is not easily rendered in a definition. too. but for dialectic only with an eye to general opinion. all statements that seem to be true in all or in most cases.e. for they are posited by those who do not also see what exception there may be. All 248 . some are on natural philosophy. It is useful also to make them by selecting not only those opinions that actually are accepted. we do not emit.g. while some are logical. In the margin. Moreover. and we taste in the same way.

so that ‘fine’ is an ambiguous term. Clearly. the one should be made into many. but also that the former are so called because of a certain intrinsic quality they themselves have. then. e. then. as long as division is possible. we must not only treat of those terms which bear different senses. in the case of ‘clear’ and ‘obscure’: for sound is called ‘clear’ and ‘obscure’. the above remarks are enough. ‘The knowledge of contraries is the same’. while in the case of a solid edge it is ‘dull’. ‘ramshackle’. for corresponding to each of the former terms the meaning of its contrary will be different. the contrary of ‘sharp’ in the case of a note is ‘flat’. As regards the names. For ‘sharp’ will not be the same when contrary to ‘dull’ and to ‘flat’. ‘The knowledge of opposites is the same’. also does ‘sharp’. the latter because they are productive of a certain result and not because of any intrinsic quality in themselves. E.propositions should be taken in their most universal form. the knowledge of ‘good and evil’. though ‘sharp’ is the contrary of each. just as ‘colour’ is too. Similarly also in other cases.g. and that what conduces to vigour and what conduces to health are called so in another. For in some cases a difference is at once displayed even in the names. there is no 249 . As regards the number of senses a term bears. of propositions. e. next. may be considered by the following means. then. so that Barhu is used with a number of meanings. whether the discrepancy between them be one of kind or one of names.g. Likewise also in other cases. In some cases there is no discrepancy of any sort in the names used. but. ‘heavy’) in the case of a note has ‘sharp’ as its contrary.g. but we must also try to render their definitions. inasmuch as its contrary also is so used. but a difference of kind between the meanings is at once obvious: e. e. also. but in the case of a solid mass ‘light’.g. ‘fine’ as applied to a picture has ‘ugly’ as its contrary.g. Whether a term bears a number of specific meanings or one only. First. then. the contrary of ‘sharp’ bears several meanings. In the same way these two should again be divided. as applied to a house. look and see if its contrary bears a number of meanings. or ‘cold and hot’. we must not merely say that justice and courage are called ‘good’ in one sense. Likewise. and that ‘of relative terms’. < div id="section15" class="section" title="15"> 15 On the formation. of ‘white and black’. and if so. Again Barhu (’flat’.

so that ‘pleasure’ is used in more than one sense. e. e.discrepancy.g. ‘to fail to see’ a phrase with more than one meaning. ‘harsh’. in the former by hearing. as some people say that a harsh sound is intermediate. therefore. but in the latter case we judge by sight. used of the frame of mind. while of ‘not to put the power of sight to active use’. To ‘love’ also. and likewise also ‘obscure’. the pleasure of drinking has a contrary in the pain of thirst. in the case either of the original terms or of their contraries: for the contrary also of sharp in either sense is ‘dull’. viz.g. to ‘love’ is an ambiguous term. but the difference in kind between the meanings is at once obvious: for colour is not called ‘clear’ in a like sense to sound. Again. in the case of the contradictory opposite. ‘clear’ and ‘obscure’ in the case of colours have ‘grey’ as an intermediate. it is ‘harsh’. (1) to fail to possess the power of sight. ‘Clear’. see if one sense of a term has a contrary. look and see if it bears more than one meaning. Moreover.g.g. This is plain also through sensation: for of things that are the same in kind we have the same sensation.g. is an ambiguous term. has to ‘hate’ as its contrary. see in regard to their intermediates. others have none. e. while others have but one. Further. whereas in the case of sound they have none. then the opposite of it also will be used in more than one meaning. it follows necessarily that ‘to see’ also has more than one meaning: for there will be an opposite to each sense of ‘to fail to see’. Likewise also with ‘sharp’ and ‘dull’ in regard to flavours and solid edges: here in the latter case we judge by touch. but in the former by taste. But if this has more than one meaning. for in the case of colours there are numbers of intermediates. if some meanings and their contraries have an intermediate. the opposite is to put it to active use. (2) to fail to put that power to active use. if they have. or. then. if some of them have more than one intermediate. e. Moreover. while as used of the physical activity (kissing) it has none: clearly. For here again there is no discrepancy in the names used. whereas the pleasure of seeing that the diagonal is incommensurate with the side has none. viz. while another has absolutely none. examine the case of terms that denote the privation or presence of a certain state: for if the one term bears more than one meaning. the opposite of ‘not to possess the power of sight’ is to possess it. if ‘to have sense’ be used with more 250 . then so will the remaining term: e. or if both have one but not the same one. For if this bears more than one meaning. moreover. as is the case with ‘clear’ and ‘obscure’. whereas we do not judge clearness by the same sensation in the case of sound and of colour. See. whereas in regard to sound there is but one.

while a sharp dagger is one containing a sharp angle (point). will be used with more than one meaning. also. too.g. Moreover. then ‘just’. the inflexion also that is formed from it will be used with more than one meaning. both as applied to the soul and as applied to the body. if ‘healthy’ describes both what produces health and what preserves health and what betokens health. Often it signifies what is of certain quantity. So then the term ‘good’ is ambiguous. Look also at the classes of the predicates signified by the term. and see if they are different without being subaltern. Look also at the genera of the objects denoted by the same term. if the word ‘justly’ be used of judging according to one’s own opinion.g. and see if they are the same in all cases. e. and in the case of medicine ‘productive of health’. as applied to the proper amount: for the proper amount too is called good. as applied to ‘man’. then ‘healthily’ also will be used with more than one meaning: e. as (e. whenever the original term bears more than one meaning. as (e. if ‘healthy’ has more than one meaning. e. That the opposition between the terms now in question depends upon the privation or presence of a certain state is clear. For if ‘justly’ has more than one meaning. whereas as applied to the soul it means to be of a certain quality. as applied to the soul and to the body. is in a closely similar case: for the same term does not bear the same meaning in all its applications: for a sharp note is a swift note. and also of judging as one ought. as the mathematical theorists of harmony tell us.g. In the same way also. then clearly the term is ambiguous: e. but in regard to a note it denotes what is ‘easy to hear’.g.) the good that happens at the right time: for what happens at the right time is called good. ‘Sharp’.than one meaning. examine the inflected forms. then ‘healthily’ also will be used to mean ‘in such a way as to produce’ or ‘preserve’ or ‘betoken’ health. whereas a sharp (acute) angle is one that is less than a right angle. then ‘just’ also will be used in like manner. signifies a colour. In the same way also ‘clear’. Sometimes it signifies what happens at a certain time. For if they are not the same. and vice versa. e. for there will be a meaning of ‘just’ to each of the meanings of ‘justly’.g. since animals naturally possess each kind of ‘sense’.) ‘donkey’. as applied to the soul and to the body. Likewise also in other cases. which denotes both the animal and the engine. temperate or courageous or just: and likewise also. as applied to a body.g.g. then ‘to be wanting in sense’ too will be used with more than one meaning. ‘good’ in the case of food means ‘productive of pleasure’. For the definition of them that corresponds to the name is different: for the one will be declared to be an 251 .

g. however. and the remainder in each case is not the same. then. Abstract.g. Often in the actual definitions as well ambiguity creeps in unawares. however. nor vice versa. have been had the meaning of ‘clear’ in each case been synonymous. we declare it to be a bird: in this way. For neither are these things said to be clear or sharp ‘in a like degree’. see if the terms cannot be compared as ‘more or less’ or as ‘in like manner’. the same expression ought to remain over.) with a ‘clear’ (lit. then. and a ‘sharp’ flavour and a ‘sharp’ note. e. For synonyms are always comparable. in the cases just mentioned.g. the genera be subaltern.animal of a certain kind. for they will always be used either in like manner. If.g. e. so that both the genera are predicated of it. Thus (e. Moreover. white) sound and a ‘clear’ garment. But in the case of genera that are not subaltern this does not happen. white) body’ of a ‘clear note’.g. for whenever we call a thing an ‘engine’. and for this reason the definitions also should be examined.) any one describes what betokens and what produces health as ‘related commensurably to health’. there is no necessity for the definitions to be different. e. while the latter will be ‘a note easy to hear’. ‘Clear’. as well. if in the latter case it means that ‘it is of the right amount to produce health’. and so is ‘bird’. and the other to be an engine of a certain kind. It should. 252 . of a ‘clear (lit.) ‘animal’ is the genus of ‘raven’. For then if what is peculiar in each case be abstracted. It is useful also to look at the definition that arises from the use of the term in combination. we do not call it an animal. If (e. Whenever therefore we say that the raven is a bird. whereas in the for it means that ‘it is such as to betoken what kind of state prevails’. This does not happen in the case of ambiguous terms. but also in the case of its contrary: for if its contrary bears several senses. Likewise also whenever we call the raven a ‘flying biped animal’. and also their definition. then. as is the case (e. we also say that it is a certain kind of animal. Look also and see not only if the genera of the term before you are different without being subaltern. or else in a greater degree in one case.g. we must not desist but go on to examine in what sense he has used the term ‘commensurably’ in each case. nor yet is the one said to be clearer or sharper than the other. For the former will be body possessing such and such a colour’. both the genera are predicated of raven. and ‘sharp’ are ambiguous. ‘a body ‘and’ a note’. clearly the term before you does so as well.

g. The differences which things present to each other should be examined within the same genera. first. those of ‘animal’ and ‘knowledge’ (for the differentiae of these are different). < div id="section17" class="section" title="17"> 17 Likeness should be studied. whereas in the case of a note it is a differentia. ‘Wherein does justice differ from courage. see if the actual meanings included under the same term themselves have different differentiae. then. e. for things that are the same have the same differentiae.g.g.) clear’ (lit.g. look and see if one of the meanings included under the same term be a species and another a differentia. ‘Wherein does sensation differ from knowledge?: for in the case of genera that are very far apart. then. and also from one genus to another. look and see if the meanings comprised under the same term are differentiae of genera that are different without being subaltern.g. Colour. e.g. then. whereas ‘colour’ in melodies has not the same differentiae. ‘colour’ in bodies and ‘colour’ in tunes: for the differentiae of ‘colour’ in bodies are ‘sight-piercing’ and ‘sight compressing’. e. in the case of things belonging to different genera. of a number of meanings in a term may be investigated by these and like means. white) as applied to a body is a species of colour. e. Moreover. the formulae being ‘A:B = C:D’ (e. provided they be not very much too far apart. ‘Sharp’. since the species is never the differentia of anything. as e. the differences are entirely obvious. For being ‘sharp’ differentiates note from note. is an ambiguous term. as knowledge stands 253 . as (e.Now since of genera that are different without being subaltern the differentiae also are different in kind. and wisdom from temperance?’-for all these belong to the same genus. and likewise also one solid from another. Again. ‘sharp’ is of a ‘note’ and a ‘solid’. is an ambiguous term: for it forms differentiae of genera that are different without being subaltern. < div id="section16" class="section" title="16"> 16 The presence.g. for one note is differentiated from another by being ‘clear’.

if it bas been made clear to him how many meanings it may have). for in so far as they have any identical attribute. < div id="section18" class="section" title="18"> 18 It is useful to have examined the number of meanings of a term both for clearness’ sake (for a man is more likely to know what it is he asserts. We should also look at things which belong to the same genus. as sight is in the eye. for in the case of the rest. This manner of argument. Practice is more especially needed in regard to terms that are far apart. if our answerer happens not to know the number of meanings of our terms. the questioner would then look ridiculous if he failed to address his argument to this. For as long as it is not clear in how many senses a term is used. does not belong properly to dialectic. to a man and a horse and a dog. and ‘As A is in B. and also with a view to ensuring that our reasonings shall be in accordance with the actual facts and not addressed merely to the term used. we shall be more easily able to see in one glance the points of likeness.to the object of knowledge. so is C in D’ (e. It helps us also both to avoid being misled and to mislead by false reasoning: for if we know the number of meanings of a term.g. so is sensation related to the object of sensation). however. and also in recognizing what any particular thing is. dialecticians should therefore by all means beware of this kind of verbal discussion. e. but only when of the many senses some are true and others are false. in so far they are alike. so is windlessness in the air). and when we ourselves put the questions we shall be able to mislead him. but shall know if the questioner fails to address his argument to the same point. we shall certainly never be misled by false reasoning.g. That it helps us in reasoning about sameness and difference is clear: for when we have discovered a difference of any kind whatever 254 . The discovery of the differences of things helps us both in reasonings about sameness and difference. and as is a calm in the sea. it is possible that the answerer and the questioner are not directing their minds upon the same thing: whereas when once it has been made clear how many meanings there are. This. so is reason in the soul. unless any one is absolutely unable to discuss the subject before him in any other way. to see if any identical attribute belongs to them all. is not possible in all cases. and also upon which of them the former directs his mind when he makes his assertion. however.

the matter before us as well: for we have first made the hypothesis that however it is in these cases. It is useful for hypothetical reasonings because it is a general opinion that among similars what is true of one is true also of the rest. so it is also in the case before us. because it is by means of an induction of individuals in cases that are alike that we claim to bring the universal in evidence: for it is not easy to do this if we do not know the points of likeness. It is clear. and the point the startingpoint of a line. and have then proved the point as regards these cases. for the observance of which the aforesaid means are useful. we shall secure a preliminary admission that however it is in these cases. the sameness of a calm at sea. Likewise. we render as the genus what is common to all the cases. we shall be at no loss into what genus we ought to put the object before us when we define it: for of the common predicates that which is most definitely in the category of essence is likely to be the genus. we shall already have shown that they are not the same: while it helps us in recognizing what a thing is. in the case of objects widely divergent. because we usually distinguish the expression that is proper to the essence of each particular thing by means of the differentiae that are proper to it. the examination of likeness is useful for purposes of definition. and also with a view to the rendering of definitions. e. The means. If. we shall get the credit of defining not inappropriately. if we are able to see in one glance what is the same in each individual case of it. that they place them in that which is common to both as their genus. also. then. and windlessness in the air (each being a form of rest). It is useful for inductive arguments. then. on the strength of the hypothesis. Definition-mongers too nearly always render them in this way: they declare the unit to be the startingpoint of number. If. and of a point on a line and the unit in number-each being a starting point. then. then. so it is also in the case before us: then when we have shown the former we shall have shown.between the objects before us. whereby reasonings are effected. 255 .g. with regard to any of them we are well supplied with matter for a discussion. The examination of likeness is useful with a view both to inductive arguments and to hypothetical reasonings. It is useful for the rendering of definitions because. are as follows. are these: the commonplace rules.

and because people more usually introduce theses asserting a predicate than denying it. then. there is nothing to prevent an attribute (e. A. for if ‘to be capable of learning grammar is an attribute of S’. The same is true also in the case of a property. then. Pickard-Cambridge < div id="book2" class="book" title="Book II"> 1 Of problems some are universal. particular problems are such as ‘Some pleasure is good’ and ‘Some pleasure is not good’. for in the case of accidents and in no other it is possible for something to be true conditionally and not universally. we shall also have shown that it belongs in some cases. Likewise. also. we must speak of the methods of overthrowing a view universally. For none of these attributes can possibly belong or not belong in part. then ‘S will be capable of learning grammar’. Likewise. because such are common to both universal and particular problems. for when we have shown that a predicate belongs in every case. so that it is not enough to show that whiteness or justice is an attribute of a man in order to show that he is white or just. e. while those who argue with them overthrow it. for it is open to dispute it and say that he is white or just in part only. is not a necessary process in the case of accidents. others particular. The methods of establishing and overthrowing a view universally are common to both kinds of problems. Book II Translated by W. First. The conversion of an appropriate name which is drawn from the element ‘accident’ is an extremely precarious thing.g. 256 . also. Universal problems are such as ‘Every pleasure is good’ and ‘No pleasure is good’. if drawn from the genus. Names drawn from the elements ‘definition’ and ‘property’ and ‘genus’ are bound to be convertible. if we show that it does not belong in any case. we shall also have shown that it does not belong in every case. whiteness or justice) belonging in part. then ‘S is an animal’.g. then it will be true by conversion to say that ‘S is an animal that walks on two feet’. In the case of accidents. if ‘to be an animal that walks on two feet is an attribute of S’. Conversion. for if ‘to be an animal is an attribute of S’. on the other hand. they must either belong or not belong absolutely.Topics.

g. e. a log.) 257 . This mistake is most commonly made in regard to the genera of things.) that ‘Justice happens (accidit) to be a virtue’. e. a man. Clearly then he renders it as an accident. Then. nor yet as its property or as its definition: for the definition and property of a thing belong to it and to nothing else.g. For those who make false statements. e. if no clear result be reached so far in these cases. you should again divide these until you come to those that are not further divisible.g. whereas many things besides white are coloured. but often even without such definition it is obvious that he has rendered the genus as an accident. for the species take on both the name and the definition of their genera. Look at them species by species.g. You should look and begin with the most primary groups.g. commit error. and those who call objects by the names of other objects (e. calling a planetree a ‘man’) transgress the established terminology. saying (e. and then proceed in order down to those that are not further divisible: e. The assertor may of course define it so in so many words.We must also define the errors that occur in problems. if one were to say that white happens (accidit) to be a colour-for being a colour does not happen by accident to white. < div id="section20" class="section" title="2"> 2 Now one commonplace rule is to look and see if a man has ascribed as an accident what belongs in some other way. For a predicate drawn from the genus is never ascribed to the species in an inflected form. a stone. but colour is its genus. Another rule is to examine all cases where a predicate has been either asserted or denied universally to belong to something. but always the genera are predicated of their species literally. They are of two kinds. if a man has said that the knowledge of opposites is the same. and see (e. and of contradictory terms. A man therefore who says that white is ‘coloured’ has not rendered ‘coloured’ as its genus. seeing that he has used an inflected form. and a horse. suppose that one were to say that whiteness is coloured or that walking is in motion. caused either by false statement or by transgression of the established diction. you should look and see whether it be so of relative opposites and of contraries and of terms signifying the privation or presence of certain states. and say that an attribute belongs to thing which does not belong to it.g.g. and not in their infinite multitude: for then the inquiry will proceed more directly and in fewer steps.

if the predicate belongs in no case. whereas if for one of the terms used in the definition a definition be stated. also. when we have suggested a division.g. a refusal to assert it will make him look absurd. For if ‘jealousy’ is pain at the apparent success of some wellbehaved person. or of being and not-being: for if in any case it be shown that the knowledge of them is not the same we shall have demolished the problem. and what should not. Thus (e. we should not here go with the multitude: e.g.) to see if it is possible to wrong a god. Likewise. and he is ‘indignant’ who grieves at the successes of the evil. Again. it is right to 258 . you should define what kind of things should be called as most men call them. then clearly the indignant man would not be jealous. you should say that we ought to use our terms to mean the same things as most people mean by them. it becomes obvious. a man should make the problem into a proposition for himself. ask what is ‘to wrong’? For if it be ‘to injure deliberately’. either of both separately or else of one of them. This rule is convertible for both destructive and constructive purposes: for if. This rule is very nearly the same as the rule to look into cases where a predicate has been attributed or denied universally: but it differs in the turn of the argument. and not stop until he comes to a familiar term: for often if the definition be rendered whole. to see if the indignant man is jealous. clearly it is not possible for a god to be wronged: for it is impossible that God should be injured. For this is useful both for establishing and for overthrowing a view: e. ask who each of them is: for then it will be obvious whether the statement is true or false. the point at issue is not cleared up. clearly the good man is not jealous: for then he would be bad.g. ask who is the ‘jealous’ man and what is ‘jealousy’.g. or of the double and the half. or else bring a negative instance to show in what case it is not so: for if he does neither of these things. Moreover. the predicate appears to hold in all or in a large number of cases. Another rule is to make definitions both of an accident and of its subject. we may then claim that the other should actually assert it universally. Again. but when we ask what kind of things are or are not of such and such a kind. or of blindness and sight. if he is ‘jealous’ who grieves at the successes of the good. A man should substitute definitions also for the terms contained in his definitions.whether it be so of just deeds and unjust. and then bring a negative instance against it: for the negative instance will be a ground of attack upon the assertion. to see if the good man is jealous. Moreover. and then look and see if anything untrue has been assumed as true in the definitions. e.

then the other man will object that the point which he himself questioned has not been discussed.call ‘healthy’ whatever tends to produce health. again. supposing ‘the right’ to mean ‘the expedient’ or ‘the honourable’. This is not to be done in every case. as do most men: but in saying whether the object before us tends to produce health or not. you should show your case of one of its several senses. If. in overthrowing a statement there is no need to start the discussion by securing any admission. it belongs universally.g. the variety of meanings of a term be obvious. then every soul is immortal. if you cannot show it of both. but only the other point. but only whenever we are not easily able to quote any single argument applying to all cases in common. and likewise also if we show that it belongs in a single case. so that a previous admission must be secured that if any soul whatever be immortal. we shall show that in one sense the attribute belongs.) the geometrician can argue that the triangle has its angles equal to two right angles. if we cannot show it of both senses: whereas if we are overthrowing a statement. This rule is to be observed in cases where the difference of meaning is undetected. we shall demolish the universal denial of it. to argue that if the soul of man be immortal. as (e. we shall have demolished the universal assertion of it.g. either when the statement asserts or when it denies the attribute universally: for if we show that in any case whatever the attribute does not belong. < div id="section21" class="section" title="3"> 3 Moreover. we should adopt the language no longer of the multitude but of the doctor. and it has been laid down that it is or that it is not an attribute of S. e. For it is not enough to discuss a single instance in order to show that an attribute belongs universally. supposing this claim to be a plausible one. distinguish how many meanings it has before proceeding either to demolish or to establish it: e. Of course. Whereas in establishing a statement we ought to secure a preliminary admission that if it belongs in any case whatever. For if we want to establish a statement. if we cannot show it of both senses. we shall show that in one sense the attribute does not belong. you should try either to establish or to demolish both 259 . This commonplace rule is convertible for purposes both of establishing and of overthrowing a view. if a term be used in several senses. then every soul is immortal. for supposing this to be obvious.g.

but in some other way: e. as (e. the sweet-toothed person desires it not because it is wine but because it is sweet. we should bring forward all such meanings as admit that view and should divide them only into those meanings which also are required for the establishment of our case: whereas if we want to overthrow a view. the desire of being doctored). the desire of health) or as a means to an end (e. by showing that it is honourable and expedient. If.g.g.g. if it is possible in some sense. as (e. The same rule applies also when the number of senses into which it is divided is more than two. that it is impossible to show both. consider those expressions whose meanings are many. but differ not by way of ambiguity of a term. that one thing is. Again. and the accidental fact that the equilateral figure has them so: for it is because of the accident of the equilateral triangle happening to be a triangle that we know that it has its angles equal to two right angles. Supposing.g. it is not possible in any sense of the term that the science of many things should be the same. if we want to establish a view. or. We must deal also in these cases as well with any uncertainty about the number of meanings involved. or again they may be an essential and an accidental attribute.) medicine is the science both of producing health and of dieting. or that it is neither honourable nor expedient.) the essential fact that the triangle has its angles equal to two right angles.g.g. in the case of wine. or is not. ‘The science of many things is one’: here ‘many things’ may mean the end and the means to that end. or as accidentally connected with it.g. then. treated either as an end or as a means to its end.g. then clearly it is possible. as. and leave the rest aside. For essentially he desires the sweet. adding an indication that it is true in the one sense and not in the other. that a particular science is of a particular thing. ‘of’ another should be established by means of the same commonplace rules. we should bring forward all that do not admit that view. The same rule holds true also of desire and all other terms that have more than one object. e.descriptions of the subject in question. however. you should show the one. For the ‘desire of X’ may mean the desire of it as an end (e. or they may be both of them ends. or again that it is not ‘of’ it in any of the aforesaid ways. Further. it clearly is altogether impossible that it should be so. or as a thing desired accidentally. he no longer desires it. Distinguish as many meanings as are required: e. and only accidentally the wine: for if it be dry. as the science of contraries is said to be the same (for of contraries the one is no more an end than the other). This rule is useful in 260 . e. His desire for it is therefore accidental.

while the second is true. whereas all those that are wanting to the species are not of necessity wanting to the genus. and ‘being fussy’ for ‘being busy’: for when the expression is made more familiar.g. if there is a bad and a good knowledge there is also a bad and a good disposition: for ‘disposition’ is the genus of knowledge. if to anything the term ‘scientific knowledge’ be applied. must also of necessity be possessed of one of its species or be described by terms derived from one of its species (e. e. e. All the attributes. For there is no necessity that all the attributes that belong to the genus should belong also to the species. while it is possible to judge rightly or wrongly. e. and to perceive is to judge. or are described by terms derived from that genus. and since those things that are possessed of the genus in question. Since those things of which the genus is predicated must also of necessity have one of its species predicated of them. This commonplace rule also is available for both purposes alike. for the man who perceives judges in a certain way. then also there will be applied to it the term ‘grammatical’ or ‘musical’ knowledge. or 261 . < div id="section22" class="section" title="4"> 4 Moreover. look at its genus.g. Now the former commonplace argument is fallacious for purposes of establishing a view.g. on the other hand. if we want to show that rightness and wrongness are possible in regard to perception. the former argument is true while the latter is fallacious. But per contra it may proceed from the species to the genus: for all the attributes that belong to the species belong to the genus as well. for all the attributes which do not belong to the genus do not belong to the species either. then animal also is good.g. to substitute ‘clear’ for ‘exact’ in describing a conception. both for establishing and for overthrowing a view. for if ‘man’ is good. then in regard to perception as well rightness and wrongness must be possible. the thesis becomes easier to attack. it is well to alter a term into one more familiar. In order to show that contrary attributes belong to the same thing. that belong to the species must of necessity belong also to the genus. for ‘animal’ is flying and quadruped. for purposes of overthrowing a view. In the present instance the proof proceeds from the genus and relates to the species: for ‘to judge’ is the genus of ‘to —perceive’. but not so ‘man’.dealing with relative terms: for cases of this kind are generally cases of relative terms. On the other hand.

look at the time involved. while if you want to overthrow a view. clearly it does not move at all.g. or what it is whose reality necessarily follows if the thing in question be real: if you wish to establish a view inquire what there is on whose reality the reality of the thing in question will follow (for if the former be shown to be real.g. then he will also possess grammatical or musical knowledge or knowledge of one of the other sciences. or will be described by a term derived from one of them. also. and so forth with all the other species of motion. If you are not well equipped with an argument against the assertion.g. and if any one possesses scientific knowledge or is described by a term derived from ‘science’. we shall have demolished the thing in question. to see if there be any discrepancy anywhere: e. what it is whose reality conditions the reality of the thing in question. while if it does not move with any of the species of motion. of the thing before you. but they do not always grow. whereas it is impossible to remember anything save what is in the past. look and see in regard to the thing in question. ask what it is that is real if the thing in question be real.) it can grow or be destroyed or come to be. For if it be not moved in any of these ways. For it will be easier to attack people when committed to a definition: for an attack is always more easily made on definitions. This commonplace rule is common for both purposes. look among the definitions.g.g. clearly it does move. < div id="section23" class="section" title="5"> 262 . and if one is not enough. whereas the other has to do also with the present and the future. real or apparent. if he has said that knowing is remembering: for the one is concerned with past time. For we are said to know things present and future (e. whether (e.knowledge of one of the other sciences. suppose a man to have stated that what is being nourished of necessity grows: for animals are always of necessity being nourished. Likewise. e. look and see whether it be possible for the soul to be moved with any of the species of motion. both for overthrowing and for establishing a view: for if the soul moves with one of the species of motion. that the soul is in motion). draw upon several. Moreover. that there will be an eclipse). as a ‘grammarian’ or a ‘musician’)-therefore if any expression be asserted that is in any way derived from the genus (e. then the thing in question will also have been shown to be real). Moreover. clearly it does not move. for if we show that what follows from the thing in question is unreal.

it increases the confusion of questioners if. and it is the answerer’s luck to be confuted on a mere side issue You should beware of the last of the aforesaid methods. and relevant to the thesis. whether it be that the man who is standing up to the argument has refused to concede something. arrives at a certain statement and then tries to demolish that statement: for when once this has been demolished. and foreign to. also. so that by the demolition of any single one of these consequences. inasmuch as each statement has a number of necessary consequences: e. sometimes an apparent necessity. but assent to those statements that are of no use in attacking the thesis. of whatever kind. there is the sophistic turn of argument. < 263 . moreover. by an induction made by means of the view laid down. the art of dialectic. But you should beware here too of making a change to a more difficult subject: for sometimes the consequence. Moreover. is the easier to demolish. This process is sometimes a real necessity. whereby we draw our opponent into the kind of statement against which we shall be well supplied with lines of argument. and the questioner thereupon addresses his arguments to the support of this view. It is an apparent necessity.5 Moreover.g. or whether he (the questioner) has first reached it by a plausible induction based upon the thesis and then tries to demolish it. the view originally laid down is demolished as well. and sometimes the original thesis. It is really necessary whenever the answerer has denied any view that would be useful in attacking the thesis. without being really so. For. adding an indication whenever he assents although he does not agree with the view. for it appears to be wholly disconnected from. the original statement is demolished as well. it is really necessary whenever he (the questioner) first. and when moreover the view in question happens to be one of a kind on which he has a good stock of lines of argument. sometimes neither an apparent nor a real necessity. the answerer should not lose his temper. Likewise. the man who said ‘X is a man’ has also said that it is an animal and that it is animate and a biped and capable of acquiring reason and knowledge. The remaining case is when the point to which the discussion comes to be directed is neither really nor apparently necessary. when the point to which the discussion comes to be directed appears to be useful. For this reason. any one who has made any statement whatever has in a certain sense made several statements. as a rule. after all propositions of this kind have been granted them. they can then draw no conclusion.

Clearly then the rule is useful for both purposes. This rule is convertible for both purposes: for when we have shown that the one attribute belongs. Moreover. just as also the expression ‘of a good hope’ may be taken to mean the man who hopes for good things. you may devise a line of attack by reinterpreting a term in its literal meaning. For the contrary of a usual attribute is always a comparatively rare attribute: e. we shall have shown that the remaining one does not belong. the expression ‘strong at heart’ will suggest not the courageous man. it is open to you to discuss it on the assumption that he meant that it happens necessarily: 264 . as (e. supposing we are well supplied as regards the one for arguing its presence or absence. with the implication that it is most fitting so to take it rather than in its established meaning: e. others however it may chance. according to the use now established. then even supposing his statement does not distinguish whether he meant that it happens usually or that it happens necessarily. Likewise also ‘well-starred’ may be taken to mean the man whose star is good. but the man the state of whose heart is strong. as Xenocrates says ‘well-starred is he who has a noble soul’.g.) a man must have either a disease or health. failing such an event itself. or if a usual event (or. The same is true also if he has declared a mere matter of chance to happen of necessity or usually. If the thing happens usually.g. we shall have shown that the remaining one does belong. if men are usually bad. we shall be well equipped as regards the remaining one as well. For if a necessary event has been asserted to occur usually.g. others usually.div id="section24" class="section" title="6"> 6 In regard to subjects which must have one and one only of two predicates.’ For a man’s star is his soul. while if we show that the one does not belong. its contrary) has been stated to occur of necessity. it always gives an opportunity for attack. so that his mistake is even worse if he has declared them to be good of necessity. if therefore a necessary event has been asserted to occur usually. Some things occur of necessity. they are comparatively seldom good. Likewise also if he has declared the contrary of what is usual to be necessary. clearly the speaker has denied an attribute to be universal which is universal. for a chance event happens neither of necessity nor usually. and so has made a mistake: and so he has if he has declared the usual attribute to be necessary: for then he declares it to belong universally when it does not so belong.

and this too gives two modes. and the other objectionable. and the one is desirable. and the other an expression denoting a defect: for an excess is generally thought to belong to the class of objectionable things. Pleasure.g. The first two then of the aforesaid conjunctions do not constitute any contrariety. we must grasp the subject of contraries. look and see also if he has stated a thing to be an accident of itself. if he has stated without any distinction that disinherited persons are bad. For to do good to friends is contrary to the doing of evil to friends: for it proceeds from the contrary disposition. e. or per contra to do evil to friends and to do good to enemies. you may assume in discussing it that he means that they are so necessarily. to do good to friends and to do evil to friends. But the other four all constitute a contrariety. he would be declaring it to be an accidental attribute of itself.g. If then any one says that joyfulness is an accidental attribute of cheerfulness. to do good to friends and to do evil to enemies. in order that it may help us both in demolishing and in establishing a view. and likewise also a defect. to do good to friends and to do good to enemies.g. unless the one be an expression denoting an excess. e. or to do evil to friends and evil to enemies. Moreover. Nor is the doing of evil to friends contrary to the doing of good to enemies: for both of these are objectionable and belong to the same disposition: and one objectionable thing is not generally thought to be the contrary of another.g. as Prodicus used to divide pleasures into joy and delight and good cheer: for all these are names of the same thing. or to do good to enemies and to do evil to enemies. and this gives two modes: e. Well then. taking it to be a different thing because it has a different name. for the doing of good to friends is not contrary to the doing of evil to enemies: for both courses are desirable and belong to the same disposition. to wit.e. Or (3) a single verb may be attached to both objects: and this also gives two modes. < div id="section25" class="section" title="7"> 7 Inasmuch as contraries can be conjoined with each other in six ways. Or else (2) both verbs may be attached to one object. and four of these conjunctions constitute a contrariety. The case is the same also in regard to the other conjunctions: 265 . that the modes of conjunction are six is clear: for either (1) each of the contrary verbs will be conjoined to each of the contrary objects.

while if they exist in us. if we examine them in the same way. it would be capable of knowledge as well: and this is not generally held-I mean that the faculty of desire is capable of knowledge. if they exist in us: for it is through the sensation of sight that we recognize the Form present in each individual. then. Likewise also if he has asserted that the faculty of desire is ignorant. it is impossible that they should be unmoved: for when we move. For according to the views of those who posit the existence of Ideas. for it is impossible that contrary predicates should belong at the same time to the same thing. as has been said. from what has been said. if the accident of a thing have a contrary.) if he has asserted that hatred follows anger. though the rule will not help you to assert that the accident actually belongs. contrary predicates must necessarily belong to the thing: e. Select therefore whichever of the two contraries is useful in attacking the thesis. For having shown that the thing in question will not admit of the contrary of the accident asserted. we shall have shown that the accident neither belongs 266 . if he has said that the ‘Ideas’ exist in us. this rule should be observed: but for purposes of establishing one. For then the result will be that they are both in motion and at rest. For purposes. it follows necessarily that all that is in us moves with us as well. and the other objectionable. be also in the ‘spirited faculty’: for if not-if friendship is in the faculty of desire-then hatred could not follow anger. and the one belongs to a reasonable disposition and the other to a bad. friendship. those Ideas are at rest and are objects of thought. of overthrowing a view. Likewise. Thus (e. the same course has more than one contrary. look and see if that which admits of the accident will admit of its contrary as well: for the same thing admits of contraries. Clearly also they are objects of sensation. You should therefore look and see if its contrary.for in each combination the one course is desirable. and moreover that they are objects both of sensation and of thought. Clearly. if there be posited an accident which has a contrary. For if it were capable of ignorance. of such a kind that if it be true. it will help you to assert that it may possibly belong. Or again. see whether it belongs to the subject to which the accident in question has been declared to belong: for if the latter belongs the former could not belong. to wit.g.g. hatred would in that case be in the ‘spirited faculty’: for that is where anger is. then. For the doing of good to friends has as its contrary both the doing of good to enemies and the doing of evil to friends. we shall find that the contraries of each of the others also are two in number. Again. Moreover. look and see if anything has been said about something.

what is not pleasant is not honourable. therefore. then. clearly the sequence is converse. ‘If what is not pleasant be not honourable. however. Clearly. for the desirable is the contrary of the objectionable. therefore. Now the sequence is direct in a case such as that of courage and cowardice: for upon the one of them virtue follows. and vice upon the other. but disease does not follow upon debility.g. then what is honourable is pleasant’. < div id="section26" class="section" title="8"> 8 Seeing that the modes of opposition are four in number. so far as may be required. (e. Then look also at the case of the contraries of S and P in the thesis. Likewise. converse in such a case as this: Health follows upon vigour. but conversely ‘not-man’ upon ‘not-animal’. also. rare in the case of contraries. our proof will merely have gone to this point. In all cases. Likewise also in other cases. while on the other hand. the conversion of the sequence formed by contradiction of the terms of the thesis is a method convertible for both purposes. a postulate of this sort should be made. Converse sequence is.nor can possibly belong.g. on the other hand. therefore.) as that man be an animal. if we show that the contrary belongs. either directly or conversely. both when demolishing and when establishing a view. what is not an animal is not a man’: and likewise also in other instances of contradictories. both when you are demolishing and when you are establishing a view: secure arguments of this kind as well by means of induction. The sequence. rather debility follows upon disease. and upon the one it follows that it is desirable. the contrary of the one term does 267 .) that ‘If the honourable is pleasant. in the latter case also is direct. In this case. we shall not indeed as yet have shown that the accident asserted does belong as well. that it is possible for it to belong. or that the thing is capable of the contrary. so is the former’. usually the sequence is direct. The sequence is. while if the latter be untrue. and see if the contrary of the one follows upon the contrary of the other. you should look for arguments among the contradictories of your terms. For in those cases the sequence is converse: for ‘animal’ follows upon ‘man but ‘notanimal’ does not follow upon ‘not-man’. converting the order of their sequence. then. and you should secure them by means of induction-such arguments (e. If. while upon the other it follows that it is objectionable.

Likewise also things that tend to produce and to preserve anything are called co-ordinates of that which they tend to produce and to preserve. not generally received as really true. and the other the privation of it. e. in the way described: for the object of sensation is an object of knowledge. and if sight be a sensation. on the ground that neither is sensation knowledge. whereas ‘inflected forms’ are such as the 268 . for many people deny that there is knowledge of objects of sensation.g. < div id="section27" class="section" title="9"> 9 Again look at the case of the co-ordinates and inflected forms of the terms in the thesis. as sensation follows sight.g. as e. e. usually describes cases such as these. if knowledge be a conceiving. whereas sensation is not knowledge. while absence of sensation follows blindness. in the case of relative terms. ‘healthy habits’ are co-ordinates of ‘health’ and a ‘vigorous constitutional’ of a ‘vigorous constitution’ and so forth also in other cases. then also the object of sight is an object of sensation. You should look also into cases of the privation or presence of a state in like manner to the case of contraries. Again. and so is a multiple to a fraction. however. it must of necessity do so as well in the original statement. The case of relative terms should also be studied in like manner to that of a state and its privation: for the sequence of these as well is direct.g. By co-ordinates’ are meant terms such as the following: ‘Just deeds’ and the ‘just man’ are coordinates of ‘justice’. in the case of such privations the converse sequence does not occur: the sequence is always bound to be direct: e. ‘Co-ordinate’. Only. then 1/3 is a fraction: for 3/1 is relative to 1/3. and ‘courageous deeds’ and the ‘courageous man’ are co-ordinates of courage. if 3/1 is a multiple. both in demolishing and in establishing it.not follow upon the contrary of the other either directly or conversely. The objection is. clearly neither does the one term follow upon the other in the statement made: whereas if the one followed the other in the case of the contraries.g. For the opposition of sensation to absence of sensation is an opposition of the presence to the privation of a state: for the one of them is a state. the principle stated is just as useful for the contrary purpose. then also the object of knowledge is an object of conception. to show that the object of sensation is not an object of knowledge. An objection may be made that there is no necessity for the sequence to take place. Moreover. then.

and such as are formed in this way. For those things whose modes of generation rank among good things. Moreover. and ‘courageously’ to courage. look at the modes of generation and destruction of a thing.g. so is the former. and if they themselves be good. of a man or thing. whatever its kind. then injustice is ignorance: and if ‘justly’ means ‘knowingly’ and ‘skilfully’. ‘healthily’. if ‘justice’ be something praiseworthy. as in the instance given just now: for ‘unjustly’ is more likely to seem equivalent to ‘skilfully’ than to ‘unskilfully’. they themselves count as good. then all the rest as well come to be shown to be so: e. of a man or an act. and at the things which tend to produce or to destroy it.g. but also in the case of its contrary. whereas if the modes of destruction count as evil. if justice be knowledge. ‘justly’. if the latter be the case. so also are their modes of generation. whereas if causes destructive of them are good. Then ‘justly’ will be rendered also ‘praiseworthily’. then they themselves rank as evil things. then.g. are themselves also good.g. as (e. for the contrary predicate: e. for neither is evil painful: or that. their modes of generation be evil. when any one member. argue that good is not necessarily pleasant. e. then so will ‘just’. for all we are claiming now is that the contrary of P shall follow the contrary of S. ‘just’. on the other hand. Clearly. It is usually held that words when used in their inflected forms as well are co-ordinates. If. and then ‘co-ordinate’ describes all the members of the same kindred series. and ‘justly’ connote something praiseworthy. neither is the former. then they themselves also are evil. ‘justice’. ‘courageously’. themselves also rank as good. derived will by the same inflexion from ‘the praiseworthy’ whereby ‘justly’ is derived from ‘justice’. both in demolishing and in establishing a view. This commonplace rule has been stated before in dealing with the sequence of contraries. < div id="section28" class="section" title="10"> 269 .following: ‘justly’. then ‘unjustly’ means ‘ignorantly’ and ‘unskilfully’: whereas if the latter be not true. they themselves rank as evil.) ‘justly’ in relation to justice. of the same kindred series is shown to be good or praiseworthy. Also. In regard to modes of destruction the converse is true: for if the modes of destruction rank as good things. Look not only in the case of the subject mentioned. The same argument applies also to things tending to produce and destroy: for things whose productive causes are good.

and if to possess sight be to see. argue from greater and less degrees. neither is it so in the case of the others. whereas if it be not so in the case of some one of them. if pleasure be good. then it belongs as well where it is more likely. for it is possible to know many things but not to be thinking of them. look at things which are like the subject in question. then if the one which is more usually thought to belong to the one subject does not belong. neither does the one that is less generally thought to belong. or. Moreover. then if the one which is more generally thought to belong does not belong. so too does the remaining predicate to the remaining subject. neither does the remaining predicate belong to the remaining subject. see whether also a greater pleasure be a greater good: and if to do a wrong be evil. neither was the former that dealt with a single thing. while if it does belong where it is less likely to belong. You should establish this by induction. while if it does not follow. if to ‘know’ a thing be to ‘think of’ it. or. then also to possess hearing will be to hear. so also will one opinion. then. then also to ‘know many things’ is to ‘be thinking of many things’. so also does the other. viz. if the one that is less generally thought to belong does belong. In regard to greater degrees there are four commonplace rules. the accident does not belong. Again: If two predicates be attributed to one subject. One is: See whether a greater degree of the predicate follows a greater degree of the subject: e. If. for if it be as stated in the case of some one like thing. Look and see also whether the cases are alike as regards a single thing and a number of things: for sometimes there is a discrepancy. see whether also to do a greater wrong is a greater evil. Moreover: If two predicates be attributed to two subjects. the latter proposition be not true. neither does it belong where it is less likely to belong. Another rule is: If one predicate be attributed to two subjects. both those which are and those which are generally held to be like. Likewise also in the case of other things. and see if they are in like case. e. The rule in question is useful for both purposes. if the one which is less usually thought to belong to the one subject does belong. clearly the accident belongs. Thus. if one branch of knowledge has more than one object. whereas this is not true. then supposing it does not belong to the subject to which it is the more likely to belong. Now this rule is of use for both purposes: for if an increase of the accident follows an increase of the subject. as we have said. that to ‘know’ a thing is to ‘think of’ it.10 Again.g.g. it is so with the other like things as well. 270 .

in a like degree. Moreover. from greater or less or like degrees of truth in the aforesaid number of ways. but only in those in which the excess described as an ‘increased intensity’ is found to take place. neither does the remaining predicate belong to the remaining subject.Moreover. in three ways. whereas formerly it was not white or good. neither does the remaining one. while if the one predicate does belong to the one subject. if an addition of something to a given object intensifies the character which it had as given. however. The above rule is. in the case of other attributes. or is supposed to belong. for the purpose of overthrowing a predication: for several predicates of which we 271 . it is not thereby made clear whether in itself it may not be good: for the addition of good to evil does not necessarily make the whole good. you should argue from the addition of one thing to another. or is generally supposed to belong.’ For supposing that one predicate belongs. Moreover. This rule is not convertible. it belongs to the remaining one as well. if the one does not belong. Again. For if the thing added does not make the other good. while if the one does belong. If the addition of one thing to another makes that other good or white. any predicate of which we can speak of greater or less degrees belongs also absolutely: for greater or less degrees of good or of white will not be attributed to what is not good or white: for a bad thing will never be said to have a greater or less degree of goodness than another. < div id="section29" class="section" title="11"> 11 You can argue. while if it belongs to the one. then. those described in the last three rules given in regard to a greater degree. the remaining predicate belongs to the remaining subject as well. any more than the addition of white to black makes the whole white. then. supposing two predicates to belong in a like degree to the same subject. also. Or. then the thing added will be white or good-it will possess the character it imparts to the whole as well. The case is the same also if two predicates belong in a like degree to two subjects. to two subjects in a like degree. viz. The rule is not applicable in all cases. either. the remaining one belongs as well. then the thing added will itself as well be of that character. for if the one predicate does not belong to the one subject. you can argue from the fact that an attribute belongs. then if it does not belong to the one. not convertible for overthrowing a view. neither does it belong to the other. Likewise. but always of badness.

but a man is a man for all that. A thing is ‘absolutely’ so which without any addition you are prepared to say is honourable or the contrary. absolutely. An objection may be raised that in a given respect people may be good by nature. In the same way also it is in certain places honourable to sacrifice one’s father. You should examine in the same way predicates attributed in a given respect. whereas it is not possible for it to escape absolutely. because that is honourable absolutely. if only one be in that state. and at a given time and place: for if the predicate be possible in some respect. they may be generous or temperately inclined. it is not honourable. e. when one is ill. but absolutely it is not possible to exist singly and alone.g. whereas. in certain places it is possible to live singly and alone. but to a certain state of health: for it is all the same whenever it occurs.cannot speak of a greater degree belong absolutely: for the term ‘man’ is not attributed in greater and less degrees.g. In the same way also it is a good thing at certain places to follow see and such a diet. it is possible also absolutely.g. while absolutely they are not good by nature. to honour the gods you will declare to be honourable without adding anything. So that whatever without any addition is generally accounted to be honourable or dishonourable or anything else of that kind. will be said to be so ‘absolutely’. 272 . because no one is prudent by nature.g. among the Triballi. Or possibly this may indicate a relativity not to places but to persons: for it is all the same wherever they may be: for everywhere it will be held honourable among the Triballi themselves. just because they are Triballi. Likewise. Moreover. though it is not a good thing absolutely.g. e. also.) you will deny that to sacrifice one’s father is honourable: it is honourable only to certain persons: it is not therefore honourable absolutely. it is possible for a destructible thing to escape destruction at a given time. is what is predicated at a given time or place: for what is absolutely impossible is not possible either in any respect or at any place or time. in infected areas. Again. Likewise. e. Thus (e. but it is not so absolutely. at certain times it is a good thing to take medicines. e. also. On the other hand. Or possibly this again may indicate a relativity not to a certain time.

or all. e. e. You should direct the argument you intend to employ to whatever purpose you require. should be examined upon the following lines: only first of all it must be clearly laid down that the inquiry we are making concerns not things that are widely divergent and that exhibit great differences from one another (for nobody raises any doubt whether happiness or wealth is more desirable). or by the experts in regard to any particular class of things. Of what is ‘better’ or ‘more desirable’ the absolute standard is the verdict of the better science. In the second place. 273 .Topics. that which is more lasting or secure is more desirable than that which is less so: and so is that which is more likely to be chosen by the prudent or by the good man or by the right law.e.g. Likewise also in other cases.g. A. that which is known as ‘an x’ is more desirable than that which does not come within the genus ‘x’-e. justice than a just man. Pickard-Cambridge < div id="book3" class="book" title="Book III"> 1 The question which is the more desirable. whatever most men or all men or all things would choose. then. but things that are nearly related and about which we commonly discuss for which of the two we ought rather to vote. whereas the other does not. or by men who are good in any particular line. i. either whatever most of them or what all of them would choose. our judgement will record our assent that whichever side happens to have the advantage is the more desirable.g. though relatively to a given individual the standard may be his own particular science. in medicine or in carpentry those things are more desirable which most. in general.g. or more than one. the good: for everything aims at the good. Clearly. First. doctors would choose. or the better. and the former is called ‘a good’. of two or more things. e. when they make their choice as such. because we do not see any advantage on either side as compared with the other. or. Book III Translated by W. in such cases if we can show a single advantage. whereas the latter is not: for nothing which does not happen to belong to the genus in question is called by the generic name. for the former falls within the genus ‘good’. a ‘white man’ is not ‘a colour’.

for the one is good by nature. the cause of good things). even though it will make no difference to us. to a god rather than to a man. e.g. Also that is better which is inherent in things better or prior or more honourable: thus (e. in respect of their properties the one surpasses the other. that which lies nearer the end. a different turn of expression. Also. e.g. too.g.g. in order that they may do us no harm. the property of God than the property of man: for whereas in respect of what is common in both of them they do not differ at all from each other. justice than the just man. Also.g.g. e.g. with. whereas the others are inherent in what is secondary. and even though they be in India. for the former is good absolutely. the man who needs an operation. that which is desirable in itself is more desirable than what is desirable per accidens.g. e. the latter only for a particular person. the latter per accidens: for we desire that our enemies should be just per accidens. whereas in our enemies we desire it for something else. vice and chance: for the one is bad in itself. a means directed 274 . and the hot and the cold. in order that they may do us no harm. that which is in itself the cause of good is more desirable than what is so per accidens. the latter for something else. e. that which is desired for itself is more desirable than that which is desired for something else. in fact in all the primary constituents of an animal. e. whereas in the other case the goodness is acquired.g. however. recovery of health than a surgical operation. In general. So too what is good by nature is more desirable than the good that is not so by nature. for what is in itself the cause of evil is more objectionable than what is so per accidens. and of two means. justice in our friends than justice in our enemies: for the former is desirable in itself. and so in other cases of the same kind. whereas chance is so per accidens. e. Also the attribute is more desirable which belongs to the better and more honourable subject.Also. and to the soul rather than to the body. what is good absolutely is more desirable than what is good for a particular person. Also. Also the end is generally supposed to be more desirable than the means. health is more desirable than gymnastics: for the former is desired for itself. For we desire justice in our friends for itself. So too the property of the better thing is better than the property of the worse. Likewise also in the case of the contrary.) health is better than strength and beauty: for the former is inherent in the moist and the dry. e. viz. and the latter per accidens. virtue than luck (for the former in itself. while beauty is generally supposed to consist in a certain symmetry of the limbs. strength being a feature of the sinews and bones. This last principle is the same as the one that precedes it.

friendship than wealth. For what produces happiness exceeds what produces health just as much as happiness exceeds health. e. ergo. if the consequences be evil. You should take. we should look at them from the standpoint of their consequences. Moreover.towards the end of life is more desirable than a means to anything else. it follows that he was ignorant before and knows afterwards.g. Also the competent is more desirable than the incompetent. whichever of the consequences suits your purpose. whereas we prize friendship for itself. while the latter do so not in themselves but for something else: for no one prizes wealth for itself but always for something else. 275 . e. yet there may possibly be some unpleasant consequence involved to turn the scale. For though both may be desirable. For the former belong in themselves to the class of things precious and praiseworthy. that which contributes to happiness than that which contributes to prudence. what produces happiness is more desirable than health: for it exceeds the same standard by a greater amount. while between a productive agent and an end we can decide by a proportional sum whenever the excess of the one end over the other is greater than that of the latter over its own productive means: e. Moreover. even though nothing else is likely to come to us from it. But health exceeds what produces health by a smaller amount. the later consequence is the better to consider. therefore. the excess of what produces happiness over what produces health is greater than that of health over what produces health. of two productive agents that one is more desirable whose end is better. that is more desirable which is followed by the less evil. supposing the excess of happiness over health to be greater than that of health over what produces health. what is in itself nobler and more precious and praiseworthy is more desirable than what is less so.g. and justice than strength. As a rule. and we cannot see any superiority in the one over the other of them. for there are prior consequences and later consequences: e.g. Clearly. whenever two things are very much like one another. Our survey from the point of view of consequences lies in two directions. therefore. < div id="section31" class="section" title="2"> 2 Moreover. For the one which is followed by the greater good is the more desirable: or. if a man learns.g. then what produces happiness is better than health.

Likewise also with the losses and contraries of things. e. Also. either absolutely or when the one is included in the other. With courage. for then the two together are not more desirable than the one.g.e. for a thing whose loss or whose contrary is more objectionable is itself more desirable. On the same principle also. than health alone. Also. some say that Ajax was a 276 . if everybody were just. for the young are more troubled by their passions than are their elders. that is more desirable which is more useful at every season or at most seasons.g.Moreover. freedom from pain in old age more than in youth: for it is of greater consequence in old age. Moreover. is more desirable than that which all may possess and still we want the other one as well. e. e.g. everything is more desirable at the season when it is of greater consequence. i. for no man chooses the young to guide him. An objection may be raised suppose in some particular case the one is valued for the sake of the other. e. what more nearly resembles the good: thus justice is better than a just man. the combination of happiness and something else which is not good may be more desirable than the combination of justice and courage. because he does not expect them to be prudent. Also. Likewise also with temperance. Also it is quite possible for what is not good. the smaller number in the greater.g. and likewise when free from pain than when attended with pain. justice and temperance rather than courage: for they are always useful. inasmuch as we desire recovery of health for the sake of health. viz. together with what is. a greater number of good things is more desirable than a smaller. the converse is the case. judge by the destructions and losses and generations and acquisitions and contraries of things: for things whose destruction is more objectionable are themselves more desirable. the same things are more valuable if accompanied than if unaccompanied by pleasure. for it is in youth that the active exercise of courage is more imperatively required. there would be no use for courage. we do not need the other thing. whereas all might be courageous. With the generations or acquisitions of things the opposite is the case: for things whose acquisition or generation is more desirable are themselves also desirable.g. to be more desirable than a greater number of good things. that which is more like than another thing to something better than itself. Also. recovery of health and health. while courage is only useful at times. Also. Take the case of justice and courage. that one of two things which if all possess. prudence is more desirable in old age. Another commonplace rule is that what is nearer to the good is better and more desirable. as e. and still justice would be of use.

and that Odysseus was a good man. Sometimes. then that is likely to be better which is more like the better. Also it may be that the one which is like the better type shows a degrading likeness. whereas a horse bears none: for the monkey is not the more handsome creature. whereas mere life itself is a necessity. Also. however. Again. supposing the resemblance of Ajax to Achilles to be slight. whereas the one which is like the worse type improves upon it: witness the likeness of a horse to a donkey. like the resemblance of a monkey to a man. then also the best man is better than the best horse. admits of an objection: for quite possibly the one only slightly resembles the better. and are sometimes more desirable as well: for the good life is better than mere life. that which is more free from connexion with evil: for what is not attended by any unpleasantness is more desirable than what is so attended. while the other strongly resembles the worse. e. This too. An objection may be raised to this that it is not true: for it is quite possible that Ajax did not resemble Achilles more nearly than Odysseus in the points which made Achilles the best of them. if Man be better than Horse. Also. though.g. and that of a monkey to a man. just dealing and the doing of good rather than the semblance of them: for we would rather really do good to our friends than seem to do so. whereas towards the man in the street the converse is the case. in the case of two things. Also the more personal possession is more desirable than the more widely shared. things which we like rather to do to our friend are more desirable than those we like to do to the man in the street. then also the best of the members of A is better than the best of the members of B. Another rule is that the more conspicuous good is more desirable than the less conspicuous. Moreover. if the best in A be better than the best in B. Look also to see whether the resemblance be that of a caricature. and good life is a superfluity. things which our friends can share are more desirable than those they cannot. and the more difficult than the easier: for we appreciate better the possession of things that cannot be easily acquired. if A be without qualification better than B. 277 . if the best man be better than the best horse. e. Also. then also A is better than B without qualification.g. then also Man is better than Horse without qualification. though unlike Achilles.g. superfluities are better than necessities. if one is more like the better thing while another is more like the worse. e. Also. e.better man than Odysseus because he was more like Achilles. Moreover. while that of Odysseus to Nestor is strong. despite its nearer resemblance to a man.g.

if one thing makes good whatever it touches. Also. as (e. < div id="section32" class="section" title="3"> 3 Moreover. but not B without A: power (e.g. then also justice means something more desirable than courage. Also.g. then that one is more desirable which we wish to be thought to possess. If both do so. Moreover. what cannot be got from another is more desirable than what can be got from another as well. and the other the body.g. Moreover. A is more desirable if A is desirable without B.) is the case of justice compared with courage. then that one is more desirable which does so in a greater degree. If both possess it.) we repudiate the love of hard work in order that people may think us geniuses. The expression ‘superfluity’ applies whenever a man possesses the necessities of life and sets to work to secure as well other noble acquisitions. but it is not more desirable for a man who lacks the necessities of life.g. while another does not. Also. then also ‘justly’ means something more desirable than ‘courageously’. necessities are more desirable. if ‘justly’ means something more desirable than ‘courageously’. and if justice be more desirable than courage. but prudence is desirable without power. or if it render good the better and more important object-if (e. and that is more desirable in whose absence it is more blameworthy for a man not to be vexed. that is more desirable in whose absence it is less blameworthy for people to be vexed.). judge things by their inflexions and uses and actions and works. Moreover. perhaps. then the one which possesses it in a greater degree is more desirable. while superfluities are better. the one makes good the soul. Similarly also in the other cases. 278 .what is better is not also more desirable: for there is no necessity that because it is better it should also be more desirable: at least to be a philosopher is better than to make money.g. Roughly speaking. and judge these by them: for they go with each other: e. of things that belong to the same species one which possesses the peculiar virtue of the species is more desirable than one which does not. the former is more desirable. thus (e.) is not desirable without prudence. if of two things we repudiate the one in order to be thought to possess the other. just as also what makes things warm is warmer than what does not.

judge by means of an addition. also.g. and with a view to what ends.g. but it is not a more desirable thing without qualification. the one which is more highly preferable to it is more desirable than the less highly preferable. one of the things added to it. Moreover. that is more desirable which serves the better purpose. Again. If the same characters belong to both things you should look and see which possesses them more markedly. Likewise. if one thing exceeds while the other falls short of the same standard of good. while the other thing is desirable on the one ground alone. Also.g. when the excess of a thing is more desirable than the excess of something else. supposing no one knew of it.e. Also. the former is more desirable. but not the other.) friendship than money: for an excess of friendship is more desirable than an excess of money. without anything else being likely to come of it. however. A thing may be taken to be more precious in itself which we choose rather for itself.) health than beauty.g. e. or if the one exceeds an even higher standard. as (e. you should distinguish in how many senses ‘desirable’ is used. that thing is itself also more desirable than the other. Moreover. and see if the addition of A to the same thing as B makes the whole more desirable than does the addition of B. Nay more. it is more desirable both for itself and for the look of it. the one which exceeds is the more desirable. expediency or honour or pleasure.g. e. a thing is more desirable if. whichever is the more precious for itself. when added to a lesser good. You must. For what is useful for all or most of them may be taken to be more desirable than what is not useful in like manner. or in some other way helps the case of. it makes the whole greater good. as (e. and the other for the look of it.) if you took a saw and a sickle in combination with the art of carpentry: for in the combination the saw is a more desirable thing. as (e. which of the two is the more pleasant or more honourable or more expedient. Moreover. beware of adducing a case in which the common term uses. whichever it be whose subtraction makes the remainder a lesser good. friends than money. i. So also that of which a man would rather that it were his by his own doing is more desirable than what he would rather get by another’s doing. you should judge by means of subtraction: for the thing upon whose subtraction the remainder is a lesser good may be taken to be a greater good. Again.Moreover. that which serves to promote virtue more than 279 . if one thing be desirable for itself. e. is also better and more desirable. Also. if there be two things both preferable to something. A thing is defined as being desired for the look of it if. you would not care to have it.g.

Likewise also in the case of objectionable things. also. if one thing does. disease more than ugliness: for disease is a greater hindrance both to pleasure and to being good. and if what is more useful be more desirable. It is possible to render some of the actual rules given above more universal by a slight alteration of the expression. e. or to which it belongs. e. 280 . impart such and such a quality to that which possesses it. that what by nature exhibits such and such a quality exhibits that quality in a greater degree than what exhibits it not by nature. then also what is useful is desirable. The same commonplace rules are useful also for showing that anything is simply desirable or objectionable: for we have only to subtract the excess of one thing over another.that which serves to promote pleasure. For in some cases in the very course of comparing the things together we at once assert also that each of them.g. argue by showing that the thing in question is in like measure objectionable and desirable: for a thing of such a character that a man might well desire and object to it alike is less desirable than the other which is desirable only. Also. then also what is precious is desirable. whenever we call the one good ‘by nature’ and the other ‘not by nature’: for dearly what is good by nature is desirable. then that one exhibits it in a greater degree which imparts it in a greater degree. < div id="section33" class="section" title="4"> 4 Comparisons of things together should therefore be conducted in the manner prescribed.g. for that is more objectionable which stands more in the way of what is desirable. e. Likewise. is desirable.g. For if what is more precious be more desirable. Moreover. and another does not. or the one of them. and if both impart it. < div id="section34" class="section" title="5"> 5 The commonplace rules relating to comparative degrees and amounts ought to be taken in the most general possible form: for when so taken they are likely to be useful in a larger number of instances. in the case of other things which admit of comparisons of that kind. then whichever does impart it is of that quality in greater degree than the one which does not impart it.

then clearly the first-named thing exhibits that character in a greater degree. it is true also of some. that has such and such a character in greater degree which admits in a greater degree of the definition proper to the given character. and see if A when added to the same thing as B imparts to the whole such and such a character in a more marked degree than B. then also all pain is evil. Moreover. Moreover. then also what is just is in some cases evil. then also some pain is evil. itself exhibits that character in a greater degree. and if what happens justly is in some cases evil. things exhibit such and such a character in a greater degree if more free from admixture with their contraries. e. you may judge by means of subtraction: for a thing upon whose subtraction the remainder exhibits such and such a character in a less degree. it imparts that character to the whole in a greater degree. apart from the rules given above.g. while the other does not reach that standard. also.g. or if. if some form of sensation be not a capacity. if in any character one thing exceeds and another falls short of the same standard. For in demolishing or establishing a thing universally we also show it in particular: for if it be true of all. and if untrue of all. then also what happens unjustly is in some cases good. Also. and the claim that if some pleasure be good. e. if the object of conception is in some cases an object of knowledge. when added to a thing which exhibits that character in a less degree. Especially handy and of general application are the commonplace rules that are drawn from the opposites and co-ordinates and inflexions of a thing: for public opinion grants alike the claim that if all pleasure be good. if the one exceeds something which exceeds a given standard.Moreover. if the definition of ‘white’ be ‘a colour which pierces the vision’. Again. < div id="section35" class="section" title="6"> 6 If the question be put in a particular and not in a universal form. also. you should judge by means of addition. then also some form of conceiving is knowledge. Likewise. if what is unjust be in some cases good. in the first place the universal constructive or destructive commonplace rules that have been given may all be brought into use. Also. then also some form of failure of sensation is not a failure of capacity. it is untrue of some. that is whiter which is more free from admixture with black. if what is pleasant is 281 . Also. Moreover. then that is whiter which is in a greater degree a colour that pierces the vision.

and a certain form of capacity be good. Moreover. e. there is no necessity that no form of knowledge either should be good. too. if what is pleasant is in some cases beneficial. then. then pleasure is in some cases an objectionable thing. so are other souls as well. then so also is knowledge. then pleasure is in some cases a beneficial thing. if the destruction of knowledge be in some cases a good thing or its production an evil thing. then so also is knowledge. if it belongs or does not belong in one case. and the processes of generation and destruction. while no member of that genus exhibits that character at all.g. then we may take it that pleasure or knowledge is in some cases an evil thing. For if anything that destroys pleasure or knowledge be in some cases good. Clearly.g. but if no form of capacity be good. except that whereas both are possible by means of like degrees. Also.in some cases objectionable. a certain form of capacity be good in a less degree than knowledge. if you take the most marked instance of the character in question. also. then. then you may take it that pleasure is not good either. The case is the same also as regards the things that destroy. you should judge by a smaller or like degree in the same way: for so you will find it possible both to demolish and to establish a view. Likewise. while no form of knowledge is good. Moreover you should judge by means of greater or smaller or like degrees: for if some member of another genus exhibit such and such a character in a more marked degree than your object. if for a man to forget his disgraceful conduct be a good thing. while if 282 . you should go to work by means of an hypothesis. not to overthrow. if it be maintained that some form of knowledge is good. does so in a like degree in all. then the knowledge of his disgraceful conduct may be taken to be an evil thing. if some form of knowledge be good in a greater degree than pleasure. then knowledge will be in some cases an evil thing. The same holds also in other cases: in all such cases the premiss and the conclusion are equally likely to be accepted.g. On the same principle. If. seeing that not even the kind upon which there is most general agreement is so. you should claim that the attribute. also. e. but also by means of the same. suppose it to be shown that prudence is not good. and a certain form of capacity be good.g. while if no form of capacity be good. it is only possible to establish a view by means of a less degree. that if the soul of man be immortal. e. then neither is knowledge. Not only by means of another genus can you overthrow a view. For if a certain form of capacity be good in a like degree to knowledge. and to remember it be an evil thing. e. neither will any other kind be good. then you may take it that neither does the object in question exhibit it. by means of a smaller degree it is possible only to establish.

the proposition in question will have been proved. or that prudence 283 . the proposition in question will have been demolished. whereas it was stated in a particular form: for he claims that the maker of a particular admission should make a universal admission. And likewise. that it does not belong to any instance at all. by reason of the hypothesis.g.this one be not so. however.g. on the other hand. you must show universally that no pleasure is good. It is clear. for in this way it will follow that it belongs to all instances. justice) is so. on the other hand. or that no pleasure. For if he meant that a particular pleasure is good. It is clear that the maker of the hypothesis universalizes the question. it is possible to overthrow a statement in only one way. is good. it be maintained that it does not belong in some instance. it will be possible to demolish it in two ways. If. or that no virtue is so. If the statement be made still more definite. then.g. to show that some particular pleasure is not good. you must show that it does belong in some instance. he has stated that only one single pleasure is good. if we show that no pleasure is good or that a particular pleasure is not good. is good. or whether we show that a particular pleasure is good. it is possible to demolish it in three ways: for by showing that all pleasure. or that more than one pleasure. Likewise. you must show that in some instance it does not belong: for then it will follow. e. the statement made be definite. the proposition in question is not yet demolished. supposing we are required to argue that some particular pleasure is not good. that it is possible to demolish an indefinite statement in one way only. If.g. then. both universally and in particular. or that some other virtue (e. without any further definition. For if we show that some particular pleasure is not good or is good. e. also. if a man has asserted that pleasure is good or is not good. If. If the problem be indefinite. we shall have demolished the statement in question. if he meant that some particular pleasure is not good you must show universally that all pleasure is good: it is impossible to demolish it in any other way. while of some it is not: for whether it be shown that all pleasure. inasmuch as he claims that if the attribute belongs in one instance. it be maintained that in some instance the attribute belongs. If. if the proposition in question is to be demolished. also. if it be maintained that it is an attribute of some particular pleasure to be good. neither are the others. there are four ways of demolishing it: for if it be shown that all virtue is knowledge. whereas it can be established in two ways: for whether we show universally that all pleasure is good. that prudence alone of the virtues is knowledge. or that no pleasure. e. it belongs also in all instances alike. we shall have produced an argument in both ways.

in cases where it is possible to make the accident definite either specifically or numerically. you can show that the soul is not a number. you should set to work by means like these. dividing them by their species until you come to those that are not further divisible. by enumerating how many species there are of movement: for if none of these belong to time. 284 . you should. nor yet a movement. if the soul be neither odd nor even. the proposition in question will have been demolished. you should look and see whether perhaps none of them belongs. in cases where some attribute has been said to belong or not to belong. by dividing all numbers into either odd or even: for then. you should take a glance among genera. In regard then to Accident. Moreover. Likewise. claim that he should either admit your point universally. It is useful also to take a look at individual instances. clearly it is not a number. as in the case of universal questions. nor yet is a movement. after adducing several instances. and in this manner.itself is not knowledge. that time is not moved. or else bring an objection showing in what case it does not hold.g. as has been said before:’ for whether the attribute is found to belong in all cases or in none. showing e. also. Moreover. clearly it does not move.

for it to be and not to be white. and likewise. For ‘snow’ is not a kind of ‘white’.g. and therefore ‘white’ is not the genus of snow. clearly good’ is not the genus of pleasure: for the genus is predicated of all the members of the same species. Book IV Translated by W. see whether it be predicated not in the category of essence. A. but rather a state of doing or of having something done to it. but the one be a substance while the other is a quality. but a certain quality of it. and see whether the genus suggested is not predicated of one of them. as happens in the case of an accident: e. For it is possible for a thing to be and not to be selfmoved. So that neither of them is predicated in the category of ‘essence’. ‘white’: for it indicates not the essence of snow. Again. Moreover. since we were saying that an accident is an attribute which can belong to a thing and also not belong. but as an accident. ‘moving’ does not seem to indicate the essence. or the one be a relative while the other is a quality. also. Pickard-Cambridge < div id="book4" class="book" title="Book IV"> 1 Next we must go on to examine questions relating to Genus and Property. Especially you should take a look at the definition of Accident. see whether some particular pleasure be not good: for. as (e.g. 285 . as ‘white’ is predicated of ‘snow’. as it often is of an animal to walk or to be walking. nor is the soul a kind of ‘moving object’: its motion is an accident of it. So that neither of these attributes is the genus but an accident. while ‘white’ is not a substance but a quality. and see whether it fits the genus mentioned. then. Likewise. or ‘self-moved’ of the soul. also.) ‘slow’ and ‘swan’ are each a substance. but dialecticians seldom address their inquiries to these by themselves.Topics.g.) is also the case in the instances just given. first take a look at all objects which belong to the same genus as the thing mentioned. If. so that ‘white’ is not the genus either of ‘snow’ or of ‘swan’. a genus be suggested for something that is. if so. Moreover. see whether the genus and the species be not found in the same division. Secondly. These are elements in the questions that relate to definitions. if ‘good’ be laid down to be the genus of ‘pleasure’. as (e.

see whether it be necessary or possible for the genus to partake of the object which has been placed in the genus. so too should be the genus. Moreover. is not the genus of knowledge. therefore. ‘To partake’ is defined as ‘to admit the definition of that which is partaken.knowledge’ is a relative. If. So that neither ‘being’ nor ‘object of knowledge’ is the genus of ‘object of opinion’: for of the objects of which the species is predicated. therefore. whereas the genus does not admit that of the species. the genus ought to be predicated as well. is itself also a relative. Likewise. ‘being’ and ‘unity’ are predicated. Clearly. see whether the object placed in the genus be quite unable to partake of any of its species: for it is impossible that it should partake of the genus if it do not partake of any of its species. if white be a quality. see if there be anything of which the species rendered is true. while ‘good’ and ‘noble’ are each a quality. which is the genus of ‘double’. nor any of the rest of the given modes of motion: for clearly you may then take it that it does not partake of any of the species. For ‘object of opinion’ will be a predicate of what does not exist. and therefore their definition as well. so that good. therefore. and if the species be a quality. nor yet be one of the individual phenomena comprised under the term 286 . the species partake of the genera. e. To speak generally. supposing ‘being’ or ‘object of knowledge’ were stated to be the genus of ‘object of opinion’. whereas that ‘being’ or ‘object of knowledge’ is not predicated of what does not exist is clear.g. you should look and see if pleasure be neither locomotion nor alteration. also. e. since what partakes of the genus must necessarily partake of one of the species as well: so that pleasure could not be a species of Motion. so too the genus should be a quality. and see whether the genus rendered partakes or can possibly partake of the species. for many things which do not exist are objects of opinion. You must look. while the genus is not so. e. as is the case with ‘double’: for multiple’. the genus ought to fall under the same division as the species: for if the species be a substance. so too should colour be. or noble.g. and therefore not of the genus either. if any one were to render anything as genus of ‘being’ or of ‘unity’: for then the result will be that the genus partakes of the species: for of everything that is. ‘Motion’ be stated as the genus of pleasure.g. For the genera of relatives ought themselves also to be relatives. except it be one of the species reached by the first division: these do partake of the genus alone. but not the genera of the species: for the species admits the definition of the genus. Again. Again. in other cases.

) an individual man partakes of both ‘man’ and ‘animal’. The elementary principle in regard to all such cases is that the genus has a wider denotation than the species and its differentia: for the differentia as well has a narrower denotation than the genus. whether it does so apply. suppose any one were to lay down that ‘knowledge’ is the genus of justice. e. and neither of these genera embraces the remaining one. as (e. since their denotation is equal. If. as for example Being and Unity: for everything has being and unity. one were to be stated as a species and the other as its genus. that of the attributes which go with everything. as compared with ‘being’: for both what is and what is not are objects of opinion. see if the species and its genus have an equal denotation. if there be any other genus of the given species which neither embraces the genus rendered nor yet falls under it. also.‘motion’. Likewise.g. so that neither is the genus of the other. to apply to some object which is not specifically different from the thing in question. See also whether the genus mentioned fails. therefore.) ‘object of opinion’ has. For all things that are not specifically different have the same genus. if your argument be constructive. and if it fails to apply to one. so that knowledge could not be the genus of justice: for it is generally accepted that whenever one species falls under 287 . For virtue is its genus as well. clearly it fails to apply to any.g. also. or.g.g. then clearly it applies to all. or might be generally thought to fail. and these do not differ as regards their species from indivisible: for straight lines are never different from each other as regards their species. it be shown to apply to one. see if the term placed in the genus has a wider denotation than the genus. if the ‘first’ of a series and the ‘beginning’ were to be placed one under the other: for the beginning is first and the first is the beginning. < div id="section37" class="section" title="2"> 2 Look and see. so that ‘object of opinion’ could not be a species of being: for the genus is always of wider denotation than the species. suppose. For the aforesaid term is not the genus of divisible lines. if any one who assumes ‘indivisible lines’ were to say that the ‘indivisible’ is their genus. as (e. for instance. Again. For individuals as well partake in the genus and the species. e. so that either both expressions are identical or at any rate neither is the genus of the other. Moreover.

however. you are overthrowing a view. seeing that there are other forms of motion as well. Yet a principle of this kind gives rise to a difficulty in some cases.two genera. for each of them is a state and a disposition. then what is rendered could not be the true genus. For some people hold that prudence is both virtue and knowledge. If. and see whether neither of these things is true of the genus rendered. at the genus of the genus rendered. but one must show in addition that walking does not partake of any of the species of motion produced by the same division except locomotion. it is not enough to show that walking is ‘motion’ in order to show that it is ‘locomotion’. all the rest. only it be disputed whether it belongs as genus-it is enough to show that one of its higher genera is predicated of the species in the category of essence. and so continually at the next higher genus. also.] If. The premiss that when one genus is predicated in the category of essence. partakes of the species: for the higher genus does not partake of any of the lower. For of necessity what partakes of the genus partakes also of one of the species 288 . as actually is the case with virtue and knowledge. You should look. there be anywhere a discrepancy. Look. it is not enough to show that one of the higher genera is predicated of the species in the category of essence: e.g. however. will be predicated of it in the category of essence: so that what has been rendered as genus is also predicated in the category of essence. follow the rule as given: if establishing one. yet it would still be generally agreed to be necessary that the genera of the same object must at any rate be subordinate either the one to the other or both to the same. will be predicated in the category of essence. If. the one is embraced by the other. all of them. if predicated at all of the species. and predicated in the category of essence: for all the higher genera should be predicated of the species in the category of essence. Supposing. see whether either the genus itself. or one of its higher genera. then-suppose that what has been named as genus be admitted to belong to the species. if predicated at all. for if the genera be subordinate neither the one to the other nor both to the same. [Again. that it be disputed whether what has been rendered as genus belongs at all. then. and see whether all are predicated of the species. and that neither of its genera is embraced by the other: although certainly not everybody admits that prudence is knowledge. any one were to admit the truth of this assertion. For both fall under the same genus. should be secured by induction. if any one has rendered ‘locomotion’ as the genus of walking. For if one of them be predicated in the category of essence. both higher and lower than this one. then. therefore. clearly what is rendered is not the true genus.

not a species. If. there be anywhere a discrepancy. For of necessity the definitions of its genera must be predicated of the species and of the objects which partake of the species: if. look among the things of which the given species is predicated as genus. and see whether they apply both to the given species and to the objects which partake of the species. a bad mistake has been made. you are overthrowing a view. see if he has rendered the differentia as the genus. For ‘odd’ is a differentia of number. then both the genera higher than it. it is useful to see whether it is predicated in the category of essence: for if so. clearly what has been rendered is not the genus. clearly it would partake of locomotion. Again. e. Clearly. at the definitions of the genera. clearly the species would be subordinate to it. For if there be anywhere a discrepancy. for the differentia of a thing is never its genus. see whether he has placed the differentia inside the genus. e. and it itself. by taking ‘odd’ as a number’. and see if what is rendered as its genus be also predicated in the category of essence of the very things of which the species is so predicated. If. Again. so that locomotion would be the genus of walking.g. and likewise if all the genera higher than this genus are so predicated as well. also. seeing that of living beings some are mortal and others immortal. then. therefore. For ‘immortal’ is a differentia of ‘living being’. walking does not partake either of increase or decrease or of the other kinds of motion. it is useful to see whether the genus fails to be predicated in the category of essence of those things of which the species too is predicated. ‘immortal’ as the genus of ‘God’. the result will be that the genus and the species will be predicated of the same object in the category of essence. If establishing a view. so that you may take it as shown that it is the genus. Also.g. as do ‘walking’ and ‘biped’. so that the same object falls under two genera: the genera must therefore of necessity be subordinate one to the other. and therefore if it be shown that the one we wish to establish as genus is not subordinate to the species. would all have been predicated in the category of essence of those objects of which the species too is predicated in the category of essence.produced by the first division of the genus. Look. Nor is the differentia generally thought to partake of the genus: 289 . then. clearly what has been rendered is not the true genus: for had it been the genus. And that this is true is clear: for a thing’s differentia never signifies its essence. but rather some quality. then.

Moreover. Clearly. by making ‘colour’ (e.) to be a thing that ‘pierces’. whereas the differentia is neither a species nor an individual. e. e. For there is no necessity that contact should be juncture: rather. All such cases should be examined by means of the same principles: for they depend upon common rules: for the genus should have a wider denotation that its differentia. nor is locomotion always ‘carriage’. and will partake of it. also. if no differentia belonging to the genus be predicated of the given species. or ‘number’ a thing that is ‘odd’. whereas. the species. by taking ‘contact’ to be a ‘juncture’. Again. Moreover. see if he has mentioned the genus as differentia: for it is possible for a man to bring forward a statement of this kind as well.’ ‘locomotion’ to be the same as ‘carriage’. of ‘soul’ neither ‘odd’ nor ‘even’ is predicated: neither therefore is ‘number’. e. by taking (e. if it be rendered in this manner.g. Also. Again. if it be possible for the genus stated. or. has a wider denotation than the genus. or ‘mixture’ a ‘fusion’. For walking is not generally thought to be carriage: for ‘carriage’ is mostly used of things that change one place for another involuntarily. or that change of place’ is the differentia of ‘carriage’. conversely.g. the differentia does not partake of the genus. therefore. juncture must be contact: for what is in contact is not always joined. for ‘movement’ to be absent from the ‘soul’. also.g. as in Plato’s definition. see whether he has placed the genus inside the species. Clearly. neither will the genus be predicated of it. e. see whether he has placed the genus inside the differentia.g. Likewise. whereas it ought to be vice versa. For the result will be that the species has an equal or wider denotation: and this cannot be. so that ‘odd’ too is no species but a differentia. that ‘mixture’ is the differentia of ‘fusion’.) ‘immortal’ to be ‘a god’. or 290 . see whether he has placed the differentia inside the species. in the remaining instances: for mixture is not always a ‘fusion’ (for to mix dry things does not fuse them). for always the differentia has an equal or a wider denotation than the species.for what partakes of the genus is always either a species or an individual. though what is joined is always in contact. Moreover. in the instances given. neither of the aforesaid requirements can be satisfied: for the genus will both have a narrower denotation than its differentia. as happens in the case of inanimate things. Moreover. or for its differentia.g. to be absent from the alleged species. see whether the species is naturally prior and abolishes the genus along with itself: for the contrary is the general view. seeing that it does not partake of the genus.g. and also should not partake of its differentia.

Seeing that of every genus there is more than one species.‘truth and falsehood’ from ‘opinion’.) if the soul has a share in life. supposing the genus to have no contrary. if he has rendered as genus a metaphorical expression. if there be any contrary to the genus. that there is a contrary to the genus. Again. while it is impossible for any number to live. if what is placed in the genus partakes or could possibly partake of any contrary of the genus: for in that case the same thing will at the same time partake of contrary things. The examination may take different forms. whereas ‘harmony’ is predicated of temperance not in a literal sense but metaphorically: for a harmony always consists in notes. also. if the species be a homonym of the genus. then clearly what has been stated could not be a genus at all. as long as it exists. then neither of the terms stated could be its genus or its differentia: for the general view is that the genus and the differentia accompany the species. Moreover. Moreover. Look and see. if there be any contrary of the species. while it partakes.g. Each of these points is made plain by means of induction. on the other hand. also. for contraries ought to be found in the same genus. You should look and see. look and see if it be impossible that there should be another species than the given one belonging to the genus stated: for if there should be none. ‘temperance’ as a ‘harmony’: a ‘harmony’: for a genus is always predicated of its species in its literal sense. first of all see if the contrary as well be found in the same genus as the species. Supposing. of the contrary genus as well. if there be no contrary to the genus. seeing that the genus is never absent from it. see whether the contrary of 291 . and employ as your elementary principles those already stated for dealing with homonymity: for the genus and the species are synonymous. also. Thus (e. see if the contrary of the species be found in the contrary genus: for of necessity the contrary species must be in the contrary genus. then the soul could not be a species of number. < div id="section38" class="section" title="3"> 3 Look and see. describing (e. see whether the species shares in any character which it is utterly impossible for any member of the genus to have. examine it.g. or can possibly partake.

whereas a particular disease. ‘good’: for if this be not found in any genus.) in the case of white and black: for ‘colour’ is the genus both of these and of all the intermediate colours as well. Likewise. as is the case with (1) virtue and vice and (2) justice and injustice: for each pair has an intermediary. you are demolishing a view. as (e. as happens in the case of ‘good’ and ‘evil’: for neither of these is found in a genus. e. e. If. If. clearly the species in question is found in it as well. and one pair of contraries have an intermediary. see if both genus and species be contrary to something. if one were to look at other instances. look and see not merely whether the contrary of the species be found in the same genus. whereas moderate amount’. An objection may be raised that ‘defect’ and ‘excess’ are found in the same genus (for both are in the genus ‘evil’).e. whenever the genus has no contrary. Moreover.g. see whether the contrary of the species be found in the genus stated. the species has none. although there is one between evil and good. but be itself a genus. yet it be not similarly related. neither will its contrary be found in any genus. fever and ophthalmia and any other particular disease. as it is in the cases of virtue and vice and of justice and injustice: for the intermediaries between both are mere negations. you are establishing a view. 292 . and if the species have. suppose the genus have no contrary: for if the contrary be found in it. but the intermediate as well: for the genus containing the extremes contains the intermediates as well. as virtue to vice and justice to injustice.g.the species be not found in any genus at all. being a species of disease. but in one case be a mere negation of the extremes.g. For if the genera have an intermediary. Moreover. both between the species and between the genera. while the genus has a contrary. For the general view is that the relation should be similar in both cases. the intermediate between them. but will itself be a genus. so should their genera as well. therefore. is found not in ‘evil’ but in ‘good’. there are three ways: in the first place. so should their species as well. there are all these ways in which you should make your examination: for if the aforesaid characters do not belong to it. but each of them is a genus. for if the genus be contrary to anything. An objection may be raised in the case of health and disease: for health in general is the contrary of disease. whereas in the other case it is a subject. so too is the species. Or see whether. clearly what has been rendered is not the genus. has no contrary. Look and see also whether. one would come to see clearly a fact like this. but not the other. on the other hand. An objection to this is that there is no intermediary between health and disease. also. though there be indeed an intermediary between both pairs. i.

) the relation of the pleasant to pleasure is like that of the useful to the good: for in each case the one produces the other. if the genus have a contrary. if (e. Again. Likewise. then also to be capable of something is to be disposed to it. Again. then also to have learnt is to have recollected.g. both in demolishing and in establishing a view.Moreover. then also the pleasant will be a kind of ‘useful’: for clearly it may be taken to be productive of good. consider the case of things that bear a like relation to one another. and if to be decomposed be to be destroyed. 293 . and if to learn be to recollect. then neither is any of the rest of them. then to be generated is to be produced. as we were saying in the case of generation and destruction. For whatever attribute belongs or does not belong to one belongs or does not belong at the same time to all. look and see whether also the contrary species is found in the contrary genus: for if so. If therefore pleasure be a kind of ‘good’. In the same way also consider the case of processes of generation and destruction. < div id="section39" class="section" title="4"> 4 Again. both in demolishing and in establishing an argument. in the case of the capacities and uses of things: for if a capacity be a disposition. Consider also in the same way the case of things that generate or destroy.g. then to have built is to have been active. and see whether they follow likewise.) to build be to be active. Thus (e. consider in the case of the inflexions and the co-ordinates of species and genus. and to have used it is to have been active. then to use it is to be active. and decomposition is a kind of destruction. For if what tends to destroy tends to decompose. you should examine things in the light of any resemblance of whatever description. clearly also the species in question is found in the genus in question. then to have been decomposed is to have been destroyed. then also to be destroyed is to be decomposed: and if what tends to generate tends to produce. and if the use of anything be an activity. then also ‘justly’ is ‘knowingly’ and the just man is a man of knowledge: whereas if any of these things be not so. e. and generation is production. and in general. and of the capacities and uses of things. seeing that pleasure is good. if justice be a particular form of knowledge.g. also. see if the intermediate species is found in the genus stated: for whatever genus contains the intermediate contains the extremes as well.

g. you should follow the rule as stated. if the term ‘double’ be used to mean the double of a ‘half’. see whether the genus be a relative term as well: for if the species be a relative term. but if establishing one there is but one way: for if the opposite species be found in the opposite genus. while ‘virtue’ is a relative term. in establishing a view. but the opposite of the species be not found in the opposite of the genus. if ‘blindness’ be a form of ‘insensibility’. see whether the term fail to be used in the same relation both when called by the name of its genus. cannot be. That. you are demolishing a view. For were this no something not good as well would then be pleasant. Otherwise ‘multiple’ could not be the genus of ‘double’. Moreover. there is no necessity that the species should be so as well: for ‘knowledge’is a relative term. according to the method described in the case of Accident: e. if ‘good’ be the genus of pleasant. then also the species in question would be found in the genus in question: e. if there be a privation opposed to both genus and species. then ‘sight’ is a form of ‘sensation’.g. and also when called by those of all the genera of its genus. then also the term ‘multiple’ ought to be used to mean multiple of a ‘half’. so too is the genus. if the pleasant be a kind of good. then what is pleasant is good. If. the genus be a relative term.g. or at least not in the same ultimate genus: e. Again. then blindness will not be a sensation. however. If the species be a relative term. then. then neither could the species rendered be in the genus rendered. you should adopt the same method of examination: for if what is not good be not pleasant. Secondly. and yet. and when called by the name of its genus: e. for it is impossible. 294 . Again. but not so ‘grammar’. if the ultimate genus containing sight be sensation.g. Secondly. ‘good’ and ‘noble’ are not relatives but qualities.If the opposite of the species be a privation. what is not good is not pleasant. look at the negations of the genus and species and convert the order of terms. For if the double be a multiple of a half. first of all by looking to see if the opposite be found in the genus rendered: for either the privation is to be found absolutely nowhere in the same genus. that anything not good should be pleasant: for of things of which the genus is not predicated. Also. If. Or possibly not even the first statement would be generally considered true: for virtue is a kind of ‘noble’ and a kind of ‘good’ thing. on the other hand. none of the species is predicated either. there are two ways of demolishing an argument. so that ‘good’ is the genus of ‘pleasant’. if there be a sensation. see whether the species fails to be used in the same relation when called by its own name. as is the case with ‘double’ and ‘multiple’: for each is a relative term.

in the case of ‘knowledge’: for both knowledge’ itself and its genera. for a ‘present’ is a ‘grant that need not be returned’. and also a ‘grant’ is of something and to some one: and ‘grant’ is the genus of ‘present’. If.g. as well as of or than something: for what is in excess or greater is always in excess in something. An objection may be raised that there is no necessity for a term to be used in the same relation when called by its own name and when called by that of its genus: for ‘knowledge’ is called knowledge ‘of an object’. The case is the same also as regards both ‘knowledge’ and ‘conception’: for these take a genitive. ‘disposition’ and ‘state’. so should the genus be as well. the double will be called by the names of all the higher genera in relation to a ‘half’. Again. inasmuch as they are not used in relation to an equal number of things with the species. e. For a present’ is of something or to some one. the number of relations in which the terms are used happens not to be equal. as do ‘double’ and ‘multiple’. clearly the one term is not the genus of the other. in any cases the constructions after conversion be not alike. in general. as in the case of ‘double’ and its higher genera: for we say both ‘double of’ and ‘multiple of’ a thing. In some cases. Again. Or possibly it is not universally true that species and genus are used in relation to an equal number of things. then. see whether terms used in like case relationships fail to yield a like construction when converted.then ‘in excess of ‘will also be used in relation to a ‘half’: and. are said to be ‘of’ something. Likewise. which is the genus of these terms. for while ‘double’ is double of something. Hence the terms in question are not the genera of ‘double’. e. For as the species is used. 295 . datives and genitives and all the rest. An objection may be raised that in some cases it is not so: for we say ‘superior to’ and ‘contrary to’ so and so. however. see whether the species and the genus fail to be used in relation to an equal number of things: for the general view is that the uses of both are alike and equal in number. as well as in excess of something. whereas ‘other’. we speak of ‘in excess’ or ‘greater’ in something. as is the case with ‘present’ and ‘grant’.g. Again. whereas it is called a ‘state’ and ‘disposition’ not of an ‘object’ but of the ‘soul’. and by conversion an ‘object of knowledge’ and an ‘object of conception’ are both alike used with a dative. demands not ‘to’ but ‘than’: for the expression is ‘other than’ so and so. see whether the genus and the species be used in the same way in respect of the inflexions they take. also. For each of these terms takes a genitive both in itself and in its converted form: for we say both a half of’ and ‘a fraction of’ something.

for in nothing else can the aforesaid terms possibly be found except in the things in relation to which they are used). it is absolutely impossible that they should be found in the things in relation to which they happen at any time to be used (as e. also. If. neither is ‘sensation’ the genus of ‘knowledge’. ‘disposition’ and ‘state’ and ‘balance’. The aforesaid commonplace rule is common to the subject of Accident as well: for it is all the same to say that ‘abiding’ is the genus of memory. though they still may be (e. if the term ‘object of knowledge’ be applied to the soul: for it is quite possible that the knowledge of itself should be possessed by the soul itself. so that the abiding of knowledge also will be found in knowledge. whether. if the opposite of the species have the opposite of the genus as its genus. Memory. or to allege that it is an accident of it. For ‘abiding’ is always found in that which abides. e. that the contrary should be found in the contrary or knowledge in the object of knowledge. if ‘multiple’ be the genus of ‘double’. seeing that it is the abiding of knowledge. therefore. For the opposite of the genus should always be the genus of the opposite species. suppose he has said that ‘memory’ is the ‘abiding of knowledge’. the things in relation to which they happen at any time to be used (e. e. while for others.g. for memory is always found in the soul.g.See. while others need not be found in the things in relation to which they are used at any time. Hence ‘object of sensation’ is not the genus of ‘object of knowledge’: and if this be so. then. For if in any way whatever memory be the abiding of knowledge.g. whereas it is not: for an object of knowledge is not always an object of sensation: for objects of knowledge include some of the objects of intuition as well. but it is not necessary. then also the object of knowledge will have to be a kind of object of sensation.g. or used of. is found in knowledge. for it is possible for this same knowledge to be found in some one else). < div id="section40" class="section" title="5"> 296 . Seeing that of relative terms some are of necessity found in. then. again.g. But this is impossible. and see whether he places a term of one kind inside a genus that is not of that kind. any one were to assert that knowledge is a kind of sensation. ‘fraction’ be also the genus of ‘half’. unless the object of knowledge happen to be a soul or a man)-you should look. the same argument in regard to it will apply. and is used of that.

whereas movement is an ‘activity’. so that anger emphatically is not pain. Sometimes. For when the angry man feels pain. and what contains ‘knowledge of grammar’ contains ‘knowledge’ as well. any one says that ‘shame’ is ‘fear’. neither is conviction conception: for it is possible to have the same conception even without being convinced of it. by defining ‘sensation’ as ‘movement communicated through the body’: for sensation is a ‘state’. for all that. and ‘courage’ and ‘justice’ as ‘control of fears’ and of ‘gains’: for the terms ‘courageous’ and ‘good-tempered’ are applied to a man who is immune from passion. For both of the things in question follow in a certain sense upon the given species. and ‘good tempered’ in the other. and at another not be. or that ‘anger’ is ‘pain’. if he has said that memory is a ‘state that is retentive of a conception’. e. the pain bas appeared in him earlier than the anger: for his anger is not the cause of his pain. but rather an activity. but neither of them is genus to it. so that not even so could the former be the genus of the latter: for the denotation of the genus should be wider. but his pain of his anger. whether both naturally come to be anywhere in the same thing: for what contains the species contains the genus as well: e. people state any kind of attendant feature as the genus.g. whereas this is impossible if conviction be a species of conception: for it is impossible for a thing still to remain the same if it be entirely transferred out of its species. They also make a bad mistake who rank a ‘state’ within the ‘capacity’ that attends it. also. also.g. By the same reasoning. or an activity inside the genus ‘state’. each of the former is attended by a capacity such that. the result will be that genus and 297 . See. Likewise. for memory is never a state.5 Again. he would control it and not be led by it: but. e. whereas ‘self-controlled’ describes the man who is exposed to passion and not led by it. if he were exposed to passion.g. a man. ‘pain’ as the genus of ‘anger’ and ‘conception’ as that of conviction’. e. what contains ‘white’ contains ‘colour’ as well.g. If. therefore. If. then ‘conception’ and ‘conviction’ will be used with an equal denotation. what is meant is an absolute immunity from any passions of that kind at all. just as neither could the same animal at one time be. see if he has placed what is a ‘state’ inside the genus ‘activity’. by defining ‘good temper’ as the ‘control of anger’. Quite possibly. on the other hand. this is not what is meant by being ‘courageous’ in the one case. indeed. any one says that a man who has a conception must of necessity be also convinced of it. also.

See also if he has put anything that is blameworthy or objectionable into the class ‘capacity’ or ‘capable’. clearly it is not an accident. a capacity is always a desirable thing: for even the capacities for doing bad things are desirable. nor is grammar knowledge in a particular respect only. for it is in respect of its body that it is perceived and seen.) ‘animal’ as an ‘animate body’. 298 . therefore.g. and therefore it is we say that even God and the good man possess them.g. Hence the terms rendered are not the genera. and ‘pain’ is found in the faculty of ‘desires’. if ‘animal’ has been described as an ‘object of perception’ or of ‘sight’. also. not in respect of its soul. Moreover. by defining a ‘sophist’ or a ‘slanderer’.g. For an animal is an object of perception or of sight in a particular respect only. Likewise also in other instances. (for in this pleasure also is found). So then ‘capacity’ can never be the genus of anything blameworthy. so that ‘body’ could not be the genus of animal. you may take it that it is not a form of ‘wishing’: for wishing is always found in the ‘reasoning’ faculty. Else. see if the species partakes of the genus attributed only in some particular respect: for it is the general view that the genus is not thus imparted only in some particular respect: for a man is not an animal in a particular respect. Again. if ‘friendship’ be found in the faculty of desires.species are not found in the same thing: for shame is found in the ‘reasoning’ faculty. so that-’object of sight’ and ‘object of perception’ could not be the genus of ‘animal’. For none of the aforesaid characters is so called because he is ‘capable’ in one of these respects: for even God and the good man are capable of doing bad things. defining (e. e. the result will be that what is blameworthy is sometimes desirable: for there will be a certain form of capacity that is blameworthy. so that if they do not appear in the same thing. Look. e. or a ‘thief’ as ‘one who is capable of secretly thieving other people’s property’. but that is not their character: for it is always in respect of their choice that bad men are so called. Likewise. whereas ‘anger’ is found in the ‘spirited’ faculty. whereas the part is not predicated in any sense of the whole. seeing that it is a part. for they are capable (we say) of doing evil. Sometimes also people place the whole inside the part without detection. and see if in the case of any of its species the genus be imparted only in a certain respect. This commonplace rule is useful also in dealing with Accident: for the accident and that of which it is an accident are both found in the same thing. seeing that they do not naturally come to be in the same faculty as the species. whereas fear is in the ‘spirited’ faculty.

For ‘vehemence’ and ‘excess’ of a thing are found in a thing which is thus vehement and in excess. any more than that knowledge is a knower or motion a moving thing. if it be ‘vehemence of conception’. too. as its genus. Moreover. Or see if he has put anything that exists in two genera or more into one of them only. Sometimes. Whereas neither of these things is generally believed. So then ‘life’ is not the genus of immortality. so that ‘wonderment’ and ‘conception’ are the genus. people make the bad mistake of putting an affection into that which is affected. so that the conception will be convinced.g. while ‘excess’ and ‘vehemence’ are the differentia. 299 . there would be an ‘excessive excess’. there would be a ‘vehement vehemence’. if any one renders ‘excess’ and ‘vehemence’ as genera. is a slanderer or cheat. but into both the aforesaid genera. conviction will be found in the conception. but that a certain accidental feature or affection enters into this one as it is. also.g. there is such a thing as excessive astonishment: if then astonishment be an excess. If. therefore. the ‘cheat’ and the ‘slanderer’: for neither he who has the will without the capacity. Moreover. astonishment be excess of wonderment the astonishment will be found in the wonderment. Moreover. nor he who has the capacity without the will. For neither ‘excess’ nor ‘vehemence’ is the genus. defining (e. those who say that immortality is everlasting life: for immortality seems to be a certain affection or accidental feature of life. and conviction to be a ‘vehement conception’. Likewise. e.g. For capacity. see if he has put anything that is precious or desirable for its own sake into the class ‘capacity’ or ‘capable’ or ‘productive’ of anything.) astonishment as ‘excess of wonderment’ and conviction as ‘vehemence of conception’. Hence he must be put not into one genus. and differentia as genus. people sometimes in converse order render genus as differentia. is always desirable for the sake of something else. That this saying is true would appear clear if any one were to admit that a man can pass from being mortal and become immortal: for no one will assert that he takes another life. but he who has both of them. a man who renders an answer in this style will in consequence find himself calling vehemence vehement and excess excessive: for there is such a thing as a vehement conviction: if then conviction be ‘vehemence’. e. For some things it is impossible to place in a single genus. then inanimate things will be convinced and astonished. and what is capable or productive of anything. so that ‘wonderment’ will be astonished! Likewise. also. but the differentia: for astonishment is usually taken to be an ‘excessive wonderment’.Also.

see whether the term rendered fail to be the genus of anything at all. for the genus is never predicated of anything except of its species. Examine the point by seeing whether the objects that partake of the genus fail to be specifically different from one another. will be a species of Being. in other cases of the kind. The result. seeing that Being and Unity are predicates of absolutely everything. whereas of a genus the species are always different.g. For people tell you that snow is ‘frozen water’ and mud is earth mixed with moisture’. is that of all things of which the genus is predicated. < div id="section41" class="section" title="6"> 6 Moreover.) wind as ‘air in motion’.g. Likewise. not about all those things of which the genus is not true. If. nor mud earth. therefore. Likewise neither is wine ‘fermented water’. clearly it would be the genus of everything. he has rendered ‘Being’ as a genus. so that neither of the terms rendered could be the genus: for the genus should be true of all its species. For in some cases. on the other hand.g. Even. then. for then clearly it also fails to be the genus of the species mentioned. e. if we ought in this instance to admit the point that wind is ‘air in motion’. see if to an affection he has ascribed as genus the object of which it is an affection. wind is ‘a movement of air’: for the same air persists both when it is in motion and when it is still. he has named as differentia some attribute that follows 300 . whereas snow is not water. If. the species is predicated as well. also. white objects: for these do not differ specifically from one another. it is not generally held to be true.g. seeing that it is predicated of everything. therefore. Hence Unity. Rather. whereas the predication of the species ought to be of narrower range. Hence wind is not ‘air’ at all: for then there would also have been wind when the air was not in motion. but only in cases where the genus rendered is a true predicate. by defining (e. so that ‘white’ could not be the genus of anything. as Empedocles speaks of ‘water fermented in wood’. Again.’ for it simply is not water at all. e. seeing that the same air which formed the wind persists. ‘mud’ or ‘snow’.Again. see whether he has named as genus or differentia some feature that goes with everything: for the number of attributes that follow everything is comparatively large: thus (e. inter alia.) ‘Being’ and ‘Unity’ are among the number of attributes that follow everything. yet we should accept a definition of the kind.

or as generally. Moreover. Moreover. seeing that contraries are found in contrary genera. too. as (e. so too does justice and the just man: for one man is called ‘more just than another’. be some attribute that follows everything. beware.g. The commonplace rule in question is useful especially in cases where the species appears to have several predicates in the category of essence. see whether the genus admits of a greater degree. so that. For if the genus. whereas neither the species does so itself nor yet any term called after it. thus showing clearly that it could not be the genus: for ‘true of S’ is the only description used of the genus in relation to its species. the genus rendered admits of a greater degree. this is the genus into which the soul should have been put. thought to be the genus be not so. if what is more generally. or wider than. The 301 . Also see if he has placed the species inside the worse and not inside the better genus. and he places the better of the contraries inside the worse genus: for the result will be that the remaining species will be found in the remaining genus. so that the better species will be found in the worse genus and the worse in the better: whereas the usual view is that of the better species the genus too is better. whereas neither the species itself does so. the denotation of the differentia will be equal to its denotation.) if he has defined the ‘soul’ as a ‘form of motion’ or ‘a form of moving thing’. If. clearly neither is the genus rendered. and where no distinction has been drawn between them.everything. see if the description ‘inherent in S’ be used of the genus rendered in relation to its species. therefore. if virtue admits of a greater degree. Again. Moreover.g. it will be still wider. if rest is the better of the two. and we cannot say which of them is genus. clearly the denotation of the differentia will be equal to. judge by means of greater and less degrees: if overthrowing a view. that of the genus. while if the genus do not follow everything. both ‘pain’ and the ‘conception of a slight’ are usually thought to be predicates of ‘anger in the category of essence: for the angry man is both in pain and also conceives that he is slighted. Look and see also if the genus fails to be synonymous with its species.g. whenever both species and genus have a contrary. then what has been rendered could not be the genus. For the genus is always predicated of its species synonymously. when it is at the same time related in like manner to both. as it is used of ‘white’ in the case of snow. For the same soul is usually thought to be a principle alike of rest and of motion. nor any term that is called after it: e. e.

so also is the other: and if that which is less generally thought to be so be a species. again. then if one be a genus. On the other hand. Since some people think that the differentia. the comparison of the genera and of the species one with another is of use: e. Likewise.g. (b) that in rendering the essence of a thing it is more fitting to state the genus than the differentia: for any one who says that ‘man’ is an ‘animal’ shows what man is better than he who describes him as ‘walking’. In establishing one. you should distinguish the genus from the differentia by employing the aforesaid elementary principles-(a) that the genus has a wider denotation than the differentia. it is still possible for one not to be the genus of the other. also. the result will be that it is predicated of several different species. or as generally. the commonplace rule that you should see if both the genus rendered and the species admit of a greater degree will not serve: for even though both admit it. If. supposing A and B to have a like claim to be a species of the genus in question. thought to be found in the genus rendered be not found therein. if what has less claim be a genus. For instance. on the other hand. supposing the species rendered to be not one single species but several different ones: for then clearly it will be the genus. then if the one be a species. is a predicate of the various species in the category of essence. whereas the genus does not do this of the differentia: for he who says ‘walking’ describes an animal of a certain quality. you should follow the rule as stated. In demolishing a view.g. also (c) that the differentia always signifies a quality of the genus. whereas he who says ‘animal’ 302 . if ‘capacity’ have more claim than ‘virtue’ to be the genus of self-control. For both ‘beautiful’ and ‘white’ admit of a greater degree. you should look and see if the genus is predicated in the category of essence of those things of which it has been rendered as the genus. therefore. Moreover. so also is what has more claim: e. supposing A and B to have a like claim to be genus. so also is the other. so also is capacity. the species rendered be single. to establish a view. on the other. so also is that which is more generally thought to be so. The same observations will apply also in the case of the species.same mode of inquiry may be applied also to the case of the species. by comparing it with some other species: for if the one which is more generally. then clearly neither could the species rendered be found therein. and neither is the genus of the other. and virtue be the genus. too. look and see whether the genus be predicated in the category of essence of other species as well: for then.

should be distinguished from the genus in this manner. ‘rest’ always follows a ‘calm’ and ‘divisibility’ follows ‘number’.describes an animal of a certain quality. and is not convertible with it. An objection to it is that ‘not-being’ always follows what is ‘coming to be’ (for what is coming to be is not) and is not convertible with it (for what is not is not always coming to be).g. and that still ‘not-being’ is not the genus of ‘coming to be’: for ‘not-being’ has not any species at all. see whether the knower in knowing is convinced: for then clearly knowledge would be a particular kind of conviction. Now seeing it is generally held that if what is musical. then. seeing that it is difficult to distinguish whatever always follows along with a thing. in regard to Genus should be investigated in the ways described. in being musical. on the other hand. then also ‘music’ is a particular kind of ‘knowledge’. but not conversely (for the divisible is not always a number. whereas B does not follow A universally-as e. Questions. The differentia. possesses knowledge in some respect. Moreover. whereas he who says ‘animal’ does not describe a walking thing of a certain quality. then.g. You should proceed in the same way also in regard to the other cases of this kind. then ‘walking’ is a particular kind of ‘movement’. you should therefore examine in the aforesaid manner any genus in which you want to establish the existence of something. do not accept it universally. nor rest a calm)-you may yourself assume in your treatment of them that the one which always follows is the genus. if you wish to prove that ‘knowledge’ is a form of ‘conviction’. whenever the other is not convertible with it: if. 303 . and also that if what walks is moved in walking. from its genus. e. if A follows B universally. some one else puts forward the proposition.

Pickard-Cambridge < div id="book4" class="book" title="Book IV"> 304 . A.Topics. Book V Translated by W.

it is an ‘essential property’ of man to be ‘by nature a civilized animal’: a ‘relative property’ is one like that of the soul in relation to the body. as in the case of a statement that it is a property of a man in relation to a horse for the former to be a biped and the latter a quadruped.] An ‘essential’ property is one which is rendered of a thing in comparison with everything else and distinguishes the said thing from everything else. as does the property which virtue possesses. in the case of a living creature. A ‘permanent’ property is one which is true at every time. For if he at the same time render this property of one thing and deny it of another. of some particular man. and never fails. A ‘temporary’ property is one which is true at some particular time.1 The question whether the attribute stated is or is not a property. If on the other hand he render one apiece of two attributes to each of two things. and is not a quadruped. that the former is naturally produced in more than one faculty. viz. and deny it in each case of the other. and also that a horse is a biped: in both ways the property would be upset. that he walks in the marketplace. If you show any of these at all. there will then be four problems. viz. and also that the horse both is a biped.g. whereas the latter is produced in that of reason alone. to be a biped. the intended attribute is demolished. as. A ‘relative’ property is one which separates its subject off not from everything else but only from a particular definite thing. as in the case of a statement that it is a property of a man. in comparison with knowledge. [The rendering of a property ‘relatively’ gives rise either to two problems or to four. and that he is a quadruped. and the other to obey: a ‘permanent property’ is one like the property which belongs to God. 305 . For one might try both to show that a man is not a biped. For then it is possible to try to show both that a man is not naturally a biped. of being an ‘immortal living being’: a ‘temporary property’ is one like the property which belongs to any particular man of walking in the gymnasium. and in those who have a reasoning faculty. that the one is fitted to command. should be examined by the following methods: Any ‘property’ rendered is always either essential and permanent or relative and temporary: e. only two problems arise. in relation to a horse. and does not of necessity always follow. like being’ compounded of soul and body’. as does ‘a mortal living being capable of receiving knowledge’ in the case of man.

is one such as the faculty of reason possesses in comparison with that of desire and spirit. belong. or that arguments in regard to these are several. So a permanent property you should observe in relation to many periods of time. for if it does not or did not. or is not going to. while the latter obeys: for the reasoning faculty does not always command. see whether the property has or has not been rendered correctly. the property could not have been rendered correctly. On the other hand. should be examined by means of the commonplace arguments relating to Accident. discuss it in comparison with many things: for the property ought to belong to its subject in comparison with every single thing that is. but also on occasion assumes the command. then. or can observe in relation to many periods of time: if essential’. viz. but sometimes also is under command. being a biped: for a man is always and in every case a biped.To render a property ‘relatively’ to something else means to state the difference between them as it is found either universally and always. in that the former commands. Of ‘properties’ the most ‘arguable’ are the essential and permanent and the relative. The so-called ‘relative’ property. permanent and essential properties should be considered by the following methods. nor is that of desire and spirit always under command. one test is to see whether the terms in which the property is stated are not or are more intelligible-for 306 . On the other hand. and so arguments in regard to it are not many. or generally and in most cases: thus a difference that is found universally and always. a difference that is found generally and in most cases. Of a rendering being incorrect or correct. whereas an arguable’ question is one in regard to which it is possible for arguments both numerous and good to arise. so that if the subject be not distinguished by it in comparison with everything else. < div id="section43" class="section" title="2"> 2 First. to several questions: for of necessity the questions arising are either two or four. as we said before. to see whether it belongs to the one thing and not to the other: on the other hand. For a relative property gives rise. it will not be a property. is one such as man possesses in comparison with a horse. about a temporary property we do not inquire further than in regard to the time called ‘the present’. whereas a horse is never a biped at any time. An essential and a permanent property you can discuss in relation to many things. whenever the soul of a man is vicious.

see whether the terms in which the property is stated are more intelligible. On the other hand. any one who has stated that it is a property of ‘fire’ to ‘bear a very close resemblance to the soul’. and for constructive purposes.g. For then the property will have been correctly stated in this respect: for of constructive arguments. so that to ‘possess sensation’ would in this respect have been correctly rendered as a property of ‘animal’. (2) to 307 . Of the terms not being more intelligible. which is less intelligible than ‘fire’-for we know better what fire is than what soul is-. Next. Thus (e. for constructive purposes. For he who does not know whether it is an attribute of the particular subject at all. and therefore a ‘very close resemblance to the soul’ could not be correctly stated to be a property of fire. has introduced a subject which is less intelligible than ‘fire’. Thus (e. viz. so that whichever of these results happens. Thus (e. will not know either whether it belongs to it alone. the property will not have been stated correctly.g. (1) to possess sensation.) a man who has said that the ‘possession of sensation’ is a property of ‘animal’ has both used more intelligible terms and has rendered the property more intelligible in each of the aforesaid senses. if so. e. whether they are not so. and whether it is found there primarily.) a man who has stated that it is a property of fire to be ‘the primary element wherein the soul is naturally found’. while others will show it without qualification. see whether any of the terms rendered in the property is used in more than one sense. for destructive purposes.destructive purposes. its character as a property becomes obscure. viz. but also it should be something whose attribution to the particular subject is a more intelligible attribution. one test is to see whether the property which he renders is altogether more unintelligible than the subject whose property he has stated: for. uses the term ‘soul’. or whether the whole expression too signifies more than one thing.g. some will show the correctness merely in this respect.g. showing the correctness of a rendering. and therefore to be ‘the primary element in which the soul is naturally found’ could not be correctly stated to be a property of ‘fire’. For then the property will not have been correctly stated. and if they are more intelligible in each of the aforesaid ways. whether they are so. For not only should the property be more intelligible than its subject. whether the soul is found in it.) seeing that to ‘being natural sentient’ signifies more than one thing. For the object of getting a property constituted is to be intelligible: the terms therefore in which it is rendered should be more intelligible: for in that case it will be possible to conceive it more adequately. Another test is to see whether the attribution of A (property) to B (subject) fails to be more intelligible.

for destructive purposes.g. on the other hand.g. because the man who is about to attempt an argument is in doubt which of the various senses the expression bears: and this will not do. (4) the use of knowledge about it-no property of the ‘knowledge of this’ could be rendered correctly unless he draw a distinction as to which of these it is whose property he is rendering. Moreover. For constructive purposes. 308 . in addition to this. Thus (e. (2) the use of its knowledge by it.) seeing that ‘the knowledge of this’ signifies many things for it means (1) the possession of knowledge by it. see whether both all the terms and also the expression as a whole avoid bearing more than one sense: for then the property will have been correctly stated in this respect.g. Thus (e. it would be correct in this respect to say that it is a property of fire to be the ‘body quickest to move upwards in space’. Next. Next.use one’s sensation. nor yet the whole expression made by putting them together. and further. nor quickest to move upwards in space’. for destructive purposes. see whether the same term has been repeated in the property. or the whole expression signifying the property. see if the term of which he renders the property is used in more than one sense. that an expression bearing more than one meaning makes the object described obscure. thus inevitably the meaning becomes obscure.) seeing that ‘body’ does not bear several meanings. just as they do in their ‘definitions’ as well: but a property to which this has happened will not have been correctly stated: for the repetition of it confuses the hearer. Thus (e. it is inevitable that those who render a property after this fashion should be somehow refuted whenever any one addresses his syllogism to that one of the term’s several meanings which does not agree. a man should see if the term of which he is rendering the property avoids bearing many senses and is one and simple: for then the property will have been correctly stated in this respect. (3) the existence of knowledge about it. The reasons why this is so are quite clear from what has been said above: for the same results are bound to follow.) seeing that ‘man’ is used in a single sense. being naturally sentient’ could not be a correct statement of a property of ‘animal’. The reason why the term you use. For people often do this undetected in rendering ‘properties’ also. For constructive purposes. ‘naturally civilized animal’ would be correctly stated as a property of man. such people are thought to babble. for the object of rendering the property is that he may understand. and no distinction has been drawn as to which of them it is whose property he is stating: for then the property will not have been correctly rendered. should not bear more than one meaning is this.

see whether he has avoided all terms that are common to everything and used a term that distinguishes the subject from something: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. For constructive purposes. which is a universal attribute. as a property of earth. ‘the substance which is by its nature most easily of all bodies borne downwards in space’. the property will not have been correctly rendered. Thus (e. and were then to substitute ‘substances of such and such a kind’ for the word ‘bodies’: for ‘body’ and ‘a substance of such and such a kind’ mean one and the same thing. on the other hand. so too in the case of properties nothing further should be rendered beside the expression that 309 . if a man replaces words by their definitions. on the other hand. and it is the business of the language Of ‘properties’. it would in this respect have been correctly stated to be a property of a ‘living creature’ to ‘have a soul’. For one which does not distinguish its subject from other things is useless.g.Repetition of the same term is likely to happen in two ways. see whether he avoids ever repeating the same term. For just as in the case of definitions too there should be no further addition beside the expression which shows the essence. as would happen if any one were to render. as also of the language of definitions. when a man repeatedly uses the same word. because of its unity’. has used in the property a term of that kind. therefore. for destructive purposes see whether he renders more than one property of the same thing.) seeing that he who has stated ‘animal capable of acquiring knowledge’ as a property of man has avoided repeating the same term several times. Thus (e. Next. and therefore the property of knowledge could not have been correctly stated. ‘the body which is the most rarefied of bodies’ (for he has repeated the word ‘body’). for destructive purposes. Thus (e. the second is. ‘unity’. without a definite proviso that he is stating more than one: for then the property will not have been correctly stated. see whether he has rendered in the property any such term as is a universal attribute. the property would in this respect have been correctly rendered of man. as would happen if any one were to render. For constructive purposes. For he will have repeated the word ‘substance’. and accordingly neither of the properties would be correctly stated.) inasmuch as he who has said that it is a property of a ‘living creature’ to ‘have a soul’ has used no term that is common to everything. Next. one is. viz.g. to distinguish. In the case contemplated. as a property of fire.) a man who has stated that it is a property of knowledge to be a ‘conception incontrovertible by argument.g.

and what is 310 . on the other hand. and therefore in this respect the property of a ‘living creature’ would have been correctly rendered. for destructive purposes. Thus (e. see whether he has employed anything either opposite to the subject or. For the object of rendering the property is that people may understand: now the subject itself is just as unintelligible as it was to start with.) a man who has said that it is a property of fire to be ‘the most rarefied and lightest body’ has rendered more than one property (for each term is a true predicate of fire alone). Thus (e.constitutes the property mentioned: for such an addition is made to no purpose. Thus (e. and so it could not be a correctly stated property of fire to be ‘the most rarefied and lightest body’. < div id="section44" class="section" title="3"> 3 Next. or any of its species: for then the property will not have been correctly stated.) any one who has said that it is property of ‘animal’ to be ‘the substance to which “man” belongs as a species’ has employed one of its species. in general. and so the property of ‘liquid’ would in this respect have been correctly stated. anything simultaneous by nature with it or posterior to it: for then the property will not have been correctly stated. while any one of its species is posterior to it.g. see whether he avoids introducing either the subject itself or any of its species: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. and so is no more intelligible. Accordingly it is impossible to understand anything further by the use of these terms. and has rendered one only: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. and therefore the property could not have been correctly stated. see whether he has avoided rendering more than one property of the same thing. On the other hand. You should inquire in the same way also in the case of other terms that do or do not make the subject more intelligible: thus.) a man who has stated that it is a property of a living creature to be ‘compounded of soul and body’ has avoided introducing among the rest either the subject itself or any of its species. For an opposite is simultaneous by nature with its opposite.g. for constructive purposes.g. For constructive purposes. see whether he has employed either the actual subject whose property he is rendering.) a man who has said that it is a property of a liquid to be a ‘body adaptable to every shape’ has rendered as its property a single character and not several. Thus (e.g. for destructive purposes.

on the other hand. for destructive purposes.g. seeing that it is the kind of attribute that may fall: and so the property will not be clear. and so the property could not have been correctly stated. Next.) any one who has said that it is a property of good to be ‘the most direct opposite of evil’. Thus (e. see whether he has rendered as property something that does not always follow the subject but sometimes ceases to be its property: for then the property will not have been correctly described. see whether he has avoided employing anything either opposite to. for destructive purposes. For constructive purposes. on the other hand. For there is no necessity either that the name of the subject must also be true of anything to which we find such an attribute belonging.g. Thus (e. see whether in rendering the property of the present time he has omitted to make a definite proviso that it is the property of the present time which he is rendering: for else the property will not have been correctly stated.g. Moreover. the subject. For in the first place.) a man who has stated that it is a property of knowledge to be ‘the most convincing conception’ has avoided employing anything either opposite to. Next. a man who omits to provide definitely whether it was the property of the present time which he intended to state. is obscure: and one should not give any occasion for adverse criticism. Thus (e. nor yet that the name of the subject will be untrue of anything to which such an attribute is found not to belong.) a man who has stated that it is a property of virtue to be ‘what makes its possessor good’ has rendered as property something that always follows. and so the property of virtue would in this respect have been correctly rendered. even after he has rendered the property it will not be clear whether it belongs.simultaneous by nature or is posterior to it does not make its subject more intelligible. For constructive purposes. in addition to this.g. in general.) a man who has stated that it is a property of animal ‘sometimes to move and sometimes to stand still’ rendered the kind of property which sometimes is not a property. and so the property of knowledge would in this respect have been correctly stated. see whether he has rendered something that of necessity must always be a property: for then the property will have been in this respect correctly stated. has employed the opposite of good. Thus (e. or simultaneous by nature with. Thus 311 . or. any unusual procedure always needs a definite proviso: and it is the usual procedure for everybody to render as property some attribute that always follows. and so the property of good could not have been correctly rendered. or posterior to it: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. In the second place. or posterior to. simultaneous by nature with the subject.

) a man who has said that it is the property of a particular man ‘to be walking now’.(e.) a man who has stated that it is a property of a surface to be ‘the primary thing that is coloured’. viz.) a man who has stated it as the property of a particular man ‘to be sitting with a particular man’. because it is evidenced only by sensation. Thus (e. see whether the property which he has rendered forms a predicate convertible with its 312 . For every sensible attribute. For constructive purposes. and so the property of ‘surface’ would in this respect have been correctly rendered. in rendering the property of the present time. made a definite proviso that it is the property of the present time that he is stating: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated.g. whenever the sun sets.) any one who has stated that it is a property of the sun to be ‘the brightest star that moves over the earth’. Thus (e. for destructive purposes. becomes uncertain.g.g. for destructive purposes. has used in describing the property an expression of that kind. but still a quality such as manifestly always belongs. biped animal’ has rendered a property of man so as to signify his essence. must clearly belong of necessity: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated.g. has introduced amongst the rest a sensible quality. and so the property of man could not have been correctly rendered. or. ‘to move over the earth’. once it is taken beyond the sphere of sensation. states the property of the present time. Next. and so the property would have been correctly stated. in stating it. This principle will be true in the case of any attributes that do not always and necessarily follow. he has. see whether.) a man who has said that it is the property of man to be ‘a walking. ‘to be coloured’. For it is not clear whether it still belongs. seeing that he has described it without any definite proviso. on the other hand. whether it continues to move over the earth.g. which is evidenced by sensation. For constructive purposes. For constructive purposes. because sensation then fails us. on the other hand. see whether he has rendered the definition as a property: for then the property will not have been correctly stated: for the property of a thing ought not to show its essence. see whether he has rendered the property of a kind that is not obvious to sensation. see whether he has rendered a property of the kind whose appropriateness is not obvious except by sensation: for then the property will not have been correctly stated. Thus (e. on the other hand. and so the sun’s property could not have been correctly rendered: for it will be uncertain. and so he cannot have rendered the property correctly. has made this distinction in his statement. if it be sensible. Thus (e. Next.

g. and so the property of a living creature could not have been correctly stated. and so the property of man’ would in this respect have been correctly rendered. Next. and then the rest of it should be appended immediately afterwards. and then appends the rest: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. For of properties. signifying its essence: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. has rendered the property after placing the subject within its essence.g. or to be a property of each of them in respect of that character of which he has rendered the property: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. take a look at each subject of which he has rendered the property. however. see whether a man first places within its essence the subject whose property he is rendering. however. and see (e. without.) he who has stated that it is a property of man to be a ‘naturally civilized animal’ has rendered the property so as to be convertible with its subject.g. for example. as also of definitions. Thus. Thus (e. and should distinguish its subject from other things.subject.) if it fails to belong to any of them at all. without. for destructive purposes. the first term to be rendered should be the genus.) a man who has said that it is a property of a living creature to ‘have a soul’ has not placed ‘living creature’ within its essence. < div id="section45" class="section" title="4"> 4 The inquiry. then. Thus (e. whether the property has been correctly rendered or no. and so the property of ‘man’ would in this respect have been correctly rendered. The question. you should examine from the following points of view.g. see whether he has rendered the property without having placed the subject within its essence. whether what is stated is or is not a property at all. showing its essence. inasmuch as it is not true of the 313 . on the other hand. should be made by these means. For constructive purposes. Thus (e. for destructive purposes. then. Firstly.) he who has stated that is a property of man to be an ‘animal capable of receiving knowledge’. Hence a property which is not stated in this way could not have been correctly rendered. or to be true of them in that particular respect. on the other hand. For the commonplace arguments which establish absolutely that the property is accurately stated will be the same as those that constitute it a property at all: accordingly they will be described in the course of them.

and if the description as well be predicated of that of which the name is predicated. if any 314 . and ‘having a soul’ is true of that of which the predicate ‘living creature’ is true. and true in that particular respect: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property.] Next. it would be a property of man to be ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’. it could not be a property of the man of science that he is not deceived by an argument. on the other hand. for example. Thus (e.g. For constructive purposes. see whether the property rendered be true of every instance. see if the description fails to apply to that to which the name applies.) inasmuch as he who has rendered ‘fire’ as the property of ‘the body with the most rarefied particles’.) inasmuch as the description ‘a living being that partakes of knowledge’ is true of God. that then the same thing will be the property of a number of things that are specifically different. see if the description fails to be true of that of which the name is true. on the other hand. Thus (e. and if the name too is predicated of that of which the description is predicated. For then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. see if the name as well be predicated of that of which the description is predicated. ‘fire’ could not be a property of ‘the body with the most rarefied particles’. see if the description too is predicated of that of which the name is predicated. and the subject will be a property of all of these. on the other hand.geometrician that he ‘cannot be deceived by an argument’ (for a geometrician is deceived when his figure is misdrawn). and so ‘having a soul would be a property of ‘living creature’. Thus (e. Thus. has rendered the subject as the property of its predicate. Next. and if the name fails to apply to that to which the description applies: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. For constructive purposes.g. The reason why the subject will not be a property of that which is found in the subject is this. see if he has rendered a subject as a property of that which is described as ‘in the subject’: for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. and if the name fails to be true of that of which the description is true: for constructive purposes.) the predicate ‘living creature’ is true of that of which ‘having a soul’ is true. commonplace rule means-for destructive purposes. in as much as the description ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’ is true of every man. For the same thing has quite a number of specifically different predicates that belong to it alone.g. for destructive purposes. and true of him qua man. to be a living being that partakes of knowledge’ could not be a property of man. for destructive purposes. while ‘man’ is not predicated of God.

Next.) he who has said that it is a property of ‘earth’ to be ‘specifically the heaviest body’ has rendered of the subject as its property something that is said of the thing in question alone. but must belong either as posterior or as prior to the attribute described in the name: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property either never. though the subject is predicated convertibly with it: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Next. and is said of it in the manner in which a property is predicated.g. inasmuch as he who has said that ‘walking on two feet’ is property of man has rendered the property as partaken of. for destructive purposes. Thus (e.) inasmuch as it is possible for the attribute ‘walking through the marketplace’ to belong to an object as prior and as posterior to the attribute ‘man’. and so ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’ would be a property of ‘man’. on the other hand. if it be predicated only of the things of which it has been stated to be the property. ‘walking through the market-place’ could not be a property of ‘man’ either never. ‘walking on two feet’ could not be a property of ‘man’. on the other hand.g.) he who has stated that to be ‘naturally sentient’ is a property of ‘animal’ has rendered the property neither as partaken of nor as showing the essence. though the subject is predicated convertibly with it. For an attribute of which the subject partakes is a constituent part of its essence: and an attribute of that kind would be a differentia applying to some one species. Thus (e. see if it always and of necessity belongs simultaneously. For constructive purposes. or not always.g. Thus (e. without being either a definition or a differentia: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. on the other hand. or not always. and so to be ‘naturally sentient’ would be a property of ‘animal’. and is neither differentia nor definition of its subject. see if he has rendered the property as partaken of: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. For constructive purposes. see if he has avoided rendering the property as partaken of. 315 . E.g. see if he has rendered what is found in the subject as a property of the subject: for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property.) the attribute ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’ always and of necessity belongs simultaneously with the attribute ‘man’. Thus (e.one states the property in this way. or as showing the essence. see if the property cannot possibly belong simultaneously. for destructive purposes.g. and so the property of earth would have been rightly stated. For constructive purposes.

it is a job to render to a sophistical questioner a property that belongs to one thing and that only. For an attribute that belongs to something qualified by an accident will also belong to the accident taken along with the subject which it qualifies. in so far as the one pair have the sameness of species that fall under the same genus. while the other pair have that of differentiae of the genus. and it is not always a property of a horse to stand by its own initiative.) inasmuch as it is called a property of a man. see if the property of things that are the same in kind as the subject fails to be always the same in kind as the alleged property: for then neither will what is stated to be the property of the subject in question. see if the same thing fails to be a property of things that are the same as the subject.) since it is a property of man to be a ‘walking biped.g. in so far as they are the same. in so far as he is a mortal. For then is stated not to be a property will be a property. because they belong to each of them in so far as each is an ‘animal’. see if of things that are the same in kind as the subject the property that is the same as the alleged property is always true: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus. see if the same thing be a property of something that is the same as the subject. for destructive purposes. if there be a white man. on the other hand. on the other hand. Next.g.’ it would also be a property of a bird to be a ‘flying biped’: for each of these is the same in kind. for destructive purposes. so far as they are the same: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. for example. of ‘animal’. to have a tripartite soul. e. Thus (e.) inasmuch as a man and a horse are the same in kind.g. in so far as he is a man. Inasmuch as ‘same’ and ‘different’ are terms used in several senses. Thus (e. This commonplace rule is useful also in dealing with Accident: for the same attributes ought either to belong or not belong to the same things. it could not be a property of a man to move by his own initiative.Next.g. For constructive purposes. in so far as it is the same. For constructive purposes. it could not be a property of the ‘desirable’ either to ‘appear good to certain persons’: for ‘proper object of pursuit’ and ‘desirable’ mean the same. This commonplace rule is deceptive whenever one of the properties mentioned belongs to some one species only while the other belongs to many. being under the genus ‘animal’. inasmuch as it is no property of a ‘proper object of pursuit’ to ‘appear good to certain persons’. as does ‘walking quadruped’. Thus (e. an attribute that belongs to ‘man’ will belong also to ‘white man’. and one that belongs to 316 . it would also be a property of a mortal. ‘to have a tripartite soul’. viz. for to stand and to move by his own initiative are the same in kind.

and white man’ another. and moreover by representing as different a certain state and what is called after that state. For constructive purposes.g. the property that 317 . < div id="section46" class="section" title="5"> 5 Next. see if. ‘biped’ could not be a property of man: for not every man is possessed of two feet. though it is called ‘another’ thing because the mode of being of the two is different: for it is not the same thing for a man to be a man and for a white man to be a white man. it could not be a property of ‘science’ that it is ‘incontrovertible by argument’.g.‘white man’ will belong also to ‘man’. For an attribute that belongs to the state will belong also to what is called after that state. then. For against an objector who sticks at nothing the defence should stick at nothing.) the man who has said that ‘biped’ is a property of man intends to render the attribute that naturally belongs. but his expression actually indicates one that invariably belongs: accordingly. and by his language indicates. saying. by representing the subject as being one thing in itself. you should say that the subject of an accident is not absolutely different from the accident taken along with its subject. for example. while intending to render an attribute that naturally belongs. and another thing when combined with its accident.) he who renders as a property of ‘man’ the phrase ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’ both intends. for destructive purposes. One might. for then the scientist also will be incontrovertible by argument. For constructive purposes. that ‘man’ is one thing. Thus (e. bring captious criticism against the majority of properties. and one that belongs to what is called after a state will belong also to the state: e. see if he intends to render the property that naturally belongs. however. Moreover. on the other hand. he states it in his language in such a way as to indicate one that invariably belongs: for then it would be generally agreed that what has been stated to be a property is upset. while the description of Science is wrong too: one should say not ‘it’ but ‘she is incontrovertible by argument’. you should take a look along at the inflections. and say that the description of the man of science is wrong: one should say not ‘it’ but ‘he is incontrovertible by argument’. inasmuch as the condition of the scientist is called after his science.g. Thus (e. and indicates it in that way in his language: for then the property will not be upset in this respect.

e. For every one tries to render as the property of a thing something that belongs to it either naturally. Moreover. as ‘life’ belongs to a particular kind of ‘living being’. man. as regards all the things that are called as they are primarily after something else. or that he calls it so after something else. or because it is the state possessed by something. it will be predicated also of ‘surface’.g. coloured’ as the property of ‘surface’. whereas if he render it of ‘body’.g. because one day that attribute will not be what it now is.) it belongs to a man to have two feet: so too he errs if he does not make a definite proviso that he is rendering what actually belongs. Hence the name as well will not be true of that of which the description is true. Accordingly he makes a mistake if he has failed to add the word ‘naturally’. Thus (e. as ‘wisdom’ to the ‘rational faculty’. or actually. So he errs if he has not shown that he states a thing to be such and such primarily.belongs by nature. as ‘incontrovertible by argument’ belongs to a ‘scientist’ (for simply and solely by reason of his being in a certain state will he be ‘incontrovertible by argument’).g. it is a job to render the property of such things. or primarily in themselves. or because the thing is in a certain state. as ‘having four fingers’ belongs to a particular man. because then its name too will not be true of that of which the description is true. as ‘life’ to ‘living being’. as ‘wisdom’ to the ‘soul’. as ‘biped’ belongs to ‘man’. For if you render a property as belonging to the subject that is so called after something else. e. then it will be true of its primary subject as well. So he errs if he has not said beforehand that he has rendered a property to a thing either 318 . ‘coloured’ will be true of body as well. or absolutely. whether rendered as a property of ‘surface’ or of ‘body’. but they have it because they already partake of ‘animal’). or on the other hand primarily. and so ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’ would not be upset or shown in that respect not to be a property of man. as ‘incontrovertible by argument’ belongs to ‘science’. or because it partakes of something else. or because it is partaken of. as ‘consisting of most rarefied particles’ belongs to ‘fire’.) if any one renders . or specifically. because what belongs naturally may fail to belong to the thing to which it naturally belongs. In the case of some properties it mostly happens that some error is incurred because of a failure to define how as well as to what things the property is stated to belong. whereas if you state it of its primary subject.g. or one that belongs to a thing only as called after something else. as ‘sensation’ belongs to ‘animal’ (for other things as well have sensation. the man’s possession of four fingers. then it will be predicated also of the thing that is so called after this other. as (e. as is the case with ‘coloured’.

the same attribute will be the property both of the term which has it absolutely and of that element therein which has it in the highest degree. Moreover. So he errs if he has not expressly distinguished the property that belongs specifically. For if he renders it because its subject is partaken of. it will belong to the state possessed. something.because that thing possesses a state. one should not give occasion for this objection. whenever the word ‘specifically’ is added: and in some cases this does not occur. as is the condition of the property ‘consisting of most rarefied particles’ in the case of ‘fire’: for this same attribute will be the property of ‘light’ as well: for it is ‘light’ that ‘consists of the most rarefied particles’. any one else renders a property in this way one should attack it. For fire is not all of one species. because then it will belong only to one of the things that fall under the term of which he states the property: for the superlative belongs only to one of them. otherwise the rule that where the description is truer the name too should be truer is not fulfilled. whereas if he renders it because its subject partakes of something else. it will belong to the things partaken of. as did ‘incontrovertible by argument’ when stated as a property of ‘science’ or of the ‘scientist’. it will belong to the things which partake of it. because then it will not be a property. For. And this should not happen unless the name too be predicated in a greater degree of that of which the description is truer. in addition to this. there should not be any species other than the one mentioned. as happens with ‘consisting of most rarefied particles’ in the case of fire: for ‘light’ consists of more rarefied particles than live coals and flame. So he errs if he has not indicated beforehand that the property belongs because the thing partakes of. or just of ‘living being. but should define in what manner one states the property at the actual time of making the statement. but are of different species. 319 . while supposing he renders it to what possesses the state. For the things in question should all be of one species. for live coals and flame and light are each of them ‘fire’. whenever ‘specifically’ is added. then the property in question will belong to some of them in a greater and to others in a less degree. If.g. it will belong to what possesses that state. Sometimes. that if there be.g. a man may even add the word ‘specifically’. supposing he renders the property to something as being a state possessed. because then the property will belong to certain other things as well. or because it is a state possessed by something. as it does not. or is partaken of by. e. too. in the case of fire. in fact. for oneself. ‘lightest’ as applied to ‘fire’. and still make a mistake. then. The reason why. as (e.) if he were to state ‘life’ to be a property of a ‘particular kind of living being’. is this.

Next. and so the largest volume of salt water’ could not be a property of the ‘sea’. if the property of the whole be not true of the part. Thus (e. Next. see if he has stated a thing as a property of itself: for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. Take an instance referring to the whole: the man who has said that it is a property of the ‘sea’ to be ‘the largest volume of salt water’. and so ‘breathable’ could not be a property of ‘air’. Thus (e. see whether. you should look and see. For constructive purposes. Now take one referring to the part: the man who has stated that it is a property of ‘air’ to be ‘breathable’ has stated the property of something that consists of like parts. but has rendered an attribute of such a kind as is not true of the part (for a particular sea is not ‘the largest volume of salt water’). on the other hand. while it is true of each of the things with similar parts.) he who has said that ‘becoming’ is a property of ‘beautiful’ has rendered the term as a property of itself (for ‘beautiful’ and ‘becoming’ are the same). in the case of things consisting of like parts.) while it is true of earth everywhere that it naturally falls downwards. though true of some air.g. while sometimes he may address himself to what is predicated of the part: and then in neither case will it have been rightly rendered. but has rendered a convertible predicate. has stated the property of something that consists of like parts. on the other hand. see if he has avoided rendering a thing as a property of itself. or if that of the part be not predicated of the whole: for then what has been stated to be the property will not be a property. so that it would be a property of ‘earth’ ‘naturally to fall downwards’. For constructive purposes. so that ‘animate substance’ would be a property of ‘livingcreature’. is still not predicable of the whole (for the whole of the air is not breathable). and what shows the essence is not a property but a definition. but he has stated an attribute such as. For a thing itself always shows its own essence. Thus he who has stated ‘animate substance’ as a property of ‘living-creature’ has not stated ‘living-creature’ as a property of itself. for destructive purposes. for destructive purposes. and so ‘becoming’ could not be a property of ‘beautiful’. 320 .g. In some cases it happens that this is so: for sometimes in rendering a property in the case of things that consist of like parts a man may have his eye on the whole. it is on the other hand a property of them taken as a collective whole: for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property. but has yet stated a convertible predicate: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. it is a property of the various particular pieces of earth taken as ‘the Earth’.

Thus (e. For then neither will the contrary of the first be a property of the contrary of the second. Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes.) inasmuch as injustice is contrary to justice. For constructive 321 . and objectionable to desirable. see if the correlative of the alleged property is a property of the subject’s correlative: for then also the correlative of the first will be a property of the correlative of the second: e.) inasmuch as ‘double’ is relative to ‘half’. therefore ‘to be the lowest evil’ could not be a property of ‘injustice’.g. inasmuch as ‘double’ is relative to ‘half’. see if the contrary is the property of the contrary: for then also the contrary of the first will be the property of the contrary of the second. while it is a property of ‘double’ to be ‘in the proportion of 2 to 1’. Thus (e. but ‘to be the highest good’ is not a property of ‘justice’.g. if the contrary of the term rendered fails to be a property of the contrary subject. and first (a) from that of the contraries. if the correlative of the term rendered fails to be a property of the correlative of the subject: for then neither will the correlative of the first be a property of the correlative of the second. For constructive purposes.< div id="section47" class="section" title="6"> 6 Next. for example. and the proportion 1:2 is relative to the proportion 2:1. neither will the attribute described in terms of the state (X) be a property of the state (Y). and see. exceeded’ could not be a property of ‘half’. and ‘in excess’ to ‘exceeded’. for destructive purposes. Secondly (h) look from the point of view of relative opposites and see. Also if.g. inasmuch as it is not predicated as a property of ‘deafness’ to be a ‘lack of sensation’. an attribute described in terms of the privation (of X) be not a property of the given privation (of Y).g.) inasmuch as evil is contrary to good. and the lowest evil to the highest good. look from the point of view of the respective opposites. on the other hand. on the other hand. ‘objectionable’ would be a property of ‘evil’. For constructive purposes. neither could it be a property of ‘hearing’ to be a ‘sensation’. and ‘desirable’ is a property of ‘good’. it would be a property of ‘half’ to be ‘in the proportion of 1 to 2’. while ‘in excess’ is not a property of ‘double’. Thus. see if an attribute described in terms of a state (X) fails to be a property of the given state (Y): for then neither will the attribute described in terms of the privation (of X) be a property of the privation (of Y). for destructive purposes. Thus (e. on the other hand.

‘inanimate’ could not be a property of ‘living creature’. if the negative term fails to be a property of the negative subject.g.g. ‘failure to see’ would be a property of ‘blindness’.g. then also the attribute that is described in terms of the state (X) will be a property of the state (Y). on the other hand.purposes. Thus (e. neither will the positive term be a property of the positive subject. Secondly (b) look from the point of view of the predicates. it will also seem to be a property of ‘not-living being’ ‘not to live’. positive or negative. and see. Also if ‘not-animal’ seems not to be a property of ‘not-man’. on the other hand. Thirdly (c) look from the point of view of the subjects taken by themselves. see if the positive term is a property of the positive subject: for then the negative term will be a property of the negative subject as well. and first (a) from the point of view of the predicates taken by themselves. neither could ‘not-animal’ be a property of ‘not-man’. Also if the negative term be a property of the negative subject. the positive will be a property of the positive as well. then the positive term or the attribute described in terms of it will not be a property of the subject: e.) inasmuch as ‘to see’ is a property of ‘sight’. For constructive purposes. the negative term or the attribute described in terms of it is a property of the subject.) see if the positive term or the attribute described in terms of it is a property of the subject: for then the negative term or the attribute described in terms of it will not be a property of the subject. inasmuch as we have not got the sight we should naturally have. if the positive term falls to be a property of the positive subject: for then neither will the negative term be a property of the negative subject. if an attribute described in terms of a privation (of X) be a property of the privation (of Y). inasmuch as ‘animate’ is a property of ‘living creature’.) inasmuch as ‘animal’ is not a property of ‘man’. look from the point of view of positive and negative terms. Thus (e. Also. neither will ‘animal’ be a property of ‘man’. Thus (e.) inasmuch as it is a property of ‘not-living being’ ‘not to live’. see if an attribute described in terms of a state (X) is a property of the given state (Y): for then also the attribute that is described in terms of the privation (of X) will be a property of the privation (of Y). Thus (e. and their respective subjects. Also if. it would be a property of ‘living being’ ‘to live’: also if it seems to be a property of ‘living being’ ‘to live’. for destructive purposes.g. inasmuch as we have sight. on the other hand. if the property rendered is a property of the positive subject: for then the same term will not be a 322 . Also. Next. and see. for destructive purposes.g. This common-place rule is useful only for a destructive purpose.

Not only in the case of the actual term mentioned should one look at the inflexions. Thus (e. Also. For constructive purposes. just as has been laid down in the case of the former commonplace rules as well. while a negative term. taking each of the other virtues as well in this way. on the other hand. and see.property of the negative subject as well.g. if the term rendered fails to be a property of the affirmative subject it would be a property of the negative.g. for destructive purposes.) inasmuch as it is a property of ‘wisdom’ to be essentially ‘the natural virtue of the rational faculty’. ‘intelligible living being’ could not be a property of God. then. see if the inflexion of the property rendered is a property of the inflexion of the subject: for then also the other inflexion will be a property of the other inflexion. Next. neither could ‘beautiful’ be a property of ‘just’. deceptive: for a positive term is not a property of a negative. though it belongs to a positive. For a positive term does not belong at all to a negative.g.’ Thus. Thus (e. but also in the case of its opposites. if none of the co-ordinate members (parallel with the property rendered) be a property of any of the remaining set of co-ordinate members (parallel with the subject): for then neither will the term stated be a property of that of which it is stated to be a property. it will not be a property of the positive.) inasmuch as ‘walking biped’ is a property of man. look from the point of view of the inflexions.) inasmuch as ‘animate’ is a property of ‘living creature’. ‘animate’ could not be a property of ‘not-living creature’. Next. however. look from the point of view of the coordinate members of a division. Thus (e.g. it would be a property of ‘temperance’ to be essentially ‘the natural virtue of the faculty of desire’. it would also be any one’s property ‘as a man’ to be described ‘as a walking biped’. for destructive purposes. Thus (e. This commonplace rule is. Thus (e.) inasmuch as ‘beautifully’ is not a property of ‘justly’. if the inflexion of the property rendered fails to be a property of the inflexion of the subject: for then neither will the other inflexion be a property of the other inflexion. For constructive purposes. on the other hand. or a negative of a positive.g. on the other hand. For constructive purposes. for destructive purposes. see if some one or other of the remaining co-ordinate members (parallel with the property rendered) be a property of each of these co-ordinate members (parallel with the subject): for then the remaining one too will be a property of that of which it has been stated not to be a property.) inasmuch as ‘sensible living being’ is not a property of any of the other living beings. does not belong as a property. see if the inflexion of the opposite of the 323 . if the term rendered be a property of the negative subject. and see.

it could not be a property of a builder to produce a house. and it is not a property of a doctor to produce health. see if the inflexion of the opposite of the property originally suggested is a property of the inflexion of the opposite of the original subject: for then also the inflexion of the other opposite will be a property of the inflexion of the other opposite. 324 . the predicate which is identically related to two subjects is the property of the subject which is identically related to it as the subject in question. it would be a property of a doctor to possess the ability to produce health. on the other hand. Thus (e.g. Thus (e. and it is a property of a trainer to possess the ability to produce vigour. For constructive purposes. Next look from the point of view of things that are identically related. Thus (e. if the predicate that is identically related towards two subjects fails to be a property of the subject which is identically related to it as the subject in question. see if what is in a relation like that of the property rendered is a property of what is in a relation like that of the subject: for then also what is in a relation like that of the first will be a property of what is in a relation like that of the second. For constructive purposes. neither could ‘badly’ be a property of ‘unjustly’. for then neither will the predicate that is identically related to both subjects be a property of the subject which is identically related to it as the first. on the other hand. look from the point of view of things that are in a like relation.property rendered fails to be the property of the inflexion of the opposite of the subject: for then neither will the inflexion of the other opposite be a property of the inflexion of the other opposite.) inasmuch as the relation of a doctor towards the possession of ability to produce health is like that of a trainer towards the possession of ability to produce vigour.) inasmuch as ‘best’ is a property of ‘the good’. if what is in a relation like that of the property rendered fails to be a property of what is in a relation like that of the subject: for then neither will what is in a relation like that of the first be a property of what is in a relation like that of the second.) inasmuch as ‘well’ is not a property of ‘justly’. for destructive purposes.g.g. on the other hand. ‘worst’ also will be a property of ‘the evil’. for destructive purposes. and see. If. < div id="section48" class="section" title="7"> 7 Next. Thus (e.g. and see.) inasmuch as the relation of the builder towards the production of a house is like that of the doctor towards the production of health.

for destructive purposes.) inasmuch as prudence is identically related to both the noble and the base. nor will the ‘becoming’the one be a property of the other qualified by the verb ‘to become’. for example. If.g. it is a property of prudence to be the knowledge of the noble.g. For constructive purposes. Thus. on the other hand.) 325 . In the same way one should derive arguments also from ‘becoming’ and ‘being destroyed’ both to ‘being’ and to the conclusions that follow from them. (e. Next.) inasmuch as it is not a property of ‘man’ to be an animal. and from ‘being destroyed’ to ‘being’ and to ‘becoming’ exactly as they have just been given from ‘being’ to ‘becoming’ and ‘being destroyed’. see if the predicate qualified by the verb ‘to be’ fails to be a property of the subject qualified by the verb ‘to be’: for then neither will the destruction of the one be a property of the other qualified by the verb ‘to be destroyed’. In the same way one should derive arguments also from ‘becoming’ to ‘being’ and ‘being destroyed’. For constructive purposes. and see. as its property: for then also the subject qualified by the very ‘to become’ will have the predicate qualified by ‘to become’ as its property. it would be a property of becoming a man to become a mortal. nor could the destruction of an animal be a property of the destruction of a man.then it will not be a property of that of which it has been stated to be a property. since it is knowledge of each of them. on the other hand.g. on the other hand. if the suggested property fails to belong to the ‘idea’ in question. inasmuch as it is a property of man to be a mortal. it could not be a property of it to be the knowledge of the base. and the subject qualified by the verb to be destroyed’ will have as its property the predicate rendered with this qualification. see if the subject set down as qualified by the verb ‘to be’ has the predicate set down as so qualified. Thus (e. exactly as was directed also for the purpose of destruction. or fails to belong to it in virtue of that character which causes it to bear the description of which the property was rendered: for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. and the destruction of a mortal would be a property of the destruction of a man. it could not be a property of prudence to be knowledge of the base. Next take a look at the ‘idea’ of the subject stated. neither could it be a property of becoming a man to become an animal. Thus (e. this commonplace rule is of no use: for what is ‘identically related’ is a single predicate in process of comparison with more than one subject.] For it is impossible for the same thing to be a property of more than one subject. for destructive purposes. and it is not a property of prudence to be knowledge of the noble.

and so 326 . For constructive purposes. Also you should look at the argument from a simple predication to the same qualified types of predication. and most-P of most-S.) inasmuch as being more highly coloured is not a property of what is more a body. and sensation simply of life simply. and further this belongs to it qua ‘living-creature’. see if P simply is a property of S simply: for then more P also will be a property of more-S. a lower degree of sensation also would be a property of a lower degree of life. nor being coloured be a property of body at all. but qua ‘idea’.g. for destructive purposes. on the other hand. and least-P of least-S. and see. if P simply fails to be a property of S simply. see if the property in question belongs to the idea.) inasmuch as it belongs to ‘living-creature-itself’ to be compounded of soul and body. Thus (e. and belongs to it in that respect in virtue of which there is predicated of it that character of which the predicate in question has been stated not to be a property: for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property.g. neither could ‘more virtuous’ be a property of what is ‘more human’. and most-P of most-S. and P simply of S simply. Thus (e. Thus (e. nor P simply of S simply. Thus (e. and least-P of least-S.inasmuch as ‘being motionless’ does not belong to ‘man-himself’ qua ‘man’.) a tendency to move upwards by nature is a property of fire. nor less-P of less-S. nor most-P of most-S. on the other hand. For constructive purposes. Thus (e. and first (a) for destructive purposes. nor least-P of least-S. For constructive purposes.) inasmuch as ‘virtuous’ is not a property of ‘man’. see if what is more-P is a property of what is more-S: for then also what is lessP will be a property of what is less S. it could not be a property of ‘man’ to be motionless. and less-P of less-S. neither could being less highly coloured be a property of what is less a body.g. on the other hand. see if what is more-P fails to be a property of what is more-S: for then neither will what is less-P be a property of what is less-S.g. it would be a property of ‘living-creature’ to be compounded of soul and body. nor least-P of least-S.) inasmuch as a higher degree of sensation is a property of a higher degree of life. nor most-P of most-S. for then neither will more-P be a property of more-S. < div id="section49" class="section" title="8"> 8 Next look from the point of view of greater and less degrees.g. and the highest of the highest and the lowest of the lowest degree.

Next. Fourthly (d) for destructive purposes.g. and it is not a property of a surface. ‘to be coloured’ could not be a property of ‘body’. inasmuch as ‘sensation’ is less likely to be a property of ‘animal’ than life’. on the other hand. see if what is less likely to be a property of it is a property.g. see if the more likely property fails to be a property of the more likely subject: for then neither will the less likely property be a property of the less likely subject. it would be a property of animal to live.g. Thus (e. Thus (e. and ‘sensation’ is a property of animal.) inasmuch as ‘perceiving’ is more likely to be a property of ‘animal’ than ‘knowing’ of ‘man’.g. ‘knowing’ could not be a property of ‘man’. see if what is as much a 327 .) inasmuch as ‘to be naturally civilized’ is less likely to be a property of man than ‘to live’ of an animal. Thus. this commonplace rule is not of any use: for it is impossible for the same thing to be a property of more than one thing. ‘life’ would be a property of animal. it will not be a property of the latter. For constructive purposes. For constructive purposes.also a greater tendency to move upwards by nature would be a property of what is more fiery. see if the less likely property is a property of the less likely subject. for then too the more likely property will be a property of the more likely subject. on the other hand. while if it is a property of a ‘surface’. for then what is more likely to be a property of it will be a property as well. Thus (e. it could not be a property of a ‘body’. and first (a) for destructive purposes. Secondly (b) for destructive purposes. In the same way too one should look at all these matters from the point of view of the others as well. Thus (e. and ‘sensible’ is not a property of animal. see if what is more likely to be a property of a given subject fails to be its property: for then neither will what is less likely to be a property of it be its property.) inasmuch as ‘to be coloured’ is more likely to be a property of a ‘surface’ than of a ‘body’. ‘divisible’ could not be a property of animal. look from the point of view of the attributes that belong in a like manner. see if the predicate fails to be a property of that of which it is more likely to be a property: for then neither will it be a property of that of which it is less likely to be a property: while if it is a property of the former. For constructive purposes. for example.) inasmuch as ‘sensible’ is more likely than ‘divisible’ to be a property of ‘animal’. and ‘perceiving’ is not a property of ‘animal’. Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes. and it is a property of man to be naturally civilized. on the other hand.

see if it fails to be a property of that of which it is as much a property: for then neither will it be a property of that of which it is as much a property as of the former. Thus (e. Thus (e.property fails to be a property of that of which it is as much a property: for then neither will that which is as much a property as it be a property of that of which it is as much a property.) inasmuch as ‘desiring’ is as much a property of the faculty of desire as reasoning’ is a property of the faculty of reason. this commonplace rule is of no use. ‘hearing’ could not be a property of man. Thus (e.g. reasoning could not be a property of the faculty of reason. not from reflection on the belonging of any 328 . and ‘to burn’ is not a property of flame. Secondly (b) for destructive purposes. and it is a property of the faculty of reason to be the primary seat of wisdom. Thus (e.g. For constructive purposes.) inasmuch as it is as much a property of ‘the faculty of reason’ to be ‘the primary seat of wisdom’ as it is of ‘the faculty of desire’ to be ‘the primary seat of temperance’. while if it be a property of the former.) inasmuch as ‘to burn’ is as much a property of ‘flame’ as of ‘live coals’. The rule based on things that are in a like relation’ differs from the rule based on attributes that belong in a like manner. For constructive purposes. it could not be a property of live coals. and ‘seeing’ is not a property of man. on the other hand. see if what is as much a property of anything fails to be a property of it: for then neither will what is as much a property be a property of it. and it is a property of the soul to be the primary possessor of a part that desires. Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes. For constructive purposes.) it is as much a property of the soul to be the primary possessor of a part that desires as of a part that reasons. Thus (e. and so it be a property of the soul to be the primary possessor of a part that reasons.’ because the former point is secured by analogy. ‘to burn’ could not be a property of live coals: while if it is a property of flame. see if what is as much a property of it is its property: for then what is as much a property of it as the former will be its property as well. it would be a property of the faculty of desire to be the primary seat of temperance. see if what is as much a property is a property of that of which it is as much a property: for then also what is as much a property as it will be a property of that of which it is as much a property. on the other hand. on the other hand. and desiring is not a property of the faculty of desire.g.g.g. it will not be a property of the other.) inasmuch as ‘seeing’ is as much a property of man as ‘hearing’.

there eh re will still be some form of body that is the lightest. it will also be capable of being acted upon or of acting in a certain way: so that to be ‘capable of being acted upon or of acting’ would be a property of ‘being’.) inasmuch as he in the superlative. see if in rendering the property potentially he renders the property either relatively to something that exists. see if he has stated the property in the superlative: for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property.g. and on the other hand has also rendered the property relatively to what does not exist:-for while air may exist. either. see if in rendering the property potentially. on the one hand. while the latter is judged by a comparison based on the fact that an attribute belongs. on the other hand. Thus (e. For people who render the property in that way find that of the object of which the description is true. has rendered the property relatively to something that exists: for when ‘being’ exists. or to something that does not exist. Next. so that ‘the lightest body’ could not be a property of fire.g.) he who renders it as a property of ‘being’ to be ‘capable of being acted upon or of acting’. be a property of air to be such as can be breathed at a time when there exists no animal such as to breathe it and so it follows that ‘breathable’ could not be a property of air. Thus (e. for destructive purposes. Thus e. rendered the property potentially (for that is ‘breathable’ which is such as can be breathed). though fire perish. for destructive purposes. in rendering the property potentially. An example would be supposing any one were to render ‘the lightest body’ as a property of ‘fire’: for. For constructive purposes. when the potentiality in question can belong to what does not exist: for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property. For constructive purposes. for it belongs most nearly to something that is in being. even though there exist no animal so constituted as to breathe the air.attribute.) he who has said that ‘breathable’ is a property of ‘air’ has. when the potentiality in question cannot belong to what does not exist: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. it is not possible to breathe it if no animal exist: so that it will not. see if he has avoided rendering the property in the superlative: for then the property will in this respect have been property of man has not rendered the property correctly stated. he has also through that potentiality rendered the property relatively to something that does not exist.g. Next. the name is not true as well: for though the object perish the description will continue in being none the less. 329 .

330 .the property would in who states ‘a naturally civilized animal’ as a this respect have been correctly stated.

again. A. he has failed to put the object defined into the genus. more mistakes are made in the latter task on account of its greater difficulty. If. or to put it into the appropriate genus (for the framer of a definition should first place the object in its genus. then. Whether. For there too the question is always ‘Is so and so true or untrue?’: for whenever we argue that an accident belongs. First. to prescribe how to investigate whether the object has been either not defined at all. Incorrectness falls into two branches: (1) first. as we said above as well. and then append its differences: for of all the elements of the definition the genus is usually supposed to be the principal mark of the essence of what is defined): or (3) that the expression is not peculiar to the object (for. he has failed to place the object in the appropriate genus. Pickard-Cambridge < div id="book6" class="book" title="Book VI"> 1 The discussion of Definitions falls into five parts.Topics. or (2) that though the object has a genus. while whenever we argue that it does not belong. we must go on to examine the case according to the commonplace rules that relate to genus and property. or if the expression be not peculiar to the object. then. then. that is. It remains. then. he has yet failed to define the object. we declare it to be true. the expression be not also true of that of which the term is true you should proceed to examine according to the commonplace rules that relate to Accident. we must proceed to examine if it has been defined incorrectly: for with anything it is easier to do it than to do it correctly. to express its essence. though he has observed all the aforesaid cautions. to see if he has defined it. apart from the foregoing. Clearly. but defined it incorrectly. a definition ought to be peculiar): or else (4) see if. Accordingly the attack becomes easier in the latter case than in the former. (5) It remains. For you have to show either (1) that it is not true at all to apply the expression as well to that to which the term is applied (for the definition of Man ought to be true of every man). the use of obscure language (for the language of a definition ought to be the very clearest 331 . we declare it to be untrue. or else defined incorrectly. Book VI Translated by W.

or ‘Health is the balance of hot and cold elements’. then. it is clear that he cannot have defined it in any sense aright. seeing that the whole purpose of rendering it is to make something known).g. also. (secondly. e. and then institute his argument against each: for if the expression used be not adequate to the subject in any of its senses. nor yet metaphorically. each of the aforesaid branches is divided into a number of others. nor yet literally. if the expression used be longer than is necessary: for all additional matter in a definition is superfluous. as when Plato describes the eye as ‘browshaded’. For a metaphorical expression is always obscure. or temperance as a ‘harmony’. For an unusual phrase is always obscure. See if he has used a metaphorical expression. < div id="section51" class="section" title="2"> 2 One commonplace rule. if he has defined knowledge as ‘unsupplantable’. e. Again. See if the meaning intended by the definition involves an ambiguity with any other. if harmony be the genus of temperance. the questioner may himself distinguish the various senses of the term rendered in the definition. or a certain spider as poison-fanged’. Moreover. It is possible.possible. to argue sophistically against the user of a metaphorical expression as though he had used it in its literal sense: for the definition stated will not apply to the term defined.g. or the marrow as ‘boneformed’. or the earth as a ‘nurse’. Another rule is. for instance. Or. Here ‘passage’ and ‘balance’ are ambiguous terms: it is accordingly not clear which of the several possible senses of the term he intends to convey. Sometimes a phrase is used neither ambiguously. Likewise also. in the case of temperance: for harmony is always found between notes. in regard to obscurity is. if the term defined be used in different senses and he has spoken without distinguishing between them: for then it is not clear to which of them the definition rendered applies. ‘Becoming is a passage into being’. nor virtue harmony. as. and one can then bring a captious objection on the ground that the definition does not apply to all the things whose definition he has rendered: and this kind of thing is particularly easy in the case where the definer does not see the ambiguity of his terms. see if he uses terms that are unfamiliar. then the same object will occur in two genera of which neither contains the other: for harmony does not contain virtue. again. as when the law is said to be the ‘measure’ or 332 . Again.

Any addition. though the additional matter may be peculiar to the given term. Moreover. see if. he has phrased the definition redundantly. it is not evident what it defines: just as in the works of the old painters. or to all that fall under the same genus as the object defined: for the mention of this is sure to be redundant. Now any term that belongs to everything separates off the given object from absolutely nothing. in the definition of man. unless there were an inscription. either to real objects in general. and one that is worse than any sort of metaphorical expression. when it is merely stated by itself. nor is the law ordinarily so called in a literal sense. So then. and the differentia from any of the things contained in the same genus. if a man says that the law is literally a ‘measure’ or an ‘image’. Such phrases are worse than metaphor. Or see if. while any that belongs to all the things that fall under the same genus does not separate it off from the things contained in the same genus. then. Or. first of all look and see whether he has used any attribute that belongs universally. it is clear that he has used an unclear expression. he speaks falsely: for an image is something produced by imitation. see if from the expression used the definition of the contrary be not clear. for those who use metaphors do so always in view of some likeness: whereas this kind of phrase makes nothing clear.‘image’ of the things that are by nature just. again. and still the expression is peculiar and makes clear his 333 . If. he does not mean the term literally. then. of that kind will be pointless. the definition be not clear. the figures used to be unrecognizable. the addition ‘capable of receiving knowledge’ is superfluous. If. on the other hand. Thus. you should proceed to examine on lines such as these. For the genus ought to divide the object from things in general. for there is no likeness to justify the description ‘measure’ or ‘image’. yet even when it is struck out the rest of the expression too is peculiar and makes clear the essence of the term. as applied to the law. on the other hand. for the latter does make its meaning to some extent clear because of the likeness involved. for strike it out. for definitions that have been correctly rendered also indicate their contraries as well. and this is not found in the case of the law. < div id="section52" class="section" title="3"> 3 If.

so that the addition ‘undigested’ is required. Or perhaps the phlegm is not absolutely the first thing to come off the food. Moreover. e.) ‘desire’ is a ‘conation for the pleasant’. Such. saying (e. see if anything contained in the definition fails to apply to everything that falls under the same species: for this sort of definition is worse than those which include an attribute belonging to all things universally. Or perhaps there is no absurdity in this. so that what is the same as desire will also be ‘for the pleasant’. would also be the definition of the soul.essence. For ‘desire’ is always ‘for the pleasant’. but only the first of the undigested matters. 334 . it is impossible that the expression as a whole should be peculiar: for it will not be predicated convertibly with the object.g. because the attribute ‘six feet high’ does not belong to everything that falls under the same species. for instance. the whole too becomes peculiar. if the remainder of the expression be peculiar. Accordingly our definition of desire becomes ‘conation-for-the-pleasant’: for the word ‘desire’ is the exact equivalent of the words ‘conation forthe-pleasant’. so that both alike will be ‘for the pleasant’.g. assuming it to be stated as a ‘self-moving number’. and therefore walking biped animal is a biped’. For in that case. Thus (e. Speaking generally. what is the same as man is a biped: but ‘a walking biped animal’ is the same as man. ‘a walking biped animal six feet high’: for an expression of that kind is not predicated convertibly with the term. Again. Here the addition of the word ‘undigested’ is superfluous. Or perhaps the expression used. though appropriate.g. for consider this instance:-Man is a biped’: therefore. see if he has said the same thing more than once. seeing that ‘the first’ is one and not many. for stated the other way the definition would not be true unless the phlegm comes first of all. Which of the two is the real state of the case it is difficult to determine clearly: the right way to treat the matter in all cases is to be guided by convenience. so that even when undigested’ is left out the definition will still be peculiar to the subject: for it is impossible that both phlegm and also something else should both be the first to arise from the food. yet does not declare the essence. as Plato defined it. if to something peculiar anything whatever that is true be added. Whereas if any part of the expression do not apply to everything that falls under the same species. the whole too will be peculiar: for absolutely always. everything is superfluous upon whose removal the remainder still makes the term that is being defined clear. if the word ‘number’ be eliminated. for the soul is just ‘the self-moving’.) it is said that the definition of phlegm is the ‘undigested moisture that comes first off food’.

see if a universal have been mentioned and then a particular case of it be added as well. not when the same word is uttered twice. accordingly. But whether he has mentioned and defined its essence or no. but as a matter of fact the subject said to be a biped is’a walking biped animal’. Again. Likewise. so that the word ‘biped’ is only used as a predicate once. or ‘the law’ as ‘the image of what is by nature noble and just’. So also. For all privation is a privation of some natural attribute. < div id="section53" class="section" title="4"> 4 Whether. for the word ‘privation’ shows of itself that the heat meant is natural heat. ‘Equity is a remission of what is expedient and just’. and we make things known by taking not any random terms.g. if he defines ‘medicine’ as ‘knowledge of what makes for health in animals and men’. then. as is done in demonstrations (for so it is with all teaching and learning). see if he has failed to make the definition through terms that are prior and more intelligible. those fail who say that ‘cooling’ is ‘the privation of natural heat’. an addition of the particular after the universal has been already stated. if he says. a man defines a thing correctly or incorrectly you should proceed to examine on these and similar lines. but when the same thing is more than once predicated of a subject. should be examined as follows: First of all. but rather the whole idea. like Xenocrates. for what is just is a branch of what is expedient and is therefore included in the latter term: its mention is therefore redundant.But this involves no real absurdity. e. e. but such as are prior and more intelligible. Absurdity results. so that there too the predication is only made once. Likewise also in the case of ‘desire’ as well: for it is not ‘conation’ that is said to be ‘for the pleasant’. For the reason why the definition is rendered is to make known the term stated. then we should certainly have ‘biped’ predicated twice of the same thing. it is clear that a man who does not define through 335 . for what is just is a branch of what is noble. so that he says the same thing more than once. that wisdom defines and contemplates reality:’ for definition is a certain type of contemplation. For ‘biped’ is not a predicate of ‘walking animal’: if it were. too.g. so that by adding the words ‘and contemplates’ over again he says the same thing twice over. so that the addition of the word ‘natural’ is superfluous: it would have been enough to say ‘privation of heat’.

all of which explain the prior by the posterior. Likewise. a point. Absolutely. One must. just as also a unit is more intelligible than a number. For annul the genus and differentia. for most people learn things like the former earlier than the latter. a line of a plane. and these representations are not the same. inasmuch as such a way of procedure is more scientific. since a correct definition must define a thing through its genus and its differentiae. Whereas to us it sometimes happens that the converse is the case: for the solid falls under perception most of all-more than a plane-and a plane more than a line. so that these are prior to the species. Otherwise. then. unless it so happens that the same thing is more intelligible both to us and also absolutely. the genus and differentia must of 336 . either supposing that its terms are absolutely less intelligible. or supposing that they are less intelligible to us: for either sense is possible. Of course. Clearly. for instance. there are to be a number of definitions of the same thing. the species. and a line more than a point. however. whereas the others require an exact and exceptional understanding. in dealing with persons who cannot recognize things through terms of that kind. there will be more than one definition of the same thing: for clearly he who defines through terms that are prior and more intelligible has also framed a definition. also. inasmuch as the definitions are different. and these belong to the order of things which are absolutely more intelligible than. and a better one. it may perhaps be necessary to frame the expression through terms that are intelligible to them. and the species too is annulled. Thus absolutely the prior is more intelligible than the posterior. any one who has not defined a thing through terms that are prior and more intelligible has not defined it at all. The statement that a definition has not been made through more intelligible terms may be understood in two senses. does not generally find acceptance: for of each real object the essence is single: if. it is better to try to make what is posterior known through what is prior. for if the species be known. and prior to.terms of this kind has not defined at all. for they say that a point is the limit of a line. This sort of view. a line. the essence of the object will be the same as it is represented to be in each of the definitions. a plane of a solid. then. however. and a plane. for it is the prius and starting-point of all number. a letter is more intelligible than a syllable. then. and a plane than a solid. than a line. Among definitions of this kind are those of a point. so that both would then be definitions of the same object. They are also more intelligible. for any ordinary intelligence can grasp them. not fail to observe that those who define in this way cannot show the essential nature of the term they define. a line than a plane.

and all the terms that are 337 . but through what is absolutely more intelligible: for only in this way could the definition come always to be one and the same. first of all the objects of sense. to the same people different things are more intelligible at different times. those who say that such definitions. Of the failure to use terms that are prior there are three forms: (1) The first is when an opposite has been defined through its opposite.necessity be known as well (for any one who knows what a man is knows also what ‘animal’ and ‘walking’ are). then. The demolition of a definition will most surely win a general approval if the definer happens to have framed his expression neither from what is absolutely more intelligible nor yet from what is so to us. what is absolutely intelligible is what is intelligible. whereas if the genus or the differentia be known it does not follow of necessity that the species is known as well: thus the species is less intelligible. those which proceed from what is intelligible to this. different things are more intelligible to different people. as they become more sharpwitted. viz. the converse. that the right way to define is not through terms of that kind. One must. It is clear. as we remarked before. and so a different definition would have to be rendered to each several person. One form. Perhaps. of the failure to work through more intelligible terms is the exhibition of the prior through the posterior. also. e. so that those who hold that a definition ought to be rendered through what is more intelligible to particular individuals would not have to render the same definition at all times even to the same person. not to all. will have to say that there are several definitions of one and the same thing. Moreover. Some people think. but to those who are in a sound state of understanding. All such points as this ought to be made very precise. observe that it is perhaps not possible to define some things in any other way. e. good through evil: for opposites are always simultaneous by nature. as it happens. however.g. so that the one is not even more intelligible than the other. Moreover. For. then.g. also. that both are objects of the same science. or the other man. the double without the half.’ Another form occurs if we find that the definition has been rendered of what is at rest and definite through what is indefinite and in motion: for what is still and definite is prior to what is indefinite and in motion.i. and made use of in the course of discussion as occasion requires. are really and truly definitions. if the definition is to be constructed from what is more intelligible to particular individuals. not the same things to all. then. just as what is absolutely healthy is what is healthy to those in a sound state of body. that.

in using the subordinate term one is bound to use the other as well: for whoever employs the term ‘virtue’ employs the term ‘good’. see whether.g. A second is. also. e. see if he has defined one coordinate member of a division by another. and accordingly in the definition of the one the other too must be embraced. for to be ‘divided in half’ means to be divided into two. Likewise also. For in bringing in ‘day’ he brings in the sun. and ‘two’ is an even number: virtue also is a kind of good. whoever has said ‘the passage of the sun over the earth’ has said ‘the sun’. This sort of error is always found where the essence of the object does not stand first in the expression. and two is even. (3) Again. One ought to learn up all such points as these. To detect errors of this sort. so that it is impossible to understand the one term without the other. e. the definition of ‘day’ as the ‘passage of the sun over the earth’.essentially relative: for in all such cases the essential being is the same as a certain relation to something. For ‘half’ is derived from ‘two’.g. so that in bringing in the ‘day’ he has brought in the sun.g. Moreover. or ‘”the good” is a “state of virtue” ‘. see if he has defined a superior through a subordinate term. supposing any one had defined the sun as a star that appears by day’. e. it has not been placed in a genus. exchange the word for its definition. This passes unobserved when the actual name of the object is not used. e. ‘An “even number” is “a number divisible into halves”’. Clearly.g. e. < div id="section54" class="section" title="5"> 5 Generally speaking. and use them as occasion may seem to require.g. (2) Another is-if he has used the term defined itself. seeing that virtue is a certain kind of good: likewise. one commonplace rule relates to the failure to frame the expression by means of terms that are prior and more intelligible: and of this the subdivisions are those specified above. ‘an odd number’ as ‘that which is greater by one than an even number’. so that the latter terms are subordinate to the former. the definition of ‘body’ as ‘that 338 . whoever employs the term ‘half’ employs the term ‘even’. then. For the co-ordinate members of a division that are derived from the same genus are simultaneous by nature and ‘odd’ and ‘even’ are such terms: for both are differentiae of number. though the object is in a genus.

while the term to be defined is used in relation to many things. e. but only he who mentions both these things. justice as a ‘state that produces equality’ or ‘distributes what is equal’: for by defining it so he passes outside the sphere of virtue. Here. however. in a case where the term to be defined is used in relation to several things. for every form of knowledge and potentiality is generally thought to be relative to the best. and so by leaving out the genus of justice he fails to express its essence: for the essence of a thing must in each case bring in its genus.g. It is the same thing if the object be not put into its nearest genus. for any one else besides the doctor is capable of producing disease.) if he define ‘grammar’ as the ‘knowledge how to write from dictation’: for he ought also to say that it is a knowledge how to read as well. for it is said essentially to do the latter. seeing that all the higher genera are predicated of the lower. in some cases that what has been said corresponds to the actual state of things: in some it does not.g. Moreover. as has been said before. see if he has rendered it as relative to the worse rather than to the better. Either. see if. if the thing in question be not placed in its own proper genus. or the definition of ‘man’. or else to the higher genus all the differentiae ought to be appended whereby the nearest genus is 339 . For in rendering it as ‘knowledge of writing’ has no more defined it than by rendering it as ‘knowledge of reading’: neither in fact has succeeded. it ought to be put into its nearest genus. In fact he has done it perhaps worse. and is submitted first of the terms in the definition. he has failed to render it in relation to all of them. since it is impossible that there should be more than one definition of the same thing.g. see if he uses language which transgresses the genera of the things he defines. supposing any one to give it. all those terms which are not used essentially in relation to both things: as medicine is said to deal with the production of disease and health. then. e.’ Moreover. for the man who puts it into the nearest one has stated all the higher genera. or what it is that knows how to count: whereas the genus is meant to indicate just this. one must examine it according to the elementary rules in regard to genera. the man who renders medicine as relative to both of these things has not defined it any better than he who mentions the one only. but the former only by accident: for it is absolutely alien to medicine to produce disease. then. as (e.which has three dimensions’. as ‘that which knows how to count’: for it is not stated what it is that has three dimensions. defining. Moreover. Again. It is only.

if not. if added to the genus. Or see if. e. in regard to the differentiae. this be no true differentia. Moreover. we must examine in like manner whether the differentiae. clearly. If. also. Hence the genus would admit of the definition of its species. see if he divides the genus by a negation. For a genus is always divided by differentiae that are co-ordinate members of a division. ‘animal’ or ‘substance’. see if. yet the addition of it to the genus fails to make a species. clearly the one stated could not be a differentia of the genus. as also is ‘length with breadth’: for ‘without breadth’ and ‘with breadth’ are differentiae. and ‘biped’. he who mentions merely the higher genus by itself. for. i. clearly. seeing that it is a co-ordinate member of a division with this. always makes a species.defined. for instance. < div id="section55" class="section" title="6"> 6 Again. does not state the subordinate genus as well: in saying ‘plant’ a man does not specify ‘a tree’. we must see whether the differentia stated possesses anything that is coordinate with it in a division. length must always either lack breadth or possess it. it yet is not true of the genus.g. so that ‘length’ as well. for then. this could not be a specific differentia of the genus: for a specific differentia. as those do who define line as ‘length without breadth’: for this means simply that it has not any breadth. Likewise. ‘flying’. since of everything either an affirmation or its negation is true. no more is the one adduced. But ‘length without breadth’ is the definition of a species. Likewise. clearly he has not defined it at all: for the aforesaid terms do not differentiate anything at all. ‘aquatic’. will be either with or without breadth. The genus will then be found to partake of its own species: for. Further. For then he would not have left out anything: but would merely have mentioned the subordinate genus by an expression instead of by name. by the terms ‘walking’. that he has stated be those of the genus. for differentiae that are co-ordinates in a division with the differentia of a thing are all true of the genus to which the thing belongs. however. though it be true. the genus of ‘line’. or has mentioned something such as is utterly incapable of being a differentia of anything. For then. neither of them could be a differentia of the genus. For if a man has not defined the object by the differentiae peculiar to it. as. though the contrasted differentia exists. and the genus and differentia constitute the definition of the species. 340 . On the other hand. too.e.

clearly ‘good’ cannot be its genus: it must rather be the differentia’. Look and see. Moreover. for they allege that absolute length and absolute animal are the genus. for co-ordinate in the division with that which is possessed of breadth is that which possesses no breadth and that only. supposing he had defined something as ‘length possessed of breadth’. e. how will it be predicable of the genus that it has breadth or that it lacks it? For one assertion or the other will have to be true of ‘length’ universally. There is no difference between dividing the genus by a negation. 341 . further. on the principle that the same thing cannot be in two genera of which neither contains the other: for ‘good’ does not include ‘state’. whether the differentia belongs only by accident to the object defined. For ‘blind’ means a thing which cannot see when its nature is to see. then. in defining privations.g. ‘a state’ indicates the essence of virtue. further. e. as do those who define ‘contumely’ as ‘insolence accompanied by jeering’. seeing that one or the other of the aforesaid differentiae is of necessity predicated of the genus. See. breadth. and consequently. Or possibly ‘good’ here is not the genus but the differentia. it is a species and not a differentia. Moreover. Both. if it is to be true of the genus at all: and this is contrary to the fact: for there exist both lengths which have. i.also. if ‘state’ is the genus of virtue. for jeering is a kind of insolence. It may be that in some cases the definer is obliged to employ a negation as well. whether the differentia rendered indicates an individual rather than a quality: for the general view is that the differentia always expresses a quality. Again. and dividing it by such an affirmation as is bound to have a negation as its co-ordinate in a division. it will admit of the definition of the differentia.g. see if he rendered the species as a differentia. so that again the genus is divided by a negation. nor vice versa: for not every state is good nor every good a ‘state’.e.g. see if he has stated the genus as the differentia. Hence the only people against whom the rule can be employed are those who assert that a genus is always numerically one. For the differentia is never an accidental attribute. and this is what is done by those who assert the real existence of the ‘Ideas’. ‘Virtue is a good or noble state: for ‘good’ is the genus of ‘virtue’. could not be genera. e. The usefulness of this principle is found in meeting those who assert the existence of ‘Ideas’: for if absolute length exist. whereas ‘good’ indicates not the essence but a quality: and to indicate a quality is generally held to be the function of the differentia. and lengths which have not.

For none of the aforesaid can possibly be predicated of the genus. it clearly follows that the species must be in two non-subaltern genera. seeing that the differentia is a term with a wider range than the various species. or any of the things which are under the species. Or perhaps it is not impossible for the same differentia to be used of two non-subaltern genera. Likewise you must inquire also if the species or any of the objects that come under it is predicated of the differentia: for this is impossible. for the differentiae are predicates of the species. it is clear also that there is no necessity for the differentia to carry with it the whole of the genus to which it belongs. then ‘animal’ would be predicated of the species several times over. not of the differentia. is predicable of the genus. if they are animals. each of the genera as well is true of that of which the differentia is true. For the general view is that the same differentia cannot be used of two non-subaltern genera. the result will be that the differentia is a species: if. the differentiae will be all either species or individuals. for every animal is either a species or an individual. Thus ‘walking animal’ and ‘flying animal’ are non-subaltern genera. and we ought to add the words ‘except they both be subordinate members of the same genus’. if either the differentia or the species. Animal (e. but prior to the species. 342 . Look and see also if the differentia mentioned belongs to a different genus.g.g. From this possibility. seeing that the genus is the term with the widest range of all. ‘walking’ and ‘biped’ import with them the genus ‘animal’. then he could not have defined the term. Else the result will be that the same species as well will be in two non-subaltern genera: for each of the differentiae imports its own genus.any more than the genus is: for the differentia of a thing cannot both belong and not belong to it. For if ‘animal’ is to be predicated of each of its differentiae. ‘man’ be predicated. e. neither contained in nor containing the genus in question. but of the objects of which the differentia is predicated. for both these are subordinate to ‘animal’. Moreover. that the same differentia may be used of two non-subaltern genera. then. for instance. Moreover. not of the actual differentia itself which we predicate of the species. Again. for the general view is that the genus is predicated. Again. see if the differentia fails to be prior to the species: for the differentia ought to be posterior to the genus. The words ‘except they both be subordinate members of the same genus’ ought therefore to be added. the differentia is clearly the human race. and ‘biped’ is the differentia of both. If. Moreover. see if the genus be predicated of the differentia. if any of the species be predicated of it.) is predicated of ‘man’ or ‘ox’ or other walking animals.

If. Hence. people condemn those who divide animals by means of the terms ‘walking’ and ‘aquatic’. while the differentia is not of that kind: for the differentia is generally considered rather to preserve that which it differentiates. Still. destroy its essence. there will be no ‘man’. subverts the essence of the thing. too. on the ground that ‘walking’ and ‘aquatic’ indicate mere locality. he has made a mistake: for we undergo absolutely no alteration in respect of our differentiae. See. if any one were to define a strigil as an instrument for dipping water. and it is absolutely impossible for a thing to exist without its own special differentia: for if there be no ‘walking’. as in the case also of knowledge. still it is aquatic: and likewise a land-animal. if intensified.but only the one or the other of its limbs together with the genera that are higher than this. practical and productive. But all the same. a man has rendered any differentia of this kind. we may lay down absolutely that a thing cannot have as its differentia anything in respect of which it is subject to alteration: for all things of that kind. The definition of a thing’s natural function is ‘that for which it would be used by 343 . some can be used in relation to something else as well. for the differentiae of relative terms are themselves relative. if he has rendered ‘existence in’ something as the differentia of a thing’s essence: for the general view is that locality cannot differentiate between one essence and another. This is classed as speculative. see if he has rendered an affection as the differentia: for every affection. then. if ever the differentia does denote existence in something. even though it be in the water. Thus sight can only be used for seeing. nor does it denote a locality. too. In fact. clearly he will have made a bad mistake. and produces something and does something. but a strigil can also be used to dip up water. Again. Look and see also if the definer renders each relative term relatively to its natural purpose: for while in some cases the particular relative term can be used in relation to its natural purpose only and to nothing else. he has made a mistake: for that is not its natural function. but a certain quality: for even if the thing be on the dry land. see if he has failed to render the differentia of a relative term relatively to something else. will still be a and not an aquatic-animal. if intensified. for ‘aquatic’ does not mean ‘in’ anything. Again. as ‘biped’ carries with it either ‘flying’ or ‘walking animal’. Or possibly in this case the censure is undeserved. and each of these denotes a relation: for it speculates upon something.

nor pain of parts naturally conjoined: for then inanimate things will be in pain. if the thing of which the term defined has been stated to be an affection or disposition.g. too.the prudent man. as knowledge. Moreover. Similar in character. or whatever it may be. Likewise. is the definition of ‘health’. Moreover. so that health would be an attribute of them.g. however. people who define in this way put effect for cause.g. be unable to admit it. perplexity is not an attribute of opposite reasonings. by defining ‘wisdom’ as the virtue of ‘man’ or of the ‘soul. or cause for effect. as a ‘balance of hot and cold elements’: for then health will be necessarily exhibited by the hot and cold elements: for balance of anything is an attribute inherent in those things of which it is the balance. whereas it ought to be. or that ‘perplexity’ is a state of ‘equality between contrary reasonings’. and by the science that deals specially with that thing’. or sensation fails because we go to sleep.’ rather than of the ‘reasoning faculty’: for ‘wisdom’ is the virtue primarily of the reasoning faculty: for it is in virtue of this that both the man and his soul are said to be wise. Likewise also an equality between contrary reasonings would be generally considered to be a cause of perplexity: for it is when we reflect on both sides of a question and find everything alike to be in keeping with either course that we are perplexed which of the two we are to do. if it is a failure of sensation. Sometimes. Possibly. supposing the ‘immortal’ to be defined as a ‘living thing immune at present from destruction’. indeed. since pain will be present in them. For sleep is not an attribute of sensation. but the one is the cause of the other: for either we go to sleep because sensation fails. owing to the ambiguity of the words 344 . e. he has failed to introduce it in its primary relation: e. Or see if. acting as such. being a disposition of soul. For the disruption of parts naturally conjoined is not pain. in this case this result does not follow. or that ‘pain’ is a ‘violent disruption of parts that are naturally conjoined’. For every disposition and every affection is formed naturally in that of which it is an affection or disposition. is formed in the soul. say. people make bad mistakes in matters of this sort. For a living thing that is immune ‘at present’ from destruction will be immortal ‘at present’. all those who say that ‘sleep’ is a ‘failure of sensation’. with regard to all periods of time look and see whether there be any discrepancy between the differentia and the thing defined: e. too. whenever a term happens to be used in a number of relations. but only a cause of pain: nor again is a failure of sensation sleep. the definer has made a mistake. Moreover.

So. the definition of ‘fire’ as the ‘body that consists of the most rarefied particles’. Moreover. see if the term to be defined applies more particularly to the one to which the content of the definition is less applicable. if indeed what is rendered according to the definition is the same as the thing. vice versa.g. if ever it does happen that what has been rendered according to the definition belongs in the present only or past. Still. or that at present it is such that it never can be destroyed. Moreover. than the man who is able to distribute what is equal: so that justice could not be an ability to distribute what is equal: for then also the most just man would be the man with the most ability to distribute what is equal. see if the thing admits of degrees. This would not be right. see if. Take. we mean that it is at present a living thing of such a kind as never to be destroyed: and this is equivalent to saying that it is immortal. so that both do not become intensified at once: they certainly should. however. they yet do not both become greater together: e.‘immune at present from destruction’: for it may mean either that the thing has not been destroyed at present.) a definition of ‘justice’ as the ‘ability to distribute what is equal’. or that it cannot be destroyed at present. then the two could not be the same. or. Moreover. suppose sexual love to be the desire for intercourse: for he who is more intensely in love has not a more intense desire for intercourse. Suppose (e. whereas what is rendered according to the definition does not. whereas what is meant by the word does not so belong. we say that a living thing is at present immune from destruction. as we have said. what is rendered according to the definition admits of degrees while the thing does not. For ‘fire’ denotes flame rather than light. < div id="section56" class="section" title="7"> 7 You should look and see also whether the term being defined is applied in consideration of something other than the definition rendered. for instance. but flame is less the body that consists of the most rarefied particles than is light: whereas both ought to be more 345 . then. suppose two things to be before you. For either both must admit them or else neither. then.g. while both of them admit of degrees. had they been the same thing. this commonplace rule ought to be followed. so that it is not meant that it is immortal only at present. Whenever. for ‘just’ describes rather the man who chooses.

Again. either in itself or in respect of its genus. to which its genus is relative. either in itself or in respect of its genus. or that. Likewise. the beautiful’ is ‘what is pleasant to the eyes or to the ears”: or ‘the real’ is ‘what is capable of being acted upon or of acting’. while of ‘pleasant to the ears’ the opposite is not pleasant to the cars’: clearly. and likewise will be both real and not real. if he has defined ‘knowledge’ as an ‘incontrovertible conception’ or ‘wishing’ as ‘painless conation’. also. therefore.g. therefore. while the other does not apply to both alike. Moreover. are identical. For ‘pleasant to the ears’ will be the same as ‘beautiful’. e. but more particularly to one of them. seeing that the being of every relative term is identical with being in a certain relation to something. Or see if a relative term has been described not in relation to its end. the end in anything being whatever is best in it or gives its purpose to the rest. ‘not pleasant to the ears’ is the same thing as ‘not beautiful’. to have said that knowledge is ‘conception of a knowable’ and that wishing is ‘conation for a good’.g.applicable to the same thing. see if the one expression applies alike to both the objects before you. if he has defined ‘grammar’ as ‘knowledge of letters’: whereas in the definition there ought to be rendered either the thing to which the term itself is relative. Moreover. < div id="section57" class="section" title="8"> 8 If the term defined be relative. see whether the definition fails to mention that to which the term. then. see if he renders the definition relative to two things taken separately: thus. it will be both beautiful and not beautiful. and the opposite of ‘beautiful’ is ‘not beautiful’. He ought. In like manner we shall show also that the same thing is both real and unreal. and then see if there be any discrepancy between them. whatever it is. is relative. if they had been the same. If. of both genera and differentiae and all the other terms rendered in definitions you should frame definitions in lieu of the terms. e. For of everything relative the essence is relative to something else. For then the same thing will be both beautiful and not beautiful. too. 346 . something be pleasant to the eyes but not to the ears. Certainly it is what is best or final that should be stated. that desire is not for the pleasant but for pleasure: for this is our purpose in choosing what is pleasant as well. so that ‘not pleasant to the ears’ will be the same as ‘not beautiful’: for of identical things the opposites.

nor a movement of the air a wind. any one who maintains the existence of Ideas ought to be brought face to face with his Ideas. On the other hand. e. also. even though he does render the word in question: for there can be no Idea of anything merely apparent: the general view is that an Idea is always spoken of in relation to an Idea: thus absolute desire is for the absolutely pleasant. Moreover. or a cloud as ‘condensation of the air’. they therefore cannot be for an apparent good or an apparently pleasant: for the existence of an absolutely-apparently-good or pleasant would be an absurdity. and in any other cases where it applies.Look and see also if that in relation to which he has rendered the term be a process or an activity: for nothing of that kind is an end. and absolute wishing is for the absolutely good. or ‘desire is a conation after the pleasant’-instead of saying ‘the apparently good’. They ought. For a movement of the earth does not constitute an earthquake. Or again. e. for almost everybody prefers the present experience of pleasure to its cessation. in defining the covetous man the quantity of money he aims at. or an earthquake as a movement of the earth’. in the case of conations. or a wind as a ‘movement of the air’. For often those who exhibit the conation do not perceive what is good or pleasant. should be stated. Or perhaps this rule is not true in all cases. One should always attack deficiency. Likewise. people sometimes define night as a ‘shadow on the earth’.g. to have rendered the definition also accordingly. also. or ‘pleasant’. therefore. in other cases of the kind: for by omitting any differentiae whatever he fails to state the essence of the term.g. or in the case of the incontinent man the quality of the pleasures. For it is not the man who gives way to any sort of pleasure whatever who is called incontinent. < 347 . ‘wishing is a conation after the good’. the quality and quantity of the honour the striving for which makes a man ambitious: for all men strive for honour. quality. whereas they ought to specify as well quantity. place. Likewise. so that they would count the activity as the end rather than its completion. but only apparently so. and cause. Again see in some cases if he has failed to distinguish the quantity or quality or place or other differentiae of an object. see if the word ‘apparent’ is left out. for the completion of the activity or process is the end rather than the process or activity itself. so that their aim need not be really good or pleasant. but only he who gives way to a certain kind of pleasure. irrespective of its manner and the amount involved. so that it is not enough to define the ambitious man as him who strives for honour. but the aforesaid differentiae must be added.

‘half’ is ‘that which is exceeded by an amount equal to itself’.g. See. clearly a mistake has been made. then. and likewise also what has knowledge and what lacks it. using the elementary principles drawn from consideration of contraries and of coordinates. For to the contrary term will apply the definition that is contrary in some one of the ways in which contraries are conjoined. in definitions of this sort it happens that what the definer defines is in a sense more than one thing: for in defining knowledge. For if it be not so rendered. that of contraries. while if it be of what is in the state. also. too. see whether a particular belief is made relative to some particular object of belief: and.) if ‘useful’=’productive of good’. look at the state: and likewise also in other cases of the kind.g. with contraries. the one is sometimes a word forced to denote the privation of the other. look at what is in the state. In the same way. see if the species is rendered as relative to a species of that to which the genus is rendered as relative. then clearly neither of the definitions rendered later could be the definition of the contrary of the term originally defined: and therefore the definition originally rendered of the original term has not been rightly rendered either. whether (e.) the definition of ‘half’ is the opposite of that of ‘double’: for if ‘double’ is ‘that which exceeds another by an equal amount to that other’. and what it is to know and to be ignorant. for one or the other of thee is bound to be contrary to the term originally used. ‘injurious’=productive of evil’ or ‘destructive of good’. Thus (e. see whether a particular multiple be made relative to a particular fraction. the others become in a certain sense clear as well. if the opposite of the term has the opposite definition. the man who is pleased is benefited. to be on our guard in all such cases against discrepancy.g. if the definition be of the state of anything. in the case of relative terms. neither of these things to be the contrary of the term originally used. if a multiple be relative to a fraction. too.div id="section58" class="section" title="9"> 9 Moreover. supposing belief to be relative to some object of belief. then. as (e. e. Moreover. Thus if the pleasant be identical with the beneficial. We have. moreover.) inequality is generally held to be the privation of equality (for ‘unequal’ merely describes things that are not equal’). Suppose. a man in a sense defines ignorance as well.g. For if the first be made clear. it is therefore clear that that 348 . Speaking generally. Seeing. then.

Therefore equality so defined will be ‘the contrary of the privation of equality’.g. then ‘good’ will be the ‘contrary of the contrary of good’. then. We must in the case of contrary terms keep an eye on this mistake. ‘good’ be the contrary of evil. also. Suppose. For to say ‘inequality’ is the same as to say ‘privation of equality’.g. e. since it is clear that ‘evil’ too will be ‘the contrary of good’ (for the definition of things that are contrary in this must be rendered in a like manner). Examine further whether he has defined by the expression ‘a privation’ a term that is not used to denote a privation: thus a mistake of this sort also would be generally thought to be incurred in the case of ‘error’ by any one who is not using it as a merely negative term. the result again is that he uses the very term being defined: for ‘good’ is inherent in the definition of ‘evil’. or contrary. Moreover. or. though he has added this. Moreover. he has made a mistake. Likewise. whether in defining ‘ignorance’ a privation he has failed to say that it is the privation of ‘knowledge’.) in ‘man’ or in ‘the soul’. but yet the definition of it be rendered in a manner like the above. e. then. and this becomes clear. a man who so defines is bound to use in his definition the very term he is defining. but 349 . and evil be nothing other than the ‘contrary of good’.contrary whose form denotes the privation must of necessity be defined through the other. and not in the ‘reasoning faculty’: for if in any of these respects he fails. e. he has failed to render the term of which it is the privation. Clearly.g. he has used the very word to be defined. suppose ‘good’ to be defined as ‘the contrary of evil’. the state. for else we should find that each is being interpreted by the other. however.g. so that he would have used the very word to be defined.g. has failed to render the thing in which it is primarily formed. see if in rendering a term formed to denote privation. that neither of the contraries be so formed as to denote privation. or has failed to add in what it is naturally formed. placing it (e. For what is generally thought to be in error is not that which has no knowledge. e. or whatever it may be whose privation it is: also if he has omitted to add either any term at all in which the privation is naturally formed. then. if for the word we substitute its definition. if he has failed to say that ‘blindness’ is the ‘privation of sight in an eye’: for a proper rendering of its essence must state both of what it is the privation and what it is that is deprived. If. whereas the other cannot then be defined through the one whose form denotes the privation. or else that in which it is naturally formed primarily. supposing any one were to define equality as the contrary of inequality: for then he is defining it through the term which denotes privation of it.

So always wherever the words ‘capable of acting on’ or ‘capable of being acted upon’ are added. the absolute Man) is not mortal. In either case. Since ambiguous terms sometimes pass unobserved. it is not true of any one of the objects described by the term. e. so that the definition will not fit the Idea. in the Platonic definition where he adds the word ‘mortal’ in his definitions of living creatures: for the Idea (e. For in some cases it will not do so. and for this reason we do not talk of inanimate things or of children as ‘erring’. This is. are synonymous. is not used to denote a mere privation of knowledge. whereas ‘life’ is generally understood to mean not one kind of thing only. In dealing with these people even arguments of this kind are useful.g. < div id="section59" class="section" title="10"> 10 Moreover. congenitally present with it’: for this is found in plants as much as in animals. Further. but to be one thing in animals and another in plants. see if he has rendered a single common definition of terms that are used ambiguously.g. he is equally at fault. see whether the like inflexions in the definition apply to the like inflexions of the term. if ‘beneficial’ means ‘productive of health’. moreover. and therefore to render the definition in this way on purpose: or it may quite well happen that a man may see the ambiguous character of the word. or of motion. it is best in questioning to treat such terms as though they were synonymous (for the definition of the one sense will 350 . ‘Error’. the definition and the Idea are absolutely bound to be discrepant: for those who assert the existence of Ideas hold that they are incapable of being acted upon. does ‘beneficially’ mean productively of health’ and a ‘benefactor’ a ‘producer of health’? Look too and see whether the definition given will apply to the Idea as well. then.g. what happens to Dionysius’ definition of ‘life’ when stated as ‘a movement of a creature sustained by nutriment. the definition applies in a like manner to the whole range of the ambiguous term. whichever course he pursues. It is possible to hold the view that life is a synonymous term and is always used to describe one thing only. then. e. if. For terms whose definition corresponding their common name is one and the same. and yet fail to see that he has rendered a definition common to both senses instead of one peculiar to the sense he intends.rather that which has been deceived. and wish to render the definition of the one sense only.

Otherwise. finding that his definition does not apply to them all. it is clear that neither does the whole definition define the whole complex. whenever the definition rendered fails to apply universally. for there are applicable to them two distinct definitions in explanation of the term. ‘such that its centre is in a line with its extremes’) ought to be a definition of straight’. just because his definition will not do so either. if now the definition of a finite line’ be the ‘limit of a finite plane’. < div id="section60" class="section" title="11"> 11 Suppose now that a definition has been rendered of some complex term. for to a synonymous term the definition should apply in its full range). there will be more than one definition of those other meanings. viz. yet in a question of terminology one is bound to employ the received and traditional usage and not to upset matters of that sort. if any one were to define a term used in several senses. and. this meaning must clearly be synonymous with those others. that some one has defined a ‘finite straight line’ as ‘the limit of a finite plane. the one previously rendered and also the later one. But an infinite straight line has neither centre nor extremes 351 . whereas in answering you should yourself distinguish between the senses.not apply to the other. were to contend not that the term is ambiguous. take away the definition of one of the elements in the complex. as the case may be: for people are more ready to agree when they do not foresee what the consequence will be. or else prove beforehand that so-and-so is ambiguous or synonymous. the rest (viz. Suppose. e. no admission has been made. and the man asserts that what is really synonymous is ambiguous because the definition he has rendered will not apply to the second sense as well. as some answerers call ‘ambiguous’ what is really synonymous. Further. one should secure a preliminary admission on such points. Again. and. vice versa. see if the definition of this second meaning applies also to the other meanings: for if so. such that its centre is in a line with its extremes’. If.g. but that even the term does not properly apply to all those senses. however. and see if also the rest of the definition defines the rest of it: if not. so that the answerer will be generally thought not to have defined it correctly. call synonymous what is really ambiguous supposing their definition applies to both senses of the term. then one may retort to such a man that though in some things one must not use the language of the people.

and moreover is less intelligible when put in that form. if actually a less well known term be substituted. If he has rendered the definition of the differentia. ‘cloak’ instead of ‘doublet’. clearly it is of the differentia rather than of the genus that a definition should be rendered. but the differentia. in which case. Look and see also whether.g. for the differentia is less familiar than the genus. so that it is not this. the term to be altered would also be that denoting the genus and not the differentia. and the genus is always the most familiar term of all. in the case of some if not of all.and yet is straight so that this remainder does not define the remainder of the term. a man is substituting for a term not merely another term but a phrase. see if in replacing one of the terms by something else he has exchanged the genus and not the differentia. clearly. in the exchange of words. e. for the one is the genus and the other the differentia. It might be held that this criticism is ridiculous: because there is no reason why the most familiar term should not describe the differentia. and not the genus. Moreover. yet the remainder is different. ‘pellucid mortal’ for ‘white man’: for it is no definition. if possible in every case.g. Moreover. seeing that there are no more terms used now than formerly.g. further definition is required of how it has a middle: for the word ‘number’ 352 . in the majority. the explanation of ‘speculative knowledge’ as ‘speculative conception’: for conception is not the same as knowledge-as it certainly ought to be if the whole is to be the same too: for though the word ‘speculative’ is common to both expressions. if the term defined be a compound notion. e. simple objects too could be defined by merely calling them by a different name. whenever he says that an odd number is a ‘number with a middle’. For at that rate. that ought to have been changed. as in the example just given: for ‘speculative’ is a less familiar term than knowledge. whereas in a definition terms ought to be rendered by phrases. For the exchange in such cases is bound to be merely one of term for term. If. however. seeing that it is the less familiar. seeing that the object of rendering the definition is to make the subject familiar. Take. see whether the definition rendered is common to it and something else as well: e. see if the definition rendered be equimembral with the term defined. the sense fails still to be the same. A definition is said to be equimembral with the term defined when the number of the elements compounded in the latter is the same as the number of nouns and verbs in the definition. or if not. The mistake is even worse. for instance.

for a definition ought to be peculiar to its own term. so that each will be a science of reality. e. Now both a line and a body have a middle. if it is said to be of Reality essentially and not accidentally: as is the case with other relative terms: for every object of knowledge is a term relative to knowledge: likewise. also. and it is the word ‘odd’ for which the phrase has been substituted. see if the term of which he renders the definition is a reality. Suppose ‘white’ to be defined as ‘colour mingled with fire’: for what is bodiless cannot be mingled with body. the phrase ‘with a middle’ be used in several senses. whereas ‘white’ does exist. Sometimes. so that ‘colour’ ‘mingled with fire’ could not exist. then. Clearly. suppose some one to have defined ‘medicine’ as a science of Reality’. not general. have for their object some real thing. on the other hand. the definition is clearly altogether false.g. impossible that a definition of this sort should be peculiar to the term rendered: for not only but the majority of the other sciences too. but not of another. So that this will either discredit the definition or prove that it is no definition at all. For if medicine be not a science of anything that is real. for it ought to hold of all reality. but have described it only so as to include it among too large a number of things. with other relative terms. so that it would be a correct rendering to render the object in relation to any one whatsoever of these. moreover. whereas what is contained in the definition is not. again. Moreover. the sense here intended requires to be defined. so that this could not be a definition of ‘odd’. Such is the definition of a rhetorician as ‘one 353 .g. it is partly false. e. such a definition does not define any science at all. if the right way to render account of a thing be to render it as it is not in itself but accidentally. if to render what it is accidentally be a correct way to render it. then each and every relative term would be used in relation not to one thing but to a number of things.is common to both expressions. people define not the thing but only the thing in a good or perfect condition. It is. while if it be a science of some real thing. inasmuch as all such are convertible. those who in the case of relative terms do not distinguish to what the object is related. For there is no reason why the same thing should not be both real and white and good. If. yet they are not ‘odd’. Moreover. < div id="section61" class="section" title="12"> 12 Again. are wrong either wholly or in part.

Even if the situation here described does not so far appear very absurd because of the occurrence of this kind of thing in other cases also (for it is quite possible for two men to have a mina between them. be a profligate. Again. too. for then both will exhibit both justice and injustice: for if justice be temperance and bravery. see if he has rendered what is desirable for its own sake as desirable for what it produces or does. yet least that they should have contrary attributes surely seems quite absurd. the definition will be true of both and yet of neither of them. but the wish to do it. though brave.who can always see what will persuade in the given circumstances. then the one will be a good rhetorician. if they each do this. both and yet neither will be just: for both together have justice. e. as ‘one who pilfers in secret’: for clearly. It might be said that it is possible for what is desirable in itself to be desirable for something else as well: but still to define what is desirable in itself in such a way is none the less wrong: for the essence contains par excellence what is best in anything. The arguments are particularly appropriate in cases where the process of putting the parts together is obvious.g. If he defines it as and B’. and the other a good thief: whereas it is not the actual pilfering in secret. that constitutes the thief.’ For if of two persons each has one of the two only. for what produces or preserves something else is one of the things desirable for something else. or as a ‘product of A and B’ or as an ‘A+B’. then injustice will be cowardice and profligacy. justice to be defined as ‘temperance and courage. e. < div id="section62" class="section" title="13"> 13 See also whether in defining anything a man has defined it as an ‘A and B’. suppose. and yet each singly fails to have it. or as in any way desirable because of something else. and omit nothing’. all the ways of showing that the whole is not the same as the sum of its parts are useful in meeting the type just described. as in a house and other 354 . for a man who defines in this way seems to assert that the parts are the same as the whole. so that this is rather what the definition too ought to have indicated. by saying that justice is ‘what preserves the laws’ or that wisdom is ‘what produces happiness’. though neither of them has it by himself). In general. and it is better for a thing to be desirable in itself than to be desirable for something else.g. and the other. and yet this will follow if the one be temperate and yet a coward. or of a thief.

but if they are both administered in a mixture.g. a line and a number. but each in a separate one. both parts and whole are found primarily in some single subject. but only in combination. 355 . Moreover. e. need not necessarily be the case. Again.g. he has said that the term being defined is not ‘A and B’ but the ‘product of A and B’. on the other hand. or for things good or bad to produce a neutral thing. clearly that term could not be the product of these things: for the whole is bound to be in the same things wherein its parts are. This again. but in a number of them. so that the whole will then be found primarily not in one subject only. however. whereas the things which he has said produce it are not found primarily in any single subject. or. as produced from a better and worse. and yet the product be no more good than evil. for some drugs are such that each taken alone is good. there is no necessity that the parts should perish too. bad. however. see whether the whole. Or it may be that this does not necessarily follow. see if the whole be good or evil. suppose shamelessness be defined as ‘the product of courage and false opinion’: here the goodness of courage exceeds the evil of false opinion. vice versa. and bad or neutral in combination. Or again. for many things that are productive are not good in themselves. that the whole perishes when the parts perish. look and see in the first place if A and B cannot in the nature of things have a single product: for some things are so related to one another that nothing can come of them. For it is impossible either for a neutral thing to produce something good or bad. If. when the whole perishes. or. see if the one thing is more distinctly good than the other is evil. see whether the parts perish together with the whole: for it ought to happen. see if that medium is not the same. fails to be worse than the better and better than the worse element.things of that sort: for there. or at least more good than evil. if they are not. but one thing in the case of the whole and another in that of the parts. e. vice versa. the whole may very well not be good. accordingly the product of these ought to have corresponded to this excess. unless each be in itself good or bad. What has just been said is most clearly illustrated in the case of things that make for health or sickness. you may have the parts and yet not have the whole. see if the term that has been defined is in the nature of things found primarily in some single subject. so that parts and whole cannot be the same. and the parts neither. Or again. they are good taken singly. per contra. as in the cases just instanced. If. clearly. Again. and to be either good without qualification. if the parts be good or evil and the whole neither. If so. unless the elements compounded be in themselves good.

and see if there is none of them in which A could be said to exist ‘+ B. and not as yet be courageous! Moreover. in relation to medical treatment (for a man may exhibit both daring and right reasoning in respect of medical treatment). For the essence of any compound thing is not merely that it is a product of so-and-so.g. it be true that A and B are each found in the same time as the other. suppose courage to have been defined as ‘daring with right reasoning’: here it is possible that the person exhibits daring in robbery. then. Some definitions rendered in this form fail to come under the aforesaid division at all. as there is no possible way in which A can exist B’. but that it is a product of them compounded in such and such a way. among the various senses above distinguished. supposing the expression to mean that they exist either in some identical thing capable of containing them (as e. any more than each to a different object. For the two must not relate to any casual object that is the same.Moreover.g. even though both be used in the same relation as well. e. however. e. distinguish between the different senses in which one thing may be said to be ‘+’ another. meeting the perils of war. If. he admits that ‘A+B’ is + B’ is the same as either of these two things.g. still. or else in the same place or in the same time.’ for ‘honey+water’ means either the honey and the water. look and see if possibly the two are not used in the same relation. Moreover. and right reasoning in regard to the means of health: but he may have ‘the former quality+the latter’ at the same time.’ Thus e. none the less. and if this be in no way true of the A and B in question. the same criticisms will apply as have already been given for meeting each of them.g. If. For what this means to say is that it is because of 356 . clearly the definition rendered could not hold of anything.g. or whatever is more properly speaking its function than this. or the ‘drink made of honey and water’. e. rather.g. or as the ‘product of A and B. the first thing to be said is that ‘A+B’ means the same either as ‘A and B’. any more than in the case of syllables: for the syllable is not synonymous with any of the letters of which it is made up. not even this combination of ‘the one+the other ‘makes him ‘courageous’. If a man has defined an object as ‘A+B’. a definition of anger as ‘pain with a consciousness of being slighted’. justice and courage are found in the soul). Moreover. see if the whole be synonymous with one of the elements: for it ought not to be. just as in the case of a house: for here the materials do not make a house irrespective of the way they are put together. they must relate to the function of courage. see if he has failed to state the manner of their composition: for the mere mention of its elements is not enough to make the thing intelligible. Thus e.

moreover. first of all see whether he has omitted to state the kind of composition. and then proceed to examine it. if the emendation 357 . one should first of all correct and reshape it in order to make some part of it clear and get a handle for attack. that neither of the aforesaid substances is the same as a ‘composition’ at all: for a composition always has a decomposition as its contrary. again. a definition is obscure. if defined as a substance capable of receiving knowledge: for it has a like capacity for receiving ignorance. For the answerer is bound either to accept the sense as taken by the questioner. even when one cannot attack the definition as a whole for lack of acquaintance with the whole. seeing that both alike are naturally liable to occur in it? Such is the definition of the soul. as (e. and every kind of living creature.) in a definition of ‘flesh’ or ‘bone’ as the ‘composition of fire. then no other compound could be a composition either. earth. whereas neither of the aforesaid has any contrary. one should attack some part of it. if he have described the whole compounded as the ‘composition’ of these things (e. < div id="section63" class="section" title="14"> 14 Again. Again.g.g. if one knows that part and sees it to be incorrectly rendered: for if the part be demolished. or else himself to explain clearly whatever it is that his definition means. else there will be more than one definition of the same thing. clearly it has not been defined. though a compound. for how is it any more a definition to define it through this one than through the other. It appears. is never a composition. just as in the assemblies the ordinary practice is to move an emendation of the existing law and. and air’.a consciousness of this sort that the pain occurs. Moreover. and the thing has been defined through the one. if in the nature of a thing two contraries are equally liable to occur. but when compounded in one way they form flesh. but you should also go on to define the kind of composition: for these things do not form flesh irrespective of the manner of their composition. ‘a living creature’ as a ‘composition of soul and body’). Moreover. if it is equally probable that every compound is a composition or else that none is. bone. Where. when in another. Also. so too is the whole definition. but to occur ‘because of’ a thing is not the same as to occur ‘+ a thing’ in any of its aforesaid senses. For it is not enough to say it is a composition.

is better. they repeal the existing law. so that one is better supplied with lines of attack. on the principle that there cannot be more than one definition of the same thing. clearly the definition already laid down will have been demolished. 358 . As to definitions. and more indicative of the object defined. In combating definitions it is always one of the chief elementary principles to take by oneself a happy shot at a definition of the object before one. with the model (as it were) before one’s eyes. For one is bound. to discern both any shortcoming in any features that the definition ought to have. or to adopt some correctly expressed definition. so one ought to do in the case of definitions as well: one ought oneself to propose a second definition: for if it is seen to be better. then. let so much suffice. and also any superfluous addition.

Again it may be examined in the light of those things which tend to produce or to destroy the things in question of their formation and destruction. seeing that the one class is not included under the other. however. Likewise also the Spartans must 359 . for they are better than anybody else. of the two things termed ‘greatest’ or most desirable’ must be numerically one: otherwise no proof will have been given that they are the same. Book VII Translated by W. each will be better than the other. their opposites also will be the same. For if justice be the same as courage. For then the Peloponnesians are bound to be better than the Spartans. in any of the recognized forms of opposition. Thus Xenocrates argues that the happy life and the good life are the same. it only follows that the one must be included under the other as ‘Spartans’ are under ‘Peloponnesians’: for otherwise. A. For it is the same thing to take the opposite of the one or that of the other. for it does not follow because Peloponnesians and Spartans are the bravest of the Greeks. in the most literal of the meanings ascribed to ‘sameness’ (and we said’ that ‘the same’ applies in the most literal sense to what is numerically one). seeing that of all forms of life the good life is the most desirable and so also is the happy life: for ‘the most desirable’ and the greatest’ apply but to one thing. may be examined in the light of their inflexions and coordinates and opposites. Pickard-Cambridge < div id="book7" class="book" title="Book VII"> 1 Whether two things are ‘the same’ or ‘different’. in a case where one of two things is said to be something or other in a superlative degree. that Peloponnesians are the same as Spartans. and so are the things that tend to produce or to destroy them. in the case of their opposites: for if two things be the same. if the one class be not included under the other. then too the just man is the same as the brave man. and in general of any thing that is related in like manner to each. seeing that they are the same. Each. seeing that ‘Peloponnesian’ is not any one person nor yet ‘Spartan’. if the other of these alleged identical things can also be described by a superlative in the same respect.Topics. Likewise. and ‘justly’ is the same as ‘bravely’.’ Likewise also in other cases of the kind. too. Look and see also. their formations and destructions also are the same. For where things are absolutely the same.

See further whether. supposing the one to be the same as something. instead of both being found in one class of predicates. and see whether the addition of each to the same thing fails to make the same whole. the differentiae predicted of either be not the same. for they too are better than anybody else. but also whether it is possible for a supposition to bring it about. just as it is not the case that a man desires intercourse more intensely. but only that the one falls under the other. or if though both admit it. so must the other also. clearly they are not the same. see if the one admits an increase of degree but not the other. Moreover. Likewise also in other cases. Inquire also not only if some impossible consequence results directly from the statement made. though the genus is the same. the remainders ought to have signified the same thing: but they do not. Moreover. that A and B are the same. Again. or the one being ‘virtue’ and the other ‘knowledge’: or see if. they are therefore the same.) being distinguished as a ‘speculative’ science. nor yet the good life.perforce be better than the Peloponnesians. the one being ‘good’ and the other evil’. so that it does not follow that.g.g. so that love and the desire for intercourse are not the same. If in any of these respects there is a discrepancy. each then is better than the other! Clearly therefore what is styled ‘best’ and ‘greatest’ must be a single thing. though it will no 360 . the one signifies a quality and the other a quantity or relation. Moreover. Suppose (e.) that he has declared ‘double a half’ to be the same as ‘a multiple of a half’: then. they do not admit it at the same time. subtracting the words ‘a half’ from each. clearly neither are they the same as one another. if it is to be proved to be ‘the same’ as another. or if the subtraction of the same thing from each leaves a different remainder. look and see if. as happens to those who assert that ‘empty’ is the same as ‘full of air’: for clearly if the air be exhausted. the other also is the same as it: for if they be not both the same as the same thing. because they are both the most desirable. examine them by means of an addition. examine them in the light of their accidents or of the things of which they are accidents: for any accident belonging to the one must belong also to the other. for ‘double’ and ‘a multiple of’ do not signify the same thing. the more intensely he is in love. Again. This also is why Xenocrates fails to prove his case: for the happy life is not numerically single. and if the one belong to anything as an accident. the other as a ‘practical’ science. from the point of view of ‘degrees’. see if the genus of each be not the same. the one (e. the vessel will not be less but more empty.

one ought to be on the look-out for any discrepancy anywhere in any sort of predicate of each term. on the other hand. but a definition must have also all the other characters already announced. if so. helps in the matter of definition. showing that they are not the same. For all that is predicated of the one should be predicated also of the other. and these the arguments. It is clear from what has been said that all the destructive commonplaces relating to sameness are useful also in questions of definition. and in the things of which they are predicated. < div id="section66" class="section" title="3"> 3 This then is the way. Moreover. see whether the one can exist without the other. whereby the attempt to demolish a definition should always be made. For there is either no necessity or even no possibility that things that are the same specifically or generically should be numerically the same. see whether things that are the same in one way are the same also in a different way. the one character is annulled and not the other. which may be true or may be false (it makes no difference which). for. they could not be the same. the other should be a predicate of it as well. and it is with the question whether they are or are not the same in that sense that we are concerned. Moreover. as was said before:’ for if what is signified by the term and by the expression be not the same. in order to establish that the former is a definition. clearly the expression rendered could not be a definition.longer be full of air. for it is not enough to show the sameness of content between the expression and the term. and of whatever the one is a predicate. the first thing to observe is that few if any who 361 . None of the constructive commonplaces. < div id="section65" class="section" title="2"> 2 Such is the number of the commonplace rules that relate to ‘sameness’. Speaking generally. on the other hand. as ‘sameness’ is a term used in many senses. we desire to establish one. So that by a supposition. If.

and also in detail as follows. that both the genus and the differentiae have been rightly rendered. that are predicated of contraries we expect to be contrary. For we have to examine into the contraries and other opposites of the thing. for if the contrary thing be found in the contrary genus to that stated in the definition. too. we have to select from those contraries the one whose contrary definition seems most obvious. So that if contrary differentiae to those in the definition are predicated of the contrary term. For if a definition is an expression signifying the essence of the thing and the predicates contained therein ought also to be the only ones which are predicated of the thing in the category of essence. and how it should be given. and the thing before you is not in that same genus. belongs to another inquiry. and accordingly we need only make the bare statement that to reason to a thing’s definition and essence is quite possible. have to be examined each as a whole in the way we have said. the definition given must of necessity be that of the term before us. In the second place. surveying the expressions used both as wholes and in detail: for if the opposite definition defines that opposite term. then it would clearly be in the contrary genus: for contraries must of necessity be either in the same genus or in contrary genera. The means whereby it should be established have been more precisely defined elsewhere. however. to say accurately what a definition is. It might be replied that there is no necessity why contrary differentiae should be predicated of 362 . The differentiae. then those rendered in the definition would be predicated of the term before us. First of all. then.g. those of white and black. see that the genus rendered is correctly rendered. e. At present it concerns us only so far as is required for our present purpose. the expression containing so and so would of necessity be a definition. while the other tends to compress it. clearly the expression given must be the right definition. seeing that there is not anything else predicated of the thing in the category of essence. but for the purposes of the inquiry now before us the same commonplace rules serve. that contraries may be conjoined in more than one way. and genera and differentiae are so predicated in that category: it is obvious that if one were to get an admission that so and so are the only attributes predicated in that category. then. That a definition may thus be reached by a process of reasoning is obvious. for the one tends to pierce the vision. The expressions. Seeing.engage in discussion arrive at a definition by reasoning: they always assume something of the kind as their starting points-both in geometry and in arithmetic and the other studies of that kind. for it is impossible that anything else should be a definition. Seeing.

for that both should be the same is not possible. else contraries will have the same definition. Moreover. or. so that if one of them is defined as ‘productive of’ that end. of its differentiae. each other. the contrary differentia to that given be predicated of the contrary term and not of the one in hand. if again ‘destructive’ means ‘apt to decompose something’s essence’. also. to forget is to lose knowledge. Thus if forgetfulness be the loss of knowledge. the others must of necessity be agreed to as well. the differentiae will be the same and the genera contrary. the definition of the term before you will be apparent also: for since its contrary is found either in the same genus or in the contrary genus. clearly the differentia stated must be predicated of the latter. Likewise also with the rest: an admission of any one of them whatever.contraries. any one whatever of these is agreed to. that the differentiae of contraries are either contrary or else the same. seeing that the body as well has its virtue and vice. clearly of the term before you there will be predicated either the same genus as of its contrary. for the one is a virtue and the other a vice of the soul: ‘of the soul’. If. or at least some of them are so while the rest remain the same. while. of justice and injustice. this will also be the definition of each of the rest as well. and all the rest are admitted too. seeing that the definition consists of genus and differentiae. is the differentia in both cases. and ‘useful’ will mean ‘productive of good. Moreover. either all are contrary to those of its contrary. then. 363 . And that is all. ‘vigorous’ too will mean ‘productive of vigour’. look at it from the point of view of things that stand in relations that are like each other. But this much at least is true. or the same as. unless the contraries be found within the same genus: of things whose genera are themselves contraries it may very well be that the same differentia is used of both. if destruction is the decomposition of the thing’s essence. and likewise also the differentiae predicated of opposites are either contrary to. For if ‘healthy’ means ‘productive of health’. and to have forgotten is to have lost knowledge. therefore.g. then. vice versa. look at it from the point of view of its inflexions and coordinates. then to be destroyed is to have its essence decomposed. or both genera and differentiae will be contrary.’ For each of these things is related in like manner to its own peculiar end. Speaking generally. Likewise. If. e. For genera and definitions are bound to correspond in either case. then also ‘destruction’ means ‘the decomposition of its essence’. and ‘destructively’ means ‘in such a way as to decompose its essence’. if the definition of the contrary term be apparent.

that of the elements of the definition rendered the one is genus and the other differentia. for if any other things as well are predicated of the thing in the category of essence. So too if any other of the commonplace rules is of general application and effective. an admission of premisses of this sort is no simple matter.g. or two definitions with one thing. This sort of inquiry is of service against those who assume the existence of Ideas. there is no telling whether the formula stated or some other one 364 . the most important are those of most general application: for these are the most effective. too.Moreover. Further. e. it should be employed.g. and to secure from those whom one is questioning. Thus if A defines a better than B defines and B is a definition of so too is A of a. This examination from the point of view of greater degrees is of no use when a single definition is compared with two things. for there cannot possibly be one definition of two things or two of the same thing. Of the rest. or predicated it of itself as though it were something different. as has been said before. and that only the genus and differentiae are predicated in the category of essence. then A too defines a. < div id="section67" class="section" title="4"> 4 The most handy of all the commonplace arguments are those just mentioned and those from co-ordinates and inflexions. Yet without these premisses it is impossible to reason to a definition. that you should examine the individual cases. For the species is synonymous with its individuals. e. and then look to see in the case of their various species whether the definition applies. if A’s claim to define a is like B’s to define B. is obvious from considerations presently to be urged. and these therefore are those which it is most important to master and to have ready to hand: for they are the most useful on the greatest number of occasions. and B defines B. < div id="section68" class="section" title="5"> 5 That it is more difficult to establish than to overthrow a definition. look at it from the point of and like degrees.’ Moreover see if a man has used a term metaphorically. in all the ways in which it is possible to establish a result by comparing two and two together. For to see for oneself.

Further. and must moreover be convertible. but not to it alone. one is bound to bring people to the view that everything contained in the definition is attributable. whereas in establishing a definition. viz. Moreover. even if it applies to everything embraced under the term. not even so is there any need to prove the converse of the proposition in the process of overthrowing the definition. in establishing a case. by showing that it belongs in every case. the original statement has 365 . so that to overthrow it. The case stands likewise in regard to the property and genus of a term also. if the definition rendered is to be peculiar to the subject. it is only necessary to demolish one of the terms used. For merely to show that the definition fails to be predicated of every one of the things of which the term is predicated. as was explained in the case of the definition. while of overthrowing it there are two ways: for if it has been shown that it belongs either never or not in a certain case. Now in demolishing a definition it is sufficient to argue against one point only (for if we have overthrown any single point whatsoever. As regards the property this is clear from what has been said: for as a rule the property is rendered in a complex phrase. there is no longer any necessity to show one’s point universally: for it is enough to show that the formula is untrue of any one of the things embraced under the term. even if it belongs to everything falling under the term. the definition is thereby demolished. but not to that only. for a definition is an expression indicating the essence of a thing. For in both cases it is easier to overthrow than to establish. The point is clear also from the following: It is easier to draw one conclusion than many. In overthrowing a view. nearly all the other rules that apply to the definition will apply also to the property of a thing. it is clear that you are bound to establish it in one way only. we shall have demolished the definition). on the other hand. too.is its definition. even supposing it should be necessary to overthrow something by a universal proposition. Then. it is overthrown in this case as well. the reasoning brought forward must be universal: for the definition put forward must be predicated of everything of which the term is predicated. is enough to overthrow it universally: and there is no need to prove the converse of this in order to show that the term is predicated of things of which the expression is not predicated. whereas to establish it is necessary to reason to them all. Moreover. In regard to the genus. whereas to overthrow one it is enough to show in a single case only that it fails to belong: further. For in establishing a property one has to show that it is true of everything included under the term in question.

the definition is thereby demolished.been demolished. Clearly. against the others we cannot bring all of the arguments drawn from definitions. so in these matters too to overthrow is easier than to establish. because as a rule it contains several terms. and moreover. it is enough to show that it belongs in a particular instance. For on account of the number of statements involved we are presented in the definition with the greatest number of points for attack. the other rules too may be used as means for attacking a definition: for if either the formula be not peculiar. Moreover. as though. while to establish one is the hardest. whereas to overthrow it. but also that it belongs as genus has to be shown. whereas to overthrow it. it is enough to show its failure to belong either in some particular case or in every case. or something included in the formula fail to belong. on the contrary. in establishing a genus it is not enough to show that it belongs. For while each of the aforesaid kinds of attribute must belong to the thing in question. that the attributes stated belong. and this has to be done correctly. it has to be shown that it never belongs at all. for to establish it. On the other hand. Moreover. nor yet of the rest: for only those relating to accidental attributes apply generally to all the aforesaid kinds of attribute. while it is the hardest to establish. in fact. that the formula indicates the essence of the thing. just as in other things to destroy is easier than to create. For there one both has to establish all those other points by reasoning (i. and the more plentiful the material. the property is most nearly of this kind: for it is easier to demolish.e. It is clear also that the easiest thing of all is to overthrow a definition. Of the rest. or the genus rendered be the wrong one. one has to show that it belongs in every case. easier to establish than to overthrow: for to establish it. the quicker an argument comes: for there is more likelihood of a mistake occurring in a large than in a small number of things. So that it is impossible to use one set as a basis of attack upon the other except in the case of definition. and that the genus rendered is the true genus. it is enough to show that it does not belong in one single case. In the case of an accidental attribute the universal proposition is easier to overthrow than to establish. whereas in overthrowing it. besides this. Likewise also the property need not belong as a genus. both because of the number of things that people must be 366 . and that the formula is peculiar to the term). it is the easiest of all things to demolish a definition. It appears. yet the genus may very well not belong as a property without as yet being thereby demolished. nor the accident as a genus or property. The particular proposition is. so long as they do belong. then.

while in other cases it is possible to demolish what is said in two ways.brought to accept. and. or that it does not belong in the particular way stated. in the case of an accidental predicate the only way to demolish it is to show that it does not belong at all. On the other hand. 367 . besides this. The easiest thing of all to establish is an accidental predicate: for in other cases one has to show not only that the predicate belongs. and accordingly. an accidental predicate is the hardest thing to overthrow. because it belongs to its subject alone and is predicated convertibly with its subject. The commonplace arguments through which we shall be well supplied with lines of argument with regard to our several problems have now been enumerated at about sufficient length. but also that it belongs in such and such a particular way: whereas in the case of the accident it is enough to show merely that it belongs. because it affords the least material: for in stating accident a man does not add how the predicate belongs. by showing either that the predicate does not belong.

thirdly and lastly. Those which are secured other than these are of four kinds. he may possibly be even anxious to secure axioms as familiar and as near to the question in hand as possible: for these are the bases on which scientific reasonings are built up. Those which are used to conceal the conclusion serve a controversial purpose only. A. 368 . secondly. or to render the argument more clear. other than the necessary premisses. Now so far as the selection of his ground is concerned the problem is one alike for the philosopher and the dialectician. may be refused by the answerer because they lie too near the original statement and so he foresees what will follow if he grants them: but for this the philosopher does not care. select the ground from which he should make his attack. Book VIII Translated by W. Nay. Not so with the philosopher. Beside these there is no other premiss which need be secured: these are the ones whereby you should try to multiply and formulate your questions. The sources from which one’s commonplace arguments should be drawn have already been described:’ we have now to discuss the arrangement and formation of questions and first to distinguish the premisses. which have to be adopted. but how to go on to arrange his points and frame his questions concerns the dialectician only: for in every problem of that kind a reference to another party is involved. or to lend weight to the argument. By necessary premisses are meant those through which the actual reasoning is constructed. although true and familiar. or to conceal the conclusion. first of all. he must frame them and arrange them one by one to himself.Topics. but inasmuch as an undertaking of this sort is always conducted against another person. we are obliged to employ them as well. Any one who intends to frame questions must. Pickard-Cambridge < div id="book8" class="book" title="Book VIII"> 1 Next there fall to be discussed the problems of arrangement and method in putting questions. and the man who is investigating by himself: the premisses of his reasoning. they serve either inductively to secure the universal premiss being granted. he must proceed actually to put them to the other party.

while at the same time. This is because the coming conclusion is less easily discerned at the greater distance and in the process of induction. or else partly by one and partly by the other. Concealment of one’s plan is obtained by securing through prosyllogisms the premisses through which the proof of the original proposition is going to be constructed-and as many of them as possible. because the previous syllogisms have not been made articulate to him: while the final syllogism.The necessary premisses through which the reasoning is effected. it is unclear how it comes about. too. The premisses. It is a useful rule. must be secured with a view to the latter. but alternately those that 369 . Thus if one desires to secure an admission that the knowledge of contraries is one. for this is likely to keep the answerer at the greatest possible distance from the original proposition. one will then argue that the knowledge of contraries is also the same. Speaking generally. it is still open to one to formulate them in so many words. that were mentioned above. even if one cannot reach the required premisses in this way. a man who desires to get information by a concealed method should so put his questions that when he has put his whole argument and has stated the conclusion. For one must secure the necessary premisses either by reasoning or by induction. The way to employ them respectively is as follows: Induction should proceed from individual cases to the universal and from the known to the unknown. if he grants this. Rather one should soar as far aloof from them as possible. for the answerer does not foresee on what grounds it is based. but only the grounds on which we reason to them. if he does not. people still ask ‘Well. but why is that?’ This result will be secured best of all by the method above described: for if one states only the final conclusion. one should secure the admission by induction. ought not to be propounded directly in so many words. This is likely to be effected by making syllogisms to prove not only the necessary premisses but also some of those which are required to establish them. is likely to be kept least articulate if we lay down not the secured propositions on which it is based. not to secure the admissions claimed as the bases of the syllogisms in their proper order. other than these. and the objects of perception are better known. showing the conclusion. although any propositions which are too obvious to be denied may be formulated in so many words. by formulating a proposition to that effect in the case of some particular pair of contraries. Moreover. but of opposites: for. seeing that contraries are opposites. do not state the conclusions of these premisses but draw them later one after another. to most people if not invariably. one should ask him to admit it not of contraries.

people formulate propositions relating to the actual terms themselves. what is secured is not the universal under which all the like cases fall. In the case. An instance would be. but is not the same thing. formulate your proposition as though you did so not for its own sake. and the universal involved is less patent. a questioner should leave it as far as possible doubtful whether he wishes to secure an admission of his proposition or of its opposite: for if it be uncertain what their opponent’s argument requires. whereas in arguments from likeness.g. One should also. for in induction it is the universal whose admission is secured from the particulars. but still it gives a certain plausibility and air of reasonableness to the denial of the proposition.g. because we become angry with our parents. try to secure admissions by means of likeness: for such admissions are plausible. but we do not desire vengeance on them. e. the conclusion that will result from them is more obvious in advance. on the other hand. supposing one had to secure the admission that the angry man desires vengeance on account of an apparent slight. so too perception of contraries is the same. Very likely the objection is not valid. that the ‘angry man’ does not desire vengeance. e. Moreover. for people deceive themselves. If. for. It is a good rule also. whenever the definition is taken in regard to a co-ordinate. secure the universal premiss by a definition relating not to the precise terms themselves but to their co-ordinates. Moreover. if this were secured. however. Speaking generally. but in order to get at something else: for people are shy of granting what an opponent’s case really requires. occasionally to bring an objection against oneself: for answerers are put off their guard against those who appear to be 370 .conduce to one conclusion and those that conduce to another. for upon some people it is vengeance enough to cause them pain and make them sorry. that since the perception is the same. so is the knowledge also. people are more ready to say what they themselves think. clearly. wherever possible. they often find that the answerer refuses to grant them because on the actual term itself he is readier with his objection. This argument resembles induction. or vice versa. into thinking that they are not making the admission universally. that ‘anger’ is a desire for vengeance on account of an apparent slight: for. and were to secure this. we should have universally what we intend. make the other person admit that as knowledge and ignorance of contraries is the same. of the definition of ‘anger’ it is not so easy to find an objection. if those which go together are set side by side.

Moreover. and productive. so far as the conclusion goes. because most people in asking questions put first the points which they are most eager to secure. as do those who draw false geometrical figures: for in the multitude of details the whereabouts of the fallacy is obscured. Moreover. Moreover. formulate your premiss as though it were a mere illustration: for people admit the more readily a proposition made to serve some other purpose. the other has been secured also. then. Further. On the other hand. it is well to expand the argument and insert things that it does not require at all. and imagining that they cannot suffer any reverse. and if the one has been secured. to add that ‘So and so is generally held or commonly said’. unless the conclusion that will result actually stares them in the face. in dealing with some people propositions of this sort should be put forward first: for ill-tempered men admit most readily what comes first. would not be granted. Ornament is attained by induction and distinction of things closely akin. if he formulated it by itself. confident in their own character. though there is no necessity to say them. or concerned with better objects. because it is not so clear from this what the result will be. Again. for people are specially inclined to deny the first questions put to them. one should put last the point which one most wishes to have conceded. the rules which should be followed are the above. do not formulate the very proposition you need to secure. for people are shy of upsetting the received opinion unless they have some positive objection to urge: and at the same time they are cautious about upsetting such things because they themselves too find them useful. For this reason also a questioner sometimes evades observation as he adds in a corner what. an instance of the kind of thing meant is the distinction of one form of knowledge as better than another by being either more accurate. For concealment. even though you really require the point: for insistence always arouses the more opposition. 371 . do not be insistent. practical. and not required on its own account. For everything of this kind lends additional ornament to the argument.arguing impartially. Likewise also with those who consider themselves smart at answering: for when they have admitted most of what you want they finally talk clap-trap to the effect that the conclusion does not follow from their admissions: yet they say ‘Yes’ readily. It is useful too. or the distinction of sciences into speculative. while at the close of an argument they show their ill-temper. What sort of process induction is obvious: as for distinction. but rather something from which that necessarily follows: for people are more willing to admit the latter.

But it is one of the very hardest things to distinguish which of the things adduced are ‘of this sort’. unless that subject happen to be the one and only thing of the kind. One ought. or to the questioner to suggest falsely that it does answer to a like description. and the other disputing the likeness of things that are. and bring their objection not in regard to the thing itself. the objector ought to make his objection in regard to some other. unless he can say that this subject is unique of its kind. But until one has oneself stated in what cases it is so. so as to leave no opportunity either to the answerer to dispute. as for instance two is the one prime number among the even numbers: for. therefore. it is possible in some cases to ask the question in its universal form. moreover. examples and comparisons should be adduced. but in others this is not easy. One ought. but in regard to some homonym of it: thus they argue that a man can very well have a colour or a foot or a hand other than his own. the one party asserting the likeness of things that are not alike. they use the phrase ‘in all cases of this sort’. and say that the thing advanced does not answer to a like description. and which are not: and in this connexion people often throw dust in each others’ eyes in their discussion. This point has been treated previously as well. on the other hand. for then the proposition is likely to become clearer. to claim that the objections should not be brought in reference to the actual subject of the proposition.’ In induction. syllogism should be employed in reasoning against dialecticians rather than against the crowd: induction.For clearness. it is not fair to demand that he shall say in what cases it is not so: for one should make the induction first. and let the illustrations be relevant and drawn from things that we know. because there is no established general term that covers all the resemblances: in this case. to try oneself to coin a word to cover all things of the given sort. when people need to secure the universal. and then demand the objection. If one has made an induction on the strength of several cases and yet the answerer refuses to grant the universal proposition. then it is fair to demand his objection. < div id="section70" class="section" title="2"> 2 In dialectics. People sometimes object to a universal proposition. as in Homer and not as in Choerilus. is most useful against the crowd. for a painter may 372 . for many things appear to answer to like descriptions that do not really do so.

have a colour that is not his own. Accordingly the thing to do is to withdraw the part objected to. the questioner should withdraw the point objected to. To meet them. without so doing. For where one has reasoned without the reduction per impossibile. If. that ‘the greater good has the greater evil as its opposite. we have to withdraw the point objected to. that if a person have lost knowledge of a thing while it still remains. and form the remainder into a universal proposition. therefore. if one is demonstrating and not arguing dialectically it makes no difference which method of reasoning be adopted. he will be forced to admit the proposition because he cannot foresee in the rest of it any case where it does not hold true: if he refuse to admit it. but he has not forgotten it. however. has a greater evil as its opposite: for disease is a greater evil than debility. he then has forgotten it. e. for when it has been withdrawn. but also if. but in argument with another reasoning per impossibile should be avoided. and a cook may have a foot that is not his own. which is a less good thing than vigour. until he secures what he requires. so long will the objection to the proposition be deemed valid. If. but to the actual thing asserted. therefore.g. One should similarly treat those who object to the statement that ‘the greater the good. because if the thing alters. and assert the remainder. in the case of forgetfulness and having forgotten: for people refuse to admit that the man who has lost his knowledge of a thing has forgotten it. however. no dispute can arise. he refuses to admit the point because he foresees something of the kind: for if the point objected to be withdrawn. you should draw the distinction before putting your question in such cases: for so long as the ambiguity remains undetected. the greater the evil that is its opposite’: for they allege that health. unless the one good involves the other as well’. he has lost knowledge of it. he checks the series of questions by an objection in regard not to some homonym. Propositions that are partly false and partly true are of this type: for in the case of these it is possible by withdrawing a part to leave the rest true. then when asked for an objection he certainly will be unable to render one. you may claim that he shall admit it: for a premiss is valid in dialectics which thus holds in several instances and to which no objection is forthcoming. In this case too.g. one 373 . as vigour involves health. the man is more likely to admit the proposition. if. This should be done not only when he formulates an objection. you formulate the proposition on the strength of many cases and he has no objection to bring. Whenever it is possible to reason to the same conclusion either through or without a reduction per impossibile. e. e.g. on the other hand.

and he will not admit them at all. even if it be not put as a question but advanced as a consequence. One should put forward all propositions that hold true of several cases. then. ‘Good means this. and the man shakes his head. clearly he asks a large number of questions. does it not?’ For questions of this sort are easily answered by a Yes or a No. Hence one should endeavour to formulate propositions of this kind in this form. if it be. they admit it for true. he is at fault in not taking him to task or breaking off the discussion. people deny it.g. The conclusion should not be put in the form of a question. so that the questioners do not get what they want. on the other hand. e. It is at the same time also perhaps fair to ask the other man how many meanings of ‘the good’ there are. unless its falsehood is too plainly manifest. and then those who do not see that it follows upon the previous admissions do not realize that those who deny it have been refuted: when. and the other denies it. or else asks the same question a large number of times: in the one case he merely babbles. For this reason questions of this kind are not dialectical unless the questioner himself draws distinctions or divisions before expressing them. or this. ‘What is man?’ or ‘How many meanings has “the good”?’ For a dialectical premiss must be of a form to which it is possible to reply ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. < div id="section71" class="section" title="3"> 374 . and to which either no objection whatever appears or at least not any on the surface: for when people cannot see any case in which it is not so.does reason to an impossible conclusion. whenever you have yourself distinguished and formulated them. people deny that it is impossible. whereas to the aforesaid it is not possible. For if he does so though the person questioned keeps on answering the questions. Not every universal question can form a dialectical proposition as ordinarily understood. the one man merely asks it as a question without even saying that it so follows. in the other he fails to reason: for reasoning always consists of a small number of premisses. he does it because the person questioned does not answer the questions. For often. it looks as if the reasoning had failed. If. e.g. it looks altogether as if the reasoning had failed. Any one who keeps on asking one thing for a long time is a bad inquirer.

whenever any problem proves intractable. while the latter have to be arrived at through many steps if one wishes to secure a continuous proof from first principles. an argument. and because of the impossibility of saying whether this obscurity is due to their being used metaphorically. For because of their obscurity. Now to define first principles is just what answerers do not care to do. Such (e. then obviously our business must be either to define or to distinguish. between the conclusion and the principle. it is safe to suppose that. further. of all definitions to treat in argument are those that employ terms about which. or a metaphorical sense. and. or else all discussion about them wears the air of mere sophistry: for to prove anything is impossible unless one begins with the appropriate principles. it is uncertain whether they are used in one sense or several.) are those things which stand first and those which stand last in the order of nature. it is impossible to refute them. and connects inference with inference till the last are reached. The inferences.3 There are certain hypotheses upon which it is at once difficult to bring. In general. in the first place. these cannot be shown through anything else: we are obliged to understand every item of that sort by a definition. however. The hardest. it is easy to bring people to see 375 . whether they are used literally or metaphorically by the definer. or to supply the intermediate premisses: for it is through these that the final conclusions are shown. For the former require definition. It often happens that a difficulty is found in discussing or arguing a given position because the definition has not been correctly rendered: e. whereby the succeeding propositions have to be shown. that lie too close to the first principle are hard to treat in argument: for it is not possible to bring many arguments in regard to them. and easy to stand up to. too. or it is not far removed from the first principles. or else the reason is that we have yet to discover in the first place just this-in which of the aforesaid directions the source of our difficulty lies: when we have made this clear. nor do they pay any attention if the questioner makes a definition: and yet until it is clear what it is that is proposed. because of the small number of those steps. This sort of thing happens particularly in the case of the first principles: for while the other propositions are shown through these. it is impossible to argue upon such terms. ‘Has one thing one contrary or many?’: here when the term ‘contraries’ has been properly defined.g.g. it is not easy to discuss it. it either needs definition or else bears either several senses.

the fact asserted becomes immediately clear: for the areas have the same fraction subtracted from them as have the sides: and this is the definition of ‘the same ratio’. If. he grants it. Whenever. One may be sure then. the circumstances under which such admissions should be claimed are different for a mere questioner and for a serious teacher. 376 . It appears also in mathematics that the difficulty in using a figure is sometimes due to a defect in definition. it be essential to reason through premisses that are better assured. the nature of a line or of a circle. whereas in a dialectical exercise he may do so if he is merely satisfied of its truth. if.e. on the other hand. in serious inquiry he ought not to grant it. he will be giving the signal for a harder undertaking than was originally proposed: if. to show them is difficult and may even prove quite impossible. e. on the other hand. < div id="section72" class="section" title="4"> 4 As to the formulation. the premiss. that one or other of the aforesaid things has happened to it. if the definitions involved. then. whenever a position is hard to discuss. because there are not many intermediate steps.whether it is possible for the same thing to have several contraries or not: in the same way also with other terms requiring definition. If. whereas if the definition be given. only the arguments that can be brought in regard to each of them are not many.g. he had better grant it. on the other hand. it is essential not to enhance the difficulty of the problem.g. on the other hand. and arrangement of one’s questions. then. In other words. about enough has been said. it is a harder task to argue to the point claimed. in proving that the line which cuts the plane parallel to one side divides similarly both the line which it cuts and the area. Clearly. the definition of the starting-points be not laid down. then. than to the resulting position. The case of the significance of verbal expressions is like that of these mathematical conceptions. be laid down. a doubt may arise whether such claims should be admitted or not: for if a man is going to refuse to admit it and claim that you shall argue to it as well. The most primary of the elementary principles are without exception very easy to show. unless he be more sure about it than about the conclusion. he will be giving the original thesis credence on the strength of what is less credible than itself. e. he had better refuse. i.

will be the same in either case. then. but only his position: for one may. The manner. If. however. distinguish between the mistake of taking up a wrong position to start with. and what kind of things he should and should not grant for the correct or incorrect defence of his position:-inasmuch. perhaps. by the speaker or by some one else. the statement laid down by the answerer be generally rejected.g.e. by some given person. when once taken up. on the other hand. and that of not maintaining it properly. The business of the questioner is so to develop the argument as to make the answerer utter the most extrvagant paradoxes that necessarily follow because of his position: while that of the answerer is to make it appear that it is not he who is responsible for the absurdity or paradox. the conclusion aimed at by the questioner is bound to be one generally accepted. while that of the answerer is to appear unaffected by him. whereas in a competition the business of the questioner is to appear by all means to produce an effect upon the other. in an assembly of disputants discussing in the spirit not of a competition but of an examination and inquiry. i. we must first define what is the business of a good answerer. to admit or to refuse to admit what has been asked. then. there are as yet no articulate rules about what the answerer should aim at. let us try to say something upon the matter for ourselves. of its acceptance or rejection.With regard to the giving of answers. The thesis laid down by the answerer before facing the questioner’s argument is bound of necessity to be one that is either generally accepted or generally rejected or else is neither: and moreover is so accepted or rejected either absolutely or else with a restriction. whereas if the former be generally accepted. as we have no tradition bequeathed to us by others. makes no difference: for the right way to answer. < div id="section73" class="section" title="5"> 5 Inasmuch as no rules are laid down for those who argue for the sake of training and of examination:-and the aim of those engaged in teaching or learning is quite different from that of those engaged in a competition. as of a good questioner. the latter is generally rejected: for the conclusion which the 377 . whatever it be. e. as is the latter from that of those who discuss things together in the spirit of inquiry: for a learner should always state what he thinks: for no one is even trying to teach him what is false.

This is why those. (2) If. e. and more familiar. the conclusion will be of the same type as well. the view laid down by the answerer be one that is generally accepted or rejected without qualification. then the standard whereby the latter must judge what is generally accepted or not. the answerer should not grant them.g. as Heraclitus says.questioner tries to draw is always the opposite of the statement laid down. of the views not generally accepted. but 378 . who introduce other’s opinions. if any of the questions put to him be not of this character. For then he will probably be thought to have argued sufficiently well. but accepted less generally than the questioner’s conclusion. of those that are not generally accepted. the answerer ought not to grant either what is thus absolutely not accepted at all. (3) Likewise. the answerer be defending some one else’s opinion. for then. so that the premisses secured by the questioner should all be views generally accepted. if the less familiar is to be inferred through the more familiar. clearly the conclusion sought by the questioner will be one generally rejected without qualification. then. again. what is laid down is generally neither rejected nor accepted. all that are less generally rejected than the conclusion sought by the questioner. that ‘good and evil are the same thing. If. but only by the answerer. Accordingly. too.’ refuse to admit the impossibility of contraries belonging at the same time to the same thing. not because they do not themselves believe this. the statement laid down by the answerer be generally accepted without qualification. and more generally accepted than his proposed conclusion. If. Now since a man who reasons correctly demonstrates his proposed conclusion from premisses that are more generally accepted. too. and must grant or refuse to grant the point asked. for in that case the result will be that the arguments will be more generally accepted. then the views that are accepted absolutely must be taken as the standard of comparison: whereas if the view laid down be one that is not generally accepted or rejected. the conclusion aimed at by the questioner will be one that is generally accepted. Consequently. any that are more generally accepted than the questioner’s conclusion. is himself. if the statement laid down by the answerer be neither rejected generally nor generally accepted. it is clear that (1) where the view laid down by him is one that generally is absolutely rejected. and. anything that appears to be true should be granted. or what is accepted indeed. on the other hand. the answerer should admit all views that are generally accepted and. If. For if the statement laid down by the answerer be generally rejected. too. then clearly it will be the latter’s judgement to which he must have regard in granting or denying the various points. on the other hand.

if. however. Those who try to draw an inference from premisses more generally rejected than the conclusion clearly do not reason correctly: hence. he should admit that it is the view generally accepted but say that it lies too close to the original proposition. and is also bound to be either relevant to the argument or irrelevant: if then it be a view generally accepted and irrelevant. the answerer. should yet protest that the proposition is too absurd to be admitted. what the aims of the answerer should be. their aim being to speak as would the man who stated the position. it may be granted without restriction. if he grants the several points with his eyes open. when men ask these things. it be relevant. < div id="section75" class="section" title="7"> 379 . then. the answerer should add the comment that. while admitting that if it be granted the conclusion sought follows. and also the questioner will be able to draw his inference. if it be irrelevant to the argument. whether the position he lays down be a view generally accepted without qualification or accepted by some definite person. For then the answerer will not be held to be personally accountable for what happens to him. the answerer should grant it and remark that it is the accepted view: if it be a view not generally accepted and irrelevant. The same thing is done also by those who take on the defence of one another’s positions. seeing that all the premisses that are more generally accepted than the conclusion are granted him. in order to avoid the appearance of being a simpleton. Suppose. If what is claimed by the questioner be relevant but too generally rejected. it be a view that is neither rejected generally nor generally accepted.because on Heraclitus’ principles one has to say so. Now every question asked is bound to involve some view that is either generally held or generally rejected or neither. < div id="section74" class="section" title="6"> 6 It is clear. again. if it be granted. If it be relevant and also be generally accepted. he should grant it but add a comment that it is not generally accepted. they ought not to be granted. and that if it be granted the problem proposed collapses. the original problem collapses. then.

i. it becomes uncertain whether originally as well he perceived the ambiguity or not. if they are true and generally held. he should say. For the answerer. the question is both clear and simple. On the other hand. he should give it an unqualified assent or denial: if. then. it be partly true and partly false. far more likely is he to be thought ill-tempered- 380 . in the other false: for if he leave this distinction till later. If. is always permitted to say ‘I do not understand’: he is not compelled to reply ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to a question which may mean different things. however. in several senses. he should answer either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. or else goes to establish one of these: (and you can always tell when it is secured in order to establish something else by the fact of a number of similar questions being put: for as a rule people secure their universal by means either of induction or of likeness):-accordingly the particular propositions should all be admitted. < div id="section76" class="section" title="8"> 8 A premiss in reasoning always either is one of the constituent elements in the reasoning.e. on the other hand. then. although he has no negative instance to show. if what is said be not clear. ‘That was not what I had in view when I admitted it. If. but assents to the question having in view the one sense of the words. Clearly. either real or apparent. a man refuses to grant the universal when supported by many instances.7 The questioner should be met in a like manner also in the case of terms used obscurely. I meant the other sense’: for if a term or expression covers more than one thing. then supposing what it says to be universally true or false. then. if he does not understand. for to bring the argument to a standstill without a negative instance. and also that in one it is true. moreover. it is easy to disagree. for often people encounter some difficulty from assenting to questions that are not clearly put. in the first place. against the universal one should try to bring some negative instance. shows ill-temper. If he does not foresee the ambiguity. If he understands the question and yet it covers many senses. he obviously shows ill-temper. if the questioner takes it in the other sense. he cannot even attempt a counterproof that it is not true. If. he should add a comment that it bears different senses. he ought not to hesitate to say that he does not understand it.

supposing him to maintain them not for the sake of argument but because he really thinks them. even though the point demolished be false.-but still. He should beware of maintaining a hypothesis that is generally rejected: and this it may be in two ways: for it may be one which results in absurd statements. but it is not on that that fallacy of the argument depends: for supposing that any one should happen to be sitting and not 381 . If.although even counter-proof is not enough: for we often hear arguments that are contrary to common opinions.g. clearly he is ill-tempered: for ill-temper in argument consists in answering in ways other than the above. the argument of Zeno that it is impossible to move or to traverse the stadium. suppose some one to secure the premisses. that pleasure is the good. so as to wreck the reasoning. e. e. this is no reason for omitting to assert the opposites of these views. ‘He who sits. and also there are all those which only a bad character would choose.g.g. For the argument may contain many falsehoods. < div id="section78" class="section" title="10"> 10 Of all arguments that reason to a false conclusion the right solution is to demolish the point on which the fallacy that occurs depends: for the demolition of any random point is no solution. a man refuses to admit the proposition without having either a negative instance or some counter-argument to bring against it. for clearly his business is to oppose those positions from which questioners demolish what he has laid down. < div id="section77" class="section" title="9"> 9 Before maintaining either a thesis or a definition the answerer should try his hand at attacking it by himself.g. whose solution is yet difficult. and that to do injustice is better than to suffer it. For people then hate him. it may be true that the point claimed is false. suppose any one were to say that everything is in motion or that nothing is. e. and still be no nearer a solution of the argument. e. then. and which are implicitly opposed to men’s wishes. Now we may demolish the proposition ‘Socrates is sitting’. writes’ and ‘Socrates is sitting’: for from these it follows that ‘Socrates is writing’.

the objection would properly be directed against the questioner. There are then. It can be done either by demolishing the point on which the falsehood that comes about depends. Accordingly. The fourth and worst kind of objection is that which is directed to the time allowed for discussion: for some people bring objections of a kind which would take longer to answer than the length of the discussion in hand. There are four possible ways of preventing a man from working his argument to a conclusion. If. whereas if something additional be granted the conclusion comes about. For it is not enough to object. the questioner be unable to pursue his argument farther. one may object to the questions asked: for it may happen that what the questioner wants does not follow from the questions he has asked because he has asked them badly. or by stating an objection directed against the questioner: for often when a solution has not as a matter of fact been brought.writing. For often the failure to carry through the argument correctly in discussion is due to the person questioned. are two different things. Any one who knows that it is on such and such a point that the argument depends. Thirdly. and of it when presented in the form of questions. then it would be against his questions. if he can do so. because he will not grant the steps of which a correct argument might have been made against his position: for it is not in the power of the one side only to effect properly a result that depends on both alike. but rather that ‘He who sits. who has demolished the point on which the fallacy depends. it would be impossible in such a case to apply the same solution. has given the solution of the argument completely. just as in the case of a figure falsely drawn. yet the questioner is rendered thereby unable to pursue the argument any farther. then. < div id="section79" class="section" title="11"> 11 Adverse criticism of an argument on its own merits. then. as we said. even if the point demolished be a falsehood. four ways of making objections: but of them the first alone is a solution: the others are just hindrances and stumbling-blocks to prevent the conclusions. but the reason of the fallacy should also be proved: for then it would be clear whether the man makes his objection with his eyes open or not. it is not this that needs to be demolished. He. knows the solution of it. Accordingly it sometimes becomes necessary to attack the 382 . writes’: for he who sits does not always write.

not a discussion. when the answerer lies in wait for the points that are contrary to the questioner and becomes abusive as well: when people lose their tempers in this way. Inasmuch as it is indeterminate when people are claiming the admission of contrary things. for this rests with the answerer. For often. their argument becomes a contest. Moreover. to contrary things and to what originally had to be proved-the argument is sure to become vitiated. It makes no difference whether he effects this as answerer or as questioner: for both he who asks contentious questions is a bad dialectician. but sometimes through false as well. when a true proposition is put forward. because while refusing to grant other points. makes it clear that adverse criticism is not to be passed in a like strain upon the argument on its own merits. and admit afterwards what they have previously denied. when questioned. since arguments of this kind are held not for the sake of instruction but for purposes of practice and examination. What has been said.speaker and not his position. but that the questioner has argued with the answerer in the best possible way: for when men lose their tempers. it may perhaps be impossible to make one’s inferences straight-forwardly as one would wish: we have to do as we can. it has to be demolished by means of false propositions: for it is possible for a given man to believe what is not the fact more firmly than the truth. who would rightly convert any one to a different opinion should do so in a dialectical and not in a contentious manner. however. The principle that a man who hinders the common business is a bad partner. it will be easier to persuade or help him. then. and when they are claiming what originally they set out to prove-for often when they are talking by themselves they say contrary things. except with mere contestants. for these cannot both reach the same goal. and also he who in answering fails to grant the obvious answer or to understand the point of the questioner’s inquiry. for in arguments as well there is a common aim in view. he does grant 383 . Sometimes also when a false proposition is put forward. and not always through true premisses. just as a geometrician should reason geometrically. clearly one has to reason not only to true conclusions. however. whether his conclusion be false or true: what kind of syllogisms are dialectical has already been said. The responsibility. and upon the questioner: for it may very well be that the argument is bad. He. if the argument be made to depend on something that he holds. for which reason they often assent. the dialectician is compelled to demolish it: and then false propositions have to be formulated. but also to false ones. Accordingly. for more than one cannot possibly win. clearly applies to an argument as well.

whenever there are many propositions both generally held and also true whereby it could easily be proved. In itself an argument is liable to five kinds of adverse criticism: (1) The first is when neither the proposed conclusion nor indeed any conclusion at all is drawn from the questions asked. suppose the premisses be less generally held and less credible than the conclusion. of the premisses on which the conclusion rests are false or generally rejected. then. It is possible also that an argument. requires only such as are generally held and true. if not all. when. and in the manner. were to be irrelevant to the original position. supposing certain additions would bring an inference about but yet these additions were to be weaker than those that were put as questions and less generally held than the conclusion. he has argued his case correctly. described above. moreover. supposing the reasoning. (5) Moreover. supposing certain withdrawals could effect the same: for sometimes people secure more premisses than are necessary. though requiring certain additions. One must not claim that the reasoning to a proposed view shall in every case equally be a view generally accepted and convincing: for it is a direct result of the nature of things that some subjects of inquiry shall be easier and some harder. (2) The second is. being commendable in itself. whereas the latter. and yet commendable in relation to the proposed conclusion. though constructed from the premisses. even though brought to a conclusion. may sometimes be worse than one which is not so concluded. though true.points of that kind. so that if a man brings people to accept his point from opinions that are as generally received as the case admits. and when most. they require more trouble to prove than the proposed view. and moreover does not rest as an argument on these additions. so that it is not through them that the inference comes about. neither any withdrawals nor additions nor both together can bring the conclusions about. clear that adverse criticism is not to be passed in a like manner upon questioners and upon their arguments. not even the argument itself is open to the same adverse criticism when taken in relation to the proposed conclusion and when taken by itself. then. (3) The third is. and yet open to reproach in relation to the proposed conclusion. or again. vice versa. or if. With those which bring about a true conclusion by means of false 384 . (4) Again. Clearly. For there is nothing to prevent the argument being open to reproach in itself. It is. while its conclusion is not so. whenever the premisses of the former are silly.

it is not fair to find fault: for a false conclusion must of necessity always be reached from a false premiss.g.) that one opinion is more properly so called than another. the one preponderates. A philosopheme is a demonstrative inference: an epichireme is a dialectical inference: a sophism is a contentious inference: an aporeme is an inference that reasons dialectically to a contradiction. when he might employ fewer steps and those already included in his argument: suppose him to be showing (e. Wherein lies the viciousness of the reasoning? Simply in that it conceals the ground on which the argument depends. it may very well be that the conclusion shown is something held more strongly than either. not a proof. or if it be for the one and against the other. on the other hand.premisses. both of which are views generally accepted. then. and suppose him to make his postulates as follows: ‘x-in-itself is more fully x than anything else’: ‘there genuinely exists an object of opinion in itself’: therefore ‘the object-of-opinion-in-itself is more fully an object of opinion than the particular objects of opinion’. Now ‘a relative term is more fully itself when its correlate is more fully itself’: and ‘there exists a genuine opinion-in-itself. on the other hand. it will be a sophism. If. which will be “opinion” in a more accurate sense than the particular opinions’: and it has been postulated both that ‘a genuine opinion-in-itself exists’. If something were to be shown from premisses. but that something is other than what is wanted and has no bearing whatever on the conclusion. but not accepted with like conviction. < div id="section80" class="section" title="12"> 385 . It is also a fault in reasoning when a man shows something through a long chain of steps. and that ‘x-in-itself is more fully x than anything else’: therefore ‘this will be opinion in a more accurate sense’. Whenever by the argument stated something is demonstrated. as is clear from the Analytics. if the pro and con be alike in the case of the premisses. but a true conclusion may sometimes be drawn even from false premisses. the conclusion too will follow suit. then no inference as to the latter can be drawn from it: and if there appears to be. they will be alike for the conclusion also: if. general opinion be for the one and neither for nor against the other.

‘Is the conclusion true or false?’. and this is the type most usually advanced. ‘Has it a conclusion?’. An argument is called fallacious in four senses: (1) when it appears to be brought to a conclusion. it is so also if some step is omitted that generally is firmly accepted. and is not really so-what is called ‘contentious’ reasoning: (2) when it comes to a conclusion but not to the conclusion proposed-which happens principally in the case of reductiones ad impossibile: (3) when it comes to the proposed conclusion but not according to the mode of inquiry appropriate to the case. whether the result reached be true or false: (4) if the conclusion be reached through false premisses: of this type the conclusion is sometimes false. and that the most ordinary. it is bad: if they be both false and also entirely contrary to general opinion. sense. the argument is dialectical. be generally accepted. though false. If. Clearly then the first thing to ask in regard to the argument in itself is. or one which is not geometrical for a geometrical argument. clearly it is bad. though true.12 An argument is clear in one. For an argument of that kind does demonstrate other things that are true: for one of the premisses laid down ought never to be there at all. they be generally rejected. the second. as was said above as well. either altogether or else in relation to the particular matter in hand. the argument is worse than many arguments that lead to a false conclusion. < 386 . a true conclusion were to be reached through premisses that are false and utterly childish. however. and the argument is concluded through premisses that are themselves conclusions: moreover. when the propositions secured are such as compel the conclusion. but only when he is not aware of it: for we often accept on its merits in preference to many true ones an argument which demolishes some true proposition if it does so from premisses as far as possible generally accepted. ‘Of what kind of premisses does it consist?’: for if the latter. Fallacy in argument is due to a mistake of the arguer rather than of the argument: yet it is not always the fault of the arguer either. as happens when a non-medical argument is taken to be a medical one. though an argument which leads to a false conclusion may also be of this type. if it be so brought to a conclusion as to make no further questions necessary: in another sense. sometimes true: for while a false conclusion is always the result of false premisses. and this will then be demonstrated. the third. a true conclusion may be drawn even from premisses that are not true. or one which is not dialectical for dialectical. whereas if.

he ought to have shown. then the other. A third way is if any one were to beg in particular cases what he undertakes to show universally: e. if he were to beg the one or the other of a pair of statements that necessarily involve one other. and begged it of certain pairs of contraries: for he also is generally considered to be begging independently and by itself what. secondly.) he were trying to prove that the knowledge of contraries is one and were to claim that the knowledge of opposites in general is one: for then he is generally thought to be begging. that mean the same thing. that the same thing is good and evil. to try to secure universally the contradictory statement. e. a man begs the question if he begs his conclusion piecemeal: supposing e. Again. fourthly. and were to claim first the one.g. e. Again.div id="section81" class="section" title="13"> 13 Of the ways in which a questioner may beg the original question and also beg contraries the true account has been given in the Analytics:’ but an account on the level of general opinion must be given now. People appear to beg their original question in five ways: the first and most obvious being if any one begs the actual point requiring to be shown: this is easily detected when put in so many words.g. The ways in which people assume contraries are equal in number to those in which they beg their original question. he were to claim that the knowledge of what makes for health or for disease is different. A second way occurs whenever any one begs universally something which he has to demonstrate in a particular case: suppose (e. if any one were to beg an opposite affirmation and negation.g. if he were to beg the contrary terms of an antithesis. together with a number of other things. if he undertook to show that the knowledge of contraries is always one. For it would happen. firstly. but it is more apt to escape detection in the case of different terms. along with a number of other things.g. or a term and an expression. thirdly. fifthly. that he had to show that medicine is a science of what leads to health and to disease. fifthly. suppose any one were to claim something universally and then proceed to beg its contradictory in some particular case. and were to beg that the side is incommensurable with the diagonal. that which he ought to have shown by itself. e. or. or. after postulating the latter view.g. if he had to show that the diagonal is incommensurable with the side. suppose him. suppose a man begs the contrary of the conclusion which 387 .g. if having secured that the knowledge of contraries is one.

If we cannot find any one else to argue with. For in this way we shall be better equipped for dealing with the proposition stated. arguments relating to the same thesis and range them side by side: for this produces a plentiful supply of arguments for carrying a point by sheer force. in dealing with any proposition. given all the premisses. for it then only remains to make a right choice of one of them. and after a few attempts we shall know several arguments by heart. whenever one is well stocked with arguments pro and con: for then you find yourself on your guard against contrary statements to the one you wish to secure. For a task of this kind a certain natural ability is required: in fact real natural ability just is the power right to choose the true and shun the false. he were to beg two premisses such that this contradictory statement that is opposite to the first conclusion will follow from them. and this would happen suppose. viz. For by ‘conversion’ of an argument is meant the taking the reverse of the conclusion together with the remaining propositions asked and so demolishing one of those that were conceded: for it follows necessarily that if the conclusion be untrue. the conclusion was bound to follow.necessarily comes about through the premisses laid down. Men of 388 . in a certain relation which they bear to one another. Always. and in refutation also it is of great service. < div id="section82" class="section" title="14"> 14 The best way to secure training and practice in arguments of this kind is in the first place to get into the habit of converting the arguments. as contributing to knowledge and to philosophic wisdom the power of discerning and holding in one view the results of either of two hypotheses is no mean instrument. Select. seeing that. Moreover. for it is by a glance at the conclusion that we tell that the original question has been begged: whereas contrary views lie in the premisses. some one of the premisses is demolished. we should argue with ourselves. The securing of contraries differs from begging the original question in this way: in the latter case the mistake lies in regard to the conclusion. moreover. even without begging the opposites in so many words. be on the look-out for a line of argument both pro and con: and on discovering it at once set about looking for the solution of it: for in this way you will soon find that you have trained yourself at the same time in both asking questions and answering them.

A like rule applies in Rhetoric as well to enthymemes. You should display your training in inductive reasoning against a young man. you should get into the habit of turning one argument into several. For yourself. For just as in geometry it is useful to be practised in the elements. in deductive against an expert. get a good stock of definitions: and have those of familiar and primary ideas at your fingers’ ends: for it is through these that reasonings are effected.g. moreover. for by a right liking or disliking for whatever is proposed to them they rightly select what is best.natural ability can do this.e. a memory of things themselves is immediately caused by the mere mention of their loci. and to have a thorough knowledge of premisses at the tip of one’s tongue. moreover. a particular demonstration always contains a universal demonstration. and particularly in regard to those propositions which are ultimate: for in discussing these answerers frequently give up in despair. the statement that ‘there cannot be one knowledge of more than one thing’: for that is the case with both relative terms and contraries and co-ordinates. each under its number. i. You should. Records of discussions should be made in a universal form. to master the heads under which other arguments mostly tend to fall. moreover. because it is impossible to reason at all without using universals. so these habits too will make a man readier in reasoning. It is best to know by heart arguments upon those questions which are of most frequent occurrence. or hypothesis. you should as far as possible avoid universalizing your reasonings. and in arithmetic to have the multiplication table up to ten at one’s fingers’ ends-and indeed it makes a great difference in one’s knowledge of the multiples of other numbers too-likewise also in arguments it is a great advantage to be well up in regard to first principles. even though one has argued only some particular case: for this will enable one to turn a single rule into several. e. always examine arguments to see whether they rest on principles of general application: for all particular arguments really reason universally. to 389 . Moreover. You should try. This can be done with arguments that are entirely universal. It is better to commit to memory a premiss of general application than an argument: for it is difficult to be even moderately ready with a first principle. You should try. For just as in a person with a trained memory. however. as well. Moreover. and conceal your procedure as darkly as you can: this kind of effect is best produced by keeping as far as possible away from topics akin to the subject of the argument. because he has his premisses classified before his mind’s eye.

For this is what gives one ability. For it is the skilled propounder and objector who is. or bad argument is sure to result. speaking generally. For you see how in practising together people cannot refrain from contentious argument. and the whole object of training is to acquire ability. a dialectician. In general. for the objector either distinguishes or demolishes. too. nor practise upon the man in the street: for there are some people with whom any argument is bound to degenerate. or whether some one put his question properly or improperly (whether it was yourself or some one else) and the point which made it the one or the other. it is indeed fair to try all means of bringing about one’s conclusion: but it is not good form. These are those that are universal. partly denying the statements proposed. not lightly to engage with casual acquaintances. Wherefore the best rule is. Do not argue with every one. for this is the thing in which they are respectively trained. It is best also to have ready-made arguments relating to those questions in which a very small stock will furnish us with arguments serviceable on a very large number of occasions. from your exercises in argumentation you should try to carry away either a syllogism on some subject or a refutation or a proposition or an objection.secure from those skilled in deduction their premisses. from inductive reasoners their parallel cases. 390 . especially in regard to propositions and objections. as a single thing-whereas to formulate an objection is to make one thing into many. partly granting. and those in regard to which it is rather difficult to produce points for ourselves from matters of everyday experience. For against any one who is ready to try all means in order to seem not to be beaten. To formulate a proposition is to form a number of things into one-for the conclusion to which the argument leads must be taken generally.

what appear to be refutations but are really fallacies instead. as also elsewhere. by dint of embellishing themselves. just as people who calculate suppose in regard to their counters. e. while others seem to be so. For names are finite and so is the sum-total of formulae. and a single name. while others are not and merely seem to be such to our sense. as it were. But the two cases (names and things) are not alike. through what has been stated: refutation is reasoning involving the contradictory of the given conclusion. while others merely seem to be so by blowing and rigging themselves out as the tribesmen do their victims for sacrifice.g.e. and of these the most prolific and usual domain is the argument that turns upon names only. a distant view of these things. In the same way both reasoning and refutation are sometimes genuine. while those made of yellow metal look golden. Now some of them do not really achieve this. the same formulae. i.On Sophisti