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How to Stop Landmines and IEDs From Killing Soldiers Now

How to Stop Landmines and IEDs From Killing Soldiers Now

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Paper discusses the overall failure of high-tech counterIED methods to protect the average foot soldier. The versatlity and adaptability of the low-tech IED are reviewed, and how low-technology countermeasures can be used and adapted to defeat the IED. The paper references recent reports on the spending of the high-tech sector. For example, 26 of 56 of JIEDDO's most expensive projects are listed as overhead because they have produced nothing. At the same time, the Armed Forces has refused all testing of low-technology methods. This refusal, in light of the high-tech spending and failures, is unconscionable.
Paper discusses the overall failure of high-tech counterIED methods to protect the average foot soldier. The versatlity and adaptability of the low-tech IED are reviewed, and how low-technology countermeasures can be used and adapted to defeat the IED. The paper references recent reports on the spending of the high-tech sector. For example, 26 of 56 of JIEDDO's most expensive projects are listed as overhead because they have produced nothing. At the same time, the Armed Forces has refused all testing of low-technology methods. This refusal, in light of the high-tech spending and failures, is unconscionable.

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HOW TO STOP LANDMINES FROM KILLING SOLDIERS NOW

By

John S. Janks

September 22, 2011

Copyright 2011 © ∑eager Detection Systems, LLC All Rights Reserved

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PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER
“It has been a general historical lesson of the many insurgencies over the past three hundred or so years that there is always, repeat, always a low♦ technology solution to any advanced technology capability.”

For the past ten years the Department of Defense (DoD) and its research arm the Defense Advanced Research Program (DARPA) have spent $billions developing high-technology countermeasures to Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). In 2003, a special unit, the Joint Improvised Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), was established to deal solely with these devices. It has become obvious that relying on high-tech solutions to protect our service men and women has been a failure. They have made matters worse by falling into the myopia syndrome, which restricts their view to high-tech countermeasures mostly developed by large defense contractors. Many smaller companies were excluded from the process and low-technology solutions are rejected without evaluation and testing. Especially in the last year, investigative reports have begun appearing detailing the military’s spending on high-technology countermeasures and just what that spending has achieved. Those reports reveal a shocking world of large defense contractors receiving enormous sums of money with little or no oversight, and providing the service man and woman on the ground with precious little defense against the IED. JIEDDO, the organization designed to detect and develop counter IED measures, is reluctant to publish any information about how many lives the high-cost countermeasures are saving and where the money is being used.1 Other recent reports (discussed in the text) likewise present a picture of waste and abuse for countermeasures that do not protect the troops, if they reach them at all. The insurgency has demonstrated conclusively that low-technology weapons are effective, inexpensive, and highly adaptable. Nevertheless, even these investigative reports, important as they are, merely expose the depths of the myopia syndrome that controls the thinking of the leadership at DoD and JIEDDO. This paper takes the next step. It not only shows the failure of high-tech countermeasures, but provides low-technology solutions that every serviceman and woman can use to protect himself/herself against their number one threat, the IED. . INTRODUCTION From the first deaths by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in June of 2003, the U.S. Department of Defense has been on a frantic search for the magic silver bullets that will

“The American Problem-High-tech vs Low,” Get a Grip! http://historygeeksblog.blogspot.com/2007/10/american-problem-high-tech-vs-low.html, October 1, 2007 Copyright 2011 © ∑eager Detection Systems, LLC All Rights Reserved

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quickly and easily destroy these horrific devices used by the insurgents against a hightech opponent. Much money and time was given to research groups and companies of all types to quickly provide our troops with protection from IEDs. Eight years in Iraq and ten in Afghanistan have shown they have not found it. Part of that is because the IED is so adaptable, and another part is that military leaders were seeking solutions from only the high-tech sector. The Improvised Explosive Device (IED), often dubbed “The Signature Weapon of the 9/11 Era,”2 is lethal, easily concealed and simple to construct. Its greatest asset, which will ensure its presence on the battlefield, is its low cost. The U.S. military was not prepared for the IED. Instead, the U.S. Army was designed to fight a fast, high technology war, requiring large quantities of supplies brought to the front via supply lines (that were later vulnerable to roadside bombers). Combat engineers had not been trained in dealing with IEDs either. Metal detectors were practically useless as Iraqi drivers use ditches to dispose of their soft drink cans. Much like their predecessors in earlier wars, combat engineers were reduced to probing the soil with metal rods. Nonetheless, by 2005 fully 70% of American casualties were caused by IEDs.3 Research accelerated to include universities and corporations. The National GeospatialIntelligence Agency (NGA) awarded numerous U.S. universities grants ranging from $150,000 to $300,000 per year.4 Many of the nation’s largest military contractors were awarded $millions and high-tech companies quickly began development programs. There were many promises and expectations were high. For example, Ionatron of Tucson, AZ, promised to send their remote controlled vehicle, traveling at 35 mph to send a surge of electricity that would disable hidden explosives up to 1,000 yards away. Company spokesman Mark Carallo said the device proved 90% effective in their field-tests to date [2005].5 More and more money and effort was put into finding a solution to the IED. A separate program designed to deal solely with IEDs, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), grew from small beginnings in 2003 to a 1,900 member staff and a budget of nearly $21 billion at present.1 Many large projects were robot and computer based. While they may have looked good in the laboratory or on paper, these devices were beset with problems that made them only marginally successful, if at all. Many other programs were delayed getting to the troops in the field. All the while casualties continued to mount.6 SWORDS, an armed robot supposedly ready for combat in 2008 began by turning its guns on US troops.7 The Army’s Future Combat System, highly dependent on sensors, was described by Rand Analyst John Gordon:
“So many of these future concepts are predicated on very, very high levels of situational awareness, but there’s precious little evidence we’re going to get there from here, particularly in a cluttered ground environment.”8

Many high-tech solutions have proven to be unsuccessful and at huge costs. In 2006, the military bought 3,800 radio jammers at a cost of $79,000 apiece from General Dynamics.
Copyright 2011 © ∑eager Detection Systems, LLC All Rights Reserved

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Another company, electronics maker EDO Corp. has supplied 4,000 jammers (Warlocks) at a cost of $200,000 each. Together these two companies received $400 million in IED contracts.9 All the while, the most recent data compiled [2009] shows that the cost of the IED is going down.2 Not surprisingly, the most common IED, the “victim-operated” one is also the cheapest, dropping from an average of $1,125 to build in 2006 to $265 in 2009.2 Most other IED types also dropped in price. THE INSURGENCIES IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN It is clear that the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan have understood that the IED is the best weapon to fight a high-tech enemy. The IED is highly adaptable due to its cost and simplicity and can be used just as easily in the rural battlefields of Afghanistan as it was in the urban ones of Iraq. Caught unprepared for this lethal low-tech weapon, the DoD began rushing high-tech countermeasures such as the radio frequency jammers and robots mentioned above to Iraq. The insurgency responded quickly to these high-tech countermeasures by adapting their IEDs. The versatility of the IED stunned military leaders. A retired Army officer who worked counter-IED issues in Iraq and Afghanistan described the Pentagon’s mindset best:10
“We all drank the Kool-Aid. We believed, and Congress was guilty as well, that because the United States was the technology powerhouse, the solution to the problem would come from science.”

Military and civilian experts now paint a picture of an enemy who is constantly changing, improving, manufacturing and detonating IEDs. They are not a ragtag bunch of rebels running around with AK-47s. The early stated goals of finding high-tech solutions to defeat this low-tech weapon is giving way to the realization that the bombs are growing in sophistication. It is a simple fact that the homemade bomb, the IED, is here to stay. Citing intelligence reports, Richard Wittstruck of the Army’s engineering intelligence program stated that terrorist cells send recruits to engineering colleges and universities to learn how to make IEDs and control radio spectrum. They see education as the key to succeeding in “spectral combat.”11 Once the insurgents see that their devices and tactics aren’t working they change them. The speed at which they adapt is impressive. “For every advance we make, they make another one. They’re getting better and there is nothing we can do about it,” said US Army Sergeant Joseph Baker in 2007.12 Early on in the Iraq War, some military analysts, particularly those from “The Fourth Generation Warfare Group,” realized that high technology alone would not solve the IED problem.13 William Lind stated,

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“Mass, of men or fire power, will no longer be an overwhelming factor. In fact, mass may become a disadvantage, as it will be easy to target. Small, highly maneuverable, agile forces will tend to dominate.”

Another member of this Group, Marine Col. T. X. Hammes said,
“There’s no money in counterinsurgency. It’s about language skills. It’s about people. It’s about a lot of soft money moving over to [Dept. of] State, Commerce, Treasury, and there’s no F-22 [fighter jet] in this program. As early as 2005 these military leaders knew, ‘There’s nothing that you can do in Iraq today that will work. That situation is irretrievably lost.’”14

Afghan insurgents, seeing the successes of the IED against U. S. troops in Iraq, are relying on them as well. By making a simple modification, they neutralized another high-tech countermeasure: the Trace Vapor Detector (commonly known as the “sniffer”). The “sniffer” goes over the terrain sampling the air for extremely minute quantities of TNT and its derivatives that escape from buried landmines or IEDs.15 But, the insurgents made a sudden and unanticipated switch from TNT to ammonium nitrate.2 A high nitrogen fertilizer, it has long been known to be an explosive (it was used in the Oklahoma City bombings, for example). It is not accounted for in sniffer data. Dealing with ammonium nitrate (or calcium nitrate) is particularly difficult for policymakers precisely because of its use as a much-needed fertilizer. The number of IED attacks reached an all-time high in June 2011: 1600.16 Paved roads, once thought to make the use of IEDs more difficult, has been shown to have no effect on IED use.17 THE SOLDIER ON THE GROUND Despite the $billions spent on high-tech counter IED weaponry little appears to have changed for the soldier on the ground trying to avoid the next landmine, IED and tripwire or locating tunnels and weapons caches used by the insurgency. Early in the Iraq War, this short dialog between CNN’s Wolf Blitzer and an unidentified combat demining engineer demonstrates how soldiers on the ground saw things:18
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [Fragment] hit right below the window. BLITZER: Did it get close to you? UNIDENTIFIED MALE: It went through five layers of the window, five out of seven layers. So I was counting my blessings that day. BLITZER: This looks like one of the most dangerous jobs anyone could ever possibly imagine. You realize how dangerous this is? UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes, it should be all right. I mean, as long as you don’t step on it, then you should be OK.

That conversation differs little from comments made by a Marine on patrol in Afghanistan:
One Marine serving in Afghanistan in 2008 was sent out ahead of his unit with a metal detector similar to those used by beachcombers. If he thought he found something two Marines with detectors would walk up front and sweep. “I remember thinking, ‘Here I am sitting in this Copyright 2011 © ∑eager Detection Systems, LLC All Rights Reserved

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quarter-million-dollar armed vehicle and we’re still out there searching for pennies on the beach.”1

As roads became increasingly dangerous to use soldiers began walking in the fields alongside the road altogether. The insurgents countered this move by mining the terrain the soldiers crossed. With no high-tech countermeasures at their disposal the commanding officer resorted to issuing the age-old maxim about moving through mined terrain: “If you see soft ground, move around.”19 The true horror and carnage caused by IEDs has been graphically described in a recent paper by Kelley Vlahos.20 The data mentioned below come from her report. From 2009 to 2010 there has been a 120 percent rise in wounded soldiers undergoing amputations. There has been a dramatic increase in multiple amputations and a 40 percent increase in fatalities. Soldiers are instructed to keep their tourniquets in their right shirt pocket, as in an IED blast, it is both legs and the left arm that are usually lost.20 Embedded reporter Michael Yon wrote that by watching the U.S. military use metal detectors to locate landmines and IEDs, Afghan insurgents are using more wood, plastic or carbon rods extracted from batteries for explosive triggers.21 The danger posed by IEDs to the soldier has, until relatively recently, been mostly unquantified. Two recent reports, one for Southern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan covering the years 2002-2009,22 and a second presenting the deaths, costs and technologies employed for the post 9/11 era, in graphic form detail the failures to stop the IED with high technology.23 MYOPIA SYNDROME All the data, reports, investigations and casualties have had virtually no effect on how the military leadership views the IED problem. Despite the length of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the cost in money and lives, DoD and JIEDDO leadership have exclusively focused upon high-tech solutions. The staggering costs of the high-tech countermeasures and the enormous length of time it takes to get the systems to the troops begs the following questions: • • • • Where did all that money go and what was it spent on? Why does military leadership restrict itself to only high-tech solutions, especially in the light of the highly adaptable low-technology IED? Why was there so little oversight? Why are there so few metrics JIEDDO is willing to give the public, or what impact these high-tech countermeasures have had?

Through it all they have steadfastly rejected to even consider or test low-technology methods, no matter what proof or experimental data are presented. Low technology has many advantages over high-tech, as has been shown by the ability of the simple IED to foil the most expensive piece of weaponry.
Copyright 2011 © ∑eager Detection Systems, LLC All Rights Reserved

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This can only be described as the myopia syndrome, in which one and only one category of countermeasure is considered, i.e., high technology. Despite years of failures, enormous quantities of money spent, or the very fact that the low-tech IED has proven itself so adaptable that it has countered every high-tech countermeasure thrown at it, the military leadership see high-tech and high-tech alone as the answer. And that myopia is keeping potentially life saving low-tech countermeasures from being used or even tested. LOW-TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS “Fight a guerilla like a guerilla”

DoD has ignored the relatively new low-technology countermeasures for use against the IED. It is easy to understand why members of congress vote for budgets that include a long list of high-technology weapons: they feel they are doing the will of their constituents and their patriotic duty to defend the soldier on the ground who is facing these deadly weapons. Landmine and IED detection is a complex topic that requires much time and effort from those who study it let alone from lawmakers already burdened with the problems of government. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining has published a list of methods currently in use – it is 226 pages long.25 Answers Provided from Soldiers in the Field There are many examples of soldiers providing low-tech solutions to low-tech problems. In the early years of the Iraq War, “hillbilly armor” was obtained by individuals from Iraqi scrap yards. To get heat-sensitive triggers to explode early soldiers hung toasters from poles ahead of their Humvees to cause the IEDs to detonate. Some are used, but many are ignored. Col. G. I. Wilson and Lt. Col. Greg Wilcox argued that major thoroughfares could be monitored via small single engine fixed-wing aircraft.9 Pilots could be in constant communication with ground commanders and check out suspicious activities where IEDs were being installed. Proponents of this approach contend that the cost would be minimal and aircraft could be deployed quickly. Their approach was rejected, and JIEDDO official Brig. Gen. Allyn refused comment. Tracking Methodology JIEDDO has used investigating tracking techniques that will teach soldiers to look for the telltale signs of someone who has been through the area and perhaps planted an IED. Footprints or exposed pieces of wire are giveaways that someone has been in the area. This technique requires training and alertness to the soldiers’ surrounding. Although they will not be listed here, there are a number of tracking schools used by the government to train soldiers. However, an adaptive insurgency is keenly aware of this training as well. Marine training team instructor, Gregory Sedia noted in 2008 that “There can never be enough

Brig. Genl. Puman Kamwar, India’s Counterinsurgency expert24

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training. Because as fast as we adapt, the insurgents adapt, which is why we want [Marines] to be aware of the signs of IEDs.”26 Hand-held Dipole Antennas Extensive new research and evaluation of two hand held wires has shown that the wires behave like dipole antennas. A series of reports and videos have documented the findings, methodology and testing.27 The dipole antenna, two L-shaped and unconnected wires, used to sit atop most TV sets. Nevertheless, the dipole phenomenon is real and when held in human hands the body itself acts as part of the circuit.28 Dipoles are unlike any of the high-tech methods that DoD has attempted to detect IEDs with for the past ten years in that it relies not on a particular wavelength or frequency (as radar or hyperspectral sensors do) but only upon electrical potential (or difference in voltage) between any two materials. Natural electromagnetic fields in the earth itself provide the force necessary to activate the dipoles. Unlike many high-tech countermeasures, hand-held dipoles produce standoff distances of, for example, 20+ meters for a buried gallon-sized object. Responding to the electrical potential means that the composition of a buried object can be made of anything, as long as it is different from the soil it is buried in. IEDs are almost exclusively metal, plastic, or ceramic, and in all cases, that potential is many orders of magnitude different. Both aboveground and belowground wires and cords produce a reaction in the dipoles. Advantages include: 1. The method can be taught throughout the armed forces, including groups specifically designed for the task, as is done with the Tracking Methods already in use by JIEDDO listed above. 2. The composition of the buried object, as well as the material it is buried in, is not a factor in determining dipole antenna movement. Therefore, metal, plastic, and ceramic objects can be found in any soil, including wet, cluttered or camouflaged ground. 3. They are lightweight and can be carried easily. Natural electromagnetic fields are sufficient to power them (no batteries needed). 4. Wire movement pattern recognition is already established for buried objects or wires and cords (above or below ground). 5. Aboveground tripwires can be located before contact is made. 6. Distance of detection is dependant upon the size and shape of the object, but is about 10 meters for a quart can and 20+ meters for a gallon can. The method provides at least ½ meter warning before encountering an aboveground tripwire. 7. The method is available for evaluation now. If proven successful in evaluation and testing, the hand-held dipole method has the potential to create a growth industry for research, development and manufacture. Those states and districts that encourage low-tech research will be the beneficiaries.
Copyright 2011 © ∑eager Detection Systems, LLC All Rights Reserved

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Many other low-tech solutions out there need to be evaluated. Some will work, some will fail, but in most cases, the product is already in place and testing can be performed quickly and effectively. CONCLUSION The myopia syndrome, which has caused the leadership of military countermeasures to focus on high technology and high technology alone, has not allowed potentially lifesaving low-tech measures into the product evaluation system. That myopia has allowed defense contractors to get $billions in funds and often have little to show it to help the U.S. soldier on the ground. Recent reports have shown that the amount of money spent, the lack of oversight and evaluation of effective of high-tech countermeasures, and the lack of metrics as to saved lives is unchecked. With IED attacks in Afghanistan at an all time high, and the number of fatalities and severe injuries rising it is time to begin testing of other counter IED efforts. Now, the US is in a time of budget shortfall and there will be cuts in military programs as well as civilian ones. The whole purpose of developing countermeasures to landmines and IEDs has been to save the lives of US servicemen and women. That purpose has not changed. It is clear that the $billions spent on just high-technology countermeasures has at best been marginally successful. The fact that the IED is a low-tech weapon and highly successful weapon seems to have not influenced decision makers. Ignoring low-tech methods is at the peril of U. S. troops safety. Leaving low-tech research untapped has been a tragic mistake. In these times of tight budgets, unending insurgencies and no clear solution to the IED on the horizon, it is unacceptable to not develop low-technology methods that are ready for immediate, legitimate evaluation. The message is simple: Use low-technology countermeasures against low-technology IEDs that will save the lives of U.S. soldiers now.

Copyright 2011 © ∑eager Detection Systems, LLC All Rights Reserved

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REFERENCES 1. Cary, P. and N. Youssef, 2011, “JIEDDO: The Manhattan Project That Bombed,” http://www.iwatchnews.org/print/3799, March 27, 2011, 14 p. 2. Ackerman, S., 2011, “$265 Bomb, $300 Billion War: The Economics of the 9/11 Era’s Signature Weapon,” http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011,2011/09/iedcost/, September 8, 2011, 4 p. 3. Grant, G., 2007, “Homemade Bombs, High-Tech Response,” Government Executive,” June 15, 2007, http://www.govexec.com/story_page_pf.cfm, 6 p. 4. Meisner, S., 2007, “NGA Announces Winners of NURI Grant Competition,” Directions Magazine, July 10, 2007, 5 p. 5. Brown, D., 2005, “U. S. Military Looking at Two New Devices to Defeat Roadside Bombs in Iraq,” Knight Ridder Newspapers, http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/12170645.htm, July 19, 2005, 2 p. 6. Lubold, G., 2007, “US Losses in Iraq Spike from IED Attacks,” http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0523/p01s04-usmi.html, May 23, 2007, 3 p. 7. Page, L., 2008, “US War Robots in Iraq ‘turned guns’ on fleshy comrades,” http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/04/11/us_war_robot_rebellion_iraq/print.htm, April 11, 2008, 3 p. 8. Axe, D., 2008, “Army’s Familiar ‘Future,’” http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/05/army-futures-20.html, May 6, 2008, 4 p. 9. Bryce, R., 2007, “Surge of Danger for U.S. Troops,” http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/01/22/ieds/print.htm, January 22, 2007, 5 p. 10. Atkinson, R., 2007, “If You Don’t Go After the Network, You’re Never Going to Stop These Guys. Never,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/10/02, October 3, 2007, 11 p. 11. Magnuson, S., 2006, “Iraq: Adaptive Foe Thwarts Counter-IED Efforts,” http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/jan/adaptive_foe.htm, January 5, 2006, 3 p. 12. “Insurgent Bomb-Makers Seek Edge in Roadside Arms Race,” 2008, Breitbart.com, http://breibart.com/print.php? =0803200150165805.0zzxd2mu&show_article=1, March 20, 2008, 3 p. 13. Lovelace, J. J. jr. and J. L. Vogel, 2004, “The Asymmetric Warfare Group: Closing the Capability Gaps,” Army Magazine, vol. 3, March 2004, 4 p. 14. Hedges, S. C., 2005, “Critics: Pentagon in Blinders,” Chicago Tribune, http://fairuse.1accesshost.com/news3/chtr19.htm June 6, 2005, 5 p. 15. Kampoor, J. C. and G. K. Kannan, 2007, “Landmine Detection Technologies to Trace Explosive Vapor Detection Techniques,” Defense Science Journal, vol. 57, no. 6, pp. 797-810. 16. Dreazen, Y. J., 2011, “IED Attacks in Afghanistan Hit All-Time High,” National Journal, http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/ied, August 3, 2011, 4 p.
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17. Medina, E. A., 2011, “Roads of War: Paved Highways and the Rise of IED Attacks in Afghanistan,” University of Pennsylvania, College of Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal, http://repository.upenn.edu/curej/139, 70 p. 18. Blitzer, W., 2005, “CNN Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer,” http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0505/29/le.01.html, May 29, 2005. 19. Cave, D., 2007, “As Comrades Search, Fatal Bomb Wreaks Havoc,” http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/27/world/middleeast/23search.html, May 23, 2007, 5 p. 20. Vlahos, K. B., 2011, “Truth Emerges About IED Carnage,” http://original.antiwar.com/vlahos/2011/08/01, August 1, 2011, 5 p. 21. Yon, M., 2011, “Low Metal Content,” http://www.michaelyon-online.com/lowmetal-content.htm, July 8, 2011. 22. Barker, A. D., 2010, “Improvised Explosive Devices In Southern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan,” Counterterrorism Strategy Policy Paper, New America Foundation, April 2010, 21 p. 23. Gregor, L., 2011, “The Dead, the Dollars, the Drones: 9/11 Era by the Numbers,” www.wired.com, September 9, 2011, 35 p. 24. Chopra, A., 2009, “The Man Behind the Force to be Reckoned With,” The National, November 3, 2009, 3 p. 25. “Guidebook on Detection Technologies and Systems for Humanitarian Demining,” 2006, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Geneva, Switzerland, March 2006, 226 p. 26. “Marines Learn Enhanced IED Procedures,” Stars and Stripes, April 14, 2008, 2 p. 27. Janks, J. S., 2010, “Dowsing Rods: Empirical Evidence and Applications for Charting the Subsurface,” Journal Borderlands Research, http://journal.borderlands.com/2010/dowsing-rods, 10 p. 28. Janks, J. S., 2011, “Low Technology for Detecting Landmines, IEDs and Tripwires,” http://www.scribd.com/doc/65351175/Low-Technology-forDetecting-Landmines-IEDs-and-Tripwires, September 18, 2011.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
John S. Janks has a BA from Monmouth College, Monmouth, IL and an MS from the University of Illinois at Chicago, both in geology. He worked in the oil, gas and chemical industries for 25 years. For nineteen of those years he worked at Texaco and Chevron/Texaco subsidiaries. He developed x-ray diffraction quantitative methods, worked in environmental geology and remote sensing. Remote sensing included satellite spectral data, spy satellite photography, and aerial photographic analysis. He developed a satellite spectral program to identify and quantify oil field operations. He taught courses and wrote manuals in all these areas of science. For the past 20 years he has used dipole antennas for locating buried objects, waste pits, pipelines, and wellheads made of metals, plastics and ceramics. The dipole antenna program was also used in providing “ground truth” for satellite and aerial photograph analyses. He has written over 30 papers and abstracts. He has spoken to domestic and international groups on x-ray diffraction methodology, satellite and aerial photography interpretation, and oil seep detection. His work has included regions such as the “stans,” the Arabian Peninsula, Angola, Peru, Colombia, China and parts of SE Asia. He has prepared environmental analyses for the governments of Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador. Abstracts of his papers are available upon request. He is a U. S. Navy Vietnam Veteran. He can be reached at: seagersystems@gmail.com

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