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of certiorari issue to review the judgments below. OPINIONS BELOW The March 1, 2011 Final Ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (―11th Cir.‖) appears at Appendix A (―App-A‖) and related rulings appears at Appendix A(1) (―App-A(1)‖)1 to the petition. The ruling of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia Denying a Rule 59(e) New Trial June 23, 2010 appears at Appendix B (―App-
B‖). The District Court April 26, 2010 Ruling Denying Motion to Set Aside
under Rule 60(b)(2),(3),(4), and (6) appears at Appendix C (―App-C‖). The 11th Cir. Ruling on July 07, 2009, Denying Reinstatement of Appeal Appendix D
(―App-D‖), the Clerk‘s Ruling Dismissing the Appeal on March 30, 2009 is at App-D(1) Clerk‘s numerous letters are at App-D(2).
The District Court‘s
Ruling on September 26, 2008, Denying Rule 59(e) New Trial (Rights violations case) is at Appendix E (―App-E‖). The District Court‘s Dismissal under Younger Abstention, of the Rights violations case, on August 26, 2008, is at Appendix F (App-F‖).
The Rulings from the Superior Court are at
App-A(1) contains the Denial of Forma Pauperis on November 12, 2010, and the January 3, 2011 Denial of Reconsideration for Forma Pauperis
Appendix G (―App-G‖, ―App.G(1), App.G(2), App.G(3)).
JURISDICTION The 11th Cir., as well as the District Court had jurisdiction to entertain the case before them. This Court‘s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1). The final ruling in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals was on March 01, 2011 CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED Due to length, the controlling Constitutional and Statutory Provisions are shown in Appendix H (App-H). STATEMENT This Petition shows that the United States District Court and United States Court of Appeals entered decisions in conflict with this Court and other United States District Courts and Courts of Appeals on the same important matter. The action in the District Court addressed very important Constitutional issues beyond the facts and parties involved. This Petition also shows that the process and proceedings in not only the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and The US District Court, but the state court as well, have all so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, as to call for an exercise of this Court‘s supervisory power; STATEMENT OF THE CASE Attempting to protect his property from a huge utility company, who had illegally taken land, rather than go through the proper channels,2 Petitioner filed a civil action in state court. Superior Court, and Judge
Becker, repeatedly violated, and aided in violating Georgia‘s real property laws, Petitioner‘s Civil, and Constitutional Rights under color of law/color of authority. Petitioner, and property co-owner Ms. McDonald, unmarried, on June 9, 2008, filed a Verified, prima facie, Complaint in US District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division (―District Court‖). Due to lack of resources,3 Petitioner, a disabled, adult male, with multiple disabilities, member of Federally protected class, denied Federally Funded-State Legal
Southern Company owns Georgia Power Company, to whom the Georgia General Assembly has given the right of condemnation, or negotiating an easement. In the case at bar, GPC, illegally took 40‘ x 100‘ of Petitioner‘s real property, then claimed an express grant easement from 1937 or 1941, by Dr. R.F. Wells, a man that never existed. The alleged easement was for an unlimited amount of land in two complete land lots, which would be around 88 acres, or between 176-528 properties. The documents used were manufactured, forged.
Received $637.00 monthly, as of January 1, 2009, receives $674.00 monthly from Supplemental Security Income
programs for which he was eligible and qualified,‖4 filed an action in District Court, against Superior Court Stone Mountain Judicial Circuit, Superior Court Judge Cynthia J. Becker (―Judge Becker‖)5, Georgia Power Company (―GPC‖), Brian P Watt, Esq (―Watt‖), and Scott A Farrow, Esq (―Farrow‖).6 All Defendants were properly served with Summons and Complaint June 10, 2008. The following day, the Superior Court case was dismissed with
prejudice for naming as defendants The Superior Court, and Judge Becker. The case taken to the District Court listed in the complaint, the fraud and fraud upon the Court that had wreaked havoc on the Superior Court proceedings.7 District Court dismissed the federal causes complaint, citing Younger Abstention and stating that Petitioner could bring up his Civil and Constitutional Violations claims in the state court. [App.F-19] District Court had actual knowledge that the day after serving Judge Ms. McDonald and Mr. Stegeman unmarried, co-own property where they both reside. In the District Court action, Ms. McDonald was co-Plaintiff, she was not part of the Appeals, and not part of this Petition.
Petitioner sought only injunctive relief against Superior Court Judge Becker. Superior Court and Judge Becker collectively are referred to as Superior Court.
Watt and Farrow were the attorneys employed by GPC to represent GPC in the Superior Court action. Watt, Farrow and GPC collectively are referred to as GPC.
GPC defendants admitted in Federal Court that they were guilty of Petitioner‘s allegations, but that they had a right to try to win the case no matter what they had to do.
Becker and Superior Court, with Summons and Complaint, the Judge and Court, retaliated against a disabled adult, attempting to enforce and enjoy Rights guaranteed to him by The State of Georgia‘s and The United States Constitutions, The Civil Rights Acts, and ADA Title II, dismissed with prejudice Petitioner‘s complaint,[App.F-3] leaving only an impermissible counterclaim intact. Petitioner, timely filed Notice of Appeal, Petition to Proceed on Appeal
in Forma Pauperis with Affidavit of Indigence. District Court stated that
Appeal was not frivolous, and GRANTED the Petition [App.E(1)]. In The United States Court of Appeals for the The Eleventh Circuit (―11th Cir.‖) Petitioner filed Motion for appointment of counsel, then a Motion to Recuse, on which the Court refused to rule. The 11th Circ. Denied
Petitioner‘s Motion for Appointment of Counsel, and his Motion for Reconsideration, thereof. The 11th Circuit, ignored Motion to Recuse and
while Petitioner was awaiting Ruling on Motion to Recuse, the Clerk dismissed the Appeal for failure to prosecute. [App-D(1)] The Clerk then Ruled as Moot, the pending Motion to Recuse, and failed to notice Petitioner. Seven days after Appeal dismissal, Petitioner received a copy of the Clerk to Clerk letter informing District Court the Appeal was Dismissed for failure to prosecute, and Motion to Recuse was Moot. That letter was mailed
from the 11th Cir. Clerk to the District Court clerk on March 29, 2009, in the letter, the clerk said that the Appeal dismissed on March 24, 2009. [App.D(1)]. The clerk, failed to give Petitioner Notice of 11th Cir. Rule 42-1(b) allowing Petitioner fourteen (14) days to remedy dismissal. With only five (5) of the fourteen (14) days left, Petitioner called and talked with the clerk, who told him the ways to remedy the problem. Petitioner followed her directions perfectly, yet the Clerk sent a letter claiming that Petitioner had not complied with the requirements,8 and gave Petitioner fourteen (14) days to remedy the defect [App-D(2)]. The identical actions of Clerk and Petitioner were performed no less than three (3) more times, each time with some other ludicrous, fictional problem [App.D(3)]. Petitioner finally began having the the Courier that delivered the papers to the Court, review what he was delivering, and sign a document stating what he was being delivered as proof against the clerk‘s ludicrous claims.9 [App.D(4)] When the Clerk continually made fictional claims that some documentation was missing from the Appeal and/or records, Petitioner went so far as to having the courier examine what was being taken to the Court, and signing a document to that effect. It still did not matter, each time, the Clerk stopped the Appeal on her level.
Petitioner had successfully Appealed to the 11th Cir. in the past, without err.
Within One Year, Petitioner Filed in District Court A Rule 60(b)
Having obtained new evidence, Petitioner filed a Motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2),(3),(4),(6), to Set Aside the District Court Ruling. District Court Denied the Motion [App-C], Petitioner, within ten (10) days, filed a Rule 59(e) Motion, which District Court, also Denied [App-B]. Notice of Appeal was timely filed; District Court Denied Petitioner Forma Pauperis for Appeal, on the grounds of frivolous. [App-B(1)]. District Court had originally granted forma pauperis, saying that the appeal was not frivolous. That is when
Petitioner knew beyond doubt that the first appeal was destined to be killed without ever being decided on the merits. Petitioner filed Petition to Appeal in Forma Pauperis in the 11th Cir., [App.A(1)]. The 11th Cir. Ruling cited that the Appeal was frivolous because no new evidence had been filed. [App-A(2)]. Petitioner Moved for Reconsideration. In the meantime, the clerk sent a letter that Petitioner had fourteen (14) days to pay the fee to Appeal.10 The 11th Cir. Denied the Motion to Reconsider, [App-A(2)]. Petitioner filed a Motion to Stay all proceedings while Petitioner requested a review by this Honorable Court; the 11th Cir. Denied the Motion, Petitioner would have gladly paid the fee, had he any assets with which to comply. Receiving $674.00 monthly, and a house payment of more than half of what he receives, he financially was estopped from continuing further. He would have gladly worked out payments, but they do not have a plan for that.
stating that Petitioner cannot Petition this Honorable Court [App-A]. Petitioner is unaware that the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals is allowed to speak for this Honorable Court, Petitioner believes that this Court still makes it‘s own decisions. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
The Superior Court Action
In Superior Court, Petitioner, and real property co-owner, Ms. McDonald, filed a Verified prima facie complaint against GPC over an ongoing easement dispute. GPC filed Verified Answers and Counterclaim,
claiming to have a valid, legal easement;11 and requested that if the Court found that they didn‘t have an easement, that the Court grant them one, then listed every kind of easement known to mankind. The entire case was based on documents supplied to Petitioner by GPC over the years leading up to the case.12 There was only one issue involved,
whether or not GPC had a ―legal valid easement‖, as they claimed in the The Verification stated that GPC had investigated the claim and their records, and that under the penalty of perjury, they had a legal valid easement. [App.G(3)]
The documents consisted of handwritten 1937 easement document, 1937 Power/Railway map, handwritten 1941 easement document, 1941 typed easement document; None of the easement documents had a Notary Seal, were not legal according Georgia law, or on file in County records. Only the map (which did have a seal) was a legal binding agreement under Georgia law.
Verified Answer. When they filed for Amendment to their Verified Answers six months after the Superior Court action had been filed, and requested reformation of the document, including the spelling of the street and Land Lot, it was obvious that they had perjured themselves in the Verification. Later when they Moved for Summary, and the Affidavits they submitted to the Superior Court showed that they had had a title search done before filing their answers, and after they filed their answers, it was further proof that they knowingly perjured themselves in the documents. Georgia General Assembly has set out specific, non-ambiguous statute on these types of proceedings, O.C.G.A. §44-2-40 ―The Land Registration Laws‖.13 Superior Court refused to appoint the required examiner of title, refused to have the clerk perform the mandated tasks required by statute to bring the property under jurisdiction of the court; the Judge‘s main obligation was to turn it over to the clerk for appoint of examiner of title: ―who shall discharge the duties provided … in this article but whose relation and accountability to the court shall be that of an auditor in the general practice…in this state‖ O.C.G.A. §44-2-100. The clerk was to have ―the Sheriff take steps necessary to bring the property under jurisdiction of the Court‖, ―these proceedings are to be in rem‖ The controlling ―Land Registration Laws‖ are reproduced in full in the Appendix H, (―App.H‖).
see O.C.G.A. §§44-2-61,14 44-2-72;
―the clerk issues process for the Sheriff The Superior Court
to serve to show cause‖, O.C.G.A. § 44-2-67(a)(1)16.
action had been filed October 26, 2007, there was never ―appointment of examiner‖, the Sheriff was never contacted, the property never ―brought under jurisdiction of the Court‖, and the proceedings were not ―in rem‖. Only the examiner of title has authority to: ―examine title and related documents‖, O.C.G.A. §44-2-10117; ―make a preliminary report consisting of: (1) Extracts from the records; (2) A statement of the facts relating to the possession of the lands; (3) The names and addresses of all persons
O.C.G.A. §44-2-61 The proceedings … for the registration of land and all proceedings … in relation to registered land shall be proceedings in rem against the land;
O.C.G.A. § 44-2-72(a) A notice… shall be delivered by the clerk to the sheriff … shall, within 30 days… post the same upon the land; (c) the sheriff shall go upon the land and ascertain the identities of the occupants. … make an official return to the court; (e) After the sheriff … has entered upon the land, posted the notices ... made his return to the court …, the land shall be deemed to have been seized and brought into the custody of the court…; and the court's jurisdiction in rem and quasi in rem shall attach thereto for purposes of land registration proceedings…
O.C.G.A. § 44-2-67(a)(1) … the clerk shall issue a process directed to the sheriffs … requiring all …persons "whom it may concern" to show cause … not less than 40 nor more than 50 days … why the prayers … should not be granted and why the court should not proceed to judgment in such cause.
O.C.G.A. §44-2-101 … It shall then become the duty of the examiner to make up a preliminary report containing an abstract of the title to the land from public records and all other evidence of a trustworthy nature that can reasonably be obtained by him
interested in the land as well as all adjoining owners‖.18 The fraudulent documents submitted with Georgia Power‘s Verified Answers in both Superior and District Courts were not Notarized, Certified, or otherwise authenticated, did not possess the required ―dated with the year, month, day, hour, and minute accurately stated‖ as required for recordation in order to be filed in County records O.C.G.A. §44-2-12119. The document GPC claimed was an easement, had never been filed/recorded, and failed to have the necessary ―description of the easement‖ in further violation of mandated Georgia statute. GPC claimed to have easement over two Land Lots in this direct area. A Land Lot is around 44 acres; GPC claims to have easement over every part of both Land Lots, somewhere in the neighborhood of 88 to 264 family residential properties20. Georgia statute states that once the above statutes have been complied
There are no power poles on Appellant‘s property, it is more than forty feet in the middle of his neighbor‘s front yard, the neighbor would be part of the proceedings.
O.C.G.A. §44-2-121: Every entry made in the register of decrees of title, in the title register, or upon the owner's certificate under any of the provisions of this article shall be signed by the clerk and dated with the year, month, day, hour, and minute accurately stated.
The figure of ―88‖ would be if every property had a one acre lot, which in DeKalb County, Georgia is unheard of, the lots are anywhere between 1/6 and ½ acre, Petitioner‘s property is large, around a half (1/2 ) acre; so a more accurate figure would be 264 properties
with, ―only the examiner‖
―shall proceed to hear evidence and make up his
final report to the court‖ O.C.G.A. §44-2-102. The examiner sets a time and place for hearing, where the examiner interviews ―witnesses, production of books and papers, hears all lawful evidence submitted; then within 15 days, he presents to the clerk his findings. Any of the parties to the proceeding may file exceptions to the conclusions of law or of fact or to the general findings of the examiner within 20 days after such report is filed. The clerk
shall thereupon notify the judge that the record is ready. If the parties
disagree, they can request a trial with or without a jury O.C.G.A. §44-2-103. The only explanation why no examiner had been appointed, would be that Petitioner would have produced for the examiner the 1937 easement document and the 1937 Power/Railway map22. The Power/Railway map
shows the power poles were to be 5‘ 2.5‖ from the white line or 15‘ 2.5‖ from the center line and crossing the road before reaching Petitioner‘s property. The map, under Georgia statute, is an undisputable, binding contract;
Nowhere does it state the Judge presides over a fictitious Motion to Compel, or that she has a part concerning the evidence or witnesses, nowhere does it state anything about a Motion to Compel filed by any party.
GPC had provided Petitioner with two different easement documents, one from 1937 which coincided with a Rail/Power map, and a document from 1941. GPC relied upon the 1941 document in the trial courts.
O.C.G.A. §44-2-29 Any plats or any blueprints, tracings, photostatic copies, or other copies of plats recorded prior to March 29, 1937, …are declared to
map was given to Petitioner by Ralph Hall, a GPC Manager, a fact confirmed in a letter from attorney Watt to GPC in house counsel Kevin Pearson. GPC could not risk the map appearing in the Court, every pole on Sheppard Road, and the South end of Ridge Ave. would be in violation according the map. GPC has illegally taken 40‘ x 100‘ of Petitioner‘s property. Rather than use the power of condemnation granted them by the Georgia General Assembly, GPC illegally took Petitioner‘s land through deception, a crime in Georgia. See Avery v. Chrysler Motors Corporation, et., al., 214 Ga. App. 602 (448 SE2d 737) (1994): ―Theft by deception is committed when a person "obtains property by any deceitful means or artful practice with the intention of depriving the owner of the property." OCGA 168-3 (a). "A person deceives if he intentionally: (1) Creates or confirms another's impression of an existing fact or past event which is false and which the accused knows or believes to be false; [or] (2) Fails to correct a false impression of an existing fact or past event which he has previously created or confirmed.‖ Petitioner provided undisputed evidence to Superior and District Courts that the man GPC‘s documents shows granted easement to GPC, ―Dr.
have been duly recorded; and the reference in any deed, mortgage, or other instrument executed prior to March 29, 1937, to the boundaries, metes, courses, or distances of the real estate delineated or shown on any plat or on any blueprint, tracing, photostatic copy, or other copy of a plat recorded prior to March 29, 1937, … shall have the same effect as if the boundaries, metes, courses, or distances of the real estate were specifically set forth in the deed, mortgage, or other instrument.
R. F. Wells‖, ―Mr. R. F. Wells‖, or ―Robert F. Wells‖ never existed; a fact GPC, to date, has failed to dispute, or addressed. Further, the use of fraudulent
land documents is illegal in both state and federal courts, and must not be condoned by either Court as it tampers with the administration of justice. As the Supreme Court noted in Hazel-Atlas Co. v. Hartford Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246, 64 S.Ct. 997, 1001, 88 L.Ed. 1250, reh'g denied, 322 U.S. 772, 64 S.Ct. 1281, 88 L.Ed. 1596 (1944), a case that also involved an allegedly fraudulent document: ―[T]ampering with the administration of justice in the manner indisputably shown here involves far more than an injury to a single litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public,…in which fraud cannot complacently be tolerated consistently with the good order of society.‖ In Superior Court Petitioner had filed Motion to Strike for perjury, fraudulent statements, use of fraudulent land documents, and fraud upon the Court. Georgia statute concerning the use of fraudulent documents in an attempt to gain property or any interest therein is very specific: O.C.G.A. § 44-2-43 Any person who: (1) fraudulently obtains or attempts …registration of title to any land or interest therein; (2) knowingly offers … any forged or fraudulent document in …any proceedings with regard to registered lands or any interest therein; (3) makes or utters any forged instrument …of mortgage or any other paper, writing, or document …proceedings required for the registration of lands or the notation of entries upon the register of titles; (4) steals or
fraudulently conceals any owner's certificate, creditor's certificate, or other certificate of title …; (5) fraudulently alters, changes, or mutilates any writing, instrument, document, record, registration, or register …; (6) makes any false oath or affidavit …; or (7) makes or knowingly uses any counterfeit of any certificate … shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years. O.C.G.A. § 44-2-44 Any clerk, …or other person performing the duties … of clerk who: (1) fraudulently enters a decree of registration …; (2) fraudulently registers any title; (3) fraudulently makes any notation or entry …; (4) fraudulently issues any certificate …; or (5) knowingly, intentionally, and fraudulently does any act of omission or commission under color of his office …shall be guilty of a felony and shall be removed from office and be permanently disqualified from holding any public office and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years. Georgia statute is very specific about false statements, as shown in The State v. Johnson, 269 Ga. 370 (499 SE2d 56) (1998) reversed: ―That statute sets forth three ways to commit the crime of false statement: (1) when a person knowingly and wilfully falsifies a material fact; (2) … makes a false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or (3) … "makes or uses any false writing or document, knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry." Id. This appeal involves the third way of violating OCGA 16-10-20. State v. Luster, 204 Ga. App. 156, 158 (1) (a) (ii) (419 SE2d 32) (1992). Even construing OCGA 16-1020 strictly against the State, see generally Jowers v. State, 225 Ga. App. 809 (2) (484 SE2d 803) (1997), the language therein unambiguously prohibits an individual from making or using any false writing or document, without regard to the identity of the individual who initially made or subsequently used the false document‖
―Where statutory language is plain and unequivocal and leads to no absurd or impracticable consequence, the court has no authority to place a different construction upon it. See generally Holden v. State, 187 Ga. App. 597 (2) (370 SE2d 847) (1988). It thus follows that under OCGA 16-10-20, all individuals who use a false writing or document, knowing it to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the State or its political subdivisions, may be charged with violating the statute.‖ ‗"Any party to a crime who did not directly commit the crime may be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished for commission of the crime …." Id. It is not necessary that the State allege 16-2-20 and 16-2-21 in the indictment. State v. Military Circle Pet Center, 257 Ga. 388 (360 SE2d 248) (1987); see also Jenkins v. State, 172 Ga. App. 715 (4) (324 SE2d 491) (1984)‖.‘ Petitioner‘s property had never been brought under jurisdiction of the Court, since Judge Becker dismissed Plaintiffs with prejudice, the Court and Becker, lacked both personal and subject matter jurisdiction, thereby, their rulings are not merely voidable, but in fact void. Petitioner showed through undisputed, documented evidence that GPC made fraudulent claims of a valid, legal easement, granted by ―Dr. R. F. Wells, R. F. Wells, or Mr. R. F. Wells‖. In Superior Court, Petitioner provided undisputed evidence that the document was a fraud, filed Motion to Strike on that basis March 5, 2008, and filed for a protective Motion To Stay Discovery and All Other Processes March 20, 2008 staying the action.
In Superior Court Appellant filed Statement for the Record and Request to Take Judicial Notice which contained the truthful events of how attorney Watt was manipulating the judicial system, the Court employees and the Court itself. In Judge Becker‘s Order Dismissing the complaint, she Ordered the filing as Denied. When it became evident that Watt was orchestrating a fictional discovery dispute,24 Petitioner filed a protective Motion to Stay Pending
Ruling on Motion to Strike.25 Judge Becker refused to acknowledge the abuse of Petitioner, he filed for a protective Motion to Stay Discovery and All Proceedings Pending Ruling on Motion to Strike. Several days later, Watt filed Motion to Compel
Discovery. Watt waited several days, filed another Motion to Compel. Watt falsely swore in both Affidavits and Certifications filed with the Motions to Compel. Petitioner, in response, filed Motion to Strike for false swearing;
The letter from attorney Watt to Georgia Power in house counsel Pearson clearly shows that they would first claim that Plaintiffs would not produce or reproduce the 1937 Power/Railway Map that is in fact a binding contract under Georgia Land Laws. When the map was given to Watt, he then made the falsum claim about the video-tape which was also a lie.
All Respondents filed Motion to Stay Pending Ruling on Motion to Dismiss while in US District Court seeking the same thing Plaintiffs/Appellant sought in Superior Court, the difference being Judge Becker ignored the Superior Court motion, whereas Judge Duffey did not ignore the Motion filed in his Court.
Petitioner‘s Motion to Stay and Motion to Strike, were ignored until the Judge Ordered Petitioner‘s case dismissed with prejudice,26 the Motion was then denied. Petitioner‘s Motion to Strike GPC‘s answers and counterclaim and Motion to Stay had been filed in Superior Court, prior to the fictional discovery dispute; Petitioner‘s Motions were not Ruled on until the order dismissing Plaintiffs‘ case with prejudice. [App.G(1)] Five months after being served with Verified Complaint, several months after Appellant filed Motion to Strike and Motion to Stay, GPC‘s Amended their counterclaim, claiming scrivener‘s error, and requesting reformation of the document. Part of the reformation, they needed the
spelling of the road changed, the Land Lot changed, the District changed, and the survey directions changed. Then, well after the filing of the District Court case, and Dismissal of it, GPC filed Motion for Summary Judgment, requesting the Superior Court to just grant them a prescriptive easement. The Superior Court Denied
Petitioner‘s Motion to Set Aside the prior Ruling Dismissing with Prejudice Plaintiff‘s action, in order to prevent Petitioner defending against Summary Judgment, and Granted Summary Judgment in favor of GPC.[App-G] The day after the Superior Court Judge was Served with Summons and Complaint, in an act of retaliation for Petitioner‘s attempt to enforce his Civil and Constitutional Rights under color of state law, the Judge dismissed the case with prejudice, leaving intact the Defendant‘s counterclaim only.
GPC attacked the sufficiency of their own Verified pleadings,
admission in judicio. As the McDonald/Stegeman Verified Complaint had
truthfully stated, GPC did not have a valid legal easement pertaining to their property. By Amendment, GPC admitted that they did not have valid or legal easement. ―What a party admits to be true in his pleadings, he is not permitted subsequently to deny.‖: State Hwy. Dept. v. Lumpkin, 222 Ga. 727 (152 SE2d 557) (1966), rev'd on other grounds, Dept. of Transp. v. Hardin, 231 Ga. 359, 361 (201 SE2d 441) (1973). Further a litigant cannot request the Court to grant them through legal process, that which cannot be legally granted, GPC‘s request, violated Georgia mandatory statute. knowingly, willingly, wantonly lied in their Verified Answers GPC and
Counterclaim, and repeatedly falsified Affidavits, and filings in the Court without consequence. Petitioner had also filed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, in Superior Court, after GPC‘s request for reformation showed that Appellant‘s claim that Georgia Power did not have a legal, valid easement pertaining to Appellant‘s property had been admitted, he was entitled to Judgment in his favor. Motion was never ruled on. Superior Court claimed that there was a Motion to Compel hearing May 27, 2008 which was neither on the Motion Calendar, nor showing in
―Scheduled Events‖ [App.G(2)] on the Docket.27
May 28, 2008 the mail
delivered Notice of Deposition which claimed that there had been an Oral Order by Becker on May 27, 2008, but no Order was included. The Notice
was in violation of statute, stated it would go on ―day after day until completed‖ as well as other violations. Plaintiffs mailed Objection to Notice, and the day before the depositions, called Watt and explained they needed to reschedule due to car problems. He told them no. The Objection was held unfiled by the Court until after the date for the depositions, then mailed back to Plaintiffs, never filed. After Judge Becker claimed to have had a hearing that was neither on a Motion Calendar, nor showing in ―Scheduled Events‖, it became obvious that she was part of a covert conspiracy to have the case dismissed for a fictional discovery dispute. [App.G(2)] There was no choice left, in order to enforce and protect their Rights,28 McDonald and Stegeman filed the District Court complaint.
There are no transcripts, evidence, or records that there was in fact a hearing; in District Court, although not one person disputed the Court calendar that Mr. Stegeman had attached as an Exhibit to show that there was not a duly noticed hearing, Judge Duffey stated that he didn‘t know when it had been printed; the District Court Judges have no business ruling on evidence that has not been disputed by the opposition. Further, if there were to be a fact finder, it would have needed to be a jury, not the judge.
Petitioner attempted more than once to have his Title II Rights observed.
―A conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons to accomplish an unlawful end or to accomplish a lawful end by unlawful means….To recover damage… must show that two or more persons, acting in concert, engaged in conduct that constitutes a tort…‖ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Mustageem-Graydon v. Suntrust Bank, 258 Ga. App. 200, 207 (573 S.E.2d 455) (2002); Miller v. Lomax, 266 Ga. App. 93, (596 S.E.2d 232) (2004) Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 06/13/1978): ―When he filed his appeal, the trial judge ordered… to change the transcript …delete testimony… tampering…‖ at : ―The final defendants who were associated with the court …altered the transcript.‖ ―In Rheuark v. Shaw, 547 F.2d 1257, 1259 (5th Cir. 1977), this court held that an action could be maintained under section 1983 against a state court clerk and stenographer for failing to forward a transcript to the state appellate court. See also Qualls v. Shaw, 535 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1976); McLallen v. Henderson, 492 F.2d 1298, 1299 (8th Cir. 1974).‖ The day after being properly served with Summons and Complaint, Superior Court retaliated against Petitioner for attempting to exercise his Rights by dismissing his case with prejudice, without a hearing. The
counterclaim was left pending. Many months later, and after District Court had Dismissed under Younger, GPC in Superior Court was the only remaining party, there was no opposing party left for Summary Judgment, a hearing was scheduled for April 27, 2009. [App.G(2)]. Petitioner hoping to participate in the Summary Judgment, filed a Motion to Set Aside the Court‘s previous dismissal with prejudice for the sole purpose of allowing Petitioner to file a Response to, defend his property in the
Superior Court denied the Motion and mailed the
Responsive Brief back unfiled, Granted summary judgment to GPC, in violation of Georgia law. [App-G]. The hearing was set to take place on a Monday, at 9:30 AM, the Order is stamped filed at 9:12 AM [App-G(2)] the day of the hearing. The Order stated that Petitioner had failed to appear for the hearing. You cannot appear at a hearing that ended before Court began that same morning. Petitioner later found the Order attached to his real property records, and the records reflecting a sale of Petitioner‘s real property. [App.G(3)]
The District Court Action
When it became obvious that GPC was planning to have the case dismissed in Superior Court for a fictional discovery dispute, and the court was aiding GPC, the District Court action was filed. It was obvious that GPC was committing a fraud upon the Court, and the court was allowing it. In District Court, GPC, Watt, and Farrow admitted Petitioner‘s allegations, including fraud upon the Court in Superior Court; and their excuse was that they had a right to try to win the case. Judge Becker refused to abide by Georgia statute concerning land, and had refused to recuse. Petitioner sought only injunctive relief against
Superior Court and Judge Becker. The day following perfected service upon
Judge Becker and Superior Court, in an act of retaliation, for being named a defendant in the District Court case,29 the Superior Court action was dismissed with prejudice, with GPC counterclaim left pending. [App-G] In the District Court case, despite the Superior Court action being between Homeowners as Plaintiff against GPC alone, District Court continually referenced the case by the name of the County ―DeKalb easement action‖ [App.F-2 ].30 Neither DeKalb County, nor the State of Georgia had an U.S.C. § 12203. Prohibition against retaliation and coercion (a) Retaliation No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, … (b) Interference, coercion, or intimidation It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this chapter.
On the same page of the same order, District Court in *n1, went to great lengths to falsify information about the Petitioner, for reasons unknown to Petitioner. He had appeared as Plaintiff in a couple different cases in front of the same court, but that gave the court no grounds to verbally assault Petitioner, and state total falsities, such as ―Plaintiff claimed he improperly was charged with elder abuse and financial fraud…revoked his Power of Attorney‖, to the contrary Petitioner had said he ―had never been charged…‖ [App.E(2)] Then District Court claims ―Wachovia Bank filed an action in the DeKalb County Superior Court against Plaintiffs Stegeman and McDonald for accounting and damages regarding an investment account in which Plaintiff Stegeman and his aunt Caffrey were joint tenants.‖ That too is a falsity, Stegeman and McDonald had filed a case against Wachovia Bank, but never was there a case filed against them by Wachovia. When a Bank sues an individual for fraud, it is a criminal matter. Just because a Court disagrees with a party‘s choice of defendants, does not grant the court grounds for stating outright lies about the party in a later lawsuit to discredit
interest in private real property, and Georgia Power Company is not a ―state‖ entity, Southern Company owns GPC. District Court, referred to it as the
DeKalb easement action for clearly improper purposes. June 17, 2008 Superior Court, in lieu of an answer, filed Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) &(6) of the Fed. R. Civ. P.; June 27, 2008, GPC, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) filed Motion to dismiss with prejudice. Petitioner Responded to Superior Court‘s Motion on June 30, 2008; and on July 11, 2008, Responded to GPC‘s Motion; July 25, 2008 Petitioner filed Certificate of Interested Persons, Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan and Initial Disclosures.31 July 31, 2008 Appellant filed Motion and Brief to Recuse or Disqualify the District Court Judge; and filed a Reply to Respondents‘ Responses thereto. Motion to Recuse or Disqualify was Denied in the District Court‘s Opinion and Order Dismissing the case on August 26, 2008 [App-Fpp7], the same day 11th Cir. dismissed Petitioner‘s Appeal from a previous, unrelated case. Judge Duffey had been the Judge in the previous action as well, and the party. Local Rules Pre-Trial Instructions, LR 26.11, LR 84.1; LR 3.3 (excluding governmental parties); and LR16.1, using the words ―shall be‖ and ―must‖ It states nowhere that parties filing Motions to Dismiss are exempt from the filings.
had no business taking the case at bar. Having defaulted for two weeks or more in the filing Certificate of Interested Persons, Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan, or Initial Disclosures on August 8, 2008 Superior Court filed Motion to Stay Proceedings Until Resolution of Defendants‘ Motion to Dismiss, GPC joined the Motion; Petitioner filed Responsive Objections August 8, 2008. District Court on August 26, 2008, Granted both Motions to Dismiss on the grounds of Younger, Denied other grounds as Moot [App-F]. Respondents‘ Motions to Dismiss contained irrelevant, scandalous, fictional allegations concerning Petitioners‘ past lawsuits in District Court. In Respondents‘ Responses to the Motions, he requested the District Court disregard and strike the irrelevant, immaterial allegations. Rather than
disregard and strike the allegations, District Court elaborated and enhanced the irrelevant, scandalous, fictional allegations [App.Fpp2,3*n1]. The verbal attack upon Petitioner was unnecessary, untrue and was meant to discredit, humiliate, and embarrass Petitioner, resulted in manifest injustice.32 ―Plaintiff Stegeman … twice before. Stegeman filed a previous action … Stegeman v. State of Georgia, et al., …, Stegeman claimed violations of his civil rights…. Plaintiff claimed he improperly was charged … Stegeman asserted state officials and the Probate Court judge violated his There is no other logical explanation for the statements to otherwise be placed in the Order
constitutional rights. He brought claims … under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). He also brought state law claims … – … July 16, 2007, the Court dismissed the Georgia Case. On August 26, 2008, the Eleventh Circuit …‖[App.F-2,3*n1] Petitioner filed Motion for Reconsideration September 9, 2009. Petitioner requested District Court remove the following fictional statements from the Court‘s Order and Opinion, which the Court refused to remove.
[App.E,pp.5,6]. ―Wachovia Bank filed an action in the DeKalb County Superior Court against Plaintiffs Stegeman and McDonald for accounting and damages… Plaintiffs asserted a variety of counterclaims alleging their rights were violated and assets improperly taken. The parties settled this litigation. Plaintiffs refused to conclude the settlement, however, and the litigation continued. Unsatisfied with the result of the matter,…‖ ―Plaintiffs Stegeman and McDonald brought a separate pro se action in the DeKalb County Superior Court against Wachovia and several other defendants. Plaintiffs‘ many claims included breach of contract, grand larceny, fraud and conspiracy. Wachovia removed the action to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See Stegeman v. Wachovia Bank, No. 1:06-cv-0242-WSD (N.D. Ga. 2006) (the ―Wachovia Case‖). On April 4, 2006, the Court remanded the Wachovia Case for lack of jurisdiction.‖33 [App.Fpp2*n1,2nd¶] Wachovia never filed a suit against Petitioner and/or Ms. McDonald for anything; there could therefore, be no counterclaim filed by either Petitioner or Ms. McDonald, they could not be dissatisfied an outcome that never happened. A suit for Accounting and damages, is a suit for fraud, which if had happened, would not have been brought by a bank, it would have been brought by the District Attorney the Disctrict Attorney had talked with Petitioner‘s attorney at that time, see [App. E(2)]or a Federal prosecutor as it is a criminal charge. District Court‘s Ruling is public record, the Court has
Superior Court and GPC both responded on September 15, 2008; Petitioner file a Reply September 24, 2008. District Court Denied Reconsideration September 26, 2008; denied the request to remove the grossly incorrect statements:34 ―Plaintiffs first state that the Court incorrectly described two other actions before this Court involving the Plaintiffs. See August 26, 2008 Order at 2-3 n.1; Pls.‘ Mot. for Reconsideration at 2-4. The Court‘s description of those cases existed solely to provide context to the rest of the Order, and any alleged errors in those descriptions cannot constitute grounds for reconsideration‖ 35 [App.E-5,6] Petitioner failed to see in what ―context‖ a Court could justify making a false statements and having it in the public record, and what such a Ruling could have to do with anything. Petitioner file Notice of Appeal, Motion to Proceed on Appeal in Forma Pauperis w/ Affidavit which District Court granted December 23, 2008. stated on Public Record a fictional statement that Petitioner and Ms. McDonald are criminals. While it is true that Appellant and McDonald filed an action against Wachovia and several of Wachovia‘s Employees, Wachovia did remove the case to US District Court, Duffey did Remand the case. There is nothing contained in the paragraphs that have relevancy to the case at bar and the only explanation for bring up the false statements would be to injure the reputations of and discredit Petitioner and Ms. McDonald. Plurality of Plaintiff(s) is incorrect, Ms. McDonald was party to only the Wachovia action, not the State action. The statement shows defamatory intent and violates First Amendment Rights.
Appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Petitioner had previously filed an Appeal in the Eleventh Circuit, and
had no problems with his filing. Contrary to the claims made by the Clerk, Petitioner is certain that everything was in order and properly filed. Appellants filing an Appeal to the 11th Circuit are not given numerous chances to get the documents correctly filed. The Clerk pretended to give Petitioner five attempts. [App.D-1] Apparently, when District Court granted
forma pauperis status for Appeal, there had been an agreement that the
Appeal would be stopped by the clerks. ARGUMENT AND CITATIONS TO AUTHORITY The complaint filed in District Court clearly stated that the case was brought due to illegal acts, fraud upon the court, and a covert conspiracy to have a case in Superior court dismissed for a fictional discovery dispute, as well as due process violation, civil and constitutional rights violation under color of law or color of authority and other causes.
Under Color of State Law Claims
There ―are three prerequisites that must be satisfied to assert a valid due process claim: (1) deprivation, (2) of property, (3) under color of state law‖. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 536-537, 101 S.Ct. at 1913-14. ―These three elements are necessary to establish a violation of due process under the fourteenth amendment; however, they alone are insufficient.‖ Id. at 537, 101 S.Ct. at 1914. In order to prove these elements, a litigant ―must also show either (1) the conduct was caused by ‗established state
procedure rather than random and unauthorized action,‘‖ Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3203, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984), or ―(2) the means of redress for property deprivations provided by the state fail to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process‖. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 537, 101 S.Ct. at 1914; see Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 583 (6th Cir.1985) (en banc). ―In this circuit, a § 1983 claim alleging a denial of procedural due process requires proof of three elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process. Cryder v. Oxendine, 24 F.3d 175, 177 (11th Cir. 1994). In that case, it was held that ―the tenants enjoyed a constitutionally-protected property interest in their continued residency at Lafayette Square, and they were deprived of that interest‖. See Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 450-51, 102 S. Ct. 1874, 1878 (1982) (concluding that continued residency in leasehold property is a "significant interest in property" subject to due process protection)‖ Further in Petitioner‘s cases for the spanse of three or more years, he was not afforded one single hearing that was actually showing on the docket report, or showing on the calendar. This Court has held ―It is beyond question that the constitutional right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before a person is finally deprived of property by government action is clearly established‖. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313, 70 S. Ct. at 656-57. Without relying on Memphis Light, however, the majority distill a further due process requirement: "[w]hen exigent circumstances prompt an emergency eviction, contemporaneous pre-deprivation notice is required," such that "tenants must receive notice of their right to challenge the condemnation decision when they are provided with the notice to vacate the building." Maj. Op. at ___. Clearly, Petitioner had met that burden. Superior Court has (1) deprived Petitioner of (2) his‘ and Ms. McDonald of her‘ property, (3) under
color of state law; the means to seek redress for property deprivations, did not ―satisfy the requirements of procedural due process‖. ―The Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual against state action,… Williams I, 341 U.S. at 341 U.S. 92 (opinion of Douglas J.)… Page 383 U.S. 800 and is therefore within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.‖ Page 383 U.S. 806: ―…no State shall deprive any person of life or liberty without due process of law … direct traditional concern of the Federal Government, …in which the federal interest has existed for at least a century, and in which federal participation has intensified as part of the renewed emphasis upon civil rights.‖
Fraudulent/Forged Real Property Easement Documents
GPC not once, denied that the documents they had supplied as their evidence, were not manufactured, forged, fraudulent documents, signed by a person that never existed. Petitioner repeatedly stated that the documents were forged, fraudulent and manufactured; this was never disputed by GPC. As the Supreme Court noted in Hazel-Atlas Co. v. Hartford Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246, 64 S.Ct. 997, 1001, 88 L.Ed. 1250, reh‘g denied, 322 U.S. 772, 64 S.Ct. 1281, 88 L.Ed. 1596 (1944), a case that also involved an allegedly fraudulent document: ―[T]ampering with the administration of justice in the manner indisputably shown here involves far more than an injury to a single litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud cannot complacently be tolerated consistently with the good order of society.‖
Further, GPC, Watt, and Farrow, not once denied, but in fact, admitted that they were guilty of the allegations about their acts in the Superior Court action, contained within the complaint. Their response was that they had a right to try to win the case. Georgia Power Co. v. Irvin, 267 Ga. 760, 482 S.E.2d 362 (Ga. 03/19/1997) SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA36: ―Appellant/defendant Georgia Power Company brings this appeal from a judgment entered by the trial court on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs/appellees Irvin and Jackson,‖ ―The present dispute began in 1986 when the DOT filed a condemnation proceeding… Named in the condemnation proceeding were appellees/plaintiffs herein and Georgia Power. Georgia Power asserts that the trial court erred in submitting the issue of title to the jury …a mixed question of law and fact — whether the facts exist which constitute adverse possession, is for the jury…The court then incorporated the jury‘s factual findings into the judgment and decreed title in plaintiffs. There was no error. Georgia law favors the admissibility of any relevant evidence, …Evidence of doubtful competency or relevancy should be admitted and its weight left to the jurors. McEachern v. McEachern, 260 Ga. 320 (1) (394 S.E.2d 92) (1990). As for the maps and ledgers, it was established that the documents, prepared by Georgia Power, contained admissions against interest,…‖ Superior Court decided that GPC has a prescriptive easement over the whole of Petitioner‘s property, with no description of the easement given in the documents.
Utility companies in Georgia cannot have prescriptive
O.C.G.A. §44-2-84 All judgments and decrees of the superior court or the judge thereof which are rendered under this article shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court.
easements, and easements that violate code, cannot be recorded into the records, a lack of description of easement, fits that category, or one that is more than 20 feet. Petitioner began with less than a half acre, and GPC has already illegally taken 40‘ by 100 ‗. Further, only a jury trial could rule on a prescriptive easement, even if a utility company could legally aquire one. Thompson Et Al. v. Mcdougal., 248 Ga. App. 270, 546 S.E.2d 44 (2001): ―Factual questions such as these regarding whether a prescriptive easement has been established must be resolved by a jury.‖ See Hasty v. Wilson, 223 Ga. 739, 743 (2) (a) (158 SE2d 915) (1967). In Petitioner‘s situation, and contrary to District Court‘s ruling Petitioner failed to appear at a hearing he had no Notice for, was not on the Docket Report, and was not showing on the Court Calendar. He was
dismissed with prejudice without a hearing whatsoever, the Court should have set the ruling aside, see TMS Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Galloway, 424 SE 2d 71 Ga. App.(1992) holding: ―The failure of counsel or a party acting pro se to receive notice of a hearing constitutes such a defect as will authorize the setting aside of the judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (3).‖ Housing Auth. Of Atlanta v. Parks, 189 Ga. App. 97, 98 (374 SE2d 842) (1988). Accord Coker v. Coker, 251 Ga. 542 (307 SE2d 921) (1983).‖
―Notice of a hearing on a motion, however, is required by OCGA § 9-11-6 (d) to be served. Service of such notice is controlled by OCGA § 9-11-5 (b), which provides specific means by which service may be accomplished and does not make provision for service by publication . . . . [P]ublication of notice of a motion hearing date is not, by itself, sufficient compliance with § 9-11-6 (d).‖ (Emphasis in original.) Goodwin v. Richmond, 182 Ga. App. 745 (356 SE2d 888) (1987). Since TMS carried its burden of showing that it did not receive notice of the hearing, we must conclude that the denial of the motion to set aside constituted error. Compare Housing Auth. Of Atlanta, supra Petitioner has consistently been denied the right to be heard, The
Probate matter was in the Superior Court for over three years without a hearing; the County suit against Petitioner was in court for two years with one Motion to Compel hearing, at which Petitioner was not allowed to speak; the Wachovia case was in court for one year seven months, without ever a hearing; Stegeman v the State was in court for over seven months without a hearing; Hicks v Stegeman where a law firm was going to sue was in court well over two years with no hearing; and The Georgia Power case in Superior Court was there well over a year, and in District Court was there for four months without a hearing. It is a pattern and practice to deny Petitioner due process of law, i.e.: Notice and Hearing, before the deprivation of property.
As Recently as Last Year, the Courts Still Ruled for Property Rights, Against the Utility Companies
In Lee et., al., v. Southern Telecom Company, et., al., 694 SE 2d 125 Ga. App. (2010), the Court held: ―The underlying premise of the trial court‘s grant of summary judgment is that the Lees could not maintain this action because the plat showed questions regarding the Lees‘ ownership of the land on which the cable was installed. This is not the law in this state. ―The right of enjoyment of private property being an absolute right of every citizen, every act of another which unlawfully interferes with such enjoyment is a tort for which an action shall lie.‘ OCGA § 51-9-1. Further, under OCGA §§ 51-92 and 51-9-3, one in bare possession of land is sufficient to authorize recovery for interference with the possession of the land ‗in any manner.‘ Bare possession of land authorizes the recovery of damages from anyone wrongfully interfering with the possession. Tacon v. Equity One, 280 Ga.App. 183, 188(2), 633 S.E.2d 599 (2006); Collins v. Baker, 51 Ga. 128*128 App. 669, 674, 181 S.E. 425 (1935). Under Georgia law, ‗a trespasser is one who, though peacefully or by mistake, wrongfully enters upon property owned or occupied by another.‘ (Punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Frank Mayes & Assoc. v. Massood, 238 Ga.App. 416, 418(1), 518 S.E.2d 903 (1999). Although Georgia law recognizes the doctrine of the innocent trespasser, whether a trespass was 34illful or innocent is generally for the jury to decide. Nichols v. Ga. Television Co., 250 Ga.App. 789, 790(1), 552 S.E.2d 550 (2001).‖ ―…merely because the trespass was committed by a contractor,…responsible to…methods of installation, does not relieve Southern Telecom from liability…whether Southern Telecom directed where the cable should be installed. Chattahoochee Brick Co. v. Goings, 135 Ga. 529, 535, 69 S.E. 865 (1910) (anyone aiding, abetting, or inciting, encouraging or directing a trespass, through words or conduct, is liable equally with actual trespassers); Evans v. Cannon, 34 Ga.App. 467, 472, 130 S.E. 76 (1925) (anyone procuring or assisting the commission of a trespass or doing any act which ordinarily induces its commission is as liable as the actual perpetrator).‖
―Thus, the *129 fact that Southern Telecom‘s contractor …committed the actual trespass does not excuse it from liability. See Jones v. Ceniza, 257 Ga.App. 806, 809(2), 572 S.E.2d 362 (2002) (evidence showed that employer pointed out an incorrect property line); Tingle v. Jones, 249 Ga.App. 654, 656, 549 S.E.2d 477 (2001) (evidence that employer disregarded property line, resulting in the trespass); Klingshirn v. McNeal, 239 Ga.App. 112-113(1), 520 S.E.2d 761 (1999) (…employer‘s instructions, contractor cut trees on property not belonging to employer).‖
District Court‘s Dismissal Under Younger
Petitioner has found very hard for his right to his property, only to have both state and federal court go against him. A disabled individual, who fought hard to get, and has fought hard attempting to keep his property, only to have the Courts rule in favor of a gigantic corporation. This Court held in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 US 350 - Supreme Court 1989 : ―"We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution." Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821). T]he courts of the United States are bound to proceed to judgment and to afford redress to suitors before them in every case to which their jurisdiction extends. They cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of another jurisdiction.' " Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 529, 534 (1893) (citations omitted). "When a Federal court is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to *359 take such jurisdiction . . . . The right of a party plaintiff to choose a Federal court where there is a choice cannot be properly denied." Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 40 (1909) (citations omitted). Underlying these
assertions is the undisputed constitutional principle that Congress, and not the Judiciary, defines the scope of federal jurisdiction within the constitutionally permissible bounds. Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 234 (1922).‖
REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS WRIT We are at a time, in the United States, when so many homeowners, in foreclosure, are wondering whether they fight to keep their real property, or do they give up and walk away. In the case at bar, we have a disabled adult male, who fought to be able to purchase his real property, and struggles to make the payment, and is not in foreclosure. He understands what it would mean if he missed a payment, and has set everything in a particular way, that no matter what, his payment will be made and made on time. Then comes Georgia Power Company. Is the message that needs to be conveyed to the real property owners in The United States that even if you never face foreclosure, that the big corporation, can waltz in, pull out some manufactured documents, and lay claim that they have an easement over your entire property, even though it lists the wrong spelling on the road, wrong Land Lot, and wrong District. And to have the Courts rule in favor of the big corporation.
Is this really what real property ownership in The United States has come to? Is this really the message that should be conveyed to the
homeowners fighting, or not fighting for real property in this country? It is time for this Honorable Court, the Highest Court in the land, the Court that as children we are promised will be there to Rule for our causes; it is time this Court put some faith back into the citizens of the United States. Faith that buying and owning real property in the United States, still means something. Petitioner has shown that in seeking redress for theft and destruction of personal real property, and his Right to own same, he filed his grievances in the Courts, and was Denied the Right to his Real Property without due process of law. Petitioner was then denied the right to appear at Summary Judgment hearings, even though without Petitioner, there could be no Summary Judgment hearing, jurisdiction of the property had never been in front of the Court. Petitioner was then, repeatedly denied his Right to appeal the rulings. Petitioner has shown his grievance, and search for Justice is worthy of Petition for Cert. And Prays that this Honorable Court will GRANT his Petition. Respectfully submitted, this 24th day of May, 2011,
By: _____________________________ JAMES B. STEGEMAN, Pro Se 821 Sheppard Rd Stone Mountain, GA 30083 (404) 300-9782
CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE I hereby Certify that, I having prepared this document, have complied with the Font Type of Century Schoolbook, and Size of 13 points, that the document has been double spaced as required, and the number of pages is 38, with 7903 words including footnotes. _______________________________ Janet D. McDonald Preparer
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