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THE HISTORY OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR: 1945 TO 1987
Course Author Sunil Ram (Canadian Forces Retired) American Military University Series Editor Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D.
Based in part on the original course by F.T. Liu Special Adviser to the International Peace Academy Former United Nations Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs Externally reviewed by Dr. Tim Mau University of Guelph, Canada
© 2008 Peace Operations Training Institute
THE HISTORY OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR: 1945 TO 1987
Course Author Sunil Ram (Canadian Forces Retired) American Military University Series Editor Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D.
Based in part on the original course by F.T. Liu Special Adviser to the International Peace Academy Former United Nations Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs Externally reviewed by Dr. Tim Mau University of Guelph, Canada
Peace Operations Training Institute
© 2008 Peace Operations Training Institute Peace Operations Training Institute 1309 Jamestown Road, Suite 202 Williamsburg, VA 23185 USA www.peaceopstraining.org
First edition: 1997 by F.T. Liu Second edition: August 2006 by Sunil Ram Cover: UN Photo #122816 by John Isaac This course was developed and updated under a generous grant from the United States Institute of Peace. The material contained herein does not necessarily reflect the views of the Peace Operations Training Institute, the Course Author(s), or any United Nations organs or affiliated organizations. Although every effort has been made to verify the contents of this course, the Peace Operations Training Institute and the Course Author(s) disclaim any and all responsibility for facts and opinions contained in the text, which have been assimilated largely from open media and other independent sources. This course was written to be a pedagogical and teaching document, consistent with existing UN policy and doctrine, but this course does not establish or promulgate doctrine. Only officially vetted and approved UN documents may establish or promulgate UN policy or doctrine. Information with diametrically opposing views is sometimes provided on given topics, in order to stimulate scholarly interest, and is in keeping with the norms of pure and free academic pursuit.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .7 The Early Phase of UNEF 3.1 Genesis of UN Peacekeeping Operations 1. . . . . . . . . . .3 UN Peace Initiatives for the Suez Canal Crisis 3.5 Summary LESSON 2 – THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.8 The Status of the Force Agreement 3. . .4 Mandate of UNTSO 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Major Contribution of Ralph Bunche 2. . .6 The Second Truce 2. . .5 Responsibilities of the Parties Involved 2. .History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations During the Cold War: 1945 to 1987 TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD . . . .2 Background on the First UN Peacekeeping Operation 2. VII FORMAT OF STUDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 The UN Emergency Force (UNEF) 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Principles Upon Which UNEF was Based 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 The Korean Crisis and Its Aftermath 1. . . . . . . . .1 Differences Between Military Observer Missions and Peacekeeping Missions 3. . 31 3.11 2. . . . . . . .10 UNTSO After 1973 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII METHOD OF STUDY. . .2 UN Collective Security System 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .IX LESSON 1 – THE GENESIS OF PEACEKEEPING. . . . . . . . . .7 The General Armistice Agreements 2. . .9 UNEF’s Composition iii . . . . . . .11 Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) 2. . . . . . . . . . .2 Background of the Suez Canal Crisis 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 Impact of UNTSO on Other Early Military Observer Missions LESSON 3 – THE FIRST UN EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF I) . . . . . . . .8 Observation Operations Between 1967 and 1973 2.1 The First UN Military Observer Mission 2. . . . . . . . . .9 The 1973 War (Yom Kippur War) 2.6 Advisory Committee 3. . . . . . .4 Increasing the Role of the General Assembly 1. . . . .1 1. . . . .
. .6 Impact of the Financial Crisis LESSON 6 – UNTEA. . . . . .11 Effects of ONUC on the United Nations 4. . . . .2 The Post-Independence Crisis (1960-61) 4.2 The Financial Background of UNEF and ONUC 5.10 6. . . .65 5. .5 The Secession of Katanga 4.11 6. .7 6.3 6. . AND DOMREP. . . . . . . . . . . . .8 Personnel and Logistics Issues 4.73 UN TEMPORARY EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY (UNTEA) IN WEST NEW GUINEA (WEST IRIAN) 6.6 6. .2 6. .4 The Stand Taken by the United States Regarding Article 19 5. . .7 The Re-establishment of the Central Government 4.4 6. . . .3 Steps Taken by the UN to Resolve Its Financial Crisis 5.13 Background on UNTEA Establishment of UNSF Establishment of UNTEA Indonesia Takes Over UNTEA’s Impact Background on UNYOM Establishment of UNYOM Organisation of UNYOM Operations and Termination Background on DOMREP The Inter-American Peace Force Role of DOMREP DOMREP’s Impact UN YEMEN OBSERVER MISSION (UNYOM) DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (DOMREP) iv .12 The Role of ONUC in the Evolution of UN Peacekeeping Operations LESSON 5 – THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF THE EARLY 1960s. . . . . .1 6. . .12 The Weaknesses and Strengths of UNEF The Egyptian-Israeli War and the Withdrawal of UNEF Consequences of the Withdrawal of UNEF LESSON 4 – UN OPERATION IN THE CONGO (ONUC) . .9 Lack of Intelligence Gathering Capability 4. .10 The Outcome of the ONUC Mission 4. . .47 4. . . .3. .8 6.11 3. .1 Background on the UN Operation in the Congo 4. . . . .12 6. . . . .4 The Constitutional Crisis 4.6 Fighting Between Katangan and ONUC Forces 4.5 The Report of the Special Committee and Resolution of the Financial Crisis 5. . . .1 What Precipitated the Financial Crisis at the United Nations 5. . . .5 6. . .10 3.3 The Withdrawal of Belgian Forces 4. . UNYOM.9 6. . . . . . .
.13 7. . . . .2 Establishment and Organisation of UNFICYP 9.5 8. . .6 The 1967 Crisis 9.3 8. .7 8. . . . .1 Background on UNFICYP 9. . .4 Liaison Arrangements and Freedom of Movement 9. . . . . .11 7. . .9 7.107 THE SECOND UN EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF II) 8. . . . . . . . .11 8.3 7.9 8. . . .13 8. . . . .3 Guiding Principles for UNFICYP 9. .5 7. .14 Background on UNOGIL Deployment of UNOGIL Role of UNOGIL Presence of U. . . . .12 7.8 8. . . .14 Background on the Six-Day War of 1967 The October 1973 War and the UN’s Response Establishment of UNEF II Composition and Strength of UNEF II Mission Mandate Renewals UNEF Command and the Status of the Force Phases of UNEF II Significance and Innovations of UNEF II Background on UNDOF Establishment of UNDOF Organisation of UNDOF Force Modernisation The Area of Separation Role and Activities of UNDOF DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE (UNDOF) LESSON 9 – UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS (UNFICYP) . . .91 UN OBSERVATION GROUP IN LEBANON (UNOGIL) 7. . . .10 7. . .2 8. .8 7.127 9. .LESSON 7 – UNOGIL AND UNMOGIP. . . . . . .7 Arms Imports v .5 Ceasefire Supervision and Normalisation Efforts 9. . . . . .6 8. .7 7.1 8. . . . .S. . . . .2 7. . . .12 8.1 7. . . . . . Military Forces in Lebanon Events in Jordan General Assembly Emergency Session Termination of UNOGIL Background on UNMOGIP Role of UNMOGIP Establishment of UNIPOM The Tashkent Agreement The Continuation of UNMOGIP The 1999 Kargil Conflict Ongoing Issues UN MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN (UNMOGIP) LESSON 8 – UNEF II AND UNDOF. . .4 8. . . .4 7. . . . .10 8. . . . . .6 7.
9. .10 9. .2 Organisation of UNIFIL to April 1982 10. . . . .2 Evaluating the Performance of UN Peacekeeping During the Cold War 11. .13 Force Reductions Between 1965-1974 The 1974 Coup d’état The 1974 de facto Ceasefire Secretary-General’s Good Offices Mission The Financial Problems and Subsequent Restructuring of UNFICYP UNFICYP to the End of 2005 LESSON 10 – UN INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 END-OF-COURSE EXAMINATION INSTRUCTIONS. . . . . .178 APPENDIX B – LIST OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.12 9.3 General Criticisms of Peacekeeping 11. . . . . . .3 Ceasefire and Israeli Withdrawal 10. . . . . . . . . .13 UNIFIL’s Deficiencies and Shortcomings 10. . . 205 vi . . . . . . . . .12 UNIFIL from July 2000 to January 2006 10.1 Background and Establishment of UNIFIL 10. . . . .169 11. . . . . . . .14 The Aftermath of UNIFIL’s Failure LESSON 11 – SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. . .8 9.7 Withdrawal of the IDF 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 9. .10 Role of UNIFIL from 1985 to April 2000 10. . . . . . . . . .11 9. . . .9 Landmine and UXO Clearance 10. . . . . . . . .4 Conclusion APPENDIX A – LIST OF ACRONYMS. . . . .8 The Force Mobile Reserve (FMR) 10. . . . . . . .1 Summary 11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 The Imperfect Buffer Zone 10. . . . . . .6 The 1982 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon 10. . .5 Limited Lebanese Government Control Over Southern Lebanon 10. . .11 The Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon 10. . . . . . . . 180 APPENDIX C – MISSION DATA. . . . . . .
FOREWORD Given the resurgence of peacekeeping in the early 21st Century. the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon–UNIFIL. Subsequent lessons discuss the smaller missions conducted in Asia. and diplomatic background that contributed to the evolution of peacekeeping operations in a general chronological order. it is relevant to deepen the knowledge and understanding of United Nations peacekeeping missions in the context of their origins and evolution. non-UN and UN-related activities that went on during the Cold War must also be considered in relation to actual UN peacekeeping operations to gain a full understanding of events. I hope that the student will find this updated and enhanced course informative and interesting and that the knowledge gained will be of use in dealing with issues that face peacekeepers throughout the world. as these missions were fundamentally different to the way operations are conducted today. Overall. The course then refocuses on the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 1967 War. Sunil V. It is important to gain a conceptual foundation and background in the history of UN Peacekeeping Operations by reviewing the historical. At the time of this writing. Therefore. and complexity of United Nations peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations in the immediate post-Cold War era. scope. The course then returns to the Arab-Israeli conflict in Lebanon. Ram July 2006 vii . the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). this course package begins with the genesis of peacekeeping and moves on to the Korean War. in which the first true UN peacekeeping and observer missions were established. the first Arab-Israeli war is discussed. as mission mandates could be terminated by the time this course comes to print. which is the final mission of the Cold War era and offers a summary and conclusion of the effectiveness of peacekeeping during the first 45 years of peacekeeping. thus. it is highly pertinent to review how peacekeeping was conducted during the Cold War. One other Cold War mission. With the expanding size. was at the periphery of unfolding events in the region. This review is even more relevant as a number of key Cold War missions are still ongoing as of 2006. From there. lessons have been written in the past tense. and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation–UNTSO) were directly in the path of the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. and the Caribbean. political. three of which (the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force–UNDOF. However. then stepping back briefly in time to 1964 and the inception of the mission in Cyprus. the study guide will familiarise the student with the significance of individual UN Peacekeeping Missions and the overall evolution and functioning of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations during the Cold War. Peacekeeping obviously did not occur in a vacuum and. some of the missions were still ongoing. Prof. the Middle East. The course then goes on to discuss the missions in the late 1950s in Egypt and Congo (1960) and the resulting financial crisis they created that nearly led to the collapse of the UN.
Course format and materials permit: • MODULAR STUDY • EASE OF REVIEW • INCREMENTAL LEARNING STUDENT’S RESPONSIBILITY The student is responsible for: • • • Learning course material Completing the End-of-Course Examination Submitting the End-of-Course Examination Please consult your enrolment confirmation email or the end of this course for examination submission instructions.FORMAT OF STUDY This course is designed for independent study at a pace determined by the student. viii .
go back to the lesson section and re-read it. you will be given one opportunity to take a second version of the End-of-Course Examination. including basic facts. an acronym list of all peacekeeping operations. you will be awarded a Certificate of Completion. maps. read the material twice to ensure maximum understanding and retention. Study the lesson content and the learning objectives. Set up guidelines regarding how you want to schedule your time. After you complete all of the lessons. • Before you begin actual studies. If you are able to. first browse through the overall course material. strive to understand concepts and overall perspectives in regard to the United Nations system. and medals. Before you go on. • • • • • • • Note: The appendices located in the back of this course contain reference materials that may be useful to the student. The material should be logical and straightforward. take time to review the main points of each lesson. and mission data profiles of the missions discussed in this text. take the End-of-Lesson Quiz. If you score below 75 percent. At the beginning of each lesson. One note about spelling is in order. Then. which give you an idea of what will be involved as you proceed. Instead of memorizing individual details. This course was written in English as it is used in the United Kingdom. take the End-of-Course Examination in one sitting. Notice the lesson outlines. orient yourself to the main points.METHOD OF STUDY The following are suggestions for how to proceed with this course. ix . For any error. be aware of the discrepancy in your understanding that led to the error. Your exam will be scored. the following hints have worked for many. Though the student may have alternate approaches that are effective. When you finish a lesson. and let time elapse between readings. while the material is fresh in your mind. and if you achieve a passing grade of 75 percent or higher. including a list of acronyms used in this text.
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LESSON 1 THE GENESIS OF PEACEKEEPING 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.5 Genesis of UN Peacekeeping Operations UN Collective Security System The Korean Crisis and Its Aftermath Increasing the Role of the General Assembly Summary .2 1.
as well as the chain of responsibilities related to each step. how it played a major role in the re-evaluation of peacekeeping by the United Nations. • • • . By the end of Lesson 1. namely. The student becomes familiar with the impact of this rivalry on the operation of the United Nations and the subsequent evolution of peacekeeping missions and military observer missions. It discusses the original system of UN collective security and why it became inoperable. Understand the impact of superpower rivalry in the evolution of peacekeeping operations. as well as the nature. and how that definition evolved with changing circumstances. their chain of command. Explain what overall steps are taken to establish a mission. Lesson 1 also takes a look at the nature of the period known as the Cold War. The lesson examines an initial regional conflict in Korea.Lesson 1 / The Genesis of Peacekeeping 2 LESSON OBJECTIVES Lesson 1 provides a look at what the term peacekeeping meant in the original Charter. the UN intervention in Korea and how it impacted UN policy towards international peacekeeping. the student should be able to meet the following objectives: • Explain the original UN system of collective security as outlined in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. and Identify and explain the early predecessor of peacekeeping operations. and roles of the countries and the forces that participate in these missions. a term reflecting the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. duties. and how it led to the increased role of the General Assembly in initiating peacekeeping measures. The lesson describes the characteristics of peacekeeping missions. and their implementation.
these ideals and some early attempts at arms control (i. Therefore. From a western perspective. the United Nations Organisation (UNO) became the mechanism to implement collective diplomacy and peace.1 Genesis of UN Peacekeeping Operations It has been argued by some historians that the origins of peacekeeping go as far back as the Delian League of ancient Greece in the fifth century. Member States of the UN have agreed to “accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council” (SC). Under Article 25 of the Charter. more substantive European attempts were made to peace-orientated agreements included the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. PKOs are not mentioned at all in the original UN Charter. but the first truly substantial system came into being after the horrors of World War I (1914-18).) and the Soviet Union (USSR) emerged after World War II and significantly affected the operation of the UN. This was known as the Cold War. should be included in an alliance that tried to resolve international disputes through mediation at a world council held in a neutral location. Over the next few centuries.e. Paris in 1763. and ideally it was conceived as a non-violent use of military force in an effort to preserve peace between warring state actors. What we now call peacekeeping came about out of necessity and was essentially an improvisation to respond to the growing tensions between the superpowers (the U. including all those outside of traditional Europe.S. But. The League of Nations was the child of American President Woodrow Wilson. BCE. which was based on peace enforcement by the SC and consensus by major powers. The founders of the United Nations had not foreseen the possibility of engaging in peacekeeping operations (PKOs). By definition. the closest example from history that first tried to personify what we see today as peacekeeping was initiated by the early medieval Catholic Church through its initiatives (the Peace of God and Truce of God) in the late tenth century to try and limit the spread of war. Peacekeeping fell between Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter. and in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars the Concert of Europe in 1815-18. like the Delian League. and it was an attempt at collective diplomacy and peace enforcement. This led to the conception of PKOs. became unworkable. on closer examination these examples of “proto” peacekeeping were clearly ordinary alliances that had little to do with ethical issues surrounding peace. and the USSR). under the Charter. the original collective security system. thus. However. It ultimately failed. He argued that all the worlds’ leaders. but after the Second World War. peacekeeping operations are essentially a practical mechanism used by the United Nations to contain international conflicts and to facilitate their settlement by peaceful means. As a result of the increasing disagreement between the two superpowers. the Second Lateran Council of 1139) were also initiated to allow the fury of interstate war in Europe to be directed at the Muslim-dominated Middle East.S.Lesson 1 / The Genesis of Peacekeeping 3 1. However. the SC has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.. A new and radical idea was offered in 1623 by Emeric Crucé. There were other attempts.” . Early peacekeeping was a response to inter-state conflict. tensions between the United States (U. Utrecht in 1713. and in the future it would be euphemistically referred to as “Chapter VI ½ operations.
It provides that in the case of: (a) A threat to the peace (b) A breach of the peace (c) An act of aggression the Security Council may take enforcement measures to restore the situation. These enforcement measures are essentially: (a) Arms embargoes (b) Economic sanctions and. It was intended to provide a collective security system for Member Nations. mainly by: (a) Negotiation (b) Conciliation (c) Mediation (d) Arbitration (e) Peaceful settlement (f) Resort to regional agencies or arrangements. Briefly. CHAPTER VII: ENFORCEMENT MEASURES If the peaceful means fail and the dispute escalates into an armed conflict. then Chapter VII comes into play. the parties concerned are obligated under Chapter VI of the Charter to seek a solution by peaceful means.2 UN Collective Security System The original system devised by the United Nations to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security is outlined in Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. (c) The use of force.Lesson 1 / The Genesis of Peacekeeping 4 1. in the last resort. Chapter VII constitutes the core of the UN Collective Security System. Plans for the use of force must be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the UN Military Staff Committee. the original system was meant to function in the following manner: CHAPTER VI: PEACEFUL RESOLUTION When a dispute arises between two governments. .
and each are endowed with the right of veto. "The official flag of the United Nations. U. this never came to be. this was the Korean Crisis in 1950. is shown in this photograph. But because the Cold War broke out shortly after the establishment of the United Nations.3 The Korean Crisis and Its Aftermath The Charter provisions on the collective use of force in Korea were invoked in a roundabout way.N. 1. Instead. and especially between the two superpowers.N. since its early days. impartiality was required from the deployed UN forces. The classical model of Cold War peacekeeping evolved over the 1950s. New York.S. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (now Russia). 1950. Peacekeeping began with unarmed observers and then evolved into missions that had both armed peacekeepers and unarmed military observers. good offices of the SecretaryGeneral. This resulted in the SC having to resort to other means in which to preserve peace and stability. The United Kingdom. are Permanent Members of the SC. peacekeeping troops were drawn on a voluntary basis from Member States. as peacekeeping evolved. which played a key role in the creation of the United Nations. and (d) Authorise the unified command to fly the United Nations flag. conciliation." (Quote from the original caption). and ultimately peacekeeping became these other means during the Cold War. The same major powers also make up the Military Staff Committee. when consent from the protagonists was required for peacekeeping intervention. however. the mediation. The background colour of the flag is the light blue associated with the U. When the North Korean army invaded South Korea in June 1950. It asked the Council to: (a) Determine that the armed attack by North Korea was a breach of the peace. Thus. the United States immediately brought the matter before the Security Council and proposed a series of draft resolutions. and the United States. the Charter provisions on the collective use of force can be applied effectively only with their consent and with their continued co-operation. (c) Request Member States to provide military assistance to South Korea and make their military units available to a unified command under the United States. (b) Call upon North Korea to withdraw its forces forthwith to the 38th parallel. and UN forces were only to resort to the use of arms in self-defence. .Lesson 1 / The Genesis of Peacekeeping 5 The five major powers. while the official United Nations seal in its centre is in white. these conditions could not be met due to the fact that the relations among the major powers. This occurred at the outset of the Korean crisis. President Franklin D. These nations are China. became marred by mistrust and disagreement. armed forces in action to restore the peace in Korea. Roosevelt had envisioned the SC’s Permanent Members as a team of “world policemen”. now flying with national banners over the U. France. There was only one instance during the Cold War in which the collective use of force was initiated under the Charter. Thus.
1961.S. In the absence of the Soviet Union. At the time. At the 1950 session of the General Assembly. it resumed its seat in the Security Council at the beginning of August 1950. known as the “Uniting for Peace Resolution. the United States draft resolutions were adopted and provided the basis to establish the United Nations Forces in Korea. the Council could no longer take any action on the Korean crisis. The medal was officially renamed the United Nations Korean Medal on November 22.4 Increasing the Role of the General Assembly The repercussions of the Korean crisis led to a re-evaluation of the UN’s role in peacekeeping. Personnel were eligible to receive the medal after a period of 30 days service in the Mission. the General Assembly could then vote to take action. proposed a draft resolution to empower the Assembly to deal with matters in this field on an emergency basis. The Soviet Union had boycotted the SC because the anti-communist government of Taiwan occupied the permanent SC seat held by China. the Assembly adopted this proposal. instead of the mainland communist government. . It proposed that if the Security Council failed to act because of the lack of unanimity among its Permanent Members. Despite the strong objection of the Soviet Union. It was a unique case made possible by the astonishing decision of the Soviet Union to stay away from the SC for six crucial weeks. the U. and • the Council’s enabling resolutions had not specifically invoked that Chapter. When the Soviet Union realised the consequences of its boycott. (Source: UNDPKO) 1. The Korean Operation was established between 1950 to 1954. and • they used force. It was undoubtedly the Korean experience that prompted the United States to seek to enhance the role of the General Assembly to maintain international peace and security. after it returned.Lesson 1 / The Genesis of Peacekeeping 6 These draft resolutions did not mention Chapter VII of the Charter. The UN Forces in Korea were not a peacekeeping operation in the way that a PKO is normally defined because: • the forces there were not directed by the SecretaryGeneral. because: • it was not under the control of the Security Council. the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council because of the question of the representation of China at the UN.” on 3 November 1950. Nor was it considered an enforcement operation under Chapter VII of the Charter. Why the Soviet Union waited that long to return to its seat on the SC remains one of the unresolved mysteries of the United Nations history.
Pearson. As further reading will show.5 Summary The Korean crisis and its aftermath highlighted the fact that the Charter provisions on the collective use of force. PKOs were developed progressively and pragmatically. were not applicable. which were based solely on agreement between the five superpowers on the Security Council. It brought out the necessity for the United Nations to devise an alternative mechanism to restore peace in case of an outbreak of armed conflict. and Brian Urquhart. The United Nations peacekeeping operations were conceived and developed as this alternative mechanism. Lester B. such as Ralph Bunche.Lesson 1 / The Genesis of Peacekeeping 7 1. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Chain of Command Source: Sunil Ram UN HQ New York SECRETARY GENERAL Office of Special Political Affairs (OSPA) Force Commander (FC)/ Chief Military Observer (CMO) Deputy Force Commander (DFC)/ Deputy Chief Military Observer (DCMO) Field Operations Division (FOD) Personal Staff Senior Advisor (SA) Legal Advisor (LA) Press Information Officer (PIO) Chief of Staff (COS) Civilian Administrative Officer (CAO) Operations Branch (OPS) Aministration & Personnel Branch (A&P) Logistics Branch (LOG) Civilian Administrative Staff MISSION HQ Infantry Battalions Military Observers Logistics Units Operations/Support Elements . thanks to the vision and efforts of the successive Secretaries-General and other prominent internationalists.
Lesson 1 / The Genesis of Peacekeeping
LESSON 1 END-OF-LESSON QUIZ
On a day-to-day basis, peacekeeping operations are directed by who? A. The General Assembly; B. The Secretary-General; C. Solely by the Commander of Operations; D. The Security Council.
The founders of the United Nations had not foreseen the possibility of engaging in what? A. Peacekeeping operations (PKOs); B. Conventional warfare; C. Development; D. Reconstruction.
When a dispute arises between two governments, which one of the following statements is true according to the UN Charter? A. Parties are not obligated to seek a resolution through any means; B. The Secretary-General establishes guidelines for its resolution under instructions from the General Assembly; C. The Security Council may invoke sanctions to induce parties to seek a peaceful resolution, and may invoke the use of force as a last resort; D. The UN Charter does not address disputes that arise between two governments.
Peacekeeping operations of the UN are outlined in: A. Chapter VI of the original Charter; B. Chapter VII of the original Charter; C. Chapters VI and VII of the original Charter; D. Not mentioned at all in the original Charter;
What does Chapter VII of the UN Charter constitute? A. The core of the UN Collective Security System; B. The secondary role of the Security Council; C. The primary rules of disengagement for the UN system; D. The operating rules for the General Assembly.
Lesson 1 / The Genesis of Peacekeeping
Military personnel who serve on UN peacekeeping operations: A. Are provided only by the five members of the Security Council; B. Always are conscripts who have been drafted by their nation; C. Are permanent employees of the United Nations; D. Are provided by Member States on a voluntary basis.
Why were the U.S. draft resolutions, that were the basis of the establishment of the United Nations Forces in Korea, adopted by the Security Council (SC)? A. There was full support from all the Permanent Members of the SC; B. The U.S. was able to pressure all the members of the SC to support the resolutions; C. At the time, the USSR was boycotting the SC because of the question of the representation of China at the UN; D. There was no clear understanding of the implications of the resolutions.
Why was Korea not considered an enforcement operation under Chapter VII of the Charter? A. It was not under the control of the Security Council; B. It did not have the full agreement of the Security Council; C. It was outside of the scope of the UN Charter as a whole; D. The Secretary-General did not endorse the mission.
The Korean experience prompted the United States to do what? A. Retrench its foreign policy and not support the UN; B. Enhance the role of the General Assembly to maintain international peace and security; C. Change the way vetoes worked in the Security Council; D. Modify the role of the Security Council in maintaining international peace.
10. The Korean crisis highlighted the need for the United Nations to devise what? A. An alternative mechanism to restore peace in case of an outbreak of armed conflict; B. A standing military force; C. A re-evaluation of superpower rivalry in the Security Council; D. A reduced role for Permanent Members in the Security Council.
ANSWER KEY: 1B, 2A, 3C, 4D, 5A, 6D, 7C, 8A, 9B, 10A
Lesson 1 / The Genesis of Peacekeeping
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LESSON 2 THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 The First UN Military Observer Mission Background on the First UN Peacekeeping Operation Major Contribution of Ralph Bunche Mandate of UNTSO Responsibilities of the Parties Involved The Second Truce The General Armistice Agreements Observation Operations Between 1967 and 1973 The 1973 War (Yom Kippur War)
2.10 UNTSO After 1973 2.11 Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) 2.12 Impact of UNTSO on Other Early Military Observer Missions
Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict 12 LESSON OBJECTIVES Lesson 2 gives the student an overview of early UN peacekeeping activities. particularly as they evolved due to the stimulus of the Arab-Israeli crisis. and Define the significance of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) and the UN Truce Supervision Observer Mission (UNTSO). List the peace initiatives taken by the United Nations to resolve the Middle East crisis. It analyses the forerunners of UN Military Observers (e.g.. and outline major details involved in those missions. in Indonesia) versus the first actual peacekeeping force in Palestine. Describe the background and origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The lesson also discusses responsibilities of the Host country and of all the parties involved in a mission. and it examines the UN Truce Supervision Observer Mission (UNTSO) in Palestine as the prototype on which all other observer missions are based. the student should be able to meet the following objectives: • • Distinguish between military observer missions and peacekeeping operations. Understand and explain the significance of the Arab-Israeli conflict in keeping the international peace. By the end of Lesson 2. State the role of the Suez Canal in the conflict in the Middle East. It looks at major principles defined by Ralph Bunche that became the foundation of peacekeeping operations. • • • • .
As per Chapter VI of the UN Charter. the United Kingdom. and the United States. the United Nations Partition Plan. Therefore. which was ratified by the General Assembly in November 1947. . namely Australia. It requested its members to make their military attaches available to carry out the monitoring task in the field. Israel. this resulted in the creation of a new Jewish state. China. When the war the late 1940s.2 Background on the First UN Peacekeeping Operation The first actual UN peacekeeping operation. UNTSO was an outgrowth of the initial UN General Assembly Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). the Security Council called for a ceasefire and established the UN Good Offices Commission (UNGOC). 2.Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict 13 2. On 29 May the Security Council called for a fourweek ceasefire. (Source: UN/DPI) broke out in Palestine in May 1948 as the British mandate ended. which was a Consular Commission comprised of local international diplomatic staff that were seconded to the UN to supervise the ceasefire and assist in the subsequent repatriation of Dutch forces back to Holland. the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation in Palestine (UNTSO). The Palestinian Arabs and regional Arab governments UNTSO observers surrounded by children in condemned the creation of a Jewish state. It was then called the UN Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) and ran until 30 April 1951. France. UNTSO is the only non-temporary agency financed by the UN’s regular budget. That Commission was composed of five members of the Security Council. the UN Security Council called on the warring parties to observe a truce (Truce Commission for Palestine) and asked the UN Mediator for Palestine (Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden) to supervise it with the help of military observers. even though it never mentioned the mission by name. UNSCOP made its final report. they were not considered to be a UN peacekeeping operation but rather the forerunners of peacekeeping operations. which had career consuls in Batavia (now Djakarta). But it should be noted that they were members of their own national delegations to the Consular Commission and thus were not directed by the Secretary-General or the UN.1 The First UN Military Observer Mission The first time that the United Nations used Military Observers (UNMOs) was in 1947. which had been established in 1947 after the United Kingdom (UK) had requested the UN to review the situation in the British Mandate of Palestine. when hostilities broke out in Indonesia between the Royal Dutch Army and the armed forces of the newly established Indonesian Government. was created in 1948 as a military observer mission in response to war between the Arabs and the Israelis. Though never formally created as a “peacekeeping” force. These military attaches were the first military observers at the service of the United Nations. when the observers were withdrawn. and through resolution 50 (1948) shaped what was to become UNTSO. what is now known as the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. UNGOC ran from 1 August 1947 to 1 January 1949.
They only took their orders from UN authorities. Lebanon. Ralph Bunche. he is especially known for first defining the principles of consent and impartiality. Jordan. UNTSO observers were part of the Mediator’s mission and were directed by the Mediator through his Chief of Staff. This is how UNTSO became the first peacekeeping operation in UN history. They received their normal pay plus a UN subsistence allowance. Sweden. and the United States) initially provide personnel. Administratively the UNMOs remained under their own army establishments. Bunche succeeded in obtaining the Security Council’s agreement to make UNTSO an autonomous operation placed under the authority of the Council and the day-to-day direction of the Secretary-General (resolution 78/1949). possible antagonists would be less prone to use their arms against UN observers if they were known to be unarmed. they were organised into a cohesive group who were given a set of principles and operating procedures. and they wore their national uniforms and a UN armband (the blue beret did not come into use until 1956). Bunche succeeded in this mission. Personnel UNOs Contributors Belgium 21 France 21 Sweden United States 21 United Nations Staff Officers Support Personnel Guards 5* 10 51** * Included the Commander Lt. These agreements established an important supervisory role to the Chief of Staff and observers of UNTSO. Bunche resolved the thorny issue of the nationality of the UNMOs by requesting that each Member State of the Truce Commission (Belgium. Bunche brought about the first agreements ever achieved between Israel and the Arab States. who was originally Deputy to the Mediator. the title of the senior appointment in UNTSO to this day remains Chief of Staff. UNTSO was set up without a time limit and has continued to operate to this . Before relinquishing his post as Acting Mediator. Under his auspices. armistice agreements were signed by Israel with each of its four neighbouring Arab States: Egypt. became the Acting Mediator after the assassination of Bernadotte in Jerusalem in September 1948. 2. Bunche also made the decision that observers should not carry side-arms because he felt that in a situation of tension. As such. and Syria. Bunche defined the principles that were to guide the organisation and functioning of UNTSO.3 Major Contribution of Ralph Bunche When these military officers arrived in the conflict area. Gen Count Thord Bonde ** Recruited from the Secretariat’s security force at UNHQ in New York. In early 1949. Out of respect to Bernadotte. and they were protected under the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations to ensure their freedom of movement and safety. France.4 Mandate of UNTSO The initial mandate of UNTSO observers was to help the Mediator supervise the truce called for by the Security Council.Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict 14 2.
2. Complaints from local military commanders were to be handled by the UN area commander of the Chief of Staff. and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. Complaints by Governments were to be handled by the Mediator. the military observers took orders exclusively from the Secretary-General and the Chief of Staff. The UNMOs were provided by Member States on a voluntary basis at the request of the SecretaryGeneral. Once assigned to UN service. However. and they were unarmed. who was appointed by the Secretary-General and was responsible to him. this time to Government House in Jerusalem.5 Responsibilities of the Parties Involved The host countries were expected to give UN observers full co-operation in the performance of their duties and to ensure their safety in the mission area in accordance with the Convention on the Immunities and Privileges of the United Nations. This new mission required a more complex and larger truce supervision system. due to the failure of the truce. Almost immediately. major fighting broke out between Arab and Israeli forces. When complaints came from local civilians or from troops of the separated parties. they had to report the matter to their supervisors. UNTSO’s HQ was moved once again. The first Headquarters (HQ) of UNTSO was located in Cairo. the SC ordered a ceasefire with the clear threat that non-compliance would lead to an enforcement of Chapter VII of the Charter. France. Re-establishment of UNTSO involved a complete rebuilding of the UN forces due to the earlier pullout. . If UNMOs were unable to come to a resolution on a complaint or incident. The Mediator requested 100 UNMOs from Belgium. and UNMOs were withdrawn on 9 July. At the Mediator’s discretion. The UNMOs had no power to prevent truce violations or enforce truce agreements. the Arab Governments did not.Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict 15 day. the UNMOs on the spot were to deal with the issue. All parties complied. The mission was composed of UNMOs of various nationalities under the command of a Chief of Staff. and on 15 July.S. he could pass on the report to the Secretary-General and. While Israel accepted the Mediator’s proposal for a truce extension. On 25 May 1949. and fighting ceased at 1500 GMT on 18 July. The Mediator appealed to the SC to intervene. 1967. The new truce had no definite termination time frame and thus was to remain in force until peace was reached in Palestine.6 The Second Truce The initial four-week truce expired on 9 July 1948. who in turn would pass it on up to the Mediator. The number of UNMOs has varied accordingly. Israel. it was subsequently moved to Haifa. They operated under the principles of consent and impartiality. their mere presence had provided some moral incentive by all sides to limit violations. whenever possible. on to the Security Council. Its functions were later modified to accommodate changing circumstances following the 1956. in late June 1948. However. and the U. ranging between 40 and 700 at the mission’s peak. through him. Required investigations were to be carried out by the UNMOs on the scene. 2. Egypt.
while another was assigned to Jerusalem. one Group covered the coast and ports of the truce area. . though 682 UNMOs had been requested. the members of which will be designated by the Central Truce Supervision Board. Each regional board will be responsible to the Central Supervision Board for the system of observation to be established in that region. One fundamental change in the way UNMOs were to operate was that they now were assigned into “Groups” to observe each Arab and Israeli army group in the mandated truce area as per SC resolution 50 (1948). Organise a detailed plan for land. Assign the observers to their posts and direct their activities. (iii) Regional Truce Supervision Boards. The Central Truce Supervision Board shall function under the chairmanship of the Chief of Military Staff and shall consist of one American. He and nine other Swedish officers comprised the Mediator’s personal staff. some 137 UNMOs had arrived. The Chief of Military Staff may designate a member of the Board to act as vice-chairman. To the extent feasible the area affected by the truce will be divided into zones in each of which there will be a ‘Regional Truce Supervision Board’. Alterations of such positions should be only in connection with local agreements negotiated concerning no-man’s land. and the mission eventually had some 572 UNMOs and auxiliary personnel. If breaches of the Truce could not be resolved by the Truce Supervision organisation. In addition. Swedish Air Force General Aage Lundström was appointed as the Chief of Staff. The SC under its “Instructions to United Nations Observers Engaged in the Supervision of the Truce in Palestine” (S/928: 28 July 1948) stated the following: Duty of the Chief of Military Staff is to: A. On the basis of field observations to define on a map the positions of the respective armed forces in the several fighting sectors at the beginning of the truce. and later one more Group was established to cover airports. C. sea and air observation with the greatest possible dispatch. Questions of principle relating to the interpretation of the terms of the truce shall be referred to the Mediator for decision. (ii) Composition and Functions of the Central Truce Supervision Board. A third Group controlled convoys between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. which would then take the appropriate action. The Central Truce Supervision Board shall advise the Chief of Military Staff on all questions relating to the administration of the truce. one Belgian and one French Senior Officer to be designated by the Mediator and the political advisor to the Chief of Military Staff. they would be reported by the Mediator to the Security Council. B.Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict 16 By August 1948.
367 S/INF/2/Rev. fighting broke out in the Lebanese sector. 1 (III) S/RES/61 (1948) S/1070 S/RES/62 (1948) S/1080 A/RES/194 (III) S/RES/66 (1948) S/1169 Objective Situation in Palestine/Assassinations report. the Negev. with the full support of both the General Assembly and the SC. the Galilee. As tensions rose over the next few months. took over the position as Mediator and was appointed Acting Mediator.Armistice to be established for permanent peace in Palestine Palestine question/UN Mediator report/UNCCP at Jerusalem/Right of return Situation in Palestine/Ceasefire/UNCCP to nominate representatives .Calls for withdrawal of forces. Ralph Bunche.Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict 17 Truce Supervision System Source: Sunil Ram UNSC Mediator Chief of Staff advice Central Truce Supervision Board Regional Truce Supervision Board Arab Armies Regional Truce Supervision Board Israeli Armies Regional Truce Supervision Board Regional Truce Supervision Board Regional Truce Supervision Board Regional Truce Supervision Board Coast & Ports UNMO Group Convoys UNMO Group (Tel Aviv & Jerusalem) Jerusalem UNMO Group Airports UNMO Group On 17 September 1948 the Mediator. The General Assembly and the Security Council reacted by passing a series of resolutions between October and December 1948 to stop the resurgent conflict. difficulties with truce supervision Ceasefire Negev situation Situation in Palestine . (UN) Date 19 October 1948 Security Council 19 October 1948 Security Council 4 November 1948 Security Council 16 November 1948 Security Council 11 December 1948 General Assembly 29 December 1948 Security Council Resolution S/RES/59 (1948) S/1045 S/PV. The Acting Mediator. by the end of 1948 put in place an effective ceasefire to be facilitated by the military observers of UNTSO. was assassinated by Jewish terrorists belonging to the Stern Gang (also known as Lehi). The resolutions are listed in the table below. Count Folke Bernadotte. permanent truce lines/Appoints Committee of the Council Situation in Palestine/Chapter VII . Bernadotte’s American deputy. and in Jerusalem. 1948. Ralph Bunche (right) and Folke Bernadotte (left).
the conclusion of the General Armistice Agreements between Israel and the four surrounding Arab states (Egypt. this was not formally done but rather a fait accompli as the armistice had been abolished. (Source: Ram Military Consulting) 2. (Source: PASSIA archives) 1947 UN Partition Plan. which had been created by the General Armistice Agreements. The termination of the Mediator role made UNTSO an autonomous operation that now answered to the SC and was headed by the Chief of Staff. Lebanon.Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict 18 Arab territories seized by Israel in 1948 in violation of the UN partition plan. The resolution also assigned new functions to UNTSO. Two key changes were the termination of the Mediator and the inactivation of the Truce Commission. Jordan.7 The General Armistice Agreements At the time. . and Syria) and the adoption of SC resolution 73 (1949) on 11 August 1949 was seen as a step towards a permanent peace in Palestine. UNTSO’s main responsibility became the work of the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs).
there was no clause disclaiming this line as an international border. including the Bethlehem and Latrun-Jerusalem roads. .Signed on 20 July 1949: The Armistice Demarcation Line and the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) were not to be interpreted as having any relation whatsoever to ultimate territorial arrangements affecting Israel and Syria. resumption of operation of the Latrun pumping station. withdrew its forces from the region in March 1949. including East Jerusalem and the Old City. • All POWs were to be exchanged. and it became the seat of the bilateral armistice committee. free access to the Holy Places and cultural institutions and use of the cemetery on the Mount of Olives. as well as those sentenced for crime or other offence. • A Special Committee was organised to oversee: free movement of traffic on vital roads. JORDAN . provision of electricity for the Old City.Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict 19 Key Points of the Four General Armistice Agreements EGYPT. SYRIA . as a de jure international border. Israel agreed to allow Jordanian forces to take over positions in the West Bank previously held by Iraqi forces.” • The area comprising the village of El Auja and vicinity was to be demilitarised. The Gaza-Rafa area along the Mediterranean Sea was left under Egyptian control and became what is now known as the Gaza Strip. and the area was handed over to Israel. and resumption of operation of the railroad to Jerusalem and any other such matters as may come up. Syria withdrew its forces from most of the territories it had controlled west of the original international border. LEBANON . • Unlike the other agreements. resumption of the normal functioning of the cultural and humanitarian institutions on Mount Scopus and free access thereto.Signed on 24 February 1949: • The armistice line was approximately drawn following the old international border that dated back to 1906. The front occupied by Iraqi forces was covered by the armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan. which was thereafter treated as it had been previously. In return. • Israel withdrew its forces in Lebanese territory from 13 villages.Signed on 23 March 1949: • The armistice line (“the Blue line”) was drawn along the international border. • Jordan withdrew its forces from their front posts overlooking the Plain of Sharon. • The Egyptian forces besieged in the Al Faluja region were allowed to return to Egypt with their weapons. which were occupied during the war. including those “whom a penal prosecution may be pending.Signed on 3 April 1949: • Jordanian forces held most of their positions in the West Bank. OTHERS: Iraq. and there was no separate agreement with Iraq. whose forces took an active part in the war (although it has no common border with Israel).
The presence of defensive areas in the DMZ. in more serious cases. The UNMOs also handled the task of handing over people. and anti-rabies agreements. They also observed the work done by the parties in regards to the anti-locust. he would bring the issue to the SC through the Secretary-General. UNTSO’s activities were oriented to the missions of the MACs. The other MACs were composed of five members—two from each side and a chairman. Israel Substation at Naqoura. The primary mission of the MACs was the investigation and examination of the claims or complaints presented by the parties relating to the application and observance of the Armistice Agreements.near the Armistice Demarcation Line . Illegal cultivation in the DMZs contrary to agreements. when the Chief of Staff (who had the status of an UNMO) was appointed to a more senior position within the UN Secretariat as a Principal Director. Over-flights of the wrong side of the Armistice Demarcation Line. they were involved in search-and-rescue (SAR) missions carried out by UNTSO on request of one of the parties. S/902 Situation in Palestine/Chapter VII). After August 1949. animals. The UNMOs were also to observe and maintain the SC ceasefire agreement resolution (15 July 1948. Lebanon . and Other “special problems” of common interest to the parties. The role of the MACs UNMOs was to investigate complaints submitted to the MAC to which they were assigned. Each MAC had a HQ and as many secondary installations that were required to fulfil its mission objectives. antimalaria. The Chief of Staff also had a special responsibility for the protection of Mount Scopus in Jerusalem. MAC HQ Egypt-Israel (EIMAC) Israel-Jordan (IJMAC) Israel-Syria (ISMAC) Israel-Lebanon (ILMAC) HQ Location DMZ of El Auja. property. and goods that had crossed the Armistice Demarcation Line in violation of the General Armistice Agreements. Crossing of the Armistice Demarcation Line by persons or animals. In the event of a breakdown in the ceasefire. Transferred to Gaza in 1956 Neutral Zone in Jerusalem Damascus Beirut Subsidiary Location Control centre in Tiberias. The position later became an Assistant Secretary-General. Further changes to command structure in UNTSO occurred in 1951. the Chief of Staff was to attempt to resolve it. The chairman in this case was the Chief of Staff (or a senior military officer designated by him). Complaints of claims fell in the following areas: • • • • • • • The presence of troops or equipment in the DMZs. S/RES/54 (1948). Firing across the Armistice Demarcation Line. Furthermore.Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict 20 Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs) The Egypt-Israel MAC was comprised of seven members—three from each side and a chairman.
There was no fighting along the Israeli-Lebanese border. Israel responded by occupying the DMZ at El Auja in September 1956. At the outbreak of war between Israel and the Arab states in June 1967. Similar problems of incursions and retaliation occurred along the Syrian. The Six-Day War ended on 11 June 1967 after the UNTSO Chief of Staff began the negotiations for the SC’s call for a ceasefire on 10 June. the status quo slowly eroded the objectives of the Armistice Agreements. UNTSO’s role was expanded to provide a limited UN presence. UNTSO continued its work. which broke out in June 1967. A series of ceasefire observation points (OPs) were set up along the new boundary lines. It should be noted that by this time Israel had achieved many of its military objectives and was thus willing to negotiate. Egypt imposed an embargo on Israel by restricting international commercial shipping and goods passing through the Suez Canal. the Secretary-General refused to accept Israel’s position. and the West Bank (Jordan).8 Observation Operations Between 1967 and 1973 Backed by various Western powers (mainly France). Israel destroyed the Arab forces of Egypt. 2. These incidents all escalated into what has become known as the SixDay War in 1967. Syria. Though Israel maintained its position on the Armistice Agreements. but without Israel’s co-operation UNTSO’s role was more symbolic than realistic. Even with the new ceasefire lines between Israel and its Arab neighbours and the fact that Israel denounced the other three agreements after the Six-Day War. the Golan Heights (Syria). a political impasse occurred and no real peace treaty was achieved due to Israel not allowing Palestinian Arabs to return to their land and the Arab states’ refusal to acknowledge the existence of the state of Israel. Even with growing UNMO intervention and good offices. In 1951. and full-scale war broke out in October 1956. UNTSO became unable to operate. UNMOs were allowed to pass through Israeli checkpoints along the coastal road between Gaza and Jerusalem. Jordanian. When Egypt established military posts near the border in the El Quseim-Abu Aweigila region. The UNTSO HQ was moved to Gaza. However. the Sinai Peninsula (Egypt). UNMOs moved into the combat areas on the early morning of 11 June. By early 1955. and Jordan and occupied the Gaza Strip (Egypt). growing Palestinian fedayeen attacks into Israel resulted in retaliatory attacks from Israel. East Jerusalem (Jordan). . there were 128 UNMOs operating with UNTSO. When UNEF I was withdrawn at the request of the Egyptian government in 1967. UNTSO’s key role at this time was the establishment and supervision of the ceasefire agreements (this now also included the new boundaries between the countries). and there was no change to UNTSO’s original mission. The limited UNTSO presence did not avert another war. The peacekeeping was now being done by the UN Emergency Force (see Lesson 3). as the UN did not recognise Israel’s refusal to participate in EIMAC.Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict 21 Breakdown of the General Armistice Agreements The General Armistice Agreements were originally envisioned as temporary arrangements. and Lebanese borders with Israel. Even though the SC requested that Egypt stop the embargo in 1953. which had been set up in the wake of the 1956 war. it was extended into the Strait of Tiran.
Israel before the Six-Day War (Source: Government of Israel) Israel after the Six-Day War (Source: Government of Israel) . 17 July 1967 Issues Originally. None were ever established around the Port Faud area. only seven OPs were established along the Suez Canal. IsraelJordan (IJMAC) IsraelSyria (ISMAC) IsraelLebanon (ILMAC) No OPs were set up as no agreement could be reached with either side 7 (controlled from Tiberius) none 9 (controlled from Damascus) 5 (controlled from Beirut & Naqoura) End of 1967 24 April 1972 Israel did not agree to the OPs.Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict 22 MAC HQ EgyptIsrael (EIMAC) OPs on Israeli side 8 (controlled from Qantara) OPs on Arab side 7 (controlled from Ismailia) Date Estb. but also did not hinder their establishment on the Lebanese side of the demarcation line. Some of the UNMOs nationalities were unacceptable to both or one side.
There was intense fighting on the Syrian front. The OGE initially operated one outpost in Ismailia and six OPs in the Sinai. It patrolled most of the Sinai except for the region that was under the mandate of the Multinational Force and Observers (see Section 2. On 6 October 1973. UNTSO UNMOs were placed under the operational command of the UNEF II Commander and assisted UNEF II in its mission. In early 1970. Some 8. neither side moved its positions. the SecretaryGeneral had indicated that the withdrawal of UNEF II did not necessarily mean the termination of UNTSO in the region.000 tons (8 million kgs) of munitions were dropped on Egyptian targets between January and April. and the UNMOs were withdrawn to Cairo. and the so-called Egyptian inspired “war of attrition” began in early 1969. On 8 October. the Second UN Emergency Force (see Lesson 8) was established. when it was merged with Observer Group Sinai-Cairo (OGSC) to form the OGE. OGE Pocket Badge . but by the summer of 1970. this in turn terminated EIMAC. Effectively EIMAC became the UN Liaison Office in Cairo (UNLOCA). Over the years the OGE OPs were reduced and its HQ was moved to Ismailia. both sides had realised they were stalemated. By 9 October. however. The IsraeliJordanian sector remained quiet. which was manned by two UNMOs. and air attacks became the norm. and UNTSO continued to operate its liaison office in Amman. proposal ended fighting by 7 August. In the aftermath of the 1973 War (also known as the Yom Kippur War). Commando raids. Egypt formerly requested the withdrawal of UNMOs from its sector as they were now behind the Egyptian frontline. Two UNMOs had been killed during the initial fighting. and fighting went on for some 20 months. which led to the withdrawal of some UNMOs.9 The 1973 War (Yom Kippur War) Tensions again began to rise between the Arab states and Israel. However. the total strength of UNTSO was 225 UNMOs from sixteen countries. artillery duels. Mediation by the Secretary-General was inconclusive. all UN OPs were closed on both sides of the Suez Canal. Egypt and Syria were planning a surprise assault on Israel. and the UNTSO liaison office in Gaza was closed in April 1996. By 1973. a U.S. Israel responded by bombing Egypt. which was headquartered in Cairo. the 1949 Armistice Agreement was superceded. The Egyptian Government did in fact request the continued presence of UNTSO.Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict 23 2. Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack against Israel. However.10 UNTSO After 1973 With the withdrawal of UNEF II in 1979 and the subsequent peace treaty between Israel and Egypt.11). In 1995 the OGE only operated one OP in El Arish. 2. By October 1973. which resulted in the creation of the Observer Group Egypt (OGE).
while the ILMAC HQ acted as a liaison office until UNIFIL established its own office in Beirut. The PLO requested that UNIFIL be deployed in Lt. Even though there were incidents of break-ins to OPs and the hijackings of UNMO vehicles. but instead form a separate unit called the Observer Detachment Damascus (ODD). Col. . The exact date of his death is unknown. On the ILMAC sector the Lebanese Army had provided security for the unarmed UNMOs. The ODD does liaison and support work for the OGG. The UNMOs assigned to UNIFIL were formed into the Observer Group Lebanon (OGL). (Rich) Higgins. The main targets of Israel’s invasion were the various insurgent groups (mainly the Palestinian Liberation Organisation .Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict 24 UNTSO’s role in the Israel-Syria sector was terminated on 31 May 1974 when the UN Disengagement Observer Force (see Lesson 8) was established. leaving the UNMOs in a very dangerous situation. USMC. OGL and Senior Military Observer. Since then the UNTSO HQ in Jerusalem has been the liaison to the Jordanian authorities. his remains were recovered 23 December 1991 and interred at Quantico National Cemetery 30 December 1991. UNIFIL’s HQ was eventually based in Naqoura. while UNTSO operated the ILMAC through its Liaison Office in Beirut (UNLOB). United States Military Observer Group. the UNTSO office in Amman was closed in 1995. and UNTSO’s UNMOs were assigned to assist UNIFIL in its tasks. the SC established the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (see Lesson 10) in March 1978. however. Erskine) would act as the Interim Commander of UNIFIL. He was declared dead on 6 July 1990. After a ceasefire was set up in Lebanon. pending the appointment of a UNIFIL Force Commander. Colonel William R. Even with this UN presence. The SecretaryGeneral asked the UNMOs to remain in place.PLO) who had been launching attacks into Israel from Lebanese territory. Lebanon has proven to be one of the most hazardous UNMO assignments in the Middle East. Higgins was subsequently murdered. The 90 UNTSO UNMOs were assigned to UNDOF. They continued their duties as before. those UNMOs who are from countries that are Permanent Members of the SC are not involved in the supervision of the disengagement agreement. disappeared south of Tyre on 17 February 1988. UNTSO (Palestine). The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 quickly led to Israeli forces reaching the outskirts of Beirut. which continued its operations under the operational control of the commander of UNDOF. After being held captive by proIranian terrorists in Lebanon. After the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty in 1994. Therefore. UNIFIL took over UNTSO’s ceasefire observation role. and in 1979 they were formed into the Observer Group Golan (OGG). A. for the most part the factions respected the status of the UNMOs. UNDOF personnel must be from nonPermanent Members of the SC. Under the disengagement agreement. The Report of the Secretary-General (S/12611 OGG Lapel Badge (1978). once the Lebanese civil war began in 1975 the national army collapsed. Lt. 19 March 1978) noted that UNTSO would still continue to function on the Armistice Demarcation Line after the termination of the mandate of UNIFIL. the UNTSO Chief of Staff (Major General E. while serving as the Chief. In addition.
and 400 Italian troops. the OGB’s role was reduced. air raids. led to the massacre of Palestinian refugees in the Sabra and Shatila camps. By mid-1992 the OGB was converted into the UN Liaison Office in Beirut (UNLOB).Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict 25 the Beirut area. Bashir Gemayel. with the UK joining the force a few months later. As of August 2005. It developed into a truly multinational force that was capable of rapid reorganisation to meet its mission objectives. by his Christian militia. 1 August 1982) the Secretary-General to deploy UNMOs in and around Beirut. They were primarily to focus on incidents between Israelis and Palestinians. the MNF also withdrew. but by 24 September the MNF had returned to the city. Once Israel withdrew from Beirut in September 1983. mine explosions. Israel. The OGB UNMOs used OPs and mobile patrols to fulfil their duties. Since its inception UNTSO has been able to adapt to the ever-changing regional politics of the Middle East. Initially ten UNTSO UNMOs from ILMAC were deployed to areas controlled by the Lebanese Government. however. The return of Israeli forces to West Beirut in the wake of the assassination of the PresidentElect of Lebanon. The MNF withdrew in 1984 after a series of major attacks against its forces. The MNF was not a UN entity. 800 French. on 1 August the SC authorised (S/RES/516 (1982). and unexplained shootings. On the request of the Lebanese government. By this time the United States had negotiated a withdrawal of PLO fighters under the supervision of the Multinational Force (MNF). On 24 September the Secretary-General informed the SC that some 2. Many of UNTSO’s military and civilian staff members casualties occurred as a result of being firefights between two warring factions.. The MNF was comprised of 800 U. Due to such a hostile environment all UNTSO personnel must be volunteers. As of July 2005. Israel would not agree to this and entered West Beirut. UNTSO still operated as an autonomous operation under the SC. though its functions had been modified.S. did not allow the OGB to be reinforced. After the PLO withdrawal from Beirut was completed on 1 September 1982. In addition. . They were designated the Observer Group Beirut (OGB) and were deployed by 3 August. as well as Israel and Jordan. On 19 September the SC responded by raising the number of UNMOs to 50 in and around Beirut. peace agreements have been concluded between Israel and Egypt. The Chief of UNLOB was designated the Chairman of ILMAC. Israel has pulled out of the Gaza Strip. often due to changing regional politics.000 troops from UNIFIL could be sent to Beirut.
The MFO was assigned the following tasks: • • • • Operation of checkpoints. MFO Organisation Source: MFO . to be carried out not less than twice a month unless otherwise agreed by the Parties. and observation posts along the international boundary and Line B. and within Zone C. Periodic verification of the implementation of the provisions MFO Patch of Annex I.11 Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) The MFO is not a UN peacekeeping mission. four security zones were established – three in the Sinai in Egypt and one in Israel along the international border. Its mission was to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and employ best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms. Additional verifications within 48 hours after the receipt of a request from either Party. and Ensuring the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran. To achieve this. reconnaissance patrols.Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict 26 2.
According to the task involved. the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) in May 1965.12 Impact of UNTSO on Other Early Military Observer Missions The arrangements and details of UNTSO were applied without major changes to all subsequent military observer missions. Five such missions were set up during the Cold War period: • • • • • United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1949. to several hundreds. Other missions were established for limited durations. supervising a ceasefire. as in the Arab-Israeli situation and in Lebanon. or supervising an armistice agreement. These missions were assigned relatively simple peacekeeping tasks. to verifying the withdrawal of foreign troops.Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict 27 2. United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 1958. Tasks ranged from monitoring a border area. Each of these will be reviewed in more detail. it should be noted that the Security Council authorised all UN military observer missions. as in the Dominican Republic. . The two first military observer missions (the Arab-Israeli and India-Pakistan missions) were set up without time limits and continue to operate. total strength might vary from a few observers. United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) in 1963. When enforcement is called for. and United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) in September 1965.
which marked the beginning of the conflict in the Middle East. Why is Ralf Bunche important in terms of defining some of the core principles of peacekeeping? A. B. In 1948. C. He had nothing to do with defining some of the core principles of peacekeeping. 3. B. C. When was the first time that the United Nations used military observers (UNMOs)? A. The Palestinian Arabs. 4. It is the only non-temporary agency financed by the UN’s regular budget. He was the head of UNTSO. In 1950. first attacked Israel. In 1946. B. It is not under the control of the Secretary-General. with the outbreak of the Korean War. Israel’s fledgling military launched pre-emptive attacks against the Arab states surrounding the new state of Israel. D. His guidance led to the creation of UNTSO. He first defined the principles of consent and impartiality. 2. Though never formally created as a “peacekeeping” force. What happened a day after the Jewish Agency in Palestinian Territory proclaimed the State of Israel on 11 May 1948? A. It was not sanctioned by the General Assembly. the first official peacekeeping mission. Israel attacked the Palestinian Arabs. D. C.Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict 28 LESSON 2 END-OF-LESSON QUIZ 1. . C. with the lead-up to India’s independence from the British Empire. aided by the Arab states. when hostilities broke out in Indonesia between the Royal Dutch Army and the armed forces of the newly established Indonesian Government. D. It is a non-multinational operation solely manned by the British. In 1947. B. resulting in military retaliation by other Arab states. with the first Arab-Israeli War. A pre-emptive attack by Egypt precipitated a larger attack by the Arab states against Israel. D. what is a unique feature of UNTSO? A.
C. Still operates as an autonomous operation under the Security Council. B. C. Why was UNTSO’s role in the Israel-Syria sector terminated on 31 May 1974? A. What was the primary mission of the MACs? A. UNTSO’s mission in the Middle East as a whole was over. A UN peacekeeping mission. D. B. Ended in 1949 when Israel. The UN Truce Supervision Organisation in Palestine (UNTSO): A. D. Which one of the following statements is true regarding UNMOs of UNTSO? A. The MFO was a what? A. 9. A large UN NGO. Egypt. D. They are not assured of co-operation from the Host country. though its functions had been modified often due to changing circumstances. 7. To investigate war crimes. Lebanon. Ended in 1973 after the Yom Kippur War. 8. . B. B. and Syria signed an agreement for permanent peace in the area. B. 6. UNEF II was established. Continues to operate from its original mandate without modification.Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict 29 5. Saudi Arabia demanded the withdrawal of UNTSO’s UNMOs. C. C. D. D. To continue peace negotiations between the parties to the Armistice Agreements. To investigate and examine the claims or complaints presented by the parties in regards to the Armistice Agreements. UNDOF was established. C. A UN military force used to impose peace in the region. They are armed and are assured of protection and full co-operation in the performance of their duties by their Host country. Jordan. They are heavily armed and will engage in combat should the need arise. To coordinate disarmament of all the parties to the Armistice Agreements. An international observer force not under the UN. They are unarmed and have no legal immunity to local laws.
UNTSO proved that there was no need for military observer missions. 8A. 4D. What was the impact of UNTSO? A. 9D. 7C. 3B. The details of UNTSO were applied. UNTSO had no impact on future UN missions. 10B .Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict 30 10. but with major changes. to five Cold War military observer missions. 5B. D. 2C. ANSWER KEY: 1B. 6A. The arrangements and details of UNTSO were applied without major changes to five Cold War military observer missions. C. B.
1 3.LESSON 3 THE FIRST UN EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF I) 3.10 The Weaknesses and Strengths of UNEF 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.11 The Egyptian-Israeli War and the Withdrawal of UNEF 3.9 Differences Between Military Observer Missions and Peacekeeping Missions Background on the Suez Canal Crisis UN Peace Initiatives for the Suez Canal Crisis The UN Emergency Force (UNEF) Principles Upon Which UNEF was Based Advisory Committee The Early Phase of UNEF The Status of the Force Agreement UNEF’s Composition 3.12 Consequences of the Withdrawal of UNEF .2 3.4 3.
The role of the UN peace force in establishing and maintaining peace in the area. Outline the importance of UNEF in the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations. the student will come to understand not only the historical significance of the first UN peacekeeping mission (UNEF). and it goes into details of peacekeeping operations regarding its unique aspects. By the end of Lesson 3. but also its role in defining UN peacekeeping operations. Lesson 3 discusses in great length the details of the Suez Canal crisis and the response of the United Nations. including perspectives regarding its significance in maintaining international relations and peace. It outlines the difference between Military Observer Missions and Peacekeeping Operations. how it was created and how it dissolved is given. • • • • • • . Give details regarding UN initiatives to resolve the Suez Canal crisis. and Understand why UNEF ended and the consequences of its withdrawal from the region. By the end of Lesson 3. which began over the Suez Canal. List the weaknesses and strengths of UNEF. and how that resulted in the first actual peacekeeping operation.Lesson 3 / The First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) 32 LESSON OBJECTIVES Lesson 3 describes the crisis in the Middle East. State the significance of UNEF for later peacekeeping missions. Describe how UNEF was established and implemented. the student should be able to meet the following objectives: • Understand the policies and politics of the origins of the Suez Canal crisis in the Middle East.
and the United Kingdom secretly planned an invasion of Egypt. a larger operation is needed that is armed and has the capability to use armed force in self-defence. Israeli forces began the invasion of Egypt on the morning of 29 October.L. Israel accepted the proposal . to restrict regional arms sales had broken down. the UK.2 Background on the Suez Canal Crisis By the summer of 1955 there had been a steady deterioration in relations between Israel and Egypt. While the SC passed a resolution on 13 October (SC 118 (1956). Egypt’s restrictions on ships going to Israel through the Suez Canal and later the Strait of Tiran further destabilised the overall political situation. Keeping in mind that Israel was part of the secret plan to attack Egypt.S. southern (El Kuntilla-El Thamad-Nakhl-Mitla Pass). In an effort to pay for the dam project. while Britain’s involvement resulted from the loss of control over the Suez Canal. On 23 September 1956. Port Said. and the U. Both also wanted to see a government in Cairo that was more amenable to western interests. France became involved partly due to Egypt’s continued support of insurgents in Algeria. 3.S. Later in the day Britain and France gave an ultimatum to both Egypt and Israel to cease hostilities within 12 hours and to withdraw their respective forces 10 miles from each side of the Suez Canal. Egyptian-supported raids by Palestinian fedayeen had led to strong military responses by Israel. central (Al Auja. 13 October 1956 [S/3675]) on how to resolve the crisis. Egypt responded by saying that various powers. But if the peacekeeping mission requires more complex tasks.El Quseima-Abu Aweigila-Bir Gifgafa-Ismailiya). Egypt was asked to allow the temporary stationing of Anglo-French forces on the Canal at Ismailia. Burns. France and the UK requested that the SC resolve the matter in their favour based on the Suez Canal Convention of 1888. which had been owned by British and French shareholders. Such a need arose in 1956 with the Suez crisis.M. called for a ceasefire and asked Israel to withdraw its forces back to its side of the border. They are adequate to monitor or supervise a truce or a ceasefire agreement. The situation further escalated when in July 1956 the U. were violating the UN Charter by their actions. Israel. and Suez ostensibly to separate the two sides and to ensure the safety of shipping through the Canal. Israel saw the opportunity to expand its territory and eliminate the growing military threat that Egypt posed. mainly France and the UK. President Gamel Abdel Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal.Lesson 3 / The First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) 33 3. Moreover. Both Israel and Egypt became involved in a major arms race with arms being supplied by both superpowers and their allies. France.1 Differences Between Military Observer Missions and Peacekeeping Missions Military observer missions are relatively modest operations involving limited numbers of unarmed military observers. Early the next morning UNTSO’s Chief of Staff. and eastern /western (which followed south on both sides of the Sinai Peninsula to Sharm el Sheikh). the 25 May 1950 Tripartite Declaration of France. Canadian Major-General E. Four Israeli columns advanced through the Sinai: northern (Gaza Strip-El Arish-El Qantara). Government withdrew its financial aid for the building of the Aswan Dam on the Nile due to Egyptian purchases of arms from the Soviet Bloc.
This refusal then precipitated French and British air attacks between 31 October and 4 November against various targets in Egypt. Israeli. British. The next day naval landings by French forces at Port Fouad and British forces at Port Said secured the northern end of the Suez Canal. 1956.Lesson 3 / The First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) 34 while Egypt refused. (Source: Ram Military Consulting) . This was followed on 5 November by an airborne assault in and around Port Said and Port Fouad by British and French paratroops. and French Attacks.
the UN deemed it necessary to: • bring about the withdrawal of the occupation forces.Lesson 3 / The First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) 35 To resolve the crisis. a limited number of officers who were to be nationals of countries other than those having permanent membership in the Security Council. Lester B. the United Nations created its first peacekeeping force. due to the British and French vetoes. it was not able to take any action on the situation. the UK. • • • . Israel. as Chief of the Command. there were only two United Nations peacekeeping operations. As per the Charter. 3.3 UN Peace Initiatives for the Suez Canal Crisis During the General Assembly’s deliberations in early November. In resolution 1000 [ES-I]. from the observer corps of UNTSO. and • establish a buffer zone between Egypt and Israel. Pearson was convinced that a military observer mission would not be able to cope with the conflict at hand and that a larger operation in the form of a police force would be required. in consultation with the Secretary-General. Burns. one in Palestine (UNTSO) and another in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). However. France. the General Assembly: • Source: UNDPKO Established a United Nations Command for an emergency international Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956. Egypt. on the basis of Pearson’s recommendations. At the time. Major-General (later Lieutenant-General) E. the Soviet Union. The matter was thus referred to the General Assembly under the latter’s Uniting for Peace Resolution. authorised that the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) be established (GA resolution 1000 [ES-I]). the Security Council met in an emergency session. to undertake the recruitment of the additional number of officers needed directly from various Member States other than the Permanent Members of the Security Council. and Eastern European States abstained. The Secretary-General submitted the plan to the General Assembly. the then Foreign Minister of Canada. To achieve these objectives.L. Appointed. Pearson. this was done with the consent of the parties concerned. known as the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a plan for the setting up of an emergency international UN force to supervise the cessation of hostilities in the Suez Canal zone (GA resolution 998 [ES-I]). which.M. He was further authorized. the Chief of Staff of UNTSO. both in the form of military observer missions. • alter the completion of the withdrawal process. Authorized the Chief of the Command to immediately recruit. Invited the Secretary-General to take such administrative measures as might be necessary for prompt execution of the actions envisaged. Following the launching of the Israeli invasion on 29 October 1956. on an emergency basis. attempted to work out a solution to the crisis in close co-operation with Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. On Pearson’s proposal.
L. 3. The Force was composed of national contingents provided by Member States of the United Nations.4 The UN Emergency Force (UNEF) UNEF was commanded by a Force Commander under the overall direction of the SecretaryGeneral. But they remained administratively under their respective army establishments. Their soldiers wore their national army uniforms. The Committee was chaired by the Secretary-General and was to address matters pertaining to the mission that were not already dealt with by the General Assembly and which did not fall within the area of the direct responsibility of the Chief of the Command. the General Assembly adopted resolution 1001 (ES-I). but with the addition of the UN insignia and UN Blue Beret the UN blue helmet or beret. UNEF would have no rights beyond those that were necessary to do its work in co-operation with local authorities.6 Advisory Committee Based on the fact that there had not been enough time to cover all matters relating to UNEF. In selecting the troop-contributing countries. and (c) the non-use of force except in self-defence. but all of his successors were appointed directly by the Secretary-General. such as the availability of suitable troops and the need for a balanced composition of countries in the Force. The establishment of UNEF in a conflict area required the consent of the host government and the other parties concerned. On 7 November. Norway and Pakistan. they were not authorised to use force except in self-defence. Ceylon. India. the Secretary-General suggested that those matters be left to a small advisory committee of the General Assembly. the various national contingents of UNEF took orders exclusively from the United Nations. the Secretary-General took into account the views of the parties concerned as well as other factors. Each contributing government covered the costs of the troops and equipment of its national contingent against reimbursement by the United Nations at an agreed rate. which approved the guiding principles for the organisation and functioning of the UNEF. Troops from the five Permanent Members of the Security Council and any countries that might have a special interest in the conflict were excluded. UNEF operated in a zone that extended from the Armistice Demarcation Lines of the 1949 Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt and the Suez Canal. (b) impartiality. 3. . Like the military observers of UNTSO. They were obliged to act with impartiality and restraint at all times and were required to carry out their tasks by persuasion and negotiation and not by coercion. He was appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Secretary-General. Moreover. Colombia. which were used for the first time at the start of UNEF. Forces were provided on a voluntary basis at the request of the Secretary-General. The first Commander of UNEF was Major-General E. The General Assembly also established an Advisory Committee composed of Brazil.M. Burns of Canada. Canada. While the soldiers of UNEF were provided with light defensive weapons.5 Principles Upon Which UNEF was Based The Force operated under the principles of: (a) consent.Lesson 3 / The First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) 36 3.
In addition. General Burns.L. the Egyptian Government made it clear that UNEF was deployed on its soil only with its express consent and would have to be withdrawn if it so requested. the Secretary-General also approached various Member States in an effort to obtain the military forces required to man UNEF. as the mission was not a Chapter VII intervention. Following consultation with the Committee. which was included in the UNEF aide-memoire. Thus. The role of the Committee was to assist the Secretary-General in his responsibilities. in particular. by the task established for the Force in the aforementioned resolutions. Israel refused to accept UNEF troops on its soil. The idea of consent became one of the key foundations of future UN peacekeeping missions. UNTSO was somewhat analogous. At the same time. the Secretary-General began negotiations with Egypt to secure the entry and stationing of UNEF in Egypt. Furthermore. 3.7 The Early Phase of UNEF UNEF became operational by mid-November 1956. Clearly there was no real precedent for creating such a force. Burns. and it could request the convening of the General Assembly if needed. This principle was enshrined by the General Assembly in resolution 1001 (ES-I) of 7 November 1956 and the subsequent Good Faith Agreement of 20 November between Egypt and the UN. the UN assured Egypt’s sovereignty and that it would retain the power to negotiate a settlement for the Suez Canal and also not need to submit to any foreign power. Once authorised by the UN. and British forces. The creation of UNEF was a pre-condition for both securing the ceasefire and for allowing an orderly withdrawal of Israeli. understanding this to correspond to the wishes of the Government of Egypt. but it was a much simpler operation. It also did not offer any insights on organisational and operational problems involved in peacekeeping. . so that UNEF was deployed only on the Egyptian side of the border. was deployed as a buffer along the Egypt-Israel border. the Secretary-General was authorised to take all necessary administrative and executive actions and to issue all essential rules and regulations for the functioning of UNEF.Lesson 3 / The First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) 37 Major-General E. However. the assembly of a viable military force and its deployment to Egypt as fast as possible were a priority for the Secretary-General. the United Nations. formed the basis for the establishment of UNEF. began planning the organisation of UNEF with some UNTSO UNMOs. It played an instrumental role in bringing about the withdrawal of the Anglo-French and Israeli occupation forces and. served as the basis for UNEF’s deployment in Egypt. Resolution 1001 (ES-I) and resolution 998 (ES-I) of 4 November. in good faith. reaffirms its willingness to maintain UNEF until its task is completed. In the meantime. French. One of the founding principles of the deployment and functioning of UNEF was the consent of the host government. in terms of applying UNEF. the Chief of Command. after the completion of the withdrawal process. Paragraph two states: The United Nations takes note of this declaration of the Government of Egypt and declares that the activities of UNEF will be guided.M. The Good Faith Agreement.
The original estimate was set at some 6. Civil and criminal jurisdiction and settlement of disputes or claims. privileges and immunities of the Force.Lesson 3 / The First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) 38 Two other agreements outlined that the area to be occupied by UNEF would be subject to agreement after the Israeli withdrawal. In context of the mission requirements and objectives. UNEF Members were to be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective national Governments in respect of any criminal offences that they might commit in Egypt. The Force was to be composed of volunteer national contingents from Member States that were acceptable for service by the Secretary-General. Problem of transportation. Extent to which the contingent would be self-contained. In addition. It provided the blueprint for many future UN peacekeeping missions and was used as a precedent when problems arose during future missions. It covered a wide range of issues. without the consent of the Egyptian Government. UNEF could not stay or operate in Egypt. Freedom of movement. UNEF was also to have adequate support units and a light air-unit. the Commander in consultation with the Secretary-General defined the size of UNEF. No one contingent was to be overly large so that UNEF . 3. Full freedom of movement in the performance of UNEF members in fulfilling their duties. Moreover. Undesirability of too great a variation in ordnance and basic equipment. The functions of UNEF were also separated from the question of the reopening of the Suez Canal.9 UNEF’s Composition The principles of consent also applied to those Member States that participated in UNEF.000 personnel.8 The Status of the Force Agreement The Status of the Force Agreement was the first of its kind. about two combat brigades. 3. The only forces that were excluded from participation were those from any country that might have had a geographical or special interest in the conflict or were Permanent Members of the SC. and Exclusive jurisdiction of UNEF Members’ national Governments in respect to any criminal offences that they might commit in Egypt. Issues that were considered in the selection of contingents included: • • • • • • Suitability in terms of the needs of the Force. and The goal of a balanced force composition. It was decided that the national contingents would be required to be sufficiently large enough to be relatively self-contained. Size and availability. including: • • • • • The premises of the Force and the use of the United Nations flag. the UNEF Force could not function in the Suez Canal or Port Said areas after the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces.
Italy offered to airlift UNEF personnel and equipment from Italy to Egypt. each national contingent of UNEF had to take orders exclusively from the Force Commander. To allow for operational planning. and the U. offered to defray part of the cost of Swiss Air charter planes.S. Norway. Norway. He also accepted the offers from Italy. The initial UNEF staging base in Egypt was the air base at Abu Suweir near Ismailia. In addition. the facilities at Capodichino Airport in Naples were offered for the assembly and transit of UNEF personnel and equipment. while Switzerland. Yugoslav troops with UNEF on patrol. New Zealand. Denmark. who was not a Member State. Denmark. Finland. Canada. Indonesia. Pakistan Peru. Burma. Colombia. Finland. Based on the various agreements and after consultations with Egypt and the Force Commander. January 1957. Romania. Ceylon. India. (UN/DPI) . Chile.S. An exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and participating Member States’ governments formalised these agreements. The following countries offered contingents: Afghanistan. Canada. Sweden and Yugoslavia. shipping. Indonesia. Ecuador. transport. Sweden and Yugoslavia. Iran. India. some continuity of service from each Member State’s contingent was also required. Switzerland.Lesson 3 / The First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) 39 would become dependent on one Member State’s contingent. Egypt. Ethiopia. and supplies. the Philippines. Laos. was willing to provide logistical support in the form of airlifts. Brazil. Moreover. The U. Colombia. El Arish. Czechoslovakia. the Secretary-General accepted the following contingents: Brazil.
The Columbians withdrew a year later in December 1958.000 5.Lesson 3 / The First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) 40 Area of Responsibility within the Armistice Demarcation Line Rafah El Arish Contingent Nationality Brazil Canada Role Infantry Battalion • Fully equipped. the Indonesian contingent withdrew in September 1957.102 4.000 personnel. the base post office. Once UNEF staff officers were appointed. followed by the Finns in December of the same year. returned to their assigned duties. As planned. light-armoured squadron for reconnaissance • Medical • Provided units for transport. Small desert outposts manned by Yugoslavian troops aided these air units. There also was a small UNEF garrison at Sharm-el-Sheikh that guarded the Egyptian army installations there. During the course of the mission. the Provost Marshal and signals • Ordnance depot and workshop. movement control and air support (RCAF Detachment) Infantry Battalion Infantry Battalion* Infantry Battalion • Supply depot and the service institute • Provided units for transport. the dental unit. By February 1957. engineering.341 5. The other contingents continued to serve with UNEF until the withdrawal of the Force in 1967.581 3. The mission over time was also reduced in size as the situation stabilised and as financial difficulties mounted vis-à-vis UN funding. the UNMOs of UNTSO. the Provost Marshal and signals Infantry Battalion Medical Infantry Battalion* and an air transport service (SCANAP)** Reconnaissance battalion Colombia Denmark Finland India Indonesia Norway Sweden Yugoslavia Khan Yunis Beit Hanun Deir-el-Ballah Beit Hanun Gaza El Arish *A joint Danish-Norwegian battalion (DANOR) **A joint Danish-Norwegian-Swedish unit Canadian and Yugoslav reconnaissance units patrolled the International Frontier. They were aided by Canadian air units that operated from El Arish east to the Gulf of Aqaba on the Red Sea. UNEF had reached its target strength of some 6. who had been temporarily assigned to planning for UNEF. Year 1957 1960 1963 1965 1966 May 1967 UNEF Strength 6.959 3. contingents had their assignments and deployments changed based on the operational requirements at the time.378 (Force began its withdrawal) .
Phase Date First phase (12 November–December 1956) Second phase (December 1956–March 1957) Third phase (March 1957) Final phase (March 1957–May 1967) Location Suez Canal area Sinai peninsula Gaza Strip and Sharm el Sheikh Israeli-Egyptian Border Description UNEF Role Supervise the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces from the Port Said area Supervise withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Sinai peninsula Supervise the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the Sharm el Sheikh area Deployment/peacekeeping role of UNEF forces along the borders between Egypt and Israel . there were no Israeli forces west of El Arish. On 21 November. Israel had withdrawn from the Gaza Strip and Sharm el Sheikh. but by 22 December 1956. By 8 March. along the international frontier between the Sinai and Israel. and UNEF moved in around the Port Said positions occupied by the British and French.Lesson 3 / The First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) 41 Withdrawal of the Belligerent Forces It took some two months to negotiate the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces. Israel responded with a new withdrawal proposal that indicated that its forces would withdraw in two phases behind the armistice lines at an un-stated date. By 15 January. as well as in the Sharm el Sheikh area. As of 8 March 1957. which covered a period of more than 10 years from November 1957 to May 1967. the Secretary-General told the General Assembly that there had been full compliance with its resolution 1124 (XI) of 2 February 1957. the General Assembly noted that this withdrawal was not behind the armistice lines. On 21 December. the withdrawal had been completed. The negotiations for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces took much longer. except in the area of Sharm el Sheikh. By 7 and 8 January 1957. However. Israeli forces withdrew another 25 to 30 kilometres eastward. On 8 March 1957. Israel indicated that its forces had withdrawn along the entire Egyptian frontier. UNEF was deployed along the western side of the Armistice Demarcation Line along the Gaza Strip. The operation of the Force during this period may be divided into four phases.
Secondly. As a result.Lesson 3 / The First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) 42 3. The Palestine problem was at the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East and remained unresolved despite the efforts of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. at Egypt’s request. 3. The history of the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations was marked by major crises. UNEF forces were deployed only on Egyptian soil. which had long accused Egyptian President Nasser of hiding behind UNEF. tension related to the Palestinians continued in the other sectors of the Middle East. UNEF was a resounding success. constituted a serious handicap. In addition. changes were made on the Egyptian base in the Sinai Peninsula in 1958.11 The Egyptian-Israeli War and the Withdrawal of UNEF The next serious crisis affecting UN peacekeeping arose in May 1967. earlier discrepancies in the establishment of UNEF brought up problems that limited the UN’s response to the Egyptian Government. application of these principles and on certain requirements (Source: Canadian Government) for each new operation. Following these. However. It helped to effectively resolve a dangerous crisis that directly involved two major powers. UNEF had been set up in November 1956 and had maintained peace along the Egyptian-Israeli borders effectively for more than ten years. Such mounting tensions precipitated the next crises for the UN. initially. The principles laid down by Dag Hammarskjöld for the organisation and functioning of UNEF were applied to Canadian members of UNEF inspect an all peacekeeping forces. despite these challenges. when the Egyptian government requested the withdrawal of UNEF. including the political circumstances at each instance. once deployed along the Egyptian-Israeli border. which later created problems. the Egyptian Government requested Secretary-General U Thant to withdraw UNEF from Sinai and the Gaza Strip. Later. the opposition of the Soviet Union. which held that the General Assembly had no authority to establish UNEF. In April 1967. First. Such revisions were based on the individual needs of each case. At this point in time. in May 1967. apparently persuaded him to re-join the Arabs in a common struggle against Israel. UNEF had been authorised by the General Assembly rather than by the Security Council. Syria. Although quiet prevailed in the Egyptian-Israeli sector. UNEF served as a model for later peacekeeping forces. a series of serious incidents took place between Israel and Syria. Secondly.10 The Weaknesses and Strengths of UNEF There were serious weaknesses in the initial establishment of UNEF. because Israel refused to accept the UN force on its territory. especially on the Israeli-Syrian front. As discussed earlier. it maintained peace in this sensitive area for more than ten years until it was withdrawn in May 1967. These are recounted in the following lessons. UNEF was deployed only along the border on the .
However. (Source: Canadian Forces) . Unfortunately. some might argue that U Thant might have brought the matter before the Security Council by invoking Article 99 of the Charter. U Thant knew that with the United States and the Soviet Union firmly on opposing sides. withdrawal of UNEF was followed within three weeks by a new war between Egypt and Israel in the Middle East (the Six-Day War). which stipulated that UNEF would be withdrawn upon Egypt’s request. UNEF commander. For three days. no action could be taken by the Council.Lesson 3 / The First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) 43 Egyptian side.M. Burns. when the Egyptian Government maintained its request per the original agreement negotiated by Dag Hammarskjöld. Secretary-General U Thant. U Thant immediately initiated intense consultations with the members of the Security Council and with the UNEF Advisory Committee. These two factors now became serious handicaps. the responsibility for dealing with the Egyptian request fell on his successor. inspects the 56 Transport Company of the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps (RCASC). such an action would have been inconsequential. U Thant had no alternative but to comply. neither government would co-operate. Thus. the Secretary-General did all he could to persuade Egypt to withdraw its request and to persuade Israel to accept the UN force on its side of the border. However. It became apparent to U Thant that there was a deep division within both groups regarding what action to take.12 Consequences of the Withdrawal of UNEF With the benefit of hindsight. 3. No new operations were established for the next six years. Though the deployment of UNEF on Egyptian soil was negotiated by Dag Hammarskjöld. Thus.L. 16-18 May. General E. This greatly affected the credibility of UN peacekeeping operations and impeded their further development. composed of the representatives of troopcontributing countries.
They were no exclusions. B. excluded contingents from which of the following groups? A. D. any Member State could provide troop contingents. UNEF forces could be stationed in Egypt and would receive the full protection of the Egyptian government. The five Permanent Members of the Security Council and any countries that might have had a special interest in the conflict. B. D. C. and it confirmed that: A. The collapse of the 1949 General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel. B. Israel’s invasion of Jordan. UNEF forces would be stationed in Egypt immediately. All North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members.Lesson 3 / The First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) 44 LESSON 3 END-OF-LESSON QUIZ 1. In 1956. 2. C. D. The “Good Faith Agreement” was a memorandum between the United Nations and the government of Egypt. which established a buffer zone between Egypt and Israel. All Warsaw Pact members. The breakout of the Korean War. C. the composition of the original UNEF I troops. UNEF or any peacekeeping force could not be stationed or operate on the territory of a given country without the consent of the government of that country. . A vote in the General Assembly to further partition Palestine. UNEF forces would destroy any Israeli forces to protect the sovereignty of Egypt. 3. based on the good faith between the UN and Egypt. The first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) was implemented in the Middle East after what event? A. but that various questions regarding details would be answered at a later point.
Lesson 3 / The First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) 45 4. C. What was the role of the Advisory Committee? A. and criminal offences of force members would be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective national governments. Dag Hammarskjöld. D. C. D. UN forces retained full freedom of movement in the performance of duties. Tell the Secretary-General what to do on a day-to-day basis with UNEF. There would be limited freedom of movement for UN forces. . What was provided by the Status of the Force Agreement? A. 7. Background on the UN deployments in the region. Ralphe Bunche. UNEF forces were deployed only on Egyptian soil. The rules of engagement for UNEF. C. B. U Thant. UN forces retained full freedom of movement in all territory of the host nation. The rules that Israel and Egypt had to abide by in relation to UNEF. What was one of the serious weaknesses in the initial establishment of UNEF I? A. The blueprint for many future UN peacekeeping missions. B. C. D. and criminal offences of force members would be subject to prosecution by the Host country. There were no serious weaknesses in the initial establishment of UNEF. Member states were not willing to provide the right equipment for their contingents. C. 5. B. UNEF I provided a pattern for later peacekeeping operations. 6. The U. B. UN forces retained full freedom of movement in the performance of duties. Who laid down the principles for the organisation and functioning of UNEF that were then applied to all peacekeeping forces? A. Assist the Secretary-General in his responsibilities with regards to UNEF. What were two key provisions of the Force agreement that related to freedom of movement and criminal liability? A. D.S. 8. did not support the mission. Oversee the Secretary-General’s decisions regarding UNEF. D. B. Lester Pearson. and they would be free from prosecution in the event of criminal activities. and criminal offences of force members would be subject to prosecution by the host country. Suggest new tactics for UN peacekeeping operations.
B. No new operations were established for the next six years. They all had robust military capabilities. There was no impact.Lesson 3 / The First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) 46 9. Israel attacked Egypt. Egypt attacked Israel. 8B. 10. 3C. C. What event precipitated the withdrawal of UNEF I form Egypt? A. 10C . B. D. 2B. 4A. 6C. ANSWER KEY: 1A. What was the impact of the withdrawal of UNEF I in 1967 on new peacekeeping missions? A. C. 7A. D. The Egyptian government requested the withdrawal of UNEF. The loss of financial support for the mission. and new missions were established immediately. New missions did not follow the principles established by UNEF I. 9D. 5D.
2 4.9 Background on the UN Operation in the Congo The Post-Independence Crisis (1960-61) The Withdrawal of Belgian Forces The Constitutional Crisis The Secession of Katanga Fighting Between Katangan and ONUC Forces The Re-establishment of the Central Government Personnel and Logistics Issues Lack of Intelligence Gathering Capability 4.6 4.12 The Role of ONUC in the Evolution of UN Peacekeeping Operations .7 4.8 4.4 4.LESSON 4 UN OPERATION IN THE CONGO (ONUC) 4.3 4.10 The Outcome of the ONUC Mission 4.5 4.11 Effects of ONUC on the United Nations 4.1 4.
• • . The lesson includes a description of the role of two UN Secretary-Generals in the Congo. Understanding the background and history between Belgium and the Congo is important in understanding the role of the UN and is presented in detail. as well as the striking effects of the involvement of each in the situation. Lesson 4 also outlines how the internal problems in the Congo impacted on the initiatives taken by the UN. and the aftermath of the mission. the student should be able to meet the following objectives: • • • Describe the background and the political implications of the crisis in the Congo. List the mandates it had over time. Finally.Lesson 4 / UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 48 LESSON OBJECTIVES Lesson 4 is an in-depth examination of the crisis in the Congo and its effects on the evolution of UN peacekeeping. specifically in how the UN learned to define a UN peacekeeping operation. and Understand the role of the Congo in the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations. Discuss the opposition of the Soviet Union to the Congo mission and how that affected the situation. By the end of Lesson 4. and how a mission could have a drastic negative impact on the UN as a whole. it includes a discussion about the mixed effect of the Congo on the UN. It goes into great detail regarding the mandates of the UN mission in the Congo that changed over time. Describe both the successes and difficulties of the UN mission in the Congo.
The treaty also ceded the military bases at Kamina and Kitona to Belgium. Congo’s strategic position in central Africa and its wealth of natural resources.000 civilians). and four days after the Belgian invasion. and co-operation was signed between Belgium and the newly formed Congolese Government. Belgium had ruled Congo in a highly brutal and paternalistic way. doctors. or urban intellectualism. By March 1960 the Belgian Government had created a constitution. The other political leader was Patrice Emery Lumumba of the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC). By the early 1950s. there were no lawyers. and its area of operation (approximately 2. though this treaty was never ratified. This organisation had been Belgium’s security force during colonial times. when the Belgian government began the process of decolonisation. the UN Operation in the Congo (generally known by its French acronym ONUC. the “Loi foundamentale. Political activity was not really allowed until 1959. the territory had historically been the personal property of King Leopold II of Belgium. a pro-independence movement. Once the newlyelected Parliament convened. On 29 June.” for the Congo and had set general and provincial elections for the same month. In turn. The Security Council established ONUC on 14 July 1960. a treaty of friendship. the native Congolese elites had formed semi-political organisations that became the main political parties in the late 1950s.000 personnel of the Force Publique. the Belgian Government would allow their troops to be called out to maintain law and order if requested by the Congolese Government.345. connections formed in schools. its responsibilities. One was Joseph Kasavubu. The paternalistic policy of the colonial administration left the local population with limited educational and political development. Even when it became a colony of Belgium in 1908. It was by far the largest peacekeeping operation in the earlier years of the UN in terms of the manpower required (nearly 20. Lumumba and the MNC formed the first government on 23 June 1960. and few Congolese had any education beyond a secondary level. The treaty allowed for many of the existing Belgian administrative and technical personnel of the former colonial administration to remain in Congo to support the transition of the new Government. assistance. l’Opération des Nations Unis au Congo).1 Background on the UN Operation in the Congo The fifth peacekeeping operation. in fact. The underlying problem with these organisations was that they had been formed on foundations based on either ethnic kinship.000 square kilometres. there were only 17 Congolese university graduates. met with serious problems.000 troops and 4. with Lumumba as Prime Minister and Kasavubu being made President on Congo’s independence on 30 June 1960. it was forced to deal with the issue of how to deal with the two dominant political leaders of Congo. which represented his own ethnic lower Congo River Bakongo people. Secretary-General Dag . Law and order was supposed to be maintained by the 25. or engineers. At the time of Independence in 1960. It thus produced the first major crisis in the history of United Nations peacekeeping. created an environment that was highly volatile. who was the leader of the ABAKO (the Association des Bakongo) movement. which is about the size of Western Europe). and it continued to be commanded by Belgian officers after independence. These groups were for the most part not politically compatible. two weeks after the Congo (formerly Zaire. combined with the rapid plan for decolonisation by Belgium.Lesson 4 / UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 49 4. the use of brutality against the indigenous population remained. now the Democratic Republic of Congo) acceded to independence.
2 The Post-Independence Crisis (1960–61) Shortly after independence. Ralph Bunche urged Belgium not to commit its forces. the Belgian Government flew in troops ostensibly to protect Belgian citizens. the majority of the Belgians who were running the machinery of government fled the country. In an Congolese troops after riots. This mutiny quickly spread to other garrisons and resulted in atrocities being committed against Europeans.Lesson 4 / UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 50 Hammarskjöld realised that Congo would require more than the Belgian Government had offered in assistance if Congo was to survive past independence. refused their request. On 11 July. the Secretary-General offered substantial UN military and technical support to Congo in an effort to stabilise the situation. but what also must not be forgotten was the tribal conflict between the Lunda and the Baluba within Katanga and between Katanga and the Congo. On 12 July Kasavubu and Lumumba requested UN intervention. On 10 July. In response. the richest region of Congo. the national security forces may be able. to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary until. They dismissed General Janssens and made Victor Lundula the new ANC commander. the Belgian commander of the Force Publique. to meet fully their tasks. the Province of Katanga. the Congolese Government put forth a formal request for UN support. the Congolese rank and file of the Force Publique demanded promotions. without the express permission of the Congolese Government. Rather than calling out the Belgian troops to quell the mutiny. declared its independence after Belgian troops arrived in Elizabethville. President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba acquiesced to the demands of the mutineers by renaming the Force Publique to the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC). with Joseph Mobutu as his Chief of Staff.” . which in turn caused a rapid nationwide collapse of essential services. Katanga represented some fifty percent of Congo’s national revenues. As a result. At the same time. All Congolese soldiers were promoted by one rank grade in an effort to “Africanise” the ANC. famously noting. It was clear that there was tacit Belgian support for the secession. General Emile Janssens. However. On 13-14 July the Security Council adopted resolution 143 (1960). The result was total chaos as the remaining Belgian officers revolted. which called for the withdrawal of Belgian forces from Congo. It also “authorise[d] the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps. through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations. in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo. 1960 effort to stave off total collapse of the Congolese Government.” On 5 July the garrison at Leopoldville mutinied. “things won’t change [for the Force Publique] just because of independence. 4. in the opinion of the Government. the next day the Secretary-General invoked Article 99 of the UN Charter to initiate an emergency meeting of the Security Council to debate the growing crisis in Congo.
Guinea. One battalion of Swedes from UNEF was also transferred to ONUC. 4. and by July 1961 ONUC reached its peek strength of 19. von Horn of Sweden was assisted by a small staff of officers also drawn from UNTSO. Seven battalions were sent.Lesson 4 / UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 51 The Secretary-General noted that in order to act quickly. all Belgian forces had been withdrawn. Offers were accepted from Ethiopia.828 military personnel and some 2. Lt. Even at its peak strength of nearly 20. Morocco. ONUC troops were forced to completely take over all security matters in Congo due to the collapse of its own security forces. and Tunisia. Both of these goals were tied to the other.3 The Withdrawal of Belgian Forces ONUC initially had two primary goals: (1) to aid the Congolese Government to restore law and order. This precipitated the withdrawal of Belgian forces. Ralph Bunche was made the temporary commander until the arrival of Lt. Ghana. Logistics. one serious problem that arose. the actual issue of the secession of Katanga was not resolved with the withdrawal of the Belgians.000 civilian experts and technicians. Members of the Canadian Army Provost Corps en route to Maluku. By the evening of 15 July 1960 the first contingent of some 90 Tunisian officers and men had landed in Leopoldville. CF) . Prime Minister Lumumba objected to the way the Secretary-General had implemented the various resolutions regarding Congo and thereafter refused to co-operate with him. Belgium was called to immediately withdraw its troops from Katanga.000 troops. The Belgian forces were withdrawn to their bases. The goal to restore law and order was far more troublesome. General Carl C. There was. With the adoption on 9 August of SC resolution 146 (1960). and signals units were brought in from western states. Therefore. In addition. Thus. The first Commander of ONUC was drawn from UNTSO. the intended UN force for Congo would be built with the support of African States. which were subsequently occupied by ONUC. General von Horn (who arrived with his staff on 18 July). however. and (2) to quickly bring about the withdrawal of Belgian forces. air support. geographical distribution in the region. on 9 October 1960. This included those at the Kamina and Kitona bases. ONUC was hard-pressed to cover such a vast country like Congo. ONUC personnel had been officially instructed that they were part of a peace force. not a combat force. The selection of the force contingents would be guided by troop availability. ONUC was successful in this initial phase of the operation. As ONUC forces began to arrive.000 troops. and by the beginning of September. On 12 August the Secretary-General personally led ONUC forces into Katanga. Congo. they could use force only when protecting people from violence and in their own self-defence. and by the beginning of August 1960 Belgian forces had been withdrawn from Congo with the exception of their two existing bases and the breakaway Province of Katanga. numbering some 4. but by August the internal situation in Congo had caused the country to fracture further. (Daryl Pentland. they started to secure critical infrastructure and to deploy into positions held by Belgian troops. and language.
The Government’s military operation in August 1960 against Kasai failed.S. Kasavubu even came to the 15th regular session of the GA. In many instances. ONUC was constantly hampered in its efforts to re-establish law and order by the non-cooperation of the central Government and its inability to fully control the ANC. On 24 November ANC forces attacked the Ghanaian Embassy in Leopoldville. ONUC troops had also been attacked during this period. Prime Minister Lumumba called for the ONUC forces to attack Katanga. on 8 November an ONUC patrol of Irish soldiers was attacked and eight were killed.Lesson 4 / UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 52 Due to existing tribal rivalries. Thus. Lumumba turned to the USSR for aid. and. The Soviets had been looking for a foothold in Africa and willingly provided Lumumba’s forces with transport planes and trucks. calling itself the “Autonomous Mining State of South Kasai. ANC forces were used to suppress the rebellious provinces. On the night of 5-6 September ONUC immediately closed down the Leopoldville airport to stop arms shipments and the arrival of rival troops. ONUC was left in the unenviable position of having to deal with de facto authority in an effort to avert civil war and protect the civilian population. The following day ONUC closed down the local radio station as it had been used to incite violence. Lumumba dismissed Kasavubu as President. 4.” This other “new state” had its capital at Bakwanga. wounding several and killing one of the UN soldiers of the Tunisian unit guarding the Embassy. as a major threat. and Congo was broken up into four distinct factional regions. however. This caused the constitutional crisis. in turn. It resolved (resolution 1474 ES-IV) to have the SecretaryGeneral take vigorous action according to previous SC resolutions. The remains of the Parliament passed a resolution that dismissed the Presidential ordinance. The General Assembly sat for an emergency special session from 17-20 September. Congo collapsed quickly into four rival regions (see page 54). it was unable to make a decision. However. thus.4 The Constitutional Crisis On 5 September 1960. Between 14-17 September the Security Council debated on how to resolve the growing crisis in Congo. ANC forces were also massed along the border of Katanga. The provinces of Equateur and Leopoldville began to oppose central Government rule. but in many cases the ANC troops proved to be uncontrollable due to their limited training and professional leadership. The UN reminded Lumumba that its forces were neutral peacekeepers. the coup was not wholly successful. they could not support either side. Delegations representing the Kasavubu and Lumumba camps came to the UN to make their respective cases for being the legitimate government of Congo. ONUC reopened the radio station on 13 September once the situation had stabilised. A Conciliation Commission was created to assist in the resolution of the Crisis. the southern part of the Province of Kasia declared itself independent. On 14 September Colonel Joseph Mobutu led a coup that placed an army-backed regime in power. and the American Government put its support behind President Kasavubu. This was seen by the U. President Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba as Prime Minister. However. these troops committed atrocities against the innocent civilian population. which went on for eleven months as there was no legal government. The various factions also started to import military equipment . nothing was resolved.
The UN put up strong objections to the transfer. The capture of Patrice Lumumba by ANC troops . resulting in ONUC’s overall strength being reduced to some 15. On 17 January 1961. including Guinea. by the end of 17 January word came that Lumumba had been murdered. Lumumba and two other political prisoners were transferred to Elisabethville in Katanga. but when he left his Leopoldville residence on the night of 27 November in an attempt to reach his political stronghold in Stanleyville.000 troops at a critical moment. The other negative impact was several troop-contributing nations. and Morocco.Lesson 4 / UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 53 and arms. withdrew their contingents. he was intercepted and arrested by ANC troops loyal to Colonel Mobutu. Once arrested by the de facto Government. though all diplomatic means were used. The reality of this murder was that the Governments of both Belgium and the United States were complicit in this crime by aiding the forces of Kasavubu in the removal and subsequent death of Lumumba. however. The Soviets demanded the resignation of the Secretary-General. The result was a nascent civil war as pro-Lumumba and anti-Lumumba forces openly clashed. ONUC simply did not have enough personnel to control all the points of entry into Congo to stop most of these shipments. ONUC troops had been guarding Lumumba. Mali. who was seen as pro-Communist. ONUC forces due to their mandate could do nothing to directly force the release of Lumumba.
Lesson 4 / UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 54 Congolese Factional Territorial Control During the Congo Crisis (1960-61) Faction National Government Rival National Government Autonomous Mining State of South Kasai Republic of Katanga Leader Joseph Kasavubu Antoine Gizenga acting on behalf of Patrice Lumumba Albert Kalonji Capital (modern name) Léopoldville (Kinshasa) Stanleyville (Kisangani) Bakwanga Province(s) Controlled Equateur Leopoldville Orientale Kivu Northern Kasai & Katanga South Kasai Map Colour Tan Mauve Yellow Moise Tshombe Elizabethville (Lubumbashi) Southern/Central Katanga Green Source: Ram Military Consulting .
held in Madagascar. who claimed that they were looking for Belgian soldiers. the port was guarded by a Sudanese detachment. ONUC troops intervened against the Katangan forces and re-established some control in the region of northern Katanga. proved to be more useful. and forty-four Ghanaian soldiers were massacred. could resolve the crisis. attacked 13 Italian airmen of ONUC. However. the Secretary-General called for a reinforcement of ONUC to some 18. near the mouth of the Congo River. the Katangan crisis was growing in the south as foreign mercenaries leading Katangan troops launched an offensive to push out anti-Tshombe forces. Major Incidents Against ONUC Forces in 1961 Date 4 March 1961 Description ONUC only had one seaport available at Matadi. Elements of the ANC attacked the port on 4 March. 28-29 April 1961 November 1961 In April. This volatile situation led to a number of serious attacks against ONUC personnel. The minister accused the local ANC of being a problem to law and order and threatened that the ONUC forces would disarm them. Many of them were brought to Leopoldville with help from and under ONUC protection. The Italians were beaten and then jailed. Kasavubu tried to set up a provisional government. This decision ultimately saved ONUC from even more casualties. and the majority of the 221 members attended. Luckily the ONUC Force Commander was briefed about the plan and instead withdrew the Sudanese detachment. and (b) the lack of cooperation from all the various Congolese factions. but only his allies participated. as they saw ONUC as a force that was trying to stop them. all were subsequently murdered. This at least brought some calm to northern Congo. ANC forces attacked the Ghanaian ONUC garrison at Port Francqui. ONUC tried to mitigate the civil war but concluded that only the reconvening of Parliament and the approval of a new national unity government. An ONUC air transport was delivering two scout cars to the Malayan contingent at the Congolese base at Kindu. At the time the strip was controlled by Congolese forces. after much debate. While the March 1961 Tananarive Conference. which authorised the use of force by ONUC in an effort to avert a full-blown civil war in Congo. in north-western Kasai Province. The ninety-man garrison was not expecting an attack and was dispersed in six different locations throughout Port Francqui. but in the meantime ONUC representatives were able to negotiate the implementation of resolution 161 with Kasavubu. one that was not being influenced by foreign interests. ONUC found its task very difficult due to: (a) its reduced strength.000 troops to stabilise the situation. After much negotiation Parliament was reopened on 22 July. Congolese soldiers. On 2 . ONUC HQ in Leopoldville ordered a counterattack using the small landing strip at Matadi as a point of entry. The Ghanaians were quickly overrun by the ANC forces. Faced with over-whelming odds and a decreasing supply of ammunition. held in Congo in late March. To facilitate the meetings. passed resolution 161 (1961). to bring in supplies. The incident was triggered by a provocative speech given by the Congolese Interior Minister during a visit to Port Francqui. they had partially obstructed it to stop reinforcements. brought little progress.Lesson 4 / UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 55 The SC met on 15 February and. The resolution also called for the evacuation of all mercenaries and other personnel not under UN command. making it of limited use but gaining him favour with the UN. the Coquilhatville Conference. In an effort to retain control of the country. ONUC provided the security. As the situation deteriorated in late February and early March 1961. A series of efforts were launched to re-establish the central government’s control over Congo. Responding to what seemed like a provocation.
however. Many of these people took over key military and administrative positions in Katanga. owned UMHK. Overall. Although Belgium never formally recognised Katanga (nor did any other state for that matter). many of whom replaced the Belgian soldiers and technical advisors. it became obvious that some had re-infiltrated to Katanga and were continuing to support the secessionist movement. tin. 73 percent of the cobalt. The Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK). The UN responded by acknowledging it would recognise this new government and give it what support it needed. ONUC began to round up those foreign elements scheduled for deportation. uranium. Tshombe. This gave Tshombe the wealth he needed to continue down the path of secession. two factors worked against these goals in regards to Katanga: (1) the influence of foreign industrial concerns. UMHK also allowed its industrial facilities to be used by the growing Katangan mercenary army. recruitment agencies were set up in Brussels for the enlistment of mercenaries. continued to recruit foreigners. UMHK simply paid its taxes to the local government led by Moise Tshombe. formed in 1906. It was not until October 1961 that the Government of Belgium began taking stronger steps to stop Belgians and other foreign nationals from entering Congo. 4. On 28 August. Furthermore. rather than the central government in Leopoldville. For the obvious commercial realities. Though many of the mercenaries were deported by 9 September. was a Belgian mining trust operating in Katanga. in late June 1961 there was still in excess of 500 mercenaries and ex-Belgian military operating with the Katangan gendarmerie. Belgium’s largest holding company. Once the new Government of national unity was formed and after all attempts to negotiate with Tshombe’s regime in Katanga failed. all of which came from Katanga. copper. and 10 percent of the copper. In this vein.Lesson 4 / UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 56 August a new Government of national unity was constituted. and (2) the presence of mercenary forces. the UN’s goal was to maintain international security while not becoming embroiled in the domestic aims of the Congolese Government. UMHK supported Katangan independence and opposed the presence of ONUC. ONUC was not authorised to take sides or exert influence on what was seen as an internal conflict. . the new Congolese Government passed an ordinance on 24 August to expel all foreign officers and mercenaries that were supporting the Katangan secession. However. ONUC at the same time was strengthened and was able to begin the evacuation/removal of non-Congolese personnel from Katanga. ONUC resorted to reconciliation to resolve the crisis. which were at the time some of the richest in the world. little was done to bring back those civilian and military personnel who had been working in the region under the 1960 treaty of friendship. This “gendarmerie” was led by some 600 Belgian soldiers who had not left the Congo as per SC resolution 143 (1960). and zinc deposits. Even so. Katanga was rich with cobalt.5 The Secession of Katanga The UN chose not to become involved in the initial phase of the Katangan secession because it did not want to undermine the territorial integrity and political independence of Congo. ONUC also set up security in and around Elizabethville to quell any possible disorder that might have occurred. In 1960 UMHK was producing 60 percent of the uranium in the West. The Société Générale de Belgique. By using its financial power. Moreover. This now left the Katangan secession to be resolved.
head of ONUC civil operations. ONUC simply did not have any substantial offensive capability due to it being established as a peace force. the Katangan Surete (political police). A further protocol was signed on 13 October. to resolve the refugee issue were rebuffed by Sture Linner.000 Baluba had fled Elizabethville and were being protected by ONUC forces. the Secretary-General flew to meet Moise Tshombe at Ndola in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia). flew to Ndola and signed the ceasefire agreement on 20 September with Tshombe. Twenty of ONUC’s soldiers were killed and 63 wounded during this fighting. On the night of 17 September his plane crashed.Lesson 4 / UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 57 4. it allowed for defensive fire if troops were attacked and prohibited the movement of ONUC and Katangan forces. However. the central Government launched its own attack against Katanga in October 1961. ONUC refused to help. began a brutal campaign against members of the antiTshombe Baluba tribe who were in Elizabethville. (Source: 71642 UN/DPI Photo) forces set up similar security precautions to those of the previous month to try to resolve the issue. Mahmoud Khiari. and in an effort to put an end to the secession. India. The attack had limited territorial success. and on 13 September ONUC 1961. and Sweden to stop Katangan air attacks. which was led by foreign officers. under the original mission mandate. 13 September Tshombe. The small Katangan air force seriously impeded ONUC’s capability to reinforce its forces in Katanga. killing him and fifteen others. outlining the provisions of the ceasefire. Almost immediately Katangan forces throughout the region attacked ONUC forces. Chief of UN Civilian Operations. but it did not resolve the secession issue. In an effort to create a ceasefire between ONUC and Katangan forces. Frustrated by events. while ONUC maintained its positions. By 9 September 1961. At his side are Premier Adoula and Dr. In short. ONUC’s overall capability had been reduced to the withdrawal of the Tunisian and Ghanaian contingents and size reductions in other ONUC units. The crisis caused a major food and health problem for ONUC and also heightened the Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld inspecting ONUC Guard of escalation of tribal conflict. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld had come to Congo to discuss the future of ONUC and also to try and resolve the Katanga secession. . The ceasefire aside. some 35. The central Government requested ONUC help to transport ANC troops. Katangan forces continued to violate it. ONUC had by now been reinforced by jet fighter squadrons from Ethiopia. ONUC’s efforts Honour in the Congo.6 Fighting Between Katangan and ONUC Forces In an effort to discredit ONUC’s actions against the mercenaries and to imply that ONUC was causing disorder. However. The flight occurred at night due to the threat of attack by a lone Katangan fighter aircraft during the day.
UN casualties amounted to 22 killed and 77 wounded. By 4 January 1962 ONUC forces had secured the Elisabethville. this mission was eventually carried out outside of the UN system due to the various secessions and the civil war. one of ONUC’s objectives had been the training of Congolese personnel to run the civil structures of government and its support agencies in the country. U Thant. FAO. but as the mandate of ONUC had been substantially fulfilled. supplied by ONUC. UNICEF. July 1962. the SC passed resolution 169 (1961) and authorised the use of force to remove the mercenaries from Katanga. Due to the obvious skill and restraint of ONUC forces. then offered a national reconciliation plan that was accepted in principle by both sides. which were suspended in June 1962. as well.297 ONUC troops remained in Congo into 1964. the UN’s new secretary-general. and Build Road. some 3. by 5 December.Lesson 4 / UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 58 On 24 November 1961. ONUC also Volunteers. However. and by December 1962 ONUC forces again were sent to engage Katangan units to regain control of the region. Zarov) took over command of the Katangan gendarmerie. Amnesty had been offered to the Katangan government in November 1961. Katangan forces began low-level violence against ONUC forces. Nothing substantial came of these negotiations. Even with continuing . there was an ever-greater need for technical experts to help in the reintegration of Katangan governmental. (Source: 74797 UN/DPI/B. Kipushi. Katangan casualties appeared to be light. By late December ONUC had stabilised the military situation. With the end of the Katangan crisis. Kamina.7 The Re-establishment of the Central Government From the onset. The SecretaryGeneral noted in his report of 29 June 1964 that the Government of Congo had to take responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and its own territorial integrity. the Katangan secession was over. ONUC forces had regained control of the area around Elizabethville and were in control of Kamina. As ONUC had continued to train people. and by 21 January Indian troops of ONUC entered the town. and Jadotville areas. monetary. the Katangan government did nothing to implement the plan. By the end of December. Though there had been an effort by ONUC to reorganise the Congolese military. this had escalated into full-scale fighting. Tshombe had retreated to his final stronghold in Kolwezi. and negotiations began to restore the peace. There had been no specific date for the termination of the ONUC mission. 4. Leopoldville. Incited by Tshombe. As of that date. and civil services with Congo. many of these individuals were now available to take over positions that had been held by Belgian technical experts in Katanga. Thus. they now accepted the offer. the force size was reduced. The Secretary-General noted that there was still a need for the presence of ONUC as per the request from Congolese Prime Minister Adoula.
on 30 June 1964. most of these issues were mitigated by the superior quality and overall professionalism of the ONUC officer corps. ONUC withdrew as planned. This situation was then compounded by the primitive transport system that existed in Congo. the logistical issues ONUC faced did not overly impact its capabilities.Lesson 4 / UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 59 problems in Kwilu. ONUC also had to deal with the reality of the lack of logistical capability and the arming and supplying of a large multinational force with different capabilities. and northern Katanga. ONUC was supported by the UN’s Field Operations Service. Kivu. observed. and many contingents did not speak either of the two official UN languages at the mission (English and French). The United States Air Force provided the majority of the airlift capability during the ONUC mission. the Force never enjoyed a satisfactory supply system because both its direction and application remained exclusively in civilian hands. The Civilian Operations programme was also terminated. he noted that no request for a mission extension had come from the Congolese Government. which was not really set up for major military operations. UNC63-164-1) . and the harsh terrain and climatic conditions of central Africa. In addition. Canadian troops arrive in the Congo. there were few good maps and even fewer local air traffic control and ground crews (most had been Belgians who had fled the country). Ultimately. However. there were few airfields that could support large military transport aircrafts. As General von Horn. the presence of ONUC forces would not help.” General von Horn’s criticism aside. “During my entire six months in the Congo. November 1963. Air transport was the only viable solution for ONUC to move anything into the interior of Congo. therefore suffering deficiencies in its administrative and planning capabilities. the mission’s first commander. with limited roads. an inoperable rail system. the six-month tours of duty created high rates of personnel turnover. There was great variation in unit capability. Thus. 4. but the overall technical assistance provided by the UN was continued under the Office of the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). which in turn created a lack of unit cohesiveness. In addition. Initially. (Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Center. which created communication difficulties.8 Personnel and Logistics Issues ONUC suffered from personnel problems due to its multinational composition.
the United Nations paid a very heavy price for its operation in the Congo. that is. ONUC’s intelligence gathering capability was still insufficient. the tragedy of his death cast a dark cloud over the entire operation. In addition. This was due to the fact that the ONUC peacekeeping mission afterwards provoked a serious political and financial crisis within the United Nations. it could not be seen acting in a military manner. 4. its successes could be listed as: • • • • All foreign troops had been withdrawn from the Congo. the intervention of the UN had insulated the Congo from superpower rivalry. 4. the UN had lost its greatest Secretary-General. gathering intelligence for clearly military uses. Part of the reason for this lack of capability was the civilian leadership’s belief that ONUC was mandated as a peacekeeping force. By the time the operation was terminated in June 1964. . in the end ONUC was able to fulfil its peace mission. its intelligence capacities were institutionalised with the creation of the Military Information Branch (MIB).Lesson 4 / UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 60 4. political and financial battles over ONUC nearly destroyed the United Nations as an organisation. Due to ONUC. Dag Hammarskjöld. creating occasional problems for the mission. The lack of an intelligence capability many times left ONUC unaware of worsening conditions until after violence had broken out.11 Effects of ONUC on the United Nations Despite this success. Therefore. This lack of capability continued until early 1961. to maintain its neutrality. and in its aftermath.10 The Outcome of the ONUC Mission Despite extreme difficulties. although ONUC was cleared of all responsibility regarding the death of Lumumba. And most important of all. Even so. A national reconciliation government had been installed in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa). The secession of Katanga had been ended without a bloodbath.9 Lack of Intelligence Gathering Capability One of the major problems that faced ONUC was the gathering of intelligence. There was no organised intelligence gathering system to provide critical information about threats against ONUC or to the civilian population it was sent to protect. Once ONUC’s mandate was changed to include enforcement.
Lesson 4 / UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 61 4. and beyond self-defence measure. ONUC was an important step in the evolution and development of UN peacekeeping. In the final analysis. considering this as an exceptional. The significance of ONUC in the evolution of PKOs is as follows: • • • It was the first peacekeeping force established by the Security Council. and in November 1961 to expel foreign mercenaries working for the Katangese secessionists.12 The Role of ONUC in the Evolution of UN Peacekeeping Operations Both the United Nations and its peacekeeping activities survived the Congo crisis. It was the first multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation which combined traditional peacekeeping tasks with important civilian activities of a political and humanitarian nature. last resort. first in February 1961 after the murder of Lumumba in order to prevent civil war. The Council gave such authorisation twice during ONUC. . and It was the only PKO during the Cold War for which the Security Council authorised the use of force.
The presence of UN military observers. It allowed ONUC to withdraw from Congo. D. Congo was invaded by Northern Rhodesia. To aid Belgian forces in restoring law and order. It authorised the use of force by ONUC. . C. What was one of ONUC’s initial primary goals? A. 5. ONUC was immediately withdrawn from Congo. Rivalry between the national political parties. 2. To aid the Congolese Government to restore law and order. B. B. C. It authorised ONUC to engage in humanitarian relief operations. C. D. There was no negative impact on ONUC or its operations. B. D. D.000 troops at a critical moment. The mutiny of the Force Publique. B. and ONUC was withdrawn from Congo. 3. D. reducing ONUC’s overall strength to some 15. The Secretary-General and the Force Commander were forced to resign. How did the murder of Patrice Lumumba negatively impact ONUC? A. C. Belgium took over Congo. ONUC was forced to withdraw from Congo.Lesson 4 / UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 62 LESSON 4 END-OF-LESSON QUIZ 1. Several troop-contributing nations withdrew their contingents. What event triggered the post-independence crisis in Congo? A. What did SC resolution 161 (1961) allow ONUC to do? A. C. B. To disarm the ANC. To bring in humanitarian aid. The invasion of Congo by Belgian forces. It allowed ONUC to withdraw to safe positions within Congo. The constitutional crisis between September 1960-61 led to what? A. 4. Congo broke up into four distinct factional regions.
C. D. 7D. B. It had no impact on the UN. D. 6B. 8A. The World Bank. 10. It provoked a serious political and financial crisis within the UN. What was one of the major problems that faced ONUC before its mandate was changed to include enforcement? A. B. 7. B. D. Its command structure was too complicated. 9B. What did SC resolution 169 (1961) of 24 November 1961 authorise? A. It was the only peacekeeping mission that failed. 10A . C. 9. B. B. The use of force to remove the mercenaries from Katanga. It set the blueprint for all future UN PKOs. ANSWER KEY: 1B. 2C. C. ONUC had what impact on the UN? A. The use of force against any group that opposed ONUC operations. 5A. C. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The Office of the Resident Representative of UNDP. 4C. It lacked an intelligence gathering capability. It had no significance on the evolution of PKOs. D. It introduced the use of the blue beret and blue helmet as a symbol of peacekeeping. UNESCO. What was the significance of ONUC in the evolution of PKOs? A. It put the UN on secure financial footing in terms of running PKOs. overall technical assistance continued to be provided under what UN entity? A. It lacked the forces to fulfil its mandate. The expansion of ONUC forces in Katanga. The withdrawal of ONUC forces from Katanga. D. 3A. 8. It was the first peacekeeping force established by the Security Council. It did not have enough political leadership. With the termination of ONUC. C.Lesson 4 / UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 63 6.
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5 5.4 5.LESSON 5 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF THE EARLY 1960s 5.1 5.3 5.2 5.6 What Precipitated the Financial Crisis at the United Nations The Financial Background of UNEF and ONUC Steps Taken by the UN to Resolve Its Financial Crisis The Stand Taken by the United States Regarding Article 19 The Report of the Special Committee and Resolution of the Financial Crisis Impact of the Financial Crisis .
Understand how and why a Special Committee was set up to examine the financing of peacekeeping missions. which involved a Special Committee. Define the roles of both the Soviet Union and the United States in the onset of the financial crisis. By the end of Lesson 5. how it was resolved.Lesson 5 / The Financial Crisis of the Early 1960s 66 LESSON OBJECTIVES Lesson 5 examines how the financial crisis occurred in the United Nations in the early 1960s. It describes several factors that were related to its onset. the lesson outlines steps taken to resolve the financial crisis. and its mandates. • • • . the student should be able to meet the following objectives: • List the costs of major missions such as UNEF and ONUC that brought on the financial crisis. and how its resolutions guarantee that such a crisis could not recur. Finally. and also in its resolution. including major peacekeeping missions related to the crisis in the Congo and the Arab-Israeli wars. Lesson 5 looks into the role of the Soviet Union and its confrontation with the United States in precipitating and worsening the situation. and State the recommendations of the Special Committee and how their resolutions guarantee that the UN would not face another financial crisis. and what steps were taken so that it would not take place again.
both UNEF and ONUC operations experienced financial problems. The bonds’ principal and interest were repaid with additional contribution assessments to the UN budget from the Member States. that the UN was facing imminent bankruptcy. Bonds were sold in the amount of $169 million and had an interest rate of 2%. in directing that operation. elected 30 November 1962. especially if the use of force was involved. the French Government joined the Soviet Union in its rejection of the authority of the General Assembly to authorise UN peace and security operations. but the contributions for the two operations were managed in special and separate accounts. essentially those of the PKOs. France also refused to pay for ONUC. and thus. 5. In addition. with the agreement of its Permanent Members.” which ruled the expenses constitutional. France felt that only the SC. U Thant. also refused to pay for ONUC because they opposed the policy adopted by the Secretary-General. could authorise any peacekeeping operation. While not opposing the expanded Congo mission on political grounds. After being warned by the SecretaryGeneral.2 The Financial Background of UNEF and ONUC From the start. Secretary-General U Thant. Their costs were very high. together with some other countries (not necessarily the same as those opposing UNEF). the General Assembly authorised the Secretary-General to issue UN bonds of up to $200 million and to use the proceeds to cover operating requirements. precipitated a grave financial crisis that nearly wrecked the United Nations. Nagata) . they had to be paid. The rate of assessment was the same as those used to raise funds for the regular budget of the United Nations.1 What Precipitated the Financial Crisis at the United Nations The expenses of ONUC (the Congo Crisis). combined with those of UNEF (the Suez Crisis). (Source: UN/DPI/Y. 5. the United Nations had a massive shortfall of some US$200 million in its regular budget and special accounts combined. On this basis. Financial problems ensued when the Soviet Union and other countries refused to pay their assessments for UNEF on the grounds that the force was not authorised by the Security Council and was therefore illegal.3 Steps Taken by the UN to Resolve Its Financial Crisis Nevertheless. The legal and constitutional issues arising from their refusal to contribute were put to the test when the General Assembly requested an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. Both operations were financed by contributions from Member States as apportioned by the General Assembly in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. averaging over US$20 million per year for UNEF and approximately $100 million per year for ONUC. by the end of 1961. the Soviet Union.Lesson 5 / The Financial Crisis of the Early 1960s 67 5. Dag Hammarskjöld. The court ruled that the expenses of UNEF and ONUC constituted “expenses of the Organisation within the meaning of the Charter.
. Article 19 A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. They in effect could vote for large assessments on the U. would undertake a comprehensive review of UN PKOs.S. The General Assembly may. This confrontation was postponed because the Member States agreed not to vote on any matters during the session and that in the interim. which included the five Permanent Members of the Security Council minus China. which had refused to pay their assessments for UNEF and ONUC in the first place. a Special Committee. The adjournment helped the UN to cut down on operating costs. the total withholdings of the Soviet Union exceeded two years’ assessed contributions and.. the financial crisis was alleviated because the U. By September 1964. the Soviet Union threatened to leave the UN if the General Assembly so decided.S. the Soviet Union would become liable to lose its right of vote in the General Assembly. stopped pressing the Soviet Union for payment. 5. nevertheless. losing its General Assembly vote. permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member. Several Member States.S. including financial aspects.S. but by January 1965 it was operating on a month-to-month basis. in accordance with Article 19 of the Charter. This solution was reached by a consensus of the General Assembly. to enforce Article 19 on the Soviet Union because the majority of poor African and Asian states in the General Assembly could use the same tactic on the U. In part. then withheld a portion of their assessed contributions to the regular UN budget for the same reason.S. In rebuttal.4 The Stand Taken by the United States Regarding Article 19 At the start of the 19th Session of the General Assembly in September 1964.Lesson 5 / The Financial Crisis of the Early 1960s 68 But the bond issue in turn brought about a new kind of financial crisis. Washington had realised that it was not in the interest of the U. which if not paid would lead to the U. the United States insisted on the application of Article 19 with regard to the arrears of the Soviet Union.
given the pallor of the Cold War. the Special Committee submitted its report to the General Assembly. the United Nations was not only able to carry out its Congo Operation to a successful end but could also set up three peacekeeping operations at the height of the Congo crisis. It recommended that: 1) The Assembly carry on its work in a normal manner in accordance with its rules of procedure. which.Lesson 5 / The Financial Crisis of the Early 1960s 69 5. whereas the preceding operations were all open-ended. despite the formidable difficulties it encountered. The next day. 2) The question of the applicability of Article 19 in regards to the arrears of the Soviet Union should not be raised with regard to UNEF and ONUC. . These three new operations will be dealt with in later lessons. Namely. was an important victory. Thus. the General Assembly adopted the report of the Special Committee. on 31 August 1965. at the close of its 19th Session. the United Nations made two adjustments: all three new operations were financed outside the UN budget. and 3) The financial difficulties of the UN should be resolved through voluntary contributions by Member States. the Member States resorted to an extraordinary and imaginative device (avoid taking votes during an entire session of the General Assembly) to avert a major crisis that could have irreparably crippled the United Nations as the primary world-peace organisation.5 The Report of the Special Committee and Resolution of the Financial Crisis One year later. the United Nations Observer Mission (UNYOM) in 1963. Second. especially contributions of the developed countries.6 Impact of the Financial Crisis The 1964 financial crisis together with the UN Operation in the Congo highlighted the flexibility and resiliency of the Organisation in two important ways. To overcome the prevailing potential constraints. and they were authorised for limited time periods. these included the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea (West Irian) (UNTEA) in 1962. the crisis of the Soviet Union’s threatened expulsion from the Security Council and threatened withdrawal from the UN was averted. First. 5. and the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964.
DOMREP 1965-66 *in millions of U. 1947-1965 YEAR 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 TOTAL EXPENDITURES* 0 4 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 9 26 30 26 76 126 126 127 91 45 MISSION UNTSO 1948-present UNMOGIP 1949-present UNEF I 1956-67 UNOGIL 1958 ONUC 1960-64 UNSF/UNTEA 1962-63 UNYOM 1963-64 UNFICYP 1964-present UNIPOM 1965-66.S. dollars .Lesson 5 / The Financial Crisis of the Early 1960s 70 UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION EXPENDITURES.
Under $20 million a year. 4. they had to be paid. D. with the agreement of its Permanent Members. Why did France refuse to pay for ONUC? A. could authorise any peacekeeping operations. At the end of 1961. D. There was no political support in France for ONUC. What was the average annual cost for UNEF I? A. 2. Some $200 million in only its regular budget. B. D. Over $20 million a year. Gross financial mismanagement at UNHQ. France felt that only the Security Council. It ruled that it was unconstitutional to force Member States to pay for all PKOs. Some $200 million in its regular budget and special accounts combined. C. D. D. Over $100 million a year. C. Under $100 million a year. 5. B. Some $200 million in only its special accounts. A global financial recession. It ruled that the expenses were constitutional. France felt it had no national interest in the events in Congo. B. how much was the UN’s financial shortfall? A. Some $169 million in its regular budget and special accounts combined. What precipitated the grave financial crisis that nearly wrecked the United Nations? A. All Member States not paying their assessments. The ICJ was unable to resolve the issue. How did the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rule to resolve the issues arising from cost of UNEF and ONUC? A. C. C. It ruled that Member States only had to pay for PKOs that they endorsed. C. The expenses of ONUC combined with those of UNEF. . B. and thus. B. 3. The French Government did not want to offend Belgium by supporting the mission.Lesson 5 / The Financial Crisis of the Early 1960s 71 LESSON 5 END-OF-LESSON QUIZ 1.
Article 19 did not apply in regards to assessments for any PKOs. It sold off UN-controlled property. C. It gave up its seat in the Security Council. D. What does Article 19 of the UN Charter state? A. What did the Soviet Union threaten to do when the United States insisted on the application of Article 19 with regard to the arrears of the Soviet Union? A. It highlighted nothing.Lesson 5 / The Financial Crisis of the Early 1960s 72 6. The Soviet Union should be expelled from the UN under Article 19. How did the UN resolve its financial crisis? A. together with the UN Operation in the Congo. It threatened to leave the UN. It borrowed money from the state banks of the Permanent Members. it is out of the UN. It paid all of its arrears. D. 8B. 3A. The 1964 financial crisis. The weakness of the Charter. 2B. If a Member State is in arrears to the UN of an equivalent to its assessments for two years. C. D. 9B. It reduced UNHQ staff by 50% and eliminated jobs in other UN agencies. 10. It paid one year of its arrears. D. C. 8. B. The UN should refrain from establishing additional PKOs until all arrears were paid in full. 7. on 31 August 1965. highlighted what about the UN? A. Its weaknesses. If a Member State is in arrears to the UN of an equivalent to its assessments for two years. C. it can lose its vote in the Security Council. it can lose its vote in the General Assembly. 7D. ANSWER KEY: 1D. B. If a Member State is in arrears to the UN of an equivalent to its assessments for two years. 5B. It issued UN bonds of up to $200 million. D. In regards to the financial crisis. The question of the applicability of Article 19 in regards to the arrears of the Soviet Union should not be raised with regard to UNEF and ONUC. No Member State can leave the UN without a vote in the General Assembly. C. What was one of its recommendations? A. B. 10A . Its flexibility and resiliency. 4C. 9. B. 6C. B. the Special Committee submitted its report to the General Assembly.
9 Background on UNYOM Establishment of UNYOM Organisation of UNYOM Operations and Termination DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (DOMREP) 6.1 6.8 6.LESSON 6 UN TEMPORARY EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY (UNTEA) IN WEST NEW GUINEA (WEST IRIAN) 6.13 Background on DOMREP The Inter-American Peace Force Role of DOMREP DOMREP’s Impact .3 6.7 6.5 Background on UNTEA Establishment of UNSF Establishment of UNTEA Indonesia Takes Over UNTEA’s Impact UN YEMEN OBSERVER MISSION (UNYOM) 6.12 6.4 6.6 6.2 6.10 6.11 6.
and in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP). Understand the development of the crisis in the Dominican Republic. Outline the origins and background of the difficulties in Yemen. which was plagued by military coups and a civil war while attempting to become a democratic nation. A Representative of the Secretary-General was also sent to the Dominican Republic. UNYOM. Describe the mandate of UNTEA. By the end of Lesson 6. Yemen (UNYOM). In terms of UNYOM. and Discuss the international repercussions which arose from the crisis in the Dominican Republic. In West New Guinea (West Irian). Define the mandate of the UN Representative in the Dominican Republic. State the problems encountered by the Executive Authority of the UN in attempting to administer West New Guinea (West Irian).Lesson 6 / UNTEA. The issues related to each will expand the student’s understanding of the broad range of purposes found in peacekeeping operations. the student should be able to meet the following objectives: • Understand how the history of the Netherlands and Indonesia played a role in the crises in New Guinea. and how it required the Secretary-General’s Special Representative to help resolve it. • • • • • • • . Lesson 6 describes the ceasefire required before peace initiatives could be taken and the ongoing issues between the Netherlands and Indonesia over that territory. In each case. Describe the mandate of UNYOM. including that of the Security Force that was a part of that mission. and how each contributed to the evolution of peacekeeping concepts. and DOMREP 74 LESSON OBJECTIVES Lesson 6 examines UN Missions in West New Guinea (West Irian) (UNTEA). Lesson 6 discusses the crises over boundaries and territorial rights that a move towards self-rule engendered. UN peace initiatives were tailored to the unique needs of each region.
tensions grew as Indonesian troops entered West New Guinea on a number of occasions in the first part of 1962. Thus. UNYOM. Protecting the security of Dutch and Indonesian forces. the UN would provide a United Nations Security Force (UNSF) to assist UNTEA to observe the implementation of the ceasefire that was to become effective before UNTEA assumed authority. The administration of West New Guinea (West Irian) was to be transferred to the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). The issue remained unresolved. UNTEA would have full authority after 1 October 1962 to administer the territory. although the matter was discussed at the General Assembly’s regular sessions from 1954 to 1957 and at the 1961 session. However. but by 31 July there was a preliminary agreement reached. The mission. Indian Brigadier-General Indar Jit Rikhye was made the UN’s Military Adviser and headed the military observer team that was sent to supervise the ceasefire set-up. The UNMOs came specifically . while Indonesia saw the Dutch role as strictly administrative. 21 September 1962) authorised UN administration of the territory. The UNMO’s tasks included: • • • • • Observing the ceasefire. The parties agreed to informal talks that began in early 1962. Ireland. By December 1961 it was becoming obvious that a negotiated settlement was unlikely. then-acting Secretary-General U Thant.Lesson 6 / UNTEA. The agreement came on 15 August and was ratified on 20 September 1962. the General Assembly in resolution 1752 (XVII. which gave Indonesia its independence. However. The next day. In addition. India. to protect the rights of the inhabitants. the status of West Irian remained unresolved. when the administration of the territory was to be transferred to Indonesia. to maintain law and order. and Providing a non-military supply line to Indonesian troops. In an effort to quickly set up the ceasefire. therefore. Ceylon. the first time this had ever been done. Assisting in informing Indonesian troops in the jungle of the existence of the ceasefire. had a dual role in terms of peacekeeping and its administrative responsibilities. offered his good offices to resolve the matter. and DOMREP 75 UNTEA IN WEST NEW GUINEA (WEST IRIAN) 6. normal services until 1 May 1963. In the postWWII push for decolonisation.1 Background on UNTEA West New Guinea (West Irian) had been a colony of the Netherlands since 1828. the Secretary-General sent UNMOs without the prior authorisation of the General Assembly or the Security Council. Brazil. the Netherlands felt it remained the sole power in West Irian. and Sweden provided 21 UNMOs for the team. the Netherlands gave independence to Indonesia in 1949. Nigeria. Due to the ambiguous nature of the language used in the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty. and to ensure uninterrupted. Restoring the situation in the event of breaches of the ceasefire. until the implied incorporation of the territory within a year after Indonesian Independence.
The UNSF mandate was to begin no later than 1 October 1962. Pakistani UNSF troops land at Kaimana. the civil police. to the extent feasible. The UN also had under its control some 1. The Papuan Volunteer Corps. which on the arrival of the United Nations Administrator would cease being part of the Netherlands armed forces.500 personnel comprised of the Papuan Volunteer Corps. by 21 September General Rikhye and his team had fulfilled their mandate without incident.500 Pakistani troops. General Rikhye and his team had to make sure that law and order was maintained in the territory. Article VIII of the Indonesian-Netherlands agreement stipulated the role and purpose of UNSF: • • • • • • The Secretary-General would provide the UNTEA with such security forces as the United Nations Administrator deems necessary. and DOMREP 76 from UNEF I or ONUC. UNSF was the “police arm” of UNTEA and would operate as an internal law and security force. With the co-operation of both sides and the support of the Thirteenth United States Task Force for the Far East and the Royal Canadian Air Force. UNYOM. Its responsibilities included the supervision of the development of a viable local police force and aiding the smooth implementation of UNTEA’s administrative mandate. . and the remaining Dutch and Indonesian troops. The United Nations Administrator would. and the force was comprised of 1. The Indonesian armed forces in the territory would be under the authority of. and The Netherlands armed forces would be repatriated as rapidly as possible and. as well as to lay the groundwork for the arrival of UNSF. Units of the RCAF and the USAF provided communications and troop transport for UNSF. 6. Such forces would primarily supplement existing Papuan (West Irianese) police in the task of maintaining law and order. The ceasefire was established at 0001 GMT on 18 August 1962.2 Establishment of UNSF With the ceasefire in place. while still in the territory. the Secretary-General for the maintenance of law and order. will be under the authority of the UNTEA. UNSF was created to uphold the authority of UNTEA. and at the disposal of. Pakistani Major-General Said Uddin Khan was appointed as the Commander of UNSF. By 5 October UNSF was in place. use the Papuan (West Irianese) police as a United Nations security force to maintain law and order and at his discretion also use the Indonesian armed forces for the same purpose.Lesson 6 / UNTEA.
was appointed on 22 October. and The right to guarantee civil liberties and property rights.3 Establishment of UNTEA When General Assembly resolution 1752 (XVII) was adopted on 21 September 1962. subject to certain qualifications. The Papuan police was an all-Dutch force. and Indonesian personnel. In addition. The judicial system had almost ceased to function once the Dutch left. Mr. On 1 October the administration of the territory was transferred from the Netherlands to UNTEA. An emergency task force was set up to recruit and retain international. The Papuan Volunteer Corps Dutch officers and non-commissioned officers were replaced with Indonesian officers. UNTEA personnel were immediately sent to the region of West New Guinea (West Irian). the UN had temporary executive authority under the jurisdiction of the Secretary-General over a territory. became the Secretary-General’s Representative in West New Guinea (West Irian). For the first time in its history. Role of UNTEA New West Guinea had little development. while the Indonesian Government provided a group of civil servants to fill key posts. There was only an estimated 900 kilometres of roads in the region. Telephones were only available inside the major towns. and DOMREP 77 6. The transfer of authority meant that the Dutch system of government and use of the Dutch language had to be replaced with Indonesian systems and the Indonesian language. the indigenous forces had to be adapted to allow UNTEA personnel to handle the situation until Indonesia took over. The right to appoint government officials and members of representative councils. The terrain also created serious communication problems. and he arrived in West New Guinea on 21 September. Once in place. UNTEA’s powers included: • • • • The administration of the territory. Mr. and there were no qualified Papuans to replace them. The Dutch officers were temporarily replaced by Filipino personnel.Lesson 6 / UNTEA. It was agreed when UNTEA took over control of the New . UNYOM. the Dutch Government encouraged its nationals to stay and help UNTEA. when the Corps was transferred to Indonesian command. Though some Papuan officials filled vacant posts. there was still a serious shortage of adequately trained locals. Dutch and Indonesian liaison missions were established with UNTEA in Hollandia/Kotabaru. This process was completed on 21 January 1963. Djalal Abdoh (Iran). he replaced Mr. which were then later replaced by Indonesians. Air transport of all supplies from ports to inland areas was a critical requirement for the mission’s success. which had created an administrative vacuum that could have caused serious disruption of government services. UNTEA quickly filled the vacant positions with qualified Indonesians. José Rolz-Bennett. Dutch. Rolz-Bennett on 15 November. The entire corps was officered by Indonesians by the end of March 1963. All these issues had to be surmounted by UNTEA to fulfil its mandate. The right to legislate for the territory. The first serious task UNTEA had to deal with was the exodus of the majority of the Dutch civil servants. On the same day. In addition. A new UN Administrator.
UNTEA was also responsible for the 11 regional (representative) councils in New West Guinea. appointing its new representatives.” UNTEA also had to run the public health system and established a comprehensive plan for the set up of hospitals and clinics throughout the territory. (Source: Indonesian Mission) . In late 1962 and early 1963. UNTEA was also responsible for opening and closing the New Guinea Council and. The resumption of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands on 13 March 1963 greatly helped UNTEA in the final phase of the territorial transfer of authority to Indonesia. there were some 1. order was always re-established by UNSF troops. All the provisions of the agreement leading up to the transfer of administration had been fully implemented.564 Indonesian and 7. except with the prior consent of the UNTEA administration. holding 7. At the end of Construction project on the main street in Jayapura. some Papuan leaders and various groups in the territory requested that the period of UNTEA administration in West Irian be shortened. assigned a small number of UN experts to oversee the territorial plebiscite as per Article XVII of the Indonesia-Netherlands agreement. was able to re-establish the existing public works system and begin new projects. only 32 of some 317 personnel stayed to support the public works system after UNTEA’s takeover. as well as other indigenous people of West Irian. UNTEA. Though there were minor incidents during the UNTEA mandate.625 Papuans. and DOMREP 78 West Guinea. with the help of the Indonesian liaison mission. In addition.625 civil service posts.Lesson 6 / UNTEA. due to the exodus of the Dutch. UNTEA informed the population of the change to the transfer of the territory’s administration to Indonesia and the question of self-determination. the UN determined that this would not be feasible. 6. in consultation with Indonesia. Again.4 Indonesia Takes Over The Governments of the Netherlands and Indonesia covered all costs equally that were incurred by UNTEA during its mandate. at the end of April the units and garrisons of UNSF began their withdrawal and were systematically replaced with Indonesian troops. and the transfer of the administration of the territory to Indonesia would occur as scheduled on 1 May 1963. and there was no situation in which the Indonesian military had to be used outside of joint patrols with UNSF. that the number of Indonesian troops would not exceed the strength of the Pakistan contingent of UNSF. The UN. By the end of April. in consultation with the Council’s members. UNYOM. The later point was about a plebiscite to be held no later than 1969 in which they could choose to “remain with Indonesia” or to “sever their ties with Indonesia. As scheduled. on 1 May 1963 UNTEA transferred administrative control of West New Guinea to the Government of Indonesia. By 15 November Dutch troops had fully withdrawn from the territory. In addition. However.
it voted to join Indonesia rather than become independent. Importantly. and To carry out this agreement. With the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2504 (XXIV) of 19 November 1969. in a plebiscite. • . UNYOM. overseeing the transition of western New Guinea from Dutch colonial rule to Indonesian administration. The Soviet Union did not raise any objection to his initiative. It was the first time in the history of peace forces that the UN came so close to full administrative authority in a territory during the course of a political-military mission.Lesson 6 / UNTEA. It was one of the more ambitious and successful peacekeeping operations carried out by the UN in its first twenty years. despite the United Nations’ endeavour to allow the populace to choose to become a democratic nation. the Secretary-General acknowledged the completion of the UN’s task as per the 1962 agreement. the population of West New Guinea (West Irian) freely chose to remain a part of Indonesia. aside from UNEF. the operation was limited in duration from the onset and had the support of both these countries. Secretary-General U Thant concluded an agreement with Indonesia and the Netherlands to establish UNTEA at no cost to the UN in order to assist in the transfer of the administration of West New Guinea (West Irian) from Dutch to Indonesian control. 6.5 UNTEA’s Impact The UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) was established in West New Guinea (West Irian) in September 1962. a voting process that was carefully orchestrated by Indonesian authorities and took place six years after the UN forces had left. Thus. who also paid for the mission. he sought the approval of the General Assembly rather than the Security Council on the grounds that it was essentially a matter of decolonisation. it was the only peacekeeping operation authorised by the General Assembly. UNTEA brought into play three innovative features: • • It was the first peacekeeping operation entrusted with exercising authority over a territory. On the other hand. and DOMREP 79 August 1969.
UNYOM. and DOMREP 80 Map of West New Guinea (West Irian) Source: Ram Military Consulting Note: Map depicts current names. .Lesson 6 / UNTEA.
In October. gave its support to the revolutionary government. accepted the credentials of the President of the Yemen Arab Republic. However. which already had a relationship with Yemen. an Egyptian-inspired coup overthrew him and declared the new state of the Yemen Arab Republic. This created a dilemma for the UN as it had two sets of representatives for the country. after reviewing the recommendation of the Credentials Committee. (Source: The Bettman Library) . and DOMREP 81 UN YEMEN OBSERVER MISSION (UNYOM) 6. recognised the new state. UNYOM. On 29 September Egypt. Imam Al-Badr escaped and was able to rally the desert tribes in northern Yemen to his side. Egyptian forces arrived in Yemen to support the war against the royalists. A week after the succession of Imam Mohammed Al-Badr on 19 September 1962. A fierce guerrilla campaign broke out between the new military-backed regime and those of the royalist forces of Iman Al-Badr. requested the UN to address the matter of foreign involvement in Yemen. Subsequently. On 27 November. Saudi Arabia and its western allies supported the royalist forces. supported by the Soviet Union. all other major powers that had regional interests did not recognise the new state or its government. it had the potential of becoming a wider regional conflict. and the Soviet Union followed suit the next day. The Sallal revolutionary government threatened to invade Saudi Arabia because of its direct involvement in supporting the royalists. while Egypt. the Yemeni mission to the UN.6 Background on UNYOM When the Yemeni civil war broke out in September 1962. On 20 December the General Assembly.Lesson 6 / UNTEA. Mohammed Al-Badr with royalist tribesmen in Yemen. By early November. militarily the situation had reached a deadlock. which was still staffed by the royalists. on request of the revolutionary government.
. was dispatched to work out with the three parties concerned how the UNMOs would operate. The cost of the mission was estimated at approximately US$1 million. On 11 June 1963. the mission was extended for an additional two months.7 Establishment of UNYOM In a report dated 29 April 1963. representatives independently review the situation since the autumn of 1962. and the Secretary-General noted that he would extend UNYOM without a decision of the Security Council if he deemed it necessary and if there was the required financial support. von Horn. the Security Council adopted resolution 179 (1963).000. Saudi Arabia. and on advisement Egypt noted that it had no objection to the termination of UNYOM on 4 September. the Governments of Egypt. Saudi Arabia stated that is could no longer afford to pay its portion of the mission costs. based on Lt. The SecretaryGeneral’s report of 27 May noted that. Thus. UNYOM. 200 UNMOs be sent immediately to establish the observer mission for a period of four months. No time limit was set for the mission. the withdrawal to be phased and to take place as soon as possible. and Yemen formally confirmed their acceptance of identical terms for disengagement in Yemen.Lesson 6 / UNTEA.S. Under the terms of the disengagement: • • • • Saudi Arabia would terminate all support and aid to the royalists of Yemen and would prohibit the use of Saudi Arabian territory by royalist leaders for carrying on the struggle in Yemen. the Chief of Staff of UNTSO. and impartial observers would be stationed there to check on the observance of the terms of disengagement. the mission costs were covered for the first two months. After successive consultation every two months. the Secretary-General noted that after having UN and U. Saudi Arabia agreed to a “proportionate share. General von Horn’s recommendations.” while Egypt agreed to provide $200. Egypt would begin withdrawing their troops that had been sent to Yemen at the request of the new Government. Swedish Lieutenant-General Carl C. A demilitarised zone would be established to a distance of 20 kilometres on each side of the demarcated Saudi Arabia–Yemen border. In late August 1964. UNYOM was extended for successive two-month periods until 4 September 1964. Simultaneously with that suspension of aid. and DOMREP 82 6. the mission was formerly terminated on 4 September 1964. On 7 November 1963 and after agreement that Saudi Arabia and Egypt would continue to fund UNYOM. it was hoped that Saudi Arabia and Egypt would bear this cost. which allowed for the establishment of the UN Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM). and The observers would also certify the suspension of activities in support of the royalists from Saudi Arabian territory and the outward movement of the Egyptian forces and equipment from the airports and seaports of Yemen. Thus.
Pier P. UNYOM. Al Hudaydah (two positions mainly used to certify the Egyptian withdrawal Jizan. 1963. When the General did leave in November 1963. Six fixed wing aircraft and six helicopters 28 staff members and a small military staff Formation Reconnaissance unit UNMOs Air support unit Location Jizan. However. and the number of UNMOs was raised to 25. However. Gyani.Lesson 6 / UNTEA. Spinelli was retained. General Gyani had to return to his UNEF command. the number of aircraft dedicated to UNYOM was reduced to two. As the end of the initial two-month period of the mission was coming to an end. Mr. and his Yugoslavian deputy. given that Lt. Spinelli. Najran and Sa’dah in the DMZ and surrounding area San’a. there was some question of further financial support from Saudi Arabia and Egypt. head of the United Nations Office at Geneva. the withdrawal plan was cancelled. General von Horn resigned. In an effort to maintain at least a civilian UN presence in Yemen after the UNYOM withdrawal. Based on this. he appointed Mr. there was no need to keep a UN military formation in the DMZ (demilitarised zone). UNYOM FORCES: 4 July-November 1963 Source UNEF UNTSO UNEF airbase El Arish International Number of Personnel 114 troops Six 50 officers and men. due to the co-operation by Yemen and Saudi Arabia and the general peace in the AOR (area of responsibility) of the mission. took command of UNYOM. He retained this dual role until the termination of UNYOM. who was put on temporary assignment from his position as Commander of UNEF. because the financial support came through. (UN) . Spinelli was appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General and was also made head of UNYOM.8 Organisation of UNYOM UNYOM began operations on 4 July 1963. The reconnaissance unit was progressively withdrawn. Ralph Bunch in Yemen. as his Special Representative in Yemen. S. the Secretary-General put in motion a plan to withdraw UNYOM. Lt. At the same time. He was replaced in September 1963 with Indian Lieutenant-General P. the idea of appointing Mr. and The DMZ on each side of the demarcated portion of the Saudi Arabian-Yemeni border. In November 1963. Colonel Branko Pavlovic. In August. and DOMREP 83 6. Najran and Sa’dah UNYOM HQ San’a UNYOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) • • The cities of San'a and Al Hudaydah.
though there had been troop reductions and conflict was limited. this became a key part of Mr. due to daytime heat. within its mandate limits. To mitigate this situation. also functioned as a mediator during negotiations between the two sides. overall there had been a failure by both sides to implement the disengagement agreement. The majority of complaints handled by UNYOM related to allegations of violations by both sides of breaches of the disengagement treaty.Lesson 6 / UNTEA. and DOMREP 84 6. UNYOM military observers were positioned at various communication centres for 40 hours or more to cover the night-time movements of people and cargos. which reunited the region. Saudi liaison officers were assigned to UNYOM checkpoints and worked hand-in-hand with the UNMOs. UNYOM had at least achieved a restraining influence during its mandate. The region soon collapsed into civil war that split the region in two until the final conflict in the mid-1990s. UNYOM did not have a ceasefire to supervise. Nonetheless. UNYOM’s authority was significantly more limited than other UN observation missions. in order to dissuade any incursions. . UNYOM. Mandate and mission limitations aside. Therefore. In addition. people travelled at night. Spinelli’s job. Certifying and reporting the termination of Saudi Arabia’s support of the royalists in Yemen. the SecretaryGeneral’s assessments between 4 September 1963 and 2 September 1964 at the termination of UNYOM clearly showed that there was very little progress towards finding a peaceful solution. UNYOM’s tasks were limited to: • • • Observing. UNYOM.9 Operations and Termination Given that there was no ceasefire agreement. This obviously limited the method of patrolling over such a large region. One problem with this plan was that traditionally. and Certifying the Egyptian troop withdrawal from Yemen. daily air and ground patrols had randomised timings and routes. In addition. As there were few passable roads in the mountainous central part of the DMZ. the presence of UNYOM had a moderating effect on hostile actions by both sides. A series of checkpoints and air/ground patrols were established to cover all main roads and tracks leading into Yemen and the demilitarised zone to stop royalist movements and material support from Saudi Arabia.
UNYOM. which had overthrown the Bosch government. the IAPF was composed of 1. was sent to Santo Domingo as Military Advisor.Lesson 6 / UNTEA. logistical support to operate. with an advance party of two UNMOs. By 26 June. and Paraguay) and 12. Jose Antonio Mayobre was made the SecretaryGeneral’s Representative in the Dominican Republic. did inform the UN Security Council of its actions and also called for a meeting of the Organisation of American States (OAS) to discuss the situation. U.S.S. a political crisis in the Dominican Republic erupted into a civil war. On 1 May the Soviet Union called for an urgent meeting of the SC to discuss if the U. who wanted the restoration of the 1963 constitution and the reinstatement of former President Juan Bosch. the two UNMOs were selected from three Member States.S. forces had enforced a safety zone on the island to begin evacuation operations. By 30 April U. had militarily intervened in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic. He reported that there was still heavy fighting in the northern part of the capital. As the Latin American soldiers arrived. where he arrived on 18 May. 6. military strength was gradually reduced as the Latin American forces began to arrive.11 The Inter-American Peace Force Further communications and discussion occurred between the UN and the OAS.S. and DOMREP 85 DOMREP IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 6. Rikhye. On 14 May the SC passed resolution 203 (1965) calling for a ceasefire and for the Secretary-General to send a representative to assess the situation in the Dominican Republic. the United States announced it was sending troops to the country in order to protect Americans there and escort them to safety. The OAS noted that the presence of the UN had compromised and interfered with its efforts and asked the UN to coordinate its efforts with the OAS representative.S. Marines and paratroopers had become involved in the fighting. Santa Domingo. Costa Rica. but on 23 May. The Council of the OAS met on 29 April and called for a suspension of armed hostilities.J. (USMC) . The U. Mr. By 25 April. U. The other five Latin countries’ personnel for the most part were ill-equipped and required U. Brazil.243 troops. Indian Major General I.130 troops.10 Background on DOMREP In the latter half of April 1965. the OAS set up the InterAmerican Peace Force (IAPF) in the Dominican Republic. On 28 April 1965. El Salvador. On 6 May the OAS informed the Security Council that it was calling on OAS members to send troops to the Dominican Republic. Honduras. At any one time. forces were eventually reduced to 6. and a group of young military officers and civilians. or Ecuador. The issue was never really resolved in a series of further meetings that went on until the summer of 1965.S. Nicaragua.600 troops and policemen from six Latin American countries (Brazil. heavy fighting had broken out between the ruling military junta. By 14 May U. Brazil was the largest Latin contingent. Canada. providing an infantry battalion with its own logistics capability of some 1.400 troops from the United States. Brazilian troops of the IAPF.S.
and DOMREP 86 IAPF Command Relationships Source: U.S. Dept.Lesson 6 / UNTEA. UNYOM. of the Army IAPF Organisation Source: OAS .
The withdrawal occurred by 22 October 1966. (U. and DOMREP 87 6. The Representative with his Military Adviser and the UNMOs were to: • • • Observe and report on the developments in the Dominican Republic. Between January and the end of May 1966. which was completed on 21 September. DOMREP reports noted that violence had shifted to acts of terrorism and armed clashes between civilians and the police and military.Lesson 6 / UNTEA. Godoy took office on 3 September. Santa Domingo.S. and the new government was installed in July. financial support. It established Hector Garcia Godoy as the sole head of the government and that both sides would accept a proposed Institutional Act. by 25 December the security forces had been able to maintain control. but that they had lessened by May. the Secretary-General noted in his 16 July report to the SC that numerous human rights violations and a worsening economic situation prevailed throughout the country. The ceasefire essentially became a de facto cessation of hostilities. but tension over reintegration of the Dominican Republic’s armed forces was creating further friction. and IAPF and Dominican military forces were confined to their barracks. Early in July a phased withdrawal of the IAPF began. The OAS was able to negotiate a proposal. The elections went smoothly.12 Role of DOMREP The Representative was able to negotiate a short ceasefire between the two sides on 21 May. The OAS invited 41 observers to report on the elections. there was an immediate need to find a political solution and bring in external emergency aid. the Secretary-General reported that there were still serious incidents occurring.S. The Dominican Foreign Minister sent a letter dated 13 October 1966 to the SecretaryGeneral. Moreover. Army) . Observe the situation there and to report to the Secretary-General on breaches of the ceasefire. Further reports observed that heavy fighting had broken out in December in Santiago followed by a wave of terrorist attacks in Santa Domingo. and technical assistance. which expressed his country’s appreciation to the UN for support in the restoration of peace in the Dominican Republic. UNYOM. The letter further noted that since the objectives of the Security Council had been achieved. Based on DOMREP reports from the Representative. U. DOMREP should be withdrawn. that was acceptable to both sides. but it was noted in early January 1966 that the situation still remained tense and unstable. the Act of Dominican Reconciliation. However. Elections were held on 1 June. 82nd Airborne Division. and Observe and report on any other events that might affect the maintenance of peace and order in the country.
the situation was further exacerbated by the presence of the IAPF. In addition. .S. for the first time.Lesson 6 / UNTEA. Moreover.13 DOMREP’s Impact The Secretary-General observed that DOMREP was of unusual complexity and had considerable international repercussions. in this case the OAS. a UN mission had operated in the same area and dealt with the same matters as an operation of a regional organisation. The presence of DOMREP had a moderating factor in a volatile situation. and DOMREP 88 6. specifically due to the unilateral decision by the U. UNYOM. to intervene early on in the coup.
He asked the U. B. . D. B. 5. One year. There was no time limit set for the mission. The UN. the first time this had ever been done. More funds becoming available from the World Bank. In regards to UNTEA. C. The right to expel anyone from the region. The resumption of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands. The administration of the territory of New West Guinea. B. B.S. The Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands. D. What greatly helped UNTEA in 1963 during the final phase of the territorial transfer of authority to Indonesia? A. The expansion of the size of the mission. Who bore the costs of UNTEA? A. D. The right to exploit the natural resources of the territory to offset the mission cost. 2. to deploy Marines while the UN forces were organised. C. and DOMREP 89 LESSON 6 END-OF-LESSON QUIZ 1. UNYOM. C. Indonesia’s military support for the mission. One of UNTEA’s powers included: A. Two years. He asked all parties concerned to withdraw their forces 100 miles from either side of the disputed border. B. what did the Secretary-General do in an effort to quickly set up the ceasefire? A. He sent the UN Peace Forces in without prior authorisation of the GA or SC. Six months.Lesson 6 / UNTEA. 4. He sent UNMOs without the prior authorisation of the GA or SC. The States that contributed forces to UNTEA. The control of all communications. through special assessments of the Member States. D. C. D. The UN. What was the time limit set for UNYOM? A. C. through its regular budget. 3.
It began a phased withdrawal. It was replaced with a new UN peacekeeping force. 10. B. To report on IAPF violations. military forces. UNYOM. what happened to IAPF? A. 7D. The mission had been successful and there was no longer a need for it. 10 UNMOs. It remained in the country for another two years. 8A. ANSWER KEY: 1B. Saudi Arabia had requested UNYOM’s withdrawal. B. The region soon collapsed into a civil war that split the region in two. C. 4D. 6B.S. D. 9. 10C . After UNYOM withdrew in 1964. 3A. B. Saudi Arabia and Yemen signed a peace accord. 7. what happened in Yemen? A. B. How many personnel made up DOMREP at any one time? A. 5D. B. D. 26 UNMOs and the Military Advisor. To review Latin American military procedures. C. and DOMREP 90 6.Lesson 6 / UNTEA. As stability returned to the Dominican Republic. One UNMO and the Military Advisor. To observe and report on the developments in the Dominican Republic. Why did the Secretary-General put in motion a plan to withdraw UNYOM at the end of the initial two-month period of the mission? A. C. 8. D. There was some question of further financial support from Saudi Arabia and Egypt. D. Two UNMOs and the Military Advisor. 2C. C. To only observe the withdrawal of U. There was a loss of support for the mission from the troop-contributing countries. C. D. What was one of the roles of DOMREP? A. The forces of Imam Mohammed Al-Badr reunited Yemen. 9D. The Soviets negotiated a peace agreement between the two Yemeni factions. It was withdrawn all at once.
3 7.S.5 7.2 7.10 7. Military Forces in Lebanon Events in Jordan General Assembly Emergency Session Termination of UNOGIL UN MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN (UNMOGIP) 7.4 7.1 7.14 Background on UNMOGIP Role of UNMOGIP Establishment of UNIPOM The Tashkent Agreement The Continuation of UNMOGIP The 1999 Kargil Conflict Ongoing Issues .LESSON 7 UN OBSERVATION GROUP IN LEBANON (UNOGIL) 7.8 7.7 Background on UNOGIL Deployment of UNOGIL Role of UNOGIL Presence of U.13 7.6 7.11 7.9 7.12 7.
Lesson 7 / UNOGIL and UNMOGIP 92 LESSON OBJECTIVES Lesson 7 covers two different UN peace initiatives: the short-lived conflict between Lebanon and Syria. despite their many complications. By the end of Lesson 7. and the long-lived dispute between India and Pakistan. State how the conflict over Kashmir began between India and Pakistan. Outline how UNIPOM and UNMOGIP are related. That mission helps the student understand how the United Nations handled long-term disputes. Lesson 7 also gives the student insight into the complex history of the rivalry between India and Pakistan. and Define the Line of Control. the student should be able to meet the following objectives: • • Understand the reasons behind the civil war in Lebanon. Describe how the UN became involved in peace initiatives in Lebanon. It explains how each dispute emerged. and how a Special UN Representative was able to intervene and help settle problems there. It sheds light on how events in Jordan shaped the conflict in Lebanon. and how the conflict proceeded. and how and why the UN was invited to help settle each dispute. and how peacekeeping missions are adjusted over time in response to changing conditions. • • • • . and what it took on as its mandate there. and how it continued to supervise the ceasefire. and why the territory of Kashmir became a point of dispute between them. Describe how the UN initiated the ceasefire between India and Pakistan.
they had two helicopters and four light observation fixed-wing aircraft at their disposal. who was made a member. By 16 June there were 100 UNMOs. The first five arrived in Beirut on 12 June 1958 and began their work on 13 June. forming the basis of the creation of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL). Infiltrating armed personnel from Syria into Lebanon. The resolution authorised the Secretary-General to send an observation group to Lebanon. Rajeshwar Dayal of India. It was hoped that the presence of UNMOs would at least discourage illegal activity. and by the end of the month. when Lebanese President Camille Chamoun (a Maronite Christian) tried to amend the country’s Constitution so he could try to be re-elected for a second term. the Lebanese Government charged Egypt (then called the United Arab Republic) with the following: • Encouraging and supporting rebellion through the supply of arms to anti-government groups in Lebanon.3 Role of UNOGIL The area of responsibility of UNOGIL consisted of the border between Lebanon and Syria. Ten UNTSO UNMOs were immediately assigned to UNOGIL.Lesson 7 / UNOGIL and UNMOGIP 93 UNOGIL – THE UN OBSERVATION GROUP IN LEBANON 7. who was in charge of the UNMOs of UNOGIL. the SC took charge of the matter.1 Background on UNOGIL In May 1958. UNMOs from UNTSO were chosen as they could reach Beirut in one day. 7. adopting resolution 128 (1958) on 11 June. Dag Hammarskjöld arrived in Beirut on 18 June as Chairman of UNOGIL. As the League was unable to resolve the conflict. 7. and Conducting a violent press and radio campaign against the Lebanese Government. It soon became an all-out civil war. arbitrate. • • The Security Council delayed debate on the matter while the League of Arab States tried to settle the dispute.2 Deployment of UNOGIL The Secretary-General made it clear that UNOGIL was only an observer force. an armed rebellion erupted. The mission was to ascertain whether the illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders was occurring. On 22 May. It is important to note that UNOGIL was not to mediate. and the Members of UNOGIL arrived the next day. The membership of UNOGIL was comprised of Mr. or forcefully prohibit illegal infiltration. who was made Chairman. and Norwegian MajorGeneral Odd Bull. and Mr. . Galo Plaza Lasso of Ecuador.
This would then require a support force of unarmed non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and other ranks.4 Presence of U. (3) An emergency reserve of military observers was to be stationed at headquarters and man observation posts for the purpose of making inquiries at short notice or investigating alleged instances of smuggling. Thus.S. (4) An evaluation team was to be set up at headquarters to analyse. The Group would also request the military observers to make specific inquiries into alleged activities as occasion required.S. and coordinate all information received from observers and other sources. Initially. The Members of UNOGIL noted that the number of UNMOs needed to be raised to 200. (2) A system of permanent observation posts was to be established and manned by military observers. The coup effectively ended the Baghdad Pact and put an end to the Iraq-Jordan Federation. UNOGIL could constantly patrol the whole frontier. (5) Aerial reconnaissance was to be conducted by light aircraft and helicopters. President Chamoun immediately asked for U. both Jordan’s and Lebanon’s leadership were seriously concerned about their survival. the former being equipped for aerial photography. However. UNOGIL had full freedom of movement to the entire Lebanese border and was assured that its ground patrols would be allowed throughout the area north of Tripoli and that it could establish permanent observation posts anywhere within the its AOR. . Military Forces in Lebanon On 14 July 1958. It was also agreed that the UNMOs could inspect all vehicles and cargoes crossing Lebanon’s northern border. which had been formed in March to counterbalance the union of Egypt and Syria. UNOGIL’s UNMOs had problems accessing the border region due to the presence of Egyptian forces. intervention to protect Lebanon’s political independence and its territorial integrity. a military coup d’état in the Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq overthrew the monarchy (most of whom were executed along with many of their officials). 7.Lesson 7 / UNOGIL and UNMOGIP 94 UNOGIL used the following methods to fulfil its mandate: (1) The UNOGIL military observers would conduct regular and frequent patrols of all accessible roads from dawn to dusk. Due to the expansionist goals of Egypt. The observers at these stations attempted to check all reported infiltration in their areas and to observe any suspicious development. evaluate. by 16 July. With this larger force. At this point only day and night aerial reconnaissance was possible. and there would also be a requirement for more observation aircraft and crews. primarily in border districts and the areas adjacent to the zones held by the opposition forces. (6) The Lebanese Government would provide the Observation Group with all available information about suspected infiltration. There were initially 10 such stations.
Sixth Fleet landed on the same day. what did occur was limited to small arms and ammunition. However.S. All three proposals were rejected or vetoed. acknowledging the inconclusive results of the SC debates. By November 1958. American troops were limited to the beach zone. On 30 July. The Secretary-General. forces. Events in Jordan (USMC) 7. Eventually. UNOGIL was operating 18 aircraft and six helicopters for aerial observation. By the end of July. the American presence had caused some limited problems carrying out the mission tasks. . and combat support of the land forces in Lebanon. Marines from the U. During the SC discussions.S. UNOGIL noted that it had not detected any incursions by enemy forces into or out of Lebanon. Initially. very little if any infiltration was taking place. This included 32 NCOs in support of ground operations and 90 such officers in the air section.” The U. due to its intensive air reconnaissance and ground patrolling. the British Government stated that its forces were being sent to Jordan to preserve the rule of King Hussein. UNOGIL felt that. it was using 290 vehicles for various tasks and had set up 49 permanently manned posts of all types. and The provision of the necessary staff.S. Moreover. the American representative informed the Security Council that the U. “to cease armed intervention in the domestic affairs of the Arab States and to remove their troops from the territories of Lebanon and Jordan immediately. 1958.S. On the same day. In this vein. logistical. countered with its own resolution to protect the territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon. Marines patrol the streets of Beirut. The Soviet Union countered by drafting a resolution that called for both the UK and U. forces were: • • The avoidance of conflict with the local U. noted that he would still act on the expansion of the mission within the existing mandate. and Sweden called for the withdrawal of UNOGIL.5 On 17 July. In addition. Lebanese irregulars. Jordan urgently asked the Security Council to review its complaint that Egypt was also interfering in its internal affairs. The major problems that faced U.S.S.Lesson 7 / UNOGIL and UNMOGIP 95 On 15 July. proposal was also rejected. U. a defence perimeter was extended out from Beirut for 20 miles to protect the city from any attacks. A subsequent proposal by Japan that followed the lines of the U. military forces had consolidated their positions. he increased UNOGIL’s strength to 287 on 20 September and to 591 in mid-November. would militarily intervene in Lebanon in an effort to stabilise the situation until UN forces could take over.S.S. UNOGIL also reported that there were no contacts between its UNMOs and the U. British paratroops landed in Jordan at the request of the King. Given the open nature of the frontier and the regular movement of tribal groups across the border.S.
two key events occurred: 1) General Fuad Chehab was elected as the new President of Lebanon. and British troops by October 1958 from their respective territories. the Under-Secretary in charge of the UN Office at Geneva.Lesson 7 / UNOGIL and UNMOGIP 96 7. The Secretary-General commented that UNOGIL’s mandate would be modified accordingly. and. UNOGIL noted that even with the presence of a large numbers armed people. in turn. had been recognised by both the UK and the U. troop withdrawal was completed by 25 October and the British withdrawal by 2 November. which had sparked the civil war. in which the UN would help facilitate the early withdrawal of the foreign troops from Jordan and Lebanon. The U. Both Lebanon and Jordan had begun negotiations for the withdrawal of U. the Security Council called an emergency special session of the General Assembly. if any infiltration was still taking place. it was regarded as insignificant. Secretary-General arriving at Beirut Airport to attend the first meetings of the UN Observation Group in Lebanon with Mr. In effect. Plaza of Ecuador (first to the right) and Ambassador Dayal of India. Pier P. In its report of 14 August. UNOGIL noted that there had been a noticeable reduction of tension in Lebanon and few armed clashes between the Government and the insurgents. The withdrawal was completed by 9 December 1958. However. UNOGIL began its planned three-phase withdrawal on 26 November. there had been a de facto nationwide truce since 31 July. On 29 September 1958.S.7 Termination of UNOGIL During the first week of October. The session ran from 8 to 21 August 1958. (Source: 57763 UN/DPI) . Chamoun’s second term. There were no detected cases of infiltration. both the British and American Governments agreed to withdraw their forces by the end of the month. there had been no serious incidents between the Lebanese army and the opposition forces.S.6 General Assembly Emergency Session On 7 August. June 1958. The Secretary-General sent Mr. On 21 August the General Assembly adopted resolution 1237 (ES-III). Spinelli. though the Government was willing to accept a special representative. 7.S. to Jordan as his Special Representative. During this time. This eliminated the whole issue of Mr. 2) The new Government of Iraq had accepted the obligations of States under the UN Charter and. Jordan was not willing to accept the presence of UN forces or even UNMOs in its territory.
These sets of rules stayed in place until the Karachi Agreement of July 1949. the mission followed the same general administrative arrangements and operating principles as those used by UNTSO. chose to accede to India. UNCIP would provide UNMOs to supervise the ceasefire. UNCIP’s members requested the presence of a Military Advisor. and the next day Belgian Lt. II. this has not yet taken place). This group formed the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). American Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz was appointed the UN Plebiscite Administrator for the resolution of the vote that would decide which country Kashmir would join (as of 2006.9 Role of UNMOGIP The UNMOs were not to directly intervene between the opposing parties. however. The new membership was composed of representatives from Argentina.8 Background on UNMOGIP Under the Indian Independence Act of 1947. The plan for partition allowed for the predominantly Moslem princely state of Kashmir to freely decide if it wished to join India or Pakistan. The first seven UNMOs arrived on 24 January. However. UNCIP began its work on 7 July 1948. whereby the membership of UNCIP was enlarged from three to five members. both India and Pakistan blocked the implementation of UNCIP. Conflict broke out between India and Pakistan as they both tried to claim the region. Consultations to allow for a free plebiscite to enable the people of Kashmir to decide their own fate. I n April 1948.S. Columbia. The establishment of a ceasefire. Belgium. The tasks of UNMOGIP’s UNMOs were to: . but the local commanders of the opposing sides were to report violations of the ceasefire to the UNMOs. and III. Once in place. A truce period leading to a withdrawal of forces by both sides. and by the end of February their strength had been raised to 20. On 20 January the SC adopted resolution 39 (1948). who was Hindu. Overall. 7. In January 1948. India and Pakistan became independent from the British Empire in August 1947. Resolution 47 envisioned UNCIP’s objectives in three phases: I. The ceasefire came into effect just before midnight on 1 January 1949. which established the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP).Lesson 7 / UNOGIL and UNMOGIP 97 INDIA AND PAKISTAN: UNMOGIP AND UNIPOM 7. the accession of Kashmir quickly became an issue when Pakistan sent Moslem tribesman into the region to seize it. General Maurice Delvoie arrived to take up the post of Military Advisor to UNCIP. the SC adopted resolution 47 (1948). India formally complained to the Security Council about the Pakistani tribal incursions. and the U. The maharaja of Kashmir. On 13 August UNCIP called for a ceasefire between India and Pakistan. Initially. whose task was to investigate and mediate the dispute. Czechoslovakia.
Crossing of the ceasefire line Firing and use of explosives within five miles of the ceasefire line New wiring and mining of any positions Reinforcing existing forward defended localities with men or warlike stores Forward movement from outside Kashmir of any warlike stores. in February UNMOGIP also began to investigate incidents along this frontier. 2. Gather as much information as possible. the Karachi Agreement established the ceasefire line. Therefore. The Karachi Agreement had not covered the boundary between Kashmir and Pakistan. On 27 July 1949. 4. The Military Advisor established six categories of breaches of the ceasefire: 1. except for relief and maintenance. The Agreement prohibited either side from strengthening their defences. 5. Flying of aircraft over the other side’s territory Organisation of UNMOGIP Source: Ram Military Consulting UN HQ New York SECRETARY GENERAL Office of Special Political Affairs (OSPA) Chief Military Observer (CMO) Deputy Chief Military Observer (DCMO) Field Operations Division (FOD) MISSION HQ Military Staff Civilian Administrative Officer (CAO) Group Control HQ Rawalpindi (Pakistan) Group Control HQ Jammu* (Indian Kashmir) Operations Branch (OPS) Military Personnel Civilian Administrative Staff *transferred at the end of March 1949 to Srinagar Liaison Field Stations Pakistan Field Stations India Command Each group was divided into two teams of two UNMOs Operations/Support Elements . or adding further military potential into the region of Kashmir. on mutual agreement. and 6.Lesson 7 / UNOGIL and UNMOGIP 98 • • • Accompany the local authorities in their investigations of ceasefire violations. which would be supervised by UNMOGIP. equipment and personnel. increasing their forces. 3. and Report their findings to the senior observer of the group.
Brigadier Angle. the number of UNMOs varied between 35 head of UNMOGIP.H. was only to deal with the question of the demilitarisation of the region. Sweden. by resolution 209 (1965) the Security Council called for a ceasefire and asked both sides to co-operate with UNMOGIP in its task of supervising the ceasefire. . Canadian General Andrew McNaughton.BGen. the SC appointed Australian Major-General Sir Owen Dixon as the UN Representative for India and Pakistan. The adoption of SC resolution 91 (1951) on 30 March 1951 continued the presence of UNMOGIP in Kashmir. On 4 September 1965. and investigating complaints. Harry Angle. based on mission requirements. full-scale fighting had broken out between both sides along the ceasefire line in Kashmir. there were 45 UNMOs from Australia. The position was now that of an Assistant Secretary-General. relations between India and Pakistan began to deteriorate due to conflicting claims over the Rann of Kutch (the waters of the tidal area on the west coast of India and Pakistan) at the southern end of the international boundary along the Indian province of Gujarat. Belgium. and two military personnel of UNMOGIP were killed when their plane crashed in Kashmir in July 1950. Italy. (Source: CF) and 67. little came of this. Between 1949 and 1964. By August.Lesson 7 / UNOGIL and UNMOGIP 99 The organisation of UNMOGIP was changed in 1959 when the Chief Military Observer’s status was changed to an appointment as an official within the UN Secretariat. one civilian. Finland. and Uruguay that were part of UNMOGIP. The Continuing Role of UNMOGIP to 1965 In an effort to continue the work of UNCIP at the same time that it was terminated. reporting. Therefore. Angle was appointed as Dixon’s Chief Military Observer and head of UNMOGIP. and like UNTSO. the SC adopted resolution 80 (1950). the year before the second Indo. however. The Representative. Denmark. which terminated UNCIP. CMO and Pakistan War broke out. UNCIP made it clear that it had not achieved its objectives as outlined in SC resolution 47 (1948). In December the SC had the Council President. New Zealand. Chile. making further efforts futile.10 Establishment of UNIPOM During the beginning of 1965. became the general rule for all heads of UN peacekeeping operations. which limited it to observing. Canada. Termination of UNCIP In September 1949. there were misunderstandings of its role. On 14 March 1950. When war broke out in 1965. meet informally with the Governments of Pakistan and India to try and resolve the Kashmir problem. 7. in that the UNMOs could not enforce anything. the members returned to UNHQ in New York. Canadian Brigadier General H. However. Due to the limited nature of UNMOGIP’s mandate.
They agreed to the withdrawal of all armed personnel to the positions they had held prior to 5 August 1965. Ninety UNMOs were assigned to UNIPOM. . UNIPOM was closely coordinated both administratively and operationally with UNMOGIP. as the conflict was beyond the existing ceasefire line in Kashmir.11 The Tashkent Agreement On 10 January 1966. 7. military representatives of India and Pakistan had a series of meetings at Lahore and Amritsar under the auspices of Chilean Brigadier-General Tulio Marambio. like those of UNMOGIP. The withdrawals were to be completed by 25 February 1966. He tried to reach some sort of negotiated solution. however. little came of it as hostilities spread by 20 September to the international border between India and West Pakistan. The SC adopted resolution 214 (1965) on 27 September. which was the end of the first three months of the ceasefire demanded by the SC in resolution 211 (1965) of 20 September 1965. the Secretary-General visited the region from 7 to 16 September. which called on both Governments to co-operate with the UN and cease all military activity. On 15 December India and Pakistan indicated that they both wanted the UN presence to remain in the region after 22 December 1965. the UNMOs. Violations continued. the leaders of India and Pakistan met in Tashkent. To finalise the withdrawal process. the SC adopted resolution 215 (1965). Its strength was raised to 102 UNMOs. had no authority or power to order a cessation of firing. was established to supervise the ceasefire along the India-Pakistan border outside the State of Jammu and Kashmir. as per the terms of the ceasefire. However. It soon became obvious that the ceasefire was not working. the UNMOs were to try and persuade the local commanders to restore the ceasefire. by request of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union. which demanded a ceasefire take effect at 0700 hours GMT on 22 September 1965 and a withdrawal of all armed forces back to the positions held before 5 August.Lesson 7 / UNOGIL and UNMOGIP 100 In an effort to calm down the situation. The disengagement and withdrawal plan was finalised in New Delhi on 22 January 1966. UNIPOM’s role was to (a) observe and (b) report on breaches of the ceasefire as per the various Security Council resolutions. However. demanding that both sides honour their commitments to observe the ceasefire and withdraw their troops. UNMOGIP took on the new ceasefire supervisory role in Kashmir. Uzbekistan (then part of the Soviet Union). UNIPOM’s mandate was extended for a second period of three-months. On the same day. who was the Secretary-General’s representative for the withdrawal process. If there was a breach of the ceasefire. an administrative adjunct of UNMOGIP. and on 5 November. the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM). the SC adopted resolution 211 (1965).
Pakistan and India began negotiations. Because the situation had changed. UNIPOM was terminated on 22 March 1966. The good offices of UNMOGIP and UNIPOM were also used during stage two. therefore. India had refused to allow Pakistani troops to cross its territory. Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrendered to India on 16 December. maintained that since the ceasefire line had changed since the 1949 Karachi Agreement. transport. By 4 December full-scale war had broken out.Lesson 7 / UNOGIL and UNMOGIP 101 The plan was to be implemented in two stages through the good offices of UNMOGIP and UNIPOM. The Secretary-General maintained that UNMOGIP could only be terminated by a decision of the Security Council. while India maintained its view that the mandate of UNMOGIP had lapsed. (who supported Pakistan) and the Soviet Union (who supported India). Due to constant guerrilla incursions and the need for political expediency. while India has not lodged a complaint since January 1972 and has restricted the activities of the UN observers on the Indian side of the LOC. Indian and Pakistani representatives met in Simla and agreed to define a “Line of Control” in Kashmir. It should be noted that India has continued to provide accommodation. which was the implementation and withdrawal of troops. it followed the same course as the ceasefire line established by the Karachi Agreement in 1949. the Secretary-General reported that the withdrawal of the troops had been completed on schedule. 7. Pakistan has continued to lodge complaints. India made it clear that it would negotiate directly with Pakistan in regards to a number of changed positions of military on both sides of the 1949 ceasefire line. and its 59 UNMOs were gradually withdrawn. In July 1972.S. Having fulfilled its mandate. Stage one was the disengagement of forces. the Indian Government announced a unilateral ceasefire on 17 December. and West Pakistan (Pakistan) was trying to move forces into the region to quell the civil war. In May 1972. which demanded that the ceasefire remain in place and a withdrawal occur back to positions demarcated by the ceasefire line supervised by UNMOGIP. Due to diplomatic wrangling between the U. the Agreement was void and.12 The Continuation of UNMOGIP At the end of 1970. General Marambio’s decision would be final and binding on both sides. Agreement of what constituted the Line of Control (LOC) was achieved in December 1972. UNMOGIP’s mandate had lapsed. India sided with the breakaway state and sent its forces into East Pakistan on 22 November 1971. at which time Indian forces crossed into West Pakistan. but India had effectively stopped participating in reporting ceasefire violations. and with minor deviations. . and other facilities to UNMOGIP. On 21 December the Security Council adopted resolution 307 (1971). Pakistan maintained the position that UNMOGIP’s presence was required. but it was forced to deal with millions of refugees from East Pakistan. By mid-1971civil war had broken out. the Secretary-General reported that Pakistan was still complying with UNMOGIP. On 26 February 1966. and if a disagreement did occur. but Pakistan continued to make claims of Indian violations of the ceasefire. however. the cessation movement of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) had begun. As of 2005. India.
The primary political objective for the Government of Pakistan was to internationalise the Kashmir issue. Pakistan’s military aim had been to exploit the large gaps that existed in the defences in the sector on both sides of the LOC. The intrusions by Pakistani forces would give Pakistan control over much of this strategic land area across the LOC. Indian patrols were surprised on 8 May when they encountered these forces on the Indian side of the LOC. aside from the nuclear threat posed by both countries. as global attention had waned over the recent years. with jagged heights of up to 18. In addition. The terrain of the LOC and Kargil are. inhospitable. and it had been assumed that this meeting had de-escalated the growing tensions that had existed since May 1998’s nuclear tests of both India and Pakistan. at best.Lesson 7 / UNOGIL and UNMOGIP 102 7. This would have given Islamabad a strong negotiating position in terms of the larger dispute over Kashmir. and temperatures as low as -60 degrees Celsius in the winter.000 feet. harsh gusts of wind. Kashmir was also one of the root causes of tension in South Asia. .13 The 1999 Kargil Conflict The 1999 Kargil conflict began with the surreptitious infiltration of Pakistani troops and Kashmiri militants during April and early May 1999. The SC noted in resolution 1172 (1998) on 6 June 1998 that. since 1977. Initial Phase of 1999 Kargil Conflict Source: Pakistani Navy The February 1999 Lahore Summit had just occurred between the respective Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan. there had been an informal concord between India and Pakistan that neither side would occupy posts from 15 September to 15 April of each year due to the extreme weather conditions that make the region almost impassable.
The continued presence of UNMOGIP and the use of its good offices could help to bring a peaceful resolution to the dispute. It never provides information to any third parties. it clearly went to great lengths to launch its surprise attack against India. India soon gained the upper hand. In the Islamabad Declaration of 6 January 2004. President Bill Clinton and pressure from the UN. In late May. South Korean. the Indian Government rejected the UN offer to send a special envoy to resolve the dispute.S. and with the intervention of U. both sides had essentially ceased their military operations. The Indian Prime Minister. (Source: Indian Air Force) UNMOGIP’s UNMOs.” However. and Croatian UNMOs at a local school in Pakistan. By 14 July 1999. 7. Though Pakistan had Indian Air Force air reconnaissance photo of Pakistani positions on always supported the presence of Muntho Dhalo. (Source: UNDPKO) . Part of that plan was to make sure Pakistani movements were not detected by UNMOGIP. Pakistan has maintained the position that UNMOGIP’s presence could play a vital role in promoting confidence-building in the region. 17 June 1999. Atal Behari Vajpayee. also rejected the Secretary-General’s suggestions to send in UNMOs and reaffirmed India’s military operations to push out Pakistani forces from Kargil. and based on its chain of command. it soon became clear that this was a major offensive planned by the Pakistani military.” UNMOGIP’s role had not changed.000 Indian troops had been moved into the region backed by large Indian Air Force assets. Pakistan denied that its military forces were involved and that these were “insurgents. Indian forces began a major high-altitude offensive against Pakistani positions in the Kashmir region.14 Ongoing Issues In 2004. its HQ only reports to UNHQ in New York. Mr. By 30 June. as Indian forces began to drive the Pakistanis out of the areas they had occupied in the Kargil sector.Lesson 7 / UNOGIL and UNMOGIP 103 On 8 May. Italian. Some 730. Pakistan and India agreed to seek a solution over the dispute for Jammu and Kashmir. Indian forces detected Pakistani troops atop the Kargil ridges. the potential for an escalation into a regional nuclear conflict was averted. the Spokesman for Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted in a UN press release (SG/SM/8335) that the local Kashmiri press had made “groundless and potentially inflammatory accusations about the role of UNMOGIP.
D. 2. Why did the Security Council establish UNCIP in 1948? A. Accompany the local authorities in their investigations of ceasefire violations. The border between Lebanon and Iraq. B. A decision made by the Security Council after a request from Jordan. D. To deal with the massive refugee and displaced persons problems in Kashmir caused by the partition of India and Pakistan. To resolve the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. Report on treaty violations by tribal groups. To observe Israeli troop movements along the Lebanese border.Lesson 7 / UNOGIL and UNMOGIP 104 LESSON 7 END-OF-LESSON QUIZ 1. C.S. One of the tasks conducted by UNMOGIP’s UNMOs is to: A. as well as observation. A decision made by the Security Council after a request from Lebanon. 3. B. . By request from the Lebanese government. To observe in order to ascertain whether an illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders was occurring. The border between Lebanon and Jordan. To investigate and mediate the dispute between India and Pakistan after India complained about the Pakistani tribal incursions into Kashmir. C. C. D. Where was UNOGIL’s area of responsibility (AOR)? A. B. 5. Observe disarmament procedures. D. The demining of the AOR. The border between Lebanon and Syria. 4. C. The border between Lebanon and Israel. C. B. To observe U. To monitor the withdrawal of Indian forces from Kashmir. B. D. troop movements across the Lebanese borders. What was the role of UNOGIL? A. By request from Jordan and the subsequent inconclusive Security Council debates. Why was UNOGIL expanded by the Secretary-General in late 1958? A. Oversee demining operations.
C. The Tashkent Agreement led to which of the following? A. By a threat of nuclear attack by India. 6C. C. 2D. 3B. D. 5A. How did the 1999 Kargil conflict begin? A. A separate UN PKO. Security Council resolution 39 (1948). B. 8. The withdrawal of all armed personnel of India and Pakistan to the positions they had held prior to 5 August 1965. 9. Security Council resolution 47 (1948). B. The Karachi Agreement of July 1949. 7. By the elimination of UNMOGIP observation posts by Pakistani commandos along the Line of Control (LOC). 7B. 8D. A final resolution of the Kashmir dispute. B. The ceding of Kashmir by India to Pakistan. C. To mutually aid in the War on Terror. B.Lesson 7 / UNOGIL and UNMOGIP 105 6. Pakistan and India agreed to what? A. 10A . ANSWER KEY: 1C. With the infiltration of Pakistani troops and Kashmiri militants into the Indian side of the LOC. D. A diplomatic operation in Kashmir. To seek a solution over the dispute for Jammu and Kashmir. D. 9C. To stop China from violating the region further. UNIPOM can be described as: A. 10. D. Which agreement or resolution established the ceasefire line to be supervised by UNMOGIP? A. A separate administrative mission in Pakistan. The Tashkent Agreement of 1966. 4C. To withdraw military forces from the region indefinitely. B. An administrative adjunct of UNMOGIP. In the Islamabad Declaration of 6 January 2004. The surrender of Kashmir to India. C. By high altitude bombing of Indian positions along the LOC by the Pakistani air force. C. D.
Lesson 7 / UNOGIL and UNMOGIP 106 This page intentionally left blank. .
6 8.LESSON 8 THE SECOND UN EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF II) 8.13 8.8 Background on the Six-Day War of 1967 The October 1973 War and the UN’s Response Establishment of UNEF II Composition and Strength of UNEF II Mission Mandate Renewals UNEF Command and the Status of the Force Phases of UNEF II Significance and Innovations of UNEF II DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE (UNDOF) 8.14 Background on UNDOF Establishment of UNDOF Organisation of UNDOF Force Modernisation The Area of Separation Role and Activities of UNDOF .2 8.3 8.9 8.5 8.7 8.4 8.11 8.10 8.1 8.12 8.
Lesson 8 / UNEF II and UNDOF
Lesson 8 addresses the Arab-Israeli conflict at a later point in time. As one of the longeststanding regional conflicts with international repercussions, the crises in the Middle East required much discussion and many initiatives from the United Nations. During the 1970s, an escalation of conflict in the area led to the October 1973 war, leading to required emergency sessions of the UN Security Council. Because the two superpowers had interests in the regional conflict, it was imperative that the situation be resolved as quickly as possible. Lesson 8 outlines the background to the conflict and the steps that were taken to resolve it. It describes the formation of UNEF II and UNDOF, as well as how each contributed to the restoration and maintenance of peace in the area.
By the end of Lesson 8, the student should be able to meet the following objectives:
• • • • • •
Understand the problems behind the ongoing conflict in the Middle East; Describe the role of the superpowers during the conflict; List the initiatives toward peace taken by the UN; Define the role of the peace conferences and peace agreements in resolving issues; State the mandates of UNEF II and UNDOF; Understand how UNEF II and UNDOF influenced the United Nations policy towards peacekeeping operations; and Describe the principles of UN peacekeeping that evolved from UNEF II and UNDOF.
Lesson 8 / UNEF II and UNDOF
THE SECOND UN EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF II)
Background on the Six-Day War of 1967
The Six-Day War ended on 10 July 1967, with a ceasefire called for by the Security Council and supervised by the military observers of UNTSO. By that time, Israel had seized large portions of Arab-controlled territories: it had seized Sinai and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. During the hostilities, the Security Council had reached agreement calling for an immediate ceasefire. However, it addressed the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the occupied territories later. In November 1967, nearly six months after the end of the Six-Day War, the Council adopted resolution 242 (1967), which called for a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict based on two principles: 1) Withdrawal of the Israeli forces from territories occupied in June 1967; and 2) The recognition of the right of all states in the region to live in peace within secure and recognised borders. In the pursuance of the same resolution, the Ambassador of Sweden, Gunner Jarring, was appointed the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to help to negotiate such a settlement. Despite intensive efforts, no agreement could be achieved, and his mediation mission ended in early 1973. The core problem that remained the underlying cause of overall conflict was the Palestinian problem. A few months later, a new war broke out in the Middle East.
The October 1973 War and the UN’s Response
In October 1973, Egyptian and Syrian forces launched simultaneous attacks against Israeli posts in the Suez Canal Zone and on the Golan Heights for the stated purpose of liberating their occupied territories. The Security Council immediately met to consider the new crisis but failed to take action because of the divergent positions of the two superpowers. Fighting intensified, especially on the Egyptian front, where on 21 October Israeli forces were about to cut off the Egyptian Third Army on the East bank of the Suez Canal. On behest of the U.S. and USSR, the Security Council met again on 22 October. It adopted resolution 338 (1973), which called on the parties to cease all fighting and to begin negotiations under appropriate auspices, aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East on the basis of resolution 242 (1967). The ceasefire call was confirmed in resolution 339 (1973) of 23 October, and the Secretary-General was requested to send UNMOs immediately. Fighting continued, however, and President Anwar Sadat of Egypt issued direct appeals to the Soviet Union and the United States, requesting them to send American and Soviet troops to the area to enforce the ceasefire. The United States Government was opposed to the request (as it had been supporting Israel), but the Soviet Union agreed. The two major powers, in disagreement after their joint ceasefire initiative, were suddenly on a collision course, each threatening military action.
Lesson 8 / UNEF II and UNDOF
The SC was convened again on 24 October at the request of Egypt. The non-aligned members of the Council, in close co-operation with the Secretary-General, worked out a resolution calling for an increase in UNTSO observers in the area and the establishment of a new United Nations peacekeeping force, which became the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II). The establishment and dispatch of the new peacekeeping operation effectively brought the crisis to an end.
Egyptian and Syrian attacks. (Source: Orbis)
On 25 October 1973, the Council ordered an immediate ceasefire. The Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, was requested to submit a report within 24 hours on the measures needed to set up the force. The report was submitted the next morning. It generally followed the principles and guidelines laid down by Dag Hammarskjöld for UNEF in 1956, but Waldheim proposed several changes in the UN application for the new emergency force. The proposed principles and guidelines for UNEF II were as follows: A. Three essential conditions must be met for the Force to be effective. First, it must have at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council. Secondly, it must operate with the full co-operation of the parties concerned. Thirdly, it must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit. B. The Force would be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the SecretaryGeneral, under the authority of the Security Council. The command in the field would be
Lesson 8 / UNEF II and UNDOF
exercised by a Force Commander appointed by the Secretary-General with the Council’s consent. The Force Commander would be responsible to the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General would keep the Security Council fully informed of developments relating to the functioning of the Force. All matters that could affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the Force would be referred to the Council for its decision. C. The Force must enjoy the freedom of movement and communication and other facilities necessary for the performance of its tasks. The Force and its personnel should be granted all relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. The Force should operate at all times separately from the armed forces of the parties concerned. Consequently, separate quarters and, wherever desirable and feasible, buffer zones would have to be arranged with the co-operation of the parties. Appropriate agreements on the status of the Force would also have to be concluded with the parties. D. The Force would be composed of a number of contingents to be provided by selected countries, upon the request of the Secretary-General. The contingents would be selected in consultation with the Security Council and with the parties concerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographical representation. E. The Force would be provided with weapons of a defensive character only. It would not use force except in self-defence. Self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the Security Council’s mandate. The Force would proceed on the assumption that the parties to the conflict would take all the necessary steps for compliance with the Council’s decisions. F. In performing its functions, the Force would act with complete impartiality and would avoid actions that could prejudice the rights, claims, or positions of the parties concerned. G. The costs of the Force would be considered as expenses of the Organisation to be borne by the Members, as apportioned by the General Assembly. In the same report, the Secretary-General set forth certain urgent steps to be taken. In order for UNEF II to fulfil the responsibilities entrusted to it, it was considered necessary that the Force have a total strength of approximately 7,000. The Force would initially be stationed in the area for a period of six months, subject to extension. The report was approved by the SC on 27 October in resolution 341 (1973). Waldheim had voluntarily proposed to relinquish several important prerogatives of the Secretary-General to the Security Council. He had been influenced by the discussions that had taken place by the Special Committee on UN Peacekeeping Operations. He also took these measures to avoid any objection by the Soviet Union that could have delayed the establishment and deployment of the new force.
trucks.000 troops. (Source: UN/DPI Photo# 124430) Canada provided an aviation unit. the Soviet Union insisted that a Warsaw Pact country should be included in UNEF II if a NATO member was also included. an Irish company reinforced the initial troop deployment. Canada and Poland. and a under direction of UNEF Canadian and Polish logistics teams (1974). as well as a Canadian service unit consisting of a supply company. a Polish freighter "Wieliczka" (named after the oldest salt mining town in Poland) movement control unit.Lesson 8 / UNEF II and UNDOF 112 8. H. During UNEF II’s mandate. in addition to those already in the region. Siilasvuo. In addition. The Force’s provisional headquarters was established in Cairo with personnel from UNTSO. Ghana. and Swedish troops detached from UNFICYP. . 8. the logistics components were well established. A few days later. Poland. each contingent was to be a battalion of 600 troops. Indonesia.3 Establishment of UNEF II The first troops of UNEF II were three units of Austrian. Lorries. The logistics support system was composed of a Polish road transport unit that included a maintenance element. Finnish. Originally. This resulted in troops coming from Canada. The Canadian contingent’s strength was about 1. Peru. However. Nepal. who had responsibility for the mission’s logistical support. However. which arrived in the conflict area within 36 hours. its personnel levels changed due to mission requirements. due to the complexity of the logistical problems for the mission. advance parties of the Canadian and Polish contingents had arrived. Their arrival stabilised a dangerous situation that could have led to a direct military confrontation between the two superpowers. as shown in the chart on the next page. By 20 February UNEF II had reached the authorised personnel level. and heavy machines being unloaded at Port Alexandria from the a maintenance company.000 force strength from western countries. had their contingent sizes increased. postal detachment. subject to the availability of a suitable building. while Poland supplied a medical unit. the Chief of Staff of UNTSO.4 Composition and Strength of UNEF II The Secretary-General now began to get commitments for the balance of the 7. Finnish Major-General (later Lieutenant-General) Ensio P. and Senegal. Panama. was appointed as interim Commander of UNEF II. By mid-November. and by the end of November. and the Polish contingent’s was about 800 troops.
Lesson 8 / UNEF II and UNDOF
113 UNEF II Mission Strength
DATE 20 February 1974
CHANGES Contingents from 12 countries: Austria (604), Canada (1,097), Finland (637), Ghana (499), Indonesia (550), Ireland (271), Nepal (571), Panama (406), Peru (497), Poland (822), Senegal (399), Sweden (620). some reduction of the Finnish, Peruvian and Swedish contingents the Irish contingent was withdrawn at the request of its Government Austrian and Peruvian contingents and elements of the Canadian and Polish logistics contingents (approximately 1,050 troops in all) were transferred from UNEF II to UNDOF in Syria. arrival of additional Canadian and Polish personnel Nepalese contingent withdrawn Panamanian contingent withdrawn Due to previous withdrawals Contingents from Canada, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Poland, Senegal, Sweden Secretary-General calls for more UNEF II personnel due to more extensive responsibilities and a large increase in the AOR for UNEF II Each non-logistic contingent reinforced by one company (an increase of some 750 all ranks) Finland, Ghana, Indonesia and Sweden each agreed to supply an additional rifle company. Polish and Canadian logistics contingents raised by 50 and 36 men, respectively Australia supplied four helicopters with their crews and support personnel (45 men) Senegalese contingent was withdrawn Withdrawal of UNEF II. Individual contingent strengths- Australia (46), Canada (844), Finland (522), Ghana (595), Indonesia (510), Poland (923), Sweden (591). Of this total, 99 all ranks were assigned to UNEF II headquarters. The international civilian supporting staff of that headquarters numbered 160. In addition to the above, UNEF II was assisted by 120 military observers from UNTSO.
February to May 1974 June 1974
End of July August 1974 November 1974 April 1975 October 1975 17 October 1975 October 1975
May 1976 May-June 1976 July 1979 4,174 4,031
Mission Mandate Renewals
The mandate of UNEF II, which was originally approved for six months until 24 April 1974, was subsequently renewed eight times, although sometimes with some resistance from Egypt. In October 1978, the Soviet Union, which was opposed to the Camp David Accords concluded earlier that year, opposed a further extension for one year, and the Security Council finally settled for an extension period of nine months. In July 1979, after the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, which had entered into force on 25 April 1979, the Council was unable to extend the mandate of UNEF II and decided to let it lapse on 24 July 1979. It should be noted that both Egypt and Israel were in favour of an extension of the mandate of UNEF II, but it was the Soviet Union that opposed the extension. In addition, under the guidelines approved by the SC in October 1973, all matters that might affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the Force would be referred to the Council for its decision. The SecretaryGeneral added that he would be ready to make the necessary arrangements, no matter what decisions the Council might reach. The SC did not extend the mandate of UNEF II, which lapsed on 24 July 1979.
Lesson 8 / UNEF II and UNDOF
Mission Terms of Reference The terms of reference of UNEF II were to:
Supervise the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973), which demanded that an immediate and complete ceasefire be observed and that the parties return to the positions they had occupied at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973; Use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting, and in the fulfilment of its tasks it would have the co-operation of the military observers of UNTSO; and Co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in its humanitarian endeavours in the area.
UNEF Command and the Status of the Force
General Siilasvuo was appointed UNEF Commander on 12 November 1973. In August 1975, he was assigned to the new post of Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East and was replaced as UNEF Commander by Swedish Major-General (later Lieutenant-General) Bengt Liljestrand, who held the post until 1 December 1976. MajorGeneral Rais Abin (Indonesia), who became Acting Force Commander on that date, was appointed UNEF Commander on 1 January 1977 and held the post until the withdrawal of the Force in 1979. No special Status of Force Agreement could be drawn up with Egypt or Israel. Therefore, a practical arrangement between the UN and the Governments of Egypt and Israel was that UNEF II would be guided by the provision of the Status of the Force agreement for UNEF I and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN. One problem that arose from this situation was the question of freedom of movement for UNEF II personnel. The specific problem related to UNEF II personnel from Ghana, Indonesia, Poland, and Senegal. As these UNEF Commander, Major General Ensio Siilasvou, briefing countries did not have diplomatic relations with the press at conclusion of a meeting held in November 1973 between Israeli and Egyptian delegations at the UN Israel, Israel refused to extend freedom of checkpoint at Kilometre 101 on the Cairo-Suez Road in movement to these UNEF II personnel in the Egypt. (Source: UN/DPI Photo# 124094) areas it controlled. UNEF II’s Soviet UNMOs were also restricted. Though there were strong protests from the UN, Israel did not relent, and those personnel that had restrictions on movement had to be deployed in the Egyptian-controlled areas or within the UN buffer zones.
Lesson 8 / UNEF II and UNDOF
Phases of UNEF II
The SC approved UNEF II’s terms of reference on 27 October 1973. They remained unchanged for the duration of the mission; however, the mission itself, due to changing regional political realities, can be divided into four key phases.
FIRST PHASE: October 1973 to January 1974 Oct. 1973 – Jan. 1974 UNEF II stopped the fighting and prevented all movement forward of the troops on both sides. Non-military supplies were provided to Suez city and the Egyptian Third Army trapped on the east bank of the Suez Canal. With the assistance of UNTSO’s UNMOs, observation posts and checkpoints were set up, and patrols were undertaken in sensitive areas. Henry Kissinger, the U.S. Secretary of State, got a preliminary agreement between Egypt and Israel for the implementation of SC resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973). The agreement came into force immediately and contained the following six points: 1. Egypt and Israel agreed to observe scrupulously the ceasefire called for by the Security Council; 2. Both sides agreed that discussions between them would begin immediately to settle the question of the return to the 22 October positions; 3. The town of Suez would receive daily supplies of food, water, and medicine, and all wounded civilians in the town would be evacuated; 4. There would be no impediment to the movement of non-military supplies to the east bank; 5. The Israeli checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez road would be replaced by United Nations checkpoints; and 6. As soon as the United Nations checkpoints were established on that road, there would be an exchange of all prisoners of war, including the wounded. Except for the provision on the return to the 22 October positions, the agreement was implemented without much difficulty.
In a UN tent, the Israelis and Egyptians discuss disengagement at Km. 101, on 11 November 1974. (Source: 130417c UN/DPI/Y. Nagata)
Lesson 8 / UNEF II and UNDOF
SECOND PHASE: January 1974 to October 1975 The United States and the Soviet Union jointly promoted the implementation of SC resolution 338 (1973), which called for negotiations to start between the parties concerned in an effort to establish a just and durable peace in the Middle East. The Peace Conference on the Middle East at Geneva convened and discussed the disengagement of forces in the Egypt-Israel sector, as well as a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem. Egypt, Israel, and Jordan attended, but Syria refused to come, and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was not invited. The Conference was inconclusive and adjourned after three meetings. However, a Military Working Group was established to discuss the question of the disengagement of forces. The Working Group was composed of the military representatives of Egypt and Israel and was chaired by the Commander of UNEF II. Separate mediation by the U.S. Secretary of State with the Governments of Egypt and Israel, in what was known as his “shuttle diplomacy,” resulted in a disengagement and separation of military forces agreement. The agreement was signed, providing for the deployment of Egyptian forces on the eastern side of the Canal, west of a line designated on the map annexed to the agreement (the line ran parallel to the Canal, about 10 kilometres east of it), the deployment of Israeli forces east of another line, the establishment of a zone of disengagement manned by UNEF II, and areas of limited forces and armament on both sides of that zone. There was a phased withdrawal of Israeli forces. At each phase, Israeli forces withdrew from a designated area after handing it over to UNEF II, and UNEF II held that area for a few hours before turning it over to the Egyptian forces. UNEF II interposed between the forces of the two sides by establishing temporary buffer zones. UNEF II, with the assistance of Egyptian and Israeli army surveyors, surveyed and marked the lines of disengagement. After the completion of the operation, most non-logistic contingents were deployed in or near the newly established zone of disengagement. UNEF II controlled this zone with static checkpoints, observation posts, and by conducting mobile patrols. Also, with the assistance of UNTSO UNMOs, UNEF II conducted weekly and later bi-weekly inspections of the areas of limited forces and armament (30 km zone), as well as inspections of other areas agreed by the parties. UNEF II also assisted in the exchange of POWs and the transfer of displaced civilians. An operation was conducted to search for the remains of soldiers killed during the October 1973 war. The headquarters of UNEF II was moved to Ismailia.
21 Dec. 1973
22 Dec. 1973
Early Jan. 1974 18 Jan. 1974
Late Jan. – 4 March
Completed in July 1974 Aug. 1974
Members of the Canadian 1st Signal Regiment testing radio equipment at UNEF Headquarters in Ismailia, Egypt (1973). (Source: UN/DPI Photo# 124321C)
Redeployment was completed in the southern area. 1975 November 1975 1 Dec. in some instances. accompanied by liaison officers of the respective parties. 1976 – Feb. Overall. 1979 UNEF II Southern Area Tasks: • • • Assure that no military or paramilitary forces of any kind. – 22 Feb. The Military Working Group signed the agreement. Complaints of violations were taken up with the party concerned by the Force Commander or the Chief Coordinator and. considered any problems arising from the agreement and assisted UNEF II in the execution of its mandate. Ensure the maintenance of the agreed limitations of forces and armament within the areas specified in the agreement by conducting bi-weekly inspections. watch stations and the Egyptian and Israeli surveillance stations in the early-warning-system area. observation posts. 1976 Mar. UNEF II began its assistance to the parties for the redeployment of their forces. military fortifications. one operated by Egyptian personnel and the other by Israeli personnel. under the aegis of the United Nations Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East. were referred to the Joint Commission. . 1975 12 Jan. To perform that task. to and from the U.S. which took place at an agreed site in the buffer zone. as required. also supervised the transfer of the oilfields and installations in the area. and ground patrols. Supervise the use of common road sections by the parties in accordance with arrangements agreed to by them and provide escorts in those sections when necessary. Its protocols set out a detailed procedure for the implementation of the agreement. UNEF II kept in close contact with representatives of ICRC and extended its assistance in providing facilities for family reunions and student exchanges. Ensure the control of southern buffer zones by maintaining permanent checkpoints along the buffer-zone lines. The United States planned to establish an early warning system in the area of the Giddi and Mitla Passes. 1975 Henry Kissinger succeeded in obtaining the agreement of Egypt and Israel for a second disengagement of their forces in the Sinai. UNEF II operated without any major incidents. consisting of three watch stations set up by the United States and two surveillance stations. Provide escorts. UNEF II. UNEF II Northern Area Tasks: • • • Ensure the control of the northern buffer zone through a system of checkpoints. or military installations were in the area. UNTSO UNMOs carried out the inspections under UNEF supervision. UNEF II established checkpoints and observation posts in accordance with the protocol and conducted ground and air patrols throughout the area. UNEF acted as a secure channel of communication and contact between the parties during the redeployment process. through the Chief Coordinator. Buffer zones controlled by UNEF II were to be established. Second phase of the redeployment took place in the northern area. A joint commission.Lesson 8 / UNEF II and UNDOF 117 THIRD PHASE: November 1975 to May 1979 1–4 Sept. 22 Sept.
the Israeli forces withdrew from the northern Sinai to the east of El Arish. Nagata) • The rate of assessment for UNEF II was different from that of the regular budget. 24 July 1979 Termination of UNEF II After the mandate of UNEF II lapsed in July 1979. In pursuance of the relevant provisions of the peace treaty. except for a Swedish guard unit and limited groups of the Canadian and Polish logistics contingents that remained in the area to assist in the winding up of the Force. and the Egyptians took over control of that area. UNEF II was financed by assessed contributions to special accounts set up outside the regular budget. the guidelines included fixing a time-limit for the operation (six months. 8. subject to extension by the Security Council). the reimbursement for UNEF II was based on a uniform rate determined by the General Assembly and applicable to all troop-contributing countries. UNEF II withdrew from the northern part of the buffer zone. However. Another change related to the method of financing. which was handed over to the Egyptian authorities (except in areas of the Sinai controlled by Egyptian forces. while those of the least developed countries was decreased. In addition to the changes mentioned above. Like UNEF I and ONUC. November 1975. The peace treaty was entered into force. each troop-contributing country was reimbursed for the costs of its contingent in accordance with a special agreement concluded with the United Nations.8 Significance and Innovations of UNEF II UNEF II was an important milestone in the development of UN peacekeeping operations. where it continued to function as before). . The new guidelines were applied to all later operations during the Cold War period and beyond. The mission was replaced by the American-led MFO. but with two differences: • Finnish troops at a UNEF observation post in Southern Sinai. In the previous peacekeeping forces. UNEF II’s mandate was allowed to lapse. and opposition by the Soviet Union in the Security Council. the various contingents were rapidly repatriated.Lesson 8 / UNEF II and UNDOF 118 FOURTH PHASE: May–July 1979 March 1979 25 April 25 May 1979 The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was concluded. contributions from the five Permanent Members of the Security Council and of some wealthy countries was significantly increased. (Source: 134268c UN/DPI/Y. Due to strong opposition to the peace treaty from the PLO and many Arab States. a practice begun with UNFICYP.
Peruvian Brigadier-General Gonzalo Briceno Zevallos. General Siilasvuo. the commander of UNEF II’s northern brigade. In the wake of the war. The details of the separation were to be resolved by the Israeli and Syrian representatives in the Military Working Group. and logistical elements of the Canadian and Polish units from UNEF II. which resulted in the conclusion of an Agreement on Disengagement (S/11302/Add. with Lt.250 personnel. tank. By 3 June. .S. the situation had become very unstable as artillery. the UNEF II Commander. Secretary of State Henry Kissenger initiated diplomatic contact. the Security Council adopted resolution 350 (1974). In an effort to avert further hostilities between Israel and Syria. which established UNDOF. 8.Lesson 8 / UNEF II and UNDOF 119 UNDOF: THE UN DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE 8. subject to renewal by the SC.1. The Force was set up initially for a six-month period. and its provisional HQ had been established in Damascus. Initially. and personnel were allowed to carry small arms for self-defence. acting as the witness. It also called for the establishment of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) to supervise its implementation. and rocket duels escalated. UNDOF had reached near its authorised strength of 1. and tensions remained high due to continued exchanges of fire and overflights of military aircraft by both sides. UNTSO provided the UNMOs. advance elements of UNDOF had arrived. through negotiations with the Military Working Group. Both sides also provided UNDOF with maps of minefield locations. U. was made the interim commander of UNDOF.9 Background on UNDOF The 1973 Yom Kippur War resulted in the destabilisation of the Golan Heights region in Syria. The mission was also allowed freedom of movement and communications relevant to its mandate. UNDOF was to generally comply with the relevant Syrian laws and regulations and not interfere with the local civilian administration. annexes I and II) between both sides. which were withdrawn from UNEF II. By 16 June. Disengagement began 24 hours after the signing of the Agreement and was completed within 20 days. The Agreement provided for an area of separation and for two equal zones of limited armaments and forces on both sides of the area. Israel and Syria exchanged POWs and returned bodies through the good offices of the ICRC. and his staff officers were drawn from UNEF II and UNTSO.10 Establishment of UNDOF On the same day the Agreement was signed. UNDOF’s personnel were drawn from existing regional UN missions and its authorised strength was set at 1. The initial composition of UNDOF was comprised of the Austrian and Peruvian contingents. the establishment of UNEF II did not fully stabilise the Israeli-Syrian front on the Golan Heights.250 personnel. The Agreement was signed on 31 May 1974. During this period. From March 1974 to the end of May 1974.
the HQs and support units.Lesson 8 / UNEF II and UNDOF 120 8. a Polish infantry unit replaced it in December. a Slovakian infantry platoon replaced an Austrian one. and logistical support was consolidated under a strengthened Canadian logistical unit. Due to domestic problems. most of the military components of UNDOF HQ in Damascus were moved to Camp Faouar. the logistics and signals units from Canada. and the international civilian staff. In addition. UNDOF Organisation Source: Ram Military Consulting SECRETARY GENERAL UN HQ New York Office of Special Political Affairs (OSPA) Force Commander (FC) Deputy Force Commander (DFC) Field Operations Division (FOD) MISSION HQ Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) Chief of Staff (COS) Civilian Administrative Officer (CAO) Liais on Operations Branch (OPS) Personnel Logistics Civilian Administrative Staff Liaison Infantry Battalions UNMOs (OGG) Logistics Unit Command Operations/Support Elements . In 1996. the Polish logistics unit was withdrawn. The Slovak platoon was integrated into the Austrian battalion. the number of soldiers on patrol and manning the observation posts remained the same. two Nepalese were now part of UNDOF. due to the withdrawal of UNEF II in 1979. There was an overall reduction of 15 percent of personnel in each military contingent. During the same period. while other elements were moved to Camp Ziouani. In 2004. In the second half of 1992. which became UNDOF’s new HQ. which was completed in 2005. and UNTSO military observers from OGG.450 personnel. UNDOF’s authorised strength was raised to 1. When Finland withdrew its infantry battalion at the end of 1993. with the Poles and Canadians providing logistical support. At the end of May 1998.11 Organisation of UNDOF UNDOF was essentially organised along the lines of UNEF II and was under the exclusive command and control of the UN. UNDOF at this time had also completed two-thirds of its modernisation programme. By May 1985. The original contingents were the Austrians and the Peruvians. UNDOF was composed of one infantry battalion from Austria and one from Poland. its strength was at 1. because the force commander came from Nepal. In addition.331 personnel. the Iranians were withdrawn in 1979 and replaced by a Finnish contingent. In July 1975 the Peruvian contingent was withdrawn and was replaced by an Iranian contingent in August. some logistical requirements were taken over by the individual contingents. a transport platoon from Japan. However. UNDOF had its force size reduced in order to reduce mission expenditures. In 1992.
flexible. working conditions. upgrading communications and buildings. Improved capability for night-time surveillance. the former Chief Logistics Officer for UNDOF. The creation of a training cell.12 Force Modernisation By the early 2000s. analyse. The objective of the changes and upgrades in military operations was to create a more mobile. Spearheaded by Canadian Lieutenant-Colonel Rick Charlebois. the mission required more vehicles to enable safe and more frequent patrolling. The existing 30 small military observer camps/positions needed to be rebuilt and consolidated. It also increased the number of troops available for operational activities. eight positions were saved that could be used at UNDOF HQ. Through consolidation. and roads. and all of it was located in mountainous areas full of hidden landmines. and responsive force. and maximising construction efficiencies. The overall impact of Force Modernisation streamlined the infrastructure and logistics support and improved communication facilities. Establishment of two permanent reserve force platoons. and report operations information. A larger armoured personnel carrier (APC) fleet. moreover. and it improved the quality of life. Increased capacity to gather. UNDOF’s Force Modernisation was completed in late 2005 and included: • • • • • • • Consolidation of 30 positions into 17. and The relocation of the Military Police HQ to improve the operational focus of the police. UNDOF had serious problems with its aging infrastructure of buildings. The changes were focused on providing adequate electrical power. and communications for UNDOF personnel. Much of the infrastructure was 30 years old and needed serious repair work. communications. UNDOF Force Modernization Concept (Source: Canadian Forces) .Lesson 8 / UNEF II and UNDOF 121 8. including using prefabricated structures. Canada led the operation to upgrade UNDOF’s infrastructure.
on the early morning of 25 June. To do this. UNDOF had permanently manned positions and observation posts. one 0 to 10 kilometres. with a detachment in Camp Faouar. The Canadian and Japanese logistic units were based in Camp Ziouani. On each side of the area of separation. UNDOF was entirely deployed within and close to the area of separation. The only serious incident occurred during the final phase of disengagement when. and the Polish battalion was deployed in the southern part. but it was inhabited and was policed by the Syrian authorities. The Austrian battalion was deployed in the northern part of the area of separation. UNDOF inspected these areas every two weeks in order to ascertain that the agreed limitations in armaments and forces were being observed. This process was completed by early July 1974. one 10 to 20 kilometres. between approximately 10 kilometres in the centre to less than one kilometre in the extreme south. No military forces other than UNDOF were permitted within the area of separation. Canadian signals bunker in Camp Ziouani. Unit insignia. The area of separation was some 80 kilometres long and varied in width. (Source: Canadian Forces) 8. .14 Role and Activities of UNDOF The primary role for UNDOF was the supervision of the area of separation by ensuring that there was no presence of military forces from either side in the area.13 The Area of Separation Disengagement Operations occurred in four phases between 14 June and 27 June. and they ran foot and mobile patrols operating at irregular intervals by day and night on predetermined routes. one Austrian soldier was wounded and another four were killed when their vehicle was destroyed by a landmine on Mount Hermon. there is one area of limitation with three zones. Following disengagement. UNDOF working with Israeli and Syrian forces delineated and marked the lines that were the boundaries of the area of separation.Lesson 8 / UNEF II and UNDOF 122 8. the terrain is very hilly and is dominated to the north by Mount Hermon. and one 20 to 25 kilometres wide. Overall.
instituted a minefield security and maintenance programme in the area of separation to identify and mark all minefields. This initiative was supported by the United Nations Children’s Fund to promote mine awareness among the civilian population. all parties.088 UN/DPI)Heights. and the mission had continued to soldiers demining in the Golan perform its functions effectively. that both the Israelis and the Syrians regularly put restrictions on the movement of UNDOF inspection teams during their visits to the areas of limitation of armament and forces.Lesson 8 / UNEF II and UNDOF 123 UNDOF also conducted humanitarian activities. the Security Council had renewed UNDOF’s mandate. however. It should be noted. also took great efforts to address the environmental consequences that resulted from its activities and presence in its AOR. providing assistance to the ICRC with facilities for mail and the passage of persons through the area of separation. As of 2005. and providing limited medical treatment to the local population. Syria. It was also noted by the Secretary-General that there had been a growing shortfall of funding for the mission in the order of US$13 million. due to its long presence in the region. including mine clearance. UNDOF. with the Syrian authorities. with the co-operation of Polish 1974. UNDOF. Due to the extensive mine threat in its AOR. (Source: 134. which was money owed to the Member States that contributed troops to UNDOF. Japanese transport unit at UNDOF (Source: Japanese Self Defence Force) .
Resolution 247 (1968) C. Resolution 242 (1967) B. D. and Syria. This was the normal rotation of contingents as dictated by the SC. The United States opposed the extension.Lesson 8 / UNEF II and UNDOF 124 LESSON 8 END-OF-LESSON QUIZ 1. Lebanon. The Soviet Union opposed the extension. why did the Security Council allow the mandate to lapse in July 1979? A. . It involved Warsaw Pact nations. There was no longer any money in the UN Special Account to pay for the mission. C. The UN moved from Chapter VI to Chapter VII missions. B. Egypt. and Saudi Arabia. Resolution 338 (1973) D. D. Jordan. Which Security Council resolution called for a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict based on two principles? A. D. Syria. Egypt and Syria. Why was UNEF II an important milestone in the development of UN peacekeeping operations? A. During UNEF II’s mandate. B. In October 1973. which countries launched simultaneous attacks against Israel? A. D. The new guidelines used in UNEF II were applied to all later operations during the Cold War period and beyond. 5. C. Certain contingents were withdrawn by their respective governments for political reasons. B. UNEF II’s personnel levels did not change. This occurred due to mission requirements. and Jordan. why did its personnel levels change? A. C. 4. Even though both Egypt and Israel were in favour of an extension of the mandate of UNEF II. Syria. B. Egypt. 3. Resolution 339 (1973) 2. C. No Member States were willing to offer contingents after 1979. It became the benchmark to resolve Arab-Israeli disputes.
10D . Due to the calm in the region. ANSWER KEY: 1A. It was did not have to comply with the relevant Syrian laws and regulations. C. The economic impact the presence of the mission had on Syria. communications. B. 3C. 6C. 7B. Supervising the area of separation by making sure there was no presence of military forces from either side in the area. It was to generally comply with the relevant Syrian laws and regulations and not interfere with the local civilian administration. 9. 7. C. UNDOF. Supervising the area of separation by making sure there were no Israeli forces in the area. 5D. Why did UNDOF have its force size reduced in 1992? A. and it did not interfere with the local civilian administration. D. UNDOF had serious problems with: A. Which of the following statements best applies to UNDOF? A. Demining the area of separation. Lack of funding from the UN. By the early 2000s. UNDOF wanted to reduce mission expenditures. B. there was little need for so many UN troops. Negotiating a permanent peace agreement between Israel and Syria. It was did not have to comply with the relevant Syrian laws and regulations. Its aging infrastructure of buildings. It was a peace enforcement mission that generally complied with the relevant Syrian laws and regulations. and roads. The environmental consequences of its activities and presence in its AOR. Its out-dated mandate. 9C. C. Acquiring new contingents from Member States. D. B. 2A. 4B. D. D. due to its long presence in the region. C. Poverty amongst the local Bedouin tribes. B. also took great efforts to address what issue? A. C. There were not enough states willing to contribute troops to the mission. The rebuilding of destroyed villages and settlements. 8.Lesson 8 / UNEF II and UNDOF 125 6. There was a need to consolidate and strengthen its infantry battalions. What was the primary role of UNDOF? A. and it could interfere with the local civilian administration when required. B. 8A. D. 10.
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11 Secretary-General’s Good Offices Mission 9.7 9.LESSON 9 UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS (UNFICYP) 9.1 9.13 UNFICYP to the End of 2005 .10 The 1974 de facto Ceasefire 9.12 The Financial Problems and Subsequent Restructuring of UNFICYP 9.4 9.5 9.9 Background on UNFICYP Establishment and Organisation of UNFICYP Guiding Principles for UNFICYP Liaison Arrangements and Freedom of Movement Ceasefire Supervision and Normalisation Efforts The 1967 Crisis Arms Imports Force Reductions Between 1965-1974 The 1974 Coup d’état 9.3 9.2 9.8 9.6 9.
State the role of Great Britain. both adding to its tensions and ultimately helping to resolve them. It discusses how Great Britain. as well as international relationship implications. and Turkey were related to the crisis. Describe the solutions that ultimately brought stability and peace to the area. Greece. List the interim steps taken towards resolving the crisis. including perspectives regarding how that crisis impacted internationally. By the end of Lesson 9. and Turkey in the internal strife of Cyprus. the struggle to establish democracy. Delineate the political and constitutional factors that contributed to the crisis and added to its escalation. Describe how its geographical location played a key role in the situation.Lesson 9 / UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 128 LESSON OBJECTIVES Lesson 9 explains the historical and political factors that led to the crisis in Cyprus. • • • • • . and Understand the mandate of UNFICYP and how it carried out its mandate. the student should be able to meet the following objectives: • • Understand the historical factors that contributed to the crisis in Cyprus. Lesson 9 shows the student how a peacekeeping mission may need to address conflicts at many levels: civil war. and the birth of a nation. Greece.
General Gyani was appointed as the mission Commander. rather than resolving the crisis between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. the representatives of the UK and Cyprus requested urgent action by the Security Council. the Greek and Turkish communities were unable to realistically apply the provisions of the Constitution. UNFICYP’s size was to be determined by the Secretary-General. During this time. The overall situation in Cyprus had not been helped by the failure of the 15 January London Conference and the growing threat of military intervention by Greece or Turkey. on 16 August 1960.S. This force was to be composed of troops from the existing garrisons of all three countries that were allowed on the island due to existing treaties with Cyprus. A ceasefire was imposed on 29 December. General Gyani’s mandate was to run through the end of February 1964 but was extended an extra month to the end of March. . Under the existing treaties. In order to establish peace. the Republic of Cyprus became a member of the UN. the Council unanimously adopted resolution 186 (1964). The growing tension eventually led to violence on 21 December 1963. and Turkey offered their joint good offices to Cyprus by sending a joint peacekeeping force to maintain order. and Turkish forces. On 6 March. which as also know as the “green line. it was decided by the UN to send a personal representative of the Secretary-General to observe the peacemaking operation.2 Establishment and Organisation of UNFICYP On 15 February 1964. he reported that there was a rapid and very serious deterioration of law and order in the country and that the British peacekeeping force was increasingly hard-pressed to do its job. This zone was to be patrolled jointly by British. which in turn led to a succession of constitutional crises. and the initial mandate was to run for three months.” The name “green line” was derived from the green wax pencil that was used by the British to mark the line on a map of Nicosia. Greece and Turkey had been allowed to maintain army contingents of 950 and 650 troops respectively on Cyprus. but was for the most part patrolled by British troops. the Treaties of Alliance and Establishment. The UK.1 Background on UNFICYP Due to Cold War realities. On agreement from all sides. a conference was schedule for January 1964 in London. On 17 January 1964. and on 30 December a neutral zone was created between the two sides along the ceasefire line. On 4 March 1964. an independent Cypriot state was created. Gyani was appointed as the personal representative. Turkey maintained that Greek Cypriot leaders had tried for more than two years to nullify the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community and denied all charges of aggression. Lt. by which it recommended the establishment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Turkey and the UK had entered into a treaty as guarantors of the basic provisions of the Constitution and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus. Indian Lieutenant-General P. In the meantime. One month after independence from the UK. However. Greece. on 27 December. Cyprus’ new constitution was designed to balance the interests of both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities on the island. the Security Council met to consider a complaint by Cyprus that charged Turkey with intervention in its internal affairs. after all attempts to restore peace on the island had failed. Greek. Lt. the capital of Cyprus. 9.Lesson 9 / UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 129 9.
Bernardes replaced him as the Special Representative. the first contingent of Canadian peacekeepers arrived. an Austrian field hospital arrived with additional troops from Sweden that had been transferred from ONUC. By 8 June. General Thimayya died during his tenure as Commander and was replaced by British Brigadier-General A. Wilson. Contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order. . Austria. who came out of retirement to command UNFICYP. and Sweden. in 1965. Turkey refused to accept his findings (a previous 1964 plan by former U. Plaza Lasso was made the Mediator. The situation deteriorated further during March. Carlos A. (Source: UN/DPI Photo# 84941) certain British units from the original peace enforcement mission were replaced. and an approximately 1. pass As UN contingents arrived. a sentry post (1964).000strong Danish contingent arrived in May. and Turkey stated on 12 and 13 March that it would send its troops to protect Turkish-Cypriots from attack. a distance of 120 miles.S. General Gyani retired in June 1964 and was replaced by another Indian officer. Denmark. At the same time. UNFICYP had reached a strength of 6. and Return the island to normal conditions. Mr. Galo Plaza Lasso of Ecuador as his Special Representative. UNFICYP was initially composed of Canadian and British forces (the existing British troops on Cyprus were incorporated into the Force). Ireland. In September. Thimayya.J. as well as advanced parties from Finland. the Secretary-General appointed Mr.S. Finnish soldiers bicycling to Nicosia from Dhekelia. and Mr. The same month. Plaza Lasso resigned his post in December of the same year. The balance of the latter three contingents arrived in April. Secretary of State Dean Acheson had also failed). who served as the acting commander until 1966. Mr. Sweden. UNFICYP did not become operational until 27 March 1964. but due to limited strength. Prevent a recurrence of fighting. which included 173 civilian police (CIVPOL) officers from Australia.411 personnel. On 11 May.Lesson 9 / UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 130 The role of UNFICYP was to: • • • • Preserve international peace and security. The CIVPOL component had been operational since 4 April 1964. General K. and New Zealand. Plaza Lasso’s attempts at mediation failed when.
Kyrenia and Lefka. districts had troop strengths based on the intensity of the armed conflict. UNFICYP Deployments 1965 Source: UNFICYP . UNFICYP troops were positioned for an observation role along the length of the “green line.Lesson 9 / UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 131 In order to foster a close working relationship with the Greek and Turkish Cypriot authorities and leaders. United Nations posts were deployed between the two defence lines. observation and patrolling took place from those posts. UNFICYP troops were generally deployed and positioned in areas where confrontation was likely to arise. were regularly deployed into areas that were likely to be potential trouble spots. On the rest of the island. Nicosia was organised as a single zone under Canadian command.” In two other districts. In Nicosia. Observation squads. backed by mobile patrols. In addition. contingents were initially deployed across Cyprus as far as possible to match their areas of responsibility (zones or districts) with the island’s existing administrative district boundaries.
Redeployment allowed UNFICYP to better utilise its personnel as the situation dictated and as new areas of tension arose. The MFR consisted of four platoons (three rifle platoons and one Argentinean armoured personnel carrier platoon). Dutch. British. and well-equipped response capability for incidents that occurred in the buffer zone. . The MFR was based within UNFICYP HQ in Nicosia and was a company size formation comprised of 105 personnel from the Argentinean. flexible. The Mobile Force Reserve (MFR) The Mobile Force Reserve was created in 1997 from the existing Permanent Force Reserve (PFR) to provide the Force Commander with a mobile.Lesson 9 / UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 132 UNFICYP Organisation Source: Ram Military Consulting UN HQ New York SECRETARY GENERAL Office of Special Political Affairs (OSPA) Force Commander (FC) Deputy Force Commander (DFC) Field Operations Division (FOD) Chief of Staff (COS) Civilian Administrative Officer (CAO) Special Repres entative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Senior Advisor (SA) Politcal Affairs Officer (PAO) Spokesman Operations Branch (OPS) Personnel Logistics Civilian Administrative Staff MISSION HQ Liaison Infantry Battalions Civilian Police (CIVPOL) Logistics Units Command Operations/Support Elements Numerous redeployments of UNFICYP contingents have occurred during the decades of this mission. Austrian. and Hungarian contingents.
UNFICYP personnel could carry small-arms for self-defence only. namely.3 Guiding Principles for UNFICYP After the first six months of the mission. areas where tension existed and might be alleviated by the presence of UNFICYP police elements. the principle of minimum force had to be used. Observing searches of vehicles by local police at roadblocks. and The personnel of the Force had to act with restraint and with complete impartiality towards the members of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. and Investigating incidents where Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots were involved with the opposite community. 1964. the Secretary-General in his report of 10 September 1964 summarised the guiding principles of the mission. including searches for persons reported as missing. (Source: UN/DPI Photo# 84927) . Accompanying Cypriot police patrols that were to check vehicles on the roads for various traffic and other offences. Manning United Nations police posts in certain sensitive areas. The key points were as follows: • • • • The Force was under the exclusive control and command of the United Nations at all times. An UNFICYP peacekeeping soldier escorts an elderly Greek woman across the bridge in Ayios Theodoros from the Turkish sector to the Greek sector. When acting in selfdefence. The CIVPOL contingent’s duties included: • • • • • Establishing liaison with the Cypriot police. The Force could not operate outside of its mandate.Lesson 9 / UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 133 Rifle Platoon Number 1 2 3 Role (the platoons rotate every 21 days) UNFICYP HQ camp security Internal and perimeter patrols Quick reaction force on a 24/7 basis Mobile patrol and reconnaissance duties Training and standby phase 9.
The conflict between 1963 and 1964 can be divided into eight periods: . Moreover. by force if necessary.Lesson 9 / UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 134 9. and interposition. However. there was still sporadic violence. which called for an immediate ceasefire. In order to implement the ceasefire. when required.5 Ceasefire Supervision and Normalisation Efforts UNFICYP. tried to stop the fighting. Freedom of movement was seen as an essential condition for the proper functioning of UNFICYP. 5. UNFICYP was impeded by both sides due to their conflicting interpretations— both of which the Secretary-General rejected—of the duties of the force: • • The Government of Cyprus felt that UNFICYP’s task was to assist it in ending the rebellion of the Turkish Cypriots and extending its authority over the entire territory of the Republic. These measures aside. evacuated the wounded. These functions were carried out in contact and consultation with the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot authorities and. which resulted in the Security Council adopting resolution 193 (1964). A number of serious incidents occurred during 1964. and tried to resolve the underlying security and related problems that were causing continued conflict. Both sides were involved in incidents of obstruction and harassment. On 14 June 1964. Though UNFICYP went to great efforts to mitigate the friction on all sides. UNFICYP set up a system of: • • • • • Fixed posts and frequent patrols. including manhandling of personnel and even firing at UNFICYP troops. both sides agreed and accepted the ceasefire without conditions.000 Greek troops arrived to form the Greek Army in Cyprus under his command. UNFICYP encountered many difficulties. negotiation. some of which resulting in the death of UNFICYP soldiers. the incidents persisted through the 1960s. even with the continued belligerence by both sides. However. with the Governments of Greece and Turkey. the mission soon became involved in carrying out a vast array of activities that affected almost every aspect of life on the island. Proposals or plans for remedying situations of military tension or conflict. The 950 men of the Greek National Contingent ostensibly remained a separate organisation. and Withdrawing or eliminating fortifications erected by the two sides. Surprisingly. it assisted civilians. Turkish fighter aircraft became involved in the conflict during the first week of August. the status of the Turkish Cypriot community under the 1960 constitution. through the use of persuasion. As tension grew over the summer of 1964. The Turkish Cypriots felt that UNFICYP’s task was to restore. During the following two months. Intervention on the spot and interposition to prevent incidents from escalating into serious fighting.4 Liaison Arrangements and Freedom of Movement Due to the comprehensive functions of UNFICYP. 9. Demarcation of ceasefire lines where appropriate. from the on-set of the mission. General Grivas returned to Cyprus.
and UNFICYP continued supervision of the road until the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Following the failure of the London Conference. and. restore essential civilian activities. and in this connection to restore governmental services and economic activities disrupted by the inter-communal strife. and for the unimpeded rotation of the Turkish national contingent. On 25 September. The road re-opened on 26 October 1964. which reaches a climax in Famagusta. the violence intensifies. Return to Normal Conditions In its efforts to return Cyprus to normal conditions.Lesson 9 / UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 135 Period 1 2 3 4 Date 21 December 1963 to 31 December 1963 1 January 1963 to 31 January 1964 1 February 1964 to 14 February 1964 15 February 1964 to 4 March 1964 5 March 1964 to 26 March 1964 27 March 1964 to 13 June 1964 14 June 1964 to 5 August 1964 6 August 1964 to 10 August 1964 Description The first outburst of violence occurs. the Secretary-General reported that fighting had virtually ceased. to the extent possible. Violence increases as the Cyprus Government attempts to consolidate its holdings before UNFICYP becomes operational. 5 6 7 8 Another critical issue to maintaining the ceasefire was the periodic partial rotation of the Turkish national contingent stationed in Cyprus. U Thant announced in the Security Council that agreement had been reached for the re-opening of the Nicosia-Kyrenia road under the exclusive control of UNFICYP. These ad hoc measures were designed to save lives. and both communities concentrate on re-organising their armed forces. UNFICYP is unable to halt the violence. The violence is contained following the return to Cyprus of General Grivas. In his report of December 1964. The violence is partially subdued while a negotiated settlement is sought at the London Conference. the underlying tensions were still present. However. UNFICYP used persuasion and negotiation exclusively on an ad hoc basis. minimise suffering. The principal objective was to restore conditions that would enable all the people of the island to go about their daily business without fear for their lives and without being victimised. The violence is again held in check while the Security Council takes up the problem and resolves to form a peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) and to send a mediator. and UNFICYP had little or no success in inducing the parties to scale down their military confrontation or dismantle their fortifications. An offensive by Greek-Cypriot troops against Turk-Cypriots at Kokkina prompts Turkish air raids and halts the attempt to find a geopolitical solution through force of arms. .
in late December all three sides agreed to the Secretary-General’s appeals. which noted the SecretaryGeneral’s appeals and the replies of the three governments. water and electricity supplies to the Turkish Cypriot sectors.6 The 1967 Crisis A series of incidents starting in January 1967 grew in intensity over the following months.Lesson 9 / UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 136 UNFICYP’s Ad Hoc Measures • Escorts for essential civilian movements. agricultural arrangements. and essential merchandise. etc. this never happened. Greece and Turkey reached an agreement under which some 12. With the aid the United States. In March 1968. including people. and the size and powers of UNFICYP was supposed to have been increased. Turkey threatened to attack Greece directly if Grivas was not removed. 9. Harvest arrangements. The Security Council met on 22 December and adopted resolution 244 (1967). the National Guard (an intensely anti-communist force led by Greek officers) was supposed to have been dissolved. many triggered by General Grivas’ forces.000 Greek troops were withdrawn from Cyprus between 8 December 1967 and 16 January 1968. including arrangements to re-employ Turkish Cypriot civil servants. especially for members of the Turkish Cypriot community who feared abduction. which merely exacerbated an already tense situation. Finally. The new junta of Greek colonels resolved to end the dispute over Cyprus by political or military means. However. Arrangements for government property in Turkish-Cypriot-controlled areas. postal services. By late November 1967. food. efforts to normalize the public services. including grain deliveries by the Turkish Cypriots to the Cyprus Grain Commission. including escorts and patrols. . Under the agreement. UNFICYP also made intensive efforts to alleviate hardships resulting from the economic restrictions that had been imposed on the Turkish Cypriot community. maintenance of abandoned citrus orchards. the escalation of incidents. • • • Though UNFICYP tried valiantly to implement the normalisation process. a military coup led by Colonel George Papadopoulos overthrew the Greek government. had created a severe political crisis. but the Turkish Cypriot community maintained their roadblocks against their Greek Cypriots neighbours. the ongoing political problems between the two sides limited the effectiveness of the normalisation efforts. on the roads of Cyprus. etc. The SecretaryGeneral sent a number of appeals to all sides in the conflict to show restraint and urged the three parties to agree upon a staged reduction and ultimate withdrawal of Greek and Turkish forces. Co-operation with the Red Cross and the Cyprus Joint Relief Commission in providing relief assistance for displaced persons (mainly Turkish Cypriots). payment of social insurance benefits. to enable farmers to till their lands in the vicinity of positions held by members of the other community. the last economic restrictions were withdrawn from the Turkish enclaves. On 21 April 1967.
UNFICYP did monitor the imports.764 4. The weapons purchased in 1972 were destroyed between April and May 2002. other military material was being imported at Boghaz. ad hoc arrangements were made to stop the distribution of weapons in regards to some shipments. but the fuses were removed and stored at the UNFICYP camp.December 1968 1969-1970 1970-1972 Military and CIVPOL Personnel 6. would be stored in a fenced area within the perimeter of an UNFICYP camp.7 Arms Imports The importation of arms and military equipment quickly became a serious problem for UNFICYP in terms of the mission’s ability to discharge its mandate. UNFICYP negotiated a provisional agreement on 10 March. the ammunition was handed over to the Cyprus government for destruction. except for the high explosives.708 Reductions to approximately 3. (Source: UN/DPI Photo# 157804C) 9. but as tensions increased due to the illegal activity by pro-Enosis (union with Greece) elements on the island.737 3. In an effort to stop an armed escalation of hostilities. but under resolution 186 (1964) it was questionable if the mission could take any additional action. 1990.150 Approximately 3. In the summer of 1999.150 . Even though it was agreed on 10 September 1964 that UNFICYP could be present at the unloading of military equipment at Famagusta and Limassol. The high explosive munitions were stored at Cyprus police headquarters. this agreement was improved in that the weapons and munitions. Time Frame December 1964 December 1965 December 1966 December 1967 April .8 Force Reductions Between 1965-1974 As tensions lessened.275 5. Again.Lesson 9 / UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 137 9. whereby the imported arms were put in safekeeping and open to inspection by the Force Commander. On 21 April. UNFICYP began a gradual reduction in its force size. unobserved by UNFICYP. A foot patrol amid the ruined homes of Athna.610 4. the government imported a substantial quantity of arms and ammunition in January 1972.
and the UK to begin discussions in Geneva on 25 July. Irish. • . including an increasing number of humanitarian tasks. The Secretary-General had also requested reinforcements from the contributing nations. UNFICYP played a major role in the evacuation of foreign missions to the British Sovereign Base Area (SBA) at Dhekelia. maintain their own police and security forces. putting UNFICYP on full alert. 9. This allowed UNFICYP to expand its operations. the Force was reduced by another 381 troops.366 to 4. On 21 July. By the spring of 1974. The Geneva Declaration and Its Results Security Council resolution 353 (1974) of 20 July prompted the foreign ministers of Turkey. UNFICYP was put on a state of alert the same day.Lesson 9 / UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 138 Between October and November 1973. the existing area between the two forces was not to be entered by any forces. The UN responded by passing a number of Security Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire. Ireland only agreed to send additional troops to the Middle East. these arrived on 24 July and 14 August.444 troops. Turkey responded by invoking the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 and subsequently launching an invasion of northern Cyprus on 20 July. they made the Geneva Declaration.9 The 1974 Coup d’état President Makarios’ decision not to disband the National Guard and request the enlargement of UNFICYP came back to haunt him on 15 July 1974 when a coup d’état staged by Greek officers of the National Guard occurred. however. This incorporated the following: • A security zone of a size to be determined by representatives of Greece. was to be established at the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish armed forces. personnel of the Austrian. but these ultimately failed. All the Turkish enclaves occupied by Greek or Greek Cypriot forces were to be immediately evacuated and would continue to be protected by UNFICYP. This zone was to be entered by no forces other than those of UNFICYP. UNFICYP also tried to maintain the ceasefire by trying to prevent incidents from escalating into full scale fighting by establishing additional OPs and extensive patrolling. Turkey. On 30 July. whereby all sides agreed on certain measures that involved action by UNFICYP. Finnish. At the same time. Pending the determination of the size and character of the security zone. raising UNFICYP’s from 2. the SC indicated to UNFICYP that it was to continue its mandate even thought the situation on Cyprus had fundamentally changed. and the United Kingdom. Their governments replaced these troops. which was to supervise the prohibition of entry. Other Turkish enclaves outside the area controlled by the Turkish armed forces would continue to be protected by an UNFICYP security zone and could. and the Irish UNFICYP contingent was reduced to a token detachment at UNFICYP’s HQ. Greece. in consultation with UNFICYP. as before. but the events of July 1974 soon changed everything. and Swedish contingents of UNFICYP were transferred to the Middle East to form the advance elements of UNEF II.
By this time. the majority of these agreements were consolidated into a simple set of rules. a special humanitarian and economics branch was set up at UNFICYP HQ. The ceasefire lines extended approximately 180 kilometres from Kato Pyrgos on the northwest coast to the east coast at Dherinia. or in need of assistance. UNFICYP kept the ceasefire lines and the buffer zone under constant surveillance through a system of observation posts . UNFICYP immediately recorded where the military forces on both sides were deployed. including some of the most valuable agricultural land.5 % of Cyprus. However. which stated the UN’s formal disapproval of the unilateral military actions undertaken against the Republic of Cyprus and urged the parties to comply with its previous resolutions and to resume the negotiations called for in resolution 353 (1974) without delay. On 16 August the Security Council adopted resolution 360 (1974). on 20 August. During July and August 1974. coupled with Turkey having reached some of its military goals and Greece realising that Turkey held a major strategic advantage. However. the lack of a UN presence resulted in civilian casualties. Due to its inability to agree on a course of action. On 22 July. the military status quo as recorded by UNFICYP at the time became the standard by which it was judged. in some areas UNFICYP had to withdraw its posts due to the serious threat from local fighting. The military status quo was clarified and adjusted through local agreements. the Secretary-General designated the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as Coordinator of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance for Cyprus. reaching as far south as the Louroujina salient. the military junta in Athens collapsed and handed over power to civilians under Constantine Karamanlis. as nearly one third of the Cyprus’ population was displaced. in effect creating a Turkish-occupied zone on the island. The line between the forces became the effective ceasefire lines between the two sides. UNFICYP also took on a number of humanitarian functions. a ceasefire came into effect at 1800. Since there was no formal ceasefire agreement. homeless.10 The 1974 de facto Ceasefire World sympathy was shifting back towards Greece due to its return to civilian rule and away from Turkey due to its invasion of Cyprus. In some cases. on 16 August 1974. It covered about three percent of the island. Given this reality. In early 1989.Lesson 9 / UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 139 • • In mixed villages. local time. The ongoing talks at the second Geneva Conference broke down on 14 August. 9. Turkish forces had occupied some 36. the functions of security and police were to be carried out by UNFICYP. and fighting resumed on the island. it soon became evident that a more systematic and larger scale of operation was needed. UNFICYP resorted to ad hoc emergency operating procedures to try to either contain or end the fighting. In response to this growing crisis. Military personnel and civilians detained as a result of the recent hostilities were to be either exchanged or released under the supervision of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) within the shortest time possible. The United Nations buffer zone between the lines varied in width from less than 20 metres in Nicosia to some seven kilometres near Athienou. whether or not any changes constituted violations of the ceasefire.
in particular to facilitate projects involving both communities. as coordinator of United Nations humanitarian assistance to needy displaced persons in Cyprus. UNFICYP periodically visited Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island and helped them maintain contact with their relatives in the north. and the rapid reaction to any incidents. and with the United Nations Organisation for Project Services. they contributed to law and order in the buffer zone and assisted in investigations and in the force’s humanitarian activities. It facilitated normal contacts between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots by making available meeting facilities. Due to the Security Council resolutions resulting from the hostilities in 1974. as necessary. UN CIVPOL maintained close co-operation and liaison with the Cyprus police and the Turkish Cypriot police on matters of inter-communal aspects. The force delivered to them supplies provided by the Cyprus Government and the Cyprus Red Cross Society. A patrol track running the length of the buffer zone was used for surveillance.Lesson 9 / UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 140 and patrols. In May 1989. UNFICYP’s additional functions were added to the mission. including medical evacuations. Further. UNFICYP co-operated with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Together with the line units. the re-supply of observation posts. • UNFICYP provided its good offices. with an emphasis of the maintenance of the ceasefire. the numbers of incidents in Nicosia were reduced. in regard to the supply of electricity and water across the lines. as well as pension and welfare payments. mostly in the Karpas peninsula. UNFICYP also delivered supplies to the Maronites living in three villages in the northern part of the island and generally assisted them in humanitarian matters. using a system of 154 observation posts. UNFICYP discharged certain humanitarian functions for the Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of the island. and delivering mail and Red Cross messages across the ceasefire lines. • • • • • . UNFICYP reached an agreement with both sides whereby they unmanned their positions and stopped their patrols in certain sensitive locations. UNFICYP monitored the status quo. the monitoring of agricultural activities. The most serious ceasefire violations occurred in Nicosia. providing emergency medical services. As a result. UNFICYP personnel verified that any permanent transfers to the southern part of the island were voluntary. where the ceasefire lines of the two sides were in close proximity. through mobile patrolling and the Mobile Force Reserve (MFR) Unit.
due to the “negative approach” of the Turkish Cypriot leader. as a result. . On 14 April 2003. By mid-1994. it involved proximity talks and then direct talks to resolve the Cyprus issue. the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that agreement on the CBMs remained beyond reach. Extensive efforts were made during 1993 and the first half of 1994 to reach an agreement on CBMs. the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that it had not been possible to reach agreement on the Set of Ideas and suggested the adoption of confidence-building measures (CBMs) as a means of facilitating progress.11 Secretary-General’s Good Offices Mission Since the inception of UNFICYP. The 1990s saw an intensification of these efforts. in a draft agreement known as the “Set of Ideas. Under the auspices of the Secretary-General. the SC expressed its regret that. Initially.” In November 1992. it had not been possible to put the Secretary-General’s settlement plan to simultaneous referenda by Turkish and Greek Cypriots and. successive UN Secretary-Generals and their special representatives have tried to use their good offices to resolve the Cyprus issue. there would be no comprehensive agreement on reunification of the island before 16 April – the date that Cyprus’ accession treaty to the European Union was to be signed.Lesson 9 / UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 141 UNFICYP Deployment 1975 Source: UNFICYP 9. an intensive effort was undertaken between 1999 and early 2003.
the Secretary-General concluded that there was “no apparent basis for resuming the good offices effort while the current stalemate continues. it had to be ratified by an electoral vote by both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. and UNFICYP was redeployed to cover the loss of the Finn battalion.12 The Financial Problems and Subsequent Restructuring of UNFICYP UNFICYP was the only UN peacekeeping mission to be financed by the Governments that provided the mission’s contingents and through voluntary contributions from Member States. it was approved by the Turkish Cypriot electorate by a margin of two to one. it was not replaced. but there was still a net reduction of 206 personnel in UNFICYP. another opportunity to resolve the Cyprus issue was missed. due to the deteriorating financial situation of the force and frustration over the lack of progress towards a lasting political solution to the Cyprus problem. The mission very quickly found itself in financial trouble as voluntary contributions were not readily forthcoming and contributing states were not being paid for covering the administrative and logistical expenditures. but it was rejected by the Greek Cypriot electorate by a margin of three to one. Ultimately. Sweden withdrew its contingent due to the force’s weak financial situation and an inability to resolve the political situation. 1990. In his report of 28 May 2004. and the UK acting as guarantors. In December 1987. and Canadian contingents reduced UNFICYP’s strength by approximately 28 percent.” 9. in 1992. talks resumed between both sides. The financial crisis was reflected in October 1977 with the withdrawal of the Finnish contingent. Due to financial constraints. Furthermore. the Danish battalion and reductions in the Austrian. A UN armoured vehicle at an observation post near Skouriotissa in DANCON The situation was mitigated (Danish contingent) territory. Thus. Turkey. Consensus was reached for the first time. a number of troop-contributing governments reconsidered their participation in UNFICYP. The loss of the Swedish infantry battalion resulted in another major redeployment of the force. The objective of the negotiators was to have a text ready to be put to referenda in April. However. .Lesson 9 / UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 142 On 10 February 2004. and the proposed Foundation Agreement in “The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem” was finalised. In December 1992. with Greece. The UN covered the operational costs for administrative and logistical support. (Source: UN/DPI) somewhat when Austria and Canada augmented their contingents. in the hope that Cyprus could be reunited in time to accede to the European Union on 1 May 2004. British.
Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1604 (2005) of 15 June 2005. To compensate for the loss of personnel. In addition. A limited number of military observers were added to UNFICYP for reconnaissance. As of 2005. By 7 February 2005. force levels. Thus.13 UNFICYP to the End of 2005 In his periodic report of 27 May 2005. had failed in reconciling the two sides and was unable to reduce the level of threat that either side felt. a strength considered to be the minimum number required to maintain effective control of the buffer zone. 9. the system of observation posts was reorganised. excluding the 1974 coup d’état period. He suggested that to resolve the matter UNFICYP should be financed through assessed contributions. by which time the special account. Thus. the Canadian battalion was withdrawn. the financing was restructured to the Secretary-General’s recommendation. the Secretary-General said that the overall situation in Cyprus remained stable. and concept of operations of UNFICYP. the mission failed in its objectives of social reintegration and nation building. and raised the number of civilian affairs officers working in the mission. by recommendation of the Secretary-General and based on a review of the mandate. in Security Council resolution 831 (1993) of 27 May 1993. On 22 October 2004. liaison. . for UNFICYP had a total deficit of approximately US$200 million. UNFICYP. contact had not been re-established between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leadership since the break of relations in the post-April 2004 referendum. the mandate of UNFICYP was extended to 15 December 2005. However. as a Cold War model of peacekeeping. it did not create the confidence on both sides that would allow the mission to end. which was due to there being no viable political solution to the overall situation and what were perceived as a series of military threats from both sides. increased the CIVPOL component to 69 officers. a larger portion of UNFICYP’s infantry battalion strength was moved into the buffer zone. Certain humanitarian activities were also given to the two sides. and there was a greater reliance on mobile patrolling.Lesson 9 / UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 143 In June 1993. The Secretary-General had repeatedly voiced his concerns about the deteriorating financial situation of UNFICYP. As of 2005. and humanitarian tasks in 1993 but were discontinued in 1994. However. UNFICYP was also restructured to a strength of three infantry battalions of approximately 350 personnel each. for the most part. the strength of UNFICYP was 875 military personnel. The result of the various force reductions left UNFICYP covering the ceasefire lines with a very thin blue line. funded by voluntary contributions. a continued distrust existed between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities and leadership. the Security Council reduced the military component of the mission to 860. Reimbursement claims from the troop-contributing countries had only been paid up to December 1981. UNFICYP has been successful in keeping the peace between the two sides. Generally.
D. B. Turkey. D. The permanent representatives to the UN of Cyprus. Which of the following was one of the guiding principles of UNFICYP? A. B. B. The Neutral Zone. The “green line”. The contingents could come under national command in times of crisis. C. . when all attempts to restore peace on Cyprus failed? A. Greece invaded Cyprus. The Force was under the exclusive command and control of the United Nations at all times. The “blue line”. 4. C. Nothing happened. Which one of the following was NOT a role of UNFICYP? A. C. B. What was its name? A. 3. D. UNFICYP withdrew to its strong points. B. What happened when the ongoing talks at the second Geneva Conference broke down on 14 August 1974? A. D. D. 2. Fighting resumed on the island. The Turkish Ambassador to the United States. and the status quo remained. NATO’s Supreme Commander could take control of the mission during a crisis. The British Foreign Minister. even to operate outside of its mandate. The Ceasefire Zone. To prevent a recurrence of fighting. a neutral zone was created the next day between the two sides along the ceasefire line. The representatives of the UK and Cyprus. To return the island to normal conditions. and the UK. After a ceasefire was imposed on 29 December 1963 in Cyprus. To preserve international peace and security. To negotiate a lasting peace with both sides to the conflict. 5. Given that Cyprus fell under the operational sphere of NATO. C.Lesson 9 / UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 144 LESSON 9 END-OF-LESSON QUIZ 1. Who requested help from the Security Council in February 1964. C. The Force could be used in whichever way the UN deemed fit.
The standard by which it was judged whether any changes constituted violations of the ceasefire. The main negotiating position of the Greek Cypriots. It gave some of its patrolling responsibilities to the CIVPOL component. B. C. but it has not been able to end due to intransigence in the Security Council. D. It was a highly successful mission in the context of the Cold War peacekeeping paradigm. It was financed through the issue of UN Bonds. It was financed by the Permanent Members of the Security Council. What did this effectively become? A. as a Cold War model of peacekeeping. B. B. The mission had continued due to the inability of the UN to resolve the dispute with Turkey. D. To serve as part of the restructuring of UNFICYP due to its financial problems. 8. What was one of the unique features of UNFICYP’s financing? A. D. To provide a robust military capability to support UN PKOs in the Middle East and the Balkans. The de facto ceasefire of 1974 created a military status quo. Which of the following statements best describes the UNFICYP mission at the end of 2005? A. 7. It allowed local police to patrol on behalf of the mission. flexible. thus not allowing the mission to end. and well-equipped response capability for incidents that occurred in the buffer zone. but it was abandoned in 1982. With the various force reductions in the 1990s. C. C. A temporary demarcation between both sides. . The line used to formally separate Cyprus between its Greek and Turkish populations. To have a rapid response capability to incidents outside the buffer zone. C. 9. 10. what did UNFICYP do to compensate for the loss of personnel? A. D. There was nothing unique about UNFICYP’s finances. had failed in reconciling the two sides. It reduced its area of responsibility. B. UNFICYP. C. A larger portion of UNFICYP’s infantry battalion strength was moved into the buffer zone. as recorded by UNFICYP at the time. D.Lesson 9 / UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 145 6. UNFICYP has been successful in keeping the peace. Why was the Mobile Force Reserve (MFR) created in 1997 from the existing Permanent Force Reserve (PFR)? A. It was the only UN peacekeeping mission to be financed by the Governments that provided the mission’s contingents. To provide the Force Commander with a mobile. B.
4B. 9C. 3D. 10C .Lesson 9 / UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 146 ANSWER KEY: 1A. 5C. 7A. 6B. 8D. 2B.
5 10.4 10.12 UNIFIL from July 2000 to January 2006 10.7 10.9 Background and Establishment of UNIFIL Organisation of UNIFIL to April 1982 Ceasefire and Israeli Withdrawal The Imperfect Buffer Zone Limited Lebanese Government Control Over Southern Lebanon The 1982 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon Withdrawal of the IDF The Force Mobile Reserve (FMR) Landmine and UXO Clearance 10.LESSON 10 UN INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL) 10.1 10.6 10.14 The Aftermath of UNIFIL’s Failure .11 The Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon 10.2 10.13 UNIFIL’s Deficiencies and Shortcomings 10.10 Role of UNIFIL from 1985 to April 2000 10.3 10.8 10.
Describe the establishment of UNIFIL and its mandate. and. in terms of the evolution of peacekeeping operations. List the difficulties and setbacks encountered by UNIFIL. • • • • . State the stand taken by the Lebanese government towards internal problems and towards UNIFIL. and as such. Aside from the operation in the Congo. the effects of its failure on international relations are elucidated for the student. its mandate. the last peacekeeping operation formed during the Cold War. Finally. because UNIFIL was the last mission established during the Cold War period. By the end of Lesson 10. Understand the involvement of the superpowers and the consequences of their involvement to the mission. and how a lack of co-operation between major parties contributed to its inability to fulfil its mandate. Lebanon was the most difficult mission of the Cold War period. Outline the role of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) throughout the crisis. the student can gain much insight from how the UN dealt with its unique complications.Lesson 10 / UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 148 LESSON OBJECTIVES Lesson 10 discusses the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon. of historical significance in the evolution of peacekeeping operations. Lesson 10 goes into detail regarding how and why UNIFIL was established. the student should be able to meet the following objectives: • • • Describe the origins of the problems in Lebanon. and Define the “Security Zone” and the pivotal role that it played.
In what became known as the Coastal Road Massacre. they occupied the area south of the Litani River. the SC adopted resolutions 425 (1978).Lesson 10 / UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 149 10. with the exception of Tyre. which had technically ended in October 1976.100 to 2.000 Lebanese were killed. this invasion was known as Operation Litani. Six of the commandos were also killed. The Lebanese Government made it clear that it had no control of the PLO in southern Lebanon and that it had no connection to the PLO attack. Lebanon was partitioned by default. The PLO became the power broker in southern Lebanon. sovereignty. and some 285.000 refugees were forced to flee their homes. which called for strict respect for the territorial integrity. In addition. which was a loose association of various Islamic and leftist parties who were backed by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). eight Fatah (armed wing of the PLO) commandos infiltrated Israel by sea from Lebanon. . most of whom were civilians. as well as to aid the South Lebanon Army.1 Background and Establishment of UNIFIL In the wake of the Lebanese civil war. an Israeli ally. On the night of 14 March. They first killed an American tourist on the beach and then hijacked a bus on the coastal road near Haifa. resolution 426 (1978) was adopted on the same day. and the armed elements of the Lebanese National Movement. On 19 March. which in turn led to intensified reprisal attacks by Israel against Palestinian bases in Lebanon. The PLO fell back to north of the Litani River and to a pocket around Tyre. and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognised boundaries. which resulted in PLO/PLO-backed commando raids across the border into Israel. On 15 March. Operation Litani’s objectives were to drive Palestinian militant groups away from the border with Israel. In a few days. and it called upon Israel IDF units cross into South Lebanon. (Source: IDF) immediately to cease its military action and withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory. calling for the immediate establishment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). while in the south no central authority existed. the Lebanese Government submitted a strong protest against the Israeli invasion to the Security Council. Israeli forces responded by invading Lebanon. This region was split between Christian militias. on 11 March 1978. The northern region was controlled through proxy by Syria. who were backed by Israel. It was estimated that some 1. 1978. The subsequent shoot-out with Israeli security forces left 35 of the passengers dead and 71 wounded.
The overall guidelines for UNIFIL were essentially the same as those for UNDOF and UNEF II. such as the PLO or the Christian militias (the Lebanese de facto forces). two key problems came into play in the early days of the mission: First. To restore international peace and security. and To assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. Force could only be used in self-defence. Second. UNIFIL AO (Source: Ram Military Consulting) . However. which then translated into different perceptions of what the mission’s AO should be. Both Israel and the Government of Lebanon had very different ideas on what the actual tasks of UNIFIL were.UNIFIL was seriously burdened by the fact that there had been no clear definition of its AO. Emphasis was put on the principles of non-use of force and non-intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon. including resistance to attempts by forcible means to prevent UNIFIL from discharging its duties. who would continue their operations along the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) after the withdrawal of UNIFIL. thus requiring both Israel and the Government of Lebanon to co-operate so that it could fulfil its mandate. The mission’s terms of reference were: • • • To confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces.Lesson 10 / UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 150 Mission Terms of Reference UNIFIL was to operate in its Area of Operations (AO) to prevent the recurrence of fighting and assure that its AO was not being utilised for hostile activities of any kind.UNIFIL had no powers of enforcement. UNIFIL would be supported by UNTSO military observers. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that UNIFIL constantly had to deal with the non-state actors from both sides.
the Norwegians arrived two weeks later and the Nepalese by midApril.2 Organisation of UNIFIL to April 1982 Ghanaian Major-General Emmanuel Erskine. The strength of UNIFIL was set at 4.Lesson 10 / UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 151 10. Iranian. which were soon reinforced by another 19 UNMOs from UNTSO. UNIFIL had reached a strength of 4. who was the UNTSO COS. as well as one reinforced company of the Iranian contingent of UNDOF. were temporality assigned to UNIFIL.061 by the beginning of May 1978. Including the Canadian. He also had 45 UNMOs in the area. To make the mission viable as soon as possible. MGen. and Norway agreed to provide the first contingents. was appointed as UNIFIL’s interim commander on 19 March. France. French troops began to arrive in Beirut on 23 March. Erskine set up a temporary HQ at the UNTSO out-station in Naqoura.000 troops. Nepal. and Swedish troops. one reinforced company from the Swedish contingent and a Canadian signals and movement control detachment of UNEF II. and the initial mandate was for six months. UNIFIL Organisation (as of 1986) Source: Ram Military Consulting UN HQ New York SECRETARY GENERAL Office of Special Political Affairs (OSPA) Personal Staff Senior Advisor (SA) Press Information Officer (PIO) Legal Advisor (LA) Field Operations Division (FOD) Force Commander (FC) Deputy Force Commander (DFC) MISSION HQ Chief of Staff (COS) Civilian Administrative Officer (CAO) Operations Branch (OPS) Liason Logistics Administration & Personnel (A&P) Civilian Administrative Staff Liaison Infantry Battalions UNMOs (OGL) Logistics Units Force Mobile Reserve (FMR) Air Unit Command Operations/Support Elements .
UNIFIL had eventually occupied 24 positions. The withdrawal of the IDF created two problems for UNIFIL: First. However. about one-tenth of the land occupied by the initial invasion. The Iranian and Swedish companies that had been detached from UNDOF and UNEF II were returned to their respective missions. . After the second phase. even after on 5 September 1978 the Government of Lebanon declared that these forces had no authority in the UNIFIL area of operation. 10. and this withdrawal took place on 30 April. thus. and a further withdrawal of Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) was demanded. By June 1982. The Security Council approved the increase in UNIFIL’s strength on 3 May in resolution 427 (1978). fundamentally handicapped its ability to fulfil its mission. after the June 1982 invasion of Lebanon by Israel. and these regions were immediately taken over by UNIFIL forces. including its HQ at Naqoura and five existing UNTSO positions.” This led to serious armed clashed between UNIFIL and PLO elements.100 troops and 42 UNMOs of the Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) from UNTSO. Israeli forces began a two-stage phased withdrawal on 11 April. Almost immediately. the Secretary-General recommended (S/12675) that the strength of UNIFIL be raised to 6.945 troops.000 personnel in early 1982. as UNIFIL began occupying the vacated territory. Fiji. Iran. This. the Secretary-General had called for a general ceasefire. Israel gave up about 45 percent of the territory it had occupied. after pressure from the UN. which by 8 April was essentially being respected by both sides. The ceiling strength of UNIFIL was further increased to 7.3 Ceasefire and Israeli Withdrawal On 27 March 1978. the strength and composition of UNIFIL fundamentally changed.Lesson 10 / UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 152 On 1 May 1978. however. this was the limit of UNIFIL’s presence and. on 14 April. and Ireland each provided a battalion. This situation led to the harassment of UNIFIL forces by the de facto forces.Once the IDF had withdrawn.Israel was very reluctant to give up the remainder of the territory it had occupied in Lebanon. By September 1978. UNIFIL’s strength was 6. in which Lebanon agreed “to facilitate commando activity by means of facilitating the passage of commandos and specifying points of passage and reconnaissance in the border areas. Second. the area evacuated left 110 sq kms. Israel agreed to a full withdrawal by 13 June 1978. By mid-June 1978. which many times resulted in injury or death to UNIFIL troops over the years. based on reports from both the Commanders of UNTSO and UNIFIL noting the harsh conditions and dangers of the mission. However. was not acceptable to the UN. Israel agreed.000 personnel. PLO armed elements began to try to enter into the region based on their interpretations of the 3 November 1969 Cairo Agreement. the Lebanese de facto forces (Israel’s allies) threatened to use force to stop further UNIFIL deployments. The de facto forces essentially created their own enclave in the area vacated by the third phase of the Israeli withdrawal. However. which arrived at the beginning of June. the mission’s strength had been raised to 6.
with the aid of the IDF. but Israel felt it was in its strategic interest to have the de facto forces occupy these positions. Negotiation with Israel was the only real option to avoid heavy combat. but only with permission of Major Saad Haddad. UNIFIL recorded 312 air and 89 sea violations. UNIFIL was only able to establish four isolated observation posts. 10. UNIFIL’s limited size. just south of Chateau de Beaufort. when the IDF launched a large helicopter commando raid backed by artillery and air support into the Chateau de Beufort and Arnun areas. From November 1979 on. IDF incursions into UNIFIL’s AO began to occur. but there was a 15kmwide gap between the two zones. By July 1981. The de facto forces also infiltrated UNIFIL’s AO between July 1979 and July 1980 and set up strategic positions. in that UNIFIL’s troops had freedom of movement on the main roads for five days a week in order to rotate personnel and re-supply.4 The Imperfect Buffer Zone Overall. the difficulty of the terrain. Thus. construction of new positions inside the Lebanese border. The other occurred in July 1981 when. the two sides were only separated by the Litani River in this area. (Source: UN) around 24 July. there were frequent exchanges of fire between the PLO and the de facto forces. after PLO forces shelled the Israeli town of Qiryat Shemona on 10 July. These included mine-laying. Their respective artillery could shoot at each other’s positions and territory. By 1980. Israeli warships became involved.Lesson 10 / UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 153 UNIFIL deployed into two separate zones south of the Litani River. manning checkpoints. These attacks included the April 1980 shooting and murder of three Irish soldiers and the heavy shelling of the UNIFIL HQ on 24 April 1980. One occurred in August 1980. UNIFIL was able to come to a modus vivendi with the de facto forces in their self-created enclave. and transporting supplies. During November 1980. there were 30 PLO armed element positions within UNIFIL’s AO. the fighting eventually died down Dutch observational post. and its lack of enforcement power made it almost impossible to stop infiltration. it would not help convincing Major Haddad to remove them. UNIFIL could also have over-flights. This situation led to two major incidents. and there were still attacks directed against UNIFIL positions and specific contingents. Israel also retaliated against the PLO positions with air attacks. the IDF retaliated with massive air and artillery strikes. Sometimes this limited movement was denied to UNIFIL. who commanded the de facto forces. . From March 1979. In regards to UNIFIL’s AO. Give there was a 15 km gap between the two AOs of UNIFIL. After nearly two weeks of conflict. by 16-17 July. the IDF was also intruding into Lebanon’s airspace and territorial waters.
Consequently.5 Limited Lebanese Government Control Over Southern Lebanon From the inception of UNIFIL. for the most part. as well as Israel’s annexing of the Golan Heights and the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. . which called for an end to the armed attacks and reaffirmed Lebanon’s independence. and on 21 July the SC adopted resolution 490 (1981).6 The 1982 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon The growing tension in the occupied territories and the response by Palestinians to violence directed at them by Jewish settlers in Gaza and the West Bank. but due to lack of Israeli support for the initiative.Lesson 10 / UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 154 The Security Council President called for an end to hostilities. Israel tried to provoke the PLO into attacking in order to provide a pretext for an attack into Lebanon. Chairman of the PLO. 10. a meeting was held between the parties on 1 December 1980. The only real threats to it were the initial attacks by Ahmed Jebril’s Syrian-backed Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC). No agreement could be reached on the matter. It was chaired by the COS of UNTSO. a second battalion was successfully deployed without any serious problems.S. but these did not evoke a response from the PLO. the PLO did not launch attacks into Israel between July 1981 and June 1982. This brought the LNA’s strength to 1. Israel’s objective was to weaken the growing strength of the PLO in the Occupied Territories by attacking its base in Lebanon. Efforts by the UN and U. the de facto forces. various efforts were made to re-establish control over the southern enclave that Israel was controlling directly or through its proxy force. led to the establishment on 24 July of a de facto ceasefire. 10. After a number of preliminary meetings and negotiations. as well as the continued over-flights of Israeli reconnaissance missions. The Lebanese Government also tried to reactivate the 1949 Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC) in an effort to re-establish control over southern Lebanon. Israel. In June. even with serious attacks by the de facto forces against UNIFIL. continued its reconnaissance missions. sovereignty. UNIFIL helped to establish Lebanese Government officials in various places in the enclave and also assisted in a number of humanitarian and rehabilitation projects in conjunction with the Government. was able to make Jebril honour the ceasefire on 27 July. some of its units were deployed beyond its initial operational limits around Arzun. UNIFIL also diplomatically supported a number of attempts to establish a presence of the newly reformed Lebanese National Army (LNA) in the enclave. and territorial integrity. and by early 1981. the same day that the fighting had abated. Yassar Arafat. UNIFIL reported that as of 1320 local time everything was quiet. The LNA battalion was reinforced in December 1980. on the other hand. The 24 July 1981 ceasefire. the task force was forced to withdraw after the de facto forces began heavy harassing fire. held until April 1982.350 troops in southern Lebanon. The first small task force was sent into the region in July 1978. A second attempt to establish a LNA battalion in April 1979 did succeed. all led to massive tension in the region. However.
Syrian and PLO forces were put under siege by the IDF for three months. under the direction of Defence Minister Ariel Sharon. French. Worse of all. in Operation Peace for the Galilee. it had not been destroyed. The Lebanese Government’s primary goal was the withdrawal of Israeli. The evacuation was to be covered by a three-nation Israeli APC and tanks in Beirut. women. MNF forces returned to Beirut at the end of September as a symbol of support for the government. Hizbollah’s manifesto was to create an Iranian-style Islamic republic in Lebanon and to remove all non-Islamic influences from the region. By mid-June. . In February 1983. 1982 Multinational Force (MNF) (Source: Lebanese Information and Research Centre) composed of American. LNA forces then began to move into the region occupied by the PLO. when newly-elected Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel was assassinated on 14 September. and children in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in west Beirut while IDF troops looked on. massacred some 700 to 800 Palestinian men. and Palestinian forces from Lebanon.Lesson 10 / UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 155 Israel was able to use the 3 June 1982 assassination attempt on Shlomo Argov.S. Over the next three days. an agreement was reached for the evacuation of PLO fighters and Syrian troops from West Beirut. Israel invaded Lebanon. However. Syria filled up the power vacuum left in the region. Syrian. though the PLO had been pushed out of Lebanon.S. The resulting Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon led to continued attacks by Lebanese Muslims. with the MNF units withdrawing by 10 September.. IDF units entered Beirut the next day. which was now led by the former president’s brother. Israel’s Ambassador to Great Britain. and in late 1982. Hizb’Allah or Hizbollah (Party of Allah) was born. In 1983. with the help of the U. Lebanese-Israeli negotiations commenced with U. Lebanese militiamen (mostly Phalangists) but also some troops of the Israeli-supported SLA. On 6 June. but it drew its ideological inspiration from revolutionary Iran. and Italian troops. In August. a small British contingent joined the MNF in Beirut. The IDF promptly bombed PLO bases and ammunition dumps in Beirut and attacked other targets in Lebanon between 4-5 June. The PLO responded with a massive artillery and mortar attack on the Israeli population of the Galilee. The evacuation was completed by 1 September. Israel had driven the PLO back and surrounded it in Beirut. while Syria provoked attacks on MNF troops. Israel only achieved part of its military and political goals. it was an Islamasist organisation backed by Syria. by Abu Nidal’s Palestinian terrorist group as a pretext for the attack. a far more dangerous organisation replaced the PLO. which inflicted heavy casualties on the IDF. participation.
It was decided that UNIFIL could no longer fulfil its mandate. for the most part. but the mission was to continue to occupy its positions unless personnel were seriously threatened. was more peaceful than the rest of Lebanon. which were now calling themselves the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and whose units were generally ill-disciplined and acted arbitrarily. UNIFIL’s area of operation had fallen under IDF control. UNIFIL troops had standing orders to disarm these forces or at least contain their activities when they were not being directly support by the IDF.Lesson 10 / UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 156 Control of Lebanon. It was also to provide humanitarian assistance whenever possible. UNIFIL remained behind the Israeli lines. UNIFIL’s major security problems came from the presence of the de facto forces. 1979-80 (Source: Ram Military Consulting) Control of Lebanon after June 1982 (Source: Ram Military Consulting) UNIFIL During the Israeli Occupation of Southern Lebanon By 8 June 1982. For three years. . which led to a lobby for the mission to be extended. This reality was recognised by local civic leaders and the Lebanese Government. Their requests to extend the mandate of UNIFIL were accepted by the UN. Between June 1982 and the phased withdrawal of Israeli forces in 1985. the UNIFIL AO.
due to ongoing fighting against the Druze militias in the Shouf Mountains.7 Withdrawal of the IDF Ongoing diplomatic efforts by the U.Lesson 10 / UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 157 10. On 14 January 1985. Israel’s decision to withdraw was based in the reality that the IDF could no longer afford the attritional guerrilla war being fought. it became clear that there was no reason to continue the talks. More and more of these attacks began to occur inside the UNIFIL AO. In an effort to find a solution. On 16 February. and due to internal opposition and pressure from Syria. By the end of the fourteenth meeting on 24 January 1985. nor did UNIFIL have the right to impede Lebanese resistance efforts on their own territory.S. the Secretary-General was able to initiate a series of talks. The Lebanese Government was not satisfied with the IDF plan. Its depth varied between two and twenty kilometres. However. and a joint security arrangement between both governments. However. During this third phase. but UNIFIL could not impede the IDF in its defensive tactics. the Lebanese government never ratified the agreement. the disbanding of other irregular forces. The second phase of the withdrawal took place between March and April 1985. Israel announced its plan for a unilateral three-phase withdrawal. . The third and final phase was completed on 10 June. the UN tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a full withdrawal of the Israeli Security Zone (Source: Ram Military Consulting) IDF and its allies. which began on 8 November 1984. when the IDF handed over its positions in the new “Security Zone” to its allies the SLA. The agreement was conditional on a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. wherein the IDF withdrew to a strip of land north of the border between Israel and Lebanon. This area extended from the Mediterranean Sea to the Hasbayya area. This resulted in more intensive attacks by Shiite guerrilla forces against the IDF. with military representatives of both sides at the UNIFIL HQ in Naqoura. led to the 17 May 1983 signing of an agreement between Israel and Lebanon for the withdrawal of the Israeli Defence Forces. this did not happen. as well as due to mounting political pressure at home due to the growing death and injury toll to Israeli soldiers. the IDF began the first phase of its withdrawal as it pulled out of Sidon. This left a power vacuum that was immediately filled by the Druze militias and resulted in attacks and massacres of Christian Lebanese in the region. Some IDF troops remained in the “Security Zone” as advisors to the SLA. the IDF pulled back to the south of the Awali River in early September 1983.
the platoons were organised as follows: . Due to these problems. This force structure resulted in the following problems: • • • • Mobility was time-consuming and inefficient. which meant that nine SISU APCs could be sent out to respond to an incident.8 The Force Mobile Reserve (FMR) Prior to the establishment of the Force Mobile Reserve in 1986. Norwegian FMR APCs on patrol. and The lack of command structure/leadership of the combined unit. When alerted. armoured units from various battalions where employed in critical situations when the use of force could be required. it was then moved to Fijian battalion Position 1-15. the unit was unable to execute its mission during the armed element attacks on French forces during August to September 1986. The camp was later named Camp Grotle after Arild Grotle. Tactical drills and procedures were not standardised and led to limited or no coordination between units. (Source: UN) The unit was initially located in Naqoura. where a tent-camp was established while the FMR camp was being constructed. the FMR. To show multinationality. The FMR was organised into four mechanised platoons that patrolled the UNIFIL AO.Lesson 10 / UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 158 10. who was the Force Commander at the time. Language difficulties and great variations in the knowledge and use of English as the operational language. FMR normally had 75 percent of the unit ready for immediate operations. acquired approval from UNHQ in New York to assemble the platoons into one unit. Finnish General Gustav Hegglund. The unit moved into the camp on 1 June 1986. the FMR should be able to reach anywhere in Western AO in less than one hour and Eastern AO in less than two hours. As a result of the losses sustained by UNIFIL forces. a Norwegian soldier in the NORPLATOON FMR who was killed when a SISU APC overturned in 1989.
SC resolution 1337 (paragraph 10) allowed UNIFIL to expand and undertake emergency demining activities in southern Lebanon. (Source: MACC SL) .9 Landmine and UXO Clearance UN Security Council resolutions 425. FMR Pocket Badge (Source: UNDPKO) 10. − FIJIPLATOON: One crew. requests from the local population for emergency demining would have been handled by UNIFIL and would have involved the clearance of minefields and clusters to extricate casualties or mines/UXO that were clearly identifiable and posed an immediate threat. − GHANPLATOON: One crew. 426. and 511 did not provide sufficient guidance to authorise UNIFIL to undertake humanitarian demining in its AOs. which was set up in a SISU XA-186NO Command Post APC. FIJI/GHAN: − FIJIPLATOON: One crew and two infantry squads.Lesson 10 / UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 159 • • • • NOR/FIJI: − NORPLATOON: One crew and two infantry squads. including a gunner/reserve leader. Belgian PRB M35 anti-personnel mine in FINBATT AO. − IRISHPLATOON: One Crew. − NEPPLATOON: Two infantry Squads. a regional Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) was established within UNIFIL in July 2000. At the request of UNIFIL. personnel from the NOR/FIJI/GHAN/IR/FIN-PLATOON manned FMR’s Command Post. including a gunner/reserve leader. In January 2002. GHAN/NOR: − GHANPLATOON: Two infantry squads and one crew. − NORPLATOON: One crew including a gunner/reserve leader. Southern Lebanon (MACC SL). However. the UNIFILMACC relocated from its office in Tyre to the former UNIFIL Logistics Base in Tyre and started its operational activities. The UNIFIL-MACC formed the core of the Mine Action Coordination Centre. UNIFIL’s demining efforts had been directed to operational areas where UNIFIL personnel were located. On missions involving two or more platoons. Generally. Thus. and FIN/IR/NEP: − FINNPLATOON: One crew.
561 2 Injuries 5 7 21 5 2 8 48 Deaths 2 0 3 2 0 1 8 Total 7 7 24 7 2 9 56 UNMACC SL Logo Source: UN Mine Action Coordination Cell (MACC) IMSMA Database.543. The IDF/SLA also imposed its own restrictions and regulations for the Lebanese population within the Security Zone. 1990. Many times. MACC SL and UNIFIL created a database for known and suspected minefields.979 777.Lesson 10 / UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 160 Minefield Incidents in UNIFIL AOs .783.948. Irish peacekeeping soldiers train members of other battalions in the use of a bomb-defusing robot.993. paragraph 10: • • • • Landmine Safety training to all United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) teams during their in-country orientation.10 Role of UNIFIL from 1985 to April 2000 Overall. there were no substantial changes to UNIFIL’s position from 1985 to 2000. this led to growing tensions between the occupiers and the occupied population. Lebanon: September 2001 The MACC SL provides the following support to UNIFIL in accordance with the original mandate and the guidance given in SC resolution 1337. .September 2001 UNIFIL AO FIJI NEPAL IRELAND GHANA FINLAND INDIA TOTAL No. areas cleared of mines. The IDF/SLA set up a number of military positions in or near the UNIFIL AO and further fortified their own positions. (Source: UNIFIL) At the end of September 2001. resulting in numerous attacks by guerrillas against the IDF/SLA. and UNTSO OGL. IMSMA mapping of mined areas to UNIFIL HQ Operations. of Minefields 43 20 54 14 78 86 295 Size of Area (m ) 1.186. This involves a brief on a monthly basis with the team members who have arrived that month. Battalions.674. and incidents. 10.251 1.968 2. IMSMA and information support to the UNIFIL DCC.479 15. Tyre. UNIFIL troops found themselves caught between the two sides. Technical advice and coordination with the UNIFIL Demining Coordination Cell (DCC).483 4. 4.365 landmines/UXO of all types had been neutralised.583 4. booby-trapped areas.
In addition. the majority of armed incidents against UNIFIL involved IDF/SLA forces. vulnerable positions were closed. UNIFIL suffered numerous casualties from this menace. when UNIFIL’s mission changed due to Israel announcement that it would withdraw from the Security Zone. Lebanese governmental control was established in the greater Beirut area. a major redeployment of UNIFIL took place between December 1986 and January 1987.Lesson 10 / UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 161 The August 1986 retaliatory attacks by the Islamic Amal Movement. causing UNIFIL to change its security stance. UNIFIL continued to try to fulfil its mandate and continued to offer humanitarian support where it could. which continued to 28 September against 10 French manned UNIFIL positions. this control was extended beyond the greater Beirut area. Further establishment of checkpoints occurred in the AO. the western part of the UNIFIL AO (approximately 32 sq. Overall.) occupied by the Ghanaian battalion was turned over to the LNA. the LNA was Beirut. and additional security precautions were instituted. In July 1991. One task that became of great importance was demining and the removal of unexploded ordinance (UXO. Further handovers continued in 1993. in August 1993. . see Section 10. a 300-man LNA unit was sent into the UNIFIL AO to maintain law and order. kms. The presence of the LNA proved to aid UNIFIL in its work. left three French soldiers dead and another 24 wounded.9). and deployments were to fewer positions with better protection. In addition. one of the worse incidents occurring on 21 March 1989 when three Irish soldiers were killed by a landmine explosion. In 1991. especially in regards to diffusing incidents involving armed elements. With the subsequent withdrawal of the French contingent. The handover was completed by early April 1992. the ad hoc force reserve was turned into a permanent composite unit called the Force Mobile Reserve (FMR. Overall. (Source: UN) deployed into the Sidon and Tyre regions. Additional shelters were built. physical defences were improved. see Section 10. the status quo remained in place between 1985 and 2000. 1990. in December 1995 the Government of Lebanon and the UN signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for UNIFIL. and militias that had been operating in these areas were disarmed and A Norwegian Peacekeeping soldier with a canine bomb scout in disbanded. The Taif Agreement for national reconciliation of October 1989 made provisions for the Lebanese Government to restore control all over the country. many of which resulted in the wounding or even death of UNIFIL soldiers. It also legitimised the Syrian presence in Lebanon but laid the groundwork for a future Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. In consultation with UNIFIL. In 1990. UNIFIL concluded that the mines had been laid on the previous night.8). UNIFIL was consolidated. With this level of co-operation established.
The Secretary-General stated that UNIFIL would require phased reinforcement to carry out its responsibilities in the light of the changed security situation in southern Lebanon. On the same day. On moving into the region vacated by the Israelis. UNIFIL monitored the line of withdrawal by means of daily ground and air patrol and immediately reported any violations to both sides. The de facto forces/SLA had been dismantled. He recommended that UNIFIL force size be raised to a total of eight battalions plus appropriate support units. The delegation also met with the PLO and the League of Arab States. UNIFIL also assisted former members of the de facto forces and their families who decided to return from Israel to Lebanon. Jordan. The Lebanese army retrieved heavy weapons abandoned by IDF and de facto forces.Lesson 10 / UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 162 10. Lebanese civilians and armed elements began to enter the former Israeli-controlled area. the IDF and de facto forces withdrew under fire. including Egypt. On 21 May. Israel began its withdrawal on 16 May. the Lebanese army. and Israel was finally in compliance with Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978). and a team of experts to meet with the Governments of Israel and Lebanon and concerned Member States in the region.” In response. together with the Lebanese authorities. and police established checkpoints to control movement and maintain law and order. Lebanon consented to the full deployment of UNIFIL. UNIFIL discovered two types of violations: • The Israeli technical fence crossed the withdrawal line in a number of places. Violations of the Line On reviewing the vacated region. and all detainees held at Al-Khiam prison had been freed. comprised of army and internal security personnel. By 25 May. while others surrendered to the Lebanese authorities. The Government of Lebanon at this point refused to consent to the deployment of UNIFIL to the vacated areas until all the Israeli violations had been corrected. The de facto forces ceased to exist within a few days of the withdrawal. or approximately 7. the Secretary-General dispatched his Special Envoy (Terje Roed-Larsen of Norway). provided humanitarian assistance to locals. UNIFIL patrolled the area and. which were completed by 24 July. Many de facto forces members fled to Israel with their families. and • The IDF used patrol tracks that also crossed the line. . gendarmerie. the Secretary-General confirmed the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425 (1978). Israel informed the Secretary-General that it would withdraw its forces from Lebanon by July 2000 “in full accordance with Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978). On 16 June. Israel committed itself to the removal of violations. Israel had also completed the withdrawal in conformity with the line identified by the UN. the Force Commander of UNIFIL. the withdrawal was complete. to establish the withdrawal process.11 The Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon On 17 April 2000.935 peacekeepers. and Syria. which was to be followed immediately by the deployment of a composite Lebanese unit.
the army would not act as a border guard for Israel and would not be deployed to the border. UNMOs alone were not sufficient to maintain the peace. India. UNIFIL focused on the remaining part of its mandate: the restoration of international peace and security. except for numerous minor violations of the line of withdrawal. UNIFIL’s strength was stabilised at 2. medical. Two serious incidents occurred on 7 October and 20 October. The reconfiguration would be achieved in the course of normal troop rotations. However. in order to free the capacity needed for the move south. UNIFIL has not been able to persuade the Lebanese authorities to assume their full responsibilities along the Blue Line. the Lebanese Government deployed a Joint Security Force of 1. The Force’s HQs were in Marjayoun and Bint Jubayl. near the Blue Line the Lebanese Government. At the same time.000 troops drawn from the Internal Security Forces and the Lebanese army. Italy. However. the Force would eventually comprise 2. provided social. Hizbollah personnel occasionally restricted the freedom of movement of UNIFIL and interfered with its redeployment. With the withdrawal of the IDF and its allies.000 all ranks. and used its best efforts through continuous and close liaison with both sides to prevent friction and limit incidents. thus evolving the mission into a more traditional observer mission. with the Lebanese authorities assisting in securing land and premises for new positions.12 UNIFIL from July 2000 to January 2006 From the end of July until early October 2000. in effect. It acted to correct violations by raising them with the side concerned. They monitored the Blue Line. penetrating deep into Lebanese airspace. SC resolution 1337 (2001) authorised the military strength of UNIFIL to be reduced by 31 July 2001. left control of the area to Hizbollah. UNIFIL monitored the area through ground and air patrols and a network of observation posts. The redeployment proceeded smoothly. At the end of July and in early August. Hizbollah forces worked in civilian attire and were normally unarmed. with UNIFIL HQ in Naqoura having a dedicated guard unit. Poland. a combination of armed infantry (two infantry battalions) and an UNMO group composed of UNTSO observers and support personnel was suggested by the Secretary-General as the new force structure for UNIFIL. The demining unit would also be maintained. Israeli aircraft continued to violate the Blue Line on an almost daily basis. and. However. The Government of Lebanon took the position that as long as there was no comprehensive peace with Israel. in some villages. Ghana. and education services. . Thus.000 troops by the end of 2002. maintained public order. the so-called Blue Line. and Ukraine. On 30 January 2001. resulting in reprisal attacks from the IDF. due to the remaining instability and lack of Lebanese Governmental control of the Blue Line. UNIFIL vacated an area in the rear and handed it over to the Lebanese authorities. The reconfiguration called for the deployment of most troops in protected positions close to the Blue Line. including troops from France. UNIFIL redeployed southwards and up to the Blue Line. Through a gradual reduction. the situation in the UNIFIL area of operations was generally calm. On 9 August.Lesson 10 / UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 163 10.
including basic internal communications equipment. These incidents coincided with the substantial escalation of tension in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory. things calmed down. the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri on 14 February 2005 created a period of increased political instability. other than in a limited self-defence role. However. During the first two months of the mission. The UN had directed national governments that were providing contingents to arrive self-sufficient and capable of supporting themselves administratively. and the Secretary-General noted in his report of 23 July 2003 that stabilisation was occurring and that this was reflected by how well demining had been going. However.. Thus the SC adopted resolution 1614 (2005). logistically. Also. problems arised due to language and procedural differences. re-established the peace. The result was that these tasks were downloaded to the already over-tasked contingents. due to pressure from the U. 10. Thus. Engineers. This. arrived lacking many of these capabilities. However. UNIFIL road patrol. (Source: UN) All these factors were soon overcome.S. Some contingents. over the decades.Lesson 10 / UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 164 There was a brief but serious outbreak of incidents from 17 January to 12 July 2002 across the Blue Line. due to the requirement for a rapid integration of a multinational HQ staff. led to many casualties and deaths of UNIFIL troops and in some instances led to . some 4. such as the Nepalese and Fijian.8 million square metres had been cleared. confusing instructions. there was no provision for an organic HQ Company that included Defence and Employment. UNIFIL continued to play a crucial role in implementing its mandate in accordance with Security Council resolution 425 (1978). and Welfare Sections. Though there had been a fragile calm over the UNIFIL AO. It also became clear that the Lebanese armed forces could maintain effective security throughout the country. which extended UNIFIL’s mandate to 31 January 2006. and a lack of direction in the handling of incidents. The Secretary-General concluded that the situation in Lebanon and the wider region did not support a change in the UNIFIL mandate or another reconfiguration of the Force. but the major problem for UNIFIL that plagued it throughout its mandate was the inability to use force. Lebanese authorities and diplomats confirmed that. the subsequent withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon at the end of April.13 UNIFIL’s Deficiencies and Shortcomings When UNIFIL was originally organised. By 2004. in the currently prevailing uncertain political and security conditions. this ability was being marginalised. and operationally for at least six months. due to planned reductions. Military Police. Transport. and the holding of free and fair parliamentary elections over a four-week period in May and June. this led to misdirected staff work.
on foot patrol in southern Lebanon. was to be followed by a resurgence of UN peacekeeping operations. the crisis in the Falkland Islands (The Malvinas).Lesson 10 / UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 165 the withdrawal of national contingents. The Washington Summit. and the military build-up of both superpowers. which can be considered as marking the beginning of the end of the Cold War. Much credit for this goes to Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika and his new thinking in international affairs. Nepalese peacekeeping troops. the Reagan administration’s espousal of unilateralism in foreign policy. after 1985. such as the invasion of Cambodia by the Vietnamese. Nonetheless. the invasion of Lebanon by Israel. It was also a time of increasing conflicts in the Third World. November 1990. This soon led to a new detente between the two superpowers. highlighted by the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. 10. a period of more than 10 years. (Source: UN Photo# 157878C) . It culminated in the Washington Summit of December 1987. during which Gorbachev and Reagan signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and agreed on the use of the United Nations machinery for the control of regional conflicts. The first years of this period of drought were marked by an intensification of the Cold War.14 The Aftermath of UNIFIL’s Failure After UNIFIL was established in March 1978. the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq. and the Cuban and South African interventions in Angola. international relations began to improve. no new peacekeeping operations were set up until May 1988. However. UNIFIL troops continued their vigil under hazardous conditions in one of the most volatile region of the world.
Lesson 10 / UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 166 LESSON 10 END-OF-LESSON QUIZ 1. 4. What was one of the terms of reference for UNIFIL? A. 2. 3. Reciprocity trade agreements within the enclave. It was seriously burdened by the fact that there had been no clear definition of its AO. To stop PLO/PLO-backed commando raids across the border into Israel. C. while no central authority existed in the south. Repatriation of occupied land. D. C. It lacked financial support from Member States. A number of attempts to establish a presence of the newly reformed LNA in the enclave. D. The northern region through proxy by Syria. To establish a DMZ based on the current positions of Israeli and Lebanese forces. C. Why did Israel launch Operation Litani? A. To restore the positions held by the PLO. UNIFIL did not support diplomatic efforts. Its overall mandate was open to interpretation by all sides to the conflict. The Christian militias. B. After the de facto end of the Lebanese civil war in 1976. What efforts were diplomatically supported by UNIFIL? A. B. To confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces. C. B. 5. D. D. B. . D. To conquer Lebanon. C. B. The government forces of Lebanon. What was one of the key problems that came into play in the early days of UNIFIL? A. To fulfil a promise the Israeli government had made to its Christian Lebanese allies. To assist the Lebanese government in demining. It lacked the personnel to fulfil its mandate. who was left in control of Lebanon? A. It was a reconnaissance mission only. Syria in the south and the PLO in the north.
D. It eliminated the previous problems of coordinating individual units from different contingents. In 2005. It was a show of strength. D. 5C. 8. D. What was the result of the removal of the PLO from Lebanon? A. C. The mission was terminated. It had ceased to exist. 7D. 7. 4A. C. B. The mission’s strength was reduced. The border around the Israeli Security Zone. 8A. 9C. in the wake of the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. 10. and all outside influences were removed. 2B. B. B. what had happened to UNIFIL’s AO? A. The mission’s mandate was extended to 2006. A more dangerous organisation called Hizbollah replaced the PLO. The Israeli-Lebanese border. By 8 June 1982. 10B . The line that separates UNIFIL’s AO with that of UNDOF. What is the so-called Blue Line in Lebanon? A. C.Lesson 10 / UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 167 6. C. The Syrians had control of it. It had fallen under IDF control. The Christian militias became the most powerful group in Lebanon. It allowed for a peaceful settlement with Israel. 9. B. D. The SC decided to withdraw UNIFIL and hand over its AO to Lebanon. 6D. It made the new Force Commander look like he was doing something new. ANSWER KEY: 1C. The Lebanese state stabilised. Why was the Force Mobile Reserve (FMR) created? A. It gave the Norwegian armour unit something to do. C. The line of withdrawal. The mission was reconfigured into a more robust peace enforcement mission. 3D. B. what happened to UNIFIL? A. D.
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1 Summary 11.3 General Criticisms of Peacekeeping 11.LESSON 11 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 11.2 Evaluating the Performance of UN Peacekeeping During the Cold War 11.4 Conclusion .
Identify the general criticisms of UN peacekeeping missions. on the evolution of peacekeeping in the United Nations. The evaluation is given both with a critical eye and with a kind eye. Describe the strengths and weaknesses of UN peacekeeping operations. • • • • . Know what types of peacekeeping operations exist. as well as the end of the Cold War. Finally. It also puts into perspective for the student what peacekeeping operations are capable of accomplishing.Lesson 11 / Summary and Conclusions 170 LESSON OBJECTIVES Lesson 11 summarises for the student how peacekeeping operations have evolved and their status by the end of the Cold War period. with a view to pointing out to the student both what has been accomplished by UN peace forces and what yet remains to be done. which encompassed the Cold War years. By the end of Lesson 11. the lesson evaluates the accomplishments of United Nations peacekeeping missions during its first 40 years of existence. the student should be able to meet the following objectives: • • • List the basic principles of UN peacekeeping missions. and Understand the effect of the Cold War. and what their limitations are. Define the balance of nuclear terror. State the overall budget of the UN organisation as compared to that of UN peacekeeping missions.
UN peacekeepers must act with impartiality and restraint at all times. It evolved at the start of the Cold War because the UN’s original collective security proposals became unworkable as a result of the increasing mistrust and disagreement between the two superpowers. The Basic Weaknesses of Peacekeeping Operations At the time of their creation. United Nations military observers are normally unarmed. one of America’s great journalists.1 Summary As observed in Lesson 1. Generally. This is a most appealing concept. (b) Second. Peacekeeping missions are based on consent and can be set up only with the consent of the main parties concerned. Lacking enforcement powers. UN peacekeeping operations must be authorised by the Security Council and. Walter Lippman. Types of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Peacekeeping operations. as they have evolved. The Basic Principles of Peacekeeping Operations In either form. when the soldiers of UN peacekeeping forces are provided with light defensive weapons. and. (b) The larger peacekeeping force. may be summarised as follows. by the General Assembly. UN peacekeeping operations may take two forms: (a) Military observer missions. not to fight enemies but to help friends. the Secretary-General always directs their day-to-day activities. which voluntarily supply the required military personnel. or. and sublime concept. Depending on the tasks involved. they are not authorised to use them except in selfdefence. even when a peacekeeping operation has been set up. said that UN peacekeeping operations were based on a new. UN peacekeeping operations have certain basic weaknesses. but in application it exhibits some problems. This principle of consent also applies to the troop-contributing countries. In either case. the United States and the Soviet Union. they cannot be set up without the consent of the parties concerned and the acquiescence of the major powers. sent to an area of conflict not to wage war but to promote peace. the concept of the soldier of peace. the concept of peacekeeping was not mentioned in the original UN Charter. They seek to carry out their mission by negotiation and persuasion rather than through coercion. bold. (a) First.Lesson 11 / Summary and Conclusions 171 11. the required co-operation is available because UN peacekeeping operations deal with international conflicts involving governments . the principles followed are the same. it can function effectively only with the co-operation of all the parties. in some exceptional cases. The two other major principles of peacekeeping are impartiality and the non-use of force.
by 1989 the expenses for UN peacekeeping operations approached that of the UN’s regular budget (in the ensuing years. During the Cold War years. they took action to avoid it. a direct military confrontation between them would have incalculable consequences. Through resolution 242. Or. the peacekeeping budget would actually exceed the regular budget). 11. a number of UN peacekeeping operations were set up during the Cold War with the support of the two superpowers (or at least their acquiescence) in order to contain potentially dangerous conflicts. unfortunately. they should be viewed in the larger context of their impact on the maintenance of international peace and security. Consequently. Despite many difficulties and obstacles. produced a sort of negative stability during the Cold War.” Both superpowers knew that with the awesome nuclear weapons they possessed in equivalent quality and quantity. their rivalry was tempered by what came to be known as the “balance of the nuclear terror. Thus. the performance and impact of UN peacekeeping operations should not be measured in funds expended. UN/DPI/Y. However.Lesson 11 / Summary and Conclusions 172 willing to consent to such an operation. often by using the UN peacekeeping mechanism. Yet each time. There . nor assessed through the enumeration of specific activities. Their rivalry often prevented affirms the establishment of peace in the Middle 22 November 1967. supplemented by the UN peacekeeping mechanism. peacekeeping operations showed great resilience and a remarkable ability to overcome temporary setbacks and to adapt to changing political circumstances. a peace process may be hopelessly deadlocked. the performance of UN peacekeeping operations often depended on the attitudes of the two superpowers. It may be said that the attempt to maintain the balance of the nuclear terror. However. New York. Indeed. when a regional conflict escalated beyond control and threatened to drag them into a direct confrontation. exceptions. Peacekeeping operations were plagued by several major crises. however. at which point some of the parties involved may be unable or unwilling to give the UN the co-operation it needs. As a more serious repercussion. they became one of the most valuable peace instruments of the United Nations. which. There are.2 Evaluating the Performance of UN Peacekeeping During the Cold War The development of UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War had many ups and downs. many regional conflicts were actively fuelled or even fomented by one or the other of the superpowers. Nagata) (Source: 101873 resolve conflicts. the Security Council were not always positive. the Security Council from taking firm action to contain or East. A complex conflict may involve not only governments but also internal factions and liberation movements. Rather.
Lesson 11 / Summary and Conclusions
were many regional conflicts and many local wars. However, all wars remained localised and a general war was avoided, which would inevitably have entailed a direct confrontation between the two superpowers (and possibly a nuclear holocaust and the end of the civilised world). UN peacekeeping operations were not the main factor of this negative stability but nevertheless played a crucial role.
General Criticisms of Peacekeeping
There have been claims of hypocrisy on the part of some states in regards to UN peacekeeping. Countries like the U.S. had been reticent to commit their armed forces to UN peacekeeping operations due to an unwillingness to have their national forces under “foreign” command, while other states have been accused of using peacekeeping for their own goals. Some have been accused of trying to increase their international power or prestige. For instance, Canada, in part to differentiate itself from its American neighbour, has created a national mythology of its importance in peacekeeping, when in fact the empirical data proves otherwise. It has been argued that Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden, who are all major arms suppliers, have participated in peacekeeping operations while at the same time selling weapons in the same regions. Some states, the U.S. having been the main voice, complained that for them to participate in UN operations their soldiers had to have immunity from the International Criminal Court. Other critics have claimed that peacekeeping is a form of neo-colonialism by using the UN Charter as a means to justify intervention throughout the globe. On the other hand, many military establishments felt that peacekeeping during the Cold War had a detrimental effect on their units’ war-fighting capabilities. In turn, it has been found that peacekeeping can be extremely stressful, and many militaries have observed higher rates of mental problems, suicide, and substance abuse among peacekeepers. Many military doctrines of the time saw peacekeeping and war fighting as two distinct activities. Moreover, some have argued that due to the diverse cultures and religions of UN peacekeeping forces, inherent cultural biases and incompatibilities existed. Contingent capabilities and equipment also varied in addition to the fact that Naval and Air Force units had to adapt to mainly ground-based missions. There is the obvious argument that Cold War peacekeeping did not, in fact, resolve conflicts but instead created an unstable status quo. As of 2005, UNTSO has continued since May 1948, UNMOGIP since January 1949, UNFICYP since March 1964, UNDOF since June 1974, and UNIFIL since March 1978. It should be kept in mind that these missions were never designed to create a permanent solution, but rather the stabilisation of a volatile Cold War situation.
Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim visits Norwegian peacekeepers with UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, 18 April 1978. (Source: 137818 c UN/DPI Photo/J. Isaac)
Lesson 11 / Summary and Conclusions
For the most part, Cold War peacekeeping was interpositional in nature. It was designed to reduce or even stop hostilities by separating the combatants and monitoring and maintaining ceasefires. The process in the early stages was an ad hoc approach and clearly was designed to stop Cold War superpower rivalries from going hot. Peacekeeping during the Cold War was not designed to use internationally-sanctioned force, nor was it created to settle disputes or induce observation of international norms or rebuild shattered societies. In fact, Member States of the UN rarely agreed on such ideals or objectives, and in many cases the major Member States, especially the permanent five of the Security Council, were unable or unwilling to commit troops. Thus, the UN became reliant on small, neutral, or poor non-aligned nations for troop contributions, which resulted, for the most part, in the UN being unable to deploy adequately equipped, trained, and integrated forces during this period. However, even with these problems, the UN was able to surmount many of them and developed peacekeeping as an alternative to war. In short, peacekeeping during the Cold War era was not a perfect instrument, but it did prove its utility in maintaining peace for some 40 years. This fact was recognised by the Nobel Committee in 1988 when it awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to UN peacekeepers.
Peacekeeping Fatalities by Year, 1948-1989*
Year 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
Total 8 3 5 0 0 1 0 0 2 16 17 10 43 156 46 35 22 18 20 22 7
Running Total 8 11 16 16 16 17 17 17 19 35 52 62 105 261 307 342 364 382 402 424 431
Year 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Total 6 8 9 6 14 41 17 14 17 28 30 20 30 26 11 14 16 27 17 11 33
Running Total 437 445 454 460 474 515 532 546 563 591 621 641 671 697 708 722 738 765 782 793 826
* does not include Korean War
Lesson 11 / Summary and Conclusions
LESSON 11 END-OF-LESSON QUIZ
Which of the following is a form of a PKO in the context of the Cold War? A. Armed interventions; B. Military Observer Missions; C. Aid operations only; D. Chapter V Operations.
Which one of the following is one of the major principles of peacekeeping? A. War fighting when required; B. Non-neutrality; C. Non-consent; D. Impartiality
Because PKOs lack enforcement powers, UN peacekeeping operations have certain basic weaknesses, such as: A. They cannot be set up without the consent of the parties concerned; B. They lack robust military capabilities; C. They can be manipulated by the whims of the SC; D. They can be forced to act when provoked.
Although peacekeeping operations were plagued by several major crises, each time they showed: A. An inability to adapt to changing circumstances; B. A tendency to suffer from mission creep, as mandates kept being changed; C. A great resilience and a remarkable ability to overcome temporary setbacks and to adapt themselves to changing political circumstances; D. An ability to become far less expensive than anticipated.
By 1989, the expenses for UN peacekeeping operations approached what? A. The expenses of the Security Council; B. The expenses of the UN’s regular budget; C. The expenses of the General Assembly; D. The expenses of all UN aid agencies combined.
Lesson 11 / Summary and Conclusions
During the Cold War years, the performance of UN peacekeeping operations often depended on: A. The attitudes of the two superpowers; B. The attitudes of the Permanent Members of the Security Council; C. The attitude of the Secretary-General; D. The attitudes of the Member States that contributed forces to a mission.
It may be said that the attempt to maintain the balance of the nuclear terror, supplemented by the UN peacekeeping mechanism, produced what? A. Global peace and security during the Cold War; B. Major conflicts between the superpowers; C. A sort of negative stability during the Cold War; D. Massive social unrest that led to constant war.
With the U.S. acting as the main voice, what did some states complain about in regards to participating in UN operations? A. Their soldiers had to have immunity from the International Criminal Court. B. Their soldiers were not obligated to do anything their contingent commander felt was not appropriate. C. They felt since they were paying UN assessments, why did they need to send their troops. D. They were a waste of time.
Which of the following Cold War peacekeeping missions was still ongoing as of 2006? A. UNEF I B. UNTEA C. ONUC D. UNFICYP
10. For the most part, Cold War peacekeeping was: A. Neutral at all times; B. Confrontational; C. Interpositional in nature; D. One-sided and confrontational.
ANSWER KEY: 1B, 2D, 3A, 4C, 5B, 6A, 7C, 8A, 9D, 10C
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Appendix A / List of Acronyms 178 APPENDIX A: LIST OF ACRONYMS Acronym ABAKO ADL ANC AO AOR APC CBM CIVPOL COS DCC DMZ FC FMR GA HQ IAPF ICC ICJ ICRC IDF ILMAC IMSMA LNA LOC MAC MACC MFO MFR MIB MNC MNF NATO NCO NGO OAS ODD Meaning Association des Bakongo Armistice Demarcation Line Armée Nationale Congolaise Area of Operation Area of Responsibility Armoured Personnel Carrier Confidence-Building Measure Civilian Police Chief of Staff Demining Coordination Cell Demilitarised Zone Force Commander Force Mobile Reserve General Assembly Headquarters Inter-American Peace Force International Criminal Court International Court of Justice International Committee of the Red Cross Israeli Defence Forces Israeli-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission Information Management System for Mine Action Lebanese National Army Line of Control Mixed Armistice Commission Mine Action Coordination Centre Multinational Force and Observers Mobile Force Reserve Military Information Branch Mouvement National Congolais Multinational Force North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Non-Commissioned Officer Non-Governmental Organisation Organisation of American States Observer Group Damascus .
Appendix A / List of Acronyms 179 Acronym OGB OGE OGG OGL OGSC OP PFLP-GC PFR PKO PLO POW SBA SC SG SLA SOFA SRSG TCC UMHK UNCI UNCIP UNDP UNDPKO UNGOC UNHCR UNHQ UNICEF UNLOB UNLOCA UNMO UNSCOP UXO Meaning Observer Group Beirut Observer Group Egypt Observer Group Golan Observer Group Lebanon Observer Group Sinai-Cairo Observation Post Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command Permanent Force Reserve Peacekeeping Operation Palestinian Liberation Organisation Prisoner of War Sovereign Base Area Security Council Secretary-General South Lebanon Army Status of Force Agreement Special Representative of the Secretary-General Troop-Contributing Country Union Minière du Haut Katanga UN Commission for Indonesia UN Commission for India and Pakistan UN Development Programme UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations UN Good Offices Commission UN High Commissioner for Refugees UN Headquarters UN Children’s Fund UN Liaison Office in Beirut UN Liasion Office in Cairo UN Military Observer UN Special Committee on Palestine Unexploded Ordinance .
Appendix B / List of Peacekeeping Operations 180 APPENDIX B: LIST OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS DOMREP MINUGUA MINURCA MINURSO* MINUSTAH* MIPONUH MONUA MONUC* ONUB* ONUC ONUCA ONUMOZ ONUSAL UNAMA* UNAMIC UNAMIR UNAMSIL UNASOG UNAVEM UNCRO UNDOF* UNEF UNFICYP* UNGOMAP UNIFIL* UNIIMOG UNIKOM UNIOSIL* UNIPOM UNMEE* UNMIBH UNMIH UNMIK* UNMIL* UNMIS* UNMISET UNMOGIP* UNMOP UNMOT UNOCI* Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti United Nations Observer Mission in Angola United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo United Nations Operation in Burundi United Nations Operation in the Congo United Nations Observer Group in Central America United Nations Operation in Mozambique United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador United Nations Mission in Afghanistan United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group United Nations Angola Verification Mission United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation United Nations Disengagement Observer Force United Nations Emergency Force United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina United Nations Mission in Haiti United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo United Nations Mission in Liberia United Nations Mission in the Sudan United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire .
asp. as of June 2006. For more information on these operations.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index. Baranja and Western Sirmium United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor United Nations Transition Assistance Group United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation United Nations Yemen Observation Mission * Ongoing operations. visit UNDPKO’s website at http://www. .Appendix B / List of Peacekeeping Operations 181 UNOGIL UNOMIG* UNOMIL UNOMSIL UNOMUR UNOSOM UNOTIL* UNPREDEP UNPROFOR UNPSG UNSF UNSMIH UNTAC UNTAES UNTAET UNTAG UNTMIH UNTSO* UNYOM United Nations Observation Group In Lebanon United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda United Nations Operation in Somalia United Nations Office in Timor-Leste United Nations Preventive Deployment Force United Nations Protection Force United Nations Civilian Police Support Group United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian) United Nations Support Mission in Haiti United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia.
Norway. Estonia. Sweden. Canada. Slovenia. Belgium. Jerusalem CHIEF OF STAFF: Brigadier General Clive Lilley (New Zealand) STRENGTH: 154 UNMOs. Netherlands. Information current as of 30 April 2006 . including the supervision of the General Armistice Agreements of 1949 and the observation of the ceasefire in the Suez Canal area and the Golan Heights following the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967. the colours of the UN.Appendix C / Mission Data 182 APPENDIX C: MISSION DATA Note: This appendix provides mission data for the operations discussed in this course. Switzerland and United States FATALITIES: 18 military personnel 14 military observers 8 international staff 4 local civilian staff 44 total FINANCING: Method of financing: United Nations regular budget Appropriations for 2006: $14. Nepal. Austria. supported by 99 international civilian personnel and 120 local civilian staff CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: Argentina. UNTSO assists and co-operates with UNDOF on the Golan Heights in the Israel-Syria sector. United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) MANDATE: UNTSO was established in May 1948 to assist the United Nations Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the observance of the truce in Palestine. and the maps and other images can be found through the UN website. Italy. Australia. France.66 million UNTSO MEDAL/RIBBON: The ribbon has a UN blue background with two narrow white stripes. The information was compiled from UNDPKO’s website. Russian Federation. Ireland. UNTSO has performed various tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council. New Zealand. At present. Chile. Denmark. UNTSO is also present in the Egypt-Israel sector in the Sinai. LOCATION: DURATION: Middle East May 1948 to present HEADQUARTERS: Government House. Since then. and UNIFIL in the Israel-Lebanon sector. Finland. Six months service is the eligibility period for service with UNTSO. Slovak Republic. China.
Appendix C / Mission Data 183 UNTSO Deployment as of July 1997 .
Colombia. Canada. the blue representing the Suez Canal.June 1967 Nov. Norway.Appendix C / Mission Data 184 First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) MANDATE: UNEF I. and the green. along the Armistice Demarcation Line in the Gaza area and the international frontier in the Sinai peninsula (on the Egyptian side) November 1956 . the Nile Valley. The mandate of the Force was to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities. the Suez Canal sector and the Sinai peninsula. 1965 Jan. 1957: 6. 1966 – June 1967 HEADQUARTERS: Gaza DURATION: FORCE COMMANDERS: Lieutenant-General E. Paiva Chaves (Brazil) Colonel Lazar Musicki (Yugoslavia) (Acting) Major-General Syseno Sarmento (Brazil) Major-General Indar J. Later. to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces and to provide impartial supervision of the ceasefire. Gyani (India) Major-General Carlos F.378 military personnel. Sweden and Yugoslavia FATALITIES: 109 military personnel 1 local staff 110 total FINANCING: Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account Expenditures: $214. 1956 – Dec. was established by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly which was held from 1 to 10 November 1956. at Egypt’s request. Two thin lines in dark blue and green appear at either end of the ribbon. supported by international and local civilian staff At withdrawal. UNEF was withdrawn in May-June 1967. Burns (Canada) Lieutenant-General P. Ninety days of service in the Mission was necessary to qualify for award of the medal. 1964 – Jan.2 million* [*The financial cost was considerably reduced by the absorption by the countries providing contingents of varying amounts of the expenses involved] UNEF MEDAL/RIBBON: The ribbon has a background of a sand or buff colour symbolising the Sinai with a wide centre band of UN blue. 1964 Jan. June 1967: 3.M.L. Feb. India. including the withdrawal of the armed forces of France. Denmark. S. after the withdrawal. 1959 Dec. Indonesia. Israel and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory and. . Rikhye (India) STRENGTH: Maximum.073 military personnel. Finland. LOCATION: First. 1964 Aug. 1964 – Aug. 1959 – Jan. 1965 – Jan. 1966 Jan. the first Untied Nations peacekeeping force. supported by international and local civilian staff CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: Brazil.
Appendix C / Mission Data 185 UNEF I Deployments as of August 1957 .
preventing the occurrence of civil war and securing the removal from the Congo of all foreign military. Liberia. Tunisia. Bunche (United States) Andrew W. Ghana. Nigeria. United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia. supported by international civilian and locally recruited staff CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: Argentina.828 all ranks. Malaya. Iran. von Horn (Sweden) Lieutenant-General Sean MacEoin (Ireland) Lieutenant-General Kebbede Guebre (Ethiopia) Major-General Christian Kaldager (Norway) Major-General Aguiyu Ironsi (Nigeria) STRENGTH: Maximum. and all mercenaries. Norway.Appendix C / Mission Data 186 United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) MANDATE: ONUC was established by Security Council resolution 143 (1960) of 14 July 1960. Ireland. India. Indonesia. Gardiner (Ghana) Max H. Cordier (United States) Rajeshwar Dayal (India) Mekki Abbas (Sudan) (Acting) OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE: Sture Linner (Sweden) Robert K. July 1961: 19. to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Republic of the Congo. Ceylon. a battalion of the Congolese National Army was incorporated in ONUC] FATALITIES: 245 military personnel 5 international civilian staff 250 total FINANCING: Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account. Sierra Leone. Sweden. Federation of Mali. Guinea. paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command. Dorsinville (Haiti) Bibiano F. Ethiopia. [From February 1963 to the end of the operation. Italy. Morocco. Expenditures: $400. Netherlands. Osorio-Tafall (Mexico) FORCE COMMANDERS: Lieutenant-General Carl C.871 all ranks. The function of ONUC was subsequently modified by 1961 to include maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo. and to assist the Government in maintaining law and order. supported by international civilian and locally recruited staff At withdrawal. Pakistan.A.1 million . to provide the Government of Congo with military and technical assistance. LOCATION: DURATION: Republic of the Congo July 1960 to June 1964 July-Aug 1960 Aug-Sept 1960 Sept 1960-May 1961 Mar-May 1961 May 1961-Jan 1962 Feb 1962-May 1963 May 1963-Apr 1964 Apr-Jun 1964 July-Dec 1960 Jan 1961-Mar 1962 Apr 1962-July 1963 Aug-Dec 1963 Jan-June 1964 HEADQUARTERS: Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) SRSGs: Ralph J. Denmark. Canada. 30 December 1963: 5. Burma. Philippines. Sudan. Austria. Brazil.
In 1963 it was decided that a distinctive ribbon should be issued (bottom). the medal awarded for service in the Congo was a UN blue and white ribbon with a bar indicating Congo service (top). flank the centre band and at either end are two bars of UN blue. To qualify for the medal three months of service in the Mission were required.Appendix C / Mission Data 187 ONUC MEDALS/RIBBONS: Originally. which was thought to be appropriate for a young nation. Two narrow white bands. representing the UN Mission. symbolic of hope. and also to represent the Congo Basin. ONUC Deployments as of June 1961 . The ribbon subsequently awarded carries a broad centre band of green.
The agreement also stipulated that the Secretary-General would provide a United Nations Security Force (UNSF) to assist UNTEA with as many troops as the United Nations Administrator deemed necessary. and a group of 21 military observers assisted in the implementation of the agreement of 15 August 1962 between Indonesia and the Netherlands on cessation of hostilities. The military observers were provided by Brazil. The dark green represents the jungle and the swampland.500 infantry personnel and 76 aircraft personnel. white and light green. provided for the administration of West New Guinea (West Irian) to be transferred by the Netherlands to a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). Ireland. the Secretary-General’s Military Adviser. to be headed by a United Nations Administrator. it was established that United Nations personnel would observe the implementation of the ceasefire that was to become effective before UNTEA assumed authority LOCATION: DURATION: West New Guinea (West Irian) October 1962 . supported by international and local civilian staff CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: Pakistan. India.April 1963 HEADQUARTERS: Hollandia (now Jayaphra) FORCE COMMANDER: Major-General Said Uddin Khan (Pakistan) STRENGTH (maximum and at withdrawal): 1. Nigeria and Sweden] FATALITIES: None FINANCING: The Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands paid full costs of the operation in equal amounts UNTEA/UNSF MEDAL/RIBBON: The medal ribbon has a background of UN blue with three centred narrow stripes in the colours dark green. white indicates the snow-capped mountains and pale green represents the coral beaches of the region.Appendix C / Mission Data 188 Untied Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) MANDATE: The agreement signed Indonesia and the Netherlands on 15 August 1962. Canada (RCAF) and United States (USAF) [From 18 August to 21 September 1962. In “related understandings” to the main agreement. prior to the establishment of UNSF. Ceylon. .
supported by international and local civilian staff At withdrawal: 25 military observers and supporting air unit. Canada. Italy. India. certifying and reporting in connection with the intention of Saudi Arabia to end activities in support of the royalists in Yemen and the intention of Egypt to withdraw its troops from that country. Sabharwal (India) November 1963 November 1963 – September 1964 STRENGTH: Maximum: 189 military personnel. Spinelli (Italy) COMMANDERS: Lieutenant-General Carl C. Denmark. Norway.September 1964 HEADQUARTERS: Sana’a SRSG / HEAD OF MISSION: Pier P.Appendix C / Mission Data 189 United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) MANDATE: UNYOM was established on 11 June 1963 by Security Council resolution 179 (1963). Saudi Arabia. Netherlands. Its establishment was not based on any ceasefire agreement and there was no ceasefire to supervise. von Horn (Sweden) July – August 1963 Colonel Branko Pavlovic (Yugoslavia) (Acting) August . The function and authority of UNYOM as defined in the agreement were considerably more limited than in the case of other United Nations observation missions.S. Sixty days of service were required to qualify for the award of the medal. the United Arab Republic and the Arab Republic of Yemen. Gyani (India) September . The centre is flanked by two stripes of UN blue.September 1963 Lieutenant-General P.September 1964 November 1963 . .C.8 million UNYOM MEDAL/RIBBON: The centre of the ribbon is a wide bar filled with varying shades of brown indicating the dry and rugged mountainous mass in Yemen. The mandate of UNYOM stemmed from the disengagement agreement entered into by the three Governments concerned. Pakistan. set out in the report of the Secretary-General of 29 April 1963. 114 officers and other ranks of reconnaissance unit. 50 officers and other ranks of air unit. supported by international and local civilian staff CONTRIBUTIONS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: Australia. LOCATION: DURATION: Yemen July 1963 . The mandate of UNYOM ended on 4 September 1964 and its personnel and equipment were withdrawn. to observe and certify the implementation of the disengagement agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic. The tasks of UNYOM were limited strictly to observing.November 1963 CHIEFS OF STAFF: Colonel Branko Pavlovic (Yugoslavia) Colonel S. while the lighter shades represent the desert. Sweden and Yugoslavia FATALITIES: None FINANCING: Method of financing: Contributions from Saudi Arabia and Egypt in equal parts Expenditures: $1. including 25 military observers. Ghana. namely.
Appendix C / Mission Data 190 UNYOM Mission Map .
LOCATION: HEADQUARTERS: DURATION: Dominican Republic Santo Domingo May 1965 . which might effect the maintenance of peace and order in the country. Canada and Ecuador FATALITIES: None FINANCING: Method of financing: Appropriations through the United Nations regular budget Expenditures: $275. on breaches of the ceasefire called by the Council or any events.October 1966 REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: José Antonio Mayobre (Venezuela) MILITARY ADVISER: Major-General Indar J. Its functions were to observe the situation in the Dominican Republic and to report to the Secretary-General.Appendix C / Mission Data 191 Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) MANDATE: DOMREP was established in accordance with Security Council resolution 203 (1965) of 14 May 1965. and through him to the Security Council. Rikhye (India) STRENGTH: 2 military observers at any one time CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY OBSERVERS: Brazil.831 .
It was not UNOGIL’s task to mediate. Finland. Portugal and Thailand FATALITIES: None FINANCING: Method of financing: Appropriations through the United Nations regular budget Expenditures: $3. Denmark. Canada. Norway.December 1958 HEADQUARTERS: Beirut MEMBERS OF OBSERVATION GROUP: Galo Plaza Lasso (Ecuador) Chairman Rajeshwar Dayal (India) Member Major-General Odd Bull (Norway) Executive member in charge of UNMOs STRENGTH: Maximum. November 1958: 591 military personnel.Appendix C / Mission Data 192 United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) MANDATE: UNOGIL was set up by Security Council resolution 128 (1958) of 11 June 1958. LOCATION: DURATION: Lebanese-Syrian border areas and vicinity of zones held by opposing forces June . Peru. Italy. Nepal. New Zealand. Ecuador.” The role of UNOGIL was strictly limited to observation. Ireland. although it was hoped that its very presence on the borders would deter any such traffic. . supported by international and local civilian staff CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: Afghanistan. Netherlands. Argentina. Chile.7 million UNOGIL MEDAL/RIBBON: This is the same medal/ribbon used by UNTSO. Indonesia. arbitrate or forcefully to prohibit illegal infiltration. India. Burma. Ceylon. supported by international and local civilian staff At withdrawal: 375 military personnel. which decided to “dispatch urgently an observation group to proceed to Lebanon so as to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders.
Appendix C / Mission Data 193 UNOGIL Mission Map .
Sweden. the Secretary-General’s position has been that UNMOGIP can be terminated only by a decision of the Security Council. LOCATION: DURTION: The ceasefire line between India and Pakistan in the State of Jammu and Kashmir January 1949 to present HEADQUARTERS: Rawalpindi (November-April) / Srinagar (May-October) CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER: Major-General Dragutin Repinc (Croatia) STRENGTH: 43 military observers. Two equal bars of UN blue appear at either end of the ribbon. and Uruguay FATALITIES: 5 military personnel 1 military observers 2 international civilian staff 3 local staff 11 total FINANCING: Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account Six-month appropriation for 2006: $3. Eligibility for the award of the medal is earned following six months of service in the Mission. supported by 22 international civilian personnel and 45 local civilian staff CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: Chile. did not accept this position. flanked by narrow white stripes representing the snow-capped mountains. Given that disagreement. Denmark. Republic of Korea. in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Information current as of 30 April 2006 . Finland. the ceasefire between India and Pakistan. In the absence of such a decision. UNMOGIP has been maintained with the same mandate and functions. Following the 1972 India-Pakistan agreement defining a Line of Control in Kashmir. Croatia.Appendix C / Mission Data 194 United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) MANDATE: The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was deployed in January 1949 to supervise. India took the position that the mandate of UNMOGIP had lapsed.87 million (gross) UNMOGIP MEDAL/RIBBON: The ribbon bears a wide central band in various shades of green to represent the Himalayan Range and the Kashmir Valley. however. Pakistan. Italy.
Appendix C / Mission Data 195 UNMOGIP Positions as of 2005 .
Norway and Sweden September 1965 . October 1965: 96 military observers. Finland.Appendix C / Mission Data 196 United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) MANDATE: UNIPOM was established in accordance with Security Council resolution 211 (1965) of 20 September 1965. supported by international and local civilian staff At withdrawal: 78 military observers. Macdonald (Canada) STRENGTH: Maximum deployment. LOCATION: DURATION: Along the India-Pakistan border between Kashmir and the Arabian Sea September 1965 . Netherlands. Chile. Denmark. where the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) operated. Ethiopia. Ceylon. Ireland. Ireland. and the withdrawal of all armed personnel to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965. Canada. New Zealand.March 1966: Brazil. Italy. supported by international and local civilian staff CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: In its initial stage (seconded from UNTSO and UNMOGIP): Australia.F. Netherlands. Burma.7 million . UNIPOM was terminated. After the withdrawal of the troops by India and Pakistan had been completed on schedule. to supervise the ceasefire along the India-Pakistan border except in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Canada. Belgium. Nepal. Nigeria and Venezuela FATALITIES: None FINANCING: Method of financing: Appropriations through the United Nations regular budget Expenditures: $1.March 1966 HEADQUARTERS: Lahore (Pakistan) / Amritsar (India) CHIEF OFFICER: Major-General B.
H. Canada. Eligibility period was 90 days of service in the Mission. supported by international and local civilian staff At withdrawal. Ireland. These terms of reference. which were approved by the Security Council on 27 October 1973 (resolution 341). Senegal and Sweden FATALITIES: 49 military personnel 2 international civilian staff 51 total FINANCING: Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account Expenditures: $446. Nepal. LOCATION: DURATION: Suez Canal sector and later the Sinai peninsula October 1973-July 1979 October 1973-August 1975 August 1975-November 1976 December 1976-September 1979 HEADQUARTERS: Cairo (October 1973-August 1974) & Ismailia (August 1974-July 1979) FORCE COMMANDERS: Lieutenant-General Ensio P. July 1979: 4. supported by international and local civilian staff CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: Australia. Finland. which demanded that an immediate and complete ceasefire between Egyptian and Israeli forces be observed and that the parties return to the positions they had occupied at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973. The Force would use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting. Austria. UNEF II was also to cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in its humanitarian endeavours in the area. but within this general framework the activities of the Force varied considerably over the years in the light of prevailing circumstances and of the agreements reached between the parties. . Poland. UNEF II was to supervise the redeployment of Egyptian and Israeli forces and to man and control the buffer zones established under those agreements. Following the conclusion of the agreements of 18 January 1974 and 4 September 1975. Siilasvuo (Finland) Lieutenant-General Bengt Liljestrand (Sweden) Major-General Rais Abin (Indonesia) STRENGTH: Maximum. and in the fulfilment of its tasks it would have the cooperation of the military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO). Indonesia. Peru.5 million UNEF II MEDAL/RIBBON: The ribbon bears a wide central band of a sand or buff colour symbolising the Sinai Desert with two narrow dark blue lines through the middle. Two wide bars of UN blue appear at either end. Ghana.973 military personnel.031 military personnel. February 1974: 6. representing the Suez Canal. Panama.Appendix C / Mission Data 197 Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) MANDATE: UNEF II was established on 25 October 1973 with the mandate to supervise the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973). remained unchanged during UNEF’s entire mandate.
Appendix C / Mission Data 198 UNEF II Mission Map .
Poland. and supported by 33 international civilian personnel and 107 local civilian staff CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: Austria.71 million (gross) UNDOF MEDAL/RIBBON: The ribbon contains a central stripe of UN blue with a red line down the middle representing the UN patrolled Area of Separation. as on previous occasions. Nepal.Appendix C / Mission Data 199 United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) MANDATE: UNDOF was established by Security Council resolution 350 (1974) of 31 May 1974 to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and Syria. symbolising the purple haze at sunset and the native thistles of the Golan. Canada. in accordance with Security Council resolution 1685 (2006) of 13 June 2006. Information current as of 30 April 2006 . outside these. unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem was reached. Japan. two narrow stripes of black. In the prevailing circumstances. to supervise the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces. In recommending the extension of the mandate. that. The current mandate expires on 31 December 2006. Hermon. as provided in the Agreement on Disengagement. representing the volcanic rock of the Golan region appear on either side with two narrow bands of white. the situation in the Middle East was very tense and was likely to remain so. At either end are wide bands of burgundy. India. despite the present quiet in the Israeli-Syrian sector. LOCATION: DURATION: Syrian Golan Heights May 1974 to present HEADQUARTERS: Camp Faouar FORCE COMMANDER: Lieutenant-General Bala Nanda Sharma (Nepal) STRENGTH: 1. the Secretary-General observed.30 June 2006: $43. and to supervise the areas of separation and limitation. assisted by some 57 military observers of UNTSO’s Observer Group Golan. symbolic of the snow on Mt. Ninety days service is the qualifying time for award of the medal. he considered the continued presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential.033 troops. Slovak Republic FATALITIES: 41 military personnel 1 international civilian staff 42 total FINANCING: Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account Approved budget: 1 July 2005 . The mandate of UNDOF has since been renewed every six months.
Appendix C / Mission Data 200 UNDOF Mission Map .
Chile. India. Qualifying time for the medal is three months of service in the Mission.30 June 2006: $46. In the absence of a political settlement to the Cyprus problem. the Security Council adopted a number of resolutions expanding the mandate of UNFICYP to include supervising a de facto ceasefire. UNFICYP became operational on 27 March 1964. Canada. Paraguay. Croatia. Italy. UNFICYP continues its presence on the island.5 million from Greece UNFICYP MEDAL/RIBBON: The medal has three equal bars.Appendix C / Mission Data 201 United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) MANDATE: UNFICYP was established through Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964. and Uruguay] CONTRIBUTORS OF CIVILIAN POLICE PERSONNEL: Argentina. Slovakia. Peru. Bosnia and Herzegovina. The bars are separated by two narrow bands of dark blue symbolising the Mediterranean Sea. supported by 33 international civilian personnel and 108 local civilian staff CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: Argentina*. Information current as of 30 April 2006 . Brazil. one of white in the centre and two of UN blue at either end. Croatia. and the United Kingdom [*The Argentinean contingent included soldiers from Bolivia. Hungary. and Netherlands FATALITIES: 167 military personnel 3 civilian police 4 international civilian staff 2 local civilian personnel 176 total FINANCING: Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account Approved budget: 1 July 2005 . Austria. which came into effect on 16 August 1974. including voluntary contributions of one-third share from Cyprus and $6. The Security Council most recently extended the mandate of the Force until 15 December 2006 by its resolution 1687 adopted on 15 June 2006. El Salvador. Australia.51 million (gross). with the mandate to prevent a recurrence of fighting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. Following the hostilities of 1974. and maintaining a buffer zone between the lines of the Cyprus National Guard and of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces. Ireland. LOCATION: DURATION: Cyprus March 1964 to present HEADQUARTERS: Nicosia SRSG / CHIEF OF MISSION: Michael Møller (Denmark) FORCE COMMANDER: Major General Rafael José Barni (Argentina) STRENGTH: 928 total uniformed personnel. including 859 troops and 69 civilian police.
Appendix C / Mission Data 202 UNFICYP Deployment as of May 2006 .
Ghana. France. green and UN blue. Ireland. each bisected by a narrow red line. assisted by some 50 military observers of UNTSO. The bands are separated by two equal sized white stripes.23 million (gross) UNIFIL MEDAL/RIBBON: The ribbon bears three equal bands of UN colour: blue. and supported by 95 international civilian personnel and 295 local civilian staff CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: China. restore international peace and security. and Poland FATALITIES: 249 troops 2 military observers 2 international civilian staff 4 local staff 257 total FINANCING: Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account Approved budget: July 2005 . and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.Appendix C / Mission Data 203 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) MANDATE: According to Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978.30 June 2006: $99. The qualifying period of service to earn the medal is 90 days of service in the Mission. India. UNIFIL was established to: confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon. The colours represent the UN and Lebanese flags. Information current as of 30 April 2006 . Most recently the mandate of UNIFIL was extended until 31 July 2006 by Security Council resolution 1655 (2006) of 31 January 2006. LOCATION: DURATION: Southern Lebanon March 1978 to present HEADQUARTERS: Naqoura FORCE COMMANDER / CHIEF OF MISSION: Major-General Alain Pellegrini (France) STRENGTH: 1. Italy.991 troops.
Appendix C / Mission Data 204 UNIFIL Deployment as of 2006 .
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Ram has also published and presented numerous articles and books over the years and has contributed occasional columns on military affairs for Canada’s national newspaper. he took part in many United Nations peacekeeping and political missions overseas. military affairs. Ram has also dedicated his time to a number of private.T. he assisted the Secretary-General in managing and supervising UN peacekeeping operations and related peacekeeping missions. Ram has won a number of awards over the years. the most important being The Royal Canadian Military Institute. non-NGO supported development projects in Africa that have directly helped local populations in numerous ways. the private defence journal of the Royal Canadian Military Institute. where he worked for 37 years until December 1986. in West Virginia. During most of this period.ABOUT THE AUTHORS PROFESSOR SUNIL V. Liu worked mainly at UN Headquarters. Liu was a graduate of the Institute of Political Science of Paris and the faculty of Sciences (mathematics) of the University of Paris. including the UN Global Citizen Award. which was presented to him in 1995 by the UN. Prof. he died in New York at the age of 81. HistoryDuring 090625 . F. particularly in the 1960s. for Special Political Affairs. He presently teaches Military History and Land Warfare to the U. Liu taught as a visiting professor at the University of Nice in France. In addition to his regular assignments at United Nations Headquarters. Mr. of which he acted as Senior Advisor. F. He is also the Contributing Editor of SITREP. and later Assistant Secretary-General. the UNAC. Canada. He has served in the Canadian Forces (CF) as both a soldier and officer between 1980 and 1999. and the Canadian Committee for the 50th Anniversary of the UN for the furthering of world peace through public awareness of peacekeeping. teaching. the Globe and Mail. He has over a decade worth of experience as a military advisor with the Saudi Royal Family.S. he was assigned to the Office of Special Political Affairs. Ram resides in Toronto. As Director. and association with the International Peace Academy. Prof. Armed Forces at American Military University. He is an active member of a number of prestigious Canadian think tanks and organisations. RAM Originally from the UK. Throughout the final years of his life. Liu Mr. where he played an important role in the organisation and development of United Nations peacekeeping operations. In 2001. including involvement in the 1991 Gulf War and the Yemeni conflict in the 1990s. T. and the Middle East. He joined the United Nations Secretariat at the beginning of 1949. F. Prof. Mr. where he sits on the Defence Studies Committee. From 1970 to 1986. Prof. Prof. Ram is also one of Canada’s acknowledged experts in the fields of peacekeeping.T. Liu remained active through his writing. These include work in the DRC and Somalia. Following his retirement from the United Nations.
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