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GOVERNMENT Elements of the State DE JURE AND GOVERNMENTS DE FACTO

2. Government of PARAMOUNT FORCE. 3. Government established by the native inhabitants who rise in INSURRECTION against the parent state. The second issue revolved around McArthur’s proclamation. It did not have the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of Philippine Courts under the PEC and the RP by virtue of the principle of POSTLIMINY in international law. Postliminium is a principle in international law which considers valid, except in a very few cases, the acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do so, notwithstanding the fact that the territory which has been occupied by him comes again in the power of its legitimate government or sovereignty. The last issue was the question of whether or not an enabling law was required. It isn’t. Conquest or colonization is impotent to amend laws. Laws remain unchanged until the new sovereign by a legislative act creates such change. In Re: Saturnino Bermudez (1986) A lawyer questions Article 18 of proposed 1986 Constitution regarding who the provision refers to when it says President and Vice President. The court dismisses it outright for lack of jurisdiction and a cause of action. Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent

Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh (1945) Co Kim Cham has a civil case in CFI Manila instituted under the Republic of the Philippines during the period of Japanese occupation. Judge Dizon alleges that the case shouldn’t be continued because: 1. The PEC and RP under Japanese military occupation were not de facto governments. 2. McArthur’s proclamation invalidated all judicial proceedings and judgments of Philippine Courts under the PEC and the RP. 3. Lower courts have no jurisdiction to continue pending judicial proceedings with the absence of an enabling law to grant such authority. A writ of mandamus was issued to the judge ordering him to take cognizance and render final judgment of the case. The first issue involved was whether or not the PEC and the RP were de facto governments. And the SC held that they were by expounding on the different kinds of de facto governments (which are listed below) and pointing out that all acts and proceedings of the PEC/RP (which was classified as a de facto government of the second form) are good and valid. 1. Government that USURPS by FORCE or BY THE VOICE OF THE MAJORITY the rightful legal government.

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President Corazon C. Aquino and VicePresident Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.

the state, appointment of key officers in the administration, departure of officials of the previous regime, and the revamp of the military and judiciary signaled the point where the legal system had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino people. Estrada v. Desierto (2001) Erap alleges that he is still the President, albeit on-leave, where as Arroyo merely claims to be President. He sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any criminal complaints against his office until after the term of his presidency was over and only if legally warranted. The first issue raised by the respondents is that the case is a political question and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the SC. To determine whether or not the question is political, the court looks to the most authoritative guideline in determining such issues: Justice Brennan’s words in the 1962 case of Baker v. Carr. The Philippines’ leading case is Tanada v. Cuenco, where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer: “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.” The court held that the Arroyo government was not a revolutionary government as compared to its Aquino counterpart. EDSA I involved extraconstitutional exercise of people power revolution (and is thus a political question and not subject to judicial review) whereas

In re: Letter Reynate Puno

of

Associate

Justice

This is an administrative matter in the SC. Puno was elevated in the seniority rankings of the CA from no. 12 to no. 5. This, however, caused Javellana and Campos to file a motion for reconsideration. Puno countered by saying that Aquino had pledged that “no right provided under the 1973 Constitution shall be absent from the Freedom Constitution” and thus by virtue of Section 2 E.O. 33, Puno can claim seniority. This was debunked by the SC on the ground that a revolution changes everything because it went in defiance of the then existing 1973 Constitution. The core issue at hand was precisely WON the existing legal order was overthrown by the revolutionary government. It was. The little resistance met by the new government, control of

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EDSA II provoked the resignation of the sitting president which resulted in the succession of the vice president (which is intra-constitutional and thus justiciable). EDSA I overthrew the whole government. EDSA II sought to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. CONSTITUENT FUNCTIONS ACCFA v. CUGCO ACCFA is being sued by CUGCO because of alleged violations of a collective bargaining agreement, discrimination against members, and refusal to bargain. The CIR favored the complainants but ACCFA petitioned to the SC questioning WON the CIR has jurisdiction over the case depending on WON ACCFA exercised governmental or proprietary functions. The court ruled that the implementation of the land reform program of the government according to Republic Act No. 3844 is most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function. The CIR has no jurisdiction but nevertheless the collective bargaining agreements must be enforced. The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions. These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"),4 such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and AND MINISTRANT

prosperity of the people — these letter functions being ministrant he exercise of which is optional on the part of the government. The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals,"5 continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice. PARENS PATRIAE Gov. of Phil. Islands v. Monte de Piedad (1916) Contributions were collected during the Spanish Regime for the relief of the victims of an earthquake. Part of the money was never distributed and was instead deposited with the defendant bank. In an action for its recovery later filed by the government, the defendant questioned the competence of the plaintiff (PI government), contending that the suit could be instituted only by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by the heirs of the victims. The issue of concern here is

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WON the PI has the right to file a case in behalf of its citizens. It does in its capacity as the guardian or parens patriae of the people.

SOVEREIGNTY Elements of the State Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh (1945) There was no change of sovereignty during the period of Japanese occupation. Possession of sovereignty remained with the Americans while the exercise of the acts of sovereignty belonged to the belligerent invaders. Macariola v. Asuncion (1992) In a civil case of the CFI Leyte, Judge Asuncion ruled a partition of lots of one deceased Francisco Reyes among Macariola (sole child of Francisco’s first wife) and the children from his second marriage. A year later, the judge bought one of the lots he settled from a certain Galapon. Macariola charges Asuncion with a complaint of committing “acts unbecoming a judge.” The main issues are twofold: the first is WON he violated Article 1491 (5) of the CC; and second is WON he violated Article 14 (1) & (5) of the Code of Commerce. The prohibition of the article in the first issue has already been decided in recent cases by reasoning of: ". . . for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property"1 Thus, no violation of said provision took place. As for the second regarding the violation of the Code of Commerce provision:
1

Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto). It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business; hence, political in essence. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of the Spanish Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly reenacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs that: "'By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following a conquest or otherwise, . . . those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty.'2 "While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the laws of the new sovereign continue in
2

The Director of Lands vs. Ababa, et al., [1979]; Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, [1978]

Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899

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force without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do not. 3 Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto, this Court stated that: "It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated." There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. Ruffy v. Chief of Staff (1946) Ruffy, a provincial commander of the Philippine Constabulary, instead of surrendering to the Japanese forces, disbanded his company, retreated to the mountains and led a guerilla unit. Lieut. Col. Jurado, recognized by the United States Armed Forces, was sent to replace Ruffy but was slain by the latter and his companions. The same people who killed the replacing officer claim that they were not subject to military law at the time when the offense was committed. But the rule suspending political laws only affects the civilian inhabitants of the occupied territory and is not intended to bind the enemies in arms. Thus, members of the armed forces continued to be covered by the National Defense Act, the Articles of War, and other laws relating to the armed forces even during the Japanese occupation. By the acceptance of the
3

petitioners’ appointments as officers in the Philippine Army they became amenable to the Articles of War. Peralta v. Director of Prisons (1945) Petitioner, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary, was prosecuted for the crime of robbery as defined by the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines. He was found guilty and sentenced to serve time by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created in sec. 1 of Ordinance no. 7 promulgated by the President of the Republic. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court’s existence was void ab initio because it was created as a political instrumentality under the command of the Japanese Imperial Army; that the provisions of said ordinance violate his constitutional rights; that the penalties provided for are much more severe than the RPC. SolGen is of the opinion that the petition should be granted because the Ordinance mentioned in creating said court is “tinged with political complexion”, that the procedure does not afford a fair trial and violates constitutional right of accused persons under a legitimate Constitution. The court is of the opinion that: As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7, the only factor to be considered is the authority of the legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance. It is well established in International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered state, — it is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. The authority thus derived can be asserted either through

Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14

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special tribunals, whose authority and procedure is defined in the military code of the conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and authorities of the occupied district." (Taylor, International Public Law, p. 598.) The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant, had therefore the power or was competent to create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not a court is of a political complexion, for it is mere governmental agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be of a political complexion or not depending upon the nature or character of the law so applied. There is no room for doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the court in question. The validity of the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which imposes life imprisonment upon the herein petitioner, depends upon the competence or power of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65 which punishes the crime of which said petitioner was convicted. It appears clear that it was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate, through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act No. 65 of the said Assembly, which penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses by imprisonment ranging from the maximum period of the imprisonment prescribed by the laws and ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic as minimum, to life imprisonment or death as maximum. Although these crimes are defined in the Revised Penal Code, they were altered and penalized by said Act No.

65 with different and heavier penalties, as new crimes and offenses demanded by military necessity, incident to a state of war, and necessary for the control of the country by the belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the army of occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of its operations. The last question is the legal effect of the reoccupation of the Philippines and restoration of the Commonwealth Government; that is, whether or not, by the principle of postliminy, the punitive sentence which petitioner is now serving fell through or ceased to be valid from that time. We have already held in our recent decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra, that all judgment of political complexion of the courts during the Japanese regime, ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium. Applying that doctrine to the present case, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur. Alcantara v. Director of Prisons Petitioner was convicted of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms. The CA modified the sentence from arresto mayor to prision correccional. Petitioner questions the validity of the CA on the sole ground that the court was a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation. In Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, the court ruled that the RP and the PEC were governments de facto and that judicial acts were good and valid and remained good and valid after the

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restoration of the Commonwealth Government. The CA that existing during Japanese occupation was the CA after the restoration. And even if the CA was a new court, its judgments would still remain good and valid provided that they do not have a political complexion. A punitive or penal sentence is said to be of a political complexion when it penalizes either a new act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate government, but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as new offenses committed against the belligerent occupant, incident to a state of war and necessary for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier. They are acts penalized for public rather than private reasons, acts which tend, directly or indirectly, to aid or favor the enemy and are directed against the welfare, safety and security of the belligerent occupant. As examples, the crimes against national security, such as treason, espionage, etc., and against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, etc., were crimes against the Commonwealth or United States Government under the Revised Penal Code, which were made crimes against the belligerent occupant.

Administration). Although the respondent relented, the amount released was far less than what the veteran was legally entitled to. He appealed. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be invoked by the PVA. Where litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public official being tried cannot be held liable by virtue of state immunity. However, where the suit against such a government official had to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute appropriating funds for the benefit of the plaintiff, then the doctrine of state immunity cannot be applied. Republic v. Feliciano (1987) Feliciano allegedly owns a parcel of land through his possession of informacion possesoria. But this same land, by virtue of Proclamation No. 90 of President Ramon Magsaysay, became reserved for settlement purposes. Feliciano seeks to prove that his ownership of the land as evidenced by his informacion is valid and makes a claim to recover said property. However, the court ruled that the state did not give its consent to be sued and thus immune from the complaint. Although the proclamation stated that it shall be “subject to private rights if any there be”, this cannot be construed as an express waiver of immunity. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris4.
4

STATE IMMUNITY CHARACTERIZATION OF SUIT Begosa v. Chairman, Phil. Vet. Assoc. (1970) A veteran, Begosa, suffering from permanent disability was being denied what has been granted him specifically by legislative enactment (which certainly is superior to any regulation that may be promulgated by the Philippine Veterans

STRICTISSIMI JURIS. The most strict right or law. In general, when a person receives an advantage, as the grant of a license, he is bound to conform receives an advantage, as the grant of a license, he is bound to conform strictly to the exercise of the rights given him by it, and in case of a strictly to the exercise of the rights given him by it, and in case of a dispute, it will be strictly construed.

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Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.

RATIONALE FOR IMMUNITY Sanders v. Veridiano (1988) Rossi and Wyer, gameroom attendards, are suing Sanders and Moreau (superiors of the attendants) for libelous imputations committed by the latter which eventually cost them their jobs. However, the court ruled that the alluded acts were official and not personal and that the acts petitioners are called to account were performed in the discharge of their official duties. Given the official character of the abovedescribed letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts. The doctrine of state immunity is applicable not only to our own government but also to foreign states who are subject to the jurisdiction of our courts. The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right

depends." In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium5 and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations." Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land." The acts of petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith, which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Mistakes concededly committed by such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. Exceptions to the doctrine of state immunity as enumerated in the case are: Officer is sued to compel him to do an act required by law [such as restraining a Cabinet member from enforcing a law claimed to be unconstitutional]. When the government violated its own laws. When an officer acted without or in excess of authority in forcibly taking private property without paying just compensation thereof, though the property was converted for the public good. United States v. Guinto (1990) Three main cases dealing with doctrine of state immunity
5

the are

All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.

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consolidated in this case with the fourth being remanded due to a lack of information. (1) Respondents file for a case of cancellation of a barbershop concessionaire. The State herein can be sued because barbershop concessionaires are commercial in nature and the state entering into such a proprietary contract implicitly gave its consent to be sued. (2) A cook was found guilty of pouring urine in soup and was subsequently relieved from duty. He files a complaint against the club manager who invokes state immunity. The State can be sued since restaurant operation is a commercial affair, however, it does not necessarily mean that the state is liable. (3) Luis Bautista was caught in a buy-bust operation; he was then subsequently relieved from duty. He now sues with the complaint of illegal dismissal. The respondent State cannot be sued because it performed acts within its official capacity. There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. Even without such affirmation [in Art. 16, Sec. 3 of 1987 Constitution], we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of

its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states. XXX The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its nonsuability. That is hardly fair, at least in democratic societies, for the state is not an unfeeling tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents. The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation. The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, under which the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." In Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, a special law was passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged tort. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. Waiver is also implied

the Holy See is nonetheless immune from suit because the transaction entered into was not for profit or for gain. 18 We have held that not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability. it entered into a commercial . It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living there made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation (construction of Papal Nuncio’s residence). each widely held and firmly established. the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. As for the filing of a complaint by the government. of its own free will. According to the classical or absolute theory. transaction for the sale of a parcel of land located in the Philippines.10 when the government files a complaint. distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. suability will result only where the government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant. the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state. On the other hand. Ruiz) In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be considered "commercial" and as constituting acts jure gestionis. Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute. Rosario (1994) The Holy See. a sovereign cannot. Private respondent’s opinion is untenable. a dispute arose as to who held the responsibility of clearing the said parcels of land of squatters. If the foreign The Holy See v. but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis (United States of America v. represented by the Papal Nuncio. we have to come out with our own guidelines. Certainly. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot. tentative they may be. and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises. thus opening itself to a counterclaim. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. However. The burden of the petition is that respondent trial court has no jurisdiction over petitioner.Mars Veloso 1C. The above rules are subject to qualification. Aside from the privilege of sovereign immunity established by the DFA. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. According to the newer or restrictive theory. private respondent insists that the doctrine of non-suability is not anymore absolute and that petitioner has divested itself of such a cloak when.5 Page No. There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity. be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. being a foreign state enjoying sovereign immunity. without its consent. Respondents filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale of the land but the DFA filed a motion to intervene claiming that it had a legal interest in the outcome of the case as regards the diplomatic immunity of petitioner. has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint. because the petitioners were unable to evict the squatters. sold certain parcels of land to two buyers.

However. So it was stressed in the petition of the then Solicitor General Makasiar.. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY Sayson v. then it is an act jure imperii. Amigable v. Neither does such answer come under the implied forms of consent as earlier discussed. petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State Republic v. for the payment of the alleged balance of the cost of spare parts supplied by him to the Bureau of Public Highways. Sayson failed to pay the corresponding balance to Singson after discovering that the equipment being sold by Singson was overpriced.Mars Veloso 1C. Cuenca (1972) The government used a portion of the land owned by Amigable for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues without prior negotiation/expropriation. Purisima (1977) Yellow Bell Freight Lines brought a suit against the Rice and Corn Administration for an alleged breach of contract. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim. Amigable sues Cuenca in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways seeking payment for the appropriated land.. the claim is void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law. is a suit against the State. Express waiver of immunity cannot be made by a mere counsel of the government but must be effected through a duly-enacted statute.. especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity. the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment. the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. However.. Respondent judge dismissed the motion to dismiss. Thus: "It is apparent that respondent Singson's cause of action is a money claim against the government. although as will be shown hereunder. The court ruled in favor of the state by virtue of applying state immunity. Actually. the SC set aside the lower courts decision on . Singson (1973) Singson filed a money claim against the Highways Auditor General petitioning the latter to be compelled to pay the balance due to Singson.. or an incident thereof. surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis.11 state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade. mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State. but an ordinary action for specific performance. Rice and Corn moved to dismiss the suit by using the doctrine of state immunity. The SC held that the courts do not have jurisdiction to pass upon the merits of the claims against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government. In the case at bench. morals or public policy. Assuming momentarily the validity of such claim. The lower court was unmindful of the fundamental doctrine of non-suability. To state the facts is to make clear the solidity of the stand taken by the Republic. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business.5 Page No.

as it should. . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. in Cebu City. City of Cebu (1971) Petitioners seek just compensation for a registered lot alleging that the government took physical and material possession of it and used it for the widening of Gorodo Ave. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time. The issue is WON the RP gave its consent when it accepted the terms of donation given by Santiago. It is just as important. with the BPI as the donee. if not more so. The government being the . . the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment.12 the basis that “immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for penetrating an injustice on a citizen." Santiago v. CFI dismissed the case on the ground of immunity of the state to be sued without its consent. In the case at bar. If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for public use were to be respected. gave its implied consent to perform the conditions of the donation. the court held that the donor. The SC there said: ". Petitioner then is led to conclude that he was exempt from compliance with such an explicit constitutional command. Petitioner alleges that the donee failed to comply the terms of the donation. He (the donor) has the right to be heard. which prohibits a suit against the Republic without its consent.Mars Veloso 1C. as donee. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked. or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use. that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained.5 Page No. His plea was for the revocation of a deed of donation executed by him and his spouse in 1971. petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now. to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment. the fundamental postulate of non-suitability cannot stand in the way. thereby allowing itself to be sued based on the high dictates of equity and justice. may it have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned. then a suit of this character should not be summarily dismissed. is entitled to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of such donation. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.” Ministerio v.' If there were an observance of procedural regularity. In such a case as this. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires. which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation. Republic (1978) Santiago filed an action in the CFI naming as defendant the Government of the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI). a complaint would have been filed by it. with the Republic as donee. the government would stand to benefit. it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. Under the circumstances. The SC held that: where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale. the Republic. to be judicially ascertained.

Brownell (1960) Lim is claiming ownership over certain lots of land that were reclaimed by the US government and subsequently. So it was indicated in a recent decision. Stated differently. is instituted by a person who is neither an enemy or ally of an enemy for the purpose of establishing his right. its commercial activities or economic affairs. Villasor (1973) Respondent Judge Villasor is alleged to have acted in excess of jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. turned over to the RP. Lim v. Congressional consent to such suit has expressly been given by the United States. title or interest in vested property. Lim claims these lands originally belong to his deceased mother but were illegally possessed by Japanese troops.13 beneficiary manifests its adherence to the highest ethical standards. indisputably a function of the government of the highest order. Providence . It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.5 Page No. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines. Ruiz (1985) Respondent was able to win a bid for a project for the repair of the wharves/shoreline of the Subic Bay Area. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. The latter files suit for awarding the project to him and for damages as well. The immunity of the state from suit. which can only be ignored at the risk of losing the confidence of the people. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. Petitioner asked for a quotation but later on denied the respondent the project stating that the respondent was not qualified. not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory. and thus. however. they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. and of recovering his ownership and possession. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. United States v. the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and void." Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar.Mars Veloso 1C. cannot be invoked where the action. It is readily understandable why it must be so. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Republic v. but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. as in the present case. a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. The US was able to take possession of said lands after the war by virtue of the Trading with the Enemy Act. In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit.

PNR engages in a purely commercial action. in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle. One reason is. Gov." SUITS AGAINST AGENCIES GOVERNMENT Baliwag Bus and an express train collided resulting to death and damages. The SC ruled. but PNR raises the defense that it was the bus driver who was negligent and the doctrine of state immunity exempts them from suit. Baliwag sues PNR. which has never been seriously questioned. When the government enters in a commercial business. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished. they ran over someone and did not even stop to check what happened. the NIA’s charter specifically allows the NIA to sue and be sued. PNR was created not to discharge a governmental function but to operate a transport service which is essentially a business concern.5 Page No. although it may be due government employees. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go to court. that the NIA is a government agency with juridical personality that is separate and distinct from the government. at the least provocation. NIA avers that they were an agency of the government and therefore not liable for the acts of the driver who was a special agent. the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. LIABILITY Merritt v. Therefore it is not immune from suit. belong to the latter. National Railways v. Republic of the Philippines. SUITABILITY V." Justice Malcolm: "A rule. In a hurry to reach their destination. of the Phil Islands (1916) Plaintiff Merritt on a motorcycle collided with an ambulance which did not warn of Phil. IAC ruled in favor of Baliwag. may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature. by virtue of its sovereignty. hence this appeal. is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. is that money in the hands of public officers. as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government. Fontanilla (1991) The NIA group was on its way to a campsite. National Irrigation Administration v. could very well be imagined. the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits.Mars Veloso 1C. IAC (1993) . it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other private corporation. Although PNR is a government formed department. v.14 Washington Insurance Co. however. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it. although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. with its affirmation that "a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. It turned out to be the son of herein respondents who subsequently filed suit. and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Besides. that the State.

therefore. but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. supra. officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903.15 its impending approach.5 Page No.Mars Veloso 1C. the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally liable for the damages resulting therefrom. in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government. . authorized Merritt to bring suit in the CFI Manila in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital. and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent. Did the government simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: “The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent." It is. for the acts of its agents. evident that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable. The government. by no less than an Act.

if granted. . propose amendment and call a convention — at the same time. COMELEC dismissed the petition which instigated the association’s filing of a review by certiorari. 3. Gonzales. 1967. not a general election.Mars Veloso 1C. must be a special election. prayed that the decision in this case be deferred until an identical case pending (which was expected soon) was decided on. No digests for the first two sections of this chapter: Separation of Powers and the Non-Delegation Doctrine . 2. 1967. The election. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election. Facts: The House of Representatives passed a bill which allowed for proposals in Resolution 1 (increasing max number of representatives from 120-180) and Resolution 3 ( authorizing Senators and Representatives to be delegates in a constitutional convention) to be passed. SolGen maintains that the SC has no jurisdiction upon the ground that the same is "merely political" as held in Mabanag vs. nor of rendering its acts null and void. COMELEC November 9.16 GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS6 Gonzales v. filed a class suit and prayed that: (1) COMELEC restrain from performing acts that would result in the holding of the plebiscite for ratification. does not have the legal effect of rendering illegal the House of Representatives elected thereafter. de facto Congressmen. at best. do not exist — as to give the people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the nature and implications of said amendments. on the other hand. PHILCONSA (Philippine Constitution Association). which approved the proposed amendments. and (2) declare the Act unconstitutional. a taxpayer. It was urged by the petitioners that said resolutions are null and void because: 1. must be held under such conditions — which.5 Page No. The Members of Congress. allegedly. Lopez Vito. and c) that "the failure of Congress to enact a valid reapportionment law .A. C. as well as the resolution calling a convention 6 to propose amendments. b) that the petition. would. . in which officers of the national and local governments — such as the elections scheduled to be held on November 14. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1." Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON the SC has jurisdiction. and 4. in which proposals for amendment shall be submitted to the people for ratification. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives propose — amendments or call a convention therefore but may not avail of both — that is to say. This was subsequently approved by the President as R. Senator Arturo Tolentino objected to the PHILCONSA petition on the following grounds: a) that the Court has no jurisdiction either to grant the relief sought in the petition.J. or to pass upon the legality of the composition of the House of Representatives. Concepcion. are. in effect. 4913 which provided for amendments to be made subject to the people’s approval at the general elections of Nov. 1967 — will be chosen. render in operational the legislative department. in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted for ratification.

the conclusion that failure to comply with such obligation rendered Congress illegal or unconstitutional. that the issues therein raised were political questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review. not political. "The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. Commission on Elections.Mars Veloso 1C. Cuenco. this Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators necessary for a quorum in the Senate. we nullified the election. No.A. and in the fourth. of two (2) Senators belonging to the first party. On the argument of the petitioners that Congress may only amend or call a convention but not do both. it is constitutional. Lopez Vito declaring the issue to be “merely political” has been weakened by Suanes vs. as claimed by the latter. however. as members. not of that of the Senate President. advanced in these four (4) cases. and Macias vs. Angara v. In short. On the argument that the acting congress was unconstitutional because it failed to apportion itself within three years. and. was of the view that the spirit of the Constitution demanded that “election” be read as “special election” in order that the transcendental importance of a constitional amendment could command the undivided attention of the . and. Tañada vs. but not enough to constitute a qualified majority needed to declare a law unconstitutional. for the second party. Cuenco.5 Page No. in the second. hence. upon the ground that the apportionment had not been made as may be possible according to the number of inhabitants of each province. in the third. Avelino vs. (2) WON R. On the choice between a special election and a general election. 4913 is unconstitutional. The force of the precedent in Mabanag vs. or that its Members have become de facto officers. Failure to make the apportionment does not dissolve Congress or makes it illegal. Lopez Vito. Even though it is urged that the Congress became unconstitutional because the Apportionment Act was deemed illegal (act was not made according to the number of inhabitants of the different provinces of the Philippines). 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.17 Yes. by Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of votes in said chamber. Electoral Commission. Laurel. the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent assembly — violates the Constitution essentially justiciable. purporting to act on behalf of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. a majority of the SC. this is untenable. the SC ruled that this was a question of wisdom and not authority and hence was a political question. of the. to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point. Thus we rejected the theory. the latter should be deemed modified accordingly. In the first. Senate Electoral Tribunal." – Dr. we held that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision and control. this argument isn’t tenable. The fact that Congress is under legal obligation to make said apportionment does not justify. we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion the representative districts for the House of Representatives. subject to judicial review. Chief Accountant of the Senate. Jose P.

the lack of unanimity or even of a consensus among the members of the Court in respect to this issue creates the need for more study and deliberation. however. is a situation to be hoped for. approved its first formal proposal to amend the Constitution by Organic Resolution No. 1971. it does not perceive absolute necessity to resolve that question. It is a goal the attainment of which should be promoted. 28. Presumably. 1971. on Sept. then.”7 After the Constitional Convention of 1971 came into being and after its election of delegates.18 electorate. COMELEC October 16. they find themselves unable to subscribe thereto without. for obvious reasons. SECTION 1. in effect. 4913. The ideal conditions are. however. Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON only Congress can call a plebiscite for ratification of amendments. J. the convention. since the spirit of the law should not be a matter of sheer speculation. – Mars. grave and important as it may be Truth to tell. The SC chose not to answer the question on whether or not the power to call a plebiscite was exclusively legislative. Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition to restrain COMELEC from holding a plebiscite on November 8 at which the proposed amendment could be ratified by the people. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.” ARTICLE XV AMENDMENTS Tolentino v. After all. 1971.5 Page No. Otherwise. But. overwhelmingly. No product of human endeavor is beyond improvement. Facts: 7 Despite this decision of the SC which cleared the way for the plebiscite. and as time is of the essence in this case. The Congress in joint session assembled. “ On the issue of insufficiency of the publicity and time for discussion afforded by the mechanism of ratification provided by the legislature. Arturo M. is another thing. Barredo. the plebiscite nevertheless. reading into the Constitution what they believe is not written thereon and can not fairly be deduced from the letter thereof. it could have done something better to enlighten the people on the subjectmatter thereof. certainly. The question whether the Constitution forbids the submission of proposals for amendment to the people except under such conditions. 1 (Lowering the Voting Age to 18 in Article V).Mars Veloso 1C. The minority but prevailing view. no law is perfect. November 8. said: “This. We will refrain from making any pronouncement or expressing Our views on this question until a more appropriate case comes to Us. “In the view the Court takes of the present case. the date set by the Convention for the plebiscite it is calling. Much as the writer and those who concur in this opinion admire the contrary view. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when . no legislation would be constitutional and valid. the basis of this decision is as important and decisive as any can be. one thing. being nigh. rejected Resolutions 1 and 3. by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. again the minority but prevailing opinion said: “We do not believe it has been satisfactorily shown that Congress has exceeded the limits thereof in enacting Republic Act No.

Mars Veloso 1C. “The Court holds that there is [a violation]. Yes. privileges. and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members . (2) WON Sec. It is too late to deny the applicability of the 1973 Constitution. Facts: Occena and Gonzales filed an action of prohibition against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments.” Barredo reasoned out his grammatical argument by saying that partial amendments do not reflect a study of the whole Constitution in its entirety which is necessary in order to amend a fragment or portion of its parts. 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution. Article XV of the Constitution. C. the same should be submitted to them not separately from but together with all the other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: "The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions. It being indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only the first amendment the Convention will propose We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8. 1 and is thus unconstitutional.J. This was already decided on by a 6-4 vote in Javellana v. Thus.5 Page No. rights. 1 Article XV is violated by the act of the Convention in calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1981. The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. “We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed amendment. Yes.19 approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable.” Occena v. hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent COMELEC in that direction are null and void. regardless of the recent Javellana ruling. and it is the condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. responsibilities. COMELEC April 2. Fernando. Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON the 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law of the land.” (2) WON the Batasang Pambansa has the power to propose amendments: Yes it does. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. “There is no further obstacle to the new constitution being considered in force and effect. thereby implying the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law. a single election of these amendments ensures that all the proposed and accepted amendments are compatible with the entire Constitution and not just within the provision’s scope. We are only holding that under Section 1. Executive Secretary.

In that capacity. “At any rate. As restated by me in the 1977 case of Hidalgo.e. (Dissenting): 1. Teehankee. the October 1976 constitutional amendments which created the Interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the Interim National Assembly were invalid since as ruled by the Court therein.Mars Veloso 1C. constitutional provisions on amendments "dealing with the procedure or manner of amending the fundamental law are binding upon the Convention and the other departments of the government (and) are no less binding upon the people" and "the very Idea of deparcing from the fundamental law is anachronistic in the realm of constitutionalism and repugnant to the essence of the rule of law. Prescinding from the foregoing and assuming the validity of the proposed amendments. The language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above questions. Under the prevailing doctrine of Tolentino vs. Petitioners would argue that the amendments proposed are so extensive as to constitute a revision. then) in Tolentino is fully applicable in the case at bar." One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. petitioners have not made out a case that calls for a judgment in their favor. 2. i. only a majority vote is needed.5 Page No. The three resolutions proposing complex. whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people. Comelec and subsequently officially adopted by the required constitutional two-thirds majority vote of the Court (of eight votes." .” Regarding the issue of votes necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper submission. 3. complicated and radical amendments of our very structure of government were considered and approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 27. The Interim Batasang Pambansa. sitting as a constituent body. 1981. Comelec that the proposed amendments to be valid must come from the constitutional agency vested with the constituent power to do so. 1981 which is totally inadequate and far short of the ninety-day period fixed by the Constitution for submittal to the people to "sufficiently inform them of the amendments to be voted upon. under the controlling doctrine of Tolentino. J." The proposed amendments at bar having been adopted by the Interim Batasang Pambansa as the fruit of the invalid October.20 thereof. in the Interim National Assembly provided in the Transitory Article XVII which would then have to be convened and not from the executive power as vested in the President (Prime Minister) from whom such constituent power has been withheld. I reiterate my stand in Sanidad that the doctrine of fair and proper submission firs enunciated by a simple majority of six Justices (of an eleven member Court prior to the 1973 Constitution which increased the official composition of the Court to fifteen) in Gonzales vs. 1976 amendments must necessarily suffer from the same congenital infirmity. can propose amendments. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. to conscientiously deliberate thereon and to express their will in a genuine manner. It set the date of the plebiscite for thirty-nine days later on April 7. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed.

Changes in government are to be feard unless benefit is certain. and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest. For. Jr.. as we have earlier stated. can be allowed efficacy . not to the whim of the people.' As Montaign says: 'All great mutation shake and disorder a state. What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government. Facts: The Filipino electorate will go to the polls to approve or reject amendments to the Constitution proposed by resolutions of the Batasang Pambansa.. we take the view that the words 'submitted to the people for their ratification. Alba January 25. 3 and No.5 Page No."' Almario v.21 4. Sanchez in his separate opinion in Gonzales bears repeating as follows: ". Good does not necessarily succeed evil. .. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps.. one thing is submission and another is ratification. The great men who builded the structure of our state in this respect had the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley. intelligent consent or rejection. amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or spurning.. educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. then so be it. Petitioners seek to delay the date of ratification/rejection in order to give ample time to study the ramifications of the two questions stated in Question No. 4 . who has said 'A good Constitution should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion. 1984. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. J. free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious influences. It is needed for stability and steadiness. in submitting an amendment for ratification. If with all these safeguards the people still approve the amendments no matter how prejudicial it is to them.. which alone if the government is to be safe. within its maximum capabilities.. "The minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the people of a proposed constitutional amendment" as stated by retired Justice Conrado V. Therefore. another evil may succeed and a worse.. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions.' if construed in the light of the nature of the Constitution – a fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the people. or hot blood. or the thought evolved in excitement. an expression of their sovereign will – is that it can only be amended by the people expressing themselves according to the procedure ordained by the Constitution.. They are not to vote blindly. and the proposed amendments and the meaning. Gutierrez.Mars Veloso 1C. compare them with the proposed amendments. should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to enlighten the people. should strain every short to inform every citizen of the provisions to be amended. nature and effects thereof. There must be fair submission. We believe the word 'submitted' can only mean that the government. but the sober second thought. ." Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt citation that ". For the people decree their own fate. it must yield to the thought of the people.

The petitioners have failed to make out a case that the average voter does not know the meaning of "grant" of public land or of "urban land reform.22 Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON Questions No. Article XIV or that the addition of two paragraphs including one on urban land reform to Section 12 of Article XIV result in amendments of such nature that when the people go to the polls on January 27. Assuming that a member or some members of this Court may find undesirable any additional mode of disposing of public land or an urban land reform program. Comelec. (21 SCRA 774. expediency. the people must be "sufficiently informed of the amendments to be voted upon." . Comelec (41 SCRA 702. The petitioners have failed to show that the addition of the one word "grant" to Section 11. The issue before us has nothing to do with the wisdom of the proposed amendments. Art. The sufficiency of the period during which amendments are submitted to the people before they vote to either affirm or reject depends on the complexity and intricacy of the questions presented. whether or not "grant" of public land and "urban land reform" are unwise or improvident or whether or not the proposed amendments are unnecessary is a matter which only the people can decide. (Dissenting): The doctrine of fair and proper submission to the people of proposed constitutional amendments as enunciated by the Court in Tolentino vs. 817). to conscientiously deliberate thereon. to express their will in a genuine manner." Teehankee. concurred in by the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Justice Calixto Zaldivar. or the danger of the power being abused. The issue is whether or not the voters are aware of the wisdom. is that the necessity. More important. 16. under Sec. 4 have been properly submitted to the people. or the dangers of abuse. J. and wisdom of the proposed amendments are beyond the power of the courts to adjudicate. 1984 they cannot arrive at an intelligent judgment on their acceptability or non-acceptability. a period of three months for an information campaign regarding the intended amendments." There must be fair submission and intelligent consent or rejection. Yes.5 Page No. the remedy is to vote "NO" in the plebiscite but not to substitute his or their aversion to the proposed amendments by denying to the millions of voters an opportunity to express their own likes or dislikes. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. As the late Justice Conrado V. their desirability. 3 and No.Mars Veloso 1C. the desirability. however. The Constitution provides. it must provide the voter not only sufficient time. but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. 2. Precisely. 729) mandates that "in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may be validly held. The questions are presented for their determination. Sanchez stressed in his separate opinion in the earlier case of Gonzales vs.

GMA is engaged in doublespeak 8 A lot of dissenting opinions. it does not imply primacy of international law over national law. the terrorist attacks 9/11 prompted America to declare an international terrorist campaign. GMA pledged the country’s support to the endeavor. They argue (a) that the Abu-Sayyaf bandits do not constitute an external armed force and thus. But in the case at bar. . members of the USAF (United States Armed Forces) arrived in Mindanao to. They also claim that the VFA signed in 1999 does not authorize US soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine territory. the US may sojourn in the Philippines for purposes other than military. on an impermanent basis. SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGAGAWA. the question is WON American troops are engaged in combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of alleged training and exercise. not even to fire back if fired upon. The Court cannot answer this question because it lacks sufficient information. Two party-list intervenors. Newspapers or electronic reports per se cannot be considered apt support for petitioner’s allegations. Too lazy. The Constitution espouses a view that has marked antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country. as opposed to combat.23 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES Lim v. Petitioners claim that it violates the Renunciation Clause of the Constitution (The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy) but neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory. Petitioners Lim and Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. Pres.5 Page No. Being lawyers does not invest them with personality to initiate the case and they have failed to demonstrate the requisite of suffering proximate injury. approved the Draft Terms of Reference upon presentation by then VP Guingona.Mars Veloso 1C. the Senate. The Court. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. are authorized by the MDT and the VFA. the Philippines is not subject to armed external attack contemplated in the MDT (mutual defense treaty) of 1951 to warrant US military assistance. In this manner. aver that some of their members are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu and thus are directly affected by operations conducted in Mindanao. On January 2002. Will get back to them when I have time. lawyers and taxpayers. take part in the “Balikatan 02-1” exercises. They filed suit as citizens. Executive Secretary8 2002. J Two years after the VFA was approved in 1999. The word was used to give leeway in negotiation by both parties. Facts must be established according to the rules of evidence. Although international laws are adhered to. Issues/Held/Ratio: (1) WON petitioners have legal standing. Jr. No. as expressed by the Indoctrination Clause. The VFA permits the USAF to engage. De Leon. They cannot file suit as taxpayers because the military exercise does not involve Congress’ taxing or spending powers. can nullify such an agreement. if it sees that the treaty runs counter to Congress or goes against the fundamental law. after conducting a hearing on the military exercise. WON Pres. Issues raised premature and based on a fear of future violations of the Terms of Reference. in “activities”. The next month. (2) WON the “Balikatan” exercises violate the Constitution. Combat-related activities. along with the AFP. No.

Art.10 10 "1. they proceeded to appeal with NLRC which affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. et. was covered by the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of which the Philippine Government was an original signatory (Rollo. "Sec. 1. It is. confiscation. invoked the constitutional mandate that the State shall afford full protection to labor and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all (1987 Constitution. UNRFNRE Feb. 621.) We quote Sections 4 and 5 of Article III thereof: In support thereof. understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution mphasis supplied). requisition. "Sec. they filed an instant petition for certiorari in the SC. likewise. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes. Quiason." Corollary to the cited article is the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations. Petitioners argued that the acts of mining exploration and exploitation are outside the official functions of an international agency protected by diplomatic immunity. Petitioners.Mars Veloso 1C. Private respondent is a specified agency of the United Nations. Even assuming that 9 private respondent was entitled to diplomatic immunity. 23. private respondent attached a letter from the Department of Foreign Affairs dated August 26.9 Labor Arbiter subsequently dismissed the claim made by the petitioner. 4. being a special fund administered by the United Nations. shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity. "2. petitioners insisted that private respondent waived it when it engaged in exploration work and entered into a contract of employment with petitioners.5 Page No. 21). Under Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations. With their motion for reconsideration denied. The letter confirmed that private respondent. which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations. which acknowledged its immunity from suit. 1995. shall be immune from search. Sec. Facts: Lasco.24 involves a question of fact… the question is thus not fit for a special civil action for certiorari. p. J. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization. Lasco. however. 1991. wherever located and by whomsoever held. The premises of the specialized agencies shall be inviolable. Philippine Treaty Series. Without seeking a reconsideration of the resolution. They filed suit with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal and damages. The property and assets of the specialized agencies. 5. Petition is thereby dismissed. The Office of the Solicitor General is of the view that private respondent is covered by the mantle of diplomatic immunity. al. to which the Philippines was a signatory (Vol. 3). et. p. v. expropriation and any other . wherever located and by whomsoever held. XIII. The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of the Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island. Respondent UNRFNRE filed a motion to dismiss claiming the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction because the respondent enjoyed diplomatic immunity (citing the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations). their property and assets. al were dismissed from the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE). The specialized agencies.

This is not to say that petitioners have no recourse. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations states that "each specialized agency shall make a provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party. III. which is not so in the case at bench (Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. administrative. 682. Art. judicial or legislative action". will put up a bond as surety Ratio: Mejoff v. the Philippine Government adopts the generally accepted principles of international law (1987 Constitution. The Board of Commissioners of Immigration declared that he entered the country illegally in 1944 and was ordered deported immediately Has been in detention ever since (failed attempts to deport him) while authorities try to make new travel arrangements The Court held that temporary detention is a necessary step in the process of expulsion of undesirable aliens and said detention for a reasonable length of time is a Government right  No period was fixed within which immigration authorities would carry out the deportation  “Reasonable time” depends on the circumstances Issue/Held/ WON Mejoff should be discharged from custody Writ will issue commanding petitioner’s release w/ terms: shall be placed under surveillance. he was handed to the Commonwealth for disposition according to Commonwealth Act No. . Both treaties have the force and effect of law. including that of petitioners.Mars Veloso 1C. whether by executive. the Philippine Government adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Art.25 1951 (Jackie Espenilla) Issues/Held/Ration: WON the respondent is immune by virtue of its diplomatic status. The Deportation Board found that he had no travel documents and was thus an illegal alien. II. Director Of Prisons form of interference. Its mission is not to exploit our natural resources and gain pecuniarily thereby but to help improve the quality of life of the people. Its presence here is by virtue of a joint project entered into by the Philippine Government and United Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. The People’s Court later released him." Nature: a 2nd petitition for habeas corpus by Boris Mejoff (a Russian who was brought to the country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese) Facts: Mejoff was arrested as a Japanese spy upon Phil liberation by the US Counter Intelligence Corps. 4). Sec.5 Page No. As a matter of state policy as expressed in the Constitution. Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines. 2). Being a member of the United Nations and a party to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations. Sec. Our courts can only assume jurisdiction over private respondent if it expressly waived its immunity.

detention or exile Philippine law on immigration was copied from US law. Watkins applies (writ of habeas corpus was sustained. Nature: Petition to declare EO No.5 Page No. 3 – the Phils adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation Phils was part of UN General Assembly that approved Universal Declaration of Human Rights. thus the reasoning in Staniszewski v. Jalandoni (Jackie Espenilla) 11 12 EO No. Sec.26 Non-enemy Foreign nationals against whom no charge has been made other than the expiry of their permission to stay may not be indefinitely kept in detention Protection against deprivation of liberty without due process is not limited to Filipinos (extends to everyone except enemy aliens)11 Art 2. 2. 68 is valid Yes. 68 because (a) it violates local laws and constitution and (b) because the Phils. 13 Note: Petitioner’s entry in to the Phils was not unlawful as was brought in by a de facto belligerent Jap govt (decrees were law) letting those in his command to commit atrocities and other high crimes against civilians and prisoners in violation of the laws and customs of war . Kuroda v.  Said Declaration outlined: • All human beings are born free and equal in rights • Everyone is entitled to the freedoms set forth in this Declaration w/o making any distinctions • Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by competent tribunals for acts violating fundamental rights granted to him by the Consti or law • No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest. is not a signatory of the Hague Convention on Rules and regulations covering Land Warfare Issues/Held/Ratio: (1) WON EO No. 68 – established a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals. he is now charged before a military commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with having failed to discharge his duties 13 Kuroda now petitions SC to establish the illegality of EO No. 6812 invalid/ petition to prohibit proceeding with the case Facts: Kuroda was formerly a Lt. General of the Japanese Army and Commanding General of the Japanese forces in the Phils. 3 of Consti – Phils. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the nation The Hague Convention and Geneva Conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. Petitioner was released w/ condition to inform immigration officials of his whereabouts every month until he can be properly deported) Further. Sec. petitioner has no pending charges against him and the prospects of bringing any against him are slim and remote.Mars Veloso 1C. SC says it is valid and constitutional Art.

68 which says that participating lawyers have to be qualified in the Phils. He is thus STATELESS and a REFUGEE of this country Issues/Held/Ratio: International jurisprudence established that all persons who have been guilty of planning or staging a war. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Kookooritchkin v. 68 is valid. their principles form part of our law even if Phils. It is not violative of Consti because the Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law and not by ROC which govern civil courts. was under the sovereignty of the US at the time the crimes were committed so we are equally bound to uphold the principle Rights and sovereignty obligations were not erased by assumption of Nature: Appeal from a decision of lower court denying petition for naturalization of Eremes Kookooritchkin Facts: Kookoo applied for citizenship under Commonwealth Act 473 as amended by Act 535 Established at the hearing that he was a native born Russian and grew up in Russia under the czars. for about 25 years Married to a Filipina with whom he has a son Works as a shop superintendent with about 80 Pinoys under him. etc are to be held accountable14 (2) WON respondents Hussey prosecuting petitioner’s case and Port can participate in Yes. he fled the country and found his way to Manila in 1923 Permanently established residence in Camarines Sur on May 1925  Remained a resident except from 1942-1945 because he became an underground guerilla officer. Gets income Can speak English and Bicol dialect. since US is a party in interest EO No. After the liberation. Solicitor General (Jackie Espenilla) 14 EO No.Mars Veloso 1C. Nothing in EO. Common in military tribunals that counsels are usually military personal Spirit of comity esp. chose to fight in guerilla movement Although a Russian by birth.27 Since both US and Japan signed them. he went back to Camarines  Has resided in Phils. 68 is in conformity with this . he disclaims allegiance to the present Communist govt of Russia. Intermingles with Pinoys.5 Page No. was not a signatory Phils. committing atrocious crimes and offenses. When Bolsheviks took over. Has good moral character and believes in the Phil Constitution Applicant could have been chummy with the Japanese but instead. Military commission can proceed.

Styer (Jackie Espenilla) Nature: Petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Lt. Only a reconstituted declaration was presented as the records of the Bureau of Justice were destroyed during the battle for the liberation of Manila ii. Languages (3) WON Kookoo is really stateless and WON he is disqualified from citizenship Lower court is upheld in pronouncing Kookoo stateless. Kookoo owes and feels no allegiance to Russia Appealed decision is AFFIRMED. 2 of Commonwealth Act No. declaration is still valid coz proven by other competent evidence (2) WON Kookoo established a legal residence in the Phils and WON he can speak and write in Phil.5 Page No. Jackie: Kookoo is Pinoy! . 473 Lower court found that he could speak and write English and Bicol.Mars Veloso 1C. Even if reconstituted. Styer (Commanding General of the US Army Forces) Facts: Yamashita was the commanding general of the 14th army group of the Japanese army in the Phils and is now charged before the American military commission for committing heinous acts against Americans and Pinoys Was originally classified as prisoner of war but was later changed to war criminal Yamashita now wants to be changed back to prisoner of war and that the military commission be prohibited from further trying him Issues/Held/Ratio: WON Yamashita may seek writ of habeas corpus Nope.28 (1) WON declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen is invalid and insufficient as a basis for the petition for naturalization Sec. Gen. Languages Testimonies on the record show that he was a legal resident for a continuous period of not less than 10years as required by Sec. 5 of Revised Naturalization Law – No declaration shall be valid until entry for permanent residence has been established and a certificate showing the date. Besides. Appellee’s testimony is uncontradicted and it is a well known fact that modern dictatorships have scattered stateless refugees all over the world. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.15 15 Yamashita v. place and manner of arrival has been issued i. no specific standard has been set on the use of the principal Phil. Petition DENIED.

Yamashita is charged with permitting atrocities like rape of young girls. Spain has also severed diplomatic relation with Japan . Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON the IBP has standing. J. and (b) through Letters of Instruction formulated by the head of the national police. units and organizations accused as war criminals will be the Military Commissions to be convened by or under the authority of the Commander in Chief. (2) WON the President’s decision is subject to judicial review. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Articles of War Nos. it is incumbent for the petitioners to show that the decision was without factual basis. Facts: IBP alleged that Erap.5 Page No. it is alleged that Spain (Japan’s protecting power) as not given due notice before trial was begun against petitioner. No evidence of such nature was adduced. Military Commission has been validly constituted and has jurisdiction over petitioner (coz Yamashita fell into the hands of the US army) Under Par. In lieu of such a decision made by the President. 356 of the Rules of the Land Warfare.Mars Veloso 1C. the trial of persons. However. US Army Forces. beyond jurisdiction of civil court ii. No.17 16 IBP v. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. just restoration to old status as POW i. 12 and 15 recognized the military Commission appointed by military command as an appropriate tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses against the law of the war not ordinarily tried by court martial. Yes. and thus no military deployment was warranted.16 Further. a Military Commission for the trial and punishment of war criminals must be designated by the belligerent (the belligerent’s representative in this case is Styer) According to the Regulations Governing the Trial of War Criminals in the Pacific. it can still conduct an examination on whether such a decision was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether or not it was exercised constituting grave abuse of discretion. “Upholding the rule of law and the constitution” is not sufficient to clothe it with standing. 2000. the Court cannot question the wisdom or substitute its own. 347 of the Rules of Land Warfare 17 Nothing in Convention saying that notice is a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of military commissions appointed by victorious belligerent. contrary to provision of Geneva convention. Zamora August 15. destruction of property – offenses described in Par. He doesn’t seek discharge from confinement. in ordering the military deployed in Manila. the joint exercise of ‘Task Force Tulungan’ (as visibility patrols) conducted by the marines and the PNP was a violation of civilian supremacy because the task of law enforcement was civilian in nature. They failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. When the President calls out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence. Degree of confinement is a matter of military measure. massacre of noncombatants.29 Untenable. Kapunan. committed grave abuse of discretion because: (a) no emergency existed.

5 Page No. or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law. such deployment does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP. as senator. [Rossiter. In the words of the late Justice Irene Cortes in Marcos v. the President violated the civilian supremacy clause. but he concurs with the dismissal of the petition because of the lack of standing. Wide discretion. hence. files a petition for mandamus claiming that the ratification of a treaty (under domestic and international law) is a function of . the joint visibility patrols instead of showing the alleged derogation of civilian supremacy. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency. within the bounds of law. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Concurring: There being no actual controversy manifest yet. Dissenting. As evidenced by the long history of military and civilian agencies working in tandem with each other. however. Puno. 3.the marines. a civilian institution. and their assigned role specifically gives them the responsibility of directing and managing the deployment of the marines. Its’ provisions. this case calls for the exercise of the President’s powers as protector of the peace. Mendoza. The joint exercise merely constitutes a permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. in order to keep the peace. acceptance and approval of the signatory states.Mars Veloso 1C. Pimentel v. There is no incursion of the military because the marines weren’t incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP . but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the President’s exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces. leadership is vested in the PNP. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. in effect. Pimentel.” (4) WON in deploying the marines. required that it be subject to ratification. military participation in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed as evidenced by the LOI. Article II of the Constitution.30 (3) WON grave abuse of discretion was committed in calling out the military when no emergency existed. Court rules that there is no breach. Furthermore. Executive Secretary Facts: The Rome Statute was signed by the Philippines through the DFA. the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized and is thus in violation of Sec. and maintain public order and security. in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. shows mutual support and cooperation in the deployment of the marines. Separate: He contends that the executive branch’s decision to cloud its activities under the political question doctrine will not suffice. Manglapus: “More particularly. merely provided assistance in these visibility patrols. The American Presidency]. the case should not be heard. IBP contends that with the said agreement.

“It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions. Buena. actually share some common ground. the Court finds it irrelevant because the provision’s prohibition involves either one of the independent situations. has a duty to transmit the signed statute to the Senate for ratification. the power to concur with the President’s decision. Facts: The VFA. In the realm of treaty making. 2000.” “The fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements” regardless of what provision is deemed applicable. J. When the respondent says that temporary visits doesn’t make it a basing arrangement and thus invalidates the applicability of Article XIII Sec. Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON petitioners have standing. 25 have been complied with: (a) it must be under a treaty. ratification is under his/her authority.5 Page No. As chief architect of foreign policy. are deemed prohibitory in mandate and character. These constitutional provisions both embody phrases in the negative and thus. Executive Secretary October 10. when so required by congress. No. in both instances. Petitioners contend that such an agreement is in violation of Article XVIII.” and Section 25 contains the phrase “shall not be allowed. since the VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement which involves temporary visits engaged in joint military exercises. provides a limitation to such power to ratify by vesting in the Senate. Sec. The Constitution.” Additionally. Section 21 opens with the clause “No treaty x x x. ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum. the court cannot compel the Executive branch by means of mandamus because it is beyond its jurisdiction. however.31 the Senate. (2) WON the applicable provision is that stated by the petitioners or that stated by respondents. 25 of the Constitution. As concerned citizens. It does not the agency delegated to ratify but the agency to concur or not with said decision. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. hence. far from contradicting each other. The duty being in the province of the President’s official duties. was put into effect on June 1. and legislators. the concurrence of the Senate is indispensable to render the treaty or international agreement valid and effective. In particular. Bayan v. taxpayers. the Executive Dept. they fail to show that they have sustained or in danger of sustaining any direct . 1999. When the respondent avers that said Article shouldn’t be controlling because no bases are involved but merely troops and facilities. (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and. after being ratified and concurred with. the Court considers this untenable since the Constitution does not make a distinction between transient and permanent bases. President is the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. As taxpayers. The only thing to consider now is whether all the requirements of Article XVIII Sec. injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. Issues/ Held/Ratio: WON the ExecSec and DFA have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute. Respondents claim that the applicable provision is Article VII Sec 21. 25.Mars Veloso 1C. the VFA doesn’t involve the exercise by Congress in taxing/spending powers. No.

” “Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. The Constitution doesn’t specifically mandate the “natural and primary rights of parents” to those who have legitimate relationships with their children. Gonzales refused to allow Silva to be with the children on weekends. CA: “It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a spouse.Mars Veloso 1C.” CA affirmed the decision of the RTC citing Santos v. in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. files petition for annulment on the ground of psychological incapacity for failure to support the family and contribute to the management of the household. he infected her with an STD – testament to which was confinement of both parties in a hospital for treatment. is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More so. . CA Facts: Married businessman Silva cohabited with an unmarried actress Gonzales without benefit of a marriage. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights before the RTC. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use. as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. Silva v. gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se.” Issues/ Held/Ratio: WON the instant case with the circumstances presented can serve as a ground for psychological incapacity. they eventually parted ways. the United States of America in this case. Court of Appeals Facts: Married for 11 years.32 Petitioners say that there must be concurrence by the US Senate as well as illuminated by (c). wife. abandonment. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. And such visitations. Although they had two children.” Issues/ Held/Ratio: WON visitations right should be granted. to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution. former teacher of the husband in college. The CA ruled in favor of Gonzales because it saw that the rotation of custody would not be conducive to the welfare of the children. Yes. RTC dismissed the petition saying: “The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by the petitioner in support of her claim that respondent was "psychologically incapacitated" to marry her are among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for the grant of legal separation (Article 55 of the Family Code) not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or annulment thereof. Respondents claim that the only thing necessary is US recognition of the treaty which was given when the US Ambassador stated the VFA was binding. Hernandez v. chronic sexual infidelity. Petition was opposed by the mother of the children on the ground that Silva was a womanizer and a gambler and such behavior would have detrimental effects on the children. She alleges that he spent most of his time drinking with his friends and that because of his extramarital relations.5 Page No. The Court says : “To require the other contracting state. of psychological incapacity of a spouse. The RTC granted visitation rights which Gonzales still contended despite her marrying a Dutch national and emigrating to Holland with the children. would not affect the children to such an extent that it would be detrimental to their upbringing. contrary to the CA’s ruling.

There being no total log PT&T v. said concession. the petition being barred because of latches: CMTC did not immediately file an opposition when FLDC was awarded the said concession and because it had waited for two years before filing such a petition. Ministry head suspended TLA no. again denied the petition on the basis of a “new policy of consideration on forest conservation and protection. not to mention the letter reminding her of her . The labor arbiter decided that she was discriminated against because of having contracted marriage while employed with the company. NLRC Facts: A woman’s (Grace de Guzman) employment was terminated by PT&T because of alleged concealment of civil status and defalcation of company funds. Facts: CMTC’s timber concession was approved by Marcos after it was previously cancelled. CMTC. operating on TLA no. was under another concession (TLA no. on June 1986. 360 was given primacy over the TLA no. DENR June 13. In an appeal to the Office of the President and after its second motion for reconsideration. Issues/ Held/Ratio: WON PT&T’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts a marriage. CMTC claims that it had written a letter dated on the day to oppose FLDC’s grant of TLA. records. however. however. company’s policy. 106 as no longer having force and effect. Mendoza. 106 allegedly because of Marcos’ sister who was behind FLDC. proving that she was terminated because of her civil status. other than her self-serving declarations. that when she applied to work she indicated she was single when. Two years later. The Office of the President. PT&T appealed to the NLRC but the latter upheld the decision of the labor arbiter modifying the decision by saying the woman’s dishonest nature warrants a 3-month suspension from work.Mars Veloso 1C. As the Court of Appeals pointed out. petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married. 106 by writing a letter to the said government agency. sought to revalidate TLA no. 360) operated by FLDC – after issuance by Ministry of National Resources. CMTC v. She admits. She subscribed to the defense that she wasn’t aware of such a policy and thus. she was already married.) PT&T’s allegations of misappropriation is insincere and self-serving.33 No. no evidence was presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. logging still continued). 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. 1997. however. say otherwise. it was the policy itself which was the cause of Grace’s secretive conduct (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. Although PT&T asserts that it dismissed Grace because of her dishonesty. TLA no. De Guzman argues that the real reason she was fired was because she contracted the married during employment which is against company policy. DENR declared TLA no. is discriminatory and thus contrary to the Constitution? Yes. had no intent to hide the fact that she was already married. In the instant case. Sec. Alcala. 106. J. Furthermore.5 Page No. however. 360 and cancelled the license of FLDC (because in spite of previous suspension order. learning of the cancellation. in fact.” CMTC appeals to the SC saying that there were no latches and that the new public consideration averred to by the Office of the President denied the CMTC due process. She was reminded by correspondence of the company’s policy of not accepting married women as employees.

“because executive evaluation of timber licenses and their consequent cancellation in the process of formulating policies with regard to the utilization of timber lands is a prerogative of the executive department and in the absence of evidence showing grave abuse of discretion courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion. . question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the said budget as provided for by Presidential Decrees 81. With a new congress replacing the one manlegislature. Facts: The 1990 budget consisted of P98. . The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed. J. not implied”. . Main Issue/ Held/Ratio: WON the new policy of forest conservation and protection could affect the previous TLAs mentioned.” Public respondents herein. Since petitioner failed to protest the grant of concession within a “reasonable time”. .34 ban in the country (Congress still needing to make an announcement regarding the issue). 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. modified. replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Guingona v. . 5(5). . any new policy consideration should be prospective in application and cannot affect petitioner’s vested rights in its TLA no.5 Page No. and permits or licenses issued. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities. when statutes run contrary to the Constitution. They may be validly amended. . .Mars Veloso 1C. Thus. Art. it shall be void. Thus. the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. Petitioners allege that the allotted budget runs contrary to Sec. As evidenced by reports. 117. .5B. it would seem that CMTC was one of those whose TLAs were terminated in 1983. 7 of the Civil Code. new legislation regarding appropriation should be . and 1967. Carague April 22. . .8 going to debt service) and P155. under the previous dispensation. 1991. have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into. Petitioners. Timber licenses. They further contend that the Presidential Decrees are no longer operative since they became functus oficio after President Marcos was ousted. 106. XIV of the Constitution. they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause. action is barred by latches. . Gancayco. as in the present case. More so where. any notice to this effect “must be stated in good form. the judiciary will stand clear. while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources. And as provided by Art.3 from the General Appropriations Act or a total of P233. permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to develop and conserve the country's natural resources. The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and growing global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological system.4B in automatic appropriation (86. and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. as members of the Senate. only P27B was allotted for DECS. a year before its concession was awarded to FLDC. and that in any case. most especially in this country.

10 then a law must be passed by Congress to authorize said automatic appropriation.7B for education in violation of Sec. certainty and exactness in an appropriation. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. There are other imperatives of national interest that it must attend to. the amount allotted to education. however. The enormous national debt.Mars Veloso 1C. Article XIV of the Constitution. Absent an automatic appropriation clause.8B. Second. All appropriation. The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment. debt-to-debt or other such schemes. The Court disagrees that Congress’ hands are hamstrung by the provision provided. They assert that there must be definiteness. First. or to enter into arrangements that could lighten our outstanding debt burden debt-to-equity. . also. 24. if Congress . the Philippine Government has to await and depend upon Congressional action. 24. 27. in layman's parlance. bills authorizing increase of the public debt. delayed payments and arrearages may have supervened. SolGen argues. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. incurred by the previous administration. Not only for the sake of honor but because the national economy is itself at stake. 11 otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt service.8B for debt service as compared to its appropriation of P27. bills of local application. for example. revenue or tariff bills. said decrees were inconsistent with Sec. is the highest in all department budgets thereby complying with the mandate of having the highest priority as stated above. which by the time this comes. but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.5 Page No. `basket' of foreign exchange and interest rate assumption's which may significantly differ from actual rates not even in proportion to changes on the basis of the assumptions. after adoption of the 1987 Constitution. only to worsen our debt service-to-total expenditure ratio in the budget due to penalties and/or demand for immediatepayment even before due dates. they content that assuming arguendo that the said decrees did not expire with the ouster of Marcos. are based on a mathematical set or matrix or. may no longer be responsive to the intended conditions which in the meantime may have already drastically changed. the automatic appropriation obviates the serious difficulties in debt servicing arising from any deviation from what has been previously programmed. and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. or to shift from short-term to long-term instruments. the claim that payment of the loans and indebtedness is conditioned upon the continuance of the person of President Marcos and his legislative power goes against the intent and purpose of the law. whereby bills have to be approved by the President. Moreover. The purpose is foreseen to subsist with or without the person of Marcos. Current appropriation. Further. 29(1). operating on no laws therefore. petitioners state said decrees violate Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides as follows Sec.35 passed. would be unenforceable. Clearly. Article VI of the Constitution which stated that: Sec. . debt-to-asset. In the meantime. that automatic appropriation provides flexibility: ". which are usually made one year in advance. on the other hand. The annual debt service estimates. 5(5). it enables the Government to take advantage of a favorable turn of market conditions by redeeming high interest securities and borrowing at lower rates. Thus. still needs to be paid." Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON appropriation of P86.

The transitory provision provided in Sec. necessitated by the very nature of the problem being. No. letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended. these decrees issued by President Marcos relative to debt service were tailored for the periods covered by said decrees.36 allotted more for debt service such an appropriation cannot be considered by this Court as unconstitutional. Laws should be construed in light of current laws and not those made by a one-man legislative branch. decrees. No. No. credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefore as the need arises. Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees.Mars Veloso 1C. (2) WON the Presidential Decrees are still operative. The legislative intention in R. Cruz. do they violate Sec. As to the ponencia’s reference to “legislative parameters provided by law”. taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans. The Presidential Decrees do not satisfy this requirement. This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized. debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by virtue of the law. Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or are otherwise amended.D. Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that: All existing laws. The mandate is to pay only the principal. addressed. Section 31 of P. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the country. repealed or revoked. as and when they shall become due. 3. Cruz says no such regulatory boundaries exist. Dissenting: He agrees with Cruz but furthers the argument by saying that Sec. 29 (1). repealed or revoked. Today it is Congress that should determine and approve the proper appropriations for debt servicing. taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans. as this is a matter of policy that. Equally fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury. interest. Padilla. Besides. they are still operative. 4860. .5 Page No. Yes. (3) WON there was undue delegation of legislative power by automatic appropriation. No. or on the bonds.D. 1177 and P. 29(1)Article VI implies that a law enacted by Congress (and approved by the President) appropriating a particular sum or sums must be made before payment from the Treasury can be made. as amended. interest. Dissenting: He sees that an essential requirement for valid appropriation is that the sum authorized for release should be determinate or determinable. proclamations. Article VI of the Constitutional. Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid. credits or indebtedness. executive orders. 1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal.A. and if they are.

Petitioners argue that the letter. 1997. XII Sec. on the other hand. with Art. By praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement. annexes and other parts of the treaty. argues (a) that the charter provisions are not self-executing and are mere general policies. (2) Art. and in the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Facts: The Philippines. ensures that the WTO agreement doesn’t violate the Constitution. 10 – Capital owned by Filipinos. independent economy. and (c) that WTO contains sufficient provisions to protect developing countries like the Philippines from the harshness of trade liberalization.37 in my opinion. concessions for national economy gives preference to qualified Filipinos. Paras. as the policydetermining body of the Government. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The SolGen. pertains to the legislative department. 12 – Preferential use of Filipino labor. J. (3) Art. grants. Panganiban. Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing By its very title. the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. material and goods. 1 and 13. which when read properly as a whole.Mars Veloso 1C. These provisions are allegedly desecrated in the areas of investment measures.5 Page No. by ratification of the President and concurrence of the Senate became a member of the WTO. Dissenting: Any law that undermines our economy and therefore our security is per se unconstitutional. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review. XII Sec. Sec. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution. 19 – Self-reliant. (b) that the provisions shouldn’t be read in isolation but in conjunction . Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON the petition presents a jusiticiable controversy? In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution. Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." (2) WON the WTO agreement and its three annexes contravene the respective provisions in the Constitution. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. trade selected aspects of IPR. XII Sec. These allegedly place foreign nationals on equal footing as Filipinos in contravention of the Constitution’s Filipino-first policy. petitioners are invoking this Court's constitutionally imposed duty "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate Resolution No. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. spirit and intent of the Constitution mandating “economic nationalism” are violated by the “parity provisions” and “national treatment” clauses scattered in the agreement. Angara May 2. 97." The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution 21 is called the "basic political creed of the nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. As held in the leading case of Tanada v. Main provisions which are supposedly violated by the WTO agreement are the following: (1) Art II. and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. privileges.

and (3) An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged. Rather. privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony" and in the use of "Filipino labor. XII is self-executing or not. All told. Government Service Insurance System. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory.5 Page No. second par. services. the Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of "a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity". as follows: (1) A more equitable distribution of opportunities. income and wealth. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods.38 Kilosbayan. (2) A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation for the benefit of the people. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. and (3) by requiring the State to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. which comprise the vast majority of its members. labor and enterprises. this Court held that "Sec." In similar language. as the constitutional provision itself states. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. domestic materials and locally-produced goods". Incorporated vs. WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies Upon the other hand. as a rule. Morato.Mars Veloso 1C. with each member's vote equal in weight to that of any other. it does not prohibit them. it is enforceable only in regard to "the grants of rights. (2) by mandating the State to "adopt measures that help make them competitive. in the WTO. Art. respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing economies. 1 lays down the basic goals of national economic development. services and investments into the country. goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. It is per se judicially enforceable. In other words. it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair." It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. Sec. There is no WTO equivalent of the UN Security Council. It did not shut out foreign investments. 10 of Art.. the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions. the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos "in the grant of rights. et al. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council. at the same time. there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. 10.. while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods. privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony" and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. And we hold that there are. and speaks of industries "which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets" as well as of the protection of "Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. . It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. the issue is whether. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation." However. With these goals in context. the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality." Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional Mandates to attain Balanced Development of Economy As pointed out by the Solicitor General.

" "national treatment. the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy" does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments. filed a complaint in the RTC. and future generations of those who are entitled to the benefits of the country’s virgin tropical forests. minors represented by their parents. goods and services. rather." the fundamental law encourages industries that are "competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. Within the WTO. developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to "share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development. sponsor of this constitutional policy: "Economic self reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. Not Industries or Enterprises The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise. And given a free trade environment. Twenty five years ago. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on "equality and reciprocity. especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities.39 Hence. it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Recent surveys. Thus. the countless multitudes. the Philippine Islands will be bereft of national resources after the end of the decade. Oposa v." The WTO reliance on "most favored nation. It contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the international community. This is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. if not earlier. nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with a total proscription of foreign competition.8% of the country’s land area is composed of tropical virgin rainforests." thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment. Constitution Favors Consumers. Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion.Mars Veloso 1C. poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Factoran Facts: Petitioners. in the meantime. tropical virgin forests amounted to 53% of our land area but in 1987." Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition Furthermore. it was a taxpayer’s class suit representing themselves. Plaintiffs assert their constitutional ." As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas." and "trade without discrimination" cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire. show that only 2. satellite images showed that only four percent of the land was covered by forests. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy.5 Page No. The plaintiff’s complaint was specified as follows: that a balanced and healthful ecology in the Philippines is evidenced by 54% forest cover and 46% everything else. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Public records reveal that at the present rate of deforestation. Indeed. but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets.

waters. . The amended petition to the SC repeated its earlier right to a sound environment. development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. land. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include. and cease and desist from accepting. Feliciano. management. It is his understanding that the Court’s decision implies that within the collection of statutes. (3) Are the TLAs contracts? Are they protected by the nonimpairment clause? No. at the same time. the State may still revoke such agreements when public interest demands it." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON petitioners have standing. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. inter alia. for themselves. then head of the DENR.40 right to a balanced and healthful ecology and claim that they are entitled to protection of this right by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can. Even if a law is passed mandating cancellation/modification of the TLAs. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. and added that (a) TLAs were not contracts and even if they were considered protected by the non-impairment clause. there is a need to implead the guarantees of the same for they are indispensable parties. Petitioners should seek a specific legal right. The trial court dismissed the complaint and the judge stated that the relief sought for (cancellation of TLAs) cannot be done because it would not allow due process. Concurring: Although the petitioners are in fact entitled to a balanced and healthful ecology as stressed by the Constitutional right. (2) Is there a specific right violated that would serve a the petitioner’s cause of action? Yes. The implications of making the Sections in Article II self-executory are not the subject of this case. The complaint was filed against Factoran. Article II of the Constitution provides the right. Needless to say. one cannot classify such a right as “specific” without doing excessive violence to the language. offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration.5 Page No. every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. the same cannot be stigmatized as a violation of nonimpairment clause because it is within the State’s exercise of police power to protect its ecology. the judicious disposition. it would order the DENR to cancel all existing timber licensing agreements (TLAs) in the country. and is therefore subject to judicial scrutiny. and (b) in granting more TLAs to cover more areas of land than what is available is an act constituting grave abuse of discretion. file a class suit. the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes. renewing. considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature. processing. minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. and approving TLAs. the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. fisheries. renewal and conservation of the country's forest. mineral. 16. A cause of action is therefore present but as far as cancellation of TLA’s is concerned. Put a little differently. Sec. wildlife. Such a right. there is a specific right which the petitioners can use. The petitioners. for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations. utilization.Mars Veloso 1C. as hereinafter expounded.

Court .” An investigation ensued with the report concluding the following: (1) The lands being sold to AMARI were lands of the public domain which the government has not yet classified as alienable. in a privileged speech. was mandated to reclaim land. a Legal Task Force was formed by the President to study the JVA. Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON the case is academic and moot after subsequent events. etc… sell. Respondents – Yes. The JVA intended to develop the reclaimed Freedom Islands and reclaim an additional 250 hectares surrounding said islands.PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. Article II. After such a maneuver. as authorized by its charter created by Marcos. however. and lease these reclaimed lands. Transfer Certificate of Titles of the then reclaimed Freedom Islands were given to PEA during this time. Petitioner’s principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of Section 3. If the Amended JVA indeed violates the Constitution. the task force upheld its legality. The Amended JVA. satisfied petitioner’s prayer for disclosure of renegotiations. contending the following: Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. In 1996. moot. Petitioner 18 prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA. it is the duty of the As you’ll gather from the last few deplorable digests (and this last one) … I’ve run out of juice. improve. Article III. Estates Authority18 Facts: PEA. but contrary to the Senate investigation that decried the JVA. invoking Section 28. called the JVA “the grandmother of all scams. In 1997. During Ramos’ tenure as President. PEA. in 1998. to file suit as a taxpayer. (2) Transfer Certificate of Titles of the Freedom Islands are then void.41 Chavez v. During the time of Cory. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution. of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations.Mars Veloso 1C. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3. and the (3) JVA entered into is illegal. Finally. – Mars. develop. Presidential approval does not resolve the constitutional issue or remove it from the ambit of judicial review. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. because already signed. Petitioners . pushed through after being signed by PEA and AMARI. Chavez prayed that the renegotiated contract be declared null and void based on constitutional and statutory grounds.counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by simply fast-tracking the signing and approval of the Amended JVA before the Court could act on the issue. Article XII of the Constitution. Feel free to fix/update/mock them at your convenience. This prompted Chavez. more land was transferred to PEA under its name. with the approval of then President Estrada. which prohibits the government from alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations. petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion. a private corporation without public bidding. . and therefore the PEA has no authority to sell yet.5 Page No. and Section 7. Senate President Maceda. Phil.

petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention. exclusive and notorious occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain for at least thirty years since June 12. Article VIII of the Constitution. PEA has no affirmative duty to disclose such information. to annul the effects of such unconstitutional contract. 141 (“CA No. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. this is in violation of the rule of mandamus. Also. not of a public bidding. The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the reclamation project. the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. In the instant case. or its counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure. a public corporation. Tuvera is different from the current situation because there. Lastly. (2) WON the petition should be dismissed because judicial hierarchy wasn’t respected. 1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA No. 141” for brevity). PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. and if already implemented. the deadline for filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired on December 31. covered agricultural lands sold to private corporations which acquired the lands from private parties. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. Respondent – they didn’t ask us for the information before proceeding to Court to issue a mandamus. Besides. As it is not a trier of facts. Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim judicial confirmation of their titles because the lands covered by the Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be reclaimed. PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA. 1945 or earlier.5 Page No. the mandamus was warranted. reclaimed lands and submerged areas for non-agricultural purposes by purchase under PD No. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. continuous. 141. the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5.42 Court to enjoin its implementation. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case. The instant case. raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. Court . was the result of a negotiated contract. the ExecDept had an affirmative statutory duty to publish the President Decrees and thus. a government corporation. Also. Certain undertakings by AMARI under the Amended JVA constitute the consideration for the purchase. AMARI seeks to acquire from PEA. 1987. however. (3) WON the petition should be dismissed because of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies. PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from the Court. there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code. Under the Amended JVA.The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA. PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter’s seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses. All previous decisions of the Court involving Section 3. In the instant case. and was even in breach of this legal duty. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title requires open.Mars Veloso 1C. . The transferors of the private corporations claimed or could claim the right to judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles under Title II of Commonwealth Act. Tanada v. The law obligated PEA to make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. like the Amended JVA. The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. the disposition of government lands to private parties requires public bidding. the instant petition is a case of first impression.

documents and papers — a right guaranteed under Section 7.43 Moreover. Thus. Similarly. In Chavez v. thus “Besides.’ He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities.’ Moreover. PEA also claims that petitioner has not shown that he will suffer any concrete injury because of the signing or implementation of the Amended JVA. i. ‘public interest [was] definitely involved considering the important role [of the subject contract] . PCGG. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal standing.e. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case. . management and operation of the Manila International Container Terminal.5 Page No. such as in this case.[28] the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer’s suit on matters of transcendental importance to the public. the matter of recovering the illgotten wealth of the Marcoses is an issue of ‘transcendental importance to the public. Reyes. The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to official records. Further. There are two constitutional issues involved here. information which the Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. Article III of the 1987 Constitution.’ and if they ‘immediately affect the social. is a Filipino citizen. when the subject of the case involved public interest. the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. and this alone is determinative of this issue. First is the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. Petitioner. the disclosure provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for upholding the petitioner's standing. Moreover. (1) . petitioner emphasizes. He invokes several decisions of this Court which have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi. as a consequence. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands worth billions of pesos.’ We concluded that. the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question. the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right. a former solicitor general. in Albano v. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution. economic and moral well being of the people. (4) Do petitioners have standing? PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his constitutional right to information without a showing that PEA refused to perform an affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution. if the issues raised are of ‘paramount public interest. in the economic development of the country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved.Mars Veloso 1C. The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer’s suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation. . we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have been involved under the questioned contract for the development.

As explained by the Court in Valmonte v. and to documents. as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights. An informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. and papers pertaining to official acts. this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. thus: Sec. subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit. Yet.” (5) Whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.Mars Veloso 1C. shall be afforded the citizen. Access to official records. Section 7.” PEA asserts. These twin provisions are essential to the exercise of freedom of expression. we rule that the petition at bar should be allowed. Belmonte. Article II of the Constitution. Requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at the pre-decisional stage will degrade the quality of decision-making in government agencies. Article III of the Constitution explains the people’s right to information on matters of public concern in this manner: Sec. will be speculative and amount to nothing. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. 28.”[29] for unless citizens have the proper information. . putting them under all kinds of pressure before they decide. even if expressed without any restraint. AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the right. “An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. These twin provisions are also essential to hold public officials “at all times x x x accountable to the people.[31] that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to information is limited to “definite propositions of the government. as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development. If the government does not disclose its official acts. transactions. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people’s will. transactions and decisions to citizens.5 Page No. Armed with the right information.” The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people’s right to information on matters of public concern.44 the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen. PCGG. Jr. 7.” These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government. whatever citizens say. citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. This State policy is expressed in Section 28.” PEA maintains the right does not include access to “intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the ‘exploratory stage’. citing Chavez v. they cannot hold public officials accountable for anything. Government officials will hesitate to express their real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public dissemination of their discussions. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.” Also. or decisions. AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-decisional stage or before the closing of the transaction.

establishing. however. From this moment. as well as other government representatives. The first category refers to any document that is part of the public records in the custody of government agencies or officials. These include the size. of course. The third category refers to research data. the parties qualified to bid. and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition process. we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers.5 Page No. supporting. Information. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern. While the evaluation or review is still on-going. a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. transactions. the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood that the right to information “contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction. must pertain to definite propositions of the government.” namely: (1) official records.” The right covers three categories of information which are “matters of public concern. because the Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. Such information. the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated. (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts. the terms and conditions of the disposition. disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its property. any citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time during the bidding process. and information the constitutional right to information requires PEA to release to the public. not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the “exploratory” stage. or decisions” on the bids or proposals. on its own and without demand from anyone. justifying or explaining official acts. confirming. once the committee makes its official recommendation. . Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract. evidencing. diplomatic or foreign relations. to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general. as discussed earlier – such as on matters involving national security. There is need. effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. the Court ruled as follows: “Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution.” Contrary to AMARI’s contention. PCGG.45 We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires PEA to disclose publicly. transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials. and if one is consummated. If PEA fails to make this disclosure. nor a retreat by the State of its avowed “policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. technical description and nature of the property being disposed of. location. In Chavez v. to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. the minimum price and similar information. though. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right. Before the consummation of the contract. PEA must.Mars Veloso 1C. there arises a “definite proposition” on the part of the government. becomes a fait accompli. and (3) government research data used in formulating policies. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information. Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract. Otherwise. which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal. there are no “official acts.” Certainly. However. transactions and decisions. intelligence and other classified information. long before the consummation of the contract. The second category refers to documents and papers recording. it may be too late for the public to expose its defects. the public’s right to information attaches.

collated or processed. The 592. legal and expert opinions. the 592. This is not the situation in the instant case. however. owned by the government and used in formulating government policies. The right does not also apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets. . terms of reference and other documents attached to such reports or minutes. which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information. documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations.46 whether raw. like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts. summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to information in several legislations. or executive sessions of either house of Congress. (6) Whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands. There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential. recommendations. abstracts. which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists. 2.5 Page No. The right may also be subject to other limitations that Congress may impose by law. like rules specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain. subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. The right to information. are alienable lands of the public domain. In their present state. However. We can now summarize our conclusions as follows: 1. Legislative and Judicial power. are recognized as confidential. The 157. which courts have long recognized as confidential.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. violate the Constitution. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands. all relating to the JVA. One who exercises the right must copy the records. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens. military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. The information. or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which. information affecting national security. does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the separation of powers. documents and papers. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments. that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. therefore. free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties. and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused.Mars Veloso 1C. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. correspondences. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. We rule. The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation reports. reclaimed or to be reclaimed. now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA. however. The right only affords access to records. The information does not cover Presidential conversations. minutes of meetings.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

Civil Service and Election). 4. agencies. and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. whether voluntary or compulsory. the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3. x x x From the three (3) cases above-mentioned (Sarmiento III vs. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. et al. the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable. Mary Concepcion Bautista v. 1. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16.). Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Thereafter. such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2. commissions. v.47 3. et al. and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. Calderon vs.5 Page No. in the courts. Mison. WHEREFORE.34 hectares[110] of the Freedom Islands. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.R. contracts whose “object or purpose is contrary to law. vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone. . VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides: Sec. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress. but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters. or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain. Still. appoint the heads of the executive departments. the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress may. other public ministers and consuls.Mars Veloso 1C. Salonga and Teresita Quintos Deles.156 hectares[111] of still submerged areas of Manila Bay. 16. Article VII. Under Article 1409[112] of the Civil Code. ownership of 77. Art. Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio. The Commission on Constitutional Commissions. 91636 April 23. with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. the petition is GRANTED. 16. or boards. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.” are “inexistent and void from the beginning.. these doctrines are deducible: 1. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. Besides. or in the heads of departments. a private corporation. there is no necessity to rule on this last issue. No. including. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI. Clearly. Carale G. Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of whether the Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government. such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3. and further declare them no longer needed for public service. ambassadors. 1992 Controversy is focused anew on Sec. The President shall nominate and. by law. those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit.” or whose “object is outside the commerce of men. the Court is not a trier of facts.” The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution. and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

VII of the Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. the first sentence of Sec.48 2. in a way. 16. Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative. require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of appointments extended by the president to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. Art. President Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public. Sometime in March 1989. 13 of RA 6715 amending Art. Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Article VII of the Constitution. the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Section 16. 16. Art.5 Page No. . It provides in Section 13 thereof as follows: xxx xxx xxx The Chairman. 215 of the Labor Code. Art. without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. beyond redemption if we are to render fealty to the mandate of the Constitution in Sec. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights). RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law). Pursuant to said law (RA 6715). the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President. and 2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. as we see it. the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715. Regretfully. by law. The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes. VII thereof. Determining their constitutionality is a judicial function. . 16. Supreme Court decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. . ISSUE 1: Whether or not Congress may. upon recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. The Court respects the laudable intention of the legislature. the constitutional infirmity of Sec. . amending the Labor Code (PD 442) was approved. the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. and shall be subject to the Civil Service Law. Art. however. Also. when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto. VII of the Constitution. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor. more specifically under the "third groups" of appointees referred to in Mison. 16. Indubitably. a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed.Mars Veloso 1C. it is unconstitutional because: 1) it amends by legislation. or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such appointments. HELD: No. No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc. rules and regulations. VII of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the President. To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. insofar as it requires confirmation of the Commission on Appointments over appointments of the Chairman and Member of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is. Undeniably. as observed in Mison.e. i. The Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall also be appointed by the President. workers and employers sectors.

. The Constitution did not change with public opinion. Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. vs. The Lambino Group claims that: (a) their petition had the support of 6. 1. and as long as it it speaks not only in the same words. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis interpretado legis vim obtinent" � the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. . or what a specific portion of the Constitution means. David. particularly those governing the separation of powers.3 million individuals.Digest On 15 February 2006. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is hereby declared unconstitutional and of no legal force and effect. Commission on Elections. Lambino. however. of course. with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its registered voters. but the same in meaning . It is not only the same words. . the Lambino Group filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. and was voted and adopted by the people . The proposed changes under the petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. but not to interpret them. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. the petition is DISMISSED. The initiative petition does not comply with Section 2. the Constitution. especially after the courts have in actual case ascertained its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision.49 since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. (Emphasis supplied) Congress. which also threw out the petition. must interpret the Constitution. must estimate the scope of its constitutional powers when it sets out to enact legislation and it must take into account the relevant constitutional prohibitions. denied due course to the petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Santiago vs. If the Legislature may declare what a law means. 2. this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. 174153. the group of Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado (”Lambino Group”) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. the Court held: We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws. On 25 August 2006.952 individuals constituting at least 12% of all registered voters." WHEREFORE. No. et al. The function of the Court in passing upon an act of Congress is to "lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former" and to "announce its considered judgment upon the question. The COMELEC. Article XVII of the Constitution on direct proposal by the people Section 2.R.5 Page No. being clearly violative of the fundamental principles of our constitutional system of government. a final court determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law or of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative department that would be neither wise nor desirable. ISSUE 2: Can legislation expand a constitutional provision after the Supreme Court has interpreted it? In Endencia and Jugo vs. COMELEC (G. . Under such a system. but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers. which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. The Lambino Group elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. . This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law. . While this provision does not expressly state that the . .327. Art. 25 October 2006) . and (b) COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.Mars Veloso 1C.

is beyond doubt a revision. and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception.” In contrast. the proposal must be embodied in a petition. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. applies only to “amendments to this Constitution. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral. faceless. and unelected individuals. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before . The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision through initiatives Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. That’s why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be “directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition” . Does the Lambino Group’s initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution? Yes. Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution.50 petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments. A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of . referring to the first and second modes. or revision of. or sentence of text of the proposed changes in the signature sheet.Mars Veloso 1C. First. The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. and (b) in particular. the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction. as an initiative upon a petition. Section 2 of Article XVII. 2. In contrast. involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress.meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. The first mode is through Congress upon threefourths vote of all its Members. If so attached. a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a UnicameralParliamentary system. the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people’s initiative. phrase. or attached to it. The initiative violates Section 2. In the case of the Lambino Group’s petition. Moreover. The third mode is through a people’s initiative.Parliamentary system of government. Second.” This distinction was intentional as shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. This omission is fatal. Section 1 of Article XVII. applies to “any amendment to.5 Page No. This means two essential elements must be present. Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. this Constitution. referring to the third mode.not after signing. not a mere amendment. the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed. On so vital an issue as amending the nation’s fundamental law. the petition must state the fact of such attachment. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution. and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. there’s not a single word. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. “an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed” and failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative void.

“a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan† includes “change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches. or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change. Similarly. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution. and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution. as well as how it affects the structure of government. or several provisions of a constitution. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions.” Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests. the substitution of the word “republican” with “monarchic” or “theocratic” in Section 1. the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances. constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. However. On the other hand. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution. but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered.51 checks-and-balances. The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. For example. a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.” Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry.affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. to undertake only amendments and not revisions. the Lambino Group’s initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. The main inquiry is whether the change will “accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision. a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100% to 60% is an amendment and not a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions. Thus. On the other hand.5 Page No. Also. Quantitatively. from presidential to parliamentary. while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended. Qualitatively. Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles. Thus. Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article. For example. a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. the Lambino Group’s proposed changes overhaul two articles . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. . depending on how it affects other provisions. Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. constitutions allow people’s initiatives. In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution. reduces. amendment broadly refers to a change that adds. Thus. as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution.Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive . there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision.Mars Veloso 1C. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings. the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government. a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is an amendment and not a revision.” A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that “jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances. the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision.

The same substantive changes. The Commission on Elections. 2167. promulgated Resolution No. assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167. ruled that the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group’s theory. Section 10(a). Lambino. Republic Act No. There is. The 6. 90878 January 29. Article XVII of the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. Prohibition on columnists. no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete.Mars Veloso 1C.com/blog/lambino-vs-comelec-gr-174153-25october-2006-digest/ 3. Section 5(b). SANIDAD vs. Donato and Agra signed the petition and amended petition. this will not change the result here because the present petition violates Section 2. COMELEC G. or vocation” out of such endeavor. No.5 Page No. b. however. therefore. COMELEC is not necessary The petition failed to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2. 3. who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER. In a petition dated November 20. The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between “amendment” and “revision” is only one of procedure. inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. providing that no petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate. when proposed through an initiative. A revisit of Santiago vs. not of substance. commentators or announcers. Sanidad. which provides: Section 19. Likewise. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated. The SC. requiring that the people must sign the petition as signatories. which provision must first be complied with even before complying with RA 6735. the petition violates the following provisions of RA 6735: a.R. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a UnicameralParliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. 1990 PABLITO V. the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS On October 23. as when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras. no mass media columnist. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.3 million signatories did not sign the petition or the amended petition filed with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution. entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. Sanidad vs. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. herein petitioner Pablito V. It’s settled that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds. The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions. courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language. Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid. Source: http://jlp-law. 6766. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. 1989. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government. 1989. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Only Attys. � During the plebiscite campaign period. profession. are called “amendments” because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an “occupation. to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. . is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Worse.52 A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution. on the day before and on the plebiscite day. substantive changes are called “revisions” because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes.

In a plebiscite. Leyson vs. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times. Comelec. neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b). No. Therefore. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. where the constitutionality of the prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda was assailed. It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to take a leave of absence. the electorate is asked to vote for or against issues. announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues. the same is not meritorious. v. In other words. announcer or personality. including the forum. Office of the Ombudsman G. including reasonable. L-32546. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. This is also the reason why a "columnist. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason. it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. In fact. for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. 6646). not candidates in a plebiscite. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. votes are taken in an area on some special political matter unlike in an election where votes are cast in favor of specific persons for some office. 16.A. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises. Anent respondent Comelec's argument that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the organic act because he may do so through the Comelec space and/or Comelec radio/television time. In the case of Badoy. permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities. 2nd par. Section 11(b) R.Mars Veloso 1C. of R. 1970. and the right to reply.5 Page No. While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression. HELD: It is clear from Art. commentator. the instant petition is GRANTED. there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. 2000 . 134990 April 27." The evil sought to be prevented in an election which led to Our ruling in that case does not obtain in a plebiscite. Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. We ruled therein that the prohibition is a valid exercise of the police power of the state "to prevent the perversion and prostitution of the electoral apparatus and of the denial of equal protection of the laws. 2167 is unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. Jr.A. Oct. The restraining order herein issued is hereby made permanent.R. time and space. equal rates therefor. who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. 2167 has no statutory basis. However. ISSUE: Whether Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. ACCORDINGLY. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional.53 commentator. 4.

falsification of documents and reports to stop the operation of MT Transasia. Leyson Jr.85% of the shares of UNITED COCONUT. it was acquired to perform functions related to government programs and policies on oil. But these jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner in support of his claim that the CIIF companies are government owned and/or controlled corporations are incomplete without resorting to the definition of "government owned or controlled corporation" contained in par. based on the finding that the case involved breach of contract. The OMB dismissed the complaint. any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature. to the extent of at least fiftyone (51) percent of its capital stock. and respondent Oscar A. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44. which is not the owner of MT Marilag. in fact. i.influenced their insurance to disqualify MT Transasia. and. It was acquired not temporarily but as a permanent adjunct to perform essential government or government-related functions. Torralba. and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly. (f) engaged and entered into a contract with Southwest Maritime Corp.24% of the shares of GRANEXPORT. any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Torralba with violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act also before the Ombudsman anchored on the aforementioned alleged irregularities and corrupt practices. The following is a summary of the irregularities and corrupt practices allegedly committed by respondent Torralba: (a) breach of contract .. (13). Our concern has thus been limited to GRANEXPORT and UNITED COCONUT as we go back to the second requisite. There is no showing that GRANEXPORT and/or UNITED COCONUT was vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature unlike PETROPHIL in Quimpo. or. It is now funded and owned by the government as. owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly. it is in this regard that petitioner failed to substantiate his contentions.00. 2. PETROPHIL became a subsidiary of PNOC and thus shed-off its private status. 15 Obviously. Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987. or. Unfortunately. (g) overpricing in the freight rate causing losses of millions of pesos to Cocochem. vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature. as the marketing arm of the PNOC to assist the latter in selling and distributing oil and petroleum products to assure and maintain an adequate and stable domestic supply. filed with public respondent Office of the Ombudsman a grievance case against respondent Oscar A. and 92.54 On 11 March 1997 petitioner Manuel M. and. third. which is a government-owned or controlled corporation. (c) manipulation . namely.5 Page No. The definition mentions three (3) requisites. In the present case. where liabilities were waived and whose paid-up capital is only P250. where applicable as in the case of stock corporations. second.000. after it was acquired by PNOC. first.. a vital commodity in the economic life of the nation. (b) bad faith .unilateral cancellation of valid and existing contract. 91. Sec. On 2 January 1998 petitioner charged respondent Tirso Antiporda. the below 51% shares of stock in LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the definition of a government owned or controlled corporation. to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. ISSUE: Whether the OMB committed GADLAEJ in dismissing the complaint HELD: Quimpo v. Tanodbayan involved the issue as to whether PETROPHIL was a government owned or controlled corporation the employees of which fell within the jurisdictional purview of the Tanodbayan for purposes of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. e. We upheld the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan on the ratiocination that � While it may be that PETROPHIL was not originally "created" as a government-owned or controlled corporation. Chairman of UCPB and CIIF Oil Mills. (e) double standards and inconsistent in favor of MT Marilag. Executive Vice President of ITTC. The Court thus concludes that .Mars Veloso 1C. where applicable as in the case of stock corporations. (d) unreasonable denial of requirement imposed. all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies were organized as stock corporations.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL.

n�t SO ORDERED. violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. private corporations not within the scope of its jurisdiction. WHEREFORE. January 22. November 9.. 1973 SANIDAD V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS . LEGAL REALISM. the petition is DISMISSED. AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION” ROBERT CLINTON (1987) “CONSTITUTIONAL EMPIRICISM: QUASI-NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRUTHS” TIMOTHY ZICK (2003) ART XVII: REMAKING THE CONSTITUTION “MALOLOS: THE CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC” TEODORO AGONCILLO (1997) “FROM MCKINLEY’S INSTRUCTIONS CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS ON CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM” VICENTE MENDOZA (SEE LEGAL HISTORY REVIEWER) MABANAG V LOPEZ VITO TO THE THE NEW PHILIPPINE GONZALES V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS .Petitioners questioned legitimacy of Aquino government. . PRELIMINARIES ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMMISSION ABAKADA GURO V ERMITA METHOD AND INTERPRETATION “ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING. 1971 PLANAS V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS . 1973 JAVELLANA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY . May 22. i. 1976 MITRA V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. e. is different from the cause of action in the case pending before the trial court which is collection of a sum of money plus damages. Gordon 16 is instructive that forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action.. The Resolution of public respondent Office of the Ombudsman of 30 January 1998 which dismissed the complaint of petitioner Manuel M. either simultaneously or successively.1�wphi1. we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by petitioner. as found by public respondent. is AFFIRMED. October 12. 1967 TOLENTINO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS . for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. as well as its Order of 4 June 1998 denying his motion for reconsideration.55 the CIIF companies are. It is readily apparent that the present charge will not prosper because the cause of action herein.Mars Veloso 1C. April 4. March 31. 1981 LAWYERS’ LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES V AQUINO EN BANC. Costs against petitioner. 1986 FACTS/ISSUES . Leyson Jr. Executive Secretary v.5 Page No. October 16. A brief note on private respondents' charge of forum shopping. With the foregoing conclusion.

1997 FACTS Atty. . Sen. Jesus Delfin filed to the COMELEC a petition to amend the Constitution through a people’s initiative. The COMELEC took cognizance of their petition and set the case up for hearing. he wanted to amend Sec 4 and 7 of Article 6. Miriam Defensor Santiago. (1) Petitioners have no personality and no cause of action.April 10. making it a de jure gov’t. on the other hand.Mars Veloso 1C.5 Page No. .Atty. . WON the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin petition HELD 1.Proclamation No.” . . 1987 SANTIAGO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS DAVIDE. in Sec 2 of the Act (Statement and Policy). there is no separate subtitle for initiative for the Constitution. . (5) Eleven members of SC have sworn to uphold law under her gov’t. but revisions. in defiance of the provisions of 1973 Consti. arguing on the same points.Court already voted to dismiss. Lozano withdrew petitions and said that they would pursue it by extra-judicial methods.Court may brush aside technicalities in cases of transcendental importance. Yes. IN RE: SATURNINO BERMUDEZ . WON RA 6735 is an adequate enabling law for people’s initiative 3. WON the court can take action of this case despite there being a pending case before the COMELEC 2. (2) Legitimacy of gov’t is NOT justiciable. .56 . 2.Second. 3. DIK and MABINI filed their motions for intervention. it seems that the word Constitution was a delayed afterthought. and is a political question where people are the only judge. He asks the COMELEC to assist them in gathering the sufficient number of signatures by setting up signature stations all over the country.Case may be treated as a special civil action for certiorari since delfin didn’t come up with the minimum number of signatures .First. ISSUES 1. in the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the constitution. 1986 DE LEON V ESGUERRA August 31. Thereafter. The law is inadequate. (4) Community of nations has also accepted it. HELD Petitions have no merit. LABAN. March 19.Her gov’t was said to be illegal since it was not established pursuant to 1973 Consti.October 24. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.Third. as required by COMELEC Resolution No. No. Comelec’s failure to act on roco’s motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under sec 2 rule 65 of rules of court . It only proves that it is silent to amendments in the constitution. Senator Raul Roco then filed a motion to dismiss before the COMELEC. 2300 is valid 4. Sec 4 of Article 7 and Sec 8 of Article 10 in order to lift the term limits of all elective government officials. The word Constitution was neither germane nor relevant to the said section. In his petition. She further alleges that what the petitioners are willing to propose are not amendments. 2300.April 17. saying that RA 6735 is deficient insofar as the initiative for amending the Constitution is concerned. WON the COMELEC resolution no. stating that it was not the initiatory petition properly cognizable before the COMELEC. filed a special civil action for prohibition.“…Aquino gov’t is installed through direct exercise of power of the Filipino people. (3) People have already accepted such gov’t. which is in effective control of the country.

delivered a speech entitled "I ACCUSE" wherein he accused Estrada of receiving 220 million pesos worth of jueteng money from Gov.Comelec cannot be delegated power. the law clearly intends to include amendments to the Constitution. Chavit Singson. 2000 ~ Estrada's "sharp decent from power" began. It only follows that since the RA 6735 is incomplete. 3. Heherson Alvarez.5 Page No. 2000~ Sen. Singson . Estrada's family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.May 11.Nature: Writ of Preliminary Injunction against complaints against him until his term is over . 4. PANGANIBAN RA 6735 is not perfect but taken together with the Constitution and COMELEC Res.Therefore.The privilege speech was referred by Sen. . Singson. FACTS . some 10 million Filipinos voted for Estrada and both Estrada and Arroyo were to serve a 6-year term. Drilon to the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice for joint investigation . it seems that the main thrust of the act is on initiative and referendum of national and local laws. . No. since the law is incomplete as it fails to provides a sufficient policy and standard for the delegated power. 11. . Also. ESTRADA V DESIERTO PUNO. The intent of the framers was to provide for a law for initiative on amendments to the Constitution. FRANCISCO [concur and dissent] looking at the definition of terms in the said RA. (he cited the sponsorship remarks of Roco) VITUG The COMELEC should have dismissed the petition. it does not have the power to prescribe rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.Oct. Decision Petition granted SEPARATE OPINION PUNO [concur and dissent] RA 6735 is not defective. since it did not have the required number of signatures. RESOLUTION . Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach Estrada.Mars Veloso 1C. . No. 2000~ CBCP also cried out for Estrada's resignation . Teofisto Guingona Jr. There was insufficient number of signatures.Oct.Reps. Yes. comelec acquires jurisdiction upon filing of the petition. 13. 5. Singson from November 1998 till August 200 and obtained another 70 million peson on excise tax still from Gov. publicly accused Estrada. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Estrada's long time friend.Oct. The delfin petition was only in its initiatory pleading.57 . 2300. . 1998 ~ Estrada was elected President.Oct. Arroyo was VP. 2000 ~ Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement asking Estrada to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern . 4.The House of Reps also decided to investigate the expose of Gov. It failed to provide for details in implementation of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. it is sufficient to implement Constitutional initiatives.

(According to J. the extent of the immunity) 5. 16. . 175 experiencing full support to GMA's administration and also HR no.November ended with a "big-bang" because on November 13.But before that.5 Page No. 2000~ Former Pres. 84 certifying vacancy in the Senate. Ocampo testified that she was one foot away from Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents involving a 500 million pesos investment account with their bank on Feb 4 2000. more bombshells were exploded. Puno: "The heat is on. 2001~ withdrawal of support from the Armed Forces. presiding.Jan 20. betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution) signed by 115 representatives to the Senate. HELD 1. this resulted to what we know as "EDSA II" . passed House Resolution No. WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.Feb. Aquino joined the calls for resignation and former Pres. 2000~ The impeachment trial started. 2001~ Arroyo discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. 20. > He also wrote a letter saying that the VP shall be the acting president and said letter was transmitted to former Speaker Fuentebella and Sen. . Davide Jr. WON the petitions present a justiciable controversy 2.Mars Veloso 1C. Senate passed Res. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading. 176 . No. PNP and mass resignations ensued . WON the petitioner resigned as president 3. which confirmed the authority given by the 12 members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice to administer the oath of office to GMA. change of presidency was done extra-constitutionally whereas EDSA II was .Jan 21. Pimentel.Feb 15. 2001~ Estrada surrendered. of Finance Atty.3 billion pesos in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Panganiban inhibited themselves from participating in this case as per Saguisag's motion. .Dec. graft and corruption. > Estrada left Malacañang and issued a press statement saying that he now leaves Malacañang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. 2001~ Despite the receipt of Estrada's letter. WON the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as president 4. No. (In this part. They of course debunked his charge "that they have compromised their weight on one side" but nonetheless recused themselves.Oct. 2001~ with a vote of 11-10.January 19.CJ Davide and J. > Jan. 7.") . the SVP of Equitable-PCI BANK. ISSUES 1. 21 senators took their oath as judges with SC Chief Justice Hilario G.Feb 7. CJ Davide administered the oath to Arroyo as the President of the Philippines.58 . 82 confirming GMA's nomination of Teofisto Guingona as VP and the Senate's support of the new gov't. 83 recognizing that the impeachment court is functus offictio. and also in the same date.Nov. 17. Arroyo already resigned as DSWD Secretary and also asked for Estrada's resignation but Estrada really held on to his office and refused to resign. Espiritu testified that Estrada jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. House of Reps. . on Oct 12. The Court shall consider as justiciable the issue of WON the change in the presidency was done in the manner prescribed by the 1987 Constitution. The SC issued a resolution. 2001~ Senate passed Res. > Sec. 2001. . At 12 nn. Pres. 2000~ Senate finally opened the impeachment trial.Impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas and when January came. WON the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit (and assuming he enjoys immunity." > In short. House Speaker Manuel Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment (which was based on the grounds of bribery. . 24. Senate passed Resolution No. . the ponente differentiated EDSA I from EDSA II saying that EDSA I was a revolution.Jan. . 8. the Senator judges ruled against opening the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held 3. 2001~ Despite receipt of Estrada's letter claiming inability. . Ramos joined the chorus as well.Dramatic point of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo.

see Art. 1999. i. contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.e. Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal. in his capacity as citizen and taxpayer. 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus. there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity.) 4.In this regard. the President issued Executive Order No. 2000 FACTS . 70 which extended the time frame of the PCCR’s work until Dec 31 1999. WON the Court may issue a writ of mandamus ordering Exec Sec Ronaldo Zamora to provide petitioner with names of executive . ISSUES 1. The Court shall rule that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity. ART VII Sec 8 and ART VII Sec 11 in this case so look at those provisions too. and the manner of implementing the same. WON the President has power to create positions (70) in the Office of the President and appoint presidential consultants (20).” > The PCCR was instructed to complete its task on or before June 30. > The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on Dec 20. The issue is a political question and the Court cannot review Congress' decision without violating the principle of separation of powers. 43 in order to “study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution. Gonzales: > seeks to enjoin the PCCR and the presidential consultants. The Court held (shall rule) that the President enjoys immunity only during his tenure. the President is intervening in a process from which he is totally excluded by the Constitution. . assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the PCCR on two grounds: > it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of law > by creating the PCCR. On Feb 19. (Reasoning in the In Re: Bermudez case that the incumbent President is immune from suit or from being brought to court during his period of his incumbency and tenure but not beyond. advisers and assistants > prays for an order compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner with information on certain matters. 1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same day. the Court is interpreting ART II sec 1. WON petitioner has standing as a citizen 3. (In relation to this. the change was done to an element of the government only and it was done intra-constitutionally because GMA swore to uphold or protect the 1987 Constitution. VII. the amendment of the fundamental charter. The Court held that the question WON it may review and revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing GMA as the de jure President of the Philippines is a political one. . WON petitioner has standing as a taxpayer 4.Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform or PCCR was created by then President Joseph Estrada on Nov 26. WON the case has become moot and academic 2.Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED. advisers (22) and assistants (28) 5. The Court held that resignation shall be determined from the totality of prior. 1999.Ramon Gonzales. Deicison The petitions of Joseph E.) 5. Also. Read it if u want a better understanding.59 not a revolution.5 Page No. (Congress has laid Estrada's claim of inability to rest because of its recognition of GMA as president. August 14.Mars Veloso 1C. Section 8) 3. advisers and assistants from acting as such > seeks to enjoin Exec Sec Ronaldo Zamora from enforcing their advice and recommendations > seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential consultants.) 2. GONZALES V NARVASA GONZAGA-REYES. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.

and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacañang. copies of their appointments. the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action.” The appropriations were authorized by the President.” Decision Petition is dismissed. and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. but also that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement.The right to information is a public right. Obiter Under Sec 7 of EO No 43 which created the PCCR. As enshrined in Sec 7 of the Bill of Rights. V) STATE DEFINED in Kilosbayan v Morato citing Valmonte v Phil Charity Sweepstakes Office . It is beyond the scope of judicial power to give advisory opinion.“matters of public concern” is a term which “embrace(s) a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know. In fact. or decisions. there was no appropriation at all since appropriation has 19 been defined ‘as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury. Ratio A citizen has standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government.Petitioner does not have the personality to raise this issue as he has not proven that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any injury as a result of the appointment. 4. Access to official records. “the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. in the exercise of the Chief Executive’s power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec 25 (5) Art VI of Constitution. shall be afforded the citizen. either because these directly affect their lives. as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development. with the exception that respondent Zamora is ordered to furnish petitioner with information requested. it is for the courts to determine in a case to case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance. the amount of P3 million is “appropriated” for its operational expenses “to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President. and the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and therefore part of the general public which possesses the right. subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Obiter The interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal.5 Page No.’ The funds for the PCCR was taken from the funds intended for the Office of the President. . and he has not alleged the necessary facts to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayer’s interest. 2. Relief prayed for by Gonzales (prohibition) is impossible to grant and is an inappropriate remedy as body sought to be enjoined no longer exists.60 officials holding multiple positions in government. 5. not by Congress. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Appointment is not synonymous with creation. and papers pertaining to official acts. In the final analysis. the action of which is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. Obiter The case has already become moot and academic as the PCCR has already ceased to exist. II. Any ruling regarding the PCCR would only be in the nature of an advisory opinion. Ratio A taxpayer has standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. and to documents. HELD 1. as it relates to or affects the public.19 3. THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE (ART I. transactions. He must be able to show that the law is invalid. or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. .” .Mars Veloso 1C. IV. Ratio An act is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead.

de Cerdeira. similarly would point to the power entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international relations. . . not a foreign country. does not impose transfer or death taxes upon intangible personal properties of our citizens not residing therein. its people occupying a definite territory.If a foreign country is to be identified with a state. or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes.974. must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code HELD . refers to a government of that foreign power which.State is a territorial society divided into government and subjects. Morocco from 1931 up to the time of her death in 1955. . therefore.Collector of Internal Revenue held Antonio Campos Rueda. With the latter requisite satisfied. . that of Liechtenstein. 1971 FACTS . did fall under this exempt category. not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our Government in order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the last proviso of Section 122 of our Tax Code. .Supreme Court affirmed Court of tax Appeal’s Ruling. although not an international person in the sense of international law.Collector of Internal Revenue v.' used in the last proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. liable for the stun of P 161.Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the expression 'foreign country. as administrator of the estate of the late Estrella Soriano Vda. It is. a Spanish national having been a resident of Tangier. Moreover. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.Mars Veloso 1C. .Rueda requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for tax exemption.This Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality. ISSUE Whether or not the requisites of statehood.5 Page No.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes for the transfer of intangible personal properties in the Philippines. it was held to be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.Rueda’s request for exemption was denied on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. . claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of an international personality. De Lara: There can be no doubt that California as a state in the American Union was lacking in the alleged requisite of international personality. acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. October 29.The stress is on its being a nation. respondent denied this request on the grounds that there was no reciprocity [with Tangier. legally supreme within its territory. politically organized. hardly an international personality in the traditional sense. . However. which was moreover] a mere principality.it is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands. the deceased. exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality. it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by ties of nationhood. international law does not exact independence as a condition of statehood. Nonetheless.61 COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V CAMPOS RUEDA FERNANDO. . SOVEREIGNTY AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ART II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES .

5. . and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote. who are at least 18 years of age. restricts and impairs legislative power of the Congress. . property.DTI secretary Rizalino Navarro signed the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. They also claim that since the Senate only concurred with the WTO agreement and not on all the contents of the Final act. ART V SUFFRAGE Sec 1: Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines. practice and procedures. ISSUES 1. 4. . on the other hand.Mars Veloso 1C.Petition dismissed. Until then. they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect secrecy of the ballot.The President signed the Instrument of Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the WTO and the agreements and associated legal instruments of that agreement.Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the treaty.5 Page No. By signing it. which expresses their concurrence in the ratification of the president of the Agreement Establishing the WTO. 1997 FACTS . 10 and 12 Article 12 of the Constitution (“economic nationalism” clauses). Sec. not otherwise disqualified by law.) . Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates form them. the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services to the Senate for its concurrence.The Senate adopted Resolution number 97. HELD .Another letter was sent by the president. 1. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.The president then sent to the senate a letter which submits the Uruguay Round Final Act for their concurrence . the final act aims to liberalize and expand world trade and strengthen the interrelationship between trade and economic policies affecting growth and development. WON the WTO agreement intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading.The final act signed by Secretary Navarro. Yes.62 Sec 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican state. . the Agreement Establishing the WTO. This time. he submits the Uruguay Final Round Act. they impliedly rejected the Final act. May 2. (Final Act). No literacy. WON the concurring of the senate only in the WTO agreement and not in the final act implies rejection of the final act. . WON the parity provisions and national treatment clauses in the WTO agreement violates Sec. or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage Sec 2: The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. for at least six months immediately preceding the election. WON the WTO agreement unduly limits.Petition for Certiorari . he agreed on behalf of the Philippines o To submit the WTO agreement to competent authorities for their approval o Adopt the ministerial declarations and decisions (Basically. TANADA V ANGARA PANGANIBAN. 2. embodies not only the WTO agreement but also the ministerial declarations and decisions and the understanding on commitments in financial services. 3. 19 Article 2. WON the case is justiciable.

.443.The judiciary has the duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress 2. it is just a summary of the proceedings.The declaration of principles are not intended to be selfexecuting. 1959 –Reagan was assigned at the Clark Field Air Base April 22.The WTO protects the weak economies. . 1969 FACTS APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals Petitioner: William Reagan –civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines Respondent: Commissioner of Internal Revenue July 7. its officials and its citizens. provides a similar presumption in cases of infringement of patent design. There are specific provisos in the agreement with respect to tariffs. 1960 –petitioner asked Base Commander for permit to sell the car which was granted provided that he sell it to a member of the US Armed Forces or a US citizen employed in the Philippine . No .The underlying concept in the partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines. REAGAN V COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE FERNANDO. which they did. . No. 4.The burden of proof is not transferred in cases of patent infringement. especially Sec 1 and 13 of Article 12. They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances.Limitations imposed by treaty stipulations .The Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring to as shown by the member’s deliberations.The new rule should not really present any problem in changing the rules of evidence as the present law on the subject.The final act need not be ratified. . . .When the Philippines join the UN. The final act only required that the senate concur with the WTO agreement. 5. It is not the treaty itself. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy.The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise. rather. . No . . . nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with total prescription of foreign competition.There are certain restrictions to the Constitution . Rather. . treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty . .The Constitution does not rule out foreign competition. 3.5 Page No. (Reagan vs Commission of Internal Revenue) .Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events.83 July 11.By their inherent nature.Sovereignty is not absolute because it is subject to restrictions and voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. and by the legislature in enacting laws. they are just aid and guides by the judiciary in judicial review.The economic nationalism provisions should be read with other constitutional mandates.Limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations. December 27. 1960 –He imported a tax-free Cadillac with accessories valued at $6.63 .Conclusion in the third issue also applies. domestic subsidies and protection from unfair competition which are intended to help developing economies. .The Constitution did not envision a hermit type isolation of the country. It is still on the patent owner to introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged identical product. .Mars Veloso 1C. These broad principles need legislative enactments to implement them. No. RA 165 (Patent Law). it consented to restrict its soverign rights under the concept of auto-limitation.

connections or relationship. petitioner Republic. influence. They are still subject to its authority. authority. After paying the sum. respondent. Likewise. 2003 FACTS .5 Page No.00 to Willie Johnson. he sold his car for $6. the Republic. filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan. by its consent. it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character.00 as the income tax paid by petitioner is affirmed. whether located in the Philippines or abroad. its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. directly or through nominees. . So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. 1 did not take part) The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals denying the refund of P2. there is a diminution of its sovereignty. If it does so. . and was charged with the task of assisting the President in the “recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Within its limits. cannot be invoked in this case.64 military bases. They retain their status as native soil.Concept of auto-limitation: Any state may. Jr. . certainly not excluding the power to tax. subordinates and close associates.Petitioner relies on a statement of Justice Tuason in Co Po v.979. by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers. July 15.00 income tax. but it does not disappear.Marcos. Certiorari. . . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. he filed the case with the Court of Tax Appeals which denied his petition.Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court.In said case. the Philippines’ jurisdictional rights over the bases. 2 concur in the result. 1 issued on February 28. relatives. Ferdinand E. of the US Marine Corps. it has to be exclusive. Its jurisdiction may be diminished. .912. the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (estimated to be US$658 million inclusive of interest as of 20 An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the Procedure Therefor. On the same date. represented by his Estate/heirs and Imelda R. his immediate family.The Philippines being independent and sovereign. an appropriate exemption was provided for. He contends that in legal contemplation the sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond its jurisdiction to tax. petitioner sought a refund claiming that he was exempt. pursuant to RA 137920. .Therefore. fixed his net taxable income arising from the sale at P17.Mars Veloso 1C. represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) sought: a. They are not and cannot be foreign territory. express or implied. have been preserved. . It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. .Petitioner asserts that he is exempt from paying the income tax. If it were not thus. 1986 by then President Corazon Aquino.34 rendering him liable for P2. REPUBLIC V SANDIGANBAYAN CORONA. Marcos. its decrees are supreme. including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during is administration. Marcos.As a result of the transaction. submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. .979.Judgment (7 concur. Collector of Internal Revenue: “While in army bases or installations within the Philippines those goods were in contemplation of law on foreign soil. ISSUE WON the Clark Field Air Base is Philippine territory HELD Yes. its commands paramount.Dec 17 1991. through the Presidential Commission on Good Government or PCGG.” The court resolved this by pointing out that the statement was merely obiter dictum in that case and therefore.600. Bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the Military Bases Agreement of 1947 remain part of Philippine territory. after deducting the landed cost of the car as well as petitioner’s personal exemption. As to certain tax matters. but pending action on his request.” . PCGG was created by virtue of Executive Order No. entitled Republic of the Philippines vs.

May 26 1998 Mrs. Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-SpinusAvertina-Foundation accounts 3. *The ff account groups. . a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements dated Dec 28. as ill-gotten wealth. Jr. using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks.5 Page No. essential facts which warrant the forfeiture of the funds are admitted by respondents in their pleadings and other submissions made in the course of the proceeding b. Marcos filed manifestation claiming she was not a party to the motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that the owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate.Oct 18. (Random House Webster’s Legal Dictionary. respondents Imelda R Marcos. other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. Irene M Araneta and Ferdinand R Marcos. The Fund Transfer .” The decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter 21 Money or a deed or other instrument deposited with a third person for a delivery to a given party upon the fulfillment of some condition.65 the time of decision) deposited in escrow21 in the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Switzerland an additional request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in PNB.Mars Veloso 1C. 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family . New York. Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts 5.The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify. While in the keeping of the third party. Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts 2. and funds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow in 1998. the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple’s salaries.Aug 10 1995 petitioner Republic filed with the District Attorney in Zurich. filed their answer.It was stated in one of the “whereas clauses” the fact that petitioner Republic “obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on Dec 21 1990 that the US$356 million belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditions are met…. Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed ruling of District Attorney of Zurich.Mar 10 2000 petitioner filed another motion for summary judgment “pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million. Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts 4. This was granted.Before case was set for pre-trial. 1996) Cosandey granting legal assistance to Republic. The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements . collate. cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the conditions contained therein. Ma. Maler Foundation accounts b. based on ff grounds: a. respondents’ admission made during pre-trial that they do not have any interest or ownership over the funds tenders . . the money or instrument is said to be “in escrow”. . Respondents filed their opposition.Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental Agreements. These treasury notes are frozen at the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas by virtue of freeze order issued by PCGG. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. . . Imelda M Manotoc. Cosandey declared the various deposits in the name of the foundations to be of illegal provenance and ordered that they be frozen to await the final verdict in favor of the parties entitled to restitution. .Marcoses appealed. 1993.Oct 18 1996 petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. previously held the funds: 1.Nov 20 1997 Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the motion to approve the compromise agreement “(took) precedence over the motion for summary judgment” . Random House. The Petition for Summary Judgment .

.Petitioner asserts in the main that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision on the ground that the original copies of the authenticated Swiss Federal Supreme Court decisions and their “authenticated translations” have not been submitted to the Court.The five group accounts have a total balance of US$356 million.Sep 19 2000 Sandiganbayan granted petitioner’s motion for summary judgment.414.487.the Marcoses reported P16. Petitioner adds that nowhere in the respondents’ motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration were the authenticity.Ferdinand Marcos made it appear that he had an extremely profitable legal practice before he became President.109. Sandiganbayan reversed its Sep 19 2000 decision.935) and as President from 1966 to 1985 (1966-1976 at P60. Analysis of Respondents’ Legitimate Income . accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever challenged.5 Page No.75. Marcos children followed. .000/year. Ratio Mere denials. 2. WON petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is long overdue. . . Imelda Marcos’ salary as Minister of Human Settlements from 1976 to 1986 (P75. Marcos filed motion for reconsideration on Sep 26 2000. HELD 1.In Jan 31 2002 resolution. the present petition. assert that the petition should be denied. and declared the funds.Mar 24 2000 hearing on motion for summary judgment was conducted . and that he was still receiving payments almost 20 years after . . when in fact the Sandiganbayan quoted extensively a portion of the Swiss decisions in denying a previous motion dated July 29 1999. forfeited in favor of the State. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. public policy and deep historical repercussions.00 or US$2. which were deemed unlawfully acquired as ill-gotten wealth. stating that there is no issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence. ISSUES 1.Mars Veloso 1C. WON respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either justify or negate summary judgment. stating that “the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds”. Obiter Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated its search for and reversion of ill-gotten wealth. plus other sources.91 in total income over a period of 20 years from 1965 to 1984. (P15. and thus denied petitioner’s motion for summary judgment.Mrs.Computations establish the total net worth of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda. (assuming income from legal practice is valid) .66 no genuine issue or controversy as to any material fact in the present action . . WON petitioner Republic’s action for certiorari is proper. .Respondents. Marcos filed her opposition. Summary judgment should take place as a matter of right.Mrs. certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the existence and availability of the remedy of appeal. in the amount of US$957.000/year). income from legal practice (P11.000/year). 2. Ratio Where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest. if unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible in evidence at a hearing.This amount includes Ferdinand Marcos’ salary as Senate President in 1965. 3.408.442. 1977-1985 at P100. . are not sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will not defeat a motion for summary judgment Obiter Court held that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. which was later adopted by corespondents Marcos children.836). for the years 1965 to 1984. Hence. of course.484.

estoppel by laches had already set in against petitioner. perform or commit. it must stand as proved.Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. November 18. that these were lawfully acquired and that there are other legitimate sources of income.Court rules that petitioner could validly move for summary judgment any time after the respondents’ answer was filed or. . . The Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment if it is demonstrated by affidavits. 3. performed or committed a particular act which the latter did not in fact do. but that petitioner was able to present sworn statements of witnesses who had personal knowledge of the Marcoses’ participation in the illegal acquisition of funds. motion for summary judgment is premised on the assumption that the issues presented need not be tried either because these are patently devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact. not a genuine issue as to any material fact. A presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed.Respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation contained in the petition for forfeiture in the manner required by the rules (Sec 10 Rule 8 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). The Court holds that if an allegation directly and specifically charges a party with having done. could or should have been done earlier. estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time to do that which. Whether by the time motion for summary judgment was filed on Mar 10 2000. were deemed admitted pursuant to Sec 11 Rule 8 of 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. .the Court not only took into consideration that respondents themselves made admissions in their pleadings and testimonies. 2003 . .67 . a categorical and express denial must be made. unless the fact thus prima facie established by legal presumption is disproved. RESOLUTION CORONA. .a genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence. in invoking doctrine of estoppel by laches. a. Ratio The prima facie presumption raised by the law that a property is unlawfully acquired when the amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who owns it stands as proved unless defendant shows. b. Nor can estoppel validate an act that contravenes law or public policy. It is a procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue. Propriety of Summary Judgment .Mars Veloso 1C. No.5 Page No. Their answers include “they have no sufficient knowledge” or “they could not recall because it happened a long time ago” or “the funds were lawfully acquired” without stating the basis of such assertions. respondents must show not only unjustified inaction but also that some unfair injury to them might result unless the action is barred. . not having been specifically denied by respondents in their answer. warranting a presumption that the person has abandoned his right or declined to assert it. and proves. depositions or admissions that the issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious. Whether petitioner Republic had bound itself to go to trial and had legally waived right it had to move for summary judgment. and. c.Question: Whether the kind of denial in respondents’ answer qualifies as the specific denial called for by the rules. Obiter burden of proof was on respondents to dispute presumption and show by clear and convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other legitimate sources of income.The allegations for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits. for that matter. at any subsequent stage of the litigation.Doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights. as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and contrived. set up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance. by exercising due diligence. The fact that petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in any way prevent it from moving for summary judgment.

1899). burden of proof shifted to respondents to show by clear and convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other legitimate sources of income.essence of due process is found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit one’s evidence in support of his defense . .Mateo Carino.Respondents: RA 1379 is penal in substance and effect. .68 . the salutary objective being to restore the ownership of the Swiss deposits to the rightful owner – that is. free from vexatious. defenses and pleadings. contests dismissal of application of registration of their ancestral land through writ of error.” Motions for reconsiderations denied with finality.procedural due process means compliance with procedures or steps. . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. and pastured parts for cattle for more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris (April 11. Petitioner Republic having established this presumption.SC: Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural. There must be a compliance with both substantive and procedural requirements in order that a particular act may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause. Is summary judgment in forfeiture proceedings a violation of due process? .Carino’s ancestors maintained fences for cattle. hence they are entitled to constitutional safeguards enjoyed by accused.Mars Veloso 1C.Although the plaintiff applied in 1893-1894 and 1896-1897. . the Republic of the Philippines – in the shortest possible time. unreasonable or unjust. Respondents were not deprived of their property through forfeiture for arbitrary reasons. They obstinately refused to do so and have tried to confuse the issues and the Court and to delay the disposition of the case . . This land is also used for inheritance in accordance to Igorot custom. capricious and oppressive delays.forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem. 1904 ) . thus civil in nature.Civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired property under RA 1379 may be proven by preponderance of evidence. DOMINIUM AND IMPERIUM CARINO V INSULAR GOVERNMENT HOLMES. in conformity with the standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to administer it. The Government is required only to state the known lawful income of respondents for the prima facie presumption of illegal provenance to attach. contrary to respondents’ contention that they are penal in character.Respondents were repeatedly accorded full opportunity to present their case. Respondents failed on this part.Court -– application of land registration granted (March 4. an Igorot from the Province of Benguet. The proceedings under RA 1379 do not terminate in the imposition of penalty but merely in the forfeiture in favor of the State of properties illegally acquired. .substantive due process refers to intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person to his property . cultivated some parts. .Procedure .5 Page No. . In 1901.“the people and the State are entitled to favorable judgment. February 23. plaintiff alleged ownership under mortgage law and the lands were registered to him but it only established possessory title. no document of title was issued by Spanish Crown. 1909 FACTS .SC: Respondents in their motions for reconsideration do not raise any new matters for the Court to resolve. even periods. prescribed by the statute.there is no showing that RA 1379 is unfair. .

cultivated land 20 years.” Obiter Writ of error is the general method of bringing cases to this court (Federal SC).And US succeeded the title of Spain (through Treaty of Paris) . uncultivated 30 years.CFI affirmed RDM's refusal hence this appeal. Inc .December. was his property. as a valid title by prescription. . if not by earlier law.Philippine SC – affirmed decision of CFI Benguet .Also. Our first object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives not to exploit their country for private gain. alien. KRIVENKO V REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA MORAN. .The case was already voted upon and the majority decision was being prepared. November 15. 1947 FACTS .The reason for taking over the Philippines was different (compared to occupation of white race against Native Americans).CFI of Benguet – appeal on behalf of Government of the Philippines and US having taken possession of property for military and public purposes.The registration of the lot was interrupted by the war. so it is not certain whether registration granted was under Spanish laws .Decree of June 25.Federal SC – writ of error reviewing judgment of Philippine SC . . .Applicant should be granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of what by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived. through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain. . confined to equity in the main.Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like present. 1902. 1941-Krivenko. Plaintiff’s father was owner of land by the very terms of this decree. 1880 required registration within a limited time to make the title good . 1945-Krivenko sought to accomplish said registration but the Register of Deeds of Manila (RDM) denied on the ground that he is an alien and cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction.Respondents argue: . mentioned in the royal cedula of 1754 states: “Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds.5 Page No.Given that . and appeal the exception. .Plaintiff’s land not registered and he had lost all rights and a mere trespasser . Krivenko filed a motion to withdraw the appeal.No prescription against the Spanish Crown .May. .” . .Argument seems to amount to denial of native titles throughout an important Island of Luzon ISSUE WON Carino owns the land HELD Ratio Prescription.Decree of June 25.69 . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Decision REVERSED .Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila . application dismissed . as already conferred by the decree. it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession. .The effect of proof was not to confer title but simply to establish it.By Organic Act of July 1.Spain assumed and asserted that they had title to all the land in the Philippines except to permit private lands to be acquired .After the briefs have been presented.Mars Veloso 1C.Plaintiff argues: . 1880 states: possession for certain times shall be deemed owners.Krivenko filed as suit in the CFI of Manila by means of a consulta. . Benguet never brought under civil or military government of the Spanish Crown. bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate. all the property and rights acquired there by the United States are to be administered “for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.

. shall not be alienated" and with respect to public agricultural lands. . petitioners .The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it. .It would be futile to prohibit the alienation of public lands to aliens if. XIII. . . the Hon. .Ratio The Court shall rule that it cannot grant a motion withdrawing an appeal if such a withdrawal would result to a permanent offense to the Constitution. .The Court shall rule that under the provisions of the Constitution.5 Page No. which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre) through accretion. the effect of the withdrawal would be offensive to the opinion reached by a majority of the members of the Court after long and exhaustive deliberations on the constitutional question.This provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands. Granting a withdrawal of appeal is discretionary upon the Court after the briefs have been presented. after all.Mars Veloso 1C.The Court held that NO. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Simeon.To allow the withdrawal under such circumstances is equivalent to tolerating an offense to the constitution. together with the circumstance that (2) probably a similar question may never come up again before the Court. December 27. . .RDM naturally obeyed the circular. Rosita and Leoncio LEE HONG HOK. a new circular of the Department of Justice (Circular No. all acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the Constitution became effective are null and void per se and ab initio. 510) because they alleged to own the disputed lot (226 m2 Lot 2892. with the exception of public agricultural land. .Also. . including residential lands. aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands in the Philippines and as a consequence. particularly (1) the circular of the Dept.The case was decided under section 5 of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it PROHIBITS THE TRANSFER TO ALIENS OF ANY PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL LAND INCLUDING RESIDENTIAL LAND WHATEVER ITS ORIGIN MIGHT HAVE BEEN.70 . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. offense that may be permanent.This provision secures the policy of nationalization in Sec. . aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands. (The votes were: 8-3) . the Director of Lands and Court of Appeals . they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of the Filipino citizens. 1947 was issued. the withdrawal was denied because under the circumstances. . . 128) dated August 12.It cannot grant appellant's motion withdrawing his appeal only because the constitutional issue should be avoided. 1972 FACTS . instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens.Petitioners wanted to declare null and void David’s Torrens Title (OCT No.Rule 52. 1 of Art. ISSUE Jurisdiction: WON the Court should grant the motion withdrawing an appeal with the issuance of the said circular of the DOJ Primary Issue: WON an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land. HELD The Court denied the motion withdrawing the appeal.Pedro.Aniano DAVID. LEE HONG HOK V DAVID FERNANDO. of Justice issued while this case was pending before the Court and ordering all registers of deed to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens. .While the motion was pending.APPEAL by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals. section 4 of the Rules of Court: Court's discretion to grant a withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been presented.This provision should be read in connection with section 1 of Article XIII "natural resources.

HELD 1.” Only the government can question the validity of the title which it gave. The disputed lot is a result of reclamation. but until it is raised by the government and set aside. all lands held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us (the Spanish state) according as they belong to us. but also their future and their probable increase. 1959 – Naga City Register of Deeds issued David OCT No. in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys. therefore a private – not public . The land in question is not private property. the only remedy for the appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud committed by respondents. Dominium enables the state to provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources. since they are not the registered owners of the land and they had not been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their private property.Jun 18.71 . WON the indefeasible character of a public land patent after one year should not be recognized (this court says it should be). The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government.domain (this court says it does not warrant any further consideration) 2. therefore a public land. Plaintiffs are private parties and not government officials. 1959 – Undersecretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources issued David a Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain the sole power is vested in Congress. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.Aug 26. 2. in which all lands – in Spain and its earlier decrees – were held by the Crown. Only the government. WON Lot 2892 came into being not by reclamation but by accretion. confirming in them in what they now have and giving them more if necessary. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise. 510 ISSUES 1. ways. In Montano v Insular Government. everything was done in the open – notices were published. including their disposition. In Valenton v Murciano (1904). audiencias. WON authoritative doctrines do not preclude a party other than the government to dispute the validity of a grant (this court says it does) 3. and therefore cannot institute for the nullification of David’s Torrens Title. 1958 – Director of Lands issued David a sales patent of the lot . and governors may seem necessary for public squares. the respondents) cannot question it. . There was no fraud. except as limited by the Constitution.5 Page No. the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained the public character thereof by virtue of reclamation (and not by accretion which the petitioners claim). sale and awarding of land to David were public official acts of a Government officer. The present Constitution adopts the modified concept of jure regalia. all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish. and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage. and the present Constitution holds that it is the state which possesses ownership (Cariño v Insular Government).Mars Veloso 1C. and dominium is the state’s capacity to own or acquire property. taking into consideration not only their present condition.Oct 21. or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Imperium is the government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty. Therefore. V-1209 . pastures and commons in those places which are peopled. can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. Maninang v Consolacion states that “[t]he fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. represented by the Director of Lands. the defendant (in this case.

The court shall rule that taxpayer has no legal standing to question executive acts that do not involve the use of public funds 2. The decision of Court of Appeals of January 31. “a holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of registered property. both take the nature of judicial proceedings.The court shall rule that the President had the power to administer a trust created by an agreement with a foreign country .EO 30 has the creation of a trust for the benefit of the Filipino people under the name and style of the Cultural Center of the Philippines to awaken our people’s consciousness in the nation’s cultural heritage and encourage its preservation. stress was laid on the funds administered by the Center as coming from donations and contributions and not a single centavo raised by taxation . PD 15 was issued creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines ISSUES 1. July 31. WON petitioner has standing 2. promotion and development .In the Court of First Instance. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. 1969 are affirmed GONZALES V MARCOS FERNANDO. This is fatal to them because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent. 1975 FACTS .Mars Veloso 1C. After registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent.” David’s application was a renewal of his deceased wife’s application. WON EO 30 encroached on the legislative prerogative 3.Later. Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible. WON the issue on the validity of EO 30 became moot and academic HELD 1.RA 496 § 48 says that any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. the land is automatically covered by RA 496 --. wherein his deceased wife occupied Lot 2892 since 1938. “[t]he proceedings under the Land Registration Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that both are against the whole world. 1961 and its resolution of March 14. Since the filing of the sales application of David and during all the proceedings in connection with said application. the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of RA 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein.Respondents argue EO 30 as: 1) legitimate exercise of executive power and that 2) this is supplementary to rather than a disregard of RA 4165 creating the National Commission on Culture and that 3) petitioner Gonzales did not have the requisite personality to contest as a taxpayer the validity of EO 30 as the funds held by the Cultural Center came from donations and contributions and not one centavo came from taxation . and for both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and final. In Cabacug v Lao. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title. the appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto.Gonzales assailed the validity of EO 30 as an impermissible encroachment by the President on the legislative prerogative .72 3.5 Page No. up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor. but in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a period of five years. In Aquino v Director of Lands (1919).

(3) Sections 51. which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination".5 Page No. Section 1 of the NCIP Admin. 52. hunting grounds.. 65.Ancestral domains (sec.Mars Veloso 1C. coastal areas and natural resources therein. . 6. . forests. filed for PROHIBITION (directing NCIP to cease from implementing IPRA and its IR. as spokesman in domestic and foreign affairs. agricultural. and other lands individually owned. burial grounds. DENR Secretary to cease from implementing Circular 2. pasture. communally or individually since time immemorial continuously to the present. (2) Sections 3a and 3b violate the RIGHTS OF PRIVATE LANDOWNERS. held under a claim of ownership. in behalf of the estate as parens patriae.3b IPRA) ..Land occupied by members of the ICC/IP since time immemorial.Areas generally belonging to ICC/IP comprising lands. is . including residential lots.Indigenous peoples/cultural communities (IP/ICC) -Group of people identified by self-ascription and ascription by others. still no encroachment and that it is already moot and academic CRUZ V SECOF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RES PER CURIAM... private forests. particularly the home ranges of ICC who are still nomadic or shifting cultivators. hence the suit has assumed a moot and academic character Obiter (1)-The funds administered by the President of the Philippines came from donations and contributions and not by taxation -There was that absence of the requisite pecuniary or monetary interest (2) –As head of State.73 3. swidden farms. under claims of individual or traditional group ownership. 7. including ancestral lands. mineral and other resources. ISSUES The following provisions of RA8371 and its Implementing Rules were questioned (1) Sections 3a. occupied or possessed by ICC/IP. by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. rice terraces or paddies. residential. 59. Part 2. the President has authority to implement for the benefit of the Filipino people by creating the Cultural Center consisting of private citizens to administer the private contributions and donations given not only by the US government but also by private persons -Creation of rules governing the administration of a trust may be concurrently exercised by the President and Congress Decision DISMISSED. inland waters. DBM Secretary to cease from disbursing public funds) and MANDAMUS (commanding DENR Secretary to comply with his duty of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate) assailing certain provisions of RA8371 (IPRA) as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.Republic Act No. as Chief Executive.1. 6 December 2000 FACTS . violate the DUE PROCESS clause of the Constitution. 8. 66 which define the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and make customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and lands. who have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory.Ancestral lands (sec. 3b..3a IPRA) . by themselves or through their ancestors.Procedure: CRUZ and EUROPA. Order No. and lands no longer occupied exclusively by ICC but to which they had traditional access. 63.EO 30 was superseded by PD 15. as citizens and taxpayers (upon the plea that questions raised are of "transcendental importance"). bodies of water. (4) Rule 7. 57. 58 amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's ownership over LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (including the minerals and other natural resources therein) in violation of the REGALIAN DOCTRINE. . 5. worship areas. and tree lots. No standing and even if there was. 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997) . 53.

J. Mendoza . (2) The right of ownership and possession by the ICC/IP to their AD is a LIMITED form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate such AD. J. Vitug. Accordingly.2 Art. The case was then redeliberated upon. But the AD is owned in common by the ICC/IP and not by one particular person.2 Art. J. For purposes of registration under the PLA and the Land Registration Act. Sec. by their very nature. Laws of the Indies: All lands became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Torrens system requires that the government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of such property described. B. .Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System A. the petition is DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 56. Murciano (1904): "While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time.74 invalid as it infringes upon the President's power of control over executive departments. b. J. J.5 Page No. Valenton vs. Davide Jr. J. but the voting still remained the same. J. the IPRA expressly converts AL into public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. Managing and conserving these resources. Puno. The necessary implication is that AL is private. HELD There was NO MAJORITY VOTE reached as the Justices were equally divided at 7-7.12 of the 1987 Consti. Carino is the only case that specifically and categorically recognizes native title.7a limits the right of ownership of the IP. and it was reiterated in the 1973 and 1987 Consti. Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. D. "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government. J. a. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Gonzaga-Reyes." C. J. as they have acquired such properties by NATIVE TITLE (AD/AL) and TORRENS TITLE (AL). necessarily reject .12 of the 1987 Consti. Native title presumes that the land is private and was never public. a. J. Santiago.3. Sec. Quisumbing. (3) The Regalian Doctrine has not been violated as the right of ICC/IP to develop lands and NR within the AD does not deprive the State of ownership over the NR. Kapunan. Lands may be transferred only to the members of the same ICC/IP.. De Leon SEPARATE OPINIONS PUNO [dismiss] .Mars Veloso 1C. The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible. Melo. and of control and supervision in their development and exploitation. b.Those in favor of granting petition: J. a. But the Implementing Rules of IPRA included the term "natural resources" in such rights of ownership which is CONTRARY to Sec. Bellosillo. J. yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers. The indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title. -Provisions of IPRA do NOT contravene the Constitution (1) AD and AL are the private property of the IP and do not constitute part of the land of the public domains. It is private because it is not part of the public domain. Philippine Constitutions: The Regalian Doctrine was established 1935 Constitution. in accord with customary laws. Panganiban. and until he did that the State remained the absolute owner. c. and subject to the right of redemption of IP for a period of 15 years if transferred to a nonmember of IP. b.7b of the IPRA is allowed under par. Public Land Acts (PLA) and the Torrens System: Under the PLA. The small-scale utilization of NR in Sec. Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors but extends to all generations of the ICC/IP. J. Pardo.Those in favor of dismissing petition: J. Buena. and obtain from them his deed.

The grant of priority rights implies that there is a superior entity that owns these resources and who has the power to grant such preferential rights. with specificity and by proper recitals. Insular Government cannot override the collective will of the people expressed in the Constitution. they possess the public right to ensure that the national patrimony is not alienated and diminished in violation of the Constitution. to hew them to. c.2.75 utilization in a large-scale.Mars Veloso 1C.12 sec. and make them part of the stream of laws. (2) Petitioners have the requisite standing. (petition should have been filed in the lower court first) the Court assumes jurisdiction in view of the importance of the issues raised. through the imposition of requirements and conditions for the exploration.12 of the 1987 Consti.12 of the 1935 Consti allows small-scale utilization of natural resources by its citizens. Sec. • to negotiate the terms and conditions for exploration of NR in the area (refers only to the preliminary activity of search and prospecting of mineral resources). (2) The provisions of RA8371 do not infringe upon the State's ownership over the natural resources within the ancestral domains. as the notion of community property involves matters of proprietary interest AND also some forms of self-governance over the property. ~Substantive issues(1) The provisions recognizing ownership of IP over the ancestral lands and domains are not unconstitutional. The Regalian theory does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial. Under sec. Sec. • to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation . its purpose is definitional and not declarative of a right or title. b.5 Art. c. The concept of native title to natural resources.3a merely defines coverage of AD. • to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of NR. unlike native title to land."The constitutional aim is to get Congress to look closely into the customary laws and.5 par. (2) The decision of the US Court in Carino vs.12 of 1935 Constitution does not state that certain lands which are "absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence. It does not ipso facto convert the character of such natural resources as private property of the IP. b.2 Art. The State retains full control over such activities. rights given to IP are duly circumscribed and are limited: • to manage and conserve NR within territories." There should be a balancing of interests between specific need of IP and imperatives of national interest. (4) Notwithstanding the failure of petitioners to observe the hierarchy of courts. a. (4) IPRA is a recognition of our active participation in the International Indigenous Movement. KAPUNAN [dismiss] ~Preliminary issues(1) The petition presents an actual controversy. (3) The provisions of IPRA pertaining to the utilization of natural resources are not unconstitutional. As taxpayers. (3) The petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy.5 Page No. b. Sec. As citizens. has NOT been recognized in the Philippines." Framers did not intend Congress to decide whether AD shall be public or private property.1 and 4.7b. Sec. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.57 of IPRA may be harmonized with par. The large-scale utilization of NR in Sec. development and utilization of the NR.2(3) Art. (3) Art. VITUG [grant] (1) IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the ancestral domains." shall then be owned by the State. they possess the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. a.12 expresses sovereign intent to "protect the rights of IP to their AL. as they have acknowledged that AD shall be treated as private property. Sec. a.1 Art.

c. even if it is a collective right. under certain conditions. • to receive just and fair compensation for any damages sustained by such projects.RA8371 is unconstitutional in thatA.5 Page No. Priority rights do not mean exclusive rights. ~Corollary issues(1) IPRA does not violate the Due Process clause. a. (2) Petitioners do not have legal standing. Because of the State's implementation of policies considered to be for the common good. Where the law does not distinguish. and utilization of natural resources" which should under be the full control and supervision of the State." (1) All Filipinos. development and utilization of NR or it could enter into co-production." B. The property rights referred to in Sec.56 ("Existing property regimes should be protected") belong to those acquired by individuals. The grant of said priority rights is not a blanket authority to disregard pertinent laws and regulations.3 Art. where ALL parties involved are members of IP. MENDOZA [dismiss] (1) It is not a justiciable controversy. or will appear to be so incapable. solicitor general estimates that AD cover 80% of our mineral resources and between 8 and 10 million of the 30 milion hectares of land in the country. the people are regarded as the real party in interest. but RA8371 speaks of no area or term limits to ancestral lands and domains. Although NCIP is independent to a certain degree. (3) Sec. all those concerned have to give up. (5) Yes. But in this case. b. are subject to the Constitution. when the question is one of public right and the object of mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty.7 of the Consti. In Tanada v. It lessens the authority of the State to oversee the "exploration. Tuvera. whether indigenous or non-indigenous. . is still subject to the President's power of control and supervision under Sec. even vested rights of ownership.12 of the Consti provides that the State may directly undertake exploration. the courts should not distinguish. The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of the AD. Ownership of NR is in ALL the Filipino people. (2) Implementing Rules of IPRA does not infringe upon the President's power of control over the Executive Department.76 and implementation of any project that will affect AD. Based on ethnographic surveys. still perpetually withdraws such property from the control of the State and from its enjoyment by other citizens of the Republic. • to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with these rights c. “what public right is there for petitioners to enforce when the IPRA does not apply to them except in general and in common with other citizens??” PANGANIBAN [grant] .Mars Veloso 1C. of delivering justice to the non-IP. It recognizes and grants rights of ownership over "lands of the public domain which are owned by the State. development. (2) The concept of ownership of ICC/IP. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.12 of the Consti provides that Filipino citizens may acquire no more than 12 hectares of alienable public land. it was placed by Congress "under the Office of the President" and as such.2 Art. ICC/IP should be given priority in the use of their AD and AL but they should not be granted perpetual ownership and control of the nation's substantial wealth to the exclusion of other law-abiding Filipino citizens. joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or entities at least 60% Filipinoowned (and such agreements shall not exceed 25 years). The fact that NCIP shall be composed exclusively of members of IP does not mean that the NCIP is incapable. (4) Sec. Judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual cases or controversies without upsetting balance of power.17 Art. whether indigenous or not. RA 8371 relinquishes this power in favor of ICC/IP and they may even exercise such right without any time limit.

it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. WoN the officers of the US Armed Forces performing official functions in accordance with the powers vested in them under the Philippine American Military Bases Agreement are immune from suit (even w/o consent of the State).662 if she was employed at the time. GS 1710-9. Damages which are merely possible are speculative. 3. HELD As expressed in Art. Yes the petitioners are guilty of discrimination against Shauf. Persi did not even consider the former’s application. or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. for which she is eminently qualified. since the damages to Shauf will be taken from funds of the US. Section 2. WYLIE V RARANG . She had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS 1710-9 level for approximately four years at the time she applied for the same position in 1976. By reason of her non-selection to the position. applied for the vacant position of Guidance Counselor. November 27. in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base. Since the petitioner was able to prove the discrimination in the non-consideration of her application. Unauthorized acts of government officials are not acts of the State. The US officers are NOT IMMUNE from suit even without the consent of the State. who had some reservations regarding Shauf’s work experience. The respondents are being sued in their private and personal capacity.77 SUITS AGAINST THE STATE ART XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS Sec 3: The State shall not be sued without its consent SHAUF V COURT OF APPEALS REGALADO. is not a suit against the State covered by the rule of immunity. This is a generally accepted principle of International law under Art II. WoN Shauf should be awarded compensatory damages. XVI. The case at hand may be construed as a suit against the US. 2. and Sarmiento. a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the United States Air Force. However. The respondents however answered with mere denials of the charges.5 Page No. There was no proof that she really was to earn $39. her application was forwarded to Anthony Persi. Doctrine Yes. and an action against the officials by one whose rights have been invaded by such offenses. Isakson was selected for the position. Section 3 of the 1987 Consti. 1990 FACTS Petitioner Loida Q. Persi was then informed by CORRO that an Edward B. Loida Shauf filed an equal employment opportunity complain against respondents for alleged discrimination against the former by reason of her nationality and sex. Shauf need not be awarded compensatory damages. Paras. Persi then requested the Civilian Personnel Office to initiate immediate inquiry to the Central Oversea Rotation and Recruiting Office (CORRO). Trial court held in favor of Shauf. 2. Despite Shauf’s qualifications. 3. WoN the respondents are guilty of discrimination against petitioner Shauf. A public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith. while Court of Appeals reversed decision. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. Isakson was placed on the rolls at Clark Air Base on January 1977. Regalado is concurred with by Melencio-Herrera. the burden shifted to the respondents. ISSUES 1. 1. Padilla. Shauf. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. the state may not be sued without its consent.Mars Veloso 1C. There must be an actual proof of loss.

S.XVI. an “action line inquiry”. Suit against US Naval Base was dismissed. WON officials of the US Naval Base inside Philippine Territory. Defendants alleged that (1) defendants acted in performance of their official functions as officers of the US Navy and are thus immune from suit (2) US Naval Base is immune from suit being an instrumentality of the US Government and (3) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties involved.  this is part of the second issue) Art. in discharge of their official duties. Wylie. it has been necessary to distinguish them –– between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private. Respondent Aurora Rarang was an employee in the Office of the Provost Marshal assigned as the merchandise control guard. and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty.78 GUTIERREZ. they are immune. 1992 FACTS Petitioners Wylie and Williams were the assistant administrative officer and commanding officer. contempt and ridicule. that the petitioners actively participated in screening the features and articles in the POD as part of their official functions. 2.1978. Lower court ruling: defendants pay damages because acts were not official acts of the US government.3. commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Ratio Officers of the US Navy as instrumentalities of the US government are immune from suit (but only when they are acting/ discharging their official functions. court is still bound by the doctrine of incorporation22. Rarang. The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. in herself. of the US Naval base in Subic. are immune from suit. then it should follow that the petitioners may not be held liable for the questioned publication. as one of his duties.3 of 1987 consti provides that state may not be sued without its consent. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. It is to be noted.5 Page No. therefore. May 28. The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred. Because the activities of states have multiplied. injurious. went to press an action for damages against Wylie and Williams and the US Naval Base.Mars Veloso 1C. The doctrine is applicable not only to suits against the state but also to complaints filed against officials for acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their official duties. officials in the performance of their official functions are immune from suit. 2. Are US officers who commit a crime or tortious act while discharging official functions still covered by the principle of state immunity from suit? HELD 1. No. the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states . There is no question. a disgrace to the office. Upon its admission to such society. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. an inquiry was published saying that confiscated goods were being consumed/ used for personal benefit by the merchandise control inspector and that a certain “Auring” was. ISSUES 1. On feb. supervised the publication of the “Plan of the Day” a daily publication that featured among others. (That Rarang was indeed the Auring mentioned in the inquiry was proven by the apology letter issued by Wylie for the inadvertent publication. but personal and tortious acts (which are not included in the rule that a sovereign country can’t be sued without its consent). 22 principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. that the petitioners were sued in their personal capacities for their alleged tortious acts in publishing a libelous article. Yes. But even without this affirmation. Under the rule that U. respectively. being the only person named Auring in the said office.) She alleged that the article constituted false. sec. however.

Defendants.Petitioners filed motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was a suit against the United States." Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. .R. we presume. Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barbering services in the said base. Air Force. 76607 . in their personal capacities are liable for the damages they caused the private respondent. however. . Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. . It was a tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent. defendants were also immune from suit.S. The petitioners.Genove poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking vegetables served to club customers.Trial Court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction as well as the motion to dismiss. The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith. which found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. Under Art. 1990 FACTS .R. Such fault or negligence. 79470 . causes damage to another. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. and that the suit was in effect against the United States. and that as officials/employees of the U. to conduct rebidding and to allow respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating concessions pending litigation.S. Air Force Recreation Center at John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. G. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.Respondent court issued an order directing petitioners to maintain the status quo.Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the SC. there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Air Force.Private respondents Valencia. all involving state immunity. as club manager.Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the SC. moved to dismiss the complaint. . .5 Page No. were negligent because under their direction they issued the publication without deleting the name "Auring. alleging that Lamachia. . suspended Genove and referred the case to the Board of Arbitrators. joined by the United States of America. . Belsa.Genove filed a complaint for damages against Lamachia. which has not given its consent to be sued. The petitioners. 2176 of the civil code. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name Auring if the article were published.Said motion was denied. as an officer of the U.Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review the decision of the RTC of Angeles City . whoever by act or omission. No.79 Ratio Our laws and. Cartalla and Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the U. G.Lamachia. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V GUINTO CRUZ. .Mars Veloso 1C. the ff: facts were ascertained: . was immune from suit. No. Tanglao and del Pilar sued officers of the U. February 26. alone. . After investigation.This case is a consolidation of four separate cases. Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3. which has not waived its non-suability.S.Respondents sought to compel the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX) and individual petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon. those of the United States do not allow the commission of crimes in the name of official duty. .S. 1978 is a defamation against the character and reputation of the private respondent.

.Express-embodied in a general or special law . Dye and Bostick.All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over the other.Bautista was dismissed from employment. handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them and caused them extensive injuries.According to defendants. Reasoning . . .A.The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent now expressed in Article XVI.R. of the 1987 Constitution. then the state will be deemed to have impliedly consented to the suit. .Luis Bautista. . . 80258 . defendants (herein petitioners) beat them up. * If it is not proven that the acts were done by the individual petitioners in the performance of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States. the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest. . as well as the motion for reconsideration.He was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by individual petitioners King. Section 3.R. No. G. officers of the United States Air Force and special agents of the United States Air Force Office of Special Operations. or the Dangerous Drugs Act.The rule says that a state may not be sued without its consent. 6425. 80018 .Motion was denied by respondent judge. The defendants also claimed immunity for acts done by them in the performance of their official functions. proprietary and private function.Petitioners filed for certiorari preliminary injunction in the SC.Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the SC. not all contracts operate as a waiver of non-suability—a distinction must be made between contracts entered into in a state’s governmental and sovereign capacity or private.According to plaintiffs (herein respondents). WON the individual petitioners may invoke immunity from suit by mere assertion that the acts were done by them in the performance of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States HELD 1) Ratio If the case involves the state entering into a contract in the discharge of its commercial.The latter implies waiver of non-suability.Trial court denied the motion to dismiss. for violating R.However.Consent may be express or implied. then they may not invoke immunity form suit. and prohibition with ISSUES 1.Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the defendants were acting in their official capacity when they did the acts complained of and that the suit was against the United States without its consent.Private respondents filed a complaint for damages for injuries sustained as a result of the acts of herein petitioners. .Mars Veloso 1C. . . WON the cases against the petitioners were suits against the United States. proprietary and commercial capacity . .80 G. to which it has not consented 2. is one of the generally accepted principles of international law. .He then filed a complaint for damages against individual petitioners. . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents. the former does not. an extension of Clark Air Base. was employed as barracks boy in Camp O’ Donnel. No.5 Page No. .The United States of America and the individually named defendants moved to dismiss the case and argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the United States which has not given its consent to be sued. .Implied-when the state enters into a contract or it commences litigation . .

. 80258 .Petition is granted.81 . G. and not in their private or unofficial capacity.Petition is dismissed. .It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States.Florencio Sacramento was one of the 74 security assistance support personnel (SASP) working at JUSMAG Phils.The court hesitates to make a conclusion because the record is too meager to indicate if the individual petitioners were acting in the discharge of their official functions. of Labor and Employment (March 31.Barbershops subject of the concessions granted by US are commercial enterprises operated by private persons.Petition is dismissed and the respondent court is directed to proceed with the hearing and decision.R. Petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them. complaint in the court below must still be dismissed. case against petitioners is dismissed.JUSMAG failed to refute the employer-employee rel’p under the control test and 2) it has waived its right to immunity from suit when it hired Sacramento’s services. and charges against them may not be dismissed just by mere assertion. 76607 .R. petitioners cannot plead any immunity.He filed a complaint with the Dept. . No.The doctrine of state immunity is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. which has not given its consent to be sued. . asked for reinstatement . NLRC PUNO.R.NLRC relied on Harry Lyons vs. G. USA (“US Govt waived its immunity from suit by entering into a contract of stevedoring services. in saying .The fact that the acts were done by the individual petitioners in the performance of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States is a matter of evidence. . he had been with JUSMAG for more than 20yrs (1969-1992).NLRC reversed—JUSMAG had lost its right not to be sued based on: 1) estoppel.Only after needed inquiry in the lower court shall have determined in what capacity the individual petitioners were acting will the Court determine if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable. 1992 .Labor Arbiter Daniel Cueto dismissed complaint for want of jurisdiction . they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal.. it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of local courts”) . No. 2) Ruling: (Application of ratio in the different cases) G.However. . also alleged lack of employer-employee rel’p and it has no juridical personality to sue and be sued . 1994 FACTS . . The contracts being decidedly commercial.R. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Although suable. or had actually exceeded their authority. then they alone must satisfy the judgment.JUSMAG filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking its immunity from suit as an agency of US.JUSMAG now contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the labor arbiter’s decision. No. G. notwithstanding these considerations. JUSMAG PHILIPPINES V. the petitioners are not liable because of the strength of evidence that they acted properly in terminating Genove for his disgusting offense. case against petitioners is dismissed.Petition is granted. 79470 .Restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its proprietary capacity. December 15. . No. 80018 . was dismissed on April 27. 1992) on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed.Individually-named petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions.5 Page No.Mars Veloso 1C. . and thus. If the individual petitioners are found liable for personal torts in which the US itself is not involved.

.A state cannot be sued in the courts of another state. The suit is.does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions” .it was in this light that the state immunity issue in Harry Lyons vs. Ruiz: “. in effect. it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. however.. per se. 1947 between the Philippines and the US. the sovereign state has descended the level of the citizen and its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract. Santos.was created pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated March 21.. the suit is.” .82 that JUSMAG waived its immunity from suit.SASP are employees of the AFP as consistently contended by JUSMAG..Memorandum of Agreement between AFP and JUSMAG-Phils . and housing. Hence. US manifested its preparedness to provide funds to cover the salaries of SASP and security guards. An exception to the doctrine. et al: “the state itself may be sued. one against the US and. The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to commercial..It is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of private respondent. Recognizes and adopts as part of the law of the land. .Immunity of State from suit is one of the universally recognized principles of international law that the Phils. because by entering into a contract. resolution of NLRC is reversed and set aside PNB V CIR FERNANDO. Immunity is understood as the exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the US pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement.” . the rent of bldgs.In this jurisdiction.in 1991. USA was decided . et al vs. it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the US. the complaint cannot prosper. thus it is not estopped from denying employeremployee relationship Dispositive Petition for certiori is granted. at all times.Salaries. and in considering JUSMAG estopped from denying that respondent is its employee for failure to present proof. without its consent or waiver. Reasoning . AFP to assume the severance/retirement pay liability for all appointed SASP .Historical Background of JUSMAG .Mars Veloso 1C. et al: “petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity. in finding an employer-employee relp between JUSMAG and Sacramento.US vs.5 Page No. primary task was to advise and assist the Philippines on air force. ISSUE Is the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the RP (JUSMAG-PHIL) immune from suit? HELD Ratio As it stands now. 1978 . . private and proprietary acts. considering that the US has not waived or consented to the suit. . under the total operational control of the Chief JUSMAG-Phils.SASP are employees of the AFP.Exception evolved: existence of contract does not. Hon. in effect.for security guards and SASP . be sued in local courts. the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities. was recognized in Santos. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. This is anchored on the principle of sovereign equality of states (an equal has no power over an equal).US vs. January 31. and cost of utilities . army and naval matters . mean that sovereign states may.When JUSMAG took the services of Sacramento. Discussion . Immunity of State is a universally accepted principle. even without its consent. Rodrigo. one against the US Government.the reason is that by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions.

the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation had a juridical existence enabling it to sue and be sued. Ratio 1. Pursuant to this real estate loan said spouses executed on March 26. However. HELD No.On July 9. defendant SSS filed an application with the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by the plaintiffs on the ground. Pateros. the Clerk of this Court has the authority to issue writs of execution and notices 23 2. and all of the monthly installments due and payable thereafter up to the present date. for lack of merit. 1968 announcing the sale at public auction of the said mortgaged property. 2000 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal its collateral. 1968. 1983 FACTS . the appointment of respondent Gilbert Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law *** PNB contends that the service of notice by the authorized deputy sheriff of this court contravenes Sec. 103. February 21.also the attachment of such property . .Mars Veloso 1C. Notice of the Sheriff's Sale of the mortgaged property was initially published in the Sunday Chronicle in its issue of July 14.83 FACTS .00 which was later increased to P48. 10523 *** It argues that it is the sheriff of QC and not the Clerk of this court who is its Ex-officio Sheriff.In March 1963.5 Page No. Rizal covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. Therefore. And 2nd. Cruz and Socorro Cancio Cruz applied for and were granted a real estate loan by the SSS with their residential lot located at Lozada Street. petitioner PNB’s motion to quash a notice of garnishment24 can be stigmatized as a grave abuse of discretion. spouses David B. defendant SSS still went on to publish second and third publications of foreclosure. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Sto. the plaintiff Cruz spouses instituted before the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for damages and “All writs and processes issued by the court shall be served and executed free of charge by provincial sheriffs or by any person authorized by this court. First.500. 1968.On July 24. that has the authority to serve the notice of garnishment and that the actual service of the latter officer of said notice is therefore not in order 2. SSS v CA MELENCIO-HERRERA. 11 of Commonwealth Act No. the tone in asserting this argument was even irresolute. Rosario. 4201 has already repealed Commonwealth Act No. among others that the conditions of the mortgage have been broken since October 1967 with the default on the part of the mortgagor to pay in full the installments then due and payable on the principal debt and the interest thereon. The premise that the funds spoken of are public in character may be accepted in the sense that it was government-owned.PNB filed a motion to quash the notice based on 2 grounds: 1. There’s no grave abuse of discretion.000. the funds subject of the character “may be public in character” . in the same manner as writs and processes of Courts of First Instance 24 Garnishment – a legal warning concerning the attachment of property to satisfy a debt -.COIR denied PNB’s motion to quash a notice of garnishment ISSUE WON an order of Court of Industrial Relations (COIR) denying. 1963 the corresponding real estate mortgage originally in the amount of P39. RA No. it is now the Clerk of this Court that is at the same time the Ex-Officio Sheriff.00 covering said property. it does not follow that they were exempt from garnishment. and under this law. Despite plaintiff’s letter to defendant demanding the latter to withdraw foreclosure and discontinue the publication of the notice of sale of their property claiming that plaintiffs were up-to date in the payment of their monthly amortizations.Petitioner PNB received a notice of garnishment which was served upon its branch on QC by an authorized deputy sheriff of the court *** What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation deposited at the petitioner’s branch in QC in order to satisfy the decision of the respondent court . .

(3) Ratio No moral and/or temperate damages is to be adjudged against a party which commenced foreclosure proceedings in view of the irregular payments of the debtor of his installments. the enabling law being R. “It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private corporation. the appellant could no longer suddenly and without prior notice to the mortgagors apply for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. Voting 10 justices concur. factual findings of the lower court are not subject to review by this Court. • SSS exercises purely governmental functions and cannot be sued without its consent for the tortious acts of its personnel COMMISIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS V BURGOS DE CASTRO. Applying this rule in the present case. Applying the rule. (3) SSS cannot be held liable for damages. David B. (2) SSS is deemed to have waived its immunity from suit. this petition for review on certiorari.37 per square meter based on the price .” The enabling law is R. in fact. put money in it and has allowed it to site and be sued in any court under its charter. SEPARATE OPINION MAKASIAR [dissent] • What was committed in this case was a tortious act (grossly negligent bordering on malice or bad faith) of the employees of the SSS in foreclosing the mortgage of the wrong mortgagedebtor • SSS cannot be held liable for the damages caused by the tortious acts of its employees in the performance of their regular functions • SSS as a public instrumentality for social welfare is immune from suit despite its Charter provision that it can sue and be sued. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.A. While it is true that the payments of the monthly installments were previously not regular. HELD (1) Ratio On questions of appreciation of evidence. Reasoning Again. Cruz and Socorro Concio-Cruz were up-to-date and current in the payment of their monthly installments. 1161 and P.84 attorney's fees against the SSS and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal alleging. Hence. violated their real estate mortgage contract with the SSS as would have warranted the publications of the notices of as would have foreclosure (2) WON the SSS is immune from suit (3) WON SSS can be held liable for damages. In that case it said. the leg of reasoning is ratio by precedence. 1968 the appellee.D. Court of Appeals affirmed Trial Court’s decision. 6395. 24. that they had fully and religiously paid their monthly amortizations and had not defaulted in any payment.Mars Veloso 1C. (110 SCRA 457). March 31. Reasoning The reasoning used precedence to arrive at this ratio.A. 1980 FACTS . is deemed to have waived immunity from suit. which involved the National Power Corporation as an entity performing governmental functions. Court of First Instance of Bulacan. 3 took no part. there’s a statutory consent by the SSS to waive right of immunity from suit. citing Rayo v. ISSUES (1) WON the Cruz spouses had.The facts of the case is as per above except that the compensation determined is now the issue. 1 dissent. No. Decision (1) The ruling of the lower courts remain. the SSS’ own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in Court. it can be said therefore. although it does not thereby concede its liability. The value of the property was pegged at P 2.Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu . among other things. Trial Court rendered judgment against defendant SSS. by virtue of the explicit provision of an enabling law.5 Page No. Having accepted the prior late payments of the monthly installments. (2) Ratio An entity performing governmental functions. Hence. it is a fact that as of June 30. that the findings of the Court of Appeals that the mortgage-debtors have not in fact violated their contract because SSS accepted their installment payments although given late will not be disturbed on appeal.

or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots.000 attorney’s fees and hence the amount requested is reasonable.79 the amount awarded became P49. Since there is no contract to speak of because the obligation of the government sought to be enforced does not originate from contract. for instance the appointment of one Tecson as justice of the peace and the branding of Trinidad H. . shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding two years. were explicitly raised among others. the court a quo in determining due compensation. 1903 FACTS The defendants.Amigable is still entitled to interest on the price of the land as there was no motion of reconsideration from the Solicitor General before the decision became final. However.410. appealed the decision contending that the court a quo erred in applying its method and violated the high court’s order to make as a basis of compensation the price or the value of the land when it was taken.00} and the product being multiplied by 6. or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. The just compensation is the value of the property at the time it was taken. (the original amount of 14. relied on Article 1250 of the New Civil Code which provides for payment of an obligation in an amount different from what has been agreed on because of the supervention of extra-ordinary inflation or deflation. May 19. Based on this amount. publish. Dispositive Judgment appealed is reversed as to the basis of determining the price of the land. Total due from the government. So instead of just P14. 1902. The Solicitor General also took issue with the award of ten percent as attorney’s fees as exhorbitant considering that Amigable only sought P5.615. in revising upward the compensation.775).Apparently.” (Italics mine)  .00. . publishing. considered the value of the pesos to the dollar at the time the case was being decided. 1971). ISSUES 1. then Article 1250 does not apply. the Court noted that the provision applies only if there was a contract or agreement.Mars Veloso 1C.356. or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands. including attorney’s fee of ten percent amounted to P214. or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. WON the attorney’s fees awarded were exorbitant HELD 1) In a review of the relevant Article of the New Civil Code.00 to US$1. the court determined interest to be P145.000. or who shall unknowingly conceal such evil practices.459. or to disturb the peace of the community. 25 “Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches. And the price of P2. 292 of the Commission25.5 Page No. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. GOVERNMENT UNITED STATES V DORR LADD.79 divided by 2 {the exchange rate at the time of the taking to be P2. this appeal.75. the court expressed the view that the taking of private property by the government in the exercise of its eminent domain does not give rise to a contractual obligation.79 plus six percent per annum interest reckoned from the time the property was taken to the time the compensation is paid.615. have been convicted upon a complaint charging them with the offense of writing. the court a quo. The complaint is based upon section 8 of Act No. Fred Dorr et al. 2) The Court noted that Amgable only sked for P5.37 per square meter or total amount is P14.. Virulent attacks on the Civil Commission and its members. Using the precedent. or both.615. and circulating a scurrilous libel against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands. . in the discretion of the court. through the Solicitor General. The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of “Manila Freedom” of April 6. Pardo de Tavera as a coward and a rascal.44. write. or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office.34. WON the compensation awarded by the court is proper 2. Velasco vs Manila Electric (L19390 December 29.The government. Hence.85 used in the conveyance of several pieces of property in the same area at about the same time. the safety and order of the Government.

utter. uttered. uttering. the existing laws and institutions of the Islands. regardless of their breadth and dimensions. no seditious tendency being apparent. or to bring them. Furthermore. and connecting the islands of the archipelago. What is meant in section 8 of Act No. 292 by the expression “the Insular Government of the Philippines”?26 2. or published or to knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No. 1798. and their private morals. Whether the article constitutes an offense under section 8 of Act No.86 ISSUES 1. constitutes no offense under section 8 of Act No. • All waters around. 3046 An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines . The publication of the article therefore. the insular shelves. or to excite against them or either any of them the hatred of the good people of the United States…" . in a general and abstract sense. printed. “It is made an offense to write. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission as having seditious tendencies unless it has a tendency to produce disaffection or a feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to its laws. Reasoning There are two admissible meanings of the term “government” provided: a.. TERRITORY ART I NATIONAL TERRITORY The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago. form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. with all the islands and water embraced therein. their public integrity. • All waters beyond outermost islands of archipelago but within limits of boundaries set forth in such treaties. and US-Britain treaty (1930). administered.) Congress on July 14. 292) Dispositive The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendants are acquitted. is enforced in these Islands. Reasoning The article in question contains no attack upon the government system of the U. The following form part of territorial sea of the Phils: • All waters within limits set forth in Treaty of Paris (1898). N. publish or cause to procure to be written. US-Spain treaty (1900). The waters around. or the said President. scandalous. fluvial and aerial domains. the aggregate of the individuals by whom the Government of the Islands is. between. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission is used in the abstract sense of the existing political system as distinguished from the concrete organism of the Government – the Houses of Congress and the Executive. and malicious writing or writings against the Government of the United States.S. REPUBLIC ACT NO. or the President of the United States. Ratio The term “government” as employed in Act No. and though grossly abusive as respects both the Commission as a body and some of its individual 26 27 members.Approved: 17 June 1961 Whereas clauses – 1. consisting of its terrestrial. printing. with intent to defame the said Government. it is the character of the men who are intrusted with the administration of the government that the writer is seeking to bring into disrepute by impugning the purity of their motives.Mars Veloso 1C. into contempt or disrepute. print. including its territorial sea. We need to answer this question first in order to be able to resolve the next issue. The first admissible definition is derived from the act of (the U. or either of them. and other submarine areas. between and connecting the various islands of the archipelago.B. and the wisdom of their policy. .S. Ratio The publication of an article can not be punished under Act No. for the time being. commonly known as the Sedition Act)27 2. the subsoil. or publishing any false. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission. or b.S. or either House of said Congress. the seabed. and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. 292? HELD 1.The publication of an article abusive of the United States Philippine Commission and its members is not a libel upon the Government and does not fall within said Act No. it contains no attack upon the governmental system by which authority of the U.

1968. 5446 is simply an Act to correct typographical errors in Section 1 of R. . Section 2 – All waters within the baselines provided in sec1 are considered inland or internal waters of the Phils.when it overlaps another EEZ. installations and structures. effective occupation and control established in accordance with international law. over which the Republic of the Phils. PEOPLE PREAMBLE . situated in North Borneo.5 Page No. The baselines from which the territorial sea of Philippines is determined consist of straight lines joining appropriate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago. historical. • said area is vital to the security and economic survival of the Philippines and much of it is part of the continental margin of the Phil. 3046 defining the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippines. the common boundaries shall be determined by countries . PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1978 .Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a seazone over which a state has special rights over the exploration and use of marine resources – Wikipedia . 1599 Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone and for Other Purposes . has acquired dominion and sovereignty. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. the preservation of the marine environment. off-shore terminals.000-P100. Marcos issued P. 1596 June 11.It also restricts other countries from exercising the rights above in our EEZ.It extends from two hundred nautical miles beyond and from the baselines from which the territorial sea . 1596 declaring certain area (the Kalayaan Island Group or more commonly known as the “Spratly Islands”) as Philippine territory as well as providing for its Government and Administration.Mars Veloso 1C.What can be exercised in EEZ? o Sovereignty rights for the purpose of exploration and exploitation.D. indispensable need.A. subsoil.Anyone who violates any provision of the decree shall be subject to a fine (P2. It further says that the definition of the baselines of the territorial seas of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah. 5446 R. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. said area (including its sea-bed. including the prevention and control of pollution.000) or imprisonment (6 mos – 10 yrs) or both. archipelago • the area does not legally belong to any state or nation and by reason of history.87 2.A. conservation and management of the natural resources o Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect to the establishment and utilization of artificial islands. Vessels and other equipment or articles used shall be confiscated. or AFP officers as may be designated by the Pres. and scientific research o Other rights recognized by international law or state practice . and equitable grounds • named it “Kalayaan” and constituted it as a distinct and separate municipality of Palawan • administration and government shall be vested in the Secretary of National Defense or in other Civil govt. Approved September 18.The President may authorize a government agency to promulgate rules for the purposes of this decree . • other states’ claims to some of the area cannot prevail over the claims of the Philippines on legal.Recognizes that other countries have EEZs . Section 1 – It defines and describes the baselines for the territorial sea of the Phils. continental margin and air space) must be deemed to belong to and subject to the sovereignty of the Phil.Pres.

FPJ’s parents were foreigners – his mother Bessie Kelley Poe was an American and his father Allan F. 1936.Allan F. 2004 FACTS . to render personal.Even if no such prior marriage existed. . The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and. he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ because FPJ was illegitimate. in order to build a just and humane society and establish s Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations. Poe was a Spanish national being a son of Lorenzo Pou. the sovereign Filipino people.Mars Veloso 1C.On December 31. . Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before marrying Bessie Kelley according to an “uncertified” copy of a supposed certification of the marriage in July 5. 2003. Poe was a Filipino citizen. justice. March 3. do ordain and promulgate this Constitution. born in Manila on August 20. 1939. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS VITUG. imploring the aid of Almighty God. love.5 Page No. FPJ filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP). Sec 16: The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ART III BILL OF RIGHTS Sec 2: Sec 7: ART VII EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Sec 4: ART XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS Sec 2: ART XVIII TRANSITORY PROVISIONS Sec 25: TECSON V.In his certificate of candidacy. ART II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES Sec 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sec 15: The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.On January 9. conserve and develop our patrimony. Poe married Bessey Kelley only a year after the birth of FPJ. all citizens may be required. Allan F. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. under conditions provided by law. in the fulfillment thereof. military or civil service. equality. Fornier filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen. and secure to ourselves and our posterity.” or “Ronald Allan” Poe. . 2004. .88 We. Jr. and peace. FPJ represented himself to be a natural-born citizen. a Spanish subject. The marriage certificate of their marriage reflected the . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Victorino X.His real name was stated to be “Fernando. freedom. . . promote the common good.Even if Allan F. . Sec 4: The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth.According to Fornier.

. Pangasinan. . 2004 hearing before the COMELEC. 1940 where Allan was 25. Ratio Jurisdiction issue . .Certified photocopy of an affidavit by Paulita Gomez-Poe attesting that she had filed a bigamy case against Allan F. .Copies of tax declarations under the name of Lorenzo Pou .No birth certificate for Lorenzo but his death certificate issued upon his death in September 11.89 date of their marriage to be on September 16. 1954 at age 84 identified him as a Filipino residing in San Carlos. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos. . COMELEC and Velez v. 2004 – Fornier filed a petition before the Supreme Court. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the three cases filed? 2. Poe and Paulita Gomez . . Procedure .Original Certificate of Title if the Registry Deeds of Pangasinan in the name of Lorenzo Pou.Certified copy of the certificate of birth of Allan F.February 10. . 1915. Fornier presented the following pieces of evidence: . Can FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on the ground that he materially misrepresented in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born Filipino? HELD 1. Poe) challenge the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and assert that only the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.Certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos.The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would not include cases directly brought before it questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held. Poe because of his relationship with Kelley (in Spanish) English translation of (b) . a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. unmarried and Filipino. 2004.Certification from OIC of the Archives Division of the National Archives stating that there was no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. 2004. Poe . Pangasinan .Certification by the OIC of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there was no available information about the marriage of Allan F. ISSUES 1.The two other petitions (Tecson and Desidero v. The motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on February 6.Mars Veloso 1C.In the January 19. Pangasinan stating that the records of the birth of the said office from 1900 to May 1946 were destroyed during World War II .Certification that there was no available information regarding the birth of Allan F.Lorenzo married Marta Reyes and their son Allan was born on May 17.FPJ presented the following pieces of evidence among others: . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Poe .The COMELEC’s decision on disqualified cases involving a presidential candidate could be elevated to and could be taken cognizance by the Supreme Court.Certification from the director of the Records Management and Archives Office stating that a Lorenzo Poe/Pou resided in the Philippines before 1907 . praying for TRO. and Bessie was 22. unmarried and American.Copy of marriage contract of Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley .Certificate of birth of Ronald Allan F.Copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ .Copy of certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou . The birth certificate of Allan showed that his father was an Español father and to a mestiza Español mother. .FPJ’s earliest established ascendant was his grandfather Lorenzo Pou.5 Page No. 2004 – COMELEC dismissed the Fornier petition for lack of merit and Fornier filed a motion for reconsideration on January 26.January 23. Poe .

78) . according to Art. Reasoning . 52. 2.Concept of citizenship .Yes .5 Page No. 7 dissent.The rules speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election.“…the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of enduring free.“Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests…relating to qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.” (Rule 14) . . same) . Sec.Tecson petition and Velez petition .Fornier petition . Sec.The distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy should only remain in the sphere of civil law and should not unduly impinge on the domain of political law.” (Rule 12) . The Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal state: .” (Rule 13) . 1.The Tecson and Velez petitions make use of Art. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.“Only the registered candidate for President or VicePresident who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President…by filing a verified petition…within 30 days after the proclamation of the winner. 7. 69. Constitution). Fornier relied on the following: . 1 abstention and 1 separate opinion) .” . 8.“any interested party” authorized to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate (Art. Sec 4(7) of the Constitution in assailing the COMELEC’s jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the Fornier petition because the “Supreme Court sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election.“A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 is false…” (Omnibus Election Code.Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court which includes the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch of instrumentality of the government. same) .The 1935 Constitution confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino regardless of whether such children are legitimate of illegitimate. 7 of the Constitution.A “contest” refers to a post-election scenario.Aristotle described a citizen as a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office and . returns and qualifications of the President and the Vice President and not candidates for President or Vice-President.Does the Court have jurisdiction over the three cases filed? . (Art.In seeking the disqualification of FPJ before the COMELEC.Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court under the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 65). Sec. .“An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election contest or a petition for quo-warranto against the President or Vice-President. order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt thereof.No . “any decision. Aside from that. 9.90 Reasoning . Ratio FPJ’s citizenship issue (Voting 6 concur.Can FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on the ground that he materially misrepresented in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born Filipino? . Election contests are either election protests or a quo warranto which would have the objective of dislodging the winner from office.” . orderly and honest elections…” (Sec.Mars Veloso 1C.

it expanded to include political citizenship which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.Citizenship underwent changes in the 18th to 20th centuries. the native inhabitants of the Philippines became Spanish subjects. .In the 20th century.Citizenship deals with rights and entitlements on the one hand and with concomitant obligations on the other.The 1876 Spanish Constitution was not extended to the Philippines because the colony was to be governed by special laws.Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 1870 .5 Page No. may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy .In the 19th century. . not a citizen of another country .They did not become American citizens but were issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to protection of the US.During the Spanish period.An inhabitant who was a native of Spain . no such term as “Philippine citizens. .An inhabitant of the Philippines and a Spanish subject on April 11.Article 10 of the Treaty of Paris stated that the civil and political status of the native inhabitants would be determined by the US Congress. 1902 as there was no citizenship law in the Philippines. the following were Spanish citizens: .Residing in the Philippines on the said date .” A citizen of the Philippine islands under this Act was: . .Persons born in Spanish territory . .” In church records.A native born inhabitant . personal liberty and justice) . . there was the development of social citizenship which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security.A Spanish subject on April 11.Internationalization of citizenship is an ongoing development.Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law) – A native born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of April 11. If no such declaration is made.Order de la Regencia of 1841 . .An inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before April 11.Spanish laws on citizenship included: . Spanish subjects and natives who choose to remain in the territory may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making a declaration of their decision within a year from the date of the ratification of the treaty. 1899 . 1899.” only “Spanish subjects. the concept was civil citizenship which established the rights necessary for necessary for individual freedom (eg. 1899. 1899 if: .Philippine Organic Act of 1902 – first appearance of the term “citizens of the Philippine islands. their allegiance shall be held renounced and they would have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.Mars Veloso 1C. 1899 and July 1. . .Since that date.Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 (defined the political status of children born in the Philippines) . natives were identified as “indios. .Those who.” .91 the state would be composed of such individuals in order to achieve a self-sufficient existence. .Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers .Upon ratification of the treaty. Rights to property.According to the Civil Code of Spain. .Children of a Spanish father or mother even if they were born outside Spain . . The common law principle jus soli (principle of territoriality) was said to govern those born in the Philippines during this time. without such papers.An inhabitant meant: .Citizenship in the Philippines from the Spanish times to the present .In the 18th century.Controversy as to the citizenship of a child born between April 11.

had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands . elect Philippine citizenship . 3 (4) of the 1935 Constitution.1987 Constitution – aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution which outlines in Article 4.Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who.5 Page No. Sec. 7.Mars Veloso 1C.Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution . Art. . 3 of the 1973 Constitution state that the following are citizens of the Philippines: .Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution . 2 of the same article which provided that a female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retainers her Philippine citizenship unless by her act or omission she is deemed to have renounced her citizenship under the law.Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines . a natural-born citizen of the Philippines (Art.Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. Poe was a Filipino citizen because his father Lorenzo was also Filipino. 1940. before the adoption of this Constitution. Poe was Lorenzo Pou.Natural born citizen – citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship . Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. as stated in Sec. 1939. The provisions of Sec.Those born before January 17.At the time of his death on September 11.Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines . . 1.The parents of FPJ were Allen Poe and Bessie Kelley. 1954. This was deemed discriminatory in that it incapacitated the Filipino woman from transmitting her citizenship to her legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.Add Sec. . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. 1973 of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority .The Constitution requires that the President of the Philippines should be. marriage certificate of Bessie and Allan and the .FPJ was born to them on August 20.Citizenship of FPJ in relation to grandfather Lorenzo Pou’s citizenship and father Allan F. . Poe’s citizenship . 1.The father of Allan F.The three documents (birth certificate of FPJ. Art. which. 1. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on September 16. when taken together with the existing civil law provisions would provide that women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands. . . 1 that the following are Filipino citizens: .1973 Constitution – Corrected Sec. 3: .92 . Art. .Conclusions with some degree of certainty to be drawn from the documents presented: .Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines . 2). .Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the 1935 Constitution . Sec. among the many requirements.1935 Constitution – provided that jus sanguinis (blood relationship) be the basis for citizenship. .Allan F.Those who are naturalized in accordance with law .Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution .Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority.Allan F.The public documents submitted are deemed trustworthy.Those who are naturalized in accordance with law . .

being that branch of law which is concerned with the organization of the family and regulation of property. . will or a statement before the court in authentic writing) . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.Compulsory (demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation) . . Section 3) state that when the subject of the inquiry is the content of the document. 173 and 175 and the rules have retroactive effect (Article 255). FPJ’s father.93 death certificate of Lorenzo) were certified true copies of the originals.Mars Veloso 1C.The Rules of Court (130.Fornier argues that the mandatory rules under civil rule should apply because FPJ was an illegitimate son. Section 44) that the entries in official records made by a public officer in the performance of his duty are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The duly notarized declaration by Ruby Kelley Mangahas. .For proof of filiation or paternity. . Poe. proving the acts of Allan F. Poe in the birth certificate of FPJ. FPJ’s maternal aunt and sister of his mother Bessie. Acknowledgement in the birth certificate by signing name) .5 Page No. recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ (living with Bessie and the children in one house as one family) would be accepted. Publicity of the record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred .As public documents.1950 Civil Code – acknowledgement of illegitimate children of three types which had to be done during the lifetime of the presumed parent: . Poe.It is safe to assume that Lorenzo Pou’s place of residence at the time of death was the same as his residence before death in the absence of evidence that would attest otherwise. .Acknowledgement needed to establish paternity (eg. There is little indication that this should also govern his political rights. The penalty affixed to a breach of that duty. . Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill effected in 1902. . Routine and disinterested origin of most such statements. .The Family Code has liberalized the rules as stated in Articles 172. These provisions are there to govern the private and personal affairs of the family. Pangasinan. .Lorenzo born sometime in 1870 during the Spanish colonization period. .In the FPJ case. no evidence shall be admissible except the original document itself.Legal (in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized as natural) .Voluntary (expressly made in record birth. the three documents are prima facie proof of their contents as stated in the Rules of Court (130. .Fornier argues that Lorenzo was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of 1898 to 1902 but there is no existing record to attest to that claim. there was no signature of Allan F. the mandatory rules of civil law would not apply in this case.This should be taken in the context of civil law. In that case. . This is grounded on:’ of official duty in the preparation of the statement made.Lorenzo’s residence at the time of death was in San Carlos. One of the exceptions however is when the original is a public record in the custody of a public office is recorded in a public office.Fornier failed to show that Lorenzo was out of the country during that same time period. This citizenship would then extend to his son Allan F.

Court has jurisdiction. SEPARATE OPINION PUNO Jurisdiction .The pronouncement that an illegitimate child cannot inherit the father’s citizenship has no textual basis in the Constitution and violates the equal protection clause. Decision 1.In the cases cited above. it is important to note the lis mota in each case. .The proof of filiation for purposes of determining citizenship status should be deemed independent from those prescribed for civil code purposes.FPJ was alleged to be illegitimate because of the bigamous marriage between his parents Allan and Bessie for the reason that Allan allegedly had a prior existing marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez.Tecson and Valdez petitions – petitioners cannot invoke Art VII S4 of the Constitution because the word “contest” means that the Court can only be invoked after the election and proclamation of a President or Vice President. .5 Page No. Allan’s citizenship would not have been transmitted to FPJ because FPJ was illegitimate.There is no jurisprudence to prove that an illegitimate child cannot inherit his father’s citizenship.The 1935 Constitution applies to FPJ since he was born during that time period and it states that Filipino citizens include those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.Fornier argues that even if Allan F.Fornier also contended that even if Allan and Bessie’s marriage was not bigamous. . there was no jus sanguinis in the lis mota of the cases. . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Republic.Certiorari power of the SC to review COMELEC decisions is a limited power . it was there to ensure a Filipino nationality for the child with the assumption that the mother would gain custody. .SC is unanimous on the issue of jurisdiction . 2.COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence that FPJ deliberately misrepresented that he is a natural-born Filipino citizan in his CoC . The Court held that the veracity of this marriage between Paulita and Allan is doubtful. Poe were Filipino. COMELEC and Velez v.DNA testing to prove paternity could also be resorted to. it is mere obiter dictum.In all of the mentioned cases. Tecson v. . . Fornier based his arguments on the cases of Morano v. . 15 of the Civil Code. it was mere obiter dictum. Fornier v. . Chiongbian v. it would constitute doctrine courtesy of stare decisis. FPJ was still illegitimate because his parents were married after he was born.Mars Veloso 1C. The evidence does not establish conclusively FPJ’s citizenship but the evidence preponderates in his favor to hold that he could not be guilty of misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy. There can be no “contest” before a winner is proclaimed. . arbitrary or capricious) . If there was jus sangunis mentioned. Vivo. de Leon and Serra v. . .Can only reverse or change the COMELEC decision on the ground that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion (despotic.Fornier petition – as a review under R64 in relation to R65 of the RoC. If not. COMELEC DISMISSED for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for dismissing the original petition. If the pronouncement of jus sangunis was in the lis mota.For jurisprudence that regarded an illegitimate child to inherit the mother’s citizenship. . The ordinary rules should govern. Poe DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.94 The relevance of citizenship is exemplified in Art.

Sworn statements of Paulita Gomez charging Allan Poe with bigamy and marriage license of between Allan Poe and Paulita Gomez.Assuming that COMELEC gravely abused its jurisdiction and the issue of whether respondent Poe is a natural-born citizen Filipino should now be resolved.Remand will violate respondent Poe’s right to due process.Poe from the time of his involuntary birth has always conducted himself as Filipino . .Remand will change the nature of a Sec 78 proceeding by judicial legislation. does not prove anything besides birth . hence. OIC Archives Div that the Register of Births that there is no information on the National Archives on the birth of Allan Poe to the spouse Lorenzo Pou and Marta Reyes – lack of information is not proof .Remand to the COMELEC to give the petitioner a second opportunity to prove his case is a palpable error .Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC – misrepresentation must not only be material but also deliberate and willful . hence. the body is no longer an impartial tribunal is there are three of the seven members of the commission that have given firm view that Poe is not a natural-born Filipino citizen .Respondent submitted affidavits that show that the files submitted by the petitioner are fabricated by Manapat’s instructions .“In light of these erudite opinions of our amici curae.“For failure of the petitioner to discharge the burden of proof.Petitioner claims that the affidavits must not be considered because of technical grounds .Mars Veloso 1C. .” Poe does not need to present contrary evidence for the burden of proof is not shifted to him.If case were remanded to the COMELEC. not that he is not a natural-born citizen . unconstitutional . Manapat – pulled out because they were fabricated . .Remanding the case to COMELEC will change the character of a S78 proceeding (WON FOJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen will be the main issue and not just an issue incidental to the issue of material misrepresentation) .Certificate of birth – only proved the date of birth of FPJ.Principal issue: whether respondent deliberately made a material misrepresentation in his CoC when he wrote that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.Certification of Estrella Domingo. unconstitutional . the Fornier petition need not be remanded to the COMELEC for further reception of evidence .The ruling of the COMELEC denying the petition to disqualify respondent Poe is based on substantial evidence.Analysis of petitioner’s evidence .Petitioner has burden to prove evidence to show that (1) respondent made misrepresentation in his CoC.SC cannot engage in judicial legislation as it is something only legislature can change by another law .Birth certificate of Allan Poe – also fabricated. it is daylight clear that petitioner Fornier is not only wring with his facts but also wrong with his law. Poe is entitled to an outright dismissal of the Fornier petition.Remand will delay the resolution of the issue of whether respondent Poe is qualified.5 Page No. hence is not despotic. Manapat that the National Archives has no record that Lorenzo Pou entered or resided in the Philippines before 1907 – manufactured .Favors of remand cannot be extended to the litigant because of political neutrality .Remand means a new round of litigation in the COMELEC when its proceedings have long been closed and terminated. to give another chance to prove facts which he failed to prove before . presented thru Dir.Certification of Dir. . Delay will also prejudice his candidacy and will favor his political opponents.SC ruled that the COMELEC is a quasi-judicial body and are not bound by the technical rules of evidence.95 . (2) that misrepresentation is material to the position to which he is candidate and (3) that material misrepresentation was made deliberately and willfully . whimsical or capricious .

161634 and 161824 are DISMISSED. is qualified to run for President involves a constitutional issue but its political tone is no less dominant. therefore do not constitute stare decisis. the court should itself decide the issue and declare respondent Poe as a natural-born citizen on the basis of the evidence adduced before the COMELEC . Dispositive Whether respondent Fernando Poe.5 Page No.that is the critical fact. Such distinction must be germane to the purpose of the law.R. .People v Cayat – established the doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions.” .January 23.To disqualify respondent Poe because he is illegitimate will violate our treaty obligation. but not those of national officials like the president. Nos. The Court is split down the middle on the citizenship of respondent Poe. Jr.Ubi les non distinguit ne nos distinguere debemus.Whether respondent Poe is illegitimate is irrelevant in determining his status as natural-born citizen --.The law does not make any distinction in applying jus sanguinis to illegitimate children. The court’s ruling should have stopped here but the SC followed with an obiter dictum that even if Quintin’s father were Filipino. 2004 – Fornier filed petition to disqualify FPJ and to cancel his certificate of candidacy for the May 10 elections because of he is not a natural-born Filipino citizen .Paa v Chan – Quintin claims that his father is Filipino because his grandmother is a Filipina.There is no textual foundation . IN VIEW WHEREOF. The right to run is empty if the chance to win is diminished of denied a candidate. . For on political questions.To establish that respondent Poe is a natural-born citizen.that is the law. provincial and city officials. the better policy approach is to let the people decide who will be the next President. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.Mars Veloso 1C.Serra v Republic – an illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother .It violates the equal protection clause . . . Given the indecisiveness of the votes of the members of this Court. . . DAVIDE FACTS . 161434.96 .Tan Chong v Secretary of Labor – “The duty of this Court is to forsake and abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in violation of the law in force. this Court may err but the sovereign people will not.Merlin Magallona – transmissive essence of citizenship . especially if the distinction has no textual .Reasons why court should create new doctrine: . To be sure.Obiter dicta do not establish doctrine even if repeated endlessly. the petitions in G.Filipino citizenship of Allan Poe. . an issue of first impression made more difficult by the interplay of national and international law. . he would not be Filipino because he was illegitimate. the Constitution did not grant to the unelected members of this Court the right to elect in behalf of the people. . a Filipino citizen --.“The right to run for public office includes the right to equal chance to compete. The court ruled that since there is no proof that his grandmother is Filipino then his father is not Filipino thereby not making him Filipino as well. .To avoid delay. 2004 – COMELEC dismissed the case declaring that its jurisdiction is limited to all matters relating to election. . returns and qualifications of all elective regional. all that is needed is proof of his filiation to his father Allan Poe.The statements on the illegitimate child were unnecessary and were just obiter dicta and not ratio decidendi.Morano v Vivo – WON the stepson was to file the natural cerebral house.January 9. respondent’s father is well established.Chiongbian v de Leon – a legitimate son whose father became Filipino because of election to a public office before the 1935 constitution .

the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected.97 . Ratio For the purposes of citizenship. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. 2.Tecson and Velez petitions .Ruling of COMELEC is the same as Mandoza opinion. FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 in Manila. by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum. I think that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected. if he’s a naturalborn Filipino citizen Jurisdiction .but it has jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of citizenship of national officials under sec 78 of OECon petitions to deny due course or cancel certificates of candidacy on the ground of false material representation. in his Separate Opinion said. 4.SC has jurisdiction over the case under (Art IX-A S7 Consti ) . Jr prayed special civil action of certiorari under R65 RoC to challenge jurisdiction of COMELEC over the issue of FPJ’s citizenship. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ May court exercise judicial power to disqualify a candidate before the election? . FPJ was born to Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley. albeit a Spanish subject. It will wreck the constitutional right of the people to choose their candidates.Fornier petition . Velez and Fornier . was not shown to have declared his allegiance to Spain by virtue of the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902.Velez filed petition with the ff issues: .Whether SC has jurisdiction over the petitions of Tecson. Allan Poe was a Filipino because his father. an illegitimate child whose father is Filipino and whose mother is an alien. Petitions are dismissed. . . Mendoza.Fornier evidence is not substantial . Lorenzo Poe. proof of paternity or filiation is enough for the child to follow the citizenship of the father COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in holding that FPJ is a Filipino citizen pursuant to Art IV S1 per 3 consti. a retired member of this Court. They claim that only the Sc has jurisdiction (ArtVII S4.Findings: .Court may not. 3.Mr.Whether COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitions to deny due course or cancel certificated of candidacy of Presidential candidates . Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC .” .Pre-election remedies are not within the jurisdiction of the SC . consti) .The provision in the constitution only refers to past-election remedies.SC can take cognizance of issue of WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the challenged resolution by virtue of (ArtVIII S1 Consti) WON FPJ is a natural-born Filipino Citizen Facts: 1.5 Page No. and if so. they should have resorted to pre-election remedies in the OEC which are implemented by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure .Under the OEC. Justice Vicente V. 2004 . The provision did not make any distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children of Filipino fathers.Whether FPJ is a Filipino citizen. Bessie Kelley and Allan Poe were married on 16 September 1940.January 29. COMELEC has original jurisdiction to determine whether a candidate for an elective office ineligible for the office for which he filed his certificate of candidacy because of any of the recognized grounds for disqualification.Mars Veloso 1C.FPJ did not commit any falsehood in material representation when he stated that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen . Philippines. “In my view.Tecson and Desiderio. .

The SC may become like the Iranian Guardian Council. free and fair election.Petitioners claim that Allan Fernando Poe is a citizen of Spain because his .FPJ is not a citizen because both his parents are aliens. misinform. Respondent Poe committed false material representation by stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is a natural born Filipino citizen.To justify the cancellation of CoC.We cannot discern from the records any indication that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Fornier’s petition. -Grave abuse of discretion – capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross that it amounted to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law .“A person. or hide fact which would render a candidate ineligible .Mars Veloso 1C. Borlongan v Madrideo – burden of proof is on the party asserting the affirmative of an issue . writ of certiorari can only be granted if it can be proven that COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion.Palanca v Republic – . false representation mentioned must pertain to material matter .Fornier did not dispute that Allan Fernando Poe is the father of FPJ . Whether the respondent committed a material and false representation when he declared in his CoC that he is a naturalbron Filipino citizen . .Allan’s father. his availment of the extraordinary writ of certiorari is grossly misplaced.In re Bosque – expiration of the term of 18 months without making an express declaration of intention to retain their Spanish nationality resulted in the loss of the latter and thereby becoming subjects of the new sovereign in the same manner as the natives of these islands . He knowingly made such false representation.FPJ is Filipino citizen.This Court. not he who denies. .Ei incumbit probation qui decit. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissinG Fornier’s petition for disqualification against respondent . . .Fornier petition brought under R65 RoCP – where COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in Jan 23 and Feb 6 resolutions holding that “considering the evidence presented by the petitioner is not substantial.Fornier failed to prove allegations.The marriage certificate was shown to have been falsified. 1899 when Spain ceded the Philippines (Treaty of Paris.98 .Director Manapat of the National Archives falsified the marriage contract of FPJ’s parents and his father’s birth certificate. 4 . Lorenzo Pou is a Spanish subject and an inhabitant of the Philippines on April 11. and 2. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. – he who asserts. non que negat. is a Filipino citizen.Salcedo v COMELEC – the only instance when a petition raising the qualifications of a registered candidate is before election (S78 OEC) .Disqualifying respondent Poe will be viewed as directed against the “masses. must prove. by virtue of the provisions of Sec. who was an inhabitant of the Philippine Islands and a naturalized subject of Spain on the 11th day of April 1899. . .COMELEC held that the FPJ did not commit any material misrepresentation in his CoC because his father is a Filipino by virtue of jus sanguinis and under the 1935 constitution. we declare that the respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation when he stated in his CoC that he is a natural born Filipino citizen” Allegations in the COMELEC petition: 1. as the last guardian of democracy. Phil Bill 1902 and Jones Law) . has the duty to protect the right of our nation to a genuine.” a situation not allowed by the Constitution.Marriage Contract with Paulita Gomez shows that his parents are citizens of Spain.Valles v COMELEC – Philippine law on citizenship adheres to jus sanguinis .There must be deliberate attempt to mislead.5 Page No. S1 R131 RroE. Indeed. having been born to a Filipino father .

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of the Act of Congress on 1 July 1902 and of Sec. 2 of the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916. Under the Constitution, he is also a citizen of the Philippines because he was such at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.” - Constitution did not specify in referring to those whose fathers are Filipino citizens as to whether this only applies to legitimate children or not. - Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus, especially if the distinction has no textual foundation in the Constitution, serves no state interest, and even imposes an injustice on an innocent child. (Fr Bernas) - To introduce a distinction between legitimacy or illegitimacy in the status of the child vis-à-vis the derivation of his citizenship from the father defeats the transmissive essence of citizenship in blood relationship. (Dean Merlin Magalona) In fine, I reiterate that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in rendering its assailed Resolutions dated January 23, 2004 and February 6, 2004. WHEREFORE, I concur with Justice Jose C. Vitug in his ponencia and with Senior Justice Reynato S. Puno in his Separate Opinion DISMISSING Fornier’s petition CARPIO-MORALES Issues for Resolution: 1) Whether this Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of presidential candidates; 2) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it issues its Resolutions of Jan. 23, 2004 and Feb. 6, 2004, dismissing the Petition for Disqualification; 3) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino and therefore qualified to seek election as President. 1) Jurisdiction: - Petitions in G.R. Nos. 161464 and 161634 - Petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez assert that this Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to determine whether FPJ is qualified to be a candidate for President: paragraph 7, Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution:

- The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. - refers to this Court’s jurisdiction over electoral contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President, and not to the qualifications or disqualifications of a presidential candidate. FPJ is still just a candidate; petition: premature. - Petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez claim that the issue of FPJ’s qualification for the Presidency may also be brought directly to this Court on the basis of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, specially considering that the instant case is one of transcendental importance. - a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is not available where there is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law—like in this case: (to intervene in the Petition for Disqualification) - in determining whether procedural rules, such as standing, should be relaxed on the ground of “transcendental importance,” the following should be considered: the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. Considering that the substantive issues raised by petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez in G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634, respectively, are virtually identical to those raised by petitioner Fornier in G.R. No. 161824, this Court is not convinced that the “transcendental importance” of the issues raised herein justifies a direct resort to this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court or the exercise of its expanded certiorari jurisdiction under Sec. 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. - Petition in G.R. No. 161824

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- this Court definitely has jurisdiction over the petition for Certiorari questioning the Resolutions of Jan. 23, 2004 and Feb. 6, 2004, issued by COMELEC: Section 7 of Art. IX-A of the Constitution vests this Court with the power of review over decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC. - COMELEC’s Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter of the Petition for Disqualification Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. - not really a constitutional question… 2) Whether The COMELEC Acted with Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Petition for is qualification for Lack of Merit. - the COMELEC did indeed act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing them: By resolving to dismiss the petition in the Petition for Disqualification without stating the factual bases therefore: - Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.” - By resolving to dismiss the Petition for Disqualification without ruling categorically on the issue of FPJ’s citizenship. - To justify its evasion of the duty to rule squarely on the issue of citizenship, the COMELEC relies on this Court’s ruling in Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, and held that held that Fornier should have presented “proof of misrepresentation with a deliberate attempt to mislead” on the part of FPJ— confined the issue in the Petition for Disqualification to whether FPJ “must have known or have been aware of the falsehood as [allegedly] appearing on his certificate.” - Carpio-Morales: it is impossible for the COMELEC to determine whether FPJ was aware of a false material representation in his Certificate of Candidacy without first determining whether such material representation (in this case, his claim of natural-born citizenship) was false. The fact alone that there is a public document (i.e., his birth certificate) which FPJ might have relied upon in averring

natural-born citizenship does not automatically exclude the possibility that (a) there is other evidence to show that such averment is false, and (b) that FPJ was aware of such evidence. 3) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino - Five crucial factual questions (1) Whether Lorenzo Pou has been established to be a Filipino citizen at the time of the birth of his son, Allan F. Poe; - the evidence presented does not show that Lorenzo Pou acquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of the Treaty of Paris or the Organic Acts covering the Philippine Islands. (no evidence as to his residence, only prima facie evidence.) (2) Whether Allan F. Poe, the putative father of FPJ was a Filipino at the time of the birth of the latter; - Claim: Allan F. Poe acquired Filipino citizenship independently of his father’s by virtue of jus soli, Allan F. Poe having been allegedly born in the Philippines on November 27, 1916. - even assuming arguendo that Allan F. Poe was born in the Philippines on November 27, 1916, such fact, per se, would not suffice to prove that he was a citizen of the Philippine Islands absent a showing that he was judicially declared to be a Filipino citizen: In Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, this Court ruled that the principle jus soli or acquisition of citizenship by place of birth was never extended or applied in the Philippine Islands: (3) Whether FPJ is a legitimate or illegitimate child; - FPJ’s birth certificate indicates that his parents were married, and that he is a legitimate child. However, the Marriage Contract of his putative parents, Fernando R. Pou and Bessie Kelley, is dated September 16, 1940, thereby indicating that he was born out of wedlock. Since, in the Marriage Contract, the two contracting parties, Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, participated in its execution, the entry therein with respect to the date of their marriage should be given greater weight than the birth certificate, which was executed by a physician who had to rely on hearsay as regards FPJ’s legitimacy. - FPJ was born out of wedlock, and was thus an illegitimate child at birth.

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(4) Whether Allan F. Poe has been legally determined to be the father of FPJ (Assuming arguendo that Allan F. Poe has been shown to have acquired Philippine citizenship) - As proof of his filiation, FPJ relies upon (1) the stipulation by petitioner Fornier, both before the COMELEC and this Court that Allan F. Poe is indeed the father of FPJ; (2) the declaration of Ruby Kelley Mangahas; and (3) a certified copy of an affidavit of “Fernando R. Poe” for Philippine Army Personnel. - none of the proofs supplied are sufficient proofs of filiation under Article 172 of the Family Code. (5) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino Citizen. - Carpio-Morales adopts the rule that an illegitimate, child of an alien-mother who claims to be an offspring of a Filipino father may be considered a natural-born citizen if he was duly acknowledged by the latter at birth, thus leaving the illegitimate child with nothing more to do to acquire or perfect his citizenship (nothing more to do to acquire citizenship = natural born). - no evidence has been submitted to show that Allan F. Poe did indeed acknowledge FPJ as his own son at birth - Since FPJ then was born out of wedlock and was not acknowledged by his father, the only possible Filipino parent, at the time of his birth, the inescapable conclusion is that he is not a natural-born Philippine citizen. Conclusion WHEREFORE, I vote to: (1) DISMISS the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634 for being premature, (2) DECLARE COMELEC Resolutions dated January 23, 2004 and February 6, 2004, rendered in COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 NULL AND VOID, and (3) DIRECT the COMELEC to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe Jr., for containing a false material representation. IN RE: CHING KAPUNAN; October 1, 1999 FACTS - Petition for Admission to the Phil Bar - April 1964: Vicente D Ching born as the legitimate son of sps Tat Ching, Chinese citizen, and Prescila Dulay, Filipina, in La Union. Since birth, Ching has resided in the Phils

- During this time, the governing charter is the 1935 Constitution. Father’s citizenship is followed, with a right to elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority - July 1998: Ching, after graduating from St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the ’98 Bar Examinations. - Sept 1998: Court allowed Ching to take the exams provided he must submit proof of his Phil citizenship - Nov 1998: Ching submitted certification that he is CPA, Voter Cert from COMELEC, and Cert as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union also from COMELEC. - April 1999: results of Bar Exams were released and Ching passed. He was further required to submit more proof of citizenship. - July 1999: Ching filed Manifestation w/ Affidavit of Election of Phil Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance. - OSG commented that Ching being the “legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother and born under the 1935 Consti was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Phil citizenship. If Ching formally elects Phil citizenship, it would already be beyond the reasonable time allowed by present jurisprudence - Two conditions of an effective election of Phil citizenship (from OSG): 1st – the mother of the person making the election must be a Phil citizen 2nd – election must be made upon reaching the age of majority (w/c means a reasonable time interpreted by the Sec of Justice as 3 yrs, from the Velayo case; in Cuenco, noted that this pd not inflexible, however, held in the same case that 7 yrs not reasonable time) - Ching, to support his cause, invokes these special circumstances: continuous and uninterrupted say in the Philippines, being a CPA, a registered voter, and elected public official ISSUE 1. WON Ching has elected Phil citizenship w/in a reasonable time and if so, WON his citizenship has retroacted to the time he took the bar.

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2. WON Ching’s special circumstances entitle him to citizenship

HELD 1. No, Ching’s election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable pd w/in which to exercise the privilege. Being born in April 1964, he was already 35 yrs old when he complied w/ the requirements of C.A. No 625 in June ’99. He was already more then 14 yrs over the age of majority. Although the Court is sympathetic of his plight, controlling statues and jurisprudence compel the Court in its decision. Also, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Phil citizenship, the latter not being a tedious and painstaking process. Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. It should be availed of with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. 2. No, the abovementioned special circumstances cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election. Decision Court denies Vicente D Ching’s application for admission to the Philippine Bar BENGZON III V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL KAPUNAN; May 7, 2001 FACTS - Constitutional requirement for members of the House of Representatives: “no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural born citizen.” - Teodoro Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac on April 27, 1960. On November 5, 1985 he enlisted in the US Marine Corps without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines. He took an oath of allegiance to the US and as a consequence he lost his Filipino Citizenship because under the Commonwealth Act no. 63 a Filipino may lose his citizenship by rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces

of a foreign country. Any doubts as to his citizenship at the time was settled by his naturalization as a US citizen on June 5, 1990. - May 17, 1994 he reacquired his citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630. - He was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in 1998 and his opponent was Bengson. - Bengson filed a case Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with HRET claiming Cruz, not being a natural-born citizen by the contention that Aricle IV, Sec 2 of the Consti defines natural-born citizens as “citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship, was not eligible to be member of the House. ISSUES 1. WON Cruz, a natural born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship via Repatriation, so that the question of WON he is eligible to be a member of the House might be addressed 2. - WON the HRET committed serious erros and grave abuse of discreation amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ruling in favour of Cruz as natural-born citizen HELD 1. Yes. Ratio Two ways of acquiring Filipino citizenship o By birth – natural born citizens o Naturalization – Naturalized citizens (those who become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under the Commonwealth Act no. 473. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications - 1987 Constitution only provides for 2 classes of citizens: o Natural born o Naturalized - Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may reacquire it by naturalization, repatriation or by direct act of Congress.

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Naturalization – mode for acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. o Repatriation – available for those who have lost their citizenship due to desertion of the armed forces, service in the armed forces of the allied forces in WWII, service in the armed forces of the US at any other time, marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien, and political and economic necessity. Process: taking an oath of allegiance to the RP and registering it in the Local Civil Registrar of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. - Repatriation would result in the recovery of the original nationality. He will be restored to his former status as a naturalborn citizen. Cruz recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen because of his repatriation. Note: As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of taking an oath of allegiance to the RP and registering said oath with the Local Civil Registry - 1987 Constitution does not provide a separate category for persons who after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquires it because they are either natural born or naturalized depending on the reason for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for reacquisition. - Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. 2. No. Ratio HRET has been empowered by the Consti to be the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the elction, returns and qualifications of the members of the House. Court’s jurisdiction is merely to check WON there has been grave abuse; absent such showing, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power o SEPARATE OPINION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Additional Facts:

- In the 1995 local elections, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor declaring himself to be a naturalized Filipino citizen - Thereafter, Cruz ran for Congres, this time declaring himself as natural-born - Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretation of the phrase “from birth” in Art IV, Sec 2 of the Consti - Petitioner avers: means starting from a definite point and must be continuous, constant and without interruption - Respondent contends: refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a “natural-born” - J. Sandoval-Gutierrez holds: - Natural-born citizens are so by virtue of birth without performing any acts. To repatriate, Cruz had to perform certain acts before he could again become a Filipino citizen. Therefore, he does not reaquire natural-born citizenship - The history of the Consti shows that the meaning and application of the requirement of being natural-born have become more narrow and qualified over the years, more stringent; and the decision of HRET in the case at bar reverses the historical trend and clear intendment of the Consti, a matter which can only be accomplished through consti amendment; clearly, HRET has acted with grave abuse of discretion. COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 473 An Act to Provide for the Acquisition of the Citizenship by Naturalization, and to repeal Acts 2927 and 3448 Sec 1: Title: “Revised Naturalization Law” Sec 2: Qualifications: Who may become citizens of the Philippines by naturalization? 1. >21 years old at the day of the hearing of the petition 2. resided in the Philippines for CONTINUOUS period of >10yrs 3. of good moral character + believes in principles underlying the Philippine Constitution (1935 Consti) + conducted himself in proper and irreproachable manner during entire period of residence in the Philippines in relation with

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constituted government and community with community in which he is living 4. (must own real estate in the Philippines > P5000) or Philippine currency or lucrative trade/profession/lawful occupation 5. able to speak and write English/Spanish + any one of the principal Philippine language 6. enrolled his MINOR children of school age in any of the public schools/private schools during the entire period of residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition …School: - recognized by the Office of Private Education of the Philippines - teaches Philippine history, government and civics and prescribes it as part of the school curriculum Sec 3: Special qualifications: when the 10 year qualification required in Sec2(2) could be reduced to a continuous 5 years? 1. had honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines/ under that of any of the provinces, cities, municipalities, or political subdivisions thereof [aliens, particularly American citizens, were the ones who were governing the country prior to the Commonwealth] 2. established new industry/ introduced a useful invention in the Philippines 3. married to a Filipino woman 4. engaged as a teacher in the Philippines for >2 yrs school: public/recognized private school + not established for exclusive instruction of children of persons of particular nationality/race 5. born in the Philippines Sec 4: Who are disqualified? Persons… a. opposed to organized government/affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized gov’t b. defending/teaching the necessity or propriety of violence/personal assault/assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas c. Polygamists/believers of polygamy d. Convicted of crimes (moral turpitude)

e. Suffering from mental alienation/incurable contagious disease f. Not mingled socially w/ Filipinos, have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace customs, traditions, and ideals of Filipinos g. Citizens/subjects of nations w/whom US and the Philippines are at war – during such war h. Citizens/subjects of foreign country [OTHER THAN US!] whose laws don’t grant Filipinos right to become naturalized citizens/subjects Sec 5. Declaration of intention: file declaration that it is his bona fide intention to become a citizen of the Philippines - under oath - 1 year prior to the filing of petition for admission to Philippine citizenship of the Bureau of Justice -contents+ name + age + occupation + personal description + place of birth +last foreign residence and allegiance +date of arrival +name of vessel/aircraft (if any) in which he came to the Philippines +place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making the declaration *to be valid: establish lawful entry for permanent residence + issued certificate showing date, place, and manner of arrival *also state that he had enrolled his minor children in school (see sec2(6)) *2 pictures of himself Sec 6. Widow and minor children of aliens dying after declaration of intention not required to file declaration of intention Sec 7. Petition for citizenship: requirements filed with competent court *a petition in triplicate

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contents of petition: +name and surname +present and former places of residence +occupation +place and date of birth +status; if married and the father, include name, age, birthplace and residence of wife and each child +approximate date of his/her arrival in the Philippines +name of the port of debarkation + name of ship (if remembered) +declaration of qualifications and non-disqualification +declaration that he has complied with sec. 5 +declaration of continuous residence in RP from date of filing petition to admission as RP Citizen *2 photographs of petitioner *petition signed by applicant + supported by affidavit of at least 2 credible persons (see provision for requirements) Sec 8. Competent court: CFI of province in w/c the petitioner has resided for at least 1 yr immediately preceding the filing of the petition Sec 9. Notification and appearance. Tasks of clerk of court …publish petition for 3 consecutive weeks in OG and in one of gen circulation newspapers in the province where petitioner resides …post copies of petitions in conspicuous places (contain name, birthplace and residence of petitioner, date and place of arrival, names of witnesses, date of hearing the petition) *hearing shall not be held w/n 90 days from date of last publication of notice …forward copies of the petition, sentence, naturalization certificate and pertinent data to Department of the Interior, Bureau of Justice, Provincial Inspector of the Philippine Constabulary of the province, and justice of peace of the municipality where petitioner resides Sec 10. Hearing of the petition. *no hearing w/n 30 days preceding any election *public hearing

*Solicitor-General/representative/provincial fiscal appear for Commonwealth at all proceedings *upon belief of court of qualifications and non-disqualification of petitioner, court order proper naturalization certificate in proper civil registry (required in Sec. 10, Act No. 3753) Sec 11. Appeal: to the SC Sec 12: Issuance of the Certificate of Naturalization: 30 days after and from date of notice to the parties (in case of appeal, SC confirmed deci), clerk of court issue naturalization certificate contents of certificate of naturalization” *file no. of petition *number of naturalization certificate *signature of the person naturalized affixed in the presence of the clerk of court *personal circumstances of the person naturalized *dates of filing of declaration of intention and petition *date of decision granting petition *name of the judge who rendered deci *photograph of peti with dry seal of court w/c granted petition *oath declared in open court [refer to the original] Sec 13. Record Books: clerk of court keep 2 books: (1) record of petition and declarations of intentions in chronological order; (2) record of naturalization certificate Sec 14. Fees. *P30.00 (for recording of petition and for proceedings + issuance of certificate) *P24.00 (for each appeal and for connected services rendered) sec 15. Effect of naturalization on wife and children *on wife: shall be deemed a citizen of Philippines (if just married or also naturalized) *on minor children: …if born in the Philippines: Filipino …if foreign-born but dwelling in the Philippines during naturalization of parent: Filipino …if foreign-born, not dwelling in the Philippines during naturalization of parent: Filipino during minority, unless

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resides in the Philippines permanently and still a minor, then legally Filipino upon age of majority …if foreign-born after naturalization of parent: Filipino unless fails to register and take oath 1 yr after age of majority Sec 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners_who_have_died: continue proceedings, same legal effect Sec 17. Renunciation of title or orders of nobility: unless w/ express consent of the National Assembly Sec 18. Cancellation of naturalization certificates issued *upon motion made in proper proceedings by SolicitorGeneral/representative/proper provincial fiscal *cancelled by competent judge on the ff. grounds: a. naturalization certificate obtained fraudulently/illegally b. person naturalized establishes permanent residence outside Philippines w/n 5 yrs after issuance of naturalization certificate c. petition made on invalid declaration of intention d. minor children shown to have failed to graduate from school in sec 2 (6) through fault of parents either by neglect to support or by transferring them to another school(s) e. naturalized citizen only used as a dummy to violate constitutional or legal provision requiring Philippine citizenship Sec 19 Penalties for violation of this Act: fine < P5,000.00 or imprisonment< 5 yrs or both, naturalization cancelled Sec 20. Prescription: file complaint w/n 5 yrs from detection/discovery of commission of offense Sec. 21. Regulation and blanks. *Secretary of Justice: issue necessary regulations *Solicitor-General, subject to approval of Secretary of Justice: naturalization certificate blanks, etc. Sec 22. Repealing clause: Repeals Act. No. 2927 as amended by Act No. 3448 [Naturalization Law] REPUBLIC ACT NO. 530 An Act Making Additional Provisions for Naturalization

- Requires the publication of petitions for citizenship (also required by previous law, prob. Act 423, below) - Court will hear petitions for citizenship 6 months after the publication - Decisions granting the application become executory only after 2 years, and - The Solicitor General or his representative finds that during the intervening time, applicant has:  NOT left the Philippines  Dedicated himself continuously to lawful calling or profession  NOT been convicted of any offense or violation of govt. rules  NOT committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any govt. announced policies - After the finding, the order of the court granting citizenship will be registered and the oath taken by the applicant before he will be entitled to the privileges of citizenship. - Repealed inconsistent parts of Act No. 423. - Approved, June 16, 1950. COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63 An Act Providing for the Ways in Citizenship may be lost or reacquired

which

Philippine

Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support constitution or laws of foreign country upon +21y.o.: a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship while the RP is at war; (4) rendering services to/accepting commission in, the armed forces of foreign country: rendering of service to/the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of RP, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the ff. is present:

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(a) RP has defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign country; or (b) said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory w/ consent of RP: Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service/or acceptance of said commission, & taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country: & provided that any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to/or is commissioned in, the armed forces of foreign country under (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of RP during period of service to/commission in, the armed forces of said foreign country. automatically entitled to full enjoyment of civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen upon his discharge; (5) cancellation of certificates of naturalization; (6) having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the AFP in time of war, unless pardon or granted amnesty; & (7) woman: marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husband's country, she acquires his nationality. *** Sec 1 amended by RA 106, section 1, approved June 2, 1947 *when dual citizenship was allowed at that time: …acquisition of citizenship by natural born Filipino citizen from Iberian/democratic Ibero-American countries/ United Kingdom if the law of that country grants same privilege to its citizens – agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and foreign country from which citizenship is acquired. Section. 2. How citizenship may be reacquired. (1) naturalization: applicant possess none of the disqualification's prescribed in sec 2, Act No. 2927 (repealed by CA 473 – so sec 4) (2) repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp: Provided, woman by sec 1(7) may be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of this Act after the termination of the marital status;(see PD 725 for more details) (3) direct act of the National Assembly. Section 3. Procedure incident to reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Apply Act No. 2927 (now CA 473) to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by naturalization provided for in the next

preceding sec: Provided, qualifications and special qualifications prescribed in sec 3 & 4 of Act 2927 shall not be required (sorry guys, I can’t find a copy of Act 2927 in the net so I don’t know what these sections are in CA 473): further, applicant… (1) at least 21 y.o. + resided in RP at least 6 mos. before he applies for naturalization; (2) have conducted himself in proper and irreproachable manner during +the entire period of his residence in RP +in his relations with the constituted government +with the community in which he is living; and (3) subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign authority/state/sovereignty of which he was a citizen or subject. Section 4. Repatriation: effected by merely taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth of the Philippines (RP) and registration in the proper civil registry. (used in the Bengzon Case) Section 5. Similar to Sec 21 of CA 473 YU V DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO PADILLA; January 24, 1989 FACTS - Petition for Habeas Corpus - 1971 – Yu was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971 valid for 5 years & renewed for same period upon presentment before Portuguese consular officer - Feb. 10, 1978 – He was naturalized as a Phil. citizen - April 1980 – signed commercial documents in Hong Kong (Companies Registry of Tai Shun Estate, Ltd.) and he declared his nationality as Portuguese - July 21, 1981 – He applied & was issued another Portuguese passport in Tokyo. Passport will expire July 20, 1986. Procedural Facts: - July 4, 1988 – He filed for a petition for habeas corpus. He was detained because the Commission on Immigration & Deportation was processing his deportation. CID claims that his acts are tantamount to an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

Yu ordered to explain why he should still be considered a Phil citizen. he should at least be given a full trial where his actions may be explored & the facts fully ascertained. He was given the opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine citizenship but he failed. Go Gallano). 10. When a person pleads vigorously that he has not renounced his citizenship.Philippine citizenship is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient.Dec. SEPARATE OPINION CRUZ [concur] Yu has failed to overcome presumption that he has forfeited his status as naturalized Filipino by obtaining Portuguese passport. SC is not a trier of facts. But due to petitioner’s insistence. 5.Dec. . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Filed urgent motion for issuance of restraining order. 63. Something as important as denaturalization should be filed & prosecuted in proper trial court in accordance w/the due process clause. Yu filed MFR. 7.5 Page No. Citizenship w/ full awareness of its significance & consequences as provided for in CA No.He does not dispute the facts. He may have passport for other purposes (employment. SC had to do it.Mars Veloso 1C. 13. His resumption/reacquisition of his Portuguese citizenship and passport and representation as a Portuguese even after he has acquired Filipino citizenship are proof enough of his renunciation.108 .Trial court should have jurisdiction over this case. convenience). Passports are generally issued only to nationals. GUTIERREZ [dissent] Summary procedure would not suffice. 88. ISSUE WON the acts of Yu constitute an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. He complied. . CID ordered to cease & desist from deporting Yu pending conclusion of hearings before Board of Special Inquiry of CID. Mere use of a foreign passport is not express renunciation. Some high gov’t officials have done acts w/c are more indicative of express renunciation than mere use of passport or different citizenship has .Dec. In a deportation proceeding where alien claims citizenship w/substantial evidence. 1988 – SC issued TRO. There is no denial of due process. denied. Evidence must be clear & express w/o room for interference or implication.Dec. 1988 – SC resolution denied petition for habeas corpus & resolved issued on jurisdiction of CID over naturalized Filipino citizen & validity of warrantless arrest & detention.Renunciation – made known distinctly & explicitly and not left to interference or implication (BI Commissioners vs. . 1988 – Respondent commissioner filed motion to lift TRO saying the commission already issued a summary judgment of deportation against Yu on Dec. His reply revealed aforementioned substantive facts. . he’s entitled to have his status determined by judicial & not an executive tribunal. . 1988 – Yu filed motion for clarification w/prayer for restraining order. 1988 – Yu filed an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention. He deserves a full-blown trial under more rigid rules of evidence in a court proceeding. HELD Yes. 2. denied w/finality. Ratio . No proof of Yu’s unequivocal & deliberate renunciation of Phi. Motion for release from detention denied. TRO lifted. 13. Opposed vigorously to lifting of TRO.Nov. 1988 – oral arguments . Dangerous precedent to allow administrative officials to rule that one has renounced his citizenship based on informal evidence. . FERNAN [dissent] Summary procedure & pieces of documentary evidence are not enough to reach such decision. . . Commercial documents signed are not proof enough of renunciation.July 20.

WON Anselma reacquired citizenship after executing an oath of allegiance to the RP and filing it with the Municipal Treasurer 2. it was held that “there is no proceeding established by law or the rules by which any person claiming to be a citizen may get a declaration in a court of justice to that effect or in regard to his citizenship.The Anti-Dummy Law provides that only Filipino citizens may own local agricultural land. No. Yu’s morality is beside the point. Reasoning In Lim v. PEOPLE V AVENGOZA RELOVA.CFI issued an order declaring petitioner as “judicially repatriated. ISSUE WON the judicial decree by the RTC was necessary for repatriation. Go Gam and Gavina passed away. SC is not a trier of facts. Appeal from Decision of CFI of Camarines Sur . if so. appealed the case. Anselma executed an oath of allegiance to the RP and filed it with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer for the purpose of reacquiring her citizenship by repatriation. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. citizenship.Her handicapped mother erroneously registered her as an alien and she was issued an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). 1982 FACTS . however this does not necessarily mean that she was a Filipino citizen prior to such marriage. Anselma became an alien by reason of her lawful marriage to a Chinese citizen. by way of a petition for repatriation filed in CFI of Davao.Criminal Case.” and ordered cancelled her ACR. thus not substantial and are inadequate. . and that the issue of the criminal case is rendered moot and academic . . JAO V REPUBLIC VASQUEZ.Pending litigation. like an alien who became a naturalized Filipino citizen. No.She is claiming back her Phil.” All that is . . her repatriation will not exempt her from criminal liability for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law. 37 SCRA 783. CORTES [dissent] CID findings are subject to judicial review. .Anselma Avengoza and husband Go Gam. averring by reason whereof that her criminal liability is thereby extinguished. Evidence presented were not authenticated by proper Philippine consul. HELD Ratio Proceedings to declare a person as “judicially repatriated” are a complete nullity. There is no law requiring or authorizing that repatriation should be effected by a judicial proceeding.Upon Go Gam’s passing. together with the former’s mother Gavina Avengoza and Rafaela Anfante are being charged with violation of the Anti-Dummy Law on transactions for the spouses to own agricultural lands in the Philippines. He deserves his full day in court. acquired Chinese citizenship .Anselma Avengoza. . December 7. WON such reacquisition of citizenship exempted her from liability for the violation of the Anti-Dummy Law HELD 1. . .Provincial Fiscal in behalf of the Republic. upon marriage to Go Gam. . Ratio Even had she been considered repatriated. 1983 FACTS . Would-be repatriate should show conclusive proof that she has the qualifications to be so repatriated.5 Page No. Republic. a Chinese.Mars Veloso 1C. March 29.Trial court dismissed case principally predicated on its opinion that Anselma had validly reacquired Philippine citizenship ISSUES 1. 2. Loss of Yu’s Filipino citizenship has not been established. Ratio Mere taking of oath of allegiance insufficient for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.She married a Chinese man and therefore lost her Philippine citizenship but he is now dead.Modesta Jao claims to be a Philippine citizen because she was born of a Chinese father and an illiterate Filipina mother who were not legally married.109 been signed.

isolation. petition for judicial repatriation. the women were forcibly hustled aboard the steamers Corregidor and Negros and sent off to Davao to work as laborers without their consent. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. The respondents were only able to bring forward 8 women and challenged the issuance of the writ. VILLAVICENCIO V LUKBAN MALCOLM. The court issued another order this time calling for the respondents to produce all of the women not in Manila. The SC can decide upon where the writ shall be made returnable to (whether before the SC or before a lower court). . “is for her to take necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Phil. WON there was compliance with the court orders 3. to bring the women before the court. citizenship may not be declared in a nonadversary suit where the persons whose rights are affected by such a declaration are not parties. March 25. The court awarded the writ of habeas corpus (w of hc) and ordered Lukban and co. etc. alleging that Justo Lukban. Yes Ratio When it is is impossible for a party to sign an application for the w of hc. or an action to cancel registration as an alien.110 needed for a female citizen of the Phil. They reached Davao 4 days later and were met by Francisco Sales. such as an action for declaratory relief. WON the women were actually restrained of their liberty 2. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. Reasoning The CFI of Davao was not in session. governor of Davao and by hacendero Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. 1b No Ratio The w of hc may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippines. The brothels were closed and the workers (170 women) were rounded up and kept confined to their houses in the district by the police for a little more than a week. On contempt of court HELD 1a. they were given another chance.” Disposition Decision appealed from is revoked and set aside.During their voyage. and others deprived the women of their liberty. . WON the S.Mars Veloso 1C. It is the consistent rule in this jurisdiction that Phil. citizenship prior to her marriage for being allegedly an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipina mother may not be established in an action where the mother or her heirs are not parties. 1919 FACTS . On the night of Oct. The case involves parties from different parts of the country. Although they returned with none of the women. without opportunity to consult with friends/family or to defend their rights. Reasoning It was impossible for the women to have signed a petition for habeas corpus with the way their expulsion was conducted. wanting to exterminate vice. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf.5 Page No. citizen. WON the petitioners had standing b. 1918.C. Obiter Petitioner’s claim of Phil. who lost her citizenship to an alien to reacquire her Phil. along with Anton Hohmann (the police chief). Habeas Corpus was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.25. 5 Justices concur. another person may submit it in his/her behalf. Yes Ratio The forcible taking. erred in assuming jurisdiction c. Reasoning The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary and to relieve a person from such restraint if it is illegal. Justo Lukban. upon the termination of her martial status. ISSUES 1. 1c. Re: the proper granting of the writ: a. and to register the said oath in the proper civil registry. and transfer of the women is constitutive of deprivation of freedom of locomotion.Manila Mayor. They were first isolated from society and then shipped. ordered the closing of the city’s red light district. the women’s relatives and friends initiated an application for habeas corpus.

Reasoning There is nothing in EO68 which requires that counsel appearing before said commissions must be attys. police helped. free shipping to Manila was provided) and the fact that they had a sincere desire to see the unhappy incident finally closed. A military commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues. The court could have sent the respondents to jail however. noting the effort (placards were posted. War Crimes Office is unconstitutional and that 2 prosecuting attorneys. WoN their appointment as prosecutors is violative of the Constitution HELD 1. 2B. which are part of the law of the nation. and POWs. Its promulgation was an exercise of the President of his powers as Commander in Chief of the whole armed forces. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. the court held that “the power to create a military commission for the trial and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. An officer’s failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus. in accordance with the Rules of Court. Tyer. KURODA JALANDONI MORAN.5 Page No. As such. 1st order: No. 1949 FACTS Kuroda. a high ranking Japanese army official is being charged by the Military Commission with failure to perform duties as commander in preventing crimes/atrocities against civilians. No . WON EO68 is unconstitutional 2. 68 (EO68) which established a Natl. Some were merely following the orders of their superiors or merely fulfilling a duty. the court forebore drastic action because it did not want the public to see a clash between executive officials and the judiciary and because it wanted to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong. including the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention. WON they are qualified to practice in accordance with the Rules of Court B. Rest of respondents found not to be in contempt of court. Ratio The President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate an unfinished aspect of war which is the trial and punishment of war criminals through the issuance and enforcement of EO68.Mars Veloso 1C. 2nd order: Yes. March 26. qualified to practice law in the Phil. In defense. his methods were unlawful. he is alleging that Executive Order No. Reasoning He was primarily responsible for setting forth this whole chain of events and had under his power as head of the city government to facilitate the return of the women to Manila but failed. The mandate called for all of the women not in Manila. The rest of the respondents other than Lukban are not guilty of contempt.111 2. It conforms to the generally accepted principles/policies of international law. Hussey and Port (both American) have no authority to practice law in the country.” 2A. Iin Yamashita v. Lukban found in contempt of court and shall pay Php 100 within 5 days. However. Respondents (through better effort) were able to produce 8 women. Re: Attys. the respondents should be prohibited from proceeding with this case. Reasoning EO68 was issued by the President to establish a Natl. Disposition No further action on the w of hc. Ratio The Military Commission is special military tribunal governed by a special law and not by the Rules of Court. 3. Ratio Only Lukban is guilty of contempt. Respondents were not able to bring the women before the court on the day named. Hussey and Port A. the court decided that there was substantial compliance. War Crimes Office and provide for rules and regulations in trying accused war criminals. His intentions were commendable. is contempt committed in the face of the court. ISSUES 1. when he has power to do so. Another was merely drawn into the case through miscommunication.

WON the title of the Act is misleading or deceptive. arbitrary or oppressive? 3. existence of reasonable basis for distinction and classification made C. 3. 1957 FACTS . or corporations. which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her govt. as it conceals the real purpose of the bill. Due Process clause . insistent and illimitable . and having jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by having said petitioner in its custody. WON RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws. Equal Protection Clause . presence of public interest and welfare 2. should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes.the most positive and active of all governmental processes. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. May 31. in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents. this Court will not interfere with the due processes of such Military Commission. with jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 2. No. Police Power .has to do with reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power . and her people to a tribunal of our nation.Procedure Lao Ichong. . which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. in a modern democratic framework B. as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. it requires that all persons shall be treated alike. Petition denied.Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved A. if it applies alike to all persons within such class. and partnerships adversely affected by RA 1180 filed a petition for Injunction and Mandamus against Jaime Hernandez.is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class.Injunction and Mandamus . In effect it nationalizes the retail business. HELD 1. . partnerships. Secretary of Finance and Marcelino Sarmiento.” It prohibits aliens and associations. WON RA 1108 violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines. WON RA 1180 deprives alien residents of their liberty and property without due process of law.necessary esp. .against undue favor and individual or class privilege. to engage directly or indirectly in the retail trade.The Legislature enacted RA 1180 entitled ”An Act to Regulate the Retail Business. is it not unreasonable. 68. Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used or is it merely an unjustified interference with private interest? ISSUES 1. The act does not transcend the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution if there is a question of public . the most essential. Reasoning It is only fair and proper that the US.Questions for test: 1. existence of reasonable relation between purposes and means 3. ICHONG V HERNANDEZ AND SARMIENTO LABRADOR.Mars Veloso 1C. corporations.Criteria for Test of EPC 1. City Treasurer of Manila. Is the Act is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature’s purpose. With costs de oficio. under like circumstances and conditions . Is there is a public interest/purpose? 2. and reasonable grounds exists for making distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. which are not wholly owned by citizens. Disposition The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law. 4.112 Ratio The appointment of the 2 American attorneys is not violative of our national sovereignty.5 Page No.

alien retailer has shown disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. is actual.Essentially held that the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. in this case between nationals and aliens. precedents Smith Bell & Co. Anton vs. Reasoning a.held that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not valid because the laws were found to be arbitrary. No. There is due process if the laws passed are seen to have reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose. Based on experience of the country. or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines” c. Michigan State Board of Examiners . GONZALES V HECHANOVA CONCEPCION. Both of these have always been included within the term regulation.hoarding essential commodities .Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the economic control and domination of others. the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. legitimacy of the purpose of the law . it may not annul the legislation if not in excess of the legislative power. Gibbon vs.113 interest involved or pursued and the classification or distinction used by the legislature. Ongden Commonwealth vs.believed to have evaded tax laws . Reasoning a.Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life\ .bribing public officials b. and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law. 3. Templar vs.Section 8 of Article XIV provides that “no franchise. or were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility.violating price control laws . certificate. No treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. Takahashi vs. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Alien participation in the retail trade has been attended by intolerable practices like the ff: . Reasoning a. especially if not of their own race or country. Economic reason – alien retailer never really makes a genuine contribution to national income and wealth since the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country’s economy and increase national wealth. and there was no question of public interest involved or pursued. The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of the bill and the title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law. 4. Aliens lack spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the country. October 22. real and reasonable.5 Page No.Mars Veloso 1C. and all persons of one class are treated alike.boycotting honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands . Natividad. and every presumption is in favor of its validity. Hana. and as it cannot be said that classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded. Van Winkle. Provisions of law not unreasonable . b Nationalistic protective policy laid down in the Constitution . 1963 . vs. The provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title. Fraser vs. No. unreasonable or capricious. 2. The term regulate is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Fish and game Commission.The legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions. McConway & Tarley . and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. c.

The “benefit of the people” argument can’t be accepted because there is no local rice shortage. to import rice. Pres must prepare for threats without waiting for any special authority. has already paid. Petitioner has not exhausted all administrative remedies available before coming to court. has no power to authorize importation in question and he exceeded jurisdiction in granting authority. .RA 2207 and 3452 also applies to importations of the government itself bec. 1989 FACTS .Petitioner has no sufficient interest to file petition. The importation is not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions. Even if they were. These RAs are only in addition to Commonwealth Act No. the Phils. .Mars Veloso 1C.Case at bar involves question which is a purely legal one. ISSUE WON respondents are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction HELD . The alleged consummation does not render this case academic.Even if the proposed importation violated the RAs. a rice planter and President of Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association. The contracts may have already been entered into and the payment may have been made but the actual importation has not yet taken place. incl. Sec. As such. those for armed forces. The contracts w/ Vietnam and Burma are not executive agreements. by and on behalf of government. 138 which says that in all purchases by gov’t. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V SECRETARY OF DAR CRUZ. preference is given to materials produced in the Phils. Gonzales.RA 3452 says that the gov’t policy is to purchase basic foods directly from farmers in Phils.5 Page No. filed petition. Respondents were required to file answer and hearing was set. Sec. . it can still be permitted because it is for the benefit of the people. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Respondents’ stand: . . RA 3452 also indicates that only private parties may import rice under its provisions. These contracts have been consummated bec. Sec. the contracts should prevail because it came later.Yes. . .” .114 FACTS . authorized importation of foreign rice and created rice procurement committee. they say it’s not under RA 3452 bec. they are unlawful. It falls under the exemption from the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. In case of conflict between the RAs and the contracts. injunction prayed for is DENIED.For lack of requisite majority.The Phils is already under executive agreements with contracts for purchase of rice with Vietnam and Burma. It is declared that Exec. July 14. not for the civilian population. being against the RAs. . the RAs prohibit importation of rice and corn by “government agency” and not the government itself. And the importation is said to be for stockpile of Army.Petitioner’s action is not sufficient and not governed by RA 3452 because importation was authorized by President as Commander in Chief for military stock pile purposes.on WON respondents are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction Petitioner’s stand: .Respondent Exec. . RA 3452 explicitly prohibits importation of rice and corn by Rice and Corn Administration and any other gov’t agency.Also. RA 2207 talks about imports authorized by the President. Petitioner has sufficient interest. Procedure Case is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain implementation of decision of Exec. bec.The proposed importation is governed by RA 2207 and RA 3452 bec it covers “all importations of rice and corn into the Phils. Disposition.

5 Page No." .In 1973. otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. E.O.Mars Veloso 1C. 131. No. No. otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code. the State shall respect the right of small landowners. to own directly or collectively the lands they till or. d. had already been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8.SEC. the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands. The equal protection clause is violated when the burden of solving the agrarian problems is placed on the owners only of agricultural lands. 1972. 6657 contravene the Constitution on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers. which President Aquino signed on June 10.A. due process. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary landsharing. 1988. the revived Congress of the Philippines (formally convened on July 27. along with martial law. developmental. b. The determination of just compensation may be made only by a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines. Presidential Proclamation No. .R. No. . 6657. 131. In considering rentals as advance payment on the land. declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P. 27. 228. President Corazon C. No. undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers. to receive a just share of the fruits thereof To this end. providing the mechanics for its implementation. nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. including extensive public hearings. 4. WON petitions are justiciable. on the improvement of the interests of farmers. who are landless.D.A. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments. The just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable only in money or in cash but not in the form of bonds or other things of value. which was promulgated on October 21. and E.O. use. 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. WON P. also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights. 229. instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP).The 1987 Constitution. in the case of other farmworkers. 2. to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. 1987) took over legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations. Nos. besides echoing these sentiments. taking into account ecological. enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. in line with the above-stated principles." especially the. 27.O. c. Sub issues a.O.D. One of its sections: . No. 228 deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process.D.The Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil. This law. ownership. No. equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. Significantly. 228 and 229 and R. ISSUES 1. This was followed on July 22. No.With its formal organization. Aquino issued E. was the enactment of R.A. No. after almost a year of spirited debate. . E. . The State shall.115 . subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P. The result. less privileged. 3844. the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition. . 1963. by law. or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits. 1987.On July 17.

j. The money needed to create the P50 billon special fund under Proc. 2d. it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21. 27. Although petitioners agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened. . the State may exercise it.Mars Veloso 1C. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. their right to equal protection has been violated. they contend that she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the period. i. 2a. The power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. and the violation of the fundamental right to own property. i. The Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied but even if they are not covered by the definition. the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function. he is unjustly required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land.116 e. it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment 28 to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised. f. to be expressed in its title. 16f) 2b. Otherwise. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected.30 29 This was not discussed directly but may be construed as being under No. 131 is in futuro. 1 above. has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. in violation of the uniformity rule. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject. g. The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. There was a failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence the necessity for the exercise of the powers of eminent domain. (Sec.O. 228. The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands.. 2c.5 Page No.D.e. RD: Yes. No. No. Why? Because these powers are necessary for a state to exist. It cannot be denied that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other. E. Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. It was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree. The other two are police power and taxation. 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them. i.29 This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.O. we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. And so.D. not in esse. No. HELD 1.O. after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. It will still be the courts who will decide what just compensation would be. h. even if it is not sanctioned by any law or even the Constitution. if the landowner declares his own valuation. No.e. E. Hence. No. When E. It is the power “to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.” It is inherent because it exists without need for legislation. In declaring the beneficiaries under P. The sugar planters argued that they are a separate group with problems exclusively their own and by being lumped in the same legislation with other farmers. On the other hand. The power of eminent domain is one of the three inherent powers of the State. However. it has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at that time. conformably. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation. 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation). shall be considered as advance payment for the land. which is the expropriation of the said land for an amount equal to the government assessor's valuation of the land for tax purposes. categorically stated in its Section 1 that: All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21. 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of P. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. No..28 k.

131 and E. 27. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Sec. No. With particular reference to Section 24. the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation. 4 of the Constitution and under P. 2i.5 Page No. If you can’t see the reasoning it’s your fault. 228 and 229 was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Until then. The legislative power was then solely vested in the President of the Philippines. which is agrarian reform. and E. 131. I don’t like the way this ponente argues.A. Proc. this obviously could not have been complied with for the simple reason that the House of Representatives. No. as it were. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to 30 each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. He tackled the argument on why the State did not distribute public lands only by pointing out the Constitution’s “the just distribution of all agricultural lands” clause.O.D. had not yet been convened when the proclamation was issued. 27 are retained and recognized. Significantly. Tsk… There was a shift in subject after this. the Court holds as follows: 1. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory. The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle.A. XIII. (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only. 31 Frankly. Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article VI. No evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated. Nos. now I don’t want to explain why. (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law. No.A. . Decision WHEREFORE. No. 2. the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R. No. like any statute. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. (Sec 6: Max per landowner is 5 hec. Then he plays the political question card on the issue of why the distribution would be private lands first. No. The power of expropriation is by no means absolute. No. The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. we’re infallible remember?  His next sentence: There is no need to elaborate on this matter. 2f. It is settled that the title of a bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other. 2g.31 Some of the petitioners invoked their right of maximum retention under Art. which now has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures.D. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. Proc.117 2e. who embodied. No.D. 2h. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. 2j. are not applicable. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners. 6 of the law. and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. Anyway.D. which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. All rights previously acquired by the tenant-farmers under P. 316 which was promulgated in implementation of P. for that is not its principal purpose. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said fund. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions. R. 3 hec may be awarded to each child at least 15 yrs old and actually tilling or directly managing the land) 2k. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions. 27. it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions. Nos. 3. P. The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation. He’s like saying. Sec. R. It is not correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for.O. Basically. both houses of Congress. title remains with the landowner. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it.Mars Veloso 1C. To be valid. 6657.

petitioner. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. there is no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in agrarian reform -S13 & 32 calling for production-sharing is confiscatory and is thus violative of due process SEPARATE OPINION SARMIENTO -agrees that petition be granted but not that main issue is one of consti construction and interpretation . No. the right to directly or collectively own the land they are tilling -livestock and poultry raising is different from crop farming in that land is not a primary input in the former ISSUE WON S3(b). S4.Mars Veloso 1C. S3(b). 13 & 32 of RA 6657 are constitutional insofar as said law includes the raising of livestock.5 Page No. poultry and swine in its coverage as well as in its Implementing Rules and Guidelines HELD Instant petition GRANTED. the courts may look to the debates of the concon -the transcripts of the 1986 concon clearly show that the meaning of the word “agricultural” (its dictionary meaning aside) was never meant to include livestock and poultry industries in its coverage. No. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P. is a corporation engaged in livestock/poultry. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings. without pronouncement as to costs.A. of Agrarian Reform (SAR) promulgated Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing for RA 6657 (S13 & S32) . 11.Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform . December 4. swine and poultry 1/2/89: Sec.118 4. 11. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R. poultry and swine raising • S13: calls for production-sharing plan (distribute 3% of gross sales & 10% of gross profits to workers as additional compensation) • S16(d) & 17: vests in DAR authority to determine compensation to be paid for lands covered by RA 6657 • S32: spells out production-sharing plan in S13 -the constitutional provision under consideration is A13. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed. all the petitions are DISMISSED. Aquino approved RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which includes the raising of livestock. 1990 FACTS .1/9/89: SAR promulgated Rules and Regulations implementing S11 (commercial farms) -Luz Farms. it is also prayed that a preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the enforcement of the said law (injunction denied) 8/24/89: court granted motion for reconsideration on injunctive relief -Luz Farms questions the following provisions of RA 6657: • S3(b): includes raising of livestock in definition of “Agricultural Enterprise/Activity” • S11: defines “commercial farms” as “agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock. “Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform” which grants farmers and farm-workers who are landless. 13 & 32 of RA 6657 are constitutional insofar as said law includes the raising of livestock. adversely affected by RA 6657 -petition prays that RA be declared unconstitutional. (Unanimous court) LUZ FARMS V SECRETARY OF DAR PARAS. SO ORDERED.D. in construing any ambiguous provisions.6/10/88: Pres. 5. poultry and swine in its coverage as well as in its Implementing Rules and Guidelines are hereby declared null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby made permanent Ratio the question raised is one of constitutional construction.

subject only to a supposed Transitory Foreign Investment Negative List.in case of other farm workers.contain areas of activities and enterprises already regulated according to law and includes small and mediumsized domestic market enterprises or export enterprises which utilize raw materials from depleting natural resources with paid-in equity capital of less than the equivalent of US$500.119 A13.Section 9 is also attacked.Under Section 7.By repealing Articles 49. & 35 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1982 are done away with by RA 7042. such investments are not detrimental to but are good for the national economy. . December 2. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. it shall protect foreign enterprises too . 50.". Or even.phrase "without need of prior approval" applies to equity restrictions alone .The Transitory provisions of RA 7042. to receive a just share of the fruits thereof…”—this phrase provides a possible coverage of livestock.Under Section 5 of the said law a foreign investor may do business in the Philippines or invest in a domestic enterprise up to 100% of its capital without need of prior approval o All that it has to do is register with the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection in the case of a single proprietorship o “The SEC or BTRCP. which allow practically unlimited entry of foreign investments for three years..5 Page No. 7042 further abandons the regulation of foreign investments by doing away with important requirements for doing business in the Philippines. .00. Filipinos are not encouraged to go big.Mars Veloso 1C. S4: “. the system of negative list under Section 8 abandons the positive aspect of regulation and exercise of authority over foreign investments. meaning.He claims that the law abdicates all regulation of foreign enterprises in this country and gives them unfair advantages over local investments which are practically elbowed out in their own land with the complicity of their own government . However.000. In effect. livestock & poultry lands and crop & tree farms are not similarly situated. 32. if not. because if a Philippine national believes that an area of investment should be included in list C.contain areas of investment m which "existing enterprises already serve adequately the needs of the economy and the consumers and do not need further foreign investments.However. the burden is on him to show that the criteria enumerated in said section are met . not only completely deregulates foreign investments but would place Filipino enterprises at a fatal disadvantage in their own country. o List C . o List A – merely enumerate areas of activities already reserved to Philippine nationals by mandate of the Constitution and specific laws o List B . poultry and swine -every presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statute ISSUE: WON assailed provisions violate equal protection clause of the consti -clearly. SMEs are for Filipinos." . as the case may be. 1991 FACTS Petitioner challenges RA7042 on the ground that: .Articles 2. Sol-Gen answers: . RA No.It defeats the constitutional policy of developing a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos and the protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices . existing enterprises must be qualified as Filipino. 54 and 56 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code. shall not impose any limitations on the extent of foreign ownership in an enterprise additional to those provided in the Act” . hence the inclusion of the former in CARP would be violative of the equal protection clause GARCIA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CRUZ. “non-Philippine nationals may own up to one hundred percent (100%) of domestic market enterprises unless foreign ownership therein is prohibited or limited by existing law or the Foreign Investment Negative List under Section 8 hereof. it assumes that so long as foreign investments are not in areas covered by the list.

Section 7 of RA 7042 allows non-Philippine nationals to own up to 100% of domestic market enterprises only in areas of investments outside the prohibitions and limitations imposed by law to protect Filipino ownership and interest.contains areas already regulated pursuant to law already makes it clear that it is regulatory. Senator Paterno as Intervenor: .5 Page No.120 prior to the effectivity of RA 7042. . registration with the SEC or BTRCP. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.the over-all strategy embodied in the Act to develop a self-reliant economy. without need of prior authority from the Board of Investments (BOI). as well as the provisions designed to promote full employment for Filipinos .Re the Transitory Foreign Investment Negative List o it practically includes the same areas of investment reserved to Filipino under Section 5". if an investment by a non-Philippine nationals in an enterprise not registered under Book I was such that the total participation by non-Philippine nationals in the outstanding capital thereof exceeded 40%. Article 46 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (EO No. Under SEC and BTRCP rules and regulations.The Foreign Investment Negative List under Section 8 reserves to Filipinos sensitive areas of investments. scheme is for foreign investments to supplement Filipino capital in big enterprises. .This registration constitutes regulation and exercise of authority over foreign investments. is now the initial step to be taken by foreign investors. the areas of investments not open to foreign investors are already determined and outlined. as the case may be. can reasonably prove they are capable to make the investment needed for the domestic market activities to be undertaken by the competing applicant.Mars Veloso 1C.to allow healthy competition. o List C . particularly the Filipino partners therein. prior authority from the BOI was required. . consumers would be at the mercy of unscrupulous producers o Foreign Corporations under a valid license prior to the enactment of RA 7042 necessarily come within the protection of the law. .suggests that the constitutional challenge should be rejected outright for noncompliance with the requisites of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question. It channels efforts o at promoting foreign investments to bigger enterprises where there is an acute lack of Filipino capital. 226).Section 9 provides for the criteria to be used by NEDA in determining the areas of investment for inclusion in List C o Petition for inclusion therein requires "a public hearing at which affected parties will have the opportunity to show whether the petitioner industry adequately serves the economy and the consumers. o The Act opens the door to foreign investments only after securing to Filipinos their rights and interests over the national economy. List C prohibits foreign investors from engaging in areas of activities where existing enterprises already serve adequately the needs of the economy and the consumer." o Provision is designed to protect the consumers as not all existing enterprises satisfy the criteria inclusion in List C. . o List A – The provisions of the Constitution and other specific laws regulate or limit the extent of foreign ownership in enterprises engaged in areas of activity reserved for Filipinos o List B . . provided that a non-Philippine national could. Activities which do not adequately meet-the needs of the consumers should not be included in list C. hence. invest in: (1) any enterprise registered under Book I (Investments with Incentives). to the extent that the total investment of the non-Philippine national did not exceed 40% of the outstanding capital o On the other hand. and the “SEC shall disallow registration of the applying non-Philippine national if the existing joint venture enterprises.With the introduction of the Negative List under Sections 8 & 15. foreign investors must first comply with certain requirements before they can be issued a license to do business in the Philippines. and (2) enterprises not registered under Book I.Regarding the repealing of provisions of the Omnibus Investment Code o purposely removed because the determination of the areas of investment open to foreign investors is made easy by the Foreign Investment Negative List formulated and recommended by NEDA following the process and criteria provided in Sections 8 & 9 of the Act . under Article 47 thereof. to wit: (1) there must be an actual . if not.

a.There is no irregularity also. WON 4. as just remarked. allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. WON there is actual controversy petitioners have legal standing constitutionality lis mota of the case this entails a political question HELD 1. The petitioner.121 case or controversy. . for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. c.Mars Veloso 1C. (2) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party. not to say even a necessity to resolve it. 3. as a citizen and taxpayer. to 11 p. b. WON 2. There is at this point no actual case or controversy. Policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. particularly because of the absence of the implementing rules that are supposed to carry the Act into effect a. .. Decision Petition dismissed. To doubt is to sustain. comes under the definition that a proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. WON 3. December 2. and (4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case.Commonwealth Act No. CALALANG vs.The constitutional challenge must be rejected for failure to show that there is an indubitable ground for it. which was favorably indorsed by the Director of Public Works (PW). . that as a consequence of such enforcement. all animal drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. between the points and during the hours from 7 a. that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted." b. not conjectural or anticipatory 2. 1940 FACTS . with the approval of the Secretary of the Public Works and Communications the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments c. ISSUES 1. The constitutional question has not been raised tardily but in fact. Act does not violate any of the constitutional provisions the petitioner has mentioned 4. What we see here is a debate on the wisdom or the efficacy of the Act. justice or expediency of legislation.theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines. that shows that there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.m.m. but this is a matter on which we are not competent to rule. (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity.The Secretary of Public Works and Communications (PWC) approved with modification the recommendation that originated from the National Traffic Commission (NTC).the cause of unconstitutionality has not been proved by the petitioner d. and particularly as a member of the House of Representatives. a.5 Page No. . In Angara v Electoral Commission: "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom. 548 gives the Director of Public Works. a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted." 5 and may not annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical. prematurely. A controversy must be one that is appropriate or "ripe" for determination. WILLIAMS LAUREL. that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles.

practicality The complexities of modern governments. its own action depend. and the increased difficulty in administering the law give rise to the adoption. Wayman vs. adherence to precedent Rubi vs. May 14. in his capacity as private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila. The state may enact laws that may interfere with personal liberty.the Director of Public Works.494 employees in its 9 casinos. HELD 1. is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. 2.Mars Veloso 1C.The Legislature cannot delegate power to make law. shall promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads…”. PD 1399 was passed for PAGCOR to fully attain its objectives. Director of PW. Social justice is promoted if the greatest good is brought about to the greatest number. within certain limits. but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes. WON the rules and regulations promulgated constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion. with property.5 Page No. 1991 AMUSEMENT AND GAMING FACTS . Thus. and with business and occupation if the said laws are intended to promote the welfare of the public. 3. No. operate and maintain gambling casinos. Paradox . PAGCOR proved to be a potential source of revenue. PAGCOR became 3rd largest source of gov’t revenue. Procedure This is petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR charter – PD 1869 ISSUES . Dobbins vs. Mayor of Manila and Acting Chielf of Police of Manila. 548 is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. 2. precedents (US vs. BASCO V PHILIPPINE CORPORATION PARAS. WON Commonwealth Act No. PD 1869 was passed later on to enable PAGCOR/government to regulate and centralize all games of chance. filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the Chairman of NTC. It sponsored socio-cultural and charitable projects and at that time employed 4. No. next to BIR and Bureau of Customs. Los Angeles & People vs. (police power of the State) Reasoning 1. giving it territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Acting Secretary of PWC. but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations. Provincial Board of Mindoro. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.PAGCOR was created by virtue of PD 1067-A and was granted franchise under PD 1067-B to establish. WON the rules and regulations complained of infringe the upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being of all the people. the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials. 3. final on questions of fact.122 Procedure Maximo Calang. the multiplication of the subjects of govt’l regulations. Pomar) 2. not only in the execution of the laws. Reasoning 1.The apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation 3. with the approval of the Secretary of the Public Works and Communications. Southard – it was held here that discretion may be delegated to executive departments or subordinate officials the execution of certain acts. 548 The provision that “…. 2. or intends to make. ISSUES 1. textual interpretation of Commonwealth Act No. Gomez. No.

2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. lottery. Equal protection doesn’t preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded diff. Local governments. treatment as long as classification is not unreasonable/arbitrary. But prohibition does not mean that gov’t can’t regulate it in exercise of police power. too. not just to gov’t. etc. Also. but consistent with principle of local autonomy.123 Procedural Issue WON petitioners. The local gov’t has been described as a political subdivision of state constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. it is allegedly contrary to morals. SC brushed aside technicalities of procedure and took cognizance of the petition. it can also provide exemptions or even take back the power.g. . public policy and order 2. cockfighting.5 Page No. Manila. 3. Judiciary does not settle policy issues. PAGCOR is exempt from local taxes. July 30. there must be a showing of clear and unequivocal breach of Constitution. it is for Executive to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment. 4. For a law to be nullified. its power to tax must always yield to a legislative act. it violates equal protection clause in that it legalizes PAGCOR but outlaws other forms of gambling and vices 4. therefore Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. has no inherent right to impose taxes.In 1991 a case was filed by minors (represented by their parents) and the Philippine Ecological Network (PENI) against the then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).) are legalized while others are prohibited does not render applicable laws such as PD 1869 unconstitutional. as taxpayers and practicing lawyers can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 Substantive Issue/s WON PD 1869 should be annulled based on the ff grounds: 1. Gambling. but to society as well. Jr. It can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of a sovereign nation. Local autonomy doesn’t make local gov’t sovereign w/in state. Fulgencio Factoran. is prohibited. being a mere municipal corporation. it waived and intruded into the Manila City government’s right to impose taxes and license fees 3. unless allowed by law. it violates trend of government away from monopolistic and crony economy HELD Procedural Issue: . races. The complaint was instituted to be a . The power is now vested exclusively on national government. Municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress. The fact that some gambling activities (e. Police power is “state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. 1993 FACTS . Substantive Issues: 1. sweepstakes. every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Angel Alcala. The power of local gov’t to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limits w/c Congress may provide. OPOSA V FACTORAN DAVIDE. Whether or not PD 1869 is a wise legislation is up for Congress to determine. it can’t be an imperium in imperio. Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling has long been revoked. it simply means decentralization. It can’t be violative.The overarching theme of the case deals with the prevention the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country’s vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. Disposition Petition is DISMISSED. 2. If Congress can grant a municipal corporation the power to tax. If PD 1869 runs counter to gov’t policies. such as PAGCOR.” PAGCOR has been beneficial. But as of now.Considering transcendental public interest and the Court’s duty to check on limits of other branches of gov’t.Mars Veloso 1C. who was substituted by the new secretary. have no power to tax instrumentalities of national government.

Locus Standi: WON the case is a class suit? 2. this was also asserted to be representative of the current generation and generation that are yet to be born. Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and 2. and renewing or approving new timber license agreements. and Section 16. residential.5 Page No. the country’s islands. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. and 21 of the Civil Code (the right to a sound environment). Yes respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction because it failed to recognize the legal right of the petitioners which is the right to a balanced and healthful ecology that is incorporated in the 1987 Constitution under Section 16 Article II. reduction of earth’s capacity to process carbon dioxide. water shortages b. . 20. Yes they can. this rights need not be written in the Constitution for this deals with rights that are assumed from the very inception oh humankind. disturbance and dislocation of indigenous cultures f. The reason why it was written was because the framers feared that without a mandate as stated in the state policies future generations would inherit nothing to sustain life. its agents. representatives. . siltation and shortening of the life span of dams k.The suit starts off with statement of facts regarding the country. Given that it could also be said that . . The plaintiffs in this case are numerous and representative enough to ensure that all interests is protected. ISSUES 1. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. and those acting on its behalf to. accepting. salinization c. 192 that calls for the creation of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to safeguard the people’s right to a healthful environment. flooding of lowlands j. 2. drought h.Moreover. It is clear then that there is a legal right for a balanced healthful ecology and the right to health. Section 4 of Executive Order No. They asserted that deforestation resulted in. . use and enjoyment of the country’s virgin tropical rainforests. and of causing the impairment of contracts. massive erosion and loss of soil fertility d.Mars Veloso 1C. They contend that there is a cause of action using articles 19.124 taxpayer’s class suit as it alleges that all citizen’s of the Philippines are entitled to benefit. commercial. of being political question. to cease and desist from receiving. 3. WON minors can assert that they represent other generations and those succeeding theirs? 3. its natural resources. following the concept of intergenerational responsibility. processing. The suit also alleges that this suit represents people who are sharing the same sentiment towards the preservation of our natural resources (since not all of them could go before the court). Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve the rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful environment. siltation of rivers and seabed g.Initially the petition was dismissed on the grounds of lack of cause of action. Merits: WON the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by declaring the petitioners to have no legal right? 4. Yes it is a class suit because the subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest to all citizens of the Philippines and that it would be impracticable to bring them all to court. 1151 ( Philippine Environmental Policy). a. extinction of some of the countries flora and fauna e. The petitioners filed for certiorari hence this case. Whether or not granting the petition would violate the nonimpairment clause found in the Constitution? HELD 1. As well as the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man’s inalienable right to self-preservation and selfperpetuation in natural law. increasing velocity of typhoon winds i. and scientific evidences pointing to the requirement for the country to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology (54% should be use for forest cover and 46% for agricultural.The suit calls for two primary actions that orders the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). 1. industrial. Furthermore. and other uses). Article II of the 1987 Constitution that recognizes the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.

This attempt he also failed. WON the three-flunk rule is a proper exercise of the police power of the State HELD Ratio Measures.5 Page No. It is not irrevocable. modify. In an amended complaint. he was allowed to take a fifth attempt at NMAT. December 21. if there would be a law passed it would not be considered as a violation of the non-impairment clause as the very nature of the law deals with the exercising of the police power of the state to advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. This power to regulate and control the practice of medicine also includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 making the cause of action existent. Petitioners may amend complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements. San Diego is a BS Zoology graduate from UE. The Chief Executive may validly amend. ISSUE WON a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again. The nonimpairment clause yields to the police power of the state. Series of 1972. modify. No it does not violate the non-impairment clause because licenses are not contracts. And furthermore.decided en banc. . Or. .125 this right is further supported by Executive Order No. 4. he raised the additional grounds of due process and equal protection and also challenged the constitutionality of the aforementioned order. Director of Forestry. Decision Petition is granted. His application to take a fifth examination was denied by petitioner DECS on the basis of the “three-flunk rule” under MECS Order #12.Pendente lite.Even if the licenses are contracts. He has taken the NMAT four times and flunked it as many times. As the court held in Tan v. such as admission exams and the three flunk rule. the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. San Diego filed a petition for mandamus at the Valenzuela RTC.Respondent Roberto Rey C. unanimous Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. Gutierrez. Given that it is not a contract. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. It held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. Reasoning 1. replace. . properties or a property right that is protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.Mars Veloso 1C. 2. invoking his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. use of precedent: In Tablarin v. or rescind licenses when national interests so require. the action stated in the case still does not affect it given that no law or action by the Chief Executive to amend. Admission test and the three-flunk rule are both valid measures in the regulation of the medical profession. The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches is a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. replace. unanimous decision . or rescind licenses so it is could not as of the moment be invoked. a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful and is not a contract.analogy: Tablarin case & case at bar – issue is academic preparation of the applicant. DECS V SAN DIEGO CRUZ. 1989 FACTS . designed to gauge the academic preparation of an applicant fall within the valid exercise of the police power of the State. with the agreement of both parties. The police power of the State is validly exercised if .RTC decision released 4 July 1989 granted the petition and declared the challenged order invalid. .

in 1893-1894. however. It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. the applicant and his ancestors had held the land as owners. Costs against private respondent San Diego.(a) the interests of the public generally. The accountant." . The right to quality education is NOT absolute. . 3.. What the equal protection clause requires is equality among equals. <method> The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors..There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. an Igorot. Decision of Valenzuela RTC reversed. Section 1 of the Constitution. and authorized in general terms applications to be made by persons claiming to own the land. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III.A substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the threeflunk rule. in 1899. & (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished. does not hold the same delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated. Decision Petition is granted. require the interference of the State <lawful subject>. that process establishing only a possessory title. subject to fair. unlike other careers which. and the lands were registered to him. under the mortgage law. 1909 FACTS . for example. In 1901.126 . CARINO V INSULAR GOVERNMENT MALCOLM. . 4.An appeal to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands which affirmed a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Benguet. His father had cultivated parts and had used parts for pasturing cattle. . They all had been recognized as owners of the land by the Igorots. . <subject> It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. and again in 1896-1897.Mars Veloso 1C. which established a court for that purpose with jurisdiction throughout the Philippine Archipelago. for this reason. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study. reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. Note While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor. as distinguished from those of a particular class. . he made application for one under the royal decrees then in force. His grandfather had lived upon it and maintained fences sufficient for the holding of cattle. February 23.5 Page No. nothing has come of it. do not require more vigilant regulation. He had received the land from his father in accordance with Igorot customs and had used it for pasture. No document of title. filed an application for the registration of a certain land in the Province of Benguet. he filed a petition.It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise.Mateo Carino.496 of 1902. while belonging to an equally respectable profession.Applicant claims that he now owns the land. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people.The case at bar complies with this requisites. dismissing an application for the registration of certain land. The Court suggests the notion of appropriate calling. had issued from the Spanish crown and although I. not unduly oppressive upon individuals <lawful method> . alleging ownership. For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris. he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. and is entitled to registration under the Philippine Commission’s Act No.

if he had read every word of it. as appears from the resolution of the provincial board. that there was no prescription against the crown and that. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Disposition Judgment reversed. the court sees no sufficient reason to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines in regard to lands over which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.. For all legal effects. This being the case and the fact that his possession was not unlawful (no attempt at any such proceedings against him or his father was ever made). the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership. For cultivated land.127 . even against the Crown. By the Organic Act of July 1. This reservation. In one of the Whereas clauses. The fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain. and that the he has no rights that the Philippine government is bound to respect. escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan. Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitant of the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks. ISSUE WON the applicant owns the land HELD . required registration within a limited time to make the title good. RUBI V PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO MALCOLM. . 1880. was recognized by the laws of Spain. 1919 FACTS . 30 years. if there was.Decree of June 25. 1754 – Where such possessor shall not be able to produce title deeds. 25 signed by the provincial governor. the applicant’s father was owner of the land by the very terms of the decree. 1880 – For private ownership.Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to establish themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the Province of Mindoro and to remain there. and never to have been public land. as far back as testimony or memory goes. the regulation for the registration of royal land wrongfully occupied does not apply to him. or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. .Under the laws of Spain. extends over an area of 800 hectares of land. As prescription. solely because he escaped from the reservation. . February 28. jr.Royal Cedula of October 15. .The return of the Solicitor-General alleges that on February 1. Dabalos. Hon. and therefore became public land. it shall be presumed to have been held in the same way before the Spanish conquest. there is no clear proof that he does not own the land. Thus. the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. One of the Manguianes.Yes. those who have been in possession for certain times shall be deemed owners. a decree of June 25. it was stated that the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most convenient for the . Moreover. on which about three hundred Manguianes are confined. for uncultivated. was his property. the decree was not calculated to the mind of an Igorot Chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger. as valid title by prescription.Mars Veloso 1C. Juan Morente. The law’s primary objective is the advancement of the welfare of the nonChristian people of Mindoro. which is approximately 2.5 Page No. alleging that they are deprived of their liberty in violation of law. all the property and rights acquired by the United States are to be administered for the benefits of the inhabitants of the Philippines. When this decree went into effect. that the applicant’s land was not registered.The government claims that Spain had title to all the land in the Philippines except so far as it saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired. and should not be deprived of what by practice and belief of those among whom he live. that he United States succeeded to the title of Spain. 1917. 20 years. there must have been a grant by competent authority. The Manguianes sued out a writ of habeas corpus in this court. 1902. when.000 acres. it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession.

To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to what liberty is. p. vs.1) "What is due process of law depends on circumstances it varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation. 2. 371. It will mean. It will mean that this people should be let alone in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense. affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court.5 Page No. third. that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed.There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right conception of liberty and does not practise liberty in a rightful way. S.) "Due process of law" means simply * * * "first. WON the Mangyan’s were deprived of due process when their liberty to choose their homes were limited by the law. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will-going from one place to another in the mountains. 10 Phil. S. a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. were necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam.But does the Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practice liberty in a rightful way? . The resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive order of the governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3. property. ISSUES 1. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority. in the case at bar. Due Process of Law. second. In some instances." (Moyer vs. that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in question.. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. (See McGehee. 516. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power in furtherance of the public good which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice must be held to be due process of law. Pursuant to the Governor’s powers under section 2077 of the Administrative Code.Mars Veloso 1C. any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceeding sixty days in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. that "every citizen shall hold his life. 110 U.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. 104. Peabody [1909]. liberty. and to introduce civilized customs among them. in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court. a judicial proceeding is not always necessary." To constitute "due process of law. WON the Legislature exceeded its authority in enacting the law mandating the forcible transfer of the Mangyanes. 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake was selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior. burning and destroying forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon. California [1883]. even a hearing and notice are not requisite. that this law shall be reasonable in its operation. said that the meaning of "due process of law" is. the Government has been placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path . how can they allege that they are being deprived thereof without due process of law? ." (Hurtado vs. since a classic in forensic literature. S. In dealing with the backward population. Daniel Webster. 212 U. Ling Su Fan [1908].. that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class. and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society.) . NO. and fourth. HELD 1.128 Mangyanes to live on. whether sanctioned by age and custom. like the Manguianes. Under the resolution of the Provincial Board." as has been often held. that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government. 82. Not knowing what true liberty is and not practicing the same rightfully.." (U.

when not determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases. administrative. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter. determined on that theory. purely as an exercise of the police power. which does not find expression in tribal customs or practices which tend to brutalize or debauch the members of the tribe indulging in such customs or practices. one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered.5 Page No. it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed. that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws. not issue.The Mangyans will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations. such that it is feasible and practicable to extend to. would lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid. which control the conduct of the admittedly civilized inhabitants of the Islands. Gamble vs.. burning and destroying forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude.As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which in case of doubt. is that degree of civilization which results in a mode of life within the tribe. indeed. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will-going from one place to another in the mountains. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws. or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them. is the attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of the Government. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. The latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience. They will thus be left in a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point of attack by those who doubt. there exists a law. In a late decision with which we are in full accord. a mode of life. therefore. 2. or to expose to loss or peril the lives or .Further. NO. and judicial." as that term is used in the Philippine statute-book. . to justify its removal from the class embraced within the descriptive term "non-Christian. in the last analysis. the law seems to be reasonable. has not been followed. . 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes: We can see no objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. legislative. furthermore. the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy. may challenge the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers. It is. an unusual exercise of that power. . Decision Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. In balancing conflicting solutions. SEPARATE OPINION CARSON . Habeas corpus can. Considered. Nor can one say that due process of law. or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior cases. and it applies alike to all of a class. Every really new question that comes before the courts is.129 of civilization.Mars Veloso 1C. and enforce upon its membership the general laws and regulations. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. therefore. To allow them to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens.The legislative and administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly discloses that the standard of civilization to which a specific tribe must be found to have advanced. somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States.

I realize that a dissenting opinion carries little weight. thereof." They are to be made to accept the civilization of the more advanced Filipinos whether they want it or not. .As we have seen. but my sense of justice will not permit me to let this decision go on record without expressing my strong dissent from the opinion of Justice Malcolm.The Manguianes are not a separate state. concurred in by a majority of the court. through the organic law. or which singles out any particular individual or class as the subject of hostile and discriminating legislation.So the standard of civilization to which any given number or group of inhabitants of a particular province in these Islands. but a mode of life as would not be inimical to the lives or property or general welfare of the civilized inhabitants of the Islands with whom they are brought in contact. he deprived them of their rights and their liberty without due process of law. as briefly as may be the legal and human side of the case as it presents itself to my mind. however humble they may be and "brought under the bells" and made to stay on a reservation. Supreme Court Reports. and which would qualify them whether they reside within or beyond the habitat of a "nonChristian" tribe. and without challenging the validity of the statute. tantamount to a contention that there is no authority in law for the issuance of such an order. in order to remove such group or individual from the class embraced within the statutory description of "non-Christian. begs the question and is.The contention that in this particular case.It has been said that this is a government of laws and not of men. They are entitled to all the rights and privileges of any other citizen of this country. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. The majority opinion says "they are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. is clearly unconstitutional as being opposed to the fourteenth amendment and especially to the equal protection clause thereof. . MOIR . They are citizens of the Philippine Islands.130 property of those who may be brought in contact with the members of the tribe. Encyclopedia of U. and especially the equal protection clause. 4. I shall simply state." (Vol. In particular the fourteenth amendment. and does prohibit. or any individual member of such a group must be found to have advanced. it was intended to prohibit. This is a plain case. Legally they are Filipinos. and requires no further discussion.Mars Veloso 1C. forbids that the individual shall be subjected to any arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.5 Page No. And when the provincial governor of the Province of Mindoro attempted to take them from their native habitat and to hold them on the little reservation of about 800 hectares. primitive. S." is that degree of civilization which would naturally and normally result in the withdrawal by such persons of permanent allegiance or adherence to a "non-Christian" tribe had they at any time adhered to or maintained allegiance to such a tribe. any arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty." . They have no treaty with the Government of the Philippine Islands by which they have agreed to live within a certain district where they are accorded exclusive rights. timid. a statute which makes a purely arbitrary or unreasonable classification. I shall not attempt to analyze the opinion or to go into the questions in detail. . that there is no arbitrary body of individuals. or arbitrary spoliation of property. of course. . . the writ should issue because of the failure to give these petitioners as well as the rest of the fifteen thousand Manguianes by the reconcentration order an opportunity to be heard before any attempt was made to enforce it. declared shall be the measure and scope of all control exercised over them. not only to maintain a mode of life independent of and apart from that maintained by such tribe. Are these petitioners charged with any crime? There is no mention in the return of the Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands of any crime having been committed by these "peaceful. They are backward and deficient in culture and must be moved from their homes. that the constitutional principles upon which our government and its institutions rest do not leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power. semi-nomadic people. and they were denied the equal protection of the law. but that all in authority are guided and limited by these provisions which the people have.

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p. 366.) When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remain with the people by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. And the law is the definition and limitation of power. It is, indeed, quite true, that there must always be lodged somewhere, and in some person or body, the authority of final decision; and, in many cases of mere administration the responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of the public judgment, exercised either in the pressure of opinion or by means of the suffrage. But the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous language of Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the Government of Commonwealth 'may be a government of law and not of men.' For the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yiek Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 374.) - It is said that the present law is an old Act being in substance Act No. 547 of the Philippine Commission. But it has never been brought before this court for determination of its constitutionality. No matter how beneficient the motives of the lawmakers if the law tends to deprive any man of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, it is void. In my opinion the acts complained of which were taken in conformity with section 2145 of the Administrative Code not only deprive these Manguianes of their liberty, without due process of law, but will in all probability deprive

them of their life, without due process of law. History teaches that to take a semi-nomadic tribe from their native fastnesses and to transfer them to the narrow confines of a reservation is to invite disease and suffering and death. - From my long experience in the Islands, I should say that it would be a crime of little less magnitude to take the Ifugaos from their mountain homes where they have reclaimed a wilderness and made it a land of beauty and fruitfulness and to transfer them to the more fertile, unoccupied, malaria infested valleys which they look down upon from their fields-than it would be to order their decapitation en masse. There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes" and are in exactly the same category as the Manguianes. If the Manguianes may be so taken from their native habitat and reconcentrated on a reservation-in effect an open air jail-then so may the Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes, who have made more progress than the Ifugaos, and so may the Moros. - There are "non-Christian" in nearly every province in the Philippine Islands. All of the thirty-nine governors upon the prior approval of the head of the department have the power under this law to take the non-Christian inhabitants of their different provinces from their homes and put them on a reservation for "their own good and the general good of the Philippines," and the courts will grant them no relief. These unfortunate citizens of the Philippine Islands would hold their liberty, and their lives, may be subject to the unregulated discretion of the provincial governor. And who would be safe? After the reservation is once established might not a provincial governor decide that some political enemy was a nonChristian, and that he would be safer on the reservation. No matter what his education and culture, he could have no trial, he could make no defense, the judge of the court might be in a distant province and not within reach, and the provincial governor's fiat is final. - There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes" and are in exactly the same category as the Manguianes. If the Manguianes may be so taken from their native habitat and reconcentrated on a reservation-in effect an open air

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jail-then so may the Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes, who have made more progress than the Ifugaos, and so may the Moros. - I think this Court should declare that sections 2145 and 2759 of the Administrative Code of 1917 are unconstitutional, null and void, and that the petitioners are illegally restrained of their liberty, and that they have been denied the equal protection of the laws, and order the respondents immediately to liberate all of the petitioners. PIT-OG V PEOPLE FERNAN; October 11, 1990 FACTS - Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals - There was a communal land in Laog, Mainit, Mt. Province called the tayan. It was owned by the tomayan group whose members were descendants of the original owners thereof named Jakot and Pang-o. One of their descendants, Pel-ey Cullalad, was requested by the tomayan to act in their behalf in selling the 400-sqm residential portion of the tayan, in order that the tomayan would have something to butcher and eat during a celebration called ato. The sale was made in consideration of P1,500 and was made in favor of Edward Pasiteng, whose house had been built thereon. It was agreed that the unregistered property would be registered under Sec. 194 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3344. Besides Cullalad, several members of the tomayan affixed their signatures or thumb marks on the notarized deed of sale. Thereafter, Pasiteng declared the property as his own for taxation purposes and paid taxes thereon. - In 1983, while Pasiteng was out hunting, Erkey Pit-og (aka Mary Pit-og) and her companions destroyed the fence erected by Pasiteng and cut down and took away the sugarcane worth P1,000 and the banana fruits valued at P100 found in the area. Pasiteng reported the matter to the police. Three days later, the police filed a complaint for theft against Erkey Pit-og in the Municipal Trial Court of Bontoc. - Pit-og pleaded not guilty of theft on the ground that the tayan belonged to her, her father Lobchoken being a descendant Jakot.

She did not declare the land for taxation purposes because no one in the tomayan was allowed to declare the land as his own. However, any member of the tomayan could make improvements on the land and claim them as his own. Anyone who abandoned the land would be succeeded only by other members. No person outside the tomayan could succeed to the cultivation of the tayan. - Lobchoken, planted sugarcane in the tayan in Loag and when he died, his widow Pidchoy and their children continued cultivating the land. They also built a granary thereon. The land was later given to Pit-og by Pidchoy for cultivation. Thereafter, the family allowed Pasiteng to build a house behind the place where Pit-og and her family used to have a house because Edward was Erkey's uncle being the brother of her father. Erkey planted the bananas and avocado trees in the area and harvested the sugarcane. No one had ever prevented her from cutting the sugarcane and the other plants. The municipal trial court discredited Pit-og's story emphasizing that her claim of continuous occupation and possession of the land was baseless as she had "no papers to show" or prove such claim. It found that an the elements of theft under Article 308 of the RPC were present and accordingly rendered the judgment of conviction. - On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower courts with the following findings and observations: - Pasiteng’s claim of ownership is documented by a Deed of Conveyance, a public document which was executed between him and the members of the tomayan group. The validity of this public document has never been questioned by any one of the previous owners belonging to the tomayan group. Furthermore, the tax declarations in the name of and the realty tax payments by, Pasiteng, although not conclusive proofs of ownership, are, nevertheless, prima facie evidence of his possession of the land in question. In contrast to these documentary evidence, petitioner offers nothing better than her bare claim. The personal property taken by accused-petitioner not being hers but those of Pasiteng, and she gained from the taking thereof without the consent of the owner, accused-petitioner is guilty of the crime of theft.

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ISSUES 1. WON Pit-og had criminal intent in taking the sugarcane and the bananas. 2. WON the present case is criminal or civil in nature. HELD 1. Erkey Pit-og could not have had criminal intent because she took the sugarcane and bananas believing them to be her own. - Edward Pasiteng relied heavily on his documentary evidence to prove ownership over the sugarcane and bananas. A careful study of these documents, in conjunction with the testimonial evidence extant in the record, however, discloses matters which put a cloud of doubt upon Pit-og’s culpability. The deed of sale describes the property as containing an area of 400 sqm, while the tax declarations show that the property contains an area of 512 sqm. The testimonies presented by the prosecution and the defense show that the areas cultivated by Pasiteng and Pit-og were adjacent and so close to each other that the possibility of confusion as to who planted which plants is not remote. In fact, before the filing of this case, Pit-og had sued Pasiteng's son, Donato, who allegedly cut down bananas she had planted in the area. The fact that Edward had built a fence around the area he claimed as his does not necessarily prove that he enclosed only the 400 square meters he had purchased from the tomayan. After all, he had declared as his own for taxation purposes 112 square meters more than the area he bought. - There is on record a survey plan of the 512 square-meter area claimed by Edward but there are no indications therein of the exact area involved in this case. Proof on the matter, however, is important for it means the Identification of the rightful owner of the stolen properties. It should be emphasized that to prove the crime of theft, it is necessary and indispensable to clearly Identify the person who, as a result of a criminal act, without his knowledge and consent, was wrongfully deprived of a thing belonging to him.

2. The legal issues that must be ironed out with regard to claims of ownership over the tayan should be threshed out in an appropriate civil action. - Obiter dicta related to Article II Section22 re Indigenous Community - We see this case as exemplifying a clash between a claim of ownership founded on customs and tradition and another such claim supported by written evidence but nonetheless based on the same customs and tradition. when a court is beset with this kind of case, it can never be too careful More so in this case, where the accused, an illiterate tribeswoman who cannot be expected to resort to written evidence of ownership, stands to lose her liberty on account of an oversight in the court's appreciation of the evidence. Disposition Erkey Pit-og is ACQUITTED for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt that she committed the crime of theft. No costs. KILOSBAYAN, INC V MORATO MENDOZA; November 16, 1995 FACTS - Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this case Petitioners contend that the decision in the first case has already settled (1) whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue and (2) whether under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery, and these questions can no longer be reopened. - Petitioners argue that the two justices who changed their votes did not act according to law and that the two new appointees regardless of the merits of the case must of necessity align themselves with all the Ramos appointees who were dissenters in the first case and constitute the new majority in the second lotto case. - SC said the decision in the first case was a split decision: 7-6. With the retirement of one of the original majority (Cruz, J.) and one of the dissenters (Bidin, J.) it was not surprising that the first decision in the first case was later reversed.

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- SC cited the case of Feliciano v. Aquinas (also a split decision) which was overturned in People v. Yang. ISSUES 1. WON the constitutional policies and principles (Art II Sec 5 ,Sec 12, Sec 13, Sec 17) invoked by the petitioners may be resorted to for striking down laws or official actions which are inconsistent with them 2. WON the petitioners have standing to sue on constitutional grounds, given that the Constitution guarantees to people’s organizations “effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision making (Art XIII Sec 16). 3. WON, as settled in the first case, the PCSO under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) cannot enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery. HELD 1. NO. As already stated, however, these provisions are not selfexecuting. They do not confer rights which can be enforced in the courts but only provide guidelines for legislative or executive action. By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined that consistently with these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority. That is why we said with respect to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, "the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. . . . It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit." (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268 [1994]). 2. NO. It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise issues of constitutionality but only of contract law, which petitioners, not being privies to the agreement, cannot raise. - Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization does not give it the requisite personality to question the validity of the contract in this case. The Constitution provides that "the State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means," that their right to "effective and reasonable

participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decisionmaking shall not be abridged." (Art. XIII, §§ 15-16) - These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, §5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decision-making in the courts from decision-making in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party. - Petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained because this case does not involve illegal disbursement of public funds. Nor as concerned citizens can they bring this suit because no specific injury suffered by them is alleged. As for the petitioners, who are members of Congress, their right to sue as legislators cannot be invoked because they do not complain of any infringement of their rights as legislators. 3. Indeed in the first case it was held that the PCSO under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) cannot enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery HOWEVER THE QUESTIONS RAISED IN THIS CASE ARE LEGAL QUESTIONS AND THE CLAIMS INVOLVED ARE SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE INVOLVED IN THE PRIOR CASE BETWEEN THE PARTIES. AS ALREADY STATED, THE ELA IS SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE CONTRACT OF LEASE DECLARED VOID IN THE FIRST CASE. Also, the Court noted in its decision that the provisions of the first contract, which were considered to be features of a joint venture agreement, had been removed in the new contract. VALMONTE V BELMONTE, JR CORTES; February 13, 1989 FACTS - Petitioners are media practitioners who wish to confirm reports that certain members of the Batasang Pambansa, including some members of the opposition, were granted “clean” loans from the GSIS before the February 1986 elections. Petitioner Valmonte filed

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a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction, praying that respondent Belmonte, in his capacity as GSIS General Manager, be directed to: 1. Furnish petitioners with a list of the names of the members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure “clean” loans from the GSIS immediately prior to the February 7, 1986 elections through the intercession of then-First Lady Imelda Marcos. 2. Furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing said loans. 3. Allow petitioners access to public records for the subject information. ISSUES Procedural: Have petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies? Substantive: 1. Does the information sought by petitioners fall under “matters of public concern”? 2. Does a confidential relationship exist between GSIS and its borrowers? 3. Are loan transactions of the GSIS, being merely incidental to its insurance function, private in nature? HELD Procedural: No. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved. The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to information, can be passed upon by the court more competently than GSIS or its Board of Trustees. Substantive: 1. Yes. The public nature of GSIS funds and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. 2. No. The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. The right cannot be invoked by juridical entities, as a

corporation has no right to privacy in its name. The entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief. However, even the concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they chose to invoke this right. Public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny. 3. No. The “constituent-ministrant” dichotomy characterizing government function has long been repudiated. The government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the same function of service to the people. That the GSIS was exercising a proprietary function in granting the loans would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information. Transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation, are within the ambit of the people’s right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.

• •

Petitions are entitled to access to the documents subject to reasonable regulations. The petition is held to be meritorious as to the 2nd and 3rd alternative acts sought by petitioners. The same cannot be said, however, of the 1st act sought. Although citizens are entitled to “access to official records”, the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of public records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern. It is essential for a writ of mandamus to lie that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required. COMMISSION ON GOOD

CHAVEZ V PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT PANGANIBAN; December 9, 1998 FACTS

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- These are the main questions raised in this original action seeking (1) to prohibit and “enjoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos x x x relating to and concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad – including the so-called Marcos gold hoard”; and (2) to “compel respondents to make public all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs.” - Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, former solicitor general, brought this action in response to news reports in September 1997 referring to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks, and (2) the reported execution of a compromise between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets. Acting on a motion of petitioner, the Court issued a temporary restraining order dated March 23, 1998, enjoining respondents, their agents and/or representatives from “entering into, or perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos relating to and concerning their ill-gotten wealth. On August 19, 1998, Gloria, Celnan, Scarlet and Teresa, all surnamed Jopson, filed before the Court a motion for intervention. They aver that they are “among the 10,000 claimants whose right to claim from the Marcos family and/or the Marcos estate is recognized by the decision in In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos”. ISSUES Procedural: 1. WON the petitioner has the personality or legal standing to file the instant petition; and 2. WON this Court is the proper court before which this action may be filed. Substantive:

1. WON this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses; and 2. WON there exist any legal restraints against a compromise agreement between the Marcoses and the PCGG relative to the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. HELD Procedural: 1. Yes. When the issue concerns a public right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the action. 2. Yes. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus. The argument of respondent that petitioner should have properly sought relief before the Sandiganbayan in which enforcement of the compromise agreements was pending resolution seems to have merit, if petitioner was merely seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the compromise and/or to compel the PCGG to disclose to the public the terms contained in said Agreements. However, petitioner is here seeking the public disclosure of “all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and documents related or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs”. In other words, the petition is not merely confined to the Agreements that have already been drawn, but likewise to any other ongoing or future undertaking towards any settlement on the alleged Marcos loot. The core issue boils down to the precise interpretation, in terms of scope, of the twin constitutional provisions on “public transactions”. Substantive: 1. Yes. There is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with

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public interest. “Ill-gotten wealth”, by its very nature, assumes a public character. The assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution that “transactions” contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of a transaction, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. 2. Yes. A cursory perusal of the General and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs reveals serious legal flaws. i) While a compromise in civil suits is expressly authorized by law, there is no similar general sanction as regards criminal liability. The authority must be specifically conferred. In the present case, the power to grant criminal immunity was conferred on PCGG by Section 5 of EO No. 14 as amended by EO No. 14-A. However, the Agreements do not conform to the requirements of EO Nos. 14 and 14-A. Criminal immunity cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principal defendants in the spate of ill-gotten wealth cases now pending before the Sandiganbayan. The provision is applicable mainly to witnesses who provide information or testify against a respondent, defendant or accused in an ill-gotten wealth case. ii) Under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the property to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the Constitution. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local legislative bodies. The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax exemptions, even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases. Even granting that Congress enacts the law exempting the Marcoses from paying taxes on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special grant of exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule that “taxation shall be uniform and equitable”.

iii) The government binds itself under the General Agreement to cause the dismissal of all cases against the Marcos heirs, pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts. This is a direct encroachment on judicial powers, particularly in regard to criminal jurisdiction. Well settled is the doctrine that once a case has been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction, the matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within the full discretion and control of the judge. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution, even by the justice secretary, to withdraw the information or to dismiss the complaint. Thus, the PCGG cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases against the Marcoses pending in the courts, for said dismissal is not within its sole power and discretion. iv) The government also waives all claims and counterclaims, “whether past, present, or future, matured or inchoate,” against the Marcoses. This all-encompassing stipulation is contrary to law. Under the Civil Code, an action for future fraud may not be waived. This is a palpable violation of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. It effectively ensconces the Marcoses beyond the reach of the law. v) The Agreements do not provide for a definite or determinable period within which the parties shall fulfill their respective prestations. It may take a lifetime before the Marcoses submit an inventory of their total assets. vi) The Agreements do not state with specificity the standards for determining which assets shall be forfeited by the government and which shall be retained by the Marcoses. While the Supplemental Agreement provides that the Marcoses shall be entitled to 25 per cent of the $356 million Swiss deposits (less government recovery expenses), such sharing arrangement pertains only to the said deposit. No similar splitting scheme is defined with respect to the other properties. Neither is there, anywhere in the Agreements, a statement of the basis for the 25-75 percent sharing ratio. vii) The absence of then-President Fidel Ramos’ approval of the principal Agreement, an express condition therein, renders the compromise incomplete and unenforceable. Nevertheless, even if

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such approval were obtained, the Agreements would still not be valid. RESOLUTION PANGANIBAN; May 19, 1999 FACTS Ma. Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Irene Marcos-Araneta filed before the court a motion for leave to intervene and a motion for partial reconsideration, alleging that they were parties and signatories to the General and Supplemental Agreements which this Court declared “NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Consitution.” They claim to “have a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties or an interest against both as to warrant their intervention.” They add that their exclusion from the instant case resulted in a denial of their constitutional rights to due process and to equal protection. They also the raise the “principle of hierarchical administration of justice” to impugn the Court’s cognizance of petitioner’s direct action before it. ISSUES Procedural: WON the Motion for Leave to Intervene should be allowed. Substantive: 1. WON the exclusion of the movants from the proceedings regarding the Agreements to which they were parties and signatories was a denial of “their property right to contract without due process of law”; 2. WON the Court violated the principle of hierarchical administration of justice by ruling upon the validity of the Agreements; 3. WON the issue of right to information raised by petitioner was rendered moot and academic by the submission by the movants of the Motion for Approval of Compromise Agreements to the Sandiganbayan;

4. WON there was ratification of the Agreements by partial implementation; and 5. WON the issue raised by petitioner presented an actual case and a justiciable question. HELD Procedural: No. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, provides that a motion to intervene should be filed before rendition of judgment. Intervention can no longer be allowed in a case already terminated by final judgment. Substantive: 1. No. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. In legal terms, the movants have really no interest to protect or right to assert in this proceeding. Moreover, the movants are merely incidental, not indispensable, parties to the instant case. The petition of Francisco I. Chavez sought to enforce a constitutional right against the PCGG and to determine whether the latter has been acting within the bounds of its authority. 2. No. The principle of hierarchy of the courts generally applies to cases involving factual questions, since the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Inasmuch as the petition at bar involves only constitutional and legal questions concerning public interest, the Court resolved to exercise primary jurisdiction on the matter. 3. No. The Chavez petition was not confined to the concluded terms contained in the Agreements, but likewise concerned other ongoing and future negotiations and agreements, perfected or not. It was therefore not rendered moot and academic simply by the public disclosure of the subject Agreements. 4. No. The PCGG’s grant to the claimants’ mother of access rights to one of their sequestered properties cannot ratify the Agreements. Being null and void, they are not subject to ratification. 5. Yes. Mandamus, over which this Court has original jurisdiction, is a proper recourse for a citizen to enforce a public right. There is no political question involved. The power and authority of the PCGG

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to compromise is not the issue. But, clearly, by violating the Constitution and the laws, the PCGG gravely abused its discretion. BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN) V ZAMORA BUENA; October 10, 2000 FACTS - This is a consolidation of 5 petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement. (Trivia: Si Prof Te ang counsel para sa ibang petitioners) - March 14, 1947 – The Philippines and USA forged a Military Bases Agreement, formalizing, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by US military personnel. - August 30, 1951 – The Philippines and USA entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels and aircraft. - 1991- RP-US Military Base Agreement expired. Senate rejected proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security. (Goodbye… but Mutual Defense Treaty still in effect.) - February 10, 1998 – President Ramos approved Visiting Forces Agreement, after a series of conferences and negotiations. - October 5, 1998 – President Estrada, through Secretary of Foreign affairs, ratified VFA. - May 27, 1999- Senate passed Resolution No. 18, concurring with the ratification of the VFA. (Who concurred: Fernan, Ople, Drilon, Biazon, Tatad, Cayetano, Aquino-Oreta, Barbers, Jaworski, Magsaysay Jr, Osmeña, Flavier, Defensor-Santiago, Ponce-Enrile, Sotto, Revilla, Coseteng, Honasan. Total=17. Who rejected: Guingona, Roco, Osmeña III, Pimentel, Legarda-Leviste. Total=5) - The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. The VFA is an agreement which defines treatment of US troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It also defines the rights of the US and the Phil government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,

movement of vessel and aircraft, importation exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

and

ISSUES 1. WON the petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA. 2. WON the VFA is governed by the provisions of Sec 21, Article VII (concurrence of 2/3 of the members of the Senate) or Sec 25 Art XVIII of the Constitution (foreign military bases, troops, or facilities not allowed in the Phils except under a treaty duly concurred in by Senate, and when Congress requires, ratification by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State) 3. WON VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty. a. WON the Philippine Courts will be deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses committed by the US Military personnel. b. WON the Supreme Court will be deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher. 4. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President, and of the Senate in ratifying/concurring with the VFA? 5. WON the VFA violates Sec 1 Article III (equal protection clause), Sec 8 Article II (prohibition against nuclear weapons), and Sec 28(4) Article VI (taxation) of the 1987 Constitution. HELD 1. No (and Yes). As taxpayers, petitioners have NO legal standing as there are no public funds raised by taxation in the case. Also, petitioner-legislators do not possess the requisite locus standi as there is absence of clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong. HOWEVER, the issues raised in the petitions are of paramount importance and of constitutional significance. It is of TRANSCENDENTAL importance, so the Court brushes aside procedural barriers and takes cognizance of the petitions.

3. We treat VFA as a treaty. . subject only to the concurrence of the members of Senate. Thus once the Senate performs that power. ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum. troops. Also. Section 2 Article II of the Constitution declares that the “xxx Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land xxx” (this doesn’t really answer the issue above. Section 21 Article VII find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate (Sec 21 Art VII requires 2/3 of the members of the Senate. is an “international instrument concluded between States in written form and governed by the international law. -. 17 of 23 Senators concurred (Senator Gloria Arroyo was elected VP). it becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part to be bound by the terms of the agreement. -. c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State (US). On the other hand. so the VFA is covered by this provision). .. .In international law. 4.Were the requirements of Section 25 Art XVIII complied with? Section 25 Art XVIII requires the following conditions: a) it must be under a treaty.A ‘treaty’. Thus. . and so required by the Congress. Article 26 of the Convention: pacta sunt servanda.Complied with. but the ponente didn’t really discuss an answer WON the VFA is an abdication of sovereignty. Requirement of ratification in a national referendum unnecessary since Congress has not required it. . Section 25 Article XVIII makes no distinction whether the troops or facilities will be “transient” or “permanent”. whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments. We cannot readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for non-compliance with our obligations. the concurrence cannot be viewed to constitute an abuse of power. as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The negotiation of the VFA and the ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts of the the President. or facilities.Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. As a member of the family of nations.With the ratification of the VFA.Complied with. and of the Senate in ratifying/concurring with the VFA? No. oh well… here goes…) . b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate.Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International Law Commision 1949 provides that every state has a duty to carry out in good faith its obligations. Ambassador Hubbard’s letter states that the VFA is binding on the US gov’t and that in international legal terms such agreement is a ‘treaty’.As to the power to concur with treaties. Section 25 Article XVIII applies as it specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases. in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted by the Constitution. duties and responsibilities under international law.5 Page No. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President. while Sec 25 Art XVIII just says “duly concurred in by the Senate” with no specified number).Mars Veloso 1C.Complied with. .” .The Constitution vests the power to enter into treaties or International agreements in the President. or. It is governed by BOTH provisions.-. the Constitution lodges the same with the Senate alone. as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. (The ‘or’ is important to take note as it signifies independence of one thing from the others. .140 2. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. or exercises its prerogative within the boundaries prescribed by the Constitution. there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned. it can just be an agreement covering only troops – not bases —like the VFA. the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for the conduct of its international relations. when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despostic manner.

PGMC submitted its bid to PCSO. became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO and organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC). Pursuant to Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169). this Court must strike a blow for the sovereignty of our country by drawing a bright line between the dignity and status of a treaty in contrast with a sole executive agreement. Mita Pardo de Tavera. . 1993. 1994 FACTS Nature: Special civil action for prohibition and injunction. while the provision applies to a permanent presence of foreign troops. Berjaya Group Berhad.) 4. However we may wish it. praying for a TRO and preliminary injunction. as there are still questions on the constitutional basis and legal effects of sole executive agreements under the US law. 15. after learning that PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system. with at least 60% of its shares owned by Filipino shareholders"). 4. 29.Mars Veloso 1C. DAVIDE. the Office of the President announced that it had given PGMC the go-signal to operate the countr's on-line lottery system. Sometime before March 1993. 2. PDI.“With the cloud of uncertainty still hanging on the exact legal force of sole executive agreements under the US constitutional law. PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. INC. Nov. 1 take no part. Considering the citizenship requirement in the RFP ("Lessor shall be a domestic corporation.POINT 1: Respondents claim that the requirements do not apply as the VFA contemplates a temporary visit of the troops. 3. . JR.5 Page No.Most significant issue is whether the VFA violates Sec 25 Art XVIII of the Constitution (see requirements above). Announcement was published in Manila Times. Before August 1993. (This was preceded by complaints from the Committe's Chairperson. The bids were evaluated by the Special Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards committee (SPBAC) for the on-line lottery and its Bid Report was thereafter submitted to the Office of the President. it falls short of the requirement set by Sec 25 Art XVIII of the 1987 Constitution that the agreement allowing the presence of foreign military troops on Phil soil must be ‘recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state’. 21. 1993. Aug. a multinational company in Malaysia. VFA does not provide for a specific and limited period of effectivity. PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40%. The said temporary nature of the VFA cannot stand. .POINT 2: The requirement that it be “recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state” is crystal clear and was put there by the framers inorder not to repeat the anomalous asymmetry of the 1947 Military bases agreement where we recognized it as a treaty but the US treated it as an executive agreement.141 Decision Petitions Dismissed 11 concurring.a. by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors. 1993. and Manila Standard on Oct. 5.k. Neither the VFA nor the Mutual Defense Treaty between RP and US provides the slightest suggestion on the duration of the visits. Consequently. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. The Court will be standing on unstable ground if it places a sole executive agreement like the VFA on the same constitutional plateau as a treaty. . 3 dissenting. to prohibit and restrain implementation of "Contract of Lease" between PCSO and PGMC in connection with on-line lottery system a. The VFA as a sole executive agreement cannot climb to the same lofty height that the dignity of a treaty can reach. May 5. V GUINGONA. Oct.” KILOSBAYAN. PCSO finally formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease of Contract of an on-line lottery system for PCSO. I vote to grant the petitions. Dr. "lotto". 1. SEPARATE OPINION PUNO [dissent] .The VFA is equivalent to a sole executive agreement in the US. KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to President Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of an on-line lotttery .

Considering the denial by the Office of the President of its protest and the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that "only a court injunction can stop Malacañang. that it is actually PCSO which will operate the lottery while winning corporate bidders merely lessors. No. KILOSBAYAN reiterated its vigorous opposition to “lotto” at the meeting of the Committee on Games and Amusements of the Senate on Nov. the petitioners insist that the Articles of Incorporation of PGMC do not authorize it to establish and operate an on-line lottery and telecommunications systems. and other similar activities "in collaboration. 42. 8. Blg. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. the media announced that despite the opposition. RESPONDENTS' COMMENTS . 'in collaboration. No. Jr. 1169." ." and the imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in February 1994. since "the subscribed foreign capital" of the PGMC "comes to about 75%.Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona..Finally. 7042) where only up to 40% foreign capital is allowed. 1. that the Articles of Incorporation of PGMC authorize it to enter into the Contract of Lease. with its co-petitioners. Malacanang will push through with operation of lotto. association or joint venture' with PGM. association or joint venture with any person.P.Private respondent PGMC asserts that "(1) [it] is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work and (2) as such independent contractor. . 3846. is vested with the basic and essential prerogative to enter into all kinds of transactions or contracts as may be necessary for the attainment of its purposes and objectives. Blg.They also argue that the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act of 1991. .A.. lotteries. PGMC is not a co-operator of the lottery franchise with PCSO." .A. KILOSBAYAN. and a mutual right of control. company or entity. filed on 28 January 1994 this petition. and that the "petitioners do not appear to have the legal standing or real interest in the subject contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought.Finally. which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting charity sweepstakes races.Petitioners claim that PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC. who informed KILOSBAYAN that the documents will be transmitted before the end of the month. be granted a franchise for that purpose because of Section 11. therefore. as amended. 7. Dec. PGMC cannot do that because it has no franchise from Congress to construct. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.A.5 Page No. KILOSBAYAN requested copies of all documents pertaining to the lottery award from Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona. 19. as shown by paragraph EIGHT of its Articles of Incorporation.Moreover. Nov. No. association or joint venture" in Section 1 is "much too narrow." a characteristic which does not obtain in a contract of lease. nor is PCSO sharing its franchise.P. and the PCSO maintain that the contract of lease in question does not violate Section 1 of R. and that the petitioner's interpretation of the phrase "in collaboration. foreign or domestic. Furthermore. 1993 6. 1993. association. strained and utterly devoid of logic" for it "ignores the reality that PCSO.Mars Veloso 1C. 1993. establish. as a corporate entity. Jr. an agreement denominated as “Contract of Lease” was finally executed by PCSO and PGMC." They further claim that the establishment of the telecommunications system stipulated in the Contract of Lease does not require a congressional franchise because PGMC will not operate a public utility . Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona." And that there are terms and conditions of the Contract "showing that respondent PGMC is the actual lotto operator and not respondent PCSO.The petitioners also point out that the Contract of Lease requires or authorizes PGMC to establish a telecommunications network that will connect all the municipalities and cities in the territory.142 system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. and that the issues . However on the same date. as amended by B. sharing of profits and losses. However." What the PCSO charter "seeks to prohibit is that arrangement akin to a "joint venture" or partnership where there is "community of interest in the business. it states that the execution and implementation of the contract does not violate the Constitution and the laws. . which should be ventilated in another forum. PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or controlled corporation and cannot. as amended by B." it cannot lawfully enter into the contract in question because all forms of gambling — and lottery is one of them — are included in the so-called foreign investments negative list under the Foreign Investments Act (R. install. 12. 42. PETITIONERS' CLAIM . in violation of Section 1(B) of R. that the issue on the "morality" of the lottery franchise granted to the PCSO is political and not judicial or legal. or operate the network pursuant to Section 1 of Act No. 1169.

The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument. and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned online lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. or joint venture. exists between the contracting parties. Joint venture is defined as an association of persons or companies jointly undertaking some commercial enterprise. ISSUES Procedural: WON the petitioners have locus standi. association." Because of these serious constraints and unwillingness to bear expenses and assume risks. . whereas PCSO only has its franchise to offer. Animus hominis est anima scripti. or entity. 42. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.By the exception explicitly made in paragraph B.5 Page No. association or joint venture. the PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of collaboration. in the exercise of its discretion.. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and. and that although it wished to have the system.' . ) .. in the exercise of its sound discretion. brushing aside. all the facilities needed to operate and maintain" the system. A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may. The manegerial and technical expertise of PGMC are indespensible to the operation of the on-line lottery system. and he cannot enlarge it by equivocal or doubtful provisions or by probable inferences.Whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties. if we must. whether domestic or foreign.The Court found the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. Association means the act of a number of persons in uniting together for some special purpose or business. indeed. or joint venture with any person. the words are to be taken most strongly against the grantee . Nothing passes by mere implication. . Whatever is not unequivocally granted is withheld. exclusively bear "all capital. operating expenses and expansion expenses and risks." HELD 1. this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely. morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial review. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases. PCSO in the least will be conducting lotteries “ in collaboration or association” and in the most “in joint vernture” with PGMC." Finally. in the least. at its own expense. (Collaboration is defined as the acts of working together in a joint project. generally all contribute assets and share risks. set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. association." . privileges and franchises. transfer. be resolved in their favor. but one where the statutorily proscribed collaboration or association.Mars Veloso 1C. Substantive: WON the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in light of RA 1169 as amended by BP Blg. technicalities of procedure.A careful analysis and evaluation of the provisions of the contract and a consideration of the contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and PGMC indubitably disclose that the contract is not in reality a contract of lease under which the PGMC is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work. company. this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of 2." . the PCSO was candid enough to state in its RFP that it is seeking for "a suitable contractor which shall build.The contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and the PGMC reveal that the PCSO had neither funds of its own nor the expertise to operate and manage an on-line lottery system. PGMC is not only a Lessor. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social. Neither can it assign. [o]ne who claims a franchise or privilege in derogation of the common rights of the public must prove his title thereto by a grant which is clearly and definitely expressed. or lease such franchise. Section 1 of its charter. . which prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration.143 of "wisdom.. they allege that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit. it would have it "at no expense or risks to the government. at the most.It is a settled rule that "in all grants by the government to individuals or corporations of rights. The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the petitioners should. which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Contract of Lease is void for being contrary to law. economic.

§ (B) ) The term of the leases is eight (8) years. the PCSO has the option to purchase the equipment for the sum of P25 million. VS. the residue of the whole exercise will go to PCSO. PGMC will get its 4. Guingona. 5) It is responsible for the loss of. the PCSO agrees to pay the deficiency out of the proceeds of its current ticket sales. and conformable to this Honorable Court's aforesaid Decision.By considering this case as a taxpayer's suit could not cure the lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners. 30% of the net receipts from the sale of tickets is alloted to charity.R. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. and perhaps more importantly to warrant the judiciary's overruling the determination of a coordinate. 1195 the parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (thereafter called ELA) whereby the PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to the PCSO in consideration of a rental equivalent to 4. 7-8) Upon the expiration of the leases. 1995 FACTS . In the event the bi-weekly rentals in any year fall short of the annual minimum fixed rental thus computed. (R. commencing from the start of commercial operation of the lottery equipment first delivered to the lessee pursuant to the agreed schedule. . No public fund raised by taxation is involved. PUNO [dissenting] . . democratically elected organ of government. The contract does not involve an illegal disbursement of public funds. . or damage to. 232 SCRA 110 (1994) invalidating the Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. the parties entered into negotiations for a new agreement that would be "consistent with the latter's [PCSO] charter .Courts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases dumped into their laps nor are they free to open their doors to all parties or entities claiming a grievance.144 SEPARATE OPINION CRUZ [concurring] . the equipment from any cause and for the cost of their maintenance and repair.. Incorporated v.00 per terminal in Commercial Operation. 1-2) Under the law. 113375 (Kilosbayan.A. The contract involves strictly corporate money. while PCSO contributes the market through the dealers and in the totality the mass of Filipino gambling elements. KILOSBAYAN. ET AL.3 % of the gross amount of ticket sale derived by the PCSO from the operation of the lottery which in no case shall be less than an annual rental computed at P35.It is clear that the requirement of locus standi has not been jettisoned by the Constitution for it still commands courts in no uncertain terms to settle only “actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable”/ . (Par.000.5 Page No. (PGMC) on the ground that it had been made in violation of the charter of the PCSO.9% of gross receipts. . technology and expertise. (Pars.Mars Veloso 1C. 1169. 3) . .This case does not involve a challenge on the validity of a statute nor an attempt to restrain expenditure of public funds.As a result of our decision in G.Contract of Lease between PCSO and PGMC is a joint venture because each part contributes its share in the enterprise project. MORATO MENDOZA. July 17. (Par. PGMC contributes the facilities. MELO [dissenting] .Rationale for the standard of locus standi is to assure a vigorous adversary presentation of the case. this is a joint venture plain and simple. PADILLA [concurring] . (Pars. INC. No.On January 25.In the operation of the lottery. The rental is to be computed and paid bi-weekly.PGMC is plainly a partner of PCSO in violation of the law no matter how the assistance is called or the contract denominated." . the PCSO is to employ its own personnel.

1995 this suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground as the Contract of Leases nullified in the first case. Wigberto Tañada and Rep. Petitioners on the other hand contend that the ruling in the previous case sustaining their standing to challenge the validity of the first contract for the operation of lottery is now the "law of the case". and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. and social well-being. Does the decision in Kilosbayan v. priests. concern for stability in decisional law does not call for adherence to what has recently been laid down as the rule. (§17) (Memorandum for Petitioners. the protection of life. General Reasoning . and promote total human liberation and development. .Petitioners likewise invoke the following Principles and State Policies set forth in Art.A copy of the ELA was submitted to the Court by the PGMC in accordance with its manifestation in the prior case.Respondents question the right of petitioners to bring this suit on the ground that. and property. thus precluding respondents from assailing the legal standing of petitioners? 3. culture.145 . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. and therefore the question of their standing can no longer be reopened. Petitioners seek the declaration of the amended ELA as null and void. al. accelerate social progress.Stare decisis is usually the wise policy. justice. science and technology. nuns and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth. II of the Constitution: The maintenance of peace and order. pastors. .e. have standing to sue? 2. claimed the right to sue in the capacity of taxpayer. not being parties to the contract of lease which they seek to nullify. liberty.5 Page No. Freddie Webb. self-executing)? HELD Ratio 1. . In. (§12) The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building and shall promote their physical.The PCSO and PGMC filed a separate comments in which they question the petitioners' standing to bring suit. Sen. On February 21. Arroyo) are members of the Congress suing as such and as "taxpayer and concerned citizens. A ruling in a previous case is binding only insofar as the specific issue in that case is concerned. Joker P. The previous ruling sustaining petitioners' intervention may itself be considered a departure from settled rulings on "real parties in interest" because no constitutional issues were actually involved. and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the employment by all the people of the blessings of democracy. p. is an organization described in its petition as "composed of civicspirited citizens. But in this case.. Parties may be the same but cases are not." Its trustees are also suing in their individual and collective capacities as "taxpayers and concerned citizens. nor that of conclusive of judgment poses a barrier to a determination of petitioners' right to maintain this suit. citizen and member of the Bar. Provisions under the Declaration of Principles and States are not self-executing. 2. 7) ISSUES 1. they have no personal and substantial interest likely to be injured by the enforcement of the contract. The state shall give priority to education. arts. May the provisions under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies be readily invoked by any person in the absence of Congressional legislation (i. Just five years before that ruling this Court had denied standing to a party who. Guingona constitute the “law of the case”. spiritual. moral. (§5)] The natural and primary right and duty of the parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. The Kilosbayan. ." . and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism." The other petitioners (Sen.Neither the doctrine of stare decisis nor that of "law of the case".Mars Veloso 1C. intellectual. Does Kilosbayan et. and national renewal. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nacionalism. in questioning the validity of another form of lottery.

R. which the petitioners seek to declare invalid in this proceeding. there have been changes in the members of the Court.R. SINCE STANDING IS A CONCEPT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND HERE NO CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS ACTUALLY INVOLVED. Galido. it is not its continuation: The doctrine applies only when a case is before a court a second time after a ruling by an appellate court. It relates entirely to questions of law.R. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist on the maintenance of the ruling as to petitioners' standing. not final.The law of the case. Heirs of Roxas v. is essentially different from the 1993 Contract of lease entered into by the PCSO with the PGMC. legislators do not have stnding the question the validity of any law or official action (Philippine Constitution Association v Enriquez. 32 The issue in this case is whether 32 petitioners are the "real parties in interest" within the meaning of Rule 3. ." According to the doctrine. not even the issue in this case. .5 Page No. the ruling there cannot in any sense be regarded as "the law of this case. They have not demonstrated that the Contract entered into by the PCSO would directly injure or affect their rights. In addition. 113375) that the petitioner had standing to challenge the validity of the 1993 Contract of Lease of the parties does not preclude determination of their standing in the present suit. the ELA. if not universally. 235 SCRA 506 (1994)) . . §2 of the Rules of Court which requires that "Every action may be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. 113375. It is. 78716. right to maintain this suit foreclosed by the related doctrine of "conclusiveness of judgment." The parties are the same but the cases are not. with seven (7) members sustaining petitioners' standing and six (6) denying petitioners' right to bring the suit. 313 (1912). Tuason .It follows that since the present case is not the same one litigated by he parties before in G. 108. No. 22. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes. . the illegality of the veto would impair their prerogative as members of Congress. No.Mars Veloso 1C. The first judgment is generally. 582 (1960)) . It differs from res judicata in that the conclusive of the first judgment is not dependent upon its finality. 1987) Only recently this Court held that members of Congress have standing to question the validity of presidential veto on the ground that. . As will presently be shown.Nor is inquiry into petitioners." We do not think this doctrine is applicable considering the fact that while this case is a sequel to G. The voting on petitioners' standing in the previous case was a narrow one. No. 521 (1979) ) . petitioners have not shown that they are the real party in interest. an issue actually and directly passed upon the and determined in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different of action. Petitioners argue that inquiry into their right to bring this suit is barred by the doctrine of "law of the case. The question whether the petitioners have standing to question the Equipment or ELA is a legal question.merely expresses the practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. No. Hence the determination in the prior case (G." (Municipality of Daet v.It has been held that the rule on conclusiveness of judgment or preclusion of issues or collateral estoppel does not apply to issues COMMENT OF BRYAN_SJ: The logic of the Court in this case now becomes clearer: The concept of legal standing is a constitutional law concept which is INAPPLICABLE IN CASES WHERE THERE ARE NO CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED. if it true. and is confined in its questions of law. Specific Reasoning 1. In cases where no constitutional issues are raised the governing principle should be the concept of “real party in interest” in the Rules of Court. and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case . Court of Appeals. 113375. ." . (Peñalosa v.There is an additional reason for a reexamination of the ruling on standing. 2. 22 Phil. as applied to a former decision of an appellate court. 303. strictly speaking.Not only is petitioners' standing a legal issue that may be determined again in this case.146 (Valmonte v. NO. G. The majority was thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be maintained in any subsequent litigation. . .R. 93 SCRA 503. Conversely if the complaint is not grounded on the impairment of the powers of Congress. with the retirement of Justices Cruz and Bidin and the appointment of the writer of this opinion and Justice Francisco. Sept .Noting this distinction. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. NO.

In respect of the matter of locus standi. the one dealt with in the first proceeding. 92 L. (unless they are violative of the Constitution) even if such laws run counter to a Member's personal conviction that gambling should be totally prohibited by law. It is the duty of the Supreme Court to apply the laws enacted by Congress and approved by the President.In my separate concurring opinion in the first lotto case (G. the legality of a lease contract into by PCSO with PGMC whereby the former sought an "on-line high-tech" lottery. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. "must be confined to situations where the matter raised in the second suit is identical in all respects with that decided in the first preceding and where the controlling facts and applicable legal rules remain unchanged. pressed for recognition of locus standi on the part of petitioners in the first Kilosbayan case. SEPARATE OPINION FELICIANO [dissent] . . collateral estoppel does not govern the legal issues which occur in the second case. 59 L. such recognition in the present or second Kilosbayan case. 2 (3rd Ed.They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation. .I join the majority in voting for the dismissal of the petition in this case.. 162. the disregard which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. should be relaxed. however similar or identical it may be. . 591. Thus the second proceeding may involve an instrument or transaction identical with but in a form separable form. Sunnen. 147. 92 L. still exist and demand.S.R." (333 U. 1988)) Following this ruling it was held in Commissioner v. MELTZER. 113375). JJ. PADILLA [concur] . I fear that the Court may well have occasion in the future profoundly to regret the doctrinal ball and chain that we have today clamped on our own limbs. No. NO. The rule on collateral estoppel. United States. Mendoza. n.5 Page No. These are not. being merely a procedural rule. Ed. 440 U. with equal weight and insistence. at 601. "if the relevant facts in the two cases are separate even though they may be similar or identical. . the question is whether petitioners have legal right which has been violated. For income tax purposes what is decided with respect to one contract is not conclusive as to any other contract which was not then in issue. (Montana v. the terms of which clearly pointed to an "association. however. since the majority opinion has now evolved other adjective theories which are represented to be either different from or ramifications of the original "standing to sue" ." (333 U. 333 U. undeniably a form of gambling.. to my mind. namely. More specifically.S. collaboration or joint venture" with PGMC.1 All the factors which. at 599-600. self executing provisions. 92 L. at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. it was held.I join the penetrating dissenting opinions written by my esteemed brothers Regalado and Davide.I find myself regretfully quite unable to join the majority opinion written by my distinguished brother in the Court. expressed the view that the rule on locus standi. 222 (1979). Ed. at 907) Consequently. Ed.S. MISHKIN AND SHAPIRO.S. BATOR. this case involves basically questions of contract law. while constitutional policies are invoked. . J. I would also reiterate the concurring opinion I wrote on that subject in the first Kilosbayan case. Thus. 898 (1947) that where a taxpayer assigned to his wife interest in a patent in 1928 and in a suit it was determined that the money paid to his wife for the years 19291931 under the 1928 assignment was not part of his taxable income. at 908) 3.147 of law.Be that as it may. REGALADO [dissent] . Jr. In that situation a court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. as the issue then was of paramount national interest and importance.Mars Veloso 1C. Ed. THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1058. 2d 210 . . this determination is not preclusive in a second action for collection of taxes on amounts to his wife under another deed of assignment for other years (1937 to 1941).

It may be conceded that. does not appear to have been taken into account when the double-appeal procedure involved in one particular American concept was cited as authority in the majority opinion. since in our jurisdiction an original action for certiorari to control and set aside a grave abuse of official discretion can be commenced in the Supreme Court itself. thereby.That is the present reglementary situation in the Philippines which.148 objection raised in the first lotto case. for its applicability. and for lack of cause of action on their part . Yet on such unverified premises. and without a showing that the situations are in pari materia. the "law of the case" may also arise from an original holding of a higher court on a writ of certiorari. 1. Even in American law. there must first be a remand to a lower court which naturally could not be the court of origin from which the postulated second appeal should be taken. Obviously realizing that continued reliance on the locus standi bar to petitioner's suit is not an ironclad guaranty against it. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. . 7 and is binding not only in subsequent appeals or proceedings in the same case. an appeal to a higher court. the "law of the case" doctrine was essentially designed to express the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided 5 and. then what is necessarily challenged in the first recourse to the higher court is either an interlocutory order of the court a quo elevated on an original action for certiorari or an appealable adjudication which nonetheless did not dispose of the entire case below because it was either a special proceeding or an action admitting of multiple appeals. to emphasize the rule that the final judgment of the highest court is a final determination of the rights of the parties. an issue involved in a case originating from a lower court which is first resolved by an appellate court. has unduly constricted the factual and procedural situations where such doctrine may apply. 6 That is the actual and basic role that it was conceived to play in judicial determinations. insists that what is supposedly determinative of the issue of representation is contract law and not constitutional law. it has the same binding effect as it would have had if promulgated in a case on appeal. . prohibition or mandamus. the holding of this highest Court on a specific issue was handed down in an original action for certiorari.5 Page No. in the context of the cited cases wherein this doctrine was applied.Mars Veloso 1C. There is. but also in a subsequent suit between the same parties. the "law of the case" doctrine cannot apply. 8 What I wish to underscore is that where. Furthermore. the majority position has taken a different tack. a remand to the lower court. I will hazard my own humble observations thereon. the salvo against the adoption of the "law of the case" doctrine in the original majority ponencia. just like the rationale for the doctrines of res judicata and conclusiveness of judgment. or through an original action of certiorari. On the predicate that petitioners are not parties to the contract. If so. 2. It is insinuated that said doctrine exists only under such a scenario. .I fear that this majority rule. that case being then remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings and with the prior resolution by the higher court of that issue being the "law of the case" in any other proceeding in or a subsequent appeal from the same case. initially. . primarily or subsidiarily. two "appeals" are generally involved and the issue resolved in the first appeal cannot be reexamined in the second appeal. and then a second appeal to the higher court. unfortunately. It now invoked the concept of and the rules on a right of action in ordinary civil actions and. prescinding from its previous positions. we are told that since the case at bar does not posses the formatted sequence of an initiatory action in a lower court. it would be absurd that for its ruling therein to constitute the law of the case. through its undue insistence on the remedial procedure involved in the proceedings rather than the juridical effect of the pronouncement of the higher court. I have perforce to reject that submission as I cannot indulge in the luxury of absolute espoused by this majority view. No attempt was made to ascertain whether in the American cases cited the lex fori provided for identical or even substantial counterparts of our procedural remedies of review by a higher court on either an appeal by certiorari or writ of error. they then are real parties in interest. It is contended that this doctrine requires.Accordingly. as in the instant case.

Again. therefore.5 Page No. Questions as to the nature or validity of public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding before they may be made can be raised in an appropriate complaint before the Commission on Audit or before the Ombudsman. . . the majority urges the adoption of the standard concept of a real party in interest based on his possession of a cause of action. cannot maintain the present petition. to wit: Denial to petitioners of the right to intervene will not leave without remedy any perceived illegality in the execution of government contracts. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action. if the majority would have its way in this case. of what avail would be the suggested recourse to the Ombudsman? Finally. . Any proposed remedy must take into account not only the legalities in the case but also the realities of life. Thus. The majority believes that in view of the retirement and replacement of two members of the Court. the objection under the new terminology is "lo mismo perro con distinto collar. 3. there is the caveat that "the adoption of provision requiring that an action be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest does not solve all questions as to the proper person or persons to institute suit. they. is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has the capacity to sue. even so. Who is the real party in interest depends on the peculiar facts of each separate case. 10 Indeed. This legal dilemma or vacuum is supposedly remediable under a suggestions submitted in the majority opinion. In addition. has offended against its corporate charter or misused its franchise. and one may be a party in interest and yet not be the sole real party in interest. the Solicitor General is authorized to bring an action for quo warranto if it should be thought that a government corporation . It could not have failed to perceive.) The majority opinion quotes the view of a foreign author but unfortunately fails to put the proper emphasis on the portion thereof which I believe should be that which should correctly be stressed. it is time to reexamine the ruling in the first lotto case. . There is no clearly defined rule by which one may determine who is or is not real party in interest." 9 (Emphasis supplied. nor has there been found any concise definition of the term. It is. . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underspinnings. the syllogism of the majority can claim the merit of logic but. either in propria persona or ex relatione. . only on assumed premises.The majority has apparently forgotten its own argument that in the present case petitioners are not the real parties. has already been foreclosed by the judgment of the Court in the first lotto case. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.149 they have no right of action. and which I correspondingly reproduce: It is important to note. Ergo. As the commentators of Castille would say. but nonetheless refuses to concede. the blemish in its new blueprint is that the defense of lack of a right of action is effectively the same as lack of locus standi. standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits. hence they cannot avail of any remedial right to file a complaint or suit. As a matter of a conventional rule of procedure. that the concept of a cause of action in public interest cases should not be straitjacketed within its usual narrow confines in private interest litigations. the absence of the remedial right to sue. however. there would be no available judicial remedy against irregularities or excesses in government contracts for lack of a party with legal standing or capacity to sue. it is a perplexing suggestion that petitioners ask the Solicitor General to bring a quo warranto suit. More importantly. although it obviously simplifies procedures in actions at law. It is true that a right of action is the right or standing to enforce a cause of action.Mars Veloso 1C. highly improbable that the Commission on Audit would deign to deal with those whom the majority says are strangers to the contract." That re-christened ground. as we shall later see. . . that is. A previous judgment of the Court . adverting again to American jurisprudence. should this Court now sustain the assailed contract. . For its purposes. . as well as of broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas. . not only because one has to contend with that official's own views or personal interests but because he is himself the counsel for respondents in this case.

2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. with on the property. stays unresolved until the appointment of members sympathetic thereto. just because the present Rules do not provide a time limit for the resolution thereof. to be cleaned of any suspicions . 12 but are now mysteriously divested of the "place of standing" allegedly due to. In their case . No. an attempt to show that the subject matter in the first action is different from that in the instant case. which nevertheless continues to operate under the same basis. The people are entitled to the benefit of a duly clarified and translucent transaction. No. the judgment in G. since the former was the original contract and the latter is the supposed expanded contract..I hold the view that the matter of the right of petitioners to file and maintain this action . a compelling need for reexamination of the doctrine. 11 It is undeniable that in that case and the one at bar. 113375 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Thus. The removal and replacement of some objectionable terms of a contract. it may not sit well with the public as a judicious policy. to be sure. which I assume arguendo .Mars Veloso 1C. just as respondent deserve the opportunity. . with just some variants in the terms of the latter to eliminate those which were objected to. 113375.Yet. It does seem odd. open the door to fraud. and subvert the rules on the finality of judgments. even assuming purely ex hypothesi that the amended terms in the expanded lease agreement created a discrete set of litigable violations of the statutory charter of the Philippines Charity Sweepstakes Office. This would be to exalt form over substance. an obsession for autarky of the nation. This would be similar to the situation where a judgment promulgated by the Court is held up by a motion for reconsideration and which motion. The contrary assumption now being floated by respondents would create chaos in our remedial and contractual laws. it was an adjudication on the merits. and has long become final and executory. I am not persuaded by the proffered distinction. respondents themselves admitted that the new contract is actually the same as the original one. if not arcane.whether the objection thereto is premised on lack of locus standi or right of action .150 may.R. aside from the postulated invalidity of the contract for the governmentsponsored lottery system. be revisited but if the ostensible basis is the change of membership and known positions of the new members anent an issue pending in a case in the Court. better known in this jurisdiction as conclusiveness of judgment. Evidently. we would still have a situation of collateral estoppel. subject matter and cause of action.has already been foreclosed by our judgment in the first lotto case. Furthermore. and should even by themselves primarily seek. and the same contracting parties does not suffice to extinguish the identity of the subject matter in both cases. 4. There is.what is now being primarily resisted is the right of petitioners to sue. Hence. not on dubious technicalities intended to prevent on inquiry into the validity of the supposed amended lease contract. that would merely constitute at most a difference in the causes of action in the former and the present cases. 113375 and. No. for legal purposes. on which I insist. thereby collectively resulting in a disparate actionable wrong or delict. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 49(c). or of conclusiveness of judgment. .5 Page No. there is identity of parties. all relevant issues finally adjudged in the prior judgment shall be conclusive between the parties in the case now before us and that definitely includes at the very least the adjudgment therein that petitioners have the locus standi or the right to sue respondents on the contracts concerned. and. for economic reasons. were likewise so recognized in the expanded value added tax (EVAT) case. of course. I repeat what I said at the outset that this case should be decided on the merits and on substantive considerations. for that matter. that petitioners were held to have the requisite locos standi or right of action on said G. I see no reason why that particular issue can still be ventilated now as a survivor of the doctrinal effects of res judicata. If the majority refuses to recognize such right under the "law of the case" principle. fore the same purpose.R.R.whether of res judicata. G. the unkind criticisms of "magistrate shopping" or "court packing" levelled by disgruntled litigants is not unknown to this Court.

. Such reversal upsets the salutary doctrines of the law of the case. as amended.Mars Veloso 1C. in the certainly and stability of the pronouncements of this Court. and in no uncertain terms declared: We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public.In the said case. now. The decision has. This is a contingency which is not only possible. 1 referred to as the first lotto case) regarding the application or interpretation of the exception clause in paragraph B. . 442. thus. Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO (R. to obviate unnecessary replication I reiterate my concurrence with the findings and conclusions of Mr. res judicata. .One concluding point. the presentation whereof is completely devoid of strained or speculative premises. and on the issue of locus standi of the petitioners to question the contract of lease involving the on-line lottery system entered into between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC). DAVIDE [dissent] . instead. and not only undesirable. It opens the floodgates to endless litigations for re-examination of such pronouncements and weakens this Court's judicial and moral authority to demand from lower courts obedience thereto and to impse sanctions for their opposite conduct. While there are exceptions to the aforementioned doctrines and I am not inexorably opposed to upsetting prior decisions if warranted by overwhelming considerations of justice and irresistible desire to rectify an error. as can be gleaned from their separate manifestations that they would not ask for its reconsideration but would. and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter- . The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited cases.It must be noted that the decision in the first lotto case was unconditionally accepted by the PCSO and the PGMC. 1169. negotiate a new equipment lease agreement consistent with the decision and the PCSO's charter and that they would furnish the Court a copy of the new agreement. become final on 23 May 1994. we sustained the locus standi of the petitioners. No. I find the same to be an amply sufficient and highly meritorious analysis of the controversy on the contract. It puts to jeopardy the faith and confidence of the people.I am disturbed by the sudden reversal of our rulings in Kilosbayan. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. et al. of lotto are different. No. but probable under our oligarchic society in esse. vs. . economic.On the merits. as amended by B. Inc.151 or lingering doubts arising from the fact that the sponsors for jail alai and. I cannot accept the strained and tenuous arguments adduced in the majority opinion it justly the reversal of our rulings in the first lotto case. This sounds like a tongue-inriposte since the Court has clearly indicated that it sets aside objections grounded on judge-made constitutional theories only under cogent reasons of substantial justice and paramount public interest. specially the lawyers and litigants. I am not impressed by their stance of the majority that our taking cognizance of this case and resolving it on the merits will hereafter invite others to unduly overburden this Court with avoidable importunities. . but repugnant within a just regime of law still in posse.A. It could conceivably result in depriving the people of recourse to us from dubious government contracts through constitutionally outdated or procedurally insipid theories for such stultification. and stare decisis. Guingona. and moreover has the virtue of being based on his first-hand knowledge as a legislator of the very provisions of the law now in dispute.5 Page No.I register a dissenting vote. In this instance and absent any other operative data. Blg. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social.P. to pay unqualified obedience to the beguiling locos standi or right of action doctrines posited by the majority in this case would only not be an abdication of a clear judicial duty. none of such considerations and nothing of substance or weight can bring this case within any of the exceptions. 1169). Section 1 of R. Justice Davide in this dissenting opinion. . 2 .A. et al. On the contrary.As the writer of the said decision and as the author of the exception to paragraph B.

The principle of the law of the case "is necessary as a matter of policy to end litigation. No." as in fact it subsequently granted relief to petitioners by invalidating the challenged statutes or governmental actions.These doctrines were not adopted whimsically or capriciously. this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of. For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed. 3 this Court. and Ricardo J. locus standi therein. Reynato S. 232 SCRA 110 [1994] and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved (Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation v. Jose C. Yet. Guingona. There would be no end to a suit if every . who had also dissented in the first lotto case on the issue of locus standi. Moreover. 232 SCRA 110 (1994)] relief by the majority for upholding petitioner's standing.In this concurring opinion. ." . He said: . . as amended. In the cases in which citizens were authorized to sue. and moral wellbeing of the people . Section 1 of R. the writer of the ponencia in this case. 176 SCRA 240 [1989].Mr. . Except for the Chief Justice who took part in the first lotto case and Justice Francisco who was not yet a member of this Court at the time. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. and (d) the wide range of impact of the contract of lease and of its implementation. . Mr. Puno. also invoked the locus standi ruling in the first lotto case to deny legal standing to Tatad. speaking through Mr.Under the principle of either the law of the case of res judicata.Chief Justice Andres R. Francisco. Justice Vicente V. we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action. Kapunan. joined him in his concurring opinion. Feliciano further showed substantive grounds or considerations of importance which strengthened the legal standing of the petitioners to bring and maintain the action. Guingona. 1169. vs. et al. the rest of the Justice who joined the concurring opinion of Justice Mendoza had dissented in the lotto case on the said issue. He stated: The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national government or government-owned or controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of the law (Kilosbayan. Vitug. in the decision in Tatad vs. . Melo. Justice Florentino P. unqualifiedly concurred with the majority opinion in Tatad. Inc. and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system. . in the exercise of its sound discretion. Thus in the Lotto case [Kilosbayan. Laron. that application or interpretation has been laid to rest under the doctrine of stare decisis and has also become part of our legal system pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides: 'Judicial decisions applying interpreting the laws or the constitution shall from part of the system of the Philippines. Mendoza.R. Quiason who had joined in the dissenting opinions in the first lotto case the petitioners." Accordingly.152 productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions of pesos it is expected to raise. Mr. Narvasa and Associate Justice Abdulwahid A Bidin. (c) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specified interest in raising the questions involved therein. v. Jose A. the Court invalidated the contract for the operation of the lottery. the PCSO and the PGMC are bound by the ruling in the first lotto case on the locus standi of the petitioners and the application or interpretation of the exception clause in paragraph B. this Court found standing because it though the constitutional claims pressed for decision to be of "transcendental importance. namely: (a) the public character of the funds or other assets involved in the contract of lease. Inc. Garcia. (b) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or legal provision by the public respondent agency. They are based on public policy and other considerations of great importance and should not be discarded or jettisoned in a cavalier fashion. . Justice Santiago M.A. Justice Camilo D. this Court took into account the "paramount public interest" involved which "immeasurably affect[ed] the social. invoked and applied the ruling on locus standi in the first lotto case. they are now put to naught in this case. The legal standing than of the petitioners deserves recognition and. economic.5 Page No. Only last 6 April 1995.Mars Veloso 1C.Nor do petitioners have standing to bring this suit as citizens.

necessarily become.5 Page No. however. by repeated appeals. Our resolution that the validity of the ELA could not be decided in the said case because the decision therein had became final does not detract from the fact that this case is but a continuation of the first lotto case or a new chapter in the raping controversy between the petitioners.. for all intents and purposes. contended that the law of the case is inapplicable that doctrine applies only when a case is before an appellate court a second time after its remand to a lower court. the second illustration stated therein is subject to this NOTE: "The doctrine of the stare decisis may lead the court to refuse to reconsider the question of sovereign immunity. on the operation of the on-line lottery system.otherwise. the question of the petitioners' legal standing in the first lotto case and in this case is one and the same issue of law. And. association. these cases involve the same and not substantially unrelated subject matter. it disregards the fact that the case is nothing but a sequel to and is." 7 . Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on effects of judgment expressly provides: . It is founded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability in the law and does not require identity or privity of parties. on the other. is misplaced. on the one hand. association. company or entity. the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to aside thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto. or speculate on chances from changes in its members. Such decisions "assume the same authority as the statute itself and. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. 1169. Equally unacceptable is the majority opinion's rejection of the related doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment of the ground that the question of standing is a question." which simply means that stare decisis is an effective bar to a re-examination of a prior judgment. 9 This is explicitly fleshed out in Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal system. 2d Judgments $ 28). The legal question of locus standi which was resolved in favor of the petitioners in the first lotto case is the same in this case and in every subsequent case which would involve contracts relating or incidental to the contract or holding of lotteries by the PCSO in collaboration. the second contract between the PCSO and the PGMC on the operation of the on-line lottery system.It is. and the PCSO and the PGMC. United States 8 that preclusion or collateral estoppel does not apply to issues of law.153 obstinate litigant could. By their conduct. for it in nothing but a substitute for the latter.A.which I do not find in this case . and the petitioners commenced the instant petition also in the said case.Mars Veloso 1C. The majority opinion likewise failed to consider that in the very authority it cited regarding the exception to the rule of issue preclusion (Testament of the Law. therefore. for which reason the PGMC and the PCSO submitted in the first lotto case a copy of the ELA in question. For another. or joint venture with any person. as amended. For one thing. Section 1 of R. until authoritatively abandoned. viz. the becoming virtue of predictabiity which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the public's confidence in the stability of its solemn pronouncements diminished. The doctrine of res judicata also bars a relitigation of the issue of locus standi and a re-examination of the application or interpretation of the exception clause in paragraph B. a continuation of the first lotto case. While indeed the statement may be correct. at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. No. the parties admitted that it is. compel a court to listen to criticism on their opinions. Section 49 (b). to the extent that they are applicable."10 Abandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons . as this case involves a different or unrelated contract. the contract in question is not different from or unrelated to the first nullified contract. Respondent Morato was even candid enough to admit that no new and separate public bidding was conducted for the ELA in question because the PCSO was of the belief that the public bidding for the nullified contract was sufficient. The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle or rule of law which has been established by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving a similar situation. Its reliance on the ruling in Montana vs.

Cruz and Abdulwahid A. contract law is involved.Mars Veloso 1C. without the said doctrine. that inconsistent judicial decisions shall not be made on the same set of facts. I can say that the Tatad case has given vigor and strength to the "tenuous" majority in the first lotto case. It was the clear understanding of the Members of the Court that in the light of the issues raised and the arguments adduced therein. Hence. judicial orderliness. with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to other matter that could have been parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceedings.hence. as explicitly stressed in the concurring opinion of Justice Feliciano. because their case did not have the same importance as the lotto case. but recognizes that certainty in legal relations must be maintained. et al. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. economy of judicial time. I am not prepared to be a party to that proposition. and (2) as preclusion to the relitigation of particular facts of issues in action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. 11 Public policy.The downgrading of locus standi and its subordination to the restrictive rule on real party in interest cannot be justified by the claim that is involved here is contract law. litigating for the same thing in the same title and in the same capacity. or cause of action. that "[t]he previous sustaining petitioners intervention may in fact be considered a departure from settled ruling on real party in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved. We are not. . . The majority opinion declares that the real issue in this case is not whether the petitioners have locus standi but whether they are the real parties-in-interest. as the majority opinion contends. This doctrine has dual aspects: (1) as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim. only locus standi deserved consideration. however. Francisco. the majority opinion and the separate dissenting opinions therein dwelt lengthily on locus standi and brought in the process a vast array of authorities on the issue. but a contract between a corporation wholly owned by the government . dealing here with an ordinary contract between private parties. It produces certainty as to individual rights and gives and respect to judicial proceedings.Equally unconvincing is the majority opinion's contention that the ruling locus standi in the first lotto case may not be preserved because the majority vote sustaining the petitioners' standing was a "tenuous one" that may not be maintained in a subsequent litigation. all require that stability should be accorded judgments: that controversies once decided on their merits shall remain in repose. which is invested with paramount and transcendental public interest and other public policy . It has forgotten that. with respect to the matter cases the judgment or order is. Garcia.and a private corporation for the contract of the lotto. an instrumentality of the government . the ruling was reiterated in Tatad vs. both constitutional and legal issues were involved therein.154 (b)In all other cases the judgment or order is. Justice Mendoza denied locus standi to Tatad." It must be pointed out that the rule in ordinary civil procedure on real party in interest was never put in issue in the previous case. Accordingly. It is not at all true. when in his concurring opinion in the Tatad case. thereby effectively subordinating to that rule the doctrine of locus standi. 12 The justifications given in the majority opinion to underrate the ruling locus standi and to ultimately discard it are unconvincing. Bidin and the appointment of Justices Vicente V. Moreover. he thereby accepted the concession of standing to the petitioners in the lotto case. I wish to stress the fact that all the Justices who had dissented in the first lotto case on the issue of locus standi were either for the majority opinion or for the concurring opinion in the Tatad case. would be endless. Additionally. True. and the interest of litigants as well as the peace and order of society. demand. and that there be an end to litigation which.5 Page No. It not only puts an end to strife. as shall hereafter be discussed. Finally. This proposition is a bold move to set up a bar to taxpayer's suits or cases invested with public interest by requiring strict compliance with the rule on real party in interest in ordinary civil actions. in public law the rule of real party in interest is subordinate to the doctrine of locus standi. and that there had been changes in the membership of the Court due to the retirement of Justices Isagani A. not constitutional law.. as earlier stated. Mendoza and Ricardo J.

(2) to allow the petitioner to have access to its records on the original and amended applications for registration. excluding. the major investor in BPC expressed to DTI Secretary his desire to amend the original registration certification of its project by changing the job site from Bataan to Batangas because of the insurgency and unstable labor situation in Bataan and the presence in Batangas of a huge LPG depot owned by Philippine Shell Corporation. We said so in the first lotto case. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. . 1803 reserved 576 hectares of public domain in Lamao. privileged papers containing its trade secrets and other business and financial information. GARCIA V BOARD OF INVESTMENTS GUTIERREZ. (2) increasing the production capacity of its naphtha cracker.P. It specified Bataan as plant site. However. BPC was issued a certificate of registration on Feb. (1) exemption from taxes on raw materials. polythylene plant and polypropylene plant. asking that the Court resolve whether or not the foreign investor has the right of final choice of plant site. A.productive and retrogressive effects which are as staggering as the billions of pesos it is expected to raise and provokes issues that immeasurably affect the social. The Court merely ruled that the petitioner appears to have lost interest in the case by his failure to appear in the hearing that was set by BOI. however. that the non-attendance of the petitioner at the hearing was because the decision was not yet final and executory. . economic. Chong. management and ownership of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC). Other requested amendments are as follows: (1) increasing the investment amount from $220 million to $320 million.T. November 9. not the investor has final choice on the matter and that even a choice approved by BOI may not be ‘final’ for supervening circumstances and changes in the conditions of a place may dictate a corresponding change in the choice of plant site in order that the project will not fail. Court resolution stated that BOI. Garcia v. (3) changing the feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG. The Board of Investments”. petition was denied. . The BOI recognizes and respects the principle that the final choice is still with the proponent who would in the final analysis provide the funding or risk capital for the project. Bataan for the Petrochemical Industrial Zone under the administration. of the respondent Bataan Petrochemical Corporation.Mars Veloso 1C. . BOI approved the revision stating that. 1988. this court ordered BOI as follows: (1) to publish the amended application for registration of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation. . . . (2) eliminating the 48% ad valorem tax on naphtha if and when it is used as raw materials for the petrochemical plant. 1990 FACTS .155 considerations because the lotto has counter . . Chairman of USI Far East Corporation.In the petition entitled “Congressman Enrique T. . and therefore petitioner has not waived his right.On May 25. and one of the terms and conditions for registration was the use of naphtha cracker and naphtha as feedstock for fuel for its plant.BPC was given pioneer status ands accorded fiscal and other incentives.5 Page No. like. 24.In February 1989. and moral well-being of the people.D. (3) to set for hearing the petitioner’s opposition to the amended application in order that he may present at such hearing all the evidence in his possession in support of his opposition to the transfer of the site of the BPC petrochemical plant to Batangas. Libay.Garcia filed motion for reconsideration asking the Court to rule on whether or not the investor given the initial inducements and other circumstances surrounding its first choice of plant site may change simply because it has the final choice on the matter.A motion for reconsideration of said resolution was filed.Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals. 1989.A petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Investments (BOI)/ Department of Trade and Industry approving the transfer of site of the proposed petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). which was to be a joint venture with PNOC. No. as a petrochemical manufacturer.

19. Sec.e. 3.5 Page No. neither does the law prohibit the BOI from approving the amended application. II) to run its own affairs the way it deems best for the national interest.The government has already granted incentives for this particular venture. 1987 Omnibus Investments Code) and the Constitution (Sec. SEPARATE OPINION GRINO-AQUINO [dissenting] . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. . The Court has constitutional duty to step into this controversy to determine the paramount issue.This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the government expressed in numerous laws (i. Through the BOI decision. a government owned Filipino corporation. now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation (LPC) 3. . the PNOC shall be a partner.A. It is not for this Court to determine what is. Art.The Bataan site is ideal.Instant petition relies on the ruling that investor has no right of final choice. as implementer of policy formulated by the legislature. . Transfer will divert scarce dollars unnecessarily. can provide the feedstock requirement of the plant in Bataan. This law was specifically for the petrochemical industry. . . the BOI’s “final choice” of plant site and feedstock. a choice free from any suspicion of unscrupulous machinations and a choice which is undoubtedly in the best interests of the Filipino people. thus giving the government participation in the management of the project instead of a firm which is a huge multinational corporation.The matter of choosing an appropriate site for the investor’s project is a political and economic decision which only the executive branch.With the plant site in Bataan. . Neither BOI nor a foreign investor should disregard or contravene expressed policy by shifting the feedstock from naphtha to LPG. Art.The respondents have not shown nor reiterated that the alleged peace and order situation in Bataan or unstable labor situation warrant a transfer to the plant site in Batangas.Capital requirements would be greatly minimized if LPC does not have to buy the land for the project and its feedstock shall be limited to naphtha. . the result of careful study. ISSUES 1. 1 and 10. whereas the country is short of LPG and there is a need to import for the use of the plant in Batangas. Disposition: Petition granted. 2. 2. . . The decision to transfer to Batangas and to shift the use of feedstock is unjustified. 6767 exempted naphtha as feedstock from ad valorem tax but excluded LPG from the exemption.There is no provision in the 1987 Investments Code prohibiting the amendment of the investor’s application for registration of its project. WON its feedstock originally of naphtha only should be changed to naphtha and/or LPG the approved amended application of the BPC. Decision set aside as null and void. it surrenders even the power to make a company abide by its initial choice. WON the petrochemical plant should remain in Bataan or should be transferred to Batangas 2. On Justiciablity: There is an actual controversy. .The Bataan Refining Corporation.R. or should be. WON the categorical admission of the BOI that it is the investor who has the final choice of the site and the decision on the feedstock constitutes a grave abuse of discretion for the BOI to yield to the wishes of the investor. Art. XII.156 . BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in the investor all other circumstances to the contrary not withstanding. is empowered to make. national interest notwithstanding HELD 1.Mars Veloso 1C.

2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. . 1993.Bet Jul 22. Although H No 11197 originated fr House of Reps. Re: Art VI Sec 26(2) 1. ART VI: LEGISLATURE TOLENTINO V SECRETARY OF FINANCE MENDOZA. 3. H No 11197 and S No 1630 were referred to conference committee w/c after meeting 4 times.Mars Veloso 1C. not H No 11197. However. The enrolled bill was presented to President who. challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716.H No. . recommended that HB in consolidation w/ SB be approved in accordance w/ bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees. Re: BCC acted within its power . 1992 and Aug 31. 1994 signed it. Sec of Finance issued Revenue Regulations No.Petitioners contend: Re: Art VI Sec 24 1. These were referred to House Ways and Means Committee w/c recommended for approval H No 11197. MELENCIO-HERRERA [dissenting] . The constitutional design is to limit Senate’s power in revenue bills to compensate for the grant to the Senate of treaty-ratifying power.[The majority Decision] has made a sweeping policy determination and has unwittingly transformed itself into what might be termed a “government by the Judiciary. on May 5.It was sent to Senate and was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means. S No 1630 was passed no in substitution of H No 11197 but of another Senate bill (S No 1129).These are original actions in SC.” something never intended by the framers of the Constitution when they provided for separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of government and excluded the Judiciary from policy-making. 11-94 exempting circulation income of print media. 1994. The growing budget deficit was not an unusual condition in this country. Mar 24.Senate approved S No 1630 on second rdg. August 25. submitted in substitution of S No 1129. it was S No 1630 that was certified urgent. The verb “shall originate” is qualified by the word “exclusively”.The petitioner’s recourse against the BOI’s action is by an appeal to the President (Sec. taking into consideration PS Res No 734 and H No 11197 . . It became RA 7716.157 . it was not passed by Senate but was consolidated w/ Senate version in the Conference Committee to produce the bill. . 2. 1994 FACTS . 2. On May 12.RA 7716 amended § 103 and made print media subject to VAT in all aspect of operations. 3. not to this Court. by vote of 11 to 4. bills were introduced in House of Reps to amend NIRC relative to VAT. . . and on third rdg by affirmative votes of 13 and 1 abstention.RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system by amending National Internal Revenue Code. The certification of urgency was invalid bec there was no emergency.Implementation was suspended until Jun 30 to allow time for registration of businesses. . Senate merely took H No 11197 into consideration in enacting S No 1630. Implementation was stopped by TRO fr Court.5 Page No. Certiorari and prohibition. 11197 was considered on second rdg and was approved by House of Reps after third and final rdg. Income fr advertisements are still subject to VAT. . Also. 36. 1987 Investments Code). it was published in 2 newspapers of gen circulation and it took effect on May 28.The Conference Committee Bill was approved by House of Reps and Senate. The second and third rdgs were on the same day. The Committee submitted report recommending approval of S No 1630.

2. 3.000 but not more than P750. Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends: 3. Also.Petitioner Philippine Bible Society contends: Re: Art III Sec 5 1.Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association contends: Re: Art III Sec 10 1. RA 7716 singled out press for discriminatory treatment. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Imposition of VAT violates constitutional provision on no law impairing obligation of contracts . Incomplete remarks of members are marked in the stenographic notes by ellipses.158 1.5 Page No. WON there’s violation of Art VI § 26(1) of Consti (only one subject which is expressed in title) / WON amendment of § 103 of NIRC is fairly embraced in title of RA 7716 although no mention is made therein Substantive: .Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends: Re: Art III Sec 4 1. Increase in price of books and educ materials will violate govt mandate to prioritize education ISSUES Procedural 1. 2.Petitioner Philippine Airlines Inc contends: Re: Art VI Sec 26(1) 1. It is required that the Committee’s report undergo three rdgs in the two houses. The Rules of the two chambers were disregarded in preparation of BCC Report because Report didn’t contain “detailed and explicit statement of changes” 4. RA 7716 is the bill which the BCC prepared. Besides. WON there’s violation of Art VI § 26(2) of Consti (three readings on separate days) 3.Petitioner Cooperative Union of the Philippines contends: Re: Art III Sec 1 1. BCC met behind closed doors. VAT will reduce mark up of its members by as much as 90%. 2. Although exemption was subsequently restored. Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association contends: 2. . amendment of PAL’s franchise may be made only by special law which will expressly amend the franchise (§24 of PD 1590). .000 is discriminatory. 4. . It questions law bec exemption previously granted to press under NIRC was withdrawn. VAT will drive some of its members out of circulation. PPI says there’s possibility that exemption may still be removed by mere revocation by Secretary of Finance. . giving broadcast media favored treatment. 3. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee acted within its power 4. This was not reflected in the title. The registration provision of the law is invalid when applied to the press. WON there’s violation of Art VI § 24 of Consti (revenue bill originating exclusively fr House of Reps) 2. Withdrawal of exemption of some cooperatives while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives not only goes against policy to promote cooperatives but also violate equal protection of law. Neither H No 11197 nor S No 1630 provided for removal of exemption of PAL transactions fr payment of VAT and this was made only by the BCC. BCC included provisions not found in the HB or SB and these were “surreptitiously” inserted.Petitioner Philippine Educational Publishers Association contends: Re: Art II Sec 17 1.Mars Veloso 1C. . Imposing VAT only on print media whose gross sales exceeds P480. Secretary of Finance has no power to grant tax exemption because that power is vested in Congress and the Secretary’s duty is to execute the law and the removal of exemption of religious articles violates freedom of thought/conscience. there is still unconstitutional abridgment of press freedom because of VAT on gross receipts on advertisements.

c. for religious purpose exempt) is violated 11. science and tech) is violated HELD . This is not to say that the enrolled bill doctrine is absolute. This certification dispensed w/ printing and rdg the bill on separate days. YES the BCC acted within its power a. It was because Pres certified S No 1630 as urgent. The result could be a third version. WON Art III § 5 (free exercise of religion) is violated 8. WON Art VI § 28(1) (uniform/equitable. Example is RA 5440 which had 2nd and 3rd rdgs on the same day after bill had been certified urgent. WON Art III § 1 (deprivation of life/liberty/property. The Reps are expected to be more sensitive to the local needs. But where allegations are nothing more than “surreptitiously” inserting provisions. There’s no difference bet Senate preserving house bill then writing its own version on one hand and on the other hand. are also charged w/ enforcement of Consti. 1. Pres likewise certified H No 9210 then pending. There was also nothing unusual in the executive sessions of the BCC. Procedural Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of the RA must be resolved in its favor. c. It was only after Senate rcvd H No 11197 that legislation in respect of it began w/ referral to Senate Committee on Ways and Means. WON Art II § 17 (gov’t priority on education. No Senator controverted factual basis of the certification and this should not be rvwd by the Court. 2.Mars Veloso 1C. considered an amendment in nature of substitute. It would violate coequality of the legislative power of the two houses. WON Art III § 10 (no law impairing obligation of contracts) is violated 9.5 Page No. It’s not the law but the revenue bill which is required to originate exclusively in the House of Reps. Legislative power is issue here.159 5. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 24 a. To insist that a revenue statute (and not the bill) must be the same as the House bill would deny the Senate’s power to concur with and propose amendments. b. The phrase “except when the President certifies to the necessity…” qualifies two stated conditions: (1) the bill has passed 3 rdgs on separate days and (2) it has been printed in final form and distributed 3 days before finally approved. To construe that the “except” clause dispenses only with printing would violate grammar rules and would also negate the necessity of the immediate enactment of the bill. It is w/in power of BCC to include an . equal protection) is violated 6. Treaty-ratifying power is not legislative power but an exercise of check on executive power. Consti simply says that it’s the initiative for filing the bill that must come fr House of Reps. the only requirement that the 3 rd version be germane to subject of the HB and SB. Under congressional rules. BCCs are not expected to make material changes but this is a difficult provision to enforce. A bill originating in House may undergo extensive changes in Senate. It was S No 1630 that Senate was considering. SC gives due respect to other branches of gov’t. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(2) a. b. WON Art VI § 28(3) (church/parsonage etc. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. An enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. bec not all Consti provisions are self executing. 3. separately presenting a bill of its own on the subject matter. When matter was before the House. WON Art III § 4 (freedom of speech/expression/press) is violated 7. “Give and take” often marks the proceedings of BCC. SC declines going behind enrolled copy of bill.Not all are judicially cognizable. Nor does Consti prohibit filing in Senate of substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of bill fr House so long as action by Senate is withheld pending receipt of House bill. evolve progressive system of taxation) is violated 10. Other govt depts.

This is also short of evidence. one way is to widen the base by withdrawing some exemptions. Also. 5. It is a mere administrative fee. particularly to those w/in reach of higher income grps. NO Art III Sec a is not violated a. b. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. it’s equal to 10% of gross selling price . c. And under Consti. the law would be discriminatory if the only privilege withdrawn is that to the press. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally applicable sales and use tax on sale of religious materials by religious org. The statute applies to a wide range of goods and services. there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) a. regressivity is not a negative standard. It has not been shown that the class subject to tax has been unreasonably narrowed.When freedom of the mind is imperiled by law. Registration is a central feature of the VAT system. Since the title states that the purpose is to expand the VAT system. To insist that PD 1590 in addition to § 103 of NIRC be mentioned in title. After all. 6. not a fee on exercise of privilege or right. 9.000 are exempted. 4. c. There’s no violation of press freedom. would be to insist that title of a bill be a complete index of its content. This could have been caused by stenographer’s limitations or to incoherence that sometimes characterize conversations.Mars Veloso 1C. Notes VAT is levied on sale. Essential attributes of sovereign is read into contracts as a basic postulate of legal order. VAT distributes tax burden to as many goods and svcs as possible. NO. Parties to a contract can’t fetter exercise of taxing power of State. Substantive . Also. NO there is no clear showing that Art III Sec 1 is violated . The press is not immune fr general regulation by the State. barter/exchange of goods and svcs. Also. What is required is that we “evolve” a progressive taxation system. d. Business establishments with annual gross sales of < P500. That was just to prevent amendment by an inconsistent statute. it is freedom that commands respect. not the BCC report. SC is not proper forum for these internal rules. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally applicable sales and use tax on sale of religious materials by religious org. but only because of removal of exemption previously granted to it by law. c. It’s not that it is being singled out. there would be no end to negotiation since each house may seek modifications of the compromise bill. d. This limit does not apply to press alone but to all sales. a. If this were the case. This is a mere allegation. alteration. when property is imperiled. 10. This is standard practice in bill-drafting. debate on wisdom of law should be in Congress. b. Then. grant of franchise for operation of public utility is subject to amendment.as RA 7716 merely expands base of VAT as provided in the orig VAT law. report of BCC is not final and still needed approval of both houses to be valid. That requirement must be construed only to mean bills introduced for the first time in either house. NO Art III Sec 5 is not violated a. lawmakers’ judgment prevails.5 Page No. NO Art III Sec 10 is not violated a. repeal by Congress when common good requires. b. 8. Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. NO there is no violation of Art II Sec 17 a. But that is not the case. Decision Petitions are dismissed. b. This is actually a policy argument. Same reason/ratio under issues on free speech/press. The fixed amount of P1000 is for defraying part of the cost of registration. 11.160 entirely new provision. 7.

The case revolves around the constitutionality of the Republic Act 9337 that increased the Value-Added Tax percentage from 10% to 12%. Dissenting Opinion Puno. The Bill still originated through the House of Representatives. 9337. . This was later consolidated the Bicameral Conference Committee. This gave way to the Expanded Vat Law (E-Vat Law) otherwise known as Republic Act No. the Senate within the said provision only proposed amendments after the House Bills were approved.The increasing budget problems of the government in the form of fiscal problems. September 1. 2. barter. VAT is intended to fall on the immediate buyers and end-consumers. L. Senators Pimentel/ Estrada.Mars Veloso 1C.161 Narvasa. Separate Opinion Cruz. 5. (favorite ratio Ü) 2./ Estrada. WON there was a violation of the Origination Clause as stated in Art VI Sec 24. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Dissenting Opinion Bellosillo. and Governor Garcia. J. or lease of goods or properties and services. 3. Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers/Petron/Caltex. WON a VAT law such as that of RA 9337 is in violation of the Constitutional provision Art VI Sec 28 (1) that requires taxation to be uniform. because the amendment rule refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills in each of the said respective houses before the bill is transmitted to the other house for its concurrence and amendment. ISSUES Procedural 1. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee has strictly complied with the rules of both houses thereby remaining within the jurisdiction conferred upon it by congress. > It is an indirect tax on expenditure. No. Congressman Escudero. . . Dissenting Opinion Davide.RA 9337’s legislative history is as follows: It originated from House Bill 3555 that was approved on the 27th of January 2005 and House Bill 3705 that was approved on the 28th of February 2005 and Senate Bill 1950 that was approved on the 13 th of April 2005. Dissenting Opinion Romero. Separate Opinion Vitug. Substantive 4.Backgrounder on Value-Added Tax (VAT): > VAT is a tax on spending or consumption. 2005 FACTS . 3. In this case there were 4 different petitioners: Abakada Guro Party List. Separate Opinion Regalado. All of them question the constitutionality of RA 9337. revenue generation. The Bill was approved on the 11th of May 2005 by the Senate and 10th of May 2005 by the House of Representatives. and fiscal allocation inadequacy prompted the congress to create a law to address such problems. The Supreme Court decided that it would not rule on the violation of the senate and house rules unless there is a showing that it is in clear violation of a constitutional provision or of the rights of private individuals.5 Page No. The Bicameral Conference Committee inserted and deleted some of the original provisions. It is levied on the sale. Dissenting Opinion ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST V ERMITA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ. exchange. Separate Opinion Padilla. The seller of goods or services may pass on the amount of tax paid to the buyer. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee violated Article VI Sec 26 that states that no amendment would be done after three readings. WON there was undue delegation to the President and Secretary of Finance. / Lacson/ Lim/ Madrigal/ Osmeña. equitable and that the Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. HELD 1. No.

7/30/1987: RP. and both averring that such testimonies would “unduly prejudice” the defendants of civil case no. BENGZON V SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE PADILLA. Enrile called upon the Senate to investigate a possible violation of S5 of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act w/c prohibits any relative of the President by affinity or consanguinity up to the 3rd civil degree. Aquino’s brother-in-law. Inc. WON the Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry is in aid of legislation. No. claiming that the Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose -the Committee claims that the Court cannot enjoin the Congress or its committees from making inquiries in aid of legislation. 0035. because the President is just executing the law and is still working within the standard and policy of the law. While the VAT is currently not yet progressive it still is directed towards a goal of a progressive taxation. under the doctrine of separation of powers (quoting Angara v. etc. he is only executing the law. November 20. Bengzon Law Offices). 5. praying for a temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief. represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). 2. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. among others: -obtaining control over Meralco. Ricardo Lopa –Sen. Benjamin ‘Kokoy’ Romualdez. to intervene in any transaction w/ the government -the matter was referred to the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee) -the Committee subpoenaed the petitioners and Ricardo Lopa to testify on “what they know” about the sale of the 36 Romualdez corporations -at the hearing.0035 -petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition. SEPARATE OPINION PANGANIBAN Sections 1.Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee . filed w/ the Sandiganbayan the civil case no. Comelec) -the Court finds this contention untenable and is of the view that it has the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries and determine the scope and extent of the power of the Blue Ribbon Committee ISSUES 1.162 4. resident foreign and nonresident foreign corporations. owned by Pres.. 1991 FACTS . Benguet Mining Co. PCI Bank. the concealment of the assets subject to the complaint from the PCGG under the veil of corporate identity. Shell. “RP vs.” -The complaint alleges that defendants Benjamin and Juliette Romualdez took advantage of their relationship w/ Defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos to engage in schemes to enrich themselves at the expense of the Plaintiff and the Filipino People. The Secretary of Finance is also not given undue delegation as he is considered as an alter ego of the president thus following the same logic. (corporators. 2) the increase of tax credit against taxes due from nonresident foreign corporations on intercorporate dividends.Mars Veloso 1C. et al. . and 3 of RA 9337 is unconstitutional as 1) the increase of tax rates on domestic. Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify. selling interests to PNI Holdings.. the former invoking the due process clause. etc.5 Page No. 8/2-6/1988: reports circulate of the sale of the Romualdez companies for 5M (far below market value) without PCGG approval to the Ricardo Lopa Group. and 3) the reduction of the allowable deduction for interest expense were not really part of the House version of the E-VAT Law therefore in violation of the origination clause in Article VI Section 24. WON Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch of government. 2.

US. As held in Hutcheson v. US: the possibility that invalid as well as valid legislation might ensue from an inquiry does not limit the power of inquiry US v. as ordained by the Constitution. -A6 S21 provides that “the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. Congress cannot tread on private rights. SEPARATE OPINION GUTIERREZ [dissent] Re: WON the Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry is in aid of legislation. YES Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch of government . that is. US. Kapunan states that the Constitutional right against self-incrimination extends to all proceedings sanctioned by law and in cases in w/c the witness is an accused. would be violative of the principle separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments.Sen. it is not necessary that every question be material to the proposed legislation.It has been held that “a congressional committee’s right to inquire is subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. The doctrine in Cabal v. testify. Re: WON the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due process. Congress may investigate for its own purposes even thought the subjects of the investigation are currently under trial. -the right against self-incrimination may only be invoked when incriminating questions are posed. it may not pry into private affairs if such actions are not in furtherance of a legitimate task of congress—no inquiry is an end in itself. The petition is GRANTED.Mars Veloso 1C.5 Page No..163 3. but rather only requires that such rights be respected. Disposition the petitioners may not be compelled by the Committee to appear. US it was held that Congress’ power of inquiry is broad but limited. HELD 1. NO Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry is not in aid of legislation . including…the Bill of Rights”. Barsky v. 3. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due process.” However. it can’t be assumed that legislative purpose is always justified by public need. Arnault v. Deutch: Congress has the right to secure information in order to determine WON to legislate on a particular subject matter on w/c it is w/in its constitutional powers to act. US v. and produce evidence before it because such inquiries would not be in aid of legislation and if pursued. Orman: where the information sought concerns what Congress can legislate. any further investigation by Congress would only serve to complicate matters and produce conflicting opinions—as held in Baremblatt v. As held in Jean L. a legitimate legislative purpose must be presumed. -the requirement that an inquiry be “in aid of legislation” is easier to establish here where Congress’ legislative field is unlimited unlike in the US. but the witness may not refuse .Since the issue had been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan. the inquiry must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power vested in the Committee by the Constitution. Leon Nazareno et al. but directly related to the subject of the inquiry. -the legislative purpose is distinctly different from the judicial purpose. it is expressly granted by A6 S21. -the power of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent and needs no textual grant—even so. In Watkins v. such a restriction does not call for the complete prohibition of such investigations where a violation of a basic right is claimed. Congress cannot inquire into matters w/c are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. YES the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due process . 2. Also. Enrile’s inquiry merely intended to find out WON Ricardo Lopa had any part in the alleged sale of the Romualdez corporations—there was no intended legislation as required by A6 S21 of the constitution.

and for other purposes. COURAGE. In the case at bar. hence the allegation of violation of rights is premature.Consti Provisions allegedly violated: Art.O. adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in legislative inquiries in aid of legislation under the Constitution. 46433 issued Sept. 7. the Executive Dept. Thereafter. G. . however. their inability to attend due to lack of appropriate clearance from the Pres. 169667 Alternative Law Groups (ALG) G. ISSUES Primary Issue 1. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. and cannot refuse taking the witness stand outright. prayed for dismissal of petitions for lack of merit. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in the Congress Secondary Issues 2. 28.O. Drilon. filed requests for postponement of hearings for varying reasons such as existence of urgent operational matters.The respective officials of the Executive Dept. 169834 PDP-Laban E. 28. 21. III Sec. II Sec. 169777 Senate of the Phils. did not accede to their requests because the requests were sent belatedly and that preparations and arrangements have already been completed. in this case. 4. etc. pursuant to E. enforcing.Between Sept.” . WON E. Arnault v. Arroyo issued E. CODAL G. Pres. Art. more time to prepare a more comprehensive report.On Sept. of 2005 to Feb. and observing the assailed order. 169659 BAYANMUNA. they may only invoke the right against self-incrimination only when such a question is posed. no.R. 28.O. officials subject to Senate investigations claimed that they were not allowed to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings without consent (written approval) from the President.R. 464. 2005. VI Sec.O. several cases were filed challenging E. 464 which took effect immediately. Respondent Executive Secretary Ermita et al. which had not been granted unto them. Daugherty: it is not necessary that the resolution ordering an investigation …expressly state that the object of the inquiry is to obtain data in aid of proposed legislation Re: WON the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due process.this is a consolidation of various petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of E. and It has no right to assume the contrary..Mars Veloso 1C. Legal standing of petitioners: G. Art.O. CRUZ [dissent] Re: WON the Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry is in aid of legislation. 16 33 . Citing E. Art. including the AFP and PNP for them to appear in public hearings on inquiries concerning mainly: (A) The alleged overpricing in the NorthRail Project (B) the Wire-Tapping activity (C) the Fertilizer scam (D) the Venable contract . SENATE V ERMITA CARPIO-MORALES. XI Sec 1.164 to take the witness stand completely.O. Sen. as ordinary witnesses. 464. 169660 Francisco Chavez G. 464 “Ensuring observance of the principle of separation of powers. FACTS . 464 and praying for the issuance of a TRO enjoining respondents from implementing. 2006. 1.R. 22. Nazareno: the Court is bound to presume that an action of a legislative body is w/ legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed.5 Page No. -the petitioners are not facing criminal charges. various Senate Investigation Committees issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Dept. 2005 . Justiciability of the case: a.O. Art. the possible violation of RA 3019 in the disposition of the Romualdez corporations.R.. XIII Sec. -an inquiry into the expenditure of all public money. is an indispensable duty of the legislature Mcgrain v. no incriminating questions had been asked.R.

121246 Integrated Bar of the Phils. It does not provide precise and certain reasons for the claim.R. 464 Provides that once the head of office determines that a certain info. to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence. is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is . By mere expedient of invoking provisions of E.O. the Pres.5 Page No. 464 Its requirement to secure presidential consent.165 G. Resort to any means by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed to be valid. VI Sec. on what is covered by the executive privilege. 464. It may be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the Pres. and such presumptive authorization is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. VI Sec. 1 of E.Mars Veloso 1C.O. considers requested information privileged. . 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. (IBP) b. Due to the fact that executive privilege is of extraordinary power. In so far as it does not assert but merely implies the claim of executive privilege. It allows the Pres. The enumeration is broad. Such power must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. 2 (b) of E.O. only to the express pronouncement of the Pres.O. such determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress.Sec. .21 This is the power of the Legislature to make investigations and exact testimony that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively. that it is allowing the appearance of such official. may not authorize its subordinates to exercise it.Sec.O.O.Although the executive Dept. It gives the Congress the power to compel the appearance of executive officials to comply with its demands for information. 22 of art VI) makes it valid on its face.Sec. Ratio It is impermissible to allow the executive branch to withhold information sought by the Congress in aid of legislation. 464 Requires all public officials enumerated in section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. limited only to executive dept. 464 allows the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without the need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege. heads and to appearances in the question hour (because of its specific reference to sec. It is invalid per se. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. enjoys the power of executive privilege. this provision was intended to be distinguished from inquiries in aid of legislation. in that attendance here is merely discretionary on the part of the department heads.Inquiry in Art.O.The Power of Inquiry (in aid of legislation) Art. without it asserting a right to do so. the power of Congress is frustrated.O. 22 (question hour) As determined from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. . .Sec. 4. . 3 of E. 464 coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. HELD Primary Issue 1. and without stating reasons therefor. It does not purport to be conclusive on the other branches of government. 2 (a) of E. the courts and the public. Mere invocation of E. . is privileged. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Congress nonetheless has the right to know why the executive dept.O. E. . Actual Case or Controversy 3. WON E. WON respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E. Reasoning Executive Privilege -The power of the President and other high-level executive branch officers to withhold certain types of information of a sensitive character from Congress. 464 It merely provides guidelines binding only on the heads of office mentioned in section 2(b).

by virtue of their fundamental right for intelligent public decision-making and sound legislation is the proper party to assail an executive order which allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information crucial to law-making. is ripe for adjudication. therefore. Although E.O.The Senate. Due process requires that the people should have been apprised of the issuance of E. Yes.O. as members of the Senate. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. ALG (invoking right to info. Actual case or controversy (was not taken up by the Court) . April 22. 464 before it was implemented. Francisco that when a proceeding involves assertion of a public right. PDP-Laban (claiming standing due to the transcendental importance of issue) .166 justified under the circumstances of each case.O.O. it has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern therefore it is not exempt from the need of publication. Rule 2: To be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance there must be a showing of: 1. 464.The 1990 budget consisted of P98. 4. including its individual members. 1991 FACTS . It would be sheer abandonment of duty if the Court would refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of E. Regarding Legal Standing of petitioners: Rule 1: Legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative.4B in automatic appropriation (86. COURAGE.5B. The Senate of the Philippines . CODAL) . 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch. a. . the mere fact that the person filing is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.O.The implementation of E. 464 are declared void while sections 1 and 2(a) are VALID. a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition 3. question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in . 464 has resulted in the officials excusing themselves from attending the Senate hearings. Yes. IBP. Decision Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. on matters of public concern) . The Court held in Francisco v.When suing as a citizen.A challenged order which has already produced results consequent to its implementation and where such results are the subject of questions of constitutionality.3 from the General Appropriations Act or a total of P233. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws. Congressional investigations in aid of legislation are presumed to be a matter of public concern. gives PDP-Laban no standing. Secondary Issues 2. only P27B was allotted for DECS. It has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of such a controversy. 3.Mars Veloso 1C.There being no public funds involved and there being parties with more direct and specific interest in the controversy (the Senate and BayanMuna). lack of a party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions raised. b.5 Page No. it follows that any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations deprives the people of information. Party List (BayanMuna. the character of the funds (public)/assets involved 2. Petitioners.8 going to debt service) and P155.The party-list representatives have standing. severely frustrating its power of inquiry. Chavez. the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws must be direct and personal. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E. it is sufficient that a claim is made that E. powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. GUINGONA V CARAGUE GANCAYCO.O.

. 2.They further contend that the Presidential Decrees are no longer operative since they became functus oficio after President Marcos was ousted. or to enter into arrangements that could lighten our outstanding debt burden debt-to-equity. it enables the Government to take advantage of a favorable turn of market conditions by redeeming high interest securities and borrowing at lower rates. 29 (1).Moreover. revenue or tariff bills. 5(5). debt-to-debt or other such schemes. only to worsen our debt service-to-total expenditure ratio in the budget due to penalties and/or demand for immediatepayment even before due dates. WON appropriation of P86. They assert that there must be definiteness. it shall be void. but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.7B for education in violation of Sec. which are usually made one year in advance. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. In the meantime. for example. 7 of the Civil Code. WON there was undue delegation of legislative power by automatic appropriation. Article VI of the Constitutional. operating on no laws therefore. . And as provided by Art. . . .SolGen argues. 24. which by the time this comes. they contend that assuming arguendo that the said decrees did not expire with the ouster of Marcos. WON the Presidential Decrees are still operative. 24. bills authorizing increase of the public debt. Absent an automatic appropriation clause. Article XIV of the Constitution. Further. Second. . All appropriation. after adoption of the 1987 Constitution.Petitioners allege that the allotted budget runs contrary to Sec. may no longer be responsive to the intended conditions which in the meantime may have already drastically changed.5 Page No. the claim that payment of the loans and indebtedness is conditioned upon the continuance of the person of President Marcos and his legislative power goes against the intent and purpose of the law. 3. otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt service. the Philippine Government has to await and depend upon Congressional action. in layman's parlance. With a new congress replacing the one manlegislature.Mars Veloso 1C. debt-to-asset. . 29(1). 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. and if they are. First. Article VI of the Constitution which stated that: Sec. The purpose is foreseen to subsist with or without the person of Marcos. XIV of the Constitution. The annual debt service estimates. would be unenforceable. said decrees were inconsistent with Sec. then a law must be passed by Congress to authorize said automatic appropriation.8B for debt service as compared to its appropriation of P27. 5(5)." ISSUES 1. when statutes run contrary to the Constitution. Current appropriation. . and 1967. delayed payments and arrearages may have supervened. new legislation regarding appropriation should be passed. are based on a mathematical set or matrix or. the automatic appropriation obviates the serious difficulties in debt servicing arising from any deviation from what has been previously programmed. `basket' of foreign exchange and interest rate assumption's which may significantly differ from actual rates not even in proportion to changes on the basis of the assumptions. 117. that automatic appropriation provides flexibility: ". or to shift from short-term to long-term instruments. on the other hand. whereby bills have to be approved by the President. Art.167 the said budget as provided for by Presidential Decrees 81. bills of local application. certainty and exactness in an appropriation. The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment. also. petitioners state said decrees violate Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides as follows Sec.Clearly. do they violate Sec.

168 HELD 1. 1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal. or on the bonds. PADILLA [dissent] . proclamations. No. executive orders.Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid. incurred by the previous administration. they are still operative. debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by virtue of the law. taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans. The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the country. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury. The Court disagrees that Congress’ hands are hamstrung by the provision provided. interest.Mars Veloso 1C. letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended.8B. 3. The Presidential Decrees do not satisfy this requirement. The transitory provision provided in Sec. repealed or revoked.A. interest.This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized. 1177 and P. Thus. as amended. . The enormous national debt. decrees. necessitated by the very nature of the problem being addressed. No. 3. As to the ponencia’s reference to “legislative parameters provided by law”. Yes. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. Laws should be construed in light of current laws and not those made by a one-man legislative branch. There are other imperatives of national interest that it must attend to. Cruz says no such regulatory boundaries exist. taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans. repealed or revoked. 4860. . however.He agrees with Cruz but furthers the argument by saying that Sec. is the highest in all department budgets thereby complying with the mandate of having the highest priority as stated above.D. No. the amount allotted to education. if Congress allotted more for debt service such an appropriation cannot be considered by this Court as unconstitutional. SEPARATE OPINION CRUZ [dissent] He sees that an essential requirement for valid appropriation is that the sum authorized for release should be determinate or determinable. The mandate is to pay only the principal. . . 2. 27. The legislative intention in R.5 Page No. the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees. Section 31 of P. Not only for the sake of honor but because the national economy is itself at stake. still needs to be paid. credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefore as the need arises. No. 29(1)Article VI implies that a law enacted by Congress (and approved by the President) appropriating a particular sum or sums must be made before payment from the Treasury can be made.Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. credits or indebtedness. as and when they shall become due. Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or are otherwise amended.D. Equally fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated. Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that: All existing laws.

as the policydetermining body of the Government.In G." .” the special provision in Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses. as this is a matter of policy that. On the same day. .R. . pertains to the legislative department. (c) Ombudsman. 1993. Today it is Congress that should determine and approve the proper appropriations for debt servicing. and (c) the veto of the President of the Special Provision of Article 48 of the GAA of 1994 .9 B allocated for the DECS.In G. WON the act of Congress giving debt service and not education36 as the highest priority in the allocation of budget unconstitutional 4. No.169 . NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR.On December 30. the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994). and declared the same to have become Republic Act No. to override the vetoes) in effect saying that they do not have the requisite legal standing to bring the suits.Mars Veloso 1C. .R. the DPWH. since said power in an appropriation act is in implementation of a law 3. (d) Commission on Human Rights. he claimed that the remedy of the Senators in the other petitions is political (i. (b) Commission on Audit (COA).House Bill No. the General Appropriation Act (GAA) of 1994. Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) et al. 113105. the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message. 113174. WON the petitioners have legal standing35 Substantive 2. the Court invited former Chief Justice Enrique M. No. sued as taxpayers. 1994 FACTS . 1993. Senators Romulo and Tañada contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).R. No. 10900. AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" While the Solicitor General did not question the locus standi of petitioners in G.R. the President signed the bill into law. Senators Romulo and Tañada together with the Freedom from Debt Coalition. and (2) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service. 36 Article XIV Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution states that: "The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment.e. (CHR). Fernando and former Associate Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae. (b) Article 48 on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount appropriated under said Article 48 in excess of the P37. No. in his opinion. WON the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense 35 Entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE. August 19. 113105. PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION V ENRIQUEZ QUIASON. a non-stock domestic corporation. was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17..Besides. 113888. specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions. (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units 34 (CAFGU's) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC's). . . 16 Senators question: (1) the constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court.R. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. No. 113105 ISSUES Procedural 1. WON the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) or “pork barrels” is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power. 7663 34. G. 113766. No step was taken in either House of Congress to override the vetoes. and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU's.In G. these decrees issued by President Marcos relative to debt service were tailored for the periods covered by said decrees. challenging the constitutionality of the Presidential veto of the special provision in the appropriations for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefor.In G.5 Page No. and the National Housing Authority (NHA). prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as unconstitutional and void: (a) Article 41 on the Countrywide Development Fund or “pork barrels.R. No.In view of the importance and novelty of most of the issues raised in the four petitions.

5 Page No. the President.” . Reasoning: Ponencia relied on precedent (Gonzales v. In short. 113105 G. While it is true that under Section 5(5). however. No. The members only determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings in the allotments for their operating expenses but it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives who shall approve the realignment. revenue. and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may. Miller. Petitioners. Executive function under the CDF involves implementation of the priority projects specified in the law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be. Substantive 2. under Article 48 of the GAA of 1994. No. v. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Carague. or tariff bill. The constitutional provision which directs the State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education is merely directory. 113174 ISSUE WON veto of the special provision of Article 48 of the GAA of 1994 in the appropriation for debt service without vetoing the entire P86. hence constitutional 3. The CDF is not an encroachment by the legislature on executive power. & Tel. it again relied on US cases as secondary sources (Coleman v. The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify projects to be implemented by the President. Hence. Article XIV of the Constitution.R. purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries…" It was Congress itself that determined the purposes for the appropriation. It is not unconstitutional. if the proposed projects qualify for funding under the CDF. Reasoning: It relied on precedence. Macaraig) and a US case (United States v. Jr. Then in forming the ratio decidendi. G. the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 4. as it is contrary to Article VI Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution37 HELD Procedural 1. it is the President who shall implement them. Schlesinger) as well as the opinion of Justice Fernando as Amicus Curiae. Holtzman v. 3. It simply exercises its power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. No. the Speaker of the House of Representatives. 4. simply put: WON the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution38 HELD 37 "No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations. No.R. A member of Congress has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or any other act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress. the President of the Senate. be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.Mars Veloso 1C. Congress’ act is not unconstitutional. as members of Congress have locus standi Substantive 2. but veto shall mot affect the item or items to which he does not object. American Tel. the proposals and identifications made by the members of Congress are merely recommendatory. The power of appropriation lodged in Congress carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. Co) as secondary source to recognize legal standing. by law. Decision Procedural 1. No.3 B for said purpose is unconstitutional Or. Reasoning: The CDF is explicit that it shall be used "for infrastructure. Congress is mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education” it does not thereby follow that Congress is deprived of its power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. Guingona.170 category is unconstitutional." 38 Article VI Section 27(2) of the 1987 Constitution states that: “The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation.

WON the veto of special provisions on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment is unconstitutional 5. Citing Gonzales: As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. Hence the item veto of said provisions is void. (Notice how the ratio is applied in the ruling or dispositive) 40 39 Also included in the category of “inappropriate provisions” which are intended to amend our laws. for whatever reason. No. or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation. Edwards: When the legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill. because clearly these laws have no place in an appropriations bill. No. cannot be vetoed separately. The President vetoed the entire paragraph 1 of the Special Provision of the item on debt service. Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President.171 Any provision which does not relate to any particular item. WON the veto of the provision on purchase of medicines by AFP is unconstitutional 4. Ombudsman. COA. Edwards to support its ratio. Harvard Law Review) 41 Note that this ratio is also applied in issue [6] aside from the ratio which I formulated there. “Again we state: a provision in an appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. it used this case as precedent. Jr. is considered "an inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. 113766 G.R. is considered “an inappropriate provision”39 which can be vetoed separately from an item. WON veto of the President setting conditions or guidelines in the appropriations for the Supreme Court. 113888 ISSUES 1. 113174 G. No. and therefore unconstitutional. DPWH and CHR is unconstitutional HELD [1] to [5] Any provision which does not relate to any particular item. therefore unconstitutional (Issue on Impoundment40) 7. Reasoning: The issue. this is an “inappropriate provision” which can be vetoed separately. including the provisos that the appropriation authorized in said item "shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" and that "in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators. Hence." it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item. being appropriate provisions since they germane to and have a direct connection with the item on debt service. WON the veto for revolving funds of State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s) is unconstitutional 2. Citing Henry v. Decision Yes. Henry v. Hence the reasoning for the ratio is the same as well. WON the veto of the provision in the appropriation for the Department of Public Works and Highways on 70% (administrative) / 30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance is unconstitutional 3. to spend funds made available by Congress. or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation.” Hence. Macaraig. WON the President’s directive that the implementation of the Special Provision to the item on the CAFGU's shall be subject to prior Presidential approval is tantamount to an administrative embargo of the congressional will to implement the Constitution's command to dissolve the CAFGU's. . G. according to the ponencia is a mere rehash of the one put to rest in Gonzales v.Mars Veloso 1C.5 Page No. such provisions must be treated as 'items' for purposes of the Governor's (President’s) item veto power over general appropriation bills. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type (Notes: Impoundment of Funds.R. or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation. WON the veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds is unconstitutional 6. This can be implied from. is considered “an inappropriate provision” which can be vetoed separately from an item41 Reasoning: Same ratio decidendi from the issue in the previous section is applied in the 5 issues in this section. It also cited another case.R. This is the first case before this Court where the power of the President to impound is put in issue." The said provisos.

it specifies how the said item shall be expended . No. Yale Law Journal "No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations. the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Georgetown Law Journal. and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may. the President of the Senate. 6.I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Camilo D. 5.R.172 6. Therefore. Macaraig . 2 of the item of appropriation for the DPWH. and on the other hand. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP. be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. the Speaker of the House of Representatives. and [2] G. 113888 only insofar as it prays for the annulment of the veto of: (a) the 2nd paragraph of Special Provision No. the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item. The provision in an appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws. There was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions. By setting guidelines or conditions in his veto. which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5)43 and 29(1)44 of the Article VI of the Constitution. Special Provisions Nos. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Reasoning: The ponencia simply cited notes from journals42 in discussing the issue of Impoundment to support his reasoning in the present case. Yes. No. Notes Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment and Congressional Power. Decision 1. being "inappropriate" provisions. Dispositive Petitions DISMISSED. this is an “inappropriate provision” which can be vetoed separately. 1 Dissent SEPARATE OPINION PADILLA [concur and dissent] . Nos. Thus veto is not unconstitutional.R. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. Notes: Presidential Impoundment Constitutional Theories and Political Realities. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special provision on debt service specifying that the fund therein appropriated "shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" prohibiting the use of the said funds "to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators". 7. the President is simply exercising his constitutional duty to implement the laws faithfully. The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public funds authorized by Congress is simply an exercise by the President of his constitutional duty to see that laws are faithfully executed. and (b) Special Provision No. 7. Harvard Law Review. however.Mars Veloso 1C.70% by administrative and 30% by contract. Yes. the President. by law. 43 42 Notes: Impoundment of Funds. No. Voting: 14 Concur. not an item and therefore outside the veto power of the Executive. 4. 2.An inappropriate provision is still as provision. Impliedly. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate substantive bill. The Special Provision. Quiason except in so far as it re-affirms the Court's decision in Gonzalez v." 44 "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law" . No. 3.5 Page No. No. except with respect with respect to [1] G. 12 on the purchase of medicines by the AFP which is GRANTED. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed. No.

Petition for prohibition/mandamus was filed .eliminated/decreased items included in the proposed Budget of the President . 55 was unconstitutional . I am afraid.an item submitted by the President which has been reduced by Congress cannot be restored/increased. to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. by law.December 29.I cannot debate the fact that the members of Congress. it is not possible to exercise the item veto power but should veto the whole bill as well 3) The item veto power does not carry with it the power to strike . 16 of the Appropriations Act of 1990 .The respondents in this case are member of the Cabinet who are sued in their official capacity for the implementation of the General Appropriations Act of 1989 .February 2. more than the President and his colleagues. the "use of savings" is in Section 12. 6.5 Page No.similar to Sec. November 19. "use of savings" and the vetoed provision are both in Sec.173 VITUG [concur] . 1988 .The reason for the veto: . 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Act except that this was lumped together with the use of savings . 1990 .The President vetoed 7 special provisions and Sec.being member and ex-officio members of the Finance Committee . 1989 . 55 . the President and the other abovementioned officials cannot augment any item and appropriation from their savings even if special circumstances like calamity .The Senate questioned the constitutionality of the Presidential veto of special and general provisions.substantial taxpaers whose vital interests might be affected . particularly Sec. would have the best feel on the needs of their own respective constituents. Sec 25(5) .April 11. apart from Section 55 whereas in the 1990 \Appropriations Act. to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be minded. the Senate President. An item is deemed disapproved if there is no corresponding appropriation in the Act. Speaker of the House of Representatives.No restraining order was implemented by the Supreme Court . 55 . . Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Heads of Con-Coms to augment any item in the General Appropriations law . GONZALES V MACARAIG MELENCIO-HERRERA. 1990 FACTS . 17. It is not objectionable for Congress.The House of Representatives passed HB 19186 (GA Bill for 1989) . 1989 . however.December 16.The petitioners claim they have locus standi on the ground of: .The basic difference between both provisions is that in the 1989 Appropriations Act.Senate expressed through Senate Resolution No.Mars Veloso 1C.assailed the legality of veto of Sec. 1989.Sec. would be constitutionally impermissible.Nullifies the constitutional and statutory authroity of the President.September 7.presented to President for approval .Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Supplementary Petition which raised the same issue as the original petition (questioning the presidential veto) . 1988 . to give that authority.Jan.Violates Art.The vetoed provisions include: .Petitioners' arguments: 1) The president's line veto power regarding the appropriations bill is limited to item/s and does not cover provisions and therefore exceeded her authority (Sections 55 and 16 are provisions) 2) When the president objects to provisions of an appropriation bill. 55 of the Appropriations Act of 1989 . 16 . 55 of the General Appropriations Bill for 1989 .If allowed.The bill was signed into law (became RA 6688) .Court resolved to give due course to the petition .enjoined the implementation of RA 6688 .Sec. 381 that the veto of Sec.

29.The Court held that even if there was an elimination of any reference to the veto provision. Sec 11(2) .1987 Constitution . . 6. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. the extent of the President's veto power as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill is unconstitutional and without effect HELD 1. 2) Sec. Alba case declared that the Supreme Court has the duty to declare acts of a government branch void if beyond that branch's powers b) Judicial arbitration needed because the petitioners stress the imperative need for definitive ruling by the Court c) The petitioners have locus standi because the suit is a taxpayer's suit.1973 Constitution . 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill and its counterpart Sec.The veto was more expansive since it included provisions and items in revenue and tariff bills . . revenue or tariff bill. WON the issue is justiciable 2. details. The issue is justiciable.rejected the veto in an Appropriations Bill 2. 53 is a rider which is extraneous to the Appropriations Act and should merit a veto.Veto power of the President Paragraph 1 . Sec.the item-veto of line-vbeto allows a veto over a particular item in an appropriations. The Sanidad ruling (the Court may or may not entertain a taxpayer's suit) and the Tolentino v. 27 . The Demetria v. 44 and 45 of PD 1177 as amended by RA 6670) 4) The President is empowered to veto provisions of other distinct and severable parts.174 out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation already (violative of separation of powers) 4) Power of augmentation in Article 6.A restrictive interpretation as espoused by the petitioners disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of . ISSUES 1. Art. 25(5) is provided by law so Congress has prerogative to impose restrictions in the exercise of that power . The president may not veto less than all of an item (no authority to veto part of an item and approve the remaining portion of that item).SolGen's arguments: 1) The issue is a political question and the petitioners have a political remedy which is to override the veto.An item in a bill relates to the particulars. i) Bengzon v. 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill and its counterpart Sec. NO the veto by the President of Sec. a) There is an actual case or justiciable controversy between the Senate and the Executive that the Supreme Court may take cognizance of.Originally referred to veto of items of appropriations bills in the Organic Act of Aug. .more compact version and refers to the Prime Minister as the only official who has the power .1935 Constitution. distinct and severable parts of the bill whereas a provision is of a more general nature. 3) The power of the president to augment items in appropriations for the executive branches already provided for in Budget Law (specifically Sec.Art. not political. This is also not the first time that the veto power was discussed. Valencia . 1916 .verbatim reproduction of 1973 provision except that a different public official (the President) was now involved and eliminated the reference to a veto of a provision . Secretary of Justice . 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill is constitutional *The extent of item veto power still includes the vetoing of provisions. .general veto power of the President and if exercised would veto the entire bill Paragraph 2 . ii) Bolinao Electronics v.Mars Veloso 1C. 6 Sec. WON the veto by the President of Sec.5 Page No.Court upheld the veto but reversed by the US Supreme Court because of the Appropriations Bill was not involved. COMELEC ruling (members of the Senate have personality when a Constitutional issue is raised) were used.

The GA Bill is one of primary and specific aim to make appropriation of money from the public treasury.Secs. Secs. .The power to augment lies dormant until authorized by law.5 Page No. . * Secs.These rules are settled in the sense that Congress can impose conditions on expenditure of funds and that the Executive cannot veto a condition of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself to stand.Neither shows the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures.The exercise of veto power does not partake of a legislative power as stated in the Bengzon case: . Items reduced or disapproved by Congress are not on the enrolled bill and can only be detected when compared with the original budgetary submittals of the President. 25(2). 55 and 16 are inappropriately called provisions. a) no relation to a particular or distinctive requirement. 6. . .The legislature has the power to enact laws while the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the legislature. 55 and 16 are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the veto power. .The Courts indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same way that they presume constitutionality of an act passed by the Legislature. . It is a nonappropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure. 55 and 16 do not fit this requirement. 25(5)).175 the bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. . a provision should relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein. veto powers do not have the power to strike them out.Even if assuming that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto.The special power of augmentation from savings is merely incorporated in the GA Bill.But for the rule to apply. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.The President vetoed Sections 55 and 16 because they nullified the authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of government to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations (with reference to Art. . The power of augmentation from savings is not considered a specific appropriation of money.A provision does not relate to the entire bill. .Petitioners argue that Congress is free to impose conditions in an Appropriations Bill and where conditions are attached.Secs. Sec. . c) vetoed sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Sec.Actually general law measures more appropriate for substantive and therefore separate legislation. b) disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found in the Bill. Secs. 55 and 16 are held to be inappropriate conditions. 16 are not provisions in the budgetary sense. . restrictions should be in the real sense of the term. . Restrictions should exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. The test is appropriateness. 55 and 16 prohibit this augmentation and impair the constitutional and statutory authority of the President in the interest of expediency and efficiency. They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill.Separation of powers is endangered in no way.Mars Veloso 1C. Sec.The President finds its authority in the Constitution. *Sections 55 and 16 are inappropriate conditions and are therefore susceptible to a veto. * The power of augmentation and the validity of the veto . . .The constitution allowed the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of a government branch so as to afford considerable flexibility in the use of public funds. . 55 and Sec. . 6.Based on Art. . .

. ISSUES 1. Also seeking the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or TRO to enjoin implementation of the questioned provision. which is the interim and preparatory body tasked to administer the affairs of government in the Cordilleras.Mars Veloso 1C. can unilaterally amend/repeal E. or non-appropriaton items which relate specifically to appropriation items. 220 to be still in force and effect. . However. . But the Court shall pass upon the constitutional issues. WON the Republic should be ordered to honor its commitments as spelled out in EO 220. 1989. -Pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. the 2000 GAA has long been implemented. 270 extending the implementation of the winding up of operations of the CAR.O. However. No. WON the Philippine Government. 220 on July 15. The amounts herein appropriated shall be used to wind up the activities and operations of the CAR.Section 15.If the legislature does believe that the exercise of the veto powers by the executive were unconstitutional. ATITIW V ZAMORA TINGA. 220 3. 2000: President Estrada issued E. . Use of Fund.This is a petition for prohibition. through Congress. WON the assailed Special Provisions in RA 8760 is a rider and as such is unconstitutional 2. and Section 18.Brief historical account of the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR): . -February 15. These dialogues focused on the establishment of an autonomous government in the Cordilleras. NO the assailed Special Provisions in RA 8760 is not a rider TF it is constitutional a. September 30. Article X mandates the congressional enactment of the organic acts for each of the autonomous regions. Article X of the 1987 Constitution ordains the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras. creating the CAR. seeking the declaration of nullity of paragraph 1 of the Special Provisions of RA 8760 (General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2000. But Congress made no attempt to do so.176 . including the payment of separation and retirement benefits of all affected officials and employees…” -July 20.O. 2005 FACTS .O. HELD 1. No.5 Page No. the issuance is already moot and academic. The Court also declared E. No. 2 provisions of the Constitution prohibit them: Art VI: Sec 25(2) “No provisions or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein…” and Sec 26(1) “Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be embraced in the title thereof” .The rule should not be construed so strictly as to tie the hands of Congress: it simply requires that all the provisions are either appropriation items. . and declaratory relief as taxpayers. a veto may be overriden by the votes of 2/3 of the members of Congress. The Court ruled that Ifugao alone cannot validly constitute the CAR and upheld the disapproval of the Organic Act. A plebiscite was held where the people of the Cordilleras could ratify the Organic Act.To sanction this practice would withhold the power from the Executive and other officials and put in jeopardy the exercise of that power. mandamus. the creation of an autonomous region was overwhelmingly rejected in all of the Cordilleras except for the Ifugao province. A rider is a provisions which is alien to or not germane to the subject of the bill in which it is incorporated. on October 23. 2000: President Estrada signed into law the 2000 GAA which includes the assailed Special Provisions: “1. No. Congress enacted RA 6766 (An Act Providing for an Organic Act for for the Cordillera Autonomous Region). 1987.President Aquino initiated a series of peace talks to deal with insurgency in the Cordilleras.O. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.President Aquino promulgated E.

. . abrogate. Board of canvassers proclaims A as winner.15 February 1994: by a 6-3 vote (the six Congressmen-members as against the three Justices-members). 1995 REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL FACTS . destroy completely. 2) Unambiguous – when its application is apparent on the face of the bill and needs no reference to details/souces outside the bill. The CAR created through EO 220 is not the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution.In his memorandum cum addendum. . 2. the 2000 GAA is not the place for amending or repealing a standing law. unambiguous. (AS) & Joker P. July 14.000 pages of documentary evidence. There is no such thing as an irrepealable law." .However. Ratio when a provision is particular. HRET resolved not to . Reception of evidence followed. 3) Appropriate – when its subject does not necessarily have to be treated in a separate legislation. the CAR was not abolished. albeit dormant. .11 May 1992: Augusto L. “mere photocopies and not certified or authenticated by comparison with the original documents or identification by any witness…. HRET ordered him to show cause why his protest should not be dismissed. Implementation of EO 220 is an executive prerogative while the sourcing of funds to support CAR’s activities is legislative. Absent grave abuse of discretion. rather. 3: Except for the contention that the assailed paragraph is a rider.creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function . break up by discharging or reassigning personnel. AS changes his original posture (revision and recount of ballots) to what he calls a “truly innovative and NON-TRADITIONAL process" — the PRECINCT-LEVEL DOCUMENT-BASED EVIDENCES. Justice Gancayco’s Report and Recommendation confirm irregularities and anomalies engineered by some HRET officials and personnel: Arroyo votes were consistently reduced … while Syjuco was always constant…” . 2. It has only been deactivated. Petitioners allege: that instead of providing a budget for the CAR. Contention that Congress can’t unilaterally amend or repeal EO 220: Rejected. AS files an election protest before HRET. office continues to exist. seeking revision and recounting of ballots in 75% of the precincts.The assailed provision does not constitute a rider: it passes the above test. c. His grounds: alleged irregularities/anomalies in the tabulation and entries of votes & massive fraud. . Jr.Petition for review of the decision of the HRET . EO 220 has not established an autonomous regional government.Abolish – to do away with. .office created by the legislature is wholly within the power of that body. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. annul. it had the effect of abolishing the CAR since a special law created the CAR.By reason of the new allegations and substantial amendments (which broaden the scope of his protest. the rest of the arguments look into the wisdom and efficacy of said provisions. and it may abolish the office if it sees fit. AS submits over 200. it shall not be considered to be a rider b.177 . Serious irregularities found. change his theory of the case or introduce additional causes of action in violation of Rule 28 Revised Rules of the Tribunal). and appropriate to the appropriations bill to which it belongs. the Court cannot correct the acts of the Executive or Congress. dismissed by HRET. Syjuco. JA submits certified true copies of the Revision Reports and election returns.Mars Veloso 1C. . Political questions Still 1.Revision completed.HRET undertakes revision of ballots. . the Congress has he power to do so. It can be considered a regional coordinating agency of the National Government. Arroyo (JA) ran for congressman for the lone district of Makati.But even if the limitation of the CAR’s budget had the effect of abolishing certain offices. it has only created an administrative region.5 Page No.Test: It must be 1) Particular – if it relates specifically to a distinct item of appropriation. ARROYO V HOUSE OF TRIBUNAL FRANCISCO.Deactivate – render inactive. . JA files counter-protest questioning residence qualification of AS. office ceases to exist.

& declaring AS as the duly elected congressman. it is the duty of the court to sustain an election authorized by law if it has been so conducted as to give a free and fair expression of the popular will. Said decision also refers the case to COMELEC & the Office of the special Prosecutor for appropriate actions. that the votes must be shown to have been affected or vitiated by such fraud.JA moved to dismiss the protest but to no avail. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. recourse for a reconsideration of its . and presence of at least one (1) Justice-member is required to constitute a valid quorum).Elections should never be held void unless they are clearly illegal. even though the circumstances may be such as to subject the officers to punishment. declared that 10. This is clearly substantial amendment of the election protest expressly proscribed by Rule 28 of the HRET internal rules. ISSUES 1. Impropriety of private respondent's belated shift of theory was sensed by majority members of HRET but they still resolved not to dismiss the protest…this a clear indication of grave abuse of discretion. The "precinct level document based anomalies/evidence" theory . under Rule 16 of the HRET Rules. . WON Syjuco should be cited for indirect contempt HELD 1.Photocopies violate the best evidence rule: no evidence shall be received which is merely substitutionary in its nature so long as the original evidence can be had. . JA files the present case before SC.178 dismiss the protest. never offered in evidence by either of the parties. No hearings were conducted thereafter. and thereafter to decide the case on the merits. the misconduct of election officers or irregularities on their part will not justify rejecting the whole vote of a precinct (as was done in this case) where it does not appear that the result was affected thereby. YES HRET committed grave abuse of discretion a. c. A party is bound by the theory he adopts and by the cause of action he stands on and cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to repudiate his theory and cause of action and adopt another and seek to re-litigate the matter anew either in the same forum or on appeal. & ii. <principle of estoppel> b. Corollarily. . rendering judgment on the kind of evidence before it and the manner in which the evidence was procured. Certain vital election documents (such as certified xerox copy of the number of registered voters per precinct and photocopies of statements of votes) were procured at the sole instance of the ponente of the majority decision.25 January 1995: HRET.Majority congressmen-members of the Tribunal by themselves without the participation of any of the three (3) remaining Justicesmembers.This innovative theory broadened the scope of the election protest beyond what AS originally sought. Absent fraud. 32 These omissions are not decisive since actual voting and election by registered voters had taken place in the questioned precincts. BUT partiality of the majority of the members of the Electoral Tribunal having been shown.5 Page No.484 of the contested signature are fake.Substantial amendments to the protest maybe allowed only within the same period for the filing of the election protest 15 which. proceeding to decide the protest based on AS’ “precinct level document based anomalies/evidence" theory. . No further hearings were conducted…JA's right to due process was clearly violated.Mars Veloso 1C. and the actual result thereof is clearly ascertained. WON HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in a.HRET proceeded to annul votes without a dint of compliance with the 2 mandatory requisites for the annulment of election returns based on fraud. that more than fifty percent (50%) of the total number of votes in the precinct or precincts were involved.General rule: a tribunal rendering a decision must be given an opportunity to rectify its error through a motion for reconsideration. irregularities or terrorism. 2. annulling election results in some contested precincts.Without filing MFR. b. . The rule in an election protest is that the protestant or counterprotestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period for the filing of protest or counter protest. to continue with the examination and evaluation of the evidence on record. by the same 6-3 vote rendered its now assailed Decision annulling JA's proclamation. This grossly violates Rules 68 &5 of HRET Rules (all questions shall be submitted to the Tribunal as a body. The kind of evidence used and how they were procured . & c. mere irregularities or omissions committed by election officials which do not subvert the expression of popular will cannot countenance the nullification of election results. . . is ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner. Nullification of election results . irregularities or terrorism: i.

Jr. 1987 Constitution) as follows: AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman Associate Justice. 1991 FACTS . SC FLORENTINO P. now NP). BONDOC V PINEDA GRINO-AQUINO. SC HONORATO Y. YES Syjuco should be cited for indirect contempt .300 votes. 1987. in view of the foregoing.. and public respondent HRET's majority decision dated January 25.000.. 2.Want of intention to undermine the integrity of the Court is no excuse for the language employed by private respondent for it is a well-known and established rule that derogatory words are to be taken in the ordinary meaning attached to them by impartial observers Decision WHEREFORE. CALINGASAN Member Cong. LDP SIMEON E.On May 19. LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a . PONCE DE LEON Member Cong. Batangas.Since his statements in his Addendum which he prepared without aid of counsel appear to seriously undermine the integrity of some members of the Court . Art. CAMASURA.00) to be paid within five (5) days from receipt of this decision. . Member Cong 2nd Dist. Emigdio A.In the local and congressional elections held on May 11. Marciano M.. 1st Dist. 1995 is SET ASIDE.. . 1987. Member Cong. CERILLES Member Cong. is hereby fined the amount of one thousand pesos (P1. . Davao del Sur.Thus.July 1989 – Bondoc filed petition . In due time. LDP DAVID A. September 26. LDP JUANITO G. 4th Dist. and Electoral Tribunal decisions of suppletory application. 1st Dist. . . (GAD. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which is composed of (9) members: 3 Justices of the Supreme Court and 6 members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein (Sec.. LDP ANTONIO H. JR. LDP JOSE E. Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election with a lead of 3. A prior motion for reconsideration can be dispensed with if petitioner's fundamental right to due process was violated.5 Page No. GARCIA. Supreme Court decisions.. Syjuco.. Zamb del Sur. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. with the patent nullity of the entire proceedings before HRET and its majority decision in the election protest filed by AS. VI. 2nd Dist.Unwavering reverence to the rules of evidence as provided by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence is because they have been tested through years of experience as the most effective means of ferreting out the truth in any judicial controversy. 1st Dist. Palawan. SC ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member Associate Justice.179 decision becomes nugatory and an immediate recourse to this Court can be had based on the fundamental principle of due process. Rule 80 of the very same internal rules expressly makes the Rules of Court. Rules and uniformity of procedure are as essential to procure truth and exactness in elections as in anything else. having been found guilty of indirect contempt. Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 17.Mars Veloso 1C.Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. Nueva Ecija.Oct 1990 . FELICIANO Member Associate Justice. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Joker Arroyo’s proclamation as the winning congressman of the then lone district of Makati is deemed not to have been challenged at all. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.Persistent and deliberate violation of the Tribunal's own governing rules and of even the most basic rules of evidence cannot be justified by simply invoking that procedural rules should be liberally construed. the petition is hereby GRANTED. Private respondent Augusto L. JR. Benguet. AQUINO Member Cong.

or any other rep who may be appointed Vice Rep and HRET praying this Court to: 1. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.. 1991 . resignation. Sec 17 Const) should be amended to provide instead for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935 Const: (3) members chosen by the House or Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and (3) of the party having the second largest number of votes: and a judicial component consisting of three (3) justices from the SC > Suggestions: + The Senate Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election. 25. 1991 . and asked the HoR. . The term of office of every member thereof should be considered co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except only by death. 1991.March 19.March 4. therefore.The Court required the respondents to comment on the petition . Cong Camasura voted with the SC Justices and Cong Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest. The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes. to HRET 2. and for having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said political party. Jose S. Jr. 1991 – Cong Camasura revealed to Cong. . LDP Sec Gen that he voted for Bondoc in the final tally in the case. (like that’s possible) .March 14. 1991 in HRET Case No. delaying the finalization of the decision by at least (4) months. It was also said that: > Proportional representation in the Tribunal (Art VI. Jr. through the Speaker.the Chairman of the Tribunal. The court even said that all members of these bodies are appropriately guided only by purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases before them and that in the contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators. is sought to be aborted. 'to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the nomination of Rep. Issue a writ of prohibition restraining whomsoever may be designated in place of Camasura from assuming and discharging functions as a member of the HRET 3. Camasura. Cojuangco informed Cong. Cojuangco.Mars Veloso 1C. + There should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to membership in the Electoral Tribunal. Tribunal issued a resolution canceling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. .Justices Herrera. . the HoR decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Cong Camasura. informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP. and Feliciano promptly apprised the CJ and Assoc Jus of the SC of this "distressing development' and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET because promulgation of the decision previously scheduled for 14 March 1991. This revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal. sit in the Tribunal no longer as reps of their political parties but as impartial judges. not including political disloyalty. 1991 LDP had already expelled him and Cong Benjamin Bautista for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of "Danding" Cojuangco. Camasura by letter that on Feb 28. So that there would be lesser chances of non-judicial elements playing a decisive role in the resolution of election contests. Jr.180 reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts. 1991 . 25 because the decision lacks the concurrence of the 5 members without Cong Camasura's vote as required by Sec 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal and.5 Page No. from the Office of the Sec Gen of the HoR. Palacol.March 21. to insure their independence and objectivity. 1991 – Cong. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable. Jr.. Camasura. Mme.HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 4. . Jus Herrera.petition for certiorari.March 13. . .During HRET open session. those so designated should divest themselves of affiliation with their respective political parties. 1991. . returns and qualifications of members of the HoR and vice versa. Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP. Bondoc against Reps Pineda. cannot be validly promulgated. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his functions as a member of the HRET. Cruz. Cong Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. permanent disability. The decision reached (5 to 4 vote) may now be expected to be overturned on a motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have been defeated. or removal for valid cause. Annul the decision of the HoR of March 13. received a letter dated March 13. to the House of Electoral Tribunal. 1991 .SC declined the request of the justices to be relieved of their membership in the tribunal and directed them to do their duties. and 4.March 5. to take note of it especially in matters where party membership is a prerequisite. prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr.

) + Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET. is "purely a party affair" of the LDP and the decision to rescind his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House-of-Representative Representatives. that a Tribunal member's term of office is not coextensive with his legislative term. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action against him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in the HRET. "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline. it is a purely political question beyond the reach of judicial review. returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. incapacity.Bondoc replied that HRET acknowledged that decision by canceling the promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition as the Congress' is the sole authority that nominates and elects from its members. the petition failed to implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the House. a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its authority. HRET allegedly has the sole power to remove any member whenever the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate is materially changed on account of death.5 Page No. but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the character. impartiality. the HRET must be independent. the constitutional provision mandating representation based on political affiliation would be completely nullified. > Sol Gen also argued that the inclusion of the HRET as a party respondent is erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the Tribunal. 25 to his prejudice. (Angara vs. G. instead of equal representation of three members from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature. 1990). the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.Mars Veloso 1C. Jr. What he assails is the act of the HoR of withdrawing the nomination. not the HRET that withdrew and rescinded Congressman Camasura's membership in the HRET. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. 63 Phil." are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. ISSUE WON the HoR can interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the HRET through "reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority party HELD . + Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. .181 > Cong Juanito G. The Electoral Commission.To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction.Sec 17 reechoes Sec 11. 86647.The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment. for if a member of the Tribunal who changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal. > Cong Marciano M. Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. except the provision on the representation of the main political parties in the tribunal which is now based on proportional representation from all the political parties. and that the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP.R. Hence. removal or expulsion from the political party. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. . + Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure. — As judges. Bondoc also explained that Cong Palacol was impleaded as one of the respondents because after the HoR had announced the termination of Cong Camasura's membership in the HRET several newspapers reported that the HoR would nominate and elect Palacol to take Camasura’s seat in the Tribunal. The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court. and rescinding the election. Camasura. The petitioner does not question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights. > Cong Magdaleno M. of Camasura as a member of the HRET. . Electoral Commission. Moreover. No. and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. hence. February 5. 139. did not oppose the petition. . — The resolution of the HoR is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.

Fernan.Ratio The House Electoral Tribunal..Mars Veloso 1C.The question that must be asked in testing the validity of such legislative act is. the expiration of the term of office. as nugatory and not binding in every other department. . 1987 Constitution) . Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases. Each separate from. SEPARATE OPINION PADILLA [dissent] -A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that the powers of government are distributed among three (3) great departments.. Art. VIII. taken in the exercise of power committed exclusively to it by the Constitution. the Court. and in the interest of justice. Emigdio Bondoc vs. done pursuant to the authority vested in them. hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED. . yet coordinate and co-equal with the others each one deriving its authority directly from the fundamental law. Camasura. in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. Art. Pineda. took no part. Jr. such as. being an agency independent of the legislature..This does not extend to the point that those in authority in one department can ignore and treat the acts of those in authority in the others.5 Page No. This Court. VI.The judiciary cannot question a legislative act done within the constitutional authority of the legislature The judicial department has no power to review even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department. Jr.The jurisdiction of this Court includes the power to strike down excesses of any agency of Government. The decision of the HoR withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Cong Juanito G. 17. does the House of Representatives have the power to do what it has done and not whether the House of Representatives should have done what it has done. C. 1991. but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor. Regalado and Davide.. 1987 Constitution). A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. concurs as certified to by the Chief Justice. Paras. . 25 ("Dr.182 Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional election contests are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. Medialdea. the petition for certiorari. to be done immediately by the Tribunal. and Cong Juanita G. Costs against respondent Marciano A. Jr. 91-0018 dated March 14. Camasura.. Bidin. may not be interfered with by the House Decision WHEREFORE. prohibition and mandamus is granted. . concur. JJ. Melencio-Herrera. canceling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. but the Charter did not alter or discard the principle of separation of powers.The power to appoint or designate a member of the House of Representatives to be a member of the House Electoral Tribunal must necessarily include the power to remove said member. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.Since the expulsion of Cong Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party. .. SARMIENTO [dissent] . his death. his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause.J. . 2. . Jr. Pineda") is also set aside. hence. resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal. Gutierrez. Congressman Camasura's ouster from the Tribunal was a result of political maneuvers within the lower house. To hold otherwise would be to invalidate the principle of separation of powers.Evidently. Narvasa. Cruz and Feliciano. is ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the HRET. JJ. effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties. Therefore.The HoR has the power to nominate the members of the House Electoral Tribunal provided that the proportional representation of parties is maintained. the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. Marciano A. The HRET Resolution No. permanent disability. formal affiliation with another political party.I believe that the questions as Jus Padilla raised it — can the Court annul an act of Congress. revamping its House Electoral Tribunal? — is a political question and a question in which the Court cannot intervene. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution. J. . . or removal for other valid cause. membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause. it violated his right to security of tenure.

they risk their independence. 2. involves the illegal expenditure of public money that the so-called taxpayer suit may be allowed.183 however. 5(2) in the 1973 Constitution applies to the Interim Batasang Pambansa HELD 1. the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term. SC has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition . not the COMELEC. 1983 FACTS . This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C. Interest held in common by all members of the public is of abstract nature (as is the injury that will be sustained) and may not be used as standing to sue. while Igot alleges that. WON Art. petitioners had no standing to file for petition for mandamus . neither have petitioners the requisite interest or personality to qualify them to maintain and prosecute the present petition. orders or rulings. ISSUES 1. and therefore involves no expenditure of public funds. . which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof.Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada and Romeo Igot filed a petition for mandamus as a representative suit45 to compel the respondent COMELEC to call a special election to fill up existing vacancies numbering twelve (12) in the Interim Batasan Pambansa. and that they filed this petition in behalf of all other Filipinos since subjects are of profound and general interest.Lozada claims that he is a taxpayer and a bona fide elector of Cebu City and a transient voter of Quezon City. As reason for their petition. From the role Batasan Pambansa has to play in the holding of special elections. 45 46 Action complained of is the inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election. Section II of the 1973 Constitution47. as a taxpayer. Even from the standpoint of an action for mandamus. Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution46. and this power of the may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the Batasan to exercise its power of appropriation. who desires to run for the position in the Batasan Pambansa. it is not shown that petitioners have a clear right to the holding of a special election which is equally the clear and ministerial duty of COMELEC. he has standing to petition by mandamus the calling of a special election as mandated by the 1973 Constitution. Sec. . In this case. LOZADA V COMELEC DE CASTRO. If they do. January 27.5 Page No. is that indispensable element for one to have personality in a dispute. order or ruling. WON petitioners had standing to file for petition for mandamus 2. . order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof. . WON SC has jurisdiction to entertain this petition 3. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. which may include a legislative enactment or statute. petitioners allege that they are deeply concerned with their duties as citizens. Concrete injury.5 (2): In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election. is above politics and Justices should be the last persons to get involved in the "dirty" world of politics. VIII. or sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the legislative for and in behalf of those who wish to participate in the election irrespective of party affiliation 47 Article VIII. it would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from said body.Only the Batasan Pambansa can make the necessary appropriation for special elections.The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter's decision. with the total absence of a showing that COMELEC has unlawfully neglected or refused the performance of a ministerial duty. The petition is based on Section 5(2).As taxpayers. Any decision. Sec. there is no such decision. for to have legal standing is to have personal and substantial interest in the case.Mars Veloso 1C.As voters. petitioners may not file the instant petition. whether actual or threatened. for nowhere therein is it alleged that tax money is being illegally spent. It is only when an act complained of.

PACETE V SECRETARY OF COMMISSION FERNANDO. . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. 5(2) in the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasang Pambansa . the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus. and not interim. July 23. Ratio Petitioner buttresses his plea for prohibition on the ground that the letter of then Senator Ganzon. As per Altarejos v. the confirmation stands. the appointment may be laid on the table. and the members or the Senate and House of Representatives of Congress under the 1935 Constitution. Reasoning a. as well as the then incumbent President and Vice-President.The cited provision of the 1973 Constitution is not intended to apply to the Interim Batasang Pambansa. With such number of representatives representing each congressional district. Sec. as there would always be adequate representation for every province which forms only part of a certain region. Molo. specially considering that the Body is only transitory in character. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then President of the Philippines on August 31. on February 7. He assumed office on September 11. . even on the assumption that it was a motion to reconsider an appointment duly confirmed. it must be given force and effect. there was felt absolutely no need for filling vacancies occurring in the Interim National Assembly. 1971 FACTS Felizardo S. The need to fill up the Interim Batasang Pambansa is neither imperative nor urgent. not to mention the Senators. HELD 1. Nine months after his confirmation.184 body. with the CA being an independent organ of the Constitution.5 Page No. Petitioner was informed that on May 21. suffices to set at naught a confirmation duly made of an ad interim appointment. Decision Petition dismissed. without being acted on. was without force and effect as it was not approved by the body as a whole. . the then Secretary of Justice advised petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge. which interpreted Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments.The provision is intended to apply to the regular Batasang Pambansa. If a majority of the members present concur to grant a reconsideration. Molo. Cotabato. 1966. Appointment was unanimously confirmed on May 20. WON the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the Commission on Appointments (CA). VIII. ISSUES 1. Senator Rodolfo Ganzon (a member of the Commission on Appointments) wrote to its Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for reconsideration of the appointment in view of derogatory information which he had received.Mars Veloso 1C. because a province or representative district would have only one representative in said body. this shall be a final .The strongest reason for this is the fact that the Interim Batasang Pambansa was to be composed by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention. 1965 (with Senate President and Chairman of Commission on Appointments Ferdinand Marcos even sending him a congratulatory telegram). 1964 and discharged his duties as such.That the provision is found in the main body of the Constitution and not in included in Transitory Provisions adds to the intention that the provision applies only to the regular. Art. which reads: “Resolution of the Commission on any appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not more than one (1) day after their approval. 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan. WON the issue is a justiciable question. As his appointment was made during recess of Congress. it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next session in 1965. or a province. 1965. 2. considering the uncertainty of the duration of its existence. Batasang Pambansa. 4. The controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v.

49 Similar to the 1987 Const. has no effect whatsoever. Subsequently. Senators Lorenzo Tañada and Prospero Sanidad prepared a resolution enumerating charges48 against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. the political nature of the controversy and the Senate’s constitutional power to elect its own president Before the opening of a morning session of the Senate. except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the powers as will constitute a denial of due process. The insistence of respondent that the question involved is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court is untenable. The remaining senators unanimously approved. the President nominates.” Holding of the Court was that the mere filing of a reconsideration did not have the effect of setting aside a confirmation.” . but AVELINO and his followers prevented TAÑADA from delivering his privilege speech. and hence.A distinction is made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the CA when Congress is in session and when it is in recess. then the motion for reconsideration not having been acted upon is not approved and therefore. . the Senate is composed of 24 senators under the 1935 Const. There must either be a rejection by the CA or nonaction on its part. In the case. As with ad interim appointments. all the Senators were present. Aldeguer’s (respondent in Altarejos case) theory would give to the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration the effect which it would have if the motion approved. for which the concurrence of a majority of the members present is necessary. In the former. a resolution “declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designating… Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of 48 BRYAN SJ: Among which were advocacy of the graft and corruption in the government (particularly those committed by the Liberal Party. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. and only upon the consent of the CA may the person assume office. the appointment takes effect at once.5 Page No. It would extend the boundaries of the political question doctrine beyond its legitimate limits. The Court refused to look into the legality of the election of a Senate President. without its being voted upon and approved. but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment of Congress. upon which AVELINO and 9 other senators left the session hall. in view of the separation of powers.TAÑADA sought to be recognized. AVELINO presided the session and called the meeting in order. would dispense with the necessity of such approval. The appointment is effective until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment in Congress. AVELINO V CUENCO PER CURIAM. and except for a senator who was confined in a hospital and another who is in the United States. it is to all intents and purposes.000 after AVELINO’s assumption of office. This is inconsistent with Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission. The courts are called upon to see to it that private rights are not invaded. the Senate President Protempore took the Chair and proceeded with the session. an independent organ.185 disposition of such a motion.Mars Veloso 1C. under Section 22. What is decisive is that a confirmation duly made is not nullified simply by a motion of reconsideration being filed. 1949 RESOLUTION on Original action in the SC FACTS .49 . In case of an adjournment sine die the period for filing the motion for reconsideration having expired.Summary: The Avelino I case illustrates judicial review of internal affairs of the legislature. to which AVELINO was a member). when acting within the limits of its authority. 2. March 4. and justification of electoral fraud. like the Electoral Tribunals. . b. among others.Although the CA is not a power in our tripartite system of government. “The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress. A commotion later ensued. Its actuation in the exercise of its power to approve appointment submitted to it by the President of the Philippines is exempt from judicial supervision and interference. questionable possession of checks totaling more than P500.

" The next day the President of the Philippines recognized CUENCO as acting Senate President. If the majority of the Senators want AVELINO to preside. fails to support AVELINO’s claim.5 Page No. No state of things has been proved that might change the temper of the Filipino people as peaceful and lawabiding citizens.e.The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede might lead into a crisis.The rump session (i. and the sound parliamentary practice and experience in this country and in the United States of America. – The Constitution provides: “A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business…” [cf Art. It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to CUENCO makes it advisable. Majority necessarily has to be more than one-half. Reasoning . . Nowhere and at no time has one-half ever been the majority. nor taken over. ISSUE WON SC has jurisdiction over the subject matter HELD NO (6-4 vote) Ratio The issue of the validity of the election of the new Senate President is a political question. by the judiciary. The power to adjourn is one of the exclusive prerogatives of a legislative chamber. It cannot be exercised by any single individual. at least. . action on the proposed investigation of the charges against AVELINO and of his impeding ouster. Decision Petition dismissed. 12 is only half of 24.186 the Senate. the session after the AVELINO group walkout) had no valid quorum to transact business. the present petition.Mars Veloso 1C. SEPARATE OPINION PERFECTO [dissent] . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. . The majority mentioned in the provision cannot be other than the majority of the actual members of the Senate. The evidence.The answer is in the negative. . not in the Supreme Court. The circumstances lead us to the conclusion that illegal adjournment and the walk out of AVELINO and his supporters from the session hall had the purpose of defeating or. delaying.Hence. change or reinstate them. to adopt the hands-off policy enunciated by this Court in matters of similar nature.There was illegal adjournment of the morning session. The functions of the Senate and its opportunity to transact official business cannot be left to the discretion of a single individual without jeopardizing the high purposes for which a legislative deliberative body is established in a democratic social order. Sec. FERIA [concur] . 1987 Const].There is no provision in the present rules of the Senate which expressly or impliedly authorizes an adjournment without the consent of the body or one which authorizes the presiding officer to decree motu propio said adjournment. AVELINO asking the Court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust CUENCO. by the decisive votes of CUENCO's group. in view of the separation of powers. which power should not be interfered with. without usurpation of the collective prerogatives. 16 (2). We should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers.AVELINO alleges that he ordered the adjournment because the motion of a senator to said effect was properly made and met with no objection. . VI. would not authorize the existence of such a provision. his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall. even a revolution. the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president. however. The words "each House" in the above provision refer to the full membership of each chamber of Congress. and a majority of them cannot be less than 13. The Senate is composed of 24 Senators. upon which ours is patterned.

as regards the Houses of Congress. in their separate opinions. the amendment of the quorum provision from "the majority of all the members of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business. in view of the absence from the country of one senator." shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the majority. 2.5 Page No. and that the CUENCO group has been trying to satisfy [the constitutional] formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the AVELINO group.187 . Among others. Partly for the reasons stated in the first resolution of this Court and partly upon the grounds stated by Feria [and] Perfecto. it appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in CUENCO's election as Senate President. Chief Justice [Moran] agrees with the result of the majority's pronouncement on the quorum. SEPARATE OPINION FERIA [concur] I maintain my opinion that there was a quorum in the (rump) session. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. There is a difference between a majority of "all the members of the House" and a majority of "the House". because they were a mere surplusage. 12 senators constitute a majority of the Senate of 23 senators. that CUENCO has been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed. and this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death. JJ. WON election of Cuenco as Senate President is valid HELD 1. At the beginning of the rump session there were at least 14 senators. the latter requiring less number than the first..Mars Veloso 1C. because of the latter's persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. have been eliminated in the amendment. refusal of the Avelino group to return to the session hall despite the compulsory process served upon them). not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution. or absence from the jurisdiction of the House or for other causes which make attendance of the member concerned impossible. the Court. For this reason. [the Chief Justice] believes that the CUENCO group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the majority's ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest. RESOLUTION on Motion for Reconsideration FACTS . even through coercive process which each House is empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. to declare that there was a quorum at the session where CUENCO was elected acting Senate President. I. Decision The judgment of the Court is. reversed its original decision and now assumed jurisdiction over the case ISSUES 1. PERFECTO [concur] . Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23). for the determination of the quorum of the National Assembly. The Court has resolved (7-4 vote) to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention.In Avelino II.If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session. as Member of the Second ." into "a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business. but on actual members or incumbents. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum. WON SC will assume jurisdiction over this case 2. in light of events subsequent to Avelino I (i. constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. incapacity. Also.The words "all the members" used in the original. "the House" does not mean "all" the members.e. was it validly constituted? Yes. therefore. but to no avail.

1960. No amount of mental gymnastics or juristic logodaedaly will convince anyone that one of two equal numbers constitute a majority part of the two numbers combined. because "majority of each House" can mean only the majority of the members thereof. The word majority is a mathematical word. the House took up other business. as such. the total number of 24 senators composing the Senate. OSMENA V PENDATUN BENGZON. was the one who proposed the elimination of said surplusage. in the present case. It can never be identified with one-half (1/2) or less than one-half. we are now inclined to conclude that for the purpose of choosing CUENCO merely as Acting Senate President. and so.The above pronouncements notwithstanding. a precise and exact mathematical meaning. It implies the idea of superiority. Said "smaller number" may be 12 or even less than 12 senators to constitute a quorum for the election of a temporary or acting president. Osmeña filed with the Supreme Court a petition for "declaratory relief. Jr. of all the members. October 28. The "smaller number" referred to has to act collectively and cannot act as collective body to perform the functions specifically vested in it by the Constitution unless presided by one among their number. can and should logically be interpreted as an abandonment which entails forfeiture of office. particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President. created a special committee of 15 members to investigate the truth of the charges against the President. for words spoken in the House. He asked that said resolution be annulled and that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it." so as to avoid disruption in the functions of the respective legislative chamber. Majority presupposes the existence of a total and. The 5 fingers of one hand cannot be the majority of the combined 10 fingers of the two hands. A majority means more than one-half (1/2).Mars Veloso 1C. . through Resolution No. 1960. . he must show cause why the House should not punish him. It has. CUENCO would allow AVELINO to preside over the sessions. who will have to act until normalcy is restored. Osmeña alleged: (1) the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity. The majority of said senators cannot be less than thirteen 13. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. and (3) supposing he could be questioned and disciplined therefor. The collective body constituted by said "smaller number" has to take measure to "compel the attendance of absent members. in a privilege speech delivered before the House. (2) that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be punished. without excluding anyone.. 59.188 National Assembly and in my capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Third Reading. 16 (2).On June 23. 1987 Const]. Majority is incompatible with equality. he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House . Congressman Sergio Osmeña. he ought not to be questioned. AVELINO’s refusal to attend the sessions. 12 do not constitute the majority in a group composed of 24 units. certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salipada Pendatun and the fourteen other members of the Special Committee. sec. and that if AVELINO should attend the sessions of the Senate and insist on claiming the presidency thereof. It summoned Osmeña to appear before it to substantiate his charges. 1960 FACTS . The House of Representatives.At the hearing of this case.On July 14. that is. 7 of the Rules of the House provides that if other business has intervened after the Member had uttered obnoxious words in debate. Sec. The Constitution provides: “A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum…. VI. made the serious imputations of bribery against the President. CUENCO manifested that he was looking for an opportunity to renounce the position of Acting Senate President.5 Page No. notwithstanding CUENCO’s commitment to allow him to preside over them. the presence of the 12 senators was enough quorum. . cf Art. with the admonition that if he failed to do so. The Senate is composed of 24 senators. but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner and under such penalties as such House may provide" [again. and Rule XVII.

5 Page No. Consequently. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition. WON the Speech of Osmeña constituted unruly behavior for which he could be punished 3. be questioned in Congress itself. but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to. it has been said. demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives "shall not be questioned in any other place.Mars Veloso 1C. 192. the Committee-whose members are the sole respondents-had thereby ceased to exist.. submitted its report on July 18. to suspend one of its members. Osmeña took the additional position that the House has no power.175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session on July 18. The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior. For one thing.189 . Article VI of our Constitution which provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress. challenged the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the petition." (Vera vs.Thereafter. 59 was unanimously approved by the House. unless the Constitution provides otherwise. which according to standard parliamentary practice may be done by unanimous consent. and suspending him from office for fifteen months. clause I of Art. finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behavior. defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension. ."The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary. subject only to such limitations as are found in the Republic's Constitution. Each department. it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction. 1960. if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña's conduct constituted disorderly behavior. 2.Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. 77 Phil. ISSUES 1. which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. . Resolution No. . 175. 6.Aware of the petition. the special committee continued to perform its task. is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress. 1960. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.) 3. . 1 of the Constitution of the United States. NO. wherein the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress. such approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules. mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. the members of Congress may. upheld House Resolution No. the courts have no concern. declaring him guilty as recommended. . not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it. and after giving Osmena a chance to defend himself. YES. under the Constitution.On July 19. WON the Constitution gives members of Congress complete parliamentary immunity for words spoken in the House 2. WON the House has the power to suspend its members HELD 1. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. Avelino. Acting on such report. YES. and with their observance. has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. WON Osmeña can be held to answer for or be censured by the House. 1960. given that other business had intervened after gave the speech in question 4. and adjudication by the Courts. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court. the respondents filed their answer. nevertheless. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural. Section 15. the House approved on the same day-before closing its session-House Resolution No. 212.

Since Mayor Villegas was going abroad on an official trip. members of Parliament or of Congress have been. No.Respondents argued that RA 4056 never became law since (1) it was not the bill approved by Congress and (2) entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill should be decisive in the resolution of the issue. the Secretary of the Senate. The HoR signified its approval of HB No. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.A." 4. suspension or expulsion have been recognized in the United States. However. and instead. The practice and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take. Court issued restraining order for Astorga to not exercise the powers vested to him as Acting Mayor under the RA 4065. WON the attestation of the presiding officers of the Congress approves the bill and validates it into a law 50 An Act Defining the Powers.As a reaction. Tolentino’s substantial amendment on the section definig the powers and duties of the VM. Roxas’amendments. . No. disciplinary action against its members. the Speaker of the HoR. Mandamus. ASTORGA V VILLEGAS MAKALINTAL.HB No. who affixed his signatures by way of approval – enacted the bill into R. Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila. However. The Senate President then informed the President that the enrolled copy of the signed HB 9266 was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that his signature is invalid and had no effect. 9266 had been passed by the Senate with amendments. suspended. The Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings. . April 30. . WON the Court could resolve the issue regarding the “enrolled bill doctrine” 2. The President then withdrew his signature on the HB 9266. Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of HB 9266 signed by the President is not the version passed by the Senate since it did not contain the amendments he made. He likewise ordered the Chief of Police to recall the police officers assigned to the vice-mayor presumably under the said RA. then Sen. Sen.Mars Veloso 1C. . 406550 .190 the action when the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. 9266 was filed and was passed on the third reading without amendments in the House of Representatives (HoR). and could not validate the bill which was not the version approved by the Congress. Roxas. Tolentino’s but Sen. Villegas issued circulars ordering city government officials and operators of business establishments to disregard the provisions of RA 4065. injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction . the attached amendments were not Sen.The respondent mayor (Villegas) publicly denounced the RA.5 Page No. Roxas suggested a minor amendment on HB 9266.With the withdrawal of signatures of the Senate President and the President of the Philippines.Original Action in the SC. 9266 (with Roxas amendment) and printed copies of it which were certified and attested by the Secretary of the HoR. approved in toto Sen. Further Amending for the Purpose Section 10 and 11 of RA No. Otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila . 1974 FACTS . For unparliamentary conduct. and the Senate President. Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel respondents to comply with the provisions of RA 4065. even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. YES. or could be censured. the petitioner vice mayor (Astorga) filed a petition for “Mandamus. The Secretary of the House transmitted 4 copies of the bill to the President of the Philippines. committed to prison. ISSUES 1. 409. including imprisonment. Decision Petition DISMISSED. It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Sen. this recommendation was not acted upon by the Senate during its second hearing.After that the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the HoR that HB.

and (4) that the President of the Philippines and of the Senate already withdrew their signatures. The final passage of the bill ends the lawmaking process and the certification/attestation of the bill is only a mode of authentication devised by the Congress which does not add the validity of the bill nor cure any defect already present upon it. Obiter . sec 27(1)] 4.Mars Veloso 1C. 1 did not take part (I don’t know the difference). as amended by Act. Obiter effects of Attestation of the bill: just a mode of authentication. 21(2) = Art VI. 1946 . Obiter Attestation by the presiding officers is not mandated in the Constitution as a proof of due enactment of a bill. but requires a Journal of the Congress’ proceedings [comparison of Constitutions: 1935 consti vs 1987 Consti: Sec 10(4) = Art VI. Ratio YES. in the absence of the latter. Decision RA 4065 was declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. 2 no part. Ratio NO. TRO made permanent. 1 on leave = 12 only] MARTINEZ V MORFE FERNANDO.compared this case to the Mabanag v. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. The enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon the Courts under Section 313 of Act 190. . were delegates of the 1971 Constitutional Convention facing criminal prosecution o Martinez was charged with falsification of a public document for stating under oath in his certificate of candidacy for delegate to the Constitutional Convention that he was born on June 20. upon referring to the journal entries of the proceedings of congress. [8 concur. then RA 4065 was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law. signify the Chief Executive that the bill being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or disapproval 3. WON RA 4065 was duly enacted and therefore did not become a law HELD 1.5 Page No. No. Lopez Vito where the Court denied to resolve the issue of WON a resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an amendment to the 1935 Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto had been passed by a “vote for three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives” pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution. (2) that the Court could use the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress and. WON in the absence of the attestation of the presiding officers.Petitioners Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista.191 3. Makalintal said that the case at bar is justiciable since enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon the courts based on Section 313 of Act 190. 1945. 2. as having passed the Congress. 1972 FACTS . the Court discovered that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced to the HB but were not incorporated in the printed text which was signed by the President of the Philippines. 2210 as evidence for the due enactment of a bill. all bills authenticated by it. March 24. the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. 2210 as proof of due enactment of provisions of acts. (3) that. Sr. If attestation is absent and is not mandated in the Constitution for the validity of a statute. the “journal entry” in the Journals of Congress could constitute proof of due enactment 4. Ratio YES.basis of the enrolled bill theory: respect due to coequal and independent departments which requires the judicial department to “accept.using J. sec 26 (2). Given that (1) the Court could resolve the issue regarding the enrolled bill doctrine. Sec. the records of the proceedings of the Congress entered into the Journals of Congress as proof of the due enactment of RA 4065 since the law is deemed enacted after the passage of the bill in the 3rd reading and the attestation of the presiding officers just serve as a mode of authenticating the bill. when in truth he was born on June 20. saying that it involved a political question (enrolled bill doctrine) which is not in the province of the judiciary. J. . Bengzon’s separate opinion in the same case. No. Ratio NO. as amended by Act.

Parliamentary immunity does not cover criminal arrests. • Article VI Section 15 of the Constitution provides: “The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason.” • Immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution for treason. food. • Under Section 15 of Republic Act No. XVI. 1932. and is consequently inoperative. modified or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines…” • Article 145 which accords legislators a generous treatment exempting them from arrest even if warranted under the penal law. they would be immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same.5 Page No. • RPC took effect on January 1.Mars Veloso 1C. • A legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well without the need for any transgression of criminal law. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. until amended. WON Section 15 Article VI of the Constitution should be construed together with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code. and in going to and returning from the same. No. be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress. August 3. 2 of the 1935 Constitution states: “All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration the Commonwealth of the Philippines. is inconsistent with the Constitution. during the session of Congress. operation of parliamentary privilege excludes all crimes. when it comes to freedom from arrest. applies only to prosecutions of civil nature • There is a full recognition of the necessity to have members of the Congress. and breach of peace. and likewise. felony. he should be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that a crime should not go unpunished. and for any speech o debate therein. 1966 . altered. except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under the RPC by a penalty higher than prision mayor. delegates are entitled to the parliamentary immunities of a senator or a representative. and cigarettes at two public meetings . • Article 145 penalizes a public officer or employee who shall. delegates of the Constitutional Convention. WON the petitioners are immune from arrest 2. entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge responsibilities • However. No. felony and breach of peace o Treason-levying war against the Republic and adhering to enemies and giving them aid and comfort o Felony-an act or omission punishable by law o Breach of peace-covers any offense whether defined by RPC or any special statute • History of parliamentary immunity shows that it was never intended to exempt members of the National Assembly from criminal arrest • The power or right of the State to claim privileges is due to the fact that it has the right to carry out its function without obstacle • In England.Both wanted the respective warrants of arrest issued against them to be quashed. thereafter. Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code is inoperative. they shall not be questioned in any other place. • If a legislator or delegate is facing criminal prosecution. such laws shall remain operative. traceable to Section 15 Article VI of the Constitution as construed together with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code ISSUES 1. JIMENEZ V CABANGBANG CONCEPCION.192 o Bautista was accused of violating Section 51 of the Revised Election Code in that he gave and distributed free of charge. by virtue of the parliamentary immunity they enjoy as delegates. 2. 6132. thereby expanding congressional immunity HELD 1. unless inconsistent with this Constitution. otherwise known as the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act. Sec. drinks. it would amount to the creation of a privileged class if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense. arrest or search any member thereof. before the enforcement of the 1935 Constitution • Art.

The publication in question is not absolutely privileged. and other acts performed by Congressmen. in the discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its function as such. 2.RAC Section 68 .5 Page No. .193 FACTS . . Carlos Albert. 1965 FACTS . that the President may by executive order define the boundary of municipality. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. PELAEZ V AUDITOR GENERAL CONCEPCION. NO. issued Executive Order Nos.Lower Court dismissed . September 24.” . among others. or votes cast in the halls of Congress while it is in session. creating 33 municipalities. Jose Lukban. Col Jose regala. the defendant likewise added that it was possible that plaintiffs are unwitting tools of the plan which they may have absolutely no knowledge. WON the publication is a privileged communication 2. Sec 15 of the 1935 Constitution refers to utterances made by congressmen in the performance of their official functions. NO. to the point of entitling them to recover damages.”It is of course possible that the officers mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge.The letter in question is an open letter to the President of the Philippines dated Nov 14.provides. 93 to 121. (if not) WON it is libelous HELD 1. Jesus Vagas. 124 and 126 to 129.Defendant moved to dismiss upon ground that letter is a privileged communication and not libelous since he was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of House Committee on National Defense . .The open letter was an exposé on allegedly three operational plans. . statements made. (Plan II – A coup d’etat. by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to be prepared to become candidate for President in 1961. Nicanor Jimenez .Col.Defendant caused the publication of the letter in several newpapers.Ordinary Civil Action for the recovery of several sums of money by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang . (2)Lt. Jose Reyna…….The letter also implicated that the “planners” have under their control the following : (1) Col. of Nat’l Defense. The first plan is said to be an insidious plan or a massive political build up of then Sec. either as a member of Congress or as officer of any House Committee. either in congress or outside the premises housing its offices.Petitioners appealed ISSUES 1. (4)Col Fidel Llamas. . The statement is not derogatory to the plaintiffs.(3) Capt. 1964 the President of the Philippines. purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. increase or diminish its territory provided that the authorization of the Congress of the Phil shall first be obtained. as well as bills introduced in Congress whether it is in session or not.The phrase “speech or debate therein” as used in Article VI. 1958 while congress was presumably not in session. The letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs’ action for damages.Mars Veloso 1C.During the period from September 4 to October 29. And in thus causing it to be published he was not performing his official duty. It was an open letter to the President published by the defendant when the Congress was not in session. (5) Lt. at the time of the performance of the acts in question. such as speeches delivered.Plan III – A modification of Plan I) . Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the planners. (6)Maj.The petitioner argued that these EOs are null and void because of RA 2370 Section 3 which provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” .

The mayors who were adversely affected by the EOs intervened in the case.5 Page No. ARNAULT V NAZARENO OZAETA.000.0 million and.and (b) fix a standard – the limits of which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. 2. for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction. .This refers to two land deals entered into by the Philippine government as follows: 1. Burt. . each of which consists of several barrios.000 with the initial downpayment of P 10. industry or activity.194 except by Acts of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board “upon petition of a majority of the voters in areas affected” and the “recommendation of the council of the municipality in which the proposed barrio is situated.Sec 28 of RAC does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. on its rejection. adherence to precedent (Schechter Poultry Corp vs. carried out or implemented by the “delegate” . depositing the said funds in Court on June 21. bureaus. as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer.” . July 18. Constitutional provision (incompatible and inconsistent with RAC) . against the Auditor General. 1950 FACTS . or offices. which was the basis of the EOs has been impliedly repealed by RA 2730. BUENAVISTA ESTATE . WON the executive orders are null and void upon the ground that Section 68 of RAC.000.Procedure Emmanuel Pelaez. 1946 sold this same property to Ernest H. 1944 together with the accrued rentals of P 324. from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects of the power the President. as well as his representatives and agents. b.San Juan de Dios on June 29. Enrique Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-Fernando appeared as amici curiae. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. WON the power of the President to create municipalities under RAC amount to an undue delegation of legislative power.The Philippine government leased from San Juan de Dios Hospital for twenty five years the Buenavista estate and had an option to purchase the same for P 3. . The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. This purchase option was exercised by the then occupation republic by tendering the owner the sum of P 3. HELD 1. Yes.0 million. RA 2370’s denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities. ISSUES 1. Reasoning a.000 with the balance payable under . US) . an non-resident American for P 5. 2. (take note: such control does not include the authority either to abolish or create) Decision The Executive Orders are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent are permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Eos or any disbursement by the municipalities concerned.Mars Veloso 1C. instituted the present civil action. exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by LAW.It was held here that in Recovery Act there was an undue delegation of legislative power because it supplies no standards for any trade. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Yes. .Atty.Sec 10 of Art VII of 1935 Constitution ordains: “The President shall have control of all the executive departments. There could only be a due delegation of legislative power if the law is (a) complete in itself – it must set forth the policy to be executed. to restrain him.

the Supreme Court had to draw from American precedents in recognition of the fact that the Constitution of the Philippines were patterned after largely American institutions and practices. The Court of First Instance in this case ordered the cancellation of Burt’s title and the issuance of a new one under the name of Rural Progress Administration.195 very favorable terms. . through the Rural Progress Administration. Among them and apparently the most important was Jean Arnault. propriety of the purchase b. the institution that lent the funds to Rural Progress.The transactions resulted into a public outcry which led into the Philippine Senate adopting Resolution 8 which created a special committee to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal. in cash. Arnault.rior to discussing the issues. The discussions were as follows: a. Based on this refusal. c. The work of the Committee however was extended via Resolution 16. acquired this same property from its original owner for the sum of P 750. He was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant at arms until he reveals the name of the person he gave the money to. among others.During the said hearing. Arnault confirmed receiving the money from the government and withdrawing. Jean L. the fairness of the purchase price c. . TAMBOBONG ESTATE .00 and terms which are as generuous as those from San Juan de Dios. the parties involved/responsible for the deal .000. .000 for Tambobong). When asked to identify the person he gave the money to. .000 and subsequently instituted a notarial demand upon Burt for the resolution and cancellation of his contract of purchase with Philippine Trust for non payment. These two were represented in the trasaction by one and the same person. the Tambobong estate for P 1. the Supreme Court went into the general principles of law with regard the power of either house of Congress to punish a person not a member for contempt as this case is the first of its kind to be tried under the Philippine constitution. 1950 arraigning him for contempt and subsequently found him guilty of the charge. The Senate has already approved bills related to the transactions. the same Burt purchase from Philippine Trust Corporation.The committee was tasked.Arnault filed an original action for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme Court to obtain his release cited the following grounds: a. . There is no expressed provisions in the constitution which grant power to either House to investigate or exact testimonies to . the information sought will be self-incriminating .000 (P 4. honesty. When pressed to answer. 2. The Senate adjourned three days later. it again bought the same from Burt for a total consideration of P 5. P 440.It was also brought out that the Rural Progress Administration was headed at that time by the Justice secretary who was at the same time Chairman of the Philippine National Bank.000. various witnesses were called.During the public hearings of the Committee.Mars Veloso 1C. the person who represented Burt in the transactions. There was however no other payment received from Burt. b.000 for Buenavista and the full amount of P 500.The Philippine government. he replied that he did not know his name despite the fact that he met the person on many occasions. .5 million for Buenavista and P 500.000 which he gave to someone on instruction of Burt.For one reason or another. The government paid initially P 1. .5 Page No. the validity. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. the Senate lacks the authority to commit him in contempt for a term beyond its legislative session. In so doing.000 for the Tambobong estate through two corporations acting as Burt’s attorneys-in-fact. despite the fact the Philippine government already owned both the above estate. with determining: a. he also said that answering the question might incriminate him. the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt since the requested information is not material to the intended legislation and his refusal to answer has not impeded or obstructed the legislated process.On May of 1946.000. the senate approved a resolution on May 15.2 million with a downpayment of P 10. Burt was unable to comply with the terms agreed.

Hence. one of the suspects. .The power of the legislative body to punish for contempt is based on the necessity for its attainment of the ends. Arnault’s testimony was obviously false. the remedy is with the Court. Given this. The only time that the Supreme Court may interfere with the Senate is when a petitioner is being forced to answer questions which are not pertinent to the matter inquiry. . b. The power is however not absolute. this power of inquiry. also the power find him in contempt and to imprison him until he complies with said requirement. Decision Petition is denied SEPARATE OPINION TUASON [dissent] . Congress would be guilty of a clear abuse of authority in the exercise of its power. The Senate is not the proper forum for such vindication. He obviously knew the name of the person he gave the money to.196 exercise legislative function. Arnault’s claim to self incrimination cannot be sustained citing Mason vs US as a precedent. The requested information is needed to comply with the direction of the senate as contained in Resolution Nos. the Court said that.Mars Veloso 1C. b.Citing the case Re: Chapman. the power of the Senate to hold Arnault is a continuing power.5 Page No. The materiality of the question asked in the public hearing should be determined by its direct relation to the matter being inquired into and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. is the brother of President Quirino). 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. The Senate investigation seems to have only one objective and this is . is a necessary element to enable the body to wisely and effectively perform their respective legislative functions.Justice Tuason is of the opinion that the question being asked has no relation whatsoever to the contemplated legislation. In this case and citing McGrain vs Daugherty. And this is precisely where disagreement occur. ISSUES WON the writ of Habeas Corpus should be granted HELD a. the Senate is deemed as a continuing body whose members are elected for a six year term and are so divided that only a third of the seats become vacant every two years. Citing however the McGrain case again. However. the information required are not entirely accurate or complete. c. The only caveat of the Supreme Court in this case is that if the Senate disregards the proper limitation to jail parties in contempt. and the process to enforce it. 8 & 16 to secure the names of the persons responsible for the transaction. Congress has the implied coercive to obtain such information. A stated reason for the insistence on getting an answer to the question as to who received the money is supposedly to vindicate or clear the names of the persons suspected of getting the money (Antonio Quirino. The opinion of Justice Malcolm was cited with regard the Candido Lopez case where he opines that the imprisonment of Lopez terminates when the House of Representatives adjourns. Congress has no other recourse but to get the same from others who have them. the Supreme Court held that the Philippine Senate has the authority to compel Arnault and if he so refuses to give the information. The power to compel is limited to information required in a matter into which Congress has jurisdiction to inquire. The power of the Senate to commit Arnault to prison does not end with the termination of the legislative session. unlike the House of Representatives which losses all its members every four years (hence its term is only four years). At times. As to whether the information sought to be elicited is material to an proposed legislation. where the petitioner was jailed for contempt of the US Senate for refusing to answer questions with regard accounts of Senators in his company. the Court could not say as this is not within their scope. His refusal to testify truthfully is punishable with contempt. The Court must be given the chance to determine from all the facts and circumstances whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer any question which could incriminate him. In the absence of information that it requires.

1967 FACTS . Kat-bo. now in dispute. Matimos and Magolatung. . LIDASAN V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SANCHEZ.Mars Veloso 1C. 2. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. Cotabato. makes the title misleading.In ending. ISSUES 1. Tabangao. let alone moot”. Bakikis. Tiongko. deceptive. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. are separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton. Losain.projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. in the Province of Lanao del Sur" 8 . Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law. . Colodan. useless. The importance of names is when it comes to a criminal prosecution. SEC. reads: SECTION 1. Bongabong. Digakapan. Magabo. Tabangao. in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan. and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality. the municipality of Parang. The title . 1966. and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15. The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.The Committee’s report has been submitted to the entire Senate. reproduced in haec verba. This being the case there is no need to extract names. impertinent and irrelevant. Barrios Togaig. Bara Lidasan. 1967 and September 20. the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247. Aipang. Magabo. Justice Tuason stated that the investigation of the Senate is commendable and legal. His main objection lies in the fact that the Senate has overstepped its authority and trespassed on the territory of other braches of government “when it imprisoned a witness for contumacy on a point that is unimportant. Madalum. Bayanga.On June 18. Province of Lanao del Sur."An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton. Kapatagan.It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon. Bungabung. Kat-bo. Province of Cotabato. .197 to prepare the way for court action since they could not expect the Justice department to take the initiative to investigate and prosecute the responsible parties as it seems that the Secretary of the Justice department had a hand in the transaction. Kabamakawan. WON RA 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in Lanao del Sur NO 3. Langkong. Sarakan. and that Bayanga." read without subtlety or contortion. Tiongko. And as a matter of fact three bills were passed by the Senate in connection with the investigation.5 Page No. WON petitioner has legal standing to challenge the statute YES HELD 1. The first mayor. Province of Lanao del Sur. it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. The body of the statute. vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for local officials. be nullified. it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. SEC. prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional. WON the title of RA 4790 conforms with the constitutional requirement that the subject of a bill shall be expressed in the title NO 2. also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. This is not the a duty of the Legislative department. Dagowan. October 25. 1967 implementing the same for electoral purposes. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur. a resident and taxpayer of Parang. 3. Langkong. . This Act shall take effect upon its approval. known as Republic Act 4790. Digakapan. Colodan. Sarakan.

But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected. 1961 FACTS . not being paid overtime.2nd case: Cresencio Estano filed complaint at the DoL against Chin Hua Trading Co.was in the mind of the proponent thereof.These are different cases taken together as they present only one identical question . 16 it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of that community is affected. for not being paid overtime and vacation leave pay as a driver in the company .same circumstances as 1st case. and the constitutional portion upheld.Court rendered decision though that Reorg. That this is so. considerations. And then the reduced area poses a number of questions. the legislature would not pass the residue independently. as Reorg. the parts will be separated. He may not even know the candidates of the new town. must fall with them. Petitioner is a qualified voter.Miller filed petition for prohibition against Hearing Officer Mardo of the DoL on ground that HO has no jurisdiction to hear and decide on the case . Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for the benefit. Plan 2-A is null and void. He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different communities which are formed into the new town. and that if all could not be carried into effect.Sun Bee filed motion to dismiss. thereafter enacted into law. then. of the community affected thereby. and continue to enjoy the rights and benefits he acquired therein. thus: Could the observations as to progressive community. Where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid.. and court issued permanent injunction against hearing the cases by the Hearing Officer. he may become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress. which is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. he may feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the town before dismemberment. as conditions.4th case: Vicente Romero filed case against Sia Seng at the DoL Sia Leng did noy\t file an answer and a decision was rendered in favor of Romero. Plan is not validly passed as a statute and unconstitutional . to vote in a town different from his actual residence. . amongst others.3RD case: Numeriana Raganas filed with CFI a complaint against Sen Bee Trading Company for being underpaid. claiming that he is a driver of Miller and was arbitrarily dismissed without separation pay . or connected. But Labor Administrator Hernando refused to issue the writ of execution of the ecision as he believed that Sia Seng deserved to be heard they insist as well that Reorg. unquestionably. as is the case here. states that the seat of the government is in Togaig. He may not want. July 31. is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself. he may express a lack of desire to vote for anyone of them. collective income sufficient to maintain an independent municipality. without sick leave and vacation leave pay. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections His right to vote in his own barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected. still apply to a motely group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? 3. conditional.Mars Veloso 1C. inducements. MILLER V MARDO BARRERA.198 2. and insisted that CFI does not have jurisdiction as money claims must be filed with Regional Office of DoL under Reorg.1st case: Manuel Gonzales filed complaint against Bill Miller at the DoL. as a seamstress . all the provisions which are thus dependent. as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole. large aggregate population. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Plan 2-A . Plan 2-A did not repeal Judiciary Act that conferred to CFI original jurisdiction to take cognizance of money claims re violations of labor standards . When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress. the totality of the twenty-one barrios not nine barrios . or compensations for each other.5 Page No. he may prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was constituted. if some parts are unconstitutional.

Decision Respondents ordered to publish in Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances of general application. TANADA V TUVERA ESCOLIN. EOs. where laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates HELD Yes. he must first be officially informed of its contents.While the Reorganization Commission could create functions. they need not show any specific interest. transactions. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A. a right recognized in Section 6.Certiorari. or decisions. shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (Sec. of various presidential decrees.Mars Veloso 1C. as he was summarily dismissed wihout cause. must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated. overtime and separation pay. with no power to adjudicate money claims . etc. & to documents & papers pertaining to official acts.that two houses are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations and the determination of the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determination of the other. without separation pay. 6. April 24. The publication of presidential issuances “of public nature” or “of general applicability” is a requirement of due process. Art.Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern.They moved to dismiss as it is only an administrative body. and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette. The respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring this petition. general orders..While legislature may confer administrative boards quasi-judicial powers. 1985 FACTS . proclamations. letter of implementation and administrative orders. to be valid & enforceable. . . LOIs. IV. and .A law is not passed by mere silence or non-action of Congress even if it be stated in Sec 6(a) of RA 997 . 2. Before a person may be bound by law. It is the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern & corollarily access to official records. No it is not valid. executive orders. ISSUE WON publication in the Official Gazette is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the PDs. etc. 1973 Constitution). Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.5th case: Mariano Pabillare filed at the DoL a complaint against Fred Wilson and Co. No it was not validly passed by Congress .Conferment of quasi-judicial functions cannot be implied from a mere grant of power to create functions in connection with reorganization of the Executive 2. it must be incident to the exercise of administrative dunctions . is valid. Laws. insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor to decide on claims of laborers for wages. .199 .It is contrary to well-settled and well-understood parliamentary law. petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish.Petition to review the decision of the Executive Assistant to the President. and without sufficient notice. Judicial power rests exclusively on the judiciary . Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel public duty. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts. it referred merely to administrative and not judicial functions such as deciding on money claims.5 Page No. general orders. prohibition and injuction was filed as well – that Reorg Plan is null and void insofar as it vest original exclusive jurisdiction over money claims ISSUES 1. prepared and submitted under the authority of RA 997 as amended by RA 1241. letters of instructions. Article IV of the 1973 constitution. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A was validly passed by Congress HELD 1. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.

of course. 1985. shall be published as a condition for their effectivity.The generality of law (CC Art. TANADA V TUVERA CRUZ. declaring in the dispositive portion as follows: "WHEREFORE.Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime.In the decision of this case on April 24. 14) will never work w/o constructive notice. although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive. This is not even substantial compliance. When is the publication to be made? HELD 1 & 2. the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application. "with Secretary Tuvera"). 5. We hold therefore that all statutes.51 4. on the following questions: ISSUES 1. at present. the supposed date of effectivity. 3. specifically. What is meant by "publication"? 4. 2004 51 This was the manner in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975. . directly conferred by the Constitution. 1986 FACTS . February 24. that we do not need to examine at this time. The constitution afforded Marcos both executive & legislative powers. . which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. The ruling of this case provides that publication constitutes the necessary constructive notice & is thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse. This is a matter. its whereabouts (e." . for whatever reason. and unless so published. or at least as soon as possible. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. to cause its publication as required. as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.200 unless so published shall have no binding force and effect. the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette. they shall have no binding force and effect. The mere mention of the number of the presidential decree. for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.. We have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code. including those of local application and private laws. There is that possibility. .g. Where is the publication to be made? 5. The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or. and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. Important Point It illustrates how decrees & issuances issued by one man — Marcos — are in fact laws of general application and provide for penalties.Mars Veloso 1C. and not elsewhere. December 29. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not? 3. a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest. We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"? 2. was "published" by the Marcos administration.5 Page No. the title of such decree.This is a motion for reconsideration/clarification of the first decision. however. LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TINGA. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees.

as provided in the 1987 Constitution the COMELEC has the authority to ascertain the identity of the political parties and its legitimate officers. Equity is applied only if there absence of law that can be applied to resolve the issue which is not the case here. . Aquino contended that the Party Chairman does not have authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the Sec-Gen and asked COMELEC to disregard the Manifestation .However. which the Chairman may do so in his discretion as implied in his authority to grant such power . granted the petition for both Petitioner (Angara) and Oppositor (Aquino) in that it recognized all the candidates nominated by both parties as the official candidates of the LDP identifying each set of candidates as the “Angara Wing” and the “Aquino Wing” . the lack of authority of Aquino to certify candidates does not cancel the certificates he signed. noting that the conflict was an internal party matter and that the period for filing for the Certificate of Nomination was about to end.According to the Party Constitution. naming Sen.5 Page No. LDP filed a Manifestation informing the COMELEC a) that only the Party Chairman. Representative Agapito Aquino. the certificate was signed by Rep. The only issue to be resolved by the Commission was who as between the Chairman and the Secretary General had the authority to sign the certificates of candidacy. consequently it has the power to settle any controversy regarding leadership of the party as an incident to its power to register political parties.Rep. The candidates named will only be treated as independent candidates following COMELEC Resolution No. as found by the COMELEC during the 2001 elections. it does not follow that said authority is still existing since it can be gathered in Angara’s Manifestation that Aquino’s authority had been revoked. a Certificate of Nomination was filed with COMELEC. the COMELEC need only to refer to the Party Constitution.pending resolution.Mars Veloso 1C. 8. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. 2004 FACTS .KNP has chose Fernando Poe as its Standard Bearer for the President of the Phils in the May 2004 elections . Senator Edgardo Angara or his authorized representative may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the party’s official candidates b) that LDP had placed its Secretary General. This matter is important in determining as to who between Aquino and Angara had the authority to certify LDP’s candidates .The constitutional policy towards a free and open party system envisions a system that shall “evolve according to the free choice of the people” and not one molded by the COMELEC BRILLANTES V COMELEC CALLEJO.LDP together with other political parties formed a coalition called Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) . on “indefinite forced leave” and Ambassador Enrique Zaldivar was the Acting Sec-Gen . confused the electorate as to which set of candidates truly represent the ideologies that the LDP represents .The COMELEC. section 7 .the COMELEC.on Dec. Panfilo Lacson as LDP’s Standard Bearer for president. Aquino .LDP filed with COMELEC a petition to certify nomination of candidates for the upcoming elections . 6453. To resolve the issue. by allowing two wings to nominate their own candidates. June 15. the Sec-Gen has power to sign documents only when authorized by the Chairman. it is the Chairman who has the power to sign documents in behalf of the party. That Aquino had been given authority in the past.Angara filed the present petition assailing the COMELEC Resolution for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion ISSUE WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it applied equity and divided LDP into “wings” HELD YES there was grave abuse of discretion.201 FACTS . 2003.

. 277. 278).Hence.GMA issued EO 172 which allocated P250. However. there were budget problems for implementation because the money allocated by GMA had already been used for phases 1 and 2.Aside from Drilon’s apprehension. they do have the requisite standing to question its validity. They established a National Consolidation Center (NCC). petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention brought their misgivings to SC. the failure of the machines to read ballots correctly deferred implementation of modernization plan. Not even .000 to fund the AES for the May 10 ’04 elections. the sole authority for canvassing votes for President and VP. it is not an appropriation made by law.it disregards existing laws that any unofficial counting of votes is done by NAMFREL by using a copy of the election returns. Also issued EO 175. 2. counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating results of the national and local elections for May 11 ’98. Most of the petitioners-in-intervention are also part of NAMFREL. ISSUES 1.On 12/22/97. Art VI).Despite failure of the first 2 phases. In fact. Drilon and De Venecia are heads of Congress. COMELEC’s claim that it is not prohibited because it is an unofficial vote is unacceptable. COMELEC issued Resolution No.5 Page No.Senate President Drilon had misgivings about the proposed electronic transmission of results because according to the Constitution (Art VII. Lastly. 02-0170. the citizens’ authorized arm to conduct an unofficial quick count during elections. . WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing RA 6712 HELD 1. 2 weeks before the national and local elections. COMELEC through its commissioners still decided to implement Phase 3 . giving an additional P500M budget for the AES project.) . however. Manila. approved RESOLUTION 6712 stating the implementation of phase 3 and declared that results of each city/municipality shall be electronically transmitted in advance to COMELEC. Congress enacted RA 8436. Also allowed the acquisition of automated counting machines (ACM) and other devices to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials. Note that the results garnered in the procedure are of unofficial character. (procedure p. Implementing Phase 3 would be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress and would also lack constitutional authority . Electronic Transmission Centers (ETC) for each city/municipality and a special ETC at COMELEC for the absentee voters. still conducted a field test of the electronic transmission of results (phase 3) on 04/27/04 (Separate opinions of COMELEC officials found on p. Because the tabulation in the resolution is unofficial in character. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. COMELEC.Mars Veloso 1C. Congress has the sole authority to canvass votes for President and VP. a threephase modernization program for the 2004 elections. it may be considered a felony under Art 217 under the Penal Code (malversation of public funds/property). . authorizing COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting. Read just in case. WON petitioners have locus standi 2.COMELEC. o Phase 1 – computerized registration and validation Encountered problems in implementation because machine was reverting to old listing of voters o Phase 2 – computerized voting and counting Scrapped because COMELEC had to maintain manual voting and counting system due to the problems encountered with validation o Phase 3 – Electronic transmission of unofficial results (which is challenged in this case) .202 .the resolution goes against the constitutional provision that no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec 29. Sec 4). . The resolution usurps the tabulation of election results based on a copy of the election returns the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass votes for President and VP. .10/29/02. Petitioners claim their standing as taxpayers and since the Resolution obviously involves the expenditure of funds.000.

It also doesn’t make sense that Phase 3 of the program should go on when the first two phases have been scrapped. Details on p 302-303.Mars Veloso 1C. there will always be the need for human intervention so the problem will not be eradicated.80 .September. There are 2 conditions that COMELEC must comply with before undertaking technology for electoral purposes: take into account the situation prevailing and the funds available. Philippine Stearn Navigation Company . In the first place.resolution has no constitutional and statutory basis for COMELEC to undertake a separate and unofficial tabulation of results.COMELEC uses the problem of dagdag-bawas as a reason for the resolution.526.After paying the demanded amounts. Bolinao Electronics Corporation . . something that the NAMFREL had always undertaken? It is an unnecessary waste of government funds and effort. PLDT V PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION MAKALINTAL.COMELEC failed to notify authorized representatives of accredited political parties and all candidates of the proposed use of technology for the elections under Sec 52 of the Omnibus Election Code. ISSUES 1. Manila Electric Company . WON reliance on the use of comma/punctuation should have bearing .60. and General Shipping Company . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.610.28 September 1966—Public Service Commission denied request for reconsideration. o to use the value of property and equipment as an alternative base for fixing the rates only in case of public services not issuing shares would result in unreasonable discrimination against the latter o a comma after the words "capital subscribed or paid" and another after the words "Capital invested. 6712 is NULL AND VOID. Resolution No. . and notify authorized representatives. applies to both stock and non-stock corporations. Their reason: o the clause "or of the property and equipment. . the value of their property or equipment should provide as an alternative rate base for this class of operators 2. . 1964 – the Public Service Commission assessed several public utilities for supposed supervision and regulation fees for that year .PLDT (P214. WON the law itself draws a distinction between public utilities issuing shares and those that do not as the capital invested is difficult to ascertain where no shares have been issued.P33.40.P23. They should be taken as a whole and not independent of each other. there is a great possibility that the unofficial results will differ greatly from the official count so what is the use of spending all that money for something uncertain.203 COMELEC is authorized to use a copy of election returns for counting. (except the Philippine Steam Navigation Company which filed a formal petition instead) requesting for reconsideration of the assessments  their ground: under the said Section 40(e)." indicates the intention of the legislature to constitute the latter as an alternative of both stock and non-stock corp. Decision PETITION GRANTED.00.353. August 29. whichever is higher" in section 40(e) of the Public Service Act as an alternative base for supervision fees collectible. the said corporations sent Separate letters to the Commission. These conditions give the affected people an opportunity to object if need be. No matter how modern the technology for electoral purposes is. 1975 FACTS .5 Page No." immediately preceding the clause "property and equipment.P11.146. Accdg to them.P727. Thus.The assessed fees were based upon the value of the respective properties or equipment pursuant to Section 40(e) of the Public Service Act as amended by Republic Act 3792 . such assessments should be based not on the value of the properties but upon the subscribed and paid up capital stocks of the corporations. whichever is higher.60). modernization of the election will decrease the possibility of dagdag bawas but it doesn’t make sense because dagdag-bawas is a result of human intervention.921.

registration would be limited to the monitoring of their volumes of production and admin of quality standards .. Coco Admin. 1978.6 trial court issued TRO enjoining PCA from ussiung licenses . in the decline of the export performance of coco-based products .6 phased out some of the existing ones--. Order No.we are in accord with petitioner operators that the Commission was in error in collecting the fees in question on die basis of the original cost of their property and equipment without due allowance for depreciation. the appealed resolution of the Public Serviice Commission is AFFIRMED ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS V PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY MENDOZA.PCA was originally created by PD232 on June 30.Whether or not the PCA can renounce the power to regulate implicit in the law creating it for that is what the resolution in question actually is. reliance on punctuation is too risky a method of statutory construction . 5.204 3. No showing of difficulty in ascertaining actual capital investment of public service operators that do not issue stocks. the very statute indicates that such fees as are therein fixed were designed to raise revenue for the general expenses of the Commission. Decision judgment MODIED in the sense that the supervision fees payable under Republic Act No. it was made an independent public corp. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No. 1982 by EO826 gov’t temporarily prohibited the opening of new coco processing plants and on Dec. but one to be exercised in the context of the regulatory structure. 3. and were not limited to reimbursement of actual expenditures in supervision. February 10.Mars Veloso 1C. 1993 Resolution No.By PD1468 on June 11.28.02 series of 1991 as applicants were seeking to operate in congested areas .018-93 providing for the withdrawal of the PCA from all regulation of coconut product processing industry.Aug.charged with carrying out State’s policy to promote the rapid integrated dev’t and growth of the coco and other palm oil industry and to ensure that the coco farmers become direct participants and beneficiaries through a regulatory scheme set up by law . NO. . WON there is alleged disproportion of the total amount to be collected as supervisory fees HELD 1.. Coco Research Institute .PCA then issued certificates of registration to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants ISSUE . HELD . and the Phil.Pending the case.Nov.the consideranda on punctuation was merely employed to reinforce its main argument that nothing in the law justifies a discriminatory application of the value of the property or equipment (as alternative rate base) solely to operators not issuing shares of capital stock. 1973 to take over the powers and functions of the Coconut Coordinating Council. ultimately.The power given to the PCA “to formulate and adopt a general program of dev’t for the coconut and other palms oil industry” is not a roving commission to adopt any program deemed necessary to promote the dev’t of the coconut and other palm oils industry.the punctuation of the provision in question has undergone no alteration at all . PCA issued on March 24. 1998 FACTS .Nov. 1992 APCD brought suit to enjoin PCA from issuing permits to applicants for the establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants— issuance would violate PCA’s Admin. 3792 should be computed upon present values of properly and equipment in use. These companies are required to submit annual reports of finances and operations 2. Reasoning .because of overproduction in the industry resulting. the Phil.

1987 PCA adopted Resolution No. The regulatory system has been set up by law. rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.On July 27.PD1468 Art. PCA in effect abdicates its role and leaves it almost completely to market forces how the industry will develop .058-87 authorizing establishment and operation of additional DCN plants because of increased demand in world market .On July 31. unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader. Elections for the officers of the Senate were held on the same day with Fernan and Tatad nominated to the position of Senate President.Constitution Art. the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. By virtue thereof. Such resolution is in harmony with the objectives sough to be achieved by the laws regarding the coco industry. .Senator Tatad manifested that he was assuming the position of minority leader. 1998. Of quality standards. . Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate.duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands o Sec.The resolution deregulating the coco industry is a valid exercise of delegated legislation.The time has come for admin policies and regulations to adapt to ever-changing business needs rather than to accommodate traditional acts of the legislature .19 State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires o Any change in policy must be made by the legislative dept of the gov’t. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority.205 . Decision Petition GRANTED. belonged to the "minority. to merely monitoring volumes of production and admin. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Drilon as majority leader. 1998." .XII o Sec.On July 30." while only those who had voted for him. stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. 1998 FACTS .the questioned resolution allows not only indiscriminate opening of new plants. resolution NULL and VOID SEPARATE OPINION ROMERO [dissent] . It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to dismantle it. They allege that Senator Guingona had been usurping... with the agreement of Senator Santiago. but the virtual dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure . Senators Santiago and Tatad instituted an original petition for quo warranto to seek the ouster of Senator Guingona as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.II Revised Coco Code—the role of the PCA is to “formulate and adopt a general program of dev’t for the coco and other palm oil industry in all its aspects” o By limiting the purpose of reg. a position that. and Sen. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore. the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress.6 . the losing nominee. November 18.Mars Veloso 1C.The above measures were adopted within the framework of regulation as established by law “to promote rapid integrated dev’t and growth of coco and other palm oil industry and to ensure that the coco farmers become direct participants and beneficiaries . ISSUES 1. WON the Court have jurisdiction over the petition . according to them. 1998.Trimming down an admin agency’s functions of registration is not an abdication of the power to regulate but is regulation itself SANTIAGO V GUINGONA PANGANIBAN. the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators.23.Oct. particularly “to promote accelerated growth and dev’t of the coco industry” and “the rapid integrated dev’t and growth of the coconut industry” .5 Page No.

whenever the tribunal "finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies or previous constitutions. it is. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the validity of legislative or executive acts that are political in nature. . not by this Court. the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent." 2. In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful. has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. Yes.While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker. no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. Article VI of the Constitution." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the constitutional provision. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abuse their discretion in exercise of their functions and prerogatives . including the rules of either house of Congress. such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself. . who could thereby elect the minority leader. and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. . the court has jurisdiction. WON there is an actual violation of the Constitution 3. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. WON Fernan acted with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Guingona as the minority leader HELD 1. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. petitioners did not present sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. . that is.the very duty that justifies the Court's being. All that the Charter says is that "each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty. No. They also invoke the Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of respondents. Verily. viz.Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem. unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader. without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold . WON Guingona is usurping. it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority". there was no actual violation of the Constitution. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. questions involving an interpretation or application of a provision of the Constitution or the law.While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof.: . No. unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader 4.206 2. Respondent Guingona was not usurping.Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law.The petitioners claim that Section 16 (1). . Therefore. 3.Avelino v."Judicial power includes the duty of the court of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. Cuenco tackled the scope of the Court's power of judicial review. the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative.5 Page No. however. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm. .Mars Veloso 1C. In this case. dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress.

. private corporations under laws of British Virgin Islands. Ursula Perez alias “Ba-yay. .207 4.Mars Veloso 1C. “Creating and Designating a Portion of the Area Covered by the Former Camp John Hay as the John Hay Special Economic Zone Pursuant to Republic Act No. Katherine Pe represented and joined by her mother Rosemarie Pe. subject to the concurrence of the local government units directly affected.RA 7227: An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations into other Productive Uses. Respondent Fernan did not act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader.The latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate. 1993 – BCDA entered MoA and Escrow Agreement with TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD.” Betty Strasser. Subic Special Economic (and free port) Zone (Sebuc SEZ) > granted Subic SEZ incentives such tax and duty-free importations. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus.Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation. Wallace Air Station (La Union). in preparing for a joint venture for . Center for Alternative Systems Foundation. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader. October 24. 420. TUNTEX.Petitioners: John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition. and Camp John Hay (Baguio) . President Bases Conversion and Development Authority. exemption of businesses from local and national taxes > gave authority to the President to create through executive proclamation.Under these circumstances. .. 7227” . ASIAWORLD. Alicia Pacalso alias “Kevab. Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose. wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints. mandamus and declaratory relief with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of injunction assailing the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Regina Victoria Benafin represented and joined by her mother Elisa Benafin.Aug 16. the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated. or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. namely Clark and Subic military reservations including extension Camp John Hay Station in Baguio > created Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA). Carmen Caromina.5 Page No. the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. DENR ." Where no provision of the Constitution. Soledad Camilo. No. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.Petition for prohibition. City of Baguio. Lilia Yaranon. Ruby Giron. Inc.Respondents: Victor Lim. grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.. Diane Mondoc .” Edilberto Claravall. Series of 1994.By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 2003 FACTS . other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in Clark (Pampanga). The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. disregarded or overlooked. Mateo Carino Foundation Inc. Izabel Luyk represented and joined by her mother Rebecca Luyk. JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION V LIM CARPIO-MORALES. Providing Funds therefor and for Other Purposes OR “Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992” > setting out policy to accelerate sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of former military bases under the 1947 Philippine-United States of America Military Bases Agreement.

etc of the government are directed to give full support to BCDA and/or implementing subsidiary or joint venture to facilitate necessary approvals to expedite programs. Ramos of presidential proclamation declaring area of 288. rules. priority in employment of Baguio residents. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. and regulations to govern and regulate the zone thru the John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation (JHPPDC). Agencies and Instrumentalities: All heads of departments. and new investment laws that will be enacted. 255 (Series of 1994) seeking and supporting subject to its concurrence. the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) is established to govern JHSEZ.Dec 16. Local Authority: The affected local government units shall retain basic autonomy and identity. 420’s constitutionality or validity as well as the legality of MoA and JVA between BCDA and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD . rules and regulations governing the zone. making of a familyoriented tourist destination. the Foreign Investment Act of 1991. exclusion of the previously mentioned 9 bgys. Governing Body: pursuant to Sec 15 of RA 7227. 1994 – sanggunian passed resolution asking mayor to order determination of realty taxes which may be collected from real properties of CJH checking if CJH real properties exempt from taxes and economic activity from local and national taxes . The zone shall have all the applicable incentives of the SEZ under Sec 12 of RA 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in the Export Processing Zones. the issuance of Pres. 1993 –to exclude all the barangays partly and totally located within Camp John Hay from the reach and coverage of any plan or program for development > Jan 19. Bureaus. TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD executed a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) binding themselves to put up a joint venture company called Baguio International Development and Management Corporation leasing areas within Camp John Hay and Poro Point for tourism and recreation Sangguaniang Panglungsod of Baguio City’s Resolutions to BCDA > Sept 29. including investment incentives. 1994 – Ramos issued Proc No. 420 establishing a SEZ on Camp John Hay which reads Pursuant to powers vested in me by the law and the resolution of concurrence by the City Council of Baguio… create and designate… former Camp John Hay… as John Hay Special Economic Zone Sec 1. Offices.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in accordance to RA 7227 .June 1994 – sanggunian passed Resolution No. No. liability for local taxes of businesses BCDA-TUNTEX-ASIAWORLD response > modified the proposal stressing the need to declare CJH a SEZ as a condition to its full development according to RA 7227 .July 5. 1994 – 15-point concept of the development of CJH which includes protection of the environment. 1994 – abdication.Petitioner’s Allege: . . waiver or quitclaim of its ownership over homelots being occupied by residents of 9 barangays surrounding CJH > Feb 21.1 hectares out of 677 hectares surveyed and verified by DENR Sec 2.5 Page No. Role of Departments. the JH Poro Point Development Corporation shall implement necessary policies. and to promulgate necessary policies. authorized to determine utilization and disposition of lands subject to private rights and in consultation and coordination with the City Government of Baguio after consultation with its inhabitants. Sec 4.May 11. mandamus and declaratory relief challenging Proc. the implementing arm for its economic development and optimum utilization Sec 3. Investment Climate in JHSEZ: pursuant to Sec 5(m) and Section 15 of RA 7227. the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987. free access to base area.Mars Veloso 1C.April 25. 1995 – petition for prohibition. in consultation with pertinent government departments. Sec 5. guaranteed participation of the city government in the management and operation of the camp. Coverage of John Hay SEZ: 288.208 development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as a premier tourist destinations and recreation centers . 1993 – BCDA.

under Sec 21 of RA 7227. extending to the JHSEZ economic incentives to those enjoyed by Subic SEZ (established in RA 7227). No. No. No. Proc. only SC has the power to enjoin implementation of projects for the development of the former US military reservations therefore SC will take cognizance of this petition. 420 is constitutional by providing for national and local tax exemption within and granting other economic incentives to the John Hay SEZ 5. WON petitioners violated doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies 2. the conceptual development plan of respondents not having undergone environmental impact assessment is being illegally considered without a valid environmental impact assessment . No. WON issues regarding TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD is moot and academic 3. 420. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. City of Baguio) Allege 1. JHPPDC.Petitioners Reply 1. disregarded hierarchy of courts and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies . 420 derogates the local autonomy of Baguio City or violative of the equal protection clause 4. issues are moot and academic because in November 21. No. 420 is unconstitutional that it violates the rule that all taxes should be uniform and equitable 4.Public respondents (BCDA. No. illegal and unconstitutional 3. Reasoning .a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction prayed to enjoin BCDA. petitioners have no standing to being suit even as taxpayers in the absence of an actual controversy 5.5 Page No. 420 and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD from proceeding with their plan respecting CJH’s development pursuant to the JVA . remanding this case to the lower courts may unduly prolong adjudication of the issues . Conversion involves > focal point for investments by local and foreign entities . No. WON Proc. terms and conditions of the MoA is illegal 6. Although judicial policy of SC entails not entertaining declaratory relief or direct resort to it except when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts. WON present petition complies with the requirements of SC’s exercise of jurisdiction over constitutional issues Substantive 4. No.Mars Veloso 1C. 420 is constitutional for limiting or interfering with local autonomy of Baguio City HELD 1. the proclamation merely implements the legislative intent of said law to turn the US military bases into hubs of business activity or investment 3. in maintaining the validity of Proc.transformation of an area in CJH into a SEZ is not a simple reclassification of an area TF a crucial issue. 420 grants tax exemptions is invalid and illegal as it is an unconstitutional exercise by the President of a power granted only to the Legislature 2. WON Proc. JHPPDC and the city government from implementing Proc. they possess standing to bring petition as taxpayers ISSUES Procedural 1. Proc. 1995 BCDA formally notified TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD of the revocation of the MoA and JVA 2.209 1. or when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of SC’s primary jurisdiction. denying Proc. Besides. doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply since they are invoking the exclusive authority of SC under Section 21 of RA 7227 to enjoin or restrain implementation of projects for conversion of the base areas 2. MoA having been entered into only by direct negotiation is illegal 5. 420 limits the powers and interferes with the autonomy of the City of Baguio is invalid.Also SC retains full discretionary power to take cognizance of such petition. Proc.

not the executive. Jr. material interest for what is at stake in the enforcement of Proc. parties pitted against each other due to their adverse legal interests > in present case. . 255 which supported Proc. there is a real clash of interests and rights between petitioners and respondents arising from issuance of Proc.Art VI Sec 28(4): No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress. v Aguirre: By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act. 420 converting a portion of CJH into a SEZ where petitioners insist Proc. Unless limited by a provision in the Constitution. definite and concrete. Indeed.210 > site for vigorous business activity spurring country’s economic growth > like Sub SEZ. Bataan where SC characterized their interest in the establishment of a petrochemical plant in their place as actual.Mars Veloso 1C. constitutional question is the lis mota of the case . real.g. Yes. existence of an actual or an appropriate case > not conjectural or anticipatory. industrial. the dispute is deemed to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without an overt act. the full power to exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation and its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax. 420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City > Garcia v Board of Investments: residents of Limay. 420. present petition complies with requirements for judicial review. Reasoning . Revocation of the agreements with private respondents made issues regarding them as moot and academic. commercial. 420: Investment Climate in JH SEZ: … the zone shall have all the applicable incentives of the SEZ under Sec 12 of RA 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in the Export . if there is no express extension of tax exemption and other economic incentives granted by law. personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question > RA 7227 requires concurrence of the affected local government units to the creation of SEZs and this grant by law on LGUs of the right to concurrence is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on LGUs (recognition of real interests of communities in the utilization of such base areas) > as INHABITANTS OF BAGUIO.3 and 4 no question since action filed purposely to bring forth constitutionality issues 4. they opposed Res. vital and legal for it would affect not only their economic life but even the air they breathe > Petitioners Edilberto Claravall and Lilia Yaranon were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the time. any presidential proclamation granting such extension through implication is unconstitutional because it violates Art VI Sec 28(4) which gives the legislature. No. pleaded in the earliest opportunity 4. equitable transition for city in CJH reversion to government property e. No. is personal and substantial that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act being challenged. 3. even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or law is enough to awaken judicial duty 2. No.5 Page No. 420 3.Sec 3 Proc. Reasoning . turning into self-sustaining. 420. No. problem of scarcity of water supply in Baguio City 2.Requisites of exercise of power of judicial review 1. No. duties included deciding for and on behalf of their constituents on the question of concurrence to Proc. No. No. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. assailing Proc No. 420 has unconstitutional provisions and the respondents claiming otherwise > Pimentel. financial and investment center > critical links to a host of environmental and social concerns affecting communities are located and nation in general > challenges in providing an ecologically sustainable. environmentally sound.

tax holiday. pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers. 420. No. SS shall have a grace period within which to pay the bill. Proc. NO.420 is null and void and declared no legal force and effect. August 12. duties and other restrictions > Omnibus Investment Code of 1987 .5 Page No. 2. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.deliberations of Senate confirm exclusivity to Subic SEZ of the tax and investment privileges (discussing Sec 12 RA 7227) Angara: … we must confine these policies to Subic and provide that “THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE OF SUBIC SHALL BE ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING POLICIES”… it is very clear that these principles and policies are applicable only to Subic as a free port … so we agreed that we will simply limit the definition of pweors and description of the zone to Subic but that does not exclude the possibility of creating other economic zones within the baselands … the provision now will be confined only to Subic > RA 7916: The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 .applicability to the subject zone of rules governing foreign investments in the Philippines .such broad rights of ownership and administration vested in BCDA over CJH.211 Processing Zones. Proc. tax credit. 13-6-2000. 420 which are already extant before the issuance of the proclamation or the enactment of RA 7227 . It promulgated rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services: 1. remains valid and effective SMART COMMUNICATIONS. NO because when the law merely emphasizes or reiterates the statutory role or functions is has been granted. INC TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION YNARES-SANTIAGO. the Foreign Investment Act of 1991 and new investment laws that may be hereinafter enacted > Sec 12 RA 7227: Subic SEZ (b & c) exemption from tariff or custom duties. Wallace Air Station. Reasoning .privilege of export processing zone-based businesses of importing capital equipment and raw materials free from taxes. hold and/or administer the military reservations of John Hay Air Station. No. BCDA virtually has control over it subject to certain limitations of law Decision Sec 3 of Proc. SS shall not be disconnected from service by the public telecommunications entity (PTE). O’Donnell Transmitter Station… which may be transferred to it by the President .June 16. During such period.tax and duty exemptions. the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987.Mars Veloso 1C. also grant of privileges to JH SEZ finds no support in the other laws specified under Sec 3 Proc. issued Memorandum Circular (MC) No.SC can void an act or policy of the political departments of the govt on two grounds – infringement of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion – and clearly. In case it is received beyond 30 days. BCDA is entrusted with the following (a) to own. and other incentives > RA 7042: Foreign Investments Act of 1991 . 2000 – NTC. national and local taxes of business entities (d) free market and trade of specified goods or properties (f) liberalized banking and finance (g) relaxed immigration rules for foreign investors . Billing statements shall be received by the service subscriber (SS) not later than 30 days from the end of each billing cycle. investment incentives and the like and no express extension of the aforesaid benefits to other SEZs still to be created at the time via presidential proclamation . without the invalidated portion. 2003 V NATIONAL FACTS .under RA 7227.It is clear that under Sec 12 RA 7227 ONLY the SUBIC SEZ which was granted by Congress with tax exemption. 420 infringes upon the Constitution 5. There shall be no charge for calls that are diverted to a voice . No.

October 9. 2001 – CA granted NTC’s petition for certiorari and prohibition. Requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable GLOBE and SMART filed a joint Motion to Admit Complaint-inIntervention October 27. The authorized rates per minute shall be divided by 10. The billing unit shall be on a 6sec pulse effective October 7. recorded message or similar facility excluding the customer’s own equipment. . which was “for strict compliance. The validity of an invalid SIM card shall be installed upon request of the SS at no addtl charge except the presentation of a valid prepaid call card. voice prompt. 2. Share all necessary info of stolen cell phone units to all other CMT SO in order to prevent their use 5. SS shall be updated of the remaining value of their cards before the start of every call using the cards. MC provisions regarding sale and use of prepaid cards & unit of billing took effect 90 days from effectivity of MC . 2000.August 30. Prepaid call cards and SIM cards shall be valid for at least 2 years from the date of first use. January 10. with prayer for injunction and TRO in the RTC-QC on the grounds thata. 6 Memorandum. Deny acceptance to the networks those customers using stolen cell phone units or cell phone units registered to somebody else when properly informed of all information relative to the stolen cell phone units 4. 2000 – NTC issued a Memorandum to all CMT service operators (SO) which contained measures to minimize incidence of stealing of cell phone units. PTEs shall verify identification and address of each purchaser of prepaid SIM cards.5 Page No. WON the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear this case 2.Mars Veloso 1C. pending finality of the decision of the case. 2000 – ISLACOM and PILTEL filed against the • • • • • NTC an action for Declaration of Nullity of MC (the Billing Circular) and of the Oct. 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least 2 years from date of first use.” 1.June 22. . 2000 – RTC issued TRO enjoining NTC from implementing MC November 20. WON the Doctrine on Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is applicable . All prepaid cards and all SIM packs used by subscribers of prepaid cards sold on Oct. Require all respective prepaid SIM card dealers to comply with MC 3. 2000 – RTC denied NTC’s motion to dismiss for lack of merit. NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods since such jurisdiction belongs to the DTI under the Consumer Act of the Phils b. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. MC is oppressive and violative of the Due Process Clause (deprivation of property) c. Require all existing prepaid SIM card customers to register and present valid identification cards. 7. Injunction is granted. 2000 – NTC issued another Memorandum addressed to all PTEs. MC will result in the impairment of the viability of prepaid service by unduly prolonging the expiration of prepaid SIM and call cards d. Holders of prepaid SIM cards shall be given 45 days from the date it is fully consumed but not beyond 2yrs 45 days from date of first use to replenish SIM card. 5. . Strictly comply with MC requiring the presentation and verification of the identity and addresses of prepaid SIM card customers 2. .October 6. 3. The unit of billing for (Cellular Mobile Telephone) CMT service whether postpaid or prepaid shall be reduced from 1min/pulse to 6sec/pulse.212 mailbox. It directed CMT SO to: 1. 2002 – Motions for Reconsideration were denied by CA ISSUES 1. 2000 – MC was published in the Philippine Star.The MC provided that it shall take effect 15 days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation and three certified copies furnished at the UP Law Center. 4.Procedure • October 20.

2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Decision Consolidated petitions are GRANTED.1 1987 Consti: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the gov’t. 2. PHILCOA). and not in contradiction to the standards prescribed by law.Such letters were not acted upon and instead. 1989 FACTS Mr. .Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction: The courts will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal. which should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to such administrative agency. The regulations must be germane to the purposes of the law. 1.Even if the Doctrine on Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is applicable. 1975 (SEE DIGEST UNDER DOMINIUM AND IMPERIUM) MARCOS V MANGLAPUS CORTES. NTC issued 10/06/00 Memorandum. where the power to act in such a manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the administrative duty entrusted to it. Ratio In cases assailing the validity of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency in the performance of its QUASILEGISLATIVE function. The decision of CA and its Resolution are reversed. The power of JUDICIAL REVIEW is vested in the courts by the Constitution. of Phil. This was taken by petitioners as a clear denial of their requests. ART VII: EXECUTIVE GONZALES V MARCOS FERNANDO. arguing that before the right to travel may be impaired by . Yes.After issuance of MC. petitioners registered their protests and submitted proposed schemes for the Billing Circular.Art.During deliberation stages of MC. Marcos and the immediate members of his family filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to them and to enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Coconut Desiccators v. in exercise of its QUASILEGISLATIVE powers. experience and services of the admin. The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction is only applicable when the administrative agency is exercising its QUASI-JUDICIAL function. . Only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine (Assoc. . petitioners wrote successive letters asking for the suspension and reconsideration of the MC. records show that petitioners have complied with such requirement: . the regular courts have jurisdiction. Ratio In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule issued by an administrative agency. where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge. Petitioners state that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under Sections 1 and 6 of the Bill of Rights. tribunal to determine technical matters of fact.213 HELD Obiter Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rulemaking powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. The case is REMANDED to the RTCQC for continuation of the proceedings. • Quasi-judicial power is exercised by an administrative agency when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive nature. July 31. No. September 15. a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court.Mars Veloso 1C.VIII Sec. • Quasi-legislative power is the power to make rules and regulations. . .5 Page No.

It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. and to return to his own country. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President.214 any authority/agency of the government. cannot shirk from that responsibility.5 Page No.” “moral. the fact is that these powers exist. it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of “executive power.” “implied. which states that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country. the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. 12. 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.The request/demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in light solely of the constitutional provision guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel. The State. .” “emergency. Many terms are applied to these powers: “residual. as they must if the governance function . though still nascent. In other words. The President did not act arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return. 2. or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one.” Whatever they may be called. WON the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. HELD 1. They also invoke generally accepted principles of international law: (1) Art. WON the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.” Respondents contend that the issue of whether the two rights claimed by the Marcoses collide with the more primordial and transcendental right of the state to security and safety of its nationals involves a political question and is non-justiciable.” “inherent. subject to certain exceptions.” “aggregate. In support thereof. FERNAN [concur] History and time-honored principles of constitutional law have conceded to the Executive Branch certain powers in times of crisis or grave and imperative national emergency. including his own. 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” Corollarily. par. Yes. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. No. they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. they cite Sections 4 and 5 of the Constitution. which provides that everyone has the right to leave any country. acting through the Government. 13. The preservation of the State – the fruition of the people’s sovereignty – is an obligation in the highest order. SEPARATE OPINION ISSUES 1. is not precluded from taking preemptive action against threats to its existence if.Mars Veloso 1C. par. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country and the precarious state of the economy were the factual bases for the President to conclude that the return of the Marcoses during that time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos. sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution of the laws. The President. They also point out that the decision to bar Marcos and family from returning to the Philippines for reasons of national security and public safety has international precedents. and (2) Art. 2. there must be legislation to that effect. executive power is more than the sum of the specific powers so enumerated.

17. then Mayor of Makati. as a Filipino citizen. . the Court itself must be satisfied that the threat is not only clear but also present. has the right to return to his own country. not of an executive officer. . 1939 ~ SI recommended to the President that Villena be suspended so as to prevent the coercion of witnesses.Feb. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. public safety. 13. and public health. If at all. (SEE DIGEST UNDER REMAKING THE CONSTITUTION) VILLENA V SECRETARY OF INTERIOR LAUREL. . the Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice conducted an inquiry into the conduct of Villena.1939 due to several incidents and postponements. 9. GUTIERREZ [dissent] The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law may be impaired only upon lawful order of the court. While the President may exercise powers not expressly granted by the Constitution but may necessarily implied therefrom. the right to travel may be impaired only within the limits provided by law. But eventually postponed to March 28. April 21. The government failed to present convincing evidence to defeat Marcos’ right to return to this country. Villena. .Upon the request of the SI. sought to restrain the Secretary of the Interior (SI) and his agents from proceeding with the investigation against him until this case was settled by the SC.Feb. .Mars Veloso 1C. malicious abuse of authority and unauthorized practice of the law profession.Jose D.5 Page No. He was found to have committed bribery. The President verbally granted the recommendation on the same day. 8.1939~ SI suspended Villena from office and instructed the Provincial Governor of Rizal to advise Villena of his suspension. 1939~ the date set by Anonas when the formal investigation would begin. PADILLA [dissent] With or without restricting legislation.1939~SI wrote Villena specifying the charges against him and notifying him that Emiliano Anonas was the special investigator of the case. Under the new Constitution. The determination of whether the Marcos’ return poses a threat to national security should not be left solely to the Chief Executive.Feb. ESTRADA V DESIERTO PUNO. PARAS [dissent] The former President. . I do not think that we should differentiate the right to return home from the right to go abroad or to move around in the Philippines. 1939 FACTS . The President has been divested of the implied power to impair the right to travel.Feb. the right to travel may be impaired or restricted in the interest of national security. not even the President. except only if prevented by the demands of national safety and national security.215 of the Executive Branch is to be carried out effectively and efficiently. the latter must yield to the paramountcy of the Bill of Rights. extortion. SARMIENTO [dissent] The right to return to one’s own country cannot be distinguished from the right to travel and freedom of abode. CRUZ [dissent] Marcos is entitled to the same right to travel and liberty of abode that Aquino then invoked. the right to come home must be more preferred than any other aspect of the right to travel. Power of the state to restrict the right to travel finds abundant support in police power.

plus. WON the SI has the legal authority to order an investigation. which they are required by law to perform. > SI’s acts are null and void because: + SI usurped the power given by the Constitution to the President when SI suspended him (Villena). 79 (C) in relation with sec. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. HELD 1. and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose. > Courts of Equity have no power to restrain public officials by injunction from performing any official act. > The authority of a department head to order the investigation of a subordinate necessarily carries with it by implication the authority to take such measures as he may deem necessary to accomplish the purpose of the investigation. . 86 of the same Code which grants to the Dept of Interior “executive supervision over the administration of provinces. this petition for Prelim Injunction.216 . to try and punish municipal elective officials is lodged in some other agencies of the government. Villena contends that: > SI has no jurisdiction or authority to suspend him. 86 of the Revised AC expressly empowers the SI to “order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department” and in connection therewith to “designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigation. It is certainly not without limitation. including suspending the officer. 2188 of the AC. invoked by Villena. and not automatic and brutal. which requires that a complaint be based on a private person’s or citizen’s sworn statement. and discretion reposed in them. that SI be declared as without authority to suspend him and order his reinstatement in office.Hence. but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power real and effective. WON the SI has the legal authority to suspend Villena pending the investigation of the charges. Also. and to decide the merits of the charges because the power to suspend. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational. chartered cities and other local political subdivisions. of the charges of corruption and irregularity against Villena.Mars Veloso 1C. Villena. 79 of the Revised AC speaks of direct control. 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended.” . It is an active power. by a special investigator appointed by him.Citing Planas v. 2188 of the Revised AC.The Solicitor General contends that: > Sec. . that invoked section.Sec. direction and supervision over bureaus and offices under the jurisdiction of the SI but it should be interpreted in relation to sec. 86.His petition for the writ of preliminary injunction was denied. The SI is invested with authority to order the investigation of the charges against the petitioner. + SI must exercise the power to supervise in accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing the trials and charges of against elective municipal officials are those contained in sec. . to file administrative charges against him. which are not in excess of the authority. municipalities. Gil: “ Supervision is not a meaningless thing.Villena prays that a writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued to stop the SI and his agents from proceeding further with the investigation until this case is heard. 37 of the Reorganization Law of 1932. that SI be declared as without authority to file charges against him and to investigate such charges. + SI is exercising an arbitrary power by converting himself into a complainant and at the same time the judge of the charges he filed against him. doesn’t preclude SI from exercising the powers stated in Sec. + SI’s action didn’t follow the procedure under Sec. > Villena didn’t question the jurisdiction of the SI at the start of the investigation but merely contended that such charges were not in accordance with law for the reason that they didn’t bear the oaths of the complaints.” > Sec. ISSUES 1. the President authorized the suspension. or acts. 2. it must .5 Page No. must be read in relation to sec. . 79 in connection to Sec.

the establishment of a single.Mars Veloso 1C. 1996.On March 13. and. February 27. issued Memorandum Order No. and the acts of the secretaries of such departments. praying among others that Memorandum Order No.Citing Chief Justice Taft in Myers v. the President’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority. Then this was followed by the discussion regarding certain acts of the President that could not be validated by subsequent approval or ratification. then the suspension made by the SI.On March 20. Art. . should be sustained. 2002 FACTS .) But there were doubts regarding the verbal approval by the President of the suspension if such could be considered as ratification in law (with law giving the power to suspend being the Chief Exec. presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. 96-735 be declared “illegal and without effect. Jr. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS V MABALOT BUENA. Garcia. 7 of the 1987 Constitution. begins with the enunciation of the principle that “The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines. the lower court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining DOTC Secretary from implementing Memorandum Order . 1996. .) Hence.VII of our (1935) Constitution.217 be founded upon knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation. Ratio “xxx…under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by par. suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and proclamation of martial law and the exercise of pardon. sec.5 Page No. then DOTC Secretary Jesus B.The President should be answerable for the acts of administration of the entire Executive Department before his own conscience Note Read this case in relation to Sec. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.The First Section of Article VII of the Constitution. since the President approved it.” 2.NOTE: There was an argument regarding the verbal approval or acquiescence of the President to the suspension. 1 and 17 of Art. Executive. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive that should be exercised in person (i. in the absence of valid legislation in the particular field.On February 19. their personality is reality but the projection of that of the President.” Obiter With reference to the Executive Dept of the Gov’t. 96-735 addressed to Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board (LTFRB) Chairman Dante Lantin directing him to “effect the transfer of regional functions of that office to the DOTC-CAR Regional Office…” . they may be granted departmental autonomy as to certain matters but this is by mere concession of the executive.” . the ratio. unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive.” . 1. performed and promulgated in the regular course of business. all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is under investigation. 12. not plural. Roberto Mabalot filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against DOTC Secretary and LTFRB chair. US~ “each head of a department is. .e. and must be. are. . It was said that if the justices were to accept that the President had the authority to suspend the petitioner. there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight.As a matter of executive policy. except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act personally. the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive.” . dealing with the Executive Department. the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments. and that it is.Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments.

” ISSUE WON the assailed memorandum orders establishing the DOTC Regional Office as an LTFRB Regional Office is unconstitutional for being an undue exercise of legislative power. 1999. HELD . . or (3) by authority of law. . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. BENGUET EXPLORATION V DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES FERNANDO. 1996. presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. 96-735.On January 29. are. legally and validly decree the reorganization of the National Government in exercise of authority granted by law. . February 28. 1977 FACTS .It is as if the President himself carried out the creation and establishment of the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office. .” . their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President.The President may. through his/her duly constituted political agent and alter ego. then DOTC Secretary Amado Lagdameo issued Department Order No. 36 directed the various departments and agencies of government to immediately undertake the creation and establishment of their regional offices in CAR.In this jurisdiction. .On March 31. Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. while the continuing authority to reorganize the national government is vested by Presidential Decree No. The lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on April 8. .The President’s control over all executive departments come from Section 17. the lower court rendered a decision declaring Memorandum Order Nos. The creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was made pursuant to the third mode.The designation and subsequent establishment of DOTC-CAR as the Regional Office of the LTFRB in CAR and the concomitant exercise and performance of functions by the former as the LTFRBCAR Regional Office fall within the scope of the continuing authority of the President to effectively reorganize the DOTC (and other departments). Inc. .” Thus. Executive Secretary). 1416 (as ruled in Larin Vs.Mars Veloso 1C. pending the creation of a regular LTFRB Regional Office. reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. when in fact.Sofia Reyes filed with the Bureau of Mines an adverse claim against a domestic Mining corporation’s (Benguet Exploration. (2) by law (statute duly enacted by Congress). 97-1025 establishing the DOTC-CAR Regional Office “as the Regional Office of the LTFRB-CAR and shall exercise the regional functions of the LTFRB in the CAR…” .The assailed orders are also not in violation of Sections 7 and 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution since the organic personnel of the DOTC-CAR are.The President. their acts. Mountain Province. unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive.5 Page No. The reorganization in this case was decreed “in the interest of service” and “for purposes of economy and more effective coordination of the DOTC functions in CAR.) Lode Lease Agreement covering three mining claims in Benguet. .” . in effect. 96-735 and 97-1025 “null and void and without any legal effect as being violative of the provision of the Constitution against encroachment on the powers of the legislative department and also of the provision enjoining appointive officials from holding any other office or employment in the Government. 1997.Villena vs Secretary of the Interior: “without minimizing the importance of the heads of various departments.A public office may be created through any of the following modes: (1) by the Constitution (fundamental law).218 No. “performed and promulgated in the regular course of business. merely designated to perform the additional duties and functions of an LTFRB Regional Office subject to the direct supervision and control of the LTFRB Central Office. through Administrative Order No. the DOTC Secretary directly and merely sought to implement the Chief Executive’s Administrative Order. A reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.

presumably the acts of the Chief Executive 2. imposition or mistake. 889 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. several injured .August 21. other than error of judgment in estimating the value or effect of evidence.Reyes appealed to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resource maintaining the sufficiency of her adverse claim . Unanimous LANSANG V GARCIA CONCEPCION. so long as there is some evidence upon which the finding in question could be made Reasoning Acts of a department head.219 .5 Page No. by virtue of the powers vested upon the President by ART VII Section 10 of the 1935 Constitution. The Mining Act speaks of findings of facts of the Director of Mines “when affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources being final and conclusive.At first the Department dismissed the appeal but on a second motion for reconsideration and ordered a formal hearing of the case .Benguet Exploration. His reason was that “lawless elements have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety . is justiciable 2. 1971 – Plaza Miranda bombing. December 11. 1971. It is but a right and proper in the interest of justice that a formal hearing on the merits of this case be conducted Decision: petition for review is DISMISSED for lack of merit. 8 persons died.President Marcos issued Proclamation No. filed petition for review ISSUES 1.” in which case the aggrieved party may file a petition for review with this Court where only questions of law may be raised Reasoning No such affirmance by the secretary that’s why he ordered a hearing. A decision rendered by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and commerce. Garcia L-34004 Tomas vs Garcia L-34013 Rimando vs Garcia L-34039 De Castro vs Rabago L-34265 Oreta vs Garcia L-34339 Olivar vs Garcia .8 consolidated petitions of writ of habeas corpus.August 23. failed to abide by the requirements of the law HELD 1. Other petitions: L-33965 Arienda vs Sec of National Defense L-33973 David vs Garcia L-33982 Prudente v Yan. WON the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources can be precluded from conducting his own inquiry 3.Bureau of Mines dismissed the adverse claim . The State acting through the legislature through its power of imperium acting as a sovereign regulating property to come up with rules with which to exercise its power of dominium as owner of the property cannot act arbitrarily but in accordance with law Reasoning Indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired 3. upon a question of fact. performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are. upon a question of fact is conclusive and not subject to be reviewed by the courts unless there is a showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of fraud. 1971 FACTS: . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Inc. WON Secretary Pascual. WON the decision rendered by the Director of Lands approved by the Secretary. unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive.Mars Veloso 1C. in calling for a hearing. regardless of whether or not it is consistent with the preponderance of evidence.

c. invasion. Laguna. YES.Mars Veloso 1C. The 1st condition can be attested through jurisprudence (there were a lot of cases already – HUKBALAHAP. d. WON the Proclamation was valid/ constitutional. The 2 conditions for a valid suspension a) there must be ‘invasion. and. Rizal. or imminent danger thereof when the public safety requires it. the Court abandoned the doctrine in Barcelon v Baker and Montenegro v Castañeda (determination by the President of existence of any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus should be conclusive upon the courts. Proclamation 889. however. Isabela. Ifugao. .” intelligence sources was in a better position than the SC to ascertain the real state of peace and order). The authority to determine whether or not the Executive acted within the sphere allotted to him is vested in the Judiciary. Upon deliberation. in any way of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist. The President. Nueva Viscaya. etc. the separation of powers goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances. kidnappings. or rebellion. adherence thereto and compliance therewith may. sub-provinces. Camarines Sur. ISSUES 1. or rebellion. Zambales. insurrection. and that there was a plan of a series of assassinations. 1971 -. The 2nd condition is justified through the reports of the acts of the NPA (its infiltration of several mass-based organizations. Tarlac. a. Benguet. declared the existence of an uprising -. as amended by Proclamation 889-A. he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. EXCEPT in Bataan.” 53 “The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines. 2. North and South Cotabato. and 18 cities including Manila.September 18 and 25. WON it complied with ART III Section 1 par 1452 and ART VII Section 10 par 253 of the Constitution? 3.The Executive is vested with the power to suspend the privilege of the writ. the CPP and its front organizations are capable of preparing powerful explosive. WON petitioners detained should be released HELD 1. be inquired into by courts of justice. or rebellion. WON the Court had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ 2.5 Page No. encounters with the military. In case of invasion. . whenever it becomes necessary. YES. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. various killings and bombings. or rebellion’ or ‘imminent danger thereof’ and b) ‘public safety must require the aforementioned suspension’ are PRESENT.220 and the security of the State…” and that “public safety requires immediate and effective action” . Nueva Ecija. and like the limitations and restrictions imposed upon the legislative department. Bulacan. Pampanga. mass destruction of property. insurrection. Quezon. Aurora.Several people were apprehended and detained including the petitioners on “reasonable belief” that they had “participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion. WON the Petitioners are covered by PN 889. etc) and the threat it poses to the public safety. insurrection. 889-C and 889-D lifted the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in some provinces. restricted (more so because it is stated in the negative – “shall not be… except”). insurrection. undertaking.August 30.” . According to intelligence reports. with all the 52 “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion. Lanao. when the public safety requires it. . within proper bounds. 1971 – Proclamation 889-A amended Proclamation 889. The emergence and establishment of CPP NPA is proof of the existence of a rebellion. cities. The grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute no unqualified.“lawless elements xxx joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of staging. October 4. confined. waging and are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion xxx” b. he may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus. The authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is circumcised. WON the President act arbitrarily in issuing PN 889 4. or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. and the Executive is supreme within its own sphere. Quirino. etc).Proclamations 889-B.

unfair and contemptuous. As to petitioners David. Decision President did not act arbitrarily. and had reason to feel that the situation was critical. The President did not act arbitrarily. Fernando dissents only as to the fourth issue. September 17. Jr. Diokno filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition.December 28. The suspension of the privilege of the writ in the entire Philippines was justified as he could not have ascertained the places to be excluded at the time of the proclamation. proclaiming a state of Martial Law in the Philippines .Pending resolution of these Petitions. their release may not be ordered by the SC. The PN 889 being valid. Felipe. L33982. del Rosario and Sison. were released from custody on different dates under a “Conditional Release” . immediately effected the arrest of the herein petitioners .Secretary of National Defense. L34013. he consulted his advisers. imputing delay in the disposition of his case. he cannot “reasonably expect to get justice in this case” .Petitioners sought relief from Court. and he gradually lifted the suspension. filing petitions for habeas corpus .The Court denied Diokno’s motion with a vote of 5 to 7 . AQUINO V PONCE ENRILE MAKALINTAL. Jose Diokno).Respondents filed their “Return to Writ and Answer to the Petition” and prayed that the petition be dismissed . L34039. CFI to conduct investigation and issue warrants of arrest or order of release as to petitioners still under detention. . 1972. All concur. 1972. petitioners. He had possession of intelligence reports. 1974 FACTS . to be issued by a judge after a finding of probable cause. de los Reyes.September 22. 4. That is to comply with the constitutional requirement against unreasonable search and seizure. Benigno Aquino. they have been charged with violation of the AntiSubversion Act/ accused of overt acts covered by the PN 889.The respondents opposed the motion on the grounds that there is a public interest in the decision of these cases and that the reasons given for the motion to withdraw are untrue. 1973. Marcos signed Proclamation No. Some petitioners were already released and with respect to them. to order their release. 2 was signed by the President which provided an order to the Secretary of National Defense to arrest and take into custody the individuals named in the list for being participants in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the government by force . the issue is moot and academic. Juan Ponce Enrile. . 1081. SEPARATE OPINION FERNANDO [dissent] .September 21. but the CFI is directed to act with utmost dispatch in conducting the preliminary investigation of the charges and to issue corresponding warrants of arrest if probable cause is found or otherwise .221 3. and Sen. General Order No. Olivar.To keep them in confinement after ordinary processes of the law are to be availed of is to ignore the safeguard of the Bill of Rights that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.Mars Veloso 1C. PN 889 not unconstitutional. and asseverating that because of the decision of the Court in the Ratification Cases and the action of the Members of the Court in taking an oath to support the New Constitution. Petitions L33964. L33965. except for two (Sen. . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.I find it difficult to accept the conclusion that the six petitioners still under detention should be set free.5 Page No. still under detention. NO. L34265 dismissed. President Ferdinand E.The petitioners ought not to be further deprived of their liberty in the absence of a warrant of arrest for whatever offense they may be held to answer. L34004.

Teehankee. Muňoz-Palma. J. concurs in the dismissals in a separate opinion.. concur. . Antonio. A showing that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be and obstacle to judicial inquiry. Zaldivar. explains his reasons for his concurrence in the dismissal of all the petitions. The question before the judiciary is not the correctness but the reasonableness of the action taken. in the light of the credible information furnished by the President. files a separate opinion. Teehankee.5 Page No.” . FERNANDO [justiciable] .Referred to Lansang vs. J. Garcia where the Court sustained the presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as there was no showing of arbitrariness in the exercise of a prerogative belonging to the executive. it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. not to supplant the Executive. J. the judiciary has the duty to look into its validity. Fernando. WON petitioners were illegally detained entitling them the relief of habeas corpus HELD All petitions dismissed except those which have been previously withdrawn by the respective petitioners with the approval of this Court.. in a separate opinion.cited Lansang vs. Necessarily then. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. SEPARATE OPINION WON the Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation of martial law (justiciability of the martial law proclamation) CASTRO [justiciable] . Esguerra.Mars Veloso 1C. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. WON Proclamation No.The judicial department can determine the existence of conditions for the exercise of the President’s powers and is not bound by the recitals of his proclamation... Castro. Fernando.Makalintal. . Where private rights are affected. JJ. Makasiar. or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the . Fernandez. But whether in the circumstances obtaining public safety requires the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law is initially for the President to decide. the function of the Court is merely to check. was arbitrary.222 .. WON the Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation of martial law 2. concurs in a separate opinion.The range of permissible inquiry to be conducted by the Court is necessarily limited to the ascertainment of whether or not such a suspension. Chief Justice Concepcion in his opinion: In the exercise of such authority. the judiciary merely acting as a check on the exercise of such authority. J. concurs and dissents in a separate opinion. Aquino and Barredo voted to grant Diokno’s motion to withdraw petition ISSUES 1. Muñoz Palma and Aquino. Barredo. Garcia where the Court asserted the power to inquire into the “existence of the factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in order to determine the sufficiency thereof. Its improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy.. 1081 is valid given then the circumstances required by the Constitution for the proclamation of a state of martial law 3. J. The President’s findings as to necessity is persuasive upon the courts.The action taken by any or both the political branches whether in the form of a legislative act or an executive order could be tested in court.

both under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department. 2. if these are by their very nature capable of unquestionable demonstration.Mars Veloso 1C. since the requirements for the exercise of these powers are the same and are provided in the very same clause] in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof.' Far from being full and plenary. the President is the specifically assigned protector of the safety. involve the reception of evidence to be weighed against those on which the President has acted. 'imminent danger thereof-'when the public safety requires it. within proper bounds. the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed. the frames of our Constitution could not have intended to engage in such a wasteful exercise in futility. establish and define the extent.It is entirely up to the Court to determine and define its own constitutional prerogatives vis-à-vis the proclamation and the existing martial law situation. And.5 Page No. 1. The Constitution expressly provides that “in case of invasion. In the same way the Supreme Court is the designated guardian of the Constitution. by providing that '(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended x x x.While a declaration of martial law is not absolutely conclusive. confined and restricted.' It is only by way of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege 'in cases of invasion. These factors and the aforementioned setting or conditions mark. . the Court’s inquiry into its constitutional sufficiency may not. VII of the Constitution. nor may it extend to the investigation of what evidence the President had before him. it postulates the former in the negative. TEEHANKEE [justiciable] "it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases [stated in the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or placing the country under martial law as the case may be. insurrection.. not to exercise the power vested in him or the determine the wisdom of his act. 3. beyond which it does not exist. the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. is limited and conditional.223 constitutional limits of his jurisdiction. 4. Such inquiry must be limited to what is undisputed in the record and to what accords or does not accord with facts of judicial notice. but also. contrary to what is implied in Lansang."32 The Court stressed therein that "indeed.The inquiry which the Constitution contemplates for the determination of the constitutional sufficiency of a proclamation of martial law by the President should not go beyond facts of judicial notice and those that may be stated in the proclamation. like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative department. The Judiciary provisions of the Constitution point to the Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter of all conflicts as to what the Constitution or any part thereof means. the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless. as regards the time when and the place where it may be exercised. as well as an exception thereto. the confines and the limits of said power. What is more. The precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule. Surely. evidently to stress its importance. or rebellion'-or under Art. The authority conferred upon by the Constitution. insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof. given the reasons for the declaration and its avowed objectives. This means among other things that all the powers of the government and of all its officials from the President down to the lowest emanate from it." BARREDO [qualified vote: justiciable] . This responsibility of the President is his alone and may not be shared by any other Department. the Executive may place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law” . tranquility and territorial integrity of the nation. adherence thereto and compliance therewith may. be inquired into by the courts of justice. in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist. when the public safety requires it. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence. Otherwise.

Whereas the Bill of Rights of the 1935 Constitution explicitly enjoins that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended. Section 10 (2) thereof. under Section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1. without any limitation or qualification. And when the Chief Executive has decided that conditions exist justifying the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. is the sole judge of the existence of war or insurrection. MAKASIAR [political question] AQUINO [political question] FERNANDEZ [political question] . It is similarly explicit in specifying the occasions for its exercise. insurrection or invasion exists. In the same manner that the Executive power conferred upon the Executive by the Constitution is complete.The power to proclaim martial law is exclusively vested in the President. 6. These doctrines are rooted on pragmatic considerations and sound reasons of public policy. when the public Safety requires it. declares that a state of rebellion. ANTONIO [political question] . .Mars Veloso 1C. 1902. such person is to be considered the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts" has been recognized by all courts and "has never been disputed by any respectable authority.The right of a government to maintain its existence is the most pervasive aspect of sovereignty. and by reason thereof the public safety requires the suspension of the privileges of habeas corpus. and as being essential to the exercise of its functions" . since the deprivation it enjoins is only that which is without due process of law and laws are always enacted in the national interest or to promote and safeguard the general welfare. were generally considered to belong to every government as such. courts will presume that such conditions continue to exist until the same authority has decided that such conditions no longer exist." . this declaration is held conclusive upon the judicial department of the government. there is no similar injunction whether expressed or implied against the declaration of martial law. at the time of adopting the Constitution. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. on the President of the Philippines. and when it declares either of these emergencies to exist. its action is not subject to review or liable to be controlled by the judicial department of the State. liberty.5 Page No.These powers which are to be exercised for the nation's protection and security have been lodged by the Constitution under Article VII.224 5." The political department according to Chief Justice Taney in Martin v. implicit in the Constitution itself. insurrection. or imminent danger thereof. from external as well as internal threats. "In case of invasion. or property without due process of law readily reveals that the Constitution’s concern for individual rights and liberties is not entirely above that for the national interests. Even the basic guarantee of protection of life. is the very whole of that power. Baker. he (the President as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines) may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.The Constitution is sufficiently explicit in locating the power to proclaim martial law. . so also. the Court should abstain from interfering with the Executive’s Proclamation. or rebellion. Mott.Cited Barcelon vs. To protect the nation's continued existence. 7. It enunciated the principle that when the GovernorGeneral with the approval of the Philippine Commission. the government "is invested with all those inherent and implied powers which. . total and unlimited.Political questions are not per se beyond the Court’s jurisdiction… but that as a matter of policy. The "doctrine that whenever the Constitution or a statute gives a discretionary power to any person. Baker : The existing doctrine at the time of the framing and adoption of the 1935 Constitution was that of Barcelon v. The proclamation and its attendant circumstances therefore form a political question. the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and the inferior courts. who is clothed with exclusive authority to determine the occasion on which the powers shall be called forth.

Whether or not there is constitutional basis for the President’s action is for him to decide alone. Much less does it have the power nor should it even exercise the power. orders.I maintain that Proclamation No. 1081 is valid given then the circumstances required by the Constitution for the proclamation of a state of martial law CASTRO [valid] .Granted that Proclamation No. binding. Garcia MUNOZ-PALMA [justiciable] With Lansang. assuming its existence.Unless this Court decides that every act of the executive and of the legislature is justiciable there can be no clearer example of a political question than Proclamation No. to nullify a proclamation of the President on a matter exclusively vested in him by the Constitution and on issues so politically and emotionally charged. Its function is to determine whether or not a question is indeed justiciable. WON Proclamation No. or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land. it is still valid because the president has not acted arbitrarily in issuing it. that the veracity or sufficiency of its factual bases cannot be inquired into by the Courts and that the question presented by the petitions is political in nature and not justiciable. . issued. or rebellion.The so called “open court” theory does not apply to the Philippine situation because our 1935 and 1973 Constitutions expressly authorize the declaration of martial law even where the danger to public safety arises merely from the imminence of invasion.5 Page No. that: All proclamations. insurrection. instructions. Baker over Lansang vs. 1081. The people have entrusted to him the estimation that the perils are so ominous and threatening that this ultimate weapon of our duly constituted government must be used. and acts promulgated. Our people have entrusted to the President through a specific provision of the fundamental law the awesome responsibility to wield a powerful weapon. . and shall remain valid. . and effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution. what with the universally recognized insidious nature of Communist subversion and its overt operations FERNANDO [valid] While it is beyond question that the 1973 Constitution stipulates.225 . Moreover. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. insurrection or rebellion but also of “imminent danger” thereof. that responsibility and duty of the Court must be preserved and fulfilled at all costs if We want to maintain its role as the last bulwark of democracy in this country. ESGUERRA [political question] . The Court's function in such cases is to assume jurisdiction for the purpose of finding out whether the issues constitute a political question or not.Ruled Barcelon vs. the highest Court of the land takes upon itself the grave responsibility of checking executive action and saving the nation from an arbitrary and despotic exercise of the presidential power granted under the Constitution to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or proclaim martial law. legal.Our Constitution authorizes the proclamation of martial law in cases not only of actual invasion. unless modified. 1081 is constitutional. It is not given the authority by the Constitution to expand or limit the scope of its use depending on the allegations of litigants. in a transitory provision.Mars Veloso 1C. It is not authorized by the Constitution to say that martial law may be proclaimed in Isabela and Sulu but not in Greater Manila. . decrees. It is the exercise by the highest elective official of the land of a supreme political duty exclusively entrusted to him by the Constitution. the theory is too simplistic for our day. . valid and binding. 1081 is not political but justiciable.The Supreme Court was not given the jurisdiction to share the determination of the occasions for its exercise.

As the danger to public safety has not abated. as dictated by the very proclamation itself.5 Page No. An arbitrary act is one that arises from an unrestrained exercise of the will. This is self-evident. one which is not founded on a fair or substantial reason. The test is again arbitrariness as defined in Lansang. The arrest and detention of those contributing to the disorder and especially of those helping or otherwise giving aid and comfort to the enemy are indispensable. it carries with it a presumption of validity. I cannot say that the continued detention of Diokno and Aquino and the restrictions on the personal freedoms of the other petitioners are arbitrary. is without adequate determining principle. or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly. caprice. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. the arrest and detention of those reasonably believed to be engaged in the disorder or in fomenting it is well nigh beyond questioning. TEEHANKEE [no pronouncement] BARREDO [valid] The proclamation had merely put the Constitution in a state of anesthesia. the respondents have justified the arrest and detention of the petitioners on the ground of reasonable belief in their complicity in the rebellion and insurrection.The imposition of martial law automatically carries with it the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any event. because the proclamation of martial law was the result of conditions and events. the Presidential order of arrest and detention cannot be assailed as deprivation of liberty without due process. orders. Except Diokno and Aquino. MUNOZ-PALMA [valid] The extreme measure taken by the President to place the entire country under martial law was necessary. . The President's action was neither capricious nor arbitrary. and solely dependent on the actor's will. instructions.Mars Veloso 1C. not of his own making. although subject to defined restrictions regarding personal movement and expression of views. which undoubtedly endangered the public safety and led him to conclude that the situation was critical enough to warrant the exercise of his power under the Constitution to proclaim martial law WON petitioners were illegally detained entitling them the relief of habeas corpus CASTRO [legal] . if it continued for an unreasonable length of time. all the petitioners have been released from custody. since a major surgery is needed to save the nation’s life. FERNANDO [proclamation of martial law does not automatically carry the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus] It is not to be denied that where such a state of affairs could be traced to the wishes of the President himself.The primary and fundamental purpose of martial law is to maintain order and to insure the success of the battle against the enemy by the most expeditious and efficient means without loss of time and with the minimum effort.226 revoked. or personal preference of the actor. or other acts of the incumbent President. if martial law is to mean anything at all. Such is not the case with the act of the President. While the detention of petitioners could have been validly ordered. nonrational. . decrees. just as I am not prepared to say that the continued imposition of martial rule is unjustified.In the cases at bar. BARREDO [legal] . then his release may be sought in a habeas corpus proceeding. or superseded by subsequent proclamations.Given the validity of the proclamation of martial law. .

that.It should be important to note that as a consequence of the proclamation of martial law.5 Page No. and (c) placing the country or a part thereof under martial law. 2 dated September 22. (b) suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. etc. and one mode does not necessarily encompass the other.First.and the courts are open to issue the writ.The PNP Chief. 1(14). 2-A. the privilege of the writ cannot be suspended by mere implication. provides specifically for three different modes of executive action in times of emergency. in which event the privilege of the writ is necessarily suspended for the simple reason that there is no court to issue the writ.Second. the so-called Commander-in-Chief clause. the civil courts are closed. The police visibility patrol in urban . . the proclamation of martial law did not carry with it the automatic suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus] . the Chief of Staff of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order. VII. from the very nature of the writ of habeas corpus which as stressed in the early portion of this Opinion is a "writ of liberty" and the "most important and most immediately available safeguard of that liberty". Sec. with the declaration of martial law. viz. In the latter two instances even if the causes for the executive action are the same. . ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. still the exigencies of the situation may warrant the suspension of the privilege of the writ but not a proclamation of martial law and vice versa. Authoritative writers on the subject view the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus as an incident. as amended by General Order No. III. 12. but an important incident of a declaration of martial law. the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been impliedly suspended. IV.In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila. 10(2). . 1935 Constitution.. 1972. Sec. formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000. through Police Superintendent Edgar Aglipay. or Art. there is a total collapse of the civil authorities. 1973 Constitution. Sec. (a) calling out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawlessness. the Chief of Staff of the AFP. in a verbal directive. the arrest and detention of petitioners. IBP V ZAMORA KAPUNAN. may not now be assailed as unconstitutional and arbitrary. 1972 of the President. 15. 1973 Constitution) categorically states that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except for causes therein specified. 1935 Constitution. . August 15. and a military government takes over.Mars Veloso 1C. there can be an automatic suspension of the privilege of the writ when.227 ANTONIO [legal] . President Estrada.The Court is precluded from inquiring into the legality of arrest and detention of petitioners. The Bill of Rights (Art. Having concluded that the Proclamation of Martial Law on September 21. however. dated September 26.The Secretary of National Defense. Art. 1972 by the President of the Philippines and its continuance are valid and constitutional. 2000 FACTS . and the proclamation of martial law is not one of those enumerated. . which contains the ff: > Purpose: for the suppression of crime prevention and other serious threats to national security > Situation: Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not only by ordinary criminals but also by organized syndicates whose members include active and former police/military personnel. IX. pursuant to General Order No.Third. either under Art. Sec. FERNANDEZ [the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is ipso facto suspended upon a proclamation of martial law] MUNOZ-PALMA [not legal. is not the case with us at present because the martial law proclaimed by the President upholds the supremacy of the civil over the military authority. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.

Mars Veloso 1C. monitoring and assessing the security situation. > Mission: sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include those that are well-trained. 2000. Araneta Shopping Center. namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case. Sec. It also makes the military more powerful than what it should really be under the Constitution. The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case. Areas for deployment: Monumento Circle.The President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum. structure and procedures for the integrated planning. 3). disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/military personnel > Concept in Joint Visibility Patrol Operations: a. Finally. effective and holistic approach in addressing crime prevention. the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. ISSUES 1. WON petitioner has legal standing 2. a. Invoking his powers as Commander-in Chief under Sec. and deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to perform civilian functions of the government. WON the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review a.228 areas will reduce the incidence of crimes specially those perpetrated by active or former police/military personnel. coordinating. Sec. Ratio 2: When the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public. null and void and unconstitutional because no emergency situation obtains in Metro Manila as would justify the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work (violates Art 2. and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. although the primary responsibility over Internal Security Operations still rest upon the AFP. Principle of integration of efforts: work cohesively and unify efforts to ensure a focused. the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only. addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief. SM City North Edsa. VII of the Constitution. c. A provisional Task Force Tulungan shall be organized to provide the mechanism. The President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols. the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with. d. (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity. 18. SM Megamall. > Definition of locus standi + a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged .5 Page No. LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic Airport. the IBP filed petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Marines. deployment constitutes an insidious incursion by the military in a civilian function of government (violates Art. WON the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy. . On Judicial Review Ratio 1: When questions of constitutional significance are raised. . b. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.On January 17. (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question. the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. Art. He further stated that to heighten police visibility in the Metropolis. augmentation from the AFP is necessary. 16. Greenhills. dated 24 January 2000. Makati Commercial Center. Conducted jointly by the National Capital Region Police Office and the Philippine Marines to curb criminality in Metro Manila and to preserve the internal security of the state against insurgents and other serious threat to national security. 5). over the military and the civilian character of the PNP HELD 1.

not the legality. or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion. Carr) prominent on the surface of any case held to be a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.There is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved.(Baker v. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters. there is no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. or to act at all in contemplation of law. It has not shown any specific injury.Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive department. by interpretation or construction. which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned government act.5 Page No. VII.Congress may revoke proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. 1 of the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling out power is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of the said provision. an interest in issue affected by the decree. Likewise. or a mere incidental interest + gist: whether a party alleges such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions > The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. There is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces . There is a clear textual commitment under Art.grave abuse of discretion: capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines Definition of political question . is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case > IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Sec. or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government.concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom. 18.Mars Veloso 1C. . it may not. Ratio 4: When political questions are involved. be extended to other matters. if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to be a political question .229 + “interest” means a material interest. . or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it. as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility . . the Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. 2. conditional or subject to limitations. Cuenco) questions which are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity. of a particular act or measure being assailed .(Tanada v. the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected. or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one question Ratio 3: When the grant of power is qualified. is justiciable —the problem being one of legality or validity. par. or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made. while undoubtedly true.

executive practice. his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody . Whenever a statute gives discretionary power to any person. .(Alejandrino v.Fr. which acts are performed within the discretion of the other department. Purisima. with its very limited machinery .real authority belongs to the PNP Deployment of the Marines does not unmake the civilian character of the police force .limited participation by the Marines . sanitary inspections. Bernas: graduated power of the President as Commander-inChief. The exercise of this discretion is conclusive upon the courts. Buena. unbroken. are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.the real authority in these operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution.Systematic. Davide.the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the patrols. and not with the military . Pardo. or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government They have two aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity and (2) matters which have been specifically delegated to some other department or particular office of the government.since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP.230 . when he exercises this lesser power of calling on the armed forces. Vitug.(Barcelon v. Mendoza.Mars Veloso 1C. On the other hand. etc.Political questions are defined as those questions which under the Constitution. in contrast with the judicial department.10 concur (Kapunan. The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of the police force Constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement . Melo. Baker) Under our form of government. Red Cross. Ynares-Santiago. conduct of census work. long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. it will presume that the conditions continue until the same authority decide that they no longer exist. information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts.Military assistance in: elections. there can be no “insidious incursion” of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution Military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction . the power of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend an appointive member from the exercise of . the President has a vast intelligence network to gather information. De Leon) .Besides the absence of textual standards that the Court may use to judge necessity.Mutual support and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities. the PNP. the statute constitutes him the sole judge of the existence of those facts. one department has no authority to inquire into the acts of another.5 Page No. with discretionary power to act. Quezon) Under the Jones Law. Once a determination is made by the executive and legislative departments that the conditions justifying the assailed acts exist. when he says it is necessary. Panganiban.1 on official leave (Bellosillo) SEPARATE OPINION PUNO . Quisumbing) . there can be no appointment to a civilian position to speak of . thru its civil and military branches. are better situated to obtain information about peace and order from every corner of the nation. . never before questioned . yet. Gonzaga-Reyes. The executive branch. to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts. relief and rescue operations. not derogation of civilian supremacy Decision Petition dismissed . administration of the Phil.5 concur in the result (Puno. conduct of licensure exams.

Each department has an exclusive field within which it can perform its part within certain discretionary limits.(Osmena v.(Cunanan v Tan.(Arnault v. .5 Page No. which are mandatory in nature.(Vera v.(Abueva v. and with full confidence that he will perform such duties as his judgment dictates . It is within the province of the political department and not the judicial department of government to determine when war is at the end .In sum. Chief of Staff.(Severino v. The Philippine Legislature or any branch thereof cannot be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process . As a constituent assembly.Mars Veloso 1C. Governor-General) When the Legislature conferred upon the Governor-General powers and duties.(Tolentino v. Jr. The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. it ruled that it was not intended by the Constitution that one branch of government could encroach upon the field of duty of the other. Pendatun) The Court did not interfere with Congress’power to discipline its members .(Mabanag v. Wood) Under the principle of separation of powers. in the legal sense. The Supreme Court does not possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular action. still continues or has terminated. Balagtas) The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the legislature is a necessary concomitant of the legislative process and the legislature’s exercise of its discretionary authority is not subject to judicial interference .(Manalang v. and this power continues to exist for the preservation of peace and domestic tranquility of the nation . .231 his office. AFP) As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.(Untal v. Lopez Vito) A proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity .The Court hewed to the same line as regards the exercise of Executive Power . Avelino) Legislature has the inherent right to determine who shall be admitted to its membership . it did so for the reason that he was in a better position to know the needs of the country than any other member of the executive department. Comelec) Acts of a constitutional convention called for the purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution are at par with acts of Congress acting as a constituent assembly . acting as a constituent assembly in proposing amendments to the Constitution violates the Constitution was held to be justiciable and not a political issue. Tiaco) The President’s inherent power to deport undesirable aliens is universally denominated as political. Cuenco) The Senate is not clothed with “full discretionary authority” in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations. the members of Congress derive their authority from the fundamental law and they do not have the final say on whether their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits .) The Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Constitution and its power does not come from Congress but from the Constitution . Quitoriano) The appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President upon which no limitations may be imposed by Congress except those resulting from the need of securing concurrence of the Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of the limited legislative power to prescribe qualifications to the given appointive office .(Tanada v. the President has the power to determine whether war.(Gonzales v. Comelec) The question of whether or not Congress. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Cuenco) The Court could assume jurisdiction over the controversy in light of the subsequent events justifying intervention among which was the existence of a quorum .(Avelino v.(Forbes v. this Court brushed aside the political question doctrine and assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionallyimposed limits on the exercise of powers conferred upon the Legislature .

. invasion or rebellion. Whether or not there is compliance with these parameters is a justiciable issue and is not a political question. The extent of the power.(Montenegro v. and (2) when the public safety requires it. may call out the armed forces subject to two conditions: (1) whenever it becomes necessary.(Javellana v.232 .(Garcia-Padilla v. the Court must inquire into every phase and aspect of a person’s detention from the moment he was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition . Enrile) By the power of judicial review. Jr. Enrile) The Court upheld the President’s declaration of martial law. Sec. the President must be given absolute control for the very life of the nation and government is in peril . The power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is neither absolute nor unqualified because the Constitution sets limits on the exercise of executive discretion on the matter. MENDOZA [concur and dissent] . Garcia) The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was not a political question.5 Page No.It is clear that the President. was a political question . Enrile) The issuance of the Presidential Commitment Order by the President was not subject to judicial inquiry. as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Philippines. to ascertain whether the President has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction. the intent to be arrived at is that of the people.Mars Veloso 1C. not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. does not constitute grave abuse of discretion that would now warrant an exercise by the Supreme Court of its extraordinary power as so envisioned by the fundamental law. which may be inquired into by courts is defined by these limitations. Jr. a majority also ruled that the decisive issue of whether the 1973 Constitution had come into force and effect. but from the people who ratified it.The judgment on the substantive constitutional issues raised by petitioner must await an actual case involving real parties with injuries to show as a result of the operation of the challenged executive action .When private justiciable rights are involved in a suit. They define the constitutional parameters of the calling out power.The language of Art. insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof. v. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. v. . . VITUG The act of the President in simply calling on the armed forces of the Philippines. Undeniably. an executive prerogative. to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols in the metropolis. Executive Secretary) While a majority of the Court held that the issue of whether or not the 1973 Constitution was justiciable.(Aquino. the Court must not refuse to assume jurisdiction even though questions of extreme political importance are necessarily involved. These limits are: (1) that the privilege must not be suspended except only in cases of invasion. Castaneda) The authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring the suspension of the privilege belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive on the courts. with or without constitutional ratification. and (2) to prevent or suppress lawless violence. in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for the suspension shall exist. the Court was almost evenly divided. 1 clearly gives the Court the power to strike down acts amounting to grave abuse of discretion of both the legislative and executive branches of government .(Morales. .On the use of Bernas’ opinion: The Constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed it. .(Lansang v. VIII. The function of the Court is not to supplant but merely to check the Executive. these conditions lay down the sine qua requirement for the exercise of the power and the objective sought to be attained by the exercise of the power. In times of war or national emergency. On whether the validity of the imposition of martial law was a political or justiciable question.

427 and General Order No.August 1. 2003 – President lifted the declaration. > Social Justice Society (SJS) as Filipino citizens.Only a party injured by the operation of the governmental action challenged is in the best position to aid the Court in determining the precise nature of the problem presented.Mars Veloso 1C.5 Page No. . They demanded the resignation of GMA. .Dismiss suit on the ground of lack of standing of petitioner and the consequent lack of an actual case or controversy SANLAKAS V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TINGA. if it is capable of repetition yet evading review .233 . we do not have evidence on the effect of military presence in malls and commercial centers . and functions were allegedly affected o Declaration is a superfluity and is actually an exercise of emergency powers and therefore is a usurpation of the power of the Congress in Art 6. otherwise moot. 2004 FACTS . Pimentel o Issuances are unwarranted. WON issue is justiciable given mootness of the issue and legal standing of the parties b. was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. Sec 23 par 2 > Sen. These are purely executive powers. The President. Art 7 does not require declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces o There is no sufficient factual basis for an indefinite period since Oakwood occupation had ceased.Oakwood occupation ended in the evening after negotiations. WON issuances of the President are valid HELD 1.PARTIES > Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PD) o Sec 18. Article 6. the President issued Proclamation No.Justiciable even if moot . law professors and bar reviewers o Declaration is constitutional anomaly that confuses because overzealous public officers acting pursuant to the proclamation are liable to violate the constitutional rights of citizens o Circumvention of the report requirement in Sec 18. (2) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of. commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from proclamation of martial law o Presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President > Rep. illegal.Later that day. WON petitioners have legal standing 2. vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18. Article 7 as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2).A citizen’s suit challenging the constituti0onality of governmental action requires that (1) the petitioner must have suffered an “injury in fact” of an actual or imminent nature.Courts will decide a question. . stormed into Oakwood apartments in Makati. and abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no constitutional basis > Solicitor-General o Case has become moot because of the lifting of the declaration ISSUES 1. powers. Suplico et al as citizens and members of House of Representatives o Their rights. 2003 – Some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of AFP.July 27. . armed with ammunitions and explosives. Perez – mootness preclude the Court from addressing its Constitutionality .Because of the absence of parties with real and substantial interest to protect. in declaring state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces. and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action by this Court . . 4 both declaring “a state of rebellion” and calling out the AFP to suppress the rebellion. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Art 7.Lacson v. taxpayers. February 3. . Defense Secretary and the PNP Chief.

US Constitutional history: commander-in-chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and presidential oath of office . President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.SJS as taxpayers and citizens have no legal standing because there was no illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation 2. whenever it becomes necessary. Constitution Association v. 3..Sanlakas. orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines. . .Declaration of state of rebellion does not amount to declaration of martial law. 2006 FACTS .234 . . and pursuant to Proclamation No. O. thus: NOW. to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines. I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO. 2006.Art 7. the President issued G. . Enriquez) . .calling out power. . I. by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18. and Commanderin-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines. No.power to suspend writ of habeas corpus. Executive powers .The declaration of state of rebellion only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. thus: NOW. . the same premise as PP1017). These are not required in calling-out power (IBP v. PM.President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity of the exercise of such power. .The declaration is premised military and police intelligence containing concerted efforts of Left and Right wing factions to bring down the Arroyo Government.On the same day. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No. do hereby . by virtue of the powers vested in me under the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines. 2006. . People’s organization status would not vest them with the requisite personality to question the validity of the presidential issuances (Kilosbayan v. May 3. Morato) .Only Rep Suplico et al and Sen Pimentel have legal standing because when an act of the Executive injures the institution of the Congress and causes a derivative but substantial injury.” and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief. 2. THEREFORE.2 and 3 require concurrence of actual invasion or rebellion AND that public safety requires the exercise of such power. . Sec 18 – Sequence of graduated powers: 1. then any member can file suit (Phil. Zamora) . prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees.On February 24. .Mars Veloso 1C. . Presidential issuances are valid .rebellion. The Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but with first and foremost. 1017 dated February 24. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. . President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. and as provided in Section 17. THEREFORE. 5 implementing PP 1017 (hence. DAVID V MACAPAGAL-ARROYO SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.Declaration cannot diminish or violate constitutionality protected rights (Lacson) .power to declare martial law. . There is no proof that the President acted without factual basis. and SJS have no legal standing because they did not obtain any direct injury from the governmental act that is being challenged. as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I.President’s authority to declare state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and at the same time draws strength from her commander-in-chief powers .It does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress.

” [5] On February 17. I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP. a bomb was found and detonated at the PMA parade ground. not only by going to the streets in protest.Mars Veloso 1C. Danilo Lim. 2006.5 Page No. audio cassette cartridges. Found in his possession were two (2) flash disks containing minutes of the meetings between members of the Magdalo Group and the National People’s Army (NPA).235 call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP). a tape recorder. to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. to “disavow” any defection. the President lifted PP 1017. Lt.[7] Prior to his arrest. Thus. Saycon also phoned a man code-named Delta. and copies of subversive documents. 2006.O. Taguig City. Lim said “it was all systems go for the planned movement against Arroyo.O. Nelly Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported that Pastor Saycon. but also by wearing red bands on our left arms. Jr. as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP. members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny. longtime Arroyo critic. Let us demonstrate our disgust. to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. No.S. 5. . THERE WAS NO REFUTATION FROM PETITIONERS’ COUNSELS. President Cory Aquino’s brother. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). he immediately ordered SAF Commanding General Marcelino Franco. called a U. the authorities got hold of a document entitled “Oplan Hackle I ” which detailed plans for bombings and attacks during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City. The latter promptly obeyed and issued a public statement: “All SAF units are under the effective control of responsible and trustworthy officers with proven integrity and unquestionable loyalty. Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento. at the height of the celebration. On February 21. San Juan announced through DZRH that the “Magdalo’s D-Day would be on February 24.Special Action Force were planning to defect. escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. 2006. Lt. 2006. ARGUMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G. In a public statement. Saycon identified him as B/Gen. 2006. diskettes. at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco. businessmen and mid-level government officials plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo administration. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. 2006. During the oral arguments held on March 7. they vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. The next day. exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these petitions had been filed. Commander of the Army’s elite Scout Ranger. Generoso Senga.[6] Upon the advice of her security. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse in Batangas province. the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G. No.” On the same day. 5. PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP. The plot was to assassinate selected targets including some cabinet members and President Arroyo herself.On March 3. They called upon the people to “show and proclaim our displeasure at the sham regime. .”[8] B/Gen. Lawrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. 2006. leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA). government official about his group’s plans if President Arroyo is ousted. On January 17.” On February 23. and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. SIGNIFICANTLY. respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers. the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I.[4] They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger. President Arroyo decided not to attend the Alumni Homecoming. that a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical mass and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo protests to be held on February 24.

hence. hurricane and similar occurrences. Querubin to return to the Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio. hastened by the economic difficulties suffered by the families of AFP officers and enlisted personnel who undertake counter-insurgency operations in the field. 171396.Mars Veloso 1C.5 Page No. (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law. spokesman for the National Democratic Front (NDF) at North Central Mindanao.000 Metro Manila radicals and 25. To protect the young students from any possible trouble that might break loose on the streets. No. challenged the CIDG’s act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of “censorship” or “prior restraint. and (3) they violate freedom of expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their .” They alleged that President Arroyo “gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence and a showing that there is necessity to do so. of rendering it to weaken and unable to rule that it will not take much longer to end it. Teodoro Casiño. NPA spokesman Gregorio “Ka Roger” Rosal declared: “The Communist Party and revolutionary movement and the entire people look forward to the possibility in the coming year of accomplishing its immediate task of bringing down the Arroyo regime.O. were breaking the chain of command to join the forces foist to unseat the President. And also the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front organizations to join 5. 171485. So is the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three (3) soldiers. No. 5 constitute “usurpation of legislative powers”.” They also claimed that the term “emergency” refers only to tsunami. it is probable that the President’s ouster is nearing its concluding stage in the first half of 2006.”[9] On the other hand. 171409.O. He immediately took custody of B/Gen. Senga has remained faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the chain of command. No. According to these two (2) officers. No.R. Lim and directed Col. the antiArroyo conservative political parties. NAFLU-KMU. petitioners KMU. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. plus the groups that have been reinforcing since June 2005. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress. David.[10] By midnight of February 23. and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press. there is “absolutely no emergency” that warrants the issuance of PP 1017. However. No. the President convened her security advisers and several cabinet members to assess the gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation.236 2005. Cesar Renerio. In G. Rafael Mariano. 5 are unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees. No.R. including Representatives Satur Ocampo. Respondents further claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan was also considered as additional factual basis for the issuance of PP 1017 and G. there was no way they could possibly stop the soldiers because they too. and their members averred that PP 1017 and G. typhoon.R.000 more from the provinces in mass protests. No. Earlier. the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work within the military and the police establishments in order to forge alliances with its members and key officials. 171483. and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP 1017 and G. the President suspended classes in all levels in the entire National Capital Region. Escudero.R. petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. She directed both the AFP and the PNP to account for all their men and ensure that the chain of command remains solid and undivided. 2006. petitioners Randolf S. coalitions. In G. Gen..” He claimed that with the forces of the national democratic movement. Liza Maza. petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. of speech and of assembly. and twenty one (21) other members of the House of Representatives. et al. Inc. “violation of freedom of expression” and “a declaration of martial law. publicly announced: “Anti-Arroyo groups within the military and police are growing rapidly. PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS In G. 5.O.” In G. (2) their issuance was without factual basis.

there is a grave violation of the Constitution. petitioner Alternative Law Groups. No. second. 171483 (KMU et al. and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing Substantive 3. (c) Section 23[19] of Article VI. Cadiz et al. No. 171424. WON Supreme Court can review the factual basis of PP 1017 4.R. Moreover.). PP 1017 does not violate the people’s right to free expression and redress of grievances. Constitutional Basis c. and the public.R. if: first.R. petitioners Jose Anselmo I.” In addition.” And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial Law. when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench. fourth. if: first. petitioners asserted that PP 1017 “goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised Administrative Code. it is not necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as respondent. involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar.” And lastly. all guaranteed under Article III. WON petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al. in G.In respondents’ Consolidated Comment. (b) Sections 1. No. 5 violates the Constitution.O. 171424 (Legarda). of assembly and of the press.[31] second. 171489. the petitions should be dismissed for being moot. she stated that these issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.R. the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. In G. NO. otherwise moot and academic.Courts will decide cases. 5 are “unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of expression. alleged that PP 1017 is an “arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers. 171483 (KMU et al. Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution. ISSUES Procedural 1. petitioners argued that “it amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency powers without congressional approval. G. the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Courts will decide cases. Inc. . and the public. PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis.[17] and 4[18] of Article III.5 Page No. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.[33] and fourth. and fifth.O. 171489 (Cadiz et al. [31] second. the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts.All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions.) have no legal standing. when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench. petitioner Loren B. 171485 (Escudero et al.” In this regard. WON the moot and academic principle precludes the Court from taking cognizance of the cases 2.[32] third. doctrines or rules.) and 171489 (Cadiz et al. Facial Challenge b.237 grievances.).). petitioners in G. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.[32] third. and (d) Section 17[20] of Article XII of the Constitution. No.). WON PP 1017 and G. Nos. In G. the bar. the bar. No.R.[33] and fourth. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G. otherwise moot and academic. the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved.O. 171400.Mars Veloso 1C. third.O. and in . No. No. 171400 (ALGI). including its cognate rights such as freedom of the press and the right to access to information on matters of public concern. the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public’s interest. the Solicitor General countered that: first..[16] 2. there is a grave violation of the Constitution. As Applied Challenge HELD Procedural 1.[34] Reasoning . 171400 (ALGI). 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.[34] . 5 are unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 4[15] of Article II. 5 are unconstitutional a. Nos.

. it is in the interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic rights. concerned citizens.” The present case falls right within this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice. v. 5. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. v. KMU’s assertion that PP 1017 and G. the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. 171409.R. the “real-party-in interest” is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.. .[61] Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines.[64] that when the issue concerns a public right. They also raised the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used. No. the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers.O. they failed to take into account the Chief Justice’s very statement that an otherwise “moot” case may still be decided “provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance. there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question. 3.[65] We take judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.Now.”[37] In private suits. petitioners. Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. as amended. . . 2. In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Moreover. . who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no legal . Inc. the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule as contained in Section 2. No. for taxpayers. Enriquez.In G. particularly David and Llamas. respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. [62] Basco v.238 the present petitions.O. No.In G. provided that the following requirements are met: 1. Panganiban’s Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. . or concerned citizens. (ALGI). Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. and legislators may be accorded standing to sue. the Solicitor General does not question their legal standing. 171483.R. The same holds true with petitioners in G. The requirement of Locus standi which is the right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question shall be set aside by the Court whenever it is shown that the case is of transcendental importance.[60] Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas. Tan. respondents’ contested actions are capable of repetition. for voters. Tuvera. Rightly so. is beyond doubt. and 5.[35] And lastly. it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws. 171485.In G. Certainly. No. Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Inc.By way of summary.R. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. No. voters. . on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early.The locus standi of petitioners in G. No.”[38] Succinctly put. there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. No. the application of the above principles to the present petitions.5 Page No. the petitions are subject to judicial review. there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional.[36] However. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation. YES. this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v.Mars Veloso 1C.R.In G.” Accordingly. or legislators. 171489. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of their members. No. 2. [63] and Tañada v. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.R. 171396. the cases involve constitutional issues. Taxpayers. Cadiz et al. the military and the police. 4.R. Inc. Executive Secretary. 171400.Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. Reasoning .

Like any other official. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No.O. Under the new definition of judicial power. Her submission that she has pending electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. SETTLED IS THE DOCTRINE THAT THE PRESIDENT. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment. “this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Her claim that she is a media personality will not likewise aid her because there was no showing that the enforcement of these issuances prevented her from pursuing her occupation.This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.In G. Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. This is the underlying legal tenet of the “liberality doctrine” on legal standing. . No. [66] the Court held that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more. Furthermore. the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. But considering once more the transcendental importance of the issue involved. However. DURING HIS TENURE OF OFFICE OR ACTUAL INCUMBENCY. the courts are authorized not only “to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. a relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the “PP 1017 cases. Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. to wit. 1017 and G. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch. this Court may relax the standing rules.It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power. IT IS NOT PROPER TO IMPLEAD PRESIDENT ARROYO AS RESPONDENT. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President.” . having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No.R. while undoubtedly true.[69] Substantive 3. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.” This ruling is based on Section 1. is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case.[67] MAY NOT BE SUED IN ANY CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CASE. The fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. The petitions thus call for the application of the “transcendental importance” doctrine. However. this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi. Zamora. To paraphrase Justice Laurel. the discretion of the political departments of the government. 5. However. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. No. No. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or result of her case. The President’s “calling-out” power is a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. No. She can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.5 Page No. hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.Mars Veloso 1C. only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.” The latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory.Incidentally.239 standing.O. [81] It . AND THERE IS NO NEED TO PROVIDE FOR IT IN THE CONSTITUTION OR LAW. 5. .O. the Head of State. 1017 and G.” but also “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. 171424. this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. he remains accountable to the people[68] but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment. in view of the transcendental importance of the issue. .

Facial Challenge.” to be used “sparingly and only as a last resort. and that (3) the Court has no other alternative remedies available.” Undoubtedly.”[107] The reason for this is obvious. section 1 a. constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus. the Courts shall have authority to inquire into the factual basis of such exercise to determine whether it was within the constitutionally permissible limits or whether grave abuse of discretion attended its exercise.[82] . (This interpretation was based on Article VIII. Reasoning Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its “overbreadth. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence.[108] .However. petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.5 Page No.Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine.Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power. Article III of the Constitution and sent a “chilling effect” to the citizens.240 speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty. then “this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. it is said that a litigant may challenge . but arbitrariness.” and is “generally disfavored.Second.” Thus. And like overbreadth. Salerno. A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others. In United States v. the standard laid down is not correctness. a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully. by way of proof. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. (2) that there can be no instance that the assailed law may be valid. lawless violence. the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases. facial invalidation of laws is considered as “manifestly strong medicine. First and foremost. by issuing PP 1017.” but that “the President did not act arbitrarily. using the overbreadth doctrine.. Moreover. is totally bereft of factual basis. in other situations not before the Court. since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Facial invalidation of laws (overbreadth doctrine) shall not be resorted to in the absence of clear showing that (1) the law involves the exercise of free speech. to support his assertion. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017. Notwithstanding the discretionary nature of the constitutional exercise of the President of his/her calling out of power.[83] It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis” and that if he fails. .” . . it is also an analytical tool for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases. i. For one. “judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct. insurrection and rebellion are considered “harmful” and “constitutionally unprotected conduct.Mars Veloso 1C.” They claim that its enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4. is uncalled for.”[110] It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. .A facial review of PP 1017. a law shall be facially invalid only if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that “reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful.And third. 4. Here. YES.[104] the US Supreme Court held that “we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment” (freedom of speech).e. . with supporting reports forming part of the records.Related to the “overbreadth” doctrine is the “void for vagueness doctrine” which holds that “a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. absent any contrary allegations.

Owing to her Office’s vast intelligence network. PP 1017 is more than that. which provides: SEC. Reasoning Calling-out Power .” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence. – Proclamations.The ordinance power of the President shall not include the power to make “decrees” with the same force and effect as those issued by President Marcos. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary. in the words of Sanlakas. as Commander-in-Chief. (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship. a “sequence” of graduated powers. a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers.President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest. . which includes the power to enforce obedience of laws shall not be deemed to include calling the military to enforce or implement certain laws. is harmless. and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees. as these powers can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.” Considering the circumstances then prevailing. These are: the calling-out power. While President Arroyo’s authority to declare a “state of rebellion” emanates from her powers as Chief Executive. the greater are the limitations. Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. 4. invasion or rebellion. In declaring a state of national emergency. In these cases. the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. . however. she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country.5 Page No. b. He cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power.Under the calling-out power. For this reason. upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend. Chapter 2. Article VII of the Constitution. shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order. and the power to declare Martial Law. the greater the power. such as customs laws. Again.241 a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. that there is a distinction between the President’s authority to declare a “state of rebellion” (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. invasion or rebellion. . – Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest. the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires.The Constitution grants the President. and deemed not written. (b) ban on public assemblies. a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. .It is pertinent to state. Constitutional Basis.In the absence of delegated authority from Congress. . invasion and rebellion. . laws on obligations and contracts and the like. a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017. This involves ordinary police action. the authority of the President to declare a state of emergency shall not be deemed to include the power to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.Acts of terrorism no matter how repulsive shall not be deemed to be punishable in the absence of legislation clearly defining said acts and providing specific punishments therefor. laws governing family and property relations. President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18. petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. The authority of the President to exercise his calling out power to suppress lawless violence shall not be deemed to include the power to authorize: (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants. without legal significance. . There lies the wisdom of our Constitution. the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was Section 4. Such declaration. She also relied on Section .Mars Veloso 1C.The take care power of the President.

The second provision of PP 1017 pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. if needed. the President. President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously. It is no so. “Take Care” Power . . administrative orders. It is placed in the keeping of the President for the purpose of enabling him to secure the people from harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy their individual freedoms. It is no more than a call by the President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence.Mars Veloso 1C. Mendoza said that of the three powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief. Article VII which reads: SEC. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her calling-out power.In his “Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice” on March 13. bureaus.242 17. Book III of Executive Order No. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (c) takeover of news media and agencies and press censorship. 2006.” . It cannot be used to stifle or persecute critics of the government. 17. as in the case of Sanlakas. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution. are powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.The assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. and offices. Article XII. Mr. .Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law.Based on the above disquisition. he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines. among others.The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2.5 Page No. (b) ban on public assemblies. he will. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. As such. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless. .”[116] In the exercise of such function. without legal significance. and any act done contrary to its command is ultra vires. it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done.[115] the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. . a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. This is based on Section 17.As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested.PP 1017 states in part: “to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. Justice Vicente V. general or special orders. . may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country. The President shall have control of all the executive departments. memorandum orders/circulars. It is a strong medicine which should not be resorted to lightly. Its use for any other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope. the power to declare Martial Law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties.[121] .[117] including the Philippine National Police[118] under the Department of Interior and Local Government. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). or not written. proclamations. and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees. (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants. which allows her to issue executive orders. “execute its laws. Specifically. Before assuming office.[119] Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate “decrees”? . Indeed.

This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution. Air Manila (and) Filipinas Orient Airways . . 17. shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war. the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company. Section 1. hence. . such as customs laws. when the public interest so requires. the Philippine National Railways. Power to Take Over The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states: x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and. PP 1017 purports to grant the President.243 “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.Mars Veloso 1C. to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared . and as provided in Section 17. temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. In effect at the time of its approval was President Marcos’ Letter of Instruction No. and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. during the state of national emergency under PP 1017. orders. manifold constitutional issues arise. the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority.” To be sure. no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second. the State may. Section 18. cannot be enforced. the Philippine Air Lines. . 1972 instructing the Secretary of National Defense to take over “the management. without any authority or delegation from Congress. by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled. the Congress may. Article VII grants the President such power. President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. (2) In times of war or other national emergency. by law. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.Section 23. She can only order the military.5 Page No. To the first. Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a state of national emergency. for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe. . Article XII which reads: Sec. solve and end the present national emergency.A distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of national emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. (1) The Congress.During the existence of the state of national emergency. authorize the President. Article VI of the Constitution reads: SEC. Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislature’s emergency powers. during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it.Petitioners.The import of this provision is that President Arroyo. neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.” she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws. . laws governing family and property relations. for the successful prosecution by the Government of its effort to contain. to take over or direct the operation of any privatelyowned public utility or business affected with public interest. voting separately. 2 dated September 22. therefore. can call the military not only to enforce obedience “to all the laws and to all decrees x x x” but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17. claim that President Arroyo’s inclusion of Section 17. particularly the members of the House of Representatives. laws on obligations and contracts and the like. . With respect to “laws. What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP 1017? . under PP 1017.” . 23. control and operation of the Manila Electric Company. In times of national emergency. to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence. Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military? .As this Court stated earlier.

Certainly.Emergency. Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause.” as contemplated in our Constitution. this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress. flood. whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.But the exercise of emergency powers.Mars Veloso 1C. or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect. Implicit in this definitions are the elements of intensity. (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.” Therefore. the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President. b) natural disaster. . Now.Constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together. Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a “state of national emergency.” If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a “state of national emergency” pursuant to Section 18. Thus. .[131] This is evident in the Records of the Constitutional Commission. it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers. as perceived by legislature or executive in the United Sates since 1933. Congress is the repository of emergency powers. different clauses. typhoon. This requires a delegation from Congress. connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2).” it refers to Congress. subject to certain conditions. when Section 17 states that the “the State may. . is a different matter. (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.[129] and c) national security. variety. such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest. . classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a) economic. . Article XII. .It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to “other national emergency. economic crisis. Clearly. is of the same breadth. such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress.“Emergency. pestilence or epidemic. Article VII (callingout power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war). temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.Section 17. a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. thus: (1) There must be a war or other emergency. President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a . . and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed together and considered in the light of each other. sections. as a generic term. not the President. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it. then the Framers could have provided so. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. .[124] . have been occasioned by a wide range of situations.[123] Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI relate to national emergencies.5 Page No. and perception.Following our interpretation of Section 17. Emergencies. they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency powers. It may include rebellion.244 national policy. invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017.Generally. knowing that during grave emergencies. However. Otherwise stated.

O. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police. Such rules and regulations create no relation except between the official who issues them and the official who receives them.O. without restrictions. i. ..President Arroyo issued G. 1835 was repealed by E. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence. their object. These two (2) laws. 1985. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. however.” . do not define “acts of terrorism. search or violate the citizens’ constitutional rights.D. Likewise. c. he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.P. . . to conduct illegal arrest.e. and obedience.5 Page No. 5. not arbitrary or capricious. No. one requirement for these rules to be valid is that they must be reasonable. Congress has yet to enact a law defining and punishing acts of terrorism. without legislation. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. No. the word “terrorism” appears only once in our criminal laws.Unlike the term “lawless violence.[136] The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired. expressly or impliedly. In short. and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion. may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed illegal acts? The answer is no. . under G.” Since there is no law defining “acts of terrorism. criminal or civil actions against specific abuses committed by authorities. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. It had accomplished the end desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. 167 (which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines) enacted by President Corazon Aquino on May 5. Reasoning Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.The absence of a law defining “acts of terrorism” may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. No.O. does the illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional? .The arrest of Randy David and other acts done by the authorities pursuant to the parts of the laws herein considered unconstitutional are also deemed unconstitutional without prejudice to the filing of necessary administrative. the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17. The Court shall not declare laws as invalid solely on the basis of their misapplication or abuse or susceptibility to abuse by the people tasked to implement them.” They are internal rules issued by the executive officer to his subordinates precisely for the proper and efficient administration of law.[140] For these reasons. 1981 enacted by President Marcos during the Martial Law regime.So far. 1835 dated January 16.G. No.Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and misabused[135] and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism. however.” it is President Arroyo alone. a relationship in which power is their source. No.O.[137] PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the President’s callingout power.[139] They are based on and are the product of. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute. . The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of power. No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In general. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. No. the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. . Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress. .” the phrase “acts of terrorism” is still an amorphous and vague concept.Mars Veloso 1C.[138] This is logical.245 state of national emergency. not from its effects in a particular case. General orders are “acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.D. without legislation. Applied Challenge. .O.Now. invasion or rebellion. in P.

they violate the due process clause of the Constitution. It is a necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of speech. 5.A peace officer or a private person may. It may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from the government authorities except. certain facts are established: first. No. VALIDITY OF SPECIFIC ACTS CONDUCTED BY AUTHORITIES PURSUANT TO PP 1017 AND G. may be validly required. Thus. without a warrant. and seventh. this Court declares that the “acts of terrorism” portion of G. taking over the media enterprises. prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration. et al.O. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it.In the Brief Account[144] submitted by petitioner David.Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies petitioner David’s warrantless arrest. is that not only was their right against warrantless arrest violated.[146] Consequently. the right to assemble is not subject to previous restraint or censorship.O. III. a permit for the use of such place. such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition. 5. Certainly. Even the Solicitor General. This right is not to be limited. he was brought at Camp Karingal. neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that warranted the limitation of that right. fifth. . NO. . Arrest without warrant. when lawful.But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. during the oral argument. but also their right to peaceably assemble. . Sec.Mars Veloso 1C. were arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly. and not for the assembly itself. is actually committing.5 Page No. fourth. Further. or is attempting to commit an offense. . These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the President. and . he was treated brusquely by policemen who “held his head and tried to push him” inside an unmarked car. he was eventually released for insufficiency of evidence. much less denied. all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective “Oust Gloria Now” and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally. except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. They were not committing any crime. Quezon City where he was fingerprinted. if the assembly is intended to be held in a public place.“Assembly” under Art. breaking into offices and residences. 5 . in his presence. the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. the person to be arrested has committed. (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. of course. failed to justify the arresting officers’ conduct. 880[145] and Inciting to Sedition. arrest a person: (a) When. third.The ringing truth here is that petitioner David. there can be indiscriminate arrest without warrants. he was detained for seven (7) hours. 5 is unconstitutional. the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought. the PNP operatives arrested him on the basis of PP 1017. No. In other words. sixth. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.O.246 Consequently. The recognized exceptions are in Section 5. he was charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa No.[147] .The Constitution enunciates the general rule that no person shall be arrested without warrant. second. 2 of the Constitution means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. As can be gleaned from circumstances. All these can be effected in the name of G. he also stated that there is insufficient evidence for the charge of violation of BP 880 as it was not even known whether petitioner David was the leader of the rally. he was arrested without warrant. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880. . photographed and booked like a criminal suspect.

Moreover. in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched. room. and according to procedure. et al.G. (Cacho-Olivares. and fifth.” Director General Lomibao further stated that “if they do not follow the standards –and the standards are if they would contribute to instability in the government.’ to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this government. When a person’s right is restricted by government action. the distinction between protected and unprotected assemblies was eliminated. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. which the Solicitor General failed to refute.Thereafter. much less denied. third. the Court likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU et al.) presents another facet of freedom of speech i.R. except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. 2006. the freedom of the press. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives. under BP 880. Their dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacañang’s directive canceling all permits previously issued by local government units. it behooves a democratic government to see to it that the restriction is fair. No.5 Page No. No. They have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due notice and hearing on the determination of the presence of clear and present danger. . the search was conducted at about 1:00 o’ clock in the morning of February 25.”[149] Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the exception. 171409. or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter. This is arbitrary. Petitioners’ narration of facts. the search was conducted in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building. No. Section 4 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.. . .e. (G. .Mars Veloso 1C. .With the blanket revocation of permits.The search is illegal. the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the . 5 and Proc. a wave of warning came from government officials. 1017 – we will recommend a ‘takeover. the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local government units. policemen stationed themselves at the vicinity of the Daily Tribune offices. second.On the basis of the above principles. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor was quoted as saying that such raid was “meant to show a ‘strong presence. The best gauge of a free and democratic society rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media. He warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage during times when the national security is threatened.Not only that. or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. the search violated petitioners’ freedom of the press. Here. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime. the Daily Tribune’s offices were searched without warrant. The first time they learned of it was at the time of the dispersal. established the following: first. the police operatives seized several materials for publication. fourth. Rule 126. Chief of Staff[152] this Court held that -As heretofore stated. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house.R. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that “freedom of assembly is not to be limited. in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.’” National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to “cooperate” with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency.247 . In the Burgos v. reasonable. Only upon a showing that an assembly presents a clear and present danger that the State may deny the citizens’ right to exercise it. Such absence of notice is a fatal defect. petitioners were not even notified and heard on the revocation of their permits. 171483) unwarranted.

Freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. are plain censorship.” Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature. When in implementing its provisions. as well as decrees promulgated by the President.G. and the arrogant warning of government officials to media.In this connection. Suffice it to reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by the President of the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence. as . No. This Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it involves the most defiant of our citizens. during the oral arguments. are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. As a consequence of the search and seizure.[154] . such portion of G. and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. i. Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law. 5. the Petitions are partly granted. alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry. No. is considered an integral part of this ponencia. invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free. . It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen. However. the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17.O. . this Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017. these premises were padlocked and sealed. and no more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey. [153] Undoubtedly. invasion or rebellion.WHEREFORE.The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so.” . the The Daily Tribune was subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-government sentiments. . whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. . pursuant to G. and that the same are inadmissible “for any purpose. The search and seizure of materials for publication.O. the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press. Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL. but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation. In addition. The motto should always be obsta principiis. the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence. the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices. Chief Justice Artemio V. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies. No. Panganiban’s concurring opinion. David and Ronald Llamas.Incidentally. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. the Solicitor General admitted that the search of the Tribune’s offices and the seizure of its materials for publication and other papers are illegal.5 Page No. Decision .O.e.The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances.While admittedly. with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.248 "We Forum” newspapers. the military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens’ rights under the Constitution. attached hereto. and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers in the above case.Mars Veloso 1C. in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence.

1988. Therefore.Pres designated petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as Acting Chair of CHR. . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. 1989 FACTS . 1989 an ad interin appointment or any other kind of appointment to same office of Chair of CHR that called for confirmation by Commission on Appointments. accepted by appointee through qualification and assumption of duties.A Manila Standard news item reported that Pres designated Mallillin as Acting Chair of CHR pending resolution of Bautista’s case. BAUTISTA V SALONGA PADILLA.Bautista was extended by Pres to permanent appointment as Chair on Dec 17.No new appointment could be made to position already filled by a previously completed appointment.Sec 2(c) of EO 163 says CHR Chair is among those w/c Pres is authorized by law to appoint. the position of CHR Chair does not have express provision that appointment should be with consent of Commission on Appointments.249 well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials. 3. WON Pres could extend another appointment to petitioner on Jan 14.Bautista’s motion for reconsideration was denied. 4. being instrumentality of coequal branch. April 13.Bautista filed amended petition for restraining order impleading Mallillin as respondent. who took oath of office before CJ Fernan. . Court issued TRO regarding Mallillin but not regarding Commission on Appointments. . WON the petition has become moot and academic. . 2. WON appointment by Pres of Chair of Commission on Human Rights is to be w/ or w/o confirmation of Commission on Appointments 2. . 1988 as Chair was a completed act on the part of the Pres. COMELEC and CoA. NO Bautista’s appointment on Dec 17.Unlike Chair/Members of CSC. WON in appointments solely for Pres to make.Bautista wrote to Chair of Commission on Appointments.CHR Chair position is not among positions mentioned in Sec 16 Art 12 of Consti. Commission on Appointments disapproved Bautista’s “ad interim” appointment as Chair. ISSUES 1. the Pres can voluntarily submit such appointment to Commission on Appointment for confirmation. HELD 1. .Mars Veloso 1C. . . . are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. She discharged functions/duties of Chair of CHR.Secretary again wrote to Bautista to request her presence at a meeting to deliberate on her appointment.Petition for certiorari to review decision of Commission on Appointments . . appointment must be w/o review of Commission on Appointments. . saying why she considered Comm on Appointments as having no jurisdiction to review her appointment. NO .5 Page No. She also filed ex-parte motion to stop Mallillin fr exercising fcns of Chair and fr demanding courtesy resignations fr officers. This appointment was for Pres solely to make. .Bautista filed this petition w/ prayer for issuance of restraining order to enjoin Commission of Appointments not to proceed w/ deliberation on her appointment.Bautista rcvd letter fr Sec of Commission on Appointments requesting her to submit info and docs in connection w/ her confirmation as Chair of CHR.As conveyed in a letter to the Exec Secretary. .

. The diff bet term and tenure is impt. lawyers. NO . 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. December 17. Decision Petition is granted. . Dissenting Griño-Aquino. tenure in office can’t be later made dependent on pleasure of Pres. where by law the officer is not removable by him.To say otherwise is to say that Pres w/ Congress can from time to time move power boundaries in Consti.Even if Pres could submit to Commission on Appointments an appointment that belongs solely to her.Nor can respondents contend that the new appointment on Jan 14 was an ad interim appointment bec it does not apply to appointments solely for Pres to make. . Obiter . 4.250 .Respondent contends that w/ or w/o confirmation. . and Constitutional Law professors seeks to enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.Ratio: Only appointments mentioned in 1st sentence of Sec 16 Art VII are to be reviewed by Commission. The Commission on Appointments was allowed to intervene in the court proceeding.The case was considered justiciable given that there is great public interest such as the need for stability in public service. Gutierrez Jr.Neither Exec nor Legislative can create power where Consti confers none. . The grounds for the petition was that Mison’s stay in Office is unconstitutional as there was no confirmation coming from the Commission on Appointments that is “required” by the Constitution.. Dissenting SARMIENTO V MISON PADILLA. there was no vacancy on Jan 14 1989. Bautista can be removed fr office anytime at pleasure of Pres. It extends only to those where review of Comm on Appointments is needed. . This disposed the question of whether this is the proper remedy to question respondents right to the Office of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and also that of the legal standing of the petitioners. TRO is made permanent against Mallillin. Pres can’t grant power of participation in Commission on Appointments. And w/ disapproval of appointment/nomination by Commission on Appointments. she may be removed only for cause.Ratio: Once appointment is made. Dissenting Opinion Cruz. still. Consistent w/ CHR’s needed independence.Issue: Which appointments under 1987 Consti are to be w/ and w/o review of Commission on Appointments? . If Consti made appointment exclusive for Pres.Mars Veloso 1C.Held: Appointment of Mison as Bureau of Customs head is valid. In addition. NO . Other appointments by President are to be made w/o participation of Commission. they would want to enjoin Budget Secretary Guillermo Carague from disbursing Mison’s salary and emoluments. members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Madison . Pres’ power over the office is terminated in all cases. Nor can Commission on Appointments create power to confirm appointments that Consti has reserved to Pres alone. issue is moot and academic. SC disagrees and says petitioner came in timely manner and didn’t show intention of abandoning her petition. . 1987 FACTS .Marbury V. Thus. Mison . there was greater reason for her removal. That is why those types of appointments remain valid until disapproval by Commission on Appointments or until next adjournment of Congress.Sarmiento III V.Petitioners Sarmiento and Arcilla who are taxpayers. 3.5 Page No. Petitioner Bautista is lawful Chair of CHR.EO 163 speaks of term of office (7 yrs without reappointment) while EO 163-A speaks of tenure in office (at pleasure of Pres).

The third group are those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. therefore petitioner Mison is not in need of the approval of the Commission on Appointments and thus should be able to exercise full authority and functions and be entitled to his salary and emoluments. and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. Also. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. other public ministers and consuls. Gancayco.concurring (11) Gutierrez.Mars Veloso 1C. Bidin. Melencio-Herrera. other public ministers and consuls. . ambassadors. Narvasa. Decision Petition DISMISSED. Cortes. commissions. in the courts.” ISSUE WON Mison’s stay in Office was Constitutional HELD . Lastly. agencies. Sarmiento. In addition. ambassadors. or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain.Reading Article VII Section 16 there are 4 groups of officers who the President is able to appoint. Paras.251 . strictly interpreting the third sentence may create an absurdity for it gives Congress the discretion of not creating a law that would give the President the power to appoint those who are lower in rank. which states that: “The President shall nominate and. Yap.dissenting (2) SEPARATE OPINION CRUZ [dissent] There is a need to look at the provision in its entirety. October 13. An irony arises when those in a lower position require the approval of the Commission on Appointments while those who are higher in position would not. the records of the Constitutional Commission are merely extrinsic aids and are at best persuasive only and not necessarily conclusive. or in the heads of the departments. The court held that the 1987 provision on appointment was the middle ground that was sought by the 1986 Constitutional Commission. the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. Feliciano. The focus of the records was merely on the first sentence of the provision and the not on the following sentences. Cruz. 2005 . Both were problematic as the 1935 provision became a venue of “horsetrading” (used for political leverage) while the 1973 provision gave too much power to the President.Yes it is constitutional. PIMENTEL V ERMITA CARPIO. by law. Those are crucial given that the position in question falls under the latter. . . The first group would be the heads of the executive departments.Looking through the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission they said that the clear and positive intent of the framers were to make those officers in the first sentence the individuals that are subject to the approval and confirmation of the Commission on Appointments while those on the second and third sentence need not seek such confirmation. and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.The Constitutional Provision under careful examination is Article VII Section 16.5 Page No. Fernan. or boards. vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone.To interpret the law the Justices went back in history to look at the previous constitutions. The second group is composed of those officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. The Congress may. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Given that the position as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is not under those specified in the first sentence but the second. Teehankee. officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain. the fourth group. are those officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. In the 1935 Constitution all appointments is subject to the approval of the Commission on Appointments while this was removed in the 1973 Constitution wherein the President is able to appoint without the need for the approval of the Commission on Appointments. appoint the heads of the executive departments.

Sol Gen argues + petition is moot because GMA had issued the ad interim appointments after the recess of Congress. Joseph Durano (DOT). headed by Sen.” Petitioners fail to consider that this provision acts as a safeguard against the abuse of such appointments . is a body independent of Congress. Pimentel. must appoint an alter ego of her choice. Ejercito-Estrada and Osmena. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.7/26/2004: Congress commenced their regular session .9/23/2004: GMA issued ad interim (temporary) appointments. Florencio Abad (DOE) Avelino Cruz (DND).a department secretary is considered an alter ego of the President. Lacson. prohibition may not enjoin acts already done. it is only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary…” + while Congress is in session. possess standing in the present petition. may appoint an officer already in service or any other competent person ISSUE WON GMA’s appointment of respondents as acting secretaries w/o the consent of the Commission of Appointments while Congress is in session is unconstitutional HELD . Mike Defensor (DENR) + the aforementioned respondents took their oaths of office and assumed their duties as acting secretaries . SJ. and its executive power emanates from the Consti.9/8/2004: a group of senators. J.the court held that the President may make such appointments. as members of the Commission. Raul Gonzales (DOJ). EO 292: the Pres. though it be composed of members of Congress.EO 292 applies to appointments vested in the President by law— Congress is not the only source of law S17(3) of the previous provision states: “In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year. .5 Page No. Bernas. as the law expressly provides it S17 Ch5 Title 1 Book 3. EO 292: “…in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary. filed this present petition for certiorari and prohibition. EO 292: “… the President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the function of an office in the executive branch…” .: “acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. it holds a position of great trust and confidence. + the power to appoint is executive in nature—the Commission of Appointments. Congress cannot impose that the undersecretary automatically be appointed—the Pres. shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided by…the law” S17 Ch5 T1 B3. GMA issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments: Arthur Yap (DOA).Mars Veloso 1C. Alberto Romulo (DFA).Petitioners’ Argument + petitioners assert that GMA cannot issue such appointments because no law grants such a power S10 Ch2 B4. Hence.8/25/2004: The Commission on Appointments (composed of members of Congress) was constituted + meanwhile.252 FACTS . + only Senators Enrile. Rene Villa (DAR). EO 292: “The Pres. no appointments can be made w/o the consent of the Commission Respondents’ Argument: -respondents assert that GMA can issue such appointments for the reason that no law prohibits it S16 Ch5 T1 B3. replacing respondents’ acting capacity . that is. ad interim appointments are extended only . Angara. praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to declare these appointments by GMA unconstitutional .

Petitioner also assails her reassignment to the Law Dept. the court finds no abuse of appointments in the present case as such were issued immediately upon the recess of Congress. Angelina Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as “Acting Director IV” of the Education and Information Dept. filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Dept against Benipayo and while the complaint was pending.2.” . 2001. the appointment of Cinco as well as the disbursements made by the COMELEC Finance Services Dept officer by way of salaries and emoluments in favor of respondents. WON Benipayo’s ad interim appointment and assumption of office as COMELEC chairman is constitutional 2.5 Page No. acted in excess of jurisdiction. . did not act on their appointments. 7 (transfer of employees prohibited during election period: Jan.Benipayo. way before the lapse of one year. . citing Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular no. Benipayo denied the request and citing COMELEC Resolution no. HELD 1. and Florentino Tuason as COMELEC commissioners respectively.2-June 13.On June 1. acting as COMELEC chairman. assigned a Velma Cinco as officer-in-charge of EID and reassigned petitioner to the Law Dept. 2008. 2008. 2. April 2. ISSUE 1. Petitioner Ma. The Commission on Appointments. 2001 in the same “Temporary” capacity.The Case: Petition for Prohibition w/ prayer for a writ of prelim injunction and TRO.On Feb. They took their oaths and assumed their positions with the President submitting their ad interim appointments to the Commission on Appointments on May 22. The Congress adjourned before the Commission could act on the appointments resulting in the renewal of their ad interim appointments by the President for the 3rd time on June 8. her appointment was renewed on Feb 15. Borra and Tuason for a term of 7 years expiring on Feb.PGMA. on Sept.253 during a recess of Congress and require submission to the Commission of Appointments for approval or rejection. It is not an .On March 22. WON petitioner’s removal and reassignment is illegal (done w/o approval of the COMELEC as a collegial body) 5. If Benipayo. 2001 for confirmation. respondents Alfredo Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and Resurreccion Borra. . in making disbursements in favor of the new appointees. 1999. however. and on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members.Mars Veloso 1C. WON issue is justiciable 3. Decision Petition DISMISSED MATIBAG V BENIPAYO CARPIO. she also filed this action. Borra and Tuason were indeed appointed lawfully. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment made by the Pres. Petitioner questions the appointment and the right of respondents to remain in office as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC . WON the renewal of their appointments and subsequent assumption of office was constitutional 4. 3300. a move which she requested reconsideration for. 2001 PGMA appointed ad interim. 2002 FACTS . 6. 2001. . 2008). expiring on Feb. (EID). Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC.notwithstanding Bernas’ textbook definition. 2. The new appointees took oath a 2 nd time and the same was transmitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation on June 5. She claims that ad interim appointments violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC. WON the Officer-in-charge of COMELEC Finance Services Dept. 2000 in a “Temporary” capacity and renewed yet again on Feb 15. in the meantime that Congress is in recess. 2001. 2001). 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. PGMA renewed their ad interim appointments with the term and the expiration remaining the same (for 7 years and expiring on Feb 2. for a term of 7 years. 2001 renewed once again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo.

then she has no cause to complain provided that it was done in accordance with the Civil Service Law. this Court then decided such an appointment in Nacionalista Party v Bautista as unconstitutional declaring that. done by the President. in the meantime. “In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.Art.Although the last sentence of Art IX-C Sec 1(2) of the Constitution says. Because of her personal and material stake in the resolution of the constitutionality of respondent’s assumption of office. therefore the lis mota of this case is clearly the constitutional issue raised by petitioner. once the appointee has qualified into office. VII §16. A distinction was made between the two in Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v IAC.254 appointment in a temporary or acting capacity. petitioner’s reassignment is without legal basis.” an ad interim appointment is not a temporary appointment. held that unless the constitutionality of Benipayo’s appointment is determined. VII §16 did not provide for ad interim appointments.Mars Veloso 1C. But such is not the meaning nor the use intended in the context of Phil. and if not considered at the trial. is unable to act. 2. The ad interim appointment has since been practiced by Presidents Aquino. it was reinstated to avoid interruptions in vital govt services that would result from prolonged vacancies in govt offices. where it was held that an ad interim appointment as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary is one that is appointed to fill a vacancy. . Likewise. It takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the Pres. “It would be more in keeping with the intent.” Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments when she filed her petition before this Court. that is.The original draft of Art. purpose and aim of the framers of the Constitution to appoint a permanent Commissioner than to designate one to act temporarily. it cannot be considered at the trial. is the issue. In Brillantes v Yorac. IX-A §1 should be harmonized with Art. which is originally vested with the power or appointment. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. . if it is lawful. while the body. which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue before a competent body. the legality of petitioner’s assignment cannot be determined. decided under the present Constitution. however. this Court struck down as unconstitutional the designation by then Pres. > the constitutional issue must be the lis mota of the case The Respondents claim that the legality of petitioner’s reassignment from the EID to the Law Dept. “if it is not raised in the pleadings. The Court. . Ad interim is used to denote the manner in which said appointments were made. . for to hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointments before the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad interim appointments. If Benipayo’s appointment is unlawful. law. such that.5 Page No.Although the 1935 Consti did not have the provision prohibiting temporary or acting appointments. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. Justiciability of the case: The Court determined the justiciability of the case by tackling the requisites of judicial review raised by the respondents which they claimed to be lacking (actual case/controversy was not raised) > personal and substantial interest of the party Petitioner has a personal and material stake in the resolution of the case. however. Reasoning . The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same. she has locus standi to raise it as a constitutional issue > exercise of judicial review must be pleaded at the earliest opportunity It is not the date of filing of the petition that determines whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest opportunity. it cannot be considered on appeal. Aquino of Haydee Yorac as Acting Chairperson of the COMELEC. Ramos and Estrada. or to discharge the duties of the office during the absence or temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent.

It seeks to enjoin respondents from executing additional debt-relief contracts pursuant thereto. clearly not in breach of the 7 year term limit. October 13. their appointments were all for a fixed term expiring on Feb.The Financing Program was devised under President Corazon Aquino to manage the country’s external debt problem through a negotiation-oriented debt strategy by means of two debt-relief options: 1) cash buyback of portions of the Philippine foreign debt at a discount. is Benipayo.This Petition for Certiorari. Concurred with by JJs: Davide. De Leon. or 2) allowed creditors to convert existing Philippine debt instruments into bonds/securities. VII §16 power of Pres. The phrase “without reappointment” in Art. . IX-C §1(2) applies only to appointments by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. regardless of WoN such person appointed completes the term of office. IX-C §1(2) Nature and term of appointment of Comelec chairman and commissioner: (7 years w/o reappointment). the Officer-in-Charge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction. Decision Petition is dismissed for lack of merit. 2. Art. 3300. . Moreover. Because Benipayo is held to be the lawful COMELEC chairman. Melo. 5.Petitioners challenge the Program as follows: 1. That it is beyond the powers granted to the President under Section 20. Ynares-Santiago. 2008. Kapunan.” and hence. beyond the power of the President.The renewal of their appointments was by-passed by the Commission on Appointments. in COMELEC Resolution no. in a de jure capacity.17 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments. In no case shall there be appointment in a temporary or acting capacity. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.255 3. in the disbursement of their salaries. the COMELEC en banc. 3. The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized by law to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel and the person holding that office. Panganiban.Mars Veloso 1C. IX-A §1 The Consti Commissions… COMELEC… shall be independent Art. it is only the President who may exercise the power to enter into these contract and such power may not be delegated. It was not acted upon on the merits at the close of the session of Congress. That assuming the above as constitutionally permissible. 2005 FACTS . Consti Provisions cited: Art. CONSTANTINO V CUISA TINGA. 4. It is therefore neither fixed nor an unexpired term. Moreover. That the Program was made available for debts fraudulently contracted or void. 2. Mendoza. There was no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. . Petitioners rely on 1992 Commission on Audit . Bellosillo. approved the transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel during the election period. the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a bypassed appointee as recognized in Sec. Tuason and Borra because there were no previous appointments that were confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Article VII of the Constitution: The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines… That buyback and securitization/bond conversion schemes are neither “loans” nor “guarantees. Prohibition and Mandamus assails said contracts which were entered into pursuant to the Philippine Comprehensive Financing Program for 1992. were on official leave. Reasoning The phrase “without reappointment” does not apply to the renewal of appointments to Benipayo. JJs. Absent such decision. Puno and Vitug. and SandovalGutierrez. He has full authority to exercise all the powers of that office for so long as his ad interim appointment remains effective. Quisumbing. to make appointments during recess of Congress… effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.5 Page No.

2. such course of action would have adverse repercussions. Respondents unequivocally assert that the Republic did not waive any such right.Mars Veloso 1C.Obiter Many advocates that the Republic should renege on obligations that are considered as “illegitimate. By the very nature of the power wielded by the President.” However. The Court holds that some issues are not ripe for adjudication. Petitioners’ theory depends on a prior annulment or declaration of nullity of the preexisting loans. . WON the petitioners have locus standi. the Court must set aside the procedural barrier of standing and rule on the justiciable issues presented by the parties. The Court’s cognizance of this petition will not only determine the validity or invalidity of the subject pre-termination (buyback) and bond-conversion of foreign debts but also create a precedent for other debts or debt-related contract executed or to be executed in behalf of the President by the Secretary of Finance. . which thus far have not been submitted to this Court. On Bond-Conversion . and the well-being in general of the Filipino nation. respondents dispute the points raised by petitioners. and the bond represents the issuer’s contractual promise to pay interest and repay principal according to specific terms. ISSUES Procedural 1. It allows the President to contract and guarantee foreign loans. in which case. . . Among the consequences is that the standard cross-default provisions in Philippine foreign loans may come into effect.Where constitutional issues are properly raised in the context of alleged facts. Article VII includes bondconversion and buyback 4.Records do not show whether the so-called behest loans were subject of the debt-relief contracts.An investor who purchases a bond is lending money to the issuer. It makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of loans or . default even in one loan would be ground for other creditors to declare default on other loans. WON the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President and may not be delegated 5.In any event. . WON the scope of section 20. WON there has been grave abuse of discretion and violation of constitutional policies HELD 1. . they would be void for being waivers of the Republic’s right to repudiate the void or fraudulently contracted loans. petitioners have no real basis to fret over a possible waiver of the right to repudiate void contracts. One such issue raised by petitioners is the allegation that respondents waived the Philippines’ right to repudiate void and fraudulently contracted loans is not justiciable.For their part. the transcendental importance of the issues herein cannot be doubted. it having incorporated a “no-waiver” clause in the agreements. They also question the standing of petitioners and the justiciability of the issues presented. procedural questions acquire a relatively minor significance. Seen in this light. WON the case is ripe for adjudication Substantive 3.5 Page No. the discretion on the matter lies not with the Courts but with the executive. . The language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. 2.256 report identifying several “behest” loans contracted or guaranteed fraudulently during the Marcos regime. 3. That since these were eligible for buyback or conversion. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. asserting a right to repudiate void or fraudulently contracted loans begs the question of whether indeed particular loans are void or fraudulently contracted. the effect of using this power on the economy.As a final point.Moreover.

and the fact that the Constitution does not explicitly bar the President from exercising a power does not mean that he or she does not have that power.257 distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous than others. the Constitution. is that the loans must be subject to limitations provided by law. He shall also cause to be paid out… the principal amount of any obligations which have matured… or. redemption. . as amended.The only restriction that the Constitution provides aside from the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. with the approval of the President… after consultation with the Monetary board. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. the heads of the executive department occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity and should be of the President’s bosom confidence and alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority subject to the direction of the President. If the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power.Also. On the Buyback Scheme . to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose. and would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the government. of the Philippine Government. However.Necessity thus gave birth to the doctrine of qualified political agency. sovereign bonds may also be provided for the purchase. if redeemed prior to maturity. Upon such approval. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance. . it is noted RA 245 as amended by PD 142 entitled An Act Authorizing the Secretary of Finance to Borrow to Meet Public Expenditures Authorized by Law.Specific legal authority for the buyback even without further action from Congress is established under Section 2 of RA 240 thus: … the Secretary of Finance shall cause to be paid out of any moneys in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated… any interest falling due. In this regard. does not enumerate – let alone enumerate all – the acts which the President (or any other public officer) may not do. either direct or guaranteed. And it is upon the Secretary of Finance as the alter ego of the President to deal with matters regarding the sound and efficient management of the financial resources of Government. The Court in Guingona v. .It is true that in the separation of powers. and for Other Purposes. Congress has spoken and cannot be said to have delegated its wisdom to the Executive. since authorization therefore already exists under RA 4860 and 245. . .5 Page No. is authorized to borrow… and to issue therefore evidences of indebtedness… may be of the following types: Treasury bonds… . 4. such portion of the face value as is prescribed by the terms and conditions under which such obligations were originally issued. Though the President is the Executive of the Government and no other. the law-making authority has promulgated a law ordaining an automatic appropriations provision for debt servicing.Buyback is a necessary power which springs from the grant of the foreign borrowing power.Mars Veloso 1C. as a rule. Congress does not concern itself with details for implementation by the Executive.And although there are powers vested in the President that may not be delegated are only those that call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches . or accruing on any portion of the public debt authorized by law. Every statute is understood. In the light of this subsisting authorization. allows foreign loans to be contracted in the form of bonds thus: … the Secretary of Finance.Also under the foregoing provision. or refunding of nay obligation. by implication. this would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded. it is Congress that manages the country’s coffers by virtue of its taxing and spending powers. held: Debt service is not included in the General Appropriation Act. . Carague. and PD 1967.

probable cause must be shown in order that prosecution may be brought to bear. 264 of the Labor Code delegating to the Minister of Labor and Employment the power and discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission. the Minister of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. former President Aquino’s decision to honor outstanding debts of the Republic was purely an executive call. which had concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter and which are better equipped to conduct a firsthand examination of factual evidence in support of their allegations. 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1. The proper action for petitioners is to file their petition in the lower courts. neither can respondents be faulted for implementing the Program executed pursuant to that constitutional executive policy. 3 Sec 11. October 30." .g. and in effect make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining. herein petitioner. attacks the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. power to suspend the write of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (Par. all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employers shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. Petitioners cite an article by Jude Esguerra that under the Program a best case scenario would give a yield significantly lower than estimated by the Program and a worst case scenario where what can be gained in the best case is lesser than what can be lost in this worst case. Art VII) and the benign prerogative of mercy (Par. beyond judicial scrutiny. The Minister may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. banks. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout.” .The Court held that the policies set by the Constitution as litanized are not a panacea that can annul every governmental act sought to be struck down. 6 Sec 11.Also. The Supreme Court is not a trier or facts. Suppletorily. and those within export processing zones. Art VII). "In labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest.5 Page No. In addition. Petitioners allege therefore that the Program violates constitutional state policies to promote a social order that will “ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation” and free “the people from poverty. hospitals. Petitioner contends that [a] BP 30 is an undue delegation of legislative powers [b] such conferment of authority may also run contrary to the assurance of 54 PANGANIBAN . e. 5. foster social justice in all phases of national development. Because the petitioners failed to substantiate the charges. 1981 . A determination of the validity of such allegations requires a review of factual matters.258 of government. . companies engaged in the generation or distribution of energy. such as may occur in but not limited to public utilities. there is nothing in this decision to preclude the Department of Justice or the Office of the Ombudsman from initiating an investigation of the alleged fraudulent loans. the argument cannot be addressed. the power to contract or guarantee foreign debts does not fall within the same exceptional class. 13054 (BP 130) in so far as it amends Art. .Another important qualification is that the Secretary of Finance or any designated alter ego of the President is bound to secure the latter’s prior consent to or subsequent ratification of his acts. A lack of showing that President Aquino countermanded the acts of respondents leads us to conclude that the said acts carried presidential approval. If one has already