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The requirements for a combat capability of the “Air Weapon” in 2025
In light of the evolution of the geo-strategic framework, the changes of the threats and the advanced technology developments, what will be the future national and international missions of the Belgian Air Component and what will be the requirements for its combat capability in 2025.
Lieutenant Colonel Rudi VERRIJT
Research paper Chair Air Brussels, 2009
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Table of Contents .............................................................................................................. 2 Disclaimer.......................................................................................................................... 5 Glossary .............................................................................................................................. 6 Acknowledgement ........................................................................................................... 10 Preface .............................................................................................................................. 11 Introduction..................................................................................................................... 12 1 The geo-political playing field in 2025................................................................... 14 1.1 1.2 1.3 Introduction .........................................................................................................14 How do relevant security actors see the situation in 2025? ...............................14 The United Nations (UN) and Organisation for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE)................................................................................................................17 1.4 1.5 Current Belgian defence policy ...........................................................................17 Intermediate conclusion ......................................................................................20
2 Relevant security actors and defence planning ................................................... 22 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 NATO’s defence planning....................................................................................22 EU Defence planning ..........................................................................................24 NATO-EU cooperation on capability development.............................................27 Intermediate conclusions ....................................................................................27
3 What are the technological evolutions? ................................................................. 29 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 Evolution in space ..............................................................................................29 Evolution of fighter aircraft ...............................................................................29 Evolution of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)..................................................30 Evolution in the Information domain .................................................................31 Evolution in weapon technology .........................................................................31 Evolution in simulation capabilities ...................................................................32 Role of the (Belgian) industry in the technological evolution ............................33 Intermediate conclusions ....................................................................................34
4 National and International missions .................................................................... 36 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 Defining the missions ..........................................................................................36 Current Belgian (Air Component) Level of Ambition.........................................36 Analysis ...............................................................................................................38 Intermediate conclusions ....................................................................................39
5 Belgian defence specifics .......................................................................................... 41
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Table of Contents 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Evolution of the guidance documents ................................................................41 Budget evolution..................................................................................................41 Evolution of the personnel quorum.....................................................................41 Geographical dispersion of units throughout Belgian territory .........................42 Intermediate conclusion ......................................................................................42
6 Why Air Combat Power for Belgium ....................................................................... 43 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 Why is Air Power important ...............................................................................43 Integrated command ...........................................................................................43 Sizing the future Belgian Air Component fighter capability ............................44 Intermediate conclusions ....................................................................................44
7 Overall conclusions ................................................................................................... 45 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 Geo-political evolution.........................................................................................45 Threat evolution ..................................................................................................45 Technological evolution .......................................................................................45 Future National and International missions......................................................46 Requirement for a BAC future combat capability ..............................................47
Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 49
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Table of Contents List of Annexes................................................................................................................. 58 Annex A – Belgian Defence 2007 spending ....................................................................58 Annex B – ACT Multiple futures Project, list of drivers................................................59 Annex C – NATO Level Of Ambition .............................................................................60 Annex D - Mission Task Analysis of the NATO Defence Requirements Review ..........61 Annex E – MMR procedure used during NATO DRR 05 ..............................................67 Annex F – DRR MMR analysis of aerospace capabilities ..............................................68 Annex G - Current NATO’s LTCR list...........................................................................69 Annex H – Comparison DRR ->LTCS ............................................................................70 Annex I – NATO’s future force generation process........................................................71 Annex J – Capability Development Plan (CDP).............................................................72 Annex K – D&S Planning Horizons in the EU and NATO ............................................76 Annex L - Space base weaponry .....................................................................................77 Annex M - Analysis of future platforms. ........................................................................80 Annex N – US fighter modernization plans: near-term choices ...................................82 Annex O – Combat fighter lead-time for acquisition .....................................................83 Annex P – UAV Cost .......................................................................................................84 Annex Q – U(C)AV evolution and considerations ..........................................................86 Annex R – NATO C4ISR roadmap .................................................................................89 Annex S – Non-lethal weapons ......................................................................................90 Annex T - Strategic orientation of the Belgian defence .................................................91 Annex U - Operational capacities and sub-capacities....................................................92 Annex V – Possible engagement scenarios.....................................................................93 Annex W – Level Of Ambition of the Belgian Air Component.......................................94 Annex X – Doctrine & Requirements process at ACOS Ops & Trg ...............................97 Annex Y – BE Strategic planning guidance documents ................................................98 Annex Z - Evolution BE MOD budget ............................................................................99 Annex AA – BE MOD personnel quorum evolution.....................................................101 Annex AB – Geographical dispersion of units in Belgium...........................................102 Annex AC – Importance of Air Power ..........................................................................103 Annex AD – Development Joint Armed Forces with inter agency coordination .........105 Annex AE – F-16 MLU fleet size and pilot contingent calculation .............................106 Annex AF - Opportunities that could produce force multipliers or savings ................107
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The opinions and conclusions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the Belgian Government, Ministry of Defence, the Belgian Defence Staff, Belgian Air Component, nor the Royal Military Academy.
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3D LO A&S AAR AC ACO ACT AD AE AG AGSR AH(L) AIV AJP ASFAO ATHS ATARES BAC C2 C4ISR C4ISTAR CAO CAOC CAS CCIP CDM CDP CoG COIN CRC CSAF CSAR CTSG D&R D&S DCA DEAD DOB Diplomacy, Defence, Development, Law and Order Air & Space Air to Air Refuelling Air Component Allied Command Operations Allied Command Transformation Air Defence Aero medical Evacuation Air to Ground Air Ground Surveillance & Reconnaissance Armed Helicopter (light) Armoured Infantry Vehicle Allied Joint Publication Anti Surface Force Air Operations Automatic Target Hand-off system Air Transport and Air to Air Refueling Exchange of Services Belgian Air Component Command & Control Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (NATO terminology) Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (EU terminology) Counter Air Operations Combined Air Operations Centre Close Air Support Common Configuration Improvement Program Capability Development Mechanism Capability Development Plan Centre of Gravity COunter INsurgency Control & Reporting Centre Chief of Staff of the Air Force (US) Combat Search And Rescue Capability Transformation Steering Group Doctrine & Requirements Defence and Security Dual Capable Aircraft Defensive Counter Air Destruction of Enemy Air Defence Deployed Operating Base
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Training.Glossary DOTMLPFI Doctrine. Materiel. Organisation. Facilities and Interoperability DRR Defence Requirements Review EBAO EDA EM EMP EOD EPAF EMP ESDP ESS EW FAC FGMT FOC GES GDP GPS HALE HNS HPM HRF IED ICC ICT ICGD IDPP IED IFC INS IO ISR JAT JFAC JISR JCOP JPS JSOW KT Effects Based Approach to Operations European Defence Agency Electro Magnetic Electro Magnetic Pulse Explosive Ordnance Disposal European Participating Air Forces Electro Magnetic Pulse European Security and Defence Policy EU Security Strategy Electronic Warfare Forward Air Controller Force Generation Management Tool Full Operational Capable Ground Exploitation System Gross Domestic Product Global Positioning System High Altitude Long Endurance Host Nation Support High Power Microwave High Readiness Forces Improvised Explosive Devise Interim CAOC Capability Integrated Capability Team Information Communication Technology Intercomponenten Gebruiksdoctrine Integrated Defence Planning Process Improvised Explosive Devise Intelligence Fusion Centre Inertial Navigation System International Organisation Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance Joint Activity Trees Joint Forward Air Controller Joint Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance Joint Common Operational Picture Joint Precision Strike Joint Stand-Off Weapon Key Tasks Page 7 of 110 . Leadership and education. Personnel.
Glossary LANL LC LCC LIDAR LO LoA LPD LPI LTCR LTCS LTV MAJIIC MALE MANPADS MEC MFP MJO MLV MMR MOD MOUT MPPV MRH MRP MRTT MUSIS NATO NC NCW NEO NFH NGO NLoRC NNEC NRF NSA NTISR OCA OCCAR OH(L) OIF OO OOS OSCE Los Alamos National Laboratory Land Component Life Cycle Cost LIght Detection And Ranging or Laser Imaging Detection And Ranging Low Observable Level of Ambition Low Probability of Detection Low Probability of Intercept Long Term Capability Requirement Long Term Capability Study Long Term Vision Multi-sensor Aerospace-Ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition Medium Altitude Long Endurance MAN Portable Air Defence System Mission Essential Components Minimum Force Package Major Joint Operations Multipurpose Light Vehicle Minimum Military Requirements Minister Of Defence Military Operations in Urban Terrain Multi Purpose Protected Vehicle Multi Role Helicopter Modular Recce Pod Multi Role Tanker Transport Multinational Space-based Imaging System North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Naval Component Net Centric Warfare Non-combatant Evacuation Operation NATO Frigate Helicopter Non Governmental Organisation NATO List of Required Capabilities NATO Network Enabled Capability NATO Response Force National Security Agency (US agency) Non Traditional Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance Offensive Counter Air Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'ARmement Observation Helicopter (light) Ops Iraky Freedom Operational Objectives Operational Objectives Specifications Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Page 8 of 110 .
Surveillance and Target Acquisition Surface to Air Missile Search And Rescue Strategic Airlift Interim Solution Small Diameter Bomb Suppression of Enemy Air Defence Smaller Joint Operations Structure for Networking & Management of Tactical Information Squadron Tactical High Energy Laser Transformational Objectives Area Time Sensitive Targeting Tactical Transport Helicopter Unmanned Aerial System Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle Utility Helicopter (light) Ultra High Frequency United Nations United States Air Force Video Down Link West European Union Weapons of Mass Destruction Page 9 of 110 .Glossary PFI PIDS PIDV PLoCS PMU PSO QRA R&D RAF RAP RHID ROE RPG ROVER RRF RSTA SAM SAR SALIS SDB SEAD SJO SNMTI Sqn THEL TOA TST TTH UAS UAV UCAV UH(L) UHF UN USAF VDL WEU WMD Private Financing Initiative Plan d’Investissement pour Défense et Sécurité Plan van Inverstering voor Defensie en Veiligheid Prioritised List of Capability Shortfalls Plan Minimum Urgent Peace Support Operations Quick Reaction Alert Research & Development Royal Air Force Recognised Air Picture Royal Higher Institute of Defence Rules Of Engagement Rocket Propelled Grenade Remote Operations Video Enhanced Receiver Rapid Reaction Force Reconnaissance.
sincere thoughts and useful ideas helped me in forming my mind and getting a feeling for “the fog of decision making”. But I can not ignore the one person I need to thank most. for their availability and open door policy. At the same time I convey my gratitude to the instructors of the Air Department. She even found it to be just to encourage me in those times when ideas and inspiration were lacking or when morale support was required. Their candidness. as well as all senior officers and colleagues who gave me insight in their personal thinking as well as their official desk perspectives.Acknowledgement Acknowledgement I would like to sincerely thank all those who have helped me to write this paper. Page 10 of 110 . my wife Nadine for silently letting me go about my business while she was tending to the every day job of taking care of the family. Especially I would like to thank the general officers who graciously allowed me the time for an interview.
A deeper analysis of the title of this research paper is necessary if we want to address these issues and establish the limits and boundaries of this research paper. The BAC should be a tool which the government can employ in a rapid. interoperability and readiness”. the defence organisation will need a common roadmap for the Belgian military that applies the principle of interoperability with an expeditionary mindset. sustainability. the budget requirements must fit within the boundaries established by the government. the changes of the threats and the advanced technology developments. The extent of this document is widely influenced by the interpretation of the question itself but even more so by the implicit questions that might be found within the context of the question analysis. support and protection required to execute his job.3 Mar 2009 Page 11 of 110 . without delays or restrictions. While making sure the soldier is provided with the best possible equipment. Analysis of this question reveals following areas that need to be researched: What is the evolution of the geo-strategic framework? Which threat changes can be anticipated compared to today’s situation? o How do today’s relevant security actors foresee change in their requirements to be able to cope with these changing threats or risks? What advanced technology developments can be expected? What future national and international commitments might Belgium face? What combat capability1 will the BAC require in 2025? 1 Definition by ACOS Ops & Trg .Preface Preface How can the Belgian Air Component (BAC) of today adapt and transform to meet the challenges of tomorrow? First. Secondly.D&R. Transformation implementation “capability is the combination of manpower. deployability. what will be the future national and international missions of the BAC and what will be the requirements for its combat capability in 2025. Framing the question is nothing more than an effort to limit the scope of this research paper. equipment. flexible way. In light of the evolution of the geo-strategic framework. to 123 AStC Div . performance. Thirdly. training. the focus should be on core business and quality rather than quantity. doctrine.
The desired LoA should be translated into a comprehensive approach2 to security. in order to provide relevant. and how they will counter the security risks they perceive. A coherent transformation of the Belgian defence will be needed.13% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)4 is budgeted for defence. Development. While specific Belgian defence problems are highlighted in chapter five. Defence. the seventh and final chapter concludes this study by answering the two main questions that are put forward in this paper’s title. an analysis is made of how the international community and its relevant security actors view the impact geo-political changes will have on their requirements and capabilities. The determination of such ambitions is a task for the political authorities. it will have to adapt its size in accordance with the budget it is willing to spend. Once the advantages of having air power in Belgium are explained in chapter six. Hence the determination of the LoA is necessarily the joint responsibility of several different departments including Department of Foreign and Internal Affairs. This calls for regular coordination. Diplomacy. The goals derived from these ambitions should be distilled out of an analysis of evolving threats and the role Belgium wants to play on the international stage. taking into account such aspects as combat / combat support / combat service support. credible and well trained forces for the tasks at hand. Page 12 of 110 . 2007 figures show 1. consultation and interaction among all actors involved BE: 3D LO. Lately it has become clear that our defence organisation has to deal with some important challenges. Justice Department and the Department of both Economic Affairs and Development. They are merely an instrument for the Belgian government to be used in the execution of long term ambitions.Introduction Introduction This paper starts off with a look at how the international community perceives the geopolitical playing field in 2025. the current national and international missions and the Level of Ambition (LoA) of the AC is analysed. Furthermore. Page 9 3 Beleidsnota voor het Ministerie van Defensie (16) voor het begrotingsjaar 2008. the Belgian North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) contribution is far below the norm of 2%. Law and Order. Long standing re-organisations have led to “hervormingsmoeheid” amongst the soldiers3. In chapter four. In chapter two. In the third chapter. it is my believe that our armed forces have no God given right to exist. Furthermore. in-country training 2 NATO: security challenges require a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments. Page 5 4 Annex A “Belgian Defence spending 2007”. If Belgium has the ambition to remain relevant in the international forum. ’Politieke Oriëntatienota – Jun 2008. we analyse possible technological advances and their impact on future capabilities.
Introduction requirements. failure to learn and failure to adapt. caused by systemic problems that fall into three distinct but related categories: failure to anticipate. available and within the budget our country is willing to appropriate. national debacle. But militaries do not fail by themselves. to avoid catastrophic failure—we must redefine the Air Force for the 21 Century.5 st 5 CSAF White Paper. If our organisation is not willing or not allowed to transform. To succeed—indeed. recognize and act on changes in the strategic environment. and expeditionary operational requirements. page 2. or will be. adopt new operational concepts. Failure occurs in the context of an overall. In contrast. this statement of a United States Air Force (USAF) chief of staff becomes very true: History is replete with examples of militaries that failed due to their inability to transform organisations and culture. victory comes to those who foresee. 29 December 2007 . Page 13 of 110 . All this should be done with the personnel that is. “The nation’s guardians America’s 21st century air force”. or leverage breakthrough technologies.
several factors have resulted in a future environment sharply divided between the highly globalized world and an extremely destabilized region surrounding the equator.nato.1 Introduction This first chapter will analyse the most relevant security organisations. Multiple Futures Project – http://www. and social dimensions. These visions of the future are developed through analysing drivers. the organisation plans to deduce strategic-military implications. now and in the future. In the second phase.html “Multiple Futures Project Explained” – Page 5 6 7 Page 14 of 110 . 1.1 How do relevant security actors see the situation in 2025? NATO6 NATO has embarked on a quest to adapt to the changing security environment. From this understanding. relevant forces to enforce the will of the international community.2.act. and includes all natural. http://www. the team identified 4 possible (preliminary) futures8. The implications will be used to develop the best possible military advice for the Alliance to better guide the defence planning processes.2 1. political.10 Jan 2009 Annex B “ACT Multiple Futures Project. With this change comes the challenge to focus on the long term.The geo-political playing field in 2025 1 The geo-political playing field in 2025 1. ACT. with the presentation of a list of drivers7. The project is divided in different phases. The whole transformation strategy itself is based on anticipation of and preparation for change. possible futures. as there is a major immigration outflow from the equatorial regions to the richer countries. The developed countries are primarily concerned with the North-South dynamic. Phase I concluded in July 2008.nato.html . Preliminary Future One: Equatorial Destabilization. Since uncertainty is high NATO identified multiple. list of drivers” 8 ACT. This project is intended to frame security matters from a long term perspective.int/MultipleFutures/documents.act. drivers that in turn promote change.int/MultipleFutures/documents. and the requirement to make an investment in building an organisational understanding of what the future may hold. By 2030. These organisations will undoubtedly put political pressure on the Belgian government to take the steps and actions needed to contribute credible.
On the surface of things “Bright Horizons” is a well-ordered. worldwide many civilians have died in different conflicts and many more are displaced as a consequence of these conflicts. “Een veiliger Europa in een betere wereld. Preliminary Future Three: Rise of Technocracy. but also opportunities to positively influence ideas. Security is a condition required to allow for economic 9 Council of the European Union. Europese veiligheidsstrategie” – 12 Dec 2003 Page 15 of 110 . As challenges. It appears to diminish the strategic culture of the political class: security concerns are lulled into complacency. The network of global governance has weakened as a consequence both of absolute growth in state capacity and a relative diminishment of differences in economic power between states around the world. governance and culture. Preliminary Future Four: Return of Power Politics. poverty and diseases are the cause of a lot of suffering. but struggles to keep outsiders on its periphery away from its wealth.2. Also. and risks overdosing on a cocktail of surveillance and control.The geo-political playing field in 2025 Preliminary Future Two: Bright Horizons.2. AIDS has become one of the most devastating pandemic diseases that undermine whole societies. has become increasingly dominant. Although the process of predictive analysis is still ongoing. especially with its unpredictability.2. Technological and urban innovation has almost liberated the knowledge economy and ‘corporate man’ (suits and uniforms) from the rest of the physical world.1 EU Security Strategy (ESS) 9 The ESS predicts the future will bring world wide challenges to the organisation and identifies the most important of these threats. 1. In Africa.2 The European Union 1. It is fair to say that the future. famine. the ESS identifies the consequences of more open borders for internal and external security. will present NATO with unprecedented challenges. it serves as a basis for the Alliances’ discussion of a new strategic concept. The role of non state actors. Technocracy is a political conglomerate that reaches soaring heights of innovation and culture. Rationalism has triumphed in this world. Nation-state power politics is back. In a large number of third world countries. low conflict global environment. values and events in a globalized world. such as multinational businesses. Many see this as a source of frustration and injustice due to unequal divisions of wealth.
These conflicts lead to unrest. especially water. An initial long-term vision for European defence capability and capacity needs – 3 Oct 2006 Page 16 of 110 . WMD is perceived. 1. Weapon(s) of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation. and generates the financial means necessary for that operation. will cause more unrest and might generate even bigger migration flows. Conflicts and crime can stop this whole process. As threats. Kashmir or the Great Lakes area in Africa. which in turn increases regional instability.The geo-political playing field in 2025 growth.2. ESS sees Europe as the target of opportunity for organized crime. for example. States will find themselves concerned with issues of legitimacy in the use of force. less prosperous and surrounded by regions that struggle to cope with the consequences of globalisation. have a direct and indirect influence on Europe. and inclined to favour “security” over “defence” spending. infrastructural and societal development. Globalisation has enhanced these terrorist organisations ability to network and the ready availability of technology has made for a substantial increase in their capabilities.2 The European Defence Agency (EDA) EDA’s Long Term Vision (LTV) 10 portrays a slightly different. however.2. defence personnel policies will face a shrinking recruitment pool. to be the most important threat. Defence budgets will need to contend with pressure from a growing pension burden. which often has ties with terrorist groups. Finally. The increased capability of weapon systems could permit a few people to wreak havoc at a scale which was previously only available to states. the document highlights terrorism. terrorism and violation of human rights. resulting in insecurity and poverty. and. Terrorism jeopardizes human life and generates enormously high costs. Europe will be older. defence planners must deal with societies increasingly cautious about intervention operations. failed states and organized crime as most worrisome. Defence will need to continue adapting in several ways: o The use of force will be intimately linked with political (and media) developments – and will typically be applied in complex situations against an obscure enemy under tight rules of engagement and 24/7 media scrutiny. 10 EDA. Regional conflicts. gloomier world. Although non-proliferation treaties are in effect and have considerably slowed the process of proliferation. Failed states leave a power vacuum that is swiftly filled by warring factions. Many countries have become locked in a descending spiral. it is feared that increased access to technology and knowledge will spawn a new race. especially in the Middle East. Struggles for natural resources. The energy dependence of Europe will become a major concern in the next decennia. regional conflicts.
Hence. The Belgian security and defence strategy13 is based on five axes: 11 Lt Col Johan BREYNE ACOS Strat to NATO defence college. o Selectivity – meaning a wide range of capabilities. together with population12 safety and territorial integrity. to provide effective command decisions. Governed by a democratic model. o The United Nations (UN) and Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Both these organisations play a crucial role as overarching bodies that govern or provide frameworks for security operations. Belgian Defence Policy – 06 May 2008. directed at achieving security and stability more than “victory”. “Asymmetry” will apply not merely to an opponent’s tactics. multinational and multi-instrument. their “vision of the future” is not analysed. o Agility – implying speed of reaction and deployability. We want to contribute to a stable macroeconomic and monetary union.The geo-political playing field in 2025 The technological revolution will provide modern armed forces with great advantages. National interests are concerned with stability and peace. page 13 12 Including Page 17 of 110 .3 Sustainability – suggesting the right logistic support. whilst preserving our own voice in a multilateral environment. In such circumstances. but also the capacity to reconfigure for optimum force size and balance. the state ensures our quality of life. Key future force and capability characteristics should be: o Synergy – going beyond combined–arms warfare to coordination of effects with non military actors. They do not directly influence the combat capability requirements needed to effectively execute these operations. the military will be only one of a range of instruments applied to achieve campaign goals. but the adversary will work hard to adapt and asymmetrically exploit our own advances against us. It is complementary to information. but also to his aims and values. o 1. 13 Internal memo ACOS Strat “een analyse van de Belgische militair-strategische objectieven” – 26 Feb 2007. 1. diplomatic and economic policy. but also theatre access. and adapt quickly at the tactical level.4 Current Belgian defence policy Belgian defence policy11 is one of four pillars on which Belgian national security policy is founded. and based on our standards and values. slide 14 Belgians abroad. Information will be critical. European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operations will be expeditionary. and the means to ensure an informed and appropriate choice at each stage of the operation.
in its broadest sense. the Belgium defence policy relies upon three principles: responsibility sharing. They employ methods that do not respect either human rights or internationally accepted rules of conduct our own forces must respect. o The types of conflicts – Although major combat operations are not on the near horizon. “Politiek Orientatie Nota” – June 2008. For all types of conflicts. Speech at the Royal Higher Institute of Defence – 21 May 2008 16 Belgian Minister of Defence . Minister De Crem calls for a reorientation of the policy laid down in previous strategic guidance16. o Type of adversary – Today. Media coverage of human security violations influences local politics through public opinion. 1. burden sharing and risk sharing14. terrorism.“Strategisch Plan+” – Feb 2003 and “Defence Steering Plan” – Dec 2003 14 15 Page 18 of 110 . the minister identified situational awareness.1 Speech to the Royal Higher Institute of Defence by Belgian Minister of Defence15 In his 2008 speech. Increasing the role of the UN. Bilateral engagements can be crucial o o o o o Furthermore. opponents deploy more and more amongst the people. The Minister laid out a security environment. EU and NATO.The geo-political playing field in 2025 European identity in the area of security. Support to the OSCE. o Human security – the focus has shifted from state-centred security to protection of the individual. which was very consistent with other sources. Following topics have specific implications for the Belgian defence. The Trans-Atlantic link = cornerstone of our military security. pandemic outbreaks. page 35 Belgian Minister of Defence. etc). o The media – The struggle for international public support and the hearts and minds of the local population will be more and more influenced by the media in a Belgian MOD. Solutions to the perceived responsibility to protect can only be found if all involved parties make their resources available in order to achieve common goals.4. This necessary change is founded on the results of several different studies (UN. He highlighted weapon proliferation. crime. unequal distribution of resources. and migration as key areas of concern. they should not be excluded in view of emerging new powers. The current existing asymmetric threat still requires a robust capability across the entire spectrum of conflict. as the key to understanding how to conduct operations.
especially for such expensive assets as combat aircraft. the organisation must to take care of human security within the framework of our foreign affairs and security policy. Deployed soldiers face constant observation and scrutiny by the ever present media. radio. In its preface. integration and cooperation are of key importance. He also stressed that a pure military approach to solve conflicts is no longer viable. ships and satellite equipment. 1.4. Burden and risk sharing are an integral part of any employment strategy. the memorandum notes that although significant progress has been made in the last couple of decades. internet. interconnected Page 19 of 110 . Furthermore. The materiel in question must be interoperable with our partner nations although we only need what is essential to accomplish the mission. The Belgian defence department needs to be capable of executing its tasks anywhere in the world.The geo-political playing field in 2025 multitude of formats (press. We need to rationalize without lowering our ambition level by investing in our core capabilities and adhering to the principle of “le minimum suffisant”. an adapted command structure should permit flexible responses in an ever changing security environment. Thorough interdepartmental coordination and cooperation is essential. An expeditionary mindset should guide our transformation. o Internal and external security – The line dividing internal and external security will become increasingly blurred. But for Mr. As to the Belgian defences’ LoA. Migration and cyber incidents will be felt more and more directly by our own society although the “origin of disturbance” may be far from our national borders. June 2008. and on the other hand. Only in this way can Belgium assume its rightful place within the international community. De Crem. quick reaction and intervention capabilities become crucial. Emphasis should be on the quality and capability of the personnel. Expeditionary and technologically advanced forces demand well-trained young men and women. the fact that the world has become open. Finally. a major factor that will influence the future composition of our forces will be their integration into a European force.). According to the MOD. etc.2 Existing Belgian policy The political orientation memorandum. is the guidance document that currently steers Belgian defence strategy. both the EU and NATO remain compatible and complementary organisations. The Minister of Defence (MOD) also identified two distinct roles for Belgium’s defence apparatus. our minister indicates. television. when preventive measures fail. On the one hand the defence organisation is an extension of Belgium’s diplomatic efforts.
Voorwoord Page 2. o Closer to the people – Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) operations. terrorism and ethnical conflicts. participation to homeland security and protection of the maritime accesses.5 Intermediate conclusion Belgium strives for an effective security strategy and defence policy through multilateral cooperation. Therefore it fully subscribes to the futures projected by today’s major security organisations: UN. The documnent distinguishes three main missions that should be executed. Globalisation and the technological (r)evolution have spawned global economies and global threats. The Belgian defence retains the ambition to be a reliable17 and credible partner18. peace keeping. A partner amongst partners that is willing to realize broad. refugee aid and humanitarian relief.Through defence diplomacy22. o Efficient management of all phases of conflict solving21 .The geo-political playing field in 2025 and evolving generates numerous security risks. extensive integration and open for international cooperation. o Collective defence20 – In line with our international obligations to protect common interests and safeguard our democratic goals. From the perspective of the Belgian defence. these organisations portray a similar security environment from natural or man-made disaster through full spectrum war or large scale riots. organized crime. To be consistent the Belgian department of defence will need to tailor its operations within the framework of Belgium’s foreign policy. Solutions lie in a comprehensive global approach. Reconstruct 22 Military assistance.23 and peace-enforcement24 operations as well as disaster relief. Overall. NATO. In order to counter these risks and to play a credible role in enforcing the international community’s will. chapter VII 17 18 Page 20 of 110 . Belgian MOD. our troops will need to be capable of participating in peace and security operations through a broad spectrum of conflict. “Politiek Orientatie Nota” – June 2008. the focus has shifted from state security to human security. the use of observer and control teams…. we can conclude. A visible imbalance of wealth and resources are often the cause of (still) regional conflicts. 1. burdens and risk in international Belgian MOD. “Politiek Orientatie Nota” – June 2008. Veiligheids situatie Page 8 20 On the bases of Art V of the Treaty of Brussels (WEU) and Art 5 of the Treaty of Washington (NATO) 21 Prevent. To achieve these goals the MOD insists the focus of investment should continue to be on our Core Business19. participate in confidence building and security measures. the Belgian defence retains the ambition to be a reliable and credible partner by sharing responsibility. “Politiek Orientatie Nota” – June 2008. 23 UN charter. chapter VI 24 UN charter. Also. EU and OSCE. Veiligheids situatie Page 7 19 Belgian MOD. Solve.
We should rationalise without lowering the LoA and respect the principle of “le minimum suffisant”. multi-nationality and the comprehensive approach.The geo-political playing field in 2025 operations. In order to achieve these goals the MOD insists the focus of investment should continue to be on our Core Business [Identified as “Opdrachten” in the intercomponenten gerbuiksdoctrine25 (ICGD)] and a reorganised. Our mindset must be expeditionary. In the future (through 2025). joint. requires flexibility in response options and robustness in action throughout a broad spectrum of conflict. and combined. Accurate intelligence is needed for our interoperable forces equipped with compatible materiel. however. will require network enabled architectures for situational awareness in de broadest sense.intranet) – 1 Jan 2009 Page 21 of 110 . leaner command structure. 25 ACOT-SDP-ICOMDOC-CCSC-001_Ed2_-_SD2 (for official staffing . The rapidly changing security environment.
Furthermore.maintain and develop their individual & collective capacity to resist armed attack. While superiority in terms of firepower is still the aim throughout the planning period. modern database management technology makes the migration from essentially quantitative to qualitative methods possible. The goal is to plan for a number of weapon systems that ensures out performance of the oppositions. that states “…. These situations are specified in terms of environmental and operational parameters and form the test bed for assessing system requirements against formulated mission objectives. This cycle will be changed to four years for DRR 11. Threat-based planning The threat-based approach – used during the Cold War – involves identifying potential adversaries and evaluating their system requirements. Capability-based26 planning This method involves functional analysis of the expected future operations. NATO relies on a two year cycle27 defence planning process. the most cost-effective and efficient physical force unit options are determined. The process is founded on the basis of Art 3 of the NATO charter.1 NATO’s defence planning Currently. the evolution from the threat-based method stems from the inclusion of humanitarian and other non-threat considerations in the scenario set. 3. Once the capability inventory is defined. 2. Page 22 of 110 . Unlike the previous methods. the outcome is not expressed in concrete weapon system and manning levels. 2. 1. Defence planning methodologies have significantly evolved as a function of the complexity of the contemporary security environment.” The aim of the process is to provide a framework within which national and NATO defence planners can harmonise 26 Defined 27 by ACT as “the ability to produce an effect that users of assets or services need to achieve”. but as a description of the tasks that forces should be able to perform. Scenario-based planning This approach utilizes a representative set of situations for the employment of forces.Relevant security actors and defence planning 2 Relevant security actors and defence planning In this paragraph we investigate how the defence planning process works for the relevant security actors and what capability requirements they identify.
makes an overall assessment of the situation.2 Long Term Capability Requirements (LTCR)37 NATO has a Long Term Capability Study (LTCS)38 program whose scope projects 30 years into the future. The latest LTCS report produced a list of objectives derived from the Transformational Objectives Area (TOA)39. with special attention for development of the nontraditional Intelligence. Information Superiority. and resource planning. Two other planning disciplines are civil emergency planning and nuclear planning. Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) and all weather assured Joint Precision Strike (JPS). including force planning. and identifies shortfalls or surpluses. The MMR are verified with the available forces32 and shortfalls are identified33.a. the whole process is designed to ascertain if NATO and its member nations. the focus of effort is concentrated around “defence planning disciplines”.1. (NATO CONFIDENTIAL) – page 39. C2 planning. logistic planning.) 28 29 Page 23 of 110 . This latest DRR highlights shortfalls for combat air assets in: Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV). 2. Annex C “NATO Level Of Ambition” 30 2 MJO (Corps Size) and 6 SJO (Division or Brigade Size) of which one can be Air heavy and one Maritime heavy. combined with relevant assumptions and inputs from the “multiple future project”.1 Defence Requirements Review (DRR)31 process DRR is used to consult the member countries about their contributions and identify resulting shortfalls. Actually. Defence planning within NATO has several disciplines. to complement shortfalls in existing NATO-owned capabilities.1.…. This process looks at the Minimum Military Requirements28 (MMR). remove 2007 Bi-SC defence requirements review (DRR 07) final report. 2.Relevant security actors and defence planning their activities. armaments planning. 31 Annex D “Mission task analysis of the NATO Defence Requirements Review”. concerning air combat power. shortfalls are clearly identified35. 35 Annex F “DRR MMR analysis of aerospace capabilities” 36 2007 bi-sc defence requirements review (DRR 07) final report (NATO CONFIDENTIAL) – page 80. Its aim is to validate current LTCRs. Tactical Recce. 33 Annex E “MMR procedure used during NATO DRR 05” 34 2007 bi-sc defence requirements review (DRR 07) final report (NATO CONFIDENTIAL) – table 5 page 68. Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) potential of advanced targeting systems36. para 153. for timeframe 20082018. It is within the resource planning that we find the capability packages. Some conclusions of DRR 0734 force goals. 37 Annex G “Current NATO’s LTCR list” 38 Annex H “Comparison DRR -> LTCS” 39 (Ex: Expeditionary Ops Oriented. In these reviews. have the means available to execute its LoA29 which currently stands at 2 Major Joint Operations (MJO) and 6 Smaller Joint Operations (SJO)30. 32 Force offers out of DPQ 06. NATO NEC.
more interdependent.2 2. however. according to the TOA if needed. C2.. Maritime.1. is likely to be more diverse. These capabilities are a compilation of: • • • • • UOR = MCR = (DRR) = TCSOR = LT(C)R = Urgent Ops Requirements Min CAP Req (MC noted) Def Req Review (NC³A produced) Theatre CAP Statement of Req Long Term( CAP) Req Together.1 EU Defence planning 46 The Global Context The world of 2025.Relevant security actors and defence planning obsolete ones and add new ones as well as avoiding duplication and reprioritising.3 Future NATO defence planning40 Although a trend towards a more comprehensive41 DRR planning effort was initiated in DRR 05. combined with the practical cooperation along with involved non-NATO actors. not by stovepipes (Air. and Economic (DIME) instruments of national power to create the conditions for success. By 2025. Allied Command Operations (ACO) will manage the force generation through a Force Generation Management Tool (FGMT)45 and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) will manage the PLoCS which should create a new Integrated Defence Planning Process (IDPP). when combined with the database provide a clear overview of NATO’s required capabilities. 2. The process is completed by comparing the NLoRC to existing assets and capabilities. Comprehensive Approach or DIME44. Thus the prognosis Col Patrick WOUTERS Dep REP for BELGIUM to the MC “Future NATO Defence Planning”. 44 Effects-based thinking and terminology have been used to describe the challenge of Integrating Diplomatic. Consultation. NATO has established a database called the NATO List of Required Capabilities (NLoRC). Globalisation will make disparities between countries and regions ever more apparent. DRR 07 introduced the capability42-based methodology.. and anticipating on technology forecast & future systems. and even more unequal. Resources and Armaments Planning as to Force Planning. In the future. Informational. An initial long-term vision for European defence capability and capacity needs – 3 Oct 2006 40 41 Page 24 of 110 .2. the effective economic old age dependency ratio (retired over 65s as a percentage of the working population aged 15-64) will have risen from 37% to 48% and the average European will be 45 years old. 45 Annex I “NATO’s future force generation process” 46 EDA. Military. 2. interview Jan 2009 Same level of support to the Logistics. Out of this a Prioritised List of Capability Shortfalls (PLoCS) is compiled. 42 Capabilities are driven by tasks/effects. to create effects necessary to achieve planned objectives and ultimately the NATO end state”. Land.) 43 Definition of EBAO: “the Effects Based Approach to Operations is the coherent and comprehensive application of the various instruments of the Alliance. planning assumptions and such methodology principles as Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO43). EU defence planners predict.
will support the increasingly dominant role knowledge has in military operations. EDA. Six capability development areas were identified: Command . it is not just equipment. already exist. but encompasses strategic concepts.4 Implications for capability development In general. sensing and communication technologies. the immediate neighbourhood becomes more problematic. according to scientific consensus47.2. The role of the military will be determined within a wider campaign plan that includes close consultation with other – civil – instruments of power and influence. Moore’s law48 shows no signs of slackening. expeditionary and asymmetric – calls for an integrated and comprehensive approach to the planning and conduct of interventions. doctrine. according to EU planners. Adapting to the technological revolution Most of the technologies which may be key determinants of the military capabilities needed in 2025.Relevant security actors and defence planning is for tensions and strong migratory pressures in the regions around Europe.2 Challenges for Defence Adapting to the changing role of force The operations for which European forces should primarily prepare. Similarly. An initial long-term vision for European defence capability and capacity needs – 3 Oct 2006. training and organisations that will. such future forces and their capabilities must be founded on comprehensive and effects-based planning. 2. the precision. There is little doubt that continued advances in microelectronics.3 Implications for the military contribution to ESDP49 Operations The increasing complexity of ESDP operations – with the concurrent characteristics of being multi-national. speed and safety of military operations should benefit from rapid progress in bio. 2. in their combination.Deploy . yield the desired effects.Inform . While Europe becomes more dependent on the wider world. 2. the number of transistors that can be placed inexpensively on an integrated circuit has increased exponentially. will require force to be applied in complex situations.Sustain.2. against an opponent who conceals himself amongst the civil population. Since the invention of the integrated circuit in 1958.and material sciences.2.Engage Protect . page 11 Moore's law describes a long-term trend in the history of computing hardware. with tight and constraining Rules Of Engagement (ROE) and 24/7 media scrutiny. doubling approximately every two years 49 European Security and Defence Policy: Conclusions of the European Council “LoA ESDP is subject to change on proposal of the French presidency” – 13 Feb 2009. 17271/1/08 Rev 1 CO_CL 5 47 48 Page 25 of 110 .
A near real time targeting cycle will be fed by tactical information data links. Force catalogue FC06 and Progress catalogue” Page 26 of 110 .2. In Jul 08 the EDA steering board approved the general conclusions and identified twelve out of twenty-four capabilities as priority. the meeting in Nice produced the “Achievement of the Headline Goal – review mechanism for military capabilities”framework.5 The EU Capability Development Mechanism (CDM) Following the mandate offered by the Helsinki Council50. which specified the details of the EU CDM51 with a threefold aim: • To enable the EU to monitor achievement of the overall goals in qualitative and quantitative terms. It will remain crucial to gain and retain air superiority to guarantee freedom of movement on the ground. • To help achieve consistency between the pledges made in the EU framework and the force goals agreed to in the context of NEO planning. a list of detailed requirements was derived (RC05). 50 51 European Council Helsinki. close and rear operations with an important role for helicopters to insert and escort ground forces while protected by air power. Five illustrative scenarios. Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) will increase and create a blurred frontline requiring operation in depth. will create persistence above the operating area and will need to interlink with fast air assets to exchange targeting data. Counter Air Operations (CAO) are likely to encompass counter ballistic and cruise missiles as well as UAV. Presidency Conclusion: ”Military capabilities for Petersburg tasks” See Annex J “Requirements catalogue RC05. In 2025. The process of developing EU military capabilities towards the Headline Goal of 2010 is a first step to identify strategic planning assumptions. were identified. Air Interdiction (AI) and Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) roles will remain largely unchanged and crucial as a prerequisite for success on the ground. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). From these scenarios. The key capability to conduct fire support will be a timely delivery of precision effects with an economy of effort. • To enable the EU to evaluate and review its defined capability goals. encompassing a wide range of military operations. Like in NATO. leading to a force catalogue (FC06). comprised of deep.Relevant security actors and defence planning 2. Then the EU members were asked what forces they could offer to address these requirements. the CDP identified that knowledge based operations supported by persistent intelligence in a comprehensive & coordinated action would become the key to success. all orchestrated within a C4ISTAR infrastructure. The shortfalls identified were grouped in a progress catalogue (PC07) which then let to a Capability Development Plan (CDP). with their long endurance.
Training. for increases in intelligence processing speed. The LoA used in DRR 07 also introduced a requirement for capability advances in persistent strike. and for improved data fusion and exploitation. counter-insurgency (COIN) operations of lower intensity. the LoA change introduces an increased requirement for assured precision strike capable aircraft and non-lethal capabilities.Relevant security actors and defence planning 2. The US DoD predominantly uses the DOTMLPF acronym and NATO and international Ministries of Defence (MoDs) prefer the DOTMLPFI term. as well as “Soft kill” capabilities such as Escort/Support Jamming. it replaces questions such as “what options are there for new artillery?” with “how can we provide fire support to land forces?” Both EU’s and NATO’s defence planning tools have similar horizons54. NATO has also transitioned to similar DOTMLPFI method of capability planning. Two documents. Organisation. However. approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May 2004. It will also harmonize the capability goals and facilitate the identification of overlapping aspects of the EU’s Headline Goals with NATO’s Force Goals. for progress in ISR capability. Requirements for amounts of combat aircraft show an overall reduction as a result of the new NATO LoA. which includes the “I” for Interoperability. the DRR and LTCR.4 Intermediate conclusions NATO has embarked on a transformational process towards “capabilities needed to create effects”. Facilities and Interoperability. Materiel. nations are encouraged to develop the nontraditional potential of advanced targeting systems to provide near real time reconnaissance to the NATO Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) system. This revision has increased the significance of smaller. endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004 53 DOTMLPFI stands for Doctrine. 54 Annex K “D&S Planning horizons in the EU and NATO” Page 27 of 110 . For example. 2. are regularly updated to reflect these changing needs. The aim of delaying a decision of narrowing options is to encourage the development of more innovative alternatives and to help overcome simply replacing platforms and/or equipment with like-for-like. They have moved away from suggesting solutions (DOTMLPFI53) too early in the process. Personnel. Europe emphasizes future military contributions to ESDP and also calls for an integrated and comprehensive approach to the planning and conduct of 52 Headline Goal 2010. Leadership and education. BE describes the method in ACST-APG-CGEN-SXX-001. Both NATO and the EU have adopted the philosophy of capability based planning.3 NATO-EU cooperation on capability development The EU-NATO Capability Group52 was created to ensure the transparent and coherent development of capabilities. In addition. particularly in the Electronic Warfare and Aerospace Ground Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AGSR) domains.
requiring helicopters for insertion and protection while it is covered by air power. will provide accurate intelligence to allow near real time targeting. doctrine. yield the desired effects. it is not just equipment. Fire support to the operations will be crucial and should be coordinated trough integrated tactical networks. Future forces and their capabilities must be founded on comprehensive approach and effects-based planning. Page 28 of 110 . Emphasis will be on MOUT. training and organisations that will. but encompasses strategic concepts. mainly by UAVs and satellites. CAO and AI missions will remain crucial to create a suitable “working environment” for the forces on the ground. in their combination. The role of the military must be determined within a wider campaign plan that includes close consultation with other – civil – instruments of power and influence. Persistent C4ISTAR.Relevant security actors and defence planning interventions.
due to their advances in stealth technology. signed in 1967 by more then 90 nations. networking and communications capabilities. and shall be the province of all mankind…[and] shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance…»56 Since Belgium has ratified this treaty. are a generation ahead of what the European industry currently is producing. Unfortunately.2 Evolution of fighter aircraft 57 Fifth generation fighters.What are the technological evolutions? 3 What are the technological evolutions? In this paragraph the technological evolution is examined for different relevant areas pertaining to combat systems. These weapon platforms are comparable to F-16 Mid Life Update (MLU) / USAF Block 50-52 type aircraft. produced a capability gap in the Air Ground (AG) role. 3.gov/t/ac/trt 57 Annex M “Analysis of future platforms” 58 Rafale (F2 version) is currently still being reworked to integrate a laser designator capability. Integration contract was awarded in July 2006 but today’s RAF aircraft are not capable yet. such as the F-22 and F-35 which. including the US and Russia sought to avoid the weaponisation of outer space. This will identify areas in which the Belgian defence will need to invest in order make sure it can continue to provide capable systems in the future and stay in line with the upgrades and modernisations done by partner nations. which they are currently struggling to close58. In the past. The prices of aircraft59 vary significantly.1 Evolution in space 55 The so called ‘Outer Space Treaty’. data fusion. but the market leader will ultimately become the cheapest platform throughout its lifetime because the Research & Development (R&D) effort for system evolution can be shared by the number of countries participating in the effort. 3. with an Air Defence (AD) focus. «The exploration and the use of outer space…shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries. introducing this capability will cost much more than initially projected. open avionics architecture. it will only invest in those space based systems that increase C4ISR.state. Only the Typhoon (UK version of Eurofighter) has laser designation capability. and engine performance. equipped with the latest avionics technology. as net-centricity and data fusion were not in the initial design requirements. Experience from DG MR Sys A/C clearly shows that purchasing or Annex L “Space based weaponry” http://www. European aircraft requirements. irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development. networking. 59 Annex N “US fighter modernization plans: near-term choices” 55 56 Page 29 of 110 .
Apart from the different names. it is uncertain how their acquisition costs will rise when their capabilities increase64. A first category of these UAS is the Reconnaissance. By LtCol Rafael Saiz & Col Daniel Lewandowski – 2008. although a UAS is generally considered to encompass the UAV and its overarching network architecture. Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) platforms. Slide 54. 62 3.Flight Plan for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in NATO. Today. During the 1990’s. it is clear that UAS / U(C)AVs are here to stay. the direction of UAS development is uncertain due to a lack of overarching doctrine and critical shortfalls in bandwidth / frequency availability. The R&D for integration of the CARAPACE system (French Radar Warning Receiver) had to be paid by Belgium alone. but for these kinds of programs. These systems have earned their place in the war fighting arena. (source: Lt Col Bärd VIKEN. “UAV cost” 65 JAPCC . This self protection system is crucial for survival when threatened by radar guided missiles systems.3 Evolution of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) There is no official agreement in NATO regarding the utilization of the terms UAS vs. For Belgium. RNoAF chairman working group “best options for Norway”). 2025 seems to be far in the future. Development of high performance UCAVs. Unmanned (Combat) Aerial Vehicle (U(C)AV)63. electronic warfare (EW) and associated operations66.What are the technological evolutions? integrating country unique weapon systems or capabilities push the price very high60. 63 UAS in NATO: Fostering Transformation. established above the area of operations (AOR) or to complement satellite type intelligence information. The latter are being developed to serve as communication/network nodes. Although UAS Life Cycle Cost (LCC) appears to be cheaper than manned aircraft. Pages 24-25 66 http://www. Furthermore. and are being developed for first strike missions like SEAD/DEAD. R&D in UAS programs steadily progressed and has produced a number of sophisticated platforms. 61 Prior 2008 Norway was inclined to select the Jas 39 Gripen but LCC predictions re-oriented the choice to the JSF. For this reason. there is a lack of standard Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) procedures because of nationally developed stove-piped systems which are incompatible with each other and with NATO networks65. such as nEUROn or X-45. and a discussion about replacing this aircraft has not yet begun. the F-16 MLU roadmap extends through 2025. Therefore these systems will be not as versatile as manned fighters. Chatham House Rule 62 Annex O “Combat fighter lead time for acquisition” Briefing MR Sys A/C1 – Jan 2009. a 5-10 year procurement lead time is normal. not withstanding heavy political pressure to select the Jas 39 Gripen.com/projects/x-45-ucav/ 60 Page 30 of 110 . Norway decided to opt for the F-35. page 1 64 Annex P. are in concept demonstration phases.airforce-technology. most studies predicted a much higher degree of development. heavily based on their experience within Multi National Fighter Program (MNFP) / European Participating Air Forces (EPAF)61. and a second group is the High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) / Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) systems.
Intelligence.4 Evolution in the Information domain C4ISR68 is a strategic enabler for coherent. promises to be far better suited to the needs of soldiers and marines for on-call fire support “US fighter modernization plans: near-term choices” by Steve Kosiak – 2007. Control. the need for NNEC was reiterated as well as the need for interoperability and for information sharing70.5. largely due to national sensitivities. Ethical and ROE issues67 are also of concern and make the acquisition of such a system for BE highly unlikely. A first step to common intelligence sharing has been taken by installing the Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC) in Northwood. Briefing to Royal High Institute for Defence . recommendations for a coherent C4ISR vision will be forthcoming. 3. Computers. Communications. NATO definition: Command.What are the technological evolutions? costs of these high performance UCAVs will be difficult to determine and there will be major issues with technology transfer. Recent developments even combine guidance techniques so that pilots have options based on weather conditions in the target area. Surveillance and Reconnaissance 69 Annex R “NATO C4ISR roadmap”. Common techniques for weapon guidance include laser. United Kingdom.5 3. Artillery munitions are also being developed to use these same techniques71. though roughly triple the price of a JDAM. expedient decision making in order to permit rapid. page 47 67 68 Page 31 of 110 . D’hollander. Global Positioning System (GPS) and Inertial Navigation System (INS). But augmenting the precision of a weapon is also driven by the consideration that fewer weapons will be required to destroy a specific target. The GPS-aided Excalibur round. If these missions can be executed within a “network enabled alliance”. Through such projects as Multi-sensor Aerospace-Ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition (MAJIIC). Unfortunately. A Joint Common Operational Picture (JCOP) will permit real time C2. 70 Maj Gen G. Once this technology matures. During the Bucharest Summit in Apr 2008. 3. target acquisition and identification will improve. NATO is trying to identify gaps between current and future capabilities. Once these gaps are identified. contemporary operations indicate that information sharing has not been pro-active. it will certainly reduce Close Annex Q “U(C)AV evolution and considerations”.1 Evolution in weapon technology Precision Collateral damage has become a major feature of today’s “CNN effect”. proved difficult to employ and less than reliable. fed by a shared situational awareness (SA) and fused intelligence69. target focused mission execution. One such recommendation is to embrace the NATO Network Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) principles. the result will be decision superiority.11 March 2009 71 The Army’s laser guided Copperhead. General Manager NC3A.
Changing AOR within the same theatre is also much more cumbersome and slow. both for manned and unmanned flight training. Small Diameter Bomb (SDB).6 Evolution in simulation capabilities Advances in simulation technology will reduce the cost of air crew training requirements.3 Lethal weapons development In the development of kinetic weapons. turbo prop aircraft like the Super Tucano. 72 73 Page 32 of 110 . the emphasis will continue to be on reducing collateral damage by providing smaller and more precise weaponry.2 Non-Lethal weapons The US is researching several non-lethal weapon systems72. With smaller precision guided weapons becoming available. With the ever increasing complexity of today’s missions. but advances in network speed and bandwidth will make-up for this short fall in the not too distant future. there is no consensus on the use of this kind of weapon. 3. there seems to be a reluctance to shift major investment funds from traditional (legacy?) weapon research programs. with state of the art cockpits are set to take up the counter narcotics role and COIN. If these simulators are linked together. 3.What are the technological evolutions? Air Support (CAS) aircraft requirements. is not as deployable and is more vulnerable. Within NATO. more and more flight training is required. However. Basic (emergency) training capability is not to be confused with this tactical simulation. 3. The ethical and legal debate continues. But artillery does not have the reach of aircraft. is best example of how smaller yield and higher accuracy should mitigate the collateral damage issue. Available bandwidth remains a choke point. Although the technology is ready to shift into the next phase.5. they are in the test / demonstration phases. Currently. The tactical simulators Annex S “Non-Lethal weapons” Reflection paper Maj Luc COLIN. along with corresponding arguments over rules of engagement and national caveats73. tactical74 simulation should become more complementary to actual flight training.5. transfer of data becomes an almost unsurpassable hurtle. Display technologies and computer power now make it possible to generate better performance displays that are comparable to an actual flight view. 123 AStC “Defence against Terrorism” Dec 2008 74 The increased need for real flying Trg can only be mitigated by providing a comprehensive tactical simulation capability. real time mission simulations become possible. To mitigate the need for more real time flying (hours). since most nations do not want sensitive data passing over (even encrypted) networks.
A healthy competition should result in a better product at a lower price and more competitive firms75. Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'ARmement (OCCAR) seems to be the organisation that is paving the way for future defence procurement. The notions of economical compensation.What are the technological evolutions? should especially be used to train the less complex tactical systems and skills so more time become available to train high end performance in flight.7 Role of the (Belgian) industry in the technological evolution Ever evolving technology brings complexity to the weapon systems but especially to all aspects of program management. This coordination is needed to create stability for investments in expensive and complex systems. participation to highly technical and innovative programs has advantages for expertise building and often creates profitable spin-off opportunities. In the same time. Furthermore. When defence organisations want to acquire modern and versatile capabilities they are usually faced with the burden of acquiring very expensive systems. Although US policy strives for multiple suppliers for the acquisition of complex systems the industrial base has been largely consolidated to a handful of major firms. although in the sector of aerial systems consolidation is ongoing. has spawned opportunities in the civil world. but they do ultimately provide incentives and opportunities to the industry. Belgian firms have adopted the strategy of excelling in sub-areas of bigger systems by offering superior quality and knowledge in key areas. Europe still has a diverse defence contractor landscape that mainly lives of national orders. Job creation is still a major player when political approval for major investments is required. or global balance might seem to have a negative influence on defence contracts. EU legislation becomes a vehicle that is used more and more throughout acquisition programs. Their expertise. In Europe. Although there is still a tendency to award contracts to own defence industry. Improving efficiency of legacy systems and reducing cost for acquisition of new systems forces international cooperation and the development of new program management methods. system engineering has become so complex and expensive that prime contractors are compelled to trans-national and integrated development. 3. 75 DefenceNews “Denmark wants lowest price for new combat aircraft” – 23 March 2009. creating profits as well as opportunities to keep up own R&D efforts. “juste retour”. Currently Europe is facing problems with coordination of long term defence requirements. page 6 Page 33 of 110 . initially acquired through defence contracts.
Countries are encouraged to embrace NNEC to facilitate C4ISR growth. countries who replace their manned fighters with UCAVs will thus be limited to first strike type missions and no longer have capabilities to offer in other parts of the conflict spectrum. 2008”. They are.8 Intermediate conclusions Belgium should continue to invest in those space based systems that will form the backbone of future C4ISR76 systems and networks and therefore create assured access to critical information. since these will guarantee a larger client base in order to keep investment costs down. A JCOP will permit real time C2 fed by shared SA and fused intelligence. Furthermore. hence mitigating collateral damage. technology transfer problems. higher precision weapons. UAS and its subsystems availability are increasing mainly due to national acquisition programs. NATO has identified numerous shortfalls necessary to build a facilitating architecture. but individual nations are reluctant to commit to such an endeavour. Future investment should go to “market leader systems”. The lack of overarching employment concepts. Maintaining (fighter) combat capability in line with NATO and EU evolving capability requirements should be done through international partnerships (similar to the MNFP / EPAF model) or joint ventures in order to ensure synergy.What are the technological evolutions? 3. Tactical UAV or HALE / MALE systems will continue to evolve and become more capable and more versatile. Issues like ethics. after all. Current and future fighters must be capable of integrating newly developed capabilities like low collateral damage. however. makes it difficult to predict which systems will become widely used. Currently clear and fast decision making is hampered by a lack of willingness to share intelligence but the IFC in Northwood might bring change. cost savings and an affordable LCC. . THE answer to a requirement for a persistent presence over the battlefield. frequency and satellite availability are critical enablers NATO currently lacks. Hence. bandwidth. This phenomenon ultimately will mean that fewer 76 This to be consistent with the priorities set in “Politieke Oriënatienota. Indications are that by 2025. that in the (near) future RSTA systems will become the backbone of NATO’s C4ISR capability. and ROEs make a reliance on UCAV unlikely for a country like Belgium. high performance UCAVs will not have matured to be as mission versatile or “multi-role” as manned fighter aircraft. however. It is clear.page 52 Page 34 of 110 . Kinetic weapons will continue to seek greater precision with less explosive force. But they will become an excellent complementary system to execute highly dangerous first strike missions. political sovereignty.
What are the technological evolutions? fighters are needed since missions can be executed with greater efficiency. Today. restrictions on transfer of classified data between linked simulators. OCCAR seems to be paving the way for procurement of future expensive systems and capabilities. and the reluctance of US to shift R&D money away from classical. Defence contracts must be seen as simply one other way of doing business in which (Belgian) firms can build an expert reputation of knowledge and quality. European legislation promotes the open competition for awarding defence contracts but the diverse defence contractor landscape still needs to be consolidated. Simulators will become more and more complementary to actual flight training. severely hampers realistic networked training. In Europe. Nonlethal weapons are not considered by European countries. Precision artillery will complement CAS on the battlefield and performant prop aircraft are being equipped with precision weapons for use in counter narcotics and COIN operations. legal issues. Their use will continue to be hampered by debates over ROEs. Page 35 of 110 . The development of simulation capabilities presents us with opportunities to reduce flight time requirements for basic tactical skills thus increasing the available flying time for advanced “high end” training or the training for newly inserted capabilities. proven combat capabilities.
(sub)Cap paraatgestel door AC 83 Helios II delivers imagery to the French military both night and day.1 Defining the missions According Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3. German SAR LUPE and Italian CosmoSkymed and Pléiades systems. and is conducted to deprive the enemy of the military power he needs to occupy territory or exploit sea space. France also has an agreement to exchange some of Helios II’s optical observing capacity for future radar observation capacity now under development in Germany and Italy. from 2015-2017 onwards 77 Intercomponenten 78 Page 36 of 110 .30 Aug 04. 4.2 Current Belgian (Air Component) Level of Ambition In 2004. This document identifies capabilities at both the national strategic level and at the tactical level80. Furthermore. all air operations for strategic effect and are likely shaped by political aims and constraints. 4. • Anti-Surface Force Air Operations (ASFAO). operations in which combat support aircraft are employed to support other aircraft or forces undertaking combat roles. and responsibilities towards Belgian nationals79. MUSIS will ensure continuity of services from the current French Helios II. Belgium published its joint doctrine: ICGD77. • Supporting Air Operations. defence of universal and democratic values. Since then an updated draft78 has been prepared that reflects the requirements of the politieke oriëntatienota of 2008.1 Capabilities82 • Strategic support capabilities o Joint ISTAR Capabilities Strat level(ACOS-IS)83. paragraph 1.intranet) – 1 Jan 2009 79 Annex T “Strategic Orientation of the Belgian Defence” 80 Annex U “Operational capacities and sub-capacities” 81 Annex V “Possible engagement scenarios” 82 Annex W “Level of Ambition of the Belgian Air Component”.National and International missions 4 National and International missions 4.2. Defensive Counter Air (DCA) and Offensive Counter Air (OCA) • Strategic Air Operations. these scenarios serve as a common “language” throughout the defence organisation81. Comd en Staff elements (Assessment) Gebruiksdoctrine .3 the missions defined for air forces can be broken down into four major types. In general. Nr 04-185171 ACOT-SDP-ICOMDOC-CCSC-001_Ed2_-_SD2 (for official staffing . the missions of the Belgian armed forces are focused on three major themes: international commitments. different scenarios are developed which permit the standardisation of detachments. • Counter Air Operations (CAO).
2 Level of ambition85 • F-16 MLU o 36 F16 distributed as follows: Xx (confidential) F-16 Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA). Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). 72 Hrs notice. N2. o RC4 = 20 days • UAV B-Hunter o o Tactical UAV for real time surveillance. BSR.3 Mar 2009 (CONFIDENTIAL). o Helicopter Maritime support capability. Capable of transporting a light infantry battle group and its C2 requirement. …) . o 4.Sensors : Recce. Wing Operations. • Other capabilities o o o o o Airport exploitation. paragraph 2 LoA van de lucht gevechtscapaciteit 86 The Strike (nuclear) commitment to NATO is not mentioned in the ICGD. Active Close ground defence. Multi Role Helicopter (MRH) capability.Comd en Stafelements J2. • MRH A-109BA o o o 12 A-109 MRH and 2 A-109 AE. RC6 = 40 Days Within ACOS Ops&Trg and the components other ISTAR means are available: . not mentioned86 and 02 F-16 In Place Force (IPF) Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) 24/7 and 34 F-16 – deployable one shot or 18 F-16 – Six months max or 12 F-16 – for an indefinite period CRC for Air Policing. UAV. Fleet analysis done by COA as reply on memo to DGHR “ICGD F-16 capability”. TARGETTING POD. A3 Cbt Sp. o • Air Tpt 8 C-130 and 2 A-310. 84 Page 37 of 110 . installation protection. 2 for Search And Rescue (SAR) on the national territory and 1 permanently available in Sp of the Naval Component (NC). G2. reconnaissance and observation.National and International missions Tactical level84 • Operational Capabilities Air combat capability. Control & Reporting Centre (CRC) and Meteorological services. MITS 09-148215 . in NATO and/or EU operations. o UAV capability with real time surveillance. Deployable modules: Air Traffic Control (ATC). (A-400M in 2018) o 1 ERJ Aero medical Evacuation (AE) • JSH NH-90 . 4 NATO Frigate Helicopter (NFH).as of 2013 o 4 Tactical Transport Helicopter (TTH) in Sp of the Land Component (LC). Fire and crash crew. (Tactical) Air transport capability. 7 Pages. … 85 Annex W “Level of Ambition of the Belgian Air Component”. reconnaissance and observation. MEDINT + Intel sections withing the component units (S2.2. later Joint Support Helicopter (JSH). A2. MRP.
because its training doctrine87 and fighter capability is compatible with Belgium’s EU and NATO allies. • B-Hunter real time images. This multinational airlift consortium is chartering six Antonov An-124-100 transport aircraft 89 Technical Agreement (TA) for cash free exchange of services (currently air transport and AAR) between EAG member states to optimize the use of scarce transport and tanker resources 90 Briefing DG MR C&I “Status Report”. executed by land based Surface to Air Missiles (SAM). Therefore. 4. and mechanisms are in place to network all ISR capable platforms. the new Multi Purpose Protected Vehicle (MPPV). The air defence missions.1 Analysis Missions With its combat aircraft. • (For LC. • ACOS-IS has satellite imagery available. • 1 F-16 MLU Squadron processes information from the Modular Recce Pod (MRP).3. from ACOS-IS to the tactical units.2 Level of ambition ISTAR assets (and the information generated by different sub-systems) are dispersed throughout the defence organisation. Belgium is able to conduct these missions both nationally and internationally. For expeditionary operations. shortfalls necessary to redirect and prioritise investment can not be identified. to 123 AStC – 10 Mar 09 87 88 Page 38 of 110 . This information is gathered and processed by the system users themselves and there is a very low level of joint information sharing. • A-109 HObn. Belgium is well equipped to handle a key part of the CAO/ASFAO mission domain. However assured access to AAR is not available. PANDUR and Armoured Infantry Vehicles (AIV) are scheduled to have a Recce / Observation and FAC capability.3. • CRC makes a Recognized Air Picture (RAP). are standard throughout EPAF and USAF air forces. Hence. Unfortunately.) A generic NEC architecture is already available90. available to the analyst in the ground control station. during day / night in all weather conditions. the BAC is quite capable thanks to its own Tpt fleet and possible co-operations like Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS)88 or / Air Transport and Air to Air Refueling Exchange of Services (ATARES)89. • F-16 MLU SNIPER pod. doctrine and guidance documents are lacking. were discarded in the early 80’s and the OCA missions of SEAD / DEAD are not available. opportunities to construct a national JCOP or build the capability Mission Planning Manual 3-1 and basic employment manual 3-3.National and International missions 4.3 4.
One F-16 MLU Sqn can perform Tactical Recce with the Modular Recce Pod (MRP)94 and possesses image processing and interpretation capability. 93 F16-MLU L-16 capability provides instant secure network plug-in capability in the theater of operations. In order to accommodate for today’s short decision cycle requirements. so all systems that cannot contribute to the completion on C4ISR capability should either be optimised or discarded. Therefore. an airborne real time data link would be required. is a high performance high readiness weapon platform capable of operating throughout the whole spectrum of conflict. continuous imagery data-link97. It has day and night imagery capability at all altitudes. 97 ROVER provides cockpit video to the JFAC via a laptop.93 thus capable of interoperable-joint-combined operations. The system struggles with obsolescence99 requiring recurrent efforts to guarantee its operationality. Processed information can be made available to a CAOC via secure Interim CAOC Capability (ICC) terminals if required. but its limited engine performance seriously restricts its employability. also during “convoy protection” allowing the soldier to “look around the corner” and see what is happening in the streets around his convoy. 4. Furthermore. With these Video Down Link (VDL) systems the BAC is meeting NATO’s request to develop inherent NTISR capabilities. 94 Limited to Day good weather Low and Med + Low Level IR 95 Allows coordinates generated by a (J)FAC element to be transmitted electronically into the weapon aiming systems of the F-16 MLU. The A-109 can be used in attack98 and AE role. Today the BAC F-16 MLU.National and International missions to contribute to a JCOP in expeditionary operations are being lost. 98 A-109 can be equipped with TOW 2A missile. drastically reducing the timing from Tgt identification to weapon employment. the F-16 MLU is equipped with ATHS95 and the SNIPER96 pod. coherent guidance of the Capability Transformation Steering Group (CTSG) is crucial. 96 The SNIPER advanced targeting systems is used to guide laser guided weapons to the target. 99 Briefing MR Sys A/O to 123 AStC Div on 6 Jan 2009 91 92 Page 39 of 110 . it should not be forgotten that the BAC still has two important tasks to perform: Annex X “Doctrine & Requirement process” Through a bottom-up approach (cfr Nota CHOD-200703740 van 29 mei 2007 – Directives VCHOD suite au briefing NEC & ISTAR) integrate different information sources (C2 services en weapon systems) align investment needs and implement within a NEC context. Furthermore. It is currently used in ISAF. The use of the SNMTI board92 should be encouraged.4 Intermediate conclusions While the Belgian defence organisation is reorienting towards expeditionary operations. its logistical support has been re-engineered with an expeditionary mindset. although current system technology and the extreme large amount of information files make exploitation a slow and cumbersome process. Via Ops & Trg D&R the JISR ICT process91 should be started. The B-Hunter UAV system can provide real time TV video during day but can not provide position data. The SNIPER targeting pod is equipped with a real time. it is network enabled. Speed is everything.
The JISR ICT should be started under the guidance of the CTSG to identify priorities as well as opportunities through SNMTI. 100 For expeditionary operations. current and future. The BAC F-16 MLU is a leading performer. are compatible with the NATO Network Enabled Capabilities (NNEC). just as capable as its peers from the USAF or other EPAF countries. apart from F-16 MLU. their sustainment periods are limited. Belgium should make sure that its weapon systems. Today contribution to a JCOP in expeditionary operations. However. the AAR capability needs to be coordinated with third parties whose commitment is not guaranteed. is not possible. The UAV reconnaissance capability is limited to day operations only and can not provide position data. Plans are in place to maintain F-16 MLU evolution within MNFP/EPAF until 2025. but further guidance and doctrine are needed. Both the helicopter (RC4=20 days) and UAV (RC6=40 days) capabilities have slow response times. The current A-109 helicopter’s limited engine performance seriously restricts deployability. its interoperability with our coalition partners as well as the health of its structure is critical in order to remain relevant. Replacement for the aging C-130 transport fleet is in place. a lack of assured access100 to the AAR support function makes Belgium vulnerable to meet its deployment timelines.National and International missions • • generating a RAP while safeguarding the integrity of the Belgian airspace honouring the nuclear role in the mutual deterrence strategy Belgium has managed to establish a NEC architecture that can serve as the backbone for our C4ISR capability. Page 40 of 110 . Maintaining our combat aircraft’s operational capabilities.
The ideal budgetary division within the Belgian armed forces would be to spend 50% on personnel costs. Earlier investment commitments were based on financial situations prior to several budget cuts. Through 2013. 5. 101 102 Page 41 of 110 .2 Budget evolution Over the years. the result has been a Annex Y “BE Strategic planning guidance documents” Annex Z “Evolution of Belgian MOD Budget” 103 Politieke Oriëntatienota Jun 08 – page 2 104 Interview with MR-B/Inv.3 Evolution of the personnel quorum After the fall of the Berlin wall. Sometimes these guidelines were translated into a Belgian strategic defence plan but the political commitment was not always honoured. budgets were cut contradictory to what was laid out in the strategic plan. Most European defence organisations have restructured since the end of the Cold War. 5. today’s figures depict a defence organisation in peril102. This is especially true for Belgium given our geographical position. Their understanding is critical to comprehend future recommendations for the transformation of the organisation. This situation must be corrected.Belgian defence specifics 5 Belgian defence specifics In this chapter specific issues and challenges of the Belgian defence organisation are analysed. forced the Belgian defence to save on functioning and investment cost. This has produced a zero investment margin (vrije marge). it has become clear that the focus of our defence organisation no longer lies in safeguarding the integrity of our boundaries. Belgium’s armed forces have had to adapt to different plans and guidance documents issued by the political authorities. Together with past increase in personnel cost the situation has become critical. Today a “Plan Minimum Urgent” (PMU) identifies critical investments. Sadly. or we will not be able to maintain the ambitions of our government to be a reliable and trustworthy international partner103.1 Evolution of the guidance documents 101 Over the past decades. and even this plan still awaits approval. estimates show this margin may become negative104. 25% on functioning and 25% on investment costs respectively. The latest guideline (Politiek orientatienota) has not been translated into a new strategic plan while this is crucial to steer and prioritise all future activities. 5. Actual numbers are classified and could not be used to substantiate this reflection.
personnel issues will be THE challenge in the future.000 retiring troops or 15% of the force Speech by the Belgian Minister of Defence to the ACMP . the MOD recognizes this dilemma110. To succeed. the Belgian armed forces are predicted to fall below 27. The units of the Belgian Defence are inadequately dispersed throughout Belgium and a lot of barracks date from the early 19th century. It is clear that within 5 to 10 years. 5.000108 assuming that recruitment can be ramped up to 2000 per year. the Belgian military will shrink by 30% while we must ensure that our organisation keeps rejuvenating. According to the Belgian MOD106. This should allow resetting priorities and refocusing the required transformation. page 4 105 106 Page 42 of 110 . Action should be taken now to streamline an organisation that is prepared to function within this limited personnel and a reduced defence staff. which may be an unrealistic assumption. 5.725 by 2010107. barracks or bases109 are still in use. More than ±300 units. Rationalisation and optimalisation of the functioning budget has brought it to the goal of about 25 %. is to save on personnel as well as savings through the optimalisation in number and quality of buildings and bases/barracks while keeping an acceptable geographical dispersion in mind. Since this should be maintained. In 2008 President Sarkozy announced he would not replace 54. By 2025.5 Intermediate conclusion A new strategic plan should be issued that translates the latest political guidance. in order to create room for investment.Belgian defence specifics downsizing of the European military105 since the challenge has become the aging civilian population. although simulations show the personnel reduction will be much more profound.12-01-2009 (14:19) 108 Annex AA “BE MOD personnel quorum evolution” 109 Annex AB “Geographical dispersion of units in Belgium” 110 “Beleidsnota voor het Ministerie van Defensie (16) voor het begrotingsjaar 2008”. The budget is stretched beyond its limits and investment has come to a halt. in the coming twelve years. The installations are archaic and not adapted to today’s efficiency standards nor energy or environmental standards. we will need to shift our recruitment focus and become more “attractive”… The MOD also states that our goal should be 37.4 Geographical dispersion of units throughout Belgian territory We must consolidate the number of barracks spread throughout the country. the only opportunity left.24-10-2008 (13:24) 107 Speech by the Belgian Minister of Defence to the assembled Generals during New Years reception .
joint or multinational operations and objectives. economic. 6. If one understands that the solution to a conflict will require a comprehensive approach. in support of national. it is clear that any armed force who wants to remain credible in the contemporary security environment must be able to perform throughout full spectrum conflict for which air power is ideal. It can be brought to bear on an adversary’s political. It will be faced with budgetary constraints that will dictate trade-offs favouring those military elements that offer utility over a wide spectrum of conflict. that increases one’s ability to project power over long distances. After the analysis of importance of air power111. The need for speed. close cooperation with non military actors such as Non Governmental Organisations (NGO)s and International Organisations (IO)s. swift coordination between the different forces is a prerequisite. flexibility and availability has been demonstrated more than once to the Belgian political authorities112. Baltic States and Afghanistan (2 times) are proof of this readiness. information or social system structures simultaneously or separately. Annex AC “Importance of Air Power” This was demonstrated several times.1 Why is Air Power important “Air Power is an essential element in all military operations. It can be employed over the full spectrum of military operations. The military of the future will need to deal with a wide variety of threats in diverse parts of the world. 113 Annex AD “Development of Joint Armed Forces combined with inter agency coordination” 111 112 Page 43 of 110 . Amendola. 6. integrated command and control systems113 will be necessary to allow for fluent and expeditious coordination.Why Air Combat Power for Belgium 6 Why Air Combat Power for Belgium This chapter will highlight the advantages of having air combat power available as well as some aspects we will need to keep in mind when preparing the BAC for the future. military. Villa Franca. the aircraft were in theatre over the weekend.3 Para 201. each time the “kern cabinet” took a decision on a Friday.2 Integrated command In order to employ air power in an effective way. and it can be coordinated with land and maritime surface and subsurface and space operations or employed independently” AJP 3. The operations of the future will be executed in a social and political environment that will dictate the need to minimize both friendly casualties and collateral damage. at any level. A reinvigorated BAC can meet these requirements.
If the BAC needs to be resized to compensate for costs. At the same time the BAC delivers a maximum of (fire) fighting power with less risk to Belgian personnel compared to “boots on the ground”.. p191 116 Annex AE “F-16 fleet size and pilot contingent calculation” 114 Page 44 of 110 . CA.pdf. Real “jointness” and “unity of effort” can only be achieved if. Department of the Air Force. ‘Learning Large Lessons. 03Apr07. Air. 6. The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post-Cold War Era’. able to judge the fine line between right or wrong. currently well underway within the AC and NC but which has not really been initiated within the LC.doctrine. RAND Corporation. joint is about “Airmindedness”114. Santa Monica.4 Intermediate conclusions It is clear that having air combat power is an absolute prerequisite in order for the Belgian government to remain relevant in its contributions to international operations. and precision. Project Air Force. 2007.3 Sizing the future Belgian Air Component fighter capability 116 A combat fighter capability is a combination of pilot + aircraft + useful payload (including level of training and technical support) which is the qualitative aspect. In view of the budget situation. ‘Operations and organisation’. However. maintaining quality and quantity until 2025 will be a challenge. every effort should be made not to sacrifice quality for quantity. The achieved effect is more important than strictly defining relationships like supporting/supported commander.115 This partnership will be forced with the introduction of NCW. 6. Only then can the true effectiveness and benefits of air power be achieved. Much care should be taken to embrace the integrated command capability for expeditionary operations. Every effort should be taken not to deprive our government of this tool by substituting is with something than only can be used in specific situations but is much cheaper. While the number of pilots and aircraft determine the quantitative aspect. there is mutual respect and responsibility. from the start of the planning process. It is a way of thinking and culture. USA. The BAC combat capability offers the government a flexible. expedient tool to contribute throughout the complete range of international tasks.Why Air Combat Power for Belgium Especially in expeditionary operations. we must make sure that quality is never sacrificed for quantity.af. It is three dimensional thinking that includes all the aspects of reach. https://www. visited 01Mar08 115 JOHNSON David E. speed. land and sea forces should seek to achieve unity of effort.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD_Page_HTML/Doctrine_Docs/AFDD2. Currently our government can dispose of a highly flexible and agile tool with highly trained and capable aircrew. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2. Air and land and sea should be considered as equal partners.
Transfer of intelligence information remains a major stumbling block. to create the required environment. decision superiority is a pre-requisite requiring near-real-time JISR.2 Threat evolution NATO and the EU have developed complementary analytical tools to identify the capabilities required to counter the threats with the required effects. they will require quick decisions and fast. in chapter one. The prediction of more MOUT operations increases the requirement for insertion capability of ground troops. The Belgian government has clearly stated that it wants to be a reliable and credible partner who takes his share of burdens and risks. Our expeditionary forces will need to work in a networked environment.Overall conclusions 7 Overall conclusions 7. EU or other partner nations in a coalition framework. By 2025. They will become an excellent complementary system to execute highly dangerous first strike Page 45 of 110 . should be the main focus of future investments. accurate intelligence updates. (armed) UAVs or HALE / MALE systems will specifically address the requirement for more persistency above the battlefield. in all its aspects. NATO is working on employment guidance and doctrine but the member nations seem to be reluctant to participate. This will require that we transform and only invest in equipment related to the core business and adhere to the “minimum suffisant” principle. They should become the backbone of a C4ISR structure that is built on a NNEC compatible network. AGSR capabilities and an improved persistence above the battle field. non-lethal.1 Geo-political evolution The analysis of the geo-political situation. demonstrated that we will require our armed forces to be flexible and capable of a swift response. UCAVs will not be as versatile and flexible as manned combat aircraft. Bandwidth and frequency availability. International expeditionary operations will require us to operate with NATO. Expeditionary forces should be able to work in a comprehensive framework. To maintain control of quickly changing and complex conflicts. Air combat power will remain crucial. are critical enablers which do not suffice today. 7. Precision strike.3 Technological evolution Technological advances have spawned a wide range of air breathing or space based RSTA systems. 7. plus the supporting (satellite) networks.
International venture will create synergy. Many assets with ISR capability lack the tools required to become a capable contributor an eventual JCOP. All combat fighter requirements. the “Transformation Implementation” started by ACOS Ops & Trg.Overall conclusions missions. doctrine and guidance documents are lacking. the BAC will continue to meet all challenges through 2025. with the ICT. the challenge is to keep up with the rapidly evolving capability requirements. Due to their nature. political sovereignty and ROEs is still ongoing. Evolutions in simulation capabilities will allow to train basic tactical skills by which more real flying time becomes available to train advanced “high end” tactics or to absorb newly inserted technologies. Here. This capability offers the Belgian government a wide range of options with its global reach and robust contribution through a broad spectrum of conflict. and it is relative safe for the “soldier”. could identify valuable opportunities to produce force enablers which could serve in Belgium or in international missions. it is unlikely for Belgium to acquire such systems.3 will still cover all that is required by 2025 both in the domain of Belgian airspace integrity as expeditionary operations. For existing fighter aircraft. Newly acquired system should be “market leaders” with a large client base in order to reduce R&D required throughout the life span of the system. European legislation promotes the open competition for awarding defence contracts but a stable.4 Future National and International missions Future national and international missions will not vary substantially from what is required today. Missions identified in today’s AJP-3. 7. unified EU defence requirement is still lacking. High performance simulators will become more and more complementary to life flying. Page 46 of 110 . When upgrades are no longer possible and the acquisition of new weapon platforms is required. Although the Belgian defence organisation has succeeded in establishing a NEC structure in support of its C4ISR assets. EU defence industries will need to consolidate and develop trans-national alliances to be able to cope with the challenges of producing expensive and complex military capabilities. These high end technology contracts provide firms opportunities to build expert reputation of knowledge and quality. reduce acquisition cost and keep LCC under control. business models like MNFP and EPAF are the preferred option. The debate about ethics. With its combat fighter capability and accessory roadmap. Greater precision and less explosive force remain the strategy to mitigate collateral damage while non-lethal weapons development struggles with legal issues and ROEs.
solutions which have a too limited mission profile. When making these choices. While the organisation strives for a healthy cost structure. fighter combat capability needs to be safeguarded as an integral capability within our defence organisation. performance. Savings should be found in rejecting non core business tasks and in those capabilities that. personnel costs are above 65% of the budget and neither a short term nor long term investment plan seems sure. are met and support the Belgian government in its claim of being a reliable and credible partner. current. reveal critical shortfalls in one of the 9 area’s117 that make up a capability. careful consideration should be made before giving up this versatile capability for other. Current UAV capability can provide day. leading to limited deployability. A comprehensive plan that involves Belgian industry. With the A-109. but also with a well founded business plan. Paving the way to replacement should not only be done by considering operational aspects. Tough choices will have to be made when deciding which capabilities should be maintained. No other combat capability within the Belgian defence generates the same level of contribution to combat operations. When the need comes to replace the F-16 MLU. The BAC’s strategic and tactical transport means are sufficient and a replacement plan for the aging fleet is in place. and are less adaptable and less flexible in their employability. cheaper.D&R. training. The financial situation is dire and by 2025 a drastically reduced personnel force will necessitate a redesign of the institution. but has currently no built-in (N)NEC nor can it provide coordinates for possible targets. to 123 AStC Div . with the same (low) level of danger for the participating troops.5 Requirement for a BAC future combat capability It will be a daunting task for the Belgian defence to keep up with ever changing capability requirements. doctrine. after screening by the ICT process. and an acceptable logistical footprint.Overall conclusions identified in chapter two. equipment. and the sustainment periods are limited.3 Mar 2009 Page 47 of 110 . real time video over a limited range. sustainability. interoperability and readiness”. a variety of helicopter operations are possible albeit with restricted performance. Both the A-109 and the B-Hunter have a relatively slow reaction time before being able to put to good use in theatre. since it is the only tool immediately available to the government to demonstrate their reliability as a. and which gives them the opportunity to stay ahead in their respective 117 Briefing by ACOS Ops & Trg . 7. Transformation implementation “capability is the combination of manpower. burden and risk sharing partner. deployability.
5. 7. The inherent personnel reduction will create financial opportunities to increase the investment levels creating “breathing” room required to replace the current combat fighter fleet. 118 Annex AF – “Opportunities that could produce force multipliers or savings” 2005/0016 NATO policy for interoperability dated 2nd March 2005 119 CM Page 48 of 110 . (This should be done within the bigger Belgian defence framework). • Capabilities which do not cover a wide range of missions or are too limited in overall performance which. Locations spread out through the country should be consolidated to reduce costs. predicted to be available in the future. To be able to correctly prioritise future investments. The technological challenges put forward when participating in these programs will allow the Belgian industry to keep a competitive edge. DGs and Component Commanders. Since international cooperation is the future for large projects. the pragmatic approach would be to activate the integrated capability teams at ACOS Ops & Trg under the guidance of the CTSG.Overall conclusions fields of expertise. a new strategic plan that guides the transformation of our defence organisation is necessary. here also opportunities can be found to keep costs under control. • Identify systems that are not sustainable for a reasonable period in an expeditionary environment or those that are not interoperable119 in operations. Once this has been approved. “for the outside world” creates the perception we have equipment that can rarely be engaged. A pragmatic approach should be chosen when spending money on investment or the sustainment of weapon systems.1 Recommendations118 The current BAC force structure should be redesigned to be able to function with the personnel. this tool can also identify: • Opportunities which could yield big returns on investment at relatively small cost. It could design a roadmap for future short and long term materiel acquisition founded on inputs from all ACOSes. Guidelines like investment in core capability and “le minimum suffisant” can not be ignored nor should they be questioned or challenged. either due to problems with communications or support. For materiel currently in the inventory.
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By Teresa M.M . 98 pages • Strategic Studies Institute United States Army War College o The 21st Century Security Environment and the Future of War by Dr. Project Air Force o Shaping the Future Air Force.2002. Pumphrey – 1ste quarter 2007. Lewis . USAF – Spring 2007 o Uninhabited combat aerial vehicles: remove the pilot?. Col (Sel) Bruce W. by George Friedman. 102 pages • RAND Corporation. Space. • Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments o US fighter modernization plans: near-term choices by Steve Kosiak and Barry Watts – 2007. By CLARK R. 45 pages. o United States air and space power in the 21st century.Bibliography Defence Transformation ‘Defence’ Is Back. o Fallacies about air power by Dr. Alabama o UCAV – The next generation air-superiority fighter? By Maj William K. RN DCBM/J6. Maris “Buster” McCrabb • Strategic Forum o Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation by Thomas X. – Jun 2004 Page 55 of 110 . 41 pages. but HAS to Change!. 6 pages • Headquarters. by: David A. Berg. but not with the people. 11 Jun 2008. by Khalilzad Z .Fall 2007 o Dominant Air. Winter 1997 • Air university Maxwell air force base. by Lt Col Paul D. Air Force and the Next War.June 2002 o Combat aerial vehicles : air power by the people. United States Air Force Washington DC o Lead Turning The Future: The 2008 Strategy for United States Air Force Intelligence. Lewis . 24 Jun 1996. Gray – Winter 2008-09. • Stratfor o The U. 80 pages UK • MOD o Future command joint capability by Cdr David J. By Stephan De Spiegeleire – 13 Mar 2008. Colin S.4 July 2008 • Air Force Research Laboratories o Effect based Operations: an overview by Dr.2002. 10 pages o US • DoD o Advanced Systems & Concepts (AS&C) – 14 Oct 2006 • Joint War fighting Center o Refining How We Think about Joint Operations.S. 6 pages • Vistas o future attack capabilities. 66 pages • Strikestar 2025.14 pages. Shlapak – 2006. Gray – Winter 2008.Fall 2008 o Offensive Airpower with Chinese Characteristics . Hammes – Jan 2005 • Air & Space Power Journal o The Strategic Role of Airpower . Bewick MA. 89 pages o UCAV – The next generation air superiority fighter? By Maj William K. and Cyberspace Operations. 495 pages. for the people. Colin S. Surveillance and Reconnaissance . Carmichael – Aug 1996.2000.
ppt US • DoD http://www.washingtonpost.airforce-technology.maxwell.org/paf/agenda/aerospace.asp • Defensie.mil/actd http://www.japcc.rta.osd.php?f=41&t=49927 • Egmont.html http://www.com/projects/neuron/ http://www.html • Intranet ftp://ftp.com/dotwhat.asp?LAN=nl.nato.int/PubFullText/RTO/TR/RTO-TR-SAS-027/TR-SAS-027ANN-H-P1.com/story/cms.int/ http://transnet.mil/au/# Other http://www.be/index.globalsecurity.defence-europe.php?story_id=4198&page=0 Page 56 of 110 .af.html http://www.politicsinfo.nato.egmontinstitute.pdf http://www.hrw.be/rdc/doc/index.be/NL/pap_egm_nl.org/home/index.net/viewtopic.nato.com/projects/x-45-ucav/ http://www.foreignpolicy.act.rta.cfm?id=208&l=1 http://www.com/earlywarning/2007/03/shock_and_awe_worked _god_help.html EU http://europa.org/reports/2003/usa1203/usa1203. het standpunt van de politieke partijen http://www.dotmlpfi.acq. • DOD http://www.act.plan.eu/index_nl.be/def/index.airforce-technology.act. Koninklijk Instituut voor Internationale Betrekkingen http://www.int/MultipleFutures/documents.crisisgroup.int/WISE http://www.int/ http://www.int/WISE/Expedition/EOConferen/BriefingsD/ Documents/18ColMarin/file /_WFS/20MarinelliClosing.nato.nato.mil.php?lang=nl&TM=30&IS=61 • KHID http://www.htm http://www.html • USAF http://www.org NATO http://www.Bibliography Internetsites (visited between Nov 08 and Mar 09) BELGIUM • Federaal Plan Bureau http://www.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-22-cost.de/air_power_japcc.pdf http://transnet.html http://www.rand.htm http://blog.mil.nato.
speech 08Feb07.php?id=36&L=0&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=207&tx_t tnews[backPid]=34&cHash=c1ea9d68cd NATO • MGen F. 14 Dec 05 US • MOSELEY Michael T.asp?id=302. SACTREPEUR: “Demystifying Transformation” – Kijkduin. Speech to the RHID – 21 May 2008. The Netherlands. http://www. US Air Force Chieff of Staff.Bibliography Speeches and lectures Belgian MOD • Minister of Defence.af. Page 57 of 110 . BE Army.php?id=14&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=185&c Hash=41aef91bea&L=0 • New years reception with the Belgian Generals .pieterdecrem.24-10-2008 (13:24) http://www.be/index. http://www. ‘The US Air Force: ‘our mission is to fly and fight’’. • To the ACMP . HEY.pieterdecrem.be/index.mil/library/speeches/speech..12-01-2009 (14:19).
Malta and Ireland. Luxemburg. (For NATO this includes pension payments) Ref: Brief DG BF – BFB Briefing to 123 AStC Div on 16 Mar 2009 120 Percentage of GDB (without pension payments included) Page 58 of 110 . Belgium is ranked 30th only to be in front of Austria.62 Weighed Avg NATO Defence expenditures as % of GDP (Target = 2%) Weighed Avg ESDP+DNK 1.54 Of the 34 represented countries.List of Annexes List of Annexes Annex A – Belgian Defence 2007 spending120 60 Defence Expenditures as % of GDP 50 Other Gov't Expenses as % of GDP 40 30 20 10 0 TO US A CA N TU R NO R DN K BE L BG R CZ E DE U ES P ES T FR A G B R G R C HU N IT A LT U LU X LV A NL D PO L PR T RO U SV K SV N AU S FI N IR E M AL SW EU E (E SD C P + YP D EN ) NA 05 04 03 02 01 00 2.
increase of urbanization in developing countries and their government’s inability to provide basic public services. list of drivers Driver Changing State Capacity – national and international governance Focus of Driver The distribution and management of power at both system and state level. access.List of Annexes Annex B – ACT Multiple futures Project. It covers renewable and nonrenewable resources including energy. and the conflicts that arise as a result of competition over these scarce resources. state versus non-state actors. The main components include different polarities. such as authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism. in particular. The ageing of the population in many developed countries. Competing ideology / worldviews Resource Scarcity Climate Change Networks & Communication Population (Demographics + Urbanization + Migration) Globalization and Increasing Interdependence Technology Page 59 of 110 . intensifying. with particular attention to global warming. and growing impact of worldwide interconnectedness. food. and the strong uncertainty and unpredictability of the driver. the degree of functional interdependence. and the inherent migration pressure. Long-term significant changes in regional and global weather. The enabling or inhibiting role of technology in relation to other drivers. The driver also addresses. and other means of collaboration and information distribution and dissemination. Driver examines stresses on economic development. The popular support for particular worldviews or ideologies with a specific focus on competing ideologies/worldviews within civil society that have emerged as competitors to liberal democracy. The widening. environmental degradation and extreme weather. electronic. and the degree of homogeneity or friction in problem-solving and norm construction in the international system. and water. and world population and demographics. and sophistication of human. resource scarcity. The change in availability. The problem of infinite human needs and wants in a world of finite resources. the youth bulge of many developing countries. speeding up.
underdeveloped infrastructure and no Host Nation Support (HNS) Evolving.Air=350 sorties . 5. but still “full spectrum of conflict” incl Art 5 and larger than MJO ops 8 121 The 2007 Bi-SC defence requirements review (DRR 07) final report (NATO CONFIDENTIAL) Page 60 of 110 .Mar=Task Force) 6 SJO (4 Div/Bde size .Air=1000 sorties .List of Annexes Annex C – NATO Level Of Ambition 121 Level of Ambition Evolution of MG 03 > MG 06 MG ’03 Size 3 MJO (Corps) MG ’06 2 MJO (Corps size .Mar=Task Gp) including 1 Air heavy and 1 Maritime heavy MJO > MJO = 6 months MJO > SJO = 2 months SJO > SJO = 2 months 50 % High Intensity (war-fighting) (war50 % Low Intensity Adjacent area. 15.000 km from Brussels (low scale) Concurrency 2 months between initial phase of MJOs Intensity Not addressed Distance Not addressed Environment Not addressed 50 % austere.000 km from Brussels Strategic distance.
To meet this challenge a balance needs to be struck between: high readiness deployable forces for collective defence and crisis response. in particular it details the Defence Requirements Review and the methodology developed.rta. NATO defence planning covers the following principal planning disciplines: • Logistics Planning • CIS Planning • Nuclear Planning • Civil Emergency Planning • Resources Planning • Armament Planning • Force Planning This paper details the process followed by NATO in conducting force planning.nato.) Introduction The primary challenge for NATO Defence Planning is to maintain the military means for all missions. Defence Requirements Review The Defence Requirements Review (DRR) is one step in the Force planning process: 122 ftp://ftp.List of Annexes Annex D . longer term build-up and augmentation.pdf (Intranet) Page 61 of 110 . from Peace Support Operations to Collective Defence (Article V).Mission Task Analysis of the NATO Defence Requirements Review 122 This paper gives a general outline of the NATO Defence Requirements Review (DRR) and how mission analysis has been used to provide a consistent and detailed approach to the decomposition of complex military missions.int/PubFullText/RTO/TR/RTO-TR-SAS-027/TR-SAS-027-ANN-H-P1. and lower readiness forces for collective defence and rotation. The Mission Task Analysis methodology is described and illustrated with two examples using generic planning situations (a Peace Support Operation and a Article V operation.
followed by a risk assessment if the national contributions do not match the requirements. Each of the member Nations responds with its national contribution and a comparison is made with the requirements. Once the DRR process is complete. from top level strategic command missions through security assessment reviews. The DRR itself follows a number of steps.List of Annexes The DRR is developed directly from the mission statement(s) and details the required capability necessary to fulfil the stated mission. Page 62 of 110 . The process is shown in the following figure: The remainder of this paper focuses on the method used for determining the force requirements for each planning situation. the requirements are proposed to the member nations and force goals negotiated. to the analysis of the requirements and estimation of the future force requirements.
2) Mission Essential Components (MEC) – MECs are high level essential military tasks and includes all mandated and implied tasks. The political/military mission. Failure of a MEC implies likely failure of the mission. Changes in the set of Operational Objectives will define Phases for the mission. The final two levels of the decomposition contain the analysis and assumptions for each of the key tasks: Page 63 of 110 . The current structure is a hierarchy with components as follows: • • • • • • • Mandate Mission Essential Components Operational Objectives Operational Objective Specifications Key Tasks Joint Activity Trees Force Allocation Rules Where each level in the hierarchy has a specific definition: 1) Mandate – The political purpose for the use of military force. 3) Operational Objectives (OO) – Operational Objectives are the temporal decomposition of the Mission Essential Components into higher level operational level tasks. strategic). 5) Key Tasks (KT) – Key Tasks are related to the physical means by which the force can successfully accomplish the Operational Objective (or OOS). To decompose the mission into the lower elements a course of action needs to be chosen.e. not time dependent) statements which are not dependent on a chosen course of action.List of Annexes Mission Task Analysis Methodology This methodology was originally developed by the Operations Research Division of the NATO C3 Agency and involves an analytical method that identifies the joint mission tasks and associated force allocation rules. Both the Mandate and MECs are high level (i. Key tasks represent the lowest level of non-service specific. The course of action details how the MEC are to be achieved in time.e. The task decomposition approach attempts to identify all required and implied tasks for an operation. required tasks. 4) Operational Objective Specifications (OOS) – Specifications are an amplification of an Operational Objective within a phase. Each key task represents a separate low-level problem which can be analysed and forces (both numbers and types) associated with. global (i. The MEC are the highest level complete set of required tasks.
please decide which the best description is The above methodology has been successfully applied across a wide range of situations (including both Peace Support Operations and Mutual Defence). vii) Provide Standard Military Requirements. v) Ensure continued political support for the mission. ii) Assure continued and uninterrupted provision of essential services and the protection of strategic national assets.” Mission Essential Components – In support of the above mandate: i) Provide a secure environment by establishing the military dominance of the Peace Force. including assumptions and timings. Operational Objectives – in support of MEC (iv) “Conduct enabling operations for own force” Operational Objective Specifications – in support of the above OO “Ensure Safe and timely arrival of forces” Key Tasks – In support of the above OOS: i) Transport forces to theatre Page 64 of 110 . It should be noted that the two examples are not complete task decompositions. Example 1: Peace Enforcement to Restore Order Mandate – “The force is to provide sufficient security within the region to allow political and diplomatic activity to occur which could lead to the establishment of a recognised civil authority. iv) Deter. By comparing timings of certain JATs within the mission it is easy to see where forces assigned to complete one particular activity can be re-used for sequential tasks. Mission Task Analysis Examples you call it Mission Task Analysis methodology in the previous section.List of Annexes 6) Joint Activity Trees (JAT) . vi) Conduct operations in accordance with the principles of PSO. iii) Assist in the protection of civilian agencies in restoring the economic infrastructure and the provision of aid.The force allocation rules detail the logic behind associating forces to JAT task requirements.A JAT is a description of the low-level tasks or activities. To illustrate the methodology two examples are given here: Peace Enforcement and Collective Defence (Article V). and if necessary prevent. 7) Force Allocation Rules . adverse external intervention. Each JAT represents joint tactical solutions to the “problems” posed by key tasks.
Prevention should take the form of deterrence. Page 65 of 110 . restoration operations. to prevent sustained violation of NATO territorial integrity. if necessary. defence and.” Mission Essential Components – In support of the above mandate: i) Prevent Violation of NATO territorial integrity. within the theatre of operations.List of Annexes ii) Gain control of theatre reception/transit centres iii) Extend reception/transit centre capacities iv) Operate theatre reception/transit centres v) Ensure security of reception/transit centres Joint Activity Trees – In support of the second key task: Force Allocation Rules – Contains rules and assumptions for the above JAT: Example 2: Collective Defence – Article V Mandate – “Establish sufficient military forces.
iii) Standard Military Requirements. Conflict Prevention.List of Annexes ii) Maintain Alliance Solidarity & Cohesion. Peace Keeping and Article 5. Page 66 of 110 . Operational Objectives – In support of MEC (i) i) Conduct Deterrence Operations ii) Conduct Defensive Operations iii) Conduct Restoration Operations Operational Objective Specifications – In support of OO (i) i) Show of Force ii) Defend Vital Locations iii) Enforce Sanctions iv) Provide a Defensive Deterrence Key Tasks – In support of OOS (iv) i) Provide a deterrent force for threats ii) Deter Interference from third parties Conclusion The methodology detailed above provides a consistent approach for the decomposition of complex military missions. Extraction. As well as providing the basis for determining force requirements the methodology also provides self-documentation of the planning situations and a “scenario framework” for supporting other work. The methodology has demonstrated its suitability across the range of military missions and has been successfully applied to: Peace Enforcement.
List of Annexes Annex E – MMR procedure used during NATO DRR 05 123 Given that the overall shortfall does not always provide a full explanation with respect to shortfalls or areas of concern. 123 The 2007 Bi-SC defence requirements review (DRR 07) final report. a more detailed breakdown of the MMR for such cases is given in the format shown in Figure 11. (NATO CONFIDENTIAL) – page 45 Page 67 of 110 .
124 2007 Bi-SC defence requirements review (DRR 07) final report (NATO CONFIDENTIAL) – page 47 Page 68 of 110 .List of Annexes Annex F – DRR MMR analysis of aerospace capabilities124 Shortfall Areas and Areas of Concern Shortfall Areas and Areas of Concern Aerospace – Support Air Aerospace – Support Air Fulfilled Requirement New Capabilities Existing/Planned Capabilities Non-Apportioned Shortfalls Number of Platforms Capability only provided by one nation Some AEW shortfalls could be mitigated by employment of ground-based early warning sensors AAR ESJ/SOJ COMMS J CSAR AEW AGSR PERS AGSR UAV • Long standing Support air shortfalls have been aggravated by the new LOA • Significant non-apportioned shortfalls remain in some critical enabling capabilities Figures are removed from the graphs due to their confidentiality.
List of Annexes Annex G . Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) Communications Capability 7. Support Chain Management 36. Soldier Situational Awareness 34. Enhanced Human Performance 20. Battlefield Medical Attention 5. Network Enabled Capability 30. Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) Collection Capability 26. Area Access Control 3. Counter Threat to Low Altitude Air Vehicles 14. Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) Processing. Increased Self-Sustainment 22. Integrated Personal Protection 25. Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) 9. Biological. Extraction and Re-supply of Special Operations 37. ** Underlined implies areas where compliance is crucial if investing in the Bold capabilities. Assured Precision Strike* 4. Distributed Training and Exercise 18. Active Ballistic Missile Defence 2. Land Engagement Capability 28. Language Translation 29. Cyber Warfare Capability 16. Vehicle Mobility and Survivability * Bold Implies combat capability contribution form Air Component. Information Assurance Services 24. Counter Underwater Threats 15. Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) 10. Counter Naval Mines 12. Counter Rocket. Electro-magnetic (EM) Spectrum Denial 19. 125 Source :SACT’s 2008 Long Term Capability Study. Counter Low Signature Airborne Targets 11. Planning and Decision Support 32. Information and Integration Services 23. Artillery and Mortar 13. Support to Insertion. Deployment and Mobility of Forces 17. Space Capability Preservation 35. Systems Analysis and Knowledge Development 38. Battle Management System 6. Annex A-2 Page 69 of 110 . Fusion & Exploitation 27. Non-Lethal Capability 31. Communications Services for Networking and Information Infrastructure 8.Current NATO’s LTCR list125 1. Improved Modelling and Simulation 21. Counter Chemical. Service Management and Control Services 33.
LOA and intelligence while LTCS has no time constraints since it forecast future strategic environment and available technologies than can be used in conceptual developments 126 http://transnet.nato.ppt.act.int/WISE/Expedition/EOConferen/BriefingsD/Documents/18ColMarin/file /_WFS/20MarinelliClosing. visited Oct 08 Page 70 of 110 .List of Annexes Annex H – Comparison DRR ->LTCS126 The DRR process has to deal with constraints due to agreed strategic concepts.
List of Annexes Annex I – NATO’s future force generation process127 UORs CJSORs TCSORs OTHER Identified Requirements Min CAP Requirements identified Requirements analytical tool POLITICAL GUIDANCE LTCRs LTRS Lessons learned Planning Assumptions Guiding Principles Planning Situations Mission Types NATO LIST of existing ASSETS & CAPABILITIES PRIORITISED LIST of CAPABILITIES SHORTFALLS PRIORITISATION COMPARISON NATO list of shortfalls 127 Briefing of Dep REP of Belgium to the NATO MC. to 122 Div AStC May 2009 Page 71 of 110 .
The first step was to identify strategic planning assumptions. in qualitative and quantitative 128 http://www. resources and assets that were required in order to deal with the scenarios envisaged.europa. Based on the Headline Goal 2003. These in turn resulted in a list of reference units. were prepared: Separation of parties by force Stabilisation.consilium. Force Catalogue It was now the task of the EU to ask Member States to what extent they could offer assets and resources to meet the total force requirement. Five illustrative scenarios. A Headline Goal questionnaire was accordingly distributed to the Member States. which enabled Member States to conduct self-assessments of their contributions. it envisages that the Member States will "be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on European Union". reconstruction and military advice to third countries Conflict prevention Evacuation operation Assistance to humanitarian operations. The process of developing EU military capabilities towards the Headline Goal of 2010 is a thorough one. the EU decided to set a new Headline Goal 20102. a scrutinising methodology was developed and the scrutinising handbook produced. which identified the type of force groupings that the EU would require to solve the crises. Generic force packages were compiled. In addition. which describes. This process resulted in the compilation of the EU Force Catalogue. Development of European Military Capabilities – update Sept 2008 Page 72 of 110 . Requirements Catalogue From these scenarios. All this information was fed into a Requirements Catalogue.eu. encompassing a wide range of military operations.List of Annexes Annex J – Capability Development Plan (CDP)128 Headline Goal 2010 Following the adoption of the European Security Strategy in December 2003. focused military options were developed for how best to deal with the relevant crises. which detailed the actual types of units. A clarification dialogue was held in order to obtain a clearer picture of the capabilities being offered and the assessments of them. These options led to a planning framework from which was derived a detailed list of the capabilities that the EU would need.
This analysis resulted in the Progress Catalogue. It underwent a first revision in February 2007 to incorporate the contributions of the two new Member States.List of Annexes terms. approved by the Council in November 2007. they are. New voluntary contributions made by ten Member States in the light of the initial analysis of contributions led to a second revision of the Force Catalogue in October 2007. The Force Catalogue details military capabilities available by 2010. Progress Catalogue The Force Catalogue provided the basis for identifying the EU's shortfalls and the potential operational risks arising from them.europa. the military capabilities which the Member States could make available to the EU. taken into account in the subsequent work on managing those shortfalls. Bulgaria and Romania. is a key contribution to the Capability Development Plan drawn up by the Member States via the EDA and the EUMC. which sets out recommendations to the Member States on managing shortfalls.eda. together with the EUMC's subsequent work on prioritising the shortfalls. ESS COUNCIL PSC HLG2010 RC05 COUNCIL / PSC EUMC / EUMS ESDP political guidance HLG process WHAT DOES EUROPE HAVE / PLAN TO HAVE? WHAT IS LACKING / WILL BE LACKING? WHAT IS THE RANGE OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS? FC06 & 07 PC07 MS’ EDA PG Member States WHAT IS REQUIRED TO DELIVER A SOLUTION ? HOW TO REMEDY CAPABILITY GAPS? WHICH LOOKS MOST PROMISING? WHO WILL TAKE IT UP AND COMMIT RESOURCES? PROJECT INTO NATIONAL PROGRAMMES DELIVERY Individual Member States www. however.eu 9 © European Defence Agency 2009 CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN A method and a roadmap for the Capability Development Plan (CDP) were endorsed at the EDA Steering Board meeting on 28 June 2007. Additional contributions from non-EU European NATO members and from other candidate countries have been collected in a supplement to the Force Catalogue. Those contributions do not count towards the identification of capability shortfalls. EDA role within EU Military Capability Development Process WHAT IS EUROPE’S ROLE IN THE WORLD? WHAT DOES EUROPE WANT TO BE ABLE TO DO. The Progress Catalogue. Page 73 of 110 . MILITARILY? WHICH MILITARY CAPABILITIES WILL THAT REQUIRE? TEU.
When the CDP was worked out. worked out in close cooperation between the EDA. lessons learned from operations with regard to capabilities. the EUMC and the Member States. based in particular on the conclusions of the 2007 Progress Catalogue and other information that is useful for decisionmaking concerning the management of shortfalls. The Board approved the general conclusions and initiated work on a initial group of twelve capability areas out of the twenty-four identified in the CDP: The initial tranche of 12 selected actions: • • • • • • • • • Measures to counter man-portable air defence systems Computer network operations Mine counter-measures in littoral sea areas Comprehensive approach . target acquisition and reconnaissance architecture Medical support Chemical. the following were taken into consideration: • the consequences of Headline Goal 2010. • • current plans and programmes announced by the Member States. available technology and potential threats. An initial version of the CDP was submitted in July 2008 to the EDA Steering Board. surveillance. armament and industry and will form the cornerstone of the EDA's activities. on the basis of research into foreseeable developments of the global strategic contact. biological.military implications Military human intelligence and cultural/language training Intelligence. is to provide the latter with information which could facilitate their decision-making in the context of national capability choices. This plan is moreover one of the components of a longer-term objective: ensuring convergence of Member States' capability scenarios. It aims at providing guidelines for future work in the fields of research and technology. radiological and nuclear defence Third party logistic support Page 74 of 110 .List of Annexes The aim of the CDP. stimulate their cooperation and facilitate the launching of new joint programmes which overcome present and future EU shortfalls. such as the capability analysed in the framework of Civilian Headline Goal 2008. However. • an estimate of the capability required in 2025. proceedings conducted in the context of other pillars of the European Union or additional capability or assets that could be made available to the EU in an operation calling upon common NATO capabilities and assets. which brought together the Member States' Capabilities Directors. it will not under any circumstances be a supranational plan: it is created by and for the Member States.
drawing up a timetable of work and estimating the costs involved. the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and the Council General Secretariat. Page 75 of 110 . Emphasis was laid on the need to ensure the best possible coordination with similar work carried out by NATO. the EDA will also draw up a programme of bilateral or multilateral meetings with Member States to make the CDP known outside the circle of Defence Ministries. Other actions resulting from the CDP could be initiated at a later stage. the EUMC. In cooperation with the EUMS. by presenting it to other national bodies such as national armament or research and technology agencies. consisting in particular of defining the players involved in each area and the body which will ensure coordination. the EDA initiated the next stages. Cooperation between the EUMC and the EDA will also take place within integrated development and EDA project teams intended to support Member States in their efforts to make good the shortfalls identified.List of Annexes • • • Measures to counter improvised explosive devices Increased availability of helicopters Network-enabled capability (NEC) In cooperation with the Member States.
List of Annexes Annex K – D&S Planning Horizons in the EU and NATO129 Planning Horizon Long Term Long Term Vision Capability Development Mechanism and Plan 130 Crisis Management procedures Long Term Capability Requirements Defence Planning Process 131 Medium Term Short Term 132 Operational Planning Force Planning C³ Planning Logistics Planning Armaments Planning Resource Planning Nuclear Planning Civil Emergency Planning Prague Capability Commitment Continuous 133 Progress Catalogue European Capability Action Plan Summitdriven Helsinki Headline Goals Courtesy of Kol Patrick Wouters. 133 Sub-activities that prepare Medium Term Planning events 129 130 Page 76 of 110 . evaluated through periodic reports or reviews of the Progress Catalogue. 132 In principle only for the next operation or crisis. in principle a 4 year cycle. Dep REP from Belgium to NATO MC. Not cyclical . such as the Single Process report at the end of each Presidency. 131 Cyclical. of which sub-activities can be bi-annual.
blasting them with enough energy that causes them to self-detonate.List of Annexes Annex L .S.There is a new breed of weaponry fast approaching—and at the speed of light no less. testing of the U. sea." A leading expert in directed-energy research for some 26 years. as well as the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL). That’s the outlook of J. THEL uses a high- 134 As explained in the research paper of Maj Frederic GIVRON “The future of air/space power” .2007 Page 77 of 110 . Beason said. air. New Mexico has shown the ability of heating high-flying rocket warheads. October 2005).Space base weaponry134 LOS ALAMOS. without investment in high-technology. and space warfare depends not only on using the electromagnetic spectrum. author of the recently published book: The E-Bomb: How America’s New Directed Energy Weapons Will Change the Way Wars Will Be Fought in the Future (Da Capo Press. New Mexico -. such as the Airborne Laser. Army’s Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) in White Sands. Douglas Beason. high-energy chemical oxygen iodine laser toted skyward aboard a modified Boeing 747-400 aircraft.Beason previously served on the White House staff working for the President’s Science Advisor (Office of Science and Technology Policy) under both the Bush and Clinton Administrations.com. It utilizes a megawatt-class. Directed-energy weapons take the form of lasers. After more than two decades of research." Beason told SPACE. Beason is also Director of Threat Reduction here at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) – noting that his views are his own and do not represent LANL. the Active Denial System. Putting money into basic and long-range research is critical. Purpose of the program is to enable the detection. and other directed-energy technologies. nor the Department of Energy. high-power microwaves. Similarly. the Department of the Defence. Their adoption for ground. adding: "You can’t always schedule breakthroughs. tracking and destruction of ballistic missiles in the boost phase. Ripe for transformation? Though considerable work has been done in lasers. "History has shown that. For example. or powered part of their flight. but also upon favourable political and budgetary wavelengths too. work is on-going in the military’s Airborne Laser program. and particle beams. weaponization is still an ongoing process. They are labeled "directedenergy weapons" and may well signal a revolution in military hardware—perhaps more so than the atomic bomb. fighting the next war will be done using the last war type of technique. the United States is on the verge of deploying a new generation of weapons that discharge beams of energy. high-powered microwaves.
deuterium fluoride chemical laser. causing severe pain without damage. "It’s a matter of priority. he said. Marines." Beason explained. Meanwhile. Beason also pointed to new exciting research areas underway at the Los Alamos National Laboratory: Free-electron laser work with the Navy and a new type of directedenergy that operates in the terahertz region. Beason sees two upfront problems in moving the technology forward. could put ourselves in a very disastrous position if we allow our acquisition officials to be nontechnically competent. Unknown unknowns In Beason’s view. the THEL. as well as those advocates that over-promised. "They are only another tool. Step-wise. Active Denial Technology. "It wasn’t ready for prime time." At present." Beason said. The time is now to identify high-payoff. "I truly believe that as the airborne laser goes.List of Annexes energy." Beason pointed out. huge slugs of money are being put into legacy-type systems to keep them going. mobility of hardware. Beason noted. the Airborne Laser program." he added. We think we have the engineering defined. demonstration programs that spotlight directed-energy weapon systems are needed.S. battlefield utility. and other Page 78 of 110 . Looming even larger is the role of those that acquire new weapons. We think we have the physics defined. uses a beam of millimeter waves to heat a foe’s skin." and secondly making sure these new systems are not viewed as a panacea to solve all problems. I believe that there are still ‘unknown unknowns’ out there that are going to occur in science and technology. directed-energy systems "are barely limping along with enough money just to prove that they can work. But something always goes wrong…and we’re working too close at the margin. Over the decades. so goes the rest of the nation’s directedenergy programs. such as relay mirrors—are all works in progress that give reason for added support and priority funding. "convincing the warfighter that there’s a niche for this new type of weapon." Beason said. deter. and making the adversary flee the scene. A mobile THEL also demonstrated the ability to kill multiple mortar rounds.S. Beason said that the field of directed-energy has had its share of "snakeoil salesmen". it’s working on the margin. This technology. as well as supporting technologies. Niche for new technology While progress in directed-energy is appreciable. ease-of-operation. Then there’s Active Denial Technology—a non-lethal way to use millimeter-wave electromagnetic energy to stop. supported by the U. directed-energy projects for the smallest amounts of money. Such in-the-field displays could show off greater beam distanceto-target runs. Right now. "The U. First of all. and turn back an advancing adversary.
D." Beason said. "The good news is that directed-energy exists. destructive strikes at the speed of light with little or no collateral damage. Beason advised that "we’ll eventually see it. Beason said that one blue sky idea of his own he tagged "the voice from heaven".List of Annexes attributes. beam control." "Visionaries win wars…and not bureaucrats. But.in the megawatt-class -.require onboard fuels and oxidizers to crank out the amount of energy useful for strategic applications. Beason told his audience that laser energy.. eventually. look to advances in more efficient lasers—especially solid state laser systems—Beason advised. present-day systems are far too messy. Directed-energy is being tested and within a few years directed-energy is going to be deployed upon the battlefield. from botching up an enemy’s electronics to performing "dial up" surgical. Like some boom box in the sky. having the directed-energy source "in space" contrasted to shooting beams "through space" is another matter. I think it’s going to happen. The technology is ready to shift into front line warfare status. "But the bad news is that acquisition policies right now in this nation are one more gear toward evolutionary practices rather than revolutionary practices. speaking before the Heritage Foundation in Washington. On the other hand. you can create audible frequencies. the power sources. By tuning the resonance of a laser onto the Earth’s ionosphere." However. Directed-energy technologies can offer a range of applications. Stability of such a laser system rooted in space is also wanting. as well as knowledge about how laser beams interact with Earth’s atmosphere are quite mature." Beason reported. But you are going through space to attack anywhere on Earth. the laser-produced voice could bellow from above down to the target below: "Put down your weapons. Beason quickly added. Space-based relay mirrors—even highaltitude airships equipped with relay mirrors—can direct ground-based or air-based laser beams nearly around the world.C." Yet. "So you’re using space…exploiting it. but it is going to be a generation after the battlefield lasers. History lesson Late last year. Most high-powered chemical lasers -. We’ve seen this through history. he said. "What breakthroughs are needed…I’m not sure." Relay mirrors Regarding use of directed-energy space weapons." Beason observed Page 79 of 110 .
Germany / Italy / Spain / UK) were conceived in the same era. Lockheed Martin Global Inc. The resulting price. visited 2 Feb 2009 Interview with Mr.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-22-cost. the F-22 can be considered the “nec plus ultra” in the combat aircraft world. While today’s F-16 belongs to the fourth generation. Currently Lockheed Martin has around 3000 aircraft on order and their market prediction ranges to 4000136. The other current fighter prices vary in function of different parameters between 50 to 80 million Euro. 339 million USD. As said.List of Annexes Annex M . On the other hand his conceptual basis. from 339 to 183135. you could put the “new” European products in between the fourth and fifth generation since they lack the innovation and technology leap of the US platforms. Brussels Headquarters. It is generally accepted these machines are of a vision of the F-16 MLU generation with new technologies and possibilities applied in its conception. possesses unseen and unmatched capabilities by any other platform existing today. The Typhoon has been ordered in much smaller orders (#18 for Austria. Sweden) and the Eurofighter Typhoon (EADS. Michael Ogg. For sure in the near future these machines will perform fine across the spectrum. in view of its extreme capabilities in the symmetric arena. This fighter. #72 for Saudi Arabia).Analysis of future platforms. the Rafale (Dassault Industries. France). both also having been conceived as air defence fighters. make this aircraft not cost effective to be used in asymmetric conflicts. initially conceived in the scope of the cold war.htm. Today aircraft are catalogued according the generation they belong to. Belgium. In Europe. The main reason can be found in the fact there is less funding available and design requirements were oriented towards air defence. mainly influenced by orders from other countries put the F-35 far ahead of the competition. Regional Customer Relationships Manager.globalsecurity. the Grippen (SAAB-BAE. need to be retrofitted to be able to carry targeting pods and laser guided or GPS guided weapons. For the F-22 it is not only the price that will limit sales across the globe but certainly the reluctance of the US to sell this technology abroad. http://www. Platform costs.. but surely the converging requirements and vision between the nations make for a lack of synergy. Grippen was sold to Czech « F-22 Raptor Costs ». Although it must be noted both Eurofighter and Rafale currently still struggle to enter the Air to Ground arena. 30 Jan 2009 135 136 Page 80 of 110 . Without a doubt. has increased from the initial 86 million USD estimate. With the introduction of the F-22 and F-35 the fifth generation was born. The other aircraft on the market however will do fine in the whole range of possible conflicts. resulting in waste of effort and energy during the development process. mainly due to its reduction in numbers.
a part of the larger MNFP contract with the USAF was the strategic vector allowing small countries to keep up with the evolution of technology. For this reason. The EPAF cooperation. This is one of the major aspects to keep in mind when purchasing an aircraft. not only for initial acquisition price but especially during the evolution of the aircraft. All design changes and R&D money spend will be shared by the common base customers. The LCC will be heavily influenced by the number of countries that operate these machines. Norway recently decided to opt for the F-35 to the detriment of Grippen.List of Annexes Republic and South Africa and Dassault has not been able to close any deals yet although Libya has some aspirations. Today the EPAF MLU M5 aircraft is of the same standard as the USAF Block 50/52 Common Configuration Improvement Program (CCIP) F-16s and therefore a leader in offering capabilities on today’s “battlefields”. Page 81 of 110 .
66 pages Page 82 of 110 .US fighter modernization plans: near-term choices by Steve Kosiak and Barry Watts – 2007.List of Annexes Annex N – US fighter modernization plans: near-term choices 137 Ref page 12 Ref page 47 137 Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments .
Interoperability – Improvement of capabilities introduced with MLU -> M6 Working group at MNFP level to discuss – Scope and cooperation M7 and follow-on 54 138 Briefing MR Sys A/C “F-16 Weapon System Evolution”. to 123 AStC – Jan 09 Page 83 of 110 .List of Annexes Annex O – Combat fighter lead-time for acquisition138 Investment Planning MRSys-A/C Mx – Commonality and Interoperability Consolidation Programs Future fighter aircraft roadmap F-16 users 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 Next Gen Ftr F16 F16 remaining Period of Performance A lot of F16 users have a requirement for M-series evolution beyond M6 – Sustainability.
spare and repair parts. test equipment. 9 AN/APY-8 Lynx Synthetic Aperture Radar/Ground Moving Target Indicator (SAR/GMTI) systems. engineering support. if all Reference.Jan 2009 DOT/FAA/AM-04/24. technical assistance. 3 Satellite Earth Terminal Sub Stations (SETSS). personnel training/equipment.5 mio $ 47 mio $ 57 mio $ 1. The Government of the United Kingdom has requested a possible sale of 10 MQ-9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) aircraft. Lynx SAR and MTS-B spares.2 mio $ 141 2. reflection paper Maj Luc COLIN “Defence against Terrorism (DAT)” . August 1. and other related elements of logistics support.071 billion142. The estimated cost is $1. 2008 – The Defence Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Germany of five MQ-9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Aircraft as well as associated equipment and services.071 billion. ground support. 9 Multi-Spectral Targeting Systems (MTS-B). 2008 – On December 19. communications equipment. WASHINGTON. the Defence Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Kingdom of MQ-9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. January 3. The total value. could be as high as $1. operational flight test support. 30 H764 Embedded Global Positioning System Inertial Navigation Systems. The total value.5 mio € voor één airframe met sensor (60% van de kostprijs komt voor rekening van de sensor) 142 DSCA (Defence Security Cooperation Agency) Transmittal 08-27 139 140 Page 84 of 110 .List of Annexes Annex P – UAV Cost139 Unit Cost140 RQ-5 Hunter MQ-1 Predator MQ-9 Reaper RQ-4 Hawk Global (ter illustratie) Aircraft Cost (no sensor) System Cost (4 a/c + sensors) 26. 5 Ground Control Stations.4 mio $ 6 mio $ 20 mio $ Foreign Military Sales dossiers to acquire RQ-9 Reaper WASHINGTON. Dec 2004 141 Dit komt overeen met de kostprijs van het Belgische B-Hunter systeem van 2. if all options are exercised.
4 Mobile Ground Control Stations. and other related elements of logistics support. could be as high as $330 million. 3 Mobile Ground Control Stations. communications equipment. ground support. could be as high as $205 million. spare and repair parts. and other related elements of logistics support. spare and repair parts. operational flight test support. communications equipment. technical assistance. engineering support. The total value. The Government of Germany has requested a possible sale of 5 MQ-9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). five years of maintenance support. one year of maintenance support. August 1. The estimated cost is $205 million143. technical assistance. 143 144 DSCA Transmittal 08-59 DSCA Transmittal 08-60 Page 85 of 110 . personnel training/equipment. WASHINGTON. The estimated cost is $330 million144. test equipment. The Government of Italy has requested a possible sale of 4 MQ-9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). engineering support. 2008 – The Defence Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Italy of four MQ-9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. if all options are exercised. ground support. personnel training/equipment. operational flight test support. test equipment.List of Annexes options are exercised.
stand-off weapons are put on the manned platforms (like JSOW) or improvements are made to increase the accuracy of existing platforms (like TOMAKAWK). Their profile parameters are known well in advance. When UCAVs can dominate manned fighter aircraft in all realms of mission execution they will no longer be merely an alternative but an imperative. where human ingenuity and insight are not required. DEAD or the penetration into heavily defended areas to attack fixed targets.List of Annexes Annex Q – U(C)AV evolution and considerations • The evolution It is clear that with technological evolution we will see these machines mature and become more capable. high bandwidth networks. and until data transfer latency rates approach zero. June 2002 Reflection paper by. It is unlikely this shift of dominance will occur by the year 2025. The research and development efforts. Until fully autonomous machines can reason like humans and make moral judgments.. In a manned 145 “UCAV 146 – The next generation air-superiority fighter?” By Maj William K. identification. These are typically mission labelled as “first strike”. • The ethics For UCAVs the ethics involved will become a difficult hurtle to take. 123 Div AStC “Assessment and decision making capability in the cockpit of the future” 147 “Fallacies about air power” by Dr. for the U(C)AV capability expansion.146 + 147 • Zero casualties Removing the pilot from the vehicle provides for the ultimate “stand-off”. Colin S. Loss of life is no longer an issue and the CSAR capability.page 79 Page 86 of 110 . therefore concentrate more on those mission that create enormous risks for the aircrew like SEAD. required to recover downed aircrew. there will be a role for humans in the cockpit145. LEWIS. It is clear however that replacing manned aircraft throughout the complete range of combat missions will only be possible for those. The evolution is however. Especially for Time Sensitive Targeting (TST) operations these centres will need to be in permanent contact with the rest of the C2 chain via secure. Gray – Winter 2008. Lt Col R VERRIJT. UAS / UAV will need to be supplemented by a mission control center to take care of tracking. targeting and when needed weapon consent and damage assessment. could ultimately be discarded. Who will be responsible when a weapon misses its target and inflicts collateral damage? Is it the country that provided the satellite/data link capability? Is it the country that provided the UCAV? Or is it the country whose operator provided weapon consent. The RSTA systems will clearly evolve into an autonomous role since this type of missions can be easily programmed.
A second problem with these machines is that the user will need to get access to the overarching operational infrastructure that commands these machines. in a multinational context. since no foreign pilot or maintainer will have access. The anti tampering hardware and the firewalls protecting the software will be considered as “sensitive no foreign”. will see its autonomy in handling very limited. ethical restrictions will seriously hamper their use. Political control and responsibility will be sharply reduced. F-35 development is hampered due to releasibility issues. Introduction of UCAVs might reduce the national and sovereign authority to such a level that it becomes politically no longer acceptable. Even today F-16 nations while having acquired JDAM capability. These types of operations do not add to the risk-sharing factor. Especially for US developed and operated systems. U(C)AVs will certainly have their place on the future battlefield. Undoubtedly. sometimes to the point that they spark the debate in the home country to opt out of the program. Especially. Even today. NSA will never allow giving allies access to this type of technology. This infrastructure is build to prevent anyone from getting “remote” control. If one day technology would allow for completely autonomous machines to fight our wars. are not allowed access to the Red Keys of the GPS satellite system148. stealth technology can be implemented in UCAV without any restrictions. EPAF nations had to develop the “On Wing Acquisition” process based on regular GPS keys.List of Annexes fighter this remains clear. like Belgium. A small country. • Technology transfer Next to the question whether a UCAV is a good option from a Belgian politico-military point of view there is the problem of technology transfer. All this will make an off the shelf purchase of these machines highly unlikely for Belgium. Page 87 of 110 . in the interest of saving human life. The threshold to use these machines will become much lower since their capabilities and flexibility will overshadow today’s cruise 148 For the F-16-MLU M3 software upgrade that would introduce all weather (JDAM) strike capability. therefore reducing this kind of contributions to a pure financial one. Any possible form of artificial intelligence or directed energy weapon on board will no doubt be subject to stringent export regulations. • ROEs and International Laws of Armed Conflict The inevitable introduction of UCAVs in theatres around the world will have its impact on current International Law of Armed Conflict and spark a debate after the first engagement fails or mistakes have happened.
• Price It is a common misunderstanding that a U(C)AV would be much cheaper than a manned aircraft. During operation Provide Comfort (Northern/Southern watch) in Iraq. their price will not be far of that of a manned aircraft. DEAD or stand-off jamming) while the manned multi-role fighter generation is flexible enough to handle the full range of missions. to shut down Iraqi air defence systems. Once UCAV will be to that technological level.List of Annexes missiles. were not covered or blessed by any mandate. possibly by a factor of 50%. while an F-35 ranges anywhere from 50 to 100 Mio$. It is especially in the training environment that these unmanned aircraft will be cheaper. The order of magnitude for an X47-B would be around 30 to 50 Mio$. Page 88 of 110 . More fundamental is the universal right to defend oneself. The outcome of this debate will even become more unpredictable once directed energy weapon are mature enough to be installed on these machines. the air defence systems of Sadam were attacked since they were a direct threat to the pilots patrolling. The operator can fulfil its’ training requirement in a virtual environment although many of those that still interact with the unmanned vehicle like C2 chain and Forward Air Controllers (FAC) or JTACs will still require physical presence of the vehicle. The comparison is not correct however. since on one hand we talk about a specialized weapon system fitted to a typical task (like SEAD. nobody challenged their legality. Even though the missions.
List of Annexes Annex R – NATO C4ISR roadmap149 Ground environment evolution Air environment evolution 149 JAPCC roadmap for Air C4ISR in NATO . Annex C Page 89 of 110 .Version 1.0 dated Nov 2007.
September 2008 Page 90 of 110 . Coops.List of Annexes Annex S – Non-lethal weapons 150 NATO Research and Technology Organization (RTO) distinguishes following non-lethal weapons: Electromagnetic Directed energy Electromuscular Incapacitation Optical disruption Electromagnetic pulses Advanced Materials Anti-traction materials Encapsulating foams Riot control agents Obscurants Thermobarics Combustion modifiers/inhibitors Mechanical/kinetic Weapons/munitions Barriers Entanglements Acoustic Focused and omni-directional devices and weapons applying sound at audible and ultrasonic frequencies Ancillary Payload delivery systems 150 "NATO and the challenge of non-lethal weapons". C M. NATO Def Col Research Paper 39.
2. De voornaamste doelstelling van het Belgische Veiligheids.List of Annexes Annex T . kan vervullen.evacuatie van onderdanen .humanitaire hulp (disaster relief. kunnen ten dienste worden gesteld van de nationale of internationale gemeenschap. NIET op permanente basis en in functie van de beschikbaarheid van deze middelen in de bijzondere toestand van het ogenblik. vredesondersteunende en –opleggende operaties buiten collectieve verdediging) .steun aan de Organisatie voor Veiligheid en Samenwerking in Europa .militaire steun aan de Natie (bij natuur of menselijke rampen) deelnemen aan de strijd tegen het terrorisme.crisis response (crisispreventie. de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens of wapens met massa-effect en de georganiseerd misdaad .a.collectieve verdediging (Art V WEU. 153 De middelen die Defensie in stand houdt met het oog op de uitvoering van haar opdrachten. maar die zij in sommige extreme gevallen.en Defensiebeleid is “bijdragen tot vrede en veiligheid in de wereld“. De VIJF pijlers van dat beleid zijn : . refugee aid.samenwerking met de landen van Europa en Afrika 3. situeren zich rond drie grote thema’s154 : • Internationale verplichtingen .versteviging van de Europese identiteit inzake veiligheid . Art 5 NAVO) • Verdedigen van democratische en universele waarden . humanitarian relief) • Ten dienste van de burger zijn .(1) “Opdrachten” zijn de core business van de Krijgsmacht.intranet) – 1 Jan 2009. page 18 Para 5. voor taken die a priori NIET behoren tot de bevoegdheden van Defensie. 151 152 Page 91 of 110 .bescherming van de maritieme toegangen ACOT-SDP-ICOMDOC-CCSC-001_Ed2_-_SD2 (for official staffing . 154 Zie Politieke Oriëntatienota van juni 2008.Strategic orientation of the Belgian defence151 Strategische oriëntaties van Defensie 1. De opdrachten152 en taken153 van Defensie die door de Regering gedefinieerd werden.defensiediplomatie .behoud van de trans-Atlantische band . gepast materieel en een geschikte infrastructuur omvatten. Defensie investeert hiervoor in capaciteiten die getraind personeel.versterking van de rol van de Verenigde Naties .
List of Annexes Annex U .a.intranet) – 1 Jan 2009. page 19 Para 5.(2) Page 92 of 110 .Operational capacities and sub-capacities155 Systematiek van operationele capaciteiten en sub-capaciteiten Op het operationele niveau : • • een sub-capaciteit commando een sub-capaciteit inlichtingen Op het tactisch niveau : • • een projecteerbare tactische landcapaciteit een projecteerbare tactische luchtcapaciteit • • • een maritieme mijnenbestrijdingscapaciteit een maritieme escortecapaciteit een subcapaciteit strategisch / tactisch luchttransport • een strategische zeetransportcapaciteit Tekst in Italic identifies the proposed changes in this draft compared to the official version of 2004 155 ACOT-SDP-ICOMDOC-CCSC-001_Ed2_-_SD2 (for official staffing .
(2) Page 93 of 110 .b.List of Annexes Annex V – Possible engagement scenarios156 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 Homeland safety operation International safety operation Security operation Evacuatie van landgenoten uit crisisgebieden Defensiediplomatie Vredesbewarende operaties Vredesopleggende operaties en Counter-insurgency campaign Collectieve verdediging Tekst in Italic identifies the proposed changes in this draft compared to the official version of 2004 156 ACOT-SDP-ICOMDOC-CCSC-001_Ed2_-_SD2 (for official staffing . page 22 Para 5.intranet) – 1 Jan 2009.
(3) 3 Alouette III helicopters in Maritime Support voor steunverlening aan de Marine fregatten De Multirole Helikopter sub-capaciteit met verschillende specifieke versies van de helikopter van het A109. reconnaissance and observation met UAV van het type B-Hunter. (Sub)Cap paraatgesteld door Air Component157 a. moet de luchtcomponent in staat zijn om opdrachten van luchtverdediging. bewaking van installaties. lucht-grondsteun en luchtverkenning uit te voeren. 2.De luchttransportcapaciteit die blijft bestaan uit elf tactische C-130 transportvliegtuigen. Luchthavenuitbating. de deelneming aan ontrading. (2) Behalve een vermogen tot paraatstelling. Wing Operations. Annex C “Sub-capaciteiten” Airbus A310 (2). Meteo. (3) De maximale inspanning moet tegelijkertijd toelaten om gedurende maximum drie maanden.. Active Close Ground Defence. die zullen vervangen worden op het einde van hun levensduur. Air Traffic Control (ATC). De luchtgevechtscapaciteit (1) De Air Combat Capaciteit wordt gerealiseerd door 60 multirole F-16 gevechtsvliegtuigen. in conflicten van de hoogste tot de laagste intensiteit.List of Annexes Annex W – Level Of Ambition of the Belgian Air Component 1. b. ERJ-135 (2) en ERJ-145 (2). (2) 26 A109-BA Multirole Helicopters of MRH-capaciteit. waarvan 34 ontplooibaar. maar waarvan de vloot teruggebracht werd tot 60 toestellen in 2008. 157 158 Page 94 of 110 .intranet) – 1 Jan 2009. aan de permanente bewaking en de bescherming van het NAVO-luchtruim161. Alle toestellen kunnen worden ingezet in lucht-grond (FBX) en lucht-lucht(ADX) gevechtsoperaties en zijn Air-to-Air (AAR) refueling capable.intranet) – 1 Jan 2009. Daarnaast wordt deze capaciteit vervolledigd door toestellen van diverse commerciële types158 voor hoofdzakelijk vervoer van passagiers. Naast deze (sub-)capaciteiten stelt Luchtcomponent nog de volgende modules paraat voor bewaking van het luchtruim (CRC). Annex D “Ambitieniveau” 161 CRC Glons and TWO F-16 in Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) on the MOB. (5) Een UAV-capaciteit voor real-time aerial surveillance. Crash and Fire Rescue. twee formaties multirole ACOT-SDP-ICOMDOC-CCSC-001_Ed2_-_SD2 (for official staffing . De JSH (NFH) zal zowel de SAR als de steunopdracht voor de Marine overnemen. EOD. De Air component stelt volgende capaciteiten paraat : (1) De luchtgevechtscapaciteit gebaseerd op het multirole jachtvliegtuig F-16 dat verder wordt gemoderniseerd. Dassault Falcon DA-900 (1) en DA-20 (2) 159 See also ACOT-COD-TTH_NFH-001 160 ACOT-SDP-ICOMDOC-CCSC-001_Ed2_-_SD2 (for official staffing . die vanaf 2018 geleidelijk vervangen zullen worden door zeven A400M toestellen (die in totaal een vergelijkbare transportcapaciteit bieden). Level of Ambition van de luchtgevechtscapaciteit160 a. bij dag en bij nacht en bij elk weertype. (4) Een Search and Rescue capaciteit met 4 Sea King helicopters Vanaf 2012 zal de Joint Support Helicopter (JSH) capaciteit worden ingevoerd159 met ACHT helikopters van het type NH-90 waarvan VIER in de versie NFH en VIER in de versie TTH. op twee verschillende operatietonelen (DOB’s).
(2) VIER in de versie NFH (IOC 2013 – FOC 2014) voor de NC als boordhelikopter op de M-fregatten. (2) De C-130s moeten capabel zijn om op permanente basis tactische luchttransportopdrachten en humanitaire missies te kunnen uitvoeren. De inzet voor een langere duur of voor onbepaalde tijd vergt een vermindering van het aantal F-16’s. piloten en/of airframes 6 ontplooibare F-16 zijn steeds voorbehouden voor NRF deelname. inclusief deze ten voordele van NAVO. met ACHT C-130 en TWEE A310 en op een preadvies van 72 uren.List of Annexes gevechtsvliegtuigen (Max 34 F-16’s) en een totaal van orde van grootte van 1250 man te ontplooien. EU en UN. in één beweging de projectie te waarborgen van een formatie gelijkwaarwaardig aan een Light Infantry BattleGroup en een C² capaciteit voor de beginfase van de NEO-opdracht. De Joint Support Helicopter (JSH) capaciteit De JSH zal vanaf 2013 inzetbaar zijn met ACHT helikopters van het type NH-90 in twee versies op MAX TWEE DOB’s: (1) VIER in de versie TTH ten voordele van de LC (IOC 2013 – FOC 2015) De TTH zal kunnen ingezet worden in rechtstreekse steun van alle operaties. EU en VN. Luchtgevechtsoperaties in scenario’s 3. Scenario 4 is dimensionerend voor de luchttransportcapaciteit. Minstens één DOB dient te voldoen aan HNS High condities.v. de NAVO. Het totaal van 34 ontplooibare F-16 gevechtsvliegtuigen dekt de globale behoefte voor NAVO (HRF en NRF) en EU (RRF) operaties aan de overeenstemmende reactietermijnen. zowel d. EN voor SAR ter vervanging van de Seaking vanaf 2013.m. (a) Max 12 F-16 gedurende een onbeperkte periode (b) Max 18 F-16 gedurende 6 maanden. de EU en/of de VN (dimensionerend zijn Sc 6 en 7). indien verderzetting voor langere duur : af te bouwen naar Max 12 F-16. Dit houdt in : Page 95 of 110 . (c) Indien méér dan 18 F-16 simultaan deployed = One Shot Capability. (4) 1 ERJ in AE (Aeromed Evac) versie wordt tevens aangeboden aan NAVO. beperkt in duur door variabele limieten in de domeinen van bewapening. evenals aflossingen. Zij moeten simultaan en onbeperkt kunnen ontplooien naar en opereren vanop 2 DOBs wereldwijd. De luchttransportcapaciteit (1) De luchtcomponent moet in staat zijn. 2 F-16 staan permanent in Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) samen met het Control & Reporting Center te Glons voor de continuë bewaking en de verdediging van het nationale en NAVO-luchtruim en voor eventuele Air Police opdrachten. Max 6 F-16 kunnen worden uitgerust met een Modular Recce Pod (MRP) die E/O en IR sensoren bevat voor Tac Air Recce opdrachten. ter vervanging van de Al III die uit omloop wordt genomen vanaf 2015. c. Dit behelst onder meer het transport van Pers en Mat evenals CASEVAC/Aeromedevac ten behoeve van de opdrachten van de BEL Mediane capaciteit. (3) Overigens kunnen de luchttransportmiddelen ingezet worden in rechtstreekse steun voor alle andere operaties. Airland als Airdrop. (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) b. 6 en 7 moeten steeds gelijktijdig kunnen uitgevoerd worden en bijgevolg zijn deze 3 scenario’s dimensionerend voor de luchtgevechtscapaciteit.
Deze kunnen binnen dit kader modulair worden ingezet aan de hand van Minimum Force Packages (MFP). Deze site verzekert eveneens de voortgezette vorming en training van alle operationele bemanningen. (3) Tegelijkertijd kan een tweede Ops site worden geactiveerd in België. (2) Het projecteerbare B-HUNTER UAV Sqn is in staat tot het uitvoeren van een jaarlijks recurrente opdracht (duur 6 à 8 maanden) voor real-time surveillance. met een reactietermijn van respectievelijk 15 minuten en 1 uur. EU en/of UN in volgende rollen : (a) Recce en Surveillance met de Observation Helicopter (Light) [OH(L)] (b) Support met Utility Helicopter (Light) [UH(L)] ten voordele van Combat Support en Combat Service Support (Tpt. …) (c) Support met Armed Helicopter (Light) [AH(L)] ten voordele van Combat Support (vuursteun) met TOW2A Vanaf 2012 zal het ambitieniveau MRH aangepast worden aan de invoering van en de samenwerking met de Joint Support Helicopter. 3. (2) Multirole helikopters kunnen ontplooid worden in rechtstreekse steun voor alle operaties voor NAVO. (4) Een Sc 6 operatie kan doorlopend gehandhaafd blijven.List of Annexes (a) TWEE permanent beschikbare NFH helikopters voor SAR in het kader van de Homeland Safety Operations. 6 en 7. 6 en 14 MRH. 6 en 7 (deze zijn dimensionerend) behelst dit respectievelijk Max 6. Gelijktijdig ingezette MFP dienen steeds binnen het maximaal totaal aantal inzetbare MRH van 19 te vallen. e. (b) EEN permanent beschikbare NFH voor de Sp aan de M-FF voor een periode van ZES maanden of een One Shot operatie van EEN jaar onafhankelijk van het scenario. Behoudens het transport van troepen zullen de huidige opdrachten voor de A109 in principe behouden worden. Page 96 of 110 . Multirole helicopter capaciteit (1) De Multirole Helicopter (MRH) A109-BA capaciteit kan naargelang het scenario in DRIE typedetachementen ingezet worden op Max TWEE DOB. terwijl een Sc 7 inzet een ONE shot inzet van 6 maanden betreft. reconnaissance en observation vanaf een DOB in steun van multinationale operaties van het type CRO. Aeromedevac. PSO en preventieve ontplooiingen in scenario’s van type 1. reconnaissance and observation capaciteit (1) Onbemande vliegtuigen van het type B-Hunter UAV kunnen ontplooid worden in rechtstreekse steun voor alle operaties. (3) Bij ontplooiing in scenario’s 4. UAV Real-time aerial surveillance. voor de eventuele nationale behoeften. 4. d.
Management of the Transformation ACST-APG-CGEN-SXX-001 PHASE 1 CAPABILITY IDENTIFICATION “Supported / Supporting” ACOS/DG by phase IDENTIFICATION PHASE DEVELOPMENT PHASE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE Management of the Transformation PHASE 2 CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PHASE 3 CAPABILITY IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 4 CAPABILITY MANAGEMENT ACOS STRAT DGMR DOCTRINE ORGANIZATION TRAINING MATERIAL LEADERSHIP PERSONNEL FACILITIES INTEROPERABILITY SP SP KUR CN IOC FOC EOL ACOS O&T IOC DGHR DG FMN COMPONENTS FOC IOC FOC KUR CN IOC FOC STEERING PLAN KEY USER REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT NOTIFICATION INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY END OF LIFE FULL OPERATIONAL TRANSFORMATION CAPABILITY Management of the Transformation ACOS/DG’s Actions versus LOD IDENTIFICATION PHASE ACOS STRAT DEVELOPMENT PHASE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE ACOS O&T & COMPONENTS DOCTRINE TRAINING INTEROPERABILITY DGMR MATERIAL FACILITIES DGHR IOC FOC ORGANIZATION LEADERSHIP DG FMN PERSONNEL SP KUR CN IOC FOC Currently the LC is in the process of acquiring: Multi Purpose Protected Vehicle (MPPV). It is a structured approach toward identification of requirements and the weighing against impacts in the different domains. can be big force multipliers if the joint aspects are exploited and get the necessary priority for investment. PANDUR and Armoured Infantry Vehicles (AIV) which are scheduled to have a Recce / Observation and FAC capability. Coordination & Synchronization of the actions conducted by the different ACOS/DG in their respective functional fields will yield a good assessment on the impact a new requirement will have on the whole of the Belgian defence. The introduction of these performant vehicles with ISR capabilities + target coordinate generation as well as illumination.List of Annexes Annex X – Doctrine & Requirements process at ACOS Ops & Trg162 This process shows the different LCC phases of a material. 162 Briefing by ACOS Ops & Trg – D&R to the 123 AStC on 11 Mar 2008 Page 97 of 110 .
Speech MOD “Open en Secure” (Royal High Institute Defence.List of Annexes Annex Y – BE Strategic planning guidance documents BEL Strat Planning Strategic Planning Overview legislative Cycle 1999 VISION 2015 2003 2008 2011 2015 2030 Analysis Strategic Plan 2015 OUTLOOK (1) 2030 May 2000 Feb 2003 Strategy New Strat Plan Political (2) Steering plan Orientation note Update Steering Plan Dec 2003 Steering plans Policy Continuous: “Rolling” Strategic Planning (1) Ref. 22 Mai 08) ACOS Strat (2) Ref. 13 Nov 2008 Page 98 of 110 . Political orientation note of MOD (June 2008) Briefing ACOS Strat to 123 AStC.
List of Annexes Annex Z .650 2.Evolution BE MOD budget Evolutie Middelen Mio EUR 2004 Strategisch Plan 2000 Stuurplan 2003 Enveloppe zonder ontvangsten Enveloppe met middelen uit verkoop 100 Mia 2000 BEF 2.550 2.850 Strategisch plan : Bg 2000 = 100 Mia BEF 1 Stuurplan: Bg 2004 = Bg 2003 x Infl 2 2.750 2.450 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Ref: Briefing DGBF to MOD on 7 Jan 2008 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 actieplan dette payée avec des recettes de vente dette PIDS Mat et Infra PMU petits Inv Mat et Infra personnel fonctionnement non MR fonctionnement MR Stuurplan 2003 Normale kredieten Ref: Briefing DG MR to 123 AStC on 10 Mar 2009 Page 99 of 110 .
List of Annexes % Bg Def 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 00 01 03 04 05 06 07 20 20 02 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 08 Investissement Fonctionnement Personnel Ref Briefing HRP-Pers 16 Jan 09 to 123 Div AStC Ref Briefing HRP-Pers 16 Jan 09 to 123 Div AStC Page 100 of 110 .
000 500 0 SVP et Recrutement (UTP) 1000 500 0 Ref Briefing HRP-Pers 16 Jan 09 to 123 Div AStC Evolution des effectifs et besoins en recrutement Hyp : 28.000 31. 16 mar 2009 Page 101 of 110 .000 Mil & Civ à terme 41.FTE enveloppe 01 Jan Mil .000 29.000 25.500 1.000 Effectifs (UTP) 33.000 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Mil .500 2.Recrutement Civils .List of Annexes Annex AA – BE MOD personnel quorum evolution MILITAIREN / MILITAIRES 39000 37000 Effectieven / Effectifs 35000 33000 2000 31000 1500 29000 27000 25000 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 Toestand / Situation 01 Jan Totaal Militairen Recruit Bg Ini 09 Plan Directeur .000 37.recrutement 33 DG BudFin .Mil linéaire 4000 3500 3000 2500 Wervingen / Recrutements 2.000 27.BFB .FTE enveloppe 01 Jan Civils .SVP Mil .000 39.000 35.mars 2009 Ref Briefing DG BF – BFB to 123 AStC.000 1.
355 m² surface plancher 10.5 Mio m² routes Infra BEMIL(SAT)COM Pipelines Cimetières militaires 63 Grote Kw 42 CIS sites 37% 122 Diverse Kw 31 Mil kerkhoven 12 Kw in huur of concessie 308 Kw Ref: Briefing DG MR C&I to 123 Div AStC on 10 Mar 09 Page 102 of 110 .122 ha 4.621.List of Annexes Annex AB – Geographical dispersion of units in Belgium Le défi Arty Bn 1 (BE) Bde Naval base Bn AA Para commado Bn Para commado Bn Fighter Wing Air Force 1 (BE) Bde (-) Heli Wing Inf Bn 7 (BE) Bde Para commado Bn Fighter Wing Air Force 7 (BE) Bde (-) Arty Bn 7 (BE) Bde Location of the major combat units 1 Ref: Briefing HRP-Pers 16 Jan 09 to 123 Div AStC Aperçu global patrimoine immobilier ! 13% ! 50% Optimale geografische spreiding Analyse sleutelfactoren Staat van de bestaande infrastructuur 9 Kw in concessie gegeven 29 Kw overgedragen +300 “Quartier” 203 domaines 26.
List of Annexes
Annex AC – Importance of Air Power “If there is one attitude more dangerous than to assume that a future war will be just like the last one, it is to assume that it will be so utterly different that we can ignore all the lessons learned from the last one.” RAF Air Marshall Sir John Slessor Although one might say this is an “old” statement, it remains valid today. A current conflict should not be used as a benchmark to shape the future of your forces and the lessons from the past should not be thrown away because the future will be so different. The advantage of air power is speed and precision. This can not only neutralize and enemy but also destroy him. It will shape the battlefield so friendly troops can move freely. Like Gen MOSELEY said “Air Superiority First”163. The air weapon is also characterized by a strong tradition of intelligence gathering and analysis or in the domain of electronic warfare to jam opponents C2 structures and robust network structures. In short, airpower can shape the battle field on an strategic an operational level, it can provide fire support, ISR and Tpt of the ground forces or stabilization operations in general. US armed forces FM 3-24164, calls for extreme caution with assistance from the air. “Exercise exceptional care when using airpower in the strike role. Bombing, even with the most precise weapons, can cause unintended civilian casualties. Effective leaders weigh the benefits of every air strike against its risks. An air strike can cause collateral damage that turns people against the host-nation government and provides insurgents with a major propaganda victory. Even when justified under the law of war, bombings that result in civilian casualties can bring media coverage that works to the insurgent’s benefit.” Indeed it must be said that with current media the collateral damage effect might lead to disastrous interpretations by the general public, thus hurting the overall outcome of the conflict. This should be minimized by acting faster with more precision and by aligning the intervention with the most ideal time. Enormous efforts are underway to mitigate the blast effect by designing smaller precision weapons and more intelligent fuses. A major advantage of air power is the fact that almost no friendly soldiers are present on the battlefield. Airplanes can refuel and operate from remote safe locations, not
163 MOSELEY Michael T., US Air Force Chieff of Staff, ‘The US Air Force: ‘our mission is to fly and fight’’, speech 08Feb07, http://www.af.mil/library/speeches/speech.asp?id=302, 06 Jan 2009. 164 Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, ‘Counterinsurgency’, 15Dec06, Appendix E, pE-5.
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List of Annexes interwoven with the fight and from airfields that can be easily defended. The airplanes operate from a safe altitude far above any Gnd-air threat and unaffected by IED’s. HUMINT is often opted as the reason for “Boots on the ground” but this source of information is not crucial for the success of a conflict165. It is more important to build a joint intelligence database where the different sources are complementary. Also, pilots are highly trained officers who will not get involved emotionally; the cockpit offers all necessary situational awareness. They are in constant contact with the highest authorities, if needed. On-board sensors can generate additional, instant information. Together with their flexibility in armament employment they can intervene from a safe distance, swift and adequate. The inherently always fast evolving air machine can perfectly respond to changing threats by adapting airplane, sensors and weapons. Collateral damage should not be seen as a byproduct from air power. During OIF, there were more civilian casualties through ground troops then air support166. The emotional attachment of ground forces can even further increase the difficulties in incidents like ABU GRAIB. The strategic CoG, “win the harts and minds” might be severely jeopardized by these incidents. Even your own CoG “tolerance for body bags at the home front” will be more challenged by engaging ground forces compared to air forces. Sustainability, a key capability of air power, is usually less under pressure then for land forces167. Operating within a network environment In order for a fighter to be able to work in a network it needs to keep up with the ever evolving world of network generating technology. When replacing the F-16 MLU, one of the major concerns should be that this new fighter should have a “plug and play” function with the networks in place at that moment. The “knowledge” these platforms generate needs to be available for the whole C2 structure. Success will no longer depend on the individual aircraft, tank or ship but lies in speed of exploitation of this knowledge and execute a game plan with the best suitable tool. Key to success lies within the information domain and the speed of decision. C4ISR as a concept will be the overarching structure in which all individual platforms will generate their piece of the information puzzle.
KEEGAN John, ‘Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda, Knopf, USA, 2003, p332 ARKIN, William M., ‘Shock and Awe Worked, God help us’, Washington Post, 19Mar07, http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2007/03/shock_and_awe_worked_god_help.html 15 Jan 2009 en Human Right watch, ‘Off target: The Conduct of War and Civilian Casualties’, December 2003, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1203/usa1203.pdf 20 Jan 2009. 167 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4198&page=0 ‘The US Military Index’, February 2008, visited 25 Feb 2009.
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List of Annexes
Annex AD – Development Joint Armed Forces with inter agency coordination168
Marine Landmacht Luchtmacht
Marine Landmacht Luchtmacht
Marine Landmacht Luchtmacht
Gedeelde Doelstelling GOs IOs NGOs
168 Source: Clingendael Centrum voor Strategische Studies (CCSS), ‘Samenwerken moet – maar is het mogelijk?’, zesde essay over de toekomst van de luchtmacht, juli 2006, p7.
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7 Pages. MITS 09-148215 .Cat A Preparation Foreign Ops #Pilots -3 -1 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 Month 169 Fleet analysis done by COA in support of memo to DGHR “ICGD F-16 capability”.Cat B Trg .List of Annexes Annex AE – F-16 MLU fleet size and pilot contingent calculation 169 Pilots overview (IP & Trainees not included) 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 36 36 36 36 26 0 18 18 18 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 26 35 35 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 62 62 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 9 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 9 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 9 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 Recup QRA Trg . Page 106 of 110 .3 Mar 2009 (CONFIDENTIAL).
Although initially a bigger investment is needed. It could be considered to retire this capability early and use the saved money in the NH-90 capability. severely hampering expeditionary operations outside of central European region. Deal will privatize Search-And-Rescue Service” – Edition March 16.List of Annexes Annex AF . via efficient management and support structures creates sufficient resources in order to produce modern. These capabilities should fit in the context of the requirements identified both in chapter one and two. Page 107 of 110 . 2009.Jan 2009. • Related to capabilities o F-16 MLU Recce capability: Can only be used during day good weather low & medium or night med level. Today.Opportunities that could produce force multipliers or savings The Belgian defence must make sure that coherent economical governance of material and resources. return will surely be possible by offering the capability to other partners and saving on costs for today’s F16 pilot training requirement. can not generate performant data and need to be made compatible with (N)NEC to allow for expedient data availability. an opportunity for synergy could be found in buying /leasing aircraft that can be transformed to be AAR capable171. 170 Defence News: “UK SAR Bidders Pick Helos. o SAR: Since political guidance requires the organisation to concentrate on core business. Hence. all capabilities which do not satisfy this framework are not to be considered core business and should be screened for continued funding. o UAV: The system has limited range. If this is judged to be too expensive. 171 Reflection paper Maj Peter STAMS – “Beyond any political considerations is there a need or an interest for BE to replace his A310 by MRTT?” . o A-109 Agusta: the current helicopter capability has limited engine performance. performant capabilities with a high operational availability. the system is not capable to provide (near) real time photo/video information. delays in producing usable (interpreted) data does no longer meet requirements. serious thoughts should be given to outsourcing this capability170. Since our defence organisation is looking to replace the A-310. Furthermore. opportunities to transfer it to the department of internal affairs or have them pay for the services should be investigated. Data analysis is cumbersome. o AAR: Today the F-16 deployments can be severely hampered by the lack of available AAR capability.
it will allow to considerable reduce initial investment for buying the equipment. Leasing equipment (with options to buy) should allow for a more equal budget spending. o Partnerships and international cooperation172: For those systems where partner nations have the same compatible equipment. Of those infrastructures retained for military use. Why does the defence organisation need to own the buildings of headquarters? Much more functionality can be gained if office space is leased according the needs of the moment further allowing rationalization of the building assets as future restructuring calls for other office numbers and types. a geographical repartition that accommodates adequate job offers throughout the country. 172 Research paper Maj Peter STAMS “Welke partner voor Belgische Luchtcomponent in het kader van bilaterale samenwerking of synergie”. More and more defence organisations seek partnerships with civil companies. based on PFI like it did with the SAR contract mentioned before. April 2009 173 Watchkeeper Tactical UAV Program 174 Jane’s International Defence Review “AAR: Loitering with intent” – volume 42. synergies should be identified that allow cost savings in training.List of Annexes • Related to optimalisation o Reduction of barracks: Close those where upgrading to today’s energy and environmental standards is economically not viable. immigration services or other governmental activities. mechanisms need to be put in place to keep control of contract cost over the life cycle of the leased system. Canadian armed forces are currently buying UAV173 flying time over Iraq and Afghanistan. march 2009 Page 108 of 110 . Obviously. They should be given back to the “Regie der gebouwen” and could be used as prison. youth detention sites. Commonality in systems opens opportunities for common maintenance. o Leasing and Private Financing Initiatives (PFI) initiatives: is more and more used by different nations and the BAC is currently investigating this option for replacement of A-310. Barracks that are not required for new military structure can still be used by other governmental agencies. While in regime the exploitation costs of the system might be higher compared to a self owned system. training fields for our forces and a balanced effect on workforce flow should be studied. UK MOD signed a contract for the new Royal Air Force (RAF) future strategic tanker aircraft174. maintenance and even combining units by sharing each others bases.
tailored and sized to do the job.List of Annexes Outsourcing: Outsourcing is an option that is already well know but should be further exploited and expanded to all systems and services that do not need to be deployable in order to support combat systems like: general education and training. maintenance of buildings. catering. We should strive to offer flexible and usable tools to our government.…. Tools that do not have caveats but which are expeditionary. CIS needs for in country support. It is well understood these idea’s and thoughts are not the golden solution to our problems but it should be possible to at least explore the options and retain viable solutions. sustainable. o “In the end everything is politics” Carl von Clausewitz Page 109 of 110 .
connected to tasking agencies and networks and were able to provide (non)lethal force as required according the standing ROEs. They seamlessly integrated into existing command structures. QRA Baltic States. Rudi VERRIJT Lt Col Belgian Air Force 175 Deliberate Forge. Page 110 of 110 . the BAC proved. Synergies with other nations are in place. reducing cost and personnel requirement. ISAF 2005. Within 5 days the deployed detachment was ready to execute tasking. once again175 to be capable of operating within a multinational environment.Today. Allied Force. in Afghanistan. Our equipment is compatible and network oriented. Pilots and maintenance personnel needed no lead-in Trg time and Final Operational Capability (FOC) was obtained without delay.
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